

Multi-level Europeans

The Influence of Territorial Attachments on Political Trust and Welfare Attitudes

This study explores if the multi-level system in Europe can be seen as challenging both traditional state roles and the European integration process, since territorial identity by some is expected to be important for legitimacy and solidarity. The author argues the relevance of taking into account all levels of the multi-level system and shifting the focus from the level of the system to the individuals who live in it, and therefore investigates the influence of individuals' territorial attachments on political trust and welfare attitudes.

Incorporating theoretical insights from various research disciplines, three challenges are put forward concerning 1) multi-level territorial attachments, 2) their effect on political trust, and 3) the effect on welfare attitudes. Moreover, these relationships may be influenced by different institutional contexts. Empirically, these challenges are investigated by analyzing two different types of data sets, combining comparative opinion data from all the EU member states with more detailed data from Sweden.

The results indicate that neither the territorial attachments themselves, nor their impact on political trust, constitute a challenge to the role of the state (or to the continuation of European integration). Rather, the European multi-level system seems to have enhanced both attachment to and trust in a number of territorial levels, including the states and the EU. However, the relationship between multi-level territorial attachments and welfare attitudes is of more concern, with possible difficulties to sustain support for the welfare state if the majority of people would have strong attachments to territorial levels other than the state. Moreover, there is no indication of a demand for a "social Europe". In this regard, the European multi-level system may challenge the traditional role of the (welfare) state, but without offering any immediate alternative at the European level. Finally, the results indicate the relevance of taking into account the institutional context, not least regarding the variation of EU member states' experience of the multi-level system.

Linda Berg works as a researcher and teacher of political science. Multi-level Europeans. The Influence of Territorial Attachments on Political Trust and Welfare Attitudes is her doctoral dissertation.




GÖTEBORG UNIVERSITY

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Till minnet av
Monica Dahlgren Berg

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Göteborg, August 2007

Linda Berg

Chapter 1

Political Implications of Individuals' Territorial Attachments

The political map of Europe has changed dramatically since the end of the 1980s, with the continuing integration and enlargement of the European Union and the rising importance of sub-national political levels. This process can be described as the development of a European multi-level system, which is sometimes argued to challenge traditional state roles, although the form and extent of such a challenge has been debated (Hooghe & Marks 2001; Keating 2003; McEwen & Moreno 2005; Peters & Pierre 2004). These boundary changes at different territorial levels have led to renewed interest in the theoretical system-building tradition (Hirschman 1970; Rokkan 1974, 1987; Rokkan & Urwin 1983), especially concerning the possible system-building capacity of the EU. Some observers are more optimistic (e.g. Scharpf 1999), whereas others perceive more obstacles, regarding the continuation of European integration (Bartolini 2005; Ferrera 2005).

A key to understanding such opposing outlooks is the question of territorial identity. In the system-building tradition, territorial identity is seen as essential for the further development of democratic society, in particular, of welfare states. In the words of Maurizio Ferrera: "State-building, nation-building, mass-democracy, and redistribution are the four ingredients and at the same time the four time phases of territorial system-building in modern Europe" (Ferrera 2005:23). If the development of the multi-level system can be thought to correspond to the state-building phase, the question is whether the same three remaining steps are needed for the continuation of European integration. I will argue that such a discussion should consider *all levels* of the multi-level system and would benefit from shifting its focus from the *system* level to that of the *individuals* living in the system, i.e., the European citizens. The three remaining system-building phases can thus be explored in light of whether and how individuals' territorial attachments influence their political trust and attitudes towards welfare – at all levels of the multi-level system and in different institutional settings.

The individual-level perspective is highly relevant, due to efforts being made in the EU to create specifically European institutions (more or less corresponding to the system-building phases); at the same time, however, European citizens remain relatively hesitant to further integration. This hesitation is indicated, for example, by the generally low turnouts for European Parliament elections (Flickinger & Studlar 2007), or by the 2005 French and Dutch referenda results that refused to ratify the new European constitution (Piris 2006). Since most of the political elite in Europe tend to favour European integration, the intricacy of system-building can be thought to lie less in the actual creation of institutions, and more in the question of citizens' attachments and attitudes.

The theoretical discussions in this study will therefore concern two different levels of abstraction. The first is the macro level, or *system level*, at which the amalgamation of the system-building tradition and multi-level governance provides the overall theoretical framework of the study, explaining how the separate parts are linked and why they merit investigation. Second, at *the individual level*, more specific theories about individuals' territorial attachments and their political impact will be discussed and further developed. The empirical analyses, in contrast, will not treat both the system and individual levels, but primarily focusing on the influence of individuals' territorial attachments.¹

A multi-level perspective on system building

To explain why it is relevant to study the impact of individuals' territorial attachments, I will start the theoretical discussion at the system level. I argue that combining the system-building tradition with a *multi-level perspective* is pertinent because of the traditional theoretical focus on the nation state, which can be contrasted with the reality of boundary changes in Europe. The three system-building phases mentioned above can also be referred to using the more general concepts of *identity*, *legitimacy*, and *solidarity*. The theoretical understanding of the overall connection between these concepts in this study can be facilitated by considering Ferrera's elaboration of system building as a continuous process, which he calls "bounded structuring" (Ferrera 2005:20ff). "Bounded" refers to how the boundaries of both territory and citizens' memberships, have led to greater *closure* and fewer *exit* options. "Structuring" concerns the internal processes of relationships between centre and periphery, socio-political cleavages, and institutional organization, which have led to greater loyalty and more *voice*

¹ The only exception is the inclusion of the institutional context in Chapter 5.

options. Taken together, the bounded structuring process has contributed to creating a stronger identity among people living in the same territory, and, according to Ferrera, made the development of mass democracy (legitimacy) and redistributive welfare states (solidarity) possible. Each system-building phase can thus be thought to constitute the foundation of the next.²

The general idea of identity as a precondition for legitimacy and solidarity can also be found in the broader theoretical discourse, such as democratic theory (Dahl 1989; Held 1991), and in Marshall's (1992) three internal components of citizenship: i.e., civil, political, and social citizenship. However, these citizenship components of a democratic society have almost exclusively, at least in modern European history, been tied to national institutions. Such institutions have contributed to the crystallization of national identities, and thus to the stability of political systems and the development of welfare state policies (Ferrera 2005; McEwen & Moreno 2005; Rokkan 1974, 1999). Over time, the territorial boundaries of the states have thus come to enclose all of Marshall's internal aspects of citizenship, making the external aspects, i.e., the distinction between citizens and non-citizens, relatively unproblematic – at least in theory.

In reality, state borders and capacities (and thus citizenship categories) have been affected by several processes, such as European integration and sub-national demands for greater political autonomy. This has led to the development of a multi-level political system with large internal variations among European countries (Anderson 2003; Bache & Flinders 2004; Hooghe & Marks 2001; Keating 2003; Marks & Nielsen 1996). Because of this, I believe that it is important not only to consider either the European or national level, but also to include the sub-national levels of the multi-level system in the analyses.

In the field of *multi-level governance* studies, some scholars claim that the emergence of the multi-level system will lead to the loss of state authority, while others argue it is merely a question of new governance strategies, the state maintaining its position as the dominant political unit (Pierre & Peters 2000). Apart from interest in how state capacities are affected by a multi-level system, attention has also been paid to the role of the EU and whether or not it could shoulder the roles of its con-

² Ferrera uses these phases or concepts both to describe the historical development of welfare states, and as an analytical tool (described as a “ladder of abstraction”) with which to establish the evolutionary links between these concepts, which are considered parts of the “bounded structuring” process. Theoretically, each step involves greater voice/loyalty (internal structuring) and less exit (boundary building) (Ferrera 2005:16-28).

stituent nation states. The problem is that the multi-level system, due to its unclear distribution of competencies between levels, can also be seen as challenging the European integration process (Bartolini 2005).

The development of a multi-level system thus makes it necessary to elaborate theories on the system-building process, to consider the possible consequences for both the states and for the ongoing European integration (Bartolini 2005; Ferrera 2005). Since the system-building process is supposed to need constant reinforcement and protection, the multi-level system has changed the very foundation, i.e., the state-building step. This first step has been affected by the loosened state borders, since these boundaries are based on sovereign control over a territory. If the state-building aspect changes, by means of other territorial levels above and beneath the state becoming more politically important, this may influence *identity* (i.e., the nation-building phase). Nation building is seen as a further step towards more bounded structuring, where membership in the territory becomes bounded and territorial identity emerges (Bartolini 2005; Ferrera 2005; Rokkan 1974). Therefore, it is no surprise that political intentions to enhance new territorial identities (at regional or European levels) display similarities with the nation-building processes of the nineteenth century. Questions of control and identity in a certain territorial area are no less important today than they were then.³ Hence, at least the *possibility* of creating identities at other than state territorial levels has increased. If we accept Ferrera's arguments about a step-wise process of bounded structuring, identity changes can also be expected to affect both legitimacy and solidarity.

Against the background of the above reasoning, I will argue that the multi-level system poses three challenges to both the states and further European integration. To elaborate on and explore the consequences for both the states and European integration, I will shift the focus to include the European citizens living in this multi-level system. Each challenge will correspond to a system-building phase, but with European citizens placed at the centre of the theoretical arguments.

³ In the nineteenth century, industrialization and major social transformations caused people to move from small communities to the cities, changing old loyalties and attachments. With the requirements of the modernization process, this process is considered one of the important factors giving way to the forces of nationalism (Gellner 1983; Smith 1986).

Three challenges

For simplicity, I will start by examining how the three challenges may challenge the states, and comment on how each may affect the European integration process afterwards.

The first challenge I call the *challenge of territorial attachments*, which corresponds to identity, or the nation-building phase of system building. Some researchers have drawn attention to an increase in new territorial identities, for example, at the regional and European levels, in the European multi-level system (Bruter 2005; Catt & Murphy 2002; Keating 2003). The definition of my concept of *multi-level territorial attachments*, and how it relates to the broad, general concept of identity, will be thoroughly discussed in Chapter 2. For now, it is enough to discern that if people do have attachments to other than national levels, these attachments could be thought to challenge the states, but only if they concurrently lead to decreasing *national* attachments, i.e., if territorial attachments at different territorial levels would function as a zero-sum game. There are disparate theoretical views on whether increasing regional or European attachments imply such a *decrease* in national attachments, or whether attachments to other levels rather *contribute* to the emergence of multi-level attachments. There are surprisingly few previous empirical investigations of the matter, especially including all levels from local to European, and including all EU member states.

The next challenge is the *challenge of political trust*, which corresponds to legitimacy, or the mass-democracy phase of system building, of which identity is seen as a foundation. With the shift of focus to the citizens, I argue that this challenge could be seen as a matter of how individuals' territorial attachments may influence their political trust. Regardless of whether or not people have attachments to more than one territorial level, a multi-level system can be considered to challenge the state in two ways: (a) if there is no empirical support at all for this expected relationship, and political trust consequently risks being subject to more short-term evaluations, or (b) if the expected relationship between territorial attachments and political trust exists, but there are many people with attachments to *other* territorial levels than the nation (regardless of whether they also have a national attachment), leading to increasing political trust in *other* territorial levels. However, it is important to point out that even so, this can only be considered a challenge to the state if it also implies *decreasing* trust in national political institutions. The theoretical expectations regarding such a zero-sum game

between territorial levels needs further theoretical development, as there is also a lack of empirical investigation of the matter.

The *challenge of welfare attitudes* is the third challenge, which corresponds to solidarity, or redistribution, the last phase of system-building. At the individual level, this challenge concerns the expected relationship between individuals' territorial attachments and welfare state attitudes. The idea is that people are more willing to share and redistribute to others with whom they identify (van Oorschot 2006). Compared to political trust, this relationship is thought to be stronger and more exclusive, due to the redistribution of resources that is essential for welfare policies. This relationship can thus be considered to present a more pronounced challenge to the state,⁴ especially if people's attachments to other than national levels lead to *decreased* support for *national* welfare policies. Whereas individuals can theoretically simultaneously trust political institutions at several political levels, the redistributive features of welfare state policies have a closer resemblance to a zero-sum game regarding to whom they should apply; it is easier to trust than to share.

Finally, these challenges can vary according to the different *institutional contexts* among the European countries, not least concerning the multi-level system variations, such as time of EU-membership or type of government structure, where these individual-level relationships might be more challenging in some types of states than in others.

The same three challenges (and system-building phases) apply to the *European integration process* as well, albeit from a different angle. First, the *challenge of territorial attachments* can be described as follows. The possibility of European citizens having attachments to other territorial levels than the state is not challenging but favourable for the integration process, at least if it involves increasing European attachments. Still, given the existence of the multi-level system, and not simply a larger state, it is preferable from a system-building perspective that people have *multi-level* territorial attachments and not only a European attachment. The former would correspond more closely to the multi-level system, and hence be less challenging to the system as a whole.

Turning to the *challenge of political trust*, there needs to be a connection between individuals' European attachments and the trust they have in EU institutions. On the other hand, given the existence of the multi-level system, is it not good for the future of European integration if such a connection between attachments and trust exists only at the European

⁴ This is mainly a challenge to welfare states. Since all EU member states are considered welfare states, albeit differing in scope and character, the distinction between state and welfare state is not made here, although it will be touched on in Chapter 5.

level or at the expense of national political trust, thus undermining system stability.

Third, some commentators argue about the necessity of developing a “social Europe” (e.g. Habermas 2001). Such a development would correspond to the last system-building phase – i.e., redistribution, or solidarity – and thus to the *challenge of welfare attitudes*. From a system-building perspective, it can be argued that developing a social Europe would need the support of people having *European* attachments, who would be more likely to accept redistribution to other EU citizens. Compared to the issue of simply *adding* trust in another political level, implementing welfare policies at the EU level implies at least some *replacing* of existing national welfare policies. The relationship between territorial attachments and welfare attitudes can therefore be thought to be stronger. However, depending on one’s preferred outcome of European integration, the question of whether or not such a relationship exists can be seen as either a large or small challenge.

Finally, the experience of being an EU member state and the existing national systems differ considerably among member states, so these challenges and the individual-level relationships can be expected to vary across different types of countries (*the institutional context*).

The assumptions underlying these three challenges are more taken for granted than theoretically well-developed, especially when moving beyond the traditional nation state. Similarly, empirical analyses have been few, especially concerning the several relevant territorial levels, and there are scarcely any comparative investigations of these individual-level relationships across countries and territorial levels. The lack of previous knowledge in this field means that this study can make both theoretical and empirical contributions; it will apply a largely explorative approach to the system-building capacity of a particular multi-level system (i.e., the European Union), empirically investigating it via the political implications of individuals’ territorial attachments.

Each of the three challenges, as well as the variations in institutional context, will be treated in a separate chapter of the study. Each chapter will empirically explore the expectations regarding the individual-level relationships, and develop them using more specific individual-level theories. When the results of all the chapters are combined, they should also contribute to our understanding of the overall problem of system building and how a multi-level system might challenge the European integration process and the role of the state.


Empirically, studying cross-sectional opinion data is arguably a relevant first step in studying these challenges at the individual level. There-

fore, I will combine a large-scale comparative study of opinion data from all European Union member states with an in-depth study of opinion data from one country (Sweden). The latter represents a further contribution of this study, as I was able to influence the selection and construction of some of the survey questions. The specific theoretical and methodological approaches used will be discussed after introducing the specific aim and overall model, as follows.

Aim

Corresponding to the framework of the three challenges and the institutional context, the specific aim of this study is to theoretically develop, and empirically investigate, how individuals' territorial attachments influence their political trust and welfare attitudes in various institutional settings. The model in Figure 1.1 illustrates these relationships.

Figure 1.1 The overall model of the study



Each of the boxes corresponds to one of the three challenges to system-building in a multi-level system, as well as to a specific chapter of this study (indicated in parentheses). Starting with the *challenge of territorial attachments*, in the second chapter I will discuss the multidimensionality of my concept of multi-level territorial attachments, and how it relates to various definitions of identity. In particular, I will elaborate on the theoretical expectations when it comes to individuals' attachments to more than one territorial level, as well as how to analyse them empirically. In line with the second and third challenges, the possible impact of individuals' multi-level territorial attachments on political trust and welfare attitudes will be theoretically developed and ana-

lysed. Although not shown in the model, all the theoretical elaborations and empirical analyses will naturally take account of other existing theoretical explanations.

Specific institutional contexts are, as mentioned previously, thought to have specific impacts on individual-level relationships, in the sense that the relationship between attachment and trust, and between attachment and welfare attitudes, can vary between countries with different institutional contexts, such as time of EU membership. In Chapter 5, I will develop and investigate the theoretical expectations regarding how particular institutional contexts may impact the relationships between territorial attachments and political trust and welfare attitudes.⁵

To link the separate parts of the model with the following chapters, this chapter will introduce a broad theoretical outline of the overall model, and make some general comments regarding data and methods. The intention is to specify how each part relates to the whole model, and how they will be investigated empirically. Since each part and chapter will make use of different theories, and since developing specific theoretical expectations is part of the aim, when introducing each part of the model next, I will focus more on the overall system level and the link to the individual level, saving the details for the following chapters. First, however, I will highlight some more points concerning why the development of a multi-level system is an important general background to this study.

States under pressure and the development of a multi-level system

Both external and internal pressures, such as the modern internationalized economy and technical changes in communication, have led to new forms of political steering and changes in the institutional design of states (Iversen 2005; Pierson 2001). Cross-border contacts have also become more important, contributing to increased interaction between the economic and political lives of states (Delanty 2000; Goldmann 2001; Held 1991; Mlinar 1992). Consequently, the traditional distinction between domestic and international politics has become less meaningful (Aldecoa & Keating 1999). In Europe, the deepening integration of the European Union limits the policy options of individual member states once joint decisions are taken. In the multi-level governance field,

⁵ In other words, it is not the possible direct effect of institutional context that is of interest here, but rather the impact on previous relationships, which is commonly referred to as an interaction effect; see Chapter 5 for further discussion of this.

this situation is often analysed in light of three broad developmental trends (Pierre & Peters 2000).

First, there is a power shift upwards, to supra-national entities. The creation of the EU can be regarded as a way for states to cope with the challenges of globalization, by delegating certain policy areas to a supra-national political level (Bulmer & Lequesne 2005). Second, power in certain fields has concurrently shifted downwards to regional and local political levels (Keating & Hughes 2003; Marks & Nielsen 1996; Newman 2000; Rhodes 1996). The role of sub-national political units, especially regions, has thus become more important in most European states. Regions are gaining prominence both economically, as suitable areas for economic development, and politically, as units of territorial identification, and with this heightened prominence come demands for increased autonomy (Batt & Wolczuk 2002; Gren 1999; McEwen & Moreno 2005). Devolution of several policy areas, particularly in the field of public service, has also become common in many European countries (Ferrera 2005). Third, there is a shift of power outwards, from public to private interests, where external and internal pressures are seen as forcing states to retrench and find new solutions in the field of welfare services (Mau 2003).

In most European states there are at least four political tiers at which decisions important to the citizens are made: local, regional, national, and supra-national – i.e., the EU (Loughlin, et al. 1999). This system of political tiers corresponds to what Hooghe and Marks (2003) describe as “type I multi-level governance”. In a type I multi-level governance system, the sub-central jurisdictions (e.g., regions) are multi-purpose, memberships in such jurisdictions do not overlap, and the number of political levels is fixed.⁶ These political levels do not constitute a federal system with hierarchically ordered levels. In the multi-level system, contact, co-operation, and negotiation can take place vertically, horizontally, and across national borders. The result is a more complex polity than is suggested by the traditional image of a state and how it is supposed to be governed democratically. Variation in the size and autonomy of local and regional levels across countries also means that the main theoretical distinction should be made between the sub-national (local and regional), national, and supra-national levels when making comparisons across countries.

⁶ In comparison, in the type II multi-level governance system, the sub-central jurisdictions are functional and task specific, memberships in these jurisdictions overlap, and the number of levels is fluid.

Against this background of boundary changes implied by the development of the multi-level system, the three challenges to the state and to European integration link together, and give cause for the separate analytical parts of the overall model. In the following section, I will introduce the more specific theoretical individual-level arguments used to develop each part of the model and the relationships between them.

Individuals' multi-level territorial attachments

Following Ferrera's interpretation of the system-building phases, I suggested earlier that the *challenge of territorial attachments* could be considered the first challenge to the traditional role of the state, but only if people actually form attachments to other territorial levels at the same time as their national attachments are decreasing. In contrast, European integration could be thought to benefit from increasing European attachments, although correspondence to the multi-level system would be better with multi-level territorial attachments.

As will become obvious in Chapter 2, there are many theoretical definitions of and research approaches to the word "identity". One important basic distinction is between identity seen as a system-level characteristic, often referred to as collective identity, and identity seen as the feelings individuals have. In the introductory system level theoretical discussions of this study, identity is usually referred to in the collective sense. One example is how identity, according to the system-building phases, can be seen as a precondition for legitimacy and solidarity. However, I have also argued for the relevance of shifting the focus from the system to the individuals – the approach used in the following parts of this study. Thus from now on, individuals will be the focus of both the theoretical and empirical analyses, and the term "identity" will instead be taken to refer to how each person feels.

I have thus chosen to use a concept I call "multi-level territorial attachments", defined as the emotional ties individuals have to several territorially restricted political tiers in society.⁷ Thus I am only interested in how individuals feel, or how individuals would describe their territorial attachments. The theoretical foundation I use in examining individuals' attachments to different territorial levels is mainly drawn from psychological and sociological research, including theories of multiple identities, nested identities, and Social Identity Theory (Bourgeois

⁷ There is no consensus in the literature as to what concept of identity is better, and the variation is great; for example, the terms identity, identification, attachment, belonging, and connection are all used. See Chapter 2 for a more detailed discussion.

& Bourgeois 2005; Brodsky & Marx 2001; Lawler 1992; Medrano & Guitérrez 2001; Müller-Peters 1998; Roccas & Brewer 2002).

I will categorize people according to their forms of attachment, to investigate whether such attachment differences matter to their attitudes; this categorization will be strictly based on the territorial attachments respondents themselves have expressed in opinion studies. I will not analyse collective identities (e.g., religious or ethnic), but only attachments to territories with political or administrative demarcations. Such demarcation corresponds to the process of bounded structuring, and to the challenges to a multi-level system.

Even with such a restricted definition, the theoretical expectations are somewhat unclear, and previous empirical analyses are scarce. One issue of debate concerns whether or not individuals can be attached to more than one territorial level at the same time. The idea of emotional ties to more than one territorial level has become widespread in the wake of discussions of “Europe of the regions” and of the EU as a multi-level system. Regarding the system level, Keating argues that, “new and rediscovered identities are often multiple rather than singular, operating at two or even three levels” (Keating 2003:9). In fact, even at the individual level, several scholars today embrace the notion of possible multi-level attachments.

Some commentators’ arguments instead refer to a zero-sum game. One example is the discussion of the powers of the state being questioned, since states are less able to protect their citizens from economic crises or to provide desired levels of welfare. This situation might lead to the disintegration of national attachment, providing a breeding ground for other forms of territorial attachment (Horshman & Marshall 1994; Martin & Schumann 1997). In other words, people may become more attached to territorial units above or beneath the level of the nation state, and less attached to the state.

The theoretical arguments are thus somewhat contradictory, and existing empirical analyses of multi-level territorial attachments are rare, especially comparative ones across European countries or including all territorial levels. Some existing studies do, however, demonstrate that there are in fact some individuals with multi-level territorial attachments (Hooghe & Marks 2001; Medrano & Guitérrez 2001). Theoretically, individual variation arguably ranges from no attachment to any territorial level, to attachment to all territorial levels simultaneously; the actual distribution is an open empirical issue.

Related to the issue of attachment to several levels, is the idea of the multi-dimensionality of multi-level territorial attachments; building on

the work of Hooghe and Marks (2001), Huici et al. (1997), and Medrano and Guterrez (2001), I claim that the concept is multi-dimensional. I emphasize that there are three important dimensions: the *territorial level or levels* to which one is attached, one's *form* of attachment (e.g., exclusive or multiple), and the *strength* of the attachment. These dimensions are explained and specified in more detail in Chapter 2, along with discussion of how they can be measured and analysed.

Territorial attachments and political trust

The next system-building step, and the next challenge to the state and to the European integration process, is the *challenge of political trust*. At the system level, this is often referred to as the importance of identity to legitimacy, but for my individual-level approach, the impact of individuals' territorial attachments on political trust is a better formulation. Still, support for the general idea of the importance of identity to legitimacy is not only found in the system-building tradition, but in democratic theory (Dahl 1989; Held 1991) and in elaborations of Easton's system support theory (Easton 1965, 1975). However, what to expect from this relationship in a multi-level system has been much less explored and developed.

Starting with the broader issue of democracy, it has been debated in democratic theory whether the same principles of democracy that were developed parallel to the nation state and representative democracy can be used at all levels or are applicable to the multi-level system as a whole. Dahl and Tufte (1973:135) argue that democratic theorists have neglected the democratization of systems constituted of political units, from local to larger in scale: "The central theoretical problem is no longer to find suitable rules to apply within a sovereign unit, but to find rules to apply among a variety of units, none of which is sovereign".

The most important aspect of democratic theory for the purposes of this study is the notion that individuals' sense of community, of being attached to the territorially defined *demos*, is regarded as one foundation of a stable democratic society (Dahl 1989). Territorial attachment can be seen as an important factor making people accept majority decisions in territorially distinct political jurisdictions. Citizens make certain demands of territorially based political institutions, including the right to vote and that responsibility be taken for certain functions. Moreover,

individuals are granted citizenship in certain states.⁸ For democratic systems, it is necessary that they be legitimate in the eyes of their members (Dahl 1989; Offe 2000; Scharpf 1999). Inglehart and Welzel, for example, state that, “genuine democracy is not simply a machine that, once set up, will function effectively by itself. It depends on the people” (Inglehart & Welzel 2005:300). Regarding the importance of territorial attachments for political legitimacy, Easton puts it this way: “Underlying the functioning of all systems, there must be some cohesive cement – a sense of feeling of community amongst the members. Unless such sentiment emerges, the political system itself may never take shape or if it does, it may not survive” (Easton 1965:176).

In a multi-level system, how one *demos* is to be distinguished from another is an important matter, as well as which *demos* is relevant to which political decision. According to David Held (1999), the problem is that some decisions today lead to consequences not only for those who had the right to participate in making them, but also for people who had no right to influence the decision-making procedure. In the European multi-level system, policy decisions can be made via negotiations across borders and levels, but each individual’s primary political citizenship is still formally tied to territorially defined levels, nested in one another like Russian dolls. The stability of democratic institutions might thus be affected if people who live in a territorially defined society feel less attached to it. It is a risk that can be argued to increase in a multi-level system, as has been demonstrated in various discussions of legitimacy (for example Abromeit 1998; Agné 1999; Anderson 2003; Beetham & Lord 1998; Loughlin, et al. 1999).⁹

There could be a challenge to the state if there is a relationship between territorial attachment and trust, and if national trust were to decrease as a consequence of people’s increasing attachments to and trust in other territorial levels. There has been considerable theoretical development concerning the legitimacy of the EU and of the relationship between member states and the EU, but less attention has been paid to the full multi-level system, including the sub-national levels. Therefore, the theoretical expectations need to be developed in more

⁸ Despite the fact that some people have double citizenship while others live in states without being citizens of them, the most common situation is that people have rights in and obligations towards the state in which they live.

⁹ Of course, other important factors contribute to state stability. The idea, is not to argue that territorial attachment comprises the only, or the most important, factor, but rather that the concept can contribute to our understanding. Not least is the basic distinction between diffuse and specific support (Easton 1975), and voice versus resources (Rokkan 1987) – relevant for the theoretical elaborations in the following chapters.

detail, not least according to the multi-dimensionality of my concept of multi-level territorial attachments.

To develop these theoretical expectations, I will use existing theoretical explanations of political trust, especially explanations that fit under the umbrella concept of *cultural theories*, in which social capital and identity are considered germane to political trust (Dalton 2004; Easton 1975; Putnam 1996). It is in this broad category that I place the possible impact of multi-level territorial attachments.¹⁰ Another important aspect is the definition of the concept of political trust itself, which I define as the trust an individual has in the political institutions or political actors at each territorial level.

I claim that the theoretical reasoning about this relationship is relatively underdeveloped, and this will become even more apparent when I come to the empirical analyses. Hence, I will need to investigate this relationship in various ways, in line with the theoretically elaborated expectations regarding the different dimensions of multi-level territorial attachments.

There is also a lack of empirical analyses concerning the issue of causality. The theoretical literature on issues related to territorial attachments and trust expresses divergent views on the direction of causality between these phenomena. One view emphasizes how the political institutions in a society can affect people's attachments (McEwen & Moreno 2005), whereas another view highlights the attachments individuals have and how they can lead to the construction of certain political institutions (Paasi 2003). As I will argue in more detail later, I believe these phenomena to be reciprocal over time, and, depending on when one chooses to start, the focus can shift. My choice to take individuals' attachments as the starting point is justified by the steps of the system-building process, and the fact that most of the controversy over the causal direction concerns the system level. Moreover, since I am not trying to explain why an individual has a certain attachment, but rather the possible effects of such attachments (in this case, on political trust), I argue that it is theoretically most relevant to my research aim to start with individuals' territorial attachments.¹¹

¹⁰ Other explanations of political trust, such as the importance of the input side (i.e., the formal rules and institutions of the political system) (Rothstein 1998; Scharpf 1999; Tyler 2000), or the output side, for the system to be able to perform or produce what it is set out to do (Beetham & Lord 1998; Coleman 1990; Mishler & Rose 2001), have been used to extract the relevant control variables for the empirical analyses.

¹¹ Regarding different, albeit related issues, Inglehart and Welzel (2005) have tested the direction of causality between individuals' values and democratic institutions, and found the causality to be stronger running from values to institutions rather than reversed.

Multi-level territorial attachments and welfare attitudes

The third system-building phase, and thus also the third challenge to the state and to the European integration process, concerns the relationship between territorial attachments and welfare attitudes. Peoples' territorial attachments are considered especially important in welfare states, to create support for redistributing resources among individuals or different territorial units (Mau 2002; Scharpf 1999). Compared to political trust, which can theoretically apply equally to all levels, these relationships are thought to be stronger and more exclusive. Welfare and redistribution comprise the last of Ferrera's system-building phases, and is closely connected to Marshall's idea of social citizenship (Ferrera 2005; Marshall & Bottomore 1992; Rokkan 1999). Habermas puts it this way: "Belonging to the 'nation' made possible for the first time a relationship of solidarity between persons who had previously been strangers to one another" (Habermas 1998:111). In fact, national identity arguably made it possible to override subgroup (e.g., class or regional) interests, providing a reason for building solidarity by developing the welfare state (Anderson 1991; Ferrera 2005; Scharpf 2000). Offe (2000) elaborates this idea by discussing how the development of political communities is founded in "beliefs in communality", which have a clear territorial dimension. Territorial boundaries, he argues, contribute to forming national identity, and to demarcating the area that encompasses a nation's citizens and within which state obligations are valid. In this way, the territorial boundaries limit the state's responsibility to care for the welfare of certain individuals, i.e., the citizens of the state. Territorial boundaries and identity are thus regarded as essential for maintaining public welfare in states.

This view has been criticized by authors who cite the existence of multi-national welfare states, such as the UK or Spain. As with political trust, the direction of the causality has been debated. According to the alternative viewpoint of the causality, the development of a welfare system in a state contributes significantly to reinforcing national identity, through the symbolic significance of its institutions. The construction of the welfare state entails providing basic needs for a nation's citizens through national welfare institutions, thus strengthening social solidarity and helping shape national identities. In a national political community that guarantees social protection, citizens are less likely to shift their loyalties to other communities within or beyond its boundaries (McEwen & Moreno 2005).

The common ground between the two views of causality is the idea of reciprocity between identity and solidarity. As concerning trust, the main causality debate concerns the macro or system level. At the individual level, it is easier to argue, theoretically, for the relevance of the causal direction leading from the territorial attachments of individuals to their welfare attitudes, especially in light of how the multi-level system challenges the role of the welfare state.

With the development of a multi-level political system in Europe, political tiers other than the state have become important for welfare policies; for example, some welfare policies are now being handled at regional or local levels in many European countries. In some countries, the devolution process can be seen as a response to regional identity claims, a willingness to allow regional self-government as regards matters closely connected to culture and identity (such as education). Some observers even argue that such identity-based political claims contribute to undermining the welfare state, by compromising the common culture and sense of *demos* that made welfare states possible in the first place (Wolfe & Klausen 1997).

On the other hand, in some European countries, the devolution process can be viewed as a way for states to try to transfer responsibility for a costly public service sector to lower political levels (Pierre & Peters 2000). Moreover, Scharpf (1997) argues that it is in fact the constraints of the internal market, not globalization, that obstruct the continuation of national welfare programs in European welfare states. According to that perspective, it is just as likely that the ongoing politicization of the territorial identities in European sub-national regions is a reaction to the disintegration of national solidarity, which was formerly maintained by such national welfare systems. Either way, there is reason to expect territorial attachments to matter to attitudes towards welfare.

The possible shift of responsibility for social policy *upwards* to the EU level is a controversial issue. Some scholars argue that the construction of a European social policy is a necessity for ongoing European integration, whereas others argue that the lack of a common *European* identity means there is no basis on which such a joint policy could rest. Habermas (2001) argues that there is a need to deepen European integration to conserve the democratic achievements of the European nation states beyond their own limits. The proponents of the opposite view argue that there is no prospect that welfare-state functions could be effectively federalized in Europe, due to the normative salience of the pre-existing social contracts between the citizens and their states, and to the lack of a European identity (Offe 2000; Scharpf 2000). Mau (2005),

for example, has found empirical evidence that people with national attachments tend to resist such a development.

As I have said earlier, I believe that a shift of focus from the system to the individual level can facilitate the exploration of these arguments, especially in a multi-level setting. The arguments presented above could thus be interpreted, at the individual level, as signalling the expectation of a relationship between territorial attachments and welfare attitudes. I will elaborate this relationship in more detail in Chapter 4, consulting, among other ideas, theories on how people with whom we identify are seen as more deserving of social protection (van Oorschot 2006); and will also include the multi-level perspective. The importance of attachments to territorial areas lower or higher than the state is more debated than is the importance of national-level attachments. Some scholars argue for the necessity of a connection between sub-national attachments and welfare policies at these levels (McEwen & Moreno 2005); the corollary is that the lack of European attachments is an important factor explaining the resistance to a common European social policy.

Institutional context interactions

The last part of the model is the inclusion of the institutional context in the relationships presented in previous chapters. Institutional context is included because of the different ways European countries have historically evolved, leading to a range of institutional and organizational designs, for example, government structure, welfare regime, and time of joining the EU (Esping-Andersen 1990; Lipset & Rokkan 1967); all these differences have resulted in great variation in the preconditions for individual attachment to different territorial levels. According to research into institutions, such institutional variation is also thought to matter to individual attitudes (Hall & Taylor 1996; Huckfeldt & Sprague 1993; March & Olsen 1989; Peters 1999; Svallfors 2003). I will argue that there are important reasons to expect the impact of territorial attachments on both political trust and welfare attitudes to differ depending on the particular institutional context in which people live. Hence, I am mainly interested in the aspects of institutional context that characterize countries, especially contextual variations that form part of a multi-level political system.

I am also particularly interested in analysing how different institutional contexts affect the *relationship* between individuals' territorial attachments and political trust, or between individuals' territorial attachments and attitudes towards welfare. Hence, it is not the possible

direct effects on political trust or welfare attitudes that I will explore and analyse, but rather what are usually referred to as *interaction* effects.

To deepen my theoretical understanding of the interaction effects of institutional context variations, starting from the multi-level territorial attachment perspective, I will consult theories of political trust and welfare attitudes, to extract the kind of institutional context variations that can justifiably, on theoretical grounds, be included in the analyses. Several studies have examined the direct effect of varying institutional contexts on both individuals' territorial attachments (Bruter 2005; McEwen & Moreno 2005) and their attitudes regarding political trust and welfare attitudes (Mau 2003; Mishler & Rose 2001; Svallfors 2003). However, fewer studies have examined the *interaction* effects of these institutional contexts, especially concerning the relationship between territorial attachments and political trust or welfare attitudes. Hence, I will also do some empirical analyses, including the selection of theoretically relevant institutional contexts as interaction variables, to explore the usefulness of such an approach. It should be noted, though, that analysing the interaction effects of various institutional contexts could easily be the subject of a separate study. Therefore, the analyses in Chapter 5 will be limited to examining a few pertinent types of institutional context that differ between EU member states.

The empirical analyses and the data

Shifting our focus, as regards the system-building process, from the system to the individuals, implies the possibility of statistically analysing survey data. Choosing such an empirical approach lets me analyse the theoretical relationships across countries and territorial levels. The available data sets permit both cross-sectional analyses across all EU member states, and more thorough analyses of Swedish data. The strength of the statistical methodological approach used in this study is that it allows the possibility of generalizing to all European citizens and of evaluating the independent impact of multi-level attachments, i.e., to estimate the effect when other factors are held constant. Using cross-sectional data also makes it possible to compare attitudes in different institutional settings in Europe (van de Vijver & Leung 1997).

The weakness, as always in statistical analyses, is that the analyses naturally have to present a simplified picture of reality. I will be unable to go deeper and study several other related aspects, or to explain the working mechanisms of the relationships. When dealing with data from

opinion surveys, there is also the general problem of knowing exactly how each respondent has interpreted the individual questions in the questionnaires. On the positive side, I was able to insert some questions of my own into the Swedish surveys, especially concerning how to measure degree of attachment to different territorial levels. Moreover, I had the chance to experiment with wording my questions in different ways, and to analyse the results produced by these different wordings; this process enhances the validity of my results, especially compared to those previously reported by scholars using different methods and wordings to analyse territorial attachments (see e.g. Bruter 2005).

Another relevant question is whether also to do analyses over time, and not only over different spatial territories. The complexity and explorative nature of my model would make analyses over time an involved task, and there is also a lack of longitudinal data including all the aspects relevant to my model. Therefore, this will be simply a cross-sectional study of a single point in time, which I argue is a relevant first step in making new kind of analyses.

For a broader comparative analysis of all EU member states, I use the Eurobarometer data set, EB 62.0, collected in autumn 2004, which includes cases from all the 25 member states at the time.¹² The Swedish data sets offer further possibilities for more detailed analyses from a multi-level perspective, analyses including political trust and welfare attitudes at the local and regional levels. The Swedish data sets come from the national SOM survey¹³ of 2004 (Holmberg & Weibull 2005), and the Swedish European Parliament election study, also of 2004 (Oscarsson, et al. 2006).¹⁴ The data will be analysed using a variety of statistical methods, from simple frequency tables to various regression analyses, and each method and the reasons for its use will be described in relation to the theoretical expectations presented in each chapter.

¹² For most countries, 1000 interviews were conducted, though more were conducted in Germany and fewer in the smallest countries, such as Luxembourg (Eurobarometer 62. Public Opinion in the European Union 2005). The EB 62.0 also includes some non-EU countries, but my analyses focus only on the 25 member states, since they are parts of all levels of the EU multi-level system.

¹³ The SOM institute represents collaboration between three departments at Göteborg University: the Institute for Journalism and Mass Communication, the Department of Political Science, and the School of Public Administration. SOM has carried out nationwide mail surveys of Swedish opinions every year since 1986. The 2004 survey was distributed to a total of 6000 representative people aged 15–85 years, 60.2 per cent of whom responded.

¹⁴ The Swedish election studies are administrated by the department of Political Science at Göteborg University. The European Parliament election study 2004 is based on interviews with 2001 Swedish voters, 78 per cent of whom responded.

The year 2004

The data sets used were collected in summer and autumn 2004, which was a special year in many ways. Among other things, it was the year of the greatest enlargement in EU history, with ten new member states joining at the same time, on 1 May. For the first time, former Eastern European countries become members of the EU. It was also year of the European Parliament election, held on 13 June, and issues concerning what defines Europe and what it means to be European were prominent in the political agendas and media of all EU countries. At the same time, much attention was devoted to issues of national and regional identity. The respondents to these survey studies therefore had ample opportunity to consider the issues of interest to this study, not least concerning their territorial attachments.

The European election campaign in spring 2004 helped raise awareness of issues of trust in political institutions at different levels (especially the European level) to a higher level than in non-election years. Moreover, the EU enlargement clearly conjured up considerations of welfare and solidarity across country borders, not least concerning the issue of free movement of workers from the newest member states. This contributed to more people being aware of and informed about the themes relevant to this study (Oscarsson, et al. 2006). The fact that the newest member states had only been EU members for a few months when the data were collected is problematic; however, this factor will be accounted for as an institutional context in the analyses presented in Chapter 5.

Outline of the study

As seen in the model in Figure 1.1, I will focus on different aspects in different parts of this study; accordingly, the applicable theoretical discussions also differ depending on the part of the study. Therefore, I have decided not to have a single chapter devoted solely to theoretical matters, apart from the overall system-level discussions and short introductions to the individual-level theories presented here. Instead, each of the following chapters will contain both a theoretical and an empirical section. In the former, I will develop the theoretical expectations concerning individuals' multi-level territorial attachments and the political implications of these attachments for different territorial levels. To guide the analyses, I will formulate specific research questions for each chapter. This structure is also suitable because theoretical development

is part of my research aim. The empirical section of each chapter will contain discussion of measurement and methodological aspects, and present the results of the analyses conducted. This structure provides a more integrated approach to both theory and empirical analysis.

The remainder of this study can be outlined as follows. Chapter 2 will concentrate on the concept of multi-level territorial attachments. It will present a deeper theoretical discussion of similar concepts, such as identity, and elaborate the different dimensions of the concept and how they can be measured. In the second half of this chapter, I will present the results of some of the empirical analyses, including the different dimensions of multi-level attachments and how they relate to one another.

Chapter 3 will investigate the relationship between multi-level territorial attachments and political trust, starting with a more thorough theoretical discussion of how multi-level territorial attachments can be expected to matter to political trust. Specific research questions will be developed, measurement issues discussed, and, finally, empirical results presented.

Chapter 4 will be very similar in structure to the previous one, but in it the relationship between multi-level territorial attachments and welfare attitudes will be emphasized. The first part is devoted to my theoretical development of this relationship and the second part presents the results of the empirical analyses.

Chapter 5 is the last substantive chapter. In it, the institutional context will be included in the analyses as interaction variables, after detailed examination of the theoretically relevant expectations and methodological issues.

Finally, Chapter 6 will discuss conclusions from all previous chapters. These will be connected to the model used in the study, relating individual-level theoretical and empirical results to overall system-level theories and discussing the overall challenges to the state and to European integration.

Chapter 2

Multi-level Territorial Attachments

The changing territorial structure of Europe can be seen as challenging both EU member states and the European integration process, because of the overall expected relationship between territorial identities, legitimacy, and solidarity. Such system-level expectations can be found in theories on system building, citizenship, and democracy (Ferrera 2005; Marshall & Bottomore 1992; Offe 2000; Rokkan & Urwin 1983; Scharpf 1999). Implicit in such discussions is an expectation that shifting territorial boundaries could lead to changing territorial identities, a view also supported by research indicating the enhanced importance of, for example, regional and European identities (Batt & Wolczuk 2002; Bruter 2005; Catt & Murphy 2002; Keating 2001; McEwen & Moreno 2005). However, to discuss whether or not this situation should be seen as a challenge, I have suggested shifting the focus to individuals, and to what I call the challenge of multi-level territorial attachments. I will elaborate the theoretical expectations of the various ways individuals could be attached to different territorial levels. According to the stated point of view, the problem is not necessarily that people have attachments to other territorial levels than the state, but rather if their national attachments consequently decline. If territorial attachments are mutually exclusive, this is clearly what can be expected. As I will discuss in more detail shortly, however, there are other views on how attachments to different territorial levels might relate to one another.

Hence, it is essential for this study and the forthcoming analyses to elaborate here on my proposed concept of multi-level territorial attachments. On one hand, I need to define the concept theoretically and discuss how it differs from other similar concepts, such as that of identity. This is necessary, not only to deepen our understanding of multi-level territorial attachments per se, but also to strengthen my arguments about the likely consequences of an individual simultaneously having different sorts of territorial attachments. I will develop the analytical framework of the concept, including the three dimensions (i.e., level, form, and strength) of multi-level territorial attachments. On the other hand, I also need to empirically categorize and analyse the dimensions of multi-level territorial attachments. In the concluding part of this

chapter I will discuss how these results can and will be used as independent variables in the empirical analyses presented in the remaining chapters.

THEORETICAL ASPECTS OF MULTI-LEVEL TERRITORIAL ATTACHMENTS

The concept of multi-level territorial attachments consists of three distinct parts, each of which must be scrutinized; I will discuss all three parts in reverse order, starting with attachment.

The attachment aspect

I have chosen to use the term *attachment* instead of *identity* for two reasons. First, in a variety of academic disciplines the word “identity” has become extremely popular, being used in discussions of diverse topics ranging from economic development to individuals’ life choices (Bruland & Horowitz 2003). The downside of such popularity is the tendency for the word to mean almost anything, making it less useful as an analytical concept. Brubaker and Cooper (2000:114) state that, especially in the social sciences, the word “identity” is too ambiguous: it is either being used in a strong sense, or in a sense that is too weak to capture the essence of the researcher’s theoretical interest. A consequence of the popularity of the word is the need to specify exactly what form of identity one is studying, or, as in my case, to develop new and more precise terms.

Second, and in line with the previous consideration, the word “attachment” has the advantage of directly indicating my emphasis on the feelings of individuals. I am thus indicating my alignment with one of the two broad main strategies of identity studies, namely, how individuals identify themselves. The division between collective and individual identity has been highlighted by several scholars, not least in the study of European identity (Smith 1992).¹⁵ Collective identities are seen as encompassing all, or almost all, the individuals in a certain community, and can be found in symbols and specific cultural features. In contrast, territorial attachments can vary between individuals and situa-

¹⁵ Bruter (2005) discusses this division as two different ways to study identities, a “top-down” or a “bottom-up” way. A top-down study would concentrate on questions such as who should be considered European and where Europe ends. A bottom-up study, in contrast, would focus on questions such as who feels European and why some people tend to identify with a certain territorial area while others do not.

tions, even in the same community. The objects, or community, to which a person is attached can vary, as can the intensity of the attachment. The theoretical development of the concept of multi-level territorial attachments will thus be based on psychological and sociological research, on theories of multiple or nested identities, for example, and on social identity theory (Bourgeois & Bourgeois 2005; Brodsky & Marx 2001; Lawler 1992; Medrano & Guitérrez 2001; Roccas & Brewer 2002).¹⁶ Research into territorial attachments tends to focus on why individuals develop certain attachments, what these mean to the individual, and what effects they might have on individual attitudes and behaviour (Some examples are: Bruter 2005; Carl 2003; Duschesne & Frogner 1995; Haesly 2001; Hjerm 1998, 2000; Hooghe & Marks 2004; Müller-Peters 1998).¹⁷

Another related concept is *pride*, which is usually part of discussions of national or European pride (Citrin & Sides 2004; Müller-Peters 1998). There are theoretical reasons to believe that pride, although clearly related to territorial attachment, has a slightly different connotation. My interpretation is that pride is both stronger and more narrowly defined than territorial attachments. People with national pride will most likely have national attachments, but people with national attachments could say that they were not so proud of their country. Pride is often associated with the distinction between *thick* or *thin* identity (Cederman 2001) most commonly found in discussions of whether or not the EU needs a European identity, and, if so, what kind of identity (Beetham & Lord 1998; Follesdal 2001, 2002; Scharpf 1999). Føllesdal discusses the concept of “thick identity” as corresponding to a broad cultural basis, national pride, and empathy, stating that citizenship based on these values would tend to be exclusive and incompatible with concurrent commitments and loyalties. Both he and Scharpf agree that such a “thick identity” is not necessary for state legitimacy, and that there are states lacking such “thick” shared values but which nonethe-

¹⁶ The distinction between collective and individual identity is not always clear, and the two are obviously related. If a large group of individuals is attached to a certain territorial area, this can be seen as signaling the existence of a collective identity. However, there might still be some individuals living in the area who do not feel the same attachment. Such individual variations are not normally considered when studying collective identities. The relationship between the collective and individual levels thus explains the use of both individual- and system-level theories when examining expectations regarding multi-level territorial attachments and their implications.

¹⁷ In comparison, common approaches to examining collective identities include inquiring into what the identity consists of, how it has developed, whether it can change, and what effects it might have on individuals and society (Anderson 1991; Brubaker 1992; Calhoun 1995; Delanty 1995; Gellner 1983; Harris 2003; Smith 1986).

less possess a strong sense of community. This distinction gives reason to argue that there is a *strength* dimension to multi-level territorial attachments, i.e., people can feel more or less strongly attached.

The territorial aspect

After discussing the attachment part of the concept of multi-level territorial attachments, we will now consider the territorial aspect. The important issue is whether or not the attachments individuals have are directed towards a territory, since obviously a full range of other possible identifications is available to individuals (e.g., gender, class, ethnicity, and religion). The territorial aspect may seem easy to identify at first glance, but the situation can at times be more complex, for example, when several national identities are possible in the same state, ethnic identities exist with or without a territorial homeland (Keating 2001), or the territory sometimes functions merely as a symbol of nationality.¹⁸

In this study, the emphasis is on European, national, regional, and local attachments. These are all clearly territorial, even if the territorial boundaries are sometimes relatively unclear, as in the case of Europe itself. The question of where Europe ends could have as many answers as there are respondents (Delanty & Rumford 2005). The important point here is that I am investigating attachments to territorially defined levels of society, at which some forms of political institutions exist.¹⁹

It should be noted that in the case of attachments to Europe, it is not crucial to this study whether a person who has such an attachment only thinks of EU countries or also includes a geographically wider area. The EU has undergone several phases of enlargement, and European self-definition and possible future enlargements could include even more countries in Europe's immediate surroundings. Moreover, I am only investigating the attachments of people in current EU countries, who all have one common European political decision level.²⁰

Instead of territorial attachments, some scholars use other concepts to capture the same phenomenon. One example is Bruter (2005), who uses

¹⁸ Bourgeois and Bourgeois (2005), for example, cite the dialectic between territory and identity, saying that both "are in constant (re)construction, one as a function of the other" (Bourgeois & Bourgeois 2005:1128).

¹⁹ The territorial levels referred to are politically institutionalized, administrative levels of decision-making (e.g., local communities, regions, countries, and Europe).

²⁰ For safety's sake, I will also include measures of both the EU and Europe.

the concept of political identity.²¹ The advantage of the political identity concept, in his view, is the clear connection it makes to the political importance of attachments, as well as its focus on politically defined territories. In my opinion, however, the concept presents several disadvantages, for example, disunity arising from different interpretations of the identity concept, and the fact that attachment to a region, for example, is for many people not necessarily thought of as “political”, regardless of the political structure in the region and the possible political implications of their attachment. As well, in political science, the term “political identity” is more commonly linked to matters of party alignment and ideological self-placement, which could contribute to increased confusion; hence, I prefer the term territorial attachment.

In this study, I will pay less attention to the different qualitative meanings of territorial attachment, for example, the distinction between a more *cultural* or ethnic form, and a more *civic* or civil form of attachment, common in the literature on nationalism (Hjerm 2000; Smith 1991). One reason for this limitation is that like the concept of pride, discussed earlier, I believe the concept of territorial attachment to be broad enough to incorporate both civic and cultural aspects. Hence, I will not investigate this distinction empirically, but refer to some of the theoretical arguments when interpreting my results. According to my three dimensions of multi-level territorial attachments, some of the categorizations of individuals can be partly justified by this line of reasoning, for example, the “form” dimension, that distinguishes between exclusive and multiple attachments. According to Føllesdal, a strong cultural basis for citizenship would tend to be exclusive, so an exclusive form of attachment can thus be considered to capture this more cultural aspect.

Moreover, most empirical studies of this distinction tend to emphasize the degree to which these components are part of, for example, national identity.²² Fewer studies have investigated the possible effects of such differences; some results even indicate a need to move beyond this division, since many individuals tend to harbour a mixture of these forms of feelings (Hjerm 2000). Still, Bruter (2005) suggests the same

²¹ In his definition, political identity cannot be reduced to merely a social or personal component of identity. Instead, it involves both reference to a pre-existing group (the status aspect of social identity) and an affective component (more similar to personal identity). The affective part is evident in the sorrow experienced when “our” soldiers or citizens die, as well as in the happiness and pride when “our” team wins in international sports competitions such as the Olympics (Bruter 2005).

²² Some researchers have studied the various components of attachment to at least three levels, i.e., regional, national, and European; see, for example, Grad and Garcia (2003).

distinction regarding European attachments – or European identity, as he puts it. In his opinion, cultural identities are associated with phenomena such as language, history, religion, and myths, whereas civic identities are more related to political aspects, i.e., the rights and obligations of individuals. He has also found the civic aspect to be most pronounced in general *European* attachment:²³ “When people answer non-specific questions about their European identity in general, it is of their civic identity that they think primarily” (Bruter 2005:114). I regard this as favourable, since it is the political effects of territorial attachments that interest me; moreover, Bruter’s findings suggest that it is more likely that people think of those politically defined territorial levels that are theoretically relevant.

There has also been a tendency in some studies of European attachment to treat it as the same thing as *support for European integration* (Duschesne & Frognier 1995; Gabel 1998a; Inglehart, et al. 1991). However, I argue that these are two theoretically distinct issues and should thus be treated as such in analyses.²⁴ Conceptually, values and identities (such as territorial attachments) are supposed to precede and influence attitudes (e.g., support for European integration) (Jacoby 1991; Jolly 2005). A person can have a general European attachment without wanting either deeper or wider European integration; as well, it is theoretically plausible that a person might not feel European, but still support European integration for purely functional or self-interested reasons. There are also empirical results supporting the notion that these two are separate, though obviously connected, factors.²⁵ The question of general European attachment brings me to the final part of the concept of multi-level territorial attachments, namely, the multi-level aspect.

²³ Bruter combines several different methods, in this case experimental surveys to voluntary respondents from the UK, France, and the Netherlands, to explore this division. The correlation between general European identity and civic identity was .68, whereas the cultural identity had a correlation of .48 (Bruter 2005:119).

²⁴ One reason for this confusion might be Easton’s (1965) incorporation of diffuse support for the community (which I argue, in Chapter 3, is the same thing as territorial attachment) as the highest object in his model of system support. However, although support for the community was part of the system support model, Easton stated that it could vary independently of support for the rules of the system and its actors and institutions.

²⁵ Support for European integration correlates with both the existence of a general European identity and with both civic and cultural forms of attachment, though the correlation with the former is slightly stronger (Bruter 2005:119).

The multi-level aspect

Most research into individuals' territorial attachment has dealt with issues of *national* attachment, and in recent years, has increasingly dealt with European attachment. One of the contributions of this study is its consideration of attachments to *several* territorial levels, from the local to the European. As discussed in Chapter 1, the development of Europe into a multi-level system accentuates the need for greater knowledge of how strongly attached people can simultaneously feel to several territorial levels, and whether this matters for political trust and welfare attitudes. Hence, the multi-level part of the concept emphasizes this important aspect. Choosing to direct research interest towards multi-level territorial attachments also follows the call of Bourgeois and Bourgeois (2005) to better incorporate different territorial scales into studies of territorial attachment, and not simply to focus on the nation state level and its political institutions.

The idea that people can simultaneously feel attached to more than one political level has become widespread in the wake of discussion of "Europe of the regions" and of the EU as a multi-level system (Keating & Hughes 2003; Painter 2002). However, empirical studies in this field are still rather rare, and there is a tendency to focus on aggregated comparisons between countries and not so much on individual variation. At the individual level, studies comparing attachments to one's nation and to Europe are most prevalent (e.g. Bruter 2003, 2005; Kohli 2000; McManus-Czubinska, et al. 2003). Studies of individuals' identification with lower (i.e., sub-national) levels are more unusual, mostly focusing on EU countries with strong regions, such as Spain, or on strong historical regions, such as Scotland (Haesly 2001; Huici, et al. 1997; Martínez-Herrera 2002; Medrano & Guitérrez 2001).

There are only a few empirical studies of multi-level territorial attachments, at least studies that include sub-national levels and most EU member states (Duschesne & Frogner 1995; Hooghe & Marks 2001). Existing empirical studies tend to support the idea that at least some people have multi-level territorial attachments, although the definitions and measures of these attachments vary.

There are no clearly developed theories regarding in what ways and how strongly individuals are thought to be simultaneously attached to several different territorial levels, from local to supra-national. Thus, I need to formulate plausible theoretical expectations regarding the concept of multi-level territorial attachments and the three dimensions (i.e., level, form, and strength).

From discussions of its attachment, territory, and multi-level aspects, it is apparent that the concept of multi-level territorial attachments, as I define it, only captures part of the much broader concept of identity. On the other hand, the concept is individual and territorial, including several territorial levels considered to have at least some political importance (ranging from the local community to Europe). Moreover, the concept of multi-level territorial attachments is broader than the term *pride*, encompassing both thick and thin emotional attachment, and both the cultural and civic components.

As is to be expected, given that it includes so many aspects, the concept is not unidimensional. On the contrary, I will argue that it has three important dimensions, and that one can measure these empirically with the help of survey data. To support my reasoning, I will first describe how territorial attachments are being measured with the help of survey studies.

Measuring attachments to different territorial levels

To capture multi-level territorial attachments, one must be able to measure respondents' attachments to territorial levels, ranging from the local to the supra-national. The Eurobarometer survey contains items asking respondents how attached they are to their town, region, country, and Europe. In the Swedish survey studies, I had the chance to try out my own survey questions about multi-level territorial attachments, using wordings and response options in line with my theoretical reasoning.

The territorial levels referred to in all data sets are the politically defined territorial units that form part of the multi-level political system in Europe. National level attachment is measured in both the Swedish surveys and the Eurobarometer via questions about the degree of attachment to the *country of residence* (mentioned by name), regardless as to whether the respondent might actually have a stronger attachment to *another* country (e.g., whether he or she was born in another country). This is in line with my theoretical reasoning: I am interested in the implications of territorial attachments to the territories of residence.

As for regional level, the questionnaires do not specify the names of the administrative regional levels in which the respondents live, although it is the administrative region in which one lives that is theoretically relevant, since they are parts of the multi-level political system and correspond to Hooghe and Marks' "type I" form of multi-level govern-

ance (2003).²⁶ Therefore, there is no certainty as to what type of region people are thinking of when responding to questions, especially in the Eurobarometer where the wording is “your region”. Still, how the regional level is incorporated into the other administrative/political levels referred to in the various items does imply that it is the administrative level that is being referred to, and I argue that this is the most plausible interpretation of the results. The Swedish SOM survey is clearer, since the wording specifies the regional level as the administrative region in which individual respondents live.

The same reasoning is applicable to the local level. In the Eurobarometer, the local level is referred to as “one’s town”, supposedly to capture the town where one lives. In the Swedish SOM survey the local level is measured in two different ways, due to the unusually large size of municipalities in Sweden. In it, I ask both about attachment to the village or *part* of municipality in which the respondent lives, and about attachment to the municipality as a whole. The Swedish EUP election study only asks about the degree of attachment to one local level – i.e., the town or municipality – where respondents live.

Regarding supra-national level, Eurobarometer 62.0, asks about attachment to Europe (other Eurobarometers, however, have sometimes replaced the term “Europe” with “the EU”). The Swedish SOM survey includes both Europe and the EU, to facilitate separate analyses of attachment to the territory per se, and to the territory as a political entity; the EUP study, in contrast, only asks about attachment to the EU.

The usefulness of using survey data in analysing attachments is debated (Bruter 2005; Smith 1992); this debate is especially to the point when the discussants use the word identity, but interpret the word differently. Another reason for the scepticism is the variety of indicators used to measure particularly European attachments. One Eurobarometer question has been especially criticized, because it asks people whether in the near future they will see themselves as mainly [nationality] or mainly European (Bruter 2005), the response options thus presupposing that all respondents have a hierarchy of feelings. This is a matter that McManus-Czubinska et al. (2003) rightly point out should be explored by an *open* empirical question. However, this most criticized indicator is still being used in research, even being cited in recently published articles in well-known journals (e.g., Lutz, et al. 2006).

²⁶ The concept of a region can be interpreted in several different ways, administrative, functional, and cultural being the most common theoretical classifications (Jönsson, et al. 2000). Administrative regions have politically defined boundaries and institutionalized political control, whether via a regional parliament or a county governor.

The questions I use in all data sets ask respondents to indicate their degrees of attachment to the local, regional, national, and supra-national levels, separately. As Bruter (2005) notes, this set of questions has fewer validity limitations than do other more criticized questions, but there are still objections to comparing such items across countries, levels, and individuals, since the respondents might not be referring to the same interpretations or definitions of attachment (Burgess 2000; Smith 1992). To some extent, this is a general problem, especially with cross-country comparative opinion studies. I believe it is essential not to treat any aspect of attachment or identity as beyond possible empirical investigation, especially given the important role identity has been ascribed in modern European politics. Moreover, some of the objections to such investigation will be met through the particular theoretical and empirical construction of the dimensions of the multi-level territorial attachment concept. To that end, I will present the original survey questions in some detail before justifying the theoretical dimensions, empirical transformations, and categorizations of individuals.

In all data sets, the questions are fairly similarly formulated (if not identical), but there are some noticeable differences in the response options, as can be seen in Tables 2.1 and 2.2. In the national SOM study and the Swedish European Parliament election study, the degree of attachment is measured using a scale from 0 (not at all attached) to 10 (very strongly attached), whereas in the Eurobarometer there are four response options for degree of attachment. These different data sets will be analysed separately throughout the chapters, but the general congruencies and tendencies will be discussed and compared between the data sets.

In Sweden, with a long history as a unitary state, it is understandable that people feel most attached to their country (mean 8.27 in the SOM, or 8.54 in the EUP). In fact, a full 43 per cent of the Swedes surveyed indicated the strongest degree (10) on the scale in the SOM survey. The finding that most people are strongly attached to the national level is also supported by another Swedish data set, the investigation of the referendum about the adoption of the Euro in 2003 (see Berg 2004). Despite using different wordings about attachments, and slightly different response alternatives, the overall patterns are the same in all three data sets. It seems that some emotional connection to the territorial level is captured regardless of variations in wording, which can be argued as also supporting the possibility of comparisons across countries.

Table 2.1 Degrees of attachment to different territorial levels in Sweden, 2004 (means)

	Swedish SOM study	Swedish EUP study
	Mean	Mean
The village/town/part of municipality where you live	6.83	
The municipality you live in	6.71	7.04
The region/county you live in	6.45	6.69
Sweden	8.27	8.53
The European Union	3.92	4.08
Europe	5.88	

Comment: Source: The Swedish National SOM survey, 2004, and the Swedish European Parliament election study, 2004. The question in the SOM survey is: "People may feel different degrees of attachment to different areas. How attached do you feel to [the above alternatives]?" The scale ranges from 0 (not at all attached) to 10 (very attached). The question in the EUP study is: "How allied do you feel with [the above alternatives]?" The total number of individuals responding to each item was between 1651–1696 for the SOM study, and 1283–1310 for the EUP study.

The village, town, or part of municipality in which one lives is the second most common level to which Swedes feel attached to (6.83 and 7.04). Sweden has comparatively large and independent municipalities, and earlier investigations have found a primary attachment to one's town (over 50 per cent), when respondents were asked to select a single level from a list ranging from "one's town" to "the world as a whole" (Johansson 2002:199).²⁷ The present results thus indicate a contrast between responses indicating where one *primarily* feels at home, and responses indicating how *strongly* attached one concurrently feels to several different levels (when given the opportunity to grade them independently of one another); I will return to this point later, when discussing the measurement of the three dimensions of multi-level territorial attachments.

The lowest degrees of attachment found are to the European Union (mean 3.92 and 4.08), quite as expected, given Sweden's brief EU membership and renowned EU scepticism. Interestingly, however, the mean is significantly higher concerning attachment to Europe (5.88), when respondents are asked about it separately from attachment to the EU. The degree of attachment to Europe is thus not far from the degree of attachment felt to the weak regional level in Sweden.

The distribution of degrees of attachment to Sweden's different territorial levels could be expected to be different from a European perspective, given Sweden's long history as a unitary state. However, the pattern is in fact relatively similar to the feelings of attachment to different

²⁷ These results indicate a need to ask about the degree of attachment to all levels independently. In the above example, respondents were asked to pick the one level in which they felt most at home, which, apart from focusing on just one level, also has bearing on the proximal principle to be discussed later.

levels in all 25 EU member states. Most Europeans feel fairly or very attached to all levels, although they feel less attached to Europe.

The overall patterns for citizens in all 25 EU countries conceal the fact that there is variation in the degree of attachment to one's country between different countries. In some federal states, and in countries where the regional level is strong, people tend to feel somewhat more attached to their region than to their country. Inversely, in traditionally unitary states, such as Finland and Denmark, a higher proportion of people feel strongly attached to their country. In the ten newest EU member states, the average degree of attachment to one's country is somewhat higher than in the 15 older member states; however, the degrees of attachment in the older member states have remained stable over time.

Table 2.2 Degrees of attachment to one's town, region, and country and to Europe, in EU25, 2004 (weighted per cent)

How attached do you feel to	your town	your region	your country	Europe
Very attached	61	57	65	23
Fairly attached	29	33	29	43
Not very attached	8	8	5	25
Not at all attached	2	2	1	9
Sum, per cent	100	100	100	100
Total N	33 726	33 622	33 688	32 699

Comment: Source: Eurobarometer 62.0, autumn 2004. The question is: "People may feel different degrees of attachment to their town or village, their region, their country, and to Europe. Please tell me how attached you feel to [each alternative]". There are four possible answers for each level: very attached, fairly attached, not very attached, and not at all attached. The numbers are weighted according to the national populations of the 25 EU member states.

Questions corresponding to that presented in Table 2.2 have occasionally been part of the Eurobarometer surveys for at least ten years; over this time, the proportion of people who feel very attached to their own country has remained at just over 50 per cent, and the proportion of those *fairly* attached has remained slightly beneath 40 per cent, with no declining tendency from 1995 to 2004.²⁸ This has two implications for the analyses of the Eurobarometer data presented in the ensuing chapters. First, all analyses must be weighted according to national populations, and a dummy variable for each country must be included when analysing the effect of multi-level territorial attachments on political trust and welfare attitudes. Second, I need to include institutional contexts, in the form of country differences, as interaction effects in Chapter 5. All these analyses will use measures of the different dimensions of

²⁸ The percentages of very and fairly attached people are (weighted for then 15 EU members): 53 and 37 (1995), 52 and 38 (1999), 50 and 39 (2002), 51 and 40 (2003), and 54 and 37 (2004).

multi-level territorial attachments as independent variables. Before presenting these dimensions, let us first investigate the covariance between the degree of attachment to different levels, and how territorial attachments relate to some other indicators.

Exploring the internal and external correspondence

In all the data sets, the items concerning simultaneous attachments to several territorial levels let us investigate how these attachments correlate with each other. This gives a preliminary view of the correspondence between the levels and an empirical basis for my construction of measures of the three dimensions.

As can be seen in the correlation matrix (Table 2.3), the attachment to each level is significantly positively correlated, to some degree, to attachment to all the other levels, in both Sweden and the 25 EU member states (“EU25”). This indicates both that there is no internal opposition to simultaneous attachments to more than one level, and that most people are attached to more than one level. Both these results are preconditions for the constructions I will make to capture the various dimensions of multi-level territorial attachments. For example, the strongest correlation is found between the sub-national levels, making it possible to combine them to one measure of sub-national attachment.

Table 2.3 Correlations between attachment to different levels in Sweden and in EU25 (Pearson’s r)

Sweden	Town/part of municipality	Municipality	Region	Sweden	EU	Europe
Town/part of municipality	1					
Municipality	.83	1				
Region	.70	.78	1			
Sweden	.46	.47	.52	1		
EU	.11	.15	.18	.16	1	
Europe	.19	.20	.25	.35	.59	1

EU25	Town	Region	Country	Europe
Town	1			
Region	.70	1		
Nation	.42	.49	1	
Europe	.16	.19	.30	1

Comment: The data in the table are from the Eurobarometer 62.0, 2004, and the Swedish national SOM survey, 2004. See Tables 2.1 and 2.2. for more information on the questions. The EB data are weighted according to the national populations of the 25 EU member states. All correlations are significant at the 0.01 level (two tailed).

The size of the correlation coefficients also suggests the same sort of local–international polarization as has been demonstrated by Duschesne

and Frognier (1995).²⁹ To explore this polarization in greater depth, I did a factor analysis of the SOM data, which confirmed the division into two factors, one domestic and one European. The attachment to Sweden item loaded high on both factors, but stronger on the domestic factor, indicating bipolarity in the attachment to the national level, and further grounds for exploring different dimensions of attachments.

This pattern was one of the reasons why Hooghe and Marks (2004) chose to distinguish between people who feel exclusively national and those who feel both national and European when analysing opinions regarding European integration, to highlight the difference in opinions. The same pattern of country attachment loading on both the sub-national and supra-national factors is also found in the Eurobarometer data of 2004. Other explorative analyses also confirm the theoretical expectation of multi-dimensionality – hence, my continuous development of three different dimensions.³⁰

Earlier, I discussed the concept of pride in relation to multi-level territorial attachments, arguing that the latter are broader than pride, and not just a proxy for it. This is also supported empirically by correlating the attachments to different levels with the two available variables measuring pride, i.e., national and European pride. Attachments to country and to Europe do not display correlation levels contradicting my view that pride is a narrower concept than that of multi-level territorial attachments.³¹

At the other end of the wide–narrow scale, there have been some concerns that attachment to Europe is just another proxy for favourable attitudes towards European integration. Correlation analyses indicate a relationship between the variables, but not one close enough to indicate that they are the same thing.³²

²⁹ Using a Eurobarometer question from the 1970s about the places to which respondents felt the strongest and second-strongest senses of belonging (ranging from one's town to "the world"), they found feelings of belonging to be structured around the local and international poles, with "country" being intermediate (Duschesne & Frognier 1995).

³⁰ A cluster analysis (Aldenderfer & Blashfield 1984) with a three-cluster solution for the Swedish SOM data, resulted in one cluster capturing an exclusive form of attachment (mainly to Sweden). The other two clusters were both multiple, one capturing only the four domestic levels, and the other being multiple across all the levels.

³¹ National pride and country attachment have correlation coefficients of .363 (SOM) and .521 (EB), while European pride and European attachment have correlation coefficients of .666 (SOM) and .609 (EB). Deeper analysis indicates that most people who claim to be very proud to be Swedish also tend to indicate high degrees of national attachment. At the same time, however, there are people who do not feel very proud to be Swedish but who still indicate high degrees of national attachment.

³² In the Swedish SOM data, the question of whether one supports Swedish membership in the EU correlates by a coefficient of .272 with European attachment; the correlation with

The presentation of the variables and the preliminary analyses of internal and external correspondence support my argument about the independence of my concept from other related aspects; they also indicate the multi-dimensionality of the concept, where not only each level by itself, but also the relationship between levels, and attachment strength are important. In other words, it is time to theoretically justify and empirically scrutinize the three dimensions of multi-level territorial attachments.

DIMENSIONS OF INDIVIDUALS' MULTI-LEVEL TERRITORIAL ATTACHMENTS

All scholars acknowledge that there are undoubtedly several political levels in any political system to which people at least theoretically may feel attached. These levels are considered to be organizationally “nested”, i.e., a smaller unit is part of a larger unit, which in turn is included in an even larger unit, like nesting Russian Matryoshka dolls, and in line with what Hooghe and Marks (2003) call “type I multi-level governance”. The theoretical assumptions as to how individuals are supposed to connect emotionally to these multiple territorial levels are not very clearly developed, tending to vary between different groups of researchers. (Bourgeois & Bourgeois 2005; Brodsky & Marx 2001; Lawler 1992; Medrano & Guitérrez 2001; Müller-Peters 1998; Roccas & Brewer 2002).

One reason for the range of views on how individuals are supposed to be attached to such multiple territorial levels could be the very multi-dimensionality of the concept. I argue that there are three dimensions of multi-level territorial attachments, *territorial level*, *form*, and *strength*, each of which can vary from one individual to another. One person may, for example, be strongly attached to only one territorial level, whereas another may be fairly attached to several levels, and a third might not be attached to any territorial level at all. An overview of the three theoretical dimensions and their possible variations is presented in Table 2.4.

attachment to the EU is higher, correlating by a coefficient of .560, but is still not considered exactly the same concept. In the Eurobarometer, the correlation between attachment to Europe and believing one's country's membership in the EU to be a good thing is .355.

Table 2.4 Theoretical dimensions of multi-level territorial attachments

Dimensions	Level	Form	Strength
Variations	Unattached	Unattached	Unattached
	Sub-national	Exclusive	Fairly
	National	Multiple	Mixed
	Supra-national	Nested	Very

The first dimension is the *territorial level* (or levels) to which a person feels attached. Given that this study is limited to considering territorial levels of some political importance, this dimension mainly varies between the sub-national (local and regional), national, and the supra-national levels (Europe and the EU). It is also possible not to be attached to any level, a possibility captured by the “unattached” category. The second dimension is the *form* of territorial attachment. Apart from the group of unattached, the variation here starts with individuals who are exclusively attached to only one territorial level (no matter which). A person can also feel attached to two levels, and is then considered to have a multiple form of attachment, whereas individuals who feel attached to all territorial levels are regarded as having nested forms of attachment. The *strength* of territorial attachment can range from non-existent for the unattached group, via fairly strong and mixed strength (i.e., a mixture of fairly and very strong attachments), to very strongly attached.

Each of these dimensions will be further theoretically developed below, and then empirically scrutinized later in this chapter. Explaining why individuals have the attachments they do is not an aim of this study; nevertheless, to explore the robustness of my concept, I will also touch on some of the social background variation that has been identified by previous research (e.g., Citrin & Sides 2004). As well as investigating the three dimensions separately, they will also be analyzed in combination, via the construction of a new variable. This variable is a measure of *the strongest attachments*, and I will discuss and argue for its variations after scrutinizing each of the three dimensions.

First dimension: territorial level of attachment

The first dimension concerns the territorial *level(s)* to which a person feels attached, since they differ in size, importance, and interdependence. Although the territorial levels are organizationally nested in the EU, they still interact and function differently. The highest decision-making level is relatively new and weak compared to most national governments (even in federal states), and the contacts and negotiations

between the levels are not necessarily hierarchically ordered, as described by the multi-level governance perspective in Chapter 1 (Hooghe & Marks 2003; Peters & Pierre 2004; Pierre & Peters 2000).

Lawler (1992) has developed a theory to explain the circumstances in which individuals will identify with lower- or higher-order nested groups. He argues that individuals tend to identify with those units that provide them a greater sense of control, and are thus likely to generate more positive emotions. He discusses two contradictory rules. First, there is the “proximal” rule, stating that because of the greater salience of smaller groups or units, individuals tend to identify more with them. Second, there is also a “distal” rule, which applies when larger groups or units have acquired functions that allow them better to provide for their members’ well-being; this rule accounts for the higher probability of individuals identifying with these larger groups or levels in certain circumstances.

Similar reasoning is found in Calhoun’s observation that in any identity claim, two different purposes are sought: differentiation, and equivalence or inclusion (Calhoun 1994). Some identities may help differentiate between individuals within interaction groups, while others help make people feel that they belong to a community of equals. Different people can be expected to have varying perceptions of the degree and extent to which each of these territorial levels fulfils these purposes, due to their personal experiences and backgrounds.

The personal experiences of individuals and the historical development of the diverse territorial units both vary, thus affecting the expected attachment of each individual. This also means that everyone cannot automatically be assumed to be attached to all the levels beneath the highest level to which he or she is attached – which is otherwise known as a “spill-over effect”. Individuals have widely differing life experiences – some perhaps living in the same place all their lives, while others move across borders, living in EU member states for various lengths of time – all of which might affect the levels to which they feel attached.

Another current view held by most researchers is that even if territorial attachments are considered as some sort of “imagined communities” (Anderson 1991) that can be politically constructed or taken advantage of (Bucken-Knapp 2003; Hall 1998; Hansen 2000), emotional attachments to territorial units are still thought to take time to develop (Archibugi, et al. 1998; Smith 1991). Most people are thus expected to

have weaker attachments to new territorial levels, such as new regions or the EU (Batt & Wolczuk 2002; Bruter 2003, 2005).³³

Empirically, the *territorial level of attachment* dimension will be explored by analysing whether or not a person feels attached to a certain territorial level. I choose to differentiate between three theoretical categories of levels, namely, the sub-national, national, and supra-national levels. There are several reasons for this categorization, one being that these are the three broad levels that are theoretically mostly distinct. Another reason is the variation in form of sub-national levels in Europe, which makes the comparison of, for example, different local attachments more difficult.

Previous analyses of the internal correspondence between different territorial levels also support the combination of local and regional attachments into the sub-national attachment category. Thus, in the Swedish SOM data, data regarding attachment to one's town, municipality, and region will be combined into the sub-national attachment category. Attachment to Europe and the EU can similarly be combined to form the supra-national level.

How the question is designed in both the Swedish SOM survey and the Swedish EUP study, both of which use a 0–10 scale, yields useful information for analysing the three dimensions of multi-level territorial attachments. The downside of this 0–10 scale is the problem of cut-off points, i.e., the difficulty knowing at exactly what point a person would say he or she definitely *has* an attachment to the territorial level in question. Bear in mind that it is only the *level* dimension that is under scrutiny at the moment, and finding a cut-off point indicating when a person does or does not have an attachment to a certain level is relevant to distinguishing this dimension from the later dimension of *strength*.

There are obviously many different and justifiable ways one can stipulate a cut-off point. Zero is easy, as it clearly means absolutely no attachment at all; one suggestion would thus be to consider any response of one or higher to indicate at least extremely weak attachment. However, there is a two-fold problem with this approach. One is the almost complete lack of variation between those who are attached and non-attached, since in practice very few people actually choose “zero”. The other is the theoretical question of how weak an attachment to a territorial level can be and still be considered meaningful. Would a per-

³³ I will return to this matter in Chapter 5, where I will examine how the effects of multiple territorial levels on trust and welfare attitudes vary in different institutional settings.

son who indicates the degree of attachment to her town to be “one” really say she has a town attachment at all?

A completely different approach to finding the relevant cut-off point would be to consider people who have a stronger degree of attachment than the average of the population to be attached, while those with below average attachment would be considered unattached. If this average degree of attachment were measured for each territorial level, there would be no variation in degree of attachment between levels, basically indicating as many people feeling attached to the nation as to the EU – which clearly misrepresents the data in Table 2.1. Using the average total degree of attachment to all territorial levels as a cut-off point would represent the data slightly better, but there is no theoretical argument as to why the aggregated average should be the distinguishing factor between the attached and non-attached. Why should we expect there to be, on average, as many attached as non-attached people? Moreover, depending on the territorial levels included in the survey items, the cut-off point could shift; thus, a person’s answer could at one time be regarded as indicating attachment, and at another time as indicating non-attachment, which is clearly not theoretically acceptable. In addition, considering the bias towards a majority of people being strongly attached to most levels, the aggregated average is very high (6.32), even higher than five, which experimental studies find that most people consider the mid point of a 0–10 scale. To claim that a person who chooses the mid point (5) has no attachment is thus not rational.


For the overall concept of multi-level territorial attachments, I argue that one must go beyond the dichotomous idea of focusing only on whether or not people have an attachment. However, in order to distinguish the dimension of the territorial *level* to which a person is attached from the other dimensions, I must make such a distinction. I argue that it is reasonable to consider responses from five to ten on 10-point scales as indicating attachment to the territorial level in question; I will propose two main arguments supporting this position (apart from the rejection of the above alternatives).

The first argument is *empirical*, using the comparison of answers, presented in Figure 2.1, to the original questions from the three different Swedish data sets. What is so apt about this comparison is that in the study of the 2003 Swedish referendum about Euro adoption (the thick grey line), each respondent was *first* asked to answer whether or not he or she was attached to a certain territorial level (a town, in Figure 2.1), and *only* people answering “yes” were then asked to indicate their degree of attachment, using a 0–10 scale. No one who said he or she had

a town attachment selected zero on the scale. For comparison, however, I have included the 18 per cent that answered that they were not attached to any specific town, by coding them as zero in Figure 2.1. Of those who said that they *had* an attachment to a town, only a few selected one to four on the scale, the overwhelming majority selecting five and above.

Moreover, from five to ten on the scale, the proportions of people indicating a certain degree of attachment are also strikingly similar between all the data sets, which I believe indicates that these responses accurately capture those who have attachments. Further support comes from the fact that in the two other survey questions, the number of people choosing values between zero and four totals approximately 18 per cent – the same as the proportion of people claiming to have no attachment at all in the referendum study.

Figure 2.1 Degrees of attachment to town, part of municipality, and municipality in three different opinion studies (per cent)



Comment: The three opinion studies used in the figure are as follows: the Swedish SOM study, 2004 ("SOM 04"), the European Parliament election study in Sweden, 2004 ("EUP 04"), and the study of the Euro referendum in 2003 ("REF 03"). In REF 03 the question was divided into three parts, starting with "Is there any specific town to which you feel related?" This was followed by an open question to respondents who answered "yes" to the first question, asking the name of the town of which they were thinking. Finally, these same respondents were asked to rate the degree to which they felt connected to the town mentioned, on a scale of 0–10. Those answering "no" to the first question have been coded as zero in Figure 2.2, explaining the higher proportion of zeros here than in the other studies.

Similar patterns are also found regarding comparisons of the degrees of attachment to the regional and national levels between these different data sets.³⁴ Moreover, the general trends evident from these three different studies also validate the stability of the patterns of attachments, despite some variation in the wording of the questions and the response

³⁴ No initial yes/no question was asked concerning the European level.

options. From Figure 2.1 it is obvious that the choice of wording is not decisive, as long as the wording can be argued to capture the same underlying phenomenon. The similarities in response patterns in these three separate studies clearly indicate that there exist some sorts of emotional attachments to the local level, and that we can capture such attachment even using slightly different wordings.³⁵ These results also support the claim that questions translated into different languages can indeed capture the same phenomenon. This is important knowledge for the interpretation of Eurobarometer data. If different, but related, words can capture the same underlying phenomenon, then there is a good chance of measuring the phenomenon of interest in the Eurobarometer studies too, regardless of slight differences interpreting and translating the word “attachment” in different countries.

The *second* argument as to why I believe the cut-off point between those who are or are not attached to a certain territorial level should be five, is the comparability to a previous analysis using Eurobarometer data (Hooghe & Marks 2001:56). Of the four response options to the Eurobarometer question, “very attached” and “fairly attached” were considered to indicate that a person had an attachment, whereas “not very attached” and “not at all attached” were considered to indicate no attachment. I intend to apply the same criteria in analysing the Eurobarometer data. Hence, there is a balance in the number of possible response options with which to capture whether or not a person has a territorial attachment, in both the Swedish and the European data. As can be seen in Table 2.5, the proportion of people considered to be attached to the different levels is relatively similar in all three data sets, despite the differences in wordings and measures.

The disadvantage is that, since people can indicate strong attachments to all levels, the variation turned out to be low, especially regarding national attachment, over 90 per cent having such an attachment. Naturally, this distribution would change in the Swedish data if the cut-off point were raised to six or seven, or even higher; then, however, it would no longer be a measure of only the territorial *level* of attachment, but would also capture the *strength* of attachment dimension, which I will define in more detail shortly. Analogously, it would then be necessary to consider only those who answered “very attached” in the Euro-

³⁵ There is debate as to what words or concepts best capture territorial attachment. In the SOM study and in the Eurobarometer the word of choice is “attachment” (In Swedish: “hur fäst är du vid ..?”), while in the two other Swedish surveys the word is “samhörighet”, which can be translated as feeling related, allied, or akin to something.

barometer to be attached, not those who claimed to be “fairly attached” (which seems more obviously illogical).

The empirical categorization according to the territorial *level* dimension in the Swedish data sets will thus take account of whether a person has indicated 5–10 on the attachment scales regarding the sub-national, national, and supra-national levels. In the Eurobarometer, attachments to the local and regional levels are combined into sub-national attachment, whereas attachment to the national and supra-national levels is based on one question each. All in all, there are four possible categories in the territorial *level* of attachment dimension. The distributions for both the Swedish and the Eurobarometer data sets can be seen in Table 2.5.³⁶

Table 2.5 Territorial level of attachment in Sweden and EU25 (per cent, weighted per cent)

Level of attachment	Sweden 2004	Sweden 2004	EU25 2004
	National SOM survey	EUP election study	Eurobarometer
Unattached	4	1	2
Sub-national	84	90	93
National	94	97	94
Supra-national	68	49	66
Total N	1689	1283	29 334

Comment: Source: The Swedish National SOM survey, 2004, the Swedish European Parliament election study, 2004, and the Eurobarometer 62.0, autumn 2004. For information regarding the questions, see Tables 2.1 and 2.2. The figures represent the proportions of people attached to particular categories (or to any of the levels forming parts of these categories). In the SOM survey this means response indications from five to 10 on the scale; in the Eurobarometer it means the response options “fairly attached” or “very attached”. The Eurobarometer numbers are weighted according to the national populations of the 25 member states.

A very high percentage of the respondents do feel attached to all three categories of territorial levels (i.e., sub-national, national, and supra-national). I am stressing the fact that these categories are not mutually exclusive (apart from the unattached group), in line with the theoretical reasoning that a person can feel simultaneously attached to more than one level. Only a small fraction of all respondents comprise the *unattached*. Analyzing some of the common background variables indicates that there is a tendency for being unattached to be somewhat more common among men, younger people, and people not born in the country.

³⁶ If six is used as the breakpoint instead of five, the distribution of the SOM data is unattached (8), sub-national (74), national (87), and supra-national (52). For the forthcoming analyses, this does not change the overall patterns or the results, and the coefficients change only marginally, as will be commented on in later chapters; hence, all results are robust to the choice of cut-off points.

The first category of the *level* dimension is the *sub-national level*. The Swedish data indicate that 84 (SOM) or 90 (EUP) per cent of the respondents feel attached to at least one of the sub-national levels. Examining the distribution of sub-national attachments among different social groups, I find almost no differences between men and women, different age groups, or different levels of education. The high percentage of people having at least some degree of attachment is also found in the European data. The results for all 25 member states indicate that almost 93 per cent of respondents have a sub-national attachment. There are basically no important differences between social groups, just an almost negligible tendency for older generations and people of lower education to be over-represented in this category.

At the national level in both the Swedish and the European data sets, 94 and 97 per cent, respectively, feel at least somewhat attached to their country, and thus it is not surprising to find no variation between social groups.³⁷ Attachment to the supra-national level is found in 68 (or 49)³⁸ per cent of the Swedish and 66 per cent of the European respondents. The variation between different groups is still small, but there is a tendency for supra-national attachment to be more common among men, younger people, and people with a higher than basic educational level.

The number of people feeling attached to Europe is, perhaps surprisingly, higher in the ten newest than in the older member states, 78 compared to 65 per cent. However, the highest European attachment of all is found in the six founding countries, indicating the need to include the time of joining the European Union as an institutional context in Chapter 5. Also, the generally high degrees of attachment clearly indicate the need to further explore the variation between individuals regarding the other two dimensions of multi-level territorial attachments.

Second dimension: form of attachment

The second dimension has to do with the *form* of territorial attachment, i.e., how an individual combines his or her attachments to different levels. Two opposing ideal types can be found in the literature – *exclusive* and *nested* forms of attachment – although different terms have been used to refer to nested attachment, such as multiple or dual identification (Herrmann, et al. 2004; Hooghe & Marks 2001; Huici, et al. 1997; McManus-Czubinska, et al. 2003).

³⁷ Apart from the expected higher attachment to Sweden among Swedish citizens.

³⁸ In the EUP study, where the attachment only concerns the EU, not Europe.

The *exclusive* form of territorial attachment is based on the view that no matter how many territorial levels there are in society, only *one* of these levels matters to each individual, regardless of which level it is; the individual is supposed to “make a choice” between different levels. According to this idea, emotional attachments to different levels are regarded as incompatible with each other. In other words, feeling attached to one level excludes the possibility of also feeling attached to others. This line of reasoning is partly based on the essentialist view of how identities are formed (Cederman 2001). According to Smith (1986), national identity is arguably the only important territorial identity for individuals. On the other hand, following Inglehart (1977), arguments have been put forward that the national level could teach citizens about abstract feelings of community and thus more easily be linked to a European identity compared to the regional level (Duschesne & Frogner 1995).

In its ideal form, *nested* territorial attachments are perceived as completely vertically compatible (and even mutually amplifying) from one level to the next. A nested form of attachment thus lies at the other end of this theoretical axis. As long as different levels are organizationally nested within each other, identification with those levels can be nested too (Huici, et al. 1997). This is sometimes described as the “Russian doll” model (Risse 2004) or the concentric circle model (Bruter 2005). An interesting example of a study of nested identification is Medrano and Guitérrez’s (2001) study of the relationship between identifications with different levels in Spain. The authors say, “In Spain, people who identify strongly with Spain or/and with their region also identify strongly with Europe. Spaniards have thus developed a sort of hyphenated identity with respect to Europe” (Medrano & Guitérrez 2001:772). It is less common for such studies also to include the local level. An exception is that of Hooghe and Marks (2001), who include local, regional, national, and European levels, and call this form of territorial attachment *multiple identities*. In their model, a person with multiple identifications can feel strongly attached to all, or nearly all, levels.

The idea of a nested form of attachment is often cited in studies of the interplay between national and European identifications. Some researchers also describe the nested identification as a form of cosmopolitan identity, at least if they are only comparing national and European

identities.³⁹ In their study of exclusive and dual identities in Poland, McManus-Czubinska et al. (2003) found the pattern that the poor, the elderly, the less educated, and the rural dwellers were more exclusively Polish, whereas the more affluent, the young, the highly educated, and people in big cities more often felt equally European and Polish (McManus-Czubinska, et al. 2003).

Theoretically, the distinction between exclusive and nested forms of attachment is clear. In practical terms, however, there are more than two territorial levels in a multi-level system, making it possible for people to be attached to two or three levels before having a nested attachment to all territorial levels. My solution is that if respondents feel attached to both their municipality and their region, they will still be regarded as having an *exclusive* form of attachment, since these two territorial levels both belong to the sub-national level. The *nested* form of attachment will thus be ascribed to respondents who feel attached to *all three categories* of territorial levels. Between the exclusive and nested forms of attachment we find those who feel attached to two levels; I call this a *multiple* form of attachment.

As can be seen in Table 2.4, the unattached group is theoretically part of all three dimensions. This category is a group of people that is often neglected in the theoretical literature on identity (Hooghe & Marks 2001). For such people, territorial levels are not relevant to self-categorization, at least not those levels in which these people currently live.⁴⁰ This is of course an important category for my following analyses, since such people can be expected to have different political attitudes from those of more attached people.

The *form* of attachment is the dimension that most directly concerns the relationships between attachments to different territorial levels. The previous section demonstrated that high percentages of people are attached to the sub-national, national, and supra-national levels, indicating that some individuals are attached to at least two levels. The actual percentage distribution of respondents categorized as having unat-

³⁹ According to Delanty (2000), however, the cosmopolitan identity is not territorially based, so this is a debated statement.

⁴⁰ Such people likely have other identifications of greater importance to them; gender, age, life-style, or ideology may be more salient for their everyday life and political opinions. Another aspect here is the number of people who have moved across borders and still feel a strong attachment to territorial areas where they formerly lived, but less attachment to some or all of the territorial levels where they currently live.

tached, exclusive, multiple, and nested forms of attachment in Sweden and in all EU member states can be found in Table 2.6.⁴¹

The results indicate yet again similar overall patterns between the Swedish and the EU25 data sets. Regarding both the *form* dimension and the next dimension, *strength*, the categories are mutually exclusive and the percentages add up to 100. Five per cent of respondents are attached to only *one* level (either the sub-national, national, or supra-national level), and are hence categorized as having an exclusive form of attachment.

Table 2.6 Form of attachment in Sweden and EU25, 2004 (per cent, weighted per cent)

Form of attachment	Sweden 2004 National SOM survey	Sweden 2004 EUP election study	EU25 2004 Eurobarometer
Unattached	4	1	2
Exclusive	5	6	5
Multiple	27	48	33
Nested	64	45	60
Sum, per cent	100	100	100
Total N	1689	1281	29 334

Comment: Source: The Swedish National SOM survey, 2004, the Swedish European Parliament election study, 2004, and the Eurobarometer 62.0, autumn 2004. For information regarding the questions, see Tables 2.1 and 2.2. The unattached are coded as not being attached to any level, the exclusive are people attached to only one level, the multiple are attached to two levels, and the nested feel attached to all levels. The Eurobarometer numbers are weighted according to the national populations of the 25 member states.

More than one quarter of the Swedish SOM respondents, almost half of the EUP respondents, and one third of the EB respondents have a *multiple* form of attachment, i.e., feel attached to two levels. There are few social group variations behind these patterns. Most of the SOM and EB respondents, 64 and 60 per cent, respectively, have a *nested* form of attachment, whereas the percentage is slightly lower for the Swedish EUP respondents (45 per cent). People with higher incomes and ideologically leaning more to the right are somewhat overrepresented in this group, as are men. Education does not, however, seem to matter for belonging to this group in the Swedish data, and only to a certain extent in the Eurobarometer data.

The exclusive form of attachment can in theory be directed towards any one of the three categories of levels discussed above. Most common in Sweden is exclusive attachment to the national level (2/3 of respon-

⁴¹ The categorization has been done according to the levels to which a person feels attached. Since the proportion of people attached to each level was large, most people are categorized as having either multiple or nested forms of attachment. If the breakpoint is changed to six, the size of each category changes somewhat, but the overall results of the ensuing analyses remain the same.

dents), followed by exclusive sub-national attachment (1/5 of respondents). In all EU countries, exclusive attachment is most frequently directed towards the sub-national level. Only very few people have an exclusive form of attachment to the supra-national level.

People with a multiple form of attachment can also vary in terms of the territorial levels to which they feel attached. Most multiply attached Swedes (3/4 of respondents) have a combination of sub-national and national attachments. In EU25, almost nine out of ten respondents with a multiple form of attachment feel attached to both the sub-national and national levels.⁴²

Third dimension: strength of attachment

The third dimension is *strength* of attachment. This is an important theoretical dimension, since it is the one that captures the possibility of people having various degrees of attachment (Hooghe & Marks 2001). The theoretical possibility that people can be attached to several levels emphasizes the question of how strongly attached they feel to those levels. Moreover, the issue of strength of attachment clearly relates to the earlier discussion of thick and thin versions of identity (Cederman 2001; Scharpf 1999). It is reasonable that someone with a thick identity, who feels proud to be of a certain nationality, for example, would indicate a strong degree of attachment when answering the questions about national territorial attachment; the empirical correlations also support this interpretation.

From the two theoretically opposing views (essentialist versus constructivist) of how people supposedly can feel simultaneously attached to several territorial levels (Cederman 2001), I can extract two views regarding *strength*. The first view, that a person can only feel attached to one level (Lawler 1992; Smith 1991), implies an underlying assumption of “limited strength”. In my view, this implies that if a person actually felt attached to more than one level, this would lead to generally lower degrees of attachment to each level. Hence, the attachment strength could be considered limited in total supply, being distributed in zero-sum fashion between different levels.

⁴² A combination of national and supra-national attachment is apparent in one fifth of the sampled Swedes with a multiple form of attachment, but only among 8 per cent of the EU25 respondents. Only a handful of respondents feel both sub-nationally and supra-nationally attached, but without having national attachment. Hence, the combination of feeling both nationally and supra-nationally attached is somewhat more common in Sweden than in EU member states taken as a whole.

The opposing theoretical position regarding possible nested and multiple attachments (Hooghe & Marks 2001; Medrano & Guitérrez 2001) leads to an expectation of a more expandable view of strength, where attachments to new (or additional) levels do not necessarily decrease the strength of attachment to former levels. The average total degree of strength could thus stay the same or even increase.

In the Swedish SOM and EUP data sets, it is clearly possible to measure the strength of attachment due to the use of the 0–10 scale. When analysing strength of attachment, simply summing the total degree of attachment to every level is not a good measure. It will obscure the variation between, for example, those respondents who have overall average degrees of attachment to all levels, and those who feel strongly attached to one or a few levels but only weakly or not at all attached to others. A first step will thus be to measure the strength of attachment only to those territorial levels to which a person is attached. In the Swedish data, this means the levels to which a respondent has indicated that the strength of attachment is five or higher.

By dividing the total strength by the number of levels to which a person feels attached, I can create an index of the average degree of attachment strength, and thus compare the strength regardless of which form of attachment a person has or to which levels he or she feels attached.⁴³ My analyses indicate, for example, that it is almost as common for someone with an exclusive attachment to answer five (or ten) on the index, as it is for someone who has a multiple or nested form of attachment. The results thus support the idea of expandable rather than limited attachment strength. Any one individual can thus not only have attachments to several levels (as demonstrated earlier), but also have equally strong degrees of attachment to more than one level.

In the Eurobarometer data, attachment strength can be determined by comparing answers indicating *fairly attached* to those indicating *very attached*, and by only including in the strength calculation those levels to which respondents are considered to feel attached. This is justified by the same arguments as above. Altogether, there are four possible degrees of strength, ranging from “not at all attached” to “very strongly attached”, which can be coded from 1 to 4. By coding “fairly attached” as three, and “very strongly attached” as four, I can compute an index.

⁴³ Such a strength index ranges between five and ten; the overall average I found was 7.47. Fortunately, the variation between groups with different forms of attachment is low, suggesting an empirically rather high independence of the *strength* dimension from the *form* dimension. In the group of people having an exclusive form of attachment the mean strength is 7.17, in the multiple group the mean is 7.76, and in the nested group it is 7.79.

By dividing the total strength by the number of levels to which a person feels attached, I can create an index of the average degree of attachment, as with the Swedish data. To make the comparisons between the European and Swedish data sets more comparable in the ensuing analyses, the Swedish data will be categorized in a similar fashion: “fairly attached” (corresponding to 5–7) and “very attached” (8–10).⁴⁴

Hence, in both data sets I can categorize respondents into three groups based on strength of attachment. The first group contains people who have indicated *fairly* strong attachments, no matter whether they are to one or several territorial levels. The second group includes people with a mixture of both fairly and very strong degrees of attachments. Third, there is the group of very strongly attached people, also regardless of how many territorial levels the attachment concerns.

Table 2.7 Strength of attachment in Sweden and EU25, 2004 (per cent, weighted per cent)

Strength of attachment	Sweden 2004 National SOM survey	Sweden 2004 EUP election study	EU25 2004 Eurobarometer
Unattached	4	1	2
Fairly attached	15	13	22
Mix of fairly and very attached	55	60	43
Very attached	26	26	35
Sum, per cent	100	100	100
Total N	1625	1271	29 334

Comment: Source: The Swedish National SOM survey, 2004, the Swedish European Parliament election study, 2004, and the Eurobarometer 62.0, autumn 2004. For information regarding these questions, see Tables 2.1 and 2.2. To enable comparisons between the data sets, the answers are recoded thus: 3 = fairly attached (= 5–7 in SOM) and 4 = very attached (= 8–10 in SOM). Strength of attachment is an index, representing total strength of attachment to all levels divided by the number of levels to which a person feels attached.

Most people have a mixture of fairly and very strong degrees of attachment in all three data sets. The distribution of attachment strength across different levels and forms of attachment is rather even. For example, there are people with different degrees of attachment strength in all three form categories, although there is a tendency towards slightly stronger average degrees of strength among the respondents with multiple rather than nested attachments.⁴⁵

⁴⁴ Comparison of the data sets indicates roughly similar percentages of people selecting 5–7 (“fairly attached”) and 8–10 (“very attached”).

⁴⁵ Theoretically, an exclusively attached person can only have fairly strong or very strong attachments, since only one level would be considered. However, since a person might feel attached, for example, to both her town and her region, and still be considered to have an exclusive attachment (i.e., to the sub-national level), a few exclusively attached people have mixed fairly and very strong attachments.

There are only small differences between groups of people concerning their degrees of strength of attachment, but there are still some discernable tendencies. Men and younger people are somewhat more likely to be fairly attached than others are. More highly educated, more right-leaning, and middle-aged people are slightly overrepresented in the mixed category, whereas women, less-educated people, and older age groups are somewhat overrepresented among the very attached. The differences are small, but these background factors must obviously be controlled for in the ensuing analyses.

Territorial *level*, attachment *form*, and attachment *strength* thus each provide necessary input to forming an understanding of the concept of multi-level territorial attachments. Apart from analysing these elements separately, I also need to include all three dimensions in the ensuing analyses.⁴⁶

Combination of all three dimensions of attachment

Investigating each of the dimensions – i.e., *level*, *form*, and *strength* – separately is essential for the ensuing analyses, to explore the impact each might have on political trust and welfare attitudes. However, the three dimensions are also parts of the same broad concept of multi-level territorial attachments, so I must be able to combine the dimensions in a theoretically (and empirically) valid manner.

Returning to Lawler's idea of two different rules concerning which level a person can be expected to feel attached to, the proximal rule leads to the expectation that attachment will be strongest to the lowest level, for example, one's home town, becoming gradually weaker the further away the level (Lawler 1992). This is also described by Bruter (2005) as the concentric theory of political identities.

On the other hand, the distal rule would lead us to expect stronger attachment to the political level(s) that have the resources and power to provide for a citizen's well-being. Hence, individuals can generally be expected to feel most strongly attached to the national level. This corresponds to the argument that the construction of national welfare institutions contributes to the development of national identity, even in such divided countries as the United Kingdom (McEwen & Moreno 2005).⁴⁷ There are also the two different purposes of any identity claim: differen-

⁴⁶ The most immediate solution that springs to mind is to include all three dimensions at the same time in the regression analyses, but that is not possible for statistical reasons.

⁴⁷ The importance of different levels in this respect varies among countries according to their type of welfare system and whether they are federal or unitary states, an important aspect I will address in Chapter 5.

tiation and inclusion (Calhoun 1994). Depending on whether attachment to the level in question helps people differentiate themselves from others, or contributes to a sense of belonging to a community of equals, the strength of attachment can vary.

Therefore, I argue that evaluating the territorial level or levels to which a person feels most strongly attached is a satisfactory approach to simultaneously capturing important features of all three dimensions of attachment. It clearly includes the first theoretical dimension, *level*, since I will take into account exactly which territorial level(s) the strongest attachment is directed towards, for each individual.

Measuring the strongest attachment obviously also concerns *strength* of attachment, since the categorization is determined by the attachment strength each person has indicated for each level. Finally, the *form* of attachment dimension is also included, since the original survey questions allow people to indicate the same strength of attachment to more than one level. I can thus distinguish between people whose strongest attachment concerns one, two, or three levels, capturing the main essence of the concept of form, i.e., an exclusive, multiple, or nested form of attachment. The difference from the original *form* dimension is that according to this classification, form only concerns the strongest degree of attachment an individual has indicated, not whether a person feels attached to more than one level.

To investigate this combined measure empirically, I must first classify individuals according to the level or levels to which they have the strongest attachment. I use the coding of the different categories earlier devised for each of the three dimensions, analysing the data to determine who belongs in each category of theoretically possible combinations of levels (regardless of the attachment strength).⁴⁸

Hence, I have arrived at the following categories of the strongest level or levels of attachment (see table 2.8): *unattached*, *primarily sub-national*, *all domestic* (equally strongly attached to the sub-national and national levels), *primarily national*, *supra-national etc.* (strongest attachment to the supra-national level, and occasionally to one other level as well), and finally *all levels equal* (the same strong degree of attachment to *all* levels).

⁴⁸ For both theoretical and practical reasons (i.e., insufficient number of respondents), some of these categories are merged, in accordance with the results of the earlier factor analyses. These analyses indicated that there were two main factors structuring the answers to these questions, namely, domestic and supra-national factors, with national attachment loading on both of them.

Table 2.8 Combined dimensions of attachment in Sweden and EU25, 2004 (per cent, weighted per cent)

<i>Combined dimensions</i>	Sweden 2004	Sweden 2004	EU25 2004
<i>Strongest attachment:</i>	National SOM survey	EUP election study	Eurobarometer
Unattached	4	1	2
Primarily sub-national	7	6	10
All domestic	29	46	34
Primarily national	37	32	17
Supra-national etc.	11	7	10
All levels equal	12	8	29
Sum, per cent	100	100	100
Total N	1689	1329	29 344

Comment: Source: The Swedish National SOM survey, 2004, and the Eurobarometer 62.0, autumn 2004. For information regarding these questions, see Tables 2.1 and 2.2. The numbers indicate the proportions of people with the highest degree of attachment to each level or levels (or whether the degree of attachment is equally strong to more than one level). The Eurobarometer numbers are weighted according to the populations of the 25 EU member states.

In all three data sets, it is most common for people to belong to either the *all domestic* (in the Swedish EUP and the Eurobarometer) or *primarily national* (the Swedish SOM) categories. This clearly signals that the possibility of people having attachments to territorial levels below and above the national level has not contributed to the dominance of the strongest attachment to any other level than the national.⁴⁹ This finding is clearer in the Swedish data, which is reasonable given Sweden's unitary status and recent membership in the EU.

In the Eurobarometer data, in comparison, it is noticeable that those having equally strong attachments to all levels comprise the second largest group. More people are on average strongly attached to Europe. Still, this situation does not challenge the states in any major way, since it is the *all levels equal* group that dominates, not the *supra-national etc.* group (in which attachment to any domestic level is rare).

A glance at the background variation reveals no large overall differences between various social groups. However, a few small tendencies are worth mentioning, for example, that people whose sub-national attachment is the strongest tend to be younger than other respondents. A combination of sub-national and national attachment is slightly more common among women and people with less education. Having national attachment as the strongest attachment is somewhat more common among the more highly educated and the middle aged. Men and younger people are slightly overrepresented among those who have their strongest attachment to the supra-national level (and sometimes

⁴⁹ This is partly a consequence of using five as the breakpoint on the attachment scales; however, if six were instead used as the breakpoint, the main pattern would stay the same and the overall results presented in subsequent chapters would not change.

one other level). In contrast, the only significant pattern among those who feel equally strongly attached to all levels seems to be a minor overrepresentation of men, apart from people born or raised in another European country. None of these variations is large enough to prompt worries that my categories may actually be capturing other background phenomena, but I will nevertheless control for such factors in the ensuing analyses.

Summing up and concluding discussion

I started this chapter by raising the concern that increasing attachments to other territorial levels than the state could be seen as a challenge to the role and position of the state and to European integration. I called this factor the *challenge of territorial attachments*, but I also pointed out that for it to be a real challenge to the state or to European integration, increased attachments to other territorial levels would have to lead to a *decrease* in national attachments. The theoretical views on this matter have been diverse, which I argue is a consequence of the variety of definitions of the term “identity” and of the multi-dimensionality of the concept of multi-level territorial attachments. The lack of developed theoretical assumptions and empirical analyses concerning individuals’ attachments to all the levels in society has called for a partly explorative approach. I have built on related social and psychological theories to elaborate my concept of multi-level territorial attachments with its three dimensions (*level, form, and strength* of attachment). Moreover, I have conducted some empirical analyses of Swedish and European data to investigate the relevance and usefulness of this concept and its dimensions.

In my definition, the overall concept of multi-level territorial attachments is more specific than the term “identity”, but at the same time broader than national or European pride, and distinct from support for European integration. The concept is also individual and territorial, including a range of territorial levels from local to supra-national.

I have argued that the concept has three relevant dimensions. The first dimension is the *territorial level or levels* to which a person is attached, i.e., the sub-national (local and regional), national, and supra-national levels (Europe/EU). There are various theoretical views as to whether people can feel attached to more than one level, but according to my analyses of the Swedish and the Eurobarometer data, most people do have attachments to more than one level. People are most commonly attached to the national level, a level to which over 90 per cent of re-

spondents were attached. Therefore, there did not seem to be any lack of national attachment stemming from the other territorial attachments, as had been feared. At least this was the case when merely the presence or absence of the attachment was measured without considering the *strength* of the attachment. The figures have remained stable over at least the last ten years.

The second dimension is the *form* of territorial attachment. Compared to the dimension level, this dimension can be divided into categories that are mutually exclusive. Apart from the group of completely unattached people, these categories are: individuals with *exclusive* attachment to only one territorial level (no matter what level), individuals considered to have a *multiple* form of attachment, and individuals with *nested* attachments (i.e., they feel attached to all territorial levels). The empirical analyses demonstrate that few people are either completely unattached or have an exclusive form of attachment and that the largest group of people have nested attachments. Since people with both multiple and nested attachments are attached to more than one level, an overwhelming majority of people can be said to have multi-level territorial attachments. Before making any statements about any possible challenge to the state, however, there is the third dimension to consider.

The third dimension, the *strength* of territorial attachment, can be described as *fairly strong*, *mixed*, or *very strong*. This division into mutually exclusive categories allows us to compare the data sets and to create a measure of strength that is independent of the other two dimensions. The group of people having a mixture of fairly and very strong attachments is the largest, and the different degrees of strength are relatively evenly distributed between the forms and levels of attachment. These results indicate that there is no overall tendency for the strength of attachment to be stronger for people with an exclusive form of attachment, for example, or for attachment to a certain level; the variation between individuals, moreover, is large.

Each of these dimensions considered separately contributes to a better understanding of multi-level territorial attachments, but the ensuing analyses will also benefit from analysing their *combined* influence as well. I argued that categorizing individuals according to the level or levels to which they have *the strongest attachment* was able to capture important features of all three dimensions. The following mutually exclusive categories of the strongest level of attachment were constructed for both theoretical and empirical reasons: *unattached*, *primarily sub-national*, *all domestic*, *primarily national*, *supra-national etc.*, and *all levels equal*. The largest groups are the *all domestic*, *primarily*

national, and, in the European data, *all levels equal*. Moreover, these are the categories that include people for whom the national level is among the levels to which they feel the strongest attachment. Hence, I conclude that although these analyses demonstrate that most people have some form of multi-level territorial attachment, this is not necessarily a threat to the state or to the continuation of European integration, since national attachments remain very strong for most people.

On the other hand, the challenge to the state or to European integration might not lie so much in the *strength* of the attachment as such, but rather in the possible impact multi-level territorial attachments may have on political trust and welfare attitudes, which will be the focus of the following chapters.

Chapter 3

Multi-level Territorial Attachments and Political Trust

One of the main themes of this study is how the preconditions for political stability might be affected by ongoing social change in Europe. In line with the system-building tradition (Bartolini 2005; Ferrera 2005; Rokkan 1999), this can be described as an interest in how European integration and the whole of Europe as a multi-level system can handle the developmental shift from a “nation-building process” to a stable “mass democracy”. Shifting the focus from the system level to individuals, I have chosen to investigate this matter as how people’s multi-level territorial attachments influence their trust in political institutions and politicians at various territorial levels. This will help me to explore what I call the *challenge of political trust*.

I argue that there are three ways in which individuals’ territorial attachments could theoretically challenge the state, by giving rise to declining political trust. The first would be if national attachments influenced trust in national institutions and politicians, and the number of people with such national attachments were to diminish. However, the previous chapter demonstrated that a huge majority (over 90 per cent) of respondents had a national attachment, so this situation is of less concern. The second would be if national attachments had no effect on national political trust. In this scenario, any challenges to the state would have other sources than territorial attachments. The third would be, if national attachments indeed had an impact on national political trust, how the combinations of people’s different territorial attachments would lead to *greater* trust in *other* political levels; the challenge to the state would thus be in the form of *lower* political trust in *national* institutions and actors. For the European integration process, it could also be seen as a challenge if European attachments had no influence on trust in European institutions; however, it could also challenge the European multi-level system if such a relationship existed, but at the expense of national political trust. These challenges capture the essence of this chapter: the question of whether there is a relationship between

multi-level territorial attachments and political trust, and if so, how different aspects of attachment and trust are related.

That individuals' territorial attachments are important for a political system to be perceived as legitimate, or even to survive, is a common idea not only in the system-building tradition, but also in democratic theory and political support research (See e.g. Dahl 1989; Easton 1965; Offe 2000; Rokkan 1999; Scharpf 1999, 2000). Among the political elite at the regional and European levels, there also seems to be a strong belief in this relationship, i.e., that territorial attachments can have a positive effect on political legitimacy. There are several examples of leading politicians attempting to raise the level of citizen attachment to a sub-national region or to the EU, with the admitted purpose of trying to enhance political legitimacy (Batt & Wolczuk 2002).

This notion needs further theoretical development and empirical testing, for a number of reasons. First, there is an objection concerning the nature, or rather direction, of this relationship. There are disparate theoretical viewpoints concerning the direction of causality, whether it is territorial attachments that affect the degree of trust in political institutions, or whether it is trustworthy political institutions and politicians that give rise to the territorial attachments. Second, the theoretical approaches that do argue for a causal relationship in line with my expectations (i.e., that the direction of causality runs from territorial attachments to trust) still need to consider and develop the multi-level aspects of the relationship, i.e., how the different dimensions of multi-level territorial attachments may impact political trust. Third, more research is needed to explore empirically whether, and if so, how, multi-level territorial attachments are related to political trust at different levels.

After the following section about causality, this chapter will follow the same structure as that of the other substantive chapters: there will be a theoretical section discussing theoretical arguments relevant to the analyses, followed by an empirical section presenting and discussing the results of the analyses.

The question of causality

Many social phenomena are reciprocal over time (Hall 1997), and so, I argue, is the connection between territorial attachments and political trust. The fact that there are disparate theoretical views on the direction of causality in this case could well reflect the existence of such reciprocity over time. Paasi (1986) describes how the territorial demarcation of, for example, a region is followed by the creation of regional conscious-

ness among its inhabitants via common symbols, which entails the development of common institutions, which in turn crystallize regional identity. Once the identity exists, it is thought to continue to support the political system and its institutions (Easton 1975). Depending on where along this reciprocal causal chain a researcher chooses to start, she or he can focus on the impact either of individuals' attachments or of political institutions. Not surprisingly, in this field of study there are many differing theoretical approaches to the causality operative in this case, most of them elaborating on various aspects of Rokkan's work (Rokkan 1974, 1987, 1999). In one approach, the emphasis is on the political institutions in a society and how they affect social norms, such as territorial attachments (McEwen & Moreno 2005); these norms can in turn affect the degrees of trust people have in these political institutions, and thus their territorial attachments. According to another approach, it is the territorial attachments that lead to the creation of certain political institutions; once these institutions are established, they in turn continue to reinforce the feelings of attachment (Ferrera 2005; Paasi 1986), and thereby the trust, and so on. Admittedly, these are simplistic descriptions of theoretically reciprocal causal chains, ignoring other known explanatory factors. However, the point is that, regardless of the theoretical approach or causal view, there is a common denominator in the expectation of a relationship between territorial attachment and political trust.

These contrasting views on the direction of causality can also be illustrated by the various interpretations of Marshall's (1992) three components of citizenship (i.e., civil, political, and social). Some believe them to represent developmental stages (Ferrera 2005; Offe 2000). Others see them merely as three separate dimensions of the concept of citizenship that might evolve in different sequences depending on the country or system, with no causality between them (Bulmer & Rees 1996).

Why then would I argue that analysing the impact of territorial attachments on political trust is the approach most relevant to this study? There are two reasons. First, debate about causality tends to focus on the aggregated, or macro, levels, i.e., how institutions may affect the population at large, or how the aggregated or dominant feelings in a society may affect the construction of certain political institutions. There is also a tendency for the main debate to concern itself with origins (e.g., why a certain institutional setting exists or why a certain identity dominates an area), rather than with current relationships. However, neither of these aspects is relevant to my study; it is not the

influence on the creation of institutions that matters per se, but rather how much individuals tend to trust existing institutions.

Second, since my aim is not to explain why individuals have certain territorial attachments, but to investigate the *effects* of those attachments, it is logical for me to begin with the attachments people have, regardless of why these attachments exist. Moreover, some theories of individual political trust highlight the impact of emotional factors, which I will discuss shortly. The completely reversed causality, i.e., that individuals' degree of trust in institutions or politicians affects their territorial attachments, is much less plausible (cf. Easton 1965).

Apart from these two arguments, a practical consideration concerns the explanatory approach of this study, which involves the theoretical elaboration of plausible expectations, new ways of measuring multi-level territorial attachments, and analysing the possible consequences of these attachments. The analyses are cross-sectional, being conducted on data from one point in time; the analysis can be more detailed in the case of Sweden, and be done cross-nationally in the other EU countries, but the data do not allow me properly to test for the direction of causality.⁵⁰

THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON TERRITORIAL ATTACHMENTS AND POLITICAL TRUST

The theoretical arguments as to why it is relevant to investigate whether there is a connection between individuals' multi-level territorial attachments and political trust can, I believe, be found in one of the three main groups of theoretical explanations of political trust. I call it the group of *cultural theories*. This group includes a variety of cultural or affective explanations of political trust, invoking concepts such as social capital, group identification, and attachment to the community (Almond & Verba 1963; Dalton 2004; Inglehart & Welzel 2005; Offe 2000; Putnam, et al. 1993; Scharpf 1999). The other two main groups of explanations of political trust are *institutional performance theories*

⁵⁰ A proper test for causality would need data over time, preferably from panel studies. Instead, the first step in the present study was to determine whether the expected relationships could be found at the individual level at all, and when controlling for other relevant control variables. The more detailed analysis of how much of an existing relationship can be explained by either causal direction is a possible task for future research.

and *procedural fairness or input theories*,⁵¹ to which I will return later when selecting control variables.

In these three categories of explanations of political trust, important distinctions can be made between macro and micro variants. Macro theories emphasize that political trust is a collective or group property, shared by most members of a society, and thus focus on macro explanations. Micro theories hold that political trust varies according to individual beliefs, backgrounds, and experiences. Since I am interested in the effect of individuals' multi-level territorial attachments, it is the micro versions of these theories that are most relevant to this chapter. However, I will return to the macro versions of all three groups of explanations in Chapter 5, where I discuss and analyse institutional contexts as mediating factors.

How multi-level territorial attachments matter to political trust

The micro variants of cultural theories provide some arguments as to how multi-level territorial attachments are supposed to matter to individuals' political trust. These theories highlight the difference between individuals' feelings: not everyone in a society is expected to feel the same cultural bond, or territorial attachment, due to variations in individual socialization and life experiences. The lack of theoretical development regarding the importance of multi-level territorial attachments makes it valuable to use arguments from closely related theories to elaborate how multi-level territorial attachments matter to political trust.

One such closely related theory is Robert Putnam's theory of the importance of social capital, which has been much criticized.⁵² Nevertheless, there are some interesting conceptual connections, as well as differences, between the social capital theory and the concept of multi-level territorial attachments, useful for developing my arguments. Although investigations of social capital tend to focus on the amount of interpersonal trust, instead of on territorial attachments, the similarities lie in the emphasis on what tends to "glue" people together in a society. Trust in one's fellow citizens is supposed to help make political institu-

⁵¹ In the literature on European legitimacy, three similar broad categories are sometimes referred to as three different strategies for remedying the so-called legitimacy deficit of the EU (Eriksen & Fossum 2002), or as a legitimacy "trilemma" (Höreth 2002; Scharpf 2000).

⁵² The theory about social capital has been criticized and empirical tests outside Italy of both the macro and micro versions tend to not support its premises (see e.g. Mishler & Rose 2001; Norén Bretzer 2005).

tions work, because such interpersonal trust “spills over” into political trust (Putnam, et al. 1993).

Unlike social capital, the notion of territorial attachments as a basis for political trust does not rely on interpersonal trust per se, but rather on an attachment that is territorially defined, and connected to the boundaries of the political system. In this respect, territorial attachment is a more abstract concept than interpersonal trust is, as it is “stripped of personal life experiences” (Duschesne & Frogner 1995). In comparison, interpersonal trust risks being both too narrow (in the sense of a person thinking about his or her closest friends and neighbours) or too wide (encompassing people in general regardless of country) to be able to capture the essence of what Offe (2000) describes as a “horizontal” phenomenon linking citizens to one another. Offe also discusses the importance of mutual trust and solidarity, but within a clear territorial frame, as a “we feeling” that includes more than just interpersonal trust. According to his view, set territorial borders function as reference points for the formation of a people. For the purposes of my study, one of Offe’s arguments is particularly important, namely, that these horizontal phenomena, the territorially restricted “we feelings”, are seen as “preconditions for the ‘vertical’ phenomenon of the establishment and continued existence of state authority” (Offe 2000:5). The theory of social capital focuses less attention on the importance of territorial *boundaries* than on the concept of multi-level territorial *attachments*. Moreover, I argue that the possibility of distinguishing between different levels in society helps my model better represent the theoretical thoughts of, for example, Offe, Ferrera, and Rokkan, than does social capital theory, especially in the case of the European multi-level system.

The idea that individuals’ territorial attachments can affect trust in political institutions and politicians has yet another theoretical basis in Easton’s concept of political support. He argued that, for any political system to be stable, its members needed a feeling of community (Easton 1965). One of his main contributions relevant to this study is the distinction between *diffuse* and *specific* support (Easton 1975). Diffuse support is emotional or affective, whereas specific support is more rational or utility based. Although both are parts of Easton’s full model of system support, this distinction roughly corresponds to the distinction between the cultural theories explaining political trust and the output theories I will discuss later in connection with the selection of control variables.

The Eastonian division between diffuse and specific support has been investigated empirically in several studies (Borre & Goul Andersen

1997; Dalton 2004; Norris 1999a), especially regarding individuals' support for European integration (Carey 2002; Gabel 1998a, 1998b; Hooghe & Marks 2004; McLaren 2004). The results vary. Sometimes the diffuse aspects (e.g., exclusive national identity) seem to be more important, whereas in other studies the specific aspects (e.g., self-interest) are found to dominate. The differences in research results often depend on the particular definitions or measures chosen. These studies differ from the analyses I will conduct in two ways. First and foremost, I define and measure multi-level territorial attachments in a particular manner. As presented in Chapter 2, the territorial attachments individuals have are emotional, can concern different territorial levels, and their form and strength can vary from one individual to another. In this chapter, it is also important to remember that attachment to Europe, for example, is not the same thing as supporting European integration or "liking the EU". Second, my study is unlike previous ones in that I use different dependent variables. The emphasis of previous studies has been on explaining support for European integration rather than trust in political institutions and politicians at different territorial levels.

Since the concept of multi-level territorial attachments differs somewhat from most other frames used in investigating individuals' identification, no previous empirical analyses measure the effects on trust in institutions and politicians in the same way as I do. However, there are studies of the impact of other measures of territorial identification, such as nationality, on political trust. Silver and Titma (1998), for example, have compared the importance of nationality, citizenship, and material well-being in explaining trust in new political institutions in Estonia, finding that nationality was the most important factor.

The conclusions of this overview are that, despite competing theoretical views of the causal relationship between territorial attachments and political trust, and despite some contradictory empirical results, there still is a sufficient theoretical foundation to justify a study exploring the effects of multi-level territorial attachments on political trust.⁵³ It should be stressed that this effort is seen as complementing other known explanations of political trust, rather than claiming that multi-level territorial attachments comprise the most important factor.

Following Offe (2000), I claim that what I call the horizontal principle leads to the expectation of finding the strongest connections between attachments and political trust at the same territorial levels. Ex-

⁵³ Theoretically, I will presuppose such a causal link, use statistical techniques where such a relationship is a prerequisite, and interpret the results in this manner; despite this process, I will not empirically *test* the causal order.

pressed differently, I argue that the dimension *territorial level of attachment* (sub-national, national, and supra-national) can be expected to have a positive influence on political trust at the corresponding level.

The next dimension, *form* of attachment (exclusive, multiple, and nested), is also important. An exclusive form applies to a person who feels attached to only one level, regardless of which level it is, in which case the overall degree of trust can be expected to be on average lower than for people with multiple or nested forms of attachment. With a nested form, there is attachment to all levels, so the presence of trust in all levels is a logical expectation; the multiple form, in contrast, can be thought to be intermediate. Regarding the third dimension, *strength* (fairly, mixed, and very strongly attached), the strongest attachment could be expected to be connected to the most political trust.

What complicates these arguments is that each of the three dimensions is “pure”, i.e., uninfluenced by the other two. The benefits of this approach include the more thorough investigation of the impact of each of the dimensions, while the downside is the loss of possible combined effects. However, I am incorporating this combined-effect aspect by constructing the fourth multi-level territorial attachment variable, called the *strongest attachment*, which combines all three dimensions of attachment (see Chapter 2 for greater detail). The expected effects discussed above will be more noticeable using this independent variable.

Four specific questions will be presented to guide the empirical analyses; first, however, how the political trust concept is to be defined should be discussed, for the specific questions to make sense.

Political trust – in theory

Several concepts are used in theories and studies of what I here call political trust. Legitimacy, political support, and trust, for example, are common concepts in the field of political science. Some scholars use these concepts interchangeably, whereas others define trust, for example, as either something more specific (Mishler & Rose 2001) or something broader than political support (Hetherington 1998).

In the present study I use the concept of political trust; more specifically, I am interested in *trust in political institutions* and *trust in political actors*. They are theoretically the most interesting for this study, because they are the kinds of trust that can be expected to vary among people with different feelings of multi-level attachment. Earlier, I pointed out that political institutions have changed dramatically over recent decades in Europe, raising new questions about political trust.

Moreover, in comparison with definitions of the concept of political support (Almond & Verba 1963; Easton 1965, 1975; Norris 1999a), trust in institutions and actors can be considered merely one sort of *object*, towards which the political support could be directed.⁵⁴ Easton argued about the multi-dimensionality of the concept of political support, citing the difference between phenomena such as support for the values of a system and support for current political actors. He distinguished between support for three fundamental objects in the political system, namely, the *political community*, *political regime*, and *political authorities* (Easton 1965:165).⁵⁵ Combining these three objects into one broad concept of system support is probably one reason underlying the theoretical debate as to whether territorial attachment and political trust might be the same thing. Easton himself, however, despite merging these concepts to form a complete model of system support, pointed out that the different objects of support could vary independently of each other.⁵⁶

It is important for me to make sure that my dependent variable is as distinct as possible from multi-level territorial attachments, which further accounts for the focus on trust in political institutions and actors. Hence, my definition of political trust corresponds to the last of Easton's three objects, i.e., "support for the political authorities", because in his definition support for this object includes trust in both political institutions and political actors.⁵⁷ Norris et al. (1999a) and Dalton (2004), on the other hand, treat trust in institutions and in political actors as two distinct phenomena. They identify the possibility of a person distrusting members of parliament, while trusting parliament as such – or the other way around. Trust in institutions is seen by some as a more generalized form of support (Listhaug & Wiberg 1995), whereas trust in political actors could more easily be subject to short-term evaluation (Citrin 1974; Norris 1999a). On the other hand, political

⁵⁴ Objects of political support have been defined in different ways. Almond and Verba (1963), for example, distinguish between the system as a general object, input objects, output objects, and the self as object.

⁵⁵ This trisection has been further developed by several scholars (e.g. Dalton 2004; Norris 1999a, 1999b) into five different objects, or levels, of political support.

⁵⁶ These concerns can be compared to the earlier aspect of whether European attachment and support for EU integration were the same thing, which proved not to be the case.

⁵⁷ The other two objects, political support for the regime and for the community, are not parts of my definition of political trust. Support for the regime is usually measured as support for democracy, something that is not considered in this study. Support for the community is regarded as identical to my independent variable, i.e., multi-level territorial attachments. The similarity is both theoretical and indicated by the choices of measurements used in empirical research (Dalton 2004; Scheuer 1999).

actors could be considered more “human” or easier to relate to than fairly anonymous institutions (e.g., the European Commission). The trends in empirical research indicate a decline in trust in institutions, whereas the patterns are mixed concerning trust in political actors (Norris 1999a).

The third important aspect when defining political trust is to distinguish between different modes, or forms, of trust.⁵⁸ As mentioned previously, individuals can have both emotional and rational (or evaluative) feelings towards political objects, which Easton calls diffuse and specific support (Easton 1975). Several other researchers have drawn on Easton’s distinction when studying various aspects of political trust (e.g. Anderson & Tverdova 2003; Gabel 1998a; Hetherington 1998; Kumlin 2004). I argue that the focus on trust in political institutions and actors bears more resemblance to *diffuse* trust.⁵⁹ *Diffuse* trust refers to evaluations of what an object *is*, not what it does, and it concerns trust in institutions and positions as such, not the evaluation of incumbents. *Specific* trust, in contrast, is related to the evaluation of what political authorities do, how they do it, and the results achieved. The evaluation of institutional performance is not part of my dependent variable, but will be included in the analyses via control variables.

Finally, corresponding to the multi-level aspect of territorial attachments, a special feature of this chapter is that I am interested in “multi-level” political trust, or put differently, trust in institutions and political actors at several political levels. The increased importance of regional and EU institutions, makes it important to investigate whether all these institutions (and politicians) are trusted by the people they represent. In many countries there is an official, or elite, notion of at least three legitimate levels of government, i.e., regional, state, and supra-national (Carl 2003). From the previous chapter it is clear that most people have multi-level territorial attachments. Whether or not these territorial attachments correspond to trust in institutions and politicians at different political levels will be the focus of the empirical analyses presented in this chapter.

This aspect of the relationship between trust in different political levels in the same society also needs to be further developed. Easton ac-

⁵⁸ Almond and Verba (1963:16) distinguished between cognition, affect, and evaluation, whereas Easton (1975:436f) distinguished between *specific* and *diffuse* support.

⁵⁹ Norris et al. (1999) have chosen to define trust in institutions and political actors as being more specific forms of trust; however, I agree with Dalton (2004) concerning the interpretation that Easton’s distinction between specific and diffuse forms of trust can be extended to all *objects* of support.

knowledge that the society, or the “regime”, might constitute anything from a local community to the UN. His theoretical arguments can thus be applied to any political system, regardless of size; however, he left it open as to how to consider *simultaneous* trust in institutions and political actors at different political levels. In a system of multi-level governance, like the EU, all political levels interact, albeit not necessarily hierarchically (Hooghe & Marks 2001). Given the known range of attitudes towards the EU and given the varying degrees of legitimacy of new regions, it is likely that trust in institutions and politicians at different levels will vary from one individual to another. According to the horizontal principle, I extend the anticipated relationship between multi-level territorial attachments and political trust, and also expect to find higher degrees of trust in all levels among people with attachments to several levels. Another argument supporting this expectation is the earlier notion of there being no internal contradiction between trusted institutions and trusted politicians at each different level.

In sum, my definition of political trust refers to trust in political institutions and political actors, at all political levels in Europe, and I believe it is closer to the *diffuse* rather than the *evaluative* aspect of trust. According to the horizontal principle, the relationship between attachment and trust at a single political level can be expected to be positive, and stronger than relationships between non-corresponding levels. Hence, attachment to several levels can be expected to be related to trust in several levels. The notion that trust in political actors can be more easily affected by short-term evaluations also leads to the expectation that multi-level territorial attachments will have a generally lower impact on trust in political actors.

In the next section, I will present the variables used to measure political trust, and empirically describe the degrees of political trust found in both Sweden and the European Union.

Political trust – in Sweden and the EU

Trust in *political institutions* and *political actors* is usually empirically measured using straightforward questions in opinion surveys, concerning, for example, how much trust people have in certain institutions, or whether or not they tend to trust them. These questions are supposed to capture the more diffuse form of trust, rather than support for current incumbents or evaluations of current events.

In the Swedish SOM survey, 2004, several different questions measured trust in both institutions and political actors, at all political levels.

This provides the unique possibility of studying and comparing trust across political levels, as well as between institutions and actors. All the relevant questions are presented in Table 3.1.

When initially examining the frequencies from the Swedish sample, it is noticeable that the degrees of trust seem to be distributed relatively similarly among the different institutions and politicians; in other words, most people (approximately 40 per cent) choose the middle alternative: they have neither much nor little trust in the institution or actors in question.⁶⁰ Apart from this, the overall pattern is that the number of non-trusting people generally exceeds the number of trusting people, although the degree of this difference varies. There is no systematic overall difference between the degree of trust in institutions and in political actors either. The similarities make it easier to compare the possible impacts of multi-level territorial attachments on these two groups.

Table 3.1 Trust in political institutions and political actors at different political levels in Sweden (per cent)

Trust in:	Very much trust	Quite some trust	Neither much nor little trust	Quite little trust	Very little trust	Per cent	N
Institutions:							
Municipal executive boards in general	1	17	45	27	10	100	1665
Your municipal executive board	2	18	43	21	16	100	1600
Your regional executive board	2	10	45	24	19	100	1548
The national government	3	21	40	25	11	100	1683
The national parliament	3	22	44	22	9	100	1682
The European Commission	1	10	39	30	20	100	1671
The European Parliament	1	9	39	29	22	100	1670
Political actors:							
The political parties	1	11	45	29	14	100	1670
Swedish politicians in general	1	29	-	54	16	100	1714
Municipal politicians	1	18	40	26	15	100	1604
Regional/county politicians	1	10	39	27	23	100	1562
National politicians	2	22	43	21	12	100	1617
Members of parliament representing your constituency	2	15	52	21	10	100	1688
Swedish members of the European Parliament	1	15	45	24	15	100	1678

Comment: Source: the Swedish SOM survey, 2004. The degree of trust in all institutions and politicians above is measured using the five alternatives presented in the table, apart from trust in Swedish politicians where there were only four alternatives (no middle alternative).

Further scrutiny does reveal some smaller differences, though, concerning the different levels of the political system. The national political institutions (parliament and government) and national politicians are the most trusted; or, more correctly expressed, the least mistrusted.

⁶⁰ This is not merely a response effect of people giving the same responses, since the questions were asked in different places and contexts in the survey questionnaire.

Least trusted are, not surprisingly, the European Parliament and the European Commission, although Swedish members of the European Parliament are slightly less mistrusted than EU institutions are. I said not surprisingly, since Table 3.1 only refers to Sweden (with its well-known EU scepticism). In a Europe-wide setting, trust in EU institutions tends to exceed trust in national institutions, as can be seen in the Eurobarometer data in Table 3.2.⁶¹ The differences in trust in different levels could then be expected to be influenced by the varying territorial attachments, which will be analysed later in this chapter.

The fourteen available questions in the Swedish SOM data provide the opportunity to do separate analyses, as well as to divide the questions into different groups by constructing *indices*. Constructing trust indices is justified by the theoretical expectation of a relationship between territorial attachments and different forms of trust, such as: general trust in institutions, general trust in politicians, and trust in both institutions and politicians at the sub-national, national, and supra-national levels. Empirically, these items are also closely correlated, and indices have the advantage of improving the reliability of the measurement. These indices are thus useful in measuring trust in different ways, according to political level and type of object (i.e., institutions or actors).

The questions included in the *institutional trust index* are the ones under the heading “Institutions” in Table 3.1, and the index of *trust in political actors* includes the items in the lower half of the table.⁶² Combined in another way, according to political level, these items also constitute three level-specific indices, which measure trust in both institutions and actors at the *sub-national*, *national*, and *supra-national* levels.⁶³ These indices will be used as dependent variables in subsequent analyses.

⁶¹ Another interesting result from the Swedish frequency table is the lack of trust in one’s regional or county executive board, and in politicians. In Sweden, the counties are weak administrative regions mainly managing healthcare, and less powerful than most regions in Europe. The few newly created regions with more competences, which exist in some parts of the country, do not appear to have been able to enhance trust in institutions or politicians at the regional level.

⁶² The correlations between the variables included in the institutional trust index range between .34 and .73, and Chronbach’s alpha is .87; while the correlations between the variables in the political trust index range between .40 and .66 (Chronbach’s alpha = .89).

⁶³ All variables correlate enough to allow the construction of different indices, which is also supported by factor analyses indicating a one- or two-factor solution where there is a European dimension; however, these variables still load more strongly on the first factor (factor loadings between .65 and .78). Two items, the general trust in political parties and in politicians in general, are not included in the level-specific trust indices since they are not level specific.

In the *Eurobarometer 62.0*, 2004, the choice of items measuring trust in institutions and political actors is more limited than in the SOM survey, especially concerning trust in political actors.⁶⁴ Regarding different political levels, only questions about trust in institutions at the national or European levels are available in the questionnaire; no sub-national institutions are included, limiting the indices to the national and European levels.

The two data sets also differ in the response options available for the questions. In the Eurobarometer these options are “tend to trust”, “tend not to trust”, and “don’t know” for all questions. Thus, there is no middle alternative and there is no possibility of capturing variations in strength of trust, apart from the number of institutions trusted. One consequence of the lack of a middle alternative is the obvious high percentage of respondents answering “don’t know” when asked whether or not they tend to trust EU institutions (the “don’t know” responses are not included in the later analyses).

Table 3.2 Trust in national and European political institutions, in EU25, 2004 (weighted per cent)

Trust in:	Tend to trust	Tend not to trust	Don't know	Total per cent	N
Institutions:					
The national government	40	53	7	100	33 877
The national parliament	41	51	8	100	33 877
The Council of Ministers	46	24	30	100	33 877
The European Commission	54	22	24	100	33 877
The European Parliament	58	22	20	100	33 877

Comment: Source: Eurobarometer 62.0, autumn 2004. The questions about trust in European institutions are all part of a battery of items starting with the question, “Have you ever heard of [each institution]?”, followed by questions about how important each institution is in the life of the European Union, and finally by the question, “And for each of them, please tell me whether you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it?” Response options are “tend to trust”, “tend not to trust”, and “don’t know”. The questions about trust in national institutions are part of a battery of questions examining 16 other institutions (e.g., church, police, and media), which runs as follows: “Now, I would like to ask you about how much trust you have in certain institutions. For each of the following institutions, please tell me whether you tend to trust it, or tend not to trust it?”

Most people tend not to trust national political institutions. The overall tendency across the whole European Union is for there to be higher levels of trust in European than in national institutions, which, as noted above, is completely opposite to the trend in the Swedish data.

These figures represent the opinions and feelings of all citizens in all 25 EU countries. Thus, the degrees of trust in European and national institutions can be expected to vary significantly across countries, not

⁶⁴ Trust in political actors can only be measured as a matter of trust in political parties; hence, there is no general “trust in political actors” index, and this item cannot be included in the level-specific indices either, since it is not a level-specific kind of trust.

least according to paths of historical development, government structure, and time of joining the EU, matters to which I will return in Chapter 5. It is known that in countries with low levels of trust in national political institutions, trust in EU institutions is usually stronger (Schmitt & Thomassen 1999).

Due to the limitations of the relevant questions about trust in the Eurobarometer data, I have chosen to construct only three indices: one for general trust in all included institutions (both national and European), and two level-specific indices, one for trust in national level institutions and another for trust in supra-national level institutions.⁶⁵

Questions about multi-level territorial attachments and political trust

The general expectation arising from democratic theory and from theories of political trust is that territorial attachments should have a positive effect on political trust, an expectation that will shortly be explored empirically. This overall expectation has been discussed in terms of both the dimensions of attachment and the different definitions of political trust. Hence, it is time to summarize and connect these expectations in the form of specific questions. The explorative nature of this study means that rather than formally testing hypotheses, the analyses will be guided by four questions about the nature of the relationship between the dimensions of multi-level territorial attachments and trust in political institutions and actors.

1. The first question concerns the *level* dimension. I want to investigate whether particular territorial levels of attachment (sub-national, national, and supra-national) are related to trust in political institutions or politicians in general, as well as related to combined trust in various institutions and politicians at the sub-national, national, and supra-national levels. In addition, I want to analyse whether the relationships hold when controlling for other factors known to influence political trust (to be discussed below). The theoretical expectation arising from the horizontal principle is that attachment to a certain level should be positively, and more strongly, related to trust in institutions and politicians at the same level.

⁶⁵ The item measuring trust in political parties was excluded because it was not level specific, and because it was the least correlated with the remaining items. The correlation coefficients of the other items ranged from .27 to .76, with a Chronbach's alpha of .80. Factor analysis indicated a two-factor solution with both a national and a European dimension; however, the European trust items loaded slightly more strongly on the national factor (.66-.80).

2. The second question is whether the *form* of attachment dimension (exclusive, multiple, or nested) matters for political trust. Does the trust a person has in institutions and politicians in general differ between the sub-national, national, and supra-national levels, depending on the particular form of attachment? If so, will the difference prevail when controlling for control factors? I expect the exclusive group to be the least trusting, since they only feel attached to one level (and this could be any level), whereas the nested group is expected to be most trusting of institutions and politicians at all levels.

3. The third question is about the *strength* dimension. Are stronger territorial attachments connected with more trust in institutions and politicians in general or only at specific political levels, when controlling for other known factors? One expectation is that the stronger the attachment, the greater the political trust. On the other hand, since the strength of attachment is independent of form and level, very strong attachment could also be expected to be more common among people with exclusive forms of attachment, thus leading to less positive relationships with some of the trust indices. The uncertainty about what to expect also implies the need for the fourth question.

4. The final question is about the combination of all three dimensions, measured as the fourth independent variable, *strongest preference*. This variable represents the level or levels to which the respondents have the strongest attachment, thus capturing level, form, and strength at the same time. One expectation is that the group that feels most strongly attached to *all* levels will have on average more political trust. I also expect the horizontal principle to be more noticeable in the results when I combine the dimensions. To determine whether these explanations hold under control, I will include relevant control variables, selected from the alternative theoretical explanations of political trust.

Control variables

Both political trust and welfare attitudes (the latter to be treated in the next chapter) are well-established concepts in social science research, and knowledge of the factors influencing them is vast. My purpose is thus not to claim a dominant position for the concept of multi-level territorial attachments, but rather to emphasize that it can contribute to further knowledge, and explain how it fits with already established theoretical explanations. I will therefore discuss the main groups of theoretical explanations, as well as select control variables in accor-

dance with these explanations in the following analyses. The most important explanations of political trust are those theories related to *institutional performance* or *utility*, corresponding to Easton's notion of specific (or evaluative) support mentioned above (Easton 1975). Borre and Andersen (1997) state that when demands (normative beliefs concerning what governments should do) are met by policy output, political trust is supposed to increase. In the macro version, the institutional theories of political trust emphasize the importance of the aggregated output or institutional performance, such as economic development, avoiding corruption, and providing public service (Anderson & Tverdova 2003). Delivering what the public wants is supposed to increase the political trust in the government and other responsible political institutions (Miller 1974; Mishler & Rose 2001).

The micro variants of these performance or economic utility theories emphasize individuals' *evaluations* of institutional performance, and how these evaluations are conditioned by individual experiences. This is based on the idea of a relationship between a system fulfilling the demands of its citizens and reciprocal citizen support of the system (Easton 1965). Attention has mostly been paid to individuals' evaluations of economic performance. Huseby (2000), for example, has studied how individuals' evaluations of government economic performance in a variety of policy areas affect trust in political institutions. Personal welfare state experiences are also found to be important (Kumlin 2004). Individuals' utilitarian evaluations are also considered to be important to support for the European integration process (Gabel 1998a, 1998b; McLaren 2004). Given these theories and previous research findings, evaluations of institutional performance need to be controlled for when analysing how multi-level territorial attachments are related to political trust and socio-economic status. In the SOM study there are questions asking respondents to *evaluate whether or not economic conditions have improved* in their municipality of residence and in Sweden over the past year, and another two questions asking respondents to *evaluate the public service* offered in their municipality and region over the past year.⁶⁶

⁶⁶ Unfortunately, there is no good measure of EU institutional performance in the SOM study. One option is the indicator of how well one thinks the EU commission is performing, but it is theoretically and empirically too close to measuring *trust* in the EU commission. The only other option would be whether or not one supports Swedish EU membership, which is not regarded as capturing trust in EU institutions, since there are several reasons why a person may or may not favour EU membership.

The Eurobarometer contains fewer relevant control variables, but some indicators do capture some of the evaluative aspects, namely, whether or not one's country has *benefited from being a member of the EU*, whether the *EU is perceived to play a positive or negative role* regarding economic conditions in one's country, and whether it is perceived as a *generally good or bad thing that one's country is a member of the EU*. Socio-economic background questions will also be included in the analyses as control factors, especially gender, age, and education.

The third broad group of explanations of political trust emphasize the procedures, i.e., the *formal rules and fair political institutions*, and how these procedures and institutions affect human behaviour or attitudes (Hall & Taylor 1996; March & Olsen 1989). If the decision-making structure of a political institution is open and fair, people are supposed to trust it (Rothstein 1998).

The micro versions of these theories focus on how different individuals *perceive* the institutions and their rules and norms. Individuals who perceive the institutions and decision-making procedures as fair are assumed to be supportive of them (Tyler 2000). Another micro theory concerns the extent to which people feel their opinions are represented by the political elite. This is not a purely ideological explanation, but rather one that applies when the "policy issue distance" is great. According to it, people who hold opinions opposed to those of the elite tend to be more distrusting of political institutions and actors (Borre & Goul Andersen 1997; Holmberg 1999; Miller 1974). People supporting the party currently in power are assumed to have a higher degree of political trust than others. Hence, individuals' perceptions of their influence on the political system, or their issue representation, need to be included in the analyses as control variables.

In the Swedish SOM data, policy issue distance can be measured indirectly, using the question of whether one is a *partisan of the incumbent government party* as a proxy.⁶⁷ The Eurobarometer 62.0 contains no party preference question, but instead a question about one's perceived influence, i.e., whether one's *voice counts in the EU*. These variables will all be included as controls in the empirical analyses of the expected relationships between different dimensions of multi-level territorial attachments and political trust, to be presented next. Finally, social background variables, such as age, gender, and education will be in-

⁶⁷ Borre and Goul Andersen (1997) argue that especially in Scandinavian settings, with their long traditions of Social Democratic government, whether or not one is a Social Democrat partisan is a good proxy for policy distance.

cluded, since degrees of both trust and territorial attachment may vary between these groups.

ANALYSES OF MULTI-LEVEL TERRITORIAL ATTACHMENTS AND POLITICAL TRUST

Of the three challenges to multi-level systems, this chapter addresses the second, i.e., the relationship between multi-level territorial attachments and trust. I have argued that the challenge could be either that there is no such relationship, or – more likely given theory and previous research – that the overall relationship exists, but that the large number of people feeling attached to other territorial levels would lead to less trust in national institutions and politicians. The latter will be explored in the later analyses of the dimensions of multi-level territorial attachments, in accordance with the four chapter-specific questions.

As an introduction to the empirical results, it would be enlightening to consider whether the expected pattern exists at all, even before undertaking the dimensional or index categorizations, and before including any control variables. Hence, I will present correlation analyses of all the original Swedish items regarding territorial attachment to each political level, and all the original items of trust in institutions and politicians at all political levels. The results in Table 3.3 exhibit the clear pattern, indicated by the shaded figures, that attachment to a certain level tends to correlate positively, and most strongly, with trust in institutions and politicians at the same level. The only small exception is attachment to the regional or county level, which tends to correlate somewhat more highly with trust in municipal institutions and politicians. Since this is still a sub-national level, it does not change the overall expected pattern.⁶⁸ Attachment to the municipality correlates slightly more highly with trust in political institutions and politicians than does attachment to one's village, town, or part of municipality. This is logical, given that the organization of political institutions in Sweden follows municipal boundaries, i.e., larger geographical areas than towns or villages.

Another noticeable result is that people who feel more strongly attached to the EU and to Europe also tend to have stronger, or equally strong, trust in institutions and politicians at *all* levels than do other people – though the correlation with trust in European institutions is

⁶⁸ This is also reasonable in the Swedish context, due to the historically weak regional level described above and to the strong municipalities.

strongest. Not surprisingly, the correlation with trust in EU institutions is absolutely the strongest among those who feel attached to the EU. At first sight, this might indicate some support for the idea that attachment to a larger territorial area could “spill over” to lower levels. However, this theoretical notion was developed with respect to national levels, and as can be seen, attachment to the national level is only weakly correlated with trust in several other lower-level domestic institutions and in politicians.

Table 3.3 Correlations between attachments to different levels, and trust in political institutions and politicians, in Sweden (Pearson's r)

Trust in:	Attach- ment to town	Attachment to munici- pality	Attachment to county/ region	Attach- ment to Sweden	Attach- ment to the EU	Attach- ment to Europe
Institutions						
Municipal executive boards in general	.14*	.18*	.14*	.11*	.17*	.14*
Your municipal executive board	.16*	.21*	.16*	.06	.19*	.15*
Your regional/county executive board	.09*	.14*	.12*	.05	.16*	.14*
The national government	.10*	.13*	.11*	.12*	.18*	.14*
The national parliament	.10*	.14*	.11*	.11*	.25*	.19*
The European Commission	.04	.07*	.05	.03	.44*	.26*
The European Parliament	.03	.06	.05	.01	.45*	.25*
Political actors						
The political parties	.09*	.13*	.09*	.09*	.25*	.18*
Swedish politicians in general	.09*	.13*	.10*	.10*	.29*	.21*
Municipal politicians	.16*	.22*	.17*	.12*	.22*	.16*
Regional/county politicians	.11*	.14*	.15*	.09*	.22*	.16*
National politicians	.11*	.14*	.12*	.14*	.27*	.19*
MPs representing your constituency	.11*	.17*	.13*	.13*	.23*	.19*
Swedish MEPs	.09*	.12*	.10*	.11*	.33*	.22*

* Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (two tailed).

Comment: Source: the Swedish SOM study, 2004. The question about attachment is: “People may feel different degrees of attachment to different areas. How attached do you feel to [the above alternatives]?” The scale goes from 0 (not at all attached) to 10 (very attached). The trust items have response categories coded to range from 1 = very little trust to 5 = very much trust. Entries in the table are correlation coefficients (Pearson's r).

This pattern is not merely a Swedish phenomenon, because the Eurobarometer data display the same overall correlation patterns for all Europeans. A more probable explanation, to be further tested in the following sections, is that those people who feel attached to both the EU and to Europe might have multiple forms of attachments, and thus feel attached to several lower political levels as well. The horizontal principle is at least initially supported in both data sets, but with some interesting exceptions to be investigated in more detail in the following analyses, not least to determine whether the results hold when controlling for other relevant explanations.

Level of attachment and political trust

Above, I introduced four specific questions to guide the empirical analyses presented in this chapter. The first one focuses on the territorial *level* of attachment dimension (sub-national, national, and supra-national), and whether it has an impact on trust in political institutions or politicians in general, and on trust in institutions and politicians both at the same level (sub-national, national, and supra-national).

Five different trust indices were constructed from the Swedish SOM data (see earlier this chapter). The first measures *trust in all political institutions* regardless of level and the second *trust in all political actors* regardless of level. These two indices let us explore whether multi-level territorial attachments might have a different impact on trust in institutions than on trust in politicians. Such different impacts can be expected from the reasoning of, among others, Norris (1999a) and Dalton (2004), about political institutions and actors being different objects of support; in contrast, Easton (1965) considered institutions and political actors to be comparable.

The other three trust indices are level specific, consisting of all variables measuring trust in both institutions and politicians at the sub-national, national, and supra-national levels. They provide good prerequisite information with which to analyse the horizontal principle.

Table 3.4 presents different OLS regression analyses of the Swedish data, one column for each index.⁶⁹ Since my independent variables are categorical, all values are transformed into separate variables with a value of one if a person has the attachment, and zero if not. Concerning this dimension, however, the dummy variables are not mutually exclusive, because a person can have attachments to more than one level at the same time. The first group of rows displays the bivariate coefficients for each of the three attachment levels. Below are the estimates for the basic model when the effects of three different attachment levels are only controlled for each other, without using any control variables.

In the bivariate analyses, all attachment levels are positively related to all trust indices, apart from the sub-national attachment level; however, even when controlling for all attachment levels in the basic model, the results change. The most striking result is the significant effect of supra-

⁶⁹ Although regression analysis presupposes a casual relationship between the dependent and independent variables, I will not empirically be able to prove this causality. Instead, I argue that the theoretical arguments for this direction of causality are strong enough to justify such analyses.

national attachment; this effect is noticeable in all trust indices, regardless of object or level, although it is most apparent in the case of trust in supra-national politicians and institutions.

Table 3.4 Effect of level of attachment on trust in political institutions and politicians in Sweden, 2004 (unstandardized multivariate OLS estimates)

	Political trust indices				
	The institutional index	The political actor index	The sub-national index	The national index	The supra-national index
Bivariate analyses					
Sub-national attachment (1–0)	.13**	.23***	.23***	.22***	.08
National attachment (1–0)	.16**	.35***	.17*	.38***	.18**
Supra-national attachment (1–0)	.29***	.30***	.24***	.29***	.41***
Basic model					
Sub-national attachment (1–0)	.14**	.14**	.24***	.13**	.03
National attachment (1–0)	-.11	.12	-.12	.16*	-.08
Supra-national attachment (1–0)	.33***	.28***	.24***	.27***	.46***
Full model including control variables					
Sub-national attachment (1–0)	.13**	.11*	.23***	.10	.00
National attachment (1–0)	-.13	.14	-.07	.15*	-.02
Supra-national attachment (1–0)	.31***	.27***	.22***	.26***	.46***
Support government party (1–0)	.35***	.31***	.32***	.48***	.17***
<i>Economy & service evaluation of last year (base = got worse)</i>					
Municipality economy same	.19***	.10**	.29***	.06	.10
Municipality economy improved	.25**	-.00	.20	.00	.19
Swedish economy same	.08*	.15***	.00	.21***	.18***
Swedish economy improved	.22***	.23***	.14*	.31***	.27***
Municipality service same	.17***	.16**	.25***	.13**	.15**
Municipality service improved	.07	.15	.16	.04	.28
Swedish public service same	.06	.05	.04	.08	.04
Swedish public service improved	.45***	.37**	.29	.41**	.46**
Male (female = 0)	-.06*	-.03	-.07*	-.02	-.10**
Age (in years, year 2004)	.00**	.00**	.00	.00**	.00**
<i>Education (base = low)</i>					
Medium low education	-.00	.04	-.08	.09	.05
Medium high education	.00	.04	-.11*	.05	.15**
High education	.14**	.17***	-.03	.27**	.24***
Constant	1.94***	1.63***	1.88***	1.75***	1.67***
Adjusted R^2 for large model	.22	.17	.18	.21	.13
N	1258	1278	1201	1339	1431

* $p < .10$ ** $p < .05$ *** $p < .01$

Comment: Source: the Swedish SOM study, 2004. The trust indices are coded 1–5, where 5 is the highest degree of trust (further described in the measurement section). The attachment variables are each coded 0–1, 1 indicating the existence of attachment. These are not dummy variables since a person can feel attached to more than one level.

Also noticeable is that the effect of national attachment disappears when controlling for the other attachment levels, and that national attachment has only a weak significant effect on the national trust in-

dex.⁷⁰ One has to remember that over 90 per cent of respondents have a national attachment, and that a person can feel attached to all levels at the same time. Hence, the additional attachments become more important. In comparison, sub-national attachment has a somewhat higher effect, especially regarding trust in sub-national institutions and politicians (.24), in line with the horizontal principle.

When controlling for the other known explanatory factors, the effects of supra-national attachment clearly remain significant. This partly supports the horizontal principle, concerning the effect on the supra-national trust index, but it is interesting that supra-national attachment also remains the most important attachment for all other trust indices.⁷¹ Returning to the initial question of whether or not attachments to other territorial levels would contribute to diminishing state legitimacy, these results point in the opposite direction. It would seem that supra-national attachment is the most important factor, even for trust in national institutions and political actors. One must consider, however, that the level of attachment in this case is measured separately from the strength and form dimensions. Hence, I will return to this result further on.

Sub-national attachment has its strongest impact on the sub-national index, even under control, as expected from the horizontal principle and also to some extent from the institutional and the political actor indices. National attachments remain, having only a weak impact on the national trust index. These results indicate that there is more to the effect of multi-level territorial attachments, or more specifically, their territorial level dimension, than merely the horizontal principle. This justifies my ongoing scrutiny of the impact of the other attachment dimensions. It is not enough only to consider the importance of having or not having an attachment to a certain level; one must also simultaneously consider both the strength of such an attachment, and attachment to other territorial levels.

Another result is that the effects on the institutional and the political actor indices are almost identical, even when controlling for factors

⁷⁰ The same pattern emerges if the breakpoint for having or not having an attachment is shifted from five to six; doing so only marginally lowers the estimates of national attachment and marginally raises the estimates of sub-national attachment.

⁷¹ If a good measure of evaluation of EU institutional performance were available, it is possible that these effects could be found to be lower. As substitutes, I have included both evaluation of the EU commission (which is too close to trust) and general support for EU membership (which has too many different explanations) in the analyses. Both correlate strongly with the supra-national index, but the effect of supra-national attachments still remains significant, although decreases (to .25 and .31 respectively).

believed to be more influential on trust in political actors. So far, the results lend more support to Easton's idea that both institutions and actors belong to the same category, namely, that of political authorities. The fact that there are no relevant trust items regarding political actors in the Eurobarometer thus seems to pose less of a problem.

I should also comment on the fact that the coefficients are generally rather low. For example, concerning trust in all institutions, the difference between having or not having a supra-national attachment results in only a .31 increase on a 1–5 scale, when controlling for all other variables. For my purposes, however, it is mainly relevant that significant effects can be found at all, since I believe that the effects of multi-level territorial attachments complement other factors known to influence the degree of trust people have in political institutions and politicians. My contribution is thus to demonstrate that multi-level territorial attachments can also contribute to our understanding and hence should not be neglected, and to show how they can matter. Among the other factors, supporting the government party has a marked significant effect on most indices, as do the relevant evaluations of public service and economy. All in all, the results thus also lend support to the main alternative traditional explanations of political trust, especially the expected influence of the evaluations and perceived fairness of the institutions.

What can be concluded from the Swedish data thus far is that the *level of attachment* dimension affects both the general trust indices and specific levels. The results partly support the idea of a horizontal relationship, but most striking are the effects of having a supra-national attachment on all the trust indices. It is time to turn to the Eurobarometer results to see whether the same patterns will emerge.

The Eurobarometer data contain trust indices for only the *national* and *supra-national* levels, and for *trusting all the institutions*. The values of these three indices correspond to the number of institutions a person trusts, ranging from zero to five (the institutional index), two (the national index), and three (the supra-national index). Because of this, the regression analyses used for the Eurobarometer data are not the same as in the Swedish SOM data, but rather are ordered logistic regression analyses. This regression technique is used when the dependent variable is categorical, but has more than two values, values that can be ordered in relation to one another (Long 1997).

In an ordered logistic regression, the coefficients cannot be interpreted in the same direct way as in an OLS regression, so a common option is to calculate predicted probabilities (ranging from 0 to 1) (Hoffmann

2004; Long & Freese 2003).⁷² In this case it is the predicted probability of the highest value, i.e., of trusting all institutions included in each trust index, that is reported in the lower part of the table. In this way it is possible to compare the probabilities of trusting all the institutions, between respondents who do and do not have a certain attachment (e.g., sub-national attachment).

In Table 3.5 the same general pattern of supra-national attachment having the strongest significant effect appears in the European data as well. For example, the predicted probability of trusting all three supra-national institutions is .46 for a person without a supra-national attachment and .66 for a person with such an attachment, when the control variables are at their means.⁷³ The exception to the pattern is the national trust index, where national attachment seems to be more strongly influential, and thus more in line with the horizontal principle. This is supported by the fact that the predicted probability of having the highest value of the national trust index, i.e., trusting both national institutions, rises from .20 for people not attached to the national level, to .33 for people attached to the national level. This is a slightly larger change than that predicted for people without (.29) and with a supra-national attachment (.34). The sub-national attachment could not be analysed in the same manner, since the Eurobarometer contains no questions concerning trust in regional and local institutions.

The Eurobarometer results support the horizontal principle, at least concerning national and supra-national attachments. I also find the same pattern of supra-national attachments influencing all indices as in the Swedish data, although it is less obvious.⁷⁴

⁷² Due to the problems of interpreting the coefficients, the bivariate ones are not displayed in the table, and only the estimates of the basic model, made under controlled conditions, are shown.

⁷³ The predicted probabilities are dependent on the values of all other variables included in the analyses: if any single variable changes, the probabilities will change too. It is thus possible to calculate predicted probabilities for any type of person, for example, a less-educated man who is negative towards the EU, or a young woman of high education. Notably, the same tendencies remain even when we change some of the other variables.

⁷⁴ National attachment appears more important for national trust according to the Eurobarometer than the Swedish data, a difference that cannot be caused by more variation in the independent variable, since the Eurobarometer also indicates a 94 per cent national attachment; according to the Eurobarometer, however, fewer people trust national political institutions, and more people trust EU institutions.

Table 3.5 Effect of level of attachment on trust in political institutions and politicians in EU25, 2004 (ordered logistic regression coefficients and predicted probabilities)

<i>Trust indices:</i>	The institutional trust index		The national trust index		The supra-national index	
	Basic	Control	Basic	Control	Basic	Control
<i>Model</i>						
<i>Level of attachment:</i>						
Sub-national attachment (0–1)	.15**	.26***	.11**	.18***	.18**	.28***
National attachment (0–1)	.34***	.50***	.48***	.70***	.12**	.24***
Supra-national attachment (0–1)	1.47***	.72***	.63***	.25***	1.62***	.81***
Country benefits from EU membership (0–1)		.77***		.44***		.72***
<i>Country's EU membership (base = a bad thing)</i>						
Membership is neither a good or bad thing		.74***		.30***		.83***
Membership in the EU is a good thing		1.36***		.72***		1.49***
<i>EU effect on country's economy (base = negative)</i>						
EU neither pos. nor neg. for my country's economy		.28***		.09*		.35***
EU is positive for my country's economy		.68***		.38***		.80***
My voice counts in the EU (0–1)		.95***		.63***		1.02***
Male (female = 0)		-.04		.03		-.13***
Age (in years)		.00***		.00***		.00**
<i>Education (base = stopped before 16 yrs)</i>						
Education stopped at 16–19 years		.01		-.10**		.09*
Education stopped at 20+ years		.19***		.10**		.13**
Still studying		.27***		.31**		.13
Pseudo R^2	.04	.15	.02	.11	.07	.21
N	16176	13611	22213	17205	17319	14358
<i>Probability of trusting all institutions in the indices, depending on level of attachment:</i>						
	Sub-national attachment		National attachment		Supra-national attachment	
	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
P(trusting all the institutions)	.17	.22	.14	.22	.14	.25
P(trusting the two national institutions)	.29	.33	.20	.33	.29	.34
P(trusting the three supra-national institutions)	.54	.60	.54	.60	.46	.66

* $p < .10$ ** $p < .05$ *** $p < .01$

Comment: Source: Eurobarometer 62.0, autumn 2004. The trust indexes are formed by adding together trust variables (tend not to trust = 0 and tend to trust = 1). *The institutional index* ranges from 0 (tend to trust no institution) to 5 (tend to trust all institutions in the index). *The national index* ranges from 0 (tend to trust no institution) to 2 (tend to trust both institutions in the index). *The supra-national index* ranges from 0 (tend to trust no institution) to 3 (tend to trust all three institutions in the index). The attachment items are coded 1 (have such attachment) and 0 (do not have such attachment) and are not mutually independent, since people can be attached to more than one level. All coefficients are weighted according to the national populations in EU25. Dummies for all countries but one (Slovenia) have been included in the analyses, but are not presented in the table. The predicted probabilities are calculated when all other variables are at their means (including the control variables). Only the extreme values of the predicted probabilities (of trusting all included institutions) are presented in the table.

The general answer to question one is that the level of attachment dimension has significant effects in both the Swedish and the European data, even when controlling for other known explanations. I find support for the anticipated horizontal principle at all levels. Moreover, people with supra-national attachments tend to trust both institutions and politicians at *all* levels as much as or more than other respondents.

As well, so far there is no evidence that the effects on trust in institutions differ from the effects on trust in political actors.

Form of attachment and political trust

The dimension *form* of attachment (exclusive, multiple, and nested) is the focal point of the second chapter-specific question. It is the dimension that most clearly captures the variety of combinations of attachments to different political levels among the individuals in the sample. Theoretically, the variation in this dimension consists of the *unattached* (i.e., not attached to any level), people with *exclusive* attachments (i.e., attached to any single level), people with *multiple* attachments (i.e., attached to two levels), and finally people with *nested* attachments (i.e., attached to all levels in the polity).

In Table 3.6, the results are structured as previously. The top group of rows displays the bivariate effects of each of the dummy variables, followed by the basic model in which these variables are analysed controlling for each other. The results of analyses including control variables are presented at the bottom of the table (although the control variables are suppressed). One difference from the *level* dimension is that here all the categories are mutually exclusive, i.e., a person can be attached to only one of the categories. The unattached group is the base category, excluded from the multiple regressions, and all effects should be interpreted in relation to people who are unattached.

All forms of attachment have a bivariate effect on all trust indices, apart from the unattached group; however, when the different forms of attachment are controlled for each other, the pattern changes dramatically. The obvious finding from a multi-level territorial attachment perspective is that having a nested form of attachment has a significant impact on all the trust indices, which also holds when controlling for the other variables in the analyses (however, the control variables are suppressed in the full model, because their values are almost identical to those in Table 3.4). This explains why those described as having a supra-national attachment in the previous section tended to trust institutions and politicians at all levels. Since the *level* dimension is not mutually exclusive between the categories, anyone with a supra-national attachment could also be attached to both of the other two levels. Many of the people with a supra-national attachment have a nested form of attachment; this result is clearly in line with the theoretical expectation that people with nested attachment trust all levels and objects.

Table 3.6 Effect of form of attachment on trust in political institutions and politicians in Sweden, 2004 (unstandardized multivariate OLS estimates)

	The trust indices				
	The institutional index	The political actor index	The sub-national index	The national index	The supra-national index
Bivariate analyses					
Unattached	.16	-.34***	-.20*	-.33***	-.20*
Exclusive form of attachment (1–0)	.35***	-.27***	-.28***	-.30***	-.33***
Multiple form of attachment (1–0)	.24***	-.27***	-.23***	-.25***	-.32***
Nested form of attachment (1–0)	.30***	.34***	.28***	.33***	.38***
Basic Model					
<i>Form</i> (base = unattached)					
Exclusive form of attachment (1–0)	.14	.08	-.05	.06	-.09
Multiple form of attachment (1–0)	.02	.14	.04	.16	-.01
Nested form of attachment (1–0)	.30**	.45***	.31***	.46***	.35***
Full model including control variables					
<i>Form</i> (base = unattached)					
Exclusive form of attachment (1–0)	.17	.01	-.07	.04	-.22
Multiple form of attachment (1–0)	.03	.10	.07	.15	-.05
Nested form of attachment (1–0)	.23**	.39***	.31**	.42***	.31**
<i>[control variables suppressed]</i>					
Constant	2.01***	1.77***	1.95***	1.85***	1.80***
Adjusted R^2	.21	.18	.18	.21	.12
N	1258	1278	1201	1339	1413

* $p < .10$ ** $p < .05$ *** $p < .01$

Comment: Source: the Swedish SOM study, 2004. The trust indexes are coded 1–5, where 5 is the highest degree of trust (further described in the measurement section). The attachment variables are dummies, coded 0–1. Unattached people make up the base category, coded as not attached to any level; the exclusive form comprises people attached to only one level, the multiple form people attached to two levels, and the nested form people attached to all levels (sub-national, national, and supra-national). The control variables are the same as in Table 3.4, but not shown in this table due to their almost identical estimated values.

The results for the exclusive and multiple forms of attachment are not significant under control, and to some extent they even indicate a negative relationship with the trust indices (e.g., in the case of supra-national trust). The estimates for the control variables are almost the same as in Table 3.4, with support for government party and public service evaluations having the strongest effect. These insignificant results are not so surprising in the case of the exclusively attached people, since they were expected to be the least trusting. In fact, since the horizontal principle would lead us to expect that exclusively attached people would only trust one level, and that it could be any level for each individual, insignificant overall results are just what we would expect. The lack of effect of the multiple form of attachment is more surprising, since these people were thought to trust at least two levels. However, most multiply attached respondents tend to feel attached to the national and sub-national levels. We could thus have expected to find a connection be-

tween multiple attachment and, for example, the sub-national or national trust indices, though this is not the case in the Swedish data.

Let us turn to the Eurobarometer data and see whether the patterns are the same as in the Swedish data. After all, the overall trust levels were different between the data sets, the Swedes tending to trust national institutions more than EU institutions, and the opposite being true in all 25 EU member states. As in Table 3.5, the analyses were done using ordered logistic regression, so I present predicted probabilities, this time in the columns furthest to the right. The mutually exclusive nature of the form of attachment variables leads to the same probabilities of trusting all the institutions in each trust index for those who do not have the exclusive, multiple, or nested form of attachment. Since the variables are dummies, they all have the same base category (the unattached group). I have also chosen not to present the estimated control variables, since they are almost identical to those presented in Table 3.5.

Table 3.7 Effect of form of attachment on trust in political institutions and politicians in EU25, 2004 (ordered logistic regression coefficients and predicted probabilities)

<i>Trust indices:</i>	The institutional trust index		The national trust index		The supra-national index		P(I)	P(N)	P(S)
	Basic	Control	Basic	Control	Basic	Control			
<i>Model</i>									
<i>Form (base = unattached)</i>							.09	.16	.41
Exclusive attachment	.02	.10	.20	.21	-.00	-.02	.10	.20	.41
Multiple form of attachment	.36***	.59***	.57***	.74***	.15	.33**	.16	.29	.49
Nested form of attachment	1.61***	1.24***	1.13***	1.04***	1.55***	1.05***	.26	.36	.67
Pseudo R^2	.04	.15	.01	.11	.06	.21			
N	16176	13611	22213	17205	17319	14358			

* $p < .10$ ** $p < .05$ *** $p < .01$

Comment: Source: Eurobarometer 62.0, autumn 2004. For information on the trust indices, see Table 3.5. The form of attachment items are dummies (0–1), and the unattached group is the base category. The control variables are the same as in Table 3.5, but are not displayed because their estimated values are similar. All coefficients are weighted according to the national populations in EU25. The predicted probabilities reported in the right-hand columns are calculated with the other form of attachment variables set to zero and the control variables at their means. Only the extreme values of the predicted probabilities are presented. P(I) = the probability of trusting all five institutions, P(N) = the probability of trusting the two national institutions, and P(S) = the probability of trusting the three supra-national institutions.

The exclusive form of attachment is in general as insignificant as it is in the Swedish data. This can be seen in the very small (or non-existent) differences in the predicted probabilities, for example, the probability of trusting all institutions, P(I), is .09 for the unattached group (the base category) and .10 for the group with an exclusive form of attachment.

The findings regarding those with a multiple form of attachment differ from the comparable findings from the Swedish data. Having a multiple attachment instead of being unattached raises the predicted probability of trust, especially in national institutions, $P(N)$, from .16 to .29. The multiple form of attachment also has a small effect on trust in all institutions, and as it turns out, on supra-national trust when controlling for the other factors. In this sense, the European data support the theoretical expectations.

The most impressive change in predicted probabilities concerns those with unattached versus nested attachments. In the case of trusting all three supra-national institutions, the predicted probabilities, $P(S)$, are .41 and .67 for the unattached and nested groups, respectively, which represents a substantial rise and is in line with the horizontal principle. As in the Swedish data, however, the effects of the nested form of attachment are the strongest, regardless of the level or object trusted; this could be expected, since a nested person is attached to all levels.

In answering the second question, I conclude that nested attachment has a significant effect on all the trust indices in both the Swedish and the European data sets, whereas multiple attachment only has a significant impact on trust in the Eurobarometer data, and exclusive attachment has no significant effect at all. It is thus important for trust in all levels of institutions and politicians whether the form of attachment is nested, or perhaps multiple.

Strength of territorial attachment and political trust

The results corresponding to the third question concern the last dimension, *strength* of attachment. The strength of territorial attachment is only measured among those considered to be attached to at least one level, making the group of unattached people the reference category once more. The average degree of strength is calculated without taking account of the levels to which a person is attached or of the form of attachment. For simplicity, this average degree of strength is then divided into three groups: those on average *fairly* attached (to one or more levels), those *very* attached (to one or more levels), and those with a *combination* of fairly and very strong attachments. This procedure has the advantage of making some sort of comparison between the Swedish and the Eurobarometer data possible, despite the original variation in response options, especially regarding the strength.

What I want to find out here is to what extent stronger territorial attachments are connected with more trust in institutions and politicians,

in general or at specific political levels. The theoretical expectations in this regard are unclear, pointing in different directions.

Table 3.8 Effect of strength of attachment on trust in political institutions and politicians in Sweden, 2004 (unstandardized multivariate OLS estimates)

	The trust indices				
	The institutional index	The political actor index	The sub-national index	The national index	The supra-national index
Bivariate analyses					
Fairly attached (1–0)	.17***	-.17***	-.18***	-.17***	-.11*
Fairly and very attached (1–0)	.06	.07*	.05	.06	.11**
Very attached (1–0)	.06	.08*	.09*	.09**	-.03
Basic model					
<i>Strength</i> (base = unattached)					
Fairly attached (1–0)	.01	.19*	.04	.18	.10
Fairly and very attached (1–0)	.18*	.36***	.22*	.35**	.24**
Very attached (1–0)	.20**	.39***	.26**	.39***	.17
Full model including control variables					
<i>Strength</i> (base = unattached)					
Fairly attached (1–0)	.00	.18	.11	.20*	.07
Fairly and very attached (1–0)	.11	.30***	.23*	.32***	.18
Very attached (1–0)	.13	.32***	.27**	.34***	.13
Constant	2.03***	1.76***	1.95***	1.86***	1.80***
Adjusted R^2	.18	.14	.16	.18	.07
N	1234	1251	1177	1311	1384

* $p < .10$ ** $p < .05$ *** $p < .01$

Comment: Source: the Swedish SOM study, 2004. The trust indexes are coded 1–5, where 5 is the highest degree of trust (further described in the measurement section). The attachment variables are dummies, coded 0–1 (see Chapter 2 and the accompanying text for more information about the categorization). The control variables are the same as in Table 3.4, but are suppressed.

In Table 3.8 the pattern is different from those of the previous two dimensions. Even the bivariate estimates are very low and only a few are clearly significant, and moreover indicate *negative* effects (fairly attached). When controlling for each other (the basic model), both the very attached and those with a combination of very and fairly strong attachments have positive effects on almost all trust indices.

However, neither the institutional trust index nor the supra-national trust index is affected by any degree of strength of attachment once the control variables are included in the analyses. The impact is clear regarding effect on trust in political actors at the sub-national and national levels. It is people with mixed fairly and very strong attachments, or solely very strong attachments, who indicate trust in these indices. The theoretical expectation was unclear, and I do not find a pattern of stronger attachments leading to more trust. Instead, and in trying to

answer question three regarding the Swedish data, there seems to be some kind of domestic and personal trust pattern regarding the strength of attachment, since there were no significant connections with the institutional and supra-national indexes.

This could somewhat support the idea that indicating the highest degrees of attachment when answering such questions is connected to a more cultural (or ethnic) mode of attachment, and thus more to be expected among attachments to national and sub-national levels. For the first time, I also note an obvious difference between the effect on trust in institutions and on trust in political actors. This is not, however, a result corresponding to the expectations of Norris et al. (1999a), that political actors should be more easily affected by short-term evaluations; on the contrary, it seems to be closer to domestic trust. In the context of my study this is logical, considering the single variables included in the indices. Concerning political actors at the supra-national level, the political actor index only asks about trust in Swedish members of the European Parliament, not MEPs in general. The two indices that displayed no significant effects of strength of attachment are in fact the only two that contain questions about trust in EU institutions.

Let us turn now to the Eurobarometer data, and see how the effects of strength of attachment on trust in political institutions appear in the Europe-wide setting, where the general image of the EU tends overall to be more positive than in Sweden.

The results of the analyses of the *strength* of attachment dimension differ the most between the Swedish and European data sets. In the Eurobarometer data, changing from unattached to being fairly, mixed, or very attached has almost no effect on the results, the predicted probabilities increasing between ten and twenty points, regardless of the strength of attachment. Hence, there is a small effect, but it does not vary between the different degrees of strength.

Since the measure of strength is independent of level and form, one is as likely to find a person with a nested form of attachment in any of the strength categories, as a person attached to a certain level. The degree of strength in itself does not seem to matter; rather, the general effect of multi-level territorial attachments is captured by the more significant estimators and greater increase in predicted probabilities than those of the unattached group.

Table 3.9 Effect of strength of attachment on trust in political institutions and politicians in EU25, 2004 (ordered logistic regression coefficients and predicted probabilities)

<i>Trust indices:</i>	The institutional trust index		The national trust index		The supra-national index		P(I)	P(N)	P(S)
	Basic	Control	Basic	Control	Basic	Control			
<i>Model</i>									
<i>Strength of attachment</i> (base = unattached)							.10	.17	.43
Fairly attached	1.01***	.84***	.78***	.78***	.78***	.66***	.20	.30	.59
Fairly and very attached	1.16***	.98***	.96***	.91***	.96***	.77***	.23	.33	.62
Very attached	1.14***	.98***	.99***	.99***	.99***	.72***	.23	.35	.60
Pseudo R^2	.00	.14	.00	.11	.00	.20			
N	15996	13493	21768	16989	17097	14222			

* $p < .10$ ** $p < .05$ *** $p < .01$

Comment: Source: Eurobarometer 62.0, autumn 2004. For information regarding the trust indices, see Table 3.5. The form of attachment items are dummies (0–1), and the unattached group is the base category. The control variables are the same as in Table 3.5, but not displayed due to similar estimates. All coefficients are weighted according to the national populations in EU25. The predicted probabilities reported in the right-hand columns are calculated with the other attachment variables set to zero and the control variables at their means. Only the extreme values of the predicted probabilities are presented. P(I) = the probability of trusting all five institutions, P(N) = the probability of trusting the two national institutions, and P(S) = the probability of trusting the three supra-national institutions.

From the European data I can conclude that having an attachment at all is what makes the difference, not whether the attachment is fairly or very strong. The different patterns in the Swedish and the European data are largely explained by the different response options, but they also indicate the need to combine all three dimensions to explore which combinations of attachments matter the most for different types of political trust.

Combined dimensions of attachment and political trust

In accordance with the fourth chapter-specific question, I am investigating the impact of the combination of the three dimensions of multi-level territorial attachments. As developed both theoretically and empirically in Chapter 2, this combination is constructed as a new measure, where people are categorized according to the level or levels to which they have the strongest attachment. It is not important how strong the attachment is in absolute terms, as long as it is the strongest one held by each individual.

Since the survey questions enable people to indicate the same degree of attachment to more than one level, they do not properly rank all levels. Such a ranking, or list, can only be made in those cases where a respondent has indicated different degrees of attachment to the different levels. On the other hand, there is no theoretical reason to expect that

all individuals would be able to rank their attachment to each of the levels. On the contrary, it is one of the points of this study that people can be equally strongly attached to more than one level. Hence, it is possible that someone might indicate his or her strongest attachment to two or even all three levels of attachment. My classification is thus organized according to the level, or combination of levels, to which a person has the strongest degree of attachment. There are six different categories: *unattached*, *primarily sub-national*, *all domestic*, *primarily national*, *supra-national etc.* (with a few persons being equally strongly attached to one more level), and finally *all levels equal* (i.e., with the same strength of attachment to all levels).

Table 3.10 Effect of combined dimensions of attachment on political trust in Sweden, 2004 (unstandardized multivariate OLS estimates)

	The trust indices				
	The institutional index	The political actor index	The sub-national index	The national index	The supra-national index
Bivariate analyses					
Primarily sub-national	.10	-.08	.07	-.20**	-.11
All domestic	.03	-.04	.06	-.01	-.22***
Primarily national	.16***	-.11***	-.18***	-.06	-.17***
Supra-national etc.	.17***	.11*	-.06	.10	.48***
All levels equal	.35***	.35***	.32***	.29***	.48***
Basic model					
<i>Strongest attachment</i> (base = unattached)					
Primarily sub-national	.06	.27**	.27**	.14	.09
All domestic	.13	.31***	.25**	.31***	.03
Primarily national	.05	.27**	.09	.28**	.09
Supra-national etc.	.30***	.43***	.15	.41***	.62***
All levels equal	.46***	.64***	.48***	.57***	.61***
Full model including control variables					
<i>Strongest attachment</i> (base = unattached)					
Primarily sub-national	.04	.23*	.32**	.16	.03
All domestic	.05	.25**	.24*	.30***	-.02
Primarily national	-.01	.21*	.12	.24**	.04
Supra-national etc.	.23**	.34***	.14	.35***	.54***
All levels equal	.39***	.57***	.48***	.53***	.58***
Constant	2.05***	1.77***	1.96***	1.87***	1.83***
Adjusted R^2 for full model	.21	.16	.18	.19	.14
N	1263	1282	1205	1343	1418

* $p < .10$ ** $p < .05$ *** $p < .01$

Comment: Source: the Swedish SOM study, 2004. The trust indexes are coded 1–5, where 5 is the highest degree of trust (further described in the measurement section). The attachment variables are dummies, coded 0–1 (see Chapter 2 and the main text for more information about the categorization); those selecting sub-national attachment as the strongest comprise the base category. The control variables are the same as in Table 3.4, but are suppressed.

Using the combined measure in analysing trust in different objects and levels emphasizes and strengthens both the relevance of the horizontal principle, and the effect of being equally attached to all levels. Exemplifying the horizontal principle in Table 3.10, people with *primarily sub-national* and *all domestic* attachments tend to trust sub-national political institutions and actors, in comparison with the unattached who form the base category. The logic of the horizontal principle is clear, since the *primarily national* group does not have a significant effect on sub-national trust, but rather on national trust, and since the *all domestic* group trusts both the sub-national and national levels. Similarly, supra-national trust is mostly affected by people having a supra-national attachment among their strongest attachments. This can be compared to the results in Table 3.4, where national attachment barely had a significant effect on national trust. These results indicate the need not only to consider attachments to one territorial level at a time, but simultaneously to consider the other levels to which a respondent is attached, and how strong each attachment is.

The result, that people whose strongest attachment is to all three levels equally (*all levels equal*) have the strongest positive significant effect on all trust indices, also holds when controlling for other factors. However, an interesting comparison is that the effect of the *supra-national etc.* category is not significantly related to the sub-national trust index, and the *all levels equal* group also has much stronger effects on trust in all levels and objects. Hence, it is not enough to have a supra-national attachment per se, as could be assumed from the analyses of the *level* dimension. Instead, these results clearly signal the importance of having attachment to all levels, in order to enhance political trust in all levels. To foster trust in institutions and politicians at all levels, it is not enough to be attached only to the highest level in a multi-level system.

As well, all the attachment categories have generally stronger (and more significant) effects on trust in political actors than on trust in political institutions. Compared to the unattached group, all the attachment categories have a positive effect on trust in political actors, although most noticeable is the effect of the *all levels equal* group (.57). General trust in political institutions is, on the other hand, only significantly positively influenced by the two categories containing a supra-national attachment. There is still no support for the idea that trust in political actors would be more easily influenced by other short-term factors and thus less by attachments; however, it should be remembered that the supra-national level captures trust in *Swedish* MEPs, not all MEPs. For someone whose strongest attachment is domestic, the emo-

tional distance from a Swedish MEP could well be less than the emotional distance from EU institutions.

In the Eurobarometer data, all categories have significant positive effects on all three trust indices, even when controlling for other explanatory factors. Just as in the Swedish data, the strongest effects on all trust indices come from those people who feel equally strongly attached to all three levels. This is reflected in the predicted probabilities presented in Table 3.11, which are highest for people in the *all levels equal* category (compared to the unattached group); the predicted probability of an unattached person trusting supra-national institutions is .35, whereas it is .68 for a person who feels equally strongly attached to all levels.

Table 3.11 Effect of combined dimensions on trust in political institutions in EU25, 2004 (ordered logistic regression coefficients and predicted probabilities)

<i>Trust indices:</i>	The institutional trust index		The national trust index		The supra-national index		P(I)	P(N)	P(S)
	Basic	Control	Basic	Control	Basic	Control			
<i>Model</i>									
<i>Strongest attachment</i> (base = unattached)							.10	.16	.35
Primarily sub-national	.63***	.63***	.61***	.60***	.55***	.51***	.17	.26	.55
All domestic	.88***	1.01***	.86***	1.01***	.71***	.72***	.23	.35	.60
Primarily national	.80***	.79***	.78***	.89***	.62***	.49***	.19	.32	.54
Supra-national etc.	1.44***	.91***	1.07***	.78***	.82***	.74***	.21	.30	.60
All levels equal	1.70***	1.24***	1.17***	1.05***	1.10***	1.09***	.27	.36	.68
Pseudo R^2	.02	.15	.01	.11	.03	.19			
N	16036	13521	21843	17036	17141	14253			

* $p < .10$ ** $p < .05$ *** $p < .01$

Comment: Source: Eurobarometer 62.0, autumn 2004. *The institutional index* ranges from 0 (tend to trust no institution) to 5 (tend to trust all institutions in the index). *The national index* ranges from 0 (tend to trust no institution) to 2 (tend to trust both institutions in the index). *The supra-national index* ranges from 0 (tend to trust no institution) to 3 (tend to trust all three institutions in the index). The attachment categories are coded 1 (have such attachment) and 0 (do not have such attachment) and are dummies; the unattached group is the base category. The control variables are the same as in Table 3.5, but are repressed. All coefficients are weighted according to the national populations in EU25. The predicted probabilities are calculated with the other attachment category variables set to zero and the control variables set to their means. Only the extreme values of the predicted probabilities for each trust index (i.e., trusting all included institutions) are presented in the table.

The impact of those people who feel the strongest attachment to the supra-national level (and maybe one more level) is weaker, displaying the same overall pattern as in the Swedish data. However, one difference is that, whereas none of the domestic attachments affected trust in the supra-national level in the Swedish data, this is not the case in the EU25 data. In the Europe-wide data set, I find that that trusting all domestic levels not only has the strongest impact on national trust (as

anticipated from the horizontal principle), but also has as strong an effect as the *supra-national etc.* category does on trust in EU institutions.

The answer to question four is thus that the combination of levels provides more detailed information than do the results of the analyses of each dimension separately. In particular, the difference between those people categorized as *supra-national etc.* and those who feel equally strongly attached to all levels (*all levels equal*) is prominent. Overall trust in *all* the institutions and political actors in a multi-level system thus seems to be best upheld by people with equally strong attachments to all levels, i.e., those who truly have multi-level territorial attachments.

Chapter summary, conclusions, and theoretical implications

At the beginning of this chapter I suggested that there were two different ways, relevant to the chapter, in which territorial attachments could be thought to challenge the state. One such challenge would be if there were no relationship between territorial attachments and trust, and hence no national political trust based on more emotional (or long-term) national attachment. Another challenge would be if there were such a relationship, but the citizens felt attached to *other* territorial levels, leading to *lower* national political trust. Neither of these challenges was empirically supported by my analyses. There is evidently a relationship between territorial attachments and trust. The European integration process would be challenged if there were no relationship between European attachments and trust in EU institutions, or if such a relationship led to decreasing national political trust, thus challenging the multi-level system. In Chapter 2 we learned that most respondents were attached to more than one level, but the results of the present chapter indicate that such multi-level territorial attachments do not lead to diminished political trust in national political institutions and actors.

Despite the debated causality between these phenomena, I have argued that it is theoretically reasonable to expect the direction of the causal relationship at the individual level to extend from multi-level territorial attachments to political trust. This argument is supported by two theoretical views. One is Easton's (1965; 1975) theory of system support, with its distinction between diffuse and specific support. The other is to consider multi-level territorial attachments as one of three broad categories of theoretical explanations of political trust, namely, the cultural theory category (cf. Dalton 2004; Inglehart & Welzel 2005;

Mishler & Rose 2001; Putnam, et al. 1993). The other two categories, institutional performance and input theories, have contributed to my selection of relevant control variables for the analyses. Theoretically, the horizontal principle anticipates a correspondence between attachment and trust at the same territorial level. However, no previous theory explains how the combined impact of attachment to several levels influences political trust in different levels, which is part of the theoretical contribution of this chapter.

The definition of political trust used in this study is limited, only capturing trust in political institutions and actors at social levels ranging from municipal executive boards to the European Parliament. Empirically, several trust indices were constructed to determine whether the dimensions of attachment related differently to *general* trust in institutions or politicians at all levels, compared to trust in both institutions and politicians at the sub-national, national, and supra-national levels, *taken individually*.

Four chapter-specific questions guided the analyses, and indicated the theoretical expectations regarding the impact of each of the dimensions of multi-level territorial attachments. The first question was how the dimension *level of attachment* (sub-national, national, or supra-national) related to different forms of political trust. The findings reveal support for the horizontal principle, in both the Swedish and the European data – as far as they can be compared. Still more interesting is the finding that supra-national attachment tends to have a significant impact on trust in institutions and political actors at all territorial levels. These results hold even when controlling for other relevant explanatory variables, such as support for government party and evaluations of public service.

The second question was how the dimension *form of attachment* (exclusive, multiple, or nested) affected the same trust indices. The nested form of attachment proved to have a significant influence on all trust indices in both the Swedish and European data sets, whereas the multiple form only had an impact on trust in national institutions in the Eurobarometer data.

The focus of the third question was how *strength of attachment* related to the trust indices. The findings indicated a domestic and personal trust pattern in the Swedish data, since these data displayed no evidence of significant effects on the institutional and supra-national indices (both of which capture trust in EU institutions). In the European data, the fact of having an attachment of any sort is what seems to make the difference, not how strong that attachment is. However, the

differences between the two data sets are partly due to their different response options.

The above results identified the need to *combine all three dimensions* into one new measure, corresponding to the fourth question. I called this new measure of combined dimensions the *strongest level(s) of attachment*. From analysing effects on political trust in the Swedish data, I found a difference between those who had a supra-national attachment as their strongest (without being equally attached to all levels) and those who felt equally strongly attached to all levels. The former group did not affect sub-national trust, whereas the latter group had strong positive effects on all trust indices. The difference between the effect of having only a supra-national attachment as the strongest attachment, and of being equally strongly attached to all levels, indicates that trusting all levels is not so much a spill-over effect of being attached to the largest (or highest) level, as it is the result of many people actually having strong attachments to all levels.

In sum, in this chapter I have explored the effects of the three defined dimensions of attachment, and the results indicate that all three can contribute to improving our understanding. These dimensions can be combined into a measure of strongest attachment, which helps deepen our understanding of how territorial attachments relate to political trust. The effects are generally not very strong, but their significance indicates that the concept of multi-level territorial attachments can contribute to our understanding of political trust, and that there is a need for further analysis of the impact of this factor.

Attachments to other than national territorial levels in the EU multi-level system thus do not challenge the state – at least not by lowering political trust. On the contrary, people who have strong attachments to *all* levels tend to trust all the political institutions and actors that are part of the multi-level system. In light of discussions of the possible need for an EU identity, to foster ongoing support for the European integration process, these results indicate the importance of focusing not only on the EU level; in a multi-level system, attachments to all levels might well be equally important.

Still, political trust is something that can exist simultaneously at all levels, without trust in one level decreasing trust in another. This is no zero-sum game: no cost is involved in trusting more levels, and no deep-seated national values are threatened. In the next chapter I will “up the ante”, by analysing the importance of multi-level territorial attachments to welfare attitudes. To refer to the system level, it might not be so much state legitimacy that is being challenged, as state solidarity.

Chapter 4

Multi-level Territorial Attachments and Welfare Attitudes

Now it is time to redirect our attention to the third overall challenge to the state and to European integration, namely, the *challenge of welfare attitudes*. At the system level, welfare attitudes are associated with the last of the four phases of territorial system building, i.e., redistribution (Ferrera 2005), as well as with Marshall's social component of citizenship (Marshall & Bottomore 1992). In Chapter 1, I discussed how attachments to the territorial community are considered to be particularly important in welfare states, in order to support the necessary redistribution of resources between individuals (Bellamy 2008 ; Habermas 1998; Mau 2002; Offe 2000; Scharpf 2000). In this chapter I will analyse this statement in more detail, from a multi-level perspective.

Studying the relationship between territorial attachments and welfare attitudes makes for a harder case for the importance of territorial attachments than in the previous discussion of the impact on political trust. It is much easier for an individual to trust a political institution or a politician than to agree to redistribute part of his or her income to other individuals. There is no cost involved in trusting, and no action required; as the saying goes, actions speak louder than words.

This fundamental difference between political trust and welfare attitudes becomes even more obvious in the case of a multi-level system. Just because someone trusts the institutions or politicians at a certain political level, does not mean that he or she necessarily prefers this level to be responsible for social policy or public spending (Svallfors 1999). It is completely theoretically plausible for a person to have a very strong degree of trust in the institutions and politicians at all political tiers. However, redistribution always presupposes taking resources from someone to give to someone else, recalling a zero-sum game between individuals or territorial levels. Welfare policies usually benefit some individuals more than others, and the question of which level one prefers to make decisions regarding social policies can only be answered by choosing one level, not all. In fact, the overall idea of sub- and supra-national attachments challenging the state might be more applicable to

welfare attitudes than to political trust. Whereas attachments to several territorial levels only seem to increase the overall amount of political trust at all levels, welfare attitudes could well bring matters to a head. If anywhere, this is where we can expect to find evidence that attachments to other than state levels contribute to undermining the (welfare) state.

Historically it is the (nation) state that has been the guarantor of welfare policies (de Búrca 2005). It is in the frame of the state that the development of the generous welfare state has been achievable (Ferrera 2005). Thus, in many countries there is a strong link between the national and the welfare state. As in the theoretical literature on political trust, the causal direction of these two phenomena is debated, although to a somewhat lesser extent regarding welfare politics. Irrespective of the assumed causal direction, most scholars in this field emphasize the interconnectedness or reciprocity between attachments and welfare. Regardless of whether it was the sense of belonging to a nation that established the interrelationships of solidarity necessary for the welfare state (Habermas 1998; Offe 2000), or whether it was the construction of the welfare state institutions that contributed to shaping the national identities (McEwen & Moreno 2005), there is a common focus on the idea that there is such a relationship between attachments and welfare policies at the same level. It is also implied that only *one* shared territorial attachment, normally national attachment, has a bearing on welfare policies. This theoretical tendency to focus on the national level has meant that the territorial aspect of welfare politics has been under-explored, despite the structuring effect territorial factors have been claimed to exert on most political developments in Europe (McEwen & Moreno 2005; Rokkan 1999; Rokkan & Urwin 1983).

As before, I will be unable empirically to determine the causal relationship between these two phenomena. In the theoretical section of this chapter, however, I will argue for the reasonableness of analysing the relationship as an effect of territorial attachments on attitudes towards welfare, and develop the theoretical expectations so as to encompass multi-level territorial attachments as well. These expectations will then be investigated empirically later in the chapter. First, however, I will briefly examine how welfare state policies are challenged by the multi-level system, which calls for taking a multi-level approach to welfare attitudes research.

Territorial challenges to welfare state policies

There are two main ways the classical notion of the welfare state in Europe could be challenged. First, welfare policies and public services are often parts of policy devolutions to regional and local levels in many European countries; Sweden is no exception, approximately two thirds of the welfare sector being managed at local or regional levels (Johansson, et al. 2001; Montin 2002). Some observers regard the devolution of public service areas as a response to regional identity claims (Batt & Wolczuk 2002; Gallego, et al. 2005), or even as contributing to undermining the welfare state by compromising the common culture and sense of *demos* that made the welfare states possible in the first place (Wolfe & Klausen 1997). These views point directly to the necessity of including attachments to different territorial levels when analysing welfare attitudes. On the other hand, there are several welfare devolution processes in Europe that are not based on such identity claims from below, but rather on the economic necessity of states transferring responsibility for a costly public service sector to lower political levels (Pierre & Peters 2000). In such a situation, sub-national attachments, for example, might be less important or even not relevant at all, when it comes to explaining support for those policies.

Second, and more important to this part of the study, are ongoing discussions of the formulation of a European social policy at the EU level. Some scholars argue that such a policy is needed if European integration is to continue, whereas others argue that such a process lacks the identity basis on which such a joint policy could rest. The former position is represented by Habermas (2001), who argues that there is definitely a need for deepening European integration and for a European constitution. This necessity concerns, in his view, not only the EU itself, but also the preservation of the democratic achievements of the European nation states, achievements that have significance beyond the borders of the individual EU member states. My view is that his argument corresponds to Ferrera's (2005) idea of the different phases of territorial system building, and also to the functionalist interpretation of Marshall's components of citizenship, as representing the development of citizenship rights from civil rights, through political rights, finally arriving at social rights. According to such an interpretation, the evolution of a "social Europe" would clearly be the next logical step of European integration.

In contrast, Scharpf, among others, argues that there is no prospect that welfare-state functions could be effectively federalized in Europe,

due to the normative salience of the existing social contract (at the nation state level) between citizens and the state (Scharpf 2000). More relevant to this study is the objection to a European social policy based on the perceived absence of a European identity: “Europeans still think of themselves primarily in national terms; they have not yet developed the relations of trust and solidarity on the European level that would be necessary to underpin a stronger European governing capacity” (Offe 2000:38). Empirically, few studies have examined this relationship, but some results indicate that the lack of a European identity is one reason why there is no public demand for a social Europe (Mau 2005).⁷⁵ More research into this area is clearly needed.

In sum, welfare state policies can be found at different levels in states, and they constitute one of the most crucial factors affecting the future of the European Union. It is definitely time to include territorial considerations in theoretical research into the welfare state, as has been pointed out by several authors (Ferrera 2005; Kumlin 2007; Moreno & McEwen 2003). My contribution to this field will be to investigate how multi-level territorial attachments matter to individual attitudes towards welfare.

THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON TERRITORIAL ATTACHMENTS AND WELFARE

There are two main streams of theoretical literature concerning the relationship between territorial attachments and welfare. The first stream relates to the general macro-theoretical expectations regarding a connection between community feelings and the welfare state. The second theoretical stream emphasizes the micro, or individual, level. There is naturally a relationship between these two levels of inquiry. The community–welfare state connection at the macro (or aggregated) level would not be intelligible without some correspondence to a comparable relationship at the individual level. The interconnectedness of these two levels calls for a brief presentation of some of the macro expectations, before examining the individual-level relationship in more detail in the next section.

According to macro-theoretical reasoning, Scharpf argues that welfare measures require “a collectivity in which the identification of members

⁷⁵ In addition to other explanations, varying territorial attachments have proved to be important factors explaining why individuals do or do not support pan-European social policies (Mau 2005).

with the group is sufficiently strong to override the decisive interests of subgroups in cases of conflict” (Scharpf 2000:12). Moreover, since group membership has so far been determined by territorial boundaries, it is the identification with politically defined territorial levels that is of interest. The territorial borders of a state mark the area that encompasses the citizens, and thus, at the same time, the area where the obligations of the state are valid. In this way, territorial borders limit a state’s responsibility to care for the welfare of certain individuals, i.e., the citizens of the state (Offe 2000).

The reason for the national focus is the sense of implied solidarity, referred to by Ferrera (2005) as the process of bounded structuring. The process has two dimensions: *boundary building* (with reference to territory and membership) and *internal structuring* (with reference to centre–periphery relationships, socio–political cleavages, and institutional–organizational forms). The former dimension, boundary building, is considered to lead to greater *closure* and fewer *exit* options, whereas the latter dimension leads to greater loyalty and *voice* (Ferrera 2005:22f). Historically in Europe, this bounded structuring has occurred at the national level, explaining why welfare policies and redistribution have only been possible in the national frame.

Over recent decades, however, this situation has gradually changed, as previously emphasized, making both the sub-national and the supra-national levels more relevant when discussing welfare policies. Ferrera comments that there is a dual trend in Europe, where the *content* of citizenship is becoming thicker (more social rights) while the *container* of citizenship (i.e., national borders) is thinning out (Ferrera 2005). Territorial borders have historically been important for the higher degree of closure needed to bind citizens to a mutual system of social rights; however, with free movement in the European Union, this inclusion is contested, as are the preconditions for such solidarity, i.e., national identity.

The conclusion is that there is a strong general macro-theoretical belief in the relationship between *national* identity and the welfare *state*, a relationship considered to be challenged by other territorial identities. Despite the emphasis on the national level, I believe there is no theoretical reason why the same principle would not be relevant at other levels too. The relationship between attachment to other political levels and welfare policies can be expected to be important, especially if responsi-

bility for welfare policies is partially or completely transferred to those tiers.⁷⁶ Again I refer to this as the principle of horizontal relationship.

However, the role of attachment to lower or higher territorial levels is more debatable. Although few scholars expressly argue for the necessity of a sub-national identity if welfare policies are to be legitimate at these levels, some scholars highlight the importance of regional identity claims as an underlying reason for the devolution of welfare policies (Catt & Murphy 2002; Wolfe & Klausen 1997).⁷⁷

Regarding the idea of a “social Europe”, there has been considerable theoretical reasoning concerning the importance, or unimportance, of a European identity. Earlier in this chapter I cited Offe and his argument that the Europeans still lack the European identity necessary to support welfare policies at the EU level (Offe 2000). Similar reasoning concerning the legitimacy of welfare policies at the EU level can be found in writings by, for example, Habermas (2001) and Scharpf (1999), although there are also other, non-identity-related arguments about the inconceivability of supra-national European welfare policies.

Generally neglected in this theoretical field, irrespective of macro or micro level, are arguments and expectations concerning the multi-level system in its entirety. Despite increased interest in identities at several levels, and parallel interest in the decline of state sovereign control over welfare policies, the multi-level perspective is both theoretically and empirically underdeveloped.

How multi-level territorial attachments matter to welfare attitudes

The idea that territorial attachments are imperative for individuals' welfare state attitudes has similarities to a broad category of theoretical explanations of welfare state attitudes that I call “theories of normative values of fairness and social justice”. Interest in normative concerns as explanations of welfare state attitudes is rising (Mau 2003; Svallfors 2006), and is seen as complementary to the traditionally more investigated second broad explanatory category, which contains theories of

⁷⁶ In contrast, as Moreno and McEwen (2003) point out, the creation of welfare policies at a certain level can contribute to enhancing attachment to this level, which in turn can reinforce the support individuals have for such welfare policies.

⁷⁷ These claims are usually based on the experience of countries with historically strong regions. In unitary states, the expectation is that national attachment would be strong enough to support even local or regional social policies, which is something we will return to in the next chapter.

the importance of individuals' self-interest, socio-economic status, and class (Baldwin 1990; Edlund 1999; Iversen 2005; Svallfors 2007).⁷⁸

Drawing on some of the theories and results from the theoretical category of normative values and fairness can contribute to our understanding of how multi-level territorial attachments can be expected to affect welfare state attitudes. As with political trust, the idea is that territorial attachments may complement other known factors explaining attitudes to welfare, not least ideology and self-interest, which will be discussed later in this chapter.

A key to improving our understanding of how individuals' multi-level territorial attachments can affect their attitudes towards welfare and redistribution is to scrutinize the idea of *deservingness perceptions* (van Oorschot 2006). A deservingness perception can be thought of as a mechanism operating between a normatively based independent variable (e.g., a multi-level territorial attachment) and attitudes towards welfare. The theoretical concept of deservingness perceptions contributes to our knowledge of why some groups of people are regarded as more deserving of social protection than others are. It is not an intermediate variable to be included in the analyses, but a theoretical mechanism explaining in more detail why the relationship can be thought to exist.

van Oorschot theoretically defines five different deservingness criteria, and demonstrates empirically that the two most important ones concerning welfare attitudes are, first, control over one's neediness, and second, *identity* (my emphasis). Regarding the deservingness criterion of *identity*, he says: "needy people who are closer to 'us' are seen as more deserving" (van Oorschot 2006:26). This criterion seems to be especially important when neediness is related to ethnic or national minorities: "The deservingness criterion of identity protects the group against burdensome support claims from outside the group, while the criterion of control protects against such claims from inside the group" (van Oorschot 2006:38).

The deservingness criterion of *identity* explains how the principle of a horizontal relationship between territorial attachments and welfare functions at the individual level. Hence, I argue that the deservingness criterion of *identity* makes it reasonable to expect that people with attachments to certain territorial areas will support welfare policies di-

⁷⁸ This second theoretical category explains the choice of control variables later in this chapter. Other well-known explanations are macro theories of institutional differences, elite opinions, interest groups, and information effects; we will return to some of these as contextual factors in Chapter 5.

rected to people living in those same areas. This can be expressed as an expectation that the multi-level territorial attachment dimension of *level* should be positively related to supportive welfare attitudes directed towards the same territorial level.⁷⁹ On the other hand, the deservingness criterion of *identity* can also lead to another expectation: people who are not part of “us” would not be considered deserving of our welfare support. This touches on the downside of feelings of identity. Despite the possible benefits of identity feelings, in the form of making people feel closer to one another, there is also the reverse side of the coin, namely, how we treat the “out-group”, i.e., “them”. In the context of the present study, this translates into an expectation of less supportive attitudes regarding providing welfare support to other people at levels to which a person does not feel attached.

From the same horizontal principle it could be argued that people with multiple or nested *forms* of attachments can be expected to be more supportive of social policies existing at several (or higher) political tiers, or social policies directed towards a geographically wider range of people, than are people with an exclusive form of attachment.

Regarding *strength* of attachment, it is more difficult to argue from the deservingness criterion of *identity* that this dimension should be important. Identity as a deservingness criterion is supposed to affect perceptions of *who* is worthy of support, not to what *extent*. However, the strength dimension might be interesting in light of the discussion of thin versus thick identity presented in Chapter 2. I concluded then that thick identity is a narrower concept, more closely connected to issues of common culture, empathy, and national pride, than is my concept of multi-level territorial attachments, which can encompass both thicker and thinner versions (See also Follesdal 2001; Follesdal 2002).

Several authors, such as Scharpf (1999) and Offe (2000), argue that such a thick identity is not a precondition for political legitimacy, but that it might play a role in making people willing to share and redistribute their income and tax money to others. Hence, it is plausible that an overall stronger degree of attachment might imply thicker feelings, and hence have a stronger effect on welfare attitudes. Still, this argument is more plausible when considering the strength of attachments *within defined territorial boundaries*, not when considering strong *general* attachments. I would thus expect strength of attachment to be more important as a part of the combined measure of all three dimensions of

⁷⁹ Welfare state attitudes can be different in character, and some of their aspects are more relevant from a territorial identification point of view. We will return to this shortly, in the section “Defining welfare attitudes”.

multi-level territorial attachments. My expectation is thus that the combined measure of the level or levels to which one is strongest attached will have an impact. If attachments to domestic levels are the strongest, any European welfare policies will be regarded unfavourably, and vice versa if the European attachment is the strongest.

From these theoretical arguments and expectations we can formulate specific questions about how each of the dimensions of multi-level territorial attachments can be expected to influence attitudes towards welfare. However, for the questions to make sense, I first need to discuss what kinds of welfare attitudes I deem relevant to this study.

Attitudes towards welfare – in theory

Unlike a common perception in the USA, the word “welfare” according to a European understanding encompasses many more aspects of society and the public sector than merely the social security scheme. Attitudes towards welfare thus encompass a broad spectrum of aspects, mainly due to the variety of welfare institutions – both within and between countries (Kumlin 2007; Mau 2003; Svallfors 1991, 1996, 2003; Taylor-Gooby 1999).

In this study I embrace a broad definition of welfare. Naturally, welfare policies have redistributive features (Iversen 2005), but in my opinion welfare can be seen as a broader concept than simply redistribution. Welfare is broader because it encompasses the provision of public services that do not presuppose any *direct* redistribution of resources from some individuals to others. However, all public financing of common goods and public services is based on taxation, and thus has an indirect redistributive aspect. Likewise, even a *universal* welfare state, with transfers to all citizens, has a redistributive effect when evaluating the outcome after both taxes and transfers (Rothstein 2001). I also include attitudes about redistribution that does not occur between individuals, but between different territorial areas, and attitudes about what level of government should concern itself with welfare issues.

One important distinction when considering welfare attitudes can be made between *general* support for the idea of a welfare state and *specific* support for particular welfare policies (Svallfors 1996, 2003).⁸⁰ Both of these categories are relevant to this study. General welfare sup-

⁸⁰ Three levels of abstraction are common regarding welfare attitudes: general welfare support, support for specific policies, and evaluation of specific policies. The latter does not fall within the scope of this study and will not be considered further here (Kumlin 2007; Svallfors 2003).

port captures attitudes towards redistribution and the size of the public sector in general. More specific welfare support, for example, concerning schools, pensions, and healthcare policies, has the advantage of being more easily connected to certain tiers in the political system. However, the distinct welfare areas are not of interest in their own right because of the explorative nature of this study. As well, the theoretical underdevelopment of this research field does not provide sufficiently detailed expectations regarding individual welfare policies.⁸¹ Rather, I need to investigate whether the overall anticipated relationship between territorial attachments and welfare attitudes exists, and holds when controlling for other known explanatory factors. Hence, I will combine a number of specific welfare attitudes into indices, in accordance with the considerations discussed below.

One aspect of welfare attitudes relevant to this study is the question of *scope* (Borre & Goul Andersen 1997; Borre & Scarbrough 1995). When discussing beliefs about the scope of government, Borre and Goldsmith (1995:4) refer both to the range of government activity and to the degree to which governments engage in activities. According to their definition, *range* concerns the multiplicity of social aspects in which the government is active, whereas *degree* captures the intensity of such involvement.

The question of range and degree of government activities can be compared to individuals' attitudes towards the degree of government responsibility for various welfare policies (Svallfors 1991), or in other words, whether people prefer *private* or *public management* of a certain welfare service. Since it is more expected that public welfare management will contain elements of redistribution between individuals or groups of individuals (hitherto in the frame of the nation state), we would especially expect sub-national and national attachments to correspond to a stronger preference for public management, as long as it takes place in a national frame. Inversely, the strong connection to the nation state might make people with supra-national attachments more supportive of private management and consequently less nationally bound alternatives. The same reasoning is applicable to the difference between welfare attitudes regarding social equality and social security,

⁸¹ It could be an interesting direction for future research, to explore in detail whether the effects of multi-level territorial attachments are stronger or weaker regarding different specific welfare areas. Such differences could, for example, be theoretically plausible given the varying normative moral logic implied in different welfare programs (Mau 2003).

the former containing a larger element of redistribution, the latter being based on the idea of individual contributions (Mau 2003).⁸²

I argue that the question of who is considered eligible for welfare support, or entitled to social benefits, is also part of the *scope* aspect. The scope of welfare, in this sense, is relevant from a multi-level system perspective, and is clearly connected to the concept of multi-level territorial attachments. Within what boundaries, or to whom, are people willing to have their tax money redistributed? This corresponds directly to the deservingness criterion of *identity* discussed earlier (van Oorschot 2006).

In political terms, this is largely an issue of *the preferred level of government* (De Winter & Swyngedouw 1999) for welfare policies, where we expect people primarily to prefer that welfare issues be determined at the level of government corresponding to their territorial attachments. Given the strong historical connection between the state and welfare policies, the main controversial issue in Europe concerning the level of government responsible for welfare issues is whether or not there should be a specifically *European* social policy, and whether welfare issues should therefore be subject to EU decision-making. Thus the question of scope, from a multi-level and eligibility perspective, should definitely concern attitudes regarding the preferred level of government, and regarding solidarity and the redistribution of resources to other EU citizens or other parts of Europe.⁸³

ATTITUDES TOWARDS WELFARE IN SWEDEN AND THE EU

Given that welfare attitudes are the theme of this chapter, the choice of Sweden as a case is especially germane. To some people the words *Sweden* and *welfare state* are almost synonymous. The Swedish, or Scandinavian, welfare model is historically renowned, and closely connected to the nation-building process: “[N]owhere has the link between ‘belonging’ and ‘sharing’ become so strong in institutional as well in symbolic terms as in the Nordic countries: the Swedish metaphor of the

⁸² This also corresponds to the difference between general welfare service, with services and/or support being provided for everyone, and more specific welfare programs designed for those most in need, although this distinction is not part of this study.

⁸³ Of course, there are other interesting aspects of welfare attitudes that are not part of this study, such as attitudes regarding how much money the government should spend on different policies, and taxation policies (Edlund 1999; Svallfors 1991). The reason for not including them is that the deservingness criterion of *identity* identifies *who* is deserving of help, not *how much* help they deserve or how the taxation system should be designed.

welfare state as ‘the people’s home’ (*folkhemmet*) is the most popular and effective testimony of such a link” (Ferrera 2005:65).

However, Sweden has not been spared from economic decline in recent decades, and there were important retrenchments in the welfare system in the 1990s. Following these retrenchments, the proportion of the population supporting the public sector has been approximately 15–20 per cent higher than the proportion wanting to reduce the sector since the mid-nineties (Nilsson 2005). Another important though lesser-known feature of the Swedish system is the extensive devolution of social policies that was carried out, especially in the 1990s. Sweden’s counties (or regions) and unusually large municipalities are now responsible for most (approximately 2/3) of welfare services in Sweden.⁸⁴ This situation makes Sweden an interesting case in which to study the relationship between multi-level territorial attachments and attitudes towards welfare and redistribution. The historically strong link between national attachment and the welfare state in Sweden makes it a difficult case, however, in terms of discerning the importance of both sub-national and supra-national attachments.

With the help of Eurobarometer data, it is possible to compare the effects of multi-level territorial attachments across all EU member states. The internal organization of welfare and redistributive policies differs between states, a matter to which I will return in the next chapter. Here the focus is on the general attitudes among all EU citizens regarding the question of the preferred decision level for social policies.

Welfare attitudes in Sweden

In this chapter, the dependent variables regarding attitudes towards welfare have been chosen in accordance with the theoretical aspects of welfare attitudes and state responsibilities discussed above. In the Swedish SOM survey 2004, one set of indicators asks respondents about their opinions on a number of proposals emerging from the political debate. I have selected three proposals that concern welfare policies: reducing the size of the public sector, preventing for-profit companies from running hospitals, and having more private management of health care. Before making any analyses, I will first present the response frequencies, to be better able to explain the indices I will construct later. The three items correspond to different aspects of welfare attitudes.

⁸⁴ The municipalities and counties/regions are responsible for about two thirds of Swedish public consumption, and three quarters of people working in the public sector are employees of municipalities or counties (Johansson, et al. 2001; Montin 2002).

The first captures general welfare attitudes. Despite the range in attitudes evident in Table 4.1, the most common responses to the suggestion to reduce the size of the public sector are either not to take a stand, or to find it a rather bad idea. In the context of Sweden, with its large public sector, these responses can be interpreted as indicating that many people are relatively content with the current size of the public sector. These results correspond to those of international studies, which find ongoing and relatively strong general support for the welfare state, despite the economic pressures and retrenchments of the 1990s (Pierson 2001). The fact that there is variation in the response patterns means it is relevant to use this question in the ensuing analyses, to determine whether there is a relationship with multi-level territorial attachments. The strong national connection to welfare policies suggests a positive relationship with attachments to domestic levels.

Table 4.1 Attitudes towards welfare management, redistribution, and preferred government level of social policies, in Sweden 2004 (per cent)

Opinions about politically debated welfare issues:	Very good idea	Rather good idea	Neither good nor bad idea	Rather bad idea	Very bad idea	Per cent	N
Reducing public sector size	10	19	26	25	19	100	1606
Preventing for-profit companies from running hospitals	28	19	22	19	12	100	1669
More private management of healthcare	10	21	28	21	20	100	1682

Comment: Source: the Swedish SOM study, 2004.

The other two welfare issues concern attitudes about the scope of government involvement in specific welfare policies, or more precisely, the preference for private or public management of healthcare services. These attitudes are relatively evenly distributed in Table 4.1, although there is a small predominance of responses favouring public management. Over the past decade, the number of privately run service institutions has increased in Sweden, and according to these results, approximately one third of Swedes are in favour of such private management in the health sector. However, most of the privately provided health services in Sweden are still publicly financed. These two items will be combined into a health care index and used as a dependent variable in the analyses presented in this chapter.

The Swedish SOM survey contains another set of items asking about a preference for public or private management of six different welfare services.⁸⁵ Respondents are asked to rate, on a scale of between one and five, whether and to what extent they would prefer each public service area to be run only by the public sector (1) or any combination of public and private up to run solely by the private sector (5). Formulated in this more precise way, approximately 40 to 50 per cent of respondents prefer purely public management of each of the six service areas. Unemployment insurance and health insurance are the two areas in which purely public management is most strongly preferred, 52 per cent of respondents preferring that they be run by the public sector only. The lowest preference for public management concerns care of the elderly and hospital care, although 39 and 40 per cent, respectively, still want no private management whatsoever in these service areas. In the later multivariate analyses, these six items will be merged to form a public welfare management index, encompassing more social service areas than does the health care index.⁸⁶

Public management of welfare and social services is assumed to improve the prerequisites for redistribution and equality between citizens, since there is no expectation of profit. The ideal is that such basic services should be supplied to all citizens in accordance with their needs rather than with their resources. Hence, there is a redistributive aspect to the public management of welfare services, closely connected to the national framing of the Swedish *fokhem*, so I anticipate that attachments to domestic levels will be positively related to a preference for public management (naturally under control for other explanations, such as ideology).

In the theoretical section, I proposed incorporating the question of *who* is considered eligible for welfare policies as another aspect of scope. As Ferrera (2005) points out, the eligibility problem is usually solved with the help of territorial boundaries, and corresponds directly to the deservingness criterion of *identity* (van Oorschot 2006). In practical terms, the question of eligibility is thus connected to the aspect of preferred *decision level* concerning welfare policies.

⁸⁵ The six service areas are primary schools, eldercare, hospital care, pensions, unemployment insurance, and health insurance.

⁸⁶ The variables in the public healthcare index correlate between .31 and .49, with a Chronbach's alpha of .68. The variables in the public welfare management index correlate between .44 and .78, with a Chronbach's alpha of .89. Both indices present one-factor solutions in factor analyses.

There are no questions about the preferred decision level in the Swedish SOM 2004 study, but I was fortunately able to include a question regarding multi-level territorial attachments in the Swedish European Union Parliament election study, 2004 (Oscarsson, et al. 2006), where such a question about preferred decision level is available. The most controversial and immediate aspect of decision level applicable to social policies and redistribution is whether or not any such policies should be determined at the EU level. Therefore, it is logical to use the question that asks respondents to rate, on a scale between 1 and 7, the degree to which they prefer a number of policy areas to be determined at the national level only (1) or at the EU level only (7).⁸⁷ According to the Swedish European Union Parliament election study, 2004, very few Swedes prefer any social policy area to be determined solely at the EU level, and the overwhelming majority (approximately 70 per cent) prefers the national level to retain at least most control over welfare decisions. This is not very surprising, considering the history and large scope of the public sector and welfare policies in Sweden, compared to what is usual, on average, in the EU.

The Swedish European Parliament election study, 2004 also included two questions that more directly capture the issue of solidarity with individuals from another EU member state. The questions ask whether or not respondents agree with two different suggestions: 1) to provide social benefits to EU citizens living in Sweden, and 2) to prioritize employing Swedes over other EU citizens who might be willing to come and work in Sweden, if there is unemployment.

Table 4.2 Attitudes towards solidarity with other EU citizens, in Sweden 2004 (per cent)

Solidarity with other EU citizens	Agree completely	Agree partly	Disagree partly	Disagree completely	Per cent	N
Priority to employ Swedes before other EU citizens living in Sweden	38	33	17	12	100	1304
No social welfare rights for EU citizens living in Sweden	20	31	29	20	100	1249

Comment: Source: the Swedish European Union Parliament election study, 2004.

⁸⁷ The policy areas selected as relevant to this study are unemployment, social welfare, educational policy, and taxation policy.

In particular, the question about prioritizing the employment of Swedes was supported by most respondents in the Swedish European Parliament election study, whereas the possibility of providing social welfare to EU citizens living in Sweden garnered almost as much opposition as support. These two groups of questions, capturing the preferred decision level for a number of welfare issues and solidarity with other EU citizens, will be used to create two additive indices.⁸⁸ Given the connection to the eligibility aspect and the deservingness criterion of *identity*, I expect that supra-national attachment will have a positive statistical effect on these attitudes, whereas attachment to domestic levels will have a negative statistical effect.

Welfare attitudes in the European Union

In the Eurobarometer 62.0, 2004, the only questions that are directly relevant to the problems discussed in this chapter are those concerning the preferred decision level for a number of social policies.⁸⁹

The preferred decision level varies across policy areas, as is evident in Figure 4.1, ranging from the preference of most respondents that the national level should determine health and welfare issues, to a rather palpable support for European decision-making when it comes to supporting underdeveloped regions and alleviating poverty.

These are also two policy areas where the EU level is already involved in policy making, and provides financial support via, for example, the structural funds. Economic conditions vary greatly between EU regions, more than between countries, and poverty is especially prevalent in the newest member states.⁹⁰ Transferring the decision-making power regarding these policy areas to the EU level would increase the redistribution between all EU countries. In some countries, such a development is expected to be beneficial, whereas in others it is expected to increase the cost of EU membership and/or decrease existing levels of welfare and social rights. However, there is also (see Figure 4.1) clear opposition to the EU being the decision level for policy areas tied to culture and na-


⁸⁸ The items of the decision level index correlate between .42 and .49 (alpha .77), while the items of the EU citizen solidarity index correlate .33 (alpha .50). Both indices give one-factor solutions. The second index has a somewhat lower alpha score than is preferred in an index, but theoretical and other considerations mean it is still reasonable to construct such an index.

⁸⁹ These policy areas are health and welfare, education, the challenges of an aging population, unemployment, poverty, and support to poor regions.

⁹⁰ The 2004 enlargement involved ten new member states in which over 90 per cent of the population lived in regions where the GNP per capita was below 75 per cent of the EU average (CEC 2004).

tion-building projects, such as education, health, and welfare (Bruter 2005; McEwen & Moreno 2005).

Figure 4.1 Preferred level of decision for different policy areas, in EU25, 2004 (weighted per cent)



Comment: Source: Eurobarometer 62.0, autumn 2004.

Despite the variation between people's attitudes in connection with the various policy areas, the variables do correlate enough to form part of a single index concerning the degree to which a person prefers the EU as the decision level for social policies.⁹¹

The remainder of this chapter is devoted to the empirical analyses, to explore the relationship between multi-level territorial attachments and the welfare attitudes presented here. First, however, I will present a short summary of the theoretical expectations discussed earlier, in the form of four specific questions about this relationship.

Questions of multi-level territorial attachments and welfare attitudes

The expectations concerning the relationship between multi-level territorial attachments and welfare attitudes differ depending on both the particular dimension of multi-level territorial attachments and the type of welfare attitude. The four specific questions below are intended to guide the ensuing empirical analyses, and they summarize the discussions presented in the previous sections by identifying specific expectations.

1. The first question concerns the dimension territorial *level* of attachment (sub-national, national, and supra-national). The horizontal

⁹¹ The correlations vary between .27 and .48, the Chronbach's alpha is .78, and the factor analysis indicates a one-factor solution with factor loadings of approximately .60–.75.

principle implies that territorial attachments to a specific level should be positively related to support for welfare policies at the same territorial level (or to a preference that welfare decisions be made at that level). Together with the solidarity criterion of *identity* and the indirect redistributive features of public services discussed before, I ask how the *level* dimension affects the following attitudes: general welfare attitudes, preference for public or private management of welfare services, preferred decision level for welfare issues, and solidarity with other EU citizens (controlling for other known explanations of welfare attitudes). My theoretical expectation is that, due to the strong historical connection between the nation and welfare policies, people with national or sub-national attachments will be more supportive of welfare policies in general and of the public management of welfare. I also expect such respondents to have less solidarity with other EU citizens, and to be more inclined to prefer that a domestic level of government handle these issues; I expect to see the inverse pattern among people with a supra-national attachment.

2. The second question concerns the dimension *form* of attachment (exclusive, multiple, or nested) and how it relates to the preferred decision level for welfare issues and to solidarity with other EU citizens. In line with the deservingness criterion of *identity*, I expect that people with a nested form of attachment will be more supportive of welfare policies that include a larger group of people (or higher levels) than will people with an exclusive form of territorial attachment. I have no theoretical expectations regarding the effect of *form* of attachment on the preference for public or private management, since this question concerns a change at the same territorial level.

3. The third question concerns the role of the *strength* of territorial attachment dimension. As stated earlier, the mechanism of the deservingness criterion of *identity* only affects the perception of *who* is worthy of support, not necessarily to what degree. Still, it is somewhat plausible that stronger attachment might correspond to a “thicker” feeling of attachment. Thicker feelings are assumed to be more exclusive, which could plausibly be connected to greater support for the pre-existing national welfare system, less preference for joint European decision-making regarding welfare issues, and less solidarity with other EU citizens.

4. The fourth and final question concerns the *combined* effects of these three dimensions, when investigated as the effect of a combined variable, measuring the level or levels to which a person feels *the strongest attachment*. Using such a combined measure, the deserving-

ness criterion of *identity* is more noticeable. Hence, when multi-level territorial attachments are measured in this combined way, my theoretical expectation is that people whose national or sub-national attachments are the strongest will be more supportive of the public sector, prefer public over private management, prefer that a domestic level of government handle welfare issues, and display less solidarity with other EU citizens. I also expect people whose strongest attachment is to the supra-national level to be less supportive of the public sector, display more solidarity with other EU citizens, and be more supportive of EU-level decision-making regarding welfare issues.

Evidently, all these relationships must hold when controlling for other known explanatory factors. In the following section, I will present a short overview of the most important explanations of welfare attitudes, and discuss my selection of the control variables to be included in the empirical analyses.

Control variables

I am selecting control variables from the two broad categories of explanations of welfare attitudes mentioned earlier, namely, “theories of normative values of fairness and social justice” and “theories of the importance of individual self-interest, socio-economic status, and class”.

In the first category, theories of normative values of fairness and social justice, one of the most established explanations of welfare attitudes is *ideology and partisanship* (Borre 2001; Borre & Goul Andersen 1997). Social policy and welfare issues are at the centre of the political debate, and political parties usually have ideologically divergent positions regarding the role and scope of government and welfare policies. Partisanship functions as a shortcut to preferences regarding welfare and redistribution, or as Lipsmeyer and Nordstrom put it, “citizens’ partisan leanings cue their preferences regarding welfare spending and the role of welfare more generally” (Lipsmeyer & Nordstrom 2003). People who support left-wing parties are thus expected to favour expanding welfare programs, increased government spending, and greater government responsibility for public services, than are people who support parties that are more right-wing. Thus, including left-right position, or some other measure of ideology/partisanship, in the analyses as a control variable is theoretically justifiable. Hence, I will control for political ideology by including measures of *left-right position* (1–5) and *support for government party* (1–0) when using the Swedish SOM data,

and a measure of *left-right position* (0–10) in the Swedish European Parliament election study and (1–10) in the Eurobarometer data. It is important that the relationship between territorial attachments and welfare attitudes should still remain after using such a control.

Believing that the system is *fair* is another normative dimension of explanations of social policy preferences. Both procedural and distributive justice can be important. The term “moral economy” has been used to capture this dimension in the field of welfare state attitudes (Mau 2003; Svallfors 2004, 2006). Moral economy usually implies a reciprocal relationship between benefactors and beneficiaries, where the solidarity is conditional on the correspondence between norms of social exchange and policy practices. This aspect varies with the institutional design of the welfare state, and will be further developed in the next chapter. Another example is that if a political system is regarded as fair, in the sense that people pay taxes according to what is conceived to be just, and everyone else does too, then acceptance of the tax system is higher (Liebig & Mau 2005). According to this view, the motivation is not a feeling of altruism, but rather a sense of justice, a preparedness to comply with those just institutions that apply to us (Rawls 1980; Rothstein 1998). Unfortunately there are no good measures of distributional or institutional justice in the data sets we use; however, regarding procedural justice, I will include a subjective measure of how much one believes that one can *influence the EU* (the Swedish EUP election study) or that one’s *voice counts in the EU* (the Eurobarometer).

Turning to the second large group of theories, self-interest and socio-economic status comprise the best known of a group of factors explaining welfare state attitudes, corresponding well to common-sense perceptions of welfare attitudes. To most people, it is fairly intuitive that people who themselves benefit from social welfare policies (or are likely to use them in the future) would be more inclined to favour them.

One important aspect of self-interest is the idea of risk. Some groups of people are supposed to be at greater risk of poverty, unemployment, and ill health, for example, and are thus expected to be more in favour of government spending on social policies and social security (Borre & Goul Andersen 1997; Edlund 1999; Iversen 2005; Oskarsson 2007; Svallfors 1991). This is not just a question of risk in itself; it also involves the costs of premiums, costs that can be anticipated to increase for high-risk groups in a system designed to operate according to market mechanisms. In general, this means that the lower socio-economic strata of society are supposed to be more supportive of redistributive and welfare policies than higher strata are. Socio-economic factors such

as income, age, gender, and class are thought to be important, for example, the poor being more supportive of such policies than the rich, the unemployed more than those who work full-time, and the working class more than the middle class. Working in the public sector is also supposed to enhance the self-interest aspect of supporting welfare policies.

Despite these theoretical expectations, the results of previous empirical investigations are somewhat mixed. Earlier research has demonstrated, for example, that the underprivileged are not as economically “leftist” as could be expected (Derks 2004). In the case of preferences for a social Europe, Mau (2005) demonstrates that there are no apparent differences between high-status and low-status groups. With an increasing number of social policies being of a more general character, more people than those previously cited will benefit from them; the personal gain can be either immediate or expected in the future. Iversen and Soskice (2001), for example, find evidence that people prefer government spending on areas that are particularly useful for their own personal welfare, while other studies identify even non-recipients as very supportive of welfare programs (Sanders 1988). These mixed results can somewhat be explained by the use of different sorts of welfare attitudes as dependent variables, and by how the socio-economic and self-interest factors were measured empirically; notably, however, these results also emphasize that self-interest is not the only relevant explanation of welfare attitudes. Still, including measures of socio-economic status and public service use as control variables in the analyses is clearly theoretically justifiable.

Due to the longer tradition of citing *gender*, *age*, and *education* as explanatory factors, more measures are normally available that capture these aspects in most data sets, so I will control for these factors in all analyses. Some measure of personal *financial situation* will also be included (either income or subjective judgment of personal financial situation), where higher income groups are expected to be less supportive of the public sector for reasons of self-interest. Similarly, one’s *occupational status* is expected to matter, where self-employed and managers are supposed to have less need of social welfare services than the working class does, and are thus assumed to be less supportive. Being employed in the *public sector* provides another kind of self-interested reason for supporting more publicly managed welfare programmes.⁹²

⁹² Whether a person lives in the countryside or a city is sometimes also seen as explaining some welfare attitudes; however, it is not included here, due to my focus on attitudes possibly affected by territorial attachments, for example, preferred decision level.

Finally, concerning questions of which level of government one prefers when it comes to welfare issues (national or European), I also need to include a measure of whether a person believes his or her *country's membership in the EU is a good or a bad thing*. Negative attitudes towards the EU have a strong influence on whether or not one would prefer welfare issues to be determined at the EU level (De Winter & Swyngedouw 1999).⁹³

In the remainder of this chapter I will present the empirical analyses and answers to each of the four chapter-specific questions about the impact of the different dimensions of multi-level territorial attachments on welfare attitudes. I will thus investigate whether the expected relationships remain after controlling for the factors discussed in this part of the chapter.

ANALYSES OF MULTI-LEVEL TERRITORIAL ATTACHMENTS AND WELFARE ATTITUDES

Whether and how multi-level territorial attachments affect welfare attitudes will be investigated according to the four chapter-specific questions about the impact of each of the attachment dimensions (as well as the combined effect). Thus, not all the discussed dependent variables will be analysed in exploring the impact of all the dimensions of attachment.

One group of dependent variables is only found in the Swedish SOM data and concerns *public sector support* and the preference for public or private management of public services. Initial correlations between these variables and the original attachment variables display the expected patterns of positive relationships between attachments to domestic territorial levels and general support for the public sector and a preference for public management in the healthcare sector. In contrast, the correlations are negative between supra-national attachments and support for the public sector.⁹⁴ These attitudes are thought to be influenced only by the *level* of attachment dimension and the *combined* measure of strongest attachment.

⁹³ Since this variable is similar to the dependent variable, I will present two control models, one excluding and one including this EU attitude.

⁹⁴ However, this does not imply a general negative attitude towards redistribution among people with supra-national attachments, for example, the correlation with support for aid to developing countries is .057 (although this factor is not included due to my multi-level system focus).

Another group of dependent variables can be found in the Swedish EUP and the Eurobarometer data, i.e., *solidarity with other EU citizens* and *preferred decision level for welfare issues*. The initial correlations of all the original variables (EUP04) display a relationship between national attachment and support for the preferential employment of Swedes over other EU citizens (in Sweden), and a negative relationship with the inclusion of other EU citizens in the Swedish social security system. Supra-national attachments, on the other hand, tend to correlate positively with solidarity with other EU citizens. National attachment thus seems to have a stronger, but negative, correlation with such solidarity than do public sector attitudes. Since these matters concern welfare and redistribution beyond national borders, this is in line with the theoretical expectations. Preferring the EU as the decision level for welfare and redistributive policies tends to correlate positively with supra-national attachments and more negatively with domestic attachments. These variables will be merged to form indices, allowing us to explore the influence of all the multi-level territorial attachment dimensions.

Level of attachment and welfare attitudes

The *level* dimension is expected to affect a broader range of welfare attitudes than the other two dimensions are, and measures of different aspects of public sector support will be explored in this section. Starting with *general welfare support*, in the first chapter-specific question it was assumed that people with sub-national or national attachments would be more supportive of welfare, due to the historical connection between the national and the welfare state; people with supra-national attachments are accordingly assumed to be less supportive.

The same historical link also makes it plausible that people with national or sub-national attachments would prefer more public than private management of welfare policies in a state (due to the somewhat stronger redistributive features of public management), and be more inclined to prefer that a domestic level of government handle welfare issues. A supra-national attachment can thus be assumed to be comparatively more supportive of private management in a state, and of the idea of having some welfare issues determined at the European level.

The overall patterns of the impact of *level* of attachment are confirmed by the regression analyses (see Table 4.3) of the Swedish SOM data. Some of these results deserve extra attention, starting with *general support for the public sector*. Theoretically, I argue that attachments to

domestic levels could be expected to have a more positive influence on general support for the public sector, given the historical link with the welfare state (especially so in Sweden) (Ferrera 2005). The bivariate effect of *sub-national* attachment supports this expectation, and increases both when controlling for other levels of attachment, and when controlling for other known factors (from .16, to .25 to .32). Since most public sector services are handled by sub-national levels in Sweden, this result is logical.

Table 4.3 Effect of level of attachment on welfare attitudes in the Swedish national SOM survey (unstandardized multivariate OLS estimates)

	General support for the public sector		Public management of healthcare index		Public service management index				
	Basic	Control	Basic	Control	Basic	Control			
<i>Level of attachment</i>									
Sub-national attachment	.16*	.25**	.32***	.20**	.33***	.32***	.18***	.27***	.20***
National attachment	.10	.03	.09	.03	.00	-.09	.11	.10	-.07
Supra-national attachment	.12*	-.16**	.04	-.25***	-.30***	-.16**	-.24***	-.30***	-.16***
Left-right position (1–5)		.45***				-.48***			-.22***
Support government party		.04				.18***			.14***
Male (female = 0)		.12*				.00			.04
Age (in years)		-.01***				.00			.01***
<i>Education (base = low)</i>									
Medium low education		-.01				-.02			-.08
Medium high education		-.22**				-.31***			-.18**
High/university education		-.28**				-.37***			-.28***
Income (eight categories)		-.02				-.04**			-.02*
<i>Profession (base = workers)</i>									
Self-employed		-.11				-.33**			-.01
Managers		.06				-.03			.01
White collars		.25**				-.08			.00
Work in private sector (1–0)		.28***				-.18***			-.22***
<i>Public service evaluation of last year (base = got worse)</i>									
Municipality: is same		.05				.09			.10
Municipality: improved		.07				.07			-.08
National: is same		-.14				-.11			-.04
National: improved		-.41				-.36			-.36
Constant	3.11***	4.91***		3.17***	4.94***		3.94***	4.51***	
Adjusted R^2	.00	.26		.02	.33		.03	.25	
N	1563	1123		1613	1179		1392	1033	

* $p < .10$ ** $p < .05$ *** $p < .01$

Comment: Source: the Swedish SOM study, 2004. The three indices range from 1 to 5, where 5 is the most public-sector-friendly position. The attachment variables are coded 0–1, indicating attachment to the level, but they are not mutually independent, since a person can simultaneously be attached to more than one level. For each index, the left-most estimates in italics display the bivariate relationships, the middle columns present the estimates of the basic model where the effect of the attachment variables is measured when controlling for each other, and the last column displays the estimates of the full model, including the control variables.

More surprising is that national attachment, on the other hand, has no impact whatsoever, not even bivariate, despite the theoretical expectation of the opposite. As discussed in the previous chapter, this result might partly reflect the great number of people who claim to have a national attachment. The results also suggest, however, that the mere presence of national attachment is not salient enough in analysing attachments and welfare attitudes; rather, the full range of multi-level attachments to all territorial levels must be considered.

The effect of supra-national attachment was negative in the bivariate analysis and when controlling for the other levels, but this effect disappeared when the control variables were included in the analysis. The effect of ideology is especially strong, people on the right being less supportive of the public sector, but higher education and working in the private sector also have negative effects. The general public sector is supported by people with local or regional attachments, but not by people with national and supra-national attachments.

The next analysis, presented in the middle columns of Table 4.3, concerns the public health index. Again, I find the same effect of the impact of the sub-national attachment, this time on *preference for the public management of healthcare*. When it comes to the provision of healthcare services, I do find the theoretically expected significant negative effect of supra-national attachment, even when controlling for the other variables, such as left-right position (although in this case the effect is reduced). National attachment still has no effect.

The last columns present a broader index covering more welfare areas in which people can prefer public or private management. The pattern is still the same, except for the slightly lower effect of sub-national attachment when controlling for other factors.⁹⁵

The conclusion so far from the Swedish SOM analyses of public sector support is that the territorial *level* of attachment dimension contributes somewhat to explaining general welfare support and a preference for public or private executive authority over welfare services. In particular, it is sub-national attachment that has a positive effect. Unlike in the previous chapter, where people with supra-national attachments were found to trust political institutions and actors at all levels, here they are found to be less supportive of the public management of welfare policies. Despite the decreased effect evident after controlling for ideology, a small but significant independent effect remains. Hence, the

⁹⁵ It does not matter whether the public service areas are divided into two separate indices according to the level at which they are provided; the patterns remain the same.

third overall challenge to the state might be more serious, although further analyses are needed, especially concerning the possible impact of territorial attachments on solidarity with other EU citizens, and the preferred decision level for welfare policies.

Solidarity with other EU citizens and preferred decision level

Given the theoretically mandated national connection to welfare policies, the really crucial test of who one is prepared to include in the redistributive “us” (van Oorschot 2006) is to focus on solidarity and redistribution at the European level. The EU solidarity index concerns whether one supports the inclusion of other EU citizens in one’s social security system and workforce. The other index concerns whether one prefers social policy issues to be determined at the national or the EU level, and the Swedish EUP study makes it possible to investigate this aspect. The theoretical expectation and some previous empirical results suggest that supra-national identity may have a positive impact on support for welfare policies at the EU level (Mau 2005; Scharpf 1997). In line with these expectations, the regression analyses presented in Table 4.4 indicate the negative effects of national attachments on both solidarity with EU citizens and the preference for the EU as the decision level for welfare issues.

When controlling for socio-economic status, a factor that might explain, for example, resistance to employing non-Swedes in Sweden and to allowing other EU citizens living in Sweden access to Swedish social welfare, the effects decrease somewhat but remain significant. In fact, the negative effect of national attachment remains even when controlling for all other variables, including attitudes towards the EU ($b = -.38$).

People with a supra-national attachment, on the other hand, are more inclined to support the idea of including other EU citizens in the Swedish social service system and in the Swedish work sector, although this effect decreases by half (but remains significant) after the EU attitude is included in the controls.⁹⁶

The finding that one’s opinion of EU membership affects one’s attitude towards this issue is as expected. In fact, it is plausible that some

⁹⁶ A comment on the control variables: In line with the self-interest theories, people with higher education are also more likely to display solidarity with other EU citizens. They are the most mobile category and hence the most likely to themselves benefit from social protection in other EU countries.

of the effect of supra-national attachment could be exerted indirectly via the attitude towards the EU, since the two factors do correlate.⁹⁷

Table 4.4 Effect of level of attachment on welfare attitudes in the Swedish European Parliament election study, 2004 (un-standardized multivariate OLS estimates)

	Solidarity with EU citizens living in Sweden (index)			The EU is the preferred decision level for social policy (index)				
	Control	Incl. EU		Control	Incl. EU			
<i>Level of attachment</i>								
Sub-national attachment	<i>.01</i>	.06	.11	.11	-.00	-.01	.04	.03
National attachment	-.38***	-.51***	-.41**	-.38**	-.11	-.28	-.56**	-.54**
Supra-national attachment	.32***	.34***	.28***	.14**	.72***	.73***	.49***	.19**
Left-right position (0–10)			-.07***	-.07***			.06***	.05**
Can influence the EU (1–0)			.10***	.08**			.20***	.14***
Male (female = 0)			.09	.08			.19**	.17**
Age (in years)			.00	.00			.00	.00
<i>Education (base = low education)</i>								
Medium low education			.14	.16*			.07	.08
Medium high education			.53***	.51***			.39**	.36**
High education			.62***	.60***			.32**	.28*
<i>Exp. financial sit. next year (base = worse)</i>								
Exp. financial situation will be the same			.04	.01			.06	-.04
Exp. financial situation will be improved			.09	.06			.12	.03
<i>Profession (base = workers)</i>								
Self-employed			.23**	.23**			-.05	-.07
Managers			.16*	.15*			.03	-.02
White collar			.04	.03			.06	-.00
Work in private sector (1–0)			.01	-.01			-.01	-.06
<i>EU attitude (base = my country's membership is a bad thing)</i>								
EU membership is neither good or bad				.22**				.57***
EU membership is a good thing				.34***				.84***
Constant	2.54***	2.11***	2.04***	2.63***	1.89***	1.79***		
Adjusted R ²	.05	.15	.17	.09	.12	.17		
N	1203	781	775	1218	801	797		

* $p < .10$ ** $p < .05$ *** $p < .01$

Comment: Source: the Swedish European Union Parliament election study, 2004. The solidarity with EU citizens in Sweden index ranges from 1 to 4, where 4 represents the most solidarity. The social welfare at EU level index ranges from 1 to 7, where 7 signifies that only the EU should make decisions concerning all the included social policy areas. The attachment variables are coded 0 or 1, 1 indicating feeling attachment to the level; however, they are not mutually interdependent, since a person can feel attached to more than one level. The unattached group is excluded. For each index, the left-most estimates in italics indicate the bivariate relationships, the next columns present the estimates of the basic model where the effect of the attachment variables is measured when controlling for each other, and the last columns display the estimates including the control variables (without and with the EU attitude, respectively).

⁹⁷ This effect of the EU attitude is more apparent in the Swedish EUP Election study, because the question of supra-national attachment is formulated as attachment to the European Union, and we know from the SOM study results that general European attachment is broader and less connected to political organization (see Chapter 2).

However, the fact that supra-national attachment still has a significant effect, although small, under these hard controls, only strengthens our interpretation of the results as supporting the theoretical expectations. The effect of supra-national attachment is not just an artefact, and does not merely capture the EU attitude – as is sometimes claimed.

Regarding the issue of *preferred level of government* for welfare policies, the national (in this case, Swedish) and European levels are clearly in opposition to each other. The theoretical expectation is thus that national attachment should have a negative effect, and supra-national attachment a positive effect, when controlling for other explanatory factors. From the results presented in Table 4.4, it is evident that the preferred decision level is strongly affected by the control variable measuring the EU attitude. In the right-hand column, the bivariate effect of supra-national attachment is seen to be .72; it decreases to .49 (although it stays significant) when controlling for most factors, but declines to .19 (still significant) when the EU attitude is also included in the analysis.

Also in line with the theoretical expectation, is the negative effect of national attachment on preferring the EU as the decision level for social policy issues. In fact, when controlling for other known factors, the negative effect increases and becomes significant. This can be interpreted as indicating that the control variables, especially education, were hiding a relationship. Yet again this measure captures something other than just an EU attitude.

Sweden might be a special case when it comes to welfare state issues, given its long tradition of building a strong welfare state. In combination with the known Swedish scepticism towards the EU (Holmberg 2001), the results so far might be specific for the Swedish case and not representative of all Europeans. Therefore, the relationship between territorial level of attachment and preferred decision level has also been analysed using the Eurobarometer data.

The results indicate that national attachment has a strong negative effect on the preference for the EU as the decision level for welfare issues, just slightly decreasing when controlling for the EU attitude (–.62 to –.57). This is the same result as found in the Swedish data. A difference between the data sets is in the effect of the sub-national attachments, which is seen to have a significant negative effect in Table 4.5. This effect seems to have been hidden by counteracting factors in the bivariate analyses, but turns out to be significant and negative (–.14) when the control factors are held constant. Sub-national attachments were

expected to matter in this way, due to the devolution of welfare policies.

Table 4.5 Effect of level of attachment on welfare attitudes in EU25, 2004 (unstandardized multivariate OLS estimates, weighted for EU25)

EU preferred decision level for social policy (index)		Without EU attitude as control	Including EU attitude as control
<i>Level of attachment</i>			
Sub-national attachment	-.00	-.15***	-.14**
National attachment	-.62***	-.61***	-.57***
Supra-national attachment	.96***	.67***	.44***
Left-right position (1–10)		.04***	-.03***
My voice counts in the EU (0–1)		.63***	.45***
Male (female = 0)		.16***	.13***
Age (in years)		-.00***	-.00**
<i>Education</i> (base = stopped before 16 years old)			
Education stopped at 16–19 years		.16***	.16***
Education stopped at 20+ years		.30***	.23***
Still studying		.38***	.26***
<i>Expected household financial situation</i> (base = worse)			
Household financial situation will stay the same		-.01	-.09**
Household financial situation will get better		.00	-.10**
<i>Profession</i> (base = workers)			
Self-employed		-.19***	-.18***
Managers		.06	-.00
White collar		-.06	-.12***
<i>EU attitude</i> (base = my country's membership is a bad thing)			
Membership in the EU is a good thing			1.04***
Membership in the EU is neither a good or bad thing			.53***
Constant	2.85***	3.10***	2.61***
Adjusted R^2	.05	.17	.20
N	21634	16410	16167

* $p < .10$ ** $p < .05$ *** $p < .01$

Comment: Source: Eurobarometer 62.0, autumn 2004. The index is constructed from six items capturing the preferred decision level for social policy and redistribution matters (national level = 0, EU = 1), added to make a 0–6 scale. The attachment items are coded 1 (have such attachment) and 0 (do not have such attachment), but they are not mutually independent. Dummies for all countries but one (Slovenia) have been included in the analyses, but are not presented in the table. All coefficients are weighted according to the national populations in EU25.

A reason these results appear in the European data, but not in the Swedish data, could be the stronger rights of regional levels in some European countries to pass legislation and be solely responsible for all welfare issues. This would make the horizontal principle more apparent in a Europe-wide setting, as will be considered in Chapter 5.

Also notable in the Swedish data is the tendency for supra-national attachments to have a strong positive effect on preferring the EU as the decision level for welfare issues. The effect of the EU attitude as a control is substantial even in the Eurobarometer data, although the effect

does not decrease as much; it might thus be of interest to further analyse the indirect effect on the Eurobarometer data as well. On the other hand, this is a difficult test of my expectations, and the fact that significant effects still remain after I control for the EU attitude confirms my expectations, indicating the theoretical importance of multi-level territorial attachments as interesting and relevant independent variables.

The answer to the first question is that the *level* of attachment dimension matters for welfare attitudes. In the national framework, the public sector and the public management of public services are supported mainly by people with sub-national attachments, even when controlling for such important factors as left-right position; people with supra-national attachments tend to be less supportive. Once we go beyond state borders, however, the patterns change. It is supra-national attachment that has a positive effect on the preference for the EU as the decision level for welfare issues, and on support for the idea of including other EU citizens in national welfare systems and work markets; in contrast, national attachment has a negative effect. In other words, there are signs suggesting the relevance of the *challenge of welfare attitudes*, where increased attachments to other than state levels may contribute to undermining support for welfare state policies.

Form of attachment and welfare attitudes

The second chapter-specific question concerns the *form* dimension of multi-level territorial attachments (exclusive, multiple, or nested). Compared to the *level* dimension, where it was theoretically relevant to expect an impact on all welfare attitudes, this dimension is not expected to be theoretically relevant to some welfare attitudes.⁹⁸

However, it is theoretically justifiable to expect form of attachment to impinge on preferred decision level and on attitudes about solidarity extending beyond national borders. In line with the deservingness criterion of *identity*, people with a nested form of attachment (i.e., who feel attached to all levels) can be expected to be more supportive of welfare policies that extend to more territorial tiers, than can people with an

⁹⁸ I argued in the theoretical section that there are no theoretical reasons to anticipate that the *form* of attachment dimension should have any effect on the preference for *public* versus *private management*, and the analyses conducted support this. It is theoretically unclear what kind of relationship to expect in the case of general welfare support, although multiple and nested attachments could be thought to lead to inclusive, and thus supportive, public sector attitudes. There are no bivariate effects, but under control, both the multiple and nested forms of attachment are found to be positively related (.50 and .61).

exclusive form of territorial attachment (especially since exclusive attachment is generally directed towards domestic levels).⁹⁹

Hence, in the Swedish EUP04 data, the effect on *solidarity with other EU citizens* is analysed, to explore whether or not individuals with nested attachments are more inclined to display solidarity with EU citizens. The results reveal a strange pattern. At first, the bivariate analyses indicate that both exclusive and multiple forms of attachment have negative effects that even increase when controlling for each other (-.69 and -.64), whereas the nested form of attachment changes sign. When controlling for the other explanatory variables, all the estimates become positive, but not significant, regardless of whether or not EU attitude is included (see Table A4.1 in the Appendix). Hence, the results prove my expectations to be wrong, and the *form* of attachment dimension does not affect solidarity with other EU citizens. This result differs greatly from the effect of *form* of attachment on political trust, in which case people with a nested form of attachment were much more trusting of political institutions and politicians at all social levels. However, it is important to remember the difference in nature between the questions of trust and of solidarity across national borders: It is easier to trust institutions, since this does not cost anything.

This is also relevant to *the preferred level of government* to handle decision-making regarding welfare matters. The preferred level could be any level for people with a nested form of attachment, as they are attached to all levels and moreover trust *all* levels more than others do. Still, of the three forms of attachment, it is only the nested type that is expected to be linked to a preference for European decision-making in the welfare sector. For someone with a multiple or an exclusive form of attachment, the preferred decision level would probably be the national level, given the nature of the question (and even more so, since people with exclusive or multiple forms of attachment tend to be attached mainly to domestic levels). The initial bivariate analyses indicate that nested attachments have a positive effect on preferring the EU as the decision level for welfare issue; however, when controlling for other variables this effect disappears, and the direction changes to a negative but not significant effect. The other forms of attachment are also negative under control, but none of the estimates are significant.

⁹⁹ Theoretically, it is of course equally plausible for a person to have an exclusive form of attachment to the European level, but given the national connection to welfare policies, I would still not expect such an exclusive form of attachment to be more supportive of an extension of national solidarity to encompass other EU citizens as well. If anything, the differences might counterbalance each other and have no effect at all.

As it is, *form* of attachment has very little independent explanatory power regarding welfare attitudes in the Swedish data. Sweden, with its long welfare state tradition and known scepticism towards the EU, might be too hard a case on which to test the theoretical expectations. It is time to see whether the same strange pattern appears in the Eurobarometer data regarding the effect of form of attachment.

Table 4.6 Effect of form of attachment on welfare attitudes in EU25, 2004 (unstandardized multivariate OLS estimates, weighted for EU25)

	Index: EU preferred decision level for social policy issues			
	Bivariate	Basic model	Under control (excl. EU attitude)	Under control (including EU attitude)
<i>Form</i> (base = unattached)	.07***			
Exclusive form of attachment	-.12**	-.04	-.00	-.00
Multiple form of attachment	-.72***	-.44***	-.41***	-.38***
Nested form of attachment	.68***	.32***	.02	-.15
Constant		2.87***	2.88***	2.36***
Adjusted R^2		.03	.16	.19
N		21634	16410	16167

* $p < .10$ ** $p < .05$ *** $p < .01$

Comment: Source: Eurobarometer 62.0, autumn 2004. The index is constructed from six items capturing the preferred decision level regarding social policy and redistribution (national level = 0, EU = 1), added to make a scale of 0–6. The attachment items are dummies coded 1 (have such attachment) and 0 (do not have such attachment), with the unattached group as the base category. For information about the control variables, see Table 4.6. No control variables are displayed in the table due to their similarity to the comparable values presented in Table 4.6. All coefficients are weighted according to the national populations in EU25.

The results presented in Table 4.6 indicate that the expectations were only partly met. The multiple form of attachment displays a significant negative effect on the preference for the EU as the decision level for welfare issues. The effect decreases slightly, from $-.44$ to $-.38$, when EU attitude is included in the analysis, but still remains significant. The existence of a multiple form of attachment thus indicates a preference for determining social policy at the national level. In all fairness, this result does not contradict the theoretical expectations; the multiple form tends to be dominated by attachments to domestic levels, which, in line with theory, could lead to a preference for national control of welfare issues.

It is the nested form of attachment that does not display the anticipated pattern; it does have a bivariate positive effect on the preference for the EU as the decision level for welfare issues, which was expected. However, this effect disappears under control, and the direction changes to negative (but insignificantly so) when EU attitude is included. If a person has a nested form of attachment and thus feels at-

tached to all levels, but for whatever reason does not believe his or her country's membership in the EU to be a good thing, it is not very surprising that the preference would be to keep responsibility for welfare issues at the national level. The effect is not significant, however, and the theoretical expectation that nested attachment is the *form* of attachment most likely to have a positive effect on preferring the EU as the decision level is thus not met. I argued that the theoretical expectation, according to the horizontal principle, could be thought to allow a nested-attached person to prefer *any* territorial level, so the results might not be too surprising considering the much-debated issue of a "social Europe". People with nested attachments tend to trust political institutions at all territorial levels, but as the results indicate, that does not mean that they prefer that welfare issues be determined at the EU level.

Strength of attachment and welfare attitudes

The third question for this chapter concerns the role of *strength* of territorial attachment. There are only weak theoretical reasons to expect that stronger feelings of attachment in themselves would affect welfare attitudes, since the deservingness criterion of *identity* is supposed to affect the perception of *who* is worthy of our support, not to what degree.¹⁰⁰ However, it could be argued that *strength* could correspond to what Scharpf (1999) calls "thick identity"; hence, it is more cultural and exclusive, and is thus related to the traditional state-bound welfare policies and less supportive of sharing across borders.

Initially, a feeling of *solidarity with non-Swedish EU citizens* was seen to be negatively related to having either very strong or a mixture of very and fairly strong territorial attachments. However, these effects disappear and become non-significant when the control variables are included in the analyses (see Table A4.2 in the Appendix). Strength of attachment in itself is not a good predictor of Swedes' *preferred decision level* either. In the EUP04 data, the bivariate effects correspond to the above reasoning, but no significant effects remain after including the

¹⁰⁰ For example, *strength* of attachment is not expected to have any effect on inclination towards *public* or *private management* of welfare services, and no such effect emerges in the data either. General public sector support turned out to be somewhat affected by *strength* of attachment when other variables were controlled for. However, there was almost no variation among the different degrees of strength, suggesting that it is the *existence* of an attachment, rather than its *strength*, that is important.

control variables in the analyses. In the Eurobarometer data, however, the pattern is different, as can be seen in Table 4.7.

Table 4.7 Effect of strength of attachment on welfare attitudes in EU25, 2004 (unstandardized multivariate OLS estimates, weighted for EU25)

	Index: EU preferred level of decision for social policy issues			
	Bivariate	Basic model	Under control (but not EU attitude)	Under control (including EU attitude)
<i>Strength</i> (base = unattached)				
Fairly attached	.19***	.21**	.05	-.04
Fairly and very attached	-.19***	-.00	-.21*	-.30***
Very attached	-.02	.06	-.24**	-.31***
Constant		2.86**	2.80***	2.30***
Adjusted R^2		.00	.15	.19
N		21273	16239	16007

* $p < .10$ ** $p < .05$ *** $p < .01$

Comment: Source: Eurobarometer 62.0, autumn 2004. The index is constructed from six items capturing the preferred decision level regarding social policy and redistribution (national level = 0, EU = 1), added to make a range of 0–6. The attachment items are dummies coded 1 (have such attachment) and 0 (do not have such attachment). For information about the control variables, see Table 4.6. No control variables are displayed in the table due to their similarity to the comparable estimates presented in Table 4.6. All coefficients are weighted according to the national populations in EU25.

The reported pattern regarding the effect of *strength* of attachment on decision level preference indicates that those individuals with overall fairly strong degrees of attachment have an initial significant preference for the EU as the decision level, but that the effect becomes insignificant and changes direction when controlling for other common explanations (including EU attitude). The effects of having stronger attachments, where attachments to some levels are fairly strong and others are very strong, or all attachments are very strong, were small and not significant in the basic model (when the factors are controlled for each other). Under control, however, the effect turns out to be significant and negative, and even more so when the EU attitude is included in the analysis.

Such a change can be the result of existing counteractive factors, which disappear when controlling for other factors. The controlled effects of having fairly and very strong attachments can be argued to support the idea that thick identities are more exclusive – but that is something that needs further scrutiny. Despite unclear theoretical expectations and little evidence from the Swedish data, the Eurobarometer results indicate that it might also be relevant to consider the degree of strength when exploring the relationship between multi-level territorial attachments and welfare attitudes. There is no general indication that the stronger the attachment, the stronger the solidarity, and very strong

attachments may in fact render the development of a European social policy very difficult. The third challenge thus may not only concern the role and function of the welfare state, but also some limitations of the multi-level system process. Together with the earlier results presented in this chapter, these results identify the need to explore the effects of combinations of all three dimensions, using the combined variable of strongest attachment.

Combined dimensions of attachment and welfare attitudes

The strongest level of attachment classification combines all three dimensions, and is categorical according to the level, or combination of levels, to which a person has the strongest degree of attachment. It is not a new dimension; instead, aspects of the other three dimensions are captured in one combined measure. There are six different categories: *unattached*, *primarily sub-national*, *all domestic* (combined sub-national and national), *primarily national*, *supra-national etc.* (occasionally one more level attached to), and finally *all levels equal* (people who indicate the same strength of attachment to all levels).¹⁰¹

Earlier, I argued that this combined measure of the three dimensions should be able to detect more clearly the effect on all the welfare attitudes, compared to using each of the dimensions separately. This is because the working mechanism of the deservingness criterion of *identity* (i.e., which influences who we think deserves our support) could be expected to function more precisely when examined this way (i.e., when it concerns not only having an attachment, but also how strong the attachment is and which levels are included).

Regarding *general support for the public sector*, it turns out that the Swedish SOM data (see Table A4.3 in the Appendix) indicate that individuals who are most strongly attached to domestic levels tend to be more supportive of the public sector, clearly in line with the theoretical expectation. Individuals who feel equally strongly attached to all levels are also more supportive of the public sector, which is logical given that they feel equally strongly attached to all levels, including domestic ones. In fact, the least supportive group is the one I call *supra-national etc.*¹⁰²

¹⁰¹ See Chapter 2 for more details about the combined measure of all three dimensions.

¹⁰² I also analyzed the preference for *private* versus *public management* of healthcare and other welfare services. Theoretically, attachment to domestic levels should lead to a stronger preference for public management; unexpectedly, however, the analyses indicate that almost no effect remains when controlling for other factors. Moreover, if six is used as the breakpoint between having and not having an attachment, none of the three Swedish SOM questions are significantly affected.

Leaving the national frame and considering welfare attitudes that concern cross-border issues, this same group is the only one that displays *solidarity with non-Swedish EU citizens* in analyses of the Swedish EUP election study data (see Table 4.8). This group is thus more supportive of offering social welfare benefits to non-Swedish EU citizens staying in Sweden, and of not giving priority to employing Swedish citizens over other EU citizens, even if there is unemployment, than are people with a sub-national attachment (the base category). Theoretically, this is exactly what should be anticipated, since this group not only has supra-national attachment, but also the least attachment to domestic levels.

The results are equally clear, but in the opposite direction, regarding people who have *all domestic* and *primarily national* attachments, i.e., these attachments have negative effects on solidarity with other EU citizens. These effects are in comparison to the *primarily sub-national* group (the base category), and the results hold even when controlling for EU attitude. The *all levels equal* group could theoretically be expected to be supportive of both domestic and supra-national solidarity, which might explain the lack of a significant effect.

Table 4.8 Effect of combined dimensions of attachment on welfare attitudes in the Swedish European Parliament election study, 2004 (unstandardized multivariate OLS estimates)

Combined dimensions	Solidarity with EU citizens in Sweden (index)				EU preferred decision level for welfare issues (index)			
	Bivariate	Basic model	Under control		Bivariate	Basic model	Under control	
			not EU attitude	EU attitude			not EU attitude	EU attitude
<i>Strongest attachment</i> (base = sub-national)								
Unattached		.40	-.68	-.63		-.33	.08	.35
Primarily sub-national	.09				-.02			
All domestic	-.13**	-.19*	-.29***	-.27**	-.27***	-.21	-.34*	-.31*
Primarily national	-.16***	-.19*	-.31***	-.31***	.13*	-.07	-.24	-.24
Supra-national etc.	.61***	.48***	.41***	.33**	.97***	.90***	.33	.12
All levels equal	.29***	.17	-.02	-.11	.48***	.43**	.03	-.15
Constant		2.37***	2.14***	2.05**		2.72***	1.61***	1.53***
Adjusted R^2		.05	.17	.21		.06	.10	.17
N		1197	780	778		1211	799	795

* $p < .10$ ** $p < .05$ *** $p < .01$

Comment: Source: the Swedish European Union Parliament election study, 2004. The solidarity with EU citizens in Sweden index ranges from 1 to 4, where 4 implies the most solidarity. The attachment variables are dummies. For information on control variables, see Table 4.6. No control variables are presented in this table due to their similarity to the values presented in Table 4.6. All estimates are controlled for each other.

The obvious expectation regarding the question of *preferred decision level* is that people who not only *have* a supra-national attachment, but

for whom it is also their *strongest* attachment, should prefer that welfare issues be determined at the EU level. The *supra-national etc.* group meets that criterion, and the bivariate analysis supports such an expectation (0.97), but the effect becomes insignificant when controlling for other factors. In fact, the only significant effect after all the controls have been included, is the negative effect of the *all domestic* group. The effect is negative initially, but when controlling for other factors, such as attitude towards the EU, it becomes insignificant.

These weak effects of the combined measure of attachment on the preferred decision level for welfare policies might be more typical of the Swedish case. Earlier, I mentioned that Sweden might be one of the hardest cases for these analyses, given its generous welfare system and scepticism towards the EU.

Turning to the Eurobarometer data, it is possible to investigate whether these results are merely Swedish artefacts, or whether they are consistent with analyses of all the EU countries regarding the *preferred decision level for welfare policies*. The results in Table 4.9 are clearer when considering all the EU25. As it is, all the estimates remain significant when holding the control factors (including EU attitudes and country dummies) constant – apart from the group of unattached people.

Table 4.9 Effect of combined dimensions of attachment on welfare attitudes in EU25, 2004 (unstandardized multivariate OLS estimates, weighted for EU25)

Combined dimensions	Index: EU preferred level of decision for welfare issues			
	Bivariate	Basic model	Under control (but not EU attitude)	Under control (including EU attitude)
<i>Strongest attachment</i> (base = sub-national)	.21***			
Unattached	-.07	.11	.16	.19*
All domestic	-.47***	-.16***	-.21***	-.32***
Primarily national	.41***	-.16***	-.31***	-.20***
Supra-national etc.	.57***	.69***	.50***	.32***
All levels equal	.62***	.65***	.28***	.16***
Constant		2.76**	2.81***	2.26***
Adjusted R^2		.04	.17	.20
N		21305	16269	16037

* $p < .10$ ** $p < .05$ *** $p < .01$

Comment: Source: Eurobarometer 62.0, autumn 2004. The preferred level of decision index is constructed from six items capturing the preferred decision level regarding social policy and redistribution (national level = 0, EU = 1), added to make a range of 0–6. The attachment items are dummies coded 1 (have such attachment) and 0 (do not have such attachment). The base category is the group of people with sub-national attachments. For information about the control variables, see Table 4.5. No control variables are displayed in the table due to their similarity to the comparable values in Table 4.5. All coefficients are weighted according to the national populations in EU25.

In this analysis, the theoretical expectations are met. People who belong to the *all domestic* or *primarily national* groups are significantly more unsupportive of making welfare decisions at the EU level, even when controlling for the EU attitude. In comparison, having the supra-national level among the strongest attachments has significant positive effects. This is especially apparent in the *supra-national etc.* group, where the effect on preferring that welfare decisions be made at the EU level (.32) is twice that of the other category.

The other significantly positively related (.16) category regarding the preference for the EU as the decision level is the *all levels equal* group, i.e., people equally strongly attached to all levels. The difference between this and the *supra-national etc.* group, both of which encompass supra-national attachment, is notable. The difference indicates that the relationship is not as straightforward as it would be if supra-national attachment automatically led to a stronger preference for the EU as the decision level for welfare issues. For the *all levels equal* group, the connection is weaker, which is logical given that members of this group are equally attached to domestic levels as well. In comparison, regarding the effect on political trust, the order of precedence between these two categories was reversed: the *all levels equal* group had the strongest effect on trust in both supra-national political institutions *and* political institutions at other levels.

These individuals have the most “multi-level” attachment found in this study. Having such an attachment has the strongest impact on higher degrees of political trust, but not the same degree of impact on the preference for a social Europe (where the *supra-national etc.* group has a stronger impact). This situation is understandable in light of the divergent character of these two dependent variables.

Chapter summary, conclusions, and theoretical implications

Chapter 4 explored the third challenge to the state posed by the multi-level system, i.e., the relationship between multi-level territorial attachments and solidarity (or, more precisely, welfare attitudes). Neither the existence of multi-level territorial attachments, nor their impact on political trust, seems to challenge either state legitimacy or the whole multi-level system as such; however, the relationship with solidarity can be argued to be stronger and more exclusive. It is possible to have political trust in several different territorial levels simultaneously without reducing the strength or size of the individual kinds of trust; in contrast, the question of welfare policies or redistribution between levels and

individuals resembles a zero-sum game. It is less demanding to trust than to share.

Theoretically, there are both macro and micro expectations of such a relationship, for example, arguments about the necessary closure of nation state borders as a pre-condition for the establishment of a welfare state (Ferrera 2005), and how the collective identity of the nation makes it possible to override subgroup interests (Offe 2000; Scharpf 2000). Despite some arguments about the causal *direction* of the relationship, most scholars agree on the reciprocity between these phenomena, and there is a clear emphasis on the connection between *national* identity and the welfare *state*.

By drawing on and referring to other normatively based theories of values and of the “moral economy” (Mau 2003; Svallfors 2006), I discuss how multi-level territorial attachments can be expected to matter to welfare attitudes. A key to this is the deservingness criterion of *identity* (van Oorschot 2006), which provides a theoretical explanation of how territorial attachments influence welfare attitudes (i.e., people closer to “us” are seen as more deserving). A logical outgrowth of this explanation is the *horizontal principle* concerning the relationship between attachments and who is considered deserving.

From the theoretical discussion, four specific questions were formulated concerning the relationship between each of the three dimensions of multi-level territorial attachments (and concerning the combined effect of all three dimensions) and different welfare attitudes.

The first question concerned the *level* dimension, and the horizontal principle implied that attachments to a specific level should have a positive effect on welfare attitudes concerning the same territorial level. Analysis of the Swedish data indicates that sub-national attachments are positively related to general support for the public sector and to a preference for the public management of welfare services. People with a supra-national attachment, on the other hand, tend to prefer more private implementation of welfare policies. Notably, these effects remain significant even when controlling for ideology. This result can be understood in light of the strong historical connection between the national and the welfare state. National identity has been suggested to have the effect of overriding subgroup interests; this notion was supported, since the effects hold when controlling for ideological position and socio-economic status. Once we go beyond state borders, however, the pattern changes. It is supra-national attachment that supports the preference for the EU as the decision level for welfare issues, and that fosters extended solidarity that includes other EU citizens; national at-

tachment, in contrast, has a negative impact. Again, all results are controlled for important factors such as ideology and education. In other words, there is some evidence of the relevance of the *challenge of welfare attitudes*, in that increased attachments to other than state levels *may* undermine support for the welfare state.

The second question concerned the *form* dimension, and how it relates to welfare attitudes. In line with the deservingness criterion of *identity*, individuals with a nested form of attachment are expected to be more supportive of welfare policies that include a larger group of people than are those with an exclusive form of territorial attachment. Regarding solidarity with other EU citizens, the results prove my expectations to be wrong: neither the *form* of attachment dimension nor the preference for the EU as the decision level for welfare policies has any effect in the Swedish data. However, the Eurobarometer results indicate that people with a multiple form of attachment prefer the national level as the decision level. In other words, people who possess a nested form of attachment trust political institutions at all territorial levels, but that does not mean that they prefer welfare issues to be determined at the EU level. Compared to the dimension level, the difference is striking: when only attachment to the supra-national level is considered the effect is positive, but not when the *form* indicates that a person is attached to all levels.

The third question concerned the role of the *strength* of territorial attachments. There are few theoretical expectations concerning this dimension taken by itself, since attachment strength does not really concern the question of who is considered deserving (rather than to what degree). On the other hand, strong attachment could correspond to thicker feelings of attachment, assumed to be more exclusive, and thus lead to more support for the pre-existing national welfare system and less preference for EU decision-making regarding welfare issues. Some initial support for such reasoning is discernable, but no estimates remain significant after control for other factors in the Swedish data. In all the EU countries the pattern is for mixed and very strong attachment *strengths* to have significantly negative effects on the preference for the EU as the decision level for welfare issues, lending further support to the idea that “thickness” corresponds to attachment strength. Since it does not hold that the stronger the attachment, the stronger the solidarity, the existence of very strong attachments may obstruct the development of a European social policy. The third challenge thus may not only concern the role and function of the welfare state, but may also limit the further development of the European multi-level system.

The fourth and final question concerned the *combined* effects of these three dimensions, when investigated as the effect of a new, combined variable that categorizes individuals according to the level or levels to which they have the *strongest degree of attachment*. I suggested that the deservingness criterion of *identity* would be more noticeable in the impacts of this variable. Regarding general support for the public sector, people with the strongest attachment to domestic levels tend to be more supportive of the public sector, in line with the theoretical expectation; the group referred to as *supra-national etc.*, i.e., most strongly attached to the supra-national and occasionally to one other level, is the least supportive of the public sector. On the other hand, this is the only group with a positive effect on solidarity with other EU citizens. It is difficult to find any preference for the EU as the decision level for welfare issues in the case of Sweden; however, the Eurobarometer data indicate the anticipated pattern: people with strongest domestic attachments are unsupportive, whereas people who include the supra-national level among their strongest attachments are more supportive. This is especially noticeable for the *supra-national etc.* category. In comparison, people who are equally strongly attached to all levels (*all levels equal*) are the most trusting of all levels, but do not have the strongest preference for a social Europe.

From the analyses presented in this chapter, we can conclude that the theoretical reasoning of Scharpf and other scholars (Offe 2000; Scharpf 1997) is generally supported, and that there is a relationship between territorial attachments and welfare attitudes. General support for the public sector is positively affected by sub-national attachments, and the preference for public management of public services is negatively affected by attachments to levels above the nation state. According to the same logic, there is a pattern of resistance to shifting the responsibility for welfare issues to the European level, if one is not strongly attached to that level.

On the other hand, these conclusions must be discussed with some caution, as more research is needed. One problem is that these relationships have not been analysed at all institutional levels, especially not at the sub-national level. Another possible objection is that the measures (in particular, decision level preference) do not solely capture the sharing of welfare with a broader range of people, but may also capture aspects of power. The attitude towards the EU naturally has a strong impact on whether one would prefer welfare policy issues to be determined at the EU or national level, and is also related to supra-national

attachment. Given such a strong impact, it is remarkable that supra-national attachment still has a significant, albeit small, effect.

Despite these problems, intriguing observations can be made when comparing this chapter's results to those of the previous one. In the previous chapter we noted that having equally strong attachments to all levels, and not simply being attached to the supra-national level, was important in fostering trust in both EU and other institutions. In this chapter, however, the tendency under discussion is different. It is among people with the strongest attachment to the supra-national level, not with equally strong attachments to all levels, that the most positive impact on the preference for the EU as the decision level for welfare policies is found. This supports the initial supposition that, while it is possible simultaneously to trust all political levels equally, transferring decision-making power over welfare issues to a higher political level is a much more sensitive matter. It is more acceptable to consider the EU as a multi-level system in terms of trust than in terms of welfare issues, which is understandable given the position of welfare issues at the core of nation state functioning. Increasing the number of individuals strongly *attached* to all levels of the European multi-level system could thus be expected to raise the degree of political *trust* in the multi-level system as a whole – including the EU level; however, expectations regarding the positive effect of any such increased attachment on support for EU-level decision-making regarding welfare issues are less supported. On the other hand, general public sector support is stronger in this group, as long as there is no question of changing the governmental level responsible for welfare matters.

Chapter 5

The Institutional Context

The earlier chapters have demonstrated that the possibility of individuals having territorial attachments to several levels in fact does not challenge either the role of the state or European integration. Multi-level territorial attachments do not cause decreasing levels of trust in either national political institutions or actors. However, in the previous chapter we saw some indications that multi-level territorial attachments tended to affect welfare attitudes in such a way that, in particular, increasing supra-national attachments might challenge the preconditions for the formation of welfare states, at the same time as support for a social Europe seems to be low. Thus far, all of these analyses have used data applying only to Swedes or to all EU citizens taken together. In this chapter, I suggest that there are important reasons to expect that the impact of multi-level territorial attachments on political trust and welfare attitudes will be influenced by varying institutional context. This context can, for example, comprise structural variations in the institutional structure in which different citizens live, and the varying experiences they have of a multi-level system. At the system level, the strong influence of various institutional contexts could be problematic for individual states and for European integration if the relationships reported in earlier chapters are weaker in certain kinds of countries, for example, in older versus newer member states.

It is reasonable to expect individuals' attitudes to be affected by the institutional contexts in which they live, and this is a common subject of academic study (e.g. Hall 1997; March & Olsen 1989; Svallfors 2007). It may, for example, be intuitively reasonable to expect the relationship between the territorial *level* of attachment dimension and political trust to be stronger in older than in newer EU member states. The territorial restructuring of Europe into a multi-level system (Hooghe & Marks 2001; Keating 2003) can thus be thought to have had its most immediate impact in how the institutional contexts in which citizens exist influence their feelings and attitudes. Hence, theoretical arguments about *how* institutional context can be expected to matter to individual-level relationships need to be elaborated. I will suggest introducing institutional context variation, not as a direct effect, but as an effect on the

relationship between territorial attachments and political trust and welfare attitudes, respectively – something usually known as an *interaction* effect. This presupposes discussion of what institutional contexts would be relevant, and what empirical analyses should be conducted in line with the theoretical model.

It is a demanding undertaking, both theoretically and empirically, to include institutional contexts as interaction effects in a model of the implications of territorial attachments. In this chapter, I will therefore elaborate theoretically on the kinds of institutional contexts that are relevant, and justify why I believe them to matter. Empirically, the objective is rather limited, since analysing institutional context effects could easily be a whole study on its own. However, I will select a number of relevant institutional contexts, representative of different theoretical perspectives, with which to explore the usefulness of the institutional perspective and identify productive areas for further empirical analyses.

I will build on the empirical analyses of the individual-level relationships from previous chapters, but with some important restrictions. One concerns the multi-level territorial attachments; not all three dimensions of multi-level territorial attachments will be included, but the analyses in this chapter will concentrate on the *territorial level* dimension, and on the combination of all dimensions, i.e., the *strongest attachment*. This strategy is motivated by the results of the previous chapters indicating that territorial *level* is the dimension that tends to have the largest impact, and that the other two dimensions (*form* and *strength*) are generally more interesting when all three dimensions are combined. Moreover, due to the overall interest in challenges to the multi-level system, it is the relationship between the *level* dimension and political attitudes that is most relevant for my study. Institutional context variation across countries also implies that only the Eurobarometer data are relevant. This naturally leads to fewer available indicators of political trust and welfare attitudes. The emphasis will be on *trust in national and EU institutions* and on *preference for national or European decision levels*, with reference to a number of social policy areas.

The selection of these individual-level relationships will also affect theoretical arguments about what institutional contexts are relevant to the analyses. All the indicators emphasize territorial levels, especially at the national and the supra-national levels. Apart from the empirical arguments, the focus on territorial levels is also appropriate given the theoretical multi-level approach of the study. As will be discussed in more detail shortly, the relevant institutional contexts must therefore be

connected to the issue of different territorial levels. Before discussing the selection of institutional contexts, I will present a short review of the general theoretical relevance of an institutional context perspective to the study of people's preferences and attitudes.

How institutional contexts matter

In the introduction, I mentioned the close link between the institutions of a nation state and feelings of national attachment. The idea of a state representing people who share a common identity is thought to enhance state legitimacy, and can also be used to justify, for example, redistributive taxation. In particular, the social welfare systems of European states are said to have necessitated the formation of central public institutions of redistribution, which in turn contributed to the indistinct demarcation between society and state. Inter-country differences in historical evolution, combined with these processes of welfare state building, have contributed to for example crystallizing the varying cleavage structures in Europe, and to the emergence of a variety of welfare regimes (Esping-Andersen 1990; Lipset & Rokkan 1967; Rokkan 1999; Rokkan & Urwin 1983).

Moreno and McEwen (2005:3) claim that the nation-building process is still important today, and that modern states must continue this process to survive as national states. Through the development of the welfare state, the state improved its ability to interfere with and shape its citizens' lives. However, the amount and form of social protection guaranteed by the state varies considerably between countries, thus affecting the relationship between citizens' attachments and their political trust and welfare attitudes in different ways.

These differences in institutional design and structural contexts are highlighted as important factors influencing the attitudes and behaviour of individuals in the abundant research into the role of institutions (See e.g. Hall & Taylor 1996; March & Olsen 1989; Peters 1999; Weaver & Rockman 1993). The general idea is that all individuals live in and are thus more or less affected by their surrounding society and institutional context. The nature and amount of this impact must, however, be specified for each institutional context and individual preference, since there is no single, common theory as to how institutions impinge on individual preferences (Huckfeldt & Sprague 1993).¹⁰³

¹⁰³ There are two main theoretical views of the relationship between institutions and individual preferences. The first is rational choice institutionalism, which holds that preferences can only be held by individuals, and thus are exogenous to institutions, but

The model presented in Chapter 1 demonstrates that it is the *interaction* effect of institutional contexts that is the focus.¹⁰⁴ In other words, I am interested in how institutions influence the *relationship* between multi-level territorial attachments and political trust or welfare attitudes, rather than the direct influence one or more of those institutional contexts may have on either one of the individual-level variables. I argue that the relationship between multi-level territorial attachments and political trust or welfare attitudes can differ between various institutional settings. This approach to the influence of the institutional context is more complex, both theoretically and empirically, than simply investigating a direct institutional impact.

One can justify this approach using an example that is also plausible according to a common-sense line of reasoning. For example, for most people it is plausible that trust in EU institutions should be greater in older than in newer member states. However, such an assumption must be explored in more detail, or it will remain unclear whether the connection between the experience of long-term EU membership and trust in EU institutions is really influenced by the longer experience of membership, or by the possibility that more people living in the older member states may have individual features and experiences that make them trust EU institutions more (e.g., more people with a supra-national attachment). Hence, it is necessary to explore the effect of both the individual-level factors and institutional context factors *taken together*, considering how they interact, and controlling for each other.

Moreover, the relationship is not aggregated attachments and aggregated trust in EU institutions; on the contrary, it is the emotional attachments and attitudes of the individuals that I am exploring. Hence, it is also plausible that not all individuals would be affected in exactly the same way by the institutional contexts in which they live. As individuals, they have many unique features and experiences. It is thus likely – continuing the example – that someone with a supra-national attachment will have more trust in EU institutions if he or she lives in a coun-

endogenous to individuals (Hall & Taylor 1996; Peters 1999; Rothstein 1996). Hence, institutions influence the interactions between actors (by shaping how rational certain actions are), but they do not influence the preferences per se. The other approach is more sociological, where institutions are seen as influencing what the actors ought to prefer in a given situation, often referred to as a “logic of appropriateness” (March & Olsen 1989). The role of institutions is thus regarded as more profound in this approach, having the possibility of socially constructing the preferences and identities of actors (Hall & Taylor 1996; Rothstein 1996).

¹⁰⁴ An interaction effect is said to exist when the effect of an independent variable on a dependent variable differs depending on the value of a third variable, known as an interaction or a moderator variable (Jaccard 2001).

try that has been a member of the EU for a long time, than will another person, also with a supra-national attachment, but who lives in a country that is a more recent EU member state. This reasoning provides an example of an interaction effect. This example illustrates how the effect of having a supra-national attachment is *moderated* by the institutional context (in this case an old or new member state) in which a person lives (Jaccard & Turrisi 2003).

Institutional contexts exert their effect by interacting with, or moderating, and thus influencing the relationship between the attachments people have and the attitudes they hold regarding both political trust and decision level preferences. I argue that both individual characteristics and institutional context factors may impinge on individual preferences. However, exactly which of the individual characteristics and institutional context factors are important can vary, depending on which individual-level relationship one is interested in studying.

The selection of institutional context factors

The choice of interaction variables to be included in this study is already partly limited by the *institutional contexts* concept itself. This concept combines the two terms “institution” and “context”, both of which have received much attention in the social sciences. The common ground is the emphasis on structure rather than actors, to refer to an almost classical distinction in political theory (Rothstein 1988).

Starting with the first part of the concept, institutions, one of the most commonly cited definitions of institutions comes from Douglass North, who states that institutions “provide a set of rules of the game that define and limit the choice set” (North 1990:383); this definition is sometimes said to be in accordance with a rational choice institutionalism approach (Hall & Taylor 1996; Peters 1999; Rothstein 1996). In a sociological institutionalism approach, there is normally agreement about defining institutions according to the rules of the game. However, in this approach “rules” does not refer only to the routines and procedures of political activity; instead, the institutions are defined more broadly, to include the beliefs, symbol systems, culture, and moral codes that guide human action (Hall & Taylor 1996; March & Olsen 1989).

The second part of the overall concept, “context”, has in contrast tended to have more of a geographical dimension (Books & Prysby 1991), which seems applicable to this study and its multi-level perspective, although the geographical dimension of the context is debated (see

e.g. Huckfeldt & Sprague 1993). There is also a theoretical distinction between, on the one hand, contextual features based on *compositional* factors, i.e., assigned to the combination (or composition) of people with certain characteristics in an area and, on the other hand, those based on contextual features that cannot be classified according to the individuals' composition, but rather capture objective structural factors. Strömblad (2003) suggests the term *institutional context* as a generic term for the non-compositional factors, able to capture a broad range of variations from, for example, the economic conditions in a particular area to the political institutions at different levels.

In this study, I define the term *institutional context* as a non-compositional institutional variation with a clear territorial level dimension. This is justified by the notion that territorially bounded structuring processes challenge states (Ferrera 2005) and by the overall multi-level system approach, which emphasizes territorially defined political levels. I am not, however, interested in each country as a specific context; instead, different countries will be classified according to their institutional variations.

This provides a general idea of the kinds of institutions that can be relevant to the study. The challenges to the state that I have emphasized concern the institutional context, which can be connected to the development of a multi-level system in Europe in which the political levels both above and beneath the state level increase in importance. Two matters warrant mention. First, the states in Europe have followed different historical paths of evolution, leading to the creation of a broad range of institutional configurations. Second, the loosening of national borders and the impact of European integration has also been a gradual process proceeding at different paces in different countries.

Moreover, to be relevant as interaction variables in my model, the institutional context variables need to be theoretically related to the dependent variables, since an interaction effect can be described as one factor moderating the effect of another factor on the dependent variable (Jaccard & Turrisi 2003). The selection of theoretically relevant institutional context variables is thus facilitated by considering the macro theories, mentioned earlier, that explain political trust and welfare attitudes.

In doing so, I must consider what institutional context factors are justified by both the model and the multi-level perspective, especially the relationship between the national and EU levels. These considerations lead to an emphasis on institutional contexts that can be used to categorize different types of states, in particular, contexts that form part of the

European multi-level political system. I will not delve deeper into the more detailed institutional variation found in each country and consider, for example, the different functions of social security and health-care systems, despite their importance for other research questions (Mau 2003; Rothstein 2001).

Since each institutional context should be individually specified and theoretically justified, I will structure the descriptions of my selected variables according to three broad categories of macro explanations of political trust (and welfare attitudes), highlighting the importance of institutions. Though there are several theoretically possible interaction variables in each category, I will select one institutional context variable from each category (apart from the first category where I investigate three institutional contexts) to serve as interaction variables in my empirical analyses.

Institutional culture

The first broad category of explanations comprises various theories as to the influence of institutional culture on individual attitudes, for example, what is perceived to be natural in a certain institutional context. The type of variation of institutional culture between European countries that is relevant to this study is that concerning the European multi-level territorial system, and more specifically (due to data limitations), the relationship between the national and European levels.

The most important variation of institutional culture for the purposes of this study and from the multi-level perspective is European integration. Hence, I argue that *EU exposure* is important as an interaction variable for the impact of multi-level territorial attachments on both trust in EU institutions and the preference for the EU-level responsibility for social policy issues. EU exposure can be seen as a socialization process, and one aspect can be the duration of EU membership of different countries (Bruter 2005). Exposure to the EU will be measured in two ways in this study. First, as the difference between the newest member states (who joined the year the data were collected, 2004) and the older member states (with at least ten years of EU exposure). This is a dichotomous variable, coded as being a new member state or not. This is a questionable variable, since it could capture other factors than just experience of the EU. Eight of the ten newest member states are former non-democratic states, with all that that implies regarding preconditions for trust in national institutions and so forth. Many of the other member states have varied backgrounds, however, so I will naturally use

country dummies as controls. Moreover, I will also explore this aspect in more detail, by analysing the interaction effect of the *phase of EU enlargement* during which a country became a member of the EU, i.e., original members from the 1950s, 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, or from the newest enlargement of 2004 (see the Appendix for a list of all countries and their coding). This categorization also captures the variety of new dimensions of European integration being added with each successive phase of enlargement (Bruter 2005:59f). In this way, it is even more likely to detect a systematic interaction effect of the exposure to the EU.

The theoretical expectation is that the longer a country has been a member state of the EU, the more its citizens have been exposed to the EU. In the older member states, the manifestations of the EU have been more profound, which I argue can contribute to moderating the relationship between multi-level territorial attachments and trust in EU institutions, or the preference for the EU as the decision level for social policies.

The difference between old and new member states also has theoretical consequences for trust in national political institutions (Linde 2004). In eight of the new member states (not Cyprus and Malta), the political articulation of the national has changed with the end of the communist regimes and the democratization process. Mistrust of old governments and the initial transition problems can thus be expected to interact with the relationship between multi-level territorial attachments and trust in national political institutions, leading to a weaker relationship in the newest member states.

Regarding the *preferred decision level for welfare policies* (national or European), in most European countries the welfare institutions are tightly connected to national, or even sub-national, levels; however, there is also the discussion of whether or not there should be a European social policy (Habermas 2001; Mau 2005). The question of preferred decision level (national or EU) for welfare issues is thus relevant as dependent variable in my analyses. Compared to the question of political trust, which at least in theory can be equally strong in political institutions at all levels, the question of the preferred decision level for welfare issues clearly presupposes a *choice* between territorial levels (see Chapter 4). The specific nature of this question makes it plausible that the interaction effect of being a *new or old member state* will be more pronounced, i.e., that in the older member states people with national attachments will be more negative, and people with supra-national attachments will be more positive towards the EU as the decision level for welfare issues.

One of the most common (but criticized) institutional cultural variations referred to by scholars concerning comparative research into welfare attitudes is the issue of *welfare state regimes*. The best-known categorization is Esping-Andersen's system of three different welfare regimes: the corporatist continental regime, the liberal Anglo-Saxon regime, and the social-democratic Nordic regime (Esping-Andersen 1990). In each of these regimes, the institutional design is based on some sort of "welfare doctrine" (or culture), and the specific configurations of the welfare institutions have been shaped in accordance with the general ideological view or doctrine. The three regimes are thus thought to have different impacts on such diverse factors as the provision of social services, the quality of social rights, and the organization of the labour market (Svallfors 2003).

The idea of welfare regimes has been widely used and much criticized in comparative welfare state research.¹⁰⁵ The regimes have been redefined concerning what countries should be included in each regime,¹⁰⁶ and the welfare regime concept has been expanded, especially by the inclusion of an Eastern European and a Mediterranean regime (Cerami 2005; Ferrera 1996).¹⁰⁷ Since the idea of welfare regimes continues to be used in research, despite the criticism, I have chosen to categorize the EU member states in accordance with the expanded regime, i.e., these five regimes, in line with most common classifications found in previous research (see the Appendix).

I argue that the welfare state regimes should be included as interaction variables in my analyses, since the relationship between multi-level territorial attachments and the preferred decision level for welfare issues can be expected to vary according to the type of regime. This is because the type of welfare regime determines the rules governing entitlement to receive welfare, and thus concerns the deservingness criteria I discussed

¹⁰⁵ The regime concept has been criticized theoretically as well as empirically, as researchers have found more individual variation within countries/regimes than between them (see e.g. Kasza 2002; Svallfors 2003).

¹⁰⁶ Scholars referring to more specific welfare institutions when classifying states still tend to find support for a classification system similar to that of Esping-Andersen, with significant distinctions between social policy in different countries (Korpi & Palme 1998; Saint-Arnaud & Bernard 2003). However, some countries seem more difficult to classify than others, for example, the Netherlands, Cyprus, and Malta are not part of my classification system, since I have not found any good arguments as to the specific welfare regimes to which they should belong.

¹⁰⁷ Apart from the theoretical justification, this addition of two new categories has found empirical support from, for example, the classification of European welfare states according to a large number of social indicators by Ferreira and Figueiredo (2005), who found that the Southern and the Central/Eastern European states clearly clustered as distinct groups.

in Chapter 4, operating as a mechanism between multi-level territorial attachments and welfare attitudes. Svallfors (2006) makes a similar point regarding the moral economy of welfare states, as does Mau (2003), who has developed a motivational taxonomy of how different reciprocity interpretations relate to different institutional welfare settings. He argues that the generalized reciprocity of universal benefits has a stronger solidarity motivation, than does, for example, the insurance-based motivation of a balanced reciprocity system, or the liberal egalitarian ethos characteristic of risk reciprocity (Mau 2003:38). These categories roughly correspond to the Nordic, conservative, and liberal welfare regimes, respectively. In a similar vein, the broader support for universal welfare programs is discussed and explained by Rothstein (2001). Given such arguments, it is reasonable to expect the relationship between multi-level territorial attachments and welfare attitudes to vary between regimes, and to be the strongest in the Nordic welfare regimes, due to the higher degree of solidarity implied by more universal welfare policies.

Compared to the EU exposure factor, the type of welfare regime is more state related and contains less multi-level institutional variation, especially since I cannot consider sub-national levels in connection with it. However, the idea of a *European* social policy may be conceived as more or less threatening (or positive) depending on the experiences and moral codes that characterize different welfare regimes.

Institutional performance

The second theoretical category contains macro theories of institutional performance, economic utility, or self-interest. Regarding trust or welfare attitudes at different political levels, these theories tend to highlight the importance of economic performance or the provision of public goods. For my model, and for the exclusive focus of this chapter on the relationship between the national and EU levels, the main interesting institutional performance aspect is whether or not a country gains economically from EU membership. Both theoretical and empirical investigations have identified the balancing effect of utility- and emotionally based factors concerning legitimacy and political trust. For example, people are more likely to accept less economic gain (or even loss) if emotional support is strong (Easton 1975; Gabel 1998a).

Hence, I argue that it is important to consider whether people live in countries that are *EU net contributors* or *net recipients*. The relationship between multi-level territorial attachments and trust in EU institu-

tions can be moderated by whether one's country is a net contributor or net recipient. The argument is somewhat more complicated regarding the interaction effect of a country being a net contributor to or recipient from the EU on the relationship between multi-level territorial attachments and trust in national institutions. Arguably, gaining from EU membership could reflect positively on a national government, indicating successful negotiations in Brussels. On the other hand, if a country is a net recipient from the EU it could also be seen as indicating poor national economic performance, something expected to decrease national trust (Anderson & Tverdova 2003; Mishler & Rose 2001). Being a net-recipient country is thus expected to interact with the effect of territorial attachments (especially domestic ones) on national trust, making this relationship weaker than in economically stronger countries.

As well, I argue that the institutional context variable of whether a country is a *net contributor* to or *net recipient* from the EU also affects preferred decision level for social policy. In net-contributing countries, EU membership is not connected to economic utility, and it is likely that transferring power over social policy areas to the EU would lead to more redistribution among countries and thus higher costs for the net contributors. This leads to an expectation of an interaction effect on the relationship between multi-level territorial attachments and the preferred decision level for welfare issues. The relationship is supposedly stronger in net-contributing countries, especially concerning the impact of national attachments on resistance to transferring responsibility for social policies to the EU. For net-recipient countries, such a transfer can be expected to increase the economic gain, strengthening support for the idea, especially among people with European attachments.

The categorization is dichotomous (see the Appendix), depending on whether or not a country is a net contributor. The size of the net contributions or receipts has varied somewhat over time, but the categorization captures the status as a net contributor or net recipient over time, since a nation joined the EU.

Institutional procedure or design

The third broad category consists of input theories that emphasize the importance of formal rules and of the fairness of political institutions in enhancing political trust. Much attention has been put into comparing different types of national political institutions and how these institutions affect government quality (Kaiser, et al. 2002; Lijphart 1999) and

human behaviour and attitudes (Rothstein 1998; Weaver & Rockman 1993). Naturally, a number of such political institutions are arguably relevant as an interaction effect on the relationship between territorial attachments and political trust or welfare attitudes. However, my selection must take account of the multi-level system perspective, so the political autonomy of different territorial levels is relevant.

Once a country is an EU member, the relationship between the state and the EU becomes basically the same as it is for all other member countries. However, there is relevant variation between countries concerning the power distribution between different domestic territorial levels. This factor is captured by *government structure*, which can also be referred to as inter-governmental relationships, i.e., how power is distributed between different governmental levels in the political system of a country. Theoretically, the distribution of powers between all political levels is relevant, since the feeling of being represented (and thus political trust) can be expected to increase if strong attachments to regional territories, for example, are matched with political self-determination or influence (Catt & Murphy 2002; McEwen & Moreno 2005).¹⁰⁸

In this chapter, I can only measure trust in institutions at the national and EU levels, and which of these two levels people would prefer made social policy decisions. In this case, variations, for example, in regional strength are redundant for the ensuing analyses. Hence, I am only considering the formal governmental structure of a country, described as either *federal* or *unitary* (see the Appendix), which also is an important part of Lijphart's divided-power dimension of democracy (Lijphart 1999). In federal states, the territorial dimension is institutionalized, and a founding principle is the separation of powers between different levels. Some observers see this separation of powers as a source of institutional conflict (Rahn & Rudolph 2005), while others see such dispersal of power as instrumental in promoting consensus democracy and, by extension, enhancing political trust (Lijphart 1999).

Government structure thus varies between countries, making it an appropriate institutional context factor that can be thought to interact in the relationship between multi-level territorial attachments and trust in national political institutions. Following Lijphart (1999), the relationship between multi-level territorial attachments and political trust –

¹⁰⁸ For other research questions and when more detailed data are available, institutional contexts that better capture the procedure for influencing the EU decision-making structure could be relevant (e.g., number of MEPs, number of votes, and whether a country has one or two commissioners).

especially trust in national institutions – can be expected to be stronger in federal states. Government structure is less immediately relevant to the relationship between multi-level territorial attachments and trust in European political institutions, since the government structure at the European level is the same for all member states. I argue, however, that a nation's pre-existing government structure and division of power might well affect how it fits into the EU level. For example, the EU level could be perceived as just yet another of many levels, in a federal state, or as something unique and very strange, from a unitary state perspective.

In unitary states, the centralization of welfare institutions has given the state influence over the development of social services and emphasized the state as the provider of social security (McEwen & Moreno 2005). In contrast, federal states have usually shared political competencies between different political levels, issues of welfare and social services in particular tending to be considered sub-national responsibilities (Loughlin, et al. 1999).¹⁰⁹ It is thus plausible that, compared to citizens of unitary states, people with sub-national attachments in federal states may be more reluctant to transfer power over these issues to the EU level.¹¹⁰

After this presentation of the theoretically based, three broad categories of institutional context, I will proceed to the specific questions that guide the empirical analyses presented in this chapter. Moreover, the questions will specify in more detail the expectations as to the impact of each of the institutional contexts when included as interaction variables in the analyses.

Questions about the interaction effects of institutional contexts

The theoretical part and the discussion of which institutional context variables to include as interaction variables were structured around three broad categories of macro explanations of political trust and wel-

¹⁰⁹ It should be remembered that the devolution process in Europe has resulted in a shift of power over welfare issues to local or regional levels in most countries; legislative power, however, still remains centralized in many unitary states.

¹¹⁰ In a similar vein, the *electoral systems* of different countries could be justified since they comprise another political institution commonly cited as important for the quality of democracy, political trust, and welfare policy (Lijphart 1999; Rahn & Rudolph 2005). Regarding social policy, for example, Iversen and Soskice (2006) have shown that countries with proportional electoral systems tend to redistribute more resources than others do. However, due to the lack of variation at the EU level, and to the difficulties of theoretically arguing a plausible chain of cause and effect at this level, I have excluded this factor from the analyses.

fare attitudes. The specific questions and preliminary empirical analyses presented in this chapter will also focus on these three aspects.

First, I would like to consider the interaction effect of *institutional culture* on the relationship between territorial attachments and political trust and preferred decision level for welfare issues, respectively. With regard to institutional culture, I am specifically interested in the EU exposure, measured as *new or old member state* or the *phase of enlargement* when a country joined the EU.¹¹¹ In the older member states, the experience and the political articulations of the EU have been more profound, so I expect supra-national attachment to have a stronger impact on trust in EU institutions in older than in newer member states. Moreover, most newer member states are still struggling with the democratic transition process, so I expect the relationship between national attachments and national trust to be stronger in the older member states. To continue this argument, I also expect *old or new member state* to affect the relationship between multi-level territorial attachments and the preferred decision level for welfare issues. The assumption is that national attachment will be more negatively related, and supra-national attachment more positively related, in the old member states.

The variation in *welfare regime* between countries might also have an interaction effect. There are theoretical reasons to expect more resistance to transferring responsibility for social policies to the EU level in welfare regimes with many universal and redistributive features. Hence, I especially expect the impact of national attachment to have a stronger negative effect in the Nordic welfare regime.

Second, I want to know whether *institutional performance* has a moderating effect on the relationship between multi-level territorial attachments and political trust or preferred decision level for welfare issues. Institutional performance will be captured by whether a country is a *net contributor to or net recipient from the EU*. Since affective feelings are assumed to be able to balance issues of institutional performance concerning legitimacy, I expect supra-national attachment to be more important to trust in EU institutions in countries that are net contributors. On the other hand, it is plausible that the combination of supra-national attachment and economic gain may lead to a stronger positive effect on EU trust in net-recipient countries. The flip side of the latter argument leads to an expectation of a stronger relationship be-

¹¹¹ *New or old member state* is coded 1 for new and 0 for old. The *phase of enlargement* categories are 1950s, 1970s, 1980s, and 2004, and dummy coding using the 2004 group as the reference category.

tween territorial attachments (especially domestic ones) and national trust in the net-contributing countries, since the economic performance of the national institutions is lower in net-contributing countries.

Since the issue of EU-level decision-making regarding welfare issues has stronger consequences and is a clear issue of choice of one level over another, I believe that the moderating effect of living in a net-contributing or net-recipient country will be even more noticeable. The expectation is that the preference for national-level responsibility for welfare issues will be stronger among people with a national attachment in net-contributing than in net-recipient countries. It is also plausible that in a net-contributing country, only people with supra-national attachments would support the idea of a social dimension of the EU, since this probably would increase the cost of EU membership for their country.

Third, I will highlight the possible interaction effect of variations in formal institutional design or procedure. I will analyse how the *government structure* (federal or unitary state) interacts with the effect of multi-level territorial attachments on political trust and on preferred level of government for welfare issues. Since the idea of separation of powers between territorial levels is part of the federal system, I expect the effect of multi-level territorial attachments on political trust to be stronger in federal than in unitary states. Regarding the preferred decision level for social policies, such policies are normally the responsibility of sub-national levels in federal states. The idea of transferring the responsibility for these issues to the EU level can thus be expected to be resisted more strongly among people with a sub-national attachment in federal than in unitary states.

Methodological aspects

Including interaction effects in my theoretical model increases the complexity of the empirical analyses and renders the interpretation of the results more difficult. Due to the model's increased complexity, the analyses in this chapter should merely be considered preliminary investigations of theoretically interesting effects, which clearly could be analysed in more detail, including more interaction variables and using more statistically advanced methods.¹¹²

¹¹² For forthcoming and more advanced statistical investigations of the effect of macro-level variations on individual level outcomes, the multilevel analysis approach can be useful (see, e.g., (Snijders & Bosker 1999)).

Moreover, the overall aim of this chapter is wider than that of the empirical analyses contained in it. The overall aim includes: 1) theoretically examining the relevant kinds of institutional contexts to find a way in which they may affect the relationships between multi-level territorial attachments and political trust or welfare attitudes, and 2) exploring whether there are any indications of empirical support for these theoretical arguments. Given the overall explorative approach of this study, I argue that analysing the interaction effects of theoretically relevant factors is a reasonable first step in investigating whether institutional contexts matter to the individual-level relationships in a theoretically logical way. If there are no indications of any interaction effects (despite their varying theoretical features), the justification for continuing to do more advanced analyses is clearly weakened.

The main challenge to the statistical analyses presented in this chapter is including an interaction term in the regression analyses, and interpreting the results. I will use multiplicative interaction terms, and for each institutional context analysis will include the institutional context variables (dummy coding, 0–1) and multiplicative interaction terms that are the products of the independent variable(s) of interest and the institutional variable (Jaccard & Turrisi 2003).¹¹³ The large number of variables in a regression table that includes multiplicative interaction terms can be confusing. For simplicity, I will therefore only display the effect of each independent variable (calculated twice to give the results for both values of the institutional context), and indicate whether the interaction term is significant by itself (in an extra column or using bold-faced type). Though it may appear that the regression has been run twice, once for each group of individuals, this is not the case.

In OLS regression analyses, the coefficients can be interpreted as follows. The original attachment variables (e.g., sub-national attachment) indicate the effect when the interaction variable and all other variables in the model are zero. For pedagogical reasons, I will also calculate the coefficients for when the interaction variable is one. However, to investigate whether or not the difference between these coefficients is significant, the product terms must be consulted. The coefficients of the product terms indicate the difference in effect between the interaction groups, and whether or not this difference is significant.

Interaction effects are especially challenging to handle in logistic regression analyses. The dependent variables in logistic regression analy-

¹¹³ For example, I will include a dummy variable capturing whether or not a country is unitary, and three variables multiplying “unitary” by sub-national, national, and supra-national attachment.

ses are not scales but categorical, hence the relationship with the independent variables is non-linear (i.e., the estimated effect is not the same for all values of the independent variable). This makes interpreting the coefficients even more difficult; hence, in Chapter 3, I presented the predicted probabilities for trusting all the institutions included in each trust index, to facilitate the interpretation of the results. In logistic regression analyses, however, the predicted probabilities do not function in the same manner, and sometimes produce illogical results when multiplicative interaction terms are included. Hence, Jaccard (2001) recommends using the *odds ratios* instead, to help the interpretation of interaction effects in logistic regression analyses. The odds ratios of the multiplicative interaction terms provide some basis for determining whether or not the difference in odds ratios between the interaction groups is significant.¹¹⁴

INTERACTION EFFECTS OF INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXTS

It is time to focus on the second part of the aim of this chapter, namely, the empirical analyses of interaction effects in the Eurobarometer data. The approach is explorative, and I will discuss the interpretation of the results in light of the theoretical expectations presented in the specific questions above. The three questions for this chapter correspond to three kinds of theoretically justified interaction effects; the results section is structured similarly, starting with institutional culture as an interaction effect.

Institutional culture as interaction effect

The first question is how institutional culture can matter as an interaction effect on the relationship between multi-level territorial attachments, and political trust and preferred decision level for welfare issues, respectively. Starting with the relationship between territorial attachments and political trust, I am including EU exposure as an interaction effect. EU exposure is measured in two different ways: as the difference between old and new member states (since 2004), and as the specific phase of enlargement in which a country joined the EU. In the older

¹¹⁴ The use of odds ratios in interpreting interaction effects in logistic regressions has been debated (See e.g. Norton, et al. 2004). The exponent of the coefficient of the interaction term is not an odds ratio, but rather the odds ratio of the odds ratios between groups. However, given that predicted probabilities are even more criticized, odds ratios are seen as the better option of the two.

member states, the experience and manifestations of the EU have been more profound, so I expect supra-national attachment to have a stronger impact on trust in EU institutions in older than in newer member states. Another expectation is that, since most newer member states are still in a democratic transition process, it is reasonable to expect the relationship between national attachments and national trust to be stronger in older member states.

This last expectation is met to some extent. In the uppermost part of Table 5.1, I first indicate the direct effect of belonging to a new member state on political trust; this direct effect is negative, indicating that the degrees of national trust are lower overall in newer than in older EU member states.¹¹⁵ The next two columns present the estimates from the ordered logistic regression analyses including multiplicative interaction terms (although these interaction terms are suppressed for simplicity). I have also, after the regression, calculated the coefficients for the new member states, for easier comparison. The coefficients reported in Table 5.1 are thus computed in ordered logistic regression models incorporating multiplicative interaction terms, and the *Sig.* column indicates whether and to what degree the difference between the two groups of countries (old and new) is significant. In this manner I have investigated the interaction effect of living in an old or a new (i.e., since 2004) member state and of having, or not having, an attachment to each of the levels.

The estimated relationships between the *territorial level* dimension (especially national and supra-national attachment) and *national trust* are stronger in the older than the newer member states. However, the differences are almost not significant; supra-national attachments have a somewhat more positive effect on national trust in the older than the newer member states, though this difference is barely significant.¹¹⁶ If the differences between the two types of countries are significant, this is indicated in Table 5.1 by the asterisks appearing in the *Sig.* column

¹¹⁵ As in Chapter 3, the trust indices are not scales, but refer to the number of institutions trusted, making it better to use an ordered logistic regression analysis.

¹¹⁶ The estimates in logistic regression analyses are difficult to interpret, so it is common to use other techniques to facilitate the interpretation of strength of effects. In Chapter 3, predicted probabilities were used, however, it is much debated whether they should be used when interpreting *interaction* effects in logistic regressions, so I have calculated odds ratios instead. Odds ratios are produced by dividing the odds of one group by those of the other. If the two odds are identical, the odds ratio equals 1.0. If the odds of one group differ from those of the other, the odds ratio will deviate from 1.0, the further away from 1.0, the more significant the difference between the groups. In this case, each odds ratio indicates the difference in odds between having an attachment (e.g., sub-national) and not having the attachment (or the base category *unattached* for the combined measure).

(indicating that the suppressed multiplicative interaction terms were significant).

Table 5.1 New member state as interaction effect on the relationship between multi-level territorial attachments and trust in national and EU institutions, EU25, 2004 (logistic regression coefficients and odds ratios)

	Interaction effects				Odds ratios	
	Direct effect	Old member states	New member states	Sig.	Old member states	New member states
National trust index						
<i>Level of attachment:</i>						
Sub-national	.18***	.15**	.47**		1.167	1.598
National	.70***	.72***	.38		2.046	1.463
Supra-national	.25***	.27***	.05	*	1.312	1.046
New member state	1.68***	-1.47**				
<i>Strongest attachment:</i>						
Primarily sub-national	.60***	.70***	-.10	*	2.005	0.902
All domestic	1.01***	1.13***	-.07	***	3.110	0.937
Primarily national	.89***	.99***	.03	**	2.696	1.035
Supra-national etc.	.78***	.88***	-.04	**	2.400	1.045
All levels equal	1.05***	1.16***	.16	**	3.196	1.176
New member state	.02	1.05**				
Supra-national trust index						
<i>Level of attachment:</i>						
Sub-national	.28***	.30***	.20		1.348	1.225
National	.24***	.27***	-.12	(*)	1.316	0.884
Supra-national	.81***	.83***	.73		2.282	2.078
New member state	.44	.98				
<i>Strongest attachment:</i>						
Primarily sub-national	.51***	.52***	.74		1.678	1.605
All domestic	.72***	.75***	.57		2.111	1.767
Primarily national	.49***	.48***	.57		1.614	1.763
Supra-national etc.	.74***	.72***	.86**		2.062	2.364
All levels equal	1.09***	1.10***	1.02***		2.745	2.785
New member state	.45	.51				

* $p < .10$ ** $p < .05$ *** $p < .01$

Comment: Source: the Eurobarometer 62.0, 2004. For information on the trust indexes, see Chapter 3. *The national index* ranges from 0 (tend to trust no institution) to 2 (tend to trust both institutions in the index). *The supra-national index* ranges from 0 (tend to trust no institution) to 3 (tend to trust all three institutions in the index). The attachment items are coded 1 (have such attachment) and 0 (do not have such attachment). The *Level of attachment* items are not mutually independent, but the *Strongest attachment* items are, with the unattached group as the base category. All the coefficients are computed controlling for the control variables used in Chapter 3, plus multiplicative interaction terms, although they are suppressed in the table. The *Sig.* column indicates whether or not the multiplicative interaction term and the odds ratio are significant, and hence whether the difference in effect between the two categories of countries is significant.

The relationship between multi-level territorial attachments and trust in national political institutions is also measured as the impact of the combined measure, *strongest attachment*. Compared to the *level* dimension, this combined measure is mutually exclusive, and all the results should be interpreted in relation to the group of unattached people, which is the reference category. It is clear from both the coefficients (all

the multiplicative interaction terms were significant, as indicated in the *Sig.* column) and the odds ratios indicating that, regardless of a person's territorial attachment, the positive relationship with national trust is stronger in older than in newer member states.¹¹⁷

It is also necessary to do the analyses in more detail, considering the specific phase of enlargement in which a country joined the EU (see Table A5.2 in the Appendix). This is not only a question of duration of EU exposure; rather, the meaning of European integration has changed, becoming more supra-national and involving several more areas of decision-making responsibility. Bruter (2005), for example, has discussed the differences between the dominant ideas characterizing each of the five earliest phases of enlargement, indicating that they might have had different impacts on individuals who became citizens of Europe at different times. Therefore, I am analysing the possible interaction effect of each phase of EU enlargement separately; in so doing, the pattern becomes even clearer. In these analyses, the interaction effect of each enlargement phase is compared to that of the 2004 enlargement, indicating that *strongest level of attachment* has significant positive effects on national trust in the very oldest member states that joined in 1958 and in 1973; moreover, the multiplicative interaction terms are significant too, indicating that this institutional context difference is significant.

These results correspond to the idea of the development of a multi-level system in Europe over time. Regardless of the level to which a person has the strongest attachment (in the countries that joined the EU in 1958 or 1973), there is a positive relationship with trust in national political institutions. Neither supra-national nor sub-national attachments are perceived as conflicting with trust in national institutions in these countries. In comparison, in countries that joined the EU in the 1980s, sub-national attachment is negatively related to national trust, whereas it is positively related in the countries that joined in the 1990s. Supra-national attachment tends to be mainly positively related to national trust in all groups, apart from the newest member states. Hence, the fear that the European multi-level system will challenge the role of the state is not supported concerning trust in national political institutions. In fact, since this relationship seems to be the strongest in the

¹¹⁷ The odds ratios indicate that the odds are between two and three times stronger that attached, rather than non-attached, people in older member states will trust national political institutions. In comparison, there is no such pattern in the new member states, where the odds ratios are close to 1.0, indicating almost no difference between being attached or not.

oldest member states, it could be seen as supporting the idea of an integrated multi-level system; with time, such a system might well come to be perceived as more natural by the citizens – at least as reflected by trust in national political institutions.

Turning to *supra-national trust* (lower half of Table 5.1), I expected supra-national attachment to have a stronger positive impact in older than in newer member states, due to, for example, longer exposure to the EU. Apart from the different significances of the integration at the different enlargement phases mentioned above, there is also the situation that the longer a country has been a member state, the more its citizens have been exposed to EU institutions, and the more pronounced the manifestations of the EU. Surprisingly enough, however, there is no support for such notions. Indeed, there are positive significant relationships between all *levels* of attachment and supra-national trust in the old member states; however, the relationships seem, despite not being significant, to be similar in the newest member states, so there is no interaction effect of living in an old or new member state.¹¹⁸ The idea of an interaction effect of longer EU exposure in the older member states is thus not supported. The same pattern of similar results between the older and newer member states also appears when analysing the impact of *strongest attachment* on supra-national trust. There is no indication of the expected interaction effect. When I conduct more detailed analyses, looking at the possible interaction effect of each enlargement phase, there are a few indications of supra-national attachment having a stronger impact in the earliest enlargement phases, but the differences are weak (see the Appendix).¹¹⁹

Whether one lives in an old or new member state can also be expected to moderate the effect of individuals' multi-level territorial attachments on the *preferred decision level for welfare issues*. Although welfare institutions and policies in most European countries are closely connected to the national, or sub-national, levels, there is discussion of whether or not there should be a European social policy, making relevant the question of individual preference for national- or European-level responsibility for welfare issues. In Chapter 4, I discussed how the matter of pre-

¹¹⁸ There is only one almost significant difference in the multiplicative interaction term of the difference in national attachment, which has a positive effect in the older, but a negative effect in the newer member states. This is also evident in the odds ratios for trusting all supra-national institutions, which are over 1.0 for the older and under 1.0 for the newer member states.

¹¹⁹ The expected pattern appears when the analyses are done without country dummies; once the country dummies are included, however, the interaction effects become non-significant.

ferred decision level presupposes that people take a stand, choosing between the national and supra-national level, unlike the matter of political trust. Because of this, and because of the historically strong connection between the welfare state and national attachment, multi-level territorial attachments can be expected to have stronger effects on preferred decision level in older than in newer member states. The expectation is that national attachment should be more negatively, and supra-national attachment more positively, related to the idea of the EU as the decision level for welfare issues, in older member states. This expected pattern is found to some extent in Table 5.2, both only when focusing on the impact of *level* of attachment and the combined measure of *strongest attachment*.

Table 5.2 New member state as interaction effect on the relationship between multi-level territorial attachments and preferred decision level for welfare issues, EU25, 2004 (OLS regression coefficients)

Social policies should be determined at the EU level	Direct effect	Interaction effects		Significant interaction effect
		Old member states	New member states	
<i>Level of attachment:</i>				
Sub-national	-.14**	-.16***	-.02	
National	-.57***	-.62***	-.07	***
Supra-national	.44***	.46***	.29***	*
New member state	.31			
<i>Strongest attachment:</i>				
Unattached	.24**	.26**	-.28	
All domestic	-.27***	-.37***	.03	***
Primarily national	-.17***	-.22***	.10	
Supra-national etc.	.42***	.38***	.24*	
All levels equal	.23***	.18***	.10	
New member state	.29	.19		

* $p < .10$ ** $p < .05$ *** $p < .01$

Comment: Source: the Eurobarometer 62.0, 2004. See Chapter 4 for more information on the preferred decision level index, which ranges from 0 to 6. The attachment items are coded 1 (have such attachment) and 0 (do not have such attachment). The *level of attachment* items are not mutually independent, whereas the *strongest attachment* items are, with the sub-national attachment group as the base category. All the coefficients are computed controlling for the control variables used in Chapter 4, plus the multiplicative interaction terms, although they are suppressed in the table. The rightmost column indicates whether or not the multiplicative interaction terms are significant, and hence whether the difference in effect between the two categories of countries is significant.

The results are from a standard OLS regression with multiplicative interaction terms (suppressed, but indicated by stars in the rightmost column if significant), and the results concerning the *level* dimension indicate that the effect of being attached to both the national and supra-national levels affects the preferred decision level for social policies in the expected manner. National attachment has a stronger negative impact in the older than the newer member states. Supra-national attach-

ment is positively related, but more strongly so in the old member states. The differences between older and newer member states are significant, since the multiplicative interaction terms are significant (although these are not displayed in the table). The lower half of the table presents the *strongest attachment* classification, where there is only one clear interaction effect. Despite the overall congruency with the expected pattern, only those people whose strongest attachments are *all domestic* significantly differ in their impact on preferred decision level for welfare issues, between old and new states.

This pattern is even clearer when considering each of the *enlargement phases*. In the oldest member states (joining in 1958 and 1973), people with national attachments are most opposed to transferring decision-making power over social policies to the EU, whereas people with supra-national attachments in these countries are the most in favour. The differences from the newer groups of countries are significant, according to the multiplicative interaction terms (although they are suppressed in the table; however, the significant differences are emphasized in boldfaced type). The pattern is the same for the other groups of countries, but is weaker and lacks significant differences.

Table 5.3 Phase of joining the EU as interaction effect on the relationship between level of attachment and preferred decision level for welfare issues, EU25, 2004 (OLS regression coefficients)

Phase of EU admission	Social policies should be determined at the EU level				
	1958	1973	1980s	1995	2004
<i>Level of attachment:</i>					
Sub-national	-.13*	-.16	-.26	-.12	-.02
National	-.64***	-.76***	-.31**	-.47*	-.07
Supra-national	.43***	.77***	.22***	.32**	.29***
<i>Strongest attachment:</i>					
Unattached	.25*	.44	.25	-.26	-.28
All domestic	-.42***	-.36***	-.18*	-.32	.03
Primarily national	-.24***	-.12	-.23	-.20	.10
Supra-national etc.	.36***	.72***	-.02	.09	.24
All levels equal	.13**	.51***	.24**	-.10	.10

* $p < .10$ ** $p < .05$ *** $p < .01$

Comment: Source: the Eurobarometer 62.0, 2004. The preferred decision level index is constructed from six items (national level = 0, EU = 1), added to make a range of 0–6. The attachment items are coded 1 (have such attachment) and 0 (do not have such attachment). The *level of attachment* items are not mutually independent, but the *strongest attachment* items are, with the group of *primarily sub-national* attachment as the base category. All the coefficients are computed controlling for the control variables used in Chapter 4, plus the multiplicative interaction terms, although they are suppressed in the table. The boldfaced coefficients are significantly different from the base category.

When considering not only political trust, but also willingness to transfer decision-making concerning social policies to the EU level, there is a pronounced tendency for level of attachment to have a stronger impact in the older member states. The stronger resistance of people with national attachments, and the stronger support of people with supra-national attachments, is in line with the theoretical expectations.

Living in a nation that has been an EU member state for longer does not seem to influence the relationship between territorial attachments and trust in EU institutions, nor does it make people with national attachments more willing to support the EU as the decision level for welfare issues (though people with supra-national attachments are more supportive than others). For those who advocate the future development of a social Europe, these are not encouraging results.

A different aspect of this institutional culture category is that of *welfare regime*. I discussed earlier how the different welfare regimes encompass different welfare and redistribution regimes, and how the type of welfare regime determines the rules governing entitlement to receive welfare. These rules are closely connected to the deservingness criterion that functions as a mechanism between multi-level territorial attachments and welfare attitudes, so it is plausible that the welfare regime in which a person lives could moderate the relationship between his or her territorial (especially national) attachments and attitudes towards the preferred decision level for social policy issues.

The theoretical expectation is that the idea of a common European social policy can be seen as more or less positive depending on the kind of welfare regime in which a person currently lives. The expectation is that resistance to EU-level decision-making regarding social policy issues might be stronger among people with national attachments who live in regimes with more universal and redistributive features (i.e., the Nordic regime), because of the stronger solidarity base of such a regime (Mau 2003). As can be seen in the Appendix (Table A5.4), however, this is not at all the pattern revealed by the analyses. Instead, resistance to EU-level decision-making regarding welfare issues is stronger among people with national attachments in corporatist and liberal regimes. On the other hand, the most supportive attitudes are also found in these regimes, among people with supra-national attachments. These differences are at least partly significant, according to the multiplicative interaction terms.

The institutional context of welfare regime thus did not produce the expected effect. This could be because many of the corporatist and liberal welfare regimes examined are initial or early member states of the

EU, characteristics that could also account for the detected pattern. It is necessary to continue to analyse different institutional cultural variations as institutional contexts, but preferably using other data and methods, to allow consideration of more institutional context variation.

Institutional performance as interaction effect

The second specific question examined in this chapter is whether, and how, institutional performance can have a moderating effect on the relationship between multi-level territorial attachments and political trust or the preferred decision level for welfare issues. The most relevant institutional performance variable for this study is to consider whether a country is a net contributor to or net recipient from the EU. The overall expectation is that the *cost* of EU membership will increase the importance of multi-level territorial attachments in net-contributing countries, making the effects larger. In this section, Easton's idea of a balance between diffuse and specific support will be explored by considering the relationship between individuals' feelings of attachments and the economic utility of EU membership.

The overall stronger effects of territorial attachments in the net-contributing countries are not supported empirically in Table 5.4, but regarding *trust in national political institutions* there is such a pattern, especially when investigating the interaction effects of net contribution and *strongest attachment* on national political trust. The results of the ordered logistic regression analyses indicate that every one of the attachment categories has a stronger positive effect on national political trust in net-contributing countries than does the unattached group.

The differences between the net-contributing and net-recipient countries are significant according to both the multiplicative interaction terms (suppressed, but the level of significance is displayed by asterisks in the *Sig.* column) and the odds ratios. One example is the group of people who feel equally attached to all levels. They tend to trust their national political institutions in both groups of countries, but the difference between them and unattached people is greater in the net-contributing countries (the odds ratio is slightly over 1.6 in the net-recipient countries, but is almost 3.5 times higher in the net-contributing countries).

For the *supra-national trust index*, supra-national attachment was expected to be more important to trust in EU institutions in net-contributor than in net-recipient countries. In comparison, the fact that net-recipient states gain economically from membership could be sup-

posed to balance out the importance of the attachments, in line with the reasoning of Gabel (Gabel 1998a) and Easton (Easton 1965) for example. However, my results do not support this expectation at all. As previously demonstrated, the results indicate stronger trust in EU institutions among people who have supra-national attachments, but there is no significant difference between the two groups of countries.

Table 5.4 EU net contribution as interaction effect on the relationship between multi-level territorial attachments and trust in national and supra-national institutions, EU25, 2004 (logistic regression coefficients and odds ratios)

	Interaction effects				Odds ratios	
	Direct effect	EU recipient	EU contributor	Sig.	EU recipient	EU contributor
National trust index						
<i>Level of attachment:</i>						
Sub-national	.18***	.06	.21***		1.064	1.237
National	.70***	.92***	.64***	*	2.519	1.891
Supra-national	.25***	.10	.31***	**	1.108	1.360
EU contributor	1.68***	1.65**				
<i>Strongest attachment:</i>						
Primarily sub-national	.60***	-.11	.83***	***	0.896	2.298
All domestic	1.01***	.42	1.20***	**	1.527	3.340
Primarily national	.89***	.33	1.08***	**	1.386	2.939
Supra-national etc.	.78***	.38	.93***	*	1.466	2.525
All levels equal	1.05***	.50*	1.24***	**	1.642	3.459
EU contributor	1.65***					
Supra-national trust index						
<i>Level of attachment:</i>						
Sub-national	.28***	.12	.32***		1.128	1.378
National	.24***	.39***	.20***		1.472	1.225
Supra-national	.81***	.78***	.82***		2.186	2.278
EU contributor	-.44	-.49				
<i>Strongest attachment:</i>						
Primarily sub-national	.51***	.27	.58***		1.313	1.793
All domestic	.72***	.58**	.79***		1.779	2.199
Primarily national	.49***	.44	.51***		1.560	1.661
Supra-national etc.	.74***	1.07***	.68***		2.901	1.967
All levels equal	1.09***	1.16***	1.05***		3.202	2.854
EU contributor	-.45	.51				

* $p < .10$ ** $p < .05$ *** $p < .01$

Comment: Source: the Eurobarometer 62.0, 2004. For information on the index and the attachment items, see Table 5.1. All the coefficients are computed controlling for the control variables used in Chapter 3, although they are suppressed in the table. The table shows the logistic regression coefficients from an interaction model with multiplicative interaction terms, computed for both EU net contributors and recipients. The *Sig.* column indicates whether or not the multiplicative interaction terms are significant, and hence whether, and to what degree, the difference in effect between the two kinds of countries is significant.

The preliminary results can be interpreted as reflecting the lower national institutional performance in net-recipient countries, which is assumed to decrease the levels of political trust. The lack of variation between these groups of countries concerning trust in EU institutions

was surprising, but seems more promising from a European integration viewpoint. Perhaps trust in EU institutions might not be as dependent on the economic gain of one's country as was theoretically expected, at least not as an interaction effect with multi-level territorial attachments.

Turning to the *preferred decision level for welfare issues*, the overall expectation is that the cost of EU membership will increase the importance of multi-level territorial attachments, making resistance *stronger* in net-contributing states. There is a choice between one level and another, and the choice concerns some of the most nationally connected political issues. The fact that the costs of social policies are very high, and more or less imply redistribution, makes it pertinent to explore whether a country's being a net recipient or contributor could moderate the impact of multi-level territorial attachments on individual attitudes.

Table 5.5 EU net contribution as interaction effect on the relationship between multi-level territorial attachments and preferred decision level for welfare issues, EU25, 2004 (OLS regression coefficients)

	Interaction effects			Significant interaction effect
	Direct effect	EU net recipient	EU net contributor	
<i>Level of attachment:</i>				
Sub-national	.14**	-.08	-.15**	
National	-.57***	-.24**	-.67***	***
Supra-national	.44***	.24***	.52***	***
EU net contributor	.96***	-.68		
<i>Strongest attachment:</i>				
Unattached	.24**	-.04	.26	
All domestic	-.17***	-.16	-.42***	***
Primarily national	.27***	-.10	-.22***	
Supra-national etc.	.42***	.14	.41***	***
All levels equal	.23***	.15*	.17***	
EU net contributor	1.00**	-.86***		

* $p < .10$ ** $p < .05$ *** $p < .01$

Comment: Source: the Eurobarometer 62.0, 2004. For information on the index and the attachment items, see Table 5.2. All regression coefficients are controlled for the other variables from Chapter 4 (although they are not presented in the table). The interaction models include multiplicative interaction terms, though they are repressed in the table. The right-hand column indicates the level of significance for the interaction term, i.e., whether, and to what degree, the difference between the groups is significant.

In this case the theoretical expectations hold. In the upper half of Table 5.5, one can see that people living in net-contributing countries and who have a national attachment tend to be more strongly (and significantly) unsupportive of the transfer of decision-making power over social policies to the EU level than are people in net-recipient countries. On the other hand, people with a supra-national attachment are more inclined to be supportive of such EU-level decision-making in net-

contributing than recipient countries. Both of these group differences are significant according to the significance of the multiplicative interaction terms. The effects are generally low: considering the preferred decision level as an index from 0 to 6, having a national attachment lowers the preference for the EU by .67 in net-contributing countries, and by .24 in net-recipient countries. It should be remembered, however, that these are the extra, independent effects of national attachments, holding all other factors constant, including ideology and education level.

This pattern is also confirmed in the lower half of the table, where the *strongest level of attachment* is presented. It turns out that people with the strongest attachment to both the sub-national and national levels in the contributing countries are the least supportive of transferring social policy decision making to the EU level. This is theoretically reasonable, considering that some welfare issues are handled locally or regionally in many countries.

The fact that net EU contribution did not function as an interaction effect on multi-level territorial attachments regarding trust in EU institutions, but did regarding the preference for either national or EU-level responsibility for welfare issues, adds to the conclusions of the previous chapter. It is neither the multi-level territorial attachments by themselves nor their impact on political trust that could challenge the role of the states or the European integration process, but rather the more sensitive and politically significant issue of welfare state politics.

Institutional procedure or design as interaction effect

Time (or phase) of joining the EU, and EU net contribution status are institutional context factors that can vary over time. The third question also includes variations in formal institutional design, which in most European countries is a more stable factor. More precisely, I suggest that *government structure* (federal or unitary) might interact with the effect of multi-level territorial attachments on political trust and preferred decision level for welfare issues.

Starting with the question of trust in national political institutions, the uppermost part of Table 5.6 initially indicates few results supportive of the ordered logistic regressions. The *level* of attachment has rather similar effects in both unitary and federal states, except there is a small, barely significant tendency for people with supra-national attachments to trust national institutions to a somewhat greater degree in unitary states (the odds ratio difference between 1.1 and 1.3 is significant at the 90 per cent level).

More detailed explorations of the interaction effect on the impact of the *strongest attachment* on trust produces results in line with expectations. In federal states, the relationships between all strongest attachment categories and national trust are positive, and significantly stronger than in unitary states. The odds ratios for trusting national institutions in unitary states, if a person is most strongly attached to *all domestic* levels (compared to an unattached person), is slightly over 2.3 in unitary states, whereas it is almost 5 in federal states, and the odds ratio of this difference is significant at the 95 per cent level.

Table 5.6 Governmental structure as interaction effect on the relationship between multi-level territorial attachments and trust in national and supra-national institutions, EU25, 2004 (logistic regression coefficients and odds ratios)

	Interaction effects				Odds ratios	
	Direct effect	Federal	Unitary	Sig.	Federal	Unitary
National trust index						
<i>Level of attachment:</i>						
Sub-national	.18***	.13	.19**		1.143	1.211
National	.70***	.72***	.69***		2.062	1.999
Supra-national	.25***	.14*	.28***	*	1.153	1.326
Unitary	-.08	-1.33***				
<i>Strongest attachment:</i>						
Primarily sub-national	.60***	1.20***	.44***	**	3.321	1.560
All domestic	1.01***	1.60***	.87***	**	4.937	2.381
Primarily national	.89***	1.42***	.76***	*	4.129	2.144
Supra-national etc.	.78***	1.35***	.64***	*	3.846	1.898
All levels equal	1.05***	1.60***	.93***	*	4.954	2.524
Unitary	-1.20***	-.50				
Supra-national trust index						
<i>Level of attachment:</i>						
Sub-national	.28***	-.06	.38***	***	0.938	1.466
National	.24***	.42***	.17**	*	1.526	1.186
Supra-national	.81***	.54***	.90***	***	1.713	2.465
Unitary	.45	.01				
<i>Strongest attachment:</i>						
Primarily sub-national	.51***	-.00	.63***	*	0.998	1.885
All domestic	.72***	.01	.94***	***	1.012	2.564
Primarily national	.49***	-.01	.65***	**	0.989	1.925
Supra-national etc.	.74***	.27	.87***	*	1.311	2.391
All levels equal	1.09***	.34	1.34***	***	1.399	3.823
Unitary	.50					

* $p < .10$ ** $p < .05$ *** $p < .01$

Comment: Source: the Eurobarometer 62.0, 2004. For information on the index and the attachment items, see Table 5.1. All the above coefficients are computed controlling for the control variables used in Chapter 3, although these are suppressed in the table. The table presents the logistic regression coefficients, computed for both federal and unitary states. The right-hand columns indicate whether or not the multiplicative interaction terms are significant, and hence whether, and to what degree, the difference in effect between the two kinds of countries is significant.

This theoretical expectation comes from the separation of powers between different territorial levels encompassed in the federal institutional

design. Such a separation of powers is argued by Lijphart (1999) to bridge territorial conflict, promote consensus democracy, and thus enhance political trust. In line with such reasoning, trust in EU institutions could be expected to be stronger among people with supra-national attachments and residing in federal states, since a supra-national level and its legitimacy might fit more naturally with a federal system in which citizens are used to the territorial division of powers. In the lower half of Table 5.5 it can be seen that this expectation is not met, regardless of whether the interaction is with *level of attachment* or the combined measure of *strongest attachment*. Moreover, not only supra-national attachment, but also attachments to all other territorial levels, are more strongly connected to trust in EU institutions in unitary states. Hence, there is no evidence that a supra-national level is more easily accepted as just another level in a federal system, thus affecting this individual-level relationship.

Table 5.7 Governmental structure as interaction effect on the relationship between multi-level territorial attachments and preferred decision level for welfare issues, EU25, 2004 (OLS regression coefficients)

	Interaction effects			Significant interaction effect
	Direct effect	Federal states	Unitary states	
Level of attachment:				
Sub-national	.14**	-.22*	-.13**	
National	-.57***	-.60***	-.55***	
Supra-national	.44***	.35***	.47***	
Unitary state	.13	-.10		
Strongest attachment:				
Unattached	.24**	.50**	.12	
All domestic	-.17***	-.31***	-.28***	
Primarily national	.27***	-.36***	-.16***	
Supra-national etc.	.42***	.34***	.37***	
All levels equal	.23***	.04	.22***	*
Unitary state	.36*	.08		

* $p < .10$ ** $p < .05$ *** $p < .01$

Comment: Source: the Eurobarometer 62.0, 2004. For information on the index and the attachment items, see Table 5.2. All coefficients are controlled for the variables used in Chapter 4, although these are not displayed in the table. The coefficients are computed for both groups of countries simultaneously, with interaction terms. The right-hand columns indicate the level of significance for the interaction terms, i.e., whether, and to what degree, the difference between the groups is significant.

The third question also concerns how the government structure matters as an interaction variable, regarding the preferred decision level for welfare issues. In federal states, social policy issues are largely regarded as the responsibility of sub-national levels, whereas in unitary states there is a wider range of distribution of competencies, as well as over-

lapping competences between levels. I therefore expected the resistance to EU-level determination of welfare issues to be stronger among people with sub-national attachments in federal states; however, this is not at all evident in Table 5.7.

The overall regression results indicate very few differences between people living in federal or unitary states, in terms of support for EU-level decision-making on social policy issues. In both kinds of countries, people with domestic attachments tend not to favour, whereas people with supra-national attachments are more in favour of, such EU-level decision making. The only exception is people who feel equally strongly attached to all levels, who tend to be somewhat more supportive in unitary states, the difference being significant according to the multiplicative interaction term. Still, it is a difference that can be at least reasonably interpreted in line with theory. These people feel equally attached to all levels, but live in countries where responsibility for welfare issues is usually at the regional level; a shift of responsibility from a sub-national to the EU level can thus be considered a much larger change, despite the pre-existing multi-level attachment.

Chapter summary, conclusions, and theoretical implications

In this chapter, I have argued that there are important reasons to expect that the impact of multi-level territorial attachments on political trust and welfare attitudes may vary, depending on the institutional contexts in which people live and on their particular experiences of multi-level systems. The institutional context can thus be problematic for the state (or to European integration) if the relationships reported in earlier chapters are much weaker in certain types of countries. Including institutional contexts in the analyses deepens our understanding of the pre-conditions for multi-level territorial attachments that seem to matter the most to political trust and welfare attitudes.

The aim of this chapter has been twofold: to extend the theoretical model to include the institutional context, and to conduct empirical analyses in line with the theoretical expectations. I argue that the institutional contexts do matter in my model as *interaction* effects; in other words, I expected the *relationship* between multi-level territorial attachments and political trust, and preferred decision level for welfare issues, respectively, to be different in different institutional contexts. Depending on the institutional context, the expected interaction effect can be different, which I have elaborated in this chapter. The selection of relevant institutional context factors had to take account of both the

multi-level approach of the model and the overall study. As well, it had to be theoretically relevant to be expected to interact with the individual-level relationship between multi-level territorial attachments and political trust and welfare attitudes. With the help of macro theoretical explanations of political trust and welfare attitudes, I suggested that three kinds of institutional contexts were relevant, namely, *institutional culture*, *institutional performance*, and *institutional procedures* (or design); the variables selected for analysing these contexts were, respectively, *old or new member state* (or phase of enlargement) and *welfare state regime*, *EU net contributor or recipient*, and *federal or unitary state*.

Eurobarometer data were used for these analyses because they capture the necessary variation across countries, so the dependent variables have been somewhat limited. As a result, the multi-level perspective in this chapter concentrates on the relationship between the state and the EU, leaving the sub-national level to future studies. Another limitation is the focus of the multi-level territorial attachment concept on the territorial *level* dimension, and on the combined measure of the level(s) to which one has the *strongest attachment*.

The overall results of the analyses indicated that all three kinds of institutional contexts (culture, performance, and procedures) can have some interaction effect on the relationship of multi-level territorial attachments to political trust and to preferred decision level for welfare issues; however, there were clear differences between the various chosen institutional context factors. Among the interaction variables, *old or new member state* did not have the expected effect on trust in EU institutions; moreover, the effects were not significantly different between old and new member states. Regarding *national trust*, though, all *level* attachments were stronger and more positively related in the older member states. This pattern was even more pronounced in countries that had been EU members for at least 30 years. These results could be partly interpreted as reflecting the turmoil faced by the newest countries, due to recent transition to democracy and overall lower levels of national trust regardless of territorial attachments. As well, the impact of *level* of attachment on the preference for the EU as the *decision level for welfare issues* was stronger in the oldest member states, corresponding to the idea of longer time of EU exposure, and varying significance of the membership during different phases of enlargement. The interaction did not, however, indicate more positive relationships in the older member states; instead, the negative effect of national attachments on preference for the EU as the decision level was amplified, as was the

positive effect of supra-national attachments. Hence, longer exposure to the EU does not lead to generally more benevolent attitudes towards the EU as the decision level for welfare policy, but rather amplifies the resistance among people with national attachments.

The latter relationship was also analysed with *welfare regime* difference as the interaction variable, but the results did not support the expectation of stronger resistance among people with national attachments in the Nordic regime (due to the more universal welfare policies requiring a stronger solidarity base). In fact, the resistance was strongest in the liberal and conservative regimes, where support among people with supra-national attachments, on the other hand, was the strongest. Apart from general uncertainty as to the usefulness of the welfare regime concept, I also note that most liberal and conservative countries are early EU member states, which might provide a more plausible explanation. However, the lack of an interaction effect on, for example, the Nordic regime gives no indication that more generous welfare states are extra challenged by multi-level territorial attachments.

Institutional performance, as gauged by a *country being a net contributor to or net recipient from the EU*, was expected to make the individual-level relationships stronger in the net-contributing countries. This was the case for *national trust*, but, counter to expectations, not for *trust in EU institutions*. People with national attachments were not less trusting of EU institutions in EU net-contributing countries, and the utility aspect did not reduce the strength of the relationship with trust. Concerning the preferred *decision level for welfare issues*, however, people with national attachments were less supportive in the net-contributing states (where the supra-nationally attached were, however, more supportive). This can be interpreted as indicating that when there is no economic gain, the affective impact becomes larger.

Finally, institutional design, as captured by *federal or unitary state*, met the expectation that the relationship between territorial attachments and trust would be stronger in federal states, with regard to trust in *national institutions*. In contrast, for *supra-national trust* the pattern was the opposite, being strongest in unitary states. The idea that a supra-national level would fit more naturally, and thus be deemed more legitimate and hence trustworthy, into a federal system was thus not borne out. When investigating the same interaction effect regarding the *preferred decision level for welfare issues*, hardly any difference was found between federal and unitary states. When using other data and methods, however, I believe it would be productive to include the sub-

national aspect (e.g., regional strength as an institutional context) in analyses of these individual-level relationships.

The overall conclusion of this chapter is thus that the relationship between multi-level territorial attachments and *national trust* was influenced by most institutional context factors, whereas the relationship with *trust in EU institutions* was only moderated by the governmental structure. For the states, this indicates that the multi-level system may pose more of a challenge to some sorts of states than to others (e.g., states in democratic transition); clearly, this is an area needing more research. The *preference for the EU as the decision level for welfare issues* is a much more sensitive issue in most states, where both the resistance of people with national attachments and the support of people with supra-national attachments are amplified by duration of EU exposure (and earlier enlargement phase) and cost of membership. The question of a social Europe will most likely continue to be debated.

I have theoretically argued for the necessity of considering the institutional context when exploring relationships between multi-level territorial attachments and political trust and welfare issues, respectively. Moreover, I have suggested the kinds of theoretically relevant institutional contexts (i.e., culture, performance, and procedure), and *how* (i.e., interaction effects) these contexts are theoretically relevant. Despite the limitations of the empirical analyses conducted, I believe I have proved the usefulness of making further enquiries using combined micro and macro approach, and have also identified a selection of institutional contexts that might be useful for further analyses using other data and methods.

Chapter 6

Multi-level Europeans and the Challenges of a Multi-Level System

At the system level, the overarching theoretical question of this study is how the multi-level system in Europe can be seen as challenging both traditional state roles and the European integration process. In line with the system-building tradition (Bartolini 2005; Ferrera 2005; Hirschman 1970; Rokkan 1974, 1999), I have emphasized the role of *territorial identity* and its expected importance for the subsequent legitimacy and solidarity steps. However, I have argued that such a discussion should take account of *all levels of the multi-level system*, and that it would benefit from shifting its focus from the level of the system to the *individuals* who live in it, i.e., European citizens. This means that the theoretical discussions in this study concern both the *system level* (used in stating the overall problem and explain how the parts of the study are interlinked) and the *individual level* (used in the separate parts). The empirical analyses, in contrast, focus mainly on the individuals, by investigating the influence of individuals' territorial attachments on political trust and welfare attitudes.

In considering how the European multi-level system can be seen as challenging the role of the state and the European integration process, we can discern three specific challenges, inspired by the system-building tradition and democratic theories, and adapted to a multi-level system (e.g. Dahl 1989; Ferrera 2005; McEwen & Moreno 2005; Offe 2000; Scharpf 1999). These challenges are: 1) the *challenge of territorial attachments*, i.e., the possibility that individual attachment to other than country levels could lead to decreasing national attachment; 2) the *challenge of political trust*, i.e., that trust in national political institutions and politicians could decrease as an effect of multi-level territorial attachments; and 3) the *challenge of welfare attitudes*, i.e., that multi-level territorial attachments could lead to less support for welfare state policies. Moreover, these relationships may be affected by different institutional contexts. I will discuss my theoretical elaborations of each of these four aspects shortly, and how my study can be seen as contributing to the related theories and their continuous development.

Empirically, I have explored these challenges by analysing two different types of data sets, to investigate the relevance of my theoretical arguments and of the model presented in Chapter 1. The combination of broad comparative data from all the EU member states (obtained in 2004) and more detailed data (including my own fieldwork and indicators) from one country, Sweden, is a strength. The combination allows in-depth analyses at all territorial levels using partly unique data, as well as cross-national comparisons of all 25 EU member states in 2004.¹²⁰

As I will discuss in more detail below, my results indicate that neither the territorial attachments themselves, nor their impact on political trust, constitute a challenge to the role of the state (or to the continuation of European integration). Rather, the development of the European multi-level system seems to have enhanced both attachment to and trust in a number of territorial levels, including the states and the EU.

The relationship between multi-level territorial attachments and welfare attitudes, on the other hand, is more threatening from the point of view of challenges to the state. Sustaining support for the welfare state might turn out to be somewhat difficult if the vast majority of people develop strong attachments to territorial levels other than the state. At the same time, however, the preference for EU-level decision-making regarding welfare issues is still low, even among people with European attachments, and thus does not indicate any demand for or expectation of a “social Europe”. In this regard, the European multi-level system may challenge the traditional role of the (welfare) state, but without offering any immediate alternative at the European level. Finally, my results indicate the relevance of also considering the institutional context, not least regarding variations of the experience and significance of the multi-level system.

Multi-level Europeans?

Returning to the question of how a multi-level system might challenge the role of the state and European integration, I have argued that it is relevant to start with Europeans themselves and their territorial attachments. One reason for this approach is that political attempts to enhance attachments to other levels (e.g., regions and the EU) have fol-

¹²⁰ The Swedish data sets are the National SOM survey, 2004, and the Swedish European Parliament election study, 2004 (Holmberg & Weibull 2005; Oscarsson, et al. 2006); the European data used are from the Eurobarometer 62.0, 2004. See Chapter 1 for more information on the data sources.

lowed in the wake of the development of a European multi-level system, and because people's attachments are supposed to matter to the stability of a political system, according to democratic and system building theories (Dahl 1989; Ferrera 2005; Offe 2000; Scharpf 1999). The problem is that almost none of these existing theories have elaborated the arguments concerning the multi-level system, at least not so as to include all levels from local to European, and how it could matter if the focus shifts from the system to individuals and if people feel attached to levels other than the state.

I have argued that existing signs of increasing attachment to territorial levels both above and beneath the state in Europe, for example, regional identity and discussions of an increasing European identification (Batt & Wolczuk 2002; Bruter 2005; Catt & Murphy 2002; Keating 2003), were inconclusive. I addressed two important problems in this part of the study: that the theoretical expectations are underdeveloped, and that there is a lack of empirical investigations (especially cross-national ones). Regarding the theoretical underdevelopment, my concept of *multi-level territorial attachments* is more specific than the term "identity", but at the same time broader than national or European pride, and distinct from support for European integration. The concept is also individual and territorial, including a range of territorial levels from local to supra-national.

There is a difference of theoretical opinion as to whether or not people can feel simultaneously attached to more than one level (Kohli 2000; Lawler 1992), a difference that I have argued is at least partly a consequence of the variety of definitions and interpretations of the concept of identity (Brubaker & Cooper 2000). Moreover, attachments to territorial levels other than the nation do not necessarily challenge the state, not even if these other attachments are increasing in number or strength. Rather, there would need to be indications of *decreasing national attachments* before one could speak of such a challenge. From the viewpoint of European integration, the signs of a possible increase in European attachment can at first glance be considered as very positive. On the other hand, the EU is a multi-level system, and the states are still the politically most important levels. If territorial attachments were some kind of zero-sum game, and increasing European (and regional) attachments led to decreasing national attachments, this might cause tension between people. Hence, the emergence of concurrent attachments to *all* levels would pose the least challenge to both EU member states and European integration.

I have chosen to theoretically define the concept of multi-level territorial attachments as allowing individuals to be attached to more than one level at the same time. However, the extent to which people feel themselves to be “multi-level Europeans” is an empirical question. As long as enough individuals have such feelings, I do not expect them to challenge to the role of the states.

I have also elaborated what I believe to be the three main theoretical dimensions of this concept: *territorial level*, attachment *form*, and attachment *strength*. The range of variation in each attachment dimension is summarized in Table 6.1. This multi-dimensionality corresponds better to the idea of a multi-level political system than merely analysing the attachment level by level, since it is not only important whether or not there is attachment to a given level, but rather what *combinations of attachments* to different levels individuals have.

Each of these dimensions highlights relevant aspects of the concept of multi-level territorial attachments. When combined, however, as *the strongest level(s) of attachment*, the interplay between the dimensions becomes apparent. This classification of individuals can distinguish between those who feel attached to the same level, depending on how strongly, and to what other levels, he or she feels attached to. As will be discussed shortly, this approach has proven itself to be productive in analysing the consequences of multi-level territorial attachments.

Table 6.1 Dimensions (and the combination) of multi-level territorial attachments

Dimensions	Level	Form	Strength
Variations	Unattached	Unattached	Unattached
	Sub-national	Exclusive	Fairly
	National	Multiple	Mixed
	Supra-national	Nested	Very
Strongest level(s) of attachment			
Combined dimension variations		Unattached Primarily sub-national All domestic Primarily national Supra-national etc. All levels equal	

The second problem was the scarcity of empirical analyses of individuals' attachments to all the levels in the European polity, and comparatively between all EU member countries. Together with the underdevel-

oped theoretical expectations, this situation called for an explorative empirical approach to analysing individuals' territorial attachments according to the three dimensions. Hence, this study also makes a methodological contribution, since I have developed and tested different ways to measure these three dimensions, both individually and in combination (see Chapter 2 for details). The dimensions are "pure", in the sense of being independent of one another, which leads to a generous definition of when an individual can be said to have an attachment – a large proportion of people being attached to at least one level. I argue that this is both theoretically and empirically justified. It should not be seen as a problem, but rather as one of the main advantages of the approach: that it is not enough only to consider whether or not a person has an attachment to a certain level. For better understanding, it is important to consider all three dimensions. My empirical analyses of the Swedish and European data sets support the theoretical expectation that people can have multi-level territorial attachments, and that attachments to other levels complement rather than challenge the role and position of the state.

More specifically, I have demonstrated that most Europeans have attachments to all three levels included in the first dimension, *territorial level*, i.e., the sub-national (local or regional), national, and supra-national levels. Most people (over 90 per cent) are attached to the national level. Measured in this manner, no lack of national attachment can be seen to have resulted from people's being attached to other territorial levels. When considering the second dimension, *form*, the empirical analyses indicated that only a few per cent of people are unattached or have an exclusive form of attachment, but that the largest group of people comprise those with nested attachments, i.e., concurrent attachments to all levels. Since both people with multiple and with nested attachments are attached to more than one level, it is clear that an overwhelming majority of Europeans can be said to have some kind of multi-level territorial attachments. Regarding the *strength* dimension, most people also have a mixture of fairly and very strong attachments, and the results indicate that there is no overall tendency, for example, for the strength of attachment to be stronger among people with an exclusive form of attachment or among those with attachments to a certain level.

An additional contribution of this study is the blending of all three dimensions, to form the combined measure of the *strongest level(s) of attachment*. Empirically, the largest categories are those that embrace national attachment (such as *all levels equal* or *all domestic*), which

strongly indicates that despite the great many “multi-level Europeans”, this situation by itself does not challenge the role of the state. From a European integration perspective, it could be seen as positive that a fairly large number of Europeans have equally strong attachments to Europe and to all other territorial levels. These people are truly “multi-level Europeans”. This theoretically plausible challenge was thus not supported empirically.

Multi-level Europeans and legitimacy

The second challenge to the role of the state and to the European integration process can also be disregarded, i.e., that attachments to other territorial levels than the nation could lead to less political trust. The theoretical understanding is that territorial attachments should impinge on the political stability and legitimacy of a political system, something that is often assumed in democratic theory (Dahl 1989) and theories of political support (Easton 1965), but mainly at the system level and concerning *states*. Although political trust is a major political science interest, empirical analyses of this specific relationship are few, especially those including all levels of a multi-level system. One contribution of this study is thus the theoretical elaboration of this expected relationship in a full multi-level system, as well as empirical analysis of how the dimensions of multi-level territorial attachments may influence political trust at different levels.

Developing existing theoretical reasoning, I have suggested that there are two different ways in which a multi-level system could challenge political trust. One would be if there were no relationship at all between territorial attachments and political trust. Another would be if the relationship existed, but the fact that individuals tended to feel attached to other territorial levels led to increased trust in political institutions and actors at other levels, and thus to *decreased national political trust*. Neither of these challenges was supported empirically by the analyses. Instead, the results indicate that people who are truly “multi-level Europeans”, i.e., attached to all levels, also tend to trust the political institutions and actors at all levels. These results also hold when controlling for several other explanations of political trust, thus contributing to further knowledge.

One can of course object to these results by referring to the uncertain direction of causality. Especially at the macro level, it is debatable whether aggregated feelings of attachment lead to trust in political institutions, or whether it is the construction of trustworthy institutions that

affects the attachments people have to them (cf. Putnam, et al. 1993; Rothstein 1996). My interpretation is that this is a reciprocal process over time, and I argue that it is theoretically reasonable to investigate the relationship as the influence of multi-level territorial attachments on political trust, at the individual level. This argument is also related to views expressed in other theories of political trust (Dalton 2004; Easton 1975; Inglehart & Welzel 2005; Mishler & Rose 2001). The reverse, that an individual's trust in an institution would *cause* his or her territorial attachment, is less intuitive, given that territorial attachments can be compared to a person's beliefs, whereas political trust is closer to an attitude and is thus more easily subject to change (cf. Almond & Verba 1963). The reverse order would also focus on trying to explain why an individual has certain attachments, rather than on exploring their possible impacts (see Chapter 3 for a more detailed discussion).

Regarding the three dimensions of attachment, I have argued that the *territorial level* dimension should influence trust in political institutions and actors at the corresponding level, in accordance with the horizontal principle, and this supposition was empirically supported. More interestingly still, supra-national attachments tend to have the strongest impact on trust in institutions and political actors at *all* levels. This also corresponded to the fact that the nested *form* of attachment proved to be significantly connected with trust at all levels. Moreover, there is an evident difference between people with a dominantly European attachment (i.e., *supra-national etc.*) and people who are equally strongly attached to all levels, including Europe (*all levels equal*). The former group did not trust sub-national institutions and actors, whereas the latter group trusted all levels' institutions and actors. Hence, state legitimacy (in the form of political trust) does not seem to be challenged by the European multi-level system. In light of current discussions of European integration and of the possible need for a European identity, these results indicate the importance of not focusing on the EU level to the exclusion of other. In a multi-level system, attachments to all levels might be equally important.

To relate these results to a broader discussion of the future of European integration, these results, i.e. the rejection of the second challenge, could be seen as making it plausible that if more people had multi-level territorial attachments, the legitimacy of both the state and EU institutions could be expected to strengthen.

Multi-level Europeans and Solidarity

The third challenge to the state and to European integration is the *challenge of welfare attitudes*. I have argued that unlike the previous challenge, this challenge more clearly demands attention. The reason for this is connected both to the theoretical background and the results of the analyses. Theoretically, attitudes towards the welfare state can be seen as a harder case for gauging the impact of multi-level territorial attachment, because welfare policies usually contain redistributive features and thus bear greater resemblance to a zero-sum game. This challenge also corresponds to the last of the system-building phases, meaning it is the phase that presupposes the strongest structural bounding and the necessity of overriding subgroup interests (Ferrera 2005; Offe 2000; Scharpf 1999). This can be compared to the fact that it is theoretically possible to have equally strong trust in institutions at several levels simultaneously. This third challenge can thus be seen as a challenge to the *welfare* state in particular.

In this manner, theoretical expectations regarding the challenges posed by the European multi-level system are highlighted. My arguments are elaborated from other normatively based theories concerning values and the “moral economy” (Inglehart & Welzel 2005; Mau 2003; Svallfors 2006). One key is the deservingness criterion of *identity* (van Oorschot 2006), since it provides a theoretical explanation of the mechanism of how territorial attachments can influence welfare attitudes (people closer to “us” are seen as more deserving). Another key is the horizontal principle, which defines the boundaries of the relationships, especially between the “nation” and welfare policies.

The empirical results indicate that this is an area where it might be relevant to consider that the multi-level system could indeed pose a challenge to the welfare state. My analyses of the impact of the different dimensions of attachment indicate, for example, that people who are most strongly attached to domestic levels are more likely to hold public-sector-friendly attitudes, whereas the group with a predominantly European attachment is the most unsupportive of the public sector. These results hold even when controlling for other explanations, such as ideology, education, and class. The negative impact of predominantly European attachments can be understood, given the territorial limits of individual national public sectors.

The willingness to share national welfare systems with other EU citizens is, on the other hand, supported by people with predominantly European attachments, but not by people with national attachments.

The most immediate impact of a multi-level system concerns the preferred decision level for welfare policies, and as expected from theory, the relationship with national attachments is strongly negative, indicating a strong preference for national-level decision-making regarding welfare issues.

As a general conclusion about territorial attachments and solidarity, it seems that some of the theoretical reasoning of Scharpf (1999), Ferrera (2005), and others is supported; even at the individual level, there is a connection between territorial attachments and attitudes towards welfare, and the relationship is generally horizontal. The third challenge can thus not be rejected. Still, I argue that there is a need for further analysis of more territorial levels and other forms of welfare attitudes, in order to learn more about this relationship.

The main difference between this challenge, of welfare attitudes, and the former challenge, of political trust, is that whereas the group of most proper “multi-level Europeans” (*all levels equal*) tended to *trust* all political levels, they displayed *less* solidarity with other EU citizens and were *less* in favour of making welfare decisions at the EU level. However, people with predominantly European attachments (*supra-national etc.*), who did not trust all political levels, are the ones most favourable towards the idea of EU-level decision-making regarding welfare issues and towards sharing national social systems with other EU citizens, even when controlling for ideology or EU attitude.

If the number of people with strong European attachments were to increase, the multi-level system could thus challenge the role of the welfare state – a possibility that needs more detailed analysis in the future. From the perspective of someone who would favour deeper European integration, it may, on the one hand, be seen as positive that solidarity with other EU citizens, and the preference for the EU as the decision level for welfare issues, can be found among people who are predominantly European. This group is very small, however, and in general less supportive of a large public sector – and it is the larger group of “multi-level Europeans” who are the most trusting of the whole multi-level system. Hence, the possible acceptance of the EU as a multi-level system could more easily be discussed in terms of trust than in terms of welfare issues, which is understandable given the position of welfare issues at the core of nation state functions, and the historical process of bounded structuring at the national level.

The institutional context

Finally, the importance of the institutional context was included in Chapter 5. There are theoretical reasons to expect that the relationship between multi-level territorial attachments and political trust, or preferred decision level for welfare issues, can vary according to type of institutional context. The three challenges were all brought down to the individual level, and analysed as the impacts of individuals' territorial attachments. Including the institutional context thus implies a partial change of focus and further theoretical elaboration. Studying how institutional contexts can contribute to shaping individuals' preferences and attitudes is by no means a new field. The special feature of my model is that, unlike the vast majority of literature in this field, my study does not emphasize the direct impact of institutional context, but rather the *interaction effect* of institutional contexts on the individual-level relationships. (Interaction effects are both theoretically and methodologically complicated; see Chapter 5 for more information).

Despite the fact that I refer to the European multi-level system as a single phenomenon, the reality is that the features of this system vary considerably across countries. The theoretical contribution is thus an elaboration of what kinds of institutional contexts can be expected to influence the relationship between multi-level territorial attachments and political trust, or the preferred decision level for welfare issues.

I have argued that the relevant institutional context factors must both take account of the multi-level system approach and be theoretically relevant to be thought to interact with multi-level territorial attachments in influencing political trust and welfare attitudes. Citing macro theoretical explanations of political trust and welfare attitudes, I have suggested that three different kinds of institutional contexts were relevant from the multi-level system perspective: *institutional culture*, *institutional performance*, and *institutional procedures (or design)*. The specific selected institutional context factors for the analyses were: *old or new member state* (or phase of enlargement), *welfare state regime*, *EU net contributor or recipient*, and *federal or unitary state*.

I have conducted several analyses to investigate whether there is any empirical support for the relevance of my theoretical reasoning. The analyses are limited to considering only the relationship between the state and the EU and only a few of the individual-level relationships. Some of the results highlight the relevance of considering the institutional contexts; for example, the positive relationship between territorial attachments and national trust is much stronger in older than newer

member states. These results are reasonable, given the period of transition to democracy affecting the national institutions in most new member states. More surprisingly, there was no significant difference between old and new member states concerning the impact of individuals' territorial attachments on trust in EU institutions. Such a difference could have been expected due to the longer EU exposure in older member states.

Resistance to EU-level decision-making regarding welfare issues is much stronger among people with national attachments in older than in newer member states. There is a similar pattern of differences between net-contributing and net-recipient countries. Theoretically, this can be interpreted as indicating that when there is no economic gain, the affective impact becomes larger, thus amplifying both the negative effect of national attachments and the positive effect of supra-national attachment. However, the institutional design (i.e., government structure) met the expectation that the relationship between territorial attachments and national trust would be stronger in federal states. My argument corresponds to Lijpharts' (1999) suggestion that territorial conflict between different territorial levels can be seen as institutionalized in federal states. However, the suggestion that a supra-national level should thus fit more naturally into a federal system was not borne out, since trust in EU institutions was stronger in unitary states, at all attachment levels.

These analyses only include a few of the possible institutional contexts, but I believe that I have, both theoretically and empirically, produced enough interesting results as to highlight the necessity of considering institutional contexts in future research. Moreover, I have suggested the kinds of institutional contexts that could be theoretically relevant. The results of the empirical analyses imply the usefulness of further exploring this combined micro and macro approach, albeit using other data and methods.

Implications and future research

Several implications of this explorative study deserve highlighting. At the system level, I would argue that my results are significant for the system-building tradition, not least regarding the prospects for system building in Europe. Concerning the individual-level theories, I believe that my theoretical development of the concept of *multi-level territorial attachments* can be useful for ongoing research into (territorial) identity, especially in a multi-level setting. I have identified the necessity of

considering not only *several* levels, but how attachments to these various levels are connected and *combined*. Emphasizing the three *dimensions* of multi-level territorial attachments and their combination should lead to further theoretical elaborations of these aspects and their possible impact.

After considering the challenges of *multi-level territorial attachments* to the state and to European integration, I concentrated on the possible impacts of these attachments on political trust and welfare attitudes. Hence, some contributions are also relevant to research into *political trust* and *welfare attitudes*. In both these areas, theoretical arguments and results have indicated that, although the impacts may not be very strong, there are still both theoretical and empirical reasons to consider the multi-level territorial attachment concept as advancing our understanding of why individuals trust political institutions and actors at different territorial levels, and why they have certain welfare attitudes.

Especially in the field of welfare state research, I would claim that there are strong incentives to continue exploring the relevance of multi-level territorial attachments. Though less empirically explored, these attachments may challenge the role of the welfare state. Taken to their extreme, such attachments could even affect not only the question of what level should be responsible for welfare issues, but whether generous public welfare policies can exist at all in a multi-level system. We must reserve judgement, however, since several of the relevant analyses were conducted using only Swedish data, and Sweden is a special case in terms of welfare attitudes, given its history as a generous welfare state. Further investigation of this relationship in a comparative European setting is thus needed, also including other aspects of welfare policies and of sub-national levels.

A final theoretical implication concerns research into institutionalism and preference formation, or more specifically, the growing interest in combining macro and micro analyses. I have theoretically suggested what kinds of institutional contexts might be important to the individual-level relationships examined in this study. Despite the clear limitations of the analyses presented, I would argue that there are reasons both to continue the theoretical discussion and conduct analyses that simultaneously combine the micro and macro levels. I especially believe a multi-level analysis approach could be useful for such empirical analyses (Snijders & Bosker 1999).

Epilogue, or some final comments on possible social implications

I would like to take the opportunity to make a few comments about the possibly much broader social implications of this study, leaving behind more strictly academic considerations. The fact that multi-level territorial attachments by themselves turned out not to challenge either the role of the state or state legitimacy might be considered as a positive result for political representatives, especially national politicians. The number of people who can be defined as “multi-level Europeans”, and their overall tendency to trust all political institutions, may also please European integrationists and remind them not to focus solely on the question of whether or not there is a *European* identity. All levels are important in the European multi-level system. It can thus be argued that an increase in the number of “multi-level Europeans” could be expected to raise the degree of political trust in the multi-level system as a whole, including the EU level. However, the idea of a “social Europe” might not necessarily be supported by this group, since social sharing involves distributing scarce resources among people. Unlike trust, it is not an unlimited or easily expandable resource. On the other hand, these “multi-level Europeans” tend to be more supportive of general public welfare management than are people who are predominantly *European*, as long as there is no question of changing the governmental level responsible for these issues. A possible solution from both the state and European integration perspectives could thus be to let welfare issues remain the sole responsibilities of the state, at least for the foreseeable future.

Appendix

Table A4.1 Effect of form of attachment on redistribution and preferred decision level for social policies, in Sweden 2004 (unstandardized multivariate OLS estimates)

	Solidarity with EU-citizens in Sweden (index)				EU preferred decision level for social policy (index)			
	Bivariate	Basic	Control	Control EU-att.	Bivariate	Basic	Control	Control EU-att.
<i>Form</i> (base = unattached)	.50**				-.33			
Exclusive form	-.20*	-.69***	.50	.47	-.21	.12	-.31	-.49
Multiple form	-.26***	-.64***	.38	.35	-.59***	.02	-.46	-.64
Nested form	.28***	-.35	.64	.48	.65***	.68**	-.01	-.48
Constant		2.54***	1.39***	1.36**		2.38***	1.76***	1.86**
R2		.05	.16	.18		.07	.13	.19
N		1203	781	775		1218	801	797

* p<.10 ** p<.05 *** p<.01

Comment: Source: the Swedish European Union Parliament election study 2004. The solidarity with EU-citizens in Sweden index ranges from 1-4, where 4 equals most solidarity. The attachment variables are each coded 0-1, 1 for feeling attach to the level - but they are not dummy variables. For information on control variables, see table 4.5. No control variables are presented in this table due to the similar results to table 4.5. All estimates are under control for each other.

Table A4.2 Effect of strength of attachment on redistribution and preferred decision level for social policies, in Sweden 2004 (unstandardized multivariate OLS estimates)

	Solidarity with EU-citizens in Sweden (index)				EU preferred decision level for social policy (index)			
	Bivariate	Basic	Control	Control EU-att.	Bivariate	Basic	Control	Control EU-att.
<i>Strength</i> (base = unattached)	.50**				-.33			
Fairly attached	.12*	-.39	.57	.51	.22**	.51	-.15	-.44
Fairly and very attached	.05	-.48*	.47	.37	.20***	.40	-.26	-.59
Very attached	-.16	-.62**	.39	.38	-.36***	.06	-.48	-.64
Constant		2.54***	1.39***	1.36**		2.38***	1.76***	1.86**
R2		.05	.16	.18		.07	.13	.19
N		1203	781	775		1218	801	797

* p<.10 ** p<.05 *** p<.01

Comment: Source: the Swedish European Union Parliament election study 2004. The solidarity with EU-citizens in Sweden index ranges from 1-4, where 4 equals most solidarity. The attachment variables are each coded 0-1, 1 for feeling attach to the level - but they are not dummy variables. For information on control variables, see table 4.5. No control variables are presented in this table due to the similar results to table 4.5. All estimates are under control for each other.

Table A4.3 Effect of strongest attachment on welfare attitudes in the Swedish national SOM-survey 2004 (unstandardised multivariate OLS estimates)

	General support of the public sector			Public management of healthcare index			Public service management index		
	Bivariate	Basic	Control	Bivariate	Basic	Control	Bivariate	Basic	Control
<i>Strongest attachment</i> (base = unattached)									
sub-national	<i>-.11</i>	<i>-.01</i>	<i>.36</i>	<i>-.07</i>	<i>.07</i>	<i>-.01</i>	<i>-.06</i>	<i>.09</i>	<i>-.10</i>
All domestic	<i>.28***</i>	<i>.33*</i>	<i>.69***</i>	<i>.37***</i>	<i>.30**</i>	<i>.19</i>	<i>.30***</i>	<i>.29***</i>	<i>.03</i>
Foremost national	<i>.14**</i>	<i>.21</i>	<i>.60***</i>	<i>-.02</i>	<i>.03</i>	<i>.03</i>	<i>-.07</i>	<i>.01</i>	<i>-.17</i>
Supra-national (et al)	<i>-.47***</i>	<i>-.29</i>	<i>.29</i>	<i>-.44***</i>	<i>-.37***</i>	<i>-.25</i>	<i>-.36***</i>	<i>-.23***</i>	<i>-.26</i>
All levels equal	<i>-.30***</i>	<i>-.14</i>	<i>.48**</i>	<i>-.21**</i>	<i>-.15</i>	<i>-.07</i>	<i>-.04</i>	<i>.04</i>	<i>-.09</i>
Constant									
		<i>3.11***</i>	<i>4.91***</i>		<i>3.17***</i>	<i>4.94***</i>		<i>3.94***</i>	<i>4.51***</i>
Adjusted R2		<i>.00</i>	<i>.26</i>		<i>.02</i>	<i>.33</i>		<i>.03</i>	<i>.25</i>
N		<i>1563</i>	<i>1123</i>		<i>1613</i>	<i>1179</i>		<i>1392</i>	<i>1033</i>

* p<.10 ** p<.05 *** p<.01

Comment: Source: the Swedish SOM-study 2004. The three indices range from 1-5, where 5 is the most public sector friendly position. The attachment variables are coded 0-1, indicating attachment to the level, but they are not mutually independent since a person can be attached to more than one level. For each index, the left-most estimates in italics display the bivariate relationships, in the middle columns are the estimates of the basic model where the effect of the attachment variables is measured under control for each other, and the last column display the estimates of the full model, including the control variables.

Table A5.1 Coding of interaction variables

State	Year of EU-membership (new=1)	EU net contribution (contributor=1)	Government structure (unitary=1)	Welfare regime
Austria	1995	Contributor	federal state	Corporatist
Belgium	1958	Contributor	federal state	Corporatist
Cyprus	2004	Recipient	unitary state	-
The Czech republic	2004	Recipient	unitary state	East European
Denmark	1973	Contributor	unitary state	Nordic
Estonia	2004	Recipient	unitary state	East European
Finland	1995	Contributor	unitary state	Nordic
France	1958	Contributor	unitary state	Corporatist
Germany	1958	Contributor	federal state	Corporatist
Greece	1981	Recipient	unitary state	Mediterranean
Hungary	2004	Recipient	unitary state	East European
Ireland	1973	Recipient	unitary state	Liberal
Italy	1958	Contributor	unitary state	Mediterranean
Latvia	2004	Recipient	unitary state	East European
Lithuania	2004	Recipient	unitary state	East European
Luxembourg	1958	Contributor	unitary state	Corporatist
Malta	2004	Recipient	unitary state	-
The Netherlands	1958	Contributor	unitary state	Corporatist
Poland	2004	Recipient	unitary state	East European
Portugal	1986	Recipient	unitary state	Mediterranean
Slovakia	2004	Recipient	unitary state	East European
Slovenia	2004	Recipient	unitary state	East European
Spain	1986	Recipient	unitary state	Mediterranean
Sweden	1995	Contributor	unitary state	Nordic
United Kingdom	1973	Contributor	unitary state	liberal

Table A5.2 Phase of joining the EU as interaction effect on the relationship between level of attachment and political trust, EU25 2004 (OLS regression coefficients)

Phase of EU-admission	1958	1973	1980:ies	1995	2004
National trust index					
<i>Level of attachment:</i>					
Sub-national	.20**	.37**	-51**	.53*	.38*
National	.51***	.92***	1.05***	.49	.25
Supra-national	.41***	.33***	.24***	.10	.09
Supra-national trust index					
<i>Level of attachment:</i>					
Sub-national	.23***	.47**	-.04	.24	.33
National	.16*	.06	.64***	.34	-.09
Supra-national	.87***	1.17***	.93***	.72***	.73***
National trust index					
<i>Strongest attachment:</i>					
Foremost sub-national	.80***	1.04**	-.61	1.09	-.38
All domestic	1.18***	1.64***	-.04	.99	-.24
Foremost national	.93***	1.49***	-.20	1.00	-.17
Supra-national (et al)	1.01***	.96**	.03	.62	-.09
All levels equal	1.31***	1.40***	.09	.88	.03
Supra-national trust index					
<i>Strongest attachment:</i>					
Foremost sub-national	.20	1.47***	.12	.31	.51
All domestic	.48**	1.16***	.59	.02	.71*
Foremost national	.09	.90**	.55	.23	.71*
Supra-national (et al)	.37*	1.44***	1.54***	.50	1.15***
All levels equal	.86***	1.97***	1.51***	.51	1.12***

Table A5.4 Effect of welfare regimes on the relation between multi-level territorial attachments and preferred decision level for social policy issues, EU25 2004 (unstandardized OLS regression coefficients)

Welfare regime	Social policies should be decided at the EU-level				
	Nordic	Corporatist	Liberal	Latin	East European
<i>Level of attachment:</i>					
Sub-national	-.07	-.12	-.18	-.28*	-.02
National	-.38	-.66***	-.75***	-.38***	-.07
Supra-national	.15	.44***	.80***	.30***	.28**
<i>Strongest attachment:</i>					
Unattached	-.50	.25	.47*	.27	-.27
All domestic	-.44*	-.39***	-.35***	-.28***	.04
Foremost national	-.29	-.27***	-.10	-.16	-.10
Supra-national (et al)	-.00	.35***	.78***	.23**	.25
All levels equal	-.21	.09	.54***	.27***	.10

* p<.10 ** p<.05 *** p<.01

Comment: Source: the Eurobarometer 62.0, 2004. The preferred decision-level index is constructed from six items (national level=0, EU=1), added to range from 0-6. The attachment items are coded 1 (have such attachment) and 0 (do not have such attachment). The Level items are not mutually independent, but the strongest attachment items are, with the group of 'Foremost sub-national attachment' as the base category. All the coefficients are computed under control for the control variables used in chapter 4, plus the multiplicative interaction terms, although they are suppressed in the table. The fat marked coefficients are significantly different from the base category.

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