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**Fredrik Carlsson
Olof Johansson-Stenman**

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Voting Motives, Group Identity, and Social Norms

Fredrik Carlsson^a and Olof Johansson-Stenman^b
Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law,
University of Gothenburg, Box 640, SE 405 30 Gothenburg, Sweden

Abstract

The conventional rational voter model has problems explaining why people vote, since the costs typically exceed the expected benefits. This paper presents Swedish survey evidence suggesting that people vote based on a combination of instrumental and expressive motives, and that people are strongly influenced by a social norm saying that it is an obligation to vote. Women and older individuals are more affected by this norm than others. The more right-wing a person is, the less unethical he/she will perceive selfish voting to be. Moreover, individuals believe that they themselves vote less selfishly than others and that people with similar political views as themselves vote less selfishly than people with the opposite political views, which is consistent with social identity theory.

Keywords: social norms, self-interested voting, expressive voting, sociotropic voting, self-serving bias, group identity, in-group bias, social identity theory

JEL-classification: D70, D72

^a Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, University of Gothenburg, Box 640, SE 405 30 Gothenburg, Sweden Phone: +46 31 7864174. Fax: +46 31 7861393. E-mail fredrik.carlsson@economics.gu.se

^b Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, University of Gothenburg, Box 640, SE 405 30 Gothenburg, Sweden E-mail olof.johansson@economics.gu.se

1. Introduction

This paper utilizes two unique surveys sent to Swedish households in order to shed light on the motives underlying why people choose to vote, why people vote as they do, and peoples' beliefs about why others vote as they do. Despite the fact that voting outcomes are essential for economic and social development, the motives for voting are still poorly understood. The conventional assumption in the rational actor analysis of voting is that people vote solely based on material self-interests. However, this assumption has been rather unsuccessful in explaining why people choose to vote, since the expected benefit from voting is small compared to the time cost and effort involved. There is also much empirical evidence that we do not choose what party to vote for based solely on self-interest e.g., Ashenfelter and Kelley, 1975; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2007; Matusaka and Paldam, 1993; Mueller, 2003).

An alternative explanation is the theory of expressive voting, suggested first by Buchanan (1954) and further developed and discussed by Tullock (1971), Brennan and Buchanan (1984), Brennan and Lomasky (1993), Brennan and Hamlin (1998, 2000), and Brennan (2008). Here people are mainly motivated by the expressive act of voting, i.e., that there is a utility gain from expressing an opinion through voting. There is some empirical and experimental support for this hypothesis; see Carter and Guerette (1993), Fisher (1996), Copeland and Laband (2002), Sobel and Wagner (2004), and Tyran (2004), although it is difficult to test the theory based on observed behavior.

A third explanation for voting is that people are socialized to vote. In the words of Tullock (2000, p. 181), a citizen "will have been indoctrinated by the education process and by media hype into believing that it is important to vote in order to preserve democracy." In other words, the social norm is that we should vote, and that it is blameworthy not to vote. Various kinds of evidence support this hypothesis. For example, survey evidence by Blais (2000) suggests that individuals with strong feelings of civic duty are more likely to vote.

Experimental evidence by Grober and Schram (2006) suggests that voter turnout is affected by information regarding other voters' turnout decisions. Milligan et al. (2004) observed a causal relationship between education and voter turnout. One possible explanation to this is that higher education implies norm socialization. There is also much evidence in both psychology and economics that people like to conform to various pro-social norms, such as contributing to a public good or not littering, if they are aware that most other people conform to these norms (e.g., Alpizar et al., 2008; Cialdini et al., 1990, 2006; Fischbacher et al., 2001; Frey and Meier 2004).

The present paper is based on Swedish survey evidence where a representative sample was asked about their motives for why they vote and why they vote as they do, and about their beliefs about why others vote as they do. In addition, specific questions were asked with respect to possible social norms related to a duty to vote and to vote non-selfishly. The purpose of the paper is two-fold: (i) To contribute to our understanding of people's *perceptions* of why they vote, and of why they and others vote as they do, and (ii) to contribute to our understanding of why people *actually* vote, and why they vote as they do. Although related, these are different tasks.

The first aim is important since in a situation where the scientific community has not resolved the issues of why people vote, and vote as they do, it is of interest to compare available scientific hypotheses with people's own perception of the motives. Moreover, since there is recent economics evidence that group identity can have a powerful effect on behavior (e.g., Bernhard et al., 2006; Goette et al., 2006; and Chen and Li 2009), it is interesting to measure the role of group identity and in-group bias when judging the voting motives of others.

When analyzing the second aim, we cannot simply assume that people's actual motives coincide with their perceptions of their motives. For example, there is ample evidence from

psychological research that people prefer to have a positive self image, and that they therefore systematically bias their own perception of themselves (e.g., Taylor and Brown, 1994; Baumeister, 1998). Consequently, it is likely that people vote less for altruistic reasons than what they perceive they do. Still, despite the fact that survey methodology often remains controversial within economics (e.g., Bertrand and Mullainathan 2000), we have at least three reasons to believe that it would be a mistake to disregard survey-based methods when analyzing the motives underlying voting behavior. First, we can analyze the results in the light of available psychological research, including social identity theory, and hence to some extent adjust for, or at least reflect over, possible biases. Second, some of the questions are less associated with self-image. For example, we ask respondents what they think of people's perceptions of why others vote as they do. Third, alternative methods, such as relying on observed voting behavior, often have large identification problems. Still, we do not primarily see survey methodology as a substitute for other methods, but rather as a complement.¹

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the survey and descriptive statistics. Section 3 presents the analysis of why people vote. Section 4 analyzes why people vote as they do and their beliefs about why others vote as they do. Section 5 analyzes more directly the perceived strength of social norms, i.e., the perception of how bad it is not to vote and to vote selfishly, and Section 6 concludes the paper.

2. The surveys and data

The data reported in this paper comes from two different surveys. Survey 1 was mailed to 1,400 randomly selected individuals aged 18-75 years in Sweden in the spring of 2002; the

¹ The interest in using survey methodology has increased within many fields of economics in recent years. These include happiness research (e.g., Di Tella et al., 2001, 2003; Luttmer, 2005), concerns about relative income (e.g., Johansson-Stenman et al., 2002; Solnick and Hemenway, 2005), wage setting in labor economics (e.g., Agell and Lundborg, 2003; Agell, 2004), trust and social capital (e.g., Knack and Keefer, 1997; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002), and preferences for redistribution (e.g., Fong, 2001; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005).

response rate was 56%. Survey 2 was mailed to 2,450 randomly selected individuals aged 18-65 years in Sweden in the spring of 2004; the response rate was 45%. In both surveys, political preferences of the respondents were assessed with a question about what political party they would vote for if there were an election today. Survey 1 focused in particular on why people vote and inquired about how bad it is not to vote, while Survey 2 included specific questions on why people vote as they do.

There are seven political parties in the Swedish parliament, and the voting rate in Sweden is about 80% (SCB, 2007), which by international standards is quite high. The distributions of the political preferences for the two samples are reported in Table 1. Using data from all major opinion polls in Sweden during 2002 and 2004 (Temo, 2008), we also report the average support for each party.² Note that the party level figures are conditional on voting, both for our surveys and for the opinion polls.

<<Table 1 about here>>

In both surveys, a smaller share of respondents support the Social Democratic Party compared with in the opinion polls. On the other hand, we have a larger share of respondents supporting the Left Party. This is most likely to due to problems with representativity of our sample. In the econometric analysis, we group the respondents into various groups, as reported at the end of Table 1.

Table 2 gives a description of other socio-economic characteristics that we will use in the econometric analysis.

<<Table 2 about here>>

² For 2002 we used 119 opinion polls and for 2004 we used 48 opinion polls. The reason why there were so many more opinion polls in 2002 is that it was an election year. The average numbers reported are simply the unweighted averages of the opinion polls. In most opinion polls, the question was about what political party they would vote for had there been an election that day.

Comparing the descriptive statistics of the two samples with the national statistics for the two years, we find that the shares of respondents who are women and/or who have at least three years of university education are significantly higher in our sample than in the population as a whole. We also have a significantly higher share of people in the oldest age group in both samples.³

3. Why do people vote?

The literature presents three major competing hypotheses of why people vote: (1) An instrumental reason, i.e., to affect the outcome (Black, 1948; Downs, 1957), (2) an expressive reason, i.e., to be able to express one's views (Brennan and Buchanan, 1984; Brennan and Lomasky, 1993; Brennan and Hamlin, 1998, 2000), and (3) a social norm reason, i.e., to conform to a norm saying that it is a democratic obligation to vote (Tullock, 2000). In order to discriminate among these, we asked straightforward questions about the perceived importance of different motives for voting, as shown in Table 3.

<<Table 3 about here>>

A first striking finding is that most people seem to be motivated by more than one reason, suggesting that the search for a single motive may be in vain. A large majority consider it important to vote in order to affect the outcome. This is interesting given the extremely small probability that the vote will be decisive. Quattrone and Tversky (1984) suggest that people systematically overestimate the importance of their own vote for the outcome. However, there are other possible explanations. For example, even if people realize that their own impact on the outcome is negligible, they may still state that they vote in order to affect the outcome, perhaps because they want to express that they sympathize with the purpose of elections, i.e.,

³ One thousand samples were bootstrapped by randomly drawing observations with replacement as many times as there are observations in the original sample. By using the percentile method and a 95 % confidence interval, it can be shown whether the means significantly differ from each other at the 5 % significance level.

to affect the outcome. The democratic obligation motive, or the social norm motive, appears to be almost equally as strong. The expressive motive appears to be the least important of the three different motives. Based on pairwise Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney (WMW) tests (see Siegel and Castellan, 1988) between the motives, we can reject the hypotheses of equal distributions (p -values < 0.001). However, since more than 70% consider the expressive motive either important or very important, we can certainly not conclude that it is unimportant.

The differences between left- and right-wing voters are relatively small. Using a WMW test we can not reject the hypothesis of equal distributions between these groups for any of the three questions at the 10 % level. Thus, there is no indication that the reason for voting is fundamentally different between left-wing and right-wing voters.

To further explore the individual differences in the perceived importance of each of the three reasons for voting, we run separate regressions for each motive. Since the dependent variables are ordered categorical, it seems logical to use an ordered probit/logit model. However, a disadvantage with such an approach is that the parameters cannot be directly interpretable in terms of the magnitude of the effects. Moreover, since the pattern in terms of parameter significance is almost the same in a simple OLS, we focus on the OLS estimates in the paper, and present the ordered probit estimates in the appendix (Table A1); marginal effects for the ordered probit regressions are available from the authors upon request. Table 4 presents the results of the OLS regressions

<<Table 4 about here>>

There is a clear pattern with respect to age; compared to younger people, older people consider each of the motives to be more important. It also turns out that compared to men, women consider the first and the third motives to be more important. Both these results are consistent with the finding that there is a positive correlation between gender and age and

social preferences; see for example List (2004) and Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001). That university education has a positive influence on the importance of the instrumental reason suggests that the overall high expressed importance of this motive is not primarily due to an overestimation of the importance of a single vote. That older people and females to a larger extent think that it is a democratic obligation to vote is also consistent with the fact that voting rates are higher for older people and for females (SCB, 2007).

For political preferences, the reference group is supporters of the Left and the Green Party. Conservatives are less likely to vote in order to affect the outcome and social democrats are more likely to vote because it is a democratic obligation. Those who vote for *Other party*, i.e., a party that most likely will not constitute a part of any government coalition, are more motivated by the expressive motive, which follows intuition. Otherwise, there are no large differences among the different groups. Not surprisingly, those who express that they would not vote, that they would vote blank, or have no opinion consider the importance of each motive to be less important than what others do.

4. Why do people vote as they do?

Another controversial issue concerns the motives for why people vote as they do. There are mainly two competing hypotheses: (1) the self-interested (or pocketbook) voting hypothesis, suggesting that people mainly vote in their own self-interest (Downs, 1957), and (2) the sociotropic voting hypothesis, suggesting that people out of conviction vote in the interest of the society as a whole (e.g., Sears et al., 1980, 1990). It is inherently difficult to discriminate between these two motives since they tend to be correlated. However, some individual level analysis suggests that both of them do matter (see, e.g., Fiorina, 1978; Markus, 1988).

People's perception of the reason why they themselves vote as they do is likely to be biased for self-signaling reasons (e.g., Benabou and Tirole, 2004, 2006). That is, in a world

where our self-knowledge is imperfect, and where we prefer to have a positive self-image, we may evaluate people who are similar to ourselves more positively, simply because by doing so we send positive signals to ourselves about our own characteristics. For example, if I consider people who are like me to be more trustworthy compared with others, I also implicitly signal to myself that I am more trustworthy than others; cf. Johansson-Stenman (2008). For this reason, we also asked about the respondents' beliefs regarding why others vote as they do. In order to be able to test for an in-group bias, we also asked about people's perceptions of the voting motive among others with a specific political view, as shown in Table 5. According to social identity theory, one important reason why people display in-group bias is that it enhances social identity,⁴ thereby elevating the self-esteem or self-image of group members (e.g., Tajfel and Turner, 1986). Indeed, there is recent empirical evidence that group identity can have a powerful effect on behavior. For example, Goette et al. (2006) analyze the effects of group membership in a prisoner's dilemma game based on natural groups in terms of platoons in the Swiss army, and find more cooperation with in-group than with out-group members. Chen and Li (2009) induce group identities based on the experimental subjects' art preferences, and consistently find subjects to be more altruistic towards an in-group than an out-group match.

<<Table 5 about here>>

As can be seen in Table 5, people make a clear distinction between why they themselves vote as they do and why other people vote as they do; the hypothesis of equal distributions can be strongly rejected based on a WMW test (p -value < 0.001). This is consistent with the hypothesis that people wish to give a good impression and wish to have a self-image of being a good person; see for example Kuran (1995). Still, in both cases, most of the respondents say that they and others vote as they do both because of self-interest and because of conviction.

⁴ Tajfel (1981, p. 255) defines social identity as "the individuals' knowledge that they belong to certain social groups together with some emotional and value significance to them of their group membership."

We also find that people on average believe that conservatives more than social democrats vote more in their own self-interest; using a WMW test we can reject the hypothesis of equal distributions (p-value < 0.001). Interestingly, also right-wing voters believe that this is the case, although not to the same extent as left-wing voters believe this, which corresponds to social identity theory. In fact, there is a significant difference between left- and right-wing supporters when it comes to believing why conservatives vote as they do (p-value < 0.001). However, there is no difference when it comes to why social democrats vote as they do (p-value = 0.152).

Table 6 reports regression results for each of the four questions. The dependent variables range from 1 (mostly own interest) to 5 (mostly of conviction). The results of the ordered probit regressions are presented in the appendix (Table A2).

<<Table 6 about here>>

If we compare the first two questions, we see that the effects of socio-economic characteristics are similar with the exception of political preferences. For example, older people to a larger extent claim that they and others vote as they do because of conviction. Females are actually more likely to state that they vote for a particular party because of self-interest. This is somewhat surprising, in particular since we found that women are more likely to choose to vote because it is a democratic obligation. We will come back to this issue and possible explanations in Section 5.

Respondents with at least one child in the household are more likely to vote as they do because of self-interest, and they believe that others are more likely to vote as they do because of self-interest as well. Compared with the reference group (Left- and Green Party supporters), conservatives to a larger extent claim that they themselves vote according to self-interest. The same holds for social democrats and supporters of the middle parties, but to a

lesser extent. However, there are no significant differences among voters regarding their perception of why others vote as they do.

Older people also to a larger extent than others think that both conservatives and social democrats vote as they do as a result of conviction. Not surprisingly, given social identity theory and potential self-signalling, conservatives think that conservatives vote as they do as a result of conviction to a larger extent than what others think, and social democrats think that social democrats vote as they do as a result of conviction to a larger extent than what others think.

5. How bad is it to vote selfishly or not vote at all?

Since we have observed that social norms affect the decision to vote, it is natural to look into the perceived strengths of these social norms for different people, and to compare the perceived strengths of different norms. In this section we analyze two social norms: The first one relates to the cost of voting, and we asked in the survey, “How bad is it not to vote because it takes too much effort?” This norm relates to the main problem with the standard rational voter model when it comes to explaining why people vote when the cost exceeds the instrumental benefit. The second norm relates to self-interest, and we asked, “How bad is it to vote for a party out of self-interest?”.

<<Table 7 about here>>

The norm saying that it is bad not to vote appears to be much stronger than the norm against voting selfishly. Indeed, a large majority, almost 80%, consider it either unethical or very unethical not to vote because it takes too much effort. More left-wing voters than right-wing voters think that it is very unethical not to vote, and the difference is significant based on a WMW test (p -value = 0.019). A majority believe it is unethical to vote for a certain party out of self-interest, although fewer find this less unethical than not voting at all. We can again

reject the hypothesis of equal distributions between right- and left-wing voters based on a WMW test (p-value = 0.002).

Table 8 reports regressions for both questions. The scale of the dependent variable ranges from 1 (not unethical at all) to 4 (very unethical). The results of the ordered probit regressions, which are again qualitatively very similar, are presented in the appendix (Table A3).

<<Table 8 about here>>

There is a large effect of belonging to the oldest age group, suggesting that people older than 60 consider it more unethical than younger people not to vote. This is consistent both with the fact that voting rates are higher for older people (SCB, 2007) and with experimental evidence suggesting that young men tend to be more selfish than others (List, 2006). Similarly, female respondents think it is more unethical than men not to vote, and they too have a higher voting rate than their reference group (men) (SCB, 2007). Not surprisingly, respondents who would not vote or have no opinion consider it less unethical not to vote. Finally, there is a weak effect suggesting that respondents with higher incomes think that it is more unethical not to vote compared to others, and this is also consistent with evidence that the voting rate increases with income (SCB, 2007).

Compared to younger people and men, older people and women also consider it more unethical to vote for a certain party for selfish reasons. The latter may appear inconsistent with the results in Table 6, which suggest that women are more likely than men to state that they vote for a particular party because of self-interest. One possible explanation to this may be that some women experience that they are discriminated against, and hence feel it is morally acceptable for them to vote for selfish reasons, but not in general. Compared to non-religious people, religious people (primarily Christians) also consider selfish voting more unethical. With respect to political preferences, we see a clear pattern that the more right-wing

a person is, the less unethical he/she will perceive selfish voting to be (the left party is the base case). Those who would not vote, or have no opinion, consider it to be about equally unethical to vote selfishly as voters for the conservative party do.

6. Conclusion

This paper has analyzed people's *perceived* voting motives of themselves and others. Our basic findings are that people perceive that there are several motives underlying the fact that they vote. Women and older people appear to be more strongly affected than men and younger people by social norms saying that one ought to vote and that one ought not to vote for a certain party for selfish reasons.

It is arguably difficult to analyze motives, and the survey-based method used here is certainly not without problems. Still, we argue that there are no, or at least very few, strategic reasons (except for those based on self-signaling) for respondents not to report truthfully. Thus, we argue that there is probably not much bias with respect to people's subjectively perceived motivations. However, this does not imply that those subjectively perceived motivations are necessarily good measures of people's true, and partly unconscious, underlying motives for their actual voting behavior. Indeed, we found strong evidence of self-serving bias, or self-deception, both at the individual and group level. We observe both that people believe that they themselves more than others vote in the interest of society and less based on self-interests, and that people belonging to the same political party as themselves more than others vote in the interest of society. We believe that these findings are important in their own right.

Furthermore, we believe that our findings are informative also with respect to people's actual voting motives. First, it seems clear that people in general are motivated by more than

one voting motive. It also seems clear that most people are motivated by social norms, albeit to a varying degree, both with respect to why they vote at all and why they vote as they do.

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Table 1. Distribution of political preferences for the two surveys.

Variable	Description	Survey 1	Opinion	Survey 2	Opinion
		n = 1092	polls 2002	n = 778	polls 2004
		Mean	Mean	Mean	
No opinion	1 if do not know	0.120		0.222	
Would not vote	1 if would not vote at all	0.046			
Blank	1 if would return a blank ballot	0.069			
Would vote for a party	1 if would vote	0.766		0.778	
Left Party	1 if would vote for left party	0.122	0.103	0.101	0.089
Green Party	1 if would vote for green party	0.056	0.042	0.056	0.051
Social democrats	1 if would vote for social democratic party	0.302	0.390	0.352	0.368
Christian democrats	1 if would vote for Christian Democrats	0.061	0.101	0.078	0.056
Center Party	1 if would vote for Center Party	0.054	0.054	0.054	0.063
Liberal Party	1 if would vote for Liberal Party	0.121	0.082	0.051	0.120
Conservatives	1 if would vote for the Conservative Party	0.207	0.207	0.233	0.229
Other parties	1 if would vote for other parties	0.044	0.022	0.034	0.024
Middleer parties	1 if would vote for center parties (Christian Democrats, Center Party or Liberal Party)	0.236		0.183	
Right-wing voters	1 if would vote for middler parties or the Conservative Party	0.443		0.416	
Left-wing voters	1 if would vote for Left party, Green party or Social Democratic Party	0.481		0.509	

Table 2. Descriptive statistics for the two surveys.

Variable	Description	Survey 1	Survey 2
		n = 1092	n = 778
		Mean	Mean
Age group <30	1 if younger than 31	0.202	0.211
Age group 31-45	1 if age between 31 and 45	0.277	0.305
Age group 46-60	1 if age between 46 and 60	0.305	0.361
Age group >60	1 if older than 60	0.215	0.123
Female	1 if female respondent	0.550	0.528
Child(ren)	1 if at least 1 child under 18 in the household	0.357	0.338
Senior high	1 if completed senior high education	0.385	0.451
University education	1 if completed university education	0.407	0.352
Income	(Total monthly household income in 10,000 SEK)/(number of adults + 0.5× number of children) ^{0.75}	1.418 (std 1.172)	1.397 (std 1.466)
Religious	1 if religious	0.180	0.149
Small city	1 if lives in a village with fewer than 15,000 inhabitants, or in the countryside	0.319	0.320
Medium City	1 if lives in a city with 15,000-120,000 inhabitants	0.412	0.413
Larger city	1 if lives in a city with more than 120,000 inhabitants	0.255	0.252

Table 3. Self-assessed reasons for voting: “There can be different reasons to vote. If you intend to vote in the next election to the parliament, please answer how important the following motives are for why you intend to vote.”

	Completely unimportant	Unimportant	Important	Very important
	<u>All respondents (n=918)</u>			
Because I want to affect the outcome	2%	5%	28%	65%
Because I want to express my political views	7%	22%	33%	38%
Because it is a democratic obligation to vote	5%	8%	27%	60%
	<u>Right-wing voters (n=341)</u>			
Because I want to affect the outcome	1%	4%	24%	71%
Because I want to express my political views	5%	17%	35%	42%
Because it is a democratic obligation to vote	5%	7%	27%	60%
	<u>Left-wing voters (n=359)</u>			
Because I want to affect the outcome	1%	3%	28%	68%
Because I want to express my political views	8%	22%	32%	41%
Because it is a democratic obligation to vote	4%	6%	24%	67%

Table 4. OLS regression on self-reported reason for voting; 1 = completely unimportant, 4 = very important.

	Because I want to affect the outcome		Because I want to express my political views		Because it is a democratic obligation to vote	
	Coeff	P-value	Coeff	P-value	Coeff	P-value
Constant	3.395	0.000	3.142	0.000	3.207	0.000
Age group 31-45	0.017	0.807	0.008	0.935	0.248	0.004
Age group 46-60	0.100	0.110	0.154	0.082	0.081	0.315
Age group >60	0.197	0.009	0.325	0.003	0.209	0.028
Female	0.105	0.018	0.022	0.723	0.213	0.000
Child(ren)	-0.026	0.652	-0.133	0.097	-0.132	0.068
Senior high	0.047	0.478	-0.129	0.181	-0.017	0.839
University	0.145	0.034	0.051	0.605	0.040	0.645
Income	-0.011	0.568	-0.032	0.229	0.027	0.257
Religious	0.017	0.768	0.205	0.013	-0.055	0.452
Small city	-0.002	0.977	-0.077	0.300	-0.145	0.027
Large city	-0.095	0.080	-0.027	0.733	-0.086	0.215
Social democrats	0.101	0.154	-0.066	0.512	0.233	0.010
Middle parties	-0.029	0.703	-0.115	0.283	0.029	0.759
Conservatives	0.199	0.010	0.031	0.774	0.069	0.486
Other parties	0.282	0.031	0.302	0.099	-0.032	0.854
Blank vote	-0.658	0.000	-0.492	0.001	-0.297	0.023
No opinion	-0.171	0.043	-0.509	0.000	-0.171	0.113
Would not vote	-0.089	0.741	-0.996	0.008	-0.757	0.043
R2	0.125		0.109		0.076	

Table 5. Stated reasons why different individuals vote as they do: self-interest vs. conviction.

	Mostly self-interest	Own interest, but partly conviction	Equally much	Conviction, but partly self-interest	Mostly out of conviction
<u>All respondents (n=762)</u>					
Why do you vote as you do?	10%	23%	27%	22%	18%
Why do other people vote as they do?	20%	39%	19%	17%	6%
Why do conservatives vote as they do?	34%	35%	16%	10%	6%
Why do social democrats vote as they do?	15%	27%	24%	23%	11%
----- <u>Right-wing voters (n=249)</u>					
Why do you vote as you do?	9%	26%	26%	23%	15%
Why do other people vote as they do?	17%	42%	18%	19%	5%
Why do conservatives vote as they do?	15%	41%	22%	14%	8%
Why do social democrats vote as they do?	16%	29%	21%	20%	13%
----- <u>Left-wing voters (n=306)</u>					
Why do you vote as you do?	7%	23%	25%	25%	20%
Why do other people vote as they do?	19%	39%	21%	15%	6%
Why do conservatives vote as they do?	48%	32%	10%	7%	3%
Why do social democrats vote as they do?	10%	27%	26%	26%	10%

Table 6. OLS regression on reasons to vote for a certain party: self-interest versus conviction.

1 = mostly self- interest, 5 = mostly out of conviction.

	Why do you vote as you do?		Why do others vote as they do?		Why do conservatives vote as they do?		Why do social democrats vote as they do?	
	Coeff	P-value	Coeff	P-value	Coeff	P-value	Coeff	P-value
Constant	3.259	0.000	2.708	0.000	1.503	0.000	2.460	0.000
Age group 31-45	0.118	0.389	0.006	0.964	0.296	0.019	0.224	0.106
Age group 46-60	0.345	0.006	0.255	0.030	0.379	0.001	0.348	0.007
Age group >60	0.633	0.000	0.400	0.011	0.336	0.032	0.558	0.001
Female	-0.163	0.075	-0.089	0.295	0.013	0.877	0.009	0.925
Child(ren)	-0.183	0.099	-0.210	0.044	-0.099	0.335	-0.072	0.520
Senior high	0.028	0.829	-0.143	0.226	0.243	0.039	0.139	0.281
University	0.148	0.278	-0.186	0.143	0.222	0.079	0.123	0.374
Income	0.002	0.950	-0.030	0.404	0.001	0.984	-0.032	0.321
Religious	0.302	0.021	0.193	0.114	0.003	0.981	-0.135	0.306
Small city	-0.029	0.785	-0.066	0.510	-0.064	0.520	-0.030	0.783
Large city	0.259	0.024	0.109	0.311	-0.079	0.455	0.135	0.247
Social democrats	-0.340	0.022	-0.140	0.318	-0.033	0.812	0.288	0.058
Middle parties	-0.419	0.014	-0.091	0.572	0.500	0.002	0.189	0.280
Conservatives	-0.627	0.000	-0.091	0.549	0.802	0.000	-0.049	0.767
Other parties	0.233	0.456	-0.255	0.357	0.270	0.326	-0.146	0.633
No opinion	-0.563	0.000	-0.118	0.417	0.266	0.066	-0.006	0.970
R2	0.086		0.049		0.093		0.035	

Table 7. Stated views on not voting and voting in self-interest.

	Not unethical at all	Somewhat unethical	Unethical	Very unethical
	<u>All respondents (n=1076)</u>			
How bad is it not to vote because it takes too much effort?	8%	13%	24%	54%
How bad is it to vote for a party only out of self-interest?	29%	17%	26%	28%
	<u>Right-wing voters (n=366)</u>			
How bad is it not to vote because it takes too much effort?	7%	11%	27%	55%
How bad is it to vote for a party only out of self-interest?	32%	17%	26%	26%
	<u>Left-wing voters (n=398)</u>			
How bad is it not to vote because it takes too much effort?	6%	11%	18%	65%
How bad is it to vote for a party only out of self-interest?	23%	17%	26%	34%

Table 8. OLS regression on stated views on not voting and voting in self-interest. 1 = not unethical at all, 4 = very unethical.

	How bad is it not to vote because it takes too much effort?		How bad is it to vote for a party only out of self-interest?	
	Coeff	P-value	Coeff	P-value
Constant	3.200	0.000	2.416	0.000
Age group 31-45	0.173	0.062	0.171	0.123
Age group 46-60	0.124	0.148	0.352	0.001
Age group >60	0.322	0.001	0.795	0.000
Female	0.159	0.008	0.274	0.000
Child(ren)	-0.034	0.654	-0.038	0.676
Senior high	0.053	0.536	-0.061	0.549
University	-0.101	0.258	-0.120	0.261
Income	0.048	0.072	0.016	0.610
Religious	-0.097	0.210	0.252	0.007
Small city	-0.018	0.790	0.087	0.291
Large city	0.006	0.934	-0.075	0.398
Social democrats	-0.072	0.465	-0.295	0.013
Middle parties	-0.206	0.050	-0.357	0.005
Conservatives	-0.114	0.290	-0.573	0.000
Other parties	-0.262	0.148	-0.870	0.000
Blank vote	-0.250	0.063	-0.251	0.119
No opinion	-0.374	0.001	-0.478	0.000
Would not vote	-1.192	0.000	-0.645	0.001
R2	0.093		0.116	

Appendix 1. Results from ordered probit models

Table A1. Ordered probit on self-reported reason for voting; 1 = completely unimportant, 4 = very important.

	Because I want to affect the outcome		Because I want to express my political views		Because it is a democratic obligation to vote	
	Coeff	P-value	Coeff	P-value	Coeff	P-value
Constant	1.921	0.000	1.745	0.000	1.399	0.000
Age group 31-45	0.021	0.871	0.024	0.838	0.300	0.016
Age group 46-60	0.200	0.098	0.189	0.082	0.110	0.338
Age group >60	0.402	0.008	0.412	0.002	0.314	0.024
Female	0.210	0.015	0.049	0.532	0.310	0.000
Child(ren)	-0.045	0.673	-0.174	0.074	-0.167	0.109
Senior high	0.061	0.633	-0.182	0.131	-0.053	0.665
University	0.267	0.044	0.036	0.769	0.052	0.683
Income	-0.021	0.564	-0.040	0.207	0.041	0.258
Religious	0.082	0.483	0.258	0.013	-0.074	0.483
Small city	0.002	0.988	-0.093	0.308	-0.187	0.050
Large city	-0.156	0.141	-0.043	0.653	-0.083	0.418
Social democrats	0.165	0.231	-0.096	0.441	0.360	0.007
Middle parties	-0.073	0.615	-0.147	0.268	0.000	0.998
Conservatives	0.444	0.004	0.036	0.792	0.125	0.383
Other parties	0.628	0.027	0.400	0.091	0.017	0.947
Blank vote	-0.890	0.000	-0.573	0.001	-0.380	0.035
No opinion	-0.320	0.040	-0.602	0.000	-0.245	0.106
Would not vote	0.017	0.975	-1.197	0.008	-0.919	0.053
Threshold param 1	0.663	0.000	0.996	0.000	0.519	0.000
Threshold param 2	1.875	0.000	1.914	0.000	1.453	0.000
Pseudo R2	0.065		0.045		0.039	

Table A2. Ordered probit on reasons to vote for a certain party: self-interest versus conviction. 1 = mostly self-interest, 5 = mostly out of conviction.

	Why do you vote as you do?		Why do others vote as they do?		Why do conservatives vote as they do?		Why do social democrats vote as they do?	
	Coeff	P-value	Coeff	P-value	Coeff	P-value	Coeff	P-value
Constant	1.435	0.000	1.040	0.000	-0.244	0.206	0.679	0.000
Age group 31-45	0.111	0.354	-0.021	0.861	0.237	0.052	0.194	0.100
Age group 46-60	0.308	0.005	0.230	0.036	0.328	0.004	0.294	0.007
Age group >60	0.557	0.000	0.344	0.019	0.294	0.052	0.481	0.001
Female	-0.140	0.079	-0.067	0.401	0.009	0.914	0.013	0.871
Child(ren)	-0.155	0.110	-0.202	0.038	-0.066	0.503	-0.059	0.539
Senior high	0.019	0.862	-0.109	0.327	0.264	0.022	0.124	0.261
University	0.124	0.298	-0.137	0.249	0.273	0.027	0.121	0.304
Income	0.003	0.910	-0.031	0.365	0.005	0.859	-0.029	0.306
Religious	0.271	0.018	0.183	0.107	-0.008	0.943	-0.111	0.324
Small city	-0.024	0.795	-0.055	0.553	-0.067	0.482	-0.016	0.866
Large city	0.238	0.018	0.128	0.202	-0.065	0.524	0.135	0.174
Social democrats	-0.304	0.020	-0.120	0.355	-0.043	0.754	0.246	0.056
Middle parties	-0.383	0.011	-0.063	0.675	0.555	0.000	0.160	0.281
Conservatives	-0.552	0.000	-0.098	0.491	0.767	0.000	-0.042	0.764
Other parties	0.243	0.396	-0.285	0.275	0.185	0.497	-0.165	0.535
No opinion	-0.503	0.000	-0.128	0.346	0.274	0.051	-0.012	0.928
Threshold param 1	0.883	0.000	1.077	0.000	0.963	0.000	0.855	0.000
Threshold param 2	1.604	0.000	1.635	0.000	1.518	0.000	1.473	0.000
Threshold param 3	2.305	0.000	2.506	0.000	2.106	0.000	2.293	0.000
R2	0.029		0.017		0.037		0.012	

Table A3. Ordered probit on stated views on not voting and voting in self-interest. 1 = not unethical at all, 4 = very unethical.

	How bad is it not to vote because it takes too much effort?		How bad is it to vote for a party only out of self-interest?	
	Coeff	P-value	Coeff	P-value
Constant	1.450	0.000	0.516	0.001
Age group 31-45	0.226	0.046	0.175	0.111
Age group 46-60	0.164	0.117	0.342	0.001
Age group >60	0.389	0.002	0.773	0.000
Female	0.197	0.008	0.273	0.000
Kids	-0.049	0.605	-0.048	0.597
Senior high	0.047	0.663	-0.076	0.449
University	-0.138	0.219	-0.124	0.238
Income	0.063	0.085	0.021	0.535
Religious	-0.121	0.207	0.243	0.008
Small city	-0.007	0.932	0.085	0.300
Large city	0.007	0.941	-0.079	0.365
Social democrats	-0.091	0.476	-0.302	0.010
Middle parties	-0.293	0.029	-0.370	0.003
Conservatives	-0.184	0.184	-0.573	0.000
Other parties	-0.324	0.155	-0.878	0.000
Blank vote	-0.396	0.016	-0.276	0.080
No opinion	-0.495	0.001	-0.484	0.000
Would not vote	-1.308	0.000	-0.632	0.001
Threshold param 1	0.651	0.000	0.495	0.000
Threshold param 2	1.389	0.000	1.249	0.000
Pseudo R2	0.039		0.044	