WORLDS OF WATER: WORLDS APART

HOW TARGETED DOMESTIC ACTORS TRANSFORM INTERNATIONAL REGIMES

PATRIK STÅLGREN

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To Alma, Wilgot and Annika

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Preface

This book was written as a consequence of a discussion that I overheard at a conference reception in Kadoma just outside Harare, Zimbabwe. The conference was organised by the World Bank as part of their efforts to instigate water sector reforms throughout Africa based on the international regime of Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM). IWRM had been developed by leading international experts and was identified by United Nations as a vital step in achieving the Millennium Development Goals for eradicating poverty. Leading civil servants and water resources specialists from all over Africa had come to Kadoma to be inspired and share experiences of water sector reforms in their respective home countries.

After the first day of the meeting, we all gathered by the pool to cool off before dinner. As a junior researcher with an odd accent, I tried to keep a low profile and made conversation with a group of younger civil servants. As I enjoyed the refreshments and nodded along with the conversation of my peer group, I overheard a senior official from the Department of Water Development in Harare telling colleges from West Africa about problems getting local support for IWRM. After dinner I got a chance to talk to this Zimbabwean official in private. He told me that when Zimbabwe began its water sector reform in the early 1990's it was one of the first countries in Africa to actively engage IWRM as a policy platform. He had personally been involved in supporting the review of the legal and institutional structures, and been engaged in extensive campaigns to get public and private actors to change the way they dealt with water resources. Despite these efforts, he was disappointed by poor results. Attempting to explain this, he said:

> You know, for many people water is not just water. It is part of their lives, their worlds. So what we have seen with IWRM here is like a clash of worlds, a clash of water worlds.

This conversation is the root of the focus of this book. International regimes are developed at the international level with the aim of creating behavioural changes at domestic levels. During the implementation process the international regime can be transformed in relation to existing constructions of reality in the targeted domestic context in a way that redirects the originally intended behavioural changes. With the aim to both understand and promote the implementation of international regimes—such as IWRM—I present an analysis of domestic transformations of international regimes.

Acknowledgment

Where I come from, academic studies are, at best, a legitimate spring board to a good job in the 'real' world. Had I not meet Petter Brolin and Mats Ekelund during my early studies in economics, my life today might therefore have been quite different. Petter's persistent challenging of every aspect of normality and Mats' habit of keeping his nose in thick books on economic theory awoke my curiosity to plunge into 'real' academia. Like many students of economics, I soon became quite convinced of the inferiority of other academic disciplines. However, the inspiring teachings on International Relations by Gustaaf Geeraerts at Vesalius College, Brussels, convinced me that this was wrong, and the intellectual care of Bengt-Ove Boström at the Department of Political Science in Göteborg set me on the trajectory that lead to this dissertation.

I owe a tremendous debt to Bo Rothstein and Ulf Bjereld who have been my dissertation advisors. In his support, Bo has emphasised what he so often teaches; the importance of trust and intellectual integrity. Ulf has tirelessly pushed me to further intellectual consistency and clarity, while generously sharing advice on how to manoeuvre in social as well as spiritual spheres. I have received much encouragement, good advice and companionship from other colleagues at the Department of Political Science at Göteborg University. Monika Bauhr, Carl Dahlström, Johannes Lindvall and Daniel Naurin have provided much intellectual stimuli throughout the years. Together with Lennart J. Lundqvist and Ann Towns they have read and commented on the entire manuscript. The same goes for Fredrik Söderbaum at the Department of Peace and Development Research in Göteborg who has become not only a strong academic partner, but a close friend. Special thanks also go to Sverker Jagers, Victor Galaz, Mette Anthonsen, Ulrika Möller, Martin Sjöstedt, Jon Pierre, Erik Amnå, Eva Meuller, Edwin Muchapondwa, Christina Dyall, Robert Price and Sean Rintel. I started my post-graduate studies with Monika Bauhr, Carl Dahlström, Maria Jarl and Daniel Naurin, and without you I don't think I would have finished them.

The writing of James G. March have been a continuously source of inspiration in my academic life. I was thrilled to spend the academic year 1999/2000 at Scancor, Stanford University, enjoying Jim's teaching and warmth as well as that of Russell Hardin, Rodrik Kramer, Woddy Powell and Richard Scott. Anders Söderholm and Maria Bengtsson took me under their care and shared their family life with me when I desperately missed that of my own. The Centre for Applied Social Sciences (CASS) at the University of Zimbabwe provided guidance and support during my fieldwork. Without the legitimacy coming from being associated with CASS, I would not have been given access to the many interviewees who made this dissertation possible. Special thanks go to Claudious Chikozho, and the

late Stanely Vombo. Thanks also to Bill Derman, Francis Gonese, and Bev Sithole, as well as Alois Mandondo and Peter van der Zaag at the Institute of Environmental Studies. During the years that I commuted between Göteborg, Palo Alto, and Harare, Lars Oscàr offered housing and friendship in Harare and brought me along to the happy society of the Young Diplomatic Association of Zimbabwe. Together with Joakim Harlin and Richard Lidén, this made time away from home more bearable. My greatest debt, however, stands to all the interviewees in Zimbabwe and elsewhere who took the time, and occasionally, the risk, of talking to me.

This project has received core funding from Humanistisk samhällsvetenskapliga forskningsrådet (Swedish Council for Research in the Humanities and Social Science). Generous financial support has also been extended by Adlerbertska Stiftelserna, Forskraftstiftelsen Theodor Adelswärds Minne, Helge Ax:son Johnsons Stiftelse, Jubileumsfonden vid Göteborgs universitet, Kunt och Alice Wallenberg, Kungl och Hvitfeldtska Stiftelsen, Kungliga Vetenskapsakademin (The Royal Swedish Academcy of Sciences), Nordiska Afrikainstitutet (The Nordic Africa Institute), Oscar Ekmans stiftelse, Paul och Marie Berhaus donationsfond, Stiftelsen Lars Hiertas Minne, Svenska Institutet (The Swedish Institute), Stiftelsen Siamon, Wilhelm och Martina Lundgrens Vetenskapsfond. The research period at Stanford was made possible with support from Fulbright Commission and Rotary International Ambassadorial Scholarships.

I am part of a great family. I owe my interest and concern for problems of underdevelopment to my parents and the loving upbringing they provided in the "missionary fields" of Central Africa. My siblings, Eva and David, are closer to my heart than words can tell. Together with my extended family in Göteborg, they have provided endless moral and practical support over the years. About two years ago, I became a father and I have since been blessed once again. To Alma, Wilgot and the love of Annika I dedicate this book.

You water my worlds!

1. DOMESTIC TRANSFORMATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL REGIMES

Conservative estimates hold that the lack of clean water causes the death of five million people worldwide every year (UN 2002).[1] To grasp the magnitude of this horrendous figure, we can translate it into 12,500 jumbo jets each carrying 400 passengers. Thought of in this way, the death toll from lack of clean water is equivalent to 34 full jumbo jets crashing every day of the year.

Moreover, competition for water resources and water pollution is increasing on a global scale. The resulting soil degradation, destruction of ecosystems, and loss of productive land has serious effects for sustainable social and economic development, as well as political stability. Among the problems faced are water pollution, uneven geographic and seasonal distribution of water resources, and, perhaps most challenging, the distribution of water resources and related services between social groups and countries (UN 2003; Elliott 2004; Jønch-Clausen 2004; UN 2005a).

Over the last thirty years, a wide variety of concerned actors and experts have been engaged with advancing the understanding about, and cooperation on, water resources management. The need for sustainable water management has been at the top of the agenda at international meetings such as the UN conferences for sustainable development in Stockholm (1972), Rio de Janeiro (1992), and Johannesburg (2002). From these meetings there has grown a generally accepted understanding that the global water crisis is mainly a problem of management. The water crisis is not the result of lack of natural supply of water, nor is it primarily an engineering problem (i.e. stemming from the lack of technical solutions). Instead, as a group of experts under the UN Millennium Project recently put it, the problem is "the lack of appropriate institutions at all levels, and chronic dysfunction of existing institutional arrangements" (UN 2005a:27). The water crisis—causing the death and underdevelopment of millions of people each year—is thus not primarily constituted by over-demand for water or lack of technical know-how. It derives from under-supply of knowledge and institutions for sustainable water resources management.

[1] Researchers at John Hopkins School of Public Health put the death toll at 12 million (Hinrichsen, Robey, et al. 1997). For a comment on the methodological problems arriving at such estimate, see Gleick (2002).

The recognition of the need for improved water resources management has lead to the formation of the international regime of Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM). The international regime of IWRM consists of "norms, rules, and decision-making procedures" (Krasner 1983b:1) that leading international experts see as paramount to foster sustainable water resources management.[2] Recognising the need to accommodate to local conditions in terms of water availability and needs, IWRM does not provide detailed prescriptions for every aspect of water resources management. However, IWRM builds on a distinct set of core ideas and values that are different from previously recognised approaches to water management in several regards. Most notably, whereas water resources management used to be seen as an engineering practice with the goal to optimise the output supply of water from nature, IWRM propose an approach based on water as part of the ecosystem, the economic value of water, and the need for stakeholder participation (Global Water Partnership 2000; Jønch-Clausen 2004).

The delegates at the 2002 UN Summit in Johannesburg recommended that all countries worldwide should adopt IWRM as the basis for their water management policies as this is deemed necessary to arrive at the Millennium Development Goals set out to curb global underdevelopment (UN 2005b). To date, more than one hundred countries have embarked on IWRM-based reforms of their water management policies. The empirical material for this book was collected during the implementation process in Zimbabwe, which was one of the first countries to actively engage IWRM as a platform for a national water management policy. Current reforms in China, Brazil, and Uganda are mapped on IWRM, as is the EU's Water Framework Directive which encourages the member states to reform their water management in accordance with IWRM. All major international development agencies and institutes, including the World Bank and United Nations, as well as bilateral agencies from countries like the UK, Sweden, and Germany use IWRM as the platform for their engagements with sustainable water management in the developing world (UN 2003; Global Water Partnership 2004).

At a general level, IWRM thus has a high degree of acceptance and legitimacy throughout the world and represents a widely endorsed platform for sustainable water management. It has substantial backing from scientific experts and international policy institutions, and it already serves as the foundation for national water sector reforms in all parts of the world.

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[2] For further definition of "international regime" see chapter three. Note here that I, apart from Krasner, focus on the role of international regimes to regulate social interaction at *domestic levels*. For a review on the role of international regimes to foster behaviour between actors at the international level such as state-to-stat relations, see e.g. Young (1989a); Román (1998); Hasenclever, Mayer, et al. (2000); Little (2001).

The analytic point of departure for this book is that despite of the general acceptance of IWRM at a global level, the understanding of it may vary across different targeted domestic actors whose practices IWRM sets out to change. In the case under review this implies variations between the understandings of IWRM held by, on the one hand, development agencies and scientific experts at the international level, and, on the other hand, the targeted domestic actors in Zimbabwe whose water related practices were up for reform (e.g. policy makers, scientific experts in government departments, farmers of different sorts, and rain-makers).[3]

The reason for these variations, I suggest, is that in the process of implementing IWRM it becomes part of evolving domestic practices and politics. More specifically, IWRM is *transformed* in relation to domestic *constructions of reality*. An international regime is transformed if different actors internalise it in conjunction with their existing constructions of reality and subsequently ascribe it new meanings. The transformed understanding that is eventually held by targeted domestic actors is thus made up of a mixture of the original formulation of IWRM and prevailing constructions of reality at the domestic level. An international regime which is transformed should be distinguished from a regime which is rejected or accepted. Rejected regimes are in no way internalised or turned into practice while accepted regimes are wholly internalised and practised as a result of the implementation process (for further definitions, see chapter three).

My interest in domestic transformations of international regimes is based on the assumption that they may decrease the usefulness of international regimes as a tool to obtain specific changes in domestic policy and practice.[4] The actual impact of IWRM to meet the global water crisis is contingent on how targeted water users at domestic levels transform IWRM and turn it into concrete politics and practices. Consider two examples from the empirical study presented below. Key actors in the Zimbabwean government subscribed to a construction of reality where water resources management was of great importance in the post-colonial project of nation building in Zimbabwe. For them, gaining control over water resources was part of breaking with a history in which white men have made a habit of providing ready-made solutions to how they should manage their natural resources. Thus in relation to this conception of 'Water as Zimbabwe', IWRM was transformed into yet another instrument by imperialistic forces to interfere in Zimbabwe's domestic politics. As a consequence of this transformation,

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[3] As an analytic category, "targeted domestic actors" is distinct from advocacy groups in civil society, the private sector, or elsewhere, engaged in promoting the adoption of an international regime or norm see Checkel (1997a); Keck and Sikkink (1998); Risse, Ropp, et al. (1999).

[4] The underlying assumption—that agency derives from actors' understandings of reality—is addressed in chapter four.

the water sector reform in Zimbabwe was obstructed and delayed for several years during which the incumbent political and economic elites continued to enjoy their privileged position and existing inequalities in the water sector were further entrenched. When IWRM was eventually endorsed by the government as the platform for the water sector, its meaning was coloured by the construction of 'Water as Zimbabwe' in a way that substantially redirected its behavioural implications (see chapter five). Similarly, the concept of 'Water as a Gift from the Gods' is widespread among Zimbabweans and places jurisdiction over water resources in the hands of the ancestral gods. In this construction of reality, IWRM calls for economic and scientific means to direct the use of water were seen as tantamount to rebellion against the gods. While IWRM, for example, favoured putting a price on water to deal with water scarcity, such a policy was seen as a lack of trust in the abilities of the gods and their right to distribute water in accordance with their will. To accommodate this view, a policy was eventually developed where the price for water consumption was related to the use of the infrastructure needed to manage water (e.g. pumps and pipes) rather than on the amount of consumed water. While this policy avoided 'pricing the gift from the gods', it also made the price for water insensitive to the supply and demand for water and thus the use of market incentives to regulate consumption (see chapter eight).

These examples illustrate that targeted domestic actors in Zimbabwe transformed the original meaning of IWRM in relation to domestic constructions of reality in a way that redirected its behavioural implications. The targeted domestic actors' understandings of IWRM are made up of a mixture of the original formulation of IWRM and prevailing social, political, religious, and scientific practices surrounding water. To the extent that targeted domestic actors base their actions on transformed understandings of the international regime, rather than its original formulation, the transformation process should concern both students of international regimes and parties concerned with using international regimes as an instrument to effect domestic practices.

In order to both understand and promote the implementation of IWRM in particular, and international regimes for sustainable development in general, in this book I will present a theory of domestic transformations of international regimes. This theory seeks to explain how international regimes are transformed in the process of implementation into domestic contexts. More specifically, I ask the following questions:

1. How and why do targeted domestic actors arrive at transformed understandings of the international regime?

2. How do these transformed understandings affect the behavioural implication of the international regime?

With reference to the case-study conducted for this book, the focus is on what IWRM meant to the people in Zimbabwe whose water practices it sought to influence. How was IWRM transformed by targeted domestic actors engaged in the struggle for water resources in Zimbabwe? How did these transformed understandings affect the policies and practices around water in Zimbabwe?

Domestic transformations of international regimes and theories on international relations

My study is placed in the midst of a literature on international relations that is concerned with how politics and practices at domestic levels can be effected by policies developed at the international level (e.g. Krasner 1983a; Haas 1989; Klotz 1995; Clapham 1996; Finnemore 1996; Keohane and Levy 1996; Cortell and Davis 2000; Checkel 1997b; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Risse, Ropp et al. 1999; Meyer 2000; Checkel 2001; Miles, Underdal et al. 2002; Acharya 2004). The common denominator of this literature is the realisation that in a world with increasing global interdependence, the need for effective instruments to foster domestic behavioural change is eminent. Many of the challenges of global sustainable development derive from politics and practices at domestic levels. Global warming, HIV/AIDS, and small arms proliferation are but a few examples of policy areas that have motivated scholars to find out how developments at the international level can contribute to increased levels of cooperation at domestic levels.

The theoretical literature on international relations provides three main approaches to understand international regime implementation: realism, liberalism, and constructivism.[5] In chapter three, I argue that independent of theoretical orientation, scholars on domestic effects of international policy development have typically treated international regimes as entities that have a fixed social and political meaning throughout the implementation process. The analytical point of departure of existing theories is that actors at the international level ascribe the same meaning to an international regime as do the targeted domestic actors. The assumption is, for example, that the meaning of "human rights" or "environmental sustainability" is the same for actors at the targeted domestic levels as it is at the international level where the regime was first developed and formulated, e.g. the UN or the World Bank. While dominant theories of international relations

[5] Depending on which theory of international relations that is applied, scholars have studied domestic effects of international policies under the banner of "implementation of international regimes" (realists and liberalists) or as a process of "norm diffusion" (constructivists). For reasons that I elaborate in chapter three, I will henceforth use "implementation of international regimes".

shed light on different components of the complex puzzle of international regime implementation, my main critique of these theories is that they do not acknowledge that international regimes can be transformed and take on new meanings with new behavioural consequences during the implementation process. In contrast to the existing literature, I propose a theory that considers the meaning of international regimes during the implementation as *constructed rather than constant.*

Figure 1.1 presents the focus of my study (lower section) in contrast to the dominant focus of studies of international regime implementation (upper section).

Dominant view in international political theory on domestic implementation of international regimes.



Theory of domestic transformations of international regimes.



Figure 1.1 Contrasting the theory of domestic transformations of international regimes with the dominant view in theories on international relations.

The value added from the theory of domestic transformations of international regimes

The theory of domestic transformations of international regimes is an attempt to complement existing theories on international regime implementation. A detailed critique of existing theories is found in chapter three. Chapter four provides a comprehensive presentation of the theory

of domestic transformations. By way of introduction, three aspects of how this theory complements existing views can be outlined as follows:

Targeted domestic actors as subjects of change

The theory of domestic transformations of international regimes focuses on the relations between international regimes and domestic actors' constructions of reality. As stated above, the analytic point of departure is that this relationship is constructed rather than constant. More specifically, this relationship is analysed as a strategic process in which targeted domestic actors try to transform and establish as legitimate their understandings of the international regime.[6]

Dominant theories of international relations tend to regard the targeted domestic actors as passive recipients of international regimes. Recent scholarship has elucidated how domestic advocacy groups engage strategically to get the targeted domestic actors to adhere to an international regime. A typical example is how human rights groups pressure oppressing governments to respect international standards on human rights (Risse, Ropp et al. 1999, cf. Risse-Kappen 1995; Price 1997; Keck and Sikkink 1998). These scholars focus on the domestic actors who are advocating change, while the domestic actors who are the prime target for change are largely left out of the analysis. They are 'black-boxed', i.e. seen as a passive entity into which the international regime is inserted, and from which certain behaviour comes out. Scant interest is paid to what goes on 'inside the black box': how the targeted domestic actors receive and interpret the international regime. The targeted domestic actors are theorised as subjected to change rather than subjects of change. By contrast, the analysis that I propose focuses on the targeted domestic actors as subjects of change who actively engage to transform the meaning and implications of the international regime (see also Checkel 2000; Acharya 2004)

Transformed understandings of international regimes as proxies for action

International regimes aim to change the pattern of domestic social interaction. To assess the degree to which this is achieved, dominant theories on international regimes focus on changes in formal institutional structures, material power relations, and economic pay-offs at domestic levels (Victor, Raustiala et al. 1998; Hasenclever, Mayer et al. 2000; Miles, Underdal et al. 2002). There is, however, much research to support the argument that such

[6] By labelling a process as "strategic" I mean to emphasise that it is characterised by purposeful actors applying a carefully worked out plan or method to achieve specific goals. I do not make *a priori* assumptions about the (material or non-material) nature of the means used, nor the goals aspired to.

indications are poor proxies for how targeted domestic actors will adapt to the behavioural imperatives of international regimes. The argument is that action is influenced by actors' internally imposed constructions of reality (March and Olsen 1989; North 1990; Ostrom 1991; Bates, de Figueiredo et al. 1998; Rothstein 2000; Wendt 1999). Oran Young, a leading researcher on international regimes, has called for explorations of how "nonutilitarian forces play as drivers of behaviour associated with the operation of international regimes" (Young 1999:206). The need to expand theories on international regimes in this direction was also recently emphasised by Miles et al. (2002) in the conclusion to their major study of the implementation of fourteen international regimes. To assess the behavioural implications of international regimes, they argue that the implementation process should be analysed as a "conflict over *values*" rather than the establishment of formal regulative arrangements (p. 474, emphasis in original).

My analytic point of departure is that for an international regime to have a long term impact on domestic politics and practices, its propositions must have an impact on the targeted domestic actors' constructions of reality. The behavioural impact of an international regime at domestic levels is largely contingent on how the targeted domestic actors transform the international regime during the implementation process. A focus on the targeted domestic actors' subjectively held (but socially constructed) understandings of the international regime is therefore a better indicator of long term compliance than changes in formal regulative arrangements.

Domestic heterogeneity around international regimes

Students of international relations tend to regard the implementation of international regimes as a process leading to increased global homogeneity. The idea is that as institutions and norms spread from one country and society to the next, this leads to an increased level of similarity in the organisation and behaviour within these states. This is perhaps most evident in the work by John Meyer who analyses how "common models of social order become authoritative in many different social settings" (Meyer 2000:233; cf. Krasner 1983a; DiMaggio and Powell 1991; Katzenstein 1996; Keohane and Levy 1996; Lafferty and Medowcroft 2000; Bauhr 2005). A similar focus on processes of homogeneity dominates the work by scholars in the constructivist turn of international relations theory (Klotz 1995; Finnemore 1996; Price 1997; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Keck and Sikkink 1998). When constructivists set out to study the implementation of international regimes—or similarly, "the diffusion of norms"—their analysis leaves little or no room for the targeted domestic actors' understandings and reconstructions of these external impetus. As noted by Landolt (2004) the change that constructivists examine is often change in the direction of isomorphism;

i.e. the successful adoption of common international norms by states with a variety of material and cultural endowments.

Focusing on domestic transformations of international regimes, I argue that the global spread of international regimes is compatible with sustained domestic heterogeneity. This can be described as a process taking place on two levels: At a formal level, domestic actors may adopt the policies recommended by the international regime and make adjustments in formal regulatory arrangements (e.g. laws and institutions). Simultaneously, but at the level of subjectively held understandings of the international regime, these actors may transform the meaning of the international regime in relation to their constructions of reality. Consequently, the implementation of an international regime may lead to a situation in which different groups of domestic actors ascribe different meanings and behavioural implications to the same formal set of regulatory arrangements.

Outline of the book

Chapter two provides an introduction of the international regime of IWRM. The presentation is organised around the three 'pillars' of IWRM–environmental sustainability, economic efficiency, and democratic participation–that structures the subsequent empirical chapters (see table 1.1.). Furthermore, chapter two provides an introduction to the agenda for water management in Zimbabwe and how this was related to IWRM at the outset of the water sector reform analysed for this book.

Chapter three positions the focus on domestic transformations of international regimes in the context of dominant theories on international relations. Attention is given to the three dominant theories on international relations: the realist, liberal, and constructivist approaches. I detail my critique of this literature, and argue for how a theory of domestic transformations will add to the understanding of international cooperation.

Chapter four presents the theory of domestic transformations of international regimes. Drawing on theories in political science, social psychology and sociology, I outline how transformations of international regimes take place in the interaction of political entrepreneurs engaged in strategic reinterpretations of the international regime against the backdrop of domestic constructions of realities.

Chapters five through eight contain the empirical analysis. The analysis is organised around four constructions of realities around water in Zimbabwe and the three pillars of IWRM (see table 1.1). In chapter five, I analyse the transformation of IWRM in relation to political entrepreneurs acting out of the construction of 'Water as Zimbabwe'. Here, the main player is the political elite of Zimbabwe and the role of water in their post-colonial

project of nation building. The transformation of IWRM in relation to Water as Zimbabwe is marked by strategic considerations to strengthen the legitimacy of the nation-state and the government by placing them in the nexus of water distribution.

Chapter six is labelled 'Water as Gold' and focuses on the role of water for the white commercial farmers in Zimbabwe. The organisation of their reality centres around the collective memory of successful water management, and their constructions of racial social identities serves as background for an analysis of positions and politics during the water sector reform.

The focus of chapter seven is on the construction of water management as a scientific practice: 'Water as Science'. This construction is nurtured by water professionals within the Zimbabwe public administration who see themselves as the avant-garde in modern water management in Zimbabwe.

Chapter eight analyses the transformation of IWRM in relation to the construction of reality in which water is interlinked with the spiritual world: 'Water as a Gift from the Gods'. This construction of reality assumes the existence of an invisible world inhabited by actors that engage with people's lives in the material world. Actors in the spiritual world are in control of many of the events in the material world, including the allocation of water. The analysis of the transformation of IWRM in relation to Water as a Gift from the Gods places particular focus on how this reality construct provides a basis for legitimate rule in many rural societies. The transformation of IWRM thus becomes part of the post-colonial struggle between centralised and local rule in Zimbabwe; i.e. between proponents of Water as Zimbabwe and Water as a Gift from the Gods.

	Chapter five	**Chapter six**	**Chapter seven**	**Chapter eight**
Constructions of water in Zimbabwe / **Pillar of IWRM**	Water as Zimbabwe	Water as Gold	Water as Science	Water as a Gift from the Gods
Ecosystem management (Catchment management)				
Economic efficiency (Water as an economic good)				
Democratic participation (Stakeholder participation)				

Table 1.1. Outline of the empirical section of the book.

2. IWRM AND POLITICS AROUND WATER IN ZIMABWE

This book does not present a case-study of the implementation of IWRM in Zimbabwe in the sense of setting out to account for the implementation *per se*. I use the implementation of IWRM in Zimbabwe to illustrate and elaborate the theory of domestic transformations of international regimes. This case has been selected with the aim of arriving at a more general understanding of the transformation of international regimes.

The international community is growing dense with international regimes relating to a wide spectrum of policy areas, including gender equality, education, human rights, international trade, and small arms proliferation. In the environmental sector alone there are more than one hundred and thirty international regimes (Keohane and Levy 1996; Hasenclever, Mayer et al. 2000; Lafferty and Medowcroft 2000). While IWRM is only one of this increasing number of international regimes, it was selected for this study because it is built around norms and ideas that are widely shared by international regimes concerned with a diverse set of policy areas. There is a common core connecting IWRM and many other international regimes. This core consists of the call for environmental sustainability, economic efficiency, and democratic participation (e.g. Young 1982; Risse, Ropp et al. 1999; Little 2001; Miles, Underdal et al. 2002; Young 2002). Due to this similarity, an analysis of the transformation of IWRM may provide useful insights for better understanding and promoting the realisation of international regimes in policy areas beyond water resources management.

The Zimbabwe case has both potential and limitations for generating general knowledge. Since the turn of the millennium, the politics of land distribution in Zimbabwe has made world-wide news in a way that implies that Zimbabwe is a highly unique case. During the land reform process, the Government of Zimbabwe has shown striking disrespect for the country's own legal traditions and systematically broken any number of internationally established norms on human rights and rule of law (Worby 2001; Derman and Hellum 2004). Therefore it needs saying that the bulk of the water sector reform that was analysed for this study took place before the recent debacle in the country. My primary focus is on the water sector reform from the early 1990's until 2001. Nevertheless, while the politics surrounding natural resources in Zimbabwe may at times be extreme, it also provides an unusually clear and rich example of politics in Africa. The predicament

of the Zimbabwean government claiming sovereignty in a society with strong competing social forces (be they ethnic, geographic, religious, or economic) is shared with a large number of developing governments in Africa and elsewhere which adds to the general value of this study. In addition, many African states share the Zimbabwean predicament of stark social inequalities in the distribution of land and water, and are faced with increasing strains from pollution and unsustainable use of natural resources (Blair 2003; Chan 2003).

The remainder of this chapter provides (i) an introduction to IWRM, (ii) a description of the pre-reform system for water resources management in Zimbabwe, (iii) a description of the major components of the water sector reform in Zimbabwe and their relation to IWRM (see table 2.2 for a summary), and (iv) an introduction to the political context in Zimbabwe.

The three pillars of IWRM

IWRM is based on norms and ideas about environmental sustainability, economic efficiency, and democratic rule. Together these norms and ideas make up what can be referred to as the three pillars of IWRM. The three pillars of IWRM have been elaborated in numerous policy documents prepared by development institutions and they have been the subject of debate among scholarly experts for more than a decade.[7] The immense interest in IWRM, as well as the ambiguity of the ideas and values making up the three pillars, has lead to a number of nuances and variations in its definition. Today some presentations of IWRM emphasis the need for economic efficiency, while others may, for example, focus on aspects of the environmental pillar. Moreover, there is an ongoing debate among international experts about how to understand each of the respective pillars. There is, for example, no clear cut consensus on how to define and measure "environmental sustainability", "economic efficiency", or how to handle the potential trade-off between democratic rule around local water resources and national and regional democratic processes (Saleth and Dinar 1999; Global Water Partnership 2000; Arntzen 2003; Jønch-Clausen 2004).

I take as the point of departure the definition of IWRM prevailing in and around Zimbabwe during the early 1990's, when the water sector reform started to gain momentum.[8] At the time, Zimbabwean officials specialising

[7] The three pillars mirror the four so called Dublin Principles from 1992—widely seen as the main reference point in defining IWRM—with the exception that the Dublin Principles contain a special section stressing the rights and roles of women in water management.

[8] Why did the reform take off at this time? Prior analysts present no consensus, but point to the significance of the droughts during the late 1980's/1990's, and the mounting interest in water resources management among international development agencies, particularly the World Bank. This is discussed further in chapter five.

in water resources management went abroad on study-trips to take stock of the international state-of-the art, and related ministries and departments initiated a series of investigations to assess current and future supply and demands for water resources (Interview 16, 5B, 6B). In July 1993 the Government of Zimbabwe hosted a workshop at the Victoria Falls on "Water Resources Management in Southern Africa". Several of my interviewees in Zimbabwe pointed to the Victoria Falls workshop as an eye-opener and a major source of inspiration for how to proceed with the reforms in Zimbabwe (Interview 4, 16, 5B, 6B, 19B). The workshop was sponsored by a large number of international development agencies, in particular the United Nations and Canada (Cida). The dominant actor behind the workshop was the World Bank, however, which saw the workshop as its platform to launch IWRM-based reforms through Southern Africa (World Bank, UNDP et al. 1993; Interview 23B, 24).

The leading role of the World Bank makes its views on IWRM a suitable point of reference for the empirical analysis of the transformations of IWRM in Zimbabwe. In 1993—the same year as the workshop at Victoria Falls—the Board of the World Bank endorsed a Water Resources Management Policy Paper that outlined a policy and strategy for IWRM-based reforms thought the world (World Bank 1993). The policy paper explicitly aims to reflect the broad global consensus that emerged during the series of UN Conferences on sustainable development from Stockholm (1972) to Rio de Janeiro (1992). The Paper presents a comprehensive approach for IWRM and has implications for the institutional framework for water resources management (legal, regulatory, and formal institutions), management instruments (regulatory and financial instruments), and the development, maintenance, and operation of infrastructure (including water storage structures and conveyance, wastewater treatment, and watershed protection).

According to the 1993 World Bank's policy paper, the *ecosystem* pillar of IWRM implies that water should be seen as part of integrated ecological and social systems.[9] The policy paper stresses that the effects of any use of water resources—e.g. wetlands, irrigation, mining, sanitation—spills over on other water users all through the ecosystem. Water use has, as the economists put it, "externalities" that affect the potentials for other actors to access water. IWRM emphasise that the management of water resources should consider the externalities of water use not only on human actors, but also animals and other biological systems. The natural environment

[9] While the 1993 World Bank paper does not explicitly use the pillar-metaphor, its content can effectively be organised around them.

is a water user in its own right and the need for water in the ecosystem should be considered.[10]

To insure an integrated management of water in ecologic and social systems, the World Bank paper states that water should be managed within the confinements of river catchments (henceforth catchment). A catchment is the geographic area connected through the natural flow of water. For example, if all the waters in a valley naturally flow into the same river or ground water reservoir, this valley constitutes a catchment. All human and non-human activities that effect or are affected by the waters within a catchment should be taken into account in the management of water. Water demand and pollution from all the different sector activities in a catchment, such as agricultural, industrial, and domestic use, should be integrated in the management of water. Consequently, the independent management of water by different water-using sectors—a so called "sector specific approach"—is deemed as inferior to "a sector wide approach" by proponents of IWRM.

The *economic* pillar of IWRM is based on the assessment that water is a scarce resource, and that greater use needs to be made of incentives and economic principles in improving allocation and enhancing quality. Water should be regarded as "an economic good" and market economic principles and institutions should be used to guide the aggregation and allocation of water. The call to regard water as an economic good is perhaps the most contested aspect of IWRM among policy makers at the international level, and the World Bank is often associated with a programmatic reliance on market forces as the remedy to resource management. In the 1993 policy paper, water as an economic good is presented as the "the core" of the Bank's policy (p. 10). A closer reading of the 1993 paper also points to a more pragmatic position, which was the position presented to the Zimbabwean officials by the World Bank at the Victoria Falls Conference in 1993. As the World Bank presented the idea of water as an economic good to national policy makers from Zimbabwe, they did, for example, address issues on how to balance economic efficiency with direct measures to support the poor who cannot pay for water (World Bank, UNDP et al. 1993:15; cf. Garn 1998, who presented the Bank's position at the Victoria Falls Conference). The economic pillar thus does not exclude the need for government involvement and subsidies, but it does take a sceptical view on the efficiency and equity

[10] The World Bank's rationale for emphasising environmental protection is clearly anthropocentric: "Protection of the environment and the resource base are essential for sustainable development. The protection, enhancement, and restoration of water quality and the abatement of water pollution will therefore be a focus of Bank-supported operations, particularly since providing safe drinking water is so critical to maintaining and improving human health" (World Bank 1993:16).

of state regulation and control in favour of private sector involvement and economic pricing of water use and pollution rights.

Finally, the *democratic* pillar of IWRM states that water resources management should involve all people with a stake in the management of water. Water is an essential element of life, and the IWRM democratic pillar is a reflection of the general democratic idea of peoples' right to self-determination. Proponents of the democratic pillar of IWRM—be they from the World Bank or other institutions—see stakeholder participation not only as a basic right, but also as a means to achieve resource efficiency. The idea is that participation will create a sense of 'ownership' which will commit actors to effective resource use. The 1993 World Bank document stresses that "As communities increase their participation in managing water resources, project selection, service delivery, and cost recovery will likely improve" (p. 16; World Bank, UNDP et al. 1993p. 20-25; Jønch-Clausen 2004). This call for democratic water management is a call for inclusive institutions and processes engaging actors from the state, the private sector, and civil society. Emphasis is given to the participation of traditionally marginalised groups such as women and small land-holding farmers.

Pillar of IWRM	**IWRM at international level**	
	Original meaning	**Behavioural implication**
Catchment management	Water is integral to ecological and social systems.	Management of water resources should consider the externalities of water use for human actors and biological systems. Sector-wide approach to management systems within catchments.
Water as an economic good	Water is a scarce resource with an economic value.	Market economic principles and institutions should be used to guide the aggregation and allocation of water.
Stakeholder participation	Water is an essential component of life. Stakeholder participation gives people the right to self-determination and creates a sense of ownership, thus providing incentives for sustainable use.	Water resources management should involve all people with a stake in the management of water.

Table 2.1. Summary of the original formulation of the three pillars of IWRM at the international level at the outset of the reform in Zimbabwe (early 1990's).

Water management in Zimbabwe

Water management in Zimbabwe has centered on the problem of *who* should access water, as well as how to handle the large variations in *when* and *where* water is available. The concern with *who* should access water has strong racial connotations rooted in the system of inequality set up during the colonial period. Today's Zimbabwe experienced different forms of colonial rule from the late 1800's until Independence in 1980. This period was initiated under the conquests of Cecil Rhodes who provided the foundation for the settler state in what was soon to be called Rhodesia. During a period of some eighty years, the white settlers set up a system of rule for the benefit of their fellow whites with little or no regard for the majority of blacks (Herbst 1990; Moyo 1992; cf Smith 1997). Following a period of disagreements with the government in London on the need to accommodate the growing demands for comprehensive reform from the black majority, the white settlers in 1965 issued a Unilateral Declaration of Independence whereby the white community in Rhodesia abandoned the historical tie with the UK in an attempt to maintain their privileges.

In comparison with other colonies, Zimbabwe had a fairly large community of white settlers who engaged mainly in large scale agricultural production and the mining sector. These sectors were in great need of secure access to water, and the legal and institutional system set up by the white-minority state was designed to meet this need (Mumbengegwi 1987). For reasons that I shall explore in detail in chapter five and six, this system was kept largely intact from Independence in 1980 until the water sector reform under review. When the water sector reform set off in the early 1990's, the white farmers, who by then made up less than a half of one percent of the population, controlled eighty-five percent of water used for agricultural. The remaining fifteen percent of agricultural water was used by black farmers to sustain seventy percent of the population (Derman 1998b; van der Zaag and Savenije 2000).

The colonial system thus granted the white minority population control over Zimbabwe's water resources. The system of control over water was intertwined with the ownership of land. Simply put, access to water presupposed ownership of land that, in turn, was largely restricted to whites. The only exception to the rule of connecting water and land ownership was that of waters stored in government owned dams and known as "public water". The right to use public water depended on the date on which an application to extract water was filed at the Water Court. The distribution of public water thus followed the principle of 'first come, first served'. Those who had the earliest legally recognised rights took precedence of later claimants. In effect, however, this meant that the overwhelming majority of public water was controlled by the white farmers because at the time when the legal court system was put in place—during the colonial period—white farmers

were the first to file their applications. The black farmers were typically not informed about how the system worked, nor did they have the financial resources to properly file a claim with the Water Court (Derman 1998a; van der Zaag and Savenije 2000).

A right granted to use public water was not a private property but registered against the title of the property to which it related. However, since land was owned almost exclusively by whites, the racial imbalance of water access was maintained. In addition, the rights to use public water were granted in perpetuity which cemented the inequalities of who controlled water in Zimbabwe up until the IWRM-based water sector reform (Derman 1998b; Derman, Ferguson et al. 2000b).

Despite the stark social inequalities in the water sector, this was not the immediate trigger of the reform. The reform only gained its momentum after the 1991–1992 drought which cut Zimbabwe's agricultural production by half and raised secure access to water to the top of the political agenda. The question here is thus *when* water is available. Although unusual in its proportions, the 1991–1992 drought was only one in a series of droughts that have plagued the region. Zimbabwe is a sub-tropical country with high temporal variations in rainfall. The annual cycle consists of a dry season interrupted by rain from November to March. In addition to this annual cycle, Zimbabwe is plagued by longer periods of droughts, lasting for several years, that usually hit the region at least once every seventh or eight year (Nilsson and Hammar 1996; Manzungu 2002; Jønch-Clausen 2004). Thus along with the need to deal with inequalities in *who* has access to water, water management in Zimbabwe is also preoccupied with overlapping cycles of droughts determining *when* there is access to water.

The third major concern for water management in Zimbabwe is *where* it rains. For example, the Eastern part of the country, with its high mountains, receives five times as much rain as the lowlands in the Southwest regions. Adding to the challenge for water management, the Southwest holds some of the richest soils for agricultural production. To address these spatial variations in access to water, governments and private investors have been occupied with constructing infrastructure for water management. Today Zimbabwe has more than eight thousand dams to balance the temporal variations in water access. More than thirty five thousand boreholes have been sunk to access ground water reserves in areas with scant rains (Nilsson and Hammar 1996).

The agenda of Zimbabwe's water sector reform

The main components of Zimbabwe's water sector reform can be related to the three pillars of IWRM. While a single component on the agenda for reform can relate to more than one of IWRM's pillars, the structure in table 2.2. gives an overview of the major relationships. The overview is elaborated in the text below the table.

Pillar of IWRM	IWRM at international level		Agenda for Zimbabwe's water sector reform
	Original meaning	**Behavioural implication**	
Catchment management	Water is integral to ecological and social systems.	Management of water resources should consider the externalities of water use for human actors and biological systems. Sector-wide approach to management systems within catchments.	Envisage water as part of the ecosystem, e.g. recognise the legitimate demand for water by different species and the maintenance of wetlands. Introduce the idea of catchments as opposed to provinces being the administrative level for water management.
Water as an economic good	Water is a scarce resource with an economic value.	Market economic principles and institutions should be used to guide the aggregation and allocation of water.	Introduce market economic incentives for aggregations and allocation of water, including market priced pollution rights.
Stakeholder participation	Water is an essential component of life. Stakeholder participation gives people the right to self-determination and creates a sense of ownership, thus providing incentives for sustainable use.	Water resources management should involve all people with a stake in the management of water.	Devolve power and decision making capabilities to stakeholders. Introduce institutions for stakeholder management at lowest possible level; catchment, sub-catchment, and if needed a third level. Address social inequalities through specific attention to marginalised groups.

Table 2.2. Summary of original IWRM and its implications for Zimbabwe's waters sector reform.

On the part of the official administration of water, the reform inferred (i) the passing of two legal documents for the regulation of water (Water Act and ZINWA Act); (ii) the introduction of a new administrative unit (catchments); (iii) the setting up of a new organisational structure for the management of water at the basis of catchments under the supervision of a newly inaugurated national organisation, Zimbabwe National Water Authority (ZINWA).

The new Water Act of 1998 replaces the old water legislation, which had been only marginally revised since its inauguration in 1976, i.e. under the colonial period. The Water Act of 1998 contains the legal framework for institutional development and water management in the country. A key element was to address the historical injustices and "promote equal access to water for all Zimbabweans" (Government of Zimbabwe 2001:12).

The Water Act of 1998 further stipulates that Zimbabwe be divided into catchment areas managed by catchment councils and sub-catchment councils. There is also provision for a third, voluntary and more local level of stakeholder participation. As I will explore in detail in chapter five, introducing catchments as an administrative level was a significant break with the provincial system around which most other public administration was organised and which constituted the back-bone of the organisation of Zimbabwe as a unified nation-state.

The stated intention behind these new institutions was to provide for democratic stakeholder influence as well as environmental sustainability in the management of water. According to the Water Act, the aim was to promote an integrated approach at catchment level that would recognise that "water is a finite and vulnerable resource" part of the interdependent ecosystem (Government of Zimbabwe 2001:12f.). The terms of reference for the catchment and sub-catchment councils give them many of the key functions previously held by the central government, including the development of plans to determine future water management in the catchments, issuing and revision of permits and rights to use water, instruments to regulate and sanction water use in the catchment. In addition, steps to facilitate local, democratic elections of stakeholder representatives to catchment and sub-catchment bodies are outlined (Government of Zimbabwe 1998a).

The second legal instrument introduced during the reform aimed to regulate the new administrative body for water management, Zimbabwe National Water Authority (ZINWA) (Government of Zimbabwe 1998c). The administration of water had previously rested with the Department of Water Development (DWD). With the inauguration of ZINWA, only the development of water policy in the form of legal instruments was to be left with DWD while all other functions were put under ZINWA. ZINWA was to guarantee increasing levels of market based management and take overall responsibility for water affairs throughout the country. It was to recognize "the economic value of water by ensuring cost-recovery through appropriate pricing structures and more efficient water use methods." (Chikozho 2002:9; Government of Zimbabwe 2001:12f.).

The political context in Zimbabwe

As IWRM was introduced as the basis for water resources management in Zimbabwe, the Zimbabwean government was engaged in a process of establishing itself as a viable and legitimate actor in society, and indeed, to manifest the nation-state of Zimbabwe as a relevant political unit. Both the government and its post-colonial project of nation-building were contested by influential political actors proposing alternative political systems of rule. IWRM was, in other words, introduced into a weak-state structure that is well known in many parts of Africa (Herbst 1990; Clapham 1996).

Three main sources can be identified behind the contestation of the Zimbabwean government and its political project of establishing Zimbabwe as unified nation state.[11] One source of fragility in the construction of this nation-state derived from the intricate dynamic of ethnic divisions in the country. Shona and Ndebele make up the two biggest ethnic constructs in Zimbabwe. About eighty percent of the population are Shona, including President Robert Mugabe and much of his power elite. The more marginalised Ndebele make up about fifteen percent of the population, while the remaining five percent is divided on a number of smaller groups. The Shona and Ndebele hold quite separate historical origins with the Shona descending from the Bantu peoples in Central Africa. The Ndebele travelled north into what is presently Zimbabwe only some hundred and fifty or two hundred years ago and many Ndebele still nurture their ties to relatives in what today is South Africa (Douglas 1984; Herbst 1990).

Despite increasing social interaction and urbanisation, the Shona and Ndebele maintain a high level of geographic separation with the Shona dominating the central, western and eastern part of the country, while the Ndebele populate the south, and parts of the north. Moreover, each group respectively dominates what was for a long time Zimbabwe's two main political parties. ZANU-PF was mobilised around the Shona, while ZAPU was based on Ndebele support (Sylvester 1991; Munro 1998).

Zimbabwe has not experienced a fully fledged movement for ethnically based federalism, or secession. Nevertheless, the question of ethnic divisions has continuously contributed to the fragility of the nation building

[11] The animosity with the international regime in South Africa constituted an additional—forth—source of fragility for Zimbabwe during the first decade after Independence. Political scientist Jonathan Moyo (1992) argues that "the Government headed by Robert Mugabe, constantly feared real and imagined South African destabilisation (p.314). Since the water sector reform in Zimbabwe took off after the end of apartheid in South Africa, the threat from South Africa did not have any direct effect on the implementation of IWRM, hence my lack of elaboration on the issue.

project.[12] As political analyst Lloyd M. Sachikonye puts it, "The post-independent government of Zimbabwe views the inculcation of national consciousness and the dilution of ethnic or regional particularism as a major challenge to its project of nation-building" (Sachikonye 1996:136).

The second source of fragility for Zimbabwe was encapsulated in the racial divide of whites and blacks in Zimbabwe. Reflecting the racial segregation during the colonial period, Zimbabwe at independence was marked by striking economic inequalities along racial lines. Sixty percent of the income was earned by four percent of the population of whom the majority was white; agricultural land was divided equally between the black and the white farmers while these groups encompassed 800 000 and 4 000 families respectively. In particular, while the majority of the population lacked access to basic water facilities, the white community controlled great water resources (estimated to about half of water reserves in dams) used for irrigation of crops for export markets (Moyo S. 1993; Moyo J. 1995; van der Zaag and Savenije 2000).

The new government of Zimbabwe thus found itself in the peculiar situation of being, at best, representatives of the second most powerful group in Zimbabwe. The history of the post-independent debacles in most neighboring countries suggested that the prospects for the future thrived on the ability to balance the expectations of the blacks and the animosity of the few, but very powerful whites. As much as the new government was dependent on the powers of the white community, its own political project was constantly challenged by the same community (Smith 1997; Stiff 2000; cf. chapter six below). As shown by political scientist Jeffrey Herbst (1990) this challenge to the governments' agenda led the government to initiate an implicit agreement with the former white rulers. The government gave the white population permission to remain in the country on condition that they stayed out of the political sphere and did not challenge the agenda of the new black political elite. Herbst shows that this implicit agreement was—in the main—honoured during much of the first decade after Independence. As I show in chapter six, by the time that IWRM was introduced in Zimbabwe during the late 1990's the amicable agreement no longer regulated the relations between the former white rulers and the incumbent black government. On the contrary there were increasing hostilities between the groups including, interestingly enough, attempts by the strongest organisation of whites in Zimbabwe (Commercial Farmers Union,

[12] Indicating how real and severe the threat of ethnic and regional division was to the government, President Mugabe engaged special forces, the so-called Fifth Brigade, in a civil war to manifest control in the Matabele Provinces during the early 1980's. The death-toll of this attempt to maintain power in Harare has not yet been established due to the government's obstruction of independent investigations.

CFU) to use IWRM as a means to further its own political agenda against the governments' post-colonial agenda of nation building.

The third and perhaps most potent threat to the government's post-colonial project of nation building came from Zimbabwe's vibrant civil society made up of labour unions, media, churches, local community organisations and so on. Political scientist Munro shows how the Zimbabwean government tried to gain control over civil society, which was frequently perceived by the government as a real danger to its own viability as a political actor (Munro 1998; Raftopoulos 2000). Reviewing the history of state-society relations in Zimbabwe during a public meeting in Göteborg, Sweden, the Zimbabwean ambassador to Sweden, Mrs Mubi stated that "The political authority of the government was compromised by a strong civil society".[13] Indicating the severity of this threat at the introduction of IWRM, critical actors in the government even questioned if the post-colonial government under Robert Mugabe was better grounded in civil society than the pre-Independence government under Ian Smith (Munro 1998:268). In the middle of the water sector reform in 1997, many representatives of civil society formed the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) with the objective of engaging civil society in a nation-wide discussion about the role of the government and the need for a new constitution. In the eyes of the government, this mounted to a direct attack on the post-colonial project of nation building. Commenting on the NCA initiative, President Mugabe argued that it was "bent on ruining the national unity and loyalty of our people and their institutions" (cited in Raftopoulos 2000:39). In other words, at the time of the water sector reform, the political establishment of the state sensed a distinct threat towards their project of nation building in Zimbabwe.

The three factors outlined above made the government's agenda of nation-building after Independence very fragile. The government found itself in a context of political struggle where the national project *per se* was at stake. As I will show in chapters five through eight, the fragility of nation building in Zimbabwe and the role of the state is pivotal to understanding the transformation of IWRM by the government and other actors in society. Control of the management of water was one of the government's most important strategic resources for securing its relevance as a political actor. As IWRM was introduced and mandated specific requirements for the legitimate distribution of water resources in Zimbabwe, political entrepreneurs in the government perceived this as a yet another source of fragility to their construction of Zimbabwe as a political platform. To them, IWRM and its prescriptions for water management was potentially a threat not only to the government's control over water, but to the political project of the

[13] Official presentation by the Ambassador, Göteborg 13 Nov, 2004.

nation. At the same time, IWRM provided opportunities for other actors in society who shared the government's view of water as a source of power and legitimacy, but differed with the government concerning the construction of reality and agendas for legitimate rule. These competing views and interests set the stage for the transformation of IWRM in Zimbabwe which I present in chapter five to eight.

3. EXISTING THEORETICAL LANDSCAPE

In chapter one I argued for the need to analyse the implementation of international regimes as a process of transformation in which the international regimes becomes part of domestic politics and consequently subjected to strategic reinterpretations reflecting domestic contexts. My analytic point of departure is that the ability of an international regime to influence domestic patterns of behaviour is contingent on the understanding of the international regime held by actors in the targeted domestic policy area.

In this chapter, I will situate the theory on domestic transformations of international regimes within the context of existing theories on international relations. Attention will be given to the three bodies of work—realist, liberalist, and constructivist—that together represent the main theoretical perspectives on domestic implementation of international regimes. The focus on domestic transformations of international regimes presented in this book is developed to complement these existing theories by elucidating how targeted domestic actors reinterpret an international regime so that it becomes part of their domestic politics and practices.

Before I proceed, two definitional points are in order. Both are intended to distinguish the concept of a "transformed international regime" from similar concepts in the theoretical literature of international regime implementation. First, what distinguishes a "transformed" international regime from the more established concepts of "changed" and "localised" international regimes? Second, how does the study of the implementation of "international regimes" relate to the recently invigorated interest in the implementation of "norms"?

Definitions

"Transformed" international regime

To distinguish the concept of "transformed" international regime from the established concept of "changed" international regime we need to start with a definition of "international regime". As Kratochwil and Ruggie (1986) points out, "international regime" is a "contestable concept" for students of international relations and despite a vast literature, there is no consensual definition (p. 764). However, Stephen Krasner's (1983b) definition of international regimes is a frequently cited point of departure and is

instrumental as a baseline for my definition of "transformed" international regime. Krasner defines international regimes as "principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given issue area" (p. 1). He goes on to specify the four components that make up an international regime: "Principles are beliefs of facts, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice." (Krasner 1983b:2).

While Krasner's meticulous hierarchy of international regime components seems analytically attractive, critics have pointed out that the components are neither analytically distinct nor easily operationalised. Concerning the distinctiveness of the components, Haggard and Simmons (1987) point out that Krasner's specification of "principles" (in which Krasner includes "rectitude") is not clearly separated from "norms". "Norms", in turn, shade into Krasner's specification of "rules" ("specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action"). The problems multiply when one tries to operationalize the principles for empirical analysis. How do we empirically separate a principle from a norm? Similarly, how do we know that what we see is a "norm" and not a "rule"? (Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986; Haggard and Simmons 1987; Román 1998, ch 4).

Despite this criticism, I find Krasner's definition useful in as much as it helps us to think of international regimes as composed of an ideational core (principles and norms) with certain behavioural practices (rules and decision-making procedures). A distinction between an ideational core and its behavioural practices is instrumental for defining a "transformed" international regime. The aim of this concept is to focus on the possibility that when an international regime spreads from one social context to the next it can be given a different social meaning by the actors in the new context. For the purposes of my analysis, an international regime is transformed when a substantial part of the ideational core of the international regime has been reinterpreted in relation to a construction of reality that differs from the construction of reality in which the international regime was originally developed. An international regime is not transformed when changes occurs only in its behavioural practices. Changes in the behavioural practices in the targeted policy area can be based on reasons that do not relate to changes in the ideational core of the policy area (e.g. technical or practical adjustments). As I will soon elaborate further, a change in behavioural practices can, however, be an indication of a transformation of the ideational core. The concept "transformed" international regime is intended for the analysis of situations in which the same international regime has different social meanings depending on the reality construct of the individuals who are involved with it. (See below for a discussion on why we should consider

something as being the same international regime even if it has different meanings to different people).[14]

Krasner's idea of "change" in an international regime is similar to the concept of "transformation" in as much as he argues that the changes occur at the level of the ideational core (principles and norms) as opposed to the behavioural practices related to the international regime (Krasner 1983b). However, for Krasner, international regime change is a process in which "norms and principles are *abandoned*" (1983b:4, my emphasis). In contrast, my concept of international regime transformation focuses on how the ideational core is given new meanings as it is taken up by new actors during the process of implementation in domestic contexts. A transformed international regime is an amalgamation of the original international regime and domestically held constructions of reality. Borrowing an expression from the sociologist Richard Rorty, an international regime is transformed by "reweaving the web of beliefs" that make up the international regime (Rorty cited in Czarniawska and Joerges 1996:28).

A concept neighbouring the idea of a transformed international regime is that of a "localized" international regime. This concept was recently suggested by Amitov Acharya (2004) as a tool to examine domestic implementations of international regimes. Acharya's point of departure is similar to mine in as much as he develops this concept as a critique of existing constructivist literature that works under the assumption that the understanding of the international regime is constant throughout the implementation to domestic levels. This is, as Acharya puts it, an overtly "static" view that fails to account for the strategic role of targeted domestic actors as agenda-setting agents who reinterpret the international regime. Acharya defines a localized international regime as the result of an "active construction (...) of foreign ideas by local actors, which results in the former developing significant congruence with local believes and practices" (p. 245).

While I am sympathetic with Acharya's ambition to develop a more dynamic analysis of domestic implementation of international regimes, my concept of transformed international regimes differs form the idea of lo-

[14] The concept of a transformed international regime advanced here should not be confused with the meaning ascribed to it by Young (1982). He use the concept of "transformation" to denote changes in an international regime that pertain to internal contradictions in the international regime, changes in the underlying structure of power in the international system, or from exogenous factors such as technological innovations or increases in demand on the good that the international regime is concerned with. Young's understanding of "transformation" is thus not related to the implementation of international regimes between actors endorsing different reality constructs. Likewise, the use of the concept here is clearly distinguished from Krasner (1981) who sees "transformations" of international regimes as changes in the structure of the international system and in particular the distribution of rights and obligations between the Third World and the rest of the world within international organisations such as the UN.

calization in one important respect. Acharya's idea of localized international regime carries with it an idea of the *direction of change* in the interface with domestic contexts. As cited above, Acharya sees localization as a process "which results in the former developing significant congruence with local believes and practices". That is to say, the international regime changes in the direction of domestic contexts which, in turn, remain constant. By this definition, Acharya repeats the fallacy of the constructivists that he sets out to criticise: While existing constructivists regard the international regime (norm) as constant and expect domestic actors to adjust in its direction, Acharya focuses on changes in the international regime under the assumption that the domestic context is constant. In contrast to Acharya's idea of localization, the concept of "transformation" does not pre-empt the possibility that the implementation is a process in which both the international regime and domestic contexts are subject to change. Rather than determining the direction of change at the conceptual level, this should be an empirical question.

As noted above, a change in the behavioural pattern in the policy area targeted by the international regime is not sufficient to constitute international regime transformation. The change must pertain to the ideational core of the international regime. However, at an empirical level, the transformation of an international regime can be manifested in behavioural patterns, as well as in institutional and judicial arrangements associated with the targeted policy area. In operational terms this means that to trace international regime transformations, we need to look beyond changes in the behavioural patterns by the targeted domestic actors. We must look at these actors' motivations and meanings associated with behavioural changes provoked by the international regime, as well as the domestic actors' justifications of institutional and judicial arrangements within the targeted policy area. To count as indications of a transformation of the international regime, the targeted domestic actors' behavioural practices must derive from transformations in the ideational core of the international regime.

If the ideational core of an international regime is transformed, is it correct to say that it is still the same international regime as was originally developed? If the answer to this question is "no", we should not talk about the transformation of an international regime but perhaps about its abandonment or of the development of a new local regime. To answer this question in the affirmative, I argue that there must be a common ideational core that unites, on the one hand, the original international regime, and, on the other hand, the transformed international regime. Independent of individual opinions and positions, the ideational core provides a common point of reference in interactions between advocates of the original and transformed international regime respectively. To clarify, let me give an example. IWRM originally developed the call for stakeholder participation

along democratic ideals (see chapter two). As I will show in the empirical chapters, the call for stakeholder participation did not go down well with different groups of actors engaged with water in Zimbabwe. Parts of the political elite saw control over water management as a vital step in the process of post-colonial nation building. Acting out of this construction of water (which I have labelled 'Water as Zimbabwe') part of the political elite saw IWRM's call for stakeholder participation as a threat to their political project of nation building and indeed to their own *raison d'etre* as a national political leadership (see chapter five). By contrast, another group in Zimbabwe endorsed a construction of 'Water as a Gift from the Gods' (see chapter eight). For them, the call for stakeholders to be engaged in water management was a revolt against the divine order where anointed actors—the rain-makers—had exclusive right to issues of water management. Based on these different views of who should be engaged in the management of water, political entrepreneurs representing IWRM, Water as Zimbabwe, and Water as a Gift from the Gods negotiated new meanings of the idea of stakeholder participation. These new meanings differed substantially from the IWRM's original connection between stakeholder participation and democratic ideals. Nevertheless, the new meanings all relate to a common ideational core of democratic stakeholder participation in the sense of individuals' right to self determination. Despite the fact that the targeted domestic groups did not support or internalise this ideal, they had a strong relation to it and an intellectual understanding of IWRM's call for democratic stakeholder participation. They all developed their positions in relation to, rather than as substitute for, IWRM's call for stakeholder participation.

"International regimes" as opposed to "norms"

I turn now distinguishing my focus on the implementation of "international regimes" in relation to the study of implementation of "norms". Constructivist scholars, some of whom I will review in more detail later in this chapter, have recently invigorated the latter area of study. Why not follow suit rather than use the concept of international regimes? My first reason is empirical. Many of the international initiatives developed to facilitate cooperation at domestic levels are simply more aptly described as international regimes than norms. Recall Stephen Krasner's classic definition of an international regime as "principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures" (1983b:1). This comprehensive definition can be used to describe international initiatives to address, for example, air pollution, small arms proliferation, and the global water crisis, better than the notion of norms. Such international initiatives are frequently based on a strong commitment to norms such as sustainable development and democracy. Nevertheless, international initiatives to obtain domestic policy change typically comprise more than

norms. When developed into initiatives to address concrete policy problems in domestic contexts, the normative commitments of international initiatives are associated with concrete instructions regarding the favoured rules and decision-making procedures. Consequently, the more comprehensive concept of "international regime" as opposed to "norms" is more apt to capture the implementation of international initiatives for cooperation between actors in specific domestic policy areas.

The second reason for using the concept of international regimes as opposed to norms is analytical. The constructivist scholars who have invigorated the agenda of norms studies have been occupied with investigations into how norms that have supposedly "universal" legitimacy are adopted in domestic contexts (Acharya 2004:242). Consequently, constructivists have focused on cases such as implementation of human rights (Risse, Ropp et al. 1999), bans on chemical weapons (Price 1997), struggles against racism (Klotz 1995) and so on. Whereas the normative foundation of each one of these examples is easy to embrace, it is analytically unsatisfying to systematically select empirical cases with a strong normative agenda suggesting that the implementation process should entail a development *from* local practices and standards *towards* the international norms. Such a selection bias runs the risk of downplaying the significance of local knowledge and norms structures. If we only concern ourselves with empirical cases in which we can all agree that it would be better for everybody if the domestic practices were abandoned, why should we develop a theoretical framework to understand how the domestic practices influence domestic actors' understandings of the norm? If we limit our area of study to such universal norms we should, it can be argued, focus on how we can get the domestic actors to abandon their norms and adopt new ones. In fact, many of the constructivist researchers of norm implementation present analyses in which the targeted domestic actors are not given any agenda-setting power of their own but are rather portrayed as passive recipients of internationally favoured norms. In my attempt to move beyond such biases, I have opted to use the concept of "international regime".

Dominant theories on Domestic Implementation of International regimes

The lion's share of the academic literature on international regimes can be related to realist, liberal, and constructivist theories.[15] As I argue in this section, my objections to these theories centre around three points. First,

[15] The academic field of international relations can be divided into quite a large number of theories and sub-theories, each with its own label. Despite the usefulness of such distinctions, the broad categories of realism, liberalism, and constructivism serve the purpose of positioning the theory of domestic transformations of international relations within the field.

contemporary theories of how international regimes are implemented in domestic contexts typically do not include an analysis of the targeted domestic actors' understandings of the international regime. The targeted domestic actors' understandings of the international regime are exogenous to the analysis and no account is made of how they will have an input into the meaning of the international regime. By contrast, contemporary theories work under the assumption that the understanding of the international regime remains fixed throughout the implementation process.

Second, contemporary theories of international regime implementation regard the targeted domestic actors as passive recipients of external impetus for change. They provide scant insights into how targeted domestic actors strategically reconstitute the international regime in relation to domestic constructions of realities. The targeted domestic actors are subjected to change, but not subjects of change.

Third, existing theories downplay the role of power at the level of the targeted domestic actors. This criticism is geared primarily towards constructivist theories that tend to regard the implementation of international regimes (or norms) as a knowledge-based process with domestic actors as "willing students", or as a process of socialisation around universal norms in which the targeted domestic actors are powerless recipients without an agenda-setting capacity in their own right. By contrast, realists, and to some extent liberalism, put great emphasis on power, but place the power in the hands of international and national states rather than in the hands of the different domestic actors whose daily practices are targeted by the international regime.

Realist and liberal theories on implementation of international regimes

Below, I elaborate my critique of realist and liberal perspective on domestic implementation of international regimes. The section is organised around three explanations why these theories typically do not include an analysis of targeted domestic actors' understandings of international regimes, and why the targeted domestic actors are conceptualised as passive and powerless recipients of change rather than empowered agenda-setting actors.

The construction of the international system and the motivations for action

Realists assume that the pursuit of relative power is the prime explanation of state action. States may abide by international regimes but this is not explained by the content or structure of the international regime. The reason for compliance is that the international regime is favoured by a strong—"hegemonic"—power in the international system. From a realist perspective, the pursuit of relative power under hegemonic pressure is the likely explanations for states' compliance, not the international regime *per*

se (Strange 1983).[16] Based on this view, realists develop their analyses of the implementation of international regimes against the backdrop of the prevailing power distributions in the international system (Krasner 1981; Krasner 1983b; Hasenclever, Mayer et al. 1997:ch.4).

Little (2001) exemplifies the realist view of processes by which Third World states are forced to open up to "unfair competition" and "malign" international regimes developed in the West (p. 310). He point out that Third World states adhere to the western hegemony's call for international regime compliance because they operate in a situation in which failing to comply will put them in an even less advantageous position than before. If we borrow vocabulary from game theory, which is much favoured in this literature, realists liken international regime implementation to a "zero-sum game". In such a game, the process of international regime implementation is a power-struggle in which the hegemony will use its power to further advance its position by forcing weaker states to adopt international regimes. The Third World states subjected to coercion have only two alternatives: compliance or non-compliance. The former choice implies that they underwrite international regimes against their true interests, while the latter directly leads to increased marginalisation in the global system.

Based on this view of the role of hegemonic power in the implementation of international regimes, realists do not see states' compliance as derivative of targeted domestic actors' *understandings* of the international regime but as a function of the state's relative power position in the international system. Consequently, the realist analytic framework does not call on an analysis of domestic actors' transformed understandings of the international regime.[17]

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[16] For a realist defence against Strange's critique, see Krasner (1983b)

[17] In an attempt to expand on the realist tradition, Puchala and Hopkins (1983) aim to describe how the ideational context and content of the international regimes—not just the distribution of power—influence its dissemination. Their ambition thus resembles that behind the theory of domestic transformations of international regimes. Drawing on colonialism as an example, they show how the normative presumption of the superiority of "western values" and institutions was at the core of the spread of colonial rule throughout the world. "It was this overriding sense of legitimacy, the convictions that imperialism and colonialism were right... that contributed to the durability of the system." (p.70). Whereas Puchala and Hopkin's analysis includes an account of the power of ideational factors, it is telling that their analysis places this power in the hands of the hegemonic powers and not in the hands of the domestic actors subjected to the international regime. Portraying the subjects of colonialism as passive recipients, Puchala and Hopkin thus perpetuate the realist tradition identified above. Illustrating this lack of attention to the domestic subjects of colonialism, the analysis suggests that the system of colonial rule eroded because the material power of the hegemonic powers in Europe—the "international regime managers"—eroded. There was also growing concern over anti-colonial movements in Europe, the United States, and the Soviet Union, calling into question the moral legitimacy of colonialism. Scant account, however, is made of the domestic actors' reactions to the international regime and of their political resistance and social mobilisation for independence; cf. Davidson (1992); Pakenham (1993).

I turn now to the liberal tradition of international relations (in particular neo-liberal institutionalism). The fundamental difference between liberal and realist theories is that liberals base their analysis on an assumption that states seek absolute (economic) gains and hold the view that increased global interdependence calls for international collective action. In this context, international regimes are seen as mutually beneficial institutions adopted by actors pursuing their individual interests. The realist focus on the implementation of international regimes as an effect of hegemonic power in the international system is thus in contrast to the liberal view of international regime adherence as the result of voluntary agreements (Keohane 1984; Keohane 1986; Young 1989a; Young 1989b; Young 1997; Román 1998).

Above I likened the realist view of international regime implementation to a zero-sum game in which the outcome of the game is determined by the strongest player in the game: the hegemon. Using another metaphor from game theory, liberalists tend to conceptualise the process of international regime implementation as a "plus-sum game". In this game everyone stands to win by adhering to the international regime. Analysing international regime implementation as a process of voluntary agreements for mutual benefits, liberalists see the degree of implementation as contingent on the construction of the international regime. If the international regime offers effective solutions to problems of collective action, the chances for domestic implementation are good. However, liberals see no reason to engage in an analysis of the domestic actors' subjective interpretations of international regimes. As political scientist Robert Keohane has put it: "the norms and rules of international regimes can exert an effect on behaviour even if they do not embody common ideas but are used by self-interested states and corporations engaged in a process of mutual adjustment." (Keohane 1984:64). The explanation to the implementation of international regimes is thus to be found in how the international regime appeals to self-interested actors who act on the basis of pre-constituted preferences, not in the degree to which the international regime "embodies the actors' common ideas". Together with the optimistic assumption of international regime implementation as a process beneficial to all engaged actors, liberalists have shown scant interest in the domestic recipients' understandings of the implemented international regimes.[18]

The constructed demarcation of knowledge production in academia

The second explanation for why realists and liberalists shy away from an analysis of targeted domestic actors' understandings of international regimes

[18] Little (2001) argues that as liberalists fail to acknowledge the role of hegemonic power, they give their implicit support to the hegemony's abuse of weak states. The liberalists turn a blind eye to the asymmetric power relations under which international regime implementation typically takes place, cf. Krasner (1981); Clapham (1996).

and domestic politics surrounding the implementation process pertains to the academic distinction between the study of international and national politics. There is, as political scientist Bruce Russett recently argued, an artificial boundary between students of domestic and international politics respectively (Russet 2003:11). By tradition, students of each respective field have worked within separate university institutions, read and written different literatures, and travelled to separate conferences and workshops.

Because domestic and international politics are traditionally treated as separate fields of study, the process by which international regimes become domestic has largely been left out of theories of international relations despite the fact that international regimes aim to obtain behavioural change at domestic levels (Simmons 1998; cf. e.g. Putnam 1988; Held, McGrew et al. 1999). The academic distinction between the study of domestic and international politics has produced international political theories where the domestic level is largely left out of the analysis. The domestic level is 'black boxed' and domestic actors are conceptualised simply as passive recipients of international regimes. As we have seen above, the realist literature regards states subjected to hegemonic pressure as victims of the power structures constituted by the international system. By contrast, liberalists analyse international regime compliance as an incremental process towards solving the underlying problems of collective action. However, as in the realist tradition, domestic actors are treated as passive recipients of international regimes and the process of domestic interest formation is kept exogenous to the analysis. This separation of the study of domestic and international politics is rationalised by leading theorists in the field who tend to conceptualise the domestic and international as quite distinct political fields. Oran Young, a prominent scholar on international regimes recently argued that "membership [in international regimes] will not have significant effects on the overall identity or the basic goals of states whose existence not only predates the formation of specific international regimes but also rests on a variety of considerations that extend well beyond the purview of international regimes dealing with specific problems" (Young 2001:12). Working under such an assumption, students of international regimes can safely maintain the academic demarcation between international and national politics and stay away from an analysis of domestic understandings of the implementation of international regimes.

The confinements of rational choice theory

The third reason why realists and liberalists typically do not include an analysis of how domestic actors come to understand implemented international regimes derives from the rational choice models used by these traditions. Rational choice models presume that actors are driven by self-interest and

that the world of these actors are objectively defined. The processes of formation of interests and perceptions are exogenous to rationalistic models. As constructivist critics have rightly pointed out, realists and liberalists confine their analysis to rationalistic models in which "structural constraints such as players, rules of the game and payoffs are assumed" (Klotz 1995:19 see also Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986; Laffey and Weldes 1997; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Checkel 2001). The great theoretical rigor and coherence that is the hallmark of rational choice theory comes at the price of excluding a notion of the formation of actors, their interests, and understandings of reality. This limitation is not confined to the use of rational choice in international politics theory. Robert Bates (1998), recognised for his use of rational choice models in comparative African politics, puts it like this (with reference to game theory which is much used by rational choice theorists):

> Game theorists often fail to acknowledge that their approach requires a complete political anthropology. It requires detailed knowledge of the values of the individuals, of the expectations that individuals have of each others reactions, and of the ways in which these expectations have been shaped by history. (p. 244).

Working within the confinements of rational choice theory thus implies that students of international relations have deprived themselves of a conceptual framework for the analysis of how domestic actors re-construct and internalise implemented international regimes.[19] Consequently, neither realists nor liberalists analyse the implementation of international regimes as a process of domestic transformation.

Constructivist theories on the implementation of international regimes

Constructivism has developed over the last decade or so and can be seen as an explicit critique against some of the deficiencies of realism and liberalism reviewed above (Finnemore and Sikkink 2001; Smith 2001).[20] Two defining traits of constructivism raise hopes that constructivists would successfully overcome some of the shortcomings in realist and liberal analysis on the implementation of international regimes. First, constructivists have explicitly set out to transcend the academic division of labour traditionally separating studies of domestic and international politics (Finnemore 1996;

[19] For an analysis of how the confines of rationalistic models impede the understanding of states' interest formation in state-to-state relations at the international level, see Finnemore and Sikkink (1998).

[20] Constructivists typically write about norms rather than international regimes. For a discussion of the implications thereof, see the definitions at the beginning of this chapter.

Checkel 1997b; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Risse, Ropp et al. 1999; Börzel and Risse 2000; Acharya 2004). As I have argued in the section above, integrating studies of international and national politics is central for an analysis of domestic transformations of international regime. Only by building theories that incorporate international and national politics in the same analysis can we begin to address questions raised as international regimes interface with domestic polities.

Second, constructivists explicitly set out to theorise processes whereby reality perceptions are formed. Constructivists have done this by breaking with some of the fundamental assumptions of rational choice theory dominating realist and liberal thinking. Rational choice theorists assume that actors have fixed preferences, allowing them to make rational choices in world that is objectively defined. By contrast, constructivists ask questions about why actors have certain values and perceptions of the world, and indeed set out to address the question of identity formation in which actors are constituted as acting subjects in the first place (Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986; Laffey and Weldes 1997; Finnemore and Sikkink 2001). With my focus on domestic transformations of international regimes, this is indeed a promising ambition. Asking questions, as I do, about how domestic actors' understand international regimes, and how domestic actors and contexts are affected by these international regimes, the constructivist ambition to theorise processes of reality formation looks like a fruitful point of departure.

The constructivist literature identifies two main processes presumed to capture the implementation of international regimes: processes of learning and processes of socialisation.

"Learning" from international regimes

The constructivist literature emphasising learning as the causal process driving the implementation of international regimes builds on the assumption that when national decision makers are faced with technically complex decisions, they will turn to experts for advice. As these experts typically form part of international, knowledge-based networks—"epistemic communities"—complex decision making provides a venue for internationally accepted knowledge to become the foundation for policy change at the domestic level. Peter Haas (1992), leading author on the role of epistemic communities, puts it like this: "Epistemic communities are channels through which new ideas circulate from societies to governments as well as from country to country" (p. 27).[21]

[21] Peter Haas is sometimes seen as belonging to the neo-liberal institutional school of international relations, but his work has been a source of inspiration for many writers in the constructivist camp.

An epistemic community can consist of individuals with different professional and educational backgrounds, but the common denominator is "their shared belief or faith in the verity and applicability of particular forms of knowledge or specific truths." (Garcia 2002:20; Finnemore 1996; Selin 2000; Lidskog and Sundqvist 2002). The shared belief provides the foundation for a common definition of the problem at hand and the preferred policy response. Through the interaction between the epistemic community and national policy makers, these views become the basis of a new national policy.

The interaction between the epistemic community and the national policy makers is a learning process in which the latter adopt the knowledge of the former. International regimes thus come to play a part in domestic policymaking through a process in which members of the epistemic community 'teach' the content of the international regime to decision makers at the national level (Finnemore 1996). The national decision makers, in turn, recognise the relevance and validity of the international regimes and adjust their behaviour accordingly. Consider the description of this learning process by Lidskog and Sundqvist who both are recognised for their contribution to theories of epistemic communities. They argue that the learning process is a process in which "consensual knowledge moulds the interests of the [recipient] actors". Accordingly, "consensual knowledge can be applied directly in the policy process" without first having to be "negotiated by political parties in order to reach needed compromises" (Lidskog and Sundqvist 2002:81, 82).

This view can be illustrated by Martha Finnemore's account of how a number of Third World countries during the 1970's changed their economic policies from a focus on macro-economic industrialisation to include poverty alleviation programs (Finnemore 1996: ch. 4). Finnemore asserts that this policy change should be attributed to the work of the epistemic community in the World Bank, and in particular to its president Robert McNamara. My concern with Finnemore's work is with her view on the adaptation of the World Bank's anti-poverty international regime by domestic actors. She states that the Third World countries subjected to the new World Bank policy "subsequently endorsed ... the new policy ... in international forums, and quickly adopted it in their own development plans and policies. They accepted and accommodated the World Bank's antipoverty project" (p. 118). Finnemore bases this assertion on references to one official statement and extracts from loan applications to the Wold Bank coming from two countries (Indonesia and Nigeria). Neither domestic actors' understandings of the World Bank's policy, nor the domestic political struggle to change this policy to accommodate domestic interests, ideals, and norms are included in Finnemore's analysis.

My objection with the attempt by constructivists to conceptualise the implementation of international regime at domestic levels as a process of learning is that it fails to account for the political and social interaction involved. The implementation of international regimes is seen as an intellectual process, not as a political or social process. On a critical note, Jeffrey Checkel (2001) has described the learning process as a process in which "domestic agents observe, something goes on between the earlobes, and their values subsequently change" (p. 562).[22] This description of the implementation as an intellectual process between the epistemic community and recipients at the domestic level is detached from every conception of the political manoeuvring and power struggles at the domestic levels that one would expect to be provoked by a community of experts soliciting a new set of perceptions and policies on how to manage a targeted policy area.

In addition, according to the literature on learning, the knowledge base of epistemic communities remains fixed in relation to the targeted domestic contexts. The assumption is that the knowledge proclaimed by the epistemic community is accepted and internalised by targeted domestic actors. It is assumed that these actors' understandings of the international regime do not differ from the knowledge base that originally made up the international regime. By invoking the idea of learning, this literature focuses on how epistemic communities *teach* the international regime to the targeted domestic actors. No account is given of how these actors *understand* the international regime. No account is thus made of the social and political re-construction of knowledge by the targeted domestic actors. Consequently, the norms and ideas carried by targeted domestic actors count for nothing in the analysis. Just like realists and liberalists, any eventual influence from the ideational context of targeted domestic actors is downplayed in the analysis.

"Socialisation" around international regimes

Parallel to the idea of learning, authors in the constructivist strand of international relation theory have identified socialisation as a second major causal process driving the implementation of international regimes. Compared to learning, socialization is not limited to the role of knowledge and cognitive changes. By contrast, the explicit ambition of the literature on socialisation is to include social and political processes at play during the

[22] Jeffrey Checkel, who is a vocal and quite accurate critic of much constructivist theory, does not himself solve the analytic problem of changes in domestic actors' understanding of international norms. He avoids it. Checkel confines his analysis to the point up until "a norm first becomes, through changes in discourse or behaviour, a focus of domestic political attention or debate" (1997b:476). By limiting his story to "how norms get on the domestic political agenda in the first place" (p. 480) Checkel thus excludes the process of internalization into domestic politics from his research.

implementation of international regimes (Klotz 1995; Risse-Kappen 1995; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse, Ropp et al. 1999).

The book *The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change* (1999) by Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink is widely seen as the state of the art within constructivist theory on implementation processes. The authors explore the conditions under which international human rights norms are internalized in domestic practices throughout the world. The answer they give is that "the process by which international norms are internalized and implemented domestically can be understood as a process of *socialization* (p. 5, emphasis in original). This is a process during which "instrumental adaptation and strategic bargaining" is engaged in a mutually reinforcing interaction with "moral consciousness-raising, argumentation, dialogue, and persuasion" which leads to the endpoint of "institutionalization and habitualization" (p. 5).[23]

Risse et. al (1999) assert that, in contrast with other constructivist theories, they want to steer away from theories on "norm-induced domestic change whereby power, political struggles, and instrumental interests of actors are somehow absent in the story" (p. 9). Ostensibly, these authors thus seem to share my criticism of theories of learning. Their ambition thus promises real advancements to prior accounts of the implementation of international regimes in domestic contexts.

Despite these promises, Risse and his partners perpetuate much of the deficiencies in earlier constructivist as well as non-constructivist literature on domestic implementation of international regimes. First, they give no account of the social construction of the international regime by the targeted domestic actors. Second, the targeted domestic actors are seen as passive, powerless recipients of change. To illustrate the first point, we should start by considering that according to their theory on socialization, the end point of the implementation process is when the international norm is "taken for granted" by domestic actors (p. 17). These authors thus set out to analyse the internalisation of international norms which potentially could provide a way to understand the transformation of international regimes. However, Risse et. al. limit their analysis to a focus on the *degrees* of implementation of the original international regime. An international regime is "taken for granted" when targeted domestic actors internalise the international regime in its original form (p. 29; cf. Klotz 1995:155). By excluding an analysis of domestic actors' understandings of the implemented international regime,

[23] Similar to the role assigned to epistemic communities in the process of learning, Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink (1999) point to the role of "transnational advocacy networks" as vehicles by which domestic policy makers are socialized into international regimes and norms. Transnational advocacy networks consist of state and non-state actors at the international level, and non-state actors at the domestic level of the country supposed to adopt the international norm.

these authors work under the assumption that a successful socialization process leads all actors to internalize the same understanding of the international regime. With regard to their empirical focus on human rights, the assumption of Risse et. al. is that domestic actors are socialized into "taking for granted" the same understanding of human rights as was proclaimed by the United Nations in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. No account is made of the social construction of this international norm by the targeted domestic actors.

Second, although Risse et. al. set out to include the role of power in the implementation process, their analysis places no power in the hands of the domestic actors targeted by the international regime. In their analysis, power is held by the international actors advocating the international norm. It is the international actors and their domestic partners (such as non-governmental organisations and other actors in civil society) who set the agenda and engage in strategic action to convey this to the targeted domestic actors. The targeted domestic actors, i.e. the actors whose practices the international regime set out to change, are limited to a repertoire of different degrees of compliance. They can accept the whole or parts of the agenda presented by proponents of the internationally defined agenda. But in the analysis of Risse et. al., the targeted actors are not empowered with the capacity to formulate an independent agenda in the interface between the international regime and domestic values and norms. As Checkel has put it in a review of Risse et al., the recipients are "portrayed as passive reactants to movement pressure instead of as active agenda setters in their own right" (Checkel 2000:1339). Instead of empowering the targeted domestic actors with a capacity to strategically formulate their own agenda for change, they are portrayed as passive subjects of change.

To sum up, authors in the constructivist strand of international relations advance different theories and suggest that different processes drive the implementation of international regimes to domestic contexts. Despite their critique against realism and liberalism, and their explicit ambition to theorise about processes of actors' reality formation, constructivists give no account of how international regimes are subjected to processes of reality re-constructions at targeted domestic levels. International regimes are thought to be pre-constituted rather than socially constructed. Current constructivist theorists thus share with realists and liberals the assumption that the understanding of the international regime is constant during the implementation process. Whether constructivists advance a process of learning or one of socialization as the independent variable, they treat the dependent variable—actors' understanding of the international regime—as constant throughout the analysis.

Second, constructivists conceptualise the targeted domestic actors as passive recipients of international regimes. The targeted actors are subjected to

change, not subjects of change. Constructivist theory provides scant insights into how targeted domestic actors engage strategically to reconstitute the international regime in relation to domestic social, political, and religious realities.

Third, accounting for processes driving the implementation of international regimes, constructivist theories downplay the role of power on the part of the targeted domestic actors. Processes of learning and socialisation have been juxtaposed as alternative independent variables to the traditional theories focus on international power relations. This attempt to develop alternative explanations of the implementation of international regimes has not resulted in accounts of the role of power in the targeted domestic actors' responses to the implementation of international regimes. As Barnett and Duvall—both leading scholars of international relations—recently put it: "Mainstream constructivists, too, have pitted themselves against explanations in terms of power as they have attempted to demonstrate the causal significance of normative structures and processes of learning and persuasion" (Barnett and Duvall 2005:4). Current constructivist scholars thus repeat much of the fallacy of realist and liberal theories on the role and power of targeted domestic actors in the interface with international regimes.

Taking stock of current theories on the implementation of international regime

The review above has shown that current theories on international relations fail to account for domestic transformations of international regimes. Realists, liberalists, and constructivists advance different accounts of the causal processes of international regime implementation. However, none of these theories account for the targeted domestic actors' understandings of the international regime, i.e. the actors whose practices the international regime set out to change. Working within the constraints of rational choice theory, realists and liberals treat the targeted domestic actors' understanding of the international regime as exogenous to their models. Given the explicit ambition of constructivists to overcome this deficiency in rationalistic theories, it is surprising to find current constructivist writers regard international regimes as pre-constituted rather than re-constituted during the implementation process. Consequently, the assumption of constructivists too is that the targeted domestic actors' understandings of the international regime remain fixed as it is implemented. In addition, although constructivists correctly criticise realism and liberalism for their simplified understanding of agency, neither of the constructivists reviewed above have advanced models that account for how targeted domestic actors actively engage in

strategic response to the implemented international regimes. Realists, liberalists, and constructivists alike thus treat the targeted domestic actors of international regimes as passive and powerless subjects of externally defined agendas for change.

The three approaches reviewed above are summarized in table 3.1.

Theoretical perspective	Implementation determinants	Targeted domestic actors	Understanding of international regime being implemented
Realism	Distribution of power in the international system	Pre-constituted and rational subjects under pressure in the international system	Fixed
Liberalism	The objective characteristics of the international regime and how it contributes to absolute gains and mutual benefits.	Pre-constituted and rational subjects in search of solutions to cooperation problems	Fixed
Constructivism	Learning	Uncertain decision makers adopt solutions from epistemic communities	Fixed
	Socialisation	Normatively inferior actors are pressured to increased degrees of adaptation to international regimes	Fixed

Table 3.1. Summary of theories on implementation in International Relations Theory

4. A THEORY OF DOMESTIC TRANSFORMATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL REGIMES

The aim of this chapter is to provide a theoretically based framework to understand and empirically analyse domestic transformations of international regimes. The chapter is structured as follows: The first section outlines the concept "construction of reality" and provides a theoretical framework to understand the formation and change of constructions of reality. I will divide this concept into two parts dealing with "collective memories" and "social identities" which are intersecting parts of an actor's construction of reality. The second section of this chapter details the character and role of "political entrepreneurs". However, since I will be using this concept throughout this chapter, a *prima facie* definition is in order: Political entrepreneurs are actors who actively engage in the domestic transformation of an international regime as it is implemented in domestic contexts. They are, as Checkel (1997a) puts it, "agents of ideas-based policy change" (p. 9). In the third section, I will develop a framework of analytical categories for empirical analysis of strategies used by political entrepreneurs during the transformation process. The forth and final section accounts for the research strategy and methodological choices during the empirical research on the transformation of IWRM in Zimbabwe reported in chapter five to eight.

Constructions of reality

I am using the concept of "constructions of reality" to study what is elsewhere referred to as "culture", "history", or "world view" (Wedeen 2002; Goldstein and Keohane 1993; Hall J. 1993; Peterson and Anand 2004). Compared with these related concepts, "constructions of reality" has the advantage of viewing the creation of social contexts as a strategic process. Constructions of reality are not automatically created based on material needs in society, or evolving out of anonymous historical processes. They are deliberately created by strategically acting political entrepreneurs who aim to advance their goals and ambitions. The construction of reality is a process in which actors compete to establish particular interpretations of reality as legitimate in society as a means to obtain material and non-material

resources (Swidler and Arditi 1994; Finnemore and Sikkink 2001; Ruggie 1998; Rothstein 2000; Kaufman 2004).

In "construction of reality" I include actors' "collective memories" and "identity constructs". The distinction between the two is based on differences in the underlying social-psychological and political processes that drive their constructions (Willmott 1997). The distinction is motivated by the ambition to increase the analytic precision of the concept "constructions of reality".

Collective memories are analytically separated from social identities in as much as the former concerns the *nature of the problem* at hand, while the latter refers to the *demarcation of actors* to whom rights and obligations are attributed. Collective memories and social identities are intersecting parts of actors' constructions of reality in the sense that collective memories tend to make certain social identities more salient than others. If, for example, actor A has a collective memory in which the nature of the problem of water scarcity is related to the lack of capacity to store rain-water for the dry season, then A's collective memory tends to make salient the social identity of hydrologists trained in dam construction (see further chapter seven). By contrast, actor B may have collective memory of the lack of access to water as the gods' way of punishing people for their wrongdoings. This collective memory makes salient the social identity of rain-makers with the capacity to perform rain-making ceremonies to appease the gods (see further chapter eight).

Despite this affinity between collective memories and social identities, the relation between them should be seen as subject of empirical investigations concerned with ongoing social construction. Both A and B's collective memories are, for example, compatible with attributing salience to the social identity of international development agencies rather than hydrologists or rain makers. In relation to the collective memory of actor A, the international development agencies may be portrayed as having failed to provide financial means for the construction of dams. In relation to the collective memory of actor B, the international development agencies can be represented as the source of inspiration for the immoral behaviour of local farmers and urban water users.

The construction of both collective memories and social identities speaks to the question of legitimate distribution of material and non-material resources in society. In relation to the case study under review, collective memories of water contextualise water management against a backdrop of political, social, religious, and economic events. They define the value of water, historical causes of water-related problems in the present (giving the foundation to assign blame to someone), as well as historical events that constitute the basis of making claims on resources in the present. By contrast, the social identities clustered around water concern the strategic construction of social actors to whom rights and obligations are attributed.

Collective memories

I define "collective memories" as representations of reality shared by a group of individuals for whom they provide a common frame to interpret the past and plot the future.[24] I thus agree with Barry Schwartz—well known for his work on collective memories—who states that collective memories represent "the past as a program for the present" (Schwartz 1996:910).[25] Clarifying how collective memories embody a connection between history and present, Schwartz suggests a distinction between collective memories as a model *of* society, and as a model *for* society. A collective memory is a model *of* society, as it is "a reflection of its needs, problems, fears, mentality, and aspirations." A collective memory is a model *for* society as it is "a program that defines its experience, articulates its values and goals" (p. 910).

Collective memories thus constitute a collective point of reference through which individual actions are given social meanings and behavioural guidance. This definition gives rise to two questions: *How* do collective memories come to represent the pasts of a society? Addressing this question in the subsequent section, I focus on the role of social psychological processes in forgetting and remembering the past, and on the role of strategic political entrepreneurs engaging in constructing "the past as a program for the present". The second question, addressed in the subsequent section is: *What is the scope* within which collective memories can be legitimate models of and for society?

Forgetting, remembering, and the role of political entrepreneurs

The effects of the interface between an international regime and domestically held constructions of reality appear both on a political and social psychological level among the targeted domestic actors. At the political level, the interface challenges the existing distribution of political and material resources. This was certainly the case in Zimbabwe's water sector reform, in which the introduction of IWRM challenged, among other things, the strong social bias of water in favour of the white minority. Similarly, the government's control over water management was called into question by IWRM's emphasis on decentralisation and stakeholder participation.

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[24] Collective memories, as opposed to individual memories, are "collective" to the extent that several individuals hold similar memories. The linkage whereby individual understandings are related to collectively understandings is addressed by the sociologists Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann (1966) as they write:

> Individuals perform discrete institutionalized actions within the context of their biography. This biography is a reflected-upon whole in which the discrete actions are thought of, not as isolated events, but as related parts in a subjectively meaningful universe whose meanings are not specific to the individual, but socially articulated and shared (p. 100).

[25] Note that that "the past" should not be understood as some far distant history. The past, as we should understand it here, is a very broad temporal indication including very recent events.

In addition to the political effects, the interface between an international regime and domestic constructions of reality has effects at the social psychological level of the targeted domestic actors. The interface creates what social psychologists would call a "cognitive dissonance" in which different propositions related to the policy area stand against each other (Festinger 1957, for a review see Petty and Wegener 1998). For example, IWRM proposed that the key to sustainable water management was primarily to be found in economic and social institutions (World Bank 1993). This proposition contested the dominant view among public officials in the water sector who attributed the problems in the water sector to insufficient use of scientific models for water management (see chapter seven). Hydrology and hydrogeology rather than politics are the solution according to these officials. Research in social psychology points out that individuals who experience a state of cognitive dissonance will find this aversive and subsequently engage in various activities to reduce it. Consequently, domestic actors who come in contact with an international regime that has competing propositions about reality will try to reduce this cognitive dissonance between the propositions of the international regime and the domestic constructions of reality.

The political and social psychological tension created by the introduction of an international regime provokes the reconstruction of propositions of the international regime as well as collective memories held at the targeted domestic levels. In response, political entrepreneurs will try to reinterpret the content of the international regime as well as established collective memory of their society. Political entrepreneurs will try to achieve a constructed consistency that reduce the cognitive dissonance and put their group in a social and materially favourable position (McGuire 1985; Kramer 1991).

How do actors reduce the cognitive dissonance provoked by an international regime? Efforts to create consistency between the competing propositions made by the international regime and domestic constructions of reality will not be a rational process of finding the objective—or "real"—match between conflicting and dissonant descriptions of reality (cf. Cortell and Davis 2000; Cortell and Davis 2005). Actors engaged in reducing their cognitive dissonance and creating social legitimacy for their views are influenced by cognitive as well as social selection biases.[26] Social psychologist Daniel Gilbert (1998) suggests four ways in which our limited

[26] Some researchers attribute these selection biases to actors' limited cognitive capacity which impedes the incorporation of relevant information in decision making, see e.g. March and Olsen (1989); North (1990); Kramer (1991). Human's limited processing capacity thus makes them susceptible to a limited set of characteristics of reality which effects how they see the present and commemorate the past. Other scholars have argues that actors try to gain social legitimacy and reduce their cognitive dissonance by means of existing social templates that provides a social apparatus though which the past is reproduced, see e.g. Berger and Luckmann (1966); Ben-Yehuda (1995); Finnemore (1996); Petty and Wegener (1998).

cognitive capacity and social embeddedness effects the reconstruction of collective memories:

> *Idealism:* People see things as they expect them to be. A Chinese proverb captures this point saying that "two-thirds or what we see is behind our eyes". Similarly, someone has said that "I'll see it when I believe it". The essence of these sayings is that the perceiver's knowledge and assumptions of the world functions as information shortcuts, or filter, to re-present the world to the perceiver. New knowledge is made to fit into existing perceptions of the person's perceptions of reality. This new, filtered, reality is experienced by the person as *the* reality.
>
> *Egoism:* In the process of making sense of a situation, people tend to select and interpret reality in such a way that they themselves come out in favourable light.
>
> *Circumstantialism:* People think about only the things they see. And what they see tends to be close to them in time and space. This makes for a bias in favour of information in the vicinity at the expense of more remote sources notwithstanding their factual grounds.
>
> *Realism:* People think that they see things as they are. People don't realise that egoism and idealism and circumstantialism effect their beliefs (from Gilbert 1998a:121ff).

Gilbert's account implies that as proponents of an international regime try to have an impact on the definition of the targeted domestic policy area, they are up against domestic actors whose collective memories are marked by generic human tendencies of selective forgetting and remembering. The implication is that there are strong human tendencies associated with the perception of reality that work against efforts to achieve a certain policy change by means of new manifestations of reality compiled in an international regime. More precisely, we should expect the following effects:

> *Idealism* implies an inertia that works against dramatic changes at odds with actors' current expectations and understandings.
>
> *Egoism* tends to boost the actors' own achievements and others' imperfections. This works against redefinitions of the policy area that implies a redistribution of rights and obligations between actors in the targeted policy area.

> *Circumstantialism* works against contextualising the targeted policy area in a broader political, social, and ecological context in which problems in that sector are related to events in society at large.
>
> *Realism* implies that domestic actors typically will be quite persistent in their views as they do not realise their own socio-cognitive predicaments.

The overarching point in Gilbert's account is that collective memories are constructed and reconstructed by actors who do not recall reality as "it is" but filtered through social psychological limitations in the human constituency. However, while Gilbert identifies generic human tendencies of selective forgetting and remembering, he falls short of addressing the political dimension of constructing collective memories. Political scientist Bo Rothstein (2000) argues that

> Collective memories are deliberately created by strategically acting political entrepreneurs in order to further their political goals and ambitions. In other words, a group's or a society's collective memory is contested ideological terrain, where different actors try to establish their particular interpretation of the past as *the* collective memory for a particular group (p. 494, emphasis in original).

The political dimension in the construction of collective memories derives from the fact that collective memories have implications for the legitimate distribution of social and material resources in society. In an analysis of the role of memory and practice as vehicles for power in eighteenth century France, Historian Keith M. Baker (1985) puts it like this:

> Politics in any society depends upon the existence of cultural representations that define the relationships among political actors, thereby allowing individuals and groups to press claims upon one another and upon the whole. Such claims can be made intelligible and binding only to the extent that political actors deploy symbolic resources held in common by members of the political society, thereby refining and redefining the implications of these resources for the changing purposes of political practice. Political contestation therefore takes the form of competing efforts to mobilize and control the possibilities of political and social discourse, efforts through which that discourse is extended, recast, and—on occasion—even radically transformed. (Baker 1985:134f, cf. Schwartz 1996).

Two things stand out from this quote from Baker with regard to the study of domestic transformations of international regimes. First, Baker supports the analytic point of departure of this book, namely that the extent to which an international regime will effect the targeted policy area is contingent upon the extent to which it has an impact on the "cultural representations" which define the relationships of the concerned actors. Second, the content of these "cultural representations", what I here call collective memories, stipulates social and political relationships which allows for making specific claims on the distribution of resources in the policy area targeted by the international regime. More precisely, to gain legitimacy as "intelligible and binding", the propositions of the international regime must be grounded in commonly held "symbolic resources". This point, to which I now turn for a more detailed analysis, speaks to the question of the scope within which resource claims can be made by political entrepreneurs hoping to construct legitimate collective memories for increased resource distribution.

The scope for change of collective memories: Anything does not go

The definition of collective memories that I use stipulates that collective memories are held by individuals in the *present* as a frame to interpret the *past* (above). Some authors argue that there need not be any connection between a constructed collective memory (the present) and real historical events (the past). Halbwachs—frequently cited as the father of the "collective memory" concept—states that if a collective memory

> adapts the image of ancient facts to the beliefs and spiritual needs of the present, then a knowledge of the origin of these facts must be secondary, if not altogether useless, for the reality of the past is no longer in the past. (Halbwachs cited in Ben-Yehuda 1995:273).

Halbwachs' view is thus that there can be a fundamental discontinuity between the past and present representations of society embodied in collective memories. This view suggests that collective memories can be fabricated out of thin air to suit the strategic and political needs of effective political entrepreneurs acting in the present. The inventions by political entrepreneurs are limited only by their imagination.

In contrast to Halbwachs I argue that collective memories are constructs of reality held in the present but well founded in the past (Ben-Yehuda 1995; Rothstein 2000). As Schwartz (1991) puts it, collective memories take part in shaping the present by providing "a stable image upon which new elements are superimposed" (Schwartz 2001:234). Ultimately, of course, a political entrepreneur may try to invoke a collective memory without any foundation in real historical events and the degree to which this is successful

is an empirical question. But the analytic point that I want to make with the concept of collective memories is to understand how the past can be used to make claims in the present. And for these claims to be legitimate, they must relate to events seen as real and legitimate in wide parts of society. As Mary Douglas (1986) puts it: "(to) acquire legitimacy, every kind of institution needs a formula that founds its rightness in reason and in nature." (Douglas 1986:45; cf. Acharya 2004:244; Keck and Sikkink 1998:267f). As political entrepreneurs use collective memories to make resource claims in the present, they will thus typically draw on strategic representation of historical events with wide social and political acceptance.

Social identities

I now turn to the second component in constructions of reality, i.e. "social identities". I define "social identities" as social constructions that place an individual or group in social categories of real or imagined communities that are socially recognised. Friends, religious groups, family, ethnic groups, deceased ancestors, formal organisations, and nations are but some of the possible social categories with which we can associate, and be associated with. Identification is hence to a large extent a process of social demarcation. An identity is created through an ongoing social process by which the social space is divided into categories within which an individual or group is placed (Berger and Luckmann 1966; Brubaker and Cooper 2000; Callero 2003).

This social embeddedness of social identities is clarified by using the conventional distinction between the construction of the Self and the Other. The construction of the Self and the Other can be seen as responses to two questions: "Who am I?" and "Who are they?". Defining the construction of social identities as *social* constructions implies that the construction of the Self takes place in relation to a wider social context. In other words, the actor who asks the question "Who am I?" is not the sole respondent to this question. The answer to the question is also provided by Others: Other social actors take part in the social construction of "I".

Contrasting social identity as a social construction with rational choice theory and logic of appropriateness

The conceptualisation of social identities as a social construction can be contrasted with, on the one hand, the position advanced in rational choice theory and, on the other hand, the tradition following March and Olson's (1989) proposition of a "logic of appropriateness". These different views dominate much of the work on social identities in political science and international relations. I will deal with these two contrasting views separately with the aim to further clarify my position on social identities as social constructions.

From the perspective of rational choice theory, social identities are formed by individual agents strategically designing their identities to increase the prospects of obtaining specific goals. As Gartner and Segura (1997) put it: "identity is a choice, and we believe that choice to be rationally driven.... [C]onsequently ... new group identities or categories are constantly being constructed to serves social or political purposes." (p 135, 133). In this perspective, social identities help actors to make rational predictions about the likely behaviour of others and the most profitable strategic behaviour (Laitin 1998). As critics have noted, however, rational choice theory downplays the social embeddedness of actors while emphasising actors' preoccupation with the consequences of action (Ostrom 1998; Breen 1999; Rothstein 2000; Eriksson 2005). These "atomistic" and "consequentialistic" assumptions of rational choice theory largely leave out the psychological and political processes that effect the way social identities are formed and inform social interaction. Erik Ringmar (1996) argues that while rational choice theory makes the assertion that agents select their identities on the basis of interests, the theory does not make "clear what 'interests' are or how they are formed, and every attempt to come up with a definition of the concept will inevitably become hostage to a definition of the self to whom the interest in question is said to belong." (p. 87).

James G. March and Johan P. Olson have pursued this critique against rational choice theory, and their work has been pivotal in reintroducing identity studies into political science and international relations research (March and Olsen 1984; March and Olsen 1989; March 1994). Contrasting the consequencialist logic assumed by rational choice theory, March and Olson suggest that actors are frequently guided by a "logic of appropriatness" in which behaviour is derived from the actors' social embeddedness. They argue that when an actor address the question of identity—"Who am I?"—that actor has little or no role in how the answer is defined. The leverage for individual choice is reduced by the actors' social embeddedness. The process of social identity formation is a process where the individual enters a "prepackaged contract" stipulating obligations and expectations related to parties involved in an interaction (March and Olsen 1989:21ff; March 1994:63ff). March and Olson thus assert that social identities are socially embedded because they are formed in response to normative discourses on appropriate behaviour. The foundation of March and Olson's argument is that individual-level legitimacy is not sufficient to justify an act which is why individuals want the legitimacy of their actions to be affirmed by others. This social recognition is provided through socially defined identities that supply a normative base through which the actor can infer the right thing to do: "social identities are templates for individual action... [as] they frequently come to be assertions of morality" (March 1994:65; Zelditch 2001).

While I am generally sympathetic to March and Olson's elaboration on the social embeddedness of social identities, I argue that this emphasis has come at the expense of a focus on the reciprocal relation between individual agents and social contexts. Regarding social identities as "prepackaged contracts" March and Olson conceptualise the identity carrier as a passive recipient of socially defined templates stipulating agency. Describing the process during which an actor addresses the question of identity—"Who am I?—March and Olson take examples from business organisations. They write: "The accountant asks: 'What does an accountant do in a situation such as this?' The bureau chief asks: 'What does a bureau chief do in a situation such as this?'" (March 1994:63f). Faced with these questions, March and Olson argue that the accountant and bureau chief enter ready made social identities rather that take a progressive role in an interactive process of identity formation. The accountant and bureau chief are given no role in answering the question "Who am I?" The answer is provided by the context—through the "prepackaged contracts"—while the identity carrier is seen as a passive recipient with no active part in the process of defining his identity.

Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann (1966) provide a position on social identities that balances the traditions of rational choice theory and March and Olson's work on the "logic of appropriateness". They argue that identity carriers are neither atomistic designers of their identities (as in rational choice theory), nor passive recipients of socially defined demarcations (as in the logic of appropriateness). Berger and Luckmann emphasise that the construction of social identities is an interactive process between the individual and society. In this process the individual's identity is neither an atomistic agent nor subsumed under society. The individual maintains an independent status as he has a core identity which can be seen as the carrier of the socially constructed identity.[27] Berger and Luckmann are eager to distance themselves from the idea of atomistic individuals with an ability to freely select suitable social identities. They thus emphasise that the process of identity formation

> does not result from autonomous creations of meaning by isolated individuals, but begins with the individual 'taking over' the world in which others already live…[Through this process] we now not only understand each other's definitions of shared situations, we define them reciprocally. A nexus of motivations is established between us and extends into the

[27] For a discussion on the existence of a core identity, see further Mead and Morris (1934); Kinnvall (2003); Wendt (1999):224ff.

> future. Most importantly, there is now an ongoing mutual identification between us. We not only live in the same world, we participate in each other's being. (Berger and Luckmann 1966:150).

There are three things that we should pay attention to in this quote. First, it summarizes the view of social identities that I propose, i.e. social identities as social constructions emanating from an interactive social process in which the individual is deeply embedded in society without losing his distinct individuality and the ability to engage in strategic action. This position attempts to strike a balance between the simplistic assumptions of rational choice theory in which atomistic agents are seen as the creators of their own identities, and the overt social embeddedness of actors according to the logic of appropriateness. Second, it connects social identities and reciprocal definitions of shared situations. This reminds us of the proximity between identity constructions and constructions of collective memories which I discussed above. Third, it connects the construction of reality to actors' motivations and behaviours in collective engagements. This connection is the point of departure for my proposal to study of the domestic impact of international regimes as centring on the construction of social identities in the targeted domestic setting.

The strategic dimension of social identity formation

While Berger and Luckmann highlight the social interaction of identity formation, they fall short of addressing its political dimension. This becomes a problem with respect to applying their definition of social identities to the study of domestic transformations of international regimes. The formation of social identities is part of determining the socially legitimate distribution of resources in society, and thus social identity formation is typically characterised by strategic action (Callero 2003:118f; Callon 1986:216f).

I argue that the strategic dimension of social identity formation draw from three specific characteristics of the social-psychological processes of identity formation. These basic processes in the formation of social identities make it easy for political entrepreneurs to use social identities for strategic purposes. First, it is a fundamental characteristic of the formation of social identities that the demarcations of social identities are not fixed but rather subject to change, such that an individual can identify with new groups (Kramer 1991; Espeland 1998). This *plasticity* in the formation of an individual's social identities can be used by political entrepreneurs through the strategic inclusion and exclusion of individuals from established social identities. Brubaker and Cooper (2000) put it like this:

> [Social identities are used] to persuade certain people that they are (for certain purposes) "identical" with one another and at the same time different from others, and to organize and justify cooperation along certain lines. (p. 4-5).

Engaging in strategic inclusion and exclusion, political entrepreneurs will thus work with the plasticity of social identities to try to reshape them in ways they regard as favourable. Specifically, political entrepreneurs may try to create inclusive social identities that boost the significance and rights of themselves and their allies. Similarly, they can try to create social identities that diminish the legitimacy of potential competitors for social and political resources.

The second characteristic of social identity formation that can be used strategically is *stereotyping*. Stereotyping is an identity formation process in which individuals reduce the complexities of other actors and turn them into a homogenous group. Studying the social psychology of inter-group relations, Roderick Kramer (1991) shows that the diversity of individuals in a group is too complex to process for individuals. In the construction of Others, individual diversity is typically subordinated to achieve collective homogeneity. The homogenous Other is subsequently labelled with the same social identity; i.e. the Other is turned into a stereotype. The human tendency towards stereotyping can be used for strategic reasons because when an actor relates to someone using a stereotype, group characteristics rather than individual traits tend to determine the behavioural response and attitudes. Racial identities and constructions of the Other as 'ignorant' and 'narrow-minded' are perhaps some of the most frequent examples of strategic use of stereotyping.

The third characteristic in the formation of social identities which is open to strategic manipulation is the inclination to accept a specific individual as representative of a larger group (Kramer 1991; Callon 1986). The acceptance of representatives of a group is a process based on a different—even opposite—rationale than stereotyping. While stereotyping leads to a situation in which many individuals are counted as one, the process of accepting a representation of a social group is a process where one individual's voice counts as the voice of many. The acceptance of representatives is conducive for social interaction because the interaction between different group's actors can be reduced to interaction between representatives of each group. Group-based interactions thus often presuppose a process of accepting someone as the representative of the Self, while the Other is represented by someone from the opposing group.

The process of selection and acceptance of representatives for social groups is inevitably an act of reducing the complexity of social actors. This creates a space for manoeuvring by political entrepreneurs. The question is: Who

will be regarded as the representatives of the Self/Other? With regard to this, sociologist Callon has argued that "To speak for others is to first silence those in whose name we speak." (1986:216). When someone claims to voice the opinion of, for example, local water stakeholders, we should thus recognise this as an act of power by someone whose actual interests may not be representative of the interests of any (significant) group of actual stakeholders. Intertwined with this process we should further note the power dimension of *recognising* someone as a representative of the Other. Great strategic value can be attached to recognising a specific actor as the legitimate representative of a group. With regard to the implementation of an international regime aiming to increase the influence of local stakeholders, actors within the government may be able to claim that they have met this goal by pointing to the increased influence of someone who the government regards as a suitable "stakeholder representative". With regard to the strategic recognition of representatives, I would thus like to paraphrase Callon (above) and state that: To accept someone as the speaker for Others can be to silence those in whose name that someone speaks.

Scope for social identity change and the consequences of multiple identities

How much scope is there for political entrepreneurs to recast social identities during domestic transformation of an international regime? Or, to put the same question in its most generic form: How much can social identities be changed by strategic actors? The claim that I have made—that social identities are socially constructed in human interaction—stands in sharp contrast to both the atomistic tradition of rational choice and the essentialist tradition of the logic of appropriateness. Regarding social identities as social constructions does not, however, imply that just because humans constantly interact social identities are constantly subject to dramatic changes. The impact of human interaction, including that of political entrepreneurs, on the construction of social identities is most often quite marginal. Without this inertia, social identities would lose their function as reference points for legitimacy and agency. In the section on collective memories above, I pointed to the role of cognitive dissonance as a mechanism by which actors try to maintain continuity between established and new constructions of reality. When actors' established collective memories are challenged by, for example, an international regime, actors experience a sense of cognitive dissonance that they tend to find aversive and therefore try to reduce (Festinger 1957). Similarly, cognitive dissonance in actors' social identities impacts on the basic social-psychological function of social identities, i.e. to "sustain a sense of stability and predictable understanding in the world" (Callero 2003:124). This is reflected in the Latin root of *identity, idem,* which means "sameness and continuity". This implies that actors try to maintain the stability of social identities, and when social identities change,

the change is typically incremental and slow. Similarly, social identities can take on new shapes, but there is typically a strong resemblance with previous social identity demarcations (Brubaker and Cooper 2000; cf. Ringmar 1996:ch. 3).

Actors can also oscillate between multiple social identities. Due to the existence of multiple identities, a change of social identities might imply that actors can adopt or emphasis one of several identities which they have carried all along. The existence of multiple identities thus increases the leverage of political entrepreneurs engaged in constructing social identities.[28]

There are, however, at least three generic social-psychological processes that work against actors holding a large number of social identities. First, the array of actual social identities available to an individual is limited by the human inability to process complex information (Kramer 1991; Brubaker and Cooper 2000; cf. North 1990; Ostrom 1991). Actors find it too demanding to hold several social identities, and thus tend to rely on a limited number of identities as templates for social orientation and action. Second, a large number of social identities would reduce the level of predictability in our actions. Constant change of social identities would thus create social instability and lead to social stigmatization (Brubaker and Cooper 2000). Third, individuals tend to maintain a coherent self-image and avoid cognitive dissonance (Festinger 1957; Krantz Lindgren 2001). Constant change of social identities would make it difficult for actors to recognise themselves, which implies limits to the number of social identities that might be held.

In addition to these generic processes that limit the number of social identities available, I argue that with regard to the empirical focus on domestic transformations, the number of social identities is limited by the fact that an international regime is concerned with a specific policy area. Accordingly, only a limited number of social identities will be seen as relevant and socially legitimate. A policy area is a well specified social venue which limits the number of legitimate social identities (March and Olsson 1989). The specification is manifested in, for example, its formal organization, legal instruments, and traditional practices.

There are thus good reasons to assume that actors engaged within the policy sphere targeted by an international regime will face quite a limited repertoire of social identities. Nevertheless there will be a certain amount of leverage for change between existing social identities, demarcation of

[28] The fact that actors hold multiple social identities is an analytical insight with a clear methodological implication to the extent that we seek to connect social identities with behaviour. An analysis that connects identity with behaviour stands the risk of being over-determined since in a situation with a multitude of social identities there can easily be more than one identity which corresponds with a certain behavioural patterns. With a multitude of social identities available, to which identity should the observed behaviour be attributed?

new groups, and renegotiation of the rights and obligations attributed to each identity. This leverage for identity change defines the social and political space for the transformation of the social identities proposed by an international regime.

Political entrepreneurs

The process of domestic transformation is not a process in which international regimes *per se* have an impact on domestic actors' reality constructs (Willmott 1997:96ff). The degree to which an international regime has an impact on incumbent actors' constructions of realities is determined by actors engaged either in advocating the international regime and bestowing upon it relevance and salience, or in opposing the international regime as illegitimate and irrelevant. As Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) put it in regard to norm change: "Norms do not appear out of thin air: they are actively built by agents having strong notions about appropriate or desirable behavior in their community." (p. 897). I use the concept "political entrepreneurs" to signify actors who actively engage in the domestic transformation of an international regime as it is implemented in domestic contexts.

Jeffrey T. Checkel (1997a) defines political entrepreneurs as "agents of ideas-based policy change". They are "clever individuals with a 'game plan'" and endowed with resources to bring about policy change (p. 9, cf. Hardin 1995). A concept related to political entrepreneurs is "norm entrepreneurs" used by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998). Similar to "political entrepreneurs" Finnemore and Sikkink describe norm entrepreneurs as engaged in strategic social construction:

> Norm entrepreneurs are critical for norm emergence because they call attention to issues and even 'create' issues by using language that names, interprets, and dramatizes them...The construction of cognitive frames is an essential component of norm entrepreneurs' political strategies since, whey they are successful, new frames resonate with broader public understandings and are adopted as a new way to talking about and understanding issues (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998:897).

A significant difference between political entrepreneurs and their normative counterparts is that the latter is inclined to be motivated by normative sentiments such as empathy, altruism, and solidarity, while the motives of political entrepreneurs are geared towards holding power and resources. The political entrepreneur is not necessarily good or bad from a normative perspective. Political entrepreneurs may act to advance their in-group's

political position, achieve control over economic resources, or gain social and political legitimacy for themselves and their groups.

What determines the success of political entrepreneurs' attempts to achieve policy change? This is a question only recently asked by analysts of international relations and politics, and we still lack a satisfying answer. Checkel (1997a) points to the significance of certain endowments of political entrepreneurs, as well as the role of conducive "situational conditions". He suggests that successful political entrepreneurs are endowed with "expertise and knowledge in their given field; substantial negotiating skills; persistence; connections to relevant political actors" as well as a certain strategy for change, i.e. a game plan. He further suggests that an entrepreneur will be successful if two situational conditions are at hand: "Are there problems whose resolution would be assisted by the implementation of the entrepreneur's ideas? Are there leaders in power who recognize that such problems exit?" Together the situational conditions create a "policy window" which successful entrepreneurs manage to enter with their game plan.

While I am sympathetic to Checkel's assumptions about the endowments of political entrepreneurs I differ over keeping the situational conditions exogenous to the analysis. I argue that the empirical analysis should include how political entrepreneurs take part in the process of *creating* conducive situational conditions. Political entrepreneurs are thus not restricted to applying their game plan to a game structured by external circumstances. To understand the significance of these actors we should recognise their role in determining the rules of the game to be played. Political entrepreneurs do not only apply their game plan to the game, they also take part in determining which game is going to be played.

Political entrepreneurs are engaged in the domestic transformation of international regimes with the aim to create what they perceive as favourable matches between the international regime and incumbent actors' understanding of reality. To create these matches the political entrepreneurs engage to negotiate the content and salience of taken-for-granted facts of life as well as different components of the international regime. Some components of the international regime and established realities will be attributed new meanings, others will be given new emphasis, while others simply will be dropped from the agenda. Political entrepreneurs attempt to negotiate an amalgamated reality which puts them and those they represent in a favourable position. The *modus operandi* of political entrepreneurs can be said to be structured by three questions: (i) What kind of a situation would I like this to be? (i.e. defining the collective memory); (ii) What kind of actor would I, and those I represent, like to be in a situation such as this? (i.e. demarcations of the Self); (iii) What other kinds of actors would I like to have present in a situation such as this (i.e. the construction of Others, cf. March and Olsen 1989).

Political entrepreneurs are not atomistic strategists who stand above and beyond the social-psychological and contextual constraints limiting other actors (see above section on collective memories and social identities). As political entrepreneurs engage in the transformation process, they too are limited by their own and others collective memories and social identities (cf. Acharya 2004). Skilled political entrepreneurs might be aware of these limitations and might try to take them into account as they develop the game plane "to change the direction and flow of politics" (Schneider and Teske 1992:737). While a profound knowledge of the socio-political context is a necessary asset to a political entrepreneur it may also colour his understanding of the possibilities of change and his capacity to effect it. Political entrepreneurs are subject to the same political and social-psychological processes as actors in general. They are, for example, subject to selective biases as they recall collective memories, and to egocentric expectations based on social identities (Checkel 1997a; Shockley, Frank et al. 2002).

Where should we look to find political entrepreneurs? As examples of political entrepreneurs Checkel (1997a) counts "individuals, domestic and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and transnational coalitions." (p. 9). In Checkel's account of these actors, it is notable that all are outside what normally would be defined as "the government". Applying the concept "political entrepreneurs" to an African context such as Zimbabwe calls into question the demarcation between state and non-state actors that is assumed by Checkel. As many scholars on African politics have noted, a recurrent characteristic of African politics is that there is no clear demarcation between the sphere of the government (the public) and the rest of society (e.g. Bratton and van de Walle 1997; Stålgren 1997). African societies are typically modelled on a network of patron-client relations tying agents together with less regard to the power of official position than to the power obtained from socially accepted, but informal, positions. The logic of patron-client suggests that official positions and titles are poor proxies for power and actual influence. Consequently, political entrepreneurs should not *a priori* be regarded as situated outside the official government. In contrast to Checkel's account of potential political entrepreneurs I therefore include actors outside as well as inside the government engaged in the domestic transformation of international regimes.

Summing up the processes of domestic transformations of international regimes

The question addressed in this chapter is: How do international regimes become part of the reality constructs held by domestic actors in the targeted domestic policy area? To address this question, I have outlined the

political and social-psychological processes at play and the role of strategic political entrepreneurs. Table 4.1. provides a summary of these processes. In the subsequent section, I turn to developing a framework for empirical analysis of domestic transformations of international regimes (see summary in table 4.4.).

Components in Constructions of Reality	**Social psychological and political processes**
Collective Memories	• Cognitive dissonance • Individual limitations on memory - Idealism - Egoism - Circumstantialism - Realism
Social Identities	• Cognitive dissonance • Identity plasticity • Stereotyping • Acceptance of representatives of the Self and Other

Table 4.1. Political and social psychological processes during domestic transformations of international regimes.

Empirical Analysis of Domestic Transformations of International Regimes

This section provides a framework of analytical categories for empirical analysis of strategies used by political entrepreneurs during the domestic transformation process. I propose a distinction between, on the one hand, strategies of *naming*, and on the other hand, strategies of *claiming* and *blaming*. I will elaborate on these strategies in detail below. In short, strategies of naming are concerned with descriptions of the situation at hand and the relevant social actors. Strategies of claiming and blaming are concerned with the distribution of rights, guilt, and obligations.

The concepts of collective memories and social identities can be combined with those of naming, claiming and blaming to obtain a general framework for empirical analysis of domestic transformations of international regimes. This framework is presented in table 4.2. The framework contains four sets of empirical questions (A-D) relating to the legitimate distribution of rights and obligation in the policy area targeted for reform. The aim of this framework is to analyse empirically how political entrepreneurs engage with transforming the international regime and evolving domestic constructions of reality. For the engaged political entrepreneurs, the purpose of the

transformation process is to manifest and obtain widespread legitimacy for their specific construction of reality and subsequent distribution of material and non-material resources in society. Consequently, at an empirical level, the domestic transformation of international regimes is a strategic process where different political entrepreneur provide their respective answers to the questions below.

	Naming	**Claiming/Blaming**
Collective memories	A: What is the problem and its solution?	C: What constitutes the basis for making a legitimate claim or legitimately assign blame?
Social identities	B: Who has caused the problem; Who can and who should solve it?	D: Who can make legitimate claims or legitimately assign blame?

Table 4.2. General framework for empirical analysis of domestic transformations of international regimes

Naming based on constructions of reality

I turn first to the role of naming during the domestic transformation process, (see questions A and B in table 4.2.). A reform process, such as the reformation of Zimbabwe's water sector, is a time when taken-for granted realities of life are brought into to the foreground and contested. Established problems and their origins are re-formulated and new solutions negotiated. The aim of these negotiations is to establish new matches between reformulated problems and solutions. Drawing on research in Organizational Studies Barbara Czarniawska (1996) describes this kind of negotiation in this way:

> [T]he match does not lie in the attributes of an idea or in the characteristics of the problem ...The perceived attributes of an idea, the perceived characteristics of a problem and the match between them are all created, negotiated or imposed during the collective translation process...With some exaggeration one can claim that most ideas can be proven to fit most problems, assuming good will, creativity and a tendency to consensus. (p.25).

Czarniawska is probably right when she says that it would be an exaggeration to assume that *all* characteristics of a problem and a solution are subject to creative renegotiations during the translation process. But the

overarching point in her statement is that there is nothing "natural" neither in the description of the problems in the relevant policy area, the array of available solutions, nor in the connections between problems and solutions (cf. Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986; Haas 1992; Acharya 2004).

Czarniawka's assertion is particularly refreshing as we are dealing with a policy area—water management—that is frequently described using complex scientific models that project an image of natural and politically neutral approaches. As I will show in the empirical section, proponents of hydrology and hydrogeology can call on sophisticated models to make persuasive cases for the 'proper' analysis and addressing of water-related problems. Naming the problem and solution in scientific parlance, these actors can draw on collective memories of modern civilization and the progress of science which gives their propositions an appearance as the "natural" and scientifically uncontested approach. Others, however, would rather name the problem and solution in terms of the role of water in the construction of Zimbabwe as a nation-state (chapter five), or Water as a Gift from the Gods (chapter eight).

As political entrepreneurs engage in naming the situation at hand they will seek to obtain maximum legitimacy for their view among strategic social groups. As Keck and Sikkink (1998) have pointed out, the practices of "renaming" a situation are not necessarily about providing new scientific evidence to provide a compelling case, but actors can "dramatize situations" by using colourful language or seeking to make associations to specific, strategic events or ideas in established in society at large (p. 20ff). A case in point is the attempt by nationalistic actors in the Zimbabwean government to associate the implementation of the internationally defined regime of IWRM with the colonial tradition of white men meddling in how Zimbabweans handle their natural resources (chapter five).

The strategies of naming the problem and solution in the targeted policy area is intertwined with naming the social identities of the actors who have caused the problems and who ought to engage in its solutions (compare question A and B in table 4.2.). From propositions of the nature of the problem and solution (question A), there may be an implicit answer to the questions: Who has caused the problem? and Who should solve it? (see B in table 4.2.). As sociologist Michel Callon argues, actors will try to define the nature of a situation in a way that make themselves "indispensable to other actors in the drama" (Callon 1986:196). Despite this closeness, the distinction between questions A and B in table 4.2. comes about because there is no "automatic" or "natural" connection between the answers to the two questions. The relation between the answers to the respective questions should be empirically analysed with focus on strategic actions by political entrepreneurs. Establishing, for example, that the nature of the problem at hand is one of ineffective government rule does not automatically provide

an answer to the question of who has caused this situation, nor who should solve it. (Is it civil society, market actors, international donors, or perhaps, actors within the government?)

The stakes in the naming process are high. Failure to have their positions accepted can render actors socially, politically, and economically irrelevant. If, for example, it is widely established that the problem of water management derives from insufficient water storage capacity, this furthers the positions of water engineers with expert knowledge on dam constructions. At stake here is the social legitimacy and relevance of water engineers as a group (i.e. their social identity). However, the role and relevance of water engineers would be called into question if the reason behind the lack of storage capacity was established as a lack of efficient economic institutions and private property rights on water, as was suggested by some actors during the water sector reform in Zimbabwe. The latter position would increase the salience of economists at the expense of water engineers.

Given the above, it is possible to distinguish the following main points of reference in processes of naming the nature of water management in Zimbabwe, and the social identity of the actors with the competence and obligation to address it. However contested, each point of reference can be seen as a *preferred* construction of the water sector proposed by different political entrepreneurs:

What is the problem and its solution? (cf question A in table 4.2.)	**Who should solve the situation? (cf question B in table 4.2.)**
Spatial and geographic bias in distribution of resources	Water engineers (Hydrologists and hydro-geologists)
Lack of market economy	Expert economists and economic actors
Askewed social distribution	National political elite
Lack of modern entrepreneurial skills	Modern entrepreneurial farmers (white commercial farmers)
Lack of democratic rule	Local stakeholders (black farmers)
Immoral behaviour in modern society	Rain-makers and local leaders

Table 4.3. Preferred points of reference for naming the problem and relevant actors.

Strategic political entrepreneurs will try to strengthen their own positions by building alliances with other actors. They will thus engage in naming the problem in a way that not only puts their own in-groups in a favourable position, but also appeal to other groups in hope for additional legitimacy (cf. the concept of "leverage politics" in Keck and Sikkink 1998:23). This

creates a web in which proponents, drawing on different points of reference, will wind up supporting each other. As I will show in chapter seven, water engineers at the Department of Water Development in Harare tried to increase their social and political relevance by creating a connection between their engineering competence and the political project of nation building promoted by the national political elite. They consequently advocated a position of engineering science as "a tool in the development of the nation". By placing the application of scientific water management in the service of the nation-state, the political entrepreneurs at the Department of Water Development sought to strike an alliance with the political establishment advocating water as part of the post-colonial political project of nation building.

Claiming and blaming based on constructions of reality

I now turn to the strategies of claiming and blaming that political entrepreneurs can employ to gain legitimacy for their claims during the domestic transformation process. The focus is thus on the second column in table 4.2, which contains the empirical questions regarding claiming and blaming practices surrounding legitimate distribution of resources. The questions in the second column are: What constitutes the basis for making a legitimate claim or legitimately assigning blame? Who can make legitimate claims or legitimately assign blame?

As political entrepreneurs engage in the transformation process they will try to gain legitimacy for what they believe to be favourable constructions of claims and blames. Drawing on collective memories (question C in table 4.2.), they will attempt to establish what kind of actions and omissions should be regarded as relevant for making claims on and assigning blame in the policy area targeted for reform. With reference to Zimbabwe, one contested question was if it was achievements in the commercial agricultural sector, or a track record as a soldier in the war for Independence, that could constitute the basis for legitimate claims on water resources. The former position was advanced by the white commercial farmers while the latter was favoured by (parts of) the national government (see chapters five and six).

With regard to making claims and assigning blame by drawing on constructions of social identities (question D in table 4.2.), political entrepreneurs will try to identify themselves and strategic allies with positive features in the water sector while opponents will be blamed for the problems. In their efforts to manifest claims and assign blame, political entrepreneurs can make use of the social-psychological processes of social identity formation reviewed above: plasticity in social identities, stereotyping, and the inclination towards acceptance of representatives. One example of this can

be seen in the attempts by nationalistic actors in Zimbabwe to discredit international development agencies proposing IWRM by associating them with "the other whites", i.e. the white commercial farmers representing a strong special domestic interest with low social credibility in Zimbabwean society (chapter five). Similarly, I report in chapter seven how scientifically trained engineers working at the Department of Water Development in Harare frequently would disregard objections on the reform process coming from small scale rural farmers. Instead of evaluating the actual suggestions and views put forward, the engineers would stereotype local farmers as a group with unfounded, "unscientific", views on water management.

Research in social psychology suggests that we tend to commemorate history by putting ourselves in a favourable light at the expense of others (cf. "egoism" above, Gilbert 1998). Ross and Ward (1995) argue that "disputants are apt to feel that they have acted more honourably in the past, have been more sinned against than sinning" (p. 269; cf. March 1994:82f). In the negotiation of claims and blames, these biases in the recollection of history result in unwarrantedly high perceptions of relative entitlements on the resource. In their generic form these biases will lead to a situation in which everyone exaggerates their own relative claims and downplay those of others. Consequently, the degree of animosity and potential conflict is heightened. Roderick Kramer (1991) notes that "Groups may find themselves engaged in a competition for resources that is driven by strongly held but mutually inconsistent convictions regarding their entitlement to ... resources" (p 209). A combination of strategic manoeuvring by political entrepreneurs and inherent human biases in the recollection of reality will thus inflate actors' claims while downplaying others. Likewise, actors will be mindful to downplay any blame assigned to themselves while quite willingly assigning blame to others. The likely outcome is a situation with systematically more claims than blames on material and non-material resources during the domestic transformation of international regimes.

An integrated framework for analysing domestic transformations of international regimes

The aim of this chapter is to provide a theoretically based framework to understand and empirically analyse domestic transformation of international regimes: How and why do international regimes become part of the reality constructs held by domestic actors in the targeted policy area? How do these transformed understandings affect the behavioural implications of the international regime? Following the analytic distinction between collective memories and social identities, I have pointed to social-psychological processes and the role of strategic action by political entrepreneurs. Table 4.4 provides an overview of the framework for analysis.

Components in constructions of reality	Social psychological and political processes	Strategies available to by political entrepreneurs	Empirical questions
Collective memory	• Cognitive dissonance • Individual limitations on memory - Idealism - Egoism - Circumstantialism - Realism	• Naming • Claiming and blaming	• What is the problem and what is its solution? • What constitutes the basis for making a legitimate claim or legitimately assigning blame?
Social identities	• Cognitive dissonance • Identity plasticity • Stereotyping • Acceptance of representatives of the Self and Other	• Naming • Claiming and blaming	• Who has caused the problem? • Who can and should solve it? • Who can make legitimate claims and legitimately assign blame?

Table 4.4. An integrated framework for analysis of domestic transformations of international regimes.

Research strategy for analysing IWRM in Zimbabwe

The two main empirical sources for my analysis of the transformation of IWRM in Zimbabwe consisted of a series of ninety-one interviews with actors engaged in the reform process, and, second, an extensive review of relevant documents, such as policy reports, legal documents, protocols from stakeholder meetings, official correspondence between the concerned parties, and Zimbabwean newspapers. My general understanding of the water sector in Zimbabwe was developed by direct observations as I visited various kinds of farmers in different part of the country and sat in on stakeholder meetings at different levels (from local sub-catchment meetings to central catchment meetings).

In the process of analysing this material I have drawn on quite extensive previous research on Zimbabwean politics in general and natural resources management in particular. During my fieldwork in Zimbabwe, I was associated with the Centre for Applied Social Sciences (CASS) at University of Zimbabwe. At the time, CASS was conducting an research programme on the water sector reform which gave me direct access not only to much

of the academic expertise available in Zimbabwe but also to un-published reports and material.

The bulk of the empirical material was collected during a series of fieldtrips in Zimbabwe in the period 1997-2001, and with engaged international development agencies during 2002-2003. I have subsequently kept contact via e-mail and telephone calls with some key interviewees in Zimbabwe. This has been helpful to keep up to date with more recent developments. I have also kept in touch with and interviewed some of the key actors from Zimbabwe as we have jointly visited international conferences on water resources management in Europe.

My first entry-point into the empirical material in Zimbabwe was a number of reports from conferences in Zimbabwe where actors had met to discuss water resources management. I used the list of participants from these conferences to come up with my first list of potential interviewees. This strategy proved only partly successful as a number of the individuals present at these conferences were no longer working with water management or did not want to be interviewed. The reason for their reluctance was never spelled out, but one probable reason was the fact that at that time I lacked written or verbal recommendations, which proved quite important working in Zimbabwe. The conference listings were nevertheless quite useful as they provided me with a point of departure for developing a list of individuals and institutions engaged in water management. This allowed me to get started on the process of identifying suitable interviewees. Once I got started, the persons interviewed were frequently happy to help me meet other people of relevance in their networks of colleagues and friends (cf the notion of "snowball" sampling in Miles and Huberman 1994:28ff).

My second entry point into the empirical field was a series of field trips conducted through the research programme at CASS. Travelling with researchers from CASS allowed me to benefit from their contacts with and trust from local water users and set me in contact with small-scale farmers, elected members of stakeholder boards (catchment and sub-catchment councils), community leaders, and spiritual mediums (rain makers). This broad network of contacts was invaluable in identifying and getting access to suitable interviewees. Similar assistance was provided though the help of the Swedish Embassy and Swedish experts seconded to Zimbabwean government institutions as experts on water management. They helped me identify people at international development agencies/organisations working to promote IWRM in Zimbabwe, and also introduced me to senior officials within the related Zimbabwean administration. The staff of international development agencies and international consultants sometimes have quite short contracts for their involvement with projects such as the water sector reform in Zimbabwe. Besides my interviews with internationals based in Harare during my fieldwork, I therefore travelled to meet people engaged

in the water sector reform in the USA (representing the World Bank), and to three of the four international development agencies supporting the reform coming out of Norway, the Netherlands, and the UK. Representatives from the fourth international supporter, Germany, were interviewed over the telephone.

The process of data collection started quite inductively. My first series of interviews (twenty interviews) were intentionally rather loose, with a minimally structured interview guide, and included a diverse selection of people. The aim was to identify what a variety of water users and water related professionals regarded as the critical issues in the water sector reform. For quite some time I entertained the idea of comparing the impact of the water sector reform in a strategic selection of local communities. I had been inspired by the work of Elinor Ostrom (1990) on the role of small scale communities as a forum for sustainable development, and I considered designing my investigation to compare a strategic selection of local communities impacted by the reform process. All of this had nothing to do with domestic understandings of international regimes but was oriented towards institutional factors and their effects on actor's incentives. As I accounted for in the preface, my interest in domestic transformations was spurred out of conversations with Zimbabwean actors engaged in the implementation of IWRM. Based on these conversations I started to realise that different actors in Zimbabwe were coming up with quite different understandings of IWRM: IWRM was being transformed during the implementation process. As I decided that this was the story I was going to tell in my dissertation, I realised that I had to expand my sample beyond local communities. Based on my initial round of interviews I therefore made a first categorisation of interviewees that seemed central for my investigation. Six broad categories were determined. Table 4.5 presents the categories and the number of people that I eventually interviewed from each category.

A few comments are helpful in relation to table 4.5. This table excludes the initial round of interviews (twenty interviews) intended to give me a first overview of the water sector reform and to develop a relevant focus for my work. In addition, some of my interviewees could rightly be counted as belonging to more than one category, e.g. holding public office and conducting farming. In such cases, I have attributed them to the category representing the main capacity in which I interviewed them. On eight occasions I returned for a second interview with people I saw as key to my understanding of the developments. Table 4.5 accounts for the number of interviewees, rather than actual interviews. All in all I have conducted ninety-one documented interviews as part of the field work. (20 initially, 63 as in table 4.5, 8 repeated interviews).

Category of interviewees	Number of interviewees
Zimbabwean politicians Ministers and permanent secretaries responsible for water resources and related areas	6
Public sector officials in institutions administrating water resources Ministry of Land and Water Resources, Department of Water Development, Zimbabwe National Water Authority, and the Regional Water Authority	21
International donor agencies In particular from the World Bank and the four bilateral donors supporting the reform process (Norway, Germany, the Dutch, and the UK).	18
Large scale white commercial farmers Including representatives from the Commercial Farmers Union.	7
Small scale local farmers and leaders Including chiefs and headmen, as well as Harare based interest groups for local farmers	9
Spirit mediums/rain-makers	2

Table 4.5. List of people interviewed after initial round of interviews.

Did I conduct enough interviews with people from each category in table 4.5? This type of question is not unusual for researchers using qualitative interviews because it is generically difficult to decide when enough interviews have been conducted. Despite this difficulty, the literature on research methodology does not provide any really good answers to the question of when to stop interviewing. "Theoretical saturation" is put up as a rule-of-thumb to limit the number of interviews (Esaiasson, Gilljam et al. 2002: ch. 14). This implies that additional interviews are made until no new information comes out from adding an additional interview. Esaiasson and colleagues suggest that when the interviewees basically repeat each other, this is a sign that it is time to go home and start the analysis (p. 187). While this gives some indication of the need for additional interviews, it is typically difficult to apply as there might always be some new information coming out of an additional interview. This problematic compounds in a work-process where what actually is being said by the interviewees only becomes clear during the in-depth analysis of the interviews (see section on latent meanings below). This in-depth analysis is typically done much later than the actual period of data collection. In my case I was also limited by need to travel to Zimbabwe. It was only when I did my in-depth analysis of the interviews back in Sweden that I really started to see what

the interviewees had said, and at that stage I had quite limited resources to add additional interviews.

In my assessment, having reviewed all the material and finished the analysis, I would nevertheless say that I did conduct enough interviews to reach theoretical saturation in each category of interviewees with the exception of rain-makers. It took quite some energy and time to build up the connections and trust that finally allowed me to meet the two rain-makers that I did interview. I eventually interviewed one of them twice, for a total period of more than three hours. The interview with the second rain-maker lasted about two hours. Taken together this allowed me to go into quite some detail on their construction of reality in which ancestral spirits play a major role in the management of water (see chapter eight on Water as a Gift from the Gods). I should also say that this construction of reality was supported by a number of interviewees from other categories, in particular public sector officials and politicians. Their statements added to my knowledge on this construction of reality. In addition, there is quite a substantial academic literature, including extensive anthropological work from Zimbabwe, that spells out this construction of reality. Having reviewed much of this literature, I think that I have been able to make up for the lack of additional interviews with rain-makers. With the benefit of hindsight, I also see that I could have limited the number of interviews with public officials and international donor agents, even though these interviews were quite useful for my overall understanding of the reform process.

The list of categories of interviewees in table 4.5 does not include representatives from every form of water resources management in Zimbabwe. It does not, for example, include representatives of the mining sector, or urban planners involved in water supply and sanitation. My focus has been on actors working at a comprehensive national level and/or with agriculture. The reason for this focus is that these groups were identified as the most salient actors by the interviewees included in my initial round of interview (the twenty interviews mentioned above). This view was corroborated by my review of articles in the major Zimbabwean newspapers. This review confirmed that these actors were the most vocal in the reform process. In addition, the agricultural sector is by far the greatest user of water in Zimbabwe, and more than eighty percent of Zimbabwe's population depend on agriculture as their main source of income (Nilsson and Hammar 1996; Derman 2000).

Having finished my first initial round of interviews—which by intention were kept very open—I developed a more structured interview-guide with specific questions to pose to the second round of interviewees. From the initial round of interviews I was convinced that the three pillars of IWRM (sustainable development, water as an economic good, and stakeholder participation) were widely known and discussed among water users in Zimbabwe, and as such I decided to let them guide my subsequent interviews.

In his account of qualitative interviews, Steinar Kvale (1997) argues that an interview should be both structured and dynamic to make sure that the same topics are covered in all interviews while being sensitive to variations occurring in the meeting with individual interviewees (Kvale 1997ch. 5,7,8). To allow for structure, I asked all interviewees questions related to the three pillars of IWRM. To keep the interviews dynamic, I often adjusted the actual interview questions posed to a specific interviewee to accommodate their background and how the interview situation progressed. I thus did not ask the same questions to a high-level politician in Harare as I did to a small-scale farmer in the countryside. Nevertheless, the same themes—the pillars of IWRM—were covered in all interviews. In addition, each interview included an initial section with questions set out to capture the construction of reality of the interviewees, including how they looked at water, what social/political/religious/economic values that were attached to water, and their own role in relation to water resources management, and what other actors they regarded as important in the water sector.

My interviews with members of the international community were somewhat different, since I did not regard these actors as "targeted domestic actors" of IWRM. These interviews had more of an informant character (see below) with the aim of helping me understand the factual development of the reform process. Some of the interviewees from this category had for long periods of time worked very closely with people in the Zimbabwean water sector. Some of them were seconded as experts to the Zimbabwean water-related administration, others had extensive experience from negotiating with the top-level political leadership, while others still had worked on local projects related to water resources management. I thus regarded this group as a source of insight into the views and considerations of the targeted domestic actors. Overall my interviews were kept quite open-ended to allow room for the interviewees to elaborate their views. The interviews typically lasted between forty-five minutes and three hours, with the latter often taking place in the home of the interviewees.

To cover the wide spectrum of views in Zimbabwe's water sector, my sample of interviewees has been quite diverse. I have interviewed top-level Zimbabwean politicians who, in their fight to regain control over their lands and waters, saw their friends and family killed in the war against the white minority rulers. I interviewed rain-makers dressed only in animal skins and who granted an interview only after having asked for permission from, and introduced me to, their ancestral spirits in a ceremony. My sample also included white commercial farmers who often looked to me as a fellow white and were happy to take me in on their farms for a night or two. All this was quite different from using an interpreter to talk to a small-scale farmer out on his fields, or sitting in an air-conditioned office at a foreign Embassy in downtown Harare, or the headquarters of a development agency or Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Oslo, the Haag, or London.

Moving in this diverse terrain and asking questions about the contested issue of water resources management I often encountered questions, and in some camps even suspicion, concerning the actual intentions and interests of a person such as myself, i.e. a white young researcher from Sweden. As an indication of how contested my work was in some quarters, I could mention that on at least two occasions, people whom I worked with or interviewed used spies to track my movements. In her account of doing qualitative interviews Heléne Thomsson (2002) points out that in situations where there are strong tensions between the interview person and interviewers, this is likely to influence the interview situation and counteract the ideal of inter-subjectivity whereby the content of an interview can later be corroborated (Thomsson 2002:96f, 119ff; cf Trost 1997:92f). I took a number of measures to deal with this problem. As mentioned above, interviews were often set up based on recommendations of previous interviewees who typically also informed the new interviewee about me and my project. Being able to introduce myself as an Associate Researcher at CASS—renowned throughout Zimbabwe's water sector—was of great help in reducing the tension of interviews. I was also very concerned with adjusting to each interview situation by formulating the interview questions based on the interviewees' every day practices, and I tried to pick up on the appropriate dress codes, body language, and English accents (Kvale 1997: ch 6, 7). In a few interviews I actually made sure not to have my eyes at a higher level than the interviewee since I had been informed that this could be interpreted as a sign of disrespect in that specific setting.

Typically, I used a tape-recorder to document my interviews. On a few occasions the interviewee explicitly turned down my request to use a tape-recorder, or I felt that the dynamic of the interview would be hurt by a recorder. In such instances I took notes. To allow a better recollection of what had been said, I made a habit out of taking time to review the notes for myself as soon as possible with the tape-recorder on. The lion's share of the recorded interviews were later transcribed in full, leaving some interviews to be analysed directly from the recordings and my notes (for economic reasons).

As water resources management is a highly charged political issue in Zimbabwe I have been careful to protect the anonymity of my interviewees. Catering for anonymity is an explicit requirement from the core financial contributors of this project (the Swedish Council for Research in the Humanities and Social Sciences) and many interviewees were quite explicit that they would only allow an interview if I would guarantee anonymity. At such occasions, I typically would hand over a written statement signed by my supervisor and myself guaranteeing anonymity. On a few occasions, the person turned down my offer of anonymity. Reporting from the later interviews I have considered myself at liberty to reveal the real identity of

the interview person, but I have only done so when this adds substantially to the validity of the analysis. I have taken several measures to conceal the real identity of the interviewees asking for anonymity. In the process of transcribing the interviews, I informed my assistants of the ethical rules guiding my project, and they all signed an agreement honouring these rules. I chose not to engage anyone in Zimbabwe to help me with this job as it was sometimes difficult to know whom to trust with such sensitive information. Moreover, as I report from the interviews in the empirical section below, I have excluded all information that could be used to identify the interviewee. When presenting quotes in the empirical chapters, I have thus left out information about the person's formal position or background. I have also taken out any indications of the gender of the interviewees. This implies that I present all my interviewees as men, even though I did indeed interview a substantial number of women. Not being able to disclose information on who is behind a citation is a real drawback. It would have added to the richness of my analysis if I could disclose who was behind a particular statement. However, instead of such personal information, I have systematically used neutral labels such as "senior official", "high ranking politician" or "small scale farmer" to indicate what type of person is being quoted.

Analysing the empirical material

In table 4.2 above, I presented four questions that are based in the theory of domestic transformations of international regimes. The four questions are designed to guide the empirical analysis of the domestic transformation process. They read: (A) What is the problem and its solution? (B) Who has caused the problem?; Who can and should solve it? (C) What constitutes the basis for making a legitimate claim or legitimately assigning blame? (D) Who can make legitimate claims or legitimately assign blame?

My concern has been to understand the answers to these questions given by the targeted domestic actors by analysing these answers in relation to, on the one hand, the original formulations of IWRM, and, on the other hand, the targeted domestic actors' prevailing constructions of reality. I have thus analysed how the targeted domestic actors answered questions A–D, and by comparing this with the original formulations of IWRM as well as the domestic actors' constructions of reality, I have arrived at my empirical account of the transformation of IWRM.

This analytic strategy calls for two points of reference: the original position of IWRM, and the domestic actors' prevailing constructions of reality apart from the encounter with IWRM. Both these points of reference serve as the empirical baseline with which to compare the new, transformed, understandings that the targeted domestic actors developed during the reform

process. To arrive at the original position of IWRM I set out to distinguish the original position of IWRM with regard to each of the three pillars of IWRM that were introduced in chapter two (catchment management, water as an economic good, stakeholder participation). These answers are presented in table 4.5 and cover the four questions A–D. My primary sources for this empirical baseline were the central policy documents outlining IWRM held by its proponents in and around Zimbabwe at the outset of the reform process around 1991. Interviews with policy makers representing international actors promoting IWRM in Zimbabwe served to corroborate the views presented in the documents. As I explained in chapter two, the World Bank had taken the lead role at the international level to have IWRM implemented throughout Africa, including in Zimbabwe. This is why I have given some precedence to the view on IWRM held by the World Bank. However, as confirmed by my interviews, no substantial difference existed at that time between the view of the World Bank and other international advocates of IWRM such as UNDP and the four bilateral donor countries engaged in the water sector reform in Zimbabwe (Germany, Netherlands, Norway, and the UK).

My second empirical point of reference consisted of the targeted domestic actors' prevailing constructions of reality before the introduction of IWRM. Ideally, I should have collected information on this before the introduction of IWRM to make sure that the view that transpired was indeed independent of the propositions of IWRM. Due to resource constraints this was not possible. I therefore used two other empirical sources. As mentioned above, each interview with targeted domestic actor's in Zimbabwe included questions aiming at their general perceptions of society and the role of water. I asked questions to uncover what associations they made to water, what values were attached, and how they saw the role of themselves and others in relation to the management of water. The second source of information consisted of secondary literature covering the history of Zimbabwe, Zimbabwean politics, natural resources management in Zimbabwe and the region at large, as well as literature on religious associations to water and perceptions about the spiritual world.

In the empirical section below there are four different constructions of reality presented. I have labelled these "Water as Zimbabwe", "Water as Gold", "Water as Science", and "Water as a Gift from the Gods". Together they cover what I found to be the prevailing understandings of water in Zimbabwe. These constructions where not in anyway self-evident as I started to read about water management in Zimbabwe. In the process of developing these constructions of reality I was inspired by Max Webers' idea of "ideal-types" (Weber 1983). As I started to get some in-depth understanding of the empirical field, I was able to draw up the basic contours of these constructions. Their more precise content transpired iteratively during my field trips and later analytic work.

Component of reality construct	Naming	Claiming/Blaming
Collective memories	**Empirical question A** - What is the problem and solution? IWRM's original positions I. Catchment management: - problem: fragmented management - solution: ecosystem, sector-wide approach II. Water as an economic good - problem: lack of economic incentives - solution: market economic institutions III. Stakeholder participation: – problem: undemocratic rule, lack of ownership - solution: stakeholder democracy	**Empirical question C** What constitutes the basis for making a legitimate claim or legitimately assigning blame? IWRM's original positions I. Catchment management: - every kind of activity influencing water resources in the basin II. Water as an economic good: - economic achievements and purchasing power III. Stakeholder participation: - the right to self determination
Social identities	**Empirical question B** Who has caused the problem; Who can and should solve it? IWRM's original positions I. Catchment management: - problem: overusing by stakeholders and water managers without proper training; - solutions: trained ecosystem experts and water users. II. Water as an economic good: - problem: rational consumers under irrational incentive; - solution: rational consumers under sustainable incentives geared to collective action III. Stakeholder participation: - problem: centralistic government; - solution: local stakeholders.	**Empirical question D** Who can make legitimate claims or legitimately assign blame? IWRM's original positions I. Catchment management: - all stakeholders including nature itself II: Water as an economic good: - all economically viable actors III. Stakeholder participation: - all stakeholders

Table 4.6. The original position of IWRM with regard to its three pillars and the four questions for empirical analysis.

On the basis of these two points of reference—the original meanings of IWRM, and the prevailing domestic constructions of reality—I have looked

for how targeted domestic actors engaged in transforming the propositions of IWRM. What was the response of domestic political entrepreneurs to the propositions made by IWRM? How did the domestic political entrepreneurs use IWRM as well as prevailing domestic constructions of reality to develop their transformed understanding of IWRM and to make these understandings socially and politically viable?

Informants and respondents

It is useful to distinguish between two types of qualitative interviews: informant interviews and respondent interviews (Kvale 1997; Esaiasson, Gilljam et al. 2002). In informant interviews, interviewees are seen as a source of information about factual events and this information is verified using standard techniques such as triangulation. If interviewees are seen as respondents, the information coming out of the interview is analysed as part of a larger perspective and the aim is to arrive at an understanding of what the interviewees say that makes sense from their perspectives (cf. Kvales' account of hermeneutics, ch 3). In contrast to informants, respondents should not be understood as being right or wrong, rather the analytic focus is on making sense out of what is said taking into account the larger perspective of the person interviewed.

The overall aim of my analysis is to arrive at how targeted domestic actors transformed IWRM. With this aim, I have primarily regarded my interviewees as respondents. Selecting my interviewees, I have consequently tried to get at people who were actually involved, on a daily basis, with water resources management in Zimbabwe. What were their constructions of reality? How did they perceive IWRM? Clearly, my selection is very limited in relation to the larger group of "targeted domestic actors". I have, however, used my selection of interviewees as a source of information of the views and opinions of this larger group. I made a strategic selection of interviewees with the intention of finding people who were "information-rich" representatives who "manifest the phenomenon [i.e. the transformed understandings of IWRM] intensely, but not extremely" (Miles and Huberman 1994:28; cf, Kvale 1997: 197ff). In addition to regarding my interviewees as respondents, I have used them as informants to get insights on actual developments during the water sector reform. Who did what, when, and with whom? Whereas interviews with all different kinds of interviewees typically contained some informant data, this was particularly the case with my interviews with members of the international donor community supporting the reform process.

When I had conducted and transcribed my interviews, I started the process of actually analysing what was being said by the interviewees. I based my readings of the interviews on the theoretical framework presented earlier in this chapter. Apart from that, my approach was quite inductive. I was

looking for patterns in how the interviewees looked at water, IWRM, themselves, and others as indicated by questions A–D in table 4.2. Kvale (1997) points out that working with a large amounts of empirical material, it is useful to start by concentrating longer sections of an interview into more condensed quotes (1997:175ff; cf Miles and Humberman 1994:ch 4). Afraid that I would affect the actual content of the interview, I only applied this technique very moderately. Instead, I started to categorise the utterances from the interviews in relation to a framework consisting of (i) the four construction of reality and, as subheadings within each construction, (ii) the three pillars of IWRM (Kvale 1997:178ff). I did not use any of the available computer programs designed to analyse qualitative materials. Instead I read the interviews repeatedly and marked different sections to indicate which constructions of reality and pillars of IWRM were discussed. For example, one section of an interview could be marked "WaZ/sp" and another section "WaGG/price" to indicate that the first section should be seen in light of Water as Zimbabwe and the pillar of stakeholder participation, and the later section in relation to Water as a Gift from the Gods and the pillar of pricing water. As a second step in the analysis, I put all quotes belonging to the same sections into separate computer documents.

It should be noted that my unit of analysis in this process was not individual interviewees but separate utterances made by the interviewees. Research in social psychology has pointed out that individuals can hold multiple constructions of reality and social identities. As I wanted to be sensitive to this, I did not *a priori* regard a person in relation to one particular construction of reality. For example, as I analysed my interviews with public officials working on water management, I did not start off by assuming that they would subscribe to the construction of Water as Science. As I analysed an interview with a person whose socio-structural characteristics (work place and education) indicated that he belonged to one group, I systematically tried to keep an open mind to the possibility that his utterances were better understood in the context of any of the other three constructions of reality that I had worked out (or even in relation to a fifth construction that I had not yet become aware of). As it turned out there were, however, quite small in-group variations in the empirical material. People in and around the government generally came out in support of Water as Zimbabwe; the white commercial farmers predominantly subscribed to Water as Gold; professional water officials looked at water management along the parameters of Water as Science; and local farmers and community leaders were typically oriented around Water as a Gift from the Gods. In other words, formal positions and structural variables (race, profession, education etc) turned out to be quite good proxies for which construction of reality that was supported. The only major exception to this result concerns the construction of Water as a Gift from the Gods. I found support for this view among all categories of interviewees, with the excep-

tion of the white commercial farmers. I thus found support for Water as a Gift from the Gods not only among local farmers and traditional leaders but also among public officials with a doctoral degree in a natural science working at the Department of Water Development in Harare, as well as politicians in and around the government.

In his account of analysing qualitative interviews, Kvale (1997) makes the distinction between looking for "manifest" as opposed to "latent" meanings in the material (ch 12; cf Miles and Huberman 1994:ch 10). The manifest meaning of an interview is what the interview person says out right and explicitly. Analysing manifest meanings of an interview is typically a straight-forward exercise of taking serious note of what exactly is being said and then thinking about how this can be used to better understand the developments being analysed. I used this technique primarily on the informant data coming out of my interviews. Reading these interviews, I thus focused on what was being said explicitly and how this could help me understand the transformation process. Further, given my aim to understand how targeted domestic actors came to transform IWRM I systematically looked for manifest meanings in the interviews. This implies moving beyond what was explicitly stated by the interviewee. I searched for more profound meanings that stood out as the interview was analysed from a broader social and cultural context.

Looking for latent meanings in an interview, what the interview person said was thus analysed by placing it in a larger context that added meaning to the specific utterance. An illustrative example comes from an interview with a white farmer living in a small town south of Harare. At the beginning of the interview I asked him how it was living in this town. He replied: "Well you know, there aren't many of us in this area, but there are a few thousand people living here." As I analysed this and similar statements, I took into account that it was made in a context in which distinctions between black and white was commonplace. People constantly categorised and talked about other people and themselves in such racial categories. When he says "us" I thus take this to mean "Us-the-whites" as opposed to "Them-the-Blacks". Taking this into account, I understood his statement to mean: 'There aren't many of us whites in this area, but there are a few thousand blacks living here'. Further analysing this statement taking into account the context in which it was said, I would feel quite comfortable stating that the interviewee meant that it was a bad thing that there are so few whites in his town as opposed to the blacks. This analysis draws on the stigmatisation of blacks that I encountered repeatedly in my interviews, and that I also found in much of the literature describing contemporary Zimbabwean politics and society (see chapter five and six). At a manifest level, this interviewee did not say anything about race, nor did he make any moral statements about blacks. Based on the context in which the statement was made, however, I nevertheless read in such meanings at a latent level of this statement.

5. IWRM AND WATER AS ZIMBABWE

In this chapter, I analyse the transformation of IWRM in relation to the role of water in the project of nation building in Zimbabwe. The label "Water as Zimbabwe" denotes the reality construction of water widely held in government circles and characterised by the view that water is a strategic resource for the government to manifest itself and the nation-state of Zimbabwe as legitimate in the eyes of its inhabitants.

This chapter is organised as follows. First, I outline the construction of Water as Zimbabwe by pointing to the role of water management in the post-colonial project of nation building undertaken by the government that took office in Harare at Independence in 1980. The second section traces the developments around the first (failed) and second (successful) attempts to establish IWRM as the official platform for the water sector reform in Zimbabwe. Given that this official—or formal—adaptation of IWRM was only the first part of the implementation of IWRM in Zimbabwe, the third section provides a detailed analysis of the transformation of IWRM in relation to IWRM's call for catchment management, water as an economic good, and stakeholder participation. The forth section points to the conclusions of the analysis.

Water as Zimbabwe

At Independence in 1980, the incoming government inherited a fragile political construction encompassing competing claims for legitimacy and resources. In chapter two I pointed to three main sources of the fragility of the governments' ambition to make Zimbabwe a unified political unit: (i) ethnic divisions between Shona and Ndebele; (ii) divisions between blacks and whites (former rulers and now economically powerful commercial farmers); (iii) demands for political change from domestic civil society. Zimbabwe was, in short, a nation state in the making and the new government had to manifest the state as a viable platform for cooperation, and 'Zimbabwe' a natural point of reference in the formation of identities (Sylvester 1991; Raftopoulos 2000).

To reach these objectives, the government set out to influence the everyday lives of the rural population and to make the state apparatus the nexus in the distribution of goods and services in the rural societies (Munro 1998). In a country with over eighty percent of the population engaged in agrar-

ian production, control over the management of natural resources was the most vital instrument to manifest the state. In practical terms, this meant putting the government in control over the management of land and water resources. At the time, more than half of the country's capacity for storing water in dams was controlled by white commercial farmers widely associated with the former white minority international regime (Derman and Ferguson 2000a). Moreover, traditional practices and local leaders played the key role in administrating water resources at the local level which constituted a challenge for the post-colonial project of manifesting Zimbabwe as unified state. President Robert Mugabe acknowledged the strategic role of water and the difficult agenda for the government in water resources management. In his opening speech at one of the major dams in Zimbabwe he said:

> Government, having embarked on implementing the land reform and resettlement programme, recognises that the surest way of transforming the lives of our rural population is by facilitating their access to water. (Government of Zimbabwe 1998d).

The strategic role of water is further asserted in a major review undertaken by the government to identify obstacles to the development of the country. The review concludes:

> Documents discussing the relationship between land and water conclude generally that not land but water is the limiting factor in the further development of Zimbabwe (Government of Zimbabwe, Government of Netherlands et al. 1995:8).

In chapter four, I established that different ways of naming the problem and solution of a policy area convey different systems of resource distribution and different actors as legitimate. In this chapter, I will show how, in the context of post-colonial Zimbabwe, the government set out to name water as part of the struggle to liberate the country from its former white rulers, and as part of the project of providing development for its population. For the government of Zimbabwe, water was a strategic resource around which the social contract of nation building was to be reached. Water management was a means to manifest the legitimacy of the government, and it was at the core of the process of socialising inhabitants of the country into citizens of Zimbabwe.

I argue that advocates of Water as Zimbabwe regarded IWRM's prescriptions for water management as threats to their strategic role in the process of nation building. These actors wanted to use water management as a tool to manifest the project of nation building and thereby manifest the social

identity of the government as part of the solution to underdevelopment. By contrast, champions of IWRM defined the problem of water management in terms of the three pillars of IWRM, i.e. ecological management, economic rationality, and as a means to redistribute power from the state to local stakeholders. In particular, I argue that (i) IWRM's call for catchment management was seen as a threat by supporters of Water as Zimbabwe because it introduced a unit for cooperation—the catchment—with the potential to legitimise social and political mobilisation around water outside the control of the state. The catchment system cut across the existing provincial system which was the backbone of the government's administrative apparatus for control of rural societies (Sylvester 1991; Munro 1998); (ii) IWRM's call for water as an economic good placed water consumers in a process of socialisation into "consumers" while the government wanted water to be a means to socialise its subjects into "Zimbabwean citizens"; (iii) IWRM's call for stakeholder participation implied a devolution of power and control from the central state to local communities in a political context where the government wanted to use water management as a way to increase its legitimacy as an actor in society.

Refusing and introducing IWRM to Zimbabwe

The first attempt to introduce IWRM

In the beginning of July 1993, a group of international development agencies led by the World Bank organised a workshop at the Victoria Falls in Zimbabwe. Forty-eight senior water managers from nine southern African countries attended the five day session. The Zimbabwean government hosted the event, and fifteen senior officials from different ministries, including Minister K. Kangai with the overarching responsibility for water resources management, represented Zimbabwe at the conference (World Bank, UNDP et al. 1993). The workshop was effectively the World Bank's attempt to launch water sector reforms on the template of IWRM throughout Southern Africa. The impact of the workshop was confirmed in the document widely seen as the blueprint for the water sector reform. Entitled "Programme for the Development of a National Water Resources Management Strategy (WRMS) for Zimbabwe: Project Document", the document was produced jointly by the Government of Zimbabwe and the development agencies of the four donors that later come to be engaged in the reform: Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, and the United Kingdom. With reference to the workshop at Lake Victoria, this document states:

> During this event a common understanding was reached among key players concerned with water development in

> Zimbabwe on what should be the form and scope of a Water Resources Management Strategy (WRMS) and how it should be developed and implemented. (Government of Zimbabwe, Government of Netherlands et al. 1995:1)

This assessment was sustained by several of the workshop participants from Zimbabwe. One of them, holding one of the most senior positions in Zimbabwe's official water administration at the time, said:

> **I:** This was really a watershed in my life, it changed my way of looking at water management. It was a real eye-opener for me.[29]

Present at the workshop was also Andrew Russell from the well known London-based consultancy firm Sir William Halcrow & Partners. Russell had just been appointed team leader for a group of consultants engaged by the British authorities to come up with a report on how to assist in the reform of Zimbabwe's water sector. The report, to which I return shortly, was later to be know as the "Halcrow Report".

Minister Kangai, who had the overarching responsibility for the government's water policy, supported the appointment of the Halcrow team. At the time, Minister Kangai was one of the most pro-reformist ministers in the government, and his reformist agenda gained currency in some circles in the government and civil society. This reformist agenda also made Kangai one of Mugabe's more controversial ministers, and he was not well regarded in circles in and around the government who supported a more nationalistic agenda for the post-colonial project of nation building (Skålnäs 1995). When I interviewed Minister Kangai at his farm outside of Harare he said that the ideas presented at the Workshop at Victoria Falls had a great impact on his conception of the need to progress with Zimbabwe's water sector reform. He said that he saw Russell's team from Halcrow as welcome, and highly qualified, support in implementing IWRM in the water sector of Zimbabwe (Interview 19B). Russell confirms the influence of the Victoria Falls Workshop on the future reform process in Zimbabwe. He claims:

> **AR:** The World Bank was certainly pushing for countries to adopt water resources management strategies based on IWRM,

[29] As the number of people from Zimbabwe attending the Workshop was relatively small, I will not disclose which interviewee made this comment, as this could reveal the person's identity. When quoting from interviews, interviewees whose identities need to be protected will be denoted by the acronym "I". The researcher will always be denoted by "R". Interviewees who have agreed to be named will be denoted by firstname-surname initials (e.g. AB).

> and the workshop at Victoria Falls was very useful for us. We based quite a lot of our recommendations for Zimbabwe on what came out of that workshop (Interview 24).

The Halcrow Report was delivered in November 1993. Summarising the situation at that time, the conditions for introducing IWRM to Zimbabwe were quite favourable. Some of the most senior officials in Zimbabwe had been informed and were evidently impressed by the World Bank's presentation of IWRM at Victoria Falls. Official government documents stated that the Workshop resulted in "a common understanding" on the "form and scope" of the reform process ahead (Government of Zimbabwe 1995:1). In other words, the World Bank had successfully influenced key actors in the community of water managers in Zimbabwe with the ideas of IWRM. Adding to the favourable conditions, officials from the World Bank and other international development organisations suggest that there was a substantial willingness to fund the reform (Interview 23, 24, 26, 27). Add to that the Halcrow Report, which was authored by world-leading experts and contained a technical road map for how to carry reforms forward in accordance with IWRM.

Despite these favourable conditions in 1993, IWRM was not established as the foundation for Zimbabwe's water reform process at that time. Why not? The answer seems to be that the Halcrow Report was perceived by leading actors in the Government of Zimbabwe as contradicting key elements of the post-colonial project of nation building. Consider how the rejection of the Halcrow Report was later commented on in an official government report:

> The Terms of Reference (TOR) of the consultancy team (Sir William Halcrow and Partners), in Zimbabwe at the time of the Victoria Falls Workshop, stipulated: 'in consultation with Government and other relevant agencies, to prepare Terms of Reference for a consultancy to draw up a WRMS [water resources management strategy, i.e. the strategic instrument for implementing IWRM] for Zimbabwe'. This wording created considerable confusion at the time, because it suggested that a (foreign) consultant would prepare the strategy. A workshop later in July 1993 in Harare changed substantially the interpretation of the TOR and concluded that what specifically was <u>not</u> required was the imposition of a strategy by an outside consultant. The emphasis on making the development of WRMS an indigenous effort has been strong ever since. (Emphasis and parenthesis in original). (Government of Zimbabwe, Government of Netherlands et al. 1995).

This citation suggests two things. First, there were divisions between different actors within Zimbabwe's water administration. It is evident that there was one group who had written the TOR for the Halcrow Report and did not mind bringing in international consultants to outline the parameters of the water sector reform. There was also a second group who opposed the Halcrow Report and saw it as imposed by an outsider. This group called for an "indigenisation" of the reform process. The core of the contestation was thus the issue of *who* was to prepare the strategy for the water sector reform. The fact that foreign consultants had been entrusted with this key issue was not well received by actors proposing an indigenous approach. Considering this reaction, we should take into account that the team of consultants behind the Halcrow Report originated from the former colonial power—the UK—which also had a dubious record with the government under Prime Minister Ian Smith during the years of white minority rule (1967-1980). In other words, the Other—the foreigners—who now proposed a 'solution' to the water sector reform were 'the same' foreigners who had been part and parcel of creating the problem in the first place. This connection between the Halcrow Report and the former oppressor was emphasised by the fact that the team leader for Halcrow—Andrew Russell—had worked at the Department of Water Development for five years (1967-72) before Zimbabwe's independence (Interview 24).[30]

The second and perhaps most important thing to note in the government report above is that there seemed to have been a significant power struggle between the two groups on the issue of who should draft the strategy for the water sector reform. The citation suggests that the group who advocated that the reform should be indigenous had significant strength and managed to place their view on the agenda 'ever since'. A footnote to the quote above says that the debate over the role of the foreign consultants had created "confusion" which had "lingered on until today" and called on government representatives to "repeatedly" explain their position. This gives the picture of a power struggle between two groups of actors, both with significant political weight: One proposing the adoption of an international regime presented by an international agent; the other calling for a home-grown approach to the water sector reform.

One month before the World Bank workshop at Victoria Falls, some actors within Zimbabwe's administration launched "The Water Act Review Board" (henceforth the "Review Board"). The timing of this initiative is interesting since it indicates that the Review Board was an attempt to recap-

[30] This connection was not mentioned by any of my interviewee in Zimbabwe, but it is highly probable that at least the senior officials at the Zimbabwean Department of Water Development and related Ministry engaged in the reform would have recognised Mr. Russell from his previous engagement in Zimbabwe (Rhodesia).

ture the initiative in the reform process from outsiders such as the World Bank and the Halcrow team. It appears that the same group of political entrepreneurs who opposed the Halcrow report also launched the Review Board. The Review Board was made up of senior officials within government departments related to water and agriculture, as well as representatives of some of the most established interest groups in the agricultural sector (Water Act Review Board 1994).[31]

My interpretation of this is that the Review Board was an initiative to counter IWRM and the World Bank initiative. This argument finds support in the substantial differences between the recommendations of the Review Board, presented in January 1994, and the ideas presented by the Halcrow Report. While the Halcrow Report suggested substantial reform of Zimbabwe's water sector modelled on IWRM, the Review Board advocated a perpetuation of existing structures with only slight adjustments. In short, the two reports can be contrasted in this way: The Review Board suggested that the "priority date system" be "retained" and supplemented with "amendments" to accommodate existing inequalities. As I explained in chapter two, the priority date system worked on a 'first come, first served' principle where the actor who first filed a valid application to extract water to the appropriate officials would be given that right. That right would then be valid in perpetuity. While this system provided stability and predictability of access to water, which is conducive for investments in, for example, agricultural techniques, critics argued that this was also a source of social inequalities in distribution of water (Manzungu and van der Zaag 1996). In contrast to the priority date system, the Halcrow Report proposed a new management strategy in line with market based incentives and "an effective pricing strategy". Further, the Review Board suggested a "supply" oriented view aiming at "integrating the dams and river flow in a system in such a way as to obtain the maximum amount of water". In sharp contrast to this suggestion—but fully in line with the original intentions of IWRM—the Halcrow Report suggests "demand management" whereby market incentives are used to determine the optimal output amount of water while taking into account the need for water in the ecosystem ("natural flow"). Moreover, the Review Board did not employ the concept of "stakeholder participation", which figures prominently in the plan to reform the water sector supplied by Russell's team (Russell 1993; Water Act Review Board 1994).

[31] The following individuals were part of the Review Board: Dr. Mlambo, Chaiman (Lands Agriculture and Water Development); Mr. Makadho (Agritex); Mr. Khatzo (Regional Water Authority); Mr. Durham (DWD); Mr Chitando (Local Government, Rural and Urban Development); Mr. Mawoneke (Zimbabwe Farmers' Union); Mr. Reed, on occation replaced by Mr. Newton (CFU); Judge Matinenga (Administrative Court); Mr. Kock (Retired Judge of the Water Court).

My interpretation, therefore, is that there was significant opposition in influential government circles against attempts to exert external influence on the water sector. This interpretation is supported by my interviews with senior water officials at the Department of Water Development in Harare. Consider how one official at the Department viewed the attempts by external actors to influence the agenda for reform (for more details on the Department's responds to IWRM, see chapter seven):

> **R:** From your experience, working within the old system for water management, I mean the old Water Act and the old institutional set up, do you consider that the reform process was really called for?
>
> **I:** The old legislation wasn't devilish as such. No, it was workable, except concerning a few things, there were provisions in the old legislation to address the need for change./..../
>
> **R:** What did you think of the consultancy—the Halcrow Team—coming to help find solutions for the Zimbabweans?
>
> **I:** Well, I mean, without beating my chest, for starters it wasn't any issue. From the start we knew what we wanted, and the best thing anybody can do is to come in to help us in the direction we are going already, you know. We might need financial assistance or technical advice, not policy. Policy wise I don't know of any way in which we actually ran short of ideas. No, usually we set the parameters what we want to do, and then we ask for assistance where it's required, that's going in the direction we have decided on, yes (Interview 16).

This interview supports the conclusion that there was an influential group of actors within the administrative system who opposed the influence of foreign consultants and their attempts to bring in IWRM as the basis for a water sector policy reform. The interviewee advocates a reform based on policies derived from the Zimbabwean context. Further support for this interpretation is found in interviews with several of the members of the Review Board, although none of them would go on record and say that their report was an attempt to counteract the attempt to introduce IWRM via the Halcrow Report (Interview 13, 11B, 10B, 24B). Their hesitance is perhaps not surprising considering that IWRM was presented as the guiding principle for the water sector reform just a few years later (as I will soon explore in detail). The members of the Water Act Review Board, in

other words, were to a large extent on the losing side in the battle over the agenda for Zimbabwe's water sector reform.

To sum up thus far, despite the favourable conditions around 1993, IWRM was *not* established as the platform for Zimbabwe's water sector reform. My argument is that a substantial reason for this was opposition to the Halcrow Report. In the context of Water as Zimbabwe, the content of the Halcrow Report, i.e. IWRM, was perceived by powerful actors in and around the government as being at odds with their political project of nation building in Zimbabwe. IWRM was seen as contradicting the political ambition of manifesting the government at the nexus of the distribution of water in Zimbabwe, and the process of making the delivery of water part of the socialisation process whereby Zimbabwean farmers where supposed to become Zimbabwean citizens. In addition, the report provoked strong reactions because it was presented and financed by actors with close ties to the former colonial rulers. It was produced by the same Other—the UK—who was seen as being behind many of the problems facing the post-colonial government. The evidence presented above suggests that behind the opposition to the Halcrow Report was a group of political entrepreneurs who advocated an indigenous approach to the reform of the water sector. The aim of the indigenous approach was to counter the proposition from foreign actors such as the UK and the World Bank, including their collaborators in Zimbabwe, such as Minister Kangai and his reformist associates. These outsiders were seen as trying to impose an external 'solution' for the management of Zimbabwe's strategic water resources. The bulk of the indigenous alternative agenda was presented in the report of the Water Act Review Board and implied relatively modest adjustments to the existing system of water management. That the political momentum for water reform along the lines of IWRM was lost after 1993 indicates the political strength of the group advocating the indigenous approach.

This could very well have been the end of the story for IWRM in Zimbabwe. Strong actors in the water sector had placed a well founded alternative agenda on the table—the Water Act Review Board—that offered an alternative approach to the water sector reform well in line with the post-colonial project of developing the nation state of 'Zimbabwe'. Nevertheless, IWRM was implemented some years later. In the next section I will argue that the main reason IWRM was eventually accepted as the platform for the water sector reform was the successful construction of a connection between IWRM and the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP). During a number of years at the mid 1990's ESAP was proposed as *the* legitimate reality construct for political life in Zimbabwe. Leading members of government including—according to several sources—president Robert Mugabe himself, were fully committed to ESAP (Skålnäs 1995; Bond 1998; Bond and Manyanya 2003). Connecting IWRM with

ESAP placed IWRM within a reality construct in which IWRM could be presented as a logical and necessary implication for the water sector. ESAP provided political entrepreneurs supportive of IWRM with a reality construct sufficiently viable and legitimate to win the day from advocates of the indigenous approach who in 1993 blocked IWRM by connecting it to the post-colonial project of nation building in Zimbabwe.

If IWRM was rejected due to its exogenous nature in relation to 'Zimbabwe' how could ESAP come to be accepted? This is an important question, because the introduction of IWRM was a function of the establishment of ESAP. It is, however, beyond the scope of this book to engage in an analysis of how ESAP was introduced and established in Zimbabwe. What we can note about the situation is that researchers contend that the government's commitment to ESAP was "fundamental" at the time when the Zimbabwe government adopted IWRM as the leading principle for the water sector reform, i.e. in October 1995 (Skålnäs 1995:143; Bond and Manyanya 2003 Kanyenze 2003:83ff).

The second attempt to introduce IWRM: Connecting IWRM to the "Grand Design" of ESAP

The connection constructed between ESAP and IWRM is best spelled out in the document that I introduced above as the blueprint for the reform process: "Programme for the Development of a National Water Resources Management Strategy (WRMS) for Zimbabwe: Project Document" (Government of Zimbabwe, Government of Netherlands et al. 1995). To quote the report's ESAP proposition at length:

> Since 1991 Zimbabwe is engaged in a major effort to improve the efficiency of the economy through a better allocation of production factors and natural resources. It will be achieved through a process named the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) which is meant to transform the inefficient command model into a more efficient market-oriented economic model. Key words for the new economic strategy are market-orientation, trade liberalisation, deregulation, privatisation, stakeholder participation, and decentralisation/devolution. That is why in many areas of society activities and initiatives are going on which reflect these key words. Examples are what is happening in the context of the National Action Committee; the direction of the recommendations of the land Tenure Commission; and the establishment of the Rural District Councils. For people heavily engaged in the water sector it is not always easy to see how events and policies in their own sector relate to the national whole. In other

> words, some in the water sector may be under the impression that the drive for more efficiency in the sector through proper pricing for water; or the drive for improved institutional (ZINWA) and legal (Water Act) arrangements; or the decision to develop a comprehensive WRMS Strategy are unique to the water sector and can just be taken at their own pace. This is not so. The changes in the water sector are part of a Grand Design, of decisions taken at the highest level: it may just be that progress made in the water sector so far has been relatively slow. However, it means that the longer the delay and the more protracted the internal discussions will be, the more the pressure will mount, because the water sector has no choice but to follow the lead from the top. (Government of Zimbabwe, Government of Netherlands et al. 1995)

This quote illustrates how the framework of ESAP was used to convince people "heavily engaged in the water sector" that a reform of the water sector in accordance with the principles of ESAP tied "their own sector" to "the national whole". While the water sector was previously seen as part of the project of nation building as it was defined after Independence, the message was now that there was a new "national whole" to relate to. As an almost perfect parallel to the idea of water as part of the post-colonial project of 'Zimbabwe', the report states: "The changes in the water sector are part of a Grand Design". This "Grand Design" was now synonymous with ESAP. ESAP was designed in accordance with a number of "key words". Interestingly, the same key words make up the foundations of IWRM, in particular "market-orientation", "stakeholder participation", and "decentralisation/devolution" (cf. the three pillars of IWRM). For anyone hesitating over this new project and anyone who thought that the water sector could adopt it at its own pace, the government now made a very clear point: "the water sector has no choice but to follow the lead from the top".

The connection between ESAP and IWRM was also evident in the Parliamentary debates in which the Minister of Rural Resources and Water Development—Ms Mujuru—advocated the implications of the reform. Consider for example the Second Reading of the Zimbabwe National Water Authority Bill (ZINWA Bill), i.e. one of the two legal instruments set up as part of the reform. The first reason for the reform mentioned by Minister Mujuru is that "the formation of ZINWA is in line with the objective of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP)". Only later in the speech does she state that "other objectives for the creation of ZINWA" are to include "improved equity in access to water... improve general management... strengthen environmental protection". (Government of Zimbabwe 1998b; cf. interviews 8, 9, 14, 4B 5B, 7B, 19B).

ESAP thus placed IWRM in the context of a new overarching political project. Whereas IWRM was previously seen as conflicting with the post-colonial project of nation building, it was now tied into a project with which it shared basic principles and ideas. Why did the proponents of the Halcrow Report not draw on ESAP in 1993 the same way as was done in the 1995 document cited above? ESAP was introduced in 1991 and was thus available as the Halcrow team was writing up their report in 1993. It is always difficult to assess why someone did *not* do something. We know, however, that in the Halcrow Report, the argument for IWRM was made solely by reference to technical data such as hydrological facts, patterns of urbanisation, and the need to meet demands from the growing agricultural sector (Russell 1993). Now, two and a half years later, the same principles for water management were presented with explicit reference to ESAP, the political project of the day. Contrary to the situation in 1993, in 1995 IWRM was presented as the logical implication of the reality construction which now made up the agenda for the government of Zimbabwe. The connection to ESAP gave proponents of IWRM the necessary political leverage to make IWRM the leading principle for the reform process. From October 1995 onwards, IWRM became the designated platform for the water sector reform in Zimbabwe.

Transforming the pillars of IWRM in relation to Water as Zimbabwe

From October 1995 IWRM was officially accepted as the template for the water sector reform in Zimbabwe and at the official level the country swiftly adopted IWRM's key components of catchment planning, water as an economic good, and stakeholder participation. Legal documents were reviewed and revised and a process of organisational change was set up (Government of Zimbabwe 1998a; Government of Zimbabwe 1998c; Government of Zimbabwe 2001). Despite these changes, much remained the same in the organisation of water management in Zimbabwe. There were no signs that the proponents of the indigenous approach to reform had vanished despite the blow of not having their agenda followed. Likewise, for millions of water users in Zimbabwe the implications of the official adoption of IWRM were nil. Despite the legal and institutional changes, the impact on rural society was still to be determined. In short, the power struggle over the daily practices of water usage in Zimbabwe did not end with the changes at the official level.

The remainder of this chapter is devoted to an analysis the power struggle concerning the implications of IWRM. The focus is on how the social and political meanings of the pillars of IWRM were transformed as they were moulded in the power struggle with proponents of Water as Zimbabwe.

Catchment management

IWRM's call for catchment management implies the introduction of catchments as a new administrative unit for water management in Zimbabwe. For all other purposes, Zimbabwe is administered within the framework of the provincial system. The provincial system formed the administrative backbone of the Zimbabwean governments' attempt to manifest itself in rural society and to maintain control of the population throughout the country (Sylvester 1991; Munro 1998).

IWRM's call for catchment management implied that with regard to the strategic resource of water, the administrative system put in place for control of rural society should be replaced with a new administrative structure along the lines of catchments. IWRM called on the government to omit the strategic resource of water from its established system of control and organise the management of water within the confinements of catchments.

Adding to the challenge for the government mounted by IWRM was the fact that there was no geographical match between catchments and provinces. The demarcation of provinces dates back to the colonial period when provinces were typically set up around the emerging city structure. Many provinces also bear resemblance to the demarcations of pre-colonial cities and kingdoms.[32] By contrast, the demarcation of catchments is based on the natural flow of water through the landscape. Geographic demarcations along catchment lines thus had no precedence in the existing geographic and administrative institutional structure of Zimbabwe. Applied to the existing structure of provincial demarcations in Zimbabwe, IWRM's call for catchments implied a systematic overlap whereby one province was divided into several catchments, and the institutions set to guide the catchments constantly crossed the administrative domains of the institutional structures around the provinces (Latham 2002).

At the official level, a system of catchment management was nevertheless introduced as part of the water sector reform.[33] The geographic demarcation of catchments was handled by the Department of Water Development, and

[32] Personal communication with the late Associate Professor Anders Närman, Department of Human and Economic Geography, Göteborg University, 7 Nov. 2003.

[33] The words "catchments" and "catchment planning" existed in the pre-reform legal and professional tradition of Zimbabwe. But as the Government of Zimbabwe and supporting donors as they set out to instigate the reform, the implications of these concepts differed from what IWRM implied by catchment management. The document says that "there appears to be a lack of understanding about the interdependence of economic, social, and environmental issues in water management and the development of water resources". The document further states that "an important new dimension that WRMS will bring to bear at Department level is the recognition that environmental factors are incorporated as decision variables in catchment planning from the very beginning" (Government of Zimbabwe, Government of Netherlands, et al. 1995).

the institutional structure around catchments figured prominently in the two new legal instruments set up as part of the reform, the Water Act and the ZINWA Act. Likewise Minister Kangai, who had the overarching responsibility for water resources at the beginning of the 1990's, conveyed a picture in which the establishment of catchments was quite unproblematic:

> **KK**: We discovered that the provinces were already overloaded so we wanted to get out of that bureaucracy. We closed our eyes and said: 'There are no provinces and no local government: there are only catchments and basins (Interview 19B).

According to Minister Kangai, catchment management was thus introduced in the blink of an eye. This assessment of a swift introduction of catchment management is, however, contested by an analysis of the administrative routines of the Zimbabwean government after the official adoption of catchment management. Consider two interviews with officials from different sections of the water administration in Harare:

> **I**: Despite the fact that the catchment boundaries are now in place, we still have to give our suggestions for development in view of the provincial boundaries. So the catchment manager in each of the catchments has to submit whatever he thinks is necessary for the coming year. And this is done in accordance to the catchment. This goes into the government's system of public sector programme funding. But when the application gets there they want to know which province is this. As a result of this, we are asked to list each catchment based project according to the provinces. So it is all mixed up. There is now this new policy in place that we are working with. But the people in the government who make the actual decisions on projects and funding, like the people in cabinet, are still making their decisions according to the government, province based system (Interview 8B).

Recalling a similar pattern, a second interviewee reported:

> **I**: We at the Department of Water Development management water according to hydrological zone, but about two years ago (1999/2000) we produced the State of Dams Report to the government and we made the presentation based on hydrological zones [i.e. catchments]. But then they asked us to redo it along provincial boundaries (Interview 7B).

These interviewees suggest that despite the official adoption of catchment management, the political system in Zimbabwe had not changed but was still run along the provincial system (cf. Latham 2002).[34] According to the guiding legal instruments and the official government rhetoric, Zimbabwe had at this time acknowledged IWRM's call for catchment management. These interviewees suggest, however, that for all practical purposes, the provincial system was still the basis for managing water at the political level and the government rejected information aggregated based on catchment basis. If the government was handed such information, they sent it back and demanded that it be broken down along the familiar provincial lines.

Based on the theoretical model outlined in chapter four, my argument is that the government's reluctance to adopt catchment management should be understood in light of the strategic role of water in the government's post-colonial project in Zimbabwe, i.e. Water as Zimbabwe.[35] To manifest its viability as a political actor in Zimbabwe, the government wanted to name water management as a problem related to nation building and support its social identity as a legitimate actor in rural society. In their eyes, the introduction of catchments as the administrative unit for water management was not—as suggested by IWRM—an instrument of ecosystem management. It was an introduction of an institutional platform for social and political mobilization outside the control of the government and thus a threat to its political project of nation building.

Political conflicts around the demarcation of geographical space are not unique to the case of natural resource management in Zimbabwe. Many claim that the designation of space around natural resources has implications for the distribution of rights and opportunities in society and thus constitutes the basis for political struggles (Folke, Pritchard et al. 1998; Ostrom 1990; Mostert 1999). To understand the Zimbabwean case, though, we should recall two things. First, water management was assigned a strategic role as part of the post-colonial project. Second, the legitimacy of the political project of nation-building in Zimbabwe was contested by other groups within and outside Zimbabwe, which arguably increased the government's inclination to react negatively to initiatives that could be perceived as threats

[34] Nevertheless, the quotes attest that the officials who collected information did so at the catchment level. This is not surprising since thinking in terms of catchments is part of the basic professional toolbox of officials with training in hydrology or hydrogeology (see further chapter seven). My point is that this view was not picked up at the political level.

[35] An auxiliary, or alternative, explanation is that the Zimbabwean government at the time faced difficult material constraints. Changing the administrative structures from the existing provincial system to a novel administrative structure is costly and might easily be given a low priority in the reality of budget cuts that have constantly plagued the Zimbabwean administration. Such material constraints should be included in a full analysis of the government's lack of adaptation to IWRM's call for catchment planning.

to its viability. As I report in subsequent sections of this book, actors among the white commercial farmers (chapter six) as well as rural leaders (chapter eight) saw IWRM's call for catchment management as an opportunity to advance an alternative agenda for social and political mobilisation in opposition to the post-colonial project of Zimbabwe.

Consequently, we should understand the government's resistance to accommodate catchment management in light of the catchment's potential to function as the basis for political organisation and mobilization which could challenge the fragile political construct of Zimbabwe as a nation-state. In particular, catchment management would provide the basis for stakeholder participation and market mechanisms in which the nexus of the distribution of water was outside the control of the state. From the perspective of Water as Zimbabwe, the introduction of catchment management was transformed from IWRM's idea of ecosystem management into a threat to the viability of the government and the nation-state.

Does this transformation of catchment management—from IWRM's idea of ecosystem management into the government's view of a threat to its political project—have any implications for the actual management of water? Properly addressing this question requires counterfactual empirical material in which the state of the ecosystem in the factual situation is compared with the quality of the ecosystem that would have resulted from the government fully adopting catchment management along the ideas of IWRM. Lacking such empirical material, it is informative to recall that the idea behind IWRM's call for catchment management was that the management of water should be guided by the natural flow of water in the ecosystem. The catchment should be used as the level of management to ensure that all aspects affecting the quality and quantity of water are considered in policy decisions. The potential of realising ecologically sustainable water management thus hinged on the adoption of catchment management. Ecosystem analysts working in other empirical fields suggest that the ecosystem approach to water management is not obtained if water is managed along provincial lines since the provinces typically do not reflect the natural flow of water in the ecosystem (Sexton and Szaro 1998; Folke, Pritchard et al. 1998). In fact, some ecosystem analysts even argue that an administrative system in which "water management is the responsibility of provinces," is in "many respects *the opposite*" to catchment management since it does not take into account the natural flow of water in the ecosystem (Mostert 1999:32). This assessment suggests that the transformation of catchment management in the context of Water as Zimbabwe substantially diluted the prospects for ecosystem management in Zimbabwe.

Water as an economic good

IWRM stresses that water should be treated as an economic good. The reason for this is explained by economist Mike Garn (1998) who also represented the World Bank at the 1993 workshop at Victoria Falls. Garn argues that treating water as an economic good will increases the efficient use of water by means of market economic incentives (cf. Savenije 2002). This idea was fully acknowledged by Minister Kangai who headed the water sector reform during the mid 1990's. He maintains that:

> Price water properly and people will treat it as the precious commodity it is (Kangai 1995).

In this section, I show that Minister Kangai's accommodating position on this issue was not shared in more conservative circles of the Zimbabwean government. This opposition was based on the view that subjecting water to the market would deprive the government of control of one of the most vital instruments for the manifestation of its post-colonial project, i.e. control over the distribution of water. Naming water as an economic good in accordance with IWRM would place water outside the realm of the government and make the government virtually irrelevant as an actor in the management of water.

Water as an economic good: From market processes to state control

The politics around IWRM's call for introducing economic principles in the management of water can be studied in the paper "A National Water Pricing Policy and Strategy". The paper was presented by Minister Mujuru who replaced Minister Kangai as responsible for water resources management at the turn of the 20th century.[36] The bulk of the paper outlines the historical background of water pricing in Zimbabwe. Minister Mujuru recognizes that "Since independence, Government has not really put together a national water pricing policy" which has created a tradition of ad hoc reactions in response to "changing circumstances" and various unspecified "agreements".[37] Minister Mujuru states that it "is therefore needed to develop a clear Government policy on water pricing" (p. 2).

Outlining the government's water pricing policy, Minister Mujuru repeatedly makes references to "water as an economic good". She argues, however, that this principle is open to different interpretations and she offers three "possible strategy options" for the government's new water pricing policy:

[36] The paper is undated, but as it includes a reference to events in August 2000 it can be concluded that it is of a more recent date.

[37] Previously, farmers who owned their own dams did not pay for stored water, and farmers who used government controlled water paid for it at subsidized rates.

Site specific prices – "in this approach, every scheme is considered separately and the price charged for water is a direct function of the capital cost of the scheme... [This] system satisfies the strict dictates of economics".

Catchment blend price – "the price of water in this system is derived by dividing the total annual costs (capital redemption plus operation and maintenance) for all projects in the River Catchment Area, by the volume of water sold annually. Thus all the consumers within a Catchment Area will pay the same unit price for water...This system represents an improvement on the site specific pricing method, but would still lead to major differences in the price of water from one Catchment to another."

National blend price – "The price is calculated by dividing total annual costs for all publicly owned water, by the total volume of water sold annually."

What is interesting here is the Ministers line of reasoning as she motivates her preference for the national blend price. She argues that the national blend price is the only system in which "the unit price of water would be uniform throughout the country". It has "the advantage of creating uniformity in the price of water to all consumers, regardless of their location or climatic zone." As opposed to IWRM's call for subjecting water to market economic pricing reflecting supply and demand, the national blend price will be "calculated" by the government. The national blend price is set by the government who thus maintains control of the pricing system, which is a strategic instrument for the allocation of water.

Why did the Minister not opt for either of the other two strategy options outlined in the report? The site specific price most resembles IWRM's principle of market economic pricing. In contrast to the role of water in Water as Zimbabwe, the site specific price placed water in the realm of the market and thus outside control of the government. This option would, in the words of the Minister, "satisfy the strict dictates of economics", but it would compromise the ambition of the government to manifest itself as the nexus in the distribution of natural resources.

My argument is thus that the challenge mounted by the market towards the post-colonial project of Zimbabwe explains why Minister Mujuru did not opt for a site specific price. But the challenge of the market is not equally evident in relation to her rejection of a *catchment blend price* (the second option above). As Minister Mujuru spells out in the quote above, a catchment blend price is not tied to the market but is "derived" through

an equation in which the total cost of water management in a catchment is divided by the volume of water sold annually. To use the Minister's words, the catchment blend price is "an improvement" compared to the site specific prices. Why then did Minister Mujuru not choose a catchment blend price? One answer lies in recalling the analysis in the previous section of this chapter. I argued that catchment management was associated with political implications which were at odds with the ambition of the post-colonial project to manifest Zimbabwe as a unified nation-state. The geographic demarcation of catchments constituted an arena for social and political mobilisation potentially at odds with the ambition of national unity. This supports the argument that the catchment blend price was rejected due to its incompatibility with the political project of nation building. Additional support for this argument is offered by an interviewee from GtZ, the German international donor agencies involved in the reform process:

> **I**: When the discussion came to the guidelines and allocations, GtZ realised that it was not appropriate to apply the same principle to all catchments which are significantly different. So we said, let's not try to unify something according to this approach that one size fits all and in the end everybody is happy. Let's allow the catchments to come up with allocation systems that suite their level of water scarcity and intensity of water competition and so on. But this was a difficult hurdle to get around. First of all because the people at the DWD [Department of Water Development] and also on the legal side like something uniform. They said '*This is one country and we should have one set of rules for everybody*'. I was heavily involved in that debate and at the end we, I think, had the agreement that their idea was not the best way because different levels of scarcity and competition requires different answers, I mean that is also what property rights theory tells us: the level of effort that you invest in the definition of property rights is a function of the scarcity and level of competition for the resource. You just don't start defining highly sophisticated systems if there is no competition. That is quite simply not the economic approach. Anyway that was another thing that was quite fascinating (Interview C2, emphasis added).

This quote helps to understand why Minister Mujuru did not opt for the second, catchment pricing, option. The interviewee discloses that the question of catchment pricing had provoked significant discussions between GtZ and the government. The description of these developments as "a difficult hurdle" which required the GtZ official to get "heavily involved" attests to

a significant level of political interests and power struggle invested in deciding the pricing strategy. There was thus a difference in opinion between GtZ and the representatives of the Government of Zimbabwe concerning the appropriate strategy for pricing water. The GtZ representative is fully committed to a pricing strategy derived from economic theory that allows the relative demand and supply to guide the pricing system. He argues that since Zimbabwe's different catchments have different amount of relative demand and supply (due in part to difference in the climate and commercial structure) the catchment is a suitable level for a common price system. In other words, he would have suggested that Minister Mujuru had opted for alternative two listed above. As is clear from the quote, the objections raised by people in government against this advice were based on their preference for "something uniform" that acknowledged the ambition to manifest Zimbabwe as "one country". In other words, these people did not conceive of a catchment based price as supportive of the manifestation of a Zimbabwe as a unified state. The tension between catchment pricing and the reality construction of the post-colonial project of a unified state explains why Mujuru did not opt for this choice.[38]

To sum up, proponents of IWRM's call for water as an economic good motivated this principle by arguing that it would allow for market-like incentives to guide the use of water in more effective ways (Kangai 1995; Garn 1998). The rhetoric of water as an economic good was picked up in policy documents and official speeches by government representatives. I argue, however, that for actors subscribing to the construction of Water as Zimbabwe, IWRM's call for water as an economic good was transformed from a means to obtain economic efficiency into an attempt to deprive the

[38] An alternative explanation for Mujuru's choice would be that she acted out of a commitment to marginalised water users who, under the pure influence of the market, would stand the risk of being over-charged for water. The argument might thus be that a national blend price would allow for cross subsidies in favour of such groups. The Ministers' choice should accordingly be understood as a way to protect water users from a high water price set by the market. In contrast to my explanation, in terms of the Minister's attempt to maintain the government's control over water, we should thus understand the governments' pricing policy in terms of the governments' eagerness to cater for the needs of its population and, possibly, voters. There are however, two reasons why this alternative explanation does not hold. The first reason is that the government had already decided that "primary usage of water"—i.e. water consumption for domestic needs and petty agricultural use—should be free of charge. As Minister Mujuru outlined the government's pricing policy in the document analysed above, she was therefore not making a choice which would have any effect on the primary usage of marginalised water users. Secondly, according to Zimconsult—a Harare-based consultancy firm entrusted by the government for economic analysis during the reform—the national blend price would lead to a situation in which poor water users would subsidise richer water users. If the Minister's main concern was with marginalised farmers wanting water for irrigation, she should not have opted for the national blend price (Zimconsult 1999).

state of control of one of its most strategic resources for societal control. The distribution of water was part of the government's attempt to reach an accord with the *demos* it wanted as citizens. In light of this, a policy based on IWRM's call to define water as an economic good was a real threat to the government. Defining water in that way would make it part of a community that derived its legitimacy and control from an economic realm guided by economic processes out of government control.

Does this transformation have any implications in terms of behavioural consequences for the actual management of water? Responding to the threat mounted by the application of pure economic principles in the water sector, the government opted for a pricing system calculated by the government: the national blend price. This system was introduced under IWRM's banner of water as an economic good. The stated idea behind IWRM's call for water as an economic good was, however, that water should be subjected to market incentives by means of a pricing system that reflected supply and demand on the market. IWRM's original connection between water and market economic processes would, however, not be maintained if a national blend price was to be used. A national blend price is 'calculated' by the government rather than derived from the market. The transformation thus implies that water consumption will not be sensitive to the market incentive structures that motivated IWRM's call for treating water as an economic good. The national blend price disconnects the price of water from the forces of the market.

Stakeholder participation

Proponents of IWRM called for increased stakeholder participation in the management of water. The argument was that water is an essential part of peoples' livelihoods which makes increased stakeholder participation a democratic right. Moreover, this call was motivated by the belief that involving stakeholders would increase effectiveness in the use of water resource.

In the context of Zimbabwe, this call for stakeholder participation was mainly a call to engage the marginalised black farmers who used water in their limited agricultural production. IWRM's call for stakeholder participation is frequently mentioned in official documents and speeches by government representatives. For example, at a press conference at Valley Dam, Minister Mujuru proclaimed that:

> Stakeholders should be involved in all important decision-making and management of water resources. (Government of Zimbabwe 1997).

Similarly, in the 1995 blueprint for the reform process it is stated that:

> The structure of the Project is geared entirely towards maximum stakeholder participation. This development runs par-

> allel to decentralisation and devolution in other sectors and departments of the Government...The participatory approach is not unique to the water sector, but is very broadly based and it will be a lasting and integral feature of the Project. It will ensure that the Project is truly Zimbabwean." (Government of Zimbabwe, Government of Netherlands et al. 1995: 39f).

These two quotes suggest that the Zimbabwean government was fully devoted to stakeholder participation. No reference is made to any potential trade-offs or power struggles between devolving power to stakeholders and the ambition of the state to manifest itself as the nexus in the distribution of goods and services. Interestingly enough, the second (1995) quote even suggests that the government's commitment to stakeholder participation was advanced as a means to ensure that the reform process was "truly Zimbabwean". Stakeholder participation was legitimised by reference to the government's ambition to use water management as a means to manifest the Zimbabwean nation-state.

Based on these quotes, it appears as if my argument—that IWRM was seen by political entrepreneurs in the government as a threat to their political project of nation building—does not hold for the question of stakeholder participation. Perhaps catchment management and water as an economic good were disavowed due to their potential to violate this project, whereas stakeholder participation was seen as conducive to manifest the state?

In the empirical analysis below, I argue that, contrary to the government's official devotion to real stakeholder influence, the government did indeed see IWRM's call for stakeholder participation as a challenge to its own ambition to obtain control over water management. I will show how, in response to this challenge, political entrepreneurs in the government strategically drew on established identities and collective memories to legitimise the government's maintained, or even increased, control of water management.

Indications of real stakeholder participation

Perhaps more than any other aspect of the reform, stakeholder participation has been subjected to investigations and reports by researchers. In my review of this literature, I have not found one assessment that would support the view that the reform resulted in devolution of power to local stakeholder (see e.g. Derman and Ferguson 2000a; Derman, Ferguson et al. 2000b; Manzungu 2001; Sithole 2001).[39] The findings by Latham at the Centre for Applied Social Sciences in Harare are representative of this literature:

[39] In contrast to my focus on the relationship between stakeholders and the state, most other analysis focus on the asymmetries between different stakeholder groups (commercial farmers vs. the rest). However important and understandable, these accounts frequently fail to account for the role and motives of the state which consequently is portrayed as generally supportive to stakeholder participation.

> Amongst communal farmers, small-scale farmers, the UIM (Urban, Industrial and Mining sector) users and representatives of RDCs (Rural District Councils) there was an almost complete lack of any meaningful consultation... /The stakeholders/ all professed a complete ignorance of any water reform process, /A/ household survey in one area of communal land in Upper Guruve showed a 90% negative response /to questions about if they know about the existence of the reform/ (Latham 2002:910).

Existing research on stakeholder participation thus suggests that the government's rhetorical devotion to stakeholder participation was not turned into real stakeholder participation. The legal instruments officially set up to achieve stakeholder participation provide a second indicator of the government's action to involve the stakeholders. These legal instruments (the "Water Act" and the "ZINWA Act" – Zimbabwe National Water Authority Act) provide for establishing an institutional framework for stakeholder participation at the catchment level and calls for the formation of formal institutions for stakeholder deliberations and decisions (catchment councils and sub-catchment councils). In particular, the Water Act states that a large number of functions shall be entrusted with the stakeholders, including issue and cancel permits for water usage, investigate disputes over water usage, and initiate investigations in a wide range of water related areas.

Despite these signs of devolution of power to the stakeholders, a closer scrutiny of the Water Act shows that the actual control of the vital functions of water management was outside the stakeholders' reach. Section 1 and 2 of paragraph 28 in the Water Act states:

> (1) For the day to day management and administration of affairs of a catchment council, there shall be a catchment manager who shall be an employee of the National Water Authority.
>
> (2) In the performance of its functions, a catchment manager shall act on the advice of the catchment council and be supervised by the National Water Authority.

This extract from the Water Act indicates two things. First, the catchment manager is the key actor in the actual daily management and administration of the catchment. Second, the catchment manager takes "advice" from the stakeholder body, but is "supervised" by ZINWA. The effects of this arrangement in terms of stakeholder influence is clear if we consult the second legal instrument introduced during the reform, the ZINWA Act.

According to the ZINWA Act, the government controls the majority of the seats of the influential ZINWA board (§4:1 ZINWA Act 1998).

Consequently, much of the stakeholder influence and authority that seemed to be entrusted in the catchment council was in fact under the control of the catchment manager, who was under the control of ZINWA which, in turn, was controlled by the government. Even though the Water Act seemed to provide for stakeholder participation, the real influence over water management rested with the state. Despite the praise for stakeholder participation in the government's rhetoric, the devolution of real power was curtailed by a cleaver institutional arrangement that reflected the government's ambition to obtain the position of nexus in the distribution of water resources.[40]

Stakeholders vs. the government

By any standards, the two examples above testify to a meagre result of a reform which officially aimed at the devolution of power and influence to stakeholders. How are we to understand this? How was IWRM's call for stakeholder participation diluted from, as it said in the blueprint—what "the project is geared entirely towards"—to a situation in which the legal institutions shortcut the stakeholders who got involved, while the majority of stakeholders remained ignorant or found participation meaningless?

I posed these questions to Patrick Chinamassa who served as Attorney General when the Water Act and ZINWA Act were drafted and approved, and who was later appointed Minister of Justice.

> **PC:** Will the stakeholders have enough capacity and infrastructure? Will they have enough revenues? Are we not just putting up powerless institutions? Yes, these were questions raised, but with time I think we can start to build capacity. But there was a fear concerning the control of the catchments. To

[40] Additional illustration of the lack of ambition to obtain stakeholder participation is found in the recommendations of the Water Act Review Board (1994), i.e. the group who successfully delayed the introduction of IWRM for several years . The Water Act Review Board made recommendations that would allow close to complete control of the Minister of Lands, Agriculture and Water Development. The Water Act Review Board stated that the catchment boards "could be similar to the Advisory Councils described in Section 13, 14 and 15 of the [1976 Water] Act." Accordingly, the suggested catchment boards shall not be permanent bodies but be established "whenever the Minster considers it necessary"; "consist of such number of members as may be appointed by the Minister to represent local authorities and other groups and sections of the economy with an interest in the river system"; "hold office at the pleasure of the Minister"; "be paid such remuneration and allowance as the Minster, with the consent of the Minster responsible for finance, may fix" (Section 13 – 15, 1976 Water Act).

what extent will we be in control? Will they be dominated by the already empowered?

R: When you say that, what do you mean by "we"?

PC: Us the blacks. This is a black and white issue. We must discuss race at all times because this is a matter of race.

R: Is the new legal institutions then not just a way for you to have increased control from the government? Take for example the ZINWA board which has a majority of government appointees.

PC: If you mean control of the resources: Yes. But at the end of the day, we have to ask if the reform has resulted in increased control for the whites in the catchment councils. If this is the case we have not done our job.

Analysing these responses in light of the framework outline in chapter four, it is interesting to note how the Attorney General rationalises the steps taken during the design of the institutions for stakeholder participation. For him, stakeholder participation is *not* an issue of the distribution of power between the state and stakeholders, in which "stakeholders" signify a group of non-state actors. The issue of stakeholder participation is a racial issue between "black" and "white".[41] In the context of Water as Zimbabwe, this stereotypical identity construction stands out as part of the govern-

[41] It is clear from this response that Attorney General Chinamassa is well aware of the critique of the deficiencies of the government's actions. In the beginning he suggests that the efforts taken by the government so far should be seen as only a first step in the process of empowering the stakeholders: "with time I think we can start to build capacity". At face value, this statement fits nicely into an explanation of the demise of African states that is quite popular in the theoretical literature on African politics (for a review see Schraeder (2000): part V). According to this explanation, the government's response to stakeholder participation should be understood as an effect of its lack of material resources to successfully reach out and empower stakeholders. People have to be made aware of how to manage water properly, and be given training in how to organise as stakeholders. All of this takes time and costs money which, the argument would be, explains the lack of real stakeholder participation in Zimbabwe. An alternative explanation to my analysis of the lack of stakeholder participation would thus focus on the material constraints of the government. If we adopt this view, we would see the Zimbabwean government as willing but not able. By contrast, the view that I offer portrays the government as able but not willing. Increased stakeholder participation would threaten the government's project to manifest itself as a viable actor in the post-colonial project of nation building. In support of my account, it is instructive to recall the review of the structuring of the institutional structure found in the Water Act and ZINWA Act. Clearly, a willing government, however impotent, can at least produce laws that allow for real stakeholder participation. But the Zimbabwean government did not.

ment's endeavour to transform IWRM's idea of stakeholder participation from a call to decrease the legitimate influence of the state in favour of non-state actors. Based on this identity construction, the government is a representative of "the black" stakeholders whose influence should increase. Consequently, increased power to the marginalised stakeholders is equivalent to increased power to the state. Recall the institutional arrangement in which the catchment councils are deprived of actual control in favour of the government controlled authority for water management (ZINWA). Consider now this institutional set-up *without* taking into account the construction of Water as Zimbabwe. Outside of this construction of reality, the institutional arrangement appears as an illegitimate arrangement for the government to deprive stakeholders of real influence. However, analysing the same institutional arrangement from *within* the construction of Water as Zimbabwe the conclusion is the opposite. Within the reality of this construction, the government is a representative of the blacks in a struggle against the whites. More power to the government is thus equivalent to more power to the historically marginalised black stakeholders. In this light, the government's institutional arrangement analysed above were legitimised as a means to increase *real* stakeholder participation, i.e. more power to the "black" government.

Furthermore, constructing the issue of stakeholder participation as a racial issue, the Attorney General draws on the collective memory of white domination over blacks in the realm of natural resources in Zimbabwe. Much of the post-colonial political rhetoric in Zimbabwe is concerned with legitimizing the incumbent government's policies by framing it as a continuation of the liberation struggle in which the blacks fight the whites for control of land and water (Derman and Ferguson 2000a).[42] In this construction, the blacks have a legitimate claim on increased influence in the water sector while the whites are to be blamed for any deficiencies and injustices. Placing the IWRM's call for stakeholder participation within the construction of Water as Zimbabwe thus serves two purposes. First, as I argued above, the racial identities of "black" and "white" make the government a legitimate caretaker of the interests of the historically marginalised stakeholders. Second, the distribution of claims and blames according to this construction provides a *moral legitimacy* for redistribution of control of water in favour of the black government. Within the construction of Water as Zimbabwe it is morally justified for the state to have control of water management under the banner of "stakeholder participation".

[42] The government's policy to appropriate land from white commercial farmers is, for example, frequently referred to as the "Second Chimurenga" which alludes to the "Chimurenga", or "First Chimurenga" which is an established name for the Liberation War ending in Independence in 1990.

Evidence shows, however, that in contrast to the government's illusive version of "stakeholder participation", black farmers at the local level in Zimbabwe—who were the primary target for the official efforts to increase stakeholder participation—were kept ignorant and alienated from increased influence in the water sector (see the introduction of this section on stakeholder participation). The reality construct alluded to by the Attorney General was part of the post-colonial project to manifest Zimbabwe and to legitimise the authority of the state. In the process, the racial identities of 'Us-the-Black' and 'Them-the-Whit'e were effective instruments to silence, not only the whites, but also black stakeholders at the local level in Zimbabwe.

Conclusions

The analysis in this chapter has focused on the transformation of IWRM by actors subscribing to a construction of reality in which water is seen to have a strategic role in the political project of nation-building and manifestation of the government as a viable actor in the Zimbabwean society. I have labelled this construction Water as Zimbabwe. It consists of a collective memory in which the history of struggle and control over natural resources is the defining trait of a society and thus the management of water was part of the process of uniting the diverse communities of Zimbabwe. Proponents of Water as Zimbabwe wanted to establish the nation state of Zimbabwe as the proper forum for water management, and to promote the social identity of the government as the legitimate broker of rights and obligations related to water.

Political entrepreneurs supporting Water as Zimbabwe opposed IWRM for two reasons. First, they argued that IWRM's way of naming the problems of water management placed water beyond the control of the government and was thus a threat to the post-colonial political project of nation-building and to the legitimacy of the government as an actor. Second, opponents of IWRM pointed to the external, White, origin of IWRM as a way to have it discredited. The latter argument built on the racial stereotypes of Black and White which where much used by proponents of Water as Zimbabwe and in the political rhetoric of Zimbabwe in general (see chapter six and seven). In light of these stereotypes, the collective memory of Zimbabwean history is characterised as a struggle for control over natural resources in which the Blacks have tried to reclaim their resources from the White foreigners. Drawing on this construction of reality, opponents of IWRM in and around the government supported the social identity of the government as the legitimate representative of the Blacks: The government as the leader of the Blacks against the Whites and their history of oppressions in Zimbabwe.

These opponents of IWRM pointed to the international, White, origin of IWRM to associate it with the historical blame of Whites in the management of the country's natural resources. The argument can be summarised like this: 'The Whites, be they colonialists or development workers, have always interfered in the management of our natural resources and they are to blame for the current problems. We-the-Blacks have a legitimate claim to self-determination with regard to our natural resources why we should not be directed by IWRM. IWRM is a way for Them-the-Whites to once again interfere in how We-the-Blacks manage our natural resources.'

In the eyes of proponents of Water as Zimbabwe, IWRM was thus yet another attempt by White foreigners to dictate a solution to the Blacks. This view on IWRM constituted the background for the transformation of the three pillars of IWRM in relation to Water as Zimbabwe. The aim was to transform IWRM so that it supported, rather than challenged the post-colonial project of nation-state building. Table 5.1. summarises the transformed meanings of each pillar and points to its behavioural implications.

Water as Zimbabwe		
Pillar of IWRM	**Transformed meaning**	**Behavioural implication**
Catchment management	Threat to the viability of the nation-state and its administrative back-bone i.e. the provincial system	Support formal implementation of catchments to appease proponents of IWRM, but maintain the key managerial instruments for water management within the government controlled provincial system.
Water as an economic good	Challenge to the socialisation of water consumers into citizens. Seen as an instrument against a unified nation-state.	Government calculated NBP detached from the control of market mechanisms and incentives.
Stakeholder participation	Call for increased participation by representatives of the marginalised Blacks; i.e. the government.	Introduce formal institutions for stakeholder participation but maintain control by the state though legal arrangements and strategic appointments.

Table 5.1. Summary of transformation of IWRM in relation to Water as Zimbabwe

6. IWRM AND WATER AS GOLD

In this chapter I turn to the construction of water within the white farming community in Zimbabwe and how this influenced the transformation of IWRM. I have labeled the construction of reality dominating this community 'Water as Gold' as a reflection of the historical link between this community and the white settlers who came to present day Zimbabwe in search for minerals during the early 1900's. As I will show, the historical connection between present day white commercial farmers and the early settlers turns out to be very important in the quest to understand the transformation of IWRM by this community.

The importance of this group of actors is indicated by the fact that they represent about eighty-five percent of the country's recorded water use at the outset of the water sector reform. This water was used in commercial agricultural production which made up the backbone of Zimbabwe's economy.[43] At the time, about half of all the water in Zimbabwe that was stored in dams was found in dams owned by white commercial farmers. [44] The rest was stored and controlled by the government. However, due to a pricing system put in place prior to Independence, and little changed since, the lion's share of the government's stored water was also favorably extracted by white commercial farmers (Nilsson and Hammar 1996; Zimconsult 1999a; Zimconsult 1999b). [45]

This chapter is organized as follows. The first section provides an introduction to the construction of reality nurtured within the community of white commercial farmers in Zimbabwe. Focus is first on the collective memory of how the white farming community brought civilization and development to a country previously characterized by illness and poverty. In this section I also show that Water as Gold consists of a social identity build around the racial stereotypes 'Us-the–White' and 'Them-the-Black'.

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[43] Approximately 60 % of GDP was controlled by the white farmers making up about one half of one percent of the population (Moyo S. 1995).

[44] The white farmers did not have legal ownership to the water stored in the private dams. The ownership was vested in the state. Abstraction was made on the basis of "water rights" (see details below). In practice, however, the white farmers were the sole user of this water.

[45] Water was also abstracted from underground reservoirs, and directly from rivers. The quantities of such water, however, were relatively low. The major concern of the white commercial farmers during the water reform under review was with water stored in dams (Derman and Ferguson 2000a).

Second, I display a short history of the varying relations between the white farming community and the government of Zimbabwe. Third, I attend to the transformation of IWRM with regard to its three pillars: catchment management, water as an economic good, and stakeholder participation. The last section contains the concludes from the analysis.

Water as Gold

The analysis of this transformation of IWRM takes us back to the end of the nineteenth century when present day Zimbabwe was "discovered" by Cecile Rhodes. Rhodes named this area "the Second Rand". He thereby hoped to associate these newly discovered territories with the First Rand where thousands of white settlers had made their fortune in the gold and diamond mines and which today is the financial centre of South Africa. Rhodes' marketing campaign was successful and his vision of a Second Rand attracted not only fortune hunters but also a strand of the Afrikaner community in South Africa who were fed up with "British bigots" and London's increasing calls for political reforms. To them, the prospects of a Second Rand offered a new start to fulfill the dreams of an independent way of life (Herbst 1990; Skålnäs 1995).

But there was no Second Rand. The new territories did not hide any rich mines and the rush soon dried up. However, the fortune hunters who stayed on in the new territory soon discovered that it was not what lay under the ground that would render this area prosperous. Its riches would come from what could be grown on it. The highlands of the new territories proved to be ideal for agriculture, so the would-be miners became farmers. In addition, it turned out that the soil and climate types of the new territories easily accommodated the same types of crops and cattle as South Africa and Europe. Expanding on existing techniques and practices in the new land they laid the foundation of one of the most successful agricultural communities in Africa. As the area shifted names, reflecting differences in the political leadership—Southern Rhodesia, Rhodesia, Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, Zimbabwe—the white farming community built the 'granary of Africa' (Mumbengegwi 1987; Herbst 1990; Skålnäs 1995).

The area claimed by the commercial farmers thus offered great agricultural possibilities, and the farmers brought with them crops, cattle, and skill. The key to the success was, however, access to water. Some of the most fertile lands lay in chronically dry areas, and the whole country suffered from repeated droughts (Nilsson and Hammar 1996; Derman 1998b). The role of water set the stage for a political struggle which has marked Zimbabwe's political history ever since and, as I will show in this chapter, drove the transformation of IWRM by the community of white commercial

farmers. A descendent to one of the first white settler families explained the role of water in his community by making a parallel to Rhodes' promises of mining prospects:

> **I:** My family came up here from South Africa, but we found no gold. But water became like our gold. And as with gold, water can create prospects, but it can also drive people to cheat and deceive each other (Interview 24B).

As the interviewee continued his recollection of his family's history, he talked about the tremendous amount of hard work and entrepreneurial skill that had been necessary to make the waters of Zimbabwe into a source of prospects. This 'success story' of historical achievements in Zimbabwe's water sector was a theme repeated by many white commercial farmers. The argument was, as I show below, that the historical achievements of the white farming community made the present day white community entitled to a special favorable treatment during the water sector reform under IWRM.

The 'success story' of the white farming community

As already mentioned, the main challenge facing the white farmers in this new territory was not so much with the total quantity of water available. The occasional and very rich rains—especially in the highlands of the country—provided plenty of water. The concern was the allocation of water in space and time. Spatial allocation problems were due to the fact that the best soils and the richest waters were geographically separated. To cultivate the land, water had to be transported, which called for investments in channels and irrigation systems. Adding to the spatial problems was the fact that the incumbent agrarian tribes inhabited some of the most fertile land. For white farmers to access these areas required resettlement of the natives in areas less suitable for agricultural production. The Land Apportionment Act of 1930, supplemented by the Land Tenure Act of 1969 became the cornerstone of the legal framework to make fertile land available for the commercial agricultural production. So called "resettlement areas" were designated for the natives to allow them to continue agricultural production at their own, very basic, technical level. Moreover, the poor living conditions in the resettlement areas created a supply of labor utilized in the burgeoning agrarian industry (Interview 4, 6, 20, 2B; Mumbengegwi 1987; Sylvester 1991; Godwin and Hancock 1993; Skålnäs 1995).

The spatial allocation problems were accompanied by a temporal problem: Water had to be allocated from one time period to the next. As in much of South Saharan Africa, the settler community moved into an area subjected to erratic rainfalls. Besides the yearly cycles of dry and wet periods, droughts stretching over several years frequently plagued the area.

Farming thus became dependent on the possibilities to store water over significant periods of time to assure continued supply. Massive investments in dam constructions were called for and executed with the help of generous government subsidies. To illustrate the magnitude of this endeavor, one interviewee told me that when children in contemporary Zimbabwe study geography they are asked how many lakes there are in the country. Looking at a map, the children would see more than 1 600 pools of water that look like lakes. The point of this story is, however, that Zimbabwe has no lakes. The 1 600 pools of water are the result of the intense efforts in water management largely initiated and executed by the white farming community (Interview 10).

That the success of the white commercial farmers carried a high price for the black population living in this area prior to the whites was less emphasized by interviewees. When the white settlers started their commercial farming activities they made use of land and waterways that were part of the religious, political, and economic life of existing inhabitants in the area. For example, when the settlers installed the Water Act of 1926, all existing claims on water were nullified. Prior activities involving water in conservation or production practices did not entitle any legal claim to water in the new administrative system. According to the new system, water allocation followed the principle of 'first come, first served'. In practice, this principle meant, 'the first to properly file a claim for water under the settler regime, first served'. In addition, the Water Act of 1926 stated that once a claim for water had been "properly filed", the rights to use water was valid "in perpetuity". Since the majority of the population neither knew of this system, nor had any resources to make a proper claim, all legal claims for water were soon held by members of the white community (van der Zaag and Savenije 2000).

The social identity of being white

There is no such thing as a homogeneous white community in Zimbabwe. Dissent, history, religion, and class are all relevant demarcation lines within their group (Godwin and Hancock 1993). This diversity was reflected in my interviews with white commercial farmers who displayed a large variety of opinions and views. Nevertheless, many of my interviewees alluded to belonging to a 'White' community built on the demarcation and stigmatization of blacks as the Other: 'Them-the-Black'. The identity construct of white commercial farmers thus evolved around the racial demarcation of Us-the-Whites, and Them-the-Blacks.

The Commercial Farmers Union (CFU) is the most influential organization of white commercial farmers in Zimbabwe. Consider this statement from a CFU member who frequently represented the organisation during the water sector reform:

> **I:** The man with the pale skin comes from a climatic zone where there is rain and resources for only four to six months per year, so he has to plan. But the man of Central Africa has resources all year around so he can just pick the fruits and enjoy the climate (Interview 20).

The view held by this leading member of CFU supports a construction of a common white identity by means of racial demarcations and stigmatisations of the blacks as the Other. To support this construction of a common identity, the interviewee tries to overcome internal differences in the white community by invoking a collective memory where the "man with the pale skin" shares a common history and comes from the same harsh climatic zone in contrast to the "man of Central Africa" who belongs to a collective enjoying a history of easily available resources all year around. A similar analysis of the reality construct of CFU is made by anthropologist Blair Rutherford (2001). She says:

> [The leaders of CFU] rested very heavily on an 'us and them' contrast, stressing the advantages of a modern 'white identity' to the point that [their] 'us', the local institutions of white farmers, play a major role in resettlement as a guarantor of its (modern) commercial success. (p. 61).

As illustrated by the quotes above, the identity of blacks is associated with a natural inclination of irresponsibility derived from the favourable climate in the black people's natural environment. This view is further elaborated by a member of CFU's executive board who said:

> **I:** They are constantly in debt to somebody or the government to give them a free handout... And a lot of those guys, they don't want to move. They want to stay where they are, they just want to be properly supported (Interview 1).

The stigmatisation of the blacks as irresponsible is typically associated with the idea of the blacks sharing a history of backwardness without any of the traits signifying white men's civilisation. This theme did, for example, come out in an interview with another leading member of this community. During this interview I introduced the idea that the history of marginalisation of the blacks had entitled this group to compensation during the current water reform. Consider his response:

> **I:** We should not just compensate the black farmers, we should train them. They will just spend their compensation.

R: Would you not agree that that is a rather paternalistic view?

I: Yes, we are very paternalistic. I mean it was an exciting thing for black people to come into an economy where there was money. Before we came here they'd never seen money before. They'd never had clothes before it was just a skin around them. They didn't have law and order and freedom (Interview 6).

Similarly, Rutherford describes CFU's view like this:

> Africans as a 'race' are imagined to be generally an evolutionary step behind Europeans, to be 'traditional' and not 'modern', and thus require guidance" (Rutherford 2001:63).

These quotes illustrate the social identity cultivated by leading members of the community of white commercial farmers. This identity is built around racial demarcations and a stigmatization of Them-the-Black as economically irresponsible and incapable of long term reasoning and planning. Interlocked with this social identity is a collective memory with the basic theme of Us-the-White offering development and civilization to Them-the-Black. Consider this extract from the interview cited above (Interview 1):

I: When the white man first came here and founded a colony, it is estimated that there were about 180,000, say 200,000 black people. But from the time the white man came the population started increasing, because we stopped them dying of disease, we stopped them dying of starvation, we stopped them killing one another.... Irrigation was a new science brought in by the expertise of the white man. So, before that, these chaps planted a crop and if there was a drought you had nothing. We gradually went through a number of stages with the building of dams and the spreading of electricity which made irrigation practical, economical. So it was just with the improved know-how and technology and electricity /that we managed the droughts/. We had a fantastic system here, which was developed by the expertise of the white man that put it right throughout the whole country through working hard, investing.... if the white man had never come, where would they still have been?" (Interview 6).

Another CFU farmer conveyed the same message in not so many words:

> I: We haven't grabbed this land, we have developed it and put in resources here that will be here for ever (Interview 24B).

To sum up, the reality construct of the community of white commercial farmers was weaved around an imaginary self constructed as a negation of the irresponsible Them-the-Black. Connected to this identity is a collective memory of Them-the-White bringing civilisation to Them-the-Black.

The political organisation of the white commercial farmers

I turn now the political organisation of the white commercial farmers in Zimbabwe as a way to identify political entrepreneurs engaging in the transformation of IWRM in relation to Water as Gold. The focus will be on Zimbabwe Commercial Farmers' Union (CFU), which is the most influential political organization of the white commercial farmers in Zimbabwe. With few exceptions, the CFU has as members all white commercial farmers. It functions as a hub of expert knowledge on farming techniques, weather conditions, world market prices on different grains, and helps provide individual farmers with access to international agricultural markets. Moreover, the CFU typically voices the interests of the white farming community in talks with the national political elite. It was from the ranks of CFU that the government invited representatives of the white farmers for discussions during the water sector reform (Interview 1, Rutherford 2001; Meredith 2002; Chan 2003).

The history of the CFU dates back to at least the 1942 formation of the Rhodesian National Farmers Union. At that time, agricultural politics took centre stage in Rhodesia's political life and the Farmers Union was part of the strong network between farmers and politicians. The Rhodesian Front, in power from 1963 until Independence in 1980, was dominated by farmers. The Minister of Agriculture was typically a farmer, as was the Prime Minister during much of this period, Mr. Ian Smith. Over long periods of time, more than half the government were farmers which resulted in a wide battery of policy instruments designed to protect and support the agricultural sector (Mumbengegwi 1987; Herbst 1990; Bratton 1994; Skålnäs 1995; Smith 1997). Economist Clever Mumbengegwi describes the relationship between the state and the farmers during the period of white minority rule:

> The policy instruments chosen were intended to guarantee that the commercial farmers played the pivotal role in the pursuit of the international regime's objectives. Increased state intervention in directing and allocating resources became a necessity to ensure Rhodesia's survival in a hostile world. (Mumbengegwi 1987:204).

During the pre-independence era, a relationship was thus founded where the state and the farmers thrived in a symbiotic relationship aimed at political and economic survival for the white farmers and the white dominated state. The state ensured favorable agricultural and economic policies and the agricultural sector provided the country's economic backbone.

In contrast to the independence movement in many African countries, the incoming government under Robert Mugabe did not challenge the economic power position of the former rulers. Entering State House in Harare, Mugabe's government found itself in a peculiar situation of almost total economic dependency on its former foes (Mandaza 1987). Mumbengegwi (1987) notes that at Independence in 1980, the white commercial farming sector "accounted for 75% of the countries gross output, 95% of its marketed surplus, 100% of agricultural export earnings and 33% of the national formal wage employment" (p. 210). Adding to the new government's dependency on the white community was the lack of educated blacks in the bureaucracy. There were very few blacks even at junior posts, and no blacks held positions at senior administrative levels (Herbst 1990:30). As if this was not enough, the Lancaster House agreement—stipulating the terms for the transition to majority rule—included a clause seen to obstruct Mugabe's government from reforming land ownership structures during a period of ten years. As I have argued in chapter five, Mugabe's ability to realise the political agenda of "Zimbabwe" was thus highly dependent on his relationship to the white community.

Realising his dependency on the white community, Mugabe invited his former foes to continue the symbiotic relationship with the state (Rutherford 2001; Meredith 2002; Chan 2003). In a speech on the eve of Independence, the just recent guerrilla leader, now Prime Minister, Robert Mugabe, poetically proposed

> If yesterday, I fought you as an enemy, today you have become a friend. If yesterday you hated me, today you cannot avoid the love that binds you to me and me to you. (Robert Mugabe cited in Herbst 1990:236).

Mugabe's poetic invitation provided the foundation for a continuation of a favorable agricultural policy towards the white community. As a gesture of his intentions, Mugabe offered the post as Minister of Agriculture to the former CFU president. In the analysis of political scientist Jeffrey Herbst, Mugabe's government struck a bargain with the white community. The bargain, "which is never discussed but is generally understood", was that the whites could stay in Zimbabwe and continue their social and economic activities for the rest of their lives. On their end of the bargain, the white community was expected to encourage their children to find lives for themselves outside of the country and thus provide for a natural end

to the era of white influence in Zimbabwe. More importantly, the whites were expected to focus on economic activities and stay out of the political sphere (Herbst 1990:222 ff).

Mugabe's bargain with the whites seemed to hold for a number of years as Zimbabwe experienced a relatively stable transition to independence. However, under the surface, several factors contributed to the deterioration of the bargain between the political rulers and the white community. In the eyes of many Zimbabweans, the bargain with the whites came at the expense of reform for the blacks (Kanyenze 2003:83ff). Nearly twenty years after Independence the white community still owned the vast majority of land and water resources in the country, and large groups of black Zimbabweans increasingly voiced their demands for resource distribution (Dorman 2001; Mlambo 2001). With rising discontent among key groups within civil society, including war veterans, black businessmen, and young progressive farmers, Mugabe's political equation started to include breaking the bargain with the white farmers. These new groups had simply become too powerful for Mugabe's government to ignore their demands for distribution of land and water (Raftopoulos 2001; Kriger 2003). In addition, members of the white community ventured into politics and offered support to oppositional political groups (Mlambo 2001:23f; Raftopoulos 2000; Chan 2003). With leaders of the white farming community widely associated with opponents to Mugabe's government, the tacit bargain with the post-colonial government came to an end (Darnolf and Laakso 2003).

These factors led to the deterioration of the formerly amicable bargain between the white community of farmers and Mugabe's government. At the centre of the increasing tensions stood the question of control over Zimbabwe's natural resources and the role of the whites in politics (Worby 2001). In a speech in April 2001, President Mugabe drew on the popular social identity in which the white commercial farmers were associated with the former colonial power, Great Britain. He said:

> ...this land, this Zimbabwe, is a sacred inheritance from our forefathers. It was the *causus belli* of our armed liberation struggle. It cannot, therefore, be that we will have to beg a foreign power for and so we say hands off, Britain, hands off (Herald 19 April, 2001 cited in Dorman 2001:23)

To illustrate the degree of conflict in this relationship around the turn of the 20th century, consider a speech from October 1999 in which President Mugabe stated:

> Zimbabweans also had to be united in fending off the intruders who yesterday happened to have been our colonial masters and now pretend to be champions of democracy and transparency. (*Herald* 16 October 1999 cited in Dorman 2001:23)

This speech by Mugabe comes close to being a direct inversion of the speech held at the eve of Independence where he poetically invited the white community to a bargain for the future (see above). The animosity now expressed by Mugabe was also prevalent in CFU circles. Consider a speech by the CFU's Director, David Hasluck, at the CFU's Annual Congress in September 2000. Based on other research, I take the sentiments in Dircector Hasluch's speech to be representative of the CFU's relations with the government at this time (cf. Mlambo 2001; Worby 2001). In his speech Mr. Hasluck invoked an analogy to the biblical story of David's fight against Goliath. Hasluck suggested that David represented the CFU, and Goliath, the gigantic barbarian, stood for the Black majority in government. In the biblical story, David is anointed by God to fight the big barbarian trying to invade the land designated by God for his people. By analogy, the CFU was argued to carry a divine mission to fight for the land designated to them by God, and just as David was, the CFU was predestined to win. In his choice of analogy the director of CFU thus suggested that even if the odds looked bad, it was an historical and moral imperative for the CFU to challenge today's giant who stood in the way of David and his people as they tried to cultivate the land given to them by God. Recognising the magnitude of the task of trying to regain former positions of power, Mr. Hasluck proclaimed:

> David became great not when he slew Goliath but at the moment he decided to try. (CFU 2000).

Invoking the analogy of David and Goliath thus served to make two points. First, it conveyed that the CFU's fight against the government was a contemporary version of the fight between good and evil in which the champions of the good eventually stand to win. Second, the analogy provided the moral and historical pretext for the CFU to resist the government and its policies. The message of the CFU's leadership is that the CFU had a divine mission to re-claim the nation that once was. Even if the odds were bleak, it was the moral imperative for the CFU to accept this fight. This was a call to perpetuate the historical mission of the white farming community in Zimbabwe. This vision stands in sharp contrast to the post-colonial project of "Zimbabwe" which, as I have explained in chapter five, was centred on the ambition to establish Mugabe's government at the nexus of nation building.

Summing up Water as Gold

Five things stand out in regard to the construction of Water as Gold and how this subsequently led to the transformation of IWRM by the white farming community. First, the white community thrived on a collective memory of successfully having brought modern agricultural practices and,

indeed, civilization to what today is Zimbabwe. Second, they nurtured a social identity woven around an imaginary self constructed as a negation of Them-the-Black. Attracted to these racial stereotypes was the idea that whites are characterised by the ability to engage in long term planning and entrepreneurial projects, while blacks are irresponsible and idle. Third, based on this construction of reality, leaders of the white farming community advocated a reactionary political agenda that alluded to the pre-Independence period. Fourth, political entrepreneurs in and around the CFU worked to realise the ideals of the white farming community in political life. Finally, during the time of the water sector reform, the relationship between the CFU and the government went from amicable to increasingly conflict driven. Control over the agricultural sector, and hence control over water resources, was at the centre of this degenerating relationship.

Transforming the pillars of IWRM in relation to Water as Gold

Catchment management

I turn now to the question of how actors subscribing to the construction of Water as Gold transformed IWRM's call for catchment management. When I introduced the concept of catchment management in my interviews with white commercial farmers, they typically associated this concept with the so called Mazowe Pilot Catchment Project around the Mazowe River (henceforth MPCP, e.g. interview 1, 11, 13, 24B). Located just north of Harare, the Mazowe catchment holds some of Zimbabwe's most fertile land, and since the early days of the white settlers the area around Mazowe River has been a stronghold for the white commercial farmers in the country.

As the government officially launched MPCP in July 1997, the project was envisaged as a "test bed" which the government could use to develop and test the idea of catchment management on a small scale. Besides Mazowe, the government designated the area of Mupfure around the Sanyati river as a second pilot project. The two areas were regarded as typical cases in as much as they captured the diversity of Zimbabwe's agricultural sector. Mazowe was highly developed and dominated by white, large scale, commercial farmers. Mupfure was generally underdeveloped and populated by black, small scale farmers. For the water sector reform to succeed nationwide, the argument was that it had to be able to address the problems in Mazowe and Mupfure (Derman 1998b).[46]

[46] I confine my analysis to the experience from Mazowe as this was the most progressive and influential project in terms of advancing ideas associated with the construction of Water as Gold.

Prior to the reform, commercial water management in Mazowe had been organised around the so-called River Boards. The River Boards had legal provision to provide day-to-day water management under the auspice of the Department of Water Development.[47] This mandate was given to the River Boards in 1985 and was widely seen as a concession from the government to CFU as part of the "tacit bargain" that characterised the relationship between these parties during that time (Herbst 1990; Taylor and Chatora 1995). The River Boards were dominated and controlled by white commercial farmers along the Mazowe River, and this racial bias had made them quite controversial in political circles during the run-up to the water sector reform. The need to review the legal status of the River Boards was identified by the government as one of the reasons to engage in the reform process (Interview 10; Derman 1998a).

In response to having been designated as a pilot case for the water sector reform, a group of actors in Mazowe formed what they unofficially called the "Dream Team" or "the Old Boy's club". The Dream Team was made up of a handful of people including large-scale white commercial farmers in Mazowe, people with long experience from the judicial system regulating water management, and people with personal connections to strategic partners in the government. The Dream Team was closely connected (through official membership and institutional support) to the CFU in general and in particular to the CFU's newly founded organ the National Irrigation Liaison Committee (NILC). The formation of the NILC was part of the CFU's attempt to strengthen its institutional capacity to accommodate its members' interests during the water sector reform (World Bank, UNDP et al. 1993; Interview 1).

Consider how one of member of the Dream Team described his group and their mission:

> **I:** People like X and me we were part of the Dream Team. We dreamed about setting up the perfect water management system for Zimbabwe and we thought we could do it (Interview 11).

As indicated by this interviewee, the vision of the Dream Team was not confined to the water management system in Mazowe catchment. The Dream Team wanted to use the experiences from water management in Mazowe as a model for the water management sector in the country at large. In an interview with another member of the Dream Team, I asked what this ideal water management system looked like. What was, more

[47] Together the River Boards formed the Mazowe River Catchment River Board.

precisely, the "perfect water management system" that the Dream Team had in mind? Consider the interviewee's response:

> **I:** For the perspective of white commercial farmers in Mazowe it is not necessary to reform because blacks cannot use water. Blacks just cannot use water. And I think that the general view among the farmers who are operating in Mazowe is that there was no proper water use in this area prior to the arrival of the whites. They think that proper water usage was created by their own fathers. These whites guys look at the blacks in the communal areas and they said 'You can't run water. So why should we reform? What's wrong with what we are doing?' (Interview 10).

This quote tells us that the dream for Zimbabwe nurtured by the Dream Team was one of continued white domination over water resources. There was no need to reform and address the existing racial imbalances characterising water management. This dream of sustained racial imbalances and persistent privileges of white water users was not confined to Mazowe, but extended to the entire country. That this was the dominant view among white commercial farmers is sustained by a report commissioned and published by the German development organisation, GtZ. (GtZ was commissioned to represent Germany, which was one of the main financial sponsors of the reform). The report concluded that the aim of the white commercial farmers was to "maintain the privileges of the old Water Act for white farmers" and to maintain "the status quo" (Darby 2000:25).

The Dream Team's aspirations were rationalised by the construction of Water as Gold. The interviewee above alludes to the collective memory of the white settlers' 'success story' of bringing modernisation to the previously undeveloped area. Before the arrival of the whites, so the argument goes, there was no proper water management. Moreover, this dream thrives on social identities constructed on the two stereotypes: Us-the-Whites and Them-the-Blacks. By means of these social identities, the current white commercial farmers see themselves as the heirs of the settlers who introduced modern water management to this underdeveloped area. Likewise, the blacks are turned into a collective of idle and unproductive farmers who lack the ability to use water properly: 'blacks cannot use water'.

Based on this evidence, I argue that IWRM idea of catchment management was transformed by political entrepreneurs drawing on the construction of reality of Water as Gold. Through this transformation, catchment management was detached from IWRM's idea of being a means for ecosystem management into a platform to mobilize for continued racial imbalances in water management. The white commercial farmers in Mazowe under-

stood that one of the objectives of the water sector reform was to address the racial imbalances in the availability and usage of water in Zimbabwe, i.e. to distribute control over water from them to black farmers. Recognising this threat to their privileged position, the Dream Team engaged in strategic action to propagate Mazowe's water management system for the water sector of the entire country. This dream did not spell out ecological sustainability but rather the continuation of racial inequalities. The MPCP was used as a basis to mobilise influential actors within the judicial system, farming community, and strategic actors close to the government to advance a continuation of the privileged situation for the white commercial farmers in water management. IWRM's call for catchment management was thus transformed from a vehicle for ecologically sustainable water management to an instrument to perpetuate social and racial imbalances.

Here we should recall the political context in which this transformation took place. As I reviewed in chapter two and five, the government of Zimbabwe saw water as a strategic resource in the manifestation of the post-colonial project of nation building. Given the fact that large water resources were owned and controlled by the white commercial farmers, the realisation of the government's post-colonial project implied increasing government control over water at the expense of the whites. For the white commercial farmers water was key to the economic production of agricultural goods. But perhaps even more importantly, control over water and the development of water resources was central to the construction of reality that united this group. They defined themselves as part of the community who had explored and exploited the water resources of the country, and the collective memory of successful water management was a constitutive factor for this group (cf. presentation of Water as Gold above).

In a context in which control over water management had this kind of connotations, I argue that we should read more into the aspirations of the Dream Team than just how to manage the distribution of water. My argument is that the Dream Team's aspirations about a particular water management system were part of a larger dream about the political system for Zimbabwe. As the Dream Team engaged in strategic actions to maintain the control of water for the white commercial farmers, this was in line with the vision of a return to white domination of the political life in Zimbabwe. To sustain this interpretation, recall the vision suggested above by the CFU's director. According to this vision, it was a divine mission for the white farmers in Zimbabwe to stand up against the government and reclaim control of the country. It was, to use the director's words, a fight between the anointed David and the barbarian Goliath, in which God called on David to fight for the land designated by God to his people.

Seen in this light, the Dream Team not only transformed IWRM's call for catchment management into a platform for continuation of white domina-

tion of water resources in Zimbabwe. The call for catchment management became part of the political process in which the white commercial farmers and the government were engaged in the manifestation of competing political projects: Water as a means for white political control versus water as part of the post-colonial project of nation building.

Water as an economic good

In this section I will analyse the transformation of IWRM's emphasis on treating water as an economic by actors subscribing to the construction of Water as Gold, i.e. white commercial farmers. To understand this transformation we must take into consideration not only the original idea presented by advocates of IWRM (see chapter two), but also the way that the government of Zimbabwe came to interpret the idea of water as an economic good (see chapter five). As the actors subscribing to Water as Gold were confronted with IWRM's idea of water as an economic good, they had to take into consideration not only the original ideas of IWRM, but also how the government was responding to IWRM. As I showed in chapter five, the government opposed IWRM's idea of letting market forces set the price for water. The argument was that subjecting the price of water to market forces would deprive the government of control of an important aspect in the management of water. Consequently, the government opted for the National Blend Price (NBP), in which the price for one unit of water would be calculated as the national average cost of water production (e.g. costs for constructions of dams and canals, and administrative costs. Most importantly, the NBP would be set by the government, as opposed to the IWRM's original idea of water as an economic good for which the supply and demand of the market would determine the price. As I analyse the transformation of the idea of water as an economic good by the white commercial farmers, I will thus take into account not only IWRM's original idea but also the government's proposition in favour of the NBP, and the motivations behind the government's position.

Throughout the water sector reform, the CFU objected to the government's proposition of NBP. Instead it argued for a mixed pricing system that included prices calculated on the basis of specific sites and within the boundaries of catchments. Water is a major input in the production of agricultural goods. The greatest concern for the white commercial farmers was thus presumably to be able to buy water at the lowest possible price. Prior to the reform, the white commercial farmers could buy water from the government at a highly subsidised price (Zimconsult 1999b). In my interviews with these farmers and their representatives at the CFU, they frequently voiced the concern that an implication of the water sector reform would be that the old pricing system would be replaced and the price for water increase (e.g. Interview 10, 13,20, also CFU 1999). One interviewee

holding a senior position in the CFU described how the CFU tried to pressure the government to set a low price for water (Interview 1). The interview person recalled how the CFU at one time presented the government with a price that was obviously far below the average production cost for water (the NBP). The idea behind this was that since the CFU represented the biggest water consumer—the biggest buyer—the government had to take their demands into consideration. The interviewee said:

> **I:** The government is so unorganised and they can't get their ducks in a row, so they will just have to accept our offer. If we don't buy their water, then who will? Nobody. So they will have to accept or go bankrupt (Interview 1).

The position voiced by this interviewee suggests that the CFU responded to the threat of an increased price for water on the basis of strict economic rationality: the CFU attempted to use its strong market position to get a low price for a strategic production input.

In my interviews with other representatives of the white commercial farmers, there was, however, another recurrent line of argument regarding how to price water. This line of argument took as point of departure the historical achievements of the white farming community in the development of the country's water resources. As one CFU member put it:

> **I:** Me and my father developed this farm and in fact this whole community. Maybe the price for water has to increase for some stakeholders. But the major stakeholders, me and my peers, I think we have a major right, a legitimate right, on water (Interview 20, cf. Latham 2002; Interview 6, 12, 21,2B, 3B).

This interviewee suggests that on the basis of the historical achievements in the development of Zimbabwe, he and his peers—the white commercial farmers—are entitled to a low price on water today. He presents this as a moral argument in which it would be unjust to demand this group to pay a price for water that does not take into account the historical achievements of this community. Accordingly, a fair price should include a 'discount'. The interviewee alludes to the collective memory of what I have called the 'success story' of the white commercial farmers. It was the white commercial farmers who brought civilization and modern water management to Zimbabwe. These achievements form the foundation for a morally legitimate right to a low price on water.

Based on the line of reasoning represented by this interviewee, I argue that an important reason for the white commercial farmers' opposition to the reform water sector reform was that the government's pricing option

(NBP) did not recognise the historical achievements of the white farming community. NBP would require a *uniform* price for all consumers of water for commercial agricultural use in Zimbabwe (so called "raw water").[48] Apart from the economic arguments about the price for water, this pricing system was seen by the white commercial farmers as a way of depriving their community of a morally legitimate right obtained though their historical achievement. In the eyes of the white commercial farmers, these achievements amounted to a rightful claim on a lower price on water. Applying a national blend price would imply that the benefits from the whites' achievement would be reaped not only by the white commercial farmers but by the entire nation. In the eyes of these farmers, the heritage of whites in Zimbabwe would thus not be offered to the proper heirs but would be shared with the Other, blacks. From the perspective of Water as Gold, the government's attempts to apply a uniform price on water was a way of denying the value of the exceptional achievements of the white community.

IWRM's idea of water as an economic good was thus transformed from a question of market incentives for water management into a question of obtaining recognition for the particular construction of reality of white commercial farmers. This analysis of the CFU's policy on water pricing challenges the assumption that they acted based on economic reasons. This may be counter-intuitive since water is a major input in the production of agricultural goods, and it thus would be reasonable to assume that the CFU would be determined by economic calculations and rationality. In contrast to this economic rationality, I argue that the CFU opposed the government's attempt to introduce the NBP based on a rationale derived from the construction of reality of this group. However counter-intuitive, my interpretation is sustained by the economic analysis conducted by the widely recognised consultancy firm Zimconsult. This firm produced several reports about the different pricing options available to Zimbabwe as a means of assessing which groups would stand to gain from the respective pricing options considered during the reform (site/catchment/NBP). Interestingly, in Zimconsult's analysis, the economically most favourable pricing policy for large scale commercial farmers was NBP.[49] In other words, the government's price policy would have offered a lower price to commercial farmers than would the CFU's position. Zimconsult based its conclusion on the effects of applying a national and sub-national price system in prac-

[48] Water for "primary use"—i.e. household usage—and non-commercial agriculture would not be subjected to any price.

[49] This conclusion is concurred with by the Water Economist Stefan Helming–seconded to the DWD by GtZ–who analysed the effects of different pricing systems as part of the German government's support to the water sector reform, see Helming (1993).

tice. Using both historical and theoretical arguments, Zimconsult shows that the NBP system stood out as the most economically rational option for large scale commercial farmers. Peter Robinsson, head of Zimconsult, concluded that:

> The intention that the blend price system should protect new smallholders from the true cost of new schemes has thus not applied: it is large-scale commercial farmers who have benefited from the blend price cross-subsidies (Zimconsult 1999a:8).

In the assessment of Zimconsult, it was economically rational for the CFU to go along with the government's position. This analysis supports my interpretation that the CFU's response to the issue of water pricing was not driven by economic rationality. Using a different perspective, the economic rationality of the CFU was also questioned by David Durham, Deputy Director of Planning and Hydrology at Department of Water Development. On 24 of May 1999 Durham wrote a letter to the CFU in which he tried to convey the economic irrationality and risk of the CFU's position of opposing NBP in favour of a sub-national price (Durham 1999). Durham argued that a sub-national price would mean that the price would be based on the economic viability of each specific area or production site. Taking the example of the highly productive sugar industry, he wrote:

> [The government] could increase the price that supplies them with water ten times. This would provide a significant boost to the development of our water resources while still allowing the sugar industry to remain viable. (Durham 1999:1).

That is to say, a catchment or site-specific formula would allow the government to price water by considering the productivity of water usage in a specific area. The most productive catchments and sites would have a higher price than the average national blend price. And since the CFU typically represented the most productive farmers, the national blend price would offer CFU's members a discount on behalf of the less productive small and medium scale farmers. In a rather caustic tone, Durham ends his letter to the CFU suggesting that these calculations ought to be "food for thought for the future."

To sum up, taking into account both the economic perspective of Zimconsult and the policy perspective of the Department of Water Development, the CFU's opposition of the government's proposition of a national blend price seems to be economically irrational. The CFU's choice would not render the large commercial farming sector the lowest price for water while the government's pricing policy would. This begs the question: Why did CFU not go along with the position suggested by the government?

As I have state above, my argument is that for the white commercial farmers, the question of the water price was not an issue about strict economic rationality. It was about obtaining recognition for the historical achievements of the white community in the country. In the context of the relationship between the white commercial farmers and the government, IWRM's call for treating water as an economic good was transformed from a question of how many Zimbabwean dollars to pay for each quantity of water into a question of political recognition for Water as Gold. The CFU's response to different pricing options was derived from a rational defined by the construction of Water as Gold. This obstructed an agreement with the government on how to price water.

Stakeholder participation

In the following section I will analyse the transformation of IWRM's proposition for stakeholder participation by actors subscribing to Water as Gold. This proposition was built on the democratic ideal of widespread influence in the decision making processes related to the management of peoples' livelihood. In a manner that resembles the democratic ideal of universal suffrage, the call for stakeholder participation was based on the idea that all water users have a stake in water management and thus also hold a right to influence how it is managed.

At the outset of my fieldwork, my expectation was that the CFU would endorse IWRM's call for stakeholder participation. One might object that this was a naïve expectation. It was, however, based on the fact that prior to the reform, the white farming community was under increased political pressure to re-examine and redefine its role in the Zimbabwean society. The special 'bargain' between the government and the white community drawn up after Independence was withering away and there was increasing mobilisation in the government and society for the need to address the biased distribution of resources along racial lines (see chapter two and five). Some analysts even saw a risk of violence against the white community if the stark economic injustices were not addressed (Drinkwater 1991).

In this context, I expected that IWRM's call for stakeholder participation could be part of the CFU's strategy to reformulate its role in society. I thus expected the CFU to transform the call for stakeholder participation from IWRM's call for increased democracy in the water sector alone, into a means to gain a new and legitimate role in the changing Zimbabwean society at large. The CFU could use the water sector reform to engage in a peaceful dialogue with interested parties in society and the government on their future role in society and thus pre-empt the risk for social or even political violence against them.

For my expectation to be well grounded, my interviewees at CFU would have to be self-critical in their analysis of their role in the history of the

country. To sense a need to change, the CFU would have to recognise that it had been wrong. If the CFU was to see water sector reform as an opportunity to re-negotiate its role in society, they would have to recognise their role in the processes that had shaped the situation of social inequality now criticized. With this in mind, I asked members of the CFU how they perceived the need to modify the legal system to accommodate demands from the majority of the population whose voices currently were not heard. Consider the following extract from an interview with a high level official at the CFU concerning the reformation of the 1976 Water Act. Put in place during the time of white minority rule and remained, with only few amendments, the Act was the most important legal instrument for water distribution prior to the reform:

> **R:** Considering the fact that under the present Water Act there is little influence by the majority of the population in water management, do you think that there is a need to modify it to accommodate for the majority population as part of the water sector reform?
>
> **I:** The 1976 Water Act wasn't an exclusive thing. There was no discrimination against who could apply to the water court for a water right. Anyone who had a legitimate use for water and had the capital to buy a system could go to the water court and apply. The lack of efficient use of the Water Act and water created an unjust situation, not the system. So don't change the system, just use it better (Interview 1).

For the purpose of my analysis, what is interesting here is to analyse the consequences of the interviewee's view on the 1976 Water Act in relation to the IWRM call for stakeholder participation. In particular, it is interesting to note how the interviewee outlines his argument and what implications his reasoning have in terms of what should be regarded as the legitimate distribution of claims on and blames about water resources between different actors in the water sector. The interviewee states that the system for water management put in place prior to Independence did not discriminate against the black majority. It was, in his opinion, a legal instrument with a focus on technical prerequisites for who should be allowed to use water.[50]

[50] Technically, the interviewee is quite correct. There was nothing discriminatory, or even racist, in the in the 1976 Water Act. (Remember that the Act was put in place before Independence). The Act stipulates a set of neutral, technical requirements that have to be met before a water right can be approved (in particular Part VI and VIII of the Act). For an analysis of the political consequences of seemingly 'technical' regulations in Zimbabwe's agricultural sector, see Rutherford (2001); Derman (1998).

Any injustices in the current situation should be attributed to the misuse of the system, not the system as such.

In the context of the construction of Water as Gold, the statement of this interviewee translates into a statement that there was nothing wrong with the system for water management put in place by the whites. Any injustices in the current situation should be attributed to the misuse of the system by the blacks and their government after Independence. This statement thus alludes to the collective memory of whites bringing proper water management to an area historically characterised by underdevelopment and misuse of water. Moreover, his view fits nicely with the social identity construction of the irresponsible and backward blacks as incapable of proper water management. The bias in the social distribution of water between whites and blacks was due to the blacks being incapable of using the fair system put in place by the whites.

The line of reasoning illustrated by the interviewee above is instrumental in rebutting any argument that the white farming community had a political or moral 'debt' which would call on them to engage in stakeholder participation to rectify and re-negotiate their role in society. In fact, instead of a need to address any historical injustices, the implication of what this CFU representative says is that the historical role of the white farming community gives the white commercial farmers a legitimate right to special treatment in the current water sector reform. The reason for this is that it was the whites who provided this arid and unorganised area with a modern system for effective and equitable water management. For this they could, if anything, place a legitimate claim on continued special influence in the water sector.

At a later stage in the same interview cited above (Interview 1) I asked how the CFU's view on stakeholder participation was perceived by other actors engaged in the reform process. Recall here that IWRM's call for stakeholder participation was based on the widely accepted democratic norm of the right to self determination and had substantial backing from international development agencies, other farming groups, and, at least at a verbal level, the government itself.

> **R:** So I take it that CFU did not put too much energy in engaging new stakeholders during the reform process. How did other actors react to that? I mean there was such a strong moral and political pressure for this idea.
>
> **I:** Yeah, getting more stakeholders onboard was the politically astute thing to do at the time. And we discussed it quite a lot at the Committee on Irrigation [under the CFU Board]. We decided to advice our members that as they were heading

> to these stakeholder meetings they could stop off and grab some black guy by the collar and take him there so he can be seen. If he doesn't say a bloody word for the whole year, don't worry. Just you make sure that he gets elected the next year and stays there.

From the perspective represented by this interviewee, my expectation at the beginning of my fieldwork was thus not met. IWRM based the call for stakeholder participation on a democratic ideal resembling the ideal of universal suffrage. While I did not expect the white commercial farmers to necessarily embrace this ideal, I did expect them to see IWRM's call for stakeholder engagement as an opportunity to assess their historical role in Zimbabwe and use it as a platform for peaceful dialogue on their future position in society. From my analysis of the empirical material, the white commercial farmers' perception of their role in history precluded this motive for stakeholder participation. In their view, there was no blame associated with their historical role, and therefore there was no foundation for stakeholder engagement aiming at reconsidering the white community's role in society.

Further analysis suggests another, closely related, reason for why the white commercial farmers did not embrace IWRM's call for stakeholder participation. IWRM advanced the call for stakeholder participation based on the ideal of a democratic right to participate in the decision-making processes that affect a persons' livelihood. The right to influence the management of water is not connected to any particular achievement but is an *a priori* right held by water users. This view contrasts sharply with a recurrent theme in my interviews with white commercial farmers. According to them, the right to influence in the management of water was derived from active engagements and successful achievements in this sector. It was, as I have shown above, the historical achievement of the white farming community in Zimbabwe that formed the basis for their claims on influence. The view of these interviewee can be summarized like this: 'Stakeholder participation implies that influence in water management is taken from us who have deserved it thanks to achievements, and given to the blacks who neither have deserved it nor have the ability to deal with it' (Interviews 10, 11, 13, 20, 21).

For these actors, IWRM's call for stakeholder participation is thus transformed into a question of what value should be attributed to their and their fathers' historical achievements in water management. From the perspective of Water as Gold, IWRM's call for stakeholder participation as a democratic right equates to nullifying the value of whites' historical contribution to water management. Seen in this way, the commercial farmers' resistance to stakeholder participation should be understood as a way to try to obtain

social and political legitimacy for their construction of reality. If everybody has a right to influence in the management of water—irrespective of his or her achievements—what was the purpose of the sacrifices and hard work of the white farmers throughout history? None: if everybody was given the same rights, it would mean that society was not going to recognise the value of the whites' historical achievements.

The white commercial farmers can be further clarified if we recall how the government of Zimbabwe addressed the issue of stakeholder participation. From within the construction of Water as Zimbabwe, the government transformed IWRM's call for stakeholder participation into a legitimization of increased influence for itself (see chapter five). In its eyes, the call for stakeholder participation was not a call for increased democratisation in the sense that increased influence over water management would be placed in the hands of the voters, i.e., a devolution of power from the state to the people. Based on Water as Zimbabwe, the government saw itself as the legitimate representative of the blacks—the People—and the question of natural resources management as a quest to reclaim resources from the whites (see in particular the interview with Attorney General P. Chinamassa in chapter five). Taking this into account, the white commercial farmers' resistance to stakeholder participation should thus be seen as a resistance towards increased government influence. I have shown above that the relations between these farmers and the government were quite hostile. While the government tried to use the management of water to advance its post-colonial political project, the white commercial farmers were engaged in strategic action to manifest an alternative political agenda with special privileges for the white minority in line with Water as Gold. In the relations between the government and the white commercial farmers, IWRM's call for stakeholder participation was transformed into a component in the struggle over the manifestation of two competing constructions of reality: Water as Zimbabwe and Water as Gold.

Conclusions

In this chapter, I have analysed the transformations of IWRM by white commercial farmers subscribing to the construction of that I have labelled Water as Gold. At the centre of the transformation process were well organised political entrepreneurs in the CFU and the related group known as the Dream Team. For them, the reality of Water as Gold implied that the white commercial farmers were entitled to a very privileged position in Zimbabwe. It was, so the argument went, whites who had brought prospect to this arid land, and this gave whites the right to enjoy its fruits. These political entrepreneurs engaged in strategic action to manifest their construction of

reality and what they saw as its political and, indeed, moral implications. While the water sector reform challenged the historical privileges of the white commercial farmers—in terms of access to water at subsidised prices and strong influence in the decision making process around water—these political entrepreneurs aimed to defend and even expand what they considered to be their legitimate claims in the water sector.

Two parts of the construction of Water as Gold were essential to the transformation process. First, the white commercial farmers nurtured a collective memory in which whites had brought civilization and proper water management to an area previously characterised by underdevelopment and ineffective resource use. Second, they nurtured a social identity weaved around an imaginary self constructed as a negation of Them-the-Blacks. In this world of racial stereotypes, whites were progressive entrepreneurs while blacks were irresponsible and idle.

Water as Gold was thus instrumental to legitimising the white domination of the water sector. The white commercial farmers were keen to name the practice of water management as one that demands long terms planning and hard work. To enjoy the potentials of water resources—so the argument went—called for great entrepreneurial skills and willingness to calculate and take risks. The benefits of water are not inherent in water as such. If that had been the case, why did the blacks not enjoy it before the arrival of the white man? Successful management of water derived from the degree to which it was executed by people with the right mind-set. In the construction of Water as Gold, whites were the carrier of this ideal mind-set. By contrast, blacks—constructed as a stereotypic negation of whites—were the root of ineffective water management.

The collective memory and racial stereotypes of Water as Gold further guides what these actors regarded as the basis for making legitimate claims and blames on resources in the water sector. It is the successful achievements white men—stretching from the early days of the settlers to present day farmers—that constituted the basis for legitimate claims on resources. The black's burden was brought on themselves and implied no obligations for the white farmers. There was no historical mischief on the part of the white community—neither during the pre- nor post-Independent period—that would constitute the basis for legitimate claims for the white commercial farmers to make concessions towards the blacks. Quite the contrary, the white commercial farmers regarded themselves as entitled to legitimate claims on favourable deals in the water sector (such as a relatively lower price on water).

The construction of Water as Gold implied that the meaning of each of the three pillars of IWRM was transformed in the eyes of white commercial farmers who engaged with it to have their views manifested as legitimate in society at large. Table 6.1 summarises the transformed meanings of each pillar and points to its behavioural implications.

Water as Gold		
Pillar of IWRM	**Transformed meaning**	**Behavioural implication**
Catchment management	Platform for political mobilization against post-colonial rulers, for maintaining white farmers' reality constructions and privileges.	Use legal provision for catchment management to step-up organisation of alternative political agenda and to spread this to catchments throughout the country as part of a process aiming at a increased leverage for whites in society at large.
Water as an economic good	Call to deprive white commercial farmers of legitimate, historically obtained, discount on water pricing.	Oppose economically favourable pricing policy offered by the Government as a means to maintain recognition for construction of Water as Gold.
Stakeholder participation	Means to increase control by backward Blacks at the expense of progressive Whites.	Support the display of blacks at stakeholder meetings but obstruct any substantial influence by blacks.

Table 6.1. Summary of transformation of IWRM in relation to Water as Gold

7. IWRM AND WATER AS SCIENCE

The third IWRM transformation to be analysed is that by actors subscribing to a construction of water that I have labelled "Water as Science". Since those who enacted this transformation were primarily employed in Zimbabwean government institutions (e.g. DWD and ZINWA), I have labelled these actors as "scientific water officials" for the purposes of this chapter.

The chapter is organised as follows. The first section outlines in detail the two tenets of the construction of Water as Science: (i) a strong belief in the ability of natural sciences to distinguish the relevant problems and solutions to issues of water resources management, and (ii) the emphasis on water resources management as a scientific practice in service of the national development of Zimbabwe. In section two, I focus on the struggle around competing claims on the social identity of lead-agent in the reform process. The empirical point of departure is the fact that the Zimbabwean government chose *not* to entrust the implementation of the water sector reform with the cadre of existing scientific water officials in the administration but set up a new group of actors—the Inter-Ministerial Steering Group and the Water Resources Management Strategy team (IMSG/WRMS)—and entrusted them with this prestigious task. This set the stage for a competitive interaction between political entrepreneurs advancing the respective constructions of Water as Science (held by the scientific water officials) and IWRM (held by the IMSG/WRMS officials). The subsequent three sections focus on the transformation of IWRM with respect to the three pillars of IWRM: catchment management, water as an economic good, and stakeholder participation. The chapter closes with a presentation of the conclusions of the analysis.

Water as Science

From my interviews with people in the public institutions for water management in Zimbabwe, it became clear that many of them had a firm confidence in the ability of the natural sciences to provide the proper roadmap to water resources management. They shared a collective memory according to which the relevant problems and proper solutions to water resources management will be defined by natural sciences. Consequently, they saw the managerial challenge as simply applying natural scientific models and practices to water resources and subsequently determining the

optimal solution to the water problems (e.g. interview 16, 10B, 4B, 8B). This collective confidence in the natural science forms the basis for the first tenet of Water as Science.

The historical roots of this collective memory can be traced back to the colonial period. At the time, a significant part of Rhodesia's image as a modern, progressive nation hinged on Rhodesia's reputation as a world leader in water management. In particular, Rhodesia's world leading role in water management was manifested in the massive Kariba dam completed in 1960. The Kariba dam tamed the mighty Zambezi River into what was then, and still is, one of the world's largest dam constructions. Situated in "the middle of nowhere"—i.e. in the inhospitable Zambezi valley populated mainly by tzetze flies—the Kariba dam was widely seen as the icon of the "civilization project" in which man used science to master nature on the African continent (Interview 12, 20, 2B, 3B; Soils Incorporated (Pty) Ltd and Chalo Environmental and Sustainable Development Consultants 2000; Stålgren and Söderbaum 2002).

Water resources management as a way of using natural sciences to subject nature to the needs of mankind was a recurrent theme in my interviews in Harare (in particular interview 16, 4B, 6B). They described scientific water management as a practice of using scientific methods to define the needs and opportunities of mankind in relation to nature. Interestingly, anthropologist Wendy Nelson Espeland (1998) describes a similar way of thinking from her studies of scientific water officials in the USA. She writes this about these actors' "engineering ethos":

> [They regard] the conquest and possession of nature as a source of wealth and redemption; the transformation of what was dangerous, wasteful, and remote into something compliant useful, and accessible; how taming nature revealed man at his best – heroic, dominant, intelligent. (p. 47).

As did their colleagues in the USA, the scientific water officials in Zimbabwe described nature as a resource to be explored and enjoyed by means of scientific practices for the benefit of mankind. Connected to this collective memory was the social identity in which the scientific water officials saw themselves as the vanguard of the subjugation of nature. This was, in the words of Espeland "man at his best" engaged in "taming nature" (cf. interview 20, 20B 4B-9B).

This similarity in outlook between my findings in Zimbabwe and Espeland's in the USA can perhaps be attributed to the similar academic training of scientific water officials in the two countries. From my interviews I found out that many scientific water officials had a formal academic training in some natural science subject (mainly hydrology or hydrogeo-

logy) from universities in Africa or overseas.[51] Several of them frequently participated in international scientific conferences which kept them up to date on the latest international findings and methods of scientific water resources management.

The second tenet of Water as Science that I found in my interviews was a strong emphasis on scientific water management as a practice that should be applied in service of the nation of Zimbabwe. Based on this view, these interviewees were very reluctant to take sides on issues on the social distribution of water resources *within* the country. That was, they said, "politics" and not "water management". As one interviewee put it "You know, water is water, and water is basically non-political" (Interview 12).

Scientific water resources management was thus seen as a practice that stood above domestic political infighting with the aim of serving the development of the nation as a whole. This sentiment is captured in a statement reiterated by many interviewees, almost like an in-house slogan at the Department of Water Development:

> **I:** The basin stops at the boarder. Every drop of water that goes to Mozambique is a wasted drop of water (for ex. interview 4B, 5B, 6B; cf. Derman 2000).

Of course, those saying this would know from their natural science backgrounds that a basin does not stop at the boarder. A basin is defined by the geography that distinguishes one system of surface and groundwater from the next. The flow of water in a basin does not consider national boarders but follows the shapes of nature. Nevertheless, the interviewees compromised their scientific epistemology in this case to uphold a nationalistic ideology. Consequently, every drop of water that was not developed within the boundaries of the nation but goes downstream to Mozambique was considered a professional failure ("a wasted drop of water"). I take this as a sign that these people, besides seeing themselves as natural scientists, identified themselves as part of the development of Zimbabwe. In fact, we could respecify the statement above—that their scientific outlook implied subjecting nature to mankind—to say that their scientific outlook implied subjecting nature to the *citizens of Zimbabwe*. The scientific water officials were determined to bring water to their fellow citizens, and through their scientific outlook they subjected nature to the people of Zimbabwe.

This close affinity to the development of the nation makes it easy to associate Water as Science with the construction of Water as Zimbabwe

[51] Hydrology and hydrogeology are the two main natural science disciplines concerned with water management. Hydrologists are experts on surface water, while hydrogeologists have their expertise on groundwater management.

(chapter five). However, although both realities are constructed around an agenda of national development they should be seen as distinct. Indeed, many of the interviewed scientific water officials emphasised the need to "keep politics out" and often deplored how politicians used water as a means to favour their own political interest rather than the interests of the nation (Interview 20, 4B, 5B). In their view, politicians used water as a means to build a political platform for the benefit of the politicians. By contrast, the scientific water officials argued that water should be used as a means to build a platform for development of the entire nation.

To sum up, scientific water officials identified themselves as the vanguard in the application of natural sciences to water resources management problems in service of national development.

Competing claims on leading positions in Zimbabwe's water administration

How was IWRM transformed by actors subscribing to Water as Science? To address this question I first turn to the competition between, on the one hand, the Department of Water Development (DWD) and, on the other, the Inter-Ministerial Steering Group and the Water Resources Management Strategy team (IMSG/WRMS). The DWD group of scientific water officials had a long tradition of scientific water management in Zimbabwe, while the IMSG/WRMS group was only set up by the government and donor community to spearhead the water sector reform. The Inter-Ministerial Steering Group (IMSG) was assigned the function of the administrative nexus of the reform process. To give IMSG sufficient weight in the existing administrative structures, it was headed by the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Land and Water Resources. WRMS was the designated operational body under IMSG and mandated to drive the reform process on a day-to-day basis (Government of Zimbabwe, Government of Netherlands et al. 1995).[52]

The focus in this section is on how political entrepreneurs within the DWD acted to undermine the political and financial viability of the IMSG/WRMS. My argument is that the aim of actors within the DWD was to reclaim from the IWSG/WRMS what they saw as their entitled social identity as the vanguard of water resources management in Zimbabwe. My conclusion is that this power struggle had the effect that the actor designated by the government and supporting donors to implement

[52] Evidence suggests that as the reform got under way tensions developed between IMSG and WRMS. As I do not see these as significant for the transformation of IWRM, I do not attend to them explicitly.

IWRM in Zimbabwe—the IMSG/WRMS—was substantially weakened and de-legitimised. Those who were affiliated with the implementation of IWRM in Zimbabwe were marginalised within the administrative and political structures and, as I will show, deprived of their ability to forcefully implement IWRM.

Great expectations and disappointments

As I have shown above, the public water officials at the DWD nurtured a proud collective memory of water management dating back to the 1950's and 1960's. As the water sector reform set off at the mid-1990's, these actors saw themselves as the rightful leaders of the reform (Interview 4, 8, 5B, 6 B, 7B). The government, supported by the international donor community, did not act to meet these expectations but decided to set up a new entity—the IMSG/WRMS—and put them in the position to spearhead the reform process (Government of Zimbabwe 1995). Why did the government of Zimbabwe not trust the DWD to lead the water reform process? As I have shown in chapter five, the post-colonial government tried to manifest Zimbabwe as a political platform. To succeed in this ambition, the government had to strike the right balance between, on the one hand, demands on market liberalisations and structural reforms voiced by the international donor community and progressive parts of the Zimbabwean establishment, and, on the other hand, demands for an increased nationalisation which would free Zimbabwe from the reminiscence of white domination lingering on since the colonial period. During the early 1990's different groups of political entrepreneurs around the government supported these respective demands, i.e. increased liberalisation, and increased nationalisation respectively (Moyo 1995; Skålnäs 1995; Darnolf and Laakso 2003). The inauguration of the IMSG/WRMS was a compromise that could satisfy demands of both these camps. Even though the IMSG/WRMS were *de jure* government bodies, they had an image of independence. An official at one of the international development agencies supporting IWRM put it like this:

> **I:** WRMS were in the government, but not of the government (Interview 26).

This picture of the new agency made it easy for the liberal reformists to accept the IMSG/WRMS under the umbrella of market liberalisation and structural adjustments. For proponents of increased market liberalisation and structural adjustment, the IWRM/WRMS was a way to "outsource" the water reform in accordance with the slogan of "rolling back the state" which was popular among international development agencies at the time (Bond and Manyanya 2003). By contrast, for supporters of the nationalisation process, the choice to discount the DWD could be put up as a way to

isolate what in conservative circles was considered to be "a white unit" in the post-colonial administration (Interview 16B). As I described in chapters five and six, the post-colonial government rested heavily on the technical know-how and competence of the white community in Zimbabwe. Given the white farmers' specialisation in irrigation and water management, it is not surprising that, as one interviewee put it, the "DWD had too many white faces" (Interview 12). The political entrepreneurs in government who portrayed the DWD as a safe haven for whites could be satisfied by the government's choice not to give the DWD the prestigious and powerful task to spearhead the reform.

As the government of Zimbabwe decided to entrust the role of lead-actor in the reform to the IWSG/WRMS rather than the DWD, this was seen by my interviewees from the DWD as a direct attack on their social identity. Consider how one senior official at the DWD headquarters described these developments:

> **R:** Would you tell me about the relationship between, on the one hand, the IMSG/WRMS, and, on the other hand, DWD?
>
> **I:** Initially all things were supposed to happen within the DWD. But then WRMS became as a separate body under the Ministry. WRMS became much like just another Department. Initially they were supposed to capacity build within the DWD. But they did not; there was no capacity building and no co-ordination between WRMS and DWD. We were as two different departments. But one was the favoured son; the other was the un-favoured son.
>
> **R:** Was WRMS becoming too powerful?
>
> **I:** Yes, but they did not fulfil expectations. It can perhaps not be classified as a total failure, your view on that one depends on where you sit (Interview 5B).

This quote illustrates the disappointment and offence felt by managers at the DWD as a result of the inauguration of the IMSG/WRMS. The interviewee asserts the sentiment of entitlement to the leading role during the reform: "all things were supposed to happen within the DWD". Contrary to these expectations, the IMSG/WRMS was set up to become an organisational unit with the status of "another Department". This created a sense within the DWD of having been deprived of their social identity as the main actor within the water sector. The prestigious role of spearheading the reform was

given to a suddenly favoured upstart—"the favoured son"—without any consideration of historically based achievements and rights.

According to the blueprint of the reform, recruitment to the IMSG/WRMS should have assured the assembling of a highly qualified team with diverse professional backgrounds, whose combined experience would facilitate an *integrated* approach to water management (Government of Zimbabwe, Government of Netherlands et al. 1995). Members of the IMSG were consequently recruited from within government to assure a strong basis for the reform process within different Zimbabwean ministries with stakes in water resources management. The WRMS was made up of senior actors with different academic and professional experience, including development economics, modern environmental management, and communication experts (Government of Zimbabwe, Government of Netherlands et al. 1995: Annex 2). The intended relationship between the DWD and these new actors was stipulated in the Terms of Reference of the WRMS. It reads:

> [WRMS should] introduce to the Department of Water Resources and collaborating government entities a new approach to water resources planning. (Government of Zimbabwe, Government of Netherlands et al. 1995: Annex 6, p. 3)

What is more, the same document instructs the DWD's staff how to relate to these new actors:

> [The department's staff should] be professionally guided by the appropriate professional in the WRMS Secretariat. (Government of Zimbabwe, Government of Netherlands et al. 1995: Annex 6, p. 28).

In the eyes of management at the DWD, these formulations implied that the WRMS was set up to 'teach' the DWD proper water management while the DWD staff were to accept the role of pupils guided by the 'professionalism' of the WRMS officials (Government of Zimbabwe, Government of Netherlands et al. 1995). Given the social identity of the scientific water officials at the DWD, it is not difficult to understand that this division of labour was difficult to stomach. As to further increase the impudence felt by the DWD, their new 'teachers' comprised people without training in natural science. As frequently pointed out in my interviews at the DWD, some members of the WRMS even had a *social* science background as opposed to the strong emphasis on *natural* sciences within the department. This is how one senior manager at the DWD described the recruitment of the WRMS officials:

> **I:** The tenders that went out [for recruiting the WRMS team] were not qualified. These people had no prior experience with proper water management, at least not the majority of WRMS people (Interview 4B).

Similarly, regarding the chairman of the WRMS, Mr. Pazvakavambwa, this interviewee said:

> **I:** Simon Pazvakavambwa was recruited on political grounds. He was the former Director of Agritex [Agricultural Extensions Services] but had no prior experience for the water resources section, and today we cannot use the WRMS document for anything (Interview 4B).

My interviewees at the DWD thus constructed a social identity of the WRMS which was in large parts the opposite of their own. Contrary to the scientific water officials at the DWD, the people recruited to the WRMS were not selected based on their natural science background, nor did they have a proven track record of water management in Zimbabwe. The recruitment was seen as the result of illegitimate political considerations. The WRMS was in stark contrast to the DWD's social identity of competence in natural sciences and a-political role in the historical development of the country.

How did actors at the DWD react to the inauguration of the IMSG/WRMS to lead the reform? To address this question, the two subsequent sections outline two ways in which political entrepreneurs within the DWD tried to deal with the fact that the prestigious role of spearheading the reform had been given to "new kids on the block" (Interview 8). In line with the first strategy, managers in the DWD tried to use their established positions within the Zimbabwean bureaucracy to *bypass* the WRMS and hence regain control of the developments in the water sector. Second, as attempts to bypass this new actor were only partly successful, the DWD explored its strategic advantages of being well connected in the existing public administration to *isolate* the WRMS and render it incapable of pursuing what the DWD saw as their task.

Bypassing the "new kids on the block"

Management at the DWD had great hopes for the reform process as it began in the mid-1990's. In line with the IMF's Structural Adjustment Program, which was applied in Zimbabwe at the time, the DWD had suffered repeated budget cutbacks and consequently experienced severe 'brain drain', losing key experts to better paid jobs in the private sector in Zimbabwe and abroad. When the water sector reform was starting to take off, this was seen by the DWD's management as a sign of that the tide had turned and that

they once again would get the attention and resources of the government as well as the international donor community (Interview 4, 5B, 7B).

As I have pointed out, these hopes were not met. Realising that the IMSG/WRMS was being selected to spearhead the reform process, the DWD managers found themselves in a dilemma. On the one hand, the insult of not having been selected for this task suggested that they should disavow the WRMS completely and try to sabotage the reform process. On the other hand, the reform process represented a chance to obtain financial resources and confirm the DWD's proud history in service of the nation. Facing this dilemma, political entrepreneurs at the DWD engaged to bypass the IMSG/WRMS. That is, they tried to run the management of water sector along established routines—with the DWD as the main actor—without paying more than lip-service to the official status of the IMSG/WRMS. The aim was to render the IMSG/WRMS inefficient and irrelevant, with the result that the DWD would be reinstated to its position in the water sector, while maintaining the government's and donors' increasing attention to the sector. When it became 'obvious' that the IMSG/WRMS were incompetent—so the reasoning went—the DWD would be asked to officially take over the reform process from these "new kids on the block" (Interviews 16, 4B, 5B, 7B).

In this context we should recall that the organizational structure of the water sector reform was deliberately designed to ensure the IMSG/WRMS's firm footing in the existing web of actors in the water sector (Government of Zimbabwe, Government of Netherlands et al. 1995). The government and supporting donors had identified the link between the IMSG/WRMS and existing actors in the water sector as key to a successful water sectors reform. To this end the IMSG (which oversaw the WRMS) was assigned to function as the administrative nexus of the reform process, and all government ministries with a stake in the water sector were invited to participate in the IMSG. As political entrepreneurs at the DWD set out to isolate the IMSG/WRMS they thus targeted a key strategic component of the reform.

Despite the government and donors' attempts to give the reform a firm footing in the existing administrative structures, the DWD enjoyed the advantage of having a long history in the Zimbabwean bureaucracy. While the members of the IMSG/WRMS were busy getting organised, this strategic advantage was readily used by senior staff at the DWD to prepare drafts of key components of the country's future water management structure. The aim of these hasty moves was to bypass the IMSG/WRMS.

The first attempt by the DWD to by-pass the IMSG/WRMS was evident at a very early stage of the reform. In fact, the minutes from one of the first meeting of the the IMSG state:

> The majority [of the Inter-Ministerial Steering Group] felt that the proposal [filed by DWD] gave the impression that DWD wanted to strengthen the Department and use WRMS

as a means to achieve this. (Inter-Ministerial Steering Group 7 June 1994).

This quote indicates that the DWD did not act in line with the new administrative order set up as part of the water sector reform. On the contrary, the DWD tried to use the WRMS as a means to favour its own position while leaving the WRMS out of the administrative loop. The attempts by the DWD to bypass the IMSG/WRMS are further evident from the proceedings regarding the content of Terms of Reference for the WRMS. Table 7.1. summaries these proceedings. Since the DWD was the most experienced actor in the water sector, the DWD's management was assigned by the IMSG to draft the Terms of Reference for the WRMS. Interestingly, in the draft presented by the DWD to the IMSG, the WRMS would be administratively subsumed under the DWD and assigned a status equivalent to other branches of the Department (see the first column, table 7.1.). This structure was quite the opposite of the structure outlined by the government in which the WRMS was placed on equal footing with the DWD (Government of Zimbabwe, Government of Netherlands et al. 1995). The structures proposed by the DWD worked to bypass the WRMS and put the DWD back in control of the reform. In reaction to this move, political entrepreneurs in support of the IMSG/WRMS opposed the DWD's propositions which lead to substantial revision of the DWD's draft (see second and third column, table 7.1).

It is evident from the IMSG's deliberations regarding the WRMS Terms of Reference that the DWD failed in their attempt to bypass these new actors. As the table shows, the suggestions made by the DWD were checked and changed by the IMSG. However, as further analysis of these relations show, the DWD officials were quick to take a new initiative to try to bypass these new actors.

The second attempt to bypass the IMSG/WRMS was evident in the preparation of the ZINWA Act. The ZINWA Act was the legal foundation for the organization designed to take over the bulk of water management services in accordance with the reform (see chapter two). In other words, the ZINWA Act outlined the future workplace for many of the water managers who used to work with the DWD. The attempt to bypass the WRMS was played out at the IMSG meeting on 16 November 1994. Without prior notice and without any official mandate, the Deputy Director of the DWD, Mr. Landing, presented an outline plan for ZINWA. Not surprisingly, the DWD's bold initiative met with immediate and strong reactions by members of the IMSG. The minutes from the meeting tell us that some members of the IMSG objected by raising the questions whether the DWD's motion was "appropriate" and should be discussed at the meeting. Others moved to strike the DWD's initiative from the agenda and suggested that the meeting should continue in accordance with the stipulated procedures,

i.e. without regard to the DWD's plan for ZINWA. The minutes reveal, however, that after "some discussions" a compromise was reached whereby the DWD's motion should be reviewed in cooperation with other members of the IMSG. Trying to prevent any similar attempts in the future, the chairman of the IMSG ended the meeting by giving specific instructions that if anyone wanted to make suggestions regarding the water sector reform they should submit their proposals to the chairman. This would allow the chairman to circulate the suggestions to all the concerned parties to assure that the reform process was run according to plans (Inter-Ministerial Steering Group 16 November 1994).

The DWD's draft Terms of Reference for the WRMS	The WRMS Terms of Reference after the IMSG's move to counter the DWD	Comment
Item 2 of the draft ToR stipulates the WRMS's function: "In cooperation with the DWD Planning Unit, draw up Terms of References for diagnostic, background, field and support studies as outlined in the approved detailed Actions plan".	"Draw up ToR for diagnostic, background, field and support studies as outlined in the approved detailed Actions plan".	The IMSG moved to strike "In cooperation with the DWD Planning Unit". This change increased the leverage for the WRMS and emphasis that the reform was not run by the DWD.
Item 8 of the draft ToR stipulate that The WRMS's tasks include "Recommending changes to the legislation to ensure that the strategy as it relates to their sector can be implemented".	Recommending to the IMSG changes to the legislation to ensure that the strategy as it relates to their sector can be implemented.	The formulation in the DWD's text does not say to whom WRMS should make its recommendations. In the administrative milieu in which the DWD was the default option for any initiatives regarding water management, this omission could easily be used to the DWD's advantage. As the IMSG realized this danger, it moved to clarify the first part of Item 8 by stating that the recommendations should be made to the IMSG.
Item 9 did not exist in the DWD's draft but was added by the the IMSG.	Item 9 reads "Carry out any other task related to the WRMS as directed by the IMSG".	In light of the risk that the DWD might try to use the WRMS for its own purposes, the IMSG clearly manifests the order of command, i.e. that the WRMS is under the IMSG, not the DWD.

Table 7.1. Comparison between the Terms of Reference proposed by the DWD and the Ministry of Lands and Water Resource together with supporting donors Source: Internal documents from the DWD; Government of Zimbabwe 1995: Annex 2.

In the sections above I have analysed two attempts by political entrepreneurs within the DWD to bypass the IMSG/WRMS with the aim of regaining control of the reform. Neither of these attempts can be classified as successful. The third and final example that I shall give represents a successful attempt on behalf of the DWD. This move by the political entrepreneurs at the DWD came to the attention of the IMSG on the 31 August, 1995. The IMSG was then informed by the DWD that a "paper on the formulation of a National Water Authority (ZINWA) and proposed changes to the Water Act" had been "sent up the line" and was "currently being considered by Cabinet" (Inter-Ministerial Steering Group 31 August 1995). Compared with previous initiatives by the DWD, this time the DWD's move not only included the ZINWA Act but also the second major legal document of the reform, the Water Act which was to guide the future water distribution in Zimbabwe. In addition, while the DWD previously had presented their plans to the IMSG, this time they only reported on what was already done. The IMSG was presented with a *fait accompli*. Not surprisingly, the DWD's bold initiative evoked sharp protests from members of the the IMSG/WRMS. However, this time it was too late for the IMSG to check the move by the DWD and the proposition was already with the Cabinet.

Reading the minutes from the IMSG meeting on the 31 August 1995 it is evident that several members of the IMSG voiced their complaints. However, this time the chairman had no choice but to close the meeting with a lame request to "receive a copy of the Cabinet Memorandum". The DWD could thus record that, instead of actually steering the water sector reform, the IMSG/WRMS were now in a position of having to ask the DWD for information regarding developments initiated by the DWD regarding the key legal instruments of the reform. This must be seen as a substantial defeat for the IMSG/WRMS, and an equal victory for the DWD management in their quest to regain what they saw as the position to which they were entitled: as the organisation that should lead the water sector reform in Zimbabwe.

Isolating the "new kids on the block"

The analysis above has shown that in the eyes of political entrepreneurs at the DWD, the fact that they were not selected to spearhead the water sector reform was a great disappointment. The DWD's management had expected that the water sector reform would confirm their social identity as the vanguard of Zimbabwean development. With the inauguration of the IMSG/WRMS, these expectations were threatened.

The previous section showed that the DWD tried to *bypass* the IMSG/WRMS so as to render the latter irrelevant and promote their own position. In this section I will analyse how the DWD tried to obtain the same goal by *isolating* the newcomers from the wider administrative structure

and the international donor community. The idea was that by cutting off the IMSG/WRMS from external support it would, to use the figurative speech of one interview person, "be killed" (Interview 5B). In this context, to "kill" the IMSG/WRMS meant to make them irrelevant and hence have the DWD reinstated as the leading actor in the water sector.

The rationale behind the DWD's attempts to isolate the IMSG/WMRS becomes clear if we consider the blueprint for reform (see Government of Zimbabwe, Government of Netherlands et al. 1995:28ff). Good and functional communication between the IMSG/WRMS and the existing administrative structure was seen as essential for the long term effects of the reform. In fact, the long-term impact and dissemination of the reform was seen as a direct function of the degree to which the IMSG/WRMS were attached to and incorporated into existing administrative structures.

Many of my interviewees were reluctant to talk about the relationship between the IMSG/WRMS and the DWD. When I brought up the subject, they would describe the relationship in vague language. For example, one interviewee described the relationship simply as "cordial". Others would chose to talk about something else despite repeated questioning. The clearest testimony of these events comes from members of the IMSG/WRMS who described the effects of the DWD's moves to isolate them as a feeling of "alienation" with the existing administrative structure. One of them said:

> **I:** We were seen as us and them. It was we the WRMS people, and them at the DWD (Interview 8).

Another official in the IMSG/WRMS team expressed the same sentiment of alienation:

> **I:** We never felt owned by the Ministry and there is a great risk that the work we have done will just collect dust on some shelf. We were supposed to have a lot of support from different ministries, but instead it just turned into a power struggle.
>
> **R:** In your opinion, what was the effect of all this?
>
> **I:** There was initially this idea that WRMS should continue after its initially set life time. But now people think that it should not. The expectations on WRMS never were fulfilled, and now we have even lost the support of the donors (Interview 18).

As these quotes illustrate, the members of the IMSG/WRMS were isolated from the existing administrative structure in the Zimbabwean administra-

tion. Contrary to the initial efforts to create an integrated structure, there was a sense of "us" and "them" between the IMSG/WRMS and DWD.

Paralleling the isolation of the IMSG/WRMS from the rest of the Zimbabwean administration, a vital component in the DWD's attempt comprised steps to ensure that communication between the IMSG/WRMS and the donor community was cut off. The communication between the IMSG/WRMS and the donors was widely seen as decisive for the viability of the newcomers and the success of the reform (Government of Zimbabwe, Government of Netherlands et al. 1995:28). Of particular importance were communications with Norad (representing Norway) and DGIS (the Dutch) who were the main supporters of the WRMS. Indeed, Norad/DGIS provided the lion's share of the WRMS budget and its financial support was vital for the reform process.

In an attempt to ensure that the reform process became an integrated part of the government structures, the government had stipulated that all communications between the WRMS and donors must go via the responsible Ministry (the Ministry of Rural Resources and Water Resources, MRRWR, see Government of Zimbabwe, Government of Netherlands et al. 1995). Officially the donors endorsed this stipulation. It was, as several interviewees explained, in line with the ambition to obtain "local ownership", which was seen as vital to ensure long terms success of the reform (Interview 26, 15B). However, it is clear from my interviews with actors in the donor community that while the donors endorsed the ambition to integrate the IMSG/WRMS in the existing Zimbabwean administration, they also wanted to see these actors (in particular the WRMS) as something different from the rest of the government. The donors wanted a hybrid in which these new actors were "in the government but not of the government" (Interview 26). The IMSG/WRMS's ability to live up to this hybrid social identity was seen by many interviewees as an important reason why the IMSG/WRMS got so much donor support. In fact, one WRMS official described the organisation saying:

> **I:** We became a well fed donor baby (Interview 8).

The IMSG/WRMS's ambiguous position in the government administration—"in the government but not of the government"—was systematically used by political entrepreneurs in the DWD to isolate the baby from its mother, i.e. the donors. The first sign of this was that messages from the WRMS to the donors simply never reached their recipients (Interview 30B). According to my interviewees, the reasons for this was that the messages from the WMRS were stopped by actors in the DWD who were well connected with the administrative structure and thus had access to postage services

and the like (Interview 8,9,18). The management at the DWD thus used their established influence with the administration to interfere with the vital communication link between its adversary and the donors.

Realizing that the IMSG/WRMS was being increasingly isolated from the donors, the WRMS's chairman, Mr. Simon Pazvakavambwa, disregarded the protocol that stipulated that all communications should go via the responsible Ministry. He engaged in direct contacts with separate donor agencies. At first, the donors appreciated this directness as it matched the ambition to bypass some of the malignant state bureaucracy. Simon Pazvakavambwa's directness was in line with the donors' hoped-for hybrid social identity, and one donor said that they were "quite happy to cut some of that red tape" (Interview 30B).

However, after some time the donors started to suspect that mischief was afoot. The reason was that as the direct communication between the WRMS are the donors increased, the communication from the officially stipulated channels—via the Ministry—decreased. What had been appreciated by the donors as clear and direct communications was increasingly seen as a sign that something was wrong. Some donor agents interpreted these developments as a sign that WRMS chairman, Mr. Pazvakavambwa, had become "autocratic" (Interview 26, 15B). Other donors suspected that Mr. Pazvakavambwa's direct communication was a sign that the reform process had lost "local ownership", i.e. that the WRMS had been detached from the established government institutions (Interview 26, 16B, C3). Based on this analysis, several donors increasingly disattended Mr. Pazvakavambwa's direct approaches and encouraged him to communicate via the Ministry. As this communication link was controlled by established actors within the DWD, the WRMS was increasingly isolated from communication with the previously supportive donor community.

From the above I conclude that the political entrepreneurs trying to isolate the WRMS were quite successful. To use the language of one of the official cited above, the DWD had managed to separate the "baby" from its "mother". The isolation from the donors created severe financial problems for the WRMS. For example, several attempts were made by the WRMS's chairman to negotiate an extension of the WRMS's project. My interviews with the donors suggest that they were, in principle, quite willing to meet this request. A decisive reason why they did not, however, was that the reform process seemed to have lost "local ownership".

To sum up, I have analysed how political entrepreneurs engaged in a power struggle over the position as lead-actor of Zimbabwe's water sector reform. Drawing on their social identity as the scientific vanguard in the historical development of the country's water resources, the political entrepreneurs at the DWD felt that they had a legitimate claim for this prestigious position.

However, the IMSG/WRMS were placed in this position and the scientific water officials at the DWD attempted to bypass and isolate the IMSG/WRMS. As a means to this end, the DWD constructed a social identity that served to de-legitimize any claims made by the IMSG/WRMS on the position as lead-actor. According to this social identity, the IMSG/WRMS was an incompetent group of political appointees. This social identity was the opposite to the social identity of the scientific water officials, who were portrayed as the providers of a scientifically-based approach that would benefit the national development of Zimbabwe. Political entrepreneurs at the DWD were quite successful in their attempts to de-legitimise and out-manoeuvre the IMSG/WRMS, and the position of the IMSG/WRMS became increasingly weak during the reform process.

The effect of these developments was that the actors originally designated to implement IWRM in Zimbabwe were deprived of their political and economic viability. My argument is that as the champion of IWRM was marginalised, the room for other political entrepreneurs to transform IWRM increased. This conclusion builds on the assumption that had the IMSG/WRMS been able to maintain a strong position through the reform, it would have been able to more forcefully engage in activities to convince water users of the benefits of IWRM. In addition, it is reasonable to argue that as the scientific water officials de-legitimatised the IMSG/WRMS, this spilled over on the wider social and political legitimacy of IWRM as an approach to water resources management. These scientific water officials were widely seen as the nation's experts on water resources management. As these experts were seen to de-legitimise the messengers carrying IWRM, stakeholders in society at large could easily conclude that the established experts on water management also disavowed IWRM as the foundation of the reform process.[53]

[53] Above I argue that officials within the water sector reacted to the reform in ways that would maintain their professional identities. How does this argument fair against the popular argument that the actors were driven by economic incentives? As the water reform process gained momentum during the early 1990's, the DWD, as was much of Zimbabwe's public sector, was subjected to severe budgetary reforms in a corollary of the structural adjustment programme, ESAP. Decreasing budget funds offset a 'brain drain' from the DWD as some of its most qualified officials joined the private sector or moved to greener pastures in neighbouring countries and beyond. In this context the water sector reform was widely associated with great hopes. In 1993 the World Bank hosted a major conference on IWRM at Victoria Falls (see chapter two), and donors were showing substantial interest in funding water sector reforms in Southern Africa. In other words, water sector reform was on every donor's agenda, and IWRM was the latest fashion. So if the water sector officials were perceptive of economic incentives, adopting IWRM seems like the right thing to do. The fact that they did not adds support for non-interest based explanations as the one that I present.

Transforming the pillars of IWRM in relation to Water as Science

Catchment management

In this section I analyse how IWRM's call for catchment management was transformed by scientific water officials acting out of the construction of Water as Science. As I started my fieldwork in Zimbabwe, I did not expect scientific water officials to have any objections to IWRM's call for catchment management. The reason was that scientific water officials typically have formal training in hydrology or hydrogeology, in which catchments are a central concept. A person trained in such natural sciences is thus quite accustomed to the idea that water should be perceived and managed in accordance with the boundaries created by the natural flow of water. In other words, it is not surprising that several of the interviewed scientific water officials talked about catchment management with great familiarity. One senior official at the DWD said:

> **I:** This catchment idea was there for a long time. Actually one of the first things that I did after my education was to map out the catchments of Zimbabwe. For us as hydrologists, we have always looked at water in terms of catchments (Interview 4B).

Given the tradition of natural scientists dealing with catchments, I set out on my fieldwork with the expectation that IWRM's call for catchment management would be embraced by the scientific water officials in Zimbabwe. As I will show in this section, my expectations were not met. While scientific water officials were very supportive of the general idea of catchments as the basic unit for water management, IWRM called for a catchment management system that implied a restructuring of much of the administration for water management in Zimbabwe. Specifically it called for surface water experts (hydrologists) and groundwater (hydrogeologists) experts to work in an integrated way that challenged the distribution of professional status between these two groups. In the eyes of scientific water officials, IWRM's proposal for catchment management was not seen primarily as a way to organise the management of water, but a way to organise the water managers, i.e. themselves.

IWRM's call for catchment management implied that different subgroups of scientific water officials who had previously worked in different sections of the DWD should now work closely together. Prior to the water sector reform, surface and groundwater were managed quite separately within different sections of the DWD. The distinction between surface and groundwater management was further emphasised by the Water Act

of 1976, which stipulated different allocation systems for surface water and groundwater. Surface water was regulated according to the "appropriate principle" which connected the right to use water to the appropriate use of water in production. Groundwater was regulated as a private property and the owner of the land above the water could abstract and use under groundwater at his discretion (van der Zaag and Savenije 2000).

The legal and organisational environment of these two groups was thus quite different. This segmentation between hydrologists and hydrogeologists was challenged by IWRM's call for catchment management. Proponents of IWRM argued that surface and groundwater experts needed to work closely together so that all aspects pertaining to water in a catchment could be managed in an integrated way. Managing surface and groundwater separately would cut to the core of IWRM's idea of ecosystem management (World Bank 1993; Government of Zimbabwe, Government of Netherlands et al. 1995; Global Water Partnership 2000).

For the scientific water officials working at the DWD in Harare, the segmentation between hydrologists and hydrogeologists was, however, vital for the distribution of status and professional prestige. In particular, the hydrologists that I interviewed frequently pointed out that they generally had longer education than hydrogeologists and they argued that hydrologists therefore were entitled to a higher professional and social status than hydrogeologists (e.g. interview 8B, 29B, 3C).[54] As I asked one hydrologist holding a top-management position at the DWD how he would feel about working more closely together with hydrogeologists, he replayed:

> **I:** I am a hydrologist, hydrologist, hydrologist, and I would never work with a hydrogeologist. I belong to the old school. You need specialists in separate fields otherwise you will lose expertise. Maybe you can merge at the higher levels, but you have to stick to professionalism. I have an extensive education in hydrology. You know, there is hydrogeology and hydrology and you should not mix the two. You should get them to talk but you should not merge them (Interview 4B).

This quote testifies to a resistance against implementing IWRM's idea of catchment management based on its implications for the social identities

[54] I have not been able to corroborate if there was a material basis for the hierarchy between the two professional groups (for example in terms of differences in average wage, or distribution of professions on different managerial levels). The interesting point here, however, is that the distinction between surface and groundwater served as a the basis for a professional demarcation between groups widely seen as hierarchical in terms of social and professional status. Consequently, eliminating the distinction between hydrologists and hydrogeologists would erode the basis for professional stratification.

of scientific water officials. From the perspective of the hydrologist cited above, following IWRM would imply working closely with a professional group that he considered inferior. Consequently, following IWRM would imply the risk of losing some of the esteem associated with his social identity. IWRM's call for catchment management to be mirrored in the administrative structures for water professionals challenged the main demarcation around which different sub-groups of scientific water officials had been organised and formed their social identity. In particular, implementing this organisational implication of IWRM would deflate the status position of the formerly most prestigious group, i.e. the hydrologists.

So while IWRM's idea of catchment management was firmly established at the intellectual level (stemming from the scientific water officials' natural science education), its consequences in terms of social ranking challenged existing social identities which distinguished different sub-groups. Hydrologists therefore used their established power position to obstruct IWRM's organisational implication in terms of a close collaboration with hydrogeologists.

The effects of the power struggle between hydrologists and hydrogeologists within DWD becomes evident in a comparison between the proposed and the actual organisational structure of ZINWA, i.e. the new organisation for water management and the workplace for many of the staff of the DWD after the reform. Figure 7.1. depicts the organigram for ZINWA as drawn up by the Government of Zimbabwe and supporting donors at the beginning of the reform (Government of Zimbabwe, Government of Netherlands et al. 1995:15). This organigram reflects the logical consequences of catchment management as spelled out in IWRM. There is no mention of different organisational units for different kinds of water (surface and groundwater). On the contrary, the section "Water Management" is subdivided into "River Catchment Agency Boards" implying an integrated management approach for the entire ecosystem of the catchment. Likewise, the organigram explicitly states that "Research and Data Management" shall comprise both surface water specialists (hydrologists) and groundwater specialists (hydrogeologists). While figure 7.1. represents the organigram recommended in the policy documents guiding the reform process, figure 7.2. is the organigram of the *de facto* ZINWA organisation which developed as a result of the reform. The latter organigram upholds different and distinct organisational units for the management of surface water (hydrologist) and groundwater (hydrogeologists). In other words, the organisational implication of IWRM's call for catchment management was not realised in the organisation set up to manage water in Zimbabwe, ZINWA. Contrary to the intentions of IWRM, the new organigram set up as part of the reform maintains the disintegration between hydrologists and hydrogeologists.



Figure 7.1. Organigram for Zinwa proposed by the Government of Zimbabwe and supporting donors (Government of Zimbabwe, Government of Netherlands et al. 1995:15)



Figure 7.2. Organigram for Zinwa after reform (Internal memo Zinwa, received by Stålgren, 19 June, 2001).

To find out how this shift in organizational structure—from integrated to disintegrated—could be understood, I discussed the above organigram with a hydrologist holding a senior position in Harare. Consider this quote from the interview:

> **R:** Is it not odd that there are separate sections for surface and groundwater in an organization thought to practice integrated water resources management?

> **I:** Yes, they are kept separately even though they now sort under one man...When we are trying to convert people's mind they tend to lean on what they have been doing best for so many years (Interview 9B).

This interviewee testifies to the resistance towards IWRM's call to integrate the management of surface and groundwater. He attributes the problems of disbanding the distinction between hydrologists and hydrogeologists to resistance to give up professional positions stratified around what people "have been doing best for so many years" (see also interviews 5B, 8B).

Proponents of IWRM thus called on catchment management as a means to obtain an integrated ecosystem approach to water resources management and to ensure that all water in the catchment would be managed in a coherent way (World Bank 1993; Government of Zimbabwe, Government of Netherlands et al. 1995; Global Water Partnership 2000). In my analysis from the perspective of Water as Science, IWRM's call for catchment management was transformed from an idea about ecosystem management into a question of the distribution of social status between different professional groups. At a general, intellectual level, hydrologists and hydrogeologists alike understood the need for integrated management of all water resources in a catchment. But as IWRM called for organisational changes with the aim of realising this goal, these changes were blocked as a consequence of the struggle for prestigious social identities between sub-groups of scientific water officials. In particular, the privileged hydrologists obstructed the integrated management approach suggested by IWRM as it challenged their high status social identity. In the construction of Water as Science, catchment management was thus transformed from a platform for an ecosystem approach to water resources management into a scene for a power-struggle between different groups of scientific water officials. As a consequence of this transformation, IWRM's call for organisational changes that would cater for ecosystem management of water was not implemented. Instead, the segmented organisational structure that perpetuated existing power positions was prolonged.

Did this have any real consequences in terms of the management of water in Zimbabwe? Would the management of water in Zimbabwe have been different if hydrologists and hydrogeologists had engaged in close cooperation? This is clearly a difficult question to assess as it calls for counterfactual data. There is no way of knowing how water would have been managed had the two groups had decided to work more closely. In addition, it is difficult to assess the influence of this single factor as opposed to the array of other issues influencing the complex system of water management. Having said this, it clear that for the international experts designing IWRM, a close cooperation between hydrologists and hydrogeologists was seen as essential

for the sustainable water resources management (World Bank 1993; Global Water Partnership 2000). This includes the Programme Documents set out by the government of Zimbabwe and the supporting donors' emphasis on close cooperation between surface and groundwater specialists as a key step towards reaching the goal of ecosystem management (Government of Zimbabwe, Government of Netherlands et al. 1995). The assessment of these experts was that only if ground and surface water was managed in an integrated way could sustainable water resources management be obtained. Therefore hydrologists and hydrogeologists were called to disband traditional demarcations and work closely together. To the extent that these international experts were right, the continued separation of hydrologists and hydrogeologists in Zimbabwe impeded the achievement of sustainable water resources management.

This conclusion is supported by the August 2003 Government of Zimbabwe review of the organisational changes undertaken during the water sector reform (Presidential Land Review Committee 2003). The report points to the need for sustainable water use and deplores that the implementation of catchment management was "compromised" during the reform process. Based on this assessment, the report continues: "It is recommended that a catchment management position be created in both DWD and ZINWA." (p. 75). The role of this catchment manager would, according to the report, be to foster increased integration between surface and groundwater management at catchment level with the aim to increase the level of integrated water management. In other words, the report sustains my conclusion that the disintegration between different kinds of water managers impeded sustainable water management.

To conclude, my analysis suggests that the struggle for prestigious social identities by scientific water officials had a substantial bearing on the management of water in Zimbabwe. From their construction of reality of Water as Science, these water officials transformed IWRM call for catchment management from a vehicle for ecosystem management of water into a threat to the hierarchy of social identities and prestige. Because of this understanding of IWRM, the most prestigious group within the DWD—the hydrologists—resisted working with the lower status hydrogeologists. The jockeying for positions during the reform hindered the development of an organisation for ecosystem management approach to water and thus the degree to which IWRM's goals could be achieved.

Water as an economic good

In this section, I analyse how scientific water officials responded to the IWRM emphasis on water as an economic good. The objections raised by advocates of Water as Science against the economic thinking of IWRM are

eloquently spelled out in document that was circulated at the DWD and which can best be described as an internal, unofficial memo. It was handed to me during one of my interviews at the Department. It was written and signed by T.C Kabel, Deputy Director of the Department of Water Development, Design Branch. It is worth quoting at some length:

> Water is devalued and shamefully debased when categorised as an 'economic good'. It is far more important that that. Water is crucial element for all economic development and should not be merely classed as a simple ingredient in a myopic Keynesian theory. The provision of an adequate supply of water is a sine que non for all progress in agriculture and industry, and the benefits that flow to the nation from such a provision far exceed the superficial direct economic return derive from selling the water at a certain price. ....The cost-benefit analysis and calculations of rate of return are based on a very narrow spectrum. No cognisance is generally taken of the very significant downstream or secondary economic benefits. The provision of water is the first step in a whole chain of development initiatives, leading to increased employment, increased personal and company tax returns to the fiscus, a reduction in drought relief payments, increased export earnings and the growth of Gross Domestic Product...In addition to that, some of the values derived from water cannot be valued in money...What is the economic value of better community health? ... We should reject the slogan that 'water is an economic good'. As with all slogans, it is a substitute for rational thought"

This text captures the two reasons that I found to be the basis for why proponents of Water as Science objected to IWRM idea of water as an economic good. First, thinking of water as an economic good does not take into account the value of water for national development. Water management in the service of the nation is a central feature in the construction of Water as Science. Scientific water officials embraced the social identity of themselves as the vanguard in using science in service of their nation (see introduction to this chapter). One interviewee explained his objections to water as an economic good like this:

> **I:** Economic thinking allows the fast buck ethos of the Economists winning the argument against broader considerations (Interview 12).

According to this interview person, economic thinking puts a premium on self-interested actors who are after "the fast buck". This stands in sharp

contrast to Water as Science which embraces a *national* perspective on water. The inability of economic calculations to integrate "broader considerations" in the evaluation of water was a recurrent argument among the interviewed scientific water officials (see interviews 16, 2B-8B).

The second reason why these actors objected to water as an economic good was the inability of economic calculations to provide a *rational* approach to the evaluation of water. In the quote above, the Deputy Director at the DWD likens the ambition to apply economic principles to water management with a "slogan" which is the antithesis of science, or as he puts it: "a substitute for rational thought". In his view, the idea of water as an economic good is detached from proper analysis and consequently fails to provide a rational approach to the evaluation of water. Economic thinking—as opposed to that of natural science—does not represent a truly rational approach to evaluating water. We should understand this position in relation to the great confidence in the methodologies and techniques of natural science on which proponents of Water as Science built their construction of reality. The critique of the application of economic principles should thus not be confused with the commonplace critique that the oft-reported failures to implement economic principles in African contexts should be attributed to the lack of the proper institutional system in such contexts (Clapham 1996). The later critique sees economic principles as something attractive but difficult to obtain. In contrast, the argument above is that economic principles *per se* constitute the problem, not the lack of social and political institutions to support them. In fact the Deputy Director of the DWD associates himself with a political, national, agenda for development and his argument is a systemic critique against economics as an irrational mode of thought and thus incapable of making the right considerations for the nation and its people. [55]

To conclude, scientific water officials emphasised that the usage of water should be evaluated by scientific methods and with regard to the role of water for national development. In their view this was not obtained by thinking of water as an economic good as proposed by supporters of IWRM. By contrast, the idea of water as an economic good put a premium on the fast buck ethos of agents guided by narrow interests, and the underlying

[55] Having said this, I should recognise that some interviewees supportive of Water as Science suggested a more pragmatic view on water as an economic good. These interviewees pointed to the bad financial situation in the water sector, and argued that acknowledging economic thinking could help up the situation (Interview 4B, 5B, 8B). On one occasions, the interviewee made a direct connection between the introduction of economic principles and the fact that he had not been regularly paid due to the poor economic situation at the Department of Water Development (Interview 7B). However, this pragmatic and instrumental view on water as an economic good was typically coupled to reservations along the lines outlined above.

economic rationality was inferior to that of the natural sciences. In the eyes of scientific water officials, IWRM's idea of water as an economic good was thus transformed from a vehicle for effective resource allocation to an irrational idea that challenged the ambition of scientific water management for the good of all citizens of Zimbabwe.

Stakeholder participation

IWRM's call for stakeholder participation was to a large extent based on the normative ideal of including previously marginalised water users into the management of water resources (see chapter two). In the context of the water sector reform in Zimbabwe, this was equivalent to a call to include local, black, farmers in the management of water resources. IWRM points to this previously marginalised stakeholders and identifies them as a group whose views on water management are important and legitimate and hence should be given increased voice in the water management.

The sentiment of scientific water officials in Zimbabwe regarding stakeholder participation is aptly illustrated by a recurrent reaction that I got when I brought up this subject in my interviews with these actors. As I started taking about stakeholder participation, the scientific water officials often said:

> **I:** Don't mention the S-word. (e.g. Interview 12, 16, 4B-6B).

In fact, this phrase—"Don't mention the S-word"—was almost a slogan or running joke whenever IWRM's call for stakeholder participation was discussed in interviews or during tea breaks and casual conversations that I had with scientific water officials. As I asked a senior water official for his comment about this in-house slogan, he elaborated his own view on the matter:

> **I:** Yes, there are certain words, I used it once but I refuse it now. It is 'stakeholder'. It is part of the language that I can't handle. This idea of the consumer groups being given more shares in the decisions affecting them is a sort of philosophy. So this idea, I think this idea was probably fostered by external agencies, the various donor groups that were keen to help a developing country. Those European countries came in with assistance, and of course these guys were all full of these new concepts the way developed countries are (Interview 12).

To say the least, this interviewee does not approve of the idea of stakeholder participation. It is so despicable that he would rather not talk about it.

In particular, we should notice how the interviewee tries to de-legitimise stakeholder participation by associating it with two lines of reasoning: First, stakeholder participation is an "idea" or "philosophy", which, second, was "fostered by external agencies". By these two associations, the interview person indicates that stakeholder participation is neither founded in good, practical water management (it is "a philosophy") nor in the needs and priorities of the nation (it was "brought in by external agencies"). Stakeholder participation is illegitimate since it is based on an elusive philosophical idea without foundation in the real practical traditions and needs of Zimbabwe.

The first association above—stakeholder participation as a philosophy without foundation in practical water management—serves the dual purpose of de-legitimising stakeholders and portraying the interviewee and his ingroup as custodians of sound scientific water management. He and his scientific water official peers base their approach on well founded scientific methods rather than some elusive ideas or philosophy.

This distinction between the scientific approach of scientific water officials and the un-scientific approach of stakeholders was a recurrent theme in my interviews with actors alluding to Water as Science. The way in which these actors described their own scientific knowledge base contrasts substantially with the way they talked about the knowledge base of local stakeholders. The scientific water officials regarded their own knowledge as founded in proper natural science. By contrast, they described the knowledge base of local stakeholders in ways that is better described as "beliefs" rather than "knowledge". The idea can be summarized like this: 'Local stakeholders have *beliefs* about water: scientific water officials have *knowledge*'. The scientific knowledge which the scientific water official represents was described as learnt through a process of trial, error, and incremental adjustments within formal scientific institutions. I was frequently given lengthy descriptions of the interview persons' education background and they were sure to tell me of university degrees and courses acquired in countries such as the UK, the Netherlands, or South Africa. In contrast to their own scientific knowledge base, the belief of local stakeholders was described as emanating from oral traditions and religious practices embraced by people, many of whom could hardly read and write (e.g. interview 12, 16, 2B).[56]

This message conveys the social identity of stakeholders as a group who subscribe to unscientific beliefs about water and are therefore disquali-

[56] Some of my interviews with actors in the official water administration showed great respect for the belief systems held by stakeholders. In chapter eight I will show how some of these actors combined a strong affiliation to Water as Science with a belief in Water as a Gift from the Gods. Despite obvious contradictions between these constructions of reality, these actors seemed quite at ease and did not try to reconcile the two realities. One interviewee even called himself a "rain dancing hydrologist".

fied from the position as 'experts' in water management as proposed by IWRM. By contrast, scientific water officials are given the social identity of the guardians of scientific knowledge which entitles them to power and influence in the water sector.

I return now to the quote above from interview twelve and I will focus on the second association that he made: that the idea of stakeholder participation was fostered by external agencies. Here the interviewee alludes to the collective memory of the long history dating back to colonialism in which external powers dictated the conditions for management of Zimbabwe's national resources. Against this backdrop, I interpret the interviewee as arguing that IWRM's call for stakeholder participation is part of external agencies' agenda to direct the internal affairs of the country. IWRM is part of the tradition of external actors meddling in how Zimbabweans deal with their natural resources. IWRM is thus a variation of colonialism. This association with the collective memory of oppression by external actors serves to legitimise the interviewee and his in-group of scientific water officials as the group who should lead the water sector reform. The message is that the idea of stakeholder participation is but yet another tool used by external actors to interfere in Zimbabwean affairs. By contrast the scientific water officials stand as the custodians of water management in the service of the post-colonial project of nation building in Zimbabwe.

This message is elaborated by another interviewee at the DWD. First, this interviewee stated that it was a mistake in the first place to acknowledge IWRM's call for stakeholder participation. Then he said this:

> **I:** We should have gone ahead with what we wanted to do. The idea was not to disadvantage anybody, the idea was to level the playing field and make it OK to anybody irrespective of what colour or what sector they come from. We just wanted to come up with a piece of legislation that's workable for the whole country and anyone in it. We finally achieved that, but it was a struggle (Interview16).

The interviewee and his peers stand out in this quote as custodians of a scientific approach to water that would not favour any particular agenda but work towards a solution for the whole country "irrespective of what colour or what sector they come from". Contrary to the unscientific and narrow-minded stakeholders, he represented the group of scientific water officials in the service of their country. The interviewee leaves no doubt as to whether or not he and his peers are able to define the agenda that is best for the country. In his view, the scientific models of his profession endow him and his peers with the expertise to define a solution "that's workable

for the whole country and anyone in it". His scientific outlook puts him above domestic disputes and enables him to define an impartial agenda for water management.

A similar finding has been reported by Elinor Ostrom (1997). Summarising field work on irrigation systems in Asia she noted that

> Educated engineers presumed that uneducated farmers do not know enough about hydrology and engineering to be consulted. Consequently engineers do not learn from local farmers many of the local details about soil conditions, water velocity, and shifting watercourses that are important to make 'improved' engineering works operate better than the 'primitive' system they replace (Ostrom 1997:164).

To conclude, based on my empirical material and theoretical framework I argue that actors subscribing to Water as Science used the collective memory of external influence in the management of Zimbabwe's natural resources to de-legitimise IWRM call for stakeholder participation. They advanced two stereotypical social identity constructs to sustain that they were better suited than stakeholders to have power and influence in the water sector. First, stakeholders were depicted as relying on unscientific beliefs about water and driven by narrow self-interest. Second, the social identity of the scientific water officials was constructed as representatives of a scientific approach to water management in the service of their country. These social identities served to sustain the claim of scientific water officials as the legitimate experts on water management as much as it de-legitimised IWRM call for stakeholder participation. IWRM's call for stakeholder participation was built on an ideal of increased democratic rule in water management. In the eyes of scientific water officials, this call was transformed into a call to let self-interested dilettante be given a mandate in decisions regarding water management of great importance for the development of the nation. Did this change in views on stakeholder participation have any real consequences during the water sector reform, or was this view mostly something spelled out during tea breaks and conversations among peers? The next section addresses this question.

From "stakeholder participation" to "awareness campaigns"

I have argued above that in the eyes of scientific water officials, stakeholders were self-interested subscribers to unscientific beliefs. This view served to disqualify stakeholders from increased influence in Zimbabwe's water management at the same time as it perpetuated power positions for scientific water officials. But did it have any real consequences for how IWRM was

implemented in Zimbabwe? To address this question, consider an extract from an interview with a senior water manager at the DWD who, as part of his official mandate, was required to foster stakeholder participation during the reform process:

> **R:** How would you describe the push for stakeholder participation during the reform?
>
> **I:** I think that there was over-participation in some instances. People just slow down the process, and we should have moved much faster. Stakeholder participation is a drawback and slows the process (Interview 16).

According to this interviewee, stakeholder participation is not a matter of accumulating knowledge to determine the way for reforming the water sector as suggested by IWRM. Stakeholder participation is "a drawback" that "slows the process". I hold that this position should be understood against the confidence of scientific water officials in the ability of natural science to define the relevant problems and solutions to water management. Consequently, the roadmap for how to develop the water sector is not the outcome of stakeholder participation. It is rather the outcome of scientific calculations.

Proponents of IWRM in the Zimbabwean government and international donor community proposed a number of activities to increase the level of stakeholder participation in water management (Government of Zimbabwe, Government of Netherlands et al. 1995). To comply with these propositions, scientific water officials were tasked with setting up a large number of meetings with stakeholder groups with the stated intention to increase their participation and allow stakeholder 'expertise' to be heard. As I interviewed scientific water officials about these activities, I noticed that when they talked about stakeholder participation they would use expressions like "awareness campaigns" and "promotion activities" as synonyms for "stakeholder participation" (Interview 8, 9, 16, 6B, 14B). Rather than being consultative processes for the exchange of ideas with stakeholders, the activities of "stakeholder participation" were thus seen as forums for making people "aware" of, or to "promote", things. For actors subscribing to Water as Science, there was no need for stakeholder consultations as a means to find out how to approach water management. For them, natural science defined the proper approach and stakeholder participation was merely a process of making people accept what is established by natural science. Consequently, the IWRM call for stakeholder participation was changed from a platform for interactive communication between stakeholders and scientific water officials, to a one-way communication in terms of "aware-

ness campaigns" and "promotion activities" where scientific water officials would disseminate their knowledge to the stakeholders.[57]

The view on stakeholder participation held by scientific water officials is also evident from my interviews with some of the stakeholders invited to the stipulated stakeholder meetings. This is how one stakeholder described the process officially labelled "stakeholder participation":

> **I:** They set up a series of workshops, but unfortunately, at most of the workshops the pundits told you what they felt you should know. And when you suggested alternatives and it didn't fit in to their overall plan, it wasn't accepted. There were a couple of ding-dong battles at one or two of these workshops. Because we said:
>
> - 'We come here but we're wasting our time, because you people don't take our thoughts into consideration'.
>
> Mr. X (senior water official) brought no interference in his thoughts on how to get it done. Neither did Mr Y (Senior water official) who was also a person who wasn't prepared to listen to others because he felt he already had it (Interview 13, parenthesis added).

Another stakeholder described his experience of "stakeholder participation" in this way:

> **I:** At the time I didn't realize all the plans had been made, and it was just a process of making us stakeholders feel like we thought up the idea. Often the desirable results are predeter-

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[57] Some of my interviewees based their arguments for why it was futile to engage in stakeholder participation on the lack of material and educational capacity among stakeholders. One interviewee said:

> I: As long as the rural people are not empowered nothing much will happen. We will still have the same situation that we had before under the Old Act. It will be the same people who will use the water since these are the people who will have the land. So we have to address the land issue (Interview 18).

This interviewee argues that there is no use in engaging in stakeholder participation as long as the stakeholders are not empowered with material resources such as entitlement to their land. Clearly this is a different line of reasoning than my argument that stakeholder participation was seen as meaningless because there was nothing to be learnt from the unscientific beliefs held by stakeholders. To fully understand the lack of stakeholder participation, such materially based arguments should thus be considered.

> mined and it was very much a question of leading stakeholders down the right path, emphasizing the things that they thought needed to be emphasized. Putting cards on the board in such way that certain things become more important than others. It's a quite (pause)... It's a beautiful skill. And it works! If the stakeholders think they thought of it, then they'll push it harder, because they'll think it's their idea (Interview 11).

These quotes testify to the reluctance of scientific water officials to engage in the exchange of ideas with stakeholders. I see this as a result of the scientific water officials' social identity in which stakeholders are portrayed as bearers of unscientific beliefs about water. The distinction between this social identity and their own—the guardians of scientific knowledge—erodes the rationale for the exchange of ideas with stakeholders. The supremacy of scientific water management precluded the need for stakeholder participation. IWRM pushed for stakeholder participation as means to develop the agenda for water management, but for actors subscribing to Water as Science the appropriate agenda was better arrived at through calculation than through consultations.

Why did the scientific water officials bother to hold stakeholder meetings if they saw them as meaningless exercises? The reason seems to be that these meetings were strongly emphasised by the international donor community and those parts of the government who supported the reform process (Government of Zimbabwe, Government of Netherlands et al. 1995; interview 16, 4B,15B, 19B, 30B). Had the stakeholder meetings not been held, the scientific water officials could have experienced financial repercussions from the donors and the government. In addition to that, evidence suggests that the stakeholder meetings served to silence complaints from unsatisfied stakeholders. Any stakeholder who would say that the views of stakeholders had not been heard could be provided with the impressive statistics of how many stakeholder meetings had been held. The stakeholders were silenced by the water officials' claim that they have already been heard. As on disillusioned stakeholder put it:

> "We hear first hand how they are giving each other water so that when we question it, they will say, 'but you were there, how can you fight such a system?' " (cited in Sithole 2001:10).

My analysis is thus that having orchestrated the stakeholder meetings, the scientific water officials deprived the stakeholders of their right to object to the implications of the system.

I have argued that IWRM's call for stakeholder participation was transformed by scientific water officials and consequently seen as a threat to

their exclusive position as experts on water management. As part of this transformation, political entrepreneurs in favour of Water as Science drew on the collective memory of external interference in Zimbabwe's natural resources management. Further these scientific water officials nurtured a social identity of themselves as custodians of scientific knowledge in service of their country. To de-legitimise the competing claim for stakeholders as "experts" on water management, scientific water officials portrayed stakeholders as a negation of their own social identity. Stakeholders were constructed as their opposite Others, i.e. as non-scientific and narrow minded. Based on these identities, the scientific water officials made their claim for the role as experts on water management. As a consequence, the IWRM call for stakeholder participation was changed from a process of deliberation characterized by an exchange of ideas and priorities, into campaigns aimed at infusing ready-made conceptions of water into local communities seen to be captive to unfounded belief systems and unproductive practices.

Conclusions

In this chapter I have focused on the transformations of IWRM by those I have called scientific water officials subscribing to the construction of Water as Science. This construction of reality is characterised by two tenets. First, a collective memory consisting of a strong conviction that natural scientists can define the relevant problems and proper solutions to issue of water management. Second, that this scientific knowledge should be used as a tool in the development of the nation. Consequently, actors subscribing to this construction of reality regarded scientific water officials as the vanguard in a struggle where the mission is to use natural science in a quest to manage nature for the benefit of the citizens of Zimbabwe.

The power-struggle over the social identity as leader of the water sector reform has been a central theme in this chapter. Prior to the reform, the DWD was the central unit for water management in Zimbabwe. This was where I found most of my interviewees subscribing to Water as Science. In the view of actors at the DWD, they had a legitimate claim to lead the reform process. They had the appropriate scientific knowledge and a historical legacy of serving the nation in areas of water management. As the Zimbabwean government and supporting donors inaugurated the IMSG/WRMS as the lead actor in the reform, there was great disappointment at the DWD. The IMSG/WRMS was set up to reflect the IWRM ambition to have a multi-sector and multi-dimensional approach to water management. Consequently, it was staffed with actors from several line departments in the administration as well as non natural-science experts, such as communication experts and economists. Senior staff at the DWD

regarded this as offensive to their social identity and the collective memory in which they and their professional peers guided public sector water management. Consequently they engaged in a fierce struggle to regain what they regarded as their rightful social identity and to defend what they saw as their legitimate claim on the role of leading experts on water management. My analysis points to how these actors at the DWD used their established position in the public administration in repeated attempts to cripple the IMSG/WRMS. They tried to bypass the IMSG/WRMS in important decision-making processes, and to isolate them from both the wider water-related administration in Zimbabwe and the international donor community. The goal was, in the figurative speech of one interview persons, to "kill" the IWRM/WRMS and reinvigorate the DWD as the leading actor in the water sector reform (Interview 5B).

On balance, the political entrepreneurs at the DWD won the power struggle with the IMSG/WRMS. Due to this struggle, the IMSG/WRMS officials were deprived of much of their administrative and financial leverage as leaders of the water sector reform. I argue that this had severe consequences for the implementation of IWRM in Zimbabwe. The IMSG/WRMS was explicitly mandated to implement IWRM in Zimbabwe. My analysis makes it clear that their marginalisation contributed to the widespread transformation of IWRM by different actors in Zimbabwe. Due to the IMSG/WRMS's weakened position, the social and political meaning of IWRM could more easily be transformed by political entrepreneurs engaging in competing constructions of reality. Had the IMSG/WRMS not been marginalised by the DWD, they could have counteracted some, or most, of the transformations of IWRM that I report throughout this book.

The construction of Water as Science implies that the meaning of each of the three pillars of IWRM were transformed in the eyes of the scientific water officials. Table 7.2. summarises the transformed meanings of each pillar and points to its behavioural implications.

Water as Science		
Pillar of IWRM	**Transformed meaning**	**Behavioural implication**
Catchment management	Challenge to social stratification between different kinds of scientific water experts (hydrologists and hydrogeologists).	Maintain segmented organisational structure and distinctions between managers of surface and groundwater as opposed to IWRM call for ecosystem management.
Water as an economic good	Contradiction of rational water resources management for benefit of all of Zimbabweans. Call for inferior science (i.e. economics) to legitimise narrow-minded, egoistic use of water.	Obstruct market-based pricing in support of price reflecting national and natural scientific concerns.
Stakeholder participation	Challenge to scientific practice in which the proper road-map to water management is arrived at through calculations rather than consultations. Stakeholder management was a call for dilettantes to manage water.	Turn campaigns for stakeholder participation into one-way communication exercises to transmit solutions to water management arrived at through calculations based on natural sciences.

Table 7.2. Summary of transformation of IWRM in relation to Water as Science.

8. IWRM AND WATER AS A GIFT FROM THE GODS

This chapter analyses the transformation of IWRM by actors subscribing to a reality construct in which water is interlinked with the spiritual world. I have labelled this reality construct "Water as a Gift from the Gods".[58] Actors subscribing to Water as a Gift from the Gods assume the existence of an invisible world inhabited by spiritual beings that engage with peoples' lives in the material world. The spiritual beings control many of the events in the material world, including health, distribution of wealth, and fortune. Most significantly for my analysis, the spiritual beings are in control of the availability and distribution of water. One of my interviewees was a rain-maker (see below), who put it like this: "We have ancestral spirits lined up for the supply of water" (Interview 3, see also 3b, 29, 8, cf Nyatsanza 1970; Lan 1985; Ranger 1999; Derman 2003; Ellis and ter Haar 2004).

The first section of this chapter outlines the main content of the construction of Water as a Gift from the Gods through detailing the collective memory and social identities embraced by its supporters. I also situate the main political entrepreneurs of this construction—i.e. traditional leaders in local societies—in a political context of competing claims for legitimate rule with the national government. The three subsequent sections make up the bulk of the chapter and focus on transformations in relation to the three pillars of IWRM: catchment management, water as an economic good, and stakeholder participation. The final section provides the conclusions from my findings.

Water as a Gift from the Gods

The construction of Water as a Gift from the Gods is embraced by a wide and diverse selection of Zimbabweans. According to a survey conducted at the University of Zimbabwe, a vast majority of the rural population associate the supply of water with the benevolence of the gods (Derman 2003). Eighty-four percent of the rural population observe certain behavioural rules and/or perform certain rituals directed towards the ancestral spirits to maintain water supply. Seventy-three percent pointed to the rain-maker

[58] I use the word "gods" and "spirits" as synonyms to denote non-physical actors.

as one of the most important persons involved with water allocation.[59] In addition to this support in rural society, I also found support for Water as a Gift from the Gods among actors who I elsewhere associated with other constructions of reality, in particular Water as Zimbabwe and Water as Science (see below, cf. chapter five and seven).

While Water as a Gift from the Gods was part and parcel of many actors' constructions of reality, there was no particular organised group who systematically advocated the implications of this construction during the water sector reform. Politicians, academics, and public opinion makers gave voice to the connection between the spiritual world and water in speeches and journals (Chikozho 2002; Derman 2003). The Zimbabwe Traditional Healers Association (ZINATHA) functioned as a platform for traditional leaders and rain-makers and ZINATHA's public relations officer frequently appeared in debates and in mass media. But it would be an exaggeration to compare ZINATHA's role with, for example, the role of CFU as a proponent of Water as Gold (see chapter six).

The construction of Water as a Gift from the Gods was thus advocated by a diffuse, rather than well organised group of political entrepreneurs. This had implications for my ability to identify specific political entrepreneurs engaged in proposing Water as a Gift from the Gods during the water sector reform. Traditional leaders and rain-makers constituted the primary group of interviewees. In addition, I looked for actors from social and professional groups normally associated with other constructions who, occasionally, also promote the construction of Water as a Gift from the Gods.[60] Water as a Gift from the Gods was, for example, advanced by many of the interviewees from the public water administration who also advocated the Water as Science construction (chapter seven). Consider the following quote from an interview with a professional water official with an extensive formal academic training in hydrology who called himself a "rain-dancing hydrologist":

> **R:** I understand that some people tend to see the supply of water as connected to the spiritual world. What is your view on that?
>
> **I:** I respect the rain dance, every single one, and I have participated in my own village's every single year since I came back [from my university training abroad]. I have never missed the ritual.

[59] The methodology of this survey requires that these figures be considered with caution. The sample of interviewees was strategic rather than random but included variation in tenure systems as well as geography.

[60] See chapter four on multiple identities.

R: So such a rain dance, how is it performed?

I: Usually it is a Friday night. We are dancing and brewing a special beer all night and then five in the morning on Saturday, the elders take it up to some hill. Then people bring more beer during the day but also some meat and we eat and dance the whole afternoon. Yes, and then we leave the beer up there and the elders will ask for sufficient rain, just for rain, no lightning, so that we have a good crop. This is usually performed in September.

R: Have you ever actually experienced a change in the pattern of rain coming from such a ritual?

I: Yes, now what happens, is usually, if you send the wrong person and the beer is not accepted, then there is a problem with the rain, so you can actually tell if the ritual was well conducted or not by the rain pattern. At times it can give very violent storms. So it is not just the amount of rain but also how hard they come.

R: So, is the person who goes with the beer, if he has committed some injustices…

I: Yes, that would create problems, that is why they want to send elderly, very elderly people up there.

R: What about your own role in all of this? I mean you are quite familiar with water management.

I: Yes, everyone in the village knows that I am a water person, but I have not been consulted there. They say that this is beyond you. That it is about things that I do no know. I find that very humbling (Interview 8).

This quote points to two central tenets in the construction of Water as a Gift from the Gods. First, the interviewee points to how the availability of water is determined by the moral relationship between the gods and mankind. It is clear from the interview that the gods will consider the moral status of the person sent to ask for rain. This was a theme picked up by the rain-makers I interviewed. They emphasised that the availability of water is connected to a moral discourse stipulated by the gods (Interview 3, 3B, 29, see details below). The gods provide water to people in accordance with how

pleased they are with the moral content of people's lives: an abundance of water as a sign that they are pleased with peoples' conduct, while drought is the gods' way of calling on the people to repent and return to the morally correct ways of living. Alois Mandondo at the Institute of Environmental Studies, University of Zimbabwe, has described this view by saying that the gods exercise "tutelary powers over the living" by regulation of water (Mandondo 1997a:357; cf. Lan 1985; Wilson 1995).

The second thing that stands out from the quote above is that as much as the gods communicate to the people by regulating the rains, people can also communicate with, and effect, the gods via the rain-makers. The interviewee describes how some of the village elders are selected to be the rain-makers and perform the rituals supposed to appease the gods to send rain. Anthropologist David Lan (1985) describes how a person is selected to the prestigious and powerful position of rain-maker through a system based on hierarchy and lineage. Together with chiefs and headmen, the rain-makers make up the most important leaders in rural societies in Zimbabwe. Individuals request that rain-makers transmit their calls for rain to the gods. As described in the citation above, this request is made by means of rain making ceremonies during which the rain-maker leads the people through a well defined procedure in which people pledge to repent their wrong-doings in return for rain (cf. Nyatsanza 1970; Ranger 1999).

To better understand the role of rain-makers, consider the following extract from one of my interviews with a rain-maker. I was introduced to this rain-maker by Dr. Sibanda from ZINATHA who also functioned as my interpreter from Shona during this interview. I was only allowed to make this interview after having gone though a number of rituals (including having been introduced to the ancestral spirits in a pray conducted by the rain-maker) and having taken off my watch and shoes as a sign of my respect for this holy man who was seen to live in a world that was beyond the limitations of time:

> **R**: I understand that in the traditional Zimbabwean way of looking at water, water is very much related to the spiritual world. Could you explain for me how that works?
>
> **I**: I am the rain-maker. I know how to call the rain to fall. I know how to make rain so that there is flow in a river. I know how to make that water stand still so that people can move across. So what you are saying that life and spiritual life is in water. That's true.
>
> **R**: How come that there is sometimes so little water and sometimes even drought? How can we understand this?

> **I**: Oh, that is because we are not appeasing the spirits. Things have to be asked for. Whatever we want we should ask for it. If we haven't asked then the Creator says you do not want to follow the procedures then I will show you trouble, then he sends a drought (Interview 29).

This interviewee sums up the key characteristics of Water as a Gift from the Gods. This construction builds on the collective belief that the gods determine the amount of rain. If the gods are pleased with people's moral conduct, there will be abundance of rain, and if they are not, they will punish man by drought. In addition, the quote points to two social identities that are central in the construction of Water as a Gift from the Gods. First, the rain-maker is one of the most esteemed actors in rural society. Second, this construction of reality represents water users as moral subjects whose need for water and rain can only be met if they follow the moral codes stipulated by the gods and turn to a spirit medium to have the rain-making ceremonies preformed.

The political context

To understand the transformation of IWRM in relation to Water as a Gift from the Gods we must take into account the political context in which this transformation took place. Zimbabwe, like many African states, is characterised by two sets of institutions: customary systems controlled by traditional leadership (including chiefs, kraal head, spirit mediums, and rain-makers) and a set of statutory institutions controlled by the government. In Zimbabwe, the legislative institutions were introduced during the colonial era without much attention being paid to customary political and religious boundaries (Ranger 1999). Ever since, there has been an uneasy relation between the two systems of local level institutions. The central government has tried to control the local leadership, who, for their part, generally regard the government's institutions as obstacles to social, communal, and spiritual interaction (Mandondo 1997b; cf. Munro 1998; Derman 2003).

In an interview with a rain-maker I asked him to explain the relationship between his peers of local leaders and the central state:

> **I:** When we were colonised, it was the whites who started colonising us, they used our native law, including our water laws and then they slowly took our native laws away, phasing them out. And it was the same with the blacks who then come into power. So because of both the blacks and whites our laws are no longer guiding this country. They have phased out all of them. They are now again changing the laws of the country

and our waters. And again they do no respect how things used to be done in the past.

R: What do you think of the changes now taking place, the new water laws and organisations?

I: You see those who are now changing our water laws are acting wrong. Those new laws are not from our tradition. Before the colonialists came, the laws guiding this country used to come from us. We would specify what should not be done and what should be done. All was orderly. Patrik, be careful, we are talking of two laws. We as spiritual leaders, and our chief, we had our own laws that I am telling you about, which have been put aside since the time we were colonised. Now this new water law is not even our law. It comes from somewhere else. So that is why we are saying that the law is being imposed on us (Interview 29).

The introduction of IWRM was, according to this rain-maker, part of a tradition stretching back to colonialism whereby the traditional ways of dealing with water were increasingly marginalised. Whereas traditional leaders have tried to maintain their historical mandate and capacities, both the white colonialists and black government after Independence have tried to manifest their political presence in rural societies by expropriation of control over natural resources from customary institutions (see chapter five and six). This development is described by several analysts who conclude that even though the traditional leaders had been increasingly marginalised, the struggle for control over the local polity has so far been inconclusive (Mandaza 1987; Moyo 1992; Moyo 1993; Ranger 1999; Darnolf and Laakso 2003). At the time of the water sector reform, many daily activities in rural societies, including water management, were conducted under mixed system of traditional leadership and state control (Derman 1998b; Sithole 2000; Derman and Ferguson 2000a; Sithole 2001).

With this background on the construction of Water as Gift from the Gods and the political struggle over legitimate rule in the local polity, I now turn to an analysis of how political entrepreneurs supportive of Water as a Gift from the Gods transformed the three respective pillars of IWRM.

Transforming the pillars of IWRM in relation to Water as a Gift from the Gods

Catchment management

In chapter two I established that catchment management is central to IWRM's ambition to obtain ecosystem management of water. Catchment management is a means to apply an integrated approach to all the factors influencing water use in a demarcated geographic area, the catchment, are jointly addressed in the management of water. A consequence of this is, for example, that water should be set aside for the needs of animal and plants in the ecosystem.

As I set off to analyse how proponents of Water as a Gift from the Gods regarded the call for catchment management, my assumption was that they would find this idea attractive. My assumption rested on the presumption that the construct of Water as a Gift from the Gods encapsulated a tradition of local knowledge on how to live sustainably in the ecosystem. Alois Mandondo (1997a) writes about a similar view prevalent in the research community at large holding an "emancipatory approach" towards local cultures and beliefs are regarding local actors as living "in harmony with nature" (p. 354f).

At face value my empirical material offers support to my initial assumption. The rain-makers that I interviewed explained how the Creator had made the earth as one unified and interdependent system. Much like IWRM's emphasis on disbanding the tradition of different management systems for ground and surface water, the rain-makers emphasised that all waters are united in a holistic system guided by the spirits. The rain-makers thus offered no support for the management in place before the water sector reform, in which ground and surface water were guided by different legal and administrative practices. Rather, they seemed to agree with IWRM's emphasis on an integrated approach to water management. Furthermore, they concurred with IWRM's emphasis to include nature itself as holding legitimate rights to water. All water resources should thus not be exploited by man alone but the needs of nature itself should be catered for (Interview 3, 29).

This similarity between IWRM and Water as a Gift from the Gods was acknowledged by professional water officials at government institutions (the DWD and ZINWA) whose task it was to obtain support for the reform process in local societies. These officials went out to local villages to inform water users of the water sector reform. As I interviewed a senior information official in Harare, he described how he actively alluded to the holistic view dominating local thinking when he talked about catchment management to local water users and leaders:

> **I**: These local people seem to accept quite easily the idea of catchment management and the idea of setting aside water for the environment. Sometimes when I meet my fellow Zimbabweans, I speak in Shona [the local language] and try to explain why there needs to be water in the river. Maybe there is need for fish further down stream or there are factories further down. There are also some pools that in the Shona culture are taken to be sacred. So if no water is released these will dry up and that will be seen as a bad sign or bad omen in the Shona culture. So I try to explain why we have to make these releases for the ecosystem. They seem to accept these ideas. So I use the traditional views as a tool to help them understand these new concepts. I use these things that they can relate to (Interview 7B).

This quote suggests that IWRM's call for catchment management found support among proponents of Water as a Gift from the Gods. Proponents of both systems emphasised the need for an integrated approach to water and regard it as part of the same holistic system.

At this level of analysis, the evidence thus seemed to support my initial assumption that proponents of Water as a Gift from the Gods would be supportive of IWRM's call for catchment management. This conclusion was, however, challenged by a further analysis of the empirical evidence. Recall that IWRM's call for an integrated approach to water management built on the assumption of interconnections between activities in the physical world. Humans, animals, and the biological world are all part of an interactive ecosystem. By contrast, proponents of Water as a Gift from the Gods not only emphasise the interconnections of the physical world but also connections between the physical and spiritual worlds.

While both IWRM and the construction of Water as a Gift from the Gods favour an integrated, holistic approach to water management, they thus differ with respect to the idea of causality. IWRM assumes that the actions of man have a direct causal effect on the state of nature. Man can, according to IWRM, change the state of nature by direct interaction with nature. Consequently, changing the actions of man towards nature is the major concern for water management. By contrast, the approach favoured by Water as a Gift from the Gods did not build on an idea of a direct causal interaction within the physical world. Instead, it was based on a spiritual reality in which there is no direct link between the actions of man and the effects on nature. The causal connection between man and nature goes via the spiritual world. The state of nature is not a function of man's interaction with nature. It is a function of man's relationship with the gods.

This leads me to conclude that for actors subscribing to Water as a Gift from the Gods, IWRM's call for a holistic, integrated approach to water management was transformed from a call for integration in the physical world into an acknowledgment of the integration of the physical and the spiritual worlds. It was a transformation of the rationale behind catchment management from an ecosystem approach to a spiritual approach to water. This transformation changes the causality between man and nature from a direct to an indirect relation. As IWRM's call for ecosystem management was transformed in relation to Water as a Gift from the Gods, substantial behavioural imperatives of IWRM thus vanished. While IWRM's call was for man to be cautious in relation to water, the construction of Water as a Gift from the Gods eroded the rationale for such action. Why should people mind their interactions with nature when the state of nature is determined by the gods?

Catchment management in favour of local rule

I turn now to another way to understand the reaction to IWRM's call for catchment management by the local traditional leaders, who were one of the key groups supporting Water as a Gift from the Gods. While the above analysis centred on catchment management as a call for ecosystem management, I now focus on the consequences of IWRM's idea of catchment management in terms of demarcations of geographical units for water management. Catchment management implied abandoning water management along provincial lines which guided the administration of water prior to the reform. Proponents of IWRM argued that, to better reflect the ecosystem, water should be managed along the lines of catchments defined by the natural flow of water, not by politically defined provinces.

Recall from the introduction of this chapter that the provincial system was introduced by the central government in Harare as part of the attempt to gain control over local politics and without consideration of traditional chiefdoms and practices (cf. chapter five). Consider now an interview with a local stakeholder leader who worked to promote catchment management as part of the reform:

> **R:** Why did you not go along with the provinces instead of the catchment? Why introduce the catchments?
>
> **I:** We couldn't go with the provinces. Often rivers in a province flow in different directions. Some rivers flow north, some flow west, some flow south, and there was no way you could gain advantage in that respect. It is also in our tradition to think along the way of how water flows. It is just how the elders long time ago were looking after these areas. They divided the areas

> in terms of water sharing. Even the way the river's boundaries or the chiefs' boundaries were set, they were set in terms of water so that the chief's boundaries and the water-ways coincided. In fact, the scientific way of defining catchments and the cultural way of demarcating chiefdoms coincided (Interview 10).

This interviewee suggests that the reason why local leaders supported the introduction of catchment management was that proponents of catchment management named water in a way that implied geographic units for water management (catchments) that coincided with the demarcations of traditional chiefdoms. Naming water as part of the ecosystem (the basis for catchment management) implied managerial units that were more in line with customary institutions and patterns of interaction than the provincial system. That seems to have been one reason why catchment management was well received by local leaders.

To understand the political significance of catchment management we should consider that the political history of Zimbabwe has been marked by an uneasy relation between traditional leaders and different attempts to centralise rule (see e.g. the citation from interview 29 above). The demarcation of provinces was one way for the central government to manifest its control at the local level (Munro 1998). Therefore I argue that we should understand the support for catchment management offered by local actors and traditional leaders as part of the struggle for power in relation to the central government. From the perspective of these actors, IWRM's call for catchment management provided support in the struggle for power with the central government. Local leaders' supported IWRM's call for catchment management because it was a strategic stance *against* the provincial system favoured by their competitor for power, i.e. the central government.

In summary, as I set out to analyse the reception of IWRM's call for catchment management I expected this to be well received by proponents of Water as a Gift from the Gods. Both conceptualise water as part of an integrated and interdependent system. At face value, the empirical evidence supported this expectation, but a further analysis suggested that the idea of catchment management was substantially transformed in the construction of Water as a Gift from the Gods. For actors supportive of Water as a Gift from the Gods, the idea of catchment management was transformed from an idea in favour of ecosystem management into an acknowledgement of the connection between the physical and spiritual world. This was a shift from an ecosystem to a spiritual system approach to water. Whereas the former underlines the direct connections between the actions of man and the state of nature, the later disbands such connections in favour of water as a gift from the gods. In addition, I have argued in this section that the accommodation of catchment management should be understood in a

political context in which the demarcation of catchments was a way for local leaders to oppose the provincial system favoured by the centralistic government. This analysis suggests that the idea of catchment management was transformed from being a vehicle to achieve ecosystem management to become an instrument in a struggle around the distribution of power between the customary and state institutions. Instead of calling on local leaders to act in a way that integrated all activities in the catchment in their decision making, as IWRM suggested, catchment management became a platform in the struggle for power against the central government and its provincial system of rule.

Water as an economic good

I now turn to analysing how the idea of water as an economic good was transformed in relation to the construction of Water as a Gift from the Gods. Recall from chapter two that proponents of IWRM suggested that the consumption of water be associated with a price reflecting the relative scarcity of water. Naming water as an economic good was a way to encourage austerity and resource effective water use.

It is clear from my interviews, however, that the idea of pricing water was not well received by proponents of Water as a Gift from the Gods. The argument was, in short, that water is god given and should not be paid for. Consider an extract from one of my interviews with a rain-maker:

> **R**: Now with these new laws that are coming, they say that they want to sell the water. They want to put a price on water. What do you think about that?
>
> **I**: How can they say this? Are they the ones who know where water comes from? No, we do not want such a law. We feel that if we have a Minister of Water he should know where to ask for rain. Really, he should go to us rain-makers and ask for rain. But he acts like if he does not know where we go and ask for water. This pricing of water, we are against it. How can they price something that they do not know where it comes from? Do you now want to decide for the Creator? You are now deciding for god. God is the one who provides the water (Interview 29).

According to this rain-maker, putting a price on water would be to act against the logic of the gods. It would be to try to replace god with man: "to decide for the Creator". Pricing water would be to belittle the Creator and make him irrelevant in the process of providing water. The rain-maker suggests that only someone who is unfamiliar or hostile to the spiritual reali-

ties of rain making would propose such as thing as putting a price on water. A similar view was reported by a group of researchers from the University of Zimbabwe who conducted field work in a local community to assess the sentiments towards the reform (Manzungu, Senzanje et al. 1999). Their conclusion was that "Farmers saw no justification of the government to make farmers pay for water that came from God" (p. 9, cf. Sithole 2000; Derman and Ferguson 2000a). In the context of Water as a Gift from the Gods, the call for water as an economic good was thus transformed from a vehicle for effective resource allocation into a question of the authority of the gods. Accepting water as an economic good would be to obstruct the spiritual logic whereby the proper allocation is determined by the gods, not the markets.

Given the fundamental contradiction between Water as a Gift from the Gods and water as an economic good, it would have been reasonable that proponents of the former would reject the latter completely. Due to an intriguing renegotiation of this relationship, this was, however, not the case. Consider the continuation of the above interview with the rain-maker:

> **R**: If people are taking water for big agricultural schemes and irrigation and then they are taking these crops and they are selling them to people for food, isn't it reasonable that these people should pay for the land and for water that they are using?
>
> **I**: What I would feel should be priced or sold is the energy that moves the engine to draw water from the dam but not water itself. If you need electricity, yes, you can buy it but water is the most holy thing of God. Pricing water will never work (Interview 29).

According to this interviewee, it is not acceptable to price water *per se*, but it is possible to put a price on the infrastructure needed for managing water. Other empirical material indicates that this position was widespread among proponents of Water as a Gift from the Gods (Interview 3; Sithole 2000; Derman 2003).[61] In fact, this proposal for extracting a price from water management was identified and utilised by proponents of IWRM. Public water officials engaged in information campaigns aimed to inform water consumers about the reform. The so-called WRMS team told the local constituencies that the price that was going to be charged was not

[61] There is no indication in my material that suggests that this position was favoured because it implied a lower price for water consumed by the local communities represented by the rain-makers.

a price on water as such but a price for the infrastructure associated with managing water. One of these actors explains:

> **R:** So let's talk about another one of those concepts, water as an economic good, how did you work with that concept?
>
> **I**: We tried to explain that concept of water as an economic good. You see there are some categories of people to whom you can explain these concepts. But for other categories, it just doesn't make sense. Especially in the rural areas. So we have to do a lot of explaining. Again, the people believe, the people in the rural areas believe water is a gift from god. So they say 'Why should we pay'. So now we are getting around that problem by saying 'You are not paying for the water, but you are paying for the service. Somebody brings the water, somebody purifies the water for you so that you can drink it. You are paying for that, it's not for the actual water.' So that is how the privilege was explained. You are paying for the services that I am making which makes it possible for you to drink water.
>
> **R:** How did that argument come up? It is a very cunning argument to get around this problem.
>
> **I**: Yes, people kept arguing that water was a gift from God. So then we said 'Ok the water came from heaven, but I had to draw the water, I had to bring it up to your unit pipe. Somebody has to pay for those pipes. If you are in urban area you have to pay for the water, somebody has to pay for the chemicals that we use to purify the water So that's how we made it up explaining it (Interview 18).

This quote testifies to the strategic manoeuvre engaged on by actors implementing IWRM to accommodate people convinced that Water is a Gift from the Gods. Supporters of Water as a Gift from the Gods objected to the pricing of water but accepted the pricing of services and goods associated with water management. This distinction was used by public water officials as they tried to get acceptance for IWRM in rural societies where the construction of Water as a Gift from the Gods was widely embraced. As this distinction gained legitimacy in rural societies the idea of water as an economic good was thus transformed so that the price charged for water use was not related to water as such but to the infrastructure used in the management of water.

However cunning this line of reasoning was, it implied a clear deviation from the behavioural incentives implied by IWRM's idea of water

as an economic good. IWRM suggests that water be priced so that the price regulates the consumption of water. The price for water should be formulated to reflect the demand and supply of water and thus function as an incentive to obtain resource effective use and austerity in times of scarcity. The problem is that this behavioural implication does not follow if the price is put on infrastructure rather than on the volume of consumed water. Whereas the price of water *per se* is sensitive to the relative scarcity of water, the price of infrastructure is not. Therefore, a price on infrastructure is not instrumental in achieving the behavioural incentives that motivated IWRM's call to make water an economic good.

The way to actually calculate the price for water was one of the most difficult issues to settle during the water sector reform in Zimbabwe. Despite the different options considered by the key actors, a price formula that would function as an incentive to preserver water was, however, not established and accepted (see chapters five, six and seven). In an official review of the reform process issued by the Zimbabwean Government in 2003, one of the major challenges for the future is identified as inculcating widespread acceptance for the idea of actually paying for the consumption of water (Presidential Land Review Committee 2003).

My analysis suggests that this lack of implementation of IWRM was, in part, the result of a dilemma faced by public water officials tasked to gain support for IWRM. Their dilemma was that if they stuck to the original ideas of IWRM and put a price on the consumption on water, their efforts to implement IWRM would be refuted by proponents of Water as Gift from the Gods. If, on the other hand, they accommodate the construction of Water as a Gift from the Gods and link the price to infrastructure they would drain IWRM of one of its key instruments of behavioural change. The options were thus either a breakdown of communication with supporters of Water as a Gift from the Gods, many of whom were local leaders, or a change of the behavioural implications of IWRM. Faced with this dilemma, the public water officials opted for the latter strategy: to support the transformation of IWRM in relation to the popular construction of Water as a Gift from the Gods. This transformation came at the expense of one of IWRM's most central instruments to achieve sustainable water management: a price structure reflecting the scarcity of water.

Stakeholder participation

In my analysis of actors advocating Water as a Gift from the Gods, I found that they offered scant support for IWRM's call for stakeholder participation. My interviewees pointed to two reasons for refusing stakeholder participation. The first centred on how to name the problem of water management. Proponents of IWRM call for stakeholder participation because they believe that it is man's interaction with nature that determines the

state of nature. Changes in human behavioural patterns can thus improve, for example, the availability and quality of water. This idea of a direct causal relation between man and the state of nature is not found in the construction of Water as a Gift from the Gods (cf. the section above on the transformation of IWRM's call for catchment management). The call for stakeholder participation thus built on an idea of causality that was alien to the construction of Water as a Gift from the Gods. Allow me to return to part of a quote from the interview with the rain-maker above:

> **R**: How come that there is sometimes so little water and sometimes even drought? How can we understand this?
>
> **I**: Oh, that is because we are not appeasing the spirits. Things have to be asked for. Whatever we want we should ask for it. If we haven't asked then the Creator says you do not want to follow the procedures then I will show you trouble, then he sends a drought (Interview 29, also cited above).

This rain-maker tries to define the problem of water availability as a problem related to the will of the gods. The gods regulate water availability in accordance with how pleased they are with the moral conduct of man: Man's direct interaction with nature has nothing to do with it.

Stakeholder participation—i.e. man engaging in direct interaction to improve the state of nature—is thus futile according to Water as a Gift from the Gods. It is, quite simply, not the way things work. Increased involvement of stakeholders as a means to improve the management of nature is to act without foundation in the proper spiritual logic. In fact, both of the rain-makers who I interviewed suggested that it is blasphemy for man to get directly involved in the regulation of water (Interview 3, 29). Man should be subservient to the benevolence of the gods. If man tries to regulate nature without the involvement of the gods, this is a sign of disbelief in the powers of the gods. The rain-makers that I interviewed reiterated that if people would only follow the proper conduct and appease the gods, there would be an abundance of water. One of the rain-makers said:

> **I:** We as spiritual leaders and our laws are put aside by this new law. This new law does not come from us. And this is where the problem of stability in this country emanates from. The economy, water, poverty alleviation, what have you. The problem is that there are two laws. And one law, which is the original law, our law and the law of our ancestors, is now being bypassed. It is being oppressed. So we have problems. (Interview 29).

What is interesting here is that the rain-maker points to the connection between the state of, on the one hand, the physical world, and, on the other hand, the spiritual world. Problems in the physical world occur because people have neglected the gods and the traditional ways, but there is no direct connection between the actions of people in the physical world and the state of the physical world. People can not correct the problems in the physical world emanating from their wrongdoings. People are moral subjects under the gods.

My argument is thus that a central reason why IWRM's call for stakeholder participation was refuted by advocates of Water as a Gift from the Gods was that it built on an idea about the causal relationship between man and nature that was alien to this construction of reality. It is important, however, not to mistake this view for fatalism in the sense that the acts of people can have no effect on the human conditions. People can influence their living conditions through a causal process based on the gods' assessment of the people's moral conduct. Good behaviour, in the eyes of the gods, is blessed with abundance of rain, while drought follows from misconduct. Man's impact on nature occurs via the rain-makers and is defined by a spiritual logic.

Stakeholder participation as a threat to the social identity of traditional rulers

I turn now to the second reason why IWRM's call for stakeholder participation was refuted by leading advocates of Water as a Gift from the Gods. The reason, in short, was that the IWRM's idea of stakeholder participation provided a basis to question the legitimacy vested in the social identities of the traditional leadership at the local level.

As I outlined in the introduction to this chapter, the construction of Water as a Gift from the Gods included the social identity of rain-makers, who are part of the leadership group traditionally holding a strong position on the local level in Zimbabwe. The social identity of rain-makers provides a legitimate claim for elderly men, designated as rain-makers, to obtain a high level of social and political prestige in the local society. Typically, the selection of rain-maker follows a lineage system which puts the (earthly) control of water management in the hands of a small group of men (Nyatsanza 1970; Ellis and ter Haar 2004). By contrast, IWRM's call for stakeholder participation builds on the idea that everybody with a stake in water management has a right to participate in the procedures of managing water. In principle, this democratic ideal is the opposite of the traditional leadership structure invested in the construction of Water as Gift from the Gods. Again, recall one of the interviews with a rain-maker above. He said:

> **I**: I am the rain-maker. I know how to call the rain to fall. I know how to make rain so that there is flow in a river. I know how to make that water stand still so that people can move across (Interview 29).

This interviewee identifies the rain-maker as the medium negotiating water to the people. This position is challenged by the idea of stakeholder participation and that is why this pillar of IWRM was obstructed by local leaders. A similar sentiment of resistance towards stakeholder participation was reported by Manzungu and his team of researchers from the University of Zimbabwe (Manzungu, Senzanje et al. 1999). They concluded from their field work on the reform process that there was a strong resistance towards this idea because the traditional leaders

> have always been in charge of the scheme without government intervention and their successful history of self reliance was testimony to their ability to survive....[The traditional leaders] did not welcome any venture initiated by the government which would end up affecting their community. They argued that Mutambara was a self reliant farming community ...[and] they believed that water belonged to no one but God (p. 7).

The report by Manzungu and colleagues shows how the resistance to stakeholder participation was based on a collective memory of successful water management connected to a social identity in which traditional leaders were seen to play the key role of managing what belongs "to no one but God". This line of reasoning was also expressed in the Parliamentary debate regarding the new Water Act which emphasised the need for stakeholder participation and suggested the introduction of new local institutional structures to this end (the catchment councils, and sub-catchment councils). Member of Parliament Mr. Makoni—who also held a position in his local traditional community which allowed him to use the title of "Chief"—commented on this by saying:

> **Cheif Makoni**: Let us not run away from the fact that traditional leadership has got a very deep involvement in the procurement of water and getting ready for water to come from where it comes from. If we as traditional leaders are not involved in this committee, you will find that in other places you will have no rain and no water because you will have left the real people out. (Government of Zimbabwe 1998b).

This speech by Chief Makoni illustrates the belief in the role of the traditional leaders as rain-makers and the resistance towards allowing other actors

to come in and compete with this role. Chief Makoni's message is that if the state institutions try to challenge the power of traditional leaders by favouring stakeholder participation, the rain-makers will use their powers to see to it that there is drought. My argument is that traditional leaders and rain-makers saw stakeholder participation as a threat to the foundation of their social identity and authority in the management of water. IWRM provided the foundation to call on increased stakeholder involvement and therefore provided the basis for a struggle for power between different actors at the local level. This power struggle was between, on the one hand, traditional leadership drawing their authority on the claim of a legitimate monopoly on communications with the spiritual world, and, on the other hand, actors proposing the IWRM idea that water users, based on their social identity as stakeholders, have both a right and the ability to have a direct effect on the management of water.

The different rationales behind legitimate authority in the water sector had concrete consequences for how to establish legitimacy to engage in water management at the local level. Looking at the reported composition of the stakeholder bodies set up during the reform (Catchment Councils and Sub-catchment Councils) it is clear that these bodies quickly were dominated by members of the traditional local leadership (Sithole 2000; Sithole 2001; Chikozho 2002). I interviewed one individual who had managed to get into office as a stakeholder representative in a Catchment Council *without* holding any position in the traditional local leadership. He described his problems of being accepted based on his non-traditional/non-spiritual mandate:

> **I:** They didn't expect me to be their leader, because they think that I didn't know anything about what I am supposed to manage. I used to think that water was something that came from the tap for me to drink. That's what I know. But they say that it wasn't necessary for me to manage water because it was God given. So how could they accept to be led by me? I really had to prove myself to them (Interview C10).

This quote testifies to the struggle for legitimate power offset by the competing claims for legitimate leadership in water management. The construction of Water as a Gift from the Gods eroded the legitimacy for stakeholder representatives without foundation in traditional structures to act as managers of water.

To conclude, my analysis is that in the eyes of actors advocating Water as a Gift from the Gods, stakeholder participation was transformed from a tool for mobilising water consumer in the management of water, and instead seen as a way of rebelling against the power of gods and the au-

thority of the traditional leadership. For these actors, the legitimate way to accommodate the call for stakeholder participation was to allow for the traditional leaders and rain-makers to stand as stakeholder representatives rather than allowing for a widespread democratic process of electing popular stakeholder representatives. I suggest that the dominant construction of reality among the rural population was strategically manipulated so that the traditional leaders were seen as the only morally legitimate actors to be involved in the procedures of water management. In this context, IWRM's call for stakeholder participation was thus transformed from a vehicle for popular mobilisation of local stakeholders to a means for perpetuating the domination of the existing local elites.

Conclusions

In this chapter, I have analysed the transformation of IWRM by actors subscribing to a construction of reality characterised by a linkage between the physical and the spiritual world. According to these actors, many events in the physical world, including the availability and quality of water, are controlled by spiritual beings. I have labelled this construction Water as a Gift from the Gods.

Water as a Gift from the Gods comprises a collective memory in which the problem of water management is defined in relation to the interaction between the gods and man. Accordingly, the right to legitimate claims on water is linked to a normative discourse stipulated by the gods. If the gods are pleased with the people's morality, they will provide water, if they are not, there will be drought. Two things are important here. First, there is no automatic connection between the moral conduct of man and the availability of water. Between the gods and man stand the rain-makers, with extensive powers as mediators of people's requests for rain. Second, the construction of Water as a Gift from the Gods does not contain the idea of a direct causal link between the actions of man and the state of nature. The relation between man and nature is better described as indirect, going via the rain-makers and the judgments of the gods.

Water as a Gift from the Gods comprises two specific social identities. First, rain-makers are constructed as mediators between the gods and the people. To appease the gods and ask for rain, people must turn to the rain-makers and ask them to perform certain rain-making ceremonies. Since people cannot address the gods directly, the rain-makers have great powers in societies embracing the construction of Water as a Gift from the Gods. Second, Water as a Gift from the Gods stipulates the social identity of water users as subjects whose need for water and rain can only be met if they follow the moral codes stipulated by the gods and turn to a rain-maker.

Whereas Water as a Gift from the Gods is embraced by a wide and diverse selection of Zimbabweans, including actors normally associated with contrasting constructions of reality, its strongest base is in rural society and among traditional leaders. Zimbabwe's political history is marked by the competition for legitimate claims for power over the rural polity, where the central government has tried to manifest its presence and control by expropriation of customary institutions and marginalisation of traditional leaders. Therefore I have emphasised that the transformation of IWRM in relation to Water as a Gift from the Gods should be seen in light of a political context in which the water sector reform was part of the struggle for power in rural Zimbabwe between central government and traditional leaders.

The construction of Water as a Gift from the Gods implied that the meaning of each of the three pillars of IWRM was transformed. Table 8.1. summarises the transformed meanings of each pillar and points to its behavioural implications.

Water as a Gift from the Gods		
Pillar of IWRM	**Transformed meaning**	**Behavioural implication**
Catchment management	Recognition of holistic "spiritual-system" approach (as opposed to ecosystem approach) placing water in the hands of the gods. Support of traditional chiefdoms and platform for political mobilization for local rule against the state.	Discourage man from direct interaction with nature to improve its conditions. Increased legitimacy for local leadership at the expense of stakeholders and citizens.
Water as an economic good	Pricing water is a challenge to the authority of the gods. A sign of lack of faith.	Obstruct pricing of water. Favour pricing system based on infrastructural use (which detached the price from reflecting quantity of water used).
Stakeholder participation	Challenge to the spiritual order and social organisation based on the idea of the state of nature as determined by man's relations with the gods, rather than with nature.	Obstructing widespread stakeholder participation. Support of traditional local leaders in stakeholder institutions.

Table 8.1. Summary of transformation of IWRM in relation to Water as a Gift from the Gods.

9. CONCLUSIONS

In a world of increasing global interdependence, effective instruments that promote domestic behavioural change are crucial. Many of the challenges of global sustainable development derive from politics and practices at domestic levels with effects far beyond national borders. Global warming, HIV/AIDS, and small arms proliferation are but a few examples of global problems emanating from domestic practices. International regimes are vehicles geared to promote increased cooperation and address such problems. They are based on expert knowledge and best practice, and typically carry widespread political legitimacy to instigate reforms at domestic levels.

The international regime of Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) is a case in point. The lack of safe water causes the death of some five million people each year and unsustainable water management leads to soil erosion, the loss of productive land, and contributes to social conflicts (UN 2003; Elliott 2004; Jønch-Clausen 2004; UN 2005a). These effects are not limited to any one national context: soil erosion spreads across boarders, the loss of productive lands hits global agricultural markets, and social conflicts in one country can lead to migration and subsequent loss of political stability in the nearby region and beyond.

The international regime of IWRM is the response of the international community to address this global water crisis. IWRM provides policy guidance for sustainable water management which acknowledge water as part of the ecosystem while recognising the benefits of economic incentives and the value of democratic participation (UN 2002). It was developed and gained widespread international acceptance as the result of a number of high level conferences including the UN conferences on sustainable development in Stockholm (1972), Rio (1992), and Johannesburg (2002). More than one hundred countries worldwide are currently undertaking reforms of their water management systems based on the ideas and values of IWRM. It provides the basis for all major international development organisations engaged in promoting sustainable water management in the developing world.

The result

This book has presented an analysis of the implementation of IWRM in Zimbabwe, which was one of the first countries to undertake a water sector

reform according to IWRM principles. Even if considerable work remains to be done before the legal and institutional structures for water management in Zimbabwe are fully in line with the principles of IWRM, Zimbabwe has been classified as one of the most successful IWRM implementations. In a recent assessment of the Global Water Partnership, Zimbabwe was one of only two countries in Southern Africa reporting "good progress" in the IWRM based reform process (Global Water Partnership 2004).

Despite the official adoption of IWRM and far reaching reforms in formal regulatory arrangements, the empirical analysis presented in this book shows that various groups of actors in Zimbabwe hold very different understandings of IWRM and its implications for water related practices. The analysis, summarised in table 9.1., points to variations in understandings of IWRM between the international and domestic level, as well as across different groups of actors within Zimbabwe. In accordance with the structure of the analysis of this book, table 9.1 displays these variations across the three fundamental principles, or 'pillars', of IWRM: catchment management, water as an economic good, and stakeholder participation. Table 9.1. combines the information from the tables summarizing each of the four constructions of reality that I found around water use in Zimbabwe: Water as Zimbabwe, Water as Gold, Water as Science, Water as a Gift from the Gods.

Pillar of IWRM	**IWRM at international level**	
	Original meaning	**Behavioural implication**
Catchment management	Water is integral to ecological and social systems.	Management of water resources should consider the externalities of water use for human actors and biological systems. Sector-wide approach to management systems within catchments.
Water as an economic good	Water is a scarce resource with an economic value.	Market economic principles and institutions should be used to guide the aggregation and allocation of water.
Stakeholder participation	Water is an essential component of life. Stakeholder participation gives people the right to self-determination and creates a sense of ownership, thus providing incentives for sustainable use.	Water resources management should involve all people with a stake in the management of water.

IWRM at domestic levels		
	Transformed meaning	**Behavioural implication**
Water as Zimbabwe		
Catchment management	Threat to the viability of the nation-state and its administrative back-bone i.e. the provincial system	Support formal implementation of catchments to appease proponents of IWRM, but maintain the key managerial instruments for water management within the government controlled provincial system.
Water as an economic good	Challenge to the socialisation of water consumers into citizens. Seen as an instrument against a unified nation-state.	Government calculated NBP detached from the control of market mechanisms and incentives.
Stakeholder participation	Call for increased participation by representatives of the marginalised Blacks; i.e. the government.	Introduce formal institutions for stakeholder participation but maintain control by the state though legal arrangements and strategic appointments.
Water as Gold		
Catchment management	Platform for political mobilization against post-colonial rulers, for maintaining white farmers' reality constructions and privileges.	Use legal provision for catchment management to step-up organisation of alternative political agenda and to spread this to catchments throughout the country as part of a process aiming at a increased leverage for whites in society at large.
Water as an economic good	Call to deprive white commercial farmers of legitimate, historically obtained, discount on water pricing.	Oppose economically favourable pricing policy offered by the Government as a means to maintain recognition for construction of Water as Gold.
Stakeholder participation	Means to increase control by backward Blacks at the expense of progressive Whites.	Support the display of blacks at stakeholder meetings but obstruct any substantial influence by blacks.

Water as Science		
Catchment management	Challenge to social stratification between different kinds of scientific water experts (hydrologists and hydrogeologists)	Maintain segmented organisational structure and distinctions between managers of surface and groundwater as opposed to IWRM call for ecosystem management.
Water as an economic good	Contradiction of rational water resources management for benefit of all of Zimbabweans. Call for inferior science (i.e. economics) to legitimise narrow-minded, egoistic use of water.	Obstruct market-based pricing in support of price reflecting national and natural scientific concerns.
Stakeholder participation	Challenge to scientific practice in which the proper road-map to water management is arrived at through calculations rather than consultations. Stakeholder management was a call for dilletants to manage water.	Turn campaigns for stakeholder participation into one-way communication exercises to transmit solutions to water management arrived at through calculations based on natural sciences.
Water as a Gift from the Gods		
Catchment management	Recognition of holistic "spiritual-system" approach (as opposed to ecosystem approach) placing water in the hands of the gods. Support of traditional chiefdoms and platform for political mobilization for local rule against the state.	Discourage man from direct interaction with nature to improve its conditions. Increased legitimacy for local leadership at the expense of stakeholders and citizens.
Water as an economic good	Pricing water is a challenge to the authority of the gods. A sign of lack of faith.	Obstruct pricing of water. Favour pricing system based on infrastructural use (which detached the price from reflecting quantity of water used).
Stakeholder participation	Challenge to the spiritual order and social organisation based on the idea of the state of nature as determined by man's relations with the gods, rather than with nature.	Obstructing widespread stakeholder participation. Support of traditional local leaders in stakeholder institutions.

Table 9.1. Summary of empirical analysis.

The empirical results summarised in table 9.1. are based on the theory of domestic transformations of international regimes presented in chapter four. The aim of this theory is to be attentive to how international regimes may be transformed by domestic actors whose daily practices are the target of international regimes. This theory is developed to complement existing scholarship in international relations reviewed in chapter three. If I had conducted my analysis of the implementation of IWRM in Zimbabwe within the confinements of the existing scholarship on international regimes, a different picture would have emerged. In fact, had I applied any of the conventional theories on international regime implementation (realism, liberalism or constructivism) to the case of IWRM in Zimbabwe, I would not have seen the reported variations in targeted domestic actors' understandings of IWRM. Existing scholarship on international relations largely turns a blind eye to domestic variations in understandings of international regimes. Scholars of international relations have increasingly been concerned with the spread of international regimes and norms from the international level to national contexts. While these scholars differ with regard to theoretical orientations—be they realists, liberalists, or constructivists—they share the assumption that the understanding of the international regime is constant. The targeted domestic actors' understanding of the international regime is assumed to be the same as the understanding held by actors at the international level.

The crucial principle of the theory of domestic transformations of international regimes is to recognize that when an international regime is being implemented in domestic contexts it can become part of evolving domestic politics and practices that reflect domestic variations in constructions of reality. In this process the international regime takes on new meanings, which affects the behavioural implications of the international regime. In contrast to existing scholarship, I argue that the understanding of an international regime and its behavioural propositions are *constructed*, rather than *constant*, during the implementation process.

The theory of domestic transformations of international regimes provides an account for the causal mechanisms which result in the observed diversity in domestic actors' understandings of the international regime. How do we explain that different actors come up with different understandings of the international regime? Combining research in social-psychology, sociology and international relations, I have offered an explanation that emphasis how domestic constructions of realities and the content of the international regime set the stage for strategic action by political entrepreneurs in the targeted environment. This point should be seen in light of contemporary theories of international regime implementation that tend to regard the targeted domestic actors as passive recipients of external impetus for change embedded in international regimes. In contrast to existing scholarship, I

analyse domestic actors as political entrepreneurs with an agenda for reconstructing the international regime and a game plan for how to make this reconstruction legitimate in society.

The Implications

This study has shown that it is not the international regime in its original form that impacts upon domestic patterns of behaviour. The domestic impact of an international regime is contingent on how it is transformed by strategic domestic actors based on their constructions of reality. What are the implications of this result for theorising about the implementation of international regimes? What does this result say about the prospects of using international regimes as vehicles for international cooperation? In this final section, I point to five implications of my analysis for the study and implementation of international regimes.

International politics and changes in domestic constructions of reality

Trying to identify how domestic norms and cognitive maps change, leading scholars have pointed to changes in material circumstances (Goldstein and Keohane 1993; Hall P. 1993; McNamara 1998). The idea is that as old norms and cognitive maps fail to function due to changed material conditions, actors will grapple to find new, more suitable, ones. To these scholars, changes in norms and cognitive orientations are epiphenomenal to changes in material conditions. With regard to domestic effects of international regimes, national responses to international regimes are seen as a result of national actors trying to grapple with changing material conditions. The changing material conditions can, for example, derive from international development agencies that offer assistance only on the condition of national political reforms. Alternatively, international regimes can provide new guidelines for domestic actors subjected to changes in national or local conditions, such as ecologic or economic collapse. Domestic actors adopt international regimes that hold out the promise of a policy that better fits evolving material conditions.

My analysis of the implementation of IWRM in Zimbabwe partly supports this view. Recall, for example, how the instigation of the water sector reform was sparked by a combination of donors' conditions for sweeping policy reforms within the framework of the World Bank's Structural Adjustment Program, and a series of extraordinary droughts at the turn of the 1980's and early 1990's (chapter two and five). More interestingly, however, the dominant result of my analysis is that the implementation of IWRM was not just a process of adaptation to changing material conditions. It

was a process marked by power and politics in which domestic actors were concerned with the effects IWRM would have on their constructions of reality; their collective memories and social identities.

To give but two examples, it was pointed out in chapter six that the Commercial Farmers Union (CFU)—comprised mainly of white commercial farmers—could have obtained a lower price for water if they had accepted the pricing policy suggested by the government as part of the reform. Despite these economic prospects, this policy was stymied by the CFU because they saw it as contradictory to the social identity and collective memory that formed their construction of reality. Similarly, I showed in chapter seven how prospects for economic support from international donor agencies were held out to public officials in Zimbabwe's water administration in return for a straightforward implementation of IWRM. Despite this, and the fact that these actors understood, on an intellectual level, that IWRM would provide effective solutions to pressing problems (like integrated catchment management), they obstructed the implementation. The reason was that these actors, acting out of the construction of Water as Science, transformed the meaning of IWRM into a tool in the conflict over prestigious social identities (the distinction between hydrologists and hydrogeologists) and their collective memory (as the vanguard of modern nation-building).

This illustrates that domestic responses to international regimes will not be determined by how well the international regime provides policy guidelines to meets concrete material problems and demands. Targeted domestic actors will respond strategically to the international regime based on how it relates to, and can be reconstructed in the context of evolving constructions of reality. The transformation of IWRM was neither a functional response to changing material conditions nor was it the result of actors guided simply by ideational factors. The picture that emerges from the empirical analysis is one in which ideational factors define the interest of materially oriented actors, and, to borrow Max Weber's famous dictum, serve like switchmen who direct their action along one track or another. Similarly, Elinor Ostrom (1998) has called for "a behavioural theory of boundedly rational and moral behaviour" (p. 2). She states that "All long-enduring political philosophies have recognized human nature to be complex mixture of the pursuit of self-interest combined with the capability of acquiring internal norms of behaviour and following enforced rules when understood and perceived to be legitimate" (1998:2 cf. March and Olsen 1989; North 1990; Levi 1997; Naurin 2004). As political entrepreneurs in the local community (rain-makers and traditional leaders) acted in support of Water as a Gift from the Gods they not only reconfirmed a deep religious belief system, they reconfirmed the social identities that were the foundation of their own social and material privileges in local communities. Likewise, as much as the government's construction of water resources management in

racial terms drew on the ideas making up the government's post-colonial project of nation building, it also served the purpose of legitimising the government's increased control of society.

The point that national responses to international regimes should not be analysed as functional adoption to material conditions has been made by constructivist scholars. Martha Finnemore (1996) analysed the epistemic community around Robert McNamara in the World Bank to account for changes in economic policies of Third World countries during the 1970's. Risse, Ropp and Sikkink (1999) focus on how adaptation to the international norm of human rights can be attributed to the work of normative entrepreneurs drawing on the normative discourse of this ideal (c.f. Klotz 1995; Keck and Sikkink 1998).

The analysis that I present differs from existing constructivist scholarship in as much that the latter conceptualise domestic responses to international regimes as a movement away from domestic orientations and towards increased resemblance with the international regime. Domestic norms and ideas change while the international regime remains constant. By contrast, I show that as domestic political entrepreneurs respond to international regimes, they draw on both the international regime and domestic constructions of reality to come up with a new transformed understanding of the international regime. A transformed international regime is made up as a mixture of, on the one hand, the international regime, and, on the other hand, domestic constructions of reality. A similar point was recently made by Acharya who, critical of the "static" analysis of contemporary constructivists, set out to show how domestic actors in South East Asia have responded to international standards on regional organisations (such as the EU, Acharya 2004). In his account, rational actors at the domestic level—"norm takers"—change the international standards for regional organisation to fit prevailing domestic conditions. Although I am sympathetic to Acharya's attempt to expand on current constructivist literature, his analysis does not acknowledge the domestic level as a dynamic political entity that also changes during the influence of international regimes. Whereas constructivist analysts tend to hold the international regime constant during their analysis, Acharya's analysis does not acknowledge changes at the domestic level. Acharya envisages the implementation of international regimes as a process of "localisation", i.e. how international regimes are made local. By contrast, I offer an account of the interface between international regimes and domestic politics as a transformation in which both the international regime and domestic constructions of reality are subjected to change.

To sum up, my analysis suggests that we should understand the impact of international regimes on domestic policies and norms as a process involving strategic actors at the cross-road of international standards and domestic constructions of reality. It is not adequate to analyse their response as a search

for functional solutions to material circumstances. Nor should this be seen as a process of wholesale adoption of the international regime (leading to global homogenisation), or as the reverse, i.e., a process in which domestic standards trump international norms and ideas (as Acharya would have it). I argue that we should see the domestic impact of international regimes as contingent on a process of strategic transformations of the international regime as well as evolving domestic constructions of reality. In this process, the aim is not necessarily—if at all—to find a remedy for how to cope with material circumstances or how to adopt to internationally established ideas and norms. It is a process that turns on actors' social identities of themselves and others, their collective memories of the past and visions of the future.

Political entrepreneurs and domestic transformations of international regimes

At the outset of this book, I criticized contemporary theories of international regimes for down-playing the level of strategic action of targeted domestic actors. Existing theories regard the targeted domestic actors as passive subjects of external impetus for change rather than as agents with an agenda setting capacity in their own right. Consequently, the theories give scant insights into how targeted domestic actors strategically transform the international regime in relation to evolving domestic constructions of reality.

I have presented a theory in which domestic actors are seen as political entrepreneurs engaging in strategic actions which aim to create a transformation that they think will reduce their cognitive dissonance while increasing the legitimacy of their in-group to claim material and non-material resources. In this process, taken-for-granted facts of domestic constructions of reality as well as different components of the international regime are called into question and recast. Contrary to the dominant view among theorists of international regimes, there was thus no constant "match" or "mismatch" between IWRM and the domestic constructions in Zimbabwe (Cortell and Davis 1996; 2000; 2005).

Analysing the actions of the domestic political entrepreneurs I looked for factors shaping their perceptions of reality and setting the boundaries for what kind of transformations were likely to be viable in Zimbabwean society at large. Combining research on social-psychology, sociology and international relations, I accounted for how strategic political entrepreneurs are bounded by deep-seated constituents of human psychology and embedded in prevalent domestic constructions of reality. The presented analysis thus has the advantage of providing an understanding of variations in domestic transformations, while at the same time pointing to fundamental processes in the reconstruction of actors' collective memories and social identities.

With regard to the re-formation of collective memories, political entrepreneurs are affected by cognitive dissonance, and individual limitations in remembering reality, while at the same time recognising how these can be exploited by political entrepreneurs for strategic reasons. Similarly, social identities are shaped by basic social-psychological processes in a way that not only set limits for the constructions of social actors, but can also be used for strategic purposes by political entrepreneurs.

I analysed political entrepreneurs as part of a web of competing constructions of reality around water in Zimbabwe. The empirical analysis showed how existing constructions of reality affected which repertoire of transformations of IWRM would be seen as legitimate in society at large. Established domestic constructions of reality influenced which transformations of IWRM that were politically viable.[62] Moreover, the analysis showed how political entrepreneurs can take an active role in *creating* the domestic constructions of reality within which the international regime will be implemented. Prevalent domestic constructions not only affect the actions of political entrepreneurs, but they are affected by their actions. Checkel (1997a) describes the role of political entrepreneurs as that of developing a "game plan" for a context with pre-defined "situational conditions" (p. 9). By contrast, my analysis of the implementation of IWRM in Zimbabwe shows how political entrepreneurs took an active role in creating these situational conditions. Political entrepreneurs are thus not restricted to applying their game plan to a game structured by external circumstances. By recreating domestic constructions of reality and international regimes, they take part in determining which game is going to be played. The relations between the government of Zimbabwe and the white commercial farmers are a case in point. These relations were not determined by anonymous historical processes but were part of the strategic manoeuvrings of political entrepreneurs within these groups. The racial stereotypes of "Black" and "White" which greatly influenced the transformation of IWRM were not pre-defined conditions making up the playing-field on which political entrepreneurs were to implement IWRM. They were deliberately constructed by political

[62] For example, recall from chapter five how political entrepreneurs proposing Water as Zimbabwe managed to delay the introduction of IWRM for several years by associating it with the colonial heritage of external interference in the management of Zimbabwe's natural resources. IWRM was only introduced in Zimbabwe by connecting it with the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) which had been accepted by the top national leadership as the legitimate template for nation building during the second half of the 1990's. Only when ESAP had become available as a domestic construction of reality were political entrepreneurs able to establish legitimacy for IWRM.

[63] Recall, for example, how opponents of IWRM in the government pictured the actors supportive of IWRM as white colonialists upholding the colonial tradition from the pre-Independence period in Zimbabwe. Likewise, as the government gave in to the IWRM call of stakeholder participation, it reconstructed itself into a stakeholder representative.

entrepreneurs throughout the water sector reform.[63] Similarly, the analysis of Water as a Gift from the Gods showed how, in a context influenced by modern scientific conceptions of water management, traditional leaders used rain-making rituals and threats of the revenge of the gods to define the game of the water sector reform in terms of their construction of reality. In so doing, the traditional leaders also emphasized the imperative of paying tribute to the earthly representatives of the ancestral gods, i.e. themselves and their peers.

While the analysis provides some insights into the causal processes guiding political entrepreneurs during domestic transformations, additional research is much needed. My results suggest that this research should include particular attention to how (by what means) political entrepreneurs shape domestic contexts. This research should aim to explain variations in how successful political entrepreneurs manifest their respectively preferred transformations as legitimate in society at large. What determines if a political entrepreneur is successful in transforming international regimes?

In addition, my analysis raises questions about what determines that which political entrepreneurs regard as being in their interest. How are the perceptions and interests of political entrepreneurs formed? How can political entrepreneurs be influenced to regard the actual implementation of (untransformed) international regimes to square with their interests? Addressing these questions is vital not only from a theoretical point of view but also from the perspective of using international regimes to achieve behavioural change at domestic levels.

The power of targeted domestic actors

A third venue for further research suggested by my analysis regards what constitutes resources of power, and how this power can be executed by targeted domestic actors during the transformation process. Following the realist and liberal tradition of international relations theory, conceptions of power in the study of international regimes has predominantly been material in orientation (see e.g. Barnett and Durvall 2005).

The empirical analysis gives ample support to such a material understanding of power. It is, for example, difficult to understand the considerable impact of political entrepreneurs supportive of Water as Gold without taking into account the organisational structure and considerable material resources of the CFU. The importance of their material resources stood out even more given that their previously amicable "bargain" with the government had broken down at about the same time as the water sector reform began (chapter six). The white farmers managed to manifest their views on water despite being socially and politically contested and without historical allies.

The presented analysis further points the power derived from non-material

factors such as the construction of collective memories and social identities. Constructivist scholars interested in the power of ideational factors have shown that the implementation process can be characterised as a knowledge-based process in which domestic actors *learn* the content of international regimes or as a process of *socialisation*. Whereas I am sympathetic to this attempt to expand on material conceptions of power, my objection is that constructivists have analysed the targeted domestic actors as powerless recipients without an agenda-setting capacity in their own right. The literature on learning sees the targeted domestic actors as 'willing students' while the literature on socialisation portray them as passive subjects to the social pressure mounted by proponents of the international regime. Processes of learning and socialisation have thus been juxtaposed by constructivists as alternative independent variables set up parallel to the focus on material power used by traditional international relations theories. What is missing is an account of the power in the hands of the targeted domestic actors, i.e. the actors whose practices the international regime sets out to change. As Keck and Sikkink (1998) analyse "advocacy networks in international politics" they transcend the distinction between international and national actors to give an account of how domestic actors can draw on the power resources of their network partners at the international level to pressure the targeted domestic actors into changing their behaviour (see in particular pp. 16-32; cf. Klotz 1995; Risse, Ropp et al. 1999). These domestic actors are, however, not the actors whose behaviour is targeted by the international regime. They are change agents (non-governmental organisations, interest groups and alike) linked up in networks with international actors to help obtain change among the targeted domestic actors. My objection with this analysis is that it does not account for the role of power in the hands of the targeted domestic actor. Power is vested at the level of international actors and their domestic network-partners rather than in the hands of the actors whose practices the international regimes set out to change (such as small scale farmers or scientific water officials under pressure of IWRM).

To sum up, traditional theories of international relations have focused on how material power at the level of international actors affects the implementation of international regimes. Current constructivists have added to this analysis by pointing to the significance of non-material resources (knowledge and social pressure) and how domestic actors can be empowered by networking with international actors. Adding to this literature, my theory of domestic transformations of international regimes proposes a focus on the power of targeted domestic actors. To understand domestic transformations of international regimes, we should analyse the targeted domestic actors as powerful actors in their own right.

This research should analyse how material and non-material factors are combined by targeted domestic actors to exercise power during the implementation of international regimes. How are material resources combined

with ideational factors during the transformation of international regimes? How can political entrepreneurs with small material resources increase their leverage by strategic use of ideational factors? These questions should not only interest scholars on international relations, but should be of interest for development agencies advocating changed domestic behaviour in a context infused by power struggles around material and non-material resources.

Whose norms and ideals? Domestic contexts in the plural

The implementation of IWRM in Zimbabwe did not lead to a single national response. Rather, Zimbabwe showed great diversity in domestic responses to IWRM. In fact, as I ended my fieldwork in Zimbabwe, a decade after the initiation of the reform, there were still great differences between different domestic actors' constructions around water, and there were no signs of increased convergence around IWRM. This is evident in table 9.1., which displays the various transformed understandings of IWRM that developed during the water sector reform.

This picture of domestic heterogeneity in constructions of reality is a reflection of the vast societal pluralism of Zimbabwe. Assume that an international development agency wanted to make a renewed effort to further implement IWRM in Zimbabwe. Whose norms and ideals should they target? Or, to phrase the same question in a more generic form: In a domestic context hosting a wide variety of constructions of reality, which one should be the target of international regimes?

The answer given by the vast majority of scholars of international politics would be that the targeted construction should be that of the government. The unitary state represented by its government is given primacy as an actor in theories and models of international political theory and scholars of domestic implementation of international regimes traditionally focus on the implementation at the level of the state (see e.g. Hasenclever, Mayer et al. 1997). While this limited perspective has spurred a literature that focuses on the role of non-state actors, be they non-governmental organisations, market actors, trans-national networks, civil society, etc this research nonetheless typically sees the role of these other actors only in relation to the government. Non-state actors are brought into the analysis to the extent that they are thought to influence how governments accommodate international regimes (cf. Wapner 1995; Ruggie 2004). As Landolt (2004) points out, the focus is on "unitary states" as the target for acceptance of international regimes, forgetting the political processes taking place in society at large (p. 585; Checkel 1998:244).

The results presented in this study call for analysis of the domestic response to international regimes that includes non-state domestic actors as the prime targets of international regimes. The government in Zimbabwe did not represent the sole construction of water, nor perhaps the most important in terms of popular local support (cf. Water as a Gift from the Gods) or the

economically most viable (cf. Water as Gold). This is partly due to the fact that the state of Zimbabwe, like many of its African peers, is a weak state where the government has not been able to diffuse its norms and ideals throughout its polity. Zimbabwe society has a huge variety of alternative political agendas with implications for how to organise society in general and natural resources management in particular, some of which are more or less oppositional to the government's project of a unitary state.

Questioning the primacy of governments as the target for international regimes is not only a consequence of, and relevant to, the weak state structure in Zimbabwe (and similar African states). The primacy of the government is also brought into question by the policy area under review, i.e., natural resources management. Based on her extensive research on natural resources management, Elinor Ostrom (1998) states that "national governments are too small too govern the global commons and too big to handle smaller scale problems" (p. 17). While the small scale of national governments requires international cooperation to solve such problems, their limited capability to act at the micro-level makes sustainable resource use contingent on norms and ideals practiced by local actors on a daily basis. To the extent that it is desirable to push domestic behavioural change in the direction of more sustainable resource use, the government should not *a priori* be regarded as the primary target of international regimes, but attention should be paid to actors throughout society as actors in their own right.

Don't (always) support domestic transformations of international regimes

The rationale for implementing international regimes is typically to prompt change in domestic actors' constructions of reality and behavioural patterns in a direction supportive of sustainable development. The underlying rational is that adherence to international regimes leads to increased sustainable development. From this assumption it follows that as international regime are transformed in the direction of targeted domestic actors' constructions of reality, the change-potential of the international regime may decrease. Domestic transformations may counteract efforts for sustainable development. The more targeted domestic actors redefine the international regime in relation to domestic constructions of reality, the less chance there is that

[64] It has been argued that increased local involvement creates a sense of "ownership" conducive for effective resource use. Similarly, engaging local actors in the development and execution of reform processes can increase the level of "trust" among concerned actors (Ostrom 1991;1998). These effects should not be confused with the effects of local systems of knowledge. Whereas ownership and trust are used to determine how local actors will conceive of their relation to the project and each other, involving local systems of knowledge implies that the content and behavioural implications of a proposed project will be changed.

the implementation of the international regime will lead to sustainable development.[64]

This conclusion stands in contrast with the emphasis made by scholars and policy makers alike on the need to integrate local knowledge in development strategies to obtain sustainable natural resource use. Drawing on a vast amount of empirical field work and controlled social experiments, Elinor Ostrom has argued that building institutions and systems of governance on local knowledge vastly increases the likelihood of long term sustainability in use of both social and natural resources (e.g. Ostrom 1990; 1997; 1999). Similarly, policies for international development organisations advocate adaptation to local knowledge systems rather than the other way around. UNDP points to adoption to local knowledge-systems as part of its core strategy to meet the Millennium Development Goals (UNDP 2002; Sida 2003; Sida 2004).

Two lines of thought lie behind this call among scholars and policy makers to adjust to local knowledge systems. First, local knowledge is celebrated in its own right as representing the locus of intense insights and wisdom on sustainable resource use. Local problems associated with sustainable development often involve complex considerations about sensitive ecological and social systems. Local knowledge is developed though lengthy processes of trial and error and provides appropriate strategies to cope with local problems. In addition, Mohan and Stokke (2000) have pointed out that local knowledge is frequently associated with a moral superiority based on the idea of self-determination and an approach to development that is free from the normative biases of "non-locals". This view is shared by theorists with diverse normative standings—from (neo-)liberals to (post-)Marxists—who envisage that increased leverage for local knowledge will produce a multiplicity of local development trajectories in tune with local needs and environmental conditions (Mohan and Stokke 2000:252).[65]

The second line of thought behind the celebration of local knowledge is that this will be the ingredient in a collective learning process aiming at sustainable development. Allowing increased influence from diverse local knowledge systems will maximise the input of views and alternatives in a collective learning process that will, in turn, generate strategies for a more encompassing institutional level (such as the national, regional, or international level). This will, so the reasoning goes, produce a better approach to sustainable development than the one dictated by any single group of experts or policy makers (such as the ones writing up international regimes).

Both of these pictures celebrating the role of local knowledge are contested

[65] In the liberal scenario this is often combined with institutional decentralisation of the state and subsequent devolution of power. Post-Marxists envisage a similar distancing from capitalist movements and hegemonic power.

by my empirical results from Zimbabwe. Consider first the view that local actors' represent approaches supportive of sustainable development. The construction of Water as a Gift from the Gods presented a "spiritual system approach" to water, characterised by the idea that the state of nature is determined by the will of the gods and how the gods assess human's moral conduct. This construction undermines the most fundamental rationale for natural resources management: Why should people mind their actions towards water in hope of better access and quality if this is ultimately determined by the gods?

Similarly, consider the second line of thought presented above, i.e., that local knowledge will be an ingredient in a collective learning process optimising collective solutions for resource management. Again, my empirical analysis offers scant support for such an argument. The racial constructions held by the CFU and the government respectively (i.e. local knowledge of the "Other") drove actors in these groups further and further apart. Likewise, the very conception of what constituted knowledge (as opposed to beliefs) lead the scientific water officials in the official water administration to alienate local stakeholders during the stakeholder campaigns (chapter seven).

Throughout this study I have called attention to domestic transformations of international regimes. This should however not be mistaken for a call to support such transformations. Domestic transformations may increase the influence of local knowledge, which in turn may *undermine* reforms for sustainable development incited by international regimes.

This conclusion calls for scholars and policy makers alike to be more attentive to the potential negative effects of local participation and influence from local knowledge. It is clearly reasonable to question the assumption, made above, that international regimes represent the correct way of approaching domestic policy problems, and to acknowledge that domestic actors can represent important knowledge on sustainable resource use. Nevertheless, the question that must be addressed is *what* local knowledge is supportive of sustainable development? How do we determine which local actors represent sustainable approaches to natural resource usage?

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International regimes are developed by international experts and policy makers to encourage specific behavioural changes at domestic levels. With the aim of understanding and promoting the implementation of international regimes, this book presents a theory of domestic transformations of international regimes. Patrik Stålgren argues that the domestic implementation of international regimes is a process in which their meanings are transformed in ways that may result in behaviours that are different than originally intended.

This argument complements existing scholarship in International Relations which assumes that the understanding of international regimes during the implementation process is constant rather than constructed, and regards targeted domestic actors as passive recipients of external reform rather than subjects of change. Stålgren combines theories on international relations with social psychology and sociology to account for how actors in the targeted domestic policy area reconstruct international regimes.

At the heart of the analysis is a case study of the implementation of the international regime on Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) in Zimbabwe. IWRM was developed to address global water crises which cause the death of millions each year. IWRM resembles other international regimes in that it builds on the norms and ideas of ecosystem management, market economy and democratic participation. The United Nations and the European Union alike have recommended its members to adopt IWRM, and it is the foundation for most international development agencies supporting sustainable water use in the developing world.

Zimbabwe, setting out to reform its water sector in the early 1990's, was one of the first countries to explicitly engage IWRM as a template for the reform. The theory of domestic transformation of international regimes is used to analyse how the impact was contingent on transformations in relation to four specific constructions of reality: Water as Zimbabwe; Water as Gold; Water as Science; Water as a Gift from the Gods.

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