UNDER THE SAME SHADE

Popular Perceptions of Political Change and the Challenges of Consolidating Multiparty Democracy in Tanzania

av

Petri J. Ruotsalainen

UNIVERSITY OF GOTHENBURG

ABSTRACT: UNDER THE SAME SHADE – POPULAR PERCEPTIONS OF POLITICAL CHANGE AND THE CHALLENGES OF CONSOLIDATING MULTIPARTY DEMOCRACY IN TANZANIA

This thesis deals with the question of how people in rural areas have perceived the change of political system from one-party to multi-party during the 1990s in Tanzania. Tanzania has to this date performed three general elections but still the ruling party CCM has a strong grip over politics in the country. With landslide victories in the Presidential elections 1995, 2000 and 2005 the party has reinforced its position in the Parliament. With over eighty percent of the seats in the Parliament, the elections illustrate the failure by the opposition to attract voters and to create an alternative political platform to CCM.

This thesis explores the challenges of consolidating multiparty democracy in Tanzania leading to the overall question of this thesis: What are the possibilities and constraints for consolidation of multiparty democracy in Tanzania? Using an anthropological and inductive method, this question is approached by exploring how villagers in two separate villages in rural Tanzania understand and respond to the question of multiparty democracy. As a complement and a parallel set of information, literature and newspapers covering the political development in Tanzania has been used to be compared and analysed for enhanced understanding of the transition process and the consolidation of multiparty democracy in Tanzania and what factors might be important in a consolidation. The focus of the thesis is on the local/village level, primary on the marginalised pastoralist group of Maasai. As the Maasai has a customary leadership structure that is still strongly manifested in their society and culture, the consolidation of multiparty democracy has therefore direct impact on their society and the system of electing political leaders.

The thesis is divided into three parts. Part I, *the arena,* is an ethnographic and empirical presentation of the local setting. Part II, *towards democracy*, is of theoretical character and part III, *democracy in local practice,* has close relation to the empirical material, leading forward to three main hampering factors working against or making the consolidation of multiparty democracy not as straightforward as intended. I have categorised these factors into three themes: stability, cultural and educational and logistical and practical. One of the main arguments made is that the ruling party and its leaders on both national and local levels are frequently using the concepts peace, unity and harmony as prime values and existing conditions in the country created by the ruling party CCM and its founding father, Julius Nyerere. The usage of these concepts becomes at the local level arguments against multiparty system. Thus, the multiparty system has been met by people with caution; a political form that must be entered into carefully while keeping a watchful eye on the (still) unknown opposition parties and their qualifications.

Key words: Tanzania, anthropology, democracy, democracy transition, political change, consolidation of democracy, cognitive consolidation, elections, popular perceptions, Maasai, clan, customary leadership, Zanzibar, peace, unity, and harmony

UNDER THE SAME SHADE

POPULAR PERCEPTIONS OF POLITICAL CHANGE AND THE CHALLENGES OF CONSOLIDATING MULTIPARTY DEMOCRACY IN TANZANIA

Petri J. Ruotsalainen

PhD Dissertation

Under the Same Shade

Popular Perceptions of Political Change and the Challenges of Consolidating

Multiparty Democracy in Tanzania

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Abbreviations

AMNUT	All-Muslim National Union of Tanganyika
ANC	African National Congress
ASP	Afro-Shirazi Party
CCM	Chama cha Mapinduzi (Revolutionary Party)
CCW	Chama cha Wananchi (People's Party)
CHADEMA	Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo (Party for Democracy and Development)
CUF	Civic United Front (Chama cha Wananchi)
DC	District Commissioner
DED	District Executive Director
KAMAHURU	Kamati ya Mwelekeo wa Vyama Huru (Committee for Direction of Independent/Free Parties. A forerunner to CUF)
KINNAPA	Maasai NGO based in Kibaya - Acronym from the six founding villages. In Maa it means also 'we who support each other'
LAMP	Land Management Programme. Sida-financed environmental programme in Kiteto, Babati, Simanjiro and Singida districts between 1991 and 2007
LEGCO	Legislative Council
NCCR-M	National Congress for Reconstruction and Reform
NLD	National League for Democracy
NUTA	National Union of Tanganyika Workers
PCP	People's Convention Party
PDP	People's Democratic Party
PONA	Popular National Party
SDP	Social Democratic Party
TAA	Tanganyika African Association
TANU	Tanganyika African National Union
UDETA	Umoja wa Demokrasia Tanzania
UMD	Union for Multiparty Democracy
UTP	United Tanganyika Party
UWT	Umoja wa Wanawake wa Tanzania
VEO	Village Executive Officer (village secretary)

WEO	Ward Executive Officer (ward secretary)
ZNP	Zanzibar Nationalist Party
ZPPP	Zanzibar and Pemba People's Party

Glossary

Swahili

Amani	Peace
Baba wa Taifa	Father of the Nation
Balozi	Ten-cell leader
Boma	Homestead
Mwenyekiti	Chairperson
Mkurugenzi	Director
Mwenyekiti wa Kitongoji	Sub-village chairperson
Nane-nane	Farmers' Day, 8th August, public holiday
Nyama choma	Grilled (goat) meat
Saba-saba	Foundation of TANU, 7th July, public holiday
Serikali ya kijiji	Village government
Shamba	Field, farm
Ugali	Maize porridge
Uhuru	Freedom, independence
Ujamaa	Family ties, socialism
Umoja	Unity
Utulivu	Peacefulness, serenity

Maa

Enkaji odomongi	Red bullock, moiety
Enkaji orokiteng	Black bullock, moiety
Enkishomi (pl.inkishomitie)	Clan
Enkitok (pl.inkitok)	Woman
Entito (pl.intoyie)	Uncircumcised girl
Olaiguenani (pl. Ilaiguenak)	Customary leader, age-set leader
Olaji	Age-set

Olayoni (pl.ilayiok)	Uncircumcised boy
Olmoruak (pl.ilmoruak)	Adult men
Olmurrani (pl. ilmurran)	Warrior
Olpiron	Firestick elder
Oltasat (pl.iltasati)	Old man
Engkang	Homestead
Eunoto	Age-set ceremony to end ilmurran-hood
Oloiboni	Prophet, diviner
Olaunoni	Head of age-set
Olng'esher	Age-set ceremony to transform ilmurran into elders
Olpul	Meat-feast ceremony and site

Interview key

References to the interviews are mainly to be interpreted in the following order even if there are some exceptions from this form: ethnic group, gender, number, age group (young, middle-age, old), and sub-village. For example:

Maa.W2Y1Midl.Osi. translates to: Maasai women, 2 younger and 1 middle-aged, in Osirei sub-village.

Maa.M4E.Osi. translates to: Maasai men, 4 elder, in Osirei sub-village.

Wanguu.M3Y.Mnadaa. translates to: Wanguu men, 3 younger, in Mnadaa sub-village.

Nguu.W3Midl.Malim. translates to: Nguu women, 3 middle-aged, in Malimogo sub-village.

Preface

To get Africa 'under your skin' is an experience I share with many other visitors to the continent. It is difficult to explain what it exactly means more than you are constantly longing back to Africa and its' people. I have since my first visit in 1991 to Africa South of Sahara a desire to work and live in Africa and my wife and I were fortunate to get this opportunity. The village we moved to was Kibaya in the East of the Maasai steppe and as we entered Kibaya by car, I wondered how life was going be there. We ended up living in Kibaya for four years what came to be one of the happiest periods in our lives and Kibaya has now a very special place in my heart. Those of you who might know Swahili maybe associate the word "Kibaya" with a "bad thing" but in fact, Kibaya is a Maa word for a place you want to return to and I hope that my wish to return will be fulfilled one day.

In writing a thesis one is dependent on many individuals and organisations to back you up, especially as I did my fieldwork in quite remote villages. There are too many individuals to thank but I want to express my gratitude to all the villagers in Sunya and Ilkuishi-Oiboir villages who took part in the interviews. Without them and their cooperation I would not been able to write this thesis. I also need to express my gratitude to the Village Executive Officer in Sunya, Bakari Saidi who assisted me on my very first field-visit and who always was available to talk with during my other visits. The same appreciation goes to Mzee Ndoje in Engapune sub-village who always was a pleasure to meet. While I was staying in Sunya I was always welcomed to the house of our very close friend Gabriel Ole Tuke, his wife Naomi and her mother Selina Maiko. It is with great warmth that I think about their hospitality and invitations for dinners and morning tea and the care they showed me when I was in the field. Tuke was also an exellent informant to Maasai culture and customs and about political issues locally and nationally and have over the years been of great help.

In Ilkuishi-Oiboir I had great help from the village chairperson Lupembe A. Nina who introduced me to the villagers and who was a great host and with whom I had many interesting talks with about Maasai culture and politics. I must also mention Mzee Terengo Ole Ngare, chairperson for Engarkah sub-village who took care of me and my assistant Majuka during our final field-visit. Special thanks go

also to Mzee Michael Stoko and Olaiguenani Lengaso in Loombenek with whom we had numerous conversations and whom assisted me in various ways.

There have been many individuals among the staff at Kiteto District Council who have become good friends like Mama Ngobei, Elisabeth Mungure, Mr. Meela but one who deserves special gratidude is Mr. Shabani Luono who through his persistent work as District Forester assisted and supported villagers in their efforts to manage their village forest. Mr. Luono's knowledge and insight has been invaluable and I will always remember the times we spent together in Sunya talking about environment or politics, eating *ugali* and drinking soda or beer in the light of a kerosene lamp.

Financial support has been given by Sida-Sarec and Knut and Alice Wallenberg Foundation to whom I am very grateful. At the Commission for Science and Technology (COSTECH) in Dar es Saalam, Mr. H. M Nguli deserves to be mentioned. At Orgut Consulting Company I want to express my appreciation to CTA:s Halvor Kohlshus, Per Giertz, and Torbjörn Öckerman for their friendship and various forms of assistance during our life in Tanzania. I also have to mention the Orgut Technical Advisors Roger Andersson, Kjell Rhödin,Lars-Ove Jonsson and Håkan Sjöholm , from time to time came to Kibaya and stayed with us. It was always very appreciated since each visit meant news from outside Kibaya (at that time we did not have any satellite phones or mobile phones), as well as long discussions about LAMP-program and development issues at large. These discussions were going on late in the evenings and I looked always forward to the next visit.

Another important and close friend is Dr. Ulrike von Mitzlaff who has critically read through my drafts and has given me valuable comments and insights, not only to the Maasai culture but also to Tanzania politics, for which I hereby thank her for. Finally, my wife's colleague and our neighbour in Kibaya, Mr. Malaek Minja who has from the very beginning been there for us; as a translator when our Swahili was still rudimentary to assist us in daily problems, such as getting water to our house, when pipes were leaking, hiring carpenters or any other help we needed. Minja has beside this been a great informant and very close friend to me and my relatives who visited us in Kibaya. We will always carry with us the warm friendship expressed by Minja and his family.

To do fieldwork among the Maasai I needed some help and there are two young Maasai men who deserve special appreciation, Jacob Paringo Ole Ndiriamba and Majuka Ololkeri, who translated the conversations and interviews when Swahili could not be used. To have Jacob's and Majuka's direct connection to the Maasai society has been a huge advantage and this research would not have been possible without their keen interest in the subject and in the exploration of their own culture. I will never forget the freezing nights in June when Jacob and I were camping in Ilkuishi-Oiboir or the fierce whisking away flies from our cornflakes. I will always remember the nice campsite Majuka and I set up in Loombenek sub-village, where we camped for a month. The tranquillity and the African stars are something I will carry with me forever.

At the University of Gothenburg, School of Global Studies and especially Department of Peace and Development Research, I want to thank those who over the years have read and commented small pieces of my thesis that has been presented at the seminars at the department including Helena Lindholm-Schulz, Mona Lilja, Malin Hasselskog, Bent Jörgensen, Jonas Ewald, Christopher Kayumba and Johanna Mannergren Selimovich. I am especially grateful to Anna-Karin Evaldsson who took the time to read through a whole version and added valuable comments doing it. My thanks goes also for all valuable comments to Jan Lindström, who in a way has been involved since the beginning as we both lived in Tanzania at the same time and knows my work from start. An appreciation goes as well to Fredrik Söderbaum and Lennart Wohlgemuth for their well thought comments and suggestions. On the administrative part, Annika Forssell needs to be mentioned for her good assistance in all practicalities over the years. Special thanks goes also to Prof. Craig MacKenzie for his thorough and fast proofreading of the manuscript.

Finally, there are three persons who need to be mentioned for their contribution. First of all I want to mention and thank posthumously my first supervisor, teacher and friend, Anders Närman. He deserves my gratitude for many reasons but most importantly for being the one who got me started on this journey. Anders work was taken over by Leif Eriksson who got the responsibility to guide me through the process of writing this thesis. I want to express my sincere gratitude for his support 'till the bitter end'. You helped me to get structure of my work.

And finally, my dear wife and companion in life, Eva-Marie, who in addition to have read and commented my chapters, has always been there for me during these years. My warmest thanks! Mume wako.

<div align="right">

Petri J. Ruotsalainen
Hönö 19 oktober 2009

</div>

1   INTRODUCTION

The introduction of pluralistic political systems, liberalisation of economy, increased freedom of expression, a free press and decentralisation of decision-making are all part of the global democracy transition that engulfed Tanzania and other African countries in the late 1980s and the early 1990s. In this process, Tanzania changed its political system and officially legalised the practice of a multiparty system on 1 July 1992 after three decades of one-party rule. As early as the following year, the first multiparty elections at village and sub-village level were held in which the ruling CCM (Sw. *Chama Cha Mapinduzi* – Revolutionary Party) obtained 97% of the chairperson positions. In October 1994, local government elections were held to elect ward councillors but due to the difficulties experienced by the opposition parties in presenting candidates in all wards, elections were only held in 51% of them.[1] In October 1995, the first[2] presidential election in the multiparty system was held with twelve new opposition parties participating. CCM's candidate Benjamin Mkapa got the majority of the votes (61, 8%) and became Tanzania's first president elected in a multiparty election.[3] Tanzania has now performed three general elections but still the ruling party CCM has a strong grip over politics in the country. With landslide victories in the presidential elections 1995, 2000 and 2005, the party has reinforced its position in the parliament.[4] With over 80% of the seats in the parliament going to the ruling

---

[1] www.tanzania.go.tz/administration.html#Local%20Authorities. Elections were to be held in 2411 wards.

[2] In fact, the first presidential election with more than one party participating was held in 1962 and led to a victory for TANU and put Julius Nyerere as Tanganyika's first president.

[3] Of the new opposition parties, only NCCR-Mageuzi (National Convention for Construction and Reform), CUF (Civic United Front) and UDP (United Democratic Party) put forth candidates for the presidency.

[4] In the second general election in 2000, the strong position of the ruling party was not only manifested but even strengthened when President Mkapa won his second term by obtaining 71,7% of the votes, an increase of 10% (source http://africanelections.tripod.com/tz.html Lwaga Mwambande, 'CCM will continue to win in elections, says Mangula', *Guardian*, 10 May 2001, www.parliament.go.tz). The main opponent in the 1995 election, Augustino Mrema, did not manage to get more than 7.8% of the votes. Instead the greatest challenge came from Prof. Ibrahim Lipumba of CUF, who received 16.3% of the votes. Between the elections of 2000 and 2005, 18 parties have been formed and ten presented candidates for the presidency in the 2005 general election. Still, the same pattern repeated itself and the leading position of the ruling party remained intact. The new president, Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete, received 80.28% of the votes, leaving the opposition far behind with CUF and Ibrahim Lipumba with 11.68% in second place. The joint opposition only managed to get 19% of the votes.

party,[5] the elections illustrate the failure by the opposition to attract voters and to create an alternative political platform to CCM. Hence, Tanzania is still in practice a single party system where the opposition seems not to be able to convince the electorate of its capacity to lead the country. One could however assume, theoretically, that in a country where political pluralism, human rights and freedom of expression have been suppressed under one-party rule, the opportunity for a plural political system would somehow manifest itself in the result of elections as well provided they are free and fair[6] and the population wants a change of governance.

The expression and title of this thesis 'under the same shade' originates from an interview with Maasai women, who explained that they nowadays are sitting together with men in political meetings conducted under the same tree (shade). During my field work and the analysis of my material, I realised that the expression also symbolically characterised held perceptions and relations to the ruling party, CCM (Chama cha Mapinduzi), that since its foundation and until today the party has kept the citizens under its 'protective' shade. As the elections on mainland Tanzania have been considered free and fair by international and national observers, the increased dominant position of CCM leads to the problem of this thesis, which is to find out why CCM still receives high levels of support despite Tanzania having had a multiparty system since 1992. This thesis explores the challenges of consolidating multiparty democracy in Tanzania leading to the overall question of this thesis which is: *What are the possibilities and constraints for consolidation of multiparty democracy in Tanzania?* I approach this question by exploring how villagers in two separate villages in rural Tanzania understand and respond to the question of multiparty democracy. Using this local approach, I hope

---

[5] The House has a total of 323 parliamentarians, who comprise the constituencies (232), Special Seats (75), Zanzibar House of Representatives (5), Presidential nominees (10), the Attorney General and the Speaker (www.parliament.go.tz).

[6] On 27 January 2001, CUF and other opposition parties organised nationwide demonstrations demanding a rerun of the October 2000 elections in Zanzibar which were criticised by local and international observers as not being free and fair. The police declared the demonstrations illegal and a threat to peace and stability. The demonstrators in Zanzibar were met by excessive force by the security forces who shot and attacked demonstrators on Pemba Island and Unguja (Zanzibar). Human Rights Watch reports that security forces used teargas and beatings, shot into the crowd and pursued people fleeing the scene. Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International reports that at least 35 people were killed and more than 600 were injured, while 2000 people fled to Kenya (htpp://web.amnesty.org/library/print/ENGAFR560032001, http://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/Tanzania/zanza0402.htm).

to gain greater awareness and understanding of the transition towards and consolidation of multiparty democracy in Tanzania and what factors might be important in a consolidation process. Hence, emphasis is put on village level but as consolidation needs to take root in all social levels and groups, special attention is put on the marginalized group of Maasai pastoralists. Thus, the intention of this study is not to study political parties, the election law, electoral commissions or constitutional arrangement but to give attention to individual views. It is, however, not possible to draw any generalisations on a national level from the empirical material alone and to draw generalisations for all ethnic groups from the material. But as I have been living in the country and have also been able to follow the political development in Tanzania through newspapers and literature over several years as a parallel source of information to be compared and analysed for enhanced understanding of the overall political development in Tanznaia. Thus I follow two parallel tracks: one empirical and local and one practical/theoretical on a macro level. In this way, comparisons can be made between local and national level for increased understanding of the transition process and the consolidation of multiparty democracy.

What must be made clear is that whenever I discuss the national level it is unavoidable that I include Zanzibar. However, the history of Zanzibar is different to that of to mainland Tanzania and I have therefore no intention to probe deeply into the historical and political conditions of Zanzibar. On the other hand, Tanzania mainland and Zanzibar are bound together by history and the Union between them plays an integral role in Tanzanian politics. What takes place in Zanzibar has relevance for people on the mainland and for the whole consolidation of multiparty democracy in Tanzania and cannot for this reason be excluded from this thesis. But then again, the generalisations made on a national level in this thesis concern mainland Tanzania and not Zanzibar, due to its radically different political history marked by a revolution, a strong political opposition and politically related conflicts on a different magnitude than on mainland Tanzania.

1.2 Research Problem, Framework and Research Questions

Democracy research has during the last decades generated lot of research on a number of topics ranging from focus on why and how democratisation has occurred

(Huntington 1991, Sørensen 1993, Held 1995), to different forms of democracies and their stability (Lijphart 1991, 1999, 2004, Held 2002, Putnam 1993, Elgström and Hydén (ed.) 2002, Ottaway 2003) to the consolidation of democracies (Diamond 1999, Karvonen 1997, Diamond and Plattner et al. 1997, Diamond 1999, Bratton and Van de Walle 1997). Questions have varied from focus on structural change of political systems to what creates stability or instability in democratic political systems (Sannerstedt 1994: 56, Hydén 1998).

Researchers within the democracy field have been categorised by Sannerstedt into those who are focusing on *structural theories* and those who are focused on *actor-oriented theories*. Within structural theories, focus is on the rationality behind political system change through studying the structure of the political system. One classic example of structural theories is the connection between economic development and democracy made by Seymor L. Lipset (Sannerstedt 1994: 58). A democratic system would remain democratic if the economic development is positive, i.e. effective. The argument goes that when a nation is administered and organised in an effective way, the outcome is economic growth. This economic growth affects in turn the political system towards a democratic one (Sannerstedt 1994: 59, Diamond, Plattner et al. 1997: xxxiii, Hadenius 2002). Hence, if a country has not yet reached an economic 'take-off', efforts must be concentrated on accomplishing this first before directing efforts towards democratisation: 'the democratic project must be put on the waiting list' (Hadenius 2002: 65). As an effect of this theory the prospects for democracy are weak in underdeveloped and poor countries until economic growth and social improvements have been achieved (ibid).

The legitimacy of the political system increases with positive economic development, which in turn leads to governments being able to manage different crises more easily if their legitimacy is high. Beneficiary factors for system legitimacy, according to Lipset, are to have small rather than large diverging 'cleavages' between people in the society. Democratic stability is increased when there is a system consisting of federalism, majority elections and two-party system compared to non-federalism, proportional elections and multiparty system. The former system has, according to Lipset, an advantage over the latter for holding society together and bridging possible gaps between ethnic-, religious-, regional

and class-based groups (Sannerstedt 1994: 60). Thus, the core element in Lipset's work is his structural approach, where the causes for introducing democracy and its stability are found in the structural properties of the system. The approach enables comparisons with other countries to be made due to its quantitative component where different variables can be tested against each other (Sannerstedt 1994: 61).

Actor-oriented research (like Rustow 1970 and Lijphart 1999), on the other hand, focuses on explaining democratic changes through the actions of the political elite, political leaders and opposition leaders. Rustow includes a historical dimension to his theory and argues that the factors that contribute to democratic stability need not be the same as those initiating democratisation. He goes on to develop a model of the democratisation process consisting of several phases:

1. Background – Need for national unity.
2. Preparation phase – New elite demanding political influence and democratisation. Breakdown of non-democratic regime.
3. Decision phase – Acknowledgment by old regime to democratise.
4. Consolidation phase – Decision-making based on democratic principles.

Rustow's model emphasises the *process* involved in the democratisation of authoritarian regimes where the different phases should follow one another. It would not be enough to have certain identified criteria fulfilled and hope that this would automatically lead to democracy (Rustow 1970, Sannerstedt 1994: 63, Sørensen 1993: 41, Hadenius 2002).

My starting point is in line with Rustow, that democratisation is to be seen as a process, often with overlapping phases (Sørensen 1993, Diamond 1999). Yet consolidation of democracy has certainly not been a linear process; rather it is a development in different phases and stages involving some steps back, before one can talk about consolidated democracy. Still, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the donor community seem to have held a rather uncomplicated (structural) approach towards African countries' democratisation. Whereas historical studies have shown a picture of complicated and conflicting socio-economic and political processes stretching over decades and even over

centuries,[7] the international donor community portrays a different picture. According to Marina Ottaway, the perception held by the donor community of the democratisation transition is a picture of 'a sequence of stereotyped steps that appear ludicrously simplistic when compared with the historical record' (Ottaway 1999: 4). The road to democracy is seen as a linear path any country can enter:

- Short period of liberalisation,
- Democratic transition,
- Multiparty elections, and finally
- Democratic consolidation (Ottaway 1999: 5, 2003: 12).

This linear approach presumes a homogeneous and universal meaning attached to plural politics and democratisation. However, experience from newly democratised countries shows another picture. Ottaway argues that many of the states that embarked on the road to democracy 'combine rhetorical acceptance of liberal democracy, the existence of some formal democratic institutions, and respect for a limited sphere of civil and political liberties with essentially illiberal or even authoritarian traits' (Ottaway 2003: 3). Ottaway refers to these states as semi-authoritarian and they are not examples of countries that are 'failed' democracies, instead they are examples of 'successful semi-authoritarian states that rode the [third] wave[8] as far as they wanted and managed to stop … they are semi-authoritarian by design, not by default' (Ottaway 2003: 9).

1.2.1 Framework

The democratisation process in Tanzania should be understood as implementation of a Western form of multiparty system – a theoretical construction originating in the West - suggesting 'theoretical imperialism' (Sardar 1999) or ideological imperialism. In this case, theoretical imperialism is the domination of ideologies from the West that have been spread through colonisation and the economic

---

[7] In an example from Sorensen (1993: 41), Great Britain's consolidation took over 200 years to complete.
[8] Third wave refers to Huntington's historical description of different periods in time when groups of countries went from authoritarian regimes to democratic regimes (Huntington 1991). The third wave refers to the latest wave starting in 1974. The first wave of democratisation according to Huntington was 1828-1926 and the second 1943-62.

models of modernisation, liberalisation and today's globalisation. Concepts such as 'development', 'poverty', 'needs', 'participation' and 'democracy' (Sachs 1992) and their modern definitions have their origin in the Western cultural hemisphere and are defined by their 'owners'. However, this does not necessarily mean that democracy (or any other concept originating in the West, for that matter) is something negative and not something to strive for. The concept is used but its imbedded meaning is not necessarily interpreted and understood in the same manner as in the West. Still, the Western definition is used as the yardstick when we are measuring the level of democracy in Third World countries. Hence, we are all using the same concept but we put different meanings to it. [9] Cohen (1993) argues that the relation between a common symbol (e.g. democracy, development, poverty, party, leader, patriotism, justice) and the range of meanings it generates can be explained by the fact that their

> range of meanings can be glossed over in a commonly accepted
> symbol - precisely because it [the symbol/concept] allows its
> adherents to attach their own meaning to it. They share the
> symbol, but do not necessarily share its meanings.
>
> (Cohen 1993: 15)

Hence, large sections of a population would perhaps refer to democracy but without comprehending their own rights and responsibilities, as well as their elected leaders' rights and responsibilities that follow with the concept. Thus, my main starting point (in line with Ottaway 2003, see below) is that people, but more importantly leaders, in the newly democratised states have adopted the democracy jargon while not necessarily having adopted or sharing the embedded meaning of the concept. For this reason, democracy consolidation, or rather cognitive consolidation,[10] of democracy will most likely be a comprehensive mission.

---

[9]For example, on the Government of Vietnam's official website, the 'democracy' concept is used in the following way: 'Democratic centralism is the principle governing the organisation and activity of the National Assembly, the People's Councils, and all other State organs' (http://www.chinhphu.vn/portal/page?_pageid=439,1096045&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL). For me, this is clearly a contradiction in terms.

[10] By cognitive consolidation I mean the process that individuals need to go through in order to comprehend, understand and internalise the 'rule of the game' of democracy. This process involves

Since I have a background in three academic fields – anthropology (I had just obtained a master's degree in social anthropology when I moved to Tanzania), development studies and, to some extent, political science – these three fields came to influence my research and in the end the subject of my thesis became a combination of these fields, namely: *consolidation of democracy (political science) through the study of perceptions of democracy and multiparty system (anthropology) and people's opportunities to influence their own development through decision-making processes (development studies).*

Studies that describe the democratisation process in Tanzania have in general focused more on the creation of democratic institutions and experiences of performed multiparty elections (Cowen and Laakso 2002, Dzimbiri, Ngware and Ocharo 2000, Mmuya 1998), rather than studying how people at grass-root level during the 1990s in Africa have perceived, conceptualised and responded to the political changes. One exception is the *Research on Poverty Alleviation* (REPOA) that has in Tanzania conducted three (2001, 2003, and 2005) major quantitative surveys called 'Afrobarometer Survey'.[11] The first survey asks people's opinions about democracy and good governance; the second survey compares the opinions about democracy and if they have changed from 2001 but it looks also at people's perceptions of the quality of democracy in Tanzania. My own research, which started two or three years earlier than the Afrobarometer Survey, has been in line with it, but of course on a much smaller scale. Nevertheless, the Afrobarometer survey has given me valuable information on the national, regional, and continental level about perceptions of democracy. The survey has therefore been useful since in comparing our findings, theirs have acted as a conduit between my local material and the national level, enabling me to make some generalised conclusions on a national level as well.

---

large efforts in education but also in practical and tangible experience of how multiparty democracy works.

[11] Sydney Kwiyamba, 'Need for democracy comes from the people', *The Guardian*, 6 April 2004. The Afrobarometer Series was launched in 1999. It reports the results of national sample surveys on the attitudes of citizens in selected African countries towards democracy, markets and other aspects of development. It is a joint enterprise of Michigan University, the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA) and the Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD) in Ghana. Even though the questions posed in these studies can be questioned, it is one study that focuses on people's opinions and not on structures of democracy.

1.2.2 Research questions

This study is within the framework of the overall transition to multiparty democracy in Tanzania that is still by and large dominated by the ruling party CCM. Tanzania has by now performed three general elections and at each election the CCM has strengthened its position vis-à-vis the opposition parties, which raises the central question of the thesis:

> *What are the possibilities and constraints for the consolidation of multiparty democracy in Tanzania?*

As mentioned above, I approach this question by studying how villagers in two local settings understand and respond to the question of multiparty democracy to gain insight into how the transition to multiparty democracy was comprehended. However, it is also important to study the reasons for Tanzania entering the path towards multiparty democracy, which generates two interrelated questions:

> *What was the reason for establishing multiparty democracy in Tanzania?*
>
> *How has the transition towards multiparty democracy been comprehended by people at village level?*

By these questions I expect to gain an understanding of the forces behind the transition process from one-party system to a multiparty system, how these were experienced and what kind of thoughts and ideas this transition generated among people living in the rural areas. As part of the question, local people's perceptions about good leadership will also be explored.

Obviously, there has been an upsurge of new political parties and actors in Tanzania, all of whom require space in the mass media and in the election campaigns as a way to attract voters. The competition for votes at elections has therefore intensified between the opposition and the ruling party but also between the different new parties. The reality of several new political parties and

the process of consolidating democracy generate the following question that has relevance on both local and national levels:

> *What are the possibilities and constraints for the opposition parties to become a vehicle for political change?*

This question has relevance for the overall consolidation of the Western form of multiparty democracy in Tanzania since it is considered important for democracies to have a critical and strong opposition that can act as a counterweight to the government in place. Thus this question looks at what kind of political opposition the ruling party has at village level and at national level. In the overall democratisation process with the upsurge of new parties, one of the vital ethnic groups in this study, the Maasai, has a customary leadership structure, which is still strongly manifested in their society and culture. The consolidation of multiparty democracy in Tanzania therefore has direct impact on their society and on the system of electing political leaders. Taking into account the fact that the Maasai has to deal with this dual existence of leadership, i.e. their customary leader and a leader representing a political party, this triggers an additional question:

> *What are the perceptions of and the relationship between Maasai customary leaders and politicians representing a political party, and how are people negotiating between these leaders?*

By exploring this question I want to find out how the Maasai, as a marginalised group, comprehend the multiparty system, what their thoughts are about this changed political setting and what impact it may have on their society.

1.3 Dissertation Structure

To explore the main question of the thesis, the focus is put on the local/village level: the people's – primarily the Maasai but also non-Maa-speaking people – comprehension of the changed political system in Tanzania. Since the emphasis is on the village level and on finding out the views of villagers, the field material is at the centre and makes up the largest part of the chapters. However, the thesis is

divided into three parts, the first part being more background building in nature. These three parts are preceded by the introduction and a description of the field and methodological considerations.

Part I, The Arena, (chapters 3 and 4) is an ethnographic and empirical presentation of the local setting for the local democratic transition in this specific part of Tanzania. My intention, especially in chapter 4, is to illustrate the current leadership structure based on customary and political decision-making bodies and the local people's perception about leadership. Thus, this first part is mainly descriptive but it explores also the question: *What are the perceptions of and the relationship between Maasai customary leaders and politicians representing a political party, and how are people negotiating between these leaders?* Part II, Towards Democracy, (chapters 5 and 6) is of a more theoretical nature, looking into the forces behind the multiparty democracy transition in Tanzania. Chapter 5 presents the democratisation debate and the discussion of internal versus external influences of multiparty democracy transition is revisited. I will discuss some of the views dealing with democracy transition in Africa and what factors have been influential in this transition in general and what factors are considered to be necessary to enable democratisation and consolidation. Chapter 6 deals with the comprehension of democracy at local and at individual level. This part focuses on the questions: W*hat was the reason for establish multiparty democracy in Tanzania? How has the transition towards multiparty democracy been comprehended by people at village level?*

Part III, Democracy in Practice, (chapters 7 and 8) has first of all close reference to the empirical material with a study of the village and sub-village election in Sunya and the process involved in managing the election. In this chapter I also look at the preparations by the Maasai for the election. In chapter 8, I present a few cases that exemplify some sort of empowerment of villagers as examples of democratic procedure in practice and how the mobilisation of ordinary people challenges the power structure and the incumbent political representatives. These chapters focus again on two questions: *How has the transition towards multiparty democracy been comprehended by people at village level? What are the possibilities and constraints for the opposition parties to become a vehicle for political change?* Finally, chapter 9 focuses on the general question of the thesis:

What are the possibilities and constraints for the consolidation of multiparty democracy in Tanzania? This question has however been an underlying component in all questions and all three constituent parts of the thesis. In chapter 9, I bring together the analysis and present in my opinion the three most important factors (there are naturally more than three in total) that need to be reckoned with in the process of consolidating multiparty democracy in Tanzania, but also in other countries that set out to change their political system from one-party rule to a multiparty system. This chapter is followed by chapter 10 presenting the main conclusions and the final chapter 11, in which I pose the question 'What´s next?' This chapter looks forward to the consolidation of democracy at the national level and asks if the current Westminster model of democracy could be replaced by the consensual model of democracy as a way to solve the current political crisis in Zanzibar and the Union with Tanzania.

2 THE FIELD AND METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Research based on extensive fieldwork, in this case in remote areas, is not always done outside anthropological studies due to constraints of time, economic circumstances, logistics or convenience (Chambers 1983).[12] This fieldwork was carried out in two Tanzanian villages, Ilkuishi-Oiboir and Sunya, in two different wards in Kiteto District from 1996 to 1999 and between February 2001 and April 2002. Shorter visits were also made in November/December 1999, November 2000 and in September/October 2002. There are several reasons for selecting these two villages. The primary aim was to study remote villages and marginalised groups of people like the Maasai, but for a comparison of how the Maasai make use of the political decision-making system for their benefit, I selected the two villages based on their different ethnic settings. Ilkuishi-Oiboir is inhabited only by Maasai while the Maasai group in Sunya village is not in the majority. Instead they share the area with non-Maa speaking groups, mainly Nguu, Kamba and Kaguru.[13] The villages and wards are also quite different in their characteristics concerning the natural environment and people's livelihood patterns. They moreover differ in their exposure to donor-financed programmes[14] and the target groups in the district. The villages were also chosen because I had established some familiarity with the villages and their leadership before I was admitted as PhD student; in addition, it was possible for me to get a lift there with district staff or project cars despite the villages being in remote areas.[15]

Entering the field in question, research methods vary probably as much as there are researchers. No situation is the same as any other. In my case, entering the field started when I came to Kiteto District in Arusha Region (today Manyara Region) and its district capital Kibaya in June 1996 together with my wife who was going to work within a Sida (Swedish International Development Co-operation

---

[12] Robert Chambers (1983: 13-23) talks about six different biases that impede outsiders getting in contact with the poorest people and those in remote areas.

[13] Kaguru is sometimes also referred to as Kagulu. I will however retain Kaguru since this is the term used by people themselves in Sunya.

[14] In 1996, donors working in Kiteto were Sida (Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency) and the British Water Aid that worked in co-operation with a local Maasai NGO called KINNAPA. After 2000 additional foreign NGOs have started to assist the district.

[15] For transport, especially to Ilkuishi-Oiboir, I rented a four-wheel drive for most of the field visits.

Agency) sponsored environmental programme called Land Management Programme (LAMP, later renamed to Local Management of Natural Resources Programme). Over the years, I came to gain experience and knowledge of Tanzania and especially Kiteto District through the opportunities I had to follow my wife in her work to different villages. I attended many village meetings and in this way got acquainted with villagers, village leaders and ward councillors and it was during these meetings that my curiosity for people's perceptions of democracy, leadership issues and decision-making on a local level was aroused. Subsequently, I acquired knowledge about Tanzania and especially the district and its population during my various visits to my research villages and other villages in the district. When I started my research, I already knew some of the people in the villages and they knew me, i.e. I had a local network. As a result, before starting my formal fieldwork in 1998, I had already gained a lot of knowledge in an informal way and had lived all together two years in the research area, which benefited me in several ways. Firstly, according to sociocultural norms, the most appropriate way for a researcher to do any form of study in rural Tanzania is to try to establish a 'personal relationship' before one enters into the role of a professional researcher. The personal relationship entails be known to, accepted by and given a status within their society. I managed to establish this relationship during this first pre-research period. Secondly, during travels in the district together with district staff we were discussing a variety of topics related to politics and democracy, local development issues, people's livelihoods, problems experienced in the district as well as cultural issues. Thirdly, during this time I of course improved my knowledge of Swahili, which was crucial for acceptance by and access to the society, and which I now speak very well. And finally, just living in Kibaya for a number of years and taking part in people's ordinary lives and problems has given me valuable insights regarding how it is to live in a rural and remote area in Tanzania. Establishing a good personal relationship has probably also facilitated my chances of being accepted and trusted, a person to whom the people could talk relatively freely.

2.1 Clarifying Identities

One issue that needs to be clarified is what negative or positive impact or influences my association through my spouse to the Sida-financed programme might have had on my research results. This is a valid concern since it is not uncommon that individuals who have been working on a donor project return later to do research on issues they found interesting when working practically (see for example Assmo 1999 and Hodgson 2001). Doing so, practitioners/researchers face the risk of still being connected to the donor project and all the implicit benefits connected to this. Even though I did not work in the Sida-financed LAMP programme, there was a risk of my being associated to any existing donor project in the area. Consequently, my intention was to prevent the assumption that I was a representative from the donor community by avoiding appearing with my wife in her working situation before my role as 'accompanying family member' was commonly known. On the other hand, my wife needed in addition to confirm her status as a married woman by introducing me to the villagers. Her social status gave her credibility as an advisor in the programme. Hence, after some time I joined my wife and her colleagues to the villages not only for practical reasons but also due to common interests in development issues and it was during those field visits that I established my local network. Later on when I started my research and fieldwork, I only needed to explain the purpose of my fieldwork. It goes without saying that there are always some expectations raised among people when a person from overseas comes to these remote areas asking questions during more formal circumstances (for instance to make an appointment for an interview) rather than unplanned everyday talks. Often people asked me how my research could benefit them or what material benefits I could provide them with. These questions are understandable and it has therefore been important for me to clarify my own role as clearly as possible.[16] By being aware of this bias I do not think there have been any negative effects of my being related to the Sida-financed programme. On the contrary, through the programme and my wife's work I made many friends on the

---

[16] I explained that the research as such was not going to provide them directly with material benefits, but it could assist donors in gaining a deeper understanding of local livelihoods as well as people's perceptions on democracy and the multiparty system, which is one of the overall development goals in the donor community. In the long run the research would hopefully be beneficial for the local people as well.

district council, I got to know the ward councillors, district commissioners, Members of Parliament and district executives and I gained access to information that might not have been given to me in interviews.

2.2 Method and Analysis

When it was time for me to start my fieldwork, I was interested to find out more of people's way of life in general and what it entails. Therefore, my initial purpose was to get a broad perspective of people's way of living, their problems and their perceptions on different issues, such as: the area they live in, its benefits and disadvantages, land utilisation, the different ethnic groups' social and economic organisation, perception of what a good life entails and future prospects, development, democracy, multi-partism, leadership and the role of elders and traditional leaders. This approach served two purposes: to get a better picture of the society I myself was living in and clearing my thought pattern towards a more focused research topic. The approach is similar to the funnel principle where a wide approach is followed up, after initial analysis, with a more narrow approach. After summarising, analysing and writing a preliminary findings report, I could narrow down my approach even more and concentrate on questions dealing with perceptions on leadership and political parties. During this phase, elections of sub-village and village leaders and village governments took place in Tanzania. At this stage I focused on observations and, to a lesser extent, on formal interviews though these were more of informal, conversational character. This in turn was followed by new analysis and concept building. This approach has bearings towards what Flick (1998) describes as the 'Linear model of the research process', versus the 'Circular model of the research process' (see appendix VI). The linear model is the model, which is more commonly used in 'mainstream research', whereby a theory is tested against empirical evidence. The circular model involves the researcher starting off with a pre-assumption of the area under study and, at each step of the research process, reflecting on his/her material before proceeding to the next phase. This is the model's strength if it is used consistently. This circularity is the central aspect of the model in what is called 'Grounded theory', developed by Anselm Strauss. Grounded theory, according to Strauss and Corbin (1998) is

theory that was derived from data systematically gathered and analysed through the research process. In this method, data collection, analysis, and eventual theory stand in close relationship to one another. A researcher does not begin a project with a preconceived theory in mind (unless his or her purpose is to elaborate and extend existing theory). Rather, the researcher begins with an area of study and allows the theory to emerge from the data. Theory derived from data is more likely to resemble the 'reality' than is theory derived by putting together a series of concepts based on experience or solely through speculation (how one thinks things ought to work). Grounded theories, because they are drawn from data, are likely to offer insight, enhance understanding, and provide a meaningful guide to action.

(Strauss, Corbin 1998: 12)

Even though my research process has not been following the grounded theory as consistently as described above, the research is nevertheless based more on an inductive approach (research topics mentioned above) and, to a lesser extent, on existing theorising on democracy, leadership or governance that are to be tested on 'reality'. The used method could also be said to be hermeneutic in the way I have analysed my material by going back and forth between empirical evidence and data with the effort of studying the local and at the same time also studying the larger national picture so as to comprehend the whole of the democratisation process. This form of circularity is what hermeneutics has in common with grounded theory.

Grant McCracken (1988) writes of the benefits of qualitative methods that it can help the researcher to understand how respondents see and comprehend the world: 'The method can take us into the mental world of the individual, to glimpse the categories and logic by which he or she sees the world' (McCracken 1988: 9). The qualitative method McCracken refers to is the long interview that differs from other forms of interview techniques by its less obtrusive format, but at the same time with its special kinds of preparation and structure that maximises the time spent with the respondent and in the analysing process (McCracken 1988: 7).

According to McCracken, the purpose of the qualitative interview is not to collect information about how many individuals share a certain view. It's main purpose is to gain access to how people within a culture conceive of and see their world. Hence, the advantage of qualitative methods is to give us a social and cultural context to numbers gained through a quantitative method (ibid: 9). Related to my own research, a study of election results and voting patterns would then be improved by an understanding of the cultural setting and how individuals relate to political parties, elections and leadership structures. It is in this nexus between quantitative data of election results and the qualitative data of individuals' perceptions on the multiparty system that this thesis finds its place.

Even though the purpose is to find out people's perceptions and not to see if my preconceived perception of democracy is the same as or different from villagers' perception, previous research is of course helpful and available theories are to be seen as tools to enhance one's own thinking. Therefore, reviewing documents, literature and other written sources is naturally a part of this research. As mentioned above, my academic schooling has been within three different fields and these have had an effect on my thinking and previous understanding of the field. No researcher is a blank card when entering the field. My theoretical influences have been especially the thinking of Marina Ottaway (2003) and her 'down to earth' approach of connecting political action to individuals and how they behave. I think this relates also to Weber and his ideas of individuals being those who influence structures (Boglind, Eliæson and Månson 1993: 274. Abrahamsen (2000), Sørensen (1993) and Bratton and van de Wall (1997) gave me initial structure to the democratisation processes in Africa. Finally, Maliyamkono (1995a, 1995b, 2000) Mmuya and Chaligha (1992, 1994, 1998), and Othman (1995) are Tanzanian academics whose writing has inspired my thinking and enhanced my understanding of Tanzanian politics and its cultural residence.

As the methodological approach is inductive the aim of my thesis is to depart from empirical findings regarding the complexities existing in democracy transitions and from here, through the study of literature, newspapers and other sources, try to develop new fruitful ideas for theories The qualitative method based on deep interviews and observations has been self-evident because of the nature of the study and the choice of respondents. Since my main concern is to find

out people's perceptions, it goes without saying that it would defeat the purpose if the researcher developed a questionnaire with pre-categorised answers. Questionnaires would also eliminate those who cannot read and write, i.e. the largest proportion of the respondents and especially women and the poorest in the society. In addition, the village people are not used to questionnaires and how to fill them in. One method would have been to pose the questions and alternatives and tick in the answers myself, but this would have very time consuming and contradicting the purpose of a questionnaire, which is to gain access to multiple respondents' views. Further, as Strauss and Corbin (1998) have experienced when using structured questionnaires in the field, the answers are seldom elaborated but rather short and in phase with what is asked. However, the respondent might have additional and interesting information to offer but if the interviewer does not ask further questions, they might not continue voluntarily, fearing they might interfere in the research process (Strauss and Corbin 1998: 205). Therefore, I decided to use the qualitative methods, with open-ended questions, semi-structured interviews and the use of a question guide where different topics were probed.

2.2.1   Doing qualitative research

My approach has been a mixture of different qualitative methods discussed by Marshall and Rossman (1999), Alasuutari (1995), Flick (1998) and McCracken (1988). My participation lies in that I have been living in the Tanzanian society, but if I look critically at my approach, full participation would have meant that I lived in Ilkuishi-Oiboir and Sunya for the entire research period. This was, however, not possible for several reasons. It is a long distance between the villages and the district centre and the only mean of transport was by a car with four-wheel drive due to the very poor road conditions in the district (poor dirt roads and cattle tracks functioning as roads). During the rainy season, the roads and the tracks deteriorated completely and the villages were inaccessible for a long time even with a four-wheel drive car. Moreover, in the Maasai village there are no food supplies and no clean water for drinking or washing, which meant I had to bring all water and food with me for my stay in the field. This applied most of the time also to Sunya village. Hence, the food and water supply lasted about one week at a

time in the villages and I had to return to my home in Kibaya to buy more supplies and refill the water containers.[17] On the other hand, during periods when I was not in the villages myself, I received information and news from there by district staff, friends and villagers and also from ward councillors who now and then visited Kibaya. This wide social network enabled me to get access to more sensitive information which is usually more difficult to get by being unknown and without a social network. As Raoul Naroll (in Bernard 1995) points out, anthropologists who spent a year or more in the field were more likely to report on sensitive issues than those who spent less than a year in the field. Information and understanding of the society studied is naturally more difficult to come by during shorter fieldwork. Further, much information is obtained through small talk with friends or with other people in bars, at the market or at any other place and time besides the formal interviews – maybe because this is not seen as an *interview* and people are more relaxed and in control of the situation. I have realised that there is information that I have received informally in this way and from people I know that I could not have gotten through formal interviews with politicians or other respondents.

In the course of research, the collected material has to be analysed and interpreted and concepts need to be generated so as to decide which cases or what data is to be investigated in the next phase and with what methods they should be collected. This 'theoretical coding' is the main procedure for analysing data in order to develop grounded theory (Flick 1998: 179). Methods I have used are mainly anthropological (ethnographic) where the hermeneutic pre-understanding and dialectical relation between part and whole has been important. What I have been influenced by from grounded theory is the looking for common categories, similarities in the different interviews, what was characteristic for the responses given. I compiled all responses given under a certain subject, for example democracy, the multiparty system and leadership in one file. When I analysed my data I therefore used open coding to find similarities in the different interviews and what seemed to be at the centre of the answers (see McCracken 1988: 43 for a description of the different stages of analysis). To increase the validity, data triangulation is often recommended and one form of triangulation that I used was

---

[17] It should be noted that Kibaya is located in a remote area as well. The food supply available at the local market mainly consisted of fresh meat and vegetables.

the use of different data sources, like interviews, newspapers, books and reports. During a long stay in the country, a lot of information was received in ordinary, informal contact with various people who were living and working in the country and who provided information from the district or other districts. I have also had access to information from different workshops on gender and local governance that have been held over the years in the district, which gave me additional feedback.

One of the traits of qualitative methods is observations, which can take different forms. As I see it, observations can be of two kinds: those made during an intimate participation in the community, such as observations of modes of behaviour, and those observations made in connections with interviews. The observations I made and experiences I had over a long period of time became a natural part of my daily life and have added to my knowledge of Tanzania and especially of life in a rural area but also in many other ways. When walked to the district office I would always meet some ward councillors who were waiting to meet some district staff; it was also a place where one could hear what was being planned or if there were any urgent problems in the district (for example food shortage, illegal logging or hunting, inaccessible roads, etc.). I also experienced preparations for the yearly 'uhuru-tourch' (see page 198) and what this meant for the people and visits by President Mkapa and other high-ranking officials who from time to time came to Kibaya. These events taught me a lot about Tanzania and the way people view politicians and vice versa.

Living in a rural village meant that I could follow the farming year very closely: know what price maize fetched at the market, follow how its price increased in the autumn and be aware that people had to survive somehow until next harvest (more on this in chapter 3.3.2). The size of harvest had also close relation to the price of charcoal and how many people entered this business when their maize reserves were depleted. It meant also that we received many people asking for employment or for any kind of help we could give them. Hence, these modes of observations made over several years are invaluable as qualitative methods and for understanding a society.

Observations when conducting interviews and especially group interviews are also important. During these sessions there are usually one or two who answer the

questions to a greater extent than the others. They dominate the interview session and this can reveal important power structures in the society. Equally important is to note how people are seated and the body language in connection to verbal statements. I think, however, that interpretation of body language should be used with good sense, especially since body language varies with different cultures. On the other hand, the limitation of observations during a shorter field visit is that not all phenomena or knowledge processes can be observed in situations. Rituals or other events that seldom occur but still might have an important part in the research are at many times captured with luck if at all. Therefore, according to Flick, the knowledge generated by the researcher is mainly based on participants' verbal statements of actions rather than on pure observations of the same (Flick 1998: 147). This information may also be normative, i.e. people portray the society and their actions as they think they should be, not how they *really* are. In this respect, both forms of observations are important to try to see what people are doing, not just what they say they are doing.[18]

There are, of course, different forms of interviews in a qualitative data collection. The researcher can choose to do interviews with single respondents or with a group of persons. When doing group interviews the groups can be combined to include women and men, old and young individuals. However, the researcher has to be aware of the group composition, where cultural norms and roles can have an impact on the group dynamics and towards getting good information. According to cultural norms among all ethnic groups I have interviewed, women are subordinate to men and it is very few women who dare to violate the taboo to speak in public in front of men. Thus, my experience is that it is very difficult to get the views of women if they are put together with men, especially concerning sensitive matters dealing with their lives, power relations, socioeconomic situation, etc. To get women's views one has to put women in their own group but at the same time be aware that younger women may feel subordinate to older women and for this reason may have to be interviewed in their own peer group.

---

[18] In this sense, I was very fortunate to be in Tanzania during these years since this meant I was there as one of the most important events in the Maasai culture and their social organisation took place, i.e. when the Maasai initiated a new age-set, which only happens at intervals of several years.

With this in mind, I then purposefully conducted interviews with at least two respondents at a time, especially when I interviewed women, to create a more relaxed atmosphere. Respondents felt less shy and more secure together with a friend or two and this enabled me to get more information than I would have received in an interview with a single respondent. In addition, afterwards it is easier to do individual interviews with those who have been interviewed once before and experienced the situation. Finally, educated individuals, local government employees, those with political positions in the village and respected elders, are in general more talkative and can put their views in the open more easily than men or women who are poor, have no education or power position in the village (see Chambers 1983).

Alasuutari (1995) says that some researchers are reluctant to use group interviews or discussions, firstly since in these settings people will not reveal any controversial information. The group might be presenting a picture of themselves where they seem to agree on everything, that there are no conflicts or disagreements in the village, and secondly since individuals do not want to speak about their personal problems in front of others (Alasuutari 1995: 92f). I think this is also true and that some answers are adjusted according to the societal norm of peace and unity in the Tanzanian society that shows unanimity among the respondents in front of the interviewer. Having said this, I did also receive information contradicting a society consisting of only peace and unity. Respondents could be very candid about other groups or individuals in the different local communities.

In order for me to be able to conduct fieldwork among the Maasai, I worked together with two young Maasai warriors, Jacob Paringo Ole Ndiriamba and Majuka Ololkeri. Jacob and Majuka are two Parakuyu Maasai who assisted me individually at different stages during my field visits. Their main responsibilities were to translate interviews with Maasai who did not speak or understand Swahili. On some occasions they also helped me with the Swahili interviews and to go through taped interviews. Jacob had done some work for other researchers on previous occasions so he was acquainted with research work. Majuka, on the other hand had never been involved in research but being a relative of Jacob's, he was informed by Jacob what the work involved and I also went through with him what the research

questions were and what I wanted to achieve. Their help has naturally been invaluable to me since learning an additional language besides Swahili was simply not realistic and after our interviews or in the evenings we could continue to explore more about Maasai traditions and customs.

2.2.2   Who to interview?

According to Strauss and Corbin, in a research approach based on the funnel principle, it is not easy, or even desirable, to have a fixed category of people to interview. Since qualitative methods involve openness, it is beneficial not to structure data gathering too rigorously 'in terms of either timing or type of persons or places, even though one might have some theoretical conceptions in mind, because these might mislead the analyst of foreclose on discovery' (Strauss and Corbin 1998: 206f). It is important when doing open sampling to keep up a balance between systematically gathering data that will enable development of categories and flexibility that allows events, happenings and the direction of interviews to flow openly (ibid: 207). In open sampling one could choose to interview every person encountered in the street or at their homes, or one could compile a list of names, places or times and proceed down it (ibid: 206f). The sampling I used is a stratified sampling of different ages/ethnic groups/genders, in different villages and sub-villages. Within these strata, people I encountered were interviewed when I was not targeting any particular person in the village political system. On the whole, I have tried to include an equal amount of women and men from all the ethnic groups in Sunya village and to conduct interviews in the different sub-villages of the respective villages studied. I have conducted around 90 formal interview sessions where approximately 290 individuals have been present. However, even if there were close to three hundred individuals present, it does not mean that each and every person has been active during the interviews. The number of men and women present at these interviews are almost equal, 139 women compared with 151 men. One third of the interview sessions are with non-Maasai respondents.

I refrained from using categories such as poor households, middle-income households and rich households since this would have forced me to ask the Maasai

men about how many wives, children and cows they have. The number of cows is the main indication for wealth and prestige, yet is a very sensitive issue and it is not very easy to get access to this kind of information. Cows were at this time not taxed but discussions were held in the district that they should be liable for taxation and any number given would be less than the actual number. To estimate the number of cows would also be prone to miscalculations since all cows a person owns are not always kept in the same homestead due to grazing matters and the risk of cattle diseases. In addition, after I had visited the villages several times and become familiar with the area, I had noticed no obvious group of rich households or large landholders in Sunya and Ilkuishi-Oiboir. I would have to say that 'poverty' was quite equally divided among the residents. The village chairpersons in Sunya were not part of any 'village elite' (e.g. a teacher, businessman or part of the political elite) as sometimes is common in other villages.[19] On the other hand, the village chairperson/ward councillor in Ilkuishi-Oiboir can be considered wealthy since he is married to four wives (an indication of having many cows) and he owns a car.[20]

Generally the interview sample is to some extent dependent on the season, time of day and place. During the preparation of the farm plots and at harvesting time, very few people have time to sit down for longer interviews and this is something to keep in mind. It was established in gender sensitising workshops[21] in Kibaya that while women's work in general keeps them busy up to 16-18 hours per day, men's work occupies them four to six hours per day. One should take these issues under consideration when deciding whom to interview and when. During the rainy season, it is also difficult to reach those areas where I normally did my research. The sampling can under these circumstances depend on whomever you encounter in the village or the homesteads. It is also important to be observant that some answers about livelihood, prospects and problems in one's area are usually immediate problems related to the particular season when the interviews take place: for example, water shortage during the dry season and food shortage

---

[19] There were not many businesses in Sunya village and those existing were small shops, teahouses and two guesthouses. There was only one businessman who stood out as a 'rich' businessman but he was not involved in politics.
[20] The number of wives usually reveals the wealth of a man and how many heads of cattle he has.
[21] This information was obtained during different gender workshops held in Kibaya by international and national consultants and district staff for villagers from different ethnic groups in the district.

before harvest time. For obvious reasons, it was more difficult to get respondents to talk about politics and democracy as means to reduce poverty in the long run, than about their immediate problems and needs and how to overcome these. Finally, to get access to respondents for an interview at all, it is also common and sometimes necessary to go through the village political system – the village chairperson, sub-village leader, elders, etc. – in the higher level in the village hierarchy. My experience is that it can take several weeks before one can reach 'ordinary' people since one has to start the interviews with those in leading positions and to get a go-ahead with other villagers. This confirms their position and status and will facilitate the researcher's ease of access to the field at a later stage. From the villagers' point of view, they would probably also refuse to be interviewed unless it was sanctioned by the local leadership. Thus, the issue of whom to contact first is a very serious one and neglecting this can mean exclusion from the field and less co-operation from villagers.[22]

---

[22] Although I was well known and visited Ilkuishi-Oiboir many times before my research started, I found out at the end of my fieldwork that Maasai men had discussed in a meeting whether I was to be allowed to do my fieldwork in their village or not. I am happy they accepted my presence so that I could do my research there.

PART I

THE ARENA

At Independence the major political party TANU, and its leader Julius Nyerere, saw poverty, ignorance and disease as the largest hindrances for a free and equal society, and the people were called upon to wage war against these 'enemies'. According to Nyerere, a democratic society based on freedom and equity could not come true as long as these problems were facing people. As these issues were still facing people in the rural areas at the time of this research, the main purpose of this chapter is to give an ethnographic description of the district and its people and how some of the villagers view the prospects and problems of everyday life in their villages.

3   THE DISTRICT - KITETO

Kiteto District was formed in 1984 and was previously part of the Arusha Region, covering an area around 35 000 square kilometres. To make the administration of the district more manageable, Kiteto was divided in 1993 into two parts where the northern part became Simanjiro District. In 2001 there was a further administrative change when Kiteto and Simanjiro came to belong to the newly created Manyara Region together with Babati, Hanang and Monduli districts. Kiteto is still a large area covering 16 685 square kilometres and its internal administrative structure divides the district in to seven divisions, twenty-one wards and it has fifty villages at present. However, since more people are moving into the district and some sub-villages are growing in size, new villages will certainly be formed in the future. In the census conducted in 2002, Kiteto District had a population of 152 757 and the district capital Kibaya had a population of approximately 11 000 (2002 Population and Housing Census[23]). The district is historically considered to be an area for pastoralists and at present the pastoralists group of Maasai constitute some 32% of

---

[23] www.tanzania.go.tz/census/districts/kiteto.htm

the population, a figure that varies much between the different wards and villages. Other ethnic groups in Kiteto are Bena, Gogo (27%), Hehe, Kaguru, Kamba, Nguu, Rangi (18%) and the hunter-gatherers Akie (Ndorobo) (Government of the United Republic of Tanzania 1996: 4-6).

Kibaya is located as a communication hub on the Maasai Steppe and has during dry season fairly good communications by bus north to Arusha, south to Dodoma, west to Kondoa, east to Handeni and even to Dar es Salaam. But during the rainy season the road network is extremely unreliable and mostly impassable. Kiteto District is a semi-arid area with an annual rainfall between 379 and 579mm a year (Water Resources and Supply Study for Kiteto District, July 1996).

Source: http://mshand.geog.gla.ac.uk/DAR/tzsmall.jpg

Source: http://web.ges.gla.ac.uk/~mshand/ADMIN.PDF

Map 1: National and Regional map

Geographically the district can be divided into mainly two distinct areas. The northern part is characterised by plains with an altitude reaching 1200m and with a few hills that rise up to an altitude of 2000m. The district capital itself is situated on a high plateau at an altitude of 1500m above sea level. Kibaya is surrounded by hills and intersected by rivers, which contain water during and after heavy rains but dry out seasonally. Where the area is not cultivated it is covered by *Acacia-Commiphora* scrub and woodland. In the south-east there is a large forest area with many different trees like sandalwood, African teak, African Blackwood and other valuable trees that are used locally as timber, firewood, charcoal, for carving and as medicine. Large areas in the district are still unpopulated and uncultivated so wild life is very common. Kiteto has the same ecosystem as the adjacent national parks from which wild life is migrating to the different parts of the district.[24]

3.1 Kibaya – Administrative Centre

Kibaya is categorised as an urban centre or township even if most people coming from outside might say Kibaya is a large village rather than an urban centre. Nevertheless, in Kibaya there are most of the services people need. It is first of all the district capital where the district council and its personnel are located, as well as the police and the district court. Just opposite the police station is a bank, the National Micro-finance Bank (former National Bank of Commerce, NBC) and close to the bank is the district governmental hospital. In addition to the hospital there are a couple of dispensaries and a few pharmacies selling aspirin, different antibiotics, syringes and malaria medicine. Another societal service is the post office from where people can make phone calls.[25] There are three primary schools and the only secondary school (a boarding school) in the district is located here. It is quite easy to buy diesel or petrol in Kibaya since there are three gas stations, and if one needs to repair the car, there are a couple of garages one can utilise.

Arriving in Kibaya, one encounters the main road and all the shops along this. There are plenty of small businesses in Kibaya, ranging from those who sell only

---

[24] The national parks in question are Tarangire, Lake Manyara, Serengeti and Mikumi.

[25] The telecommunication system was improved very much after Kibaya was connected to the national electricity grid at the end of 1999. Today the district council has fax and e-mail capabilities and there is even computer education in the town. In 2006 it became possible to use mobile phones in Kibaya.

soda and beer to those who sell everything – from yeast, kerosene and batteries to shirts, trousers, *kanga* and *kitenge* (women's wraps of cotton textiles) - all in one shop. There are several guesthouses and small restaurants that cook local dishes of goat meat and maize porridge and many women have small teahouses that serve tea and *chapatti*. There is also a small permanent local market where customers can buy fruits, vegetables, meat and dried fish as a complement to the staple food consisting of maize porridge, goat meat and chicken and occasionally rice.

   The main occupational practice is agriculture, which is the main source of income even if some have small shops or restaurants on the side or have an employment at the district council. The main crop is maize, followed by different kinds of beans, groundnuts, sorghum, millet and sunflowers. Maize, however, is by far the major crop for the people's own consumption and the main source of income. The fields are in general located outside Kibaya and most people have to walk 5-10 kilometres to their fields. Kibaya has a reliable water supply and there are several water points in town to service the residents for a fee of one shilling per litre or 20 shillings for a bucket.[26] However, during dry season the water becomes very high in saline content and is not very tasty or suitable for human consumption. During the rainy season, people are less inclined to buy water and resort to collecting water from natural wells or from riverbeds. This usually results in people collecting water from dirty and infected sources causing diarrhoea and annually recurring cholera in Kibaya and in villages in the district. There is a monthly cattle-market which takes place on the outskirts of Kibaya where the Maasai bring goats, cows or bulls to be sold. There are individuals who buy one or two calves and professional cattle-traders who buy large numbers of cattle and have them driven to Moshi, Tanga or Dar es Salaam. The cattle-market has also attracted other businessmen, who travel in a caravan of lorries and Land Rovers around the district visiting different villages on certain dates. At the market they sell beads, pearls, clothes, textiles and various household utensils. They are then joined by local barkeepers and shop owners who normally have their establishments in the village selling food and beverages. If Kibaya normally is like a

---

[26] At this time 1000 TZS equalled 1.42 USD.

quiet village, it becomes at least like an urban centre bustling with life during the market day.

At the market the district staff also collects revenues of sold cattle. In total, livestock activities contributes with 38% of the income to the district while the direct selling of cattle at markets only contributes with 3.3% to the district treasury (Kiteto District Council 2001: 4). On the market day, people from neighbouring villages pour into Kibaya to attend the market, which also gives a good opportunity for people to exchange information and meet friends and relatives they have not seen for a long time. This is also a time for district staff and local politicians to meet under relaxed circumstances and drink some beer and enjoy *nyama choma* (sw. for grilled meat, usually goat meat).

3.1.2   District council

Kiteto District is divided administratively into divisions, wards, villages and sub-villages. The district council has 22 members: 15 elected ward councillors, 6 women councillors for the special seats and the Member of Parliament. The opposition party CHADEMA (Sw. *Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo* – Party for Democracy and Development) occupies one seat and all women councillors come from the ruling party CCM. The council consists of 14 departments (for example, community development, natural resources, education, water, planning and finance) with their respective heads of department and their staff. Head of the council is the District Executive Director (Sw. *Mkurugenzi*). The elected councillors constitute the Full Council at district level, which is the highest level of decision-making in the district. The councillors elect among themselves one who becomes the Council Chairperson (Sw. *Mweneykiti*) who chairs the Full Council. The Full Council is summoned usually every two or three months, starting with the different council committees, (finance, education, community development committees, etc.) that discuss on-going or new initiatives/activities that might have been raised at village level.

In the general decentralisation and poverty reduction policy conducted by the Tanzanian Government, Kiteto was chosen to be one of 35 districts to be part of the 'Local Government Reforms Programme' (LGRP), initiated in 2000. The

implications for the district council are that services will more closely follow people's specific and defined needs, that is, the local democracy will be strengthened. The decentralisation is a comprehensive process encompassing the political, financial and administrative levels of local government. The reform programme aims to train and make councillors more sensitive to their new obligations and rights in a decentralised system, to create a new mode of conduct for councillors and local government staff so as to provide for enhanced accountability towards the people. Further, the structure of council administration and committee structure should be in accordance with local resources and priorities; budget planning, procedures and financial management should be streamlined and strengthened.[27] Since lack of transparency and corruption make tax collection a prime source for embezzlement, not just within the districts, but also in the distribution and redistribution of money between the districts and the central level, the districts taking part in LGRP are to be made more independent of the central level and to finance the district plans and staff employments by relying on their own resources and collected revenues within the district.[28] In short, to be selected for the LGRP implies that the districts are more responsible for not only managing their own budget and relying on their own resources, but it also has to be done in a transparent and accountable way.

The district council have three different income sources, their own tax collection, governmental grants and grants from donors (for example the Sida-sponsored programme). The district council receive unconditional block grants for financing health, education, water and public works sectors. It is then the district councillors who decide on how to prioritise among sectors implying that services to the people will follow more closely the specific and defined needs by the people.[29]

---

[27] The United Republic of Tanzania 1998: 10.
[28] The embezzlement of locally collected taxes was a reality known to district staff and politicians. At one Full Council meeting, the new district commissioner (in 2002) went through the actual reported development levies collected in the different wards by the councillors and compared these with the population ratio in the wards. There were huge deficits in many wards and the district commissioner asked the councillors why there was a difference in numbers. Councillors reported that they had collected the required amount but money 'disappears' when it comes to the district council.
[29] Sida Follow-up Programme 1998-2000: 3.

The district's own share of the budget is however small compared with the contributions from government and donor, as seen in the figure below: [30]

District revenue 8%

Govt. grants 34%

Donor grants 58%

Figure 1: District budget and share of income contribution 1999

Hence, the district's small contribution to the budget makes it far from being economically independent from outside contributions and as a consequence the reform has had a slow start in Kiteto due to the low level of tax collection. The district's own major sources of income are produce cess (34% of total), farm cess (20%) and development levy[31] (12%).[32] In terms of revenue collection, there have been problems with the unwillingness of the people to pay taxes and poorly motivated tax collectors. In addition, lack of transport has made it difficult to collect taxes. Under LGRP, revenue collection was one of the first issues to be dealt with. The collection of produce cess was privatised and revenues to the council increased. However, the risk of collecting revenues is not small and there is always the danger of being attacked by armed robbers. Tax collectors are not their only targets; the trade caravans going between the villages were also robbed from time to time since they also carry lot of money. Hence, the first private tax collector stopped this work after one year due to the risks involved.

Nevertheless, the district has gone through several changes and improvements over the past ten years especially when it comes to health service. The district has also received assistance from different donors, both from Sida and from NGOs. Water Aid has operated in Kiteto since 1996 and focuses on improving the water supply to the different villages. It is working closely with the local NGO, KINNAPA[33],

---

[30] LAMP Impact Study 1997-2000: 63.
[31] Development levy was abolished in 2003.
[32] Kiteto District Council 2001: 5.
[33] The acronym KINNAPA is derived from the six founding villages: Kimana, Kibaya, Njoro, Ndaleta, Namelock and Partimbo but it also translates in Maa to 'we who support each other'.

which is partly financed by Water Aid. KINNAPA assists mainly Maasai communities with water for both human and livestock consumption, but covers today other developmental activities like sanitation, natural resources, education and gender. Other donors are the Medical Missionaries of St. Mary (MMM), which has been providing villagers with health care since 1982, and in recent years additional NGOs have started to work in Kibaya, providing the town with a library building and books, for example.[34] The largest donor contribution economically is the Sida-sponsored Land Management Program that has been assisting the district since 1996.[35] The program assists the district with building up the capacity among government staff to assist villagers in their specific needs, as well as providing training for different target groups in sustainable management and utilisation of natural resources, land rights, gender, small scale enterprise support and lately also with prevention of HIV/Aids.

3.1.3   Village council

After the re-introduction of local governments in 1984, the village government (*serikali ya kijiji*) became the smallest unit with its village assembly, consisting of all villagers over the age of 18, as its most important organ. The elected body, village government, consists of 25 members of whom not less than a third should be women, according to the constitution. The village government is responsible for executing the decisions made by the village assembly, overseeing the daily activities of the village and making decisions concerning village issues on behalf of the village assembly (Max 1991). The village is judicially seen as a corporate body and it can 'hold, purchase or acquire movable or immovable property, and in its corporate name can sue or be sued' (Max 1991: 154). This gives the Tanzanian village a specific and unique position.[36] The village is further divided into smaller administrative units, sub-villages, with their own sub-village chairperson (*mweneykiti wa kitongoji*) and below him are the ten-cell leaders (*balozi*). Ten-cell

---

[34] The project goes under the name 'Jifunze project', which means 'teaching oneself'.
[35] The programme was phased out during 2006/2007 and was implemented by Orgut Consulting AB.
[36] An example is the by-laws that some villages in Kiteto formulated, wherein it was written how to manage the forest, what to utilise of the forest products within the village area and the penalty for those who break the by-laws.

leaders were previously the party representatives at the lowest family level. They represent ten households but, while the structure still exists, it has no official connection to the party today. The ten-cell leader is usually responsible for the distribution of food relief and even for conflicts resolution between individuals or families. Thus, they are the first link in the network upwards to the district level.

The village government has to be convened at least four times per year and the required attendance for being legitimate is 15 members. The general decision-making procedure starts within the different committees in the villages. For example, the school committee writes a request for the construction of more school desks for the primary school and they need material and economic support for this. The plan will be taken to the village government where it will be discussed and small changes can be made. Thereafter the plan will be put forward to the village assembly meeting where villagers can comment on the plan. Sub-village chairpersons (who also are members of the village government) and ten-cell leaders will pass on to other villagers what has been decided and if there is going to be a collection of money for the construction of school desks. This procedure is adequate for smaller proposals (see fig. 2). With more elaborated plans like school buildings, teacher houses or roads the proposal will after the village assembly be taken to the Ward Development Committee, consisting of the other village chairpersons in the ward, the Ward Executive Officer and the Ward Councillor, who chairs the committee. Next, the proposals are taken to district Full Council meeting[37] for approval where after the decisions of the different proposals are delivered to the village assembly by the ward councillor. The whole process is planned to take three weeks (see fig. 3).

---

[37] Even if the Full Council meeting is to be held once a month, it was not the case. Normally it was held once every second or third month. Also village government meetings in Sunya were held only when it seemed necessary. However, there was a dramatic improvement after the election in 2000 when a new ward councillor and ward executive officer started to work in the ward. Now there was a fixed time-schedule when meetings were to be held. This change could also have been an effect of the LGRP.

Figure 2: Decision-making process at village level (smaller issues)

Figure 3: Decision-making process (larger issues)

3.2 The Ethnic Groups

I will in this chapter give a short presentation of some of the different ethnic groups living in Kiteto that have a direct relation to this study. Since I have a special focus on the Maasai, their social structure will be presented more thoroughly.

The Maasai

The origin of the Maasai is not fully established but it is generally considered that they have roots in northeastern Africa in the Nile River region and belong to the Nilotic group of peoples. The Maa language belongs to the eastern Nilotic languages spoken by the different Maasai sections in southern Kenya and northern Tanzania. Throughout history the Maa-speaking people have migrated southwards, through the Rift Valley in Kenya into present day Tanzania. In the migration, people came together or separated, became settled or moved away, shaping and shifting their different identities and communities. Eventually, the different groups came to form separate, yet related identities such as Arusha, Njemps, Samburu, Purko,

Parakuyo[38] and Kisongo,[39] all speaking their different dialect of Maa (Saitoti 1991, Mitzlaff 1988, Rigby 1992, Hodgson 2001, Ndagala 1992, Spencer 2004). Further possible categorisation is the division of Maa-speaking groups into those who are pastoralists – the 'Maasai proper' and the Samburu – and those who are agro-pastoralist – the Arusha, the Parakuyu and the Njemps) (Saitoti 1991: 18). The 'Maasai proper' tend to have a derogative attitude towards those practising agriculture (see more about this in chapter 3.4.1), but this categorisation is less and less relevant today since many Maasai proper today are also surviving on agricultural practices making this division irrelevant on these grounds. Further, even though the Maasai are cattle herders and are categorised to the transhumance groups, the Maasai today are more or less settled in permanent villages.

The geographical area inhabited by the Maasai groups is normally referred to as Maasailand. In Tanzania it was administered as the Masai District until 1974. It was the largest administrative unit at the time but has since then been divided into smaller districts. The Maasailand is roughly divided into twelve sections[40] (Spencer, 2004, mentions 'sixteen or so') where the Kisongo section[41] of the Maasai is the largest one. The second largest is the Purko in Kenya. The size of the population of the Maasai is estimated to be 430 000 (1993) in Tanzania and together with the Maasai in Kenya the population ranges between 880 000 and 900 000.[42] In this fashion, each section has its own territory, name, ceremonies, dialect, style of houses and leadership authority. There are also differences between the sections regarding style and colour of clothing and beadwork. Nevertheless, Maasai living in any particular section may belong to any of the existing clans and are regarded as family with the obligations that involves. Yet there are differences between these sections that have to be reckoned with. Spencer noticed in his own research that

---

[38] The Parakuyo or Ilparakuyo, are also known in the literature as 'Baraguyu' and as 'Wakwavi' by coastal and some other Bantu-speaking peoples. They have also been termed 'Kuafi' but these two latter terms are totally rejected by the Ilparakuyo (Rigby 1992: xvi). I use the term Parakuyu without the prefix as to avoid confusion and to avoid involvement of other prefixes defining words as feminine or masculine, singular or plural.

[39] Sometimes also referred to as Ilkisonko (Rigby 1992). I use Kisongo which is the most common usage in the literature and in ordinary conversation.

[40] Examples of sections are Purko, Matapato, Loitai, Loodokilani, Keekonyokie, Kaputiei, Damat, Siria, Laitayiok, Dalalekutuk and Wuashinkishu (Saitoti 1991: 18).

[41] The Kisongo Maasai in turn have five internal divisions each dominating a particular area. Each division is further divided into smaller geographical localities (Ndagala 1992: 33).

[42] http://www.ethnologue.com/show_language.asp?code=mas

existing literature on the Maasai 'overlooked the possibility of variation between the sixteen or so tribal sections. Writers had tended to note that the Maasai do this or that, rather than noting, for instance, that the Purko Maasai do this or the Kisonko Maasai do that' (Spencer 2004: 1). Spencer noted at least seven incompatible versions of the major events that relate to the development of a new age-set and eleven versions of the Maasai system of clanship. I shared a similar experience to Spencer and, bearing this in mind, the Maasai section relevant for this study is the Kisongo Maasai in Kiteto District.

The Kaguru, Kamba and Nguu groups

The non-Maa speaking or Bantu-speaking groups concerned in this study are the Kaguru, Kamba and Nguu ethnic groups in Sunya village. The 'home area' of Kaguru is Ugakuru in Morogoro Region, but today people are living in many different districts ranging westwards from Morogoro. Their population size was estimated to be 217 000 in 1987[43] and their livelihood is based on agriculture, growing maize, beans and, especially in Sunya village, also sugarcane and banana along the riverbeds. From sugarcane women make an alcoholic brew that is sold in the village. Previously cattle were also an important part of Kaguru livelihood but these days only a few people tend to keep cattle in Sunya.

The Kamba ethnic group migrated from Kenya in the second half of the 19th century in their search for hunting grounds, especially for elephants. According to the respondents, the history of the Kamba in Tanzania started with one hundred and eighty men who went south on their search for better hunting grounds for elephants. In the beginning they remained in the northern part of present Tanzania since slave trade was still a reality further south, but when the slave trade ended, they continued southwards ending up around Iringa (01.Kamb.M6.2E.3M.1Y.Chang.B). On their way, they encountered Arab traders who were doing business in Tabora. The Arab traders ventured into business with Kamba men who exchanged tusks for money and later on for cattle, goats and finally for women.[44] Today, Kamba practise agriculture and keep some small stock. They have

---

[43] http://www.ethnologue.com/show_language.asp?code=mas

[44] According to the respondents, Arabs captured women from different ethnic groups like Hehe, Nyamwezi, Haya and Gogo whom Kamba men married. This had the consequence that men and

adopted a clan and moiety system based on the Maasai form in addition to cultural attributes that the Maasai have: such as beads, earrings, clothes, and the removal of the lower incisors.[45]

The Nguu ethnic group has its roots in Kiteto and the neighbouring regions and districts (Morogoro, Dodoma, Handeni, Mpwapwa, Kongwa and Tanga); their livelihood is based on small-scale farming (maize, sorghum, beans and sunflowers), hunting and keeping livestock. These days, however, hunting requires permission from the district and is therefore not practised to any larger extent. The Nguu differ from the other ethnic groups in terms of religion: the Nguu are practising Muslims while the other groups belong to any of the existing Christian dominations in the district, like the Catholic Church, the Pentecostal Movement, the Lutheran Church or Seventh Day Adventists. All the ethnic groups can practise polygamy but it is most common among the Maasai and the Nguu. The Nguu is the largest group residing in Sunya village and their population in Tanzania was 132 000 in 1987.[46] Conclusively, while the study includes these three Bantu-speaking ethnic groups, the emphasis is put on the two groups of Maasai living in Ilkuishi-Oiboir and in Sunya and I will now in the following chapter give a wider presentation of the Maasai social structure.

3.3   The Maasai Social Structure

The Maasai social structure consists of two moieties and the different clans to which all individuals belong. This social structure regulates relations between the people in the society, marriage relations and towards whom people have obligations. Besides the moiety and the clan structure, the Maasai society is structured around the age-set system which gives the society its hierarchical structure and determines the status and roles of individuals. All relations between

women had different languages and did not understand each other. Still today they say women have their language and men have theirs (01.Kamb.M6. 2E.3M.1Y. Chang.B). One Mkamba woman said: "Women are the 'property' of their husband since he has paid bride price to her father. They do not have any rights and are seen just as workforce since men decide over everything in the family and this goes back to the time when Wakamba men, using tusks as payment, bought women".
[45] I do not have the population figures for Kamba in Tanzania but in 1989 the Kamba population in Kenya was estimated at 2.4 million (http://www.ethnologue.com/show_country.asp?name=KE).
[46] http://www.ethnologue.com/show_country.asp?name=TZ

men and women depend on the age-grade they are at a particular time in their lives. Roles, responsibilities and the amount of respect individuals deserve and receive are determined by their age-grade. In the following sections, the origin of the moieties and the function of the clan and the age-set system will be described.

3.3.1 Moiety and clan system

The Maasai society is divided into two socially specific organisational structures that have their origin in their mythical ancestor, the first Maasai Naiterukop and his two wives. The first wife of Naiterukop built her house to the right side of the homestead entrance and she was given a red bullock (Maa. *enkaji odomongi*) from her husband as a gift; she therefore becomes known by the name *Odo-mongi* – the owner of the red bullock. The second wife of Naiterukop built a house to the left side of the entrance and was presented with a black bullock (Maa. *enkaji orokiteng*); she therefore becomes known by the name *Orok-kiteng* – owner of the black bullock. Odomogi and Orok-kiteng gave birth to several sons who became the founders of the Maasai clans (Maa. *inkishomitie* [pl.] *enkishomi* [sing.]) bearing their names (Ndagala 1992: 124).[47] Thus Odomogi and Orok-kiteng are the mythical founders of the two moieties dividing society into the two social categories to which all Maasai belong and that determine marriage relations and formation of alliances. All existing clans belong either to the red or black bullock and the clans regulate individuals' social, political, economic and marital relations. All members of a clan are regarded as belonging to one family with certain obligations towards its members. The clan is first of all an identification that establishes the rights and obligations towards each other that people have. When people meet for the first time it is important to establish that relationship and consequently their obligations towards each other. Usually the relationship is established through long

---

[47] There are many variations in the number of clans mentioned in the literature and they also differ in the information my own informants gave. Ndagala (1992:124) mentions that Fosbrook names eight clans, two of which he lists separately (Laitayok and Marumai). Sankan names six clans omitting Namasita, whereas Kipury and Saitoti mention only five clans and exclude the Namasita and Laitayok clans. My informants listed four clans for the red bullock and five for the black bullock and several sub-clans (ilgilat [pl.] olgilata [sing.]) that belong either to the right or left side of the 'entrance'. Comparing the two moieties, the black bullock is larger and has more clans and sub-clans than the red bullock. According to Saitoti, the Ilmolelian and Ilaiser clans are the most prominent and powerful among the Maasai. The spiritual leader, prophet and healer Ilaiboni comes from Ilaiser clan.

greetings, exchange of names, father's name, clan belonging and what age-group one belongs to. For example, when a man visits a new homestead he must find out if there are any Maasai living there who belong to his clan. He will then be taken to meet his fellow clan members who are seen as his family and who will provide him with food and shelter. If visitors are herding cows that need to be taken to water, it is important to find out where fellow clan members have their water source. All water sources either belong to individuals who have dug them or belong to certain clans. Clan members are obliged to assist each other, an obligation they do not have towards members of other clans. This obligation stretches over all Maasai sections even into Kenya.

Secondly, a clan is a socioeconomic resource where the clan is the prime provider of assistance in a wide range of social matters, including economic ones. The clan can be a provider of resources that one clan member is lacking. These resources can, for instance, be the provision of cows to clan members who have lost their cows or the loan of cows to a man who do not have the agreed number of cows as bride wealth.[48] It is not only cows the clan can assist with: even children can be bestowed to childless families or individuals. There can arise a situation where a woman does not have any children to help her in her household or with taking care of the cattle. She can in this case turn to her clan and ask for help. The clan can find a family with many children who are willing to bestow one child to her. This child will be regarded as the woman's own child.[49] Or if a family does not have any sons they can ask for a boy from their clan and from another homestead to help the family to take care of the cattle.

A third role of the clan is to act as a mediator between individuals or between an individual and the community. There is the possibility that those who have lost cows can ask the clan to speak on their behalf to the whole community, since an individual cannot approach the community directly to ask for help. In this case the clan acts as a mediator. The clan can act as a mediator in family matters in cases where, for example, a wife has eloped from her husband and the husband does not know the reason. To get an explanation, he must turn to his clan and ask a fellow

---

[48] At marriage the clan will contribute with cows irrespective of whether the man has cows or not.
[49] A child given to a woman from her clan is received without any payment obligation from her side. However, if she were to accept a child from outside her clan, there would be payment involved.

clan member to look for his wife and ask why she has left him. The husband cannot do this himself so the clan acts as a negotiator and messenger. Also, if a husband beats his wife, the wife can turn to her clan for help to solve her problem. Hence through these practices the whole Maasai community takes care of those without resources, secures the clan's survival and keeps the unity and harmony of the clan intact. In addition, irrespective of where in Tanzania one encounters fellow clan members, these relationships and obligations are present.

3.3.2   Forming of age-set

The Maasai society is also organised around age-sets and a gendered age-grade system. The age-grade determines an individual's status, roles and responsibilities within the society and the amount of respect they deserve and receive from others. For men, the age-grade system has permanently existing categories, such as uncircumcised boys (*ilayiok* [pl.] *olayoni* [sing.]), circumcised boys (*ilmurran* [pl.] *olmurrani* [sing.]), adult men (*ilmoruak* [pl.] *olmoruak* [sing.]) and old men (*iltasati* [pl.] *oltasat* [sing.]), which males enter at birth and move through as members of their respective age-sets after circumcision. Women, on the other hand, do not have as many categories as men. They have only two main age-grades: uncircumcised girls (*intoyie* [pl.] *entito* [sing.]) and women (*inkitok* [pl.] *enkitok* [sing.]) (Ndagala 1992). However, women do have many rich ceremonies and rituals that are individual but less spectacular compared to the ceremonies of marriage and circumcision,[50] something I will return to later.

An age-set (*olaji*) is a ritually bound unit of age mates. All the boys who are circumcised during the same period make up one age-set and this unit is for life. When the Maasai society starts to have a large number of uncircumcised boys, it initiates a process of opening a new circumcision period. There is often pressure from the uncircumcised boys, especially from boys who were 'left-over' from the last circumcision period, to open a new period as soon as possible. Since the last period might have been closed over ten years previously (see figure below), many

---

[50] Female genital mutilation is widely practiced by many ethnic groups in Tanzania as well as among the Maasai. The practice is forbidden by Tanzanian law but it is nevertheless practiced in all Maasai communities. The issue is extremely sensitive and I once read in a newspaper about Maasai women who threatened to beat up workshop organizers who criticized the practice. I do not condone the practice but I realize it is an important part of Maasai culture and an important ceremony for many girls. This is the time when she becomes a woman, a grown-up person who is eligible to marry.

of the uncircumcised boys have already reached over twenty years of age and are eager to become olmurrani. The question of opening a new circumcision period is also discussed among elders and boys' parents who are eager to have their sons become olmurrani.

Ilmauya (1953-1957)
↑
14 years' interval
↓
Ilmakaa (1971-1975)
↑
8 years
↓
Ilandis (1983-1987)
↑
11 years
↓
Ilkorianga (1998-2002/3)

Figure 4: The four latest age-sets and their circumcision periods

When the time is ripe, the youth ask elders in the alternate age-set above (fire-stick elders, *olpiron*) to approach *oloiboni* (the spiritual leader, diviner and prophet) to request a new circumcision period to be opened. Oloiboni then decides that a new period should be opened and gives his blessing. Figure 5 illustrates the alternate age-sets above who are responsible for guiding the alternate age-sets below through the circumcision and warrior period according to Maasai customs and traditions, where (A) initiated the circumcision period of (C) and (C) initiated the circumcision period of (E) (see Spencer 2004:66).

Ilmeshuki (A) ——————→ Ilmakaa (C) ——————→ Ilkorianga (E)

        Ilmauya (B) ——————→ Ilandis (D) ——————→(F)

Figure 5: Alternate age-sets among the Kisongo Maasai

The fire-stick elders 'bring life' to the new age-set by kindling a fire, they act as patrons at the circumcision ceremony and act as the 'fathers' of a formed age-set. At the closure of the circumcision period, oloiboni curses a knife saying, 'anyone

who is circumcised after this point may the knife kill him' and the fire-stick elders break the stick marking the end for the period which has lasted for five years (Hurskainen1984: 129, Saitoti 1991: 58). The new age-set that has been formed will now take over the responsibilities of those warriors ahead of them, be the guards of homesteads and cattle, engage in dances with girls and spend the coming years learning about their roles and responsibilities, customs and traditions of Maasai society. Some of them will go to Dar es Salaam, Zanzibar or Arusha to seek employment and earn some money before returning home to get married. Hence, for boys this is the time in their life when they are free to do almost whatever they want.

3.3.3   Women's Ceremonies

Uncircumcised girls have normally a regulated life consisting of many duties within the household, but are at the same time granted a great deal of personal freedom. Girls from several homesteads form a group that is 'independent of the adults and has its own rules of behaviour' (Mitzlaff 1988: 72). The female circumcision ceremony and the girl's marriage are the two most important events in her life but they are never held simultaneously for a whole group of girls, only individually. However, all the various celebrations taking place in a woman's life are interrelated. They are predetermined and all women go through the same rituals and in this way the different stages in a woman's life are marked: the receiving of a name and an identity, from child to adolescent girl who chooses her future lovers, from uncircumcised girl to circumcised woman, from unmarried status to becoming a wife, from wife to becoming a mother and, later on, a mother preparing for the circumcision of her first child. Furthermore, women participate in other celebrations in their role as mothers. Thus, even if she as an individual goes through few ceremonies, she can during her lifetime be part of ceremonies and rituals not only for her own children, but also for her co-wives and their children, adding up to more than fifty ceremonies depending on how many children she has (Mitzlaff 1988: 124). Hence, while the ceremonies around the forming of men's age-set systems receive quite a lot of public attention, women have many ceremonies that are connected to the whole lifecycle of a woman. Mitzlaff writes

that these 'transition rites as stations of social aging are not only important for the individual in question but for the whole social structure. The relationships between the members of a society change due to the change in status of one person' (Mitzlaff 1988: 126).

The age-sets form the hierarchical structure of the Maasai society and give individuals their position in the society, while the clan system regulates the obligations people have towards one another. On these two systems are the foundations of Maasai society built. However, within this social structure there are also certain categories of customary leaders who have different, yet complementary, roles in society and who influence the political arena. I will in chapter 4.2 describe three of these customary leaders and the qualifications required to be selected as customary leader. Below follows a presentation of the villages where the research was conducted.

3.4 Ilkuishi-Oiboir Village

> Something I need to tell a person who has not been here is the problems we have with tsetse flies and water in this area.
>
> *(Maa.ME.Eng)*

> During the dry season we have to walk a long way to fetch water. Then we have to sit and wait many hours for the water to sip up from the ground.
>
> (Maa.W3.Loo)

Ilkuishi-Oiboir was formed in 1989 and is located in the north-western part of Kiteto District approximately 110km from Kibaya. It belongs administratively to Makame ward, in Ndedo division, and is an area almost entirely populated by Maasai pastoralists (97% in Makame ward according to Water Resources and Supply Study for Kiteto District, July 1996: 5). The population in Makame ward is, according to the 2002 census, 5576[51] and in Ilkuishi-Oiboir village 2278.[52] The area is

---

[51] National Bureau of Statistics, Tanzania (http://www.tanzania.go.tz/census/districts/kiteto.htm).

mainly characterised by a large grass plain, some 50-60km long and 10km wide, which is surrounded by acacia wood and scrubland. The village consists today of four sub-villages (Osirei, Ilchurra, Loombenek, and Engarkah) that are widely scattered in the area, which makes it difficult to administer for the village government. In fact, previously the furthest sub-village, Katikati,[53] was about 50km away (6-8 hours by foot or 2 hours by car) from the school and market area, which is regarded as the central part of the village. The different sub-villages in turn consist of several homesteads (Sw. *boma*; Maa. *enkang'*) of varying numbers and size.[54] The homesteads are circular and enclosed by thorn bushes to keep out wild animals. The houses are made of a mixture of cow dung and sand which is plastered on the woven sticks that constitute the wall construction.

Photo 1: Water source during the dry season
(Photo by author).

Photo 2: Maasai homestead in Ilkuishi-Oiboir
(Photo by author)

---

[52] http://www.nbs.go.tz/Village_Statistics/Village_Statistics.html.
[53] Katikati sub-village was granted village status in 2002 and no longer forms part of Ilkuishi-Oiboir.
[54] Homesteads in Ilkuishi-Oiboir vary in size from only two families to up to ten families. Normally one homestead consists of 3 to 5 families and 4 or 5 homesteads make up one sub-village.

In the area there is abundant wildlife in the form of elephants, giraffes, lions, leopards, hyenas, zebras, wildebeests, hartebeests, gerenuks, gazelles and many other herbivores and carnivores on the plain and in the acacia wood and scrubland. The area is therefore attractive to hunters from Europe and the US and, over the years, there have been many different hunting companies operating in the area. However, the central government takes 75% of the hunting income while only 25% is disbursed to the district, who in turn is supposed to disburse 20% to the ward and villages where the hunting blocks are located. In 1999 the district received just over TZS20 million from the central government, which was equivalent to 25% of total revenue collected from this sector (Kiteto District Council 2001: 4). However, the village chairperson in Ilkuishi-Oiboir said in 2001 that they had not received any money from the district.

The village has its own market every Saturday where businessmen come and sell beads, cloths, domestic utensils, batteries and bulbs for torches, maize-millet, beer, soda and so forth. Women open up teahouses and make chapattis and occasionally goats are slaughtered, grilled and consumed together with some beer. This is also an opportunity to exchange information with one another and meet relatives from the other sub-villages. People can also meet the ward councillor/village chairperson and the Village Executive Officer who have a small 'office' there during the market day. Close to the market place is the village primary school, built in 1987, with three teachers of which two are Maasai. In total there are 109 pupils attending the school, according to the head teacher. The pupils go here for four grades where after they shift to Ndedo boarding school for forms five and six. There are, on the other hand, no health facilities in the village, but the mobile clinic from Kibaya hospital makes regular visits when the roads and cattle tracks are accessible. People are also provided twice a month with health service by the flying doctor from Arusha.[55]

---

[55] It was not confirmed how reliable this service was or if it is still in practice.

3.4.1   Perception of the Area and Perceived Prospects and Problems

> Development is to have many cattle, many children. If you do
> not have these things, you cannot call your society as
> developed.
>
> (Maa.W2Y1Midl.Osi)

The Maasai are 'the people of cattle' (Århem 1985: 18) that are given and entrusted to them by God, indicating that other forms of livelihood have been considered in a derogatory manner: 'to hunt for food or dig in the earth is shame'[56] (Odner 1978: 3). Maasai life circulates around the household unit and its reproduction, where food and property pass between and within the settlements along channels of kinship, friendship and age group affiliation. This is what Århem terms a Maasai way of life and is the essence of a 'good life' (Århem 1985: 18).

However, what characterises a 'good life' in the traditional sense has over the years become more difficult to maintain. Economic and political forces beyond their control have resulted in changed livelihood patterns where it has become a survival strategy to venture into agricultural production on a regular basis and into businesses outside the Maasai community. In this changed livelihood pattern it has become common for young Maasai men and women to leave their home areas to look for work in Arusha, Dar es Salaam or Zanzibar. Men work as dealers of gemstones, parking attendants, guards, performers of traditional Maasai dances at hotels or trackers for Safari and hunting companies. Women sell beads and necklaces and participate in the Maasai dances at the tourist hotels. This has become a fact of life also for the Maasai in Ilkuishi-Oiboir.

There has always been an exchange of products between Maasai and non-Maasai groups and in Ilkuishi-Oiboir this exchange and cooperation has been conducted with their neighbours in Kondoa District, mostly with the Rangi ethnic group. In

---

[56] According to Maasai culture, working with agriculture is the lowest possible work they can think of. However, societies change and today Maasai do work as farmers, but if they can afford labour, they will hire it. This change took place earlier among Kisongo Maasai further west, in Munduli District and in Ngorongoro Conservation area. Also the Parakuyu Maasai in Handeni District started to grow maize earlier than the Kisongo in Kiteto and Simanjiro districts. These two districts are those affected latest by changes due to these being reserved for pastoralism and becoming therefore later exposed to cultivation on larger scale. See Ndagala (1992) and Århem (1985).

exchange for cows, the Maasai have received maize, beans and other agricultural products. However, over the years the Maasai noticed that their own stock of cattle diminished while the stock among their counterpart increased. It was realised that if they were not to lose all their cattle to the Rangi, they would have to start growing maize and beans themselves. Thus, farming is nowadays a part of a diversification of the Maasai livelihood to obtain money and at the same time lower the costs of purchasing food (mainly maize millet). The cultivations also provide additional food supplies compared to previously when their main food supply consisted of milk mixed with blood. Today, milk and blood is not drunk to the same extent for two reasons. Firstly, medicine given to cows enters the bloodstream and to drink cow blood can therefore be hazardous for humans, according to elders (01.Maa.4M, 2E,2M.Eng). Secondly, the number of cows to milk is lower today and therefore there is not as much milk available to be mixed with blood.

Although Ilkuishi-Oiboir is a semi-arid area, the respondents say that it is suitable for both farming and livestock keeping as long as there is enough rain, but agriculture is more risky since it needs more rain. Respondents also mention lack of tractors and ploughs as a disadvantage on the agricultural side. Still, the main problem is related to livestock keeping due to the existence of tsetse flies and other cattle diseases that occur from time to time.[57]

Access to water for human and animal consumption is a constant problem in most parts of Kiteto and Ilkuishi-Oiboir is no exception. There are several traditional wells in the area with enough water for several months provided there has been enough rain. These traditional wells are usually closer to most homesteads than the communal water point with the pump and there are only two sub-villages that can be said to have reasonable distance (3-5km) to the only water source with a pump, which is shared by both humans and animals.

---

[57] Medicine for cattle is not always available and it is regarded as expensive by most. Sometimes there are rumours spread that some particular medicine kills instead of curing the cows, or that cows will not produce any milk if they get certain vaccines. A common strategy to prevent the spread of cattle diseases is therefore to move the uninfected cattle to non-affected areas.

Photo 3 and Photo 4: Residents and donkeys at a water trough and cows at a traditional well.

(Photos by author)

What sticks out in the interviews in Ilkuishi-Oiboir is that a good life refers to having enough food over the whole year. Families experience seasonal shortage of food, which is detrimental to their health and is a sign of poverty and vulnerability. It is therefore no wonder that the idea of a good life (Sw. *maisha nzuri, maisha bora*) in this kind of environment revolves around access to food – through cattle rearing, but nowadays also through agriculture, both of which depend on the availability of rains. Nonetheless, people have plans and ideas about how to change their life situation. Respondents say a way to escape poverty is to start some form of business, like buying and selling cattle or to have a small shop, and with the profits they could buy clothes, beads and sugar and so forth. With the extra money they could also buy food and not only be dependent on what they can grow themselves; they could also through their business activities get more cows. Some of the profit could also be used to hire workers to expand their agricultural fields as a way to increase food supplies. This could be achieved at the family level, according to respondents. Other issues would be to have education for their children and a 'modern' house, i.e. a house made of concrete bricks and with a corrugated roof. Thus the respondents think that there will be more changes in their society when it comes to improving their lives, i.e. they will probably do more business to generate money. And there are already people dealing with gemstones and cattle, according to some women.

At the village level there should be a school, hospital, tractors and good communications, which would be a sign of their village being a developed one. It is understood by the respondents that the village leadership – i.e. the village chairperson and the village secretary – are responsible for the overall development of the village. They are the educated ones and have the knowledge about and connections to the District Council (and donors) so as to develop their village. It is considered that it is through their work that the village have received the water pump, the school, a dam and recently a stationary communication radio enabling communications with the District Council. It is believed that those who have education can teach those without education how to become developed. The village chairperson is mentioned as a good example due to his establishment of a small shop and by the fact that he has a car.[58] Cultural values are put forth here where the status of men in the Maasai society is the yardstick for what a developed family is. The number of children, wives and cows are the measurements and the concept of 'the more the better' applies. A man should have between five and ten wives even though the norm seems rather to be between two and four. Large numbers of cows (100-200) is a sign of good knowledge in handling cattle and many wives indicates wealth (it takes many wives to care for many cows) but also that a man is a good (and kind) husband.

As mentioned above, those with education are regarded as being responsible for 'bringing' development to people. At the same time, the Maasai have traditionally held an aversion and a suspicious attitude towards education provided by the government. During the British occupation, but also after Independence, Maasai children were not sent to school and families even moved away to more remote areas in order to escape officials and to prevent children from going to school. The Maasai were afraid that their children would change their view of their own life and become like the 'Swahili' (who at this time were regarded as their 'enemy') and in the end turn against their own culture and traditions (01.Maa.M4.3E.1Y.Ilch.). In addition, the question arose that if children were sent to school, who would look after cattle, fetch water and help their mothers? Children are important in the daily reproductive activities of a family and are for

---

[58]Maa.M2Y.Osi, Maa.M1.Osi., Maa.W1.Osi, Maa.M4E.Osi., Maa.M1.Os, Maa.W5Y.Osi, Maa.W2Y1Midl.Osi, Maa.W3Y.Osi.

these reasons reluctantly sent to school.[59] It was therefore a practice that children of the least loved wife or children not regarded as good cattle keepers should be sent to school. Thus, on the question of education, one respondent said that if she has ten children it is enough that three children get education while the rest remain at home to take care of the cattle. A second respondent sayid that she also wants just a few children to go to school since after they have become educated 'they can forget you and move away' (Maa.W2Y,1Midl.Osi). She cannot therefore agree to having all her children going to school; she needs some of her children to remain home to help her. A third respondent said that she can pay for some of her children to have higher education while the others can go to school in order to know how to read and write. Nevertheless, she wants all her children to know how to read and write while only some of her children can continue for more years in school. Still, it is not solely women who hold this view. Also, young ilmurran (warriors) say it would be enough if two out of five or eight children went to school. The others are needed herding cattle and goats and assisting their mothers. However, elders of today realise what they have missed by not having an education. They have seen that those who got an education have a better life, they have more cows and their cows are healthier. A customary leader said that many of these children who got an education have now become rich or have achieved a position as a village leader or similar. It is painfully realised that education is needed when communicating with authorities and with people from outside (like me). Even if the respondent has a high position in his society as *olaiguenani* (customary age-set leader), he cannot communicate directly with me while my assistant, who is a young olmurrani, can do this thanks to his education. In this way he emphasises the importance and benefits of education (01.Maa.WE.ME.Loo.).

As it is today, there are still more children staying home than attending school but the importance of education is recognised; more and more children, including girls, are getting an education among the Maasai. Yet, the enrolment of children to school in the district is extremely low. On average, for the district, the enrolment

---

[59] The district views this act of not allowing all children to attend school very seriously now. It was reported in the *Sunday Observer* of 20 June 2004 that 'Kiteto District Council … has rescued a total of 170 school-age children, most of them females, whose registration had been blocked by their parents. This is part of the on-going special operation aimed at ensuring that all school-age children are enrolled in school'. The District Executive Director reported that 18 people had been arrested and charged in court (http://www.ippmedia.com/cgi-bin/ipp/print.pl?id=13763).

rate of primary school in year 2000 was only 24%. For Ilkuishi-Oiboir the enrolment was 32% of the targeted 315 pupils (Kiteto District Council 2001: 8). On the other hand, the enrolment of pupils has increased in the district since the school fees for primary schools were abolished and due to increased construction of primary schools in more villages and in some sub-villages in the district. Yet the Maasai way of living is not an issue of change. People want to continue the way of life they have but with the improvements mentioned above. If these basic necessities were provided, it would not only mean a good life but also a 'modern' life.

3.5 Sunya Village

> A developed person is one who is using a tractor or oxen to plough. He/She has a nice house, a good house and there is water nearby the house.
>
> (Wanguu.3WMiddl.Malim)

> We need just to live and get married, to have our family, to enjoy our lives as our fathers do. If you have cows and children, sit and drink milk, then you can enjoy your life.
>
> *(*Maa.MY5.Engap)

Sunya village was formed in 1976 and belongs administratively to Sunya ward in Sunya Division; it is situated 120km southeast of Kibaya in one of the largest natural forest areas in Tanzania covering 167 000ha (Forest Trees and People, no. 46, 2002: 15) and consisting of miombo woodland including ebony and sandalwood among other varieties. The forest still has some wildlife in the form of lions, baboons, gazelles, leopards and, according to some people, one rhino. The forest was also earlier a passage route for elephants from Tarangire National Park to Mikumi National Park in Morogoro. Many paths in the forest are remnants of these migrations that ended sometime in the mid-1980s, but were suddenly revived once again in the year 2000. Sunya is located in the middle of the forest area, surrounded in the distance by tree-covered hills and agricultural fields intersected by small seasonal rivers. One of the rivers separates two of the sub-villages from

the rest and especially during rainy season, the river becomes a real barrier, which is not easily crossed by people or vehicles.[60]

The inhabitants of the village belong to mainly four different ethnic groups: Nguu, Kamba and Kaguru, whose main livelihood is based on subsistence agriculture but some of whom also have cattle, and the Maasai who are pastoralists but have lately started to grow some maize on small fields adjacent to their homesteads. According to the village secretary, the largest group in the village is the Nguu followed by Kamba, Maasai, and Kaguru. The figures in the Water Resource and Supply Study (1996: 5) put the Maasai in Sunya ward at only 12% of the total population. The village secretary says the population of the village (in 1998) was in total 7450, divided into 2450 women, 1955 men and 3045 children. The results of the 2002 census show a population in Sunya village of 5584, while the population in the whole ward was 13 813.[61] In the census, ethnic belonging was not considered.

The village is administratively divided into seven sub-villages, whose composition and numbers have changed over the past five years.[62] Most of them have a majority population of one of the ethnic groups present in Sunya. For example mainly Wakaguru inhabit Kiegea sub-village, Maasai inhabit Engapune sub-village while Mnadani, Kichangani (and Malimogo) are primarily inhabited by Wanguu. Wakamba, for the most part, inhabit Chang'ombe, Lendolu and Ibutu.

The houses in Sunya are of varied standard. There are rather well constructed new houses made of burned bricks with corrugated roofing while others are constructed with woven sticks, plastered with mud and with a roof made of grass. Other houses are made of sun-dried bricks with either a thatched or corrugated roof.

---

[60] In 2001 a "Dutch-bridge" was built that now enables cars to pass the river during the rainy season.

[61] http://www.nbs.go.tz/Village_Statistics/PDF_files/Table_Manyara.pdf

[62] The sub-villages were Chang'ombe, Ibutu, Kichangani, Kiegea, Lendolu, Mesera, Mnandani and Malimogo. During the local election in 1999, Malimogo sub-village 'disappeared' in the process of registering sub-villages in the village. At the time of my study, Engapune was not an official sub-village even though it was always referred to as being one. Further, there seems to be a new additional non-official sub-village being formed called 'Juhudi' (meaning advancement, diligence, drive). This area is entirely inhabited by Nguu belonging to the opposition party CHADEMA.

Photo 5: Houses in Sunya village
(Photo by author)

There is no electricity or telephone[63] in this part of the district. In the village there are two guest houses, some small food-stalls and some shops selling different commodities like soda, soap, kerosene, matches, batteries, blankets, kanga and kitenge and spare parts for bicycles, among other things. However, shops do not sell rice, potatoes, fruits or vegetables. The village has a primary school, with an enrolment rate of 73.5% of the targeted aim of 630 pupils (Kiteto District Council 2001: 8), one dispensary and a pharmacy. There are no regular communications to the village even though there was once a bus route connecting at Sunya, between Handeni and Gairo that is at the main road to Dar es Salaam. However, due to the extremely poor road conditions, this communication link was erratic during the rainy season and when the dry season came, the road was too damaged to be used by buses again. Nevertheless, the market caravan also comes to Sunya once a month, which improves the output of products and income for the local businesses. Here, as in Kibaya, cattle are bought and sold, people meet and beers are enjoyed.

3.5.1 Maasai in Engapune sub-village and their relation to the area and other non-Maasai villagers

The life situation for the Maasai in Sunya differs socially, politically and environmentally in many respects from that of the Maasai in Ilkuishi-Oiboir. The Maasai in Sunya live in a forested area where there are no open plains available for cattle to graze. Further, the population density is greater and the fields are larger and manifold requiring stricter control over the location of new fields and grazing

---

[63] Today there is mobile phone coverage in the village.

areas. On the other hand, since there is a river and smaller water sources in the area to be used by cattle and humans, there is no need to concentrate homesteads in proximity of few water sources as in Ilkuishi-Oiboir. But still, even if there is plenty of water, it is not considered to be a very good area for cattle due to many different cattle diseases, such as east coast fever and red water disease. There are also ticks and tsetse flies affecting the health of the cattle. The area is therefore considered to be more suitable for agriculture than for cattle, especially when there is enough rain (MaaWM5.Engap). Yet, the agricultural practice among the Maasai in Engapune is still on a small scale (1-2 acres) compared to the more established agricultural practice among the Maasai in Ilkuishi-Oiboir.

A particular problem raised by the Maasai respondents is the conflicts they have with farmers. These conflicts are both with farmers from Sunya and outside their village and are usually caused by cultivations too close to water sources used by the Maasai for their cattle. On the other hand, there are also complaints from farmers of cattle entering their fields. This problem with farmers started in the early 1990s, according to the Maasai respondents. Despite taking the issue to the village government, to the district council and also to the Member of Parliament, nothing has been done to ease their problems. Further, it is not only the establishment of fields close to water sources that is a problem: fields are also established over or bordering existing cattle tracks, which in the end leads to conflicts. The Maasai are frequently fined 50 000-100 000 TZS (about 65-130 USD in 1999) to pay as compensation for destroyed crops, but at the same time there are farmers who say the Maasai bribe the village leaders to avoid fines (01.Kag.M.Kieg.).[64]

---

[64] There have also been conflicts between the Massai in Ilquishi-Oiboir and farmers from Kondoa. In November 1999, there was a fight between Maasai from Kiteto District and people from the neighbouring Kondoa District. Farmers (Rangi ethnic group) from Kondoa District had started to come into Kiteto District and establish farms on Maasai pastoralists' areas without permission. The Maasai in Kiteto chased away the farmers who responded by confiscating a large amount of livestock from the Maasai who were using a water source in Kondoa District. Naturally, the Maasai wanted to retain their cattle and it was said that all together 3000 ilmurran from the district and neighbouring districts (all the way from Ngorongoro) came to the area prepared to fight. There were several incidences and some people on both sides were killed. The Field Force from Arusha together with the Regional Commissioner and the District Commissioner had to calm down the situation. The Maasai were later promised economic compensation for lost livestock.

Elder men from the non-Maa ethnic groups in the village have another perspective on the situation. They say the problem has its beginning in the early 1980s as a form of natural development of Maasai settling closer to the village centre where different social and commercial facilities are located. When Maasai were living further away, there were no conflicts between farmers and Maasai. But over the years, more families have moved closer to Sunya and at the same time the total population in the village has increased leading to the expansion of fields as well. Finally, maize fields came too close to grazing areas and water sources. Still, in former times there was co-operation and the exchange of products between them. The Maasai sold cows and goats to farmers who in turn paid with agricultural products. Post-harvest grazing was also fairly common, according to the non-Maasai elders, who see the whole situation as a dilemma since the Maasai need the social services also and have the right to live close to the village centre while at the same time this closeness results in conflicts. The elder Maasai men say they cannot relax since all they think about is whether or not their cattle have entered maize fields during the day. This creates frustration and a sense of hopelessness. The only option mentioned is to have their own area where they can 'feel free and live undisturbed' (Maasai men in Engapune), a view shared by the non-Maasai elders.

Even if women concur with men about their present situation they realise they cannot turn back the clock and have their exclusive area. The women describe their situation:

> It is like your cow, who drinks with other cows from a different area at the same water source, suddenly goes with them to their home. After a while your cow starts to think; where am I? This is not my boma, and it is lost.
>
> (01MaaW5MEngap.)

This translates to 'Maasai society being "kidnapped" by "modern" life'. Even if there are good things with this 'modern' life, like education, the feeling is in general that of a loss of control over their own situation. Even if families are farming today on a small scale, this seems less to do with a voluntary conscious shift of practice (compared with Ilkuishi-Oiboir). There is a collective

powerlessness present in the sub-village and some Maasai women say they have been 'taken to another place by other ethnic groups':

> [we are] like branches floating in a stream of water, the Maasai have come to another place without their own decision.
>
> <div align="right">(01MaaW5MEngap.)</div>

Consequently, both women and men feel that they would need their own place where they can live and decide about their own lives. As it is now, they lack influence over decision-making in the village and in the end over their own 'destiny'. Since decisions are made by others, this has led to a marginalised position in the village. This marginalisation has made the group more reserved and protective of their culture and their cultural norms. Thus, a *good life* would be to have an exclusive area where they can live in peace, where there would not be any chance for cattle to enter cultivations or for farms to be established adjacent to water sources or cattle tracks. Besides all these aspects there are of course wishes for better healthcare, availability of cattle medicine and - how strange it may sound - more agricultural equipment even though they are reluctant to increase farming areas.

Partly as a response to the conflicts over land, the Sida-sponsored natural resource management program LAMP developed, together with the district and the villagers, land-use management plans including regulations for settlements, protection and management of the forest area, traditional cattle tracks, grazing areas and water sources. The goal when making demarcations in the forest is to allow free movement of cattle between fields, villages and even districts without interfering with agriculture or homestead areas.

Photo 6: Villagers and district staff put up a signboard demarcating area for residence
(Photo by author)

One main concern was precisely how to diminish and eliminate the conflicts between the non-Maasai groups and the Maasai in the utilisation of the same natural resources. One of the regulations concerns the distance between fields and cattle tracks, fields and water sources. In the village by-laws it was established that no fields were allowed to be closer than 100m to water sources; fields were not allowed to be closer than 35m to a cattle track, on either side of the track.[65] Therefore, the village government has created new additional and alternative cattle tracks in some places and there are many signboards in the forest informing villagers whether the area is reserved for pasture, cultivation, residence or if it is a forest reserve area.

Although decisions about demarcations were made in a participatory and democratic fashion, and with emphasis on the importance of separating cattle-tracks and maize fields, democratic practice was in reality not always present. The case below is a common example of a conflict where marginalised Maasai became the victims when laws are not followed due to lack of accountability.

---

[65] I went several times and saw some areas that were in dispute and over which many complaints had been made and found that fields were immediately adjacent to water sources and also covered one cattle track previously used by the Maasai. During my last visit in 2002, I saw that signboards put up to show the existence of a cattle track had been removed and a peasant was cultivating a field just next to the cattle track. Nevertheless, progress has been made and in 2002, the villagers and the villages inhabiting the forest management area, called Suledo – constituting the three wards Sunya, Lengatei and Dongo in Kiteto District – won the UNDP Equator Prize 'for innovative approaches and outstanding community efforts'. The price sum was 30 000 USD to be shared by the nine villages constituting Suledo, of which Sunya village is part.

The Conflict Situation at Normotiok water source

At one visit to Normotiok (Maa. well, round holes) water source in July, there had been an establishment of a field just by the water where Maasai usually take their cows to drink during the dry season. When I approached the Economy and Planning Committee and the Village Executive Officer to hear more about this field and its location, they promised to look into the matter and discuss this during a planned meeting. However, the meeting was postponed. On my return five months later, the Chairperson for the Committee said the conflict in that specific area had been solved and they had made a path for the cows to enter the water. The field was moved so they could prepare the cattle track. This seemed promising but when I curiously went to see the location again, I could unfortunately not see any improvements benefitting the Maasai. The owner of the field was working and greeted me. Asking him about the situation on his field and if he was allowed to cultivate so close to a water source, he said he was permitted and he had even been instructed by the Economy and Planning Committee to plant sugarcane and banana-trees along the water rim so as to hinder soil from sliding into the water. However, he had problems with cows entering the field...

Photo 7: Maasai from Engapune sub-village explain the situation at Normotiok water source
(Photo by author)

~ 74 ~

Photo 8: Field at Normotiok water source
(Photo by author)

The Maasai in Engapune are living in an ethnically mixed village and are directly affected by decisions made by others since their customary leadership is not at all involved in political meetings at village level. The customary leaders are not residing in Engapune and have not therefore the same day-to-day contact with the villagers as the customary leaders have in Ilkuishi-Oiboir. The customary leader in Engapune does not have any contact with the politicians or attend political meetings, nor does he function as an intermediary between the villagers and the politicians, as in Ilkuishi-Oiboir. On the other hand, in Engapune elders have a strong position and especially one elder, Mzee Ndoje whom I visited frequently, is highly respected in the community. Most meetings are convened at his homestead and he is the first person people turn to when visiting the sub-village. The sub-village chairperson is secondary in this respect. Hence, given the circumstances, the Maasai blame most of their problems on the poor leadership starting at village level and stretching all the way to governmental level. They hope there will be new leaders who will be concerned with the problems they face and who will assist them. Right now they feel abandoned and it does not matter to whom they complain, no one is there to assist them, not even the MP who himself is a Maasai. They are demanding good leadership at village level, to have leaders who respect the people at all levels, which would constitute 'good life'. However, presently there is poor co-operation between their sub-village leader and the village leader. When I asked the respondents why this was so, they said:

If you look at village chairman, village secretary and councillor, they are not Maasai. That is why they do not like us. We have different ways of living.

(Maa M5,4M,1EEnga)

Still, there have been improvements after the introduction of the forest management, but the village government has obviously failed to resolve the specific issues mentioned above, which has resulted in the Maasai still being marginalised and alienated and not having their democratic rights looked after.

Photo 9: Ilmurran show where the cattle track was before the establishment of a maize field at Emugur-Endulugumi water source
(Photo by author)

Photo 10: Maize field close to Emugur-Endulugumi water source in Engapune
(Photo by author)

3.5.2   Non-Maasai perception of the area

> In a poor stage you drink porridge without fat and sugar, use the
> same clothes every day and you live in a poor house. In a good
> stage you eat good food [with fat and sugar], have a good house
> and have good clothes.
>
> (Wanguu,4W.1e.3m.Malim.)

Respondents' general perception of their village and the area is that the soil is very
fertile, which enables people to grow maize, beans, castor oil, sugar cane and
bananas. There are many shops in the village, businesses and a lot of cattle, which
are seen as positive components of the village. It is considered that the area
receives enough rain and generally there is enough water for human consumption.
Still, during the dry season, rivers and wells dry up and the remaining water has a
high saline content. Good quality water is then only available several kilometres
from the village and women have to spend many hours at the source just to fill a
bucket of water. The situation of firewood is satisfactory, yet women have to walk
a few kilometres each way to collect it since the villagers are not allowed to cut
down trees for firewood. They are only allowed to pick up branches and utilise
dead trees.[66] Despite the opinion that the soil is fertile, many still complain over
decreased harvest over the years. One respondent says that ten years ago he used
to receive 8-10 bags (100kg/bag) of beans from each acre he cultivated but today
he only receives 1-2 bags. One reason for lower yield is generally attributed to the
low use of technology. As one man says, 'The weakness of the area is that people
do not have any equipment, like a tractor, to cultivate their fields'. Hence, what
restricts good yields is that most of them are still cultivating their fields by hand-
hoes, thereby restricting the number of cultivated acres. The usage of fertiliser or
manure is negligible. On the whole, this results in low yields that are barely

---

[66] This is due to the regulations of the village forest management that prohibits the cutting down of
trees in certain areas. Firewood is preferably to be collected from the ground or from dead trees,
hence the long distance for fetching firewood. Women in Babati District, where the same form of
forest management is established, had the same experience but after ten years of forest
management there are more trees and they have reduced the time and distance for collecting
firewood (LAMP Booklet Series. 'Building a future with our forests. Experiences of community-based
forestry').

sufficient for supporting families and do not create any surplus that could be sold at a market.[67] A bumper harvest would mean a change of life, from a 'poor stage to a better stage' as one respondent put it. Then any surplus would be sold and from the income houses could be improved and clothes could be bought. In practice this means a house made of bricks with a roof of corrugated iron sheets. Thus, life revolves around how to increase harvests, which is the only thinkable way for most people in the village to improve their lives. But to implement this change of life one needs money that is only obtainable through farming, which is not producing enough. Therefore it is difficult for the villagers to get these improvements of life, say the interviewed women[68] (Wanguu.Wgroup.Mnada, Wanguu.3W Middl.Malim, Wanguu.4W.Malim.).

Development must come from themselves, according to some of the younger men. But it could also be that they are being inspired and influenced by others who have done something new and different and through this they can try to improve their life situation (Wanguu3My.Mnada). Women respondents say they can get development by their own efforts but the schools, hospital and roads are the work of the government. They can collect money for the building of a school or a hospital but it is up to the government to employ teachers, doctors and nurses (Wanguu.Wgroup.Mnada).

An additional serious question for the people concerns healthcare. Poor, or total lack of, healthcare in the village is affecting pregnant women most severely since many have to either try to reach hospitals in Kibaya, Handeni, Berega or Songea villages or give birth at home. The difficult situation for women is reflected in the statistics from Kibaya hospital where 94% of women in 1999 (7319 of 7786) delivered their children outside the healthcare system (Kiteto District Council, Data

---

[67] The food situation in the village was difficult during most of the years I was living in Tanzania. I remember particularly one time when I was in the village in October and people were already starting to have shortage of food. The next harvest was not to be expected until end of May. The price for buying one bucket of maize (20kg) was 2-3 times higher than in the district capital Kibaya.
[68] The harvest period is May–June. This is the time when people need to buy new clothes and shoes due to the cold period of the year. Since everyone has been without money for long period of time, everybody sells at the same time, giving a very low price for a bag of maize. Some of the harvest is also sold to buyers outside the district. However, the local farmers don't have any access to transport facilities nor are they up-to-date on current market prices outside the district. It is therefore the external buyers that stipulate the harvest price and often a very low one. The price of maize for a typical year ranges from 2500 TZS in May to 25 000 TZS in March. In a poor season, the price of maize can already in October be as high as 20 000 TZS. Hence, the price variation and the variations in rain patterns have an effect on how much maize a family has access to over the year.

Analysis Result Report for Council Service Provision 2001: 11). The more than seven thousand women who delivered their children outside of healthcare facilities, were assisted either by traditional midwives or female relatives.[69] Any complication is life threatening considering the poor standard of roads and lack of communications by bus or car and women emphasised this many times during different interviews.[70]

3.6 Concluding Remarks

This chapter has shown that Nyerere's 'enemies' of freedom and democracy – i.e. poverty, disease and ignorance – are still in existence in Kiteto District. The life situation of the people is still characterised by uncertainty when it comes to harvests due to irregular rains and low technological agricultural practices, but also the dependency on external traders who stipulate the price for the harvest to be sold to them. This leads to famine-like situations from time to time for many families. We have also seen that, on average, only one quarter of all targeted pupils of primary school age were attending school, making the issue of education a very important one. The poor economy of the district hampers it from providing citizens with services like good healthcare, schools or roads, which makes it more difficult for the district to fight the three enemies, and at the same time, it makes it difficult for people to succeed in uplifting their lives to a better standard. Thus, the fight Nyerere started after Independence is still going on and is far from over. In addition, the Maasai community in Engapune (co-living with other ethnic groups) feels 'trapped' and restricted in their ability to influence the decision-making in their village. Conflicts over grazing areas, water sources and cattle tracks are prevalent and add to the feelings of being a secluded and marginalised group with little say in their village.

In the coming chapter the decision-making body at the local level will be elaborated further. It illustrates the current leadership structure and perceptions of leadership. It explores the leadership structure among the Maasai and the

---

[69] In 1999, the World Bank initiated the TASAF program (Tanzania Social Fund) which focuses on financing the building of dispensaries and schools in the district to be built by the villagers themselves. In Sunya villagers built a dispensary and hopefully this has improved the healthcare situation in the village.
[70] As an example, a young man broke his leg during a football match and he needed to be taken to a hospital. The only way to transport him the some 60km to the hospital was on a bicycle. Thus, it is out of question to even think of transferring a woman in labour to a hospital.

different kinds of leadership categories they have, how they are (s)elected, what their functions are and the qualifications deemed necessary to become a leader.

4   LEADERSHIP CATEGORIES AND QUALITIES

The 'leader' concept has many different meanings and can be of various categories and on different levels within the Tanzanian society. The two concepts *leadership* and *leader* need also clarification and an explanation of how they are used in this study. A leader is a subject, an individual who holds a position where he acts as the authority figure for a group of people, e.g. political leader or customary leader. Leaders can be 'traditional'/customary[71], religious, political or representing trade unions and NGOs, for example. The position can be hereditary, eligible, usurped or one can be appointed by fellow group members. Still, whatever the category is, people will anticipate some form of assistance, guidance and/or response from the leader, i.e. that they will exercise some form of leadership. Leadership is a position but also an adjective where a prefix can be attached to the concept, like poor, bad or good leadership. However, a distinction can also be made between *leadership* and *leaderism*. Campbell (2000: 75) defines the character of the former as the 'ability to persuade others to comply voluntarily with one's wishes.' Hence, the leader has the gift to attract followers without the use of force or threats. On the other side, leaderism defines leaders who put themselves forward as the frontrunner of the people. Franz Fanon has, according to Campbell, identified the qualities of leaderism accurately when he equates them with officers who act like 'sergeant majors, frequently reminding the people of the need for silence in the ranks' (ibid). One might say that to the second category of leaders belong those who put themselves into the position through force (coup d'etat) or through manipulating elections so as to gain or to retain power.

The Kenyan writer Ngugi wa Thiong'o describes the African leaders as being characterised by selfishness with extreme 'narcissistic' qualities, especially after Independence when they as a social group held the belief that they constituted the new nations. This manifested itself in the adoption of the colonisers' language, which gave them the power to act as mediators between the West and among themselves about the fate of the nation. Ngugi wa Thiong'o says:

---

[71] The term 'traditional' leader is easily put together with 'modern' and therefore giving a picture of something being obsolete or primitive. I will therefore retain the term customary from here on.

The result of this for Africa is the rise of two nations within the same territory: a small minority speaking and conducting the affairs of the nation in European languages, and the majority speaking their own different African languages. […] It means literally the split between the mind and the body of Africa.

(in Campbell 2000: 81)

Nonetheless, what is normally considered fundamental for leadership positions is the need for the leader to justify his/her authority and to be accepted by the followers, to have some form of legitimacy. Still, far from all leaders fulfil these criteria and many occupy their leadership position through oppression mechanisms. However, the relationship between position and popularity is not straightforward. Gonzalez (2000) states that one leader who is considered impeccable may be unpopular while a popular leader may demonstrate many shortcomings. Analysts often solve this complication by falling back on the '*deus ex machina*[72] of leadership studies: the elusive, undeniable quality of charisma' (Gonzalez 2000: 132). Gonzalez argues that in leadership studies, 'charisma' is usually understood as the '"quasi miraculous", "super-human" qualities usually called for in extremely critical circumstances'. Still, Gonzalez argues, it is deemed of little importance in the studies of democracy transition of African countries in the 1990s. Instead, the poor economic situation of Third World countries was blamed on their politics where the state and the politicians were too large and too dominant in relation to the market forces. It was recommended by the donor community and lending institutions that government policies should be '"de-ideologised" and, consequently, that leaders be less "political" and more "technocratic" – less "charismatic" and more "professional"' (Gonzalez 2000: 135). Implicitly, the 'charismatic' leaders[73] were blamed for corruption and failed development programmes. Nevertheless, others argue that these leaders have other specific

---

[72] A person or a thing that is introduced into what seems to be an unsolvable situation, and provides a solution to an existing problem (Filosofilexikonet, 1988 Forum).

[73] Gonzalez says that some Latin American countries got 'more professional and less charismatic leaders' educated in US. It was anticipated that the economy of these countries would 'take-off' with these new leaders. However, after some years, the experience of those leaders was characterised by scandals and turmoil caused by fraud and/or currency collapse (Gonzalez 2000: 135).

features that need to be taken into consideration, such as intelligence, communication skills and the capacity to make decisions quickly and firmly (Blondel 1991, in Gonzalez 2000: 132). On the other hand, there are those who base leadership qualities on physical aspects, courage and sympathy (Pratt 1949 in Gonzalez 2000: 132). In the end, leaders have their position due to the possession of certain knowledge and qualities, a high social position or a combination of these elements (Gonzalez 2000: 132).

Without question, the most important leader in Tanzania was *Mwalimu* (Sw. teacher) Julius K. Nyerere and he certainly qualifies as part of the category of 'charismatic' leaders. Dr Lwaitama at the University of Dar es Salaam[74] says Nyerere turned to people in his speeches more as a teacher than a politician, where his focus in his speeches was on the problem being considered and not on who held what opinion on a certain matter, even though he could indicate he was aware that 'certain individuals' had diverging opinions. He frequently used humour and rhetorical questions followed by his own laughter to make his point, while the use of '*ndiyo*' (yes) with a rising intonation was an indication to the audience to dare disagree (Lwaitama 2000: 288). In this way he encouraged [or enforced] consensus and put focus on the problems rather than on individuals. The purpose of his speeches was to solve a political crisis by 'explaining what the crisis is about' (Lwaitama 2000: 298). Lwaitama says:

> this function of political oratory is metaphorically equated with that of a priest's sermon, a psychiatrist's psychotherapeutic conversational session with his/her clients, or a military commander's pep talk to his/her troops before a major battle.
>
> (Lwaitama 2000: 298)

Nyerere was (and still is) considered as the 'Father of the Nation' (Sw. *Baba wa Taifa*), a status he received in recognition of his role as the main character in the struggle for independence and in the building of the country. This revered title and

---

[74] Dr Lwaitama teaches linguistics at the University of Dar-es-Salaam.

the respect it invokes are reserved for him only and Nyerere never lost the position as the 'Father of the Nation' as he continued to act as a leader and influence national politics even after his retirement from the presidency in 1985. For instance, in 1992, Nyerere found out that there were some party leaders within CCM who had begun campaigning for a system of more than two terms for the presidency; this caused him to go straight to President Ali Hassan Mwinyi to persuade him to put an end to this campaign. Nyerere writes in 'Our Leadership':

> I had sought an opportunity to ask those who seemed to be doing the campaigning not to revive the issue. I had thought we understood each other. I was therefore astonished […] to learn that the question of the President's tenure was still a subject of discussion […]. So I again explained the importance of agreeing that we had already made this decision, and I reiterated the danger of reopening the debate.
>
> (Nyerere 1995: 26)

The reaction was strong from Nyerere's side and no one dared to challenge him. He was also deeply involved in the discussions over a three Government structure (instead of the existing two), with regard to the union with Zanzibar. In this latter question, Nyerere held several meetings with the president and Members of Parliament and Nyerere explained his reasons for opposing a three Governmental structure. Thus, Nyerere was very active in politics long after he retired and was often critical of the new 'Leaders' (Nyerere's quotation marks) of Tanzania (Nyerere 1995: 31).

In a multiparty system, Tanzanians now have to deal with and relate to several new potential leaders at different levels, most of whom are not well known to the electorate and whose leadership style cannot be predicted. The old leaders are familiar and hence, one knows what to expect from them. Further, the different leadership types like 'charismatic', 'nationalist' or 'popular' do not apply as much today as they used to, according to Gonzalez (2000: 136). He argues that 'democratic' leadership qualities are stressed more often today and this is likely to be connected to the democracy label many of the new parties carry (e.g., in

Tanzania: Democratic Party, United Democracy Party, or National League for Democracy).

As discussed above, there are a number of characteristics associated with a leadership position, i.e. different leading styles leaders resort to and how they practice office (such as leaderism versus leadership dichotomies), as well as individual characteristics that the populace value as signs of a good or a bad leader.

The coming section discusses the social organisation, the gender role of men and women among the Maasai and the different opportunities they have to influence decision-making in the village. It continues with people's perceptions on leadership. Emphasis is put on the functioning of a leader, the qualifications attributed to the leaders and the qualifications and deemed necessary in a leader for him to receive the trust of the people and electorate.

4.1 Power and Gender Roles

The Maasai society is strictly divided into a system based on generation, gender and on an age group organisation. Normally, the society is regarded as highly patriarchal where women do not participate much in the political and public domain. Women's responsibilities are within the reproductive and domestic sphere such as taking care of children, fetching water and firewood, preparing food, milking the cows and goats and preparing the hides and skins after cattle have been slaughtered. It is also their duty to build and repair the houses in contrast to what in many other cultures would normally be the responsibility of men, as among the Kaguru. The girls assist their mothers in most of the domestic chores, as well as cleaning the milk calabashes and making new ones. During resting hours, women sit together and make necklaces and belts out of beads. However, women are not restricted to the reproductive sphere only. The women play an important productive role, generally of low-income character, like selling milk, beads, tobacco and smaller livestock products[75] (see Mitzlaff 1988, Århem 1985, Ndagala 1992, Hodgson 2001, Ole Saitoti 1991, Spencer 2004 and Rigby 1992). The

---

[75] There are many Maasai women who sell beadwork and traditional medicines in urban areas and even on Zanzibar. There are also Maasai women who work in the mining town of Mererani in Simanjiro district running small-scale businesses.

agricultural practices that the Maasai groups are following nowadays are also tasks that women usually do.

Smaller children, both boys and girls, take care of goats, calves and sheep, while uncircumcised shepherd boys mostly take care of the cows. Shepherd boys are assisted by ilmurran if grazing areas are distant from the homesteads. When necessary, ilmurran also dig new and repair old wells for the cattle. Other duties of ilmurran include going to the market to either buy or sell cattle, delivering messages between different homesteads and sub-villages, accompanying elders on travels, guarding the homestead and cattle during night against wild animals and building and improving the thorn fences surrounding the cattle kraal located in the middle of the homestead. Men who no longer are ilmurran and elder men deal with issues 'outside' the homestead (the productive, community management, and political management roles) with connections to other homesteads and villages and also with elders from non-Maasai groups. Men are involved in business involving large amounts of money such as the selling of cattle and agricultural products. They often sit outside the enclosure of their homestead discussing matters dealing with cattle and the welfare of their families and the homestead, as well as discussing marriage arrangements between different families. If one person is sick and needs medical care at the hospital, the elders decide what to do and how to raise money if that is needed. They inspect the cattle in the morning and in the evening to make sure the animals are healthy. During the day they visit grandchildren and friends with whom they discuss various issues or simply enjoy a game of *mbao* (a board game). Elder women spend their days together with their daughters and grandchildren, making necklaces and participating in meetings with other women of same age. They are not expected to do any manual labour unless they are poor and childless.

4.1.1   Decision-making

Within the family domain, elders (both men and women) have the decision-making power, but within different spheres: men are expected to solve relational conflicts between individuals within the family and the settlements while the first wife usually has the overall power of the joint domestic issues in relation to her co-

wives.[76] Widow status in the Maasai culture is special. Unless a widow remarries, her status within the family as well in the community increases and she is seen as the head of and the spokesperson for the family.

According to the cultural norms, decision-making in the community is a male domain and women are not expected to participate in especially traditional meetings together with men, or to 'sit under the same shade' as men. Although elder men are active in announcing and declaring decisions, it is not always explained from where and from whom these decisions originated. The clans, the patrilineage, affinal connections, local groups (one or several homesteads for example) and other interest groups are all social units that act politically on different levels in their society and from where questions to be discussed can be generated (Mitzlaff 1988: 161). Although all elders are respected, there are individuals[77] who are more respected than others due to their wealth or their knowledge about Maasai traditions, culture and customs and these elders are important in decision-making.

From time to time, men and women have common meetings but women's freedom of expression is not fully acknowledged. Today, however, women have gained more say in these meetings and are even allowed to stand up (symbolically very important) when addressing the meeting. Still, there are meetings solely concerning men (e.g. concerning cattle, grazing areas, circumcision periods and marriage arrangement) where women do not attend, but women usually try to sit within hearing distance in order to be informed about what issues are being discussed. On the other hand, women have their own meetings concerning women and their situation in the community (e.g. circumcision of girls and marriage plans). At these meetings they choose one popular and respected woman[78] to head that specific meeting.

Decision-making is based on consensus and meetings can be prolonged for days until all different views are heard and consensus is reached. Then again,

---

[76] Polygamy is widely common within the Maasai culture.

[77] Mostly men due to the character of public meetings.

[78] She is called *engaiguenani* (compared to olaiguenani that is equivalent for men's leader). There are other categories of leaders among the women, where committee chairpersons (especially in the maize-milling committee) and women representatives in the village government are mentioned by the respondents.

consensus is sometimes misused as a word to imply 'customary African democratic procedure'. The system ignores the silence of women. At these meetings it is not certain that the diverse interests and opinions are necessarily acknowledged. Often the dominance of elders and the acknowledgement of verbal prowess play an important role and the views of younger speakers who are not well conversant, or are inexperienced, are frequently corrected by elders. On one hand, in this arena, all men are allowed to speak freely and there is no regard for the hierarchy when it comes to permission to speak. But then again, those elders who are wise and respected are asked for advice and guidance regarding how to solve the problem at hand. As mentioned earlier, those with many cows and wives, those who are considered as good speakers and are knowledgeable in Maasai traditions and customs are more respected than other elders or people in general and certainly have more say than others in these meetings. They can give examples from similar problems and how these were solved previously. In this way, there is a continued connection to the past, their culture and history, which is important for the continuation of Maasai way of life. Cultural norms and customs are in this way transferred orally to younger generations in repeated meetings and since the Maasai do not keep any written records, their history, traditions, customs and rituals have to be remembered. Hence, at meetings it is the elders who keep the 'records' of Maasai customs and are there as 'living files' when there is need to seek guidance from the past.

All decisions have to be anchored in their societal and customary norms. It is therefore important for the village chairperson and ward councillor to assure the support from the customary leaders and the elders for any implementation or political matter that concerns the community. The village chairman in Ilkuishi-Oiboir says that it is much easier to impose collection of money for different purposes if the elders in a homestead agree. Since the elders are the heads of family, they also decide how money should be utilised. Elders have a further important role in the society as advisers for the young in various matters according to the cultural norms.[79] If young men show disrespect towards the elders, they can

---

[79] The importance of elders is naturally ambivalent and several elders themselves say they no longer have power in the society. As in our society, many elders may feel obsolete and useless nowadays. An old man belonging to the highest age-set present (Ilnterito) said that the role of the elders 'is not there anymore'. He said that there are just two elders (belonging to the highest age-set) in the

easily be punished or have a curse put on them. This is of a serious nature and no one would want to have a curse put on him or her by an elder. On top of this, the home of elders can also function as a sanctuary for younger women, wives who have been beaten by their husbands[80] or men who have behaved badly towards another elder. The giver of sanctuary functions as a negotiator between the conflicting parties where a suitable punishment is decided or the offended is asked to forgive the offender for his, or sometimes her, bad manners or ill behaviour.

To sum up, elders in the Maasai society function as guardians of Maasai traditions and customs, as well as managing conflicts in the society and finding peaceful solutions that are accepted by both parties. Further, elders have also the power in the society to impose punishment on others if they are disrespected and if members in their community violate Maasai social norms and behaviour. According to some ilmurran, it would be unthinkable to 'tear down' this hierarchical order, since this structure preserves and confirms the unity in the Maasai community.

The political/meeting arena has changed, however, in that elder women participate more frequently in 'modern' political meetings together with men. Yet, young women are being excluded to some degree, since it is still not considered appropriate according to cultural norms for a young woman to stand in front of her father and elders to express opinions or to criticise political leaders. This can

---

area and people do not listen to them anymore. 'Not even the children respect elders anymore. They just go and take decisions without us. The only function we have is to eat, sleep and walk around' (MaaME.Eng).

[80] For example, if a man beats his wife and the wife runs away to seek protection at an elder's homestead yet the husband still continues to chase her, this is considered a great disrespect towards the elder. The punishment for the husband is to give three cows, *pombe* (customary beer made from honey) and blankets to the elder. During the time of punishment the wife (or wives) sleeps in other women's houses in the homestead and the husband has to give each wife a sheep as a fine. Another example is if an olmurrani (usually unmarried young men) sleeps with a wife of an elder in his homestead. This is seen as an act of great disrespect and the olmurrani has to pay a fine to the elder. The usual punishment is to be given pombe, meat and blankets. Sometimes the elders have to be given a bull. The Maasai have an elaborate norm system regulating sexual relations between men and women. Legitimate relations are between men and women belonging to the same age-set. Ilmurran therefore have legitimate relations with unmarried girls. But as soon as she marries an elder, a relationship with an olmurrani becomes illegitimate since she belongs to the same age-set as her husband and will be seen and categorised as mother of olmurrani. Also, if they belong to the same clan, the relationship is regarded as incestuous (see Mitzlaff 1988).

however be done by younger men, but their views might still not bear the same weight as views held by elder men.

4.2   The Maasai Leadership Structure

The customary leadership among the Maasai differs from a leadership that is based on a paramount and hereditary leadership like the chiefs among the Ndebele, Tswana or Zulu in Zimbabwe and South Africa for example. The Maasai do not have one single leader who governs the whole community. Instead, they have several categories of customary leaders who have separated and specific duties in the society and who interact with people at different societal levels and times in people's life. What is fundamental is that the customary leaders among the Maasai are closely connected to the basic organisational structure of men's age-set system. Through this, the positions are intimately connected to the social fabric of the Maasai and are part of people's ordinary lives. People are well aware of what the customary leaders' duties and responsibilities are and they also know how to relate to them. The customary leaders identified in this chapter are oloiboni, *olaunoni*, and olaiguenani,[81] all of whom are related to the central formation of the social structure based on the age-set system.

4.2.1   Oloiboni

In the efforts to administer the colonies in East and West Africa, the British Colonial power created a system where identified indigenous leaders would act as middle-men in the administrative structure. The indigenous leaders – chiefs – would have responsibility for some local decision-making and retain some judicial powers in the local courts. However, the main issue for the British was that their decisions would more easily be implemented through local leaders. Assuming the Maasai social and political organisation was based on the leadership of a single leader, the British in Tanganyika made a mistake and wrongly identified the Maasai prophet, diviner and religious leader oloiboni as the paramount leader for the Maasai. Since oloiboni is a person who demands great respect among the Maasai and plays an

---

[81] Other writers call olaiguenani age-set spokesman, but I choose to call him 'customary leader' since he has duties covering the whole Maasai society and not only his age-set.

important role in society, in addition to the fact that the position is hereditary,[82] the British thought this important 'leader' could hold a key role in the administration of the Maasai through the indirect rule. Following this line, Oloiboni Parrit (a famous and great Kisongo oloiboni) was appointed 'Chief of Tanganyika Masai' (Ndagala 1992: 49) and he was to travel with the District Commissioner to explain government policies. To seek legitimacy and approval from the Maasai for appointing Oloiboni Parrit, the British sent out a letter to all the localities seeking people's support. While it was said that elders in the Mfereji locality accepted the appointment, there were other elders who were more suspicious about this: according to the role and responsibilities of oloiboni, it is not customary for him to leave his homestead, which consequently led to this suspicion. His place is in his homestead where he can receive and attend to people's needs. Still, the British were determined to use oloiboni in administrative matters and the administrative headquarters were even moved to Monduli in order to be close to the home of oloiboni in the hope they could influence him and rest of the Maasai in this way. This did not succeed since the British failed to understand that oloiboni does not have any executive powers (Ndagala 1992: 49). He receives his respect in his role as a diviner and a prophet, as the religious leader who decides when to start and stop circumcision periods and who guides and performs blessings over ceremonies. Hence, the appointment of oloiboni, through whom the administrative system could rule the Maasai community indirectly, was a failure and the idea had to be abandoned by the British.

4.2.2 Olaunoni

Two years after the closure of a circumcision/initiation period, the *eunoto* ceremony for the newly initiated ilmurran is held. At the eunoto ceremony, junior ilmurran are promoted to senior ilmurran and the appointment of olaunoni takes place. The main duty of olaunoni is to lead his age-set, to ensure the adherence of his age-set to Maasai traditions, to guide them into the life of elderhood and to represent them and take blessings to the age-set from oloiboni. The position of olaunoni is said to be ranked higher than oloiboni in matters concerning the age-

---

[82] The cultural norm says that oloiboni must come from the Ilaiser clan.

set. Olaunoni is the symbolic head of his age-set (Hurskainen 1984: 3) and as such, great care is taken when the selection of olaunoni is made. The qualifications deemed necessary for this particular position are extensive. *Olaunoni* must be olmurrani of great honour and with good virtues. The special qualifications involved are that he must be good-tempered, of good physical condition with no defects on his body like a blind eye or a crippled leg. He must not have killed anyone or be associated with anything going against Maasai societal norms. He should be rich in cattle and his parents must be alive and of good mental and physical shape (Hurskainen 1984: 189, Saitoti 1980: 122). The appointment is made by oloiboni but it is kept a secret or else the boy who is chosen may try to escape. The reason for this is that olaunoni is a position filled with ambivalence since it is expected that he should die after having served 17-18 years as olaunoni (Hurskainen 1984: 5). If he dies before the age-set enters the stage of adult men, the blessing received by olaunoni from oloiboni will be passed on to the age-set and the men in the age-set will live long and have a healthy life. But if he stays alive, the men in his age-set will suffer, they will die in different unknown diseases and without reason. Thus, at the same time as being a position of high prestige, it is a position nobody wants to be appointed to. According to Maasai belief, it is not possible for both the olaunoni and his age-mates to prosper and live long (Hurskainen 1984: 5, Saitoti 1980, Rigby 1992, Spencer 2004). However, if his age-set is suffering and many people are dying, he has to go to oloiboni to ask for medicine, which can help his fellow age-mates (01MaaM2Olaig.E.Loo., 01MaaM1Olaigcl.Osi.).

Once olaunoni is selected, a life in solitude without his age-mates begins. The duty of olaunoni involves visiting different Maasai homesteads in Maasailand to investigate the behaviour of his age-mates. However, these visits are not welcomed, hence the ambivalent position. Respondents in one homestead said that when olaunoni comes to visit, they have to buy beer and slaughter animals every day since he does not eat meat from the same animal two days in a row (01Maa.M1Olaigcl.Osi). When people receive news that olaunoni is on his way, all the best cows and oxen are taken to another area since olaunoni has to be given whatever he wants. Usually olaunoni ends up with considerable number of cows in his possession through his position. Thus this position means that you are expected to die early and spend the rest of your life socially excluded from your age-mates.

Olaunoni can no longer stay in the same houses as his age-mates and he passes through the ceremony to adulthood by himself. But as compensation he can marry as many wives as he likes and his age-mates have to collect cows to pay the bride price. All the same, it is a position no one wants to have due to the ambivalent status it involves (Hurskainen 1984: 188).

4.2.3 Olaiguenani

Olaiguenani (pl. *ilaiguenak*) is appointed before the circumcision period of his age-set has started by men in the alternate age-set (see fig. 5 above). However, his age-mates also discuss who might be a good leader for their age-set and these discussions are taken to the elders as well. The elders scrutinise the olaiguenani by looking at the boy's family, his father and grandfather, how they have behaved in the community, if they are of good character, whether they are 'pure' Maasai or not (i.e. there are no ancestors from other ethnic groups in their lineage) and if they have lot of cattle or not. He must also be a good listener and orator, (two of the most referred to qualities by the respondents) be particularly brave, polite, generous and be able to give good advice and to know about Maasai traditions. In short, he must distinguish himself from others (Saitoti 1980: 58). Since Maasai society is an oral society, a 'good speaker' with the ability to put forth ones' opinions in a clear and understandable way is highly valued.[83] Walter J. Ong (1991: 47-55) says that in order to memorise in an oral culture one has to think or speak thoughts that are memorable, and a good speaker can do this. It is necessary to have a technique that is based on repetition of well-articulated sentences according to an easily remembered 'thought pattern'. Knowledge in an oral society, such as the Maasai, is difficult to acquire but is highly valued, hence the respect for elders and those who know much about Maasai society and traditions. This corresponds well with the definition given of a good speaker. A good speaker is one who knows to arrange his speech in a good way, in a well-structured manner that enables people to understand clearly what his intentions are. He should not

---

[83] The Maasai even have a competition between ilmurran in the art of storytelling. These stories are presented as improvised songs led by the storyteller accompanied by a choir of fellow warriors and dealing with, for example, taking the cattle to grazing areas far away and everything that happens on his journey. Since these songs are very popular, a skilful olmurrani gains prestige in the Maasai society in his way of telling a story, not to mention popularity among the girls.

speak about irrelevant issues and should not become angry when discussing with others. In contrast are those who do not have the qualities of well-articulated sentences and a clear thought pattern, and only 'speak and speak and you do not know what they have said' (Maa.W3.Loo). It is therefore not just important *what* you say, but equally important *how* you say it. Further, a good speaker is considered to be an honest person. He does not have any hidden agenda, rather the opposite. He speaks in a way that everybody understands. This person and his qualities are highly regarded and he is also much in demand as a mediator in conflicts since he is honest and not afraid of speaking the truth. The respondents said that if they were to choose a boy whose parents and grandparents have at some point misbehaved according to Maasai customs, there is a risk the boy could have inherited similar behaviour and would therefore not have the above mentioned qualities to be a suitable olaiguenani.

According to the respondents there is in general no preference from what clan the boy should belong to, but some clans are preferred above others. Men respondents said that former leaders who have come from Ilaiser, Irmarumai or Ilailayok clan have been good leaders and have not spent collected money in any bad way. Since cattle-keeping is seen as the economic and cultural backbone in the society, a large number of cattle is an additional and very important criterion for being a good leader. The respondents also said that leaders from these clans (as well as political leaders) generally have a lot of cattle. A leader with many cows is not lazy and must know what is best for them. But 'a leader without cattle can fail to rule the people since he does not know the problems of cattle' *(Maa.M2.Osi)*. Yet individuals from some clans cannot be appointed as olaiguenani. The respondents exemplified:

> In the beginning, when the Maasai were not so many people, some
> went to oloiboni to ask for help with traditional medicine for cows
> and for themselves. Sometime after the people had used the
> medicine, cows and people died. People thought this was because
> **they** went to oloiboni to get the medicine. And from here on, there is
> a belief that this clan should not go to the boma of oloiboni. The
> parents taught their children about this and still there are people

from especially Ilendukai and to some extent Ilodokishu clan who should not go there. Hence, since olaiguenani must sometimes go to oloiboni, he cannot come from these clans.

(01.MaaM5E,3M.Engap)

Thus, aside from the fact that some clans are excluded according to the narrative and preferences based on experiences through the history, there are no explicit rules that an olaiguenani should come from a certain clan, as the figure 6 below indicates. In fact, the preferences for clan and moiety differ between the age-sets according to the respondents. However, the figure shows at the same time that four out of five of the last ilaiguenak for the different age-sets in Ilkuishi-Oiboir have come from the black-oxen.

Age-set	Clan	Moiety
Ilmeshuki*	Ilaitayok	Black oxen
Ilmauya/Ilseuri	Ilaiser	Black oxen
Ilmakaa/Ilkishom	Ilmolelian	Red oxen
Ilandis/Ilkimonyak	Ilaitayok	Black oxen
Ilkorianga/Ilmerishi**	Ilmarumai	Black oxen

*Ilmeshuki is presently the highest age-set with the oldest men in the society
**Ilkorianga is the latest age-set to be formed.

Figure 6: Age-set, clan and moiety belonging among ilaiguenak.

Each age-set has its customary leader and since there are at least three age-sets present, there are usually several ilaiguenak in one village or ward, as in the case of Ilkuishi-Oiboir village. An additional customary leadership constellation representing the two moieties among the Maasai has recently been adapted from the Waarusha to the structural features of Maasai society (Mitzlaff, personal communication). This adaptation shows the importance of and trust in the customary leadership structure.

When olaiguenani finally has been appointed, he will act as the leader of the age-set in that particular locality after circumcision until elderhood. He will

participate in all meetings and ceremonies held in the locality and will receive all the respect attached to this position (Saitoti 1980: 58). When a boy is appointed olaiguenani, he will first get a brown stick showing his status. Just after entering the grade of senior ilmurran, his appointment is official and at this point he will change his brown stick for a black stick (*Olkoma orok)*, the official sign of his status being permanently manifested as olaiguenani for his age-set.

To become a leader is not an individual choice, which is visible in the careful selection and importance attributed by the community to this process. Hence, the qualifications deemed necessary for this particular position are extensive so as to produce the best customary leader for the community.

Olaiguenani is a secular and public customary leader in comparison with olaunoni whose position is more of symbolic value since he should not be engaged in politics, except as a last resort (Hurskainen 1984: 189). Neither is oloiboni supposed to be involved in politics as noted above. Thus, the importance of these positions is shown in the careful selection of who is or is not qualified.

4.2.4 Relationships and differences between appointed customary leader and politicians[84]

When it comes to the different customary leaders presented here and the selection of them, the first and most important issue is that a customary leader is appointed for life and there are no monetary gains. A politician, on the other hand, is elected formally for five years at interval elections according to constitution and there are usually some monetary benefits attached to the position (e.g. allowances). Another difference is that the appointment of olaiguenani and olaunoni follows the circumcision periods and so occurs with a changeable interval. The time between the two last age-sets initiated have been 8 and 11 years respectively and it is only during the forming of new age-sets that olaiguenani and olaunoni are appointed. However, the most important difference between these two leadership categories is the more prolonged and extensive scrutinising of the customary leader's family background and character. Politicians are nominated by their political party and its

---

[84]Both positions are referred to as olaiguenani. However, those who are appointed in accordance with Maasai customs are olaiguenani loolaji (pl. ilaiguenak loonkajijile).

members and not by the community (i.e. men in the community). Politicians can also be from another ethnic group than Maasai, making it impossible to scrutinise politicians on the same premises as customary leaders. Another difference is that it is the community as such, even though it is the elder men and oloiboni who are most active, who approach the individual who is to be appointed customary leader. When it comes to politicians, the process is quite the opposite. The politician approaches the community and tries to convince the community to elect him or her, that he or she is a good leader and can assist the community. The behaviour of political leaders in this respect is the opposite of how a (customary) leader should behave.

Figure 7: Different approaches to being appointed as leader

It is presumptuous for the Maasai to put yourself above all others and to say that you are the only one, the best one who can help your fellows. This behaviour is not in accordance with Maasai customs of selecting leaders given that the customary leader among the Maasai is *appointed* after prolonged considerations. He never campaigns. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the boy who is going to become olaiguenani or olaunoni, is not even aware that he is going to be appointed. And even if these positions give respect in the community, these are not positions one strives for. Even if these positions are associated with great honour, they also consist of great and heavy responsibilities. Olaiguenani for Ilandis age-set in

Ilkuishi-Oiboir was appointed 1983. The reason for appointing him was that his father was olaiguenani and it was thought that his son would be a good olaiguenani too. He told me that when he was appointed he felt the heavy responsibility to lead all people but, at the same time, it was somewhat scary because if he failed to fulfil his role correctly, he might upset the people. However, he also felt comfort in that he could ask his father and the other elders who know much about Maasai traditions for advice.

Still, the qualifications for customary leaders are relevant for political leaders too and it is an advantage for a politician, for many reasons, to be a good speaker, good listener and to be rich in cows. Then again, all the other qualifications mentioned above cannot be adhered to since politicians make an individual choice to compete for political positions. It is therefore not certain that those who strive for political positions will have the support and respect of people. One can therefore speculate that politicians for these reasons do not have the same legitimacy as customary leaders. The position of olaiguenani is considered to involve great responsibilities and, according to some respondents, renders more respect[85] than even being a Member of Parliament. This honour and respect given by the community is one explanation as to why no, or at least very few, customary leaders seek political offices. To combine these two positions would also involve a too-heavy workload and would possibly render a similar response to the one the elders above had regarding oloiboni travelling together with the district commissioner. Moreover, the formal qualifications for a politician to fill are basically that one is a resident in the village concerned, twenty-one years or older, can read and write Swahili or English, is a member of a party and has no mental disorder.[86] Most people fill these qualifications although a common stumbling block for any Maasai who wants to become a politician is that the majority are illiterate.

---

[85] The concept respect can have different meanings. Definitions given by respondents include that a leader might be respected because he fills a position and so has more responsibilities in the society than others. Respect can also be gained by the number of cows a person has. Still, it is considered by many respondents that respect has to be mutual. Respect further involves following traditions and customs and proper behaviour in relation to elders, such as the correct greetings and behaviour. Respect can also be filled with fear of punishment by the leader if one dares to go against the leader.

[86] Other issues are to have a legal income, not to owe any money to the village or national government, and not to have been sentenced in any court or served in prison for six months or more (Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania 1999a: 14).

Customary leaders and elders who are respected and highly valued in society usually lack formal education and the qualifications to become a politician. Education, however, is something younger generations have. Ndagala (1992) says that those who would not be suitable for customary leadership can due to their education get access to leadership positions through the political system. As most Maasai are illiterate and do not know Swahili very well, they are left with few and mostly young men. This means that those who contest for political positions in a party might not have the full support and respect from people at village level, while those who have the respect might lack the education and competence to deal with modern political institutions (Ndagala 1992: 120). An elder respondent expressed a similar opinion: he does not trust the present political system since it is enough to know how to read and write and one can seek a political position, which later on can be misused (MaaME.Eng).

In addition, what might be a disadvantage for the legitimacy of a politician is that they usually are talking about issues that are 'outside' people's ordinary life experience. The concepts they use and the language they use are unfamiliar. Further, the politicians are part of an organisational and administrative structure that can be alien to many (especially women) and therefore not understood. These issues make Maasai feel inferior in relation to the politician in comparison to the customary leader.

Still, the political system opens up the door for women to seek political leadership positions in a party. As I described in chapter 4.1.1, decision-making in the Maasai community is a male domain and as such it excludes women. Yet clans, patrilineage, affinity connections and local groups are all involved where questions can be initiated and discussed, which gives women an arena to get second-hand information. One of the main advantages of a party political system is that it makes it possible for women to be involved more actively in the political affairs and village matters of their community through being elected and being able to elect political leaders of their choice to village government and to the different village committees. Women's participation in politics is, furthermore supported in law by the setting aside of one third of the political positions for women. Thus, party politics is a prerequisite and the only channel for women's direct involvement and influence in decision-making. It would be detrimental for women to only have to

rely on customary leadership since the appointment of olaiguenani is purely men's business and women have little say in what has been decided, let alone being able to hold a decision-making post. Hence, the political system works in favour of women and gives women more opportunities to express their views in matters that have normally been considered men's domain. In other words, the political meetings give women another arena away from customs and traditions. Yet, even though the political/meeting arena has changed and elder women participate more frequently in 'modern' political meetings together with men, young women are still being excluded to some degree due to cultural norms. Many women say they are not yet equal at home while there are changes happening in other domains.

The main division of responsibilities between customary leaders and a politician, in this case the village chairperson and ward councillor, is to relations *within* the community and relations *outside* the community. The customary leadership deals with the Maasai community while a politician deals with political issues outside the community, in relation to the district council and the formal administration of village matters. However, the customary leadership is also often involved in discussions and meetings together with politicians since political decisions affect the community and some decisions taken at district level are more easily implemented if customary leaders and influential elders also approve of them. This can be an issue of monetary contributions or, as before the General Election, politicians approaching elders and customary leaders in order to gain trust and access to their influence over the villagers.

Politicians' duty is to assist the villagers with different improvements handed to them from the governmental system. Politicians are regarded to be responsible for 'bringing' water, water-pumps, health clinics and schools to the villagers and since all these implements are, so to speak, from the outside, they are the sole responsibility of the politicians. In contrast, ilaiguenak are not expected to deal directly with these questions. They are nevertheless involved in the decision-making process when discussing what improvements the village needs and how to finance these. Otherwise, their main duties are to deal with traditions and ceremonies, to have contact with oloiboni and to advise and solve conflicts between people and the community in general in a range of different matters. The

two leader categories cover different spheres of the society and can therefore be said to be complementary.

Taking the political system into account, the Maasai can be said to have a dual leadership system consisting of primarily the customary leader olaiguenani and, secondly, the politically elected leaders, such as sub-village chairperson, village chairperson and ward councillor. The dual leadership structure gives the Maasai the benefit of having the customary leader to guide the community's internal affairs, customs, traditions and laws together with the political leader to help the community with 'modern' assistance in form of healthcare, school and water and who is responsible for implementing governmental policies.

The Maasai are one of the marginalised groups in Tanzania and with many societal changes happening in and around their communities, it has become important that implementations from 'outside' are discussed and harmonised into Maasai society without destroying or changing the basic values of their culture. As a result, the co-operation between politicians, customary leaders and elders is beneficial for the community. However, while the customary leader must be a Maasai, the elected political leader does not have to be, resulting in the lack of a bond of responsibilities between a politician and a customary leader. A political leader who is not Maasai has no obligations towards the Maasai community in the same way as a Maasai politician does. Hence, a dual leadership benefitting the Maasai exists only when both leaders are Maasai, as in Ilkuishi-Oiboir, but not in Engapune subvillage in the multiethnic village Sunya as described in chapter 3.3.1.

The coming chapter deals with perceptions on leadership among some other ethnic groups in Sunya. In their social organisation, there is no dual leadership structure with customary and political leaders in the same way as among the Maasai. Needless to say, there are other prominent persons like elders and religious leaders who have an influence on the decision-making in the village.

4.3 Perceptions on Leaders among non-Maasai Groups

> [A leader is] one who shows the way. He should be as a light, which people follow, one who can give changes and whom people can imitate. A leader must speak the truth and he must

convince people if they are doing wrong things. As a leader you
must know your people and be close to them to know their
problems. A leader should sometimes use his money to buy beer
or soda or other things to people during a meeting. So when this
leader has another meeting, people can come because he is a
friend of the villagers since he has given them beer and soda.

(Young man in Sunya)

In most of the interviews, respondents said it is not necessary to have any other
education than to be literate if one is to be a leader. The most important aspect is
to be near the people, to know the people, 'take care' of them, educate them and
make the villagers follow his ideas. To be near to the people means that the leader
lives in the village and knows what problems people have and how to solve them.
The villagers know the leader and the leader knows them. In the formal political
structure, ten-cell leaders get much credit by being nearest to the people. Every
issue starts at this level, be it a personal, family or village matter. The least
importance is given to the president, while the Member of Parliament is regarded
as an important leader since he is well-known and visits the village from time to
time. Beside these formal leaders, elders are seen as important for the community.

The Maasai do not express that a leader's clan belonging plays any particular
role. However, the question of ethnic group belonging appears to play a role
according to some non-Maasai villagers when electing a leader. As a woman told
me:

It is important to elect a leader without looking at ethnicity but
here in Sunya there is segregation between ethnic groups so
people vote leaders according to ethnic group belonging.

Another respondent explored this issue further by saying that ethnicity
(*ukabila*) is still important in the district since there are some 'traditionalists'
among some ethnic groups within the district. According to the respondent, the
issue of ethnicity is not as common in villages closer to the district capital Kibaya
as in more remote areas like their own village. He gave an example from the

neighbouring Handeni District: in Handeni the Zigua ethnic group are in the majority and it is therefore very difficult for people from other ethnic groups to win any political posts. The respondent said that it is like 'giving another person food while your own child goes hungry' (*Ni sawa sawa na kumpa mtu mwingine chakula na mtoto wako anabaki njaa*). Even if a person does not have any qualifications for leadership, he will be elected due to ethnic belonging, according to the respondent. Some elders said: 'If you look here, the Wakamba are many and they can elect a leader even though he is not good' (Wazee.M9E.Sun). On the other hand, on the question regarding how people can elect a good leader, according to the definitions above, one respondent from one of the villages committees said: 'Because I live here in Sunya and the one who is to be elected is from Sunya, I know his character, his ethnic belonging, I know if he loves the people or helps us. One who has this character will be a good leader'. But it can also be expressed more drastically, like this man did:

> How do you elect a good leader?
> Through corruption! He will win through corruption! There are
> leaders who use corrupt methods to come to power.
>
> (Kag.MM.Su)

As mentioned earlier, to qualify as a politician one needs to have the basic qualifications of reading and writing Swahili. Still, it is not necessarily those who can read and write who possess good leadership qualities. Leadership positions require different qualifications and during a workshop for ward councillors and district staff in Kibaya in 1998,[87] participants were asked to list what qualifications they as politicians and administrators recognised as important for a councillor. The following extensive qualifications were listed:

1. He should be an inventor, take initiatives ****
2. He should have education and experience **
3. He should co-operate and listen to the people and solve their problems **

---

[87] The workshop was conducted by two Swedish consultants from the 'Swedish Association for Local Authorities' in April 1998. I attended as an observer even though I was encouraged by the councillors to participate in their group exercises.

4. He should care about his work **

5. He should be an example to follow **

6. He should not be a drunkard **

7. He should use nice language, not shout and use bad language towards people

8. He should be righteous, not discriminate, and respect all people

9. He should be faithful, sincere

10. He should be sound-minded

11. He should not be a conspirator

12. He should be tidy

13. He should prioritise the development of people

14. He should be fearless

Of these qualifications there were some that were congruent and thus deemed more important than others according to the groups (1-6 in the list above). To be an inventor and take initiatives was a qualification mentioned by all the four groups in this exercise. It is also a qualification appreciated among the non-Maasai villagers in Sunya. A leader who takes initiatives, has the knowledge and who is capable of judging what is best for all people in the village also has the power and capacity to 'pull' the villagers in the right direction where they can get development. A leader is a person who 'leads' his people and who guides people towards development. Therefore, he must know what is best for the people, to be one that shows the way, be a light for people to follow and one who can be a good example for people to imitate. Leaders are measured by their capability to deliver what the villagers need. This is valid for both leaders at village and at national level. During the time of the interviews, Tanzania experienced El Niño which caused severe problems for many people all over the country. There was lack of food in parts of the country, including Kiteto District. This was a moment to judge leaders, how they managed to solve the shortage of food. Women in an interview told me they were waiting to see what President Mkapa was going to do to assist the population with food. 'If Mkapa sees to it that people get food he is a good leader but if he fails to assist the people, he will lose respect and trust' (Wanguu 4W.2y.2m.Mnada, Wanguu,4W.Malim). It is the leader's role to know how to get

food and when a major catastrophe happens like in 1997/98, the president is ultimately responsible.

4.4 Concluding Remarks

In this chapter I have discussed different leadership categories within the Maasai community and the social organization that constitutes the basis for this. Given the broad meaning of the concept 'leader' or 'leadership' and the various methods in appointing yourself or others to this position, there are some fundamental expectations people have for leaders. People anticipate some form of response from the leader, preferably something that would benefit them in a positive way. It is normally considered fundamental for the leader to have some form of legitimacy. The customary leaders among the Maasai gain their legitimacy through being appointed to their positions without themselves playing an active part. They have many of the qualifications Gonzales (2000) discusses, such as communication skills, intelligence, sympathy, courage and physical aspects. Even though politicians have been present among the Maasai during the one-party system, the choice then was between two contestants from the only party that existed. Today in a multiparty system, people have to relate to different political parties, several and *unknown* politicians at different levels. Hence, it is difficult to know how these new politicians might lead while the old leaders are familiar and, hence, one knows what to expect from them.

The existence of politically elected representatives means that the Maasai in Ilquishi-Oiboir have a dual leadership system made up of the customary leader olaiguenani and the politically elected leaders. Their roles are complementary as they fill different roles in Maasai society with the main division of responsibilities being between relations within the community and relations outside the community. In addition, they fill their positions on different principles. The customary leaders are there for life while the political leaders are (re)elected after five years. Another vital difference between being a politician and a customary leader regards 'who approaches whom'. The politician approaches the community, trying to convince the community to elect him (or her), while it is the community that appoints the customary leader. These approaches are diametrically different and have relevance for the legitimacy of the leader. It gives another dimension to

the western form of electing leadership, which does not fit very well into the Maasai way of long and deep scrutinising of the social and cultural qualification. However, if the general assumption of leadership for life also spills over to the political system, then the politicians are also seen to be elected for life by the electorate. As a consequence once there is an established relationship between locally known politicians and the community, new politicians from unknown parties will have slim chances of getting any votes. Considering the dual leadership system, this duality works only when the politician is also Maasai. A politician from another ethnic group will not have the same relationship with the Maasai community, which means he does not have to seek acknowledgement from elders and customary leaders. However, the political system gives Maasai women a possibility to stand for election and elect the leader they want, which is not possible when it comes to the customary leadership.

The situation for the non-Maasai groups is not without complexities either when it comes to relations with political leaders. First of all, to qualify as a leader it is important to have the capacity to 'pull' people in the right direction and be able to guide them towards development. He (or she) needs to be a guiding light for people to follow. These qualities give legitimacy to the leader and to the leadership position. Still, a common denominator is that familiarity is important regarding the political candidate. Within this familiarity there are two dimensions: one concerns the familiarity of the politician among the electorate – being locally known since a leader needs to be a person who first of all is close to the people, lives in or visits the village frequently. Secondly, familiarity also relates to ethnicity. In this multi-ethnic village, there is a component of preferences according to ethnicity. But spanning over this is also differences in livelihoods: pastoralists and non-pastoralists. Smaller conflicts erupt due to different livelihood patterns, which can manifest and portray themselves in a 'costume of ethnic conflicts'. Still, there are voting preferences according to ethnicity, as mentioned earlier. And what seems to reveal itself within the Nguu ethnic group is the existing difference in party loyalty based on what seems to be inter-clan conflicts. I will briefly return to this issue later. Next follows Part II which starts with a theoretical description of the road towards democracy and how this transition has been understood by villagers.

PART II

TOWARDS DEMOCRACY

Having described the area, the people and their livelihood, their perceptions about leadership categories and qualities, the thesis has now come the second part. This part starts with a historic description of the political transition at the national level, commencing at the Independence when Tanganyika had a formal multiparty system, and how the first parties developed. It continues with the reason for giving up the multiparty system and why it was re-introduced and what lies behind the new political parties. After that, the thesis returns to the local area and the people, exploring how they interpret democracy and their opinions about the political change towards a multiparty system.

5   REASON FOR THE CHANGE TOWARDS A MULTIPARTY SYSTEM

> To view a one-party system in almost religious terms is wrong.
> We Tanzanians have one party as a historical necessity, but this
> is not a kind of divine decree.
>
> (Julius Nyerere in Kweka 1995: 75)

The democratisation process in Africa in the late 1980s and early 1990s was a political change of exceptional dimension. Whereas only nine countries in Sub-Saharan Africa held competitive elections in the period 1985-89, the following five year period (1990-95) demonstrated a rapid expansion of multiparty elections. As many as 38 out of 47 countries in Africa held competitive legislative elections.[88] Opposition parties won seats in parliaments and the percentage of seats held by

---

[88] Botswana, Gambia, Mauritius, Senegal, Zimbabwe (elections in which an opposition party obtained a presence in the national legislature. There was limited space for the opposition to be organised), Liberia, Madagascar, South Africa, Sudan (according to Bratton and van de Walle not free and fair but connecting Sudan to democracy can be questionable) (Bratton and van de Walle 1997: 6).

opposition parties rose from 10% to 31% in 1994. By 1994, not a single *de jure* single-party state remained in Africa (Bratton and Van de Walle 1997: 7, Sørensen 1993: 36). Still, far from all the countries that embraced democracy and performed multiparty elections have managed to become consolidated democracies (Ottaway 2003). Carothers (2002, 2006) states that in the US an analytical model of democracy transition was developed which became a paradigm for understanding democratisation processes in the 1980s. It was assumed that all countries entering a transition were going to proceed through the same steps and stages. According to Carothers, while this model was useful in the beginning, it has now outlived its usefulness since the model no longer fits the reality (Carothers 2002: 6). Carothers calls these countries that entered a democratisation process during the third wave, 'new or struggling' democracies since they have not become consolidated democracies with functioning political parties. Some of these countries have 'hardly democratized at all' (Carothers 2006: 3, 2002: 14). On the other hand, one could ask whether the transition to multiparty system is the same as transition to democracy. The answer is of course that democracy involves much more than having several political parties competing for power positions. The chapter begins therefore with some theoretical views on the democracy concept and what it is generally considered to include.

5.1 Defining Democracy

The democracy concept carries different meanings and interpretations depending on who uses it and under what circumstances. Abrahamsen states that the concept is widely disputed and is filled with ambiguity. However, in mainstream literature, multiparty elections are presented as the essence of democracy and electoral competition is placed at the heart of the effort to globalise democracy (Abrahamsen 2000: 67). It is therefore important to clarify what we mean by the concept, especially if we take into account that David Collier and Steven Levitsky have defined some 550 subtypes of democracy in their review of more than hundred different studies (Diamond 1999: 7).

First of all, there is commonly a separation between a narrow or minimalist definition and a wide, comprehensive or maximalist definition, which carry different ranges of liberties (Hydén 1998, Sørensen 1993). The former includes only

the political dimension with free and fair elections and a multiparty system with the purpose of electing a political leadership, a definition used by Joseph Schumpeter, while the latter also deals with economic and social dimensions, with economic and human liberties (Hydén 1998). For Schumpeter, democracy was a technique or an arrangement used 'for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote' (Huntington 1991: 4). In his book *The Third Wave*, Huntington defines a political system as democratic when 'its most powerful collective decision makers are selected through fair, honest, and periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote' (Huntington 1991: 6-7). Hence, democracy is seen purely as a mechanism with some rules and regulations to follow where the end product is to produce leaders who ideally should represent the views of the people. Similarly, Max Weber defines democracy as 'primarily a means of producing an effective political leadership, in the bureaucratic society, and apart from dismissing the ineffective from office, voters are assigned little or no influence over decision-making' (Abrahamsen 2000: 69). These views have a more minimalist definition of democracy and do not cover the broader social and economical liberties. The electorate's role is only to elect the leadership and thereafter let the leaders run the government. How the leadership has run the government is judged in the next election when the electorate can either give them prolonged confidence or remove them from power by electing other leaders.

On the other end, Bratton and Van de Walle use a broad definition of democracy as a system where the electorate has the opportunity to freely and fairly choose the leaders of the state and also have the opportunity to remove those they do not want. The election should be a competitive one and one where all participants accept the result. The procedure involves some necessary characteristics in order to be considered democratic. Firstly, all candidates must have the ability to contest for office, to openly express their views and to form political associations that will stand behind him or her in their contest for leadership positions. Secondly, the citizens must be able to receive information from and to get information about the different parties and not be stopped from attending any form of political meeting or joining any political party of their liking.

However, elections are not enough. A consolidation of the democratic procedures and practices in the long run necessitates the establishment of various other institutions, where military control is handed over to civilian control, where the courts and legislative system receive their independence from those in power, a system of workable opposition parties and other organisations as well as a free mass media (Bratton and Van de Walle 1997: 13).

According to Robert A. Dahl, there are no countries where all democratic conditions are perfectly satisfied (Dahl in Sørensen 1993: 12). Therefore, Dahl prefers to use the concept *polyarchy* instead of democracy, which characterises more the restricted form of democracy in existence today. Dahl emphasises the obligations of the government towards its citizens where the citizens have the right and possibility to 'formulate their preferences; signify their preferences to their fellow citizens and the government by individual and collective action; and have their preferences weighed equally in the conduct of the government' (Sørensen 1993: 12). However, in order to secure these rights there are several institutional requirements, including the freedom of citizens to form and join organisations, freedom of speech and right to vote and compete for political positions. The society must be open where citizens have free access to information from various sources, politicians can participate equally in attracting voters and elections must be free and fair (Sørensen 1993: 12, Diamond 1999: 8).

In conclusion, Diamond, Linz and Lipset's definition of democracy is often used to characterise the conditions of democracy as:

- Meaningful and extensive *competition* among individuals and organized groups (especially political parties) for all effective positions of government power, at regular intervals and excluding the use of force.
- A high inclusive level of *political participation* in the selection of leaders and policies, at least through regular and fair elections, such that no major (adult) social group is excluded.
- A level of *civil and political liberties* – freedom of expression, freedom of the press, freedom to form and join organizations –

sufficient to ensure the integrity of political competition and participation.

<div align="right">(Abrahamsen 2000: 68)</div>

Even if we agree with Dahl that there are no perfect democracies in the world today where all citizens have equal rights and resources, still democracy (in its broad sense) as a form of governance gives, theoretically but not necessarily practically, more liberties and freedom to people than other existing forms of governance. Through these liberties people have greater opportunities to organise themselves, be active in political and non-political organisations and watch over the work of the government. The existence of grass-root democracy is vital since democratic values and participatory decision-making can very well be more wanted and developed among the populace than the political elite on national level who might compete for political positions on selfish grounds. As Ottaway points out, there seems to be quite a range of states that are satisfied with only having the election performed and not carrying on or only paying little attention to other democratic reforms in the society, such as human rights issues, equity, transparency in decision making and good governance (Ottaway 2003).

In view of the fact that there are no states that are 'perfect democracies', I agree with Larry Diamond that democracy should be considered as a *developmental phenomenon*. In this manner, the protection of democratic rights and a democratic society becomes an *ongoing process* and challenge without any specific deadline in time, not just for 'third wave democracies', but also for established democracies: 'all democracies, new and established, can become more democratic' (Diamond 1999: 18).

The transition from non-democratic rule to democratic rule is not a straightforward road as it is a complex process involving several phases. As mentioned in chapter 1, Dankwart Rustow sees democratisation as a process consisting of several phases with certain pre-requisites. These phases are *preparatory, decision*, and *consolidation phases,* but these three phases are not written in stone and are not laws to be followed, nor are they followed by all countries going through a transition towards more democratic rule. For Rustow the initial prerequisite is national unity. Without national unity, the different phases

cannot be engaged. According to Rustow, national unity means that 'the vast majority of citizens in a democracy-to-be … have no doubts or mental reservations as to which political community they belong to'. Sørensen adds that 'there may well be ethnic or other cleavages between groups in the populations; it is only when such divisions lead to basic questioning of national unity that the problem must be resolved before a transition to democracy becomes feasible' (Sørensen 1993: 41).

In the following chapter I will go through the different phases above in connection to the democratisation process in Tanzania. I will also bring up internal and external factors influencing the democratisation process in general and the democratisation in Tanzania in particular. National unity is one of the core concepts that has been used by the Tanzanian government through the years to enhance peace and harmony between the different ethnic groups in the country, and ultimately enable development. But national unity has also been used by the government to legitimise the one-party rule, which the coming chapters will illustrate.

5.2 Pre-Independence and the Nascence of a Political Party

In Tanganyika at the end of 1920s, different associations consisting of teachers, civil servants and businessmen came together and formed Tanganyika African Association (TAA), where social and welfare issues for Africans were their major concern. After the Second World War, when many countries in Africa initiated their struggle for independence, TAA moved in the direction of becoming a political party. At its general conference in Dar es Salaam on 7 July 1954, TAA was transformed into a political party, taking the name Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), electing Julius Kambarage Nyerere as its president (Mmuya and Chaligha 1994: 36, Institute of Curriculum Development 1988: 85, Kimambo and Temu 1969, 1997: 202, Omari 1995: 25, Tordoff 1993, Hydén 1968, Maguire 1969). TANU's main goal was to establish national independence and from the start they mobilised and organised people for this goal. But at the same time, TANU promoted national unity and disregarded tribalism, racism and religious differences between people. However, there were some who did not agree with Nyerere that citizenship was also open for non-Africans. In October 1960 he had to respond at the National

Assembly to attitudes in TANU that citizenship in an independent Tanganyika should only be granted to Africans. Nyerere declared:

> Discrimination against people because of their colour is exactly what we have been fighting against. This is what we formed TANU for, and so soon, sir, ... some of my friends ... are preaching discrimination as a religion to us. And they stand like Hitlers and begin to glorify the race. We glorify human beings, sir, not colour.[89]

The Governor of Tanganyika, Edward Twining wanted to secure the colonial power's presence in Tanganyika through sponsoring the creation of a political party: The United Tanganyika Party (UTP). The party was formed in February 1956; consisting of a mixture of Europeans, Asians and some African chiefs, but having no roots or connections to the broad layers of the population, UTP did not last for long. There were other attempts as well between 1960 and 1965 to form Tanganyika parties and one was actually created out of TANU. Zuberi Mtemvu thought Nyerere's constitutional approach was too slow and cautious and pursued an openly socialist policy and a more radical Africanisation than TANU did (Sadleir 1999: 226). He founded the African National Congress (ANC) but people did not take him or the party seriously and without support or a social base of his own, he was no threat to Nyerere and TANU in the held elections. (Mmuya and Chaligha 1994: 38, Sadleir 1999: 225, Maguire 1969:338). There was also a short-lived All-Muslim National Union of Tanganyika (AMNUT) whose policy was promotion of the interests of the Muslim community. In 1962, the People's Democratic Party (PDP) and People's Convention Party (PCP) were formed with a similar agenda to the ANC, i.e. focusing on Africanisation of ownership of land and citizenship. Additional opposition groups were Nationalist Enterprise Party and African Independence Movement. But attracting only a small portion of people, these parties did not gain any support or credibility (Cliffe 1969, 1997: 245, Omari 1995: 26, Kweka 1995:

---

[89] *Julius Nyerere: The Ethical Foundation of his Legacy*. Cranford Pratt, University of Toronto, ON., Canada. http://www.queensu.ca/snid/pratt.htm

68). By comparison, it was the organisational structure built up by TAA with different branches all over Tanganyika that gave TANU a direct connection to the broad layers of the population and their support. This network gave TANU great advantage in politics against other parties, a network that later has been very beneficial for CCM (Mmuya and Chaligha 1994: 36, Omari 1995: 25).

As Africans had been denied seats in the colonial Legislative Council (LEGCO),[90] the first action by TANU was to demand democratic elections of the seats to the Legislative Council. The election was held in 1958 and an overwhelming victory was achieved by TANU (Mmuya and Chaligha 1994: 38). TANU continued to be the strongest party and in the elections in 1960, seventy out of seventy-one seats[91] of LEGCO went to TANU. Through the victory, TANU was able to negotiate with the colonial government a transfer of powers and on 9 December 1961, Tanganyika gained Independence with Julius Nyerere as its first Prime Minister. Nyerere became Tanganyika's first president in November 1962, when TANU received 97% of the votes (Sadleir 1999: 252, Cliffe 1969, 1997: 246). Hence, even though there were additional parties in Tanganyika at that time, people's strong support of TANU made it in practice a one-party state.

5.3 The Union with Zanzibar

The history of Zanzibar is quite different from that of mainland Tanzania and I have no intention to probe deeply into the political and historical conditions of the former. At this point and in this thesis, it suffices to explore what happened in the creation of the Union without going too deeply in any analysis of why and how and what the situation is today.

---

[90] The Parliament or National Assembly of Tanzania was established before Independence in 1926 as the Legislative Council. The council had 20 members all appointed by the Governor. The first major change to the Legislative Council occurred in 1953 when the first Speaker was appointed to replace the Governor as chairman of the council. The second major change was in 1958 when for the first time a few members of the Council were elected by the people. Three political parties participated in the elections: TANU, UTP and ANC. TANU won and become the first party to have members in the Legislative Council. The third major change to LEGCO occurred in 1960 when the second election of the council was held. For the first time the people elected all members of the council after abolishment of all members being appointed by the Governor. After independence, the name of the Legislative Council was changed to the National Assembly.
http://www.jakayakikwete.com/tanzania/articles/47/1/The-Parliament-or-National-Assembly-of-Tanzania/Page1.html
[91] The seat went to an independent candidate.

Zanzibar was under Arab rule before it became a British protectorate, but it still retained more independence from the British than the mainland and therefore the two countries were administered separately throughout the period of colonial rule (Othman 1995: 170). Life in Zanzibar was organised along racial and class-based lines. Highest in the hierarchy were the Arab landlords who owned the clove farms. Next were the Asian businessmen and administrators, followed by African labourers. The parties were founded along these divergences in society where Africans favoured the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) and Arabs preferred Zanzibar Nationalist Party (ZNP). Some members from ASP created later Zanzibar and Pemba Peoples Party (ZPPP) which did not support the pro-mainland policy of ASP and did not fully identify themselves with the politics of ZNP. The party became a Pemba-based party (Othman 1995: 171).

ZNP and ZPPP managed to navigate themselves to power positions with British help in the 1963 election and declared Independence 9 December 1963. ASP received more votes in the election but nevertheless received fewer seats than ZNP and ZPPP in the parliament. They could not accept this and in a revolution on 12 January 1964, the British-supported Sultan was overthrown (Maliyamkono 2000). Already on 26 April, the People's Republic of Zanzibar and the Republic of Tanganyika declared the formation of a Union: the United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar.

Julius Nyerere had presented a proposal for a Union to the National Assembly and stated several reasons for the Union. Some of the reasons were the close ties between TANU and ASP, the common language, the common cultural traditions and the geographical closeness between the islands and the mainland. For Nyerere this was a voluntary union between two independent countries that of 'free will decided to be One country' (Nyerere 1995: 80). Nyerere had apparently proposed the idea of a Union to Zanzibar's president Karume who agreed to the idea and to that Nyerere should be the president of this Union. Then again, there seems to have been pressure on Nyerere from the international side, especially from the USA, to contain the 'communistic' development in Zanzibar that could spread in the East African region (Othman 1995: 173). But Nyerere was also in favour of a larger Union in East Africa and was even prepared to postpone the Independence of

Tanganyika in order to create an East African Union with Kenya and Uganda. The Union with Zanzibar could be seen as the first step.

The Union was renamed United Republic of Tanzania on 29 October 1964, when the president of Zanzibar became vice-president of the Union and Zanzibar continued to be administered internally. However, having prohibited other parties from existing besides ASP and TANU, this reality contradicted in fact the Union Constitution where it was declared that Tanzania was a single-party state. Nevertheless, the way Nyerere looked at it was that TANU and ASP were liberation movements and since they already had united two countries, it was only natural to unite the two parties (which he nevertheless calls them) and create one. Nyerere compares the history of CCM with the history of Tanzania: 'Tanzania is Tanganyika and Zanzibar; and CCM is TANU and ASP' (Nyerere 1995: 80). In April 1977, the two parties merged to form one party, Chama cha Mapinduzi (The Revolutionary Party), with Nyerere as its chairperson (Mmuya & Chaligha 1992: 94).

5.4 Consolidation of the One-party System

Nyerere's belief that national unity must be the basis for an independent Tanganyika sets the table for the first basic prerequisite for a transition to democracy. National unity could, according to Nyerere, only be achieved in a one-party system and he argued for this already before the independence when he said:

> The same nationalist movement, having united the people and led them to independence, must inevitably form the first government of the new state; it could hardly be expected that a united country should halt in mid-stream and voluntarily divide itself into opposing political groups just for the sake of conforming to what I have called the 'Anglo-Saxon form of democracy' at the moment of independence.
>
> (Quoted in Kweka 1995: 64)

Nyerere was of the opinion that the multiparty system in the West was based on social and economic inequalities between individuals and this system would not suit a young African state where *equity* and *unity* were to be formed between people.

For Nyerere, two parties could only exist in a society divided by differences in social or economic class, which implicitly would lead to internal struggles (Kweka 1995: 61, Sadleir 1999: 288, Southall 2006: 234, Maguire 1969: 361). Hence, according to Nyerere, to prevent power struggles and clashes between different ethnic groups, national unity was eminent. If this was not achieved, it could lead to similar ethnic clashes in Tanzania as in other newly independent countries in Africa. Therefore, the political organisation should be based on a single-party system, but within this system, democracy would prevail through free and regular elections of political leaders.[92] In practice the legalisation of the one-party system was made by TANU's National Executive Committee (NEC) in early 1963, when a resolution was passed at the annual conference where Nyerere argued strongly for the one-party system. He said:

> I am now going to suggest: that where there is one party, and that party is identified with the nation as a whole, the foundations of democracy are firmer than can ever be where you have two or more parties, each representing only a section of the community.
>
> (Quoted in Kweka 1995: 67)

In 1964 a commission was set up, whose recommendations for a one-party system was accepted by the parliament in July 1965 and Tanganyika became a one-party State with effect from that date (Kweka A.N 1995:62,65, Sørensen 1996:26).

5.4.1 Strengthening unity and power consolidation of TANU

Nyerere's vision of the society he wanted to build was one of a 'traditional' African society where discussions were held until consensus was reached and where equality and freedom existed. The one-party system was the logical extension of this system in a 'modern' society (Kweka 1995: 62, 65, Sørensen 1993: 26). Once

---

[92] Sørensen says that the one-party system is the logical outcome of decision-making based on consensus. According to Sørensen, the way of taking decisions through consensus is not applicable to large and complex societies where there are many different groups with separate interests. The one-party system has in many cases become a system for dictators or corrupt leaders to favour themselves and their own ethnic group (Sørensen 1993: 36f).

the one-party system was in place, it was important to consolidate unity in Tanganyika. TANU had already established branches all over the country and a vast majority of people supported them. The use of Swahili as the national language became part of the unification strategy, which made it easier for people to communicate with each other. Information from the government was understood by the majority and it also enabled civil servants from one part of the country to work in another part of the country (almost) without any language barrier. In order to diminish the creation of ethnicity, civil servants were transferred[93] between regions, together with an introduction of compulsory National Service[94] aimed at strengthening unity among young people from different ethnic groups (Omari 1995: 28). In addition, Nyerere based his idea of national unity on the traditional African values found in the context of the extended family. He saw the extended family as a base for traditional form of cooperation that had disappeared during the colonisation of Tanzania, but which should be revitalised again for the building of the new country (Kweka 1995: 65). This was manifested in the *Ujamaa* (family ties, socialism) policy.

Nyerere's idea of people living and working together in designated villages would be the way out the three 'enemies', i.e. poverty, ignorance and disease. To implement Ujamaa, the educational system must be geared towards promoting this, and everything broadcast on radio and written in the press must work towards this common goal. Therefore, opposition of these principles could not be allowed. Schools, mass media, the army and the police were instruments for this political education of the people in the idea of the one-party system and Ujamaa (Kweka 1995: 69). Potential opposition groups were suppressed, such as when the trade union, The Tanganyika Federation of Labour (TFL), was reconstructed. TANU took steps to include the trade union under its control and to forbid strikes in 1962. The Tanganyika Federation of Labour (TFL) was placed under the Ministry of Labour and was replaced in 1964 by National Union of Tanganyika Workers (NUTA). NUTA was affiliated to TANU and its leaders were to be appointed by the government and its

---

[93] There can be some disadvantages with the policy of transferring civil servants since staff is, or can be, transferred between different districts frequently, making continuity of development work more difficult.
[94] National Service is not compulsory today, but there is some form of compulsory military training and exercises called *mgambo*.

finances controlled by the same. This meant that Tanganyika no longer had a free trade union.

Other organisations brought under the wing of TANU included women's organisations, youth, parent and farmer organisations (Kweka 1995: 69, Cliffe 1969, 1997: 248, Mmuya 1995: 2). To ensure that TANU was in full control of the country, Nyerere took steps to enforce the Preventative Detention Act in 1962 which enabled the police to arrest and detain people suspected of seeking to overthrow the government (Sadleir 1999: 269, Cliffe 1969, 1997: 247). However, one important event shocked the new nation and the idea of peace and national unity. On 20 January 1964, some troops of the Tanganyika Army mutinied and took control of government buildings, arresting their own (British) officers and a number of civilians. This showed how vulnerable the new state could be and that maybe not everybody was pleased with Nyerere's decision of keeping British civil servants in governmental administration. However, Nyerere was taken by surprise and several people were detained after this incident and not released until some years later (Sadleir 1999: 269, Cliffe 1969, 1997: 247).

In order to increase its control of the country, TANU built up a political control mechanism that stretched itself from the household to the national level. Households were organised around a system based on ten households making up a 'cell', led by its ten-cell leader. Thereafter the party system stretched from branch, district, regional and finally to national level. The politicians and civil servants were also merged, where village secretaries also functioned as the secretaries for the local party branch. In addition, the Regional and Area (later district) Commissioners headed the administrations in their locations at the same time as they were functioning as TANU secretaries.[95]

The party continued to consolidate its position and increase its role in the National Assembly (sw. *Bunge*). Even if it was said from the beginning that opposing

---

[95] Still today there are parts of this structure left where District Commissioners (DC) act as the president's representative in the district and the Regional Commissioner (RC) as his representative at regional level. There are, in addition, Divisional Secretaries who work as intermediaries between the ward and district level. Ten-cell leaders are still in existence but they do not have any connections to the party as they used to. Ten-cell leaders solve conflicts in and between families, are notified if one is to travel, distribute food-aid and are responsible for some money collections. They are usually the first ones people turn to before sub-village leaders and village leaders.

views within the party were going to be tolerated, some MPs were soon to learn otherwise. In 1965 the Presidential Commission on the One Party State posed a very important question:

> Should the National Assembly and the National Executive of TANU both continue in existence? If so, what should be the relationship and the division of power between them?
>
> (Msekwa 1995: 13)

The Commission recommended that NEC (National Executive Council of CCM) should have similar powers to the National Assembly and members of the NEC were granted a salary and allowances in the same way as Members of Parliament were. However, a few years later a group of MPs wanted clarification of the roles of the NEC and the National Assembly and raised the question of supremacy in parliament debates in 1968. The Parliamentary Secretary in the Office of the Second Vice-President (Mr. Wambura) pointed out that 'it was utterly wrong for MPs to think that Bunge was the supreme institution'. He said: 'Mr. Speaker, I want to make it clear that it is the Party which is supreme, and all the MPs are expected to work under the leadership and guidance of the Party'. Another MP, Mr. Chogga argued against this and said: 'Great damage would be caused to the process of democracy by recognising TANU as supreme, instead of Bunge' (Msekwa 1995: 13-14). The outcome of this controversy came to its end in October 1968 when TANU's NEC held its meeting in Tanga. At this meeting, seven MPs were expelled from the party 'for having grossly violated the Party creed both in their attitudes and in their actions, and for showing a very clear opposition to the party and its policies' (Msekwa 1995: 14). The MPs automatically lost their seats in the National Assembly. TANU's NEC became the real power in Tanzania (Kweka 1995: 71, Msekwa 1995: 14). People who questioned Nyerere's and TANU's policies and the increasing income differences between politicians and ordinary people, were categorised as 'colonialists' or 'traitors'[96] (Kweka 1995: 68). In February 1974, President Nyerere

---

[96] One can still be labelled 'traitor' if one 'abandons' the ruling party for an opposition party.

again emphasised the supremacy of the party in the following terms: 'Under our One Party Constitution, TANU is supreme' (Msekwa 1995: 15). Hence, the existence of the only party in Tanzania and the disapproval of critical voices had the consequence that there were no opportunities for people to develop the necessary structures for or even think about a competitive political system. Consequently, when the multiparty system was re-introduced it caused worries and insecurity among the populace that conflicts might erupt after decades of a uniform political system.

As a counterbalance to this uniform political system, according to Mmuya and Chaligha, it would have been necessary to develop a range of political platforms and different political parties that had connections to the electorate through local party branches and a civil society in order to promote the multiparty system. Other political leaders should have had the opprtunity to express views openly in debates or through an independent mass media. These structures were, however, never present in Tanganyika or in Tanzania before the first multiparty election in 1995 (Mmuya and Chaligha 1994: 5). This depends also on the fact that the different organisations, including the churches, mosques, academics, workers, etc., that had the potential of becoming independent voices of opinion in society were curbed and taken under the wing of the party (ibid). Those who could have contributed with alternative and individual thinking were drawn into the party system, often with personal gains in terms of lucrative positions and job opportunities in exchange for loyalty and political support (ibid: 6). Thus, the single-party system has left a legacy of a culture of monolithic politics and a patrimonial political structure where the only party restricted or suppressed critical voices, although publicly claiming to allow critical voices within the party. The conclusion is then as Mmuya and Chaligha state: 'The transition to multipartism and plural democracy becomes essentially a cultural transformation' (Mmuya and Chaligha 1994: 5-6).

The Tanzanian society has to change since people's way of relating to politics is still influenced by the one-party system. The multiparty system only exists in legislation form, 'it is multipartism without parties' (ibid). This cultural transformation then, implies thinking along liberal democratic lines of individualism and competition, where individual opinions matter more than collective opinions (Ake 2000). A cultural transformation involves, as I understand

it, also a popular understanding of the *raison d'être* of multiparty system, a 'change in attitude and behaviour' as Hydén (1994: 104) expresses it. Still, Nyerere's idea of democracy was based on decision-making based on open discussions involving the population at local level. He wanted to have a society where equity between individuals would exist and societal hierarchies would not inhibit people from discussing political matters or other issues concerning their lives. However, on his travels in the country he found that people had become afraid and silenced by local political leaders. When Nyerere toured the country in the 1980s visiting CCM party branches he found that many of them were not functioning. There were no discussions held and political leaders failed to keep in touch with the population. What he thought of as being the foundation for people's participation in decision-making no longer existed. This was a disappointment which made him reconsider the one-party system and propose a debate on a return to multipartism (Southall 2006: 242-3, Kweka 1995: 70).

5.5 Preparatory Phase

> The existence of differences is not the problem, as differences in themselves do not constitute conflict between people. What is important is how people handle their differences and how they experience them.
>
> (Glasl 1999: 17)[97]

The preparatory phase in the democratisation process, as described by Rustow, is characterised by the formation of initial opposition against the incumbent regime by individuals or by some classes in the society. Demands for fair distribution of national wealth, civic rights, freedom from oppression, etc. are put forth giving the opposition increased political space. This phase is exemplified by liberalisation, an 'opening up' of a closed society towards a more open and equal society represented by democracy. In this discussion, there are also different views of

---

[97] Glasl makes a distinction between 'social conflict' and 'difference'. He says, 'All social conflicts are based on differences – but not all differences are automatically conflicts. Conflicts only arises when further elements are added' (Glasl 1999: 16).

what economic status a country needs to have, in order to be able to have an orderly transition towards democracy. One theoretical argument is that democracy can always be implemented no matter the country's initial economic conditions. The multiparty election is the starting point, not the end (Ottaway 1999: 3). A more common argument is that a country has to reach a certain economic development before starting on the road towards democratic rule (ibid). This perspective argues that a country with political democracy, but with poor economic performance would enable people to demand rise of salaries, distribution of wealth, etc. and by this create social uprising and jeopardise the existing stability in the country.

The argument goes that the possibility for the population to demonstrate their discontent could force the state to take repressive actions in order to secure stability. However, even if demands for democratic rights are regarded as economically unsound, the government might try to avoid social unrest by satisfying popular demands. Still, in countries with weak governmental institutions this could lead to political unrest and more authoritarian rule. Seymour Lipset says that the better off a nation is, the greater the chances for sustained democracy. (Sannerstedt 1994: 58, Linde and Ekman 2006:74). If there are high rates of literacy, education, urbanisation, communication and development of mass media, the chances for democracy are also high. If a nation in addition has wealth to distribute (and is committed to distributing it) then tension is less prone to erupt when there are political conflicts. But before reaching the stage where the state has resources to distribute, it is argued that authoritarian and non-democratic methods have to be used. It is argued that political transformation could come later and in a slow process. Political and civil rights would come later when the country is ready for it and when economic development is no longer threatened by political and civil liberties.

This argument is often shared by authoritarian leaders who argue that a rapid transition towards competitive multiparty democracy would jeopardise the economic improvements made and that change has to take its time or the country would plunge back into chaos (Ottaway 1999: 2, Abrahamsen 2000: 114, Sørensen 1993: 64, Diamond, Plattner et al. 1997: xxxiii). Nevertheless, economic development and high *per capita* income does not necessarily imply the country in

question will develop into a democracy. Sørensen (1993: 26) mentions Argentina, Taiwan and South Korea as examples of countries with good economic performance, but with poor democratic performances. Today one could also add China and Vietnam[98] as examples, as both are still communistic one-party regimes with very high levels of economic growth but with poor democracy and human rights records.[99]

5.5.1   Transformation in the 1990s - towards a multiparty system

In the 1980s, Tanzania's economy was in a poor state and in decline (Mbonile 1995: 137). The country was heavily in debt, the industry could not provide the population with the necessary consumer goods and the rural population was exposed to high prices on agricultural inputs and consumer goods (ibid). The economic situation forced the government to turn to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for assistance and since the beginning of 1980s the structural adjustment programmes in Tanzania have gone through three different phases. The first phase (1981-82) was under the label 'National Economic Survival Programme' (NESP). It was worked out by the Tanzanian government itself to improve agricultural and other non-traditional exports when the negotiations with IMF broke down. In the end, the aim was too ambitious and the result was that both crop production and industrial output fell (Mung'ong'o and Loiske 1995: 162). The next attempt to control and develop the economic sector was through the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) (1982-85). The currency was partly devalued, internal and external trade was partially liberalised and agriculture privatised and liberalised (Mung'ong'o and Loiske 1995: 162). Nyerere was still president and being an opponent to demands made by foreign actors, he reluctantly agreed to these concessions in contrast to his successor Mwinyi, who became president in

---

[98] China and Vietnam had an annual official GDP growth of 8.8% and 7.1% respectively in 2002 (UNDP Human Development Report 2003). In 2005 both China's and Vietnam's annual growth rate had increased to 10.2% and 8.4% respectively
(http://devdata.worldbank.org/external/CPProfile.asp?PTYPE=CP&CCODE=CHN,
http://devdata.worldbank.org/external/CPProfile.asp?PTYPE=CP&CCODE=VNM).
However, Vietnam considers itself to practice democracy as can be read on their official website where it is written that Vietnam practices 'centralised democracy'.
http://www.chinhphu.vn/portal/page?pageid=439,1093454&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL
[99] See Human Rights Watch (www.hrw.org).

1985 and who had a more liberal economic approach (Southall 2006: 236).[100] He was also more willing to negotiate with the IMF and a new economic programme called Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) was implemented in 1986. The private sector got more freedom, the agricultural sector was reformed and stricter control and management of the currency and budget was introduced (Southall 2006: 240, Mung'ong'o and Loiske 1995: 162). Finally, the programme also involved the decontrolling of the political space by opening up to multipartism as a form of democratic governance. Even though these three programmes seem to have been home-grown, financial institutions had imposed pressure on Tanzania to liberalise its economy and its political system. At the time of the ERP, external economic assistance to Tanzania increased within a year from 287 million USD in 1985 to 680 million USD at the beginning of the ERP - which was incidentally also the time Tanzania accepted all the IMF conditions (Mung'ong'o and Loiske 1995: 162).

Thus, the situation in Tanzania at the beginning of 1990s was an economy in transition towards liberalisation and privatisation where even politicians were allowed to accumulate private wealth, something previously forbidden since the Arusha Declaration of 1967. The inflation was steadily brought under control, the currency was devalued and general positive economic growth was achieved Southall 2006: 241). While the government under Mwinyi was committed to economic liberalisation, it was not as positive about political pluralism as Nyerere was at this stage. The government's position led to strained relationship with the donor community, which by now as a condition for aid, openly advocated for multiparty democracy (Southall 2006: 244). After Mwinyi was re-elected as president in 1990, he launched a presidential commission to investigate popular sentiments about the political system in the country – the Nyalali Commission.

5.5.2   The Nyalali Commission

The formation of the Presidential Commission on the question of multiparty system can be seen as a response from the government against the growing public opposition towards the single party system. President Mwinyi appointed the Commission in February 1991 (Msekwa 1995: 5) and it was to be led by Chief Justice

---

[100] Mwinyi became known as 'Bwana Ruksa' meaning he introduced free market economy.

Francis Nyalali. The task of the Commission was, among other issues, to find out people's opinions and views on single- and multiparty systems (see appendix II). The Commission consisted of twenty members, ten from the mainland and ten from Zanzibar, who travelled the country visiting at least eight villages in each district, holding public meetings where people were invited to express their views. However, since the Commission did not consist of any members from the unofficial opposition camps or any other organisations outside CCM,[101] it and the results drew some criticism and some argued that the Commission was too expensive and unnecessary and constituted only a way for the government to be in control of a careful transition towards multiparty politics (Bagenda 1994: 68, Mmuya and Chaligha 1992: 106, 132). When the Commission finalised its work in February 1992, the government was criticised for not displaying everything for the public where it could be seen which of the Commission's recommendations that had been accepted or rejected (Bagenda 1994: 68, Msekwa 1995: 10). Nevertheless, even if the Commission found out that the majority of the interviewed wanted to continue with one-party system (with reforms of the ruling party), the Commission recommended a shift to multiparty system.[102]

In its course of work the Commission met with 36 299 citizens who had been asked in 1061 meetings on the mainland and on Zanzibar if they wanted to continue with the one-party system or not. In total 77% wanted to continue with the one-party system while 21.5% favoured a multiparty system. However, there was a difference between the mainland and Zanzibar. On mainland, 80% supported the one-party system, while only 56% held this view on Zanzibar (Kweka 1995: 76). Yet the Commission recommended a transfer to a multiparty system with the motivation that a large part of the population wanted to see a reform of the ruling party, which could only be done within a plural political system. Another reason was that there was a substantial minority for plural political system and a transfer

---

[101] According to Mmuya and Chaligha (1992), Mabere Marando who was part of the opposition and later to become Secretary General of NCCR-Mageuzi, was nominated by Nyalali to be part of the Commission but he refused to participate.

[102] It is interesting to compare the introduction of the multiparty system in Tanzania's neighbouring countries Malawi and Zambia. Malawi held a National Referendum in 1993 with the same purpose to find out if the country should continue with one-party system or change to multiparty system. The outcome differs radically from the outcome in Tanzania: in Malawi, 33% wanted to continue with one-party system while 67% voted for a multiparty system (Dzimbiri 2000: 3). Zambia, on the other hand, shifted to multiparty system without a national referendum before the election (Van Donge and Kees 1995: 2000).

would therefore preserve the peace and unity in the country (Mmuya and Chaligha, 1992: 100, 106, Msekwa 1995). In addition, in the process the Nyalali Commission acknowledged the following weaknesses[103] in the democracy of Tanzania:

a) Lack of real mass representation in State institutions

b) Lack of popular democracy

c) Little responsibility given to institutions such as workers' councils

d) Too much power vested in the presidency

e) The weakening of the role of Parliament and representative councils.

f) Lack of individual freedom of association, freedom to run for public office in elections, freedom to choose policies and programmes

g) Lack of access to free sources of information

h) Lack of respect for the rule of law

(Kweka 1995: 76)

The Commission put forth a number of recommendations and suggestions for changes in the existing Constitution in order to make it suitable and appropriate in a plural political system. Some of the major sections to be removed stated that 'all political activity within and concerning the United Republic shall be conducted by, or under the auspices and control of, the Party' (Mmuya and Chaligha 1992: 102). In another section (3) of the Constitution it is stated that all political authority is vested in the single ruling party. This gave CCM supreme power over the judiciary and the parliament, a condition not coherent with a plural political system (Mmuya and Chaligha 1992: 101).

To amend the existing Constitution and make it more in accordance with the new political system, the Commission recommended that Tanzania should have a permanent Constitution with entrenched human rights. In its recommendations the Commission put forth that some laws that undermined the practice of democracy by denying human rights should be removed. Laws within this category were: the Detention Act, Registration of Associations, Deportation Ordinance, Regional and

---

[103] Despite the fact that no opposition groups were part of the Commission, it is noteworthy to see that some critical points were made, especially in terms of human rights and democracy issues.

Area Commissioners Act, the Newspaper Act, the Establishment of Tanzania News Agency Act and Freedom of Associations, which were to be amended or removed before June 1992. By getting rid of outdated laws and legal instruments that undermined individual liberties, democracy would be enhanced (Mmuya and Chaligha 1992: 105). The roles and responsibilities of the Executive, the Legislature and the Judiciary must also be clearly defined and for an effective and easy registration of political parties, the Commission recommended that special legal measures and regulations should be adopted. In relation to this, the Commission went along with the opinion of Nyerere that all political parties in Tanzania must have a national base and character before they are registered. Nyerere had already in 1990 expressed his opinion about the conditions for political parties if Tanzania decided to opt for a multiparty system. In his lecture at the CCM Youth National Conference in Mwanza, he emphasised the importance of securing peace, harmony and unity among Tanzanians in a multiparty system. The only way to maintain this was for political parties to have national character and ban political parties based on religion, tribe, race or gender (Mmuya and Chaligha 1992: 103).

The Commission set a timetable for the transition process and in its recommendations an Electoral Commission and a Constitutional Commission should be established by July 1992. Registration of opposition parties would start in August the same year and the first local government election should be held in October 1993 and would function as a training experience and a demonstration of how well Tanzanians had adjusted to competitive politics. After this exercise, the first multiparty general election should then be held in October 1995 (Mmuya and Chaligha 1992: 105-106). Yet the Commission was concerned with the transition considering that the majority of the people interviewed wanted to continue with the single-party system. This suggested that the people might not have understood why plural politics was suggested and therefore the Commission believed that plural politics in Tanzania could only thrive if 'rigorous educational campaigns are undertaken by the CCM government'. The populace must be made aware of their rights (and responsibilities) so that they can freely organise their own civil organisations within different fields, for example, for the development of rural areas (Mmuya and Chaligha 1992: 106).

The most controversial issue brought up by the Commission was the question of the Union and its organisation based on a two-government system. The Commission had recommended a three-government structure for the Union, but this was rejected by CCM without further explanation. The reason for the Commission to recommend a three-governmental structure has partly to do with historical circumstances when the Union was formed.[104] It was formed rapidly without enough time to consider the Constitutional content. The result was a government for Zanzibar and one for the Union, while a government for Tanganyika was never established. If the Union was to be a Union between two countries, both should have remained with their respective governments and have a Union Government dealing with Union matters. Now the result became that the Tanganyika Government functioned as the Union Government while Zanzibar remained as Zanzibar (Msekwa 1995: 20-24). The Commission found there was confusion with the dual responsibility of the Union Government that had to deal with both Union and Tanganyika matters. Hence, a three-governmental structure would clarify the roles and rationalise the working process of respective governments and the Union (Msekwa 1995: 20-24). There were several turns on this issue, but the two-governmental structure was reconfirmed at the National Congress in December 1992 since any changes would mean dismantling the Union. Two years later in an internal Party referendum on the question, 62% favoured the existing structure (Nyerere 1995: 5). Nyerere himself was a fierce opponent of any change since it would be to tear the country apart and jeopardise the existing peace and unity. According to Nyerere (1995) if there were any changes to be made, it would be towards a one-governmental structure. However, one reason for not adopting the one-government system from the beginning was that it would look as if Tanganyika had control of Zanzibar, which at that time had only 300 000 inhabitants while Tanganyika had 12 million. But the main reason for not adopting three governments was (and still is) that it is too costly. Hence, to avoid the

---

[104] In April 2006 ten Zanzibaris filed a case before the Zanzibar High Court claiming the Union was illegal and demanded to see the original articles of the Union. They claimed that the original agreement had never been properly ratified. The High Court dismissed the case in October 2006 but the claimants said in May 2006 that they would continue to pursue the question (http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=61254)

expenses and the risk of Zanzibar feeling engulfed by Tanganyika, especially after they both had so recently gained Independence, the two-governmental structure was adopted in 1964 (Nyerere 1995: 34).

5.6 Decision Phase

5.6.1   Preparing the road for political change

Julius Nyerere stepped down as President in 1985 but was nevertheless very influential in domestic and foreign politics for many years after. He was attuned to political changes internationally and saw the domestic political transformation as something inevitable since in his view, the ruling party at different levels 'had gone to sleep' (Kweka 1995: 74, Southall 2006: 242). He found that leaders were not discussing with people or involving them in decision-making, but were instead sitting in their offices (Kweka 1995: 74). While many of the top politicians did not see any pressure from the population for political change, and hence, they saw no need to address the issue of multiparty system (Bagenda 1994: 67), Nyerere on his part stated in 1990 that:

> To view a one-party system in almost religious terms is wrong. We Tanzanians have one-party as a historical necessity, but this is not a kind of divine decree; it is thus not proper to treat a person who floats the idea of a multiparty system as some one who has committed treason.
>
> (Kweka 1995: 75)

Nyerere was particularly concerned about the fact that the ruling party seemed to have lost its energy to rule and stay at the forefront. Nyerere asked, 'If the Party fails to oversee the running of the economy, why shouldn't there be other parties?' (Kweka 1995: 75, Bagenda 1994: 67). Simultaneously, in the second half of 1980s, an internal opposition developed, consisting of different business groups, associations and individuals who were all urban based but who were not particularly pleased with the political situation in the country, which was not in pace with the economic liberalisation. They saw the single party as inflexible when

dealing with an economy that was becoming more and more liberal (Mmuya and Chaligha 1992: 14, Bagenda 1994: 67, Southall 2006: 244). Nonetheless, even before the formation of Nyalali Commission, some discussions were held within the party structure on the events in Eastern Europe and Soviet Union and what implications these changes could have on Tanzania. There were several workshops during 1991 on the theme of multiparty democracy, which was one step in tolerating a more open discussion about the multiparty system (Mmuya and Chaligha 1992: 13, 59, 134). In view of the fact that Tanzania had already started to liberalise its economy through the structural adjustment programs, it now needed equal liberalisation and competition within the political and social spheres in order to match the economic reforms. Thus, this adaptation can either be said to have been: 'CCM going with the time' (*Kwenda na Wakati*), as the Secretary General Kolimba put it, or 'going with the wind' (*Kwenda na Upepo*), as Nyerere put it.

The day after Nyalali Commission had delivered its final report in February 1992, CCM held its National Conference. Formally it gathered to decide on the proposal to change the political system in the country towards a multiparty system and realising that there were no other realistic options, it was decided at the conference to go for the implementation of the multiparty system and the opposition was now allowed to operate in Tanzania (Mmuya and Chaligha 1992: 143).

5.6.2   The Birth and Consolidation of an Opposition

Compared with the party system of Europe, the political parties in Africa usually lack the traditional left-right spectrum that we in the West are more familiar with. This spectrum tends to be less visible or symbolic on most parts of the continent (Carothers 2006: 36). Carothers states that even if parties are tied to ethnic constituencies, 'African parties rarely identify themselves explicitly as ethnic parties' (Ibid). Instead, political parties use concepts such as national unity,

national development, or democratic governance when they reach out to the electorate.[105]

In the formation of a political opposition in Tanzania, the aspiring groups had to go through a similar experience to what TAA had gone through some seventy years earlier when it struggled to become a political party. At the beginning of 1991 there was a formation of civic and human rights organisations with names such as 'Civil and Legal Rights Movement', 'Liberty Desk', 'Constitutional Reform Movement' and 'Committee for Reform and Freedom in Zanzibar' prior to the political parties being formally legalised in Tanzania (Mmuya and Chaligha 1992: 133). The names implied that these organisations were civic or human rights movements and not political parties and therefore had the right to exist. This informal opposition formed a Steering Committee with the purpose of organising a seminar on the multiparty system, which was held in June 1991. Thus, the up-to-then loosely organised opposition began to take form and some individuals after the meeting became leaders for different opposition groups (ibid). The June seminar arranged by the opposition elements in Tanzania was held in Dar es Salaam with participants from the major towns, was open to all and was attended by people from different spheres of society. Besides the opposition groups, the diplomatic corps, foreign agencies, academics and students participated in the seminar. Politicians from CCM did not want to participate and the party was only represented by a few junior officials (ibid: 59,136). The main objective of the conference was to have an open discussion about the benefits of a single or multiparty system but in the end, the conference filled many different purposes. The effects of the conference were:

- The launching of an opposition
- An opportunity for the opposition to recruit members

---

[105] This reflects also the names of the parties. In Tanzania there are parties with almost similar names, for example: Union for Multiparty Democracy, United People's Democratic Party, Tanzania Democratic Alliance, National League for Democracy, National Reconstruction for Alliance, United Democratic Party, The Forum for Restoration of Democracy and the Democratic Party. It is a challenge for the electorate to tell the difference between all these parties and not least, make a sensible choice between them.

- A source for publicity for the opposition and also a critical judgement on the performance of CCM and the government

<div align="right">(Mmuya and Chaligha 1992: 136)</div>

After the seminar, the National Committee for Constitutional Reform (NCCR) was formed, and was led by Abdallah Fundikira.[106] Its purpose was to coordinate the activities of the opposition but even though it turned out to be short-lived, several different opposition groups were formed at its break up, resulting in more than ten such groups in February 1992 (Mmuya and Chaligha 1992: 146). Organisations were formed such as: KAMAHURU (*Kamati ya Mageuzi na Mwelekeo wa Vyama Huru*, which translates to Committee for direction by independent/free parties), *Chama cha Wananchi* (CCW; People's Party), Union for Multi Party Democracy (UMD) and NCCR-Mageuzi (that retained the initial of the first movement) (Mmuya and Chaligha 1992: 63). Later KAMAHURU and CCW were joined to form the Civic United Front (CUF).

The second attempt to coordinate the opposition parties, supported by Western countries, was after a meeting at the Canadian Embassy in April 1992. The coordinating body National Opposition Front (NOF) incorporated NCCR-Mageuzi, UMD, National League for Democracy (NLD), the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). This coordination did not work and NOF split shortly after it was formed (Mmuya and Chaligha 1992: 64).

Mmuya and Chaligha explain the failures of these two coordination attempts with the domination by NCCR-Mageuzi that seemed more interested in how the forum could support their party and not the opposition as a whole (Mmuya and Chaligha 1992: 64). Also, many of the newly created parties had their internal conflicts, which led to disintegration or fusions with other parties. These disintegrations have, according to Mmuya and Chaligha, been caused mainly by the domination of the individual who formed the party. The party has become the chairman's personal organisation, his individual quest where personal views and opinions have dominated the party's policies (Mmuya and Chaligha 1992: 62, 1994:

---

[106] Abdallah Fundikira was the first Justice Minister in Tanzania. In 1993 he formed UMD (United Movement for Democracy). In 1999 he changed parties again and returned to CCM. http://www.ippmedia.com/ipp/guardian/2007/08/07/95918.html

65). This is not surprising considering there were many within CCM who decided to change party allegiance after the official adoption of multiparty politics in 1992. Among the most prominent were individuals such as Edwin Mtei, a previous finance minister, Bank of Tanzania Governor and a director in the International Monetary Fund who created and lead the Party for Democracy and Development (CHADEMA). Another person is Mabere Marando, a former government security agent and civil rights lawyer who eventually became the chief architect of NCCR-Mageuzi. The first minister of justice of the independent Tanganyika, Chief Abdallah Fundikira formed the UMD. Other well-known personalities included James Mapalala, a popular human rights advocate that eventually helped to create the CCW before the party merged with the Zanzibar based party KAMAHURU, led by Khamis Mloo, to form the CUF. Hence, until the 1995 national elections opposition leaders continued to emerge by either breaking away from existing opposition parties or defecting from the CCM. Without a doubt, the most popular opposition figure, Augustine Mrema, former Minister of Labour, grudgingly defected from the incumbent regime into the NCCR-Mageuzi's chairman position, subsequently propelling the party into the most prominent opposition status. John Cheyo, a prominent businessman from the Bariadi district in Shinyanga, emerged out of the UMD to form his own party, the United Democratic Party (UDP). Hence, at the time of the 1995 general elections there were some parties that had managed to be consolidated and to create a base from where they could attract voters. The main opposition parties in 1995 were NCCR-Mageuzi, CUF and CHADEMA followed by UDP, UMD, TPP, NLD, PONA (Popular National Party) and TADEA (Tanzania Democratic Alliance Party).

In contrast to the opposition parties, CCM could in its capacity as the ruling party prepare the field where the political battle would take place. This gave CCM several months to have their own rallies around the country, mobilising the people and showing the opposition and people how strong the ruling party really was and at the same time how weak or invisible the opposition was (Mmuya and Chaligha 1992: 143). However, during this first period of establishing themselves, the opposition groups received economic assistance from external sources and donors with the purpose of enabling them to have meetings and pay for different running costs. The role of donors in this change cannot be clearer than the case when all the opposition groups were invited to the residence of the Canadian Embassy in

April 1992 to discuss a unified front for the opposition and the support from Western countries for this.

5.6.3 Geographical Distribution and Recruitment of Members

The condition for registering a party is to have no less than two hundred registered members from at least ten of the country's regions and no party is allowed to have on its agenda the disintegration of the Union with Zanzibar (Mmuya and Chaligha 1992: 104, Msekwa 1995: 8, http://www.nec.go.tz/). Needless to say, it was an enormous task for the newly founded opposition parties to fulfil these requirements, which resulted in the reduction from over fifty proto-political parties to only twelve,[107] at the time of the elections in 1995. Unlike the incumbent party, these newly founded parties could not manage to get comprehensive support from all over the country. Some managed and survived but still parties have certain regions that are more closely related to them than other regions are. It is therefore possible to see some patterns from where the party leadership comes and where the party recruited most of its members.

Initially, the parties drew members from the urban areas, from areas that were easy to reach with limited resources. To recruit members in rural and more remote areas was not possible for economical and logistical reasons. The urban areas which were focused upon included Dar es Salaam, Arusha, Dodoma, Iringa, Kagera, Kigoma, Moshi, Lindi, Mara, Morogoro and Mwanza. These urban areas were the recruiting centres for members for the new parties (Mmuya and Chaligha 1994: 55). The core regions of the parties differ as well as the number of regions from which they received their main supporters. As can be seen in table 8, CUF was reaching out to three to four times as many regions as the other parties and also recruited members in more rural areas, but their main strongholds have remained Pemba and Zanzibar (Unguja). NCCR-Mageuzi and CHADEMA are concentrated in four regions. Hence, the home regions for the top leaders and founders of the parties correspond to their recruiting regions.

---

[107] As of 1 May 1994, 35 or 68.6% of the proto-political parties had attained the legal requirement for temporary registration as political parties. Of the 35 parties with temporary registration, 13 secured full registration, including the ruling party (Mmuya and Chaligha 1994: 2).

Party	Region	Origion of leadership
NCCR-Mageuzi	Dar es Salaam, Kagera, Mara and Mwanza.	Mara and Kagera.
CHADEMA	Dar es Salaam, Mtwara, Mwanza and Mbeya.	Arusha.
CUF	Kigoma, Lindi, Morogoro, Mtwara, Ruvuma, Singida, Tabora, Tanga, Zanzibar and Pemba regions.	Tabora and Zanzibar.
UMD	Kigoma, Mwanza and Tabora.	Mwanza and Tabora.
TPP	Coast Region and Ruvuma-	Ruvuma.
NLD	Mtwara and Ruvuma.	Mtwara.
PONA	Mtwara, Ruvuma and Mbeya.	Mbeya.

(Mmuya and Chaligha 1994: 56)

Table 1: The correlation between party strongholds and leaders' home region

Mmuya and Chaligha see several weaknesses in the foundation of the new parties. The fact that the leaders' origins correspond closely with the prime recruiting areas renders them poor national support and character (same situation as for the opposition parties of TANU). The party also becomes tightly connected to the founders, leaving members detached with small chance of controlling the leaders and influence party politics (Mmuya and Chaligha 1994: 56). They also consider it to be highly unlikely that the leaders in these new parties have any relationship with the general populace considering that they come from the 'petty bourgeois class'. The leadership in these opposition parties has almost comparable educational background (college) and age (60-65 years) as the CCM party leadership. The exception is NCCR-Mageuzi which has a young leadership compared to the other parties. What is more remarkable is that the leaders in many of the opposition parties have served in the state or in the ruling party, as chief ministers or ministers, ambassadors, heads of the party at regional level, heads of state enterprises, etc. (Mmuya and Chaligha 1994: 54).

5.6.4   Party rhetoric and policies

In its thirty years in power, CCM has manifested itself fundamentally on every administrative level in the country, but more importantly, it has managed to make the Party part of people's identity, of what they are. The connection CCM has to the struggle for independence and the 'Father of the Nation'- Julius Nyerere - is

something unique and retained by CCM. To combat this is an enormous task and we have to see these new parties in relation to the incumbent party and its history and long rule. CCM is also well organised and has experienced personnel working in the districts. This is something the new parties still after seventeen years need to build up. Finally, CCM has penetrated all socioeconomic spheres and, thus, has supporters within all socioeconomic groups. This makes it additionally difficult for the opposition to 'capture' a specific group or economic class in the society from where main support could be drawn, especially when CCM has gained confidence from the business elite as well (Mmuya and Chaligha 1992: 154). Taking into consideration the fact that new parties had to be founded without any previous history in Tanzania or any real connection to the population, what policies did the newly created parties have that would appeal to people?

In the transition towards the multiparty system, the ruling party went through changes regarding its policies as well. The vision of Ujamaa, a society based on socialistic values and equality, was gradually abandoned in favour of the Structural Adjustment Policies (see chapter 5.5.1) of liberalism and free market economy (*Ruksa*), even though the idea of people's equal rights is still emphasised. From the late 1980s, Tanzania had deregulated and opened up its economy to private investments, established a more privately owned economy and a privatisation of state owned companies that is still continuing today. Since these policies are part of the conditions imposed on Tanzania it would be difficult for any of the opposition parties not to follow the policies stated by these institutions and put forth policies arguing for a return to a socialistic, state-run economy. Hence, the opposition parties all talk about 'free economy'. CUF even talks about 'Enrichment' (*Utajirisho*) and UDP talks about *Mapesa* (plenty) or to 'fill the pockets of people with money' through market economy. UDP and CHADEMA express the most liberal views of all the larger opposition parties. NCCR-Mageuzi focuses on a free economy and a mixed economy. Nonetheless, neither NCCR-Mageuzi, CHADEMA nor UDP had at the time they were formed any formal manifest or document that stated their visions of the society they wanted (Mmuya 1998: 23).

What seems to have been the common denominator for the opposition parties is a form of 'Social Democratic' political system, based on free-market economy but with a social responsibility for the poorest of the country. One common issue is

the devotion to liberalism and the belief that privatisation will also decrease unemployment when many of the re-trenched staff need new work opportunities. Another common issue is the indigenisation (*Uzawa*) that is portrayed through different concepts. CCM uses *Wananchi/Wazalendo* (citizens/patriots), CUF uses *Watanzania/Wazanzibari* (Tanzanians, Zanzibarian), and CHADEMA, like the NCCR-Mageuzi, refers to *Wazawa* (the children of …). The idea of indigenisation is that historically Tanzanians were mistreated by the British within the economic sector but now they should have more benefits, rights and opportunities to start businesses in order to improve their lives. This is a way to readjust the inequality in a society where economic power has been in the hands of foreigners[108] (Mmuya 1998: 24-25). Part of this policy was to provide free education and free healthcare and simultaneously reduce or abolish taxes that burdened people. At the same time as they argued for an indigenisation of the economy, they also argued for free market economy with no discrimination (Mmuya 1998: 27). Thus, it seems that the parties tried to satisfy every group in the country, which is not unusual for any party, but the main thing missing was strategies to implement and finance the policies.

5.6.4.1   National unity

During election campaigns, politicians mainly from the ruling party, but sometimes also from the opposition, usually put forth the concepts of peace, unity and harmony (Swahili amani, umoja na utulivu) in their campaigns. The concept of peace refers to a situation in the country where there are no internal conflicts between different ethnic groups but also that Tanzania is not at war with any neighbouring country. The *unity* concept goes often hand in hand with the peace and harmony concepts referring to the (sacred) Union between Tanzania mainland and Zanzibar. It also refers to a nationhood of all citizens identifying themselves as Tanzanians. The *harmony* concept applies to the cultural norm of how to relate to other individuals, i.e. by not making the other person 'lose face'.

Considering the contested election results in Zanzibar in the 1995 general election and the conflict between CUF and CCM, a newspaper article reports that

---

[108] Many businesses in Tanzania are owned by people of Indian and Arabian origin. Whether the parties refer to these groups is not known, but there are also large investments made by South African companies especially in the mining, tourism and commercial sectors.

the party leader for CUF, Ibrahim Lipumba, had to promise Tunduru residents in a campaign for the general election in 2000, that 'his party will not throw the country into bloodshed even if it loses the general election next month'.[109] What caused Lipumba to defend his party and to assure the audience that they were not going to cause bloodshed was a question prompted by one of the Tunduru residents. Lipumba was asked for an explanation about what the red colour in the party flag represented if not violence. Lipumba answered that the red colour represented the blood of those who fought for the freedom and rights of Tanzanians. He then continued to explain what the other colours on the party flag symbolised: blue represents national unity and white stands for peace.[110] Thus, it is not just the ruling party that uses this terminology. However, during the election campaign, CUF made headlines for the opposite reason. In a newspaper article analysing why CUF lost the election of 2000, the writer identifies two slogans used by CUF in the election as the main contributing factors. The slogan *'Jino kwa Jino'* and '*Ngangari'* (a tooth for a tooth) were coupled with portrays of Ninjas and violence at rallies. The slogans, together with the fact that young CUF supporters carried banners with portraits of Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein caused people to see CUF as a party of subversive agitators which naturally frightened them. CCM used this to their advantage and claimed that the country would be plunged into anarchy if the opposition came in power.[111]

When Lipumba gave his speech in Tunduru, president Mkapa was at the same time in the home village of Lipumba in Tabora Region. He held a rally there where he warned the opposition that any attempt to break up the Union might lead to its total collapse and even to civil war. In his speech, President Mkapa said that since their formation there has been a discussion among the opposition of a three-government structure. However, Mkapa argues that a reorganisation into three governments would weaken the Union with a possible disintegration of the country into tribal groups with a total collapse of the Union. Since the Union was a creation of the Father of the Nation, Julius Nyerere, it is the legacy of CCM to carry on the

---

[109] 'No bloodshed, Lipumba promises', *Guardian* reporters, Monday 25 September 2000.
[110] Ibid.
[111] 'CUF: why, and how, it lost in Elections 2000', Emmanuel Mugambira, *Business Times*, Friday 10 November 2000.

Union and protect it.[112] Mkapa continued by saying that 'CCM is the only and true heir of the Union'. Only CCM could safeguard the Union because 'it had learned from the wisdom of retired leaders who could assist in good governance and maintain solidarity among Tanzanians'.[113] Thus, this can be interpreted that supporting the opposition would be the same as putting the country's unity, peace and harmony (security) at a great risk.

The same argument reappears in the new president Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete's speech to the parliament in December 2005.[114] The question of national unity has been and still is a key political subject and in his speech he refers to the existence of peace, unity and harmony/stability as key values for development and for maintaining peace and stability in Tanzania. The President credits peace and stability to the existence of unity, which he sees consist of two parts: (1) the Union between Tanzania mainland and Zanzibar, which now has existed for 44 years and is the new government's prime objective to protect, sustain and strengthen, and (2) the national unity among the people, who primarily consider themselves to be Tanzanians before identifying themselves by their 'tribe, race, religion, gender or region of origin'.[115]

President Kikwete claimed in his inauguration speech that one reason for the CCM landslide victory in the 2005 election was the overwhelming support by Tanzanians for the preservation of the union and for sustaining peace and harmony in the country. Political parties that do not have a clear standpoint on the union matter or are associated with violence were punished at the polls, according to Kikwete. When the one-party system was implemented by Julius Nyerere, the argument for this was to avoid the creation of different classes and ethnically based political parties (see chapter 5.4). To avoid ethnically based parties when the multiparty system was implemented, it was decided that legal political parties must have a national character and parties based on religion, ethnic groups, race or gender not be allowed, as mentioned earlier (Mmuya and Chaligha 1992: 103). Further, parties should not only have support in one or two regions, but should

---

[112] Ibid.
[113] Ibid.
[114] Kikwete's inauguration speech in Parliament, www.parliament.go.tz/bunge/docs/pspeech_en.pdf (p7).
[115] Ibid.

have supporters all over the nation. To be fully registered, parties must attain at least two hundred registered members from at least ten (out of 20) regions of the United Republic, and at least two (out of five) of these have to be from Zanzibar, one each from the islands of Unguja and Pemba. The leadership of the party has also to draw members from both the mainland and from Zanzibar. And finally, no party is allowed to have the disintegration of the Union with Zanzibar on its agenda (Mmuya and Chaligha 1992: 104, Msekwa 1995: 8). Through these regulations, national political parties were to be created with support over most parts of the country.

Since the introduction of multiparty elections in 1992, the political development on the mainland has been calm, while the situation on Zanzibar has been characterised by political tension, polarisation and outbursts of violence,[116] especially between CCM and CUF in connection with elections on Zanzibar. In relation to this President Kikwete said: 'I am distressed by the evident polarisation of politics in Zanzibar, especially between Zanzibar [Unguja] and Pemba. … We cannot run away from this historically determined polarisation'. Explicitly, any disintegration would jeopardise peace, unity and harmony in Tanzania. According to President Kikwete, the time has come to find a solution to the political polarisation in Zanzibar and keep the union intact since what happens in Zanzibar usually tends to overflow into the mainland. This question is highly prioritised by President Kikwete who has relieved the vice-president of the portfolio of poverty reduction and given him the responsibility to work on questions related to the union. The existing structures and frameworks for resolving union problems will be strengthened and the president will would study more thoroughly how the Union Government can support the socioeconomic development in Zanzibar without interfering with the autonomy of the Government of Zanzibar.[117]

---

[116] The violence after the election in 2000 culminated in January 2001 when the police killed several opposition supporters and several hundred supporters fled to Kenya. Even at local elections in 2004 there were reports of clashes between supporters from the CCM and CUF.
[117] Kikwete's inauguration speech in Parliament,
www.parliament.go.tz/bunge/docs/pspeech_en.pdf

5.6.4.2   National identity

Besides the unity between the mainland and Zanzibar, the second part of the unity concept has to do with the unity among the people: a national identity and unity attributed to Nyerere who shaped one nation from the more than 120 different ethnic groups in the country. Even though President Kikwete was grateful to Nyerere who created one national identity, he said in his inauguration speech, 'There is a genuine fear among Tanzanians that some people want to take us back to where we came from, so that we can once again ask and discriminate each other on the basis of our tribes, colour, religion or place of origin'.[118] President Kikwete would not tolerate this and would concentrate on keeping Tanzania free from internal conflicts through promoting *nationalism* and *patriotism*. Even though he stressed the importance of protecting and strengthening the national values through fighting against 'some people', he was not clear about who 'some people' were and what particular situation in the past he was referring to. However, since one of the central tasks of the new government was to strengthen national identity and union, this is to be achieved through ten strategic steps that will enable and improve the sense of national identity, especially among the younger generations. Some of these strategies are:

- Efforts will be concentrated in the educational system starting with the creation of Pan-Territorial Secondary Schools.[119] These schools will intentionally mix talented students from all parts of the country. The curriculum for civic education will be redesigned to focus on supporting nationalism and patriotism.
- Religious organisations are supported to open their schools to students from all religious backgrounds.
- National Service will be revived.

---

[118] Kikwete's inauguration speech in Parliament,
www.parliament.go.tBz/bunge/docs/pspeech_en.pdf (p8).
[119] There are already secondary schools with students from different parts of the country. Maybe Kikwete want to streamline this system more.

- The government will work with different stakeholders towards the principle of core national values (justice, equality, unity and solidarity) holding the nation together.
- Patriotic sentiments will be stimulated with the help of art, culture and sport.
- The president will appoint a Minister of State whose responsibility will include inter-religious and inter-party dialogue and cooperation.

These strategies must be added to the earlier strategies implemented by Nyerere for creating a sense of nationhood. The usage of Swahili as the national language enabled communication between people with different languages and from different parts of the country. Civil servants could therefore work in various regions (almost) without any language barriers (Omari 1995: 28). This was also supposed to diminish prejudices and create a sense of national identity when civil servants were frequently relocated from one place to another. An additional strategy was the introduction of compulsory National Service (including for women), aimed at strengthening unity especially among the young people in the country (Omari 1995: 28). National Service has since then been abandoned in its compulsory form but Kikwete wants to revive it again. There seems to be an underlying concern that critical voices against the government and a critical and a strong opposition could implicitly lead to disruption of peace and unity in the country,[120] which in turn could trigger internal ethnic or religious conflicts. In addition, leaders at different levels in politics and religious organisations are expected not to use discrimination as an instrument for power positions: 'This is something we will not tolerate; and we will not let them divide the country'.[121] Hence, high priority is still placed on generating and strengthening nationalism and patriotism in Tanzania.

---

[120] The Dar-es-Salaam Regional Police Commander Alfred Tibaigana said that he will not allow the planned Tanzania Labour Party (TLP) demonstration so as to maintain peace and harmony. TLP agreed to call off the demonstration as directed by the police. Speaking to journalists at the party's headquarters in Dar-es-Salaam, the Dar-es-Salaam Regional TLP Chairman Sabu Ali said that the party had obeyed the police order for the sake of maintaining peace in the country: 'We have realised the need to cooperate with the police for the good of the country and called off the demonstration' (Rose Ikombe, *The Guardian*, 21 December 2001).
[121] Kikwete's inauguration speech in Parliament, www.parliament.go.tz/bunge/docs/pspeech_en.pdf (p8).

5.7 Consolidation Phase

> [A consolidated democracy] is one which none of the major political
> actors, parties, organized interests, forces, or institutions consider
> that there is any alternative to democratic processes to gain power,
> and that no political institution or group has a claim to veto the
> action of democratically elected decision makers. This does not
> mean that there are no minorities ready to challenge and question
> the legitimacy of the democratic process by nondemocratic means.
> It means, however, that the major actors do not turn to them and
> they remain politically isolated. To put it simply, democracy must
> be seen as the 'only game in town'.
>
> (Juan Linz in Sørensen 1993: 45)

The biggest challenge for newly democratised countries, such as Tanzania, seems
to be staying on the path towards consolidating the democratic institutions and
practices of democratic governance. Diamond, Plattner et al. (1997: xv) state that
even if there does not seem to be any immediate threat for the newly
democratised countries to collapse, neither are there signs of democracy being
consolidated at a deeper level and becoming a stable and the only realistic
political system. Usually democratic consolidation is regarded as moving in the
right direction when the organisational practices of governance are in place that
guarantee basic individual rights and freedoms, ensure rule of law, incorporate
marginalised groups and eliminate political forces (military, elites) that are not
accountable to the electorate. Abraham Lowenthal puts it as follows: 'Before
democratic institutions can become consolidated, they must first fully exist' (in
Diamond, Plattner et al. 1997: xviii). Consolidation also includes political parties
being strengthened and having a links to social groups, in addition to having a 'civil
society' that is active and participating in local and national politics (ibid 1997:
xviii). However, a 'vibrant', institutionalised civil society is not, according to
Diamond and Plattner, directly necessary for democratic consolidation, but will
give democracy a better chance of being consolidated and will make it more suited
to survive and of a higher quality (ibid 1997: xxxii). This is exactly what most of the

third wave democracies have failed to build and therefore need to put large efforts into civic empowerment and getting citizens involved in local governance practices (ibid 1997: xxxii). According to Diamond and Plattner, even if the civil society is important in a consolidation of democracy, the party system is the most important institutional arena for democracy. It is through the political parties that representatives are elected to represent the people and through the party system that groups and individuals are introduced into the democratic process. It is through the political parties that alternative policies can be generated and implemented. Parties also function as 'watch-dogs' ready to point out wrongdoings by the government. Consequently, when the party system is institutionalised, the democratic governability and legitimacy increase, enabling an open discussion and 'making the democratic process more inclusive, accessible, representative and effective' (Diamond, Plattner et al. 1997: xxiii, Demokratirådets rapport 2000, Carothers 2006).

Diamond and Plattner (1997: xix) bring up one important question in the debate on consolidation: how do we recognise it? There is no single indicator that would suffice. Rather we are more likely to recognise it by its absence, i.e. a fragile, instable, volatile society. On the other hand, Linz and Stepan put forward a conceptual framework for consolidation: they see behaviour, attitudinal and constitutional dimensions of consolidation through which 'democracy becomes routine and deeply internalised in social, institutional and even psychological life, as well as in political calculations for achieving success' (in Diamond, Plattner et al. 1997: xvii).

As Diamond and Plattner note in 'Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies', the consolidation phase is probably the most difficult to define, is also the most demanding phase, with several steps, and is not a linear process that follows pre-written regulations. Sørensen views these democratic transitions as either being restricted, frail or unconsolidated. The *restricted* democracies put limits on competition, participation and political liberties and the process is usually obstructed by elites who want to protect their own interests. The situation in Africa has been characterised as *frail and unconsolidated* for various reasons. One of them is that the state has not been seen as legitimate, the institutions of government have been weak and people were alienated from them. Chabal and

Daloz's main argument is that the state in Africa has never been an independent institution, separate from society, and therefore never functioned in the way states in the West are supposedly functioning (Chabal and Daloz 1999: 4). After independence, the traditional settings of rule were no longer valid and what was installed could not compensate for that which had been there previously. 'There were no strong social forces in the society that were capable of disciplining political leaders' (Sørensen 1993: 47). Neo-patrimonial leaders filled the vacuum with characters of personal rule (in decision phase) and patron-client relationships in order to enrich themselves.

The decision phase overlaps the first preparatory phase and is characterised by a commitment by the rulers to engage in some democratic procedures. If this period is too short, opposition groups might not have sufficient time to be organised and become established to play any crucial role in the transition, as has been the case in Tanzania. In a 'transition from above' where the incumbent rulers remain in the new governmental setting,[122] they can through the old structures remain in control over important political fields. This decision phase is, however, the first real threshold and many countries are stuck in this early phase of decision or have chosen to do so as the semi-authoritarian regimes discussed by Ottaway. They have made some steps in the direction towards a more democratic government, but have for various reasons not continued the transition. This phase can then take decades or even centuries to complete. As described in chapter 5.6.1, Tanzania made a first step during its session in April/May 1992 when the National Assembly approved the suggestion to change the political system of Tanzania from a single-party system to a multiparty system. It was officially legalised on 1 July 1992. It was now possible for opposition parties to be legally formed, work politically and compete in elections (Msekwa 1995, Mmuya and Chaligha 1992, Kweka 1995: 77).

However, the history of politics in Tanzania has not enabled the establishment of social movements outside the party structure. All organisations, as said earlier, were connected to the party or under party supervision. Thus, the legacy from this has been, according to Omari (1997: 73), a uniform thinking, uniform political

---

[122] The governmental organisation in an authoritarian regime is not set up in such a way to enhance transparency, accountability and with a judicial system that is democratic. Also, the role of the mass-media needs to be improved and be able to write critically about the government.

organisation, centrism and the prohibition of dissident opinions. Therefore, when new parties were established, some of them, according to Maliyamkono, could be seen as economic ventures from which donor money could be generated. Other parties might have been created by CCM as 'agents' with the purpose of destabilising the opposition,[123] while parties were also created with more genuine political interests with the goal of changing the political power in the country (Maliyamkono 1995a: 24). Mmuya and Chaligha state that the new parties sprang from mainly welfare associations that did not have any well-formulated policies apart from improving people's living conditions. Also, these parties did not originate from civil movements in rural areas but are rather top-down and legislatively created parties. The backside of this is that they might not last for long unless they become firmly established among the populace (Mmuya and Chaligha 1994: 47).

The Nyalali report reflected on this issue when it expressed concerns that people had not understood the purpose of the multiparty system since most people said yes to the continuation of single-party rule (Mmuya and Chaligha 1992: 106). They therefore suggested that information and educational campaigns be organised. People must be informed of their new rights and of their right to form their own civil organisations. People have to be informed and educated about the principles of free choice between different political parties and different leaders representing their parties. All parties should be able to compete in free and fair elections, where people could choose between a variety of parties and leaders (Mmuya and Chaligha 1992: 106). In Tanzania, coming out of a single-party rule, there were suddenly twelve new political parties at the first multiparty election in 1995. However, just a fraction of these parties had some party organisations built up in the rural areas. But what is more crucial, and relates to the Nyalali report, is that the people did not understand from where all these new parties came. This, in my opinion, partly manifested itself in the results of elections since there has not been any real popular demand for the change of the political system. One would have assumed that oppressed views would take hold and be manifested through the

---

[123] The internal power struggle and conflict in NCCR-Mageuzi between the party-secretary Mabere Marando and party chairman Augustine Mrema is a prime example of what at the time seemed to be a conflict instigated by CCM. NCCR-M was the main opposition party in the 1995 general election but has since then lost its position.

new opposition parties but they have not yet managed to capture the electorate with their political programmes.

Ottaway indicates that the Western countries welcomed these political changes, but that the elections were not as orderly performed as donors and external observers would have liked them to be. However, this is no surprise since at certain places in Africa, elections were held at an early stage when the opposition was weak and not organised, and where civil strife[124] restricted freedom of movement (Ottaway 1999: 7).

5.8 Influencing Factors for a Political Change

Undoubtedly, there are internal as well as external factors behind why a transition towards democracy and a multiparty system takes place, which also affect how the transition will be and how it is consolidated. One can assume that internal demands for democracy and internal driving forces contribute, or should at least contribute, to a more 'genuine', comprehensive and consolidated transition, than an externally demanded or externally conditioned transition would. As Huntington states, while external forces were dominant in the second wave of democratisation, indigenous forces were dominant in the third wave. The third-wave regimes that moved towards democratisation fell into three main groups: one-party systems, military regimes and personal dictatorships. All of these regime types suppressed popular participation and political competition. However, Huntington sees three different ways of transitioning to democracy among the third wave democracies: transformation, replacement and transplacement. *Transformation* takes place when the leaders in power take charge of the transition towards democracy (e.g. Hungary, Spain and Ecuador). *Replacement* arises when opposition groups are in charge of the transition towards democracy and leaders either are overthrown or collapse (e.g. East Germany, Portugal and Greece). *Transplacement* comes about when both powerholders and opposition groups work together in bringing democracy (e.g. Poland, Czechoslovakia, Uruguay and Bolivia) (Huntington 1991: 112-114, see also Ottaway in chapter 1.1 above). Thus, one issue to elaborate further is: What form of transition took place in Tanzania? Was the influence for

---

[124] The human rights abuses in January 2001 are an example of low tolerance from the government of Zanzibar towards a strong opposition.

political change towards a multiparty system in Tanzania initiated internally or externally, and what factors were most influential?

There is a debate among scholars as to what extent internal and/or external factors contribute towards a political change. Scholars favouring external forces put emphasis on the economic factors and the debt situation for African countries. In order for the African countries to continue to receive aid and assistance, donors, IMF and the World Bank pressure for political changes. Tanzania was in this situation as mentioned earlier. However, other scholars regard the internal forces as more vital as will be illustrated next.

5.8.1   Internal and external factors

In general, regarding external influence, Bratton and Van de Walle see two main influencing forces behind a transition to democracy in Africa: firstly the pressure exercised by donors and finance agencies and secondly the spread of protests from other countries inspiring domestic protests, what is usually called diffusion. However, Bratton and Van de Walle do not believe that changes at the international level, such as changes in the international power balance, pressure from donor agencies and spread of protest action can be the only explanations for transitions towards democracy. Domestic factors play an important role, for example the strength of the incumbent leader and the force of the opposition. Democratisation needs a 'homegrown constituency for political reform' (Bratton and Van de Walle 1997: 33). Samuel Huntington states that, 'While external influences often were significant causes of third wave democratisations, the process themselves were overwhelmingly indigenous' (Huntington 1991: 112). Laurence Whitehead argues further that 'internal forces were of primary importance in determining the course and outcome of the transition attempt and international factors played a secondary role' (in Bratton and Van de Walle 1997: 33).

Bratton and Van de Walle found that the transitions followed a specific sequential process. In 1991 there was a political protest at the top, in 1992 political liberalisation and reforms were on the agenda, in 1993 electoral activities happened on the top and in 1994 the indicators for democracy (political rights) in

these countries were still rising (ibid 1997: 4). They detected five basic paths of regime transition in Africa:

1. From protest, through liberalisation, to free and fair elections (most frequently occurring democratisation).[125]
2. Liberalisation without democratisation. Old regimes experienced political openings following popular protest but failed to accomplish a democratic transition via free and fair elections (most common path to transition).
3. Democratisation without protest. Initiative to liberalise had been taken by political elites in the absence of political pressure from below. [126]
4. Failure to democratise occurred when elites took the lead on liberalisation.
5. Neither protest nor liberalisation.

(Bratton and Van de Walle 1997: 119)

Bratton and Van de Walle saw that political protests occurred statistically more frequently in countries with a large number of adjacent neighbours that were democratic and most likely in one-party systems while they occurred least likely in military regimes. However, protest in African countries differed much depending on whether they were West African countries or East and South African countries. West African countries were found to be more prone to protest, especially those countries that were colonised by the same (France in this case) colonial power (ibid 1997: 137). Changes in Eastern Europe were largely spread to leaders and urban elites in African countries. Ordinary citizens outside urban areas were less informed about the political changes in Europe and were therefore not influenced by these changes and by the post-Cold War environment to start protest-led regime transition in the 1990s (ibid 1997: 139).

Another component of importance in generating protests was the access to information. The existence of a literate community and the availability of free mass media enhance the probability of protests against governmental policies. The authors found a correlation between television ownership and the early and

---

[125] Countries falling into this category according to Bratton and van de Walle are: Benin, Central African Republic, Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Namibia, Niger, South Africa and Zambia.
[126] Cap Verde, Lesotho, Mozambique, Sao Tome and Seychelles.

frequent outbreaks of urban political protests. This can further be seen as 'a nascent civil society but also as evidence of the international diffusion of political ideas' (ibid 1997: 148).

Bratton and Van de Walle's main conclusion is that the political transitions in African countries were initiated domestically by political protest, which was a sign of lack of legitimacy for the regime, and that external pressure and international events only had supportive and secondary effects on the initial changes. Hence, they argue that the domestic factors are vital. In only two cases found Bratton and Van de Walle that international donor conditions had effects (Mozambique and Seychelles) that resulted in political liberalisation without domestic protests being part of the change. But in all other cases studied, external political conditions attached to aid was implemented *after* domestic protest already had occurred. Domestic causes came first, even though changes may have several causes (Bratton and Van de Walle 1997: 182).

Abrahamsen challenges the conventional explanation where domestic factors are put to the fore. She argues that international actors should not be given such a marginal importance, since this concept minimises the importance of international connections and the discourse of power where the North is the hegemony (Abrahamsen 2000: 1). Most scholars favouring internal factors argue, according to Abrahamsen, that

> lack of legitimacy and state efficacy, combined with a general feeling of discontent and despair, stimulated mass demonstrations and contributed to the emergence of pro-democracy movements across the continent. These movements incorporated wide sections of the population, but especially prominent were urban workers, trade unions and middle classes, including students, teachers and civil servants. It is with these broad-based popular protests against incumbents that many writers locate the real cause of Africa's democratic revival.
>
> (Abrahamsen 2000: 3)

Abrahamsen points out that while these internal factors are seen as contributing factors to the democratisation in Africa, there are two main external factors identified in the mainstream literature as central. These are the end of the Cold War and the diffusion of democracy, i.e. democratic change in one country that inspires and influences change in another country. The argument goes that due to the collapse of Soviet Union, only one power and one winning ideology remained (Fukuyama's 'end of history'), consisting of market liberalisation and a pluralistic political system. Through the West's new position, more stringent conditions could be applied to development assistance without fear of 'losing' governments to the 'Communist-block' (Abrahamsen 2000: 3). The drastic change in Eastern Europe and the collapse of Soviet Union had effects on African countries. Fredrick Chiluba in Zambia said shortly after the fall of the Berlin Wall that 'if owners of socialism have withdrawn from the one-party system, who are we to continue with it?' (*Time of Zambia*, 31 December 1989, in Abrahamsen 2000: 5). Nyerere on his side thought they could 'learn a lesson or two from Eastern Europe' (Huntington 1991: 288).

There were also implicit remarks made to Tanzania from external sources (donors, states, the IMF and WB) encouraging Tanzania that they were moving in the 'right direction', and that Tanzania should liberalise its political system as it was liberalising its economy (Mmuya and Chaligha 1992: 20). Francois Mitterand for example said, 'French aid [to Africa] will be lukewarm toward authoritarian regimes and more enthusiastic for those initiating a democratic transition' (Abrahamsen 2000: 108). Hence, the message from the donors was quite straightforward about what the African countries in general should do. For this reason, the pressure to change was not internal as such but rather external and only found in the higher political levels, among businessmen and in the urban areas. When donors used external pressure, it was only then that leaders agreed to change the system and to comply with internal demands and to try to gain from this new relationship and trust with external agents. Chabal and Daloz state it even more blatantly, that 'it simply cannot be a coincidence that, now that the West ties aid to democratization under the guise of multiparty elections, multiparty elections are taking place in Africa' (Chabal and Daloz 1999: 118).Thus, democratisation or the political transformation to a multiparty system in Tanzania did not happen due to high urbanisation, high educational levels and developed

mass-communication. Democratisation took place as a result of the international political current and its direction towards liberal democracy. This influenced business people and national politicians, who in their turn were encouraged by the donor community to take steps towards a multiparty system.

African countries have in general been tightly connected and highly dependent on international actors given that historically Africa and its people have been treated as not existing before Europeans 'discovered' and exploited the continent. But Africa's history is also a history of interconnections with other regions, via trade relations with Arabia, Asia and Europe. African rulers and elites have co-operated with colonial powers to sustain and improve their own position and wealth towards the people and other elite groups. This interrelationship has in the same way influenced political changes and the transition from authoritarian rule or single-party rule towards democratisation (Abrahamsen 2000: 6, Wolf 1997).

Strengthening the argument for external influences in the democratisation of Africa, Abrahamsen states that in some cases Africa has been seen as totally dependent on the North for its development and for the eradication of poverty since the internal capacities have not been present. But when it comes to the transition towards democracy, internal factors are suddenly considered to be the most important ones. This does not seem fully plausible, according to Abrahamsen, and to explain the transitions only with domestic factors is too simplistic. The political, cultural and financial connections over the globe tie countries closer together. Therefore, finance ministers, central banks and politicians are more linked today and changes within one field and one part of the globe, affect other parts of the globe faster and more deeply than previously. African countries were therefore very much influenced by the changes in Eastern Europe which motivated the transition towards democracy in most of the Sub-Saharan countries (Abrahamsen 2000: 7).

Regardless of whether transitions were domestically or externally initiated, African regime transitions 'seemed frantically hurried' (Bratton and Van de Walle 1997: 5). The political changes and the transitions in Sub-Saharan Africa in the late 1980s and early 1990s were extremely short. According to Bratton and Van de Walle, it took only an average of 35 months from the initial political protest to the performance of multiparty elections. On the other hand, the time frame of 35

months from protest to election gives a picture of the possibility of having a short timespan when transforming political systems from authoritarian rule to democratic rule and one can question the quality of a change this rapid. Herein lies, in my opinion, a false impression of democracy transition, namely the concept of there being a finishing line. Democracy in any country needs to be cherished, treasured and protected, which is an ongoing process.

Ottaway criticises this rapid (and shallow) democratisation and gives the responsibility for this to the international donor community and its policymakers. They used a model based partly on 'selective reading of the literature on democratisation' (Ottaway 2003: 11) and partly on the requirements of agencies that need to show quick results. Although many studies of democratisation emphasise that it is a process that has been developing over decades and centuries, democracy promoters of today expect results within ten years. Hence, historical studies pointing towards a long time-frame and the complexities involved in a democratisation process have been ignored. Ottaway claims that the studies made by Philippe Schmitter and Guillermo O'Donnell[127] and Robert Putnam[128] have been used in the wrong way. Schmitter and O'Donnell's *tentative* conclusions were taken as facts and, according to Ottaway, 'took on a life of their own, losing their nuances and turning into outright policy prescriptions' (Ottaway 2003: 12). Putnam's work on social capital has been misinterpreted in a similar way: social capital has not been seen as a culture of trust and cooperation that has developed over centuries, instead it is considered as something that can be created in a short period by outsiders.

> As a result, the studies with the greatest impact on democracy
> promotion have been those that looked narrowly at the final phase
> of democratic transitions without asking too many questions about
> what had happened earlier or what kind of conditions had made the
> democratic outcome possible.
>
> (Ottaway 2003: 11)

---

[127] *Transition from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).
[128] *Making Democracy Work, Civic Tradition in Modern Italy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993).

If part of the goal of democratisation is to build institutions that are accountable to and recognised by the people, then the time for implementing firm foundations for these institutions has been very short. This has had direct relevance for the consolidation of democracy in Africa (Bratton and Van de Walle 1997: 5). In relation to this, Sørensen asks if the pressure Western donors put on some countries in Africa in connection with election preparations has had counterproductive effects since democracy transition is not something to be done in a haste and over a short period of time. Sørensen says, when these kinds of 'quick fixes' of introducing a multi-party system are 'substituted for the long haul of patiently paving the way for a democratic polity, the result may be that a thin layer of democratic coating is superimposed upon a system of personal rule without changes in the basic features of the old structure' (Sørensen 1993: 53). As an effect, the political parties that developed in post-communist and developing countries were very incoherent in their political ideologies. This reflects the existence of party bans (as in Tanzania) and according to Carothers, a high level of 'donor dependency of many African states [which] gives the donor community considerable influence over their socioeconomic policies, draining most of the possible ideological life out of the party arena' Carothers 2006: 36)

Internal factors played a role in the transition process in Tanzania and these demands for a political change were situated in the urban areas where the minority of the population lives. But in my opinion, the external factors were more important, in particular the economic recovery programmes which were a part of the transition before any internal demands for democracy appeared. And as mentioned previously, the Nyalali Commission found that the majority of people preferred a reformed single-party system to a multiparty system putting emphasis on the external influences.

5.9 Concluding Remarks

I regard the process of democratic transition in Tanzania to have been primarily a result of external pressure by the donor community, in combination with the influence by Nyerere, the Nyalali Commission and some discontent with(in) CCM, which was followed by some demands within the country from informal opposition

groups. The donor community emphasised that a pluralistic political system had to accompany the already liberalised economy as a condition for continued aid (Mmuya and Chaligha 1992, 1994, Omari 1997, Mukandala and Othman 1994, Mmuya 1994, 199x, Carothers 2006). Economic crises in the end of the 1970s and at the beginning of the 1980s, together with previous mismanagement of aid money by governments and lack of openness and accountability in the decision-making structures have all contributed to the demand for political reforms by donor countries. Tanzania had, due to economic constraints, become more and more dependent on policies enforced upon them and the internal opposition domestically expressed the same opinions that were articulated more explicitly by donors. There were also implicit remarks made to Tanzania from external sources encouraging Tanzania that they were moving in the 'right direction', and that Tanzania should liberalise its political system as it was liberalising its economy (Mmuya and Chaligha 1992: 20). The collapse of Eastern Europe furthermore played a role in disseminating the message of plural politics together with changes in African countries towards a multiparty system. These outside influences came first and the internal factors were a reaction to what was happening outside Tanzania. But what is important here as well is that a change was 'sanctioned' by the views of Nyerere. Due to his identity and his status as 'Father of the Nation', his opinions mattered irrespective if he was the president or not. It seems Nyerere felt very strongly that Tanzania and her destiny were his responsibility (Nyerere 1995).

Even though the opposition groups initially went through similar developments to the TAA, the parties formed out of these proto-political groups are creations by individuals and by legislative measures. These parties were created to compete for the presidency, in contrast to TANU which was formed with a single purpose – to fight for independence. Today parties try gain a ruling position, which is quite a different matter. Secondly, there is no party today that has a 'Father of a Nation' figure to put forth. Not even CCM, which has the advantage of being seen by the majority of people as the creation of their 'Father', giving the party a strong symbolic value. Nevertheless, the opening up of democracy in Africa and elsewhere has enabled popular mobilisation since when the society becomes more open, critical views can flourish more freely than before. This enables the long-term building of a democratic society and that makes reverting to authoritarian rule less

likely (Sørensen 1993: 59). To have regular and free multiparty elections is part of this parcel where voters have the opportunity to get rid of poor leaders and elect new ones that hopefully will represent them better. However, I agree with Hydén (1994) who states that the 'introduction of multiparty politics is a change in form, but democratisation also implies changes in attitude and behaviour'. Looking at Africa and at Tanzania in particular, the transition towards democracy is still at the very beginning, and to become a consolidated democracy lies still far ahead; what has been achieved so far 'is the easy bit' (Hydén 1994: 104-5). Despite a multiparty system, CCM has had landslide victories in the first three elections. This can of course be a result of the uneven opportunites for the opposition parties' to finance, compete, reach out and participate in rallies, especially in the rural areas, but this is not enough as an explanation. We need to study other cultural underlying factors too that have a great impact on voters' party preferences.

Mmuya and Chaligha (1994) state that the single-party system in Tanzania left a legacy of a culture of monolithic politics and a patrimonial political structure where the only party restricted or suppressed critical voices, although publicly claiming to allow critical voices within the party. They therefore conclude that 'the transition to multipartism and plural democracy becomes essentially a cultural transformation' (Mmuya and Chaligha 1994: 5). Also, President Mkapa says that the multiparty system introduced is alien and in order to fit Tanzania it must be adjusted to the local circumstances. He emphasised this in an opening remark at a conference of Speakers and presiding officers of the Africa Region of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association when he said: 'You can clone sheep, yes, but it would be foolish to clone democratic institutions or parliamentary procedures from the older democracies of Europe or America'.[129] He further said that since it took centuries for democracy to develop in one culture, it cannot be imported and 'transplanted unadjusted in a different and complex culture, historical context or political environment'.[130]

I have chosen to call this wider and profound transformation and consolidation of democracy 'cognitive consolidation', which I regard to take place at an individual level along with other personal and interpersonal aspects that also need attention

---

[129] 'Master parliamentary skills, Mkapa tells MPs, Lwaga Mwambande, *The Guardian*, 29 May 1997.
[130] Ibid.

in a genuine consolidation of democracy. Thus the consolidation requires that individuals have an understanding of what democratic rule means and agree on how it should be accommodated among the populace and the politicians alike, as well as about their respective rights and responsibilities in this changed political setting. It involves an altered way of relating to hierarchy and leadership, popular participation in decision-making (as compared to the one-party system) concerning rules and regulations, but also a popular understanding of the purpose of the multiparty system, its advantages and disadvantages.

The rest of part II is devoted to presenting and discussing these issues and I will illustrate how local people in Kiteto District perceive 'democracy', as well as how the transformation towards democracy and the changed political system, from one-party rule to a multiparty system, in Tanzania has been received and perceived.

6   DEMOCRACY AND MULTIPARTY SYSTEM IN A LOCAL CONTEXT

> The aim is not to choose a specific party. The aim is to elect a good leader. If I am CHADEMA and my leader is not good and I vote for him - that is not democracy if the leader for CCM is better.
>
> > (Ec/Pl.Com.2memb.1M.1middl.Su)

> [Multipartism is to have] many leaders, and each and everyone has his own way of leading, which just gives problems for the Maasai.
>
> > (Maa.M2E2Midl.Enga)

In the first general election in 1995, thirteen parties were competing for the presidency. This was a dramatic change from previous elections and became a reason for concern to many people in Tanzania. Especially in rural areas, the new political system made people anxious as few seemed to know the reason for the introduction of multiparty system. And since Tanzania is one of the few African countries that has not experienced major internal turmoil and conflicts after Independence, many were genuinely afraid this could be the end of peace and unity in the country. In addition, many pre-election campaigns were characterised by heated discussions and speeches by the opposition parties adding to the tension.

6.1 Legacy of CCM

> We have heard about CCM for a long time. It is like 'air' blowing,
> you hear it but you do not see it. It is everywhere.
>
> > (01.Maa.M3.1M.2Y.Engap.)

> CCM is a person who has a green cap.
>
> > (01.Maa.W7.Engap.)

We are children of CCM; CCM is like our mothers.

<div align="right">(Wanguu.Wgroup.Mnada)</div>

I am used to milk my cow and it is quiet and I get milk everyday and everything is fine. Then, if one man shows me a new cow and tells me to milk it instead, I cannot do that since I do not know that cow, its habits, if it is quiet and if it will kick me or not. So, I need time to get used to the new cow first before I can start to milk it.

<div align="right">(One Maasai man in Ilkuishi-Oiboir describing his relationship with CCM and the opposition,01.Maa.M4.2E.2M.Eng.)</div>

CCM has had landslide victories in all elections [131] since the multiparty system was introduced while the opposition is still striving for a power position. As mentioned in the former chapter, the discrepancy between the ruling party and the opposition can, to some extent, be explained by the parties' different capacities and their history, but in this chapter I will argue for another factor behind the opposition's so-far weak position in politics. Considering the history of CCM, its predecessor TANU and its founding father Julius Nyerere, it goes without saying that people have a closer and more experienced relationship with CCM than with the opposition parties, even if connotations of the ruling party are sometimes vague and referred to as 'just a flag', 'something 'greenish', or 'it is a person with a green cap'. However, CCM is frequently referred to by respondents as their 'mother' or 'father', or sometimes the respondents refer to themselves as 'children of CCM' as in the quote above. In the coming part, I will explore more about these sentiments and what implications these sentiments have for a wider comprehensive consolidation of democracy, as well as for the system of multiparty elections and the opposition parties.

---

[131] At the local level, CCM won all village chairperson positions in Kiteto District in 1999 and 2004. The opposition (CHADEMA) won in five sub-villages out of 170 in 1999. In 2004 the total number of sub-villages was higher (191) and the opposition won seats in five of them (CHADEMA 3, CUF 1 and TLP 1).

6.1.1 Understanding 'Demokrasia'

As Tanzania is a multi-linguistic country there are many individuals whose first encounter with Swahili is when they start school. This is especially relevant for the Maasai who, as mentioned earlier in section 3.2.1, only reluctantly send their children to school and therefore are not very conversant in Swahili. For this reason, *Demokrasia* (Sw. for democracy) as a concept is experienced by the respondents as a foreign and recent one and it is therefore not a thoroughly comprehended word. The anonymity is caused both by language barriers between Swahili/English and other languages spoken in the country and by the poor infrastructure – both physical and non-physical – that makes it difficult to inform the citizens about the political change. In addition, the responsibility to inform the citizens has been in the hands of the ruling party and politicians have, for obvious reasons, not always felt it necessary to inform them about the political change taking place in the country.

People in non-literate cultures, like the Maasai, comprehend and conceptualise new words and concepts differently to those in literate cultures, since there are differences in how literate and non-literate cultures experience and memorise new words and concepts. In this argument I have used Walter Ong's comparison between oral and written cultures but of course there are many others who also write about the distinction between literacy and orality like Finnegan (1988, 1992), Olson and Torrance (1991), Goody (2000) and Martin (1994). Ong says that in oral cultures new knowledge (and words) must be conceptualised and verbalised with close references to the everyday life. Note, however, that this is not the same as saying that people in oral cultures lack the capacity to think in abstract terms or logically. Rather, in this way, the new and objective world is enclosed in ordinary life (Ong 1991: 56). For instance, the multiparty system must become a practical part of people's ordinary lives in order to be understandable. This may be the reason why Maasai, as cattle-keepers, almost always give references to cows when trying to explain or understand the new phenomenon of multiparty system. Opposition politicians visiting the Maasai also make references to CCM as being an old cow that needs to be replaced with a younger one that can give more milk. A reference to cows can also be made by people when they explain their cautious attitude towards opposition parties, as in the third quotation above.

Further, in oral cultures words are experienced as sounds and are not seen (and read) by the eye. Hence, the abbreviations the new parties have, such as CHADEMA, CUF, TPL, UDP and so on, are simply sounds that in order to be comprehended must be filled with experiences and reference to people's everyday lives. In comparison, Ong (1991: 24) argues that in literate cultures when we hear a (new and foreign) word we cannot only relate to the 'sounding' of the word but usually we try to 'picture' the spelling of the word when interpreting it. Ong says that in literate cultures people are used to relating to words in writing and therefore our primary experience of words is connected to the visual field. As a result, we may find it difficult to relate to a new word only to how it sounds before we start to picture how it is spelt. This perspective also enables individuals in a written culture to step back and in a way de-naturalise and decontextualise the human being by in detail presenting such things as the names of leaders and politicians in an abstract and neutral catalogue, completely without connection to human action. In an oral culture there are no similar neutral forms of expression as a catalogue. As an example, Ong says that in *Iliad* (which originally was told orally) there are extended notes of Greek leaders and the regions they ruled over but all the information of people and places are connected to human actions. Translated to the political situation in Kiteto, politicians need to be seen in person and their actions, promises, must be realised in order for them to be known and 'real' so to speak – to be contextualised. In addition, Ong says that 'thinking' in oral cultures is not about definitions. Words get their meaning through the actual circumstances in which they exist and these circumstances are not, as in a dictionary, only words, but also contains gestures, variations of voice, facial expressions and the whole human, existential environment where the real verbalised word exists. In contrast, in written cultures we have invented dictionaries where the meaning and definition of a word is noted (Ong 1991: 61).

In 2002, the Afrobarometer, in their investigation about political perceptions, tried to find out how Tanzanians understand democracy. They posed the question: 'What if anything, does 'democracy' mean to you?' The Afrobarometer found that 86% were able to attach some meaning to democracy and only 14% were unable to give any response. Almost half gave civil liberties or personal freedoms as an answer. 20% saw it in terms of electoral choice, voting or multiparty elections.

Equity and justice was mentioned by twelve percent and only six percent bring up social and economic development as a definition (Afrobarometer March 2002: 32). In my findings, in 70% of the interviews the respondents had not heard or could not define the concept *'demokrasia'* and in only 30% of the interviews could respondents give a definition. It is interesting to note the difference between the Afrobarometer survey and my own research. One reason for this difference is probably that I did my research in very remote areas with a higher degree of illiteracy and greater communication problems and, hence, it was more difficult for people to get access to information besides that information that was spread orally. In addition, even if the Afrobarometer team sometimes used open-ended questions, they also used questions with pre-fixed categories, which could have contributed to different information. In my interviews, those who were informed and defined the concept firsthand were men and non-Maasai (see table 2 below). Those who defined it mentioned *freedom* to do different things as a key component of democracy, which would correspond to the responses *civil liberties* and *personal freedom* given in the Afrobarometer survey.

DEMOCRACY CONCEPT - 54 INTERVIEWS							
Defined (in numbers of interviews)				Not defined (in numbers of interviews)			
Maasai		Non-Maasai		Maasai		Non-Maasai	
M	W	M	W	M	W	M	W
5	0	7	4	14	14*	1	9**
9%		13%	7%	26%	26%		17%
* One person had heard of the concept, but could not define it. All others interviewed had never heard the concept. ** Six respondents had heard of the concept but could not define it.							

Table 2: Familiarity with democracy concept

Information about what the concept entails has not been explained and has not reached the population in the rural areas and this is shown in the poor familiarity with democracy and the multiparty system. Since the change in Tanzania is connected to the liberalisation of economy and the introduction of a pluralistic political system resulting in the performance of three general and three local elections, people obviously know that there are several political parties in the country. Yet most people were 'left in the dark', as they say, when it came to the reasons for *why* there were suddenly more parties. There are, furthermore, discrepancies between the Maasai and the non-Maasai groups regarding knowledge and how exposed one has been to information. Obtaining information has been easier for the non-Maasai groups than for Maasai since they, firstly, speak the official language and are more literate and secondly, live in more accessible areas and in constituted villages. In addition, it is safe to say that, in general, women have been less exposed than men to information while young men and those who are politically active and members of a party have been most exposed.

Hence, men belonging to the non-Maasai groups were most frequently able to give the concept a definition in the interviews. Hardly any in the Maasai group could define it due to its novelty and due to it being Swahili (or at least a Swahili form of the English word). But when someone among the Maasai defined it, it was said that democracy is to 'work and live together' or to 'unite people so they will be free, work together to elect the leaders they like and the party they like'. One respondent said that democracy and the multiparty system go hand-in-hand (Maa.Olaig,3Adv.Maa.M1.Osi.). In all, there are three related views about what democracy entails that come forth in the responses. These are:

- One can choose a leader that will bring development.
- One can choose a party that brings development.
- It is introduced to give competition between the parties in order to bring development.

We can see that the focus here lies on development, and there are hopes that through democracy and the multiparty system there is a possibility to get a new

leader or a new party that would 'give' development more rapidly than has been done earlier. The system implies hope for some change in one's life for the better.

On the other side of the scale are those who never have heard the concept or have heard it but do not know its meaning. Those least informed among the interviewees are women in general, but Maasai women in particular, and even more so the women in Engapune sub-village. The cultural norms of excluding women from the political arena and lack of knowledge in Swahili have made them very marginalised in this matter. The Maasai women in Engapune say they do not have any knowledge about the political leadership and they do not care: they have not been involved within the political sphere previously, as it is the men who select their leaders, so 'Why should we care now?' they say. And, in addition, they do not have the time to attend political meetings since they have many other duties, according to the respondents.

Another meaning associated with the democracy concept is *freedom*.[132] One respondent who holds the position of chairperson for a non-Maasai youth group gives a broad definition of the concept: according to him, democracy contains several things including human rights, freedom at elections, freedom of choice, freedom to choose the leader and party you want and the freedom to do what you like. For some non-Maasai women, democracy is to 'make your own decisions without trouble from village government or anyone who might want to hinder you'. Freedom was also interpreted by respondents from the opposition as freedom from following government regulations such as paying certain taxes opposed by their own party.[133]

---

[132] The view of 'freedom to do what you want' coincides to some extent with the interpretation made by people of *uhuru* (freedom) at the time of Independence. The British were afraid that uhuru was to be interpreted as 'freedom from everything', i.e. freedom from paying taxes and freedom from compulsory (often endorsed by a whip) agricultural tasks such as making tie ridges and having famine reserves (Sadleir 1999: 227). Note: Ridging is an agricultural technique used by the British in Tanganyika in dry and hilly areas to prevent loss of water and humidity in the soils. Soil is banked up in 20-30cm high ridges, 70-90cm between the ridges, along the hill contours so as to collect water. Maize, cotton, beans, etc. are then planted on top of the ridges. Tie ridging means creating equal height ridges between the parallel ones with 3-4m intervals. In this way, small pools are created increasing rainwater infiltration which makes the soil more resistant to drying leading to increased harvests. After Independence this labour-demanding and compulsory practice was abandoned and farmers were encouraged to plough up and down the hillsides instead, which unfortunately has led to soil erosion and impoverished land (Personal communication with Lars-Ove Jonsson, agricultural expert, Orgut Consulting AB).
[133] This perception is very important since it points towards a lack of differentiation between what is decided by the Parliament and the ruling party. Hence, all regulations are seen as regulations

While the democracy concept is more easily understood by younger generations among the non-Maasai groups, elder generations struggle to explain it. Some elder respondents were very uncertain (maybe afraid of being seen as ignorant) about how to answer the question 'what is democracy' since they thought there was only one correct answer. After laughs and discussions on who should answer, one elder man said: 'Democracy is to decide together in a group. If they like to dig a well, they would sit together and discuss how they should go about it-this is democracy - a modern system'. Thus, the concept constitutes collective work, something done previously but also occasionally nowadays on each other's fields or building a house in exchange for food and drinks; in short, democracy is co-operation between people. This explanation resembles the Ujamaa concept of working together and co-operating for everyone's benefit. Another respondent said: 'Democracy is a way for people to decide without fear and pressure from people of higher rank. In the old times, people could not say their meaning in front of *Bwana Mkubwa* (Big Men), but today they are allowed to speak in front of the President and he can listen to your advice. Today there is this freedom where people can speak about everything in Tanzania'.

The freedom of expression is certainly one of the major changes after the introduction of the multiparty system and the liberalisation of the economy. There have been for many years a vast number of newspapers, weekly magazines and TV channels, both private and government, yet the rural areas have yet to be exposed to the variety of mass-media. With many rural areas getting electricity, bar-owners and groups of individuals are encouraged to purchase satellite dishes, giving them the opportunity to watch television and be exposed to news from different sources. Nevertheless, the message of being more 'free' has been manifested in people's minds, which is one very important aspect and step in the overall democratisation process.

---

made by the ruling party and when one does not belong to the ruling party, one does not have to follow these regulations.

6.1.2   Understanding the multiparty system

One of the core elements of a multiparty system is that the electorate has several political parties to choose between, candidates with different ideological platforms and policies who are competing for the position to rule the country or the village. Since citizens in Tanzania have experienced repeated elections where more than one party has been represented (not always the case though), one can expect that they are familiar with the concept of a multiparty system. Still, there are many of the respondents who do not know the *reason* behind its introduction. This must be seen as a deficiency since understanding the reasons for political change must be considered fundamental in a transition to and consolidation of a democratic and politically pluralistic society. One reason for the poor sharing of information is that information about the multiparty system was given by politicians from the ruling party, which must be considered disputable. For example, in the 1995 general election local politicians told the Maasai that they had to choose between different parties and that they should select 'a good party'. However, what party was to be regarded 'good' was established by the village leader and this manifested the position of the ruling party. Keeping the unity and having a consensual decision was enforced further by people's fears that several parties could only lead to conflicts and trouble between people. The atrocities in Rwanda and Burundi were in fresh memory and it was interpreted as the result of different political views and something that evidently must be avoided.

The Village Executive Officer (VEO) in Sunya told me that during the election in 1995, many people really did not know or understand the multiparty system. There were people who feared the multiparty election because they were afraid that there would be 'war' or different kinds of disorder in the country.[134] There were those who believed that if people were to elect different parties there would

---

[134] There are positive reports as well, such as this on of what took place during the election on mainland in 2000: 'In Dar-es-Salaam the presidential candidates of Chama Cha Mapinduzi, Tanzania Labour Party, and Civic United Front tickets cast their votes. They said they were satisfied with the way the voting was conducted and were also prepared to accept the results. Commenting on the situation, Jamal Maulid who had cast his vote at a centre in Mwenge said that the peace and tranquillity that prevailed was unexpected. "Most of us recalled the situation in 1995 when there was a lot of chaos during the elections. This time things have run so smooth everyone is happy. There is no tension," he said. After the voting was over, people went about their business as if nothing had happened." 'Vote Counting Starts After Peaceful Elections', *The Guardian*, 30 October 2000.

be conflicts between people and people would neither talk nor greet each other. But since the result of the election in 1995 there have not been any conflicts. Tanzanians have started to understand democracy, according to the respondent. The Ward Executive Officer (WEO) said:

> As the village secretary says, people were really worried. There were people who knew and people who did not know [about the multiparty system]. People were educated first when the parties were formed but because those parties just started every person said, what the hell is going on? Everybody was afraid. They knew about war. It was not easy, very bad. But as the village secretary said, people have understood, people eat together. Afterwards they were friends.

When looking at what Maasai brought up regarding the multiparty system, one common sentiment is that 'We have just heard that there is now multipartism and that we now have to choose between different parties' (MaaM2Y.Osi). Explanations given by some Maasai respondents for introducing several parties in Tanzania is that the ruling party was not progressing with the development of the country, i.e. other parties might make the ruling party perform better. Therefore, it is thought that people or institutions introduced the system from overseas so as to give the ruling party some competition. It is believed that through this increased competition, CCM would then work harder for the development of the country and its people (Maa.M1.Osi, Maa.M4E.Osi). These views were generally shared by non-Maasai groups and especially some young non-Maasai women were particularly upset with the lack of progress made by CCM. In a discussion between young and elder women, diverging opinions emerged about the progress made by CCM in helping people. The elder women favouring CCM said that CCM is as their 'mother' since they got rid of the colonisation power and therefore they cannot abandon it. The younger women were of opposite opinion. One young woman said:

> CCM says I am like your mother. Do not throw me away. We will solve all your problems. But CCM does not help us at all.

Another young woman said:

> If CCM says that they are just like our mothers; what mothers do
> not help their children? CCM does not help us at all! Next time we
> are going to try CHADEMA.
>
> <div align="right">(Wanguu.Wgroup.Mnada)</div>

On the more sceptical side, there are perceptions that the multiparty system was introduced because there are many politicians who want to become Bwana Mkubwa and this is easier when there are several parties (Maa.W3.Loo, Maa.ME.Ilk, Maa.W1.Osi). Within the one-party system all politicians did not stand the same chance and the multiparty system is therefore a way of creating work opportunities for politicians according to the respondents. Yet there are others who see competition between different parties and leaders as a positive sign and as something that would enable them to elect a good leader later on. Then again, some Maasai men say that they might with this system elect a good leader but they might just as easily elect a bad leader, reflecting the differences in choosing leaders. It is difficult to know who is a good leader with a multiparty system since it is not the Maasai way of choosing leadership, as discussed earlier. Nevertheless, the emphasis here is on the *leader* and not on the party. A good leader is still seen as more important than a party, but this sometimes causes a contradiction. Many respondents who support CCM mention that the opposition candidate for Member of Parliament for Kiteto is a better candidate since he is more educated and would probably be a better MP than the incumbent. However, since he belongs to the opposition, they did not vote for him. Loyalty to the party was stronger even if the opposition candidate was seen as better.[135] Hence, while people want to see a good leader, they still want that good leader to come from the ruling party.

---

[135] In a report about voters' preferences and opinions in connection with elections, Research and Education for Democracy in Tanzania (REDET) found that 'where as [sic] personal leadership qualities came first as the most important factor determining voters' preference for a presidential candidate, belonging to the same party is the first ranked reason for voters' preference for MPs (28.4%), followed by personal leadership qualities (21.1%)' ('Prospective voter majority ignore policies', by Aloyce Menda, in *Business Times*, 10 November 2000*)*

Political arguments favouring the ruling party among the Maasai at local level were that women would not have to pay any taxes and, most importantly, that there would be no taxation of Maasai cows. The question of a 'cow-tax' was favoured by CHADEMA (the largest opposition party in Kiteto District) adding to their unpopularity among the Maasai. Moreover people in general were made to believe that CHADEMA only favoured the young and that elders would be killed[136] (Kag.W3-KambW2 EEMYY.Su, MaaWYOsi). There were even respondents who said if they as much mentioned the name of the opposition party they would be killed since there would be 'police'[137] who would find out who was pro-CHADEMA. On top of this, Maasai were led to believe that they would lose all their cows and would have to survive on agriculture if the opposition were to win the election[138] (Maa.W5Y.Osi). Having this misinformation circulating in the communities, it is no surprise that people were afraid that there would be conflicts. Therefore, many of those interviewed among the Maasai found that the multiparty system was 'just about fighting', which made them afraid to vote for any other party than CCM or prefer to not vote at all (Maa.W3Y.Osi).

The main argument by those who favour the multiparty system is that the one-party system made people submissive: the system 'squeezed' people into one format where different views could not come forth. To reflect people's different opinions the multiparty system is therefore more suitable and it gives the population the opportunity to vote for another party that hopefully can bring some improvements to their lives. This hope is capitalised on by the new parties at political campaigns, with extensive promises like building schools and roads, supplying water, building hospitals, giving salaries to farmers, providing good housing, etc. Even if the same promises are made by the ruling party, the opposition parties suffer most when they cannot deliver. It seems that regardless of whether the election is won or not, promises are to be kept or it is interpreted that the opposition is no better than the ruling party. This is combined with the opinion that they have at least received some development from CCM – if not much. Since

---

[136] The rumour was spread by CCM politicians and village leaders according to the respondents. The CHADEMA candidate for Member of Parliament in Kiteto said that since CHADEMA has many young supporters this is interpreted as the party only preferring young people in their party and that old people would be neglected.
[137] This would imply vigilant CCM party supporters.
[138] This information was also spread by CCM politicians according to the respondents.

most CCM politicians are familiar and because people know CCM and its policies, they continue to vote and support them rather than jeopardise their familiar situation by voting for the opposition. Many of these views illustrate the confusion and multiple roles of CCM. This naturally has historical causes based in the one-party system when CCM included the president, the government, the parliament and the state. Even though development assistance (e.g. roads, secondary schools) might be decided in parliament in accordance with the opposition parties, the government funds and assistance are still seen as something coming from the ruling party. Hence, every improvement, including those supported by the opposition, are monopolised by CCM and regarded by people as solely an assistance funded by CCM. Government is not assisting them as such; it is the party that 'takes care of its children'.

6.1.3   Peace, unity and harmony under one-party rule

Even though people are aware of that there is a multiparty system, respondents usually only manage to mention three or four of the (in 1998) thirteen parties. This is naturally a result of the poor infrastructure and economic resources of the new parties and the other factors mentioned above. Most of the new political parties had no choice but to concentrate their efforts on certain regions and districts where they stood the best chance of getting votes. Hence, the parties most familiar to people are CCM, CHADEMA and NCCR-M while others have heard of CUF and UDP. The reason for CHADEMA being well known is that it is the major opposition party in Kiteto District and it has many supporters there, especially in Sunya village.[139] Nevertheless, presently democracy is known as the introduction of several parties in the country. Still, the respondents do not see the point of having a multiparty system, since they have not had any problems with CCM. The party has been with them since the beginning (of Independence). However the most serious reason for the dislike (and which has implications for the basis of the pluralistic political system) is that people are afraid that a multiparty system will create conflicts between people and disrupt the peace, unity, and harmony that

---

[139] The MP candidate for CHADEMA in Kiteto made a conscious choice to establish CHADEMA in Sunya as an effort to try to assist the people there. Also Sunya, unlike Ilkuishi-Oiboir, is a multiethnic village with many young people and many farmers (agricultural expansion is on the party's agenda), which is why expansion has been easier there than in a pastoral village like Ilkuishi-Oiboir.

prevail in the country, something already emphasised by Nyerere as an argument for one-party rule. A multiparty system might jeopardise the peace in the country since opposition parties can join forces and fight the ruling party for power, according to some respondents. One could say that the reasons for the positive attitudes towards the one-party system are feelings of comfort and security it evokes and the wish to continue the present situation - a state of peace in the country, with unity and harmony, that is to be preserved at any cost. Considering the situation in many other African countries, and especially the neighbouring Rwanda, Burundi and Kenya, people are understandably afraid that something similar could also happen in Tanzania if there were no peace. The message of peace, unity and harmony is therefore stressed over and over again in political rhetoric especially at the national level, but also by local politicians and the population at local level (including those I interviewed in Kiteto).

The status of peace, unity (with Zanzibar) and harmony is seen by the populace as one of the major achievements by the ruling party. First of all, the party has been with the people for a long time and during its existence it has brought peace and unity to the country. This was Nyerere's major accomplishment: to keep Tanzania peaceful without wars with other countries, without internal conflicts and disruption and enabling people from different ethnic groups to live together in cross-ethnic harmony. The fact that CCM 'has always been there' means that it is familiar and known to everybody and through the reference to the party as your 'father' or 'mother' it is also emotionally close. Whether there is a real 'correlation' or not to CCM as a 'peace-keeper', people have close and emotional relationship to the party. The opposition parties can for obvious reasons not arouse the same emotional feelings and response and do not have the same historic relationship to the populace as CCM.

6.1.4   Creation of an identity-based party

According to Hodgson (2001), TANU made some small efforts to attract Maasai voters during the end of 1950s and there were a few educated Maasai who joined the ranks of TANU and later on CCM. The most famous Maasai who succeeded to establish himself as a national politician was Edward Sokoine who became Prime

Minister in 1977. Otherwise, there does not seem to have been any major efforts to recruit party members among the Maasai (Hodgson 2001: 188). On the other hand, the interest among the Maasai to join the party themselves was not that high either due to having their own customary leadership structure. Yet one had to produce a membership card for TANU when selling or buying cattle or receiving famine relief (Hatfield 1977b: 20, in Hodgson 2001: 188). Nevertheless, general knowledge about CCM was brought to the Maasai (male) community through those who received an education.[140] Missionaries in Maasailand had established schools[141] and it was partly through the Maasai who received an education that information about TANU and later CCM was received. Information about CCM was linked to the community through the responsibility of higher age-sets to pass on information to younger generations. Hence, Ilmauya (Seuri) taught Ilmakaa and Ilmakaa taught Ilandis about the party and the positive features of the party 'that was formed by Nyerere and that brought peace among the Maasai'.[142] Maasai women were not informed to the same extent about CCM, which was also apparent in the interviews. Women usually vote as their husbands tell them to vote, i.e. what has been agreed upon in the community. Nonetheless, what is important here is that CCM was embraced as a clan. All parties are metaphorically compared to clans within the 'Swahili' society, as it is termed. This has some important implications: since you can identify yourself with the party in a similar way as you identify yourself with a clan, you would automatically always belong to that party/'clan'. As little as you

---

[140] Even though parents in the communities were reluctant to send their children to school, they were forced to do so. The reluctance was based on fears that children sent to school would forget the Maasai way of life and 'become Swahili'. There were also communities who fled to forest areas to avoid sending children to school or simply told the authorities that their children had died.

[141] The Maasai got their religious belonging depending on what church, Catholic or Lutheran, had established the school. My respondents mention one missionary by the name of Hillman as the one who brought children to school without any fee. In Hodgson (2001: 97), one respondent referred to an American missionary, Father Hillman, as the one building a missionary school among the Maasai in the early 1960s.

[142] According to Maasai mythical history, the Maasai are entitled to all cattle in the world by their God and, as such 'retrieving' of cattle is a divine quest. Accumulation of cows is also a prerequisite in marriage arrangements as bride wealth besides giving prestige. Even if a person had 200 cows, if none of them were stolen, he would not be considered as a prestigious Maasai. Given that cattle raids were in no way a safe practice and many young men were killed, those with education convinced their fellow Maasai that they could co-operate with other ethnic groups without fights. This called for a discussion among the Maasai to balance pros and cons towards ending this practice and follow government law. In the end it was regarded a positive step to stop the conflicts with other ethnic groups caused by cattle raids although many ilmurran continued with it due to the prestige involved. Hence, it is regarded by the respondents that CCM settled conflicts and 'brought' peace and has since then taken care of the Maasai; they do not want any other party since CCM saved them from further wars.

would trade away your clan belonging, would you change your party belonging.[143] I will elaborate more about this connection below.

6.1.5   The clan and the party

A significant part of Maasai social structure is the clan system. Its importance is noticed in the diversity of its functions as described in chapter 3.3.1 where clan identity establishes what rights and obligations Maasai have towards each other. Irrespective of where in Tanzania or even in Kenya one encounters one's fellow clan members, these relationships and obligations are present. Hence, through these practices the whole Maasai community takes care of those without resources and secures the survival them all, keeping the unity and harmony of the clan and the community intact. Consequently, for the Maasai CCM *is* their clan (metaphormically speaking), and since the Maasai community is seen as *one person* and like some respondents said, 'one cannot walk two paths at the same time', they cannot as Maasai belong to different parties. One olmurrani respondent said:

> I have been growing up with CCM. It has always been there. It is like my father. It can reward me and 'punish' me. There are other parties but I cannot belong to another party because I do not know them.
>
> (Maa.M5Y.Eng)

Thus, there is a way of relating to a party that differs from our Western idea of why to support a party.[144] A party is not a political party seen as having a particular ideology or policy that one has studied and made a conscious decision to support. A party is connected to one's identity but also to its track record. As mentioned earlier, the ruling party has been referred to by the Maasai as their

---

[143] In Pietilä et.al. (2002:287) the authors refer to a wealthy market woman in Mayanka who was suspected of supporting Chadema. The woman defended her position as CCM by saying: 'Why should I change the party if I would not even change my religion?'
[144] Naturally, there are also in European families who traditionally have voted for the same party for generations and in this way the party has become like a 'mother' or 'father', unthinkable to abandon for the sake of voting for the opposition. Party affiliation has become part of one's identity – it announces who you are, your political standpoint in different questions and very often your socioeconomic class.

'clan' within the 'Swahili' or political society. Hence, CCM would then be the 'hegemonic clan' for all Maasai and as unlikely as it would be to try to change your father or clan, almost as unlikely would it be to change your party belonging. The non-Maasai respondents usually refer to the party as their parent or themselves as children of CCM creating also in this way a 'family like' emotional bond to the party. Consequently, anyone who wants to move away from this structure is also breaking with their identity and becomes alienated; therefore there is a risk for conflicts since the Maasai society is seen as one, as walking the same path. Brothers belonging to different parties would, for example, not share the same homestead anymore. To walk on 'several separate paths' would be the same as splitting up the Maasai community, which would be detrimental for them, considering their already marginalised position in the society. Thus, the only way to avoid conflicts is to stay with(in) one party.

One could argue that since there are several parties today, and in a manner of speaking there are more 'Swahili' clans one could potentially belong to, people could choose his or her 'political' clan as they wish. However, it is not as straightforward as this. Considering that children are not brought up to be independent individuals but rather to be part of the larger community, individuals cannot according to the societal norms belong to different parties at the same time. CCM was the first party and it became *the* political clan for the Maasai. Following this argument there might be only one way of changing political affiliation and keep the peace, unity and harmony in the community intact. This could be done if they all as a group, and in consensus, decide to vote for a party other than CCM.[145]

6.2 Concluding Remarks

The rapid transition and implementation of a multiparty system in Tanzania was in a way counterproductive, since it *did* frighten people especially in the rural areas. As mentioned, people did not understand where all these new parties came from, let alone the reason for a political change towards a multiparty system that could

---

[145] Naturally, there are Maasai who individually vote for an opposition party but the majority stick to CCM.

jeopardise the national unity. Without question, this has had immediate consequences for a solid consolidation. If the core element of democracy is understood as a multiparty system, it must be recognised that this is a process that cannot be finalised in a decade. The populace need first to 'digest' the purpose and content of multipartism, which is why many still keep a watchful eye on the opposition and on what they can do.

Fear of conflict in connection with the elections has been obvious but asking if there were any conflicts in the area in the 1995 election, the answer is negative. Yet respondents imagine that many parties will create conflicts since people have different opinions. 'It must lead to conflicts', as one Maasai respondent said.[146] The focal point here is the perception that people with different opinions, who belong to different parties, are more prone to fight each other - as groups - than people with different opinions belonging to one party (one group) (and ideally they do not have different opinions).

Within the Maasai society, the cultural way of discussing matters that involve the community, solving conflicts and making decisions is through consensus, even though there are individuals whose opinions carry more weight than others. A consensual decision implies ultimately that there will not be any divergent party belonging either in the community. There could be, of course, different opinions initially; all people (mostly men) have the right to express their views in the meetings, where the traditional leader and elders request the different opinions. However, meetings are conducted until what might seem to be, a joint decision has been taken that all participants can agree on. In this way harmony is kept in the society. In other words, each election is preceded by a discussion in the community about candidates' and political parties' pros and cons, which defeats the purpose of electoral democracy and a secret ballot. Information of opposition parties has also been biased and the people have been given the view that the opposition is

---

[146] Even if people do not want conflicts, there are conflicts and they are not unusual and can sometimes lead to casualties. But if I try to differentiate non-political conflicts from possible conflicts connected to the multiparty system, I would argue that conflicts over grazing areas, water holes, cows destroying crops, thefts and so on are connected to people's livelihoods and are interpersonal in most cases and not based on ideological differences. On the other hand, if a party promotes as their policy agricultural expansion on the cost of diminished pastures, for example, then the 'livelihood' conflict becomes politicised and the seriousness of the conflict changes. It increases to include all of that party's supporters and is no longer a conflict between individuals but between different views, perceptions and ideas backed-up by an organisation. Herein is the difference as I see it.

going to disrupt the peace in the country. Therefore, the concepts of democracy/multiparty system are still to be filled with more positive connotations. Until now it has been equalised with a minimalist definition: a competitive election between different parties, i.e. electoral democracy.[147]

Moreover, the introduced liberal democracy is based on individualism where individual choice is promoted, which does not concur with the African perception of the relation between the society and the self. In African societies, the 'self' is commonly characterised as collectivistic, whereas the 'self' in Western society is individualistic. Individualism in this sense has not had any role in African societies as, the African political scientist Lumumba-Kasongo says:

> Although African societies are culturally, geographically and historically diverse, and colonial and neocolonial experiences have added new political and educational elements to theirs, the metaphysics of African societies are characterized more by the principle of collective existence than that of individualism. Politically and psychologically, an individual vote has more meaning in relationship to others. Liberal democracy has been challenged in Africa when it preaches individual rights as opposed to those collective rights that are part of African value system. Individual consciousness is emerging because of economic imperatives; however, it has not found a solid social base.
>
> (Lumumba-Kasongo 2005: 16)

Former President Mkapa has similar thoughts about individual versus community interest in relation to democracy and human rights. However, he also sees individual interests as a threat to the national unity. According to Mkapa there is a difference between the Western way of looking at human rights and the African way: 'Communal [rights] were above individual rights. … Human rights are anchored in a community, not in an individual. … Ultimately we might witness cases where an individual in pursuit of personal interests could pick up a quarrel

---

[147] Of course, this does not negate the fact that people can have needs covered by the Western democracy concept. People have started to request more information about land rights and human rights and pressure against local leaders has increased, something I will return to in chapter 8.

with the government or ruling party (CCM), which if allowed to prevail, could undermine national unity, or in our case undermine the Union'.[148]

Nonetheless, Tanzania has already begun down its path towards a democratic system based on individual votes in a multiparty system. The next part in my thesis will describe the 'democracy in practice' through the local elections in 1999 in Kiteto.

---

[148] 'Mkapa slams West', by Lucas Liganga, *Daily News*, 21 November, 2000

PART III

DEMOCRACY IN LOCAL PRACTICE

In this third part I aim to exemplify the challenges lying ahead in the consolidation of democracy and the multiparty system by describing first of all, the carrying out of a village election and its different components including political campaigns and election irregularities, and secondly, in chapter 8, describing a few smaller episodes exemplifying some positive events of women's and villagers' empowerment,[149] which can be seen as steps towards a consolidation of democracy. Finally, in chapter 9, the essence of the presentations in chapters 3 -8 are drawn into, what I call, core themes where some of the main impeding factors for a consolidation of the multiparty system are brought together.

The first chapter in this part III is a study of a village and sub-village election in Sunya village in 1999. This is the second election performed in a multiparty setting and reflects the perceptions the respondents have expressed in the earlier chapters that indicated not entirely positive connotations towards the multiparty system. This chapter answers the question: *How has the transition towards multiparty democracy been comprehended by people at village level?*

7   VILLAGE ELECTION IN SUNYA

[The main purpose of a campaign is to] communicate messages which will convince a majority of the electorate to vote for that party's candidates. Hence, it is each party's responsibility to set out themes or issues which the electorate will find more convincing than those of its opponents'.

(Former Speaker of the National Assembly Pius Msekwa 1995: 29)

---

[149] Empowerment here is to be understood as a change from being a silent observer and object of decision-making bodies to becoming an active, participating subject in decision-making. It means that people who are relatively powerless are able to gain more power. Sen defines it as an effect of development by increasing people's entitlements and capabilities (Spicker, Leguizamón and Gordon 2007: 63).

In a multiparty system there should ideally be several different policies to choose among with regard to how to run the local and/or the national government. These choices should be understood by the electorate and after hearing the different choices, the electorate makes their decision and votes accordingly. However, for political parties to have radically different policies to the mainstream liberal policies of today is difficult, especially in rural areas where people face severe problems of more urgent 'bread and butter' character (Msekwa 1995: 29). Campaigns in these circumstances tend to be focused on competition between politicians' character and qualities and their ability to deliver what has been promised. Thus, according to Msekwa, people's choice will in practice be influenced more by the individual qualities of the contestant than what party he/she represents. But even then, political parties have to face opinions about them that do not gain them much credibility and trust from the voters, as one young woman in Sunya said:

> The parties are just like a husband who is getting married. He promises a lot but afterwards he does not keep the promises. I love you, I love you but afterwards you do not get anything.
>
> (Wanguu.Wgroup.Mnada)

In Sunya village there are two parties: CCM and CHADEMA and naturally there is a big difference between these two parties and what support they have in the village. Even though CHADEMA is a new party, it has managed to attract supporters rather well: between 1998 and 1999, the membership base increased with 260% from 150 members to 540 members. Still, CCM is the dominant party having 1226 members in 1999, an increase from 850 the year before. On the other hand, an increase of party members does not necessarily show an increased interest in politics by the villagers: membership in a party is the prime way to receive an identity card.[150] In an interview session, the respondents complained about CCM being slow in handing out identity cards and their fee was much higher than the fee

---

[150] The other way is to have a written document from the sub-village chairperson.

taken by CHADEMA (1200 TZS and 200 TZS respectively). Thus, many started to apply for identity/membership cards through CHADEMA instead. It is not easy to say if this has been the main reason for CHADEMA's increase in members and even though the increase of members in the opposition party is very interesting, it has not resulted in more than three seats in the village government.

7.1 Nomination of Candidates

There is a major difference between CCM and CHADEMA in how candidates are nominated. While there is an election that takes place between candidates in CCM, candidates in CHADEMA seem to be nominated by the party leadership. Residents in the respective sub-villages are asked whom they prefer as CHADEMA nominee, then the political leadership within CHADEMA nominates the candidates. Thus, no election takes place. For example, one of the sub-village candidates was urged by residents in his sub-village to become a candidate. At first he did not want to, but gave in since the people were very persistent. This was something that CCM made jokes about in their rallies, that their MP candidate comes to Sunya and tells the party members who is going to run. However, this practice applies only to village chairperson and sub-village leaders, not village government candidates. Nevertheless, there are some regulations on who can run in the village election. A candidate must:

- Be a resident in the village,
- Be a Tanzanian citizen,
- Be 21 years or older,
- Be able to read and write Swahili or English,
- Have a legal income sufficient for making a living,
- Not owe any money to the village or national government,
- Be a member of a party,
- Have no mental disorder and
- Not have been sentenced in any court in Tanzania or served in prison for six months or more for criminal activity.

<div align="right">(Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania 1999a: 14)</div>

The procedure within CCM for nominating candidates starts several weeks before the election. Village chairperson candidates are nominated by party members in a closed election (*kura za maoni*) while those who come forward as candidates for village government fill in a form that states that they are qualified for such a position. A list of the candidates' names for village government is put on display for other villagers to see. In 1999's election, there are candidates from all but one sub-village. The two largest sub-villages in the centre of the village had the most candidates.

Candidates for the different chairperson posts in the village are selected through the nomination process within the party, by the party members in the respective sub-villages and by the party members in the whole village for the village chairperson candidate. In the 1999 election, CCM have three candidates (all men) who contested for the post as village chairperson. The candidates come from two different ethnic groups in the village: one from Kaguru and two from Nguu. The result of the party election was that the contestant belonging to Kaguru ethnic group received 211 votes while the other two received 98 and 32 votes respectively. Out of the 1226 party members in the village, only one third participated in this internal nomination. One explanation given was that on the same day there was a funeral of a man belonging to the Nguu ethnic group. This funeral was attended by many people and since it extended over several hours, people were more interested in resting and eating than participating in nominating a candidate. This was seen as an advantage for the Kaguru candidate.

Through talks and interviews with villagers, several different reasons for the Kaguru nomination can be observed. Social factor: the candidate's father is a well-known traditional doctor in the village and well respected by the villagers. The nominee himself, however, is not as well-known as his father and has not distinguished himself in the village as a whole even though he has been a ten-cell leader (Sw. *balozi*) since 1985. Nevertheless, during the nomination when he introduced himself, he referred to his father and immediately gained respect and recognition. According to one of the other candidates, this was enough for him to win the nomination. Ethnicity: he belongs to the Kaguru ethnic group. The Maasai and Kamba prefer a leader from this group to Nguu, to which the other two

nominees belong. The Nguu ethnic group are mainly farmers while the other ethnic groups' livelihood is based on cattle-keeping and/or agriculture. This means that the Maasai and Kamba supported the candidate since he is agro-pastoralist. These groups do not want the Nguu farmers to come to power in the village since people are afraid that there will be fewer grazing areas and that conflicts will increase. One of the candidates argued that ethnicity was more important than education of the candidates. He himself has good qualifications (agricultural science, farm management, education in the Netherlands and being fluent in English) but he was not nominated due to his ethnic belonging. Livelihood: since the candidate has some cattle, he knows the situation for the pastoralists. This is important to the Maasai. He knows about the problem with cattle tracks and he told people that if he was to be nominated he would increase the width of the tracks in order to minimise conflicts with agriculturists. Conflict: one of the candidates wanted to increase the farming areas in order to get larger harvests. The Maasai sees increased farming areas as a threat that will lead to shortage of water and grazing areas for them and their cattle and to environmental destruction. In addition, according to some respondents, a further reason for not nominating one of the Nguu candidates had to do with previous occupation-related problems that made people reluctant to support him. The third nominee, I am told has a bad reputation, is arrogant and he is not very well-liked by many villagers.

In general, the Maasai do not like the Nguu since they are regarded as a group that is not very co-operative with the other ethnic groups in the village. Since Nguu is the largest group in the village they occupy the largest part of the village government but the village leadership of Nguu is said to be 'irritating' and their style of leadership is not liked. According to the respondents, it is easier for Maasai and Kamba to argue against bad decisions if the village leader comes from an ethnic group other than Nguu.

After being nominated, the contestants for village chairperson and sub-village chairpersons are allowed to hold meetings in order to make themselves known to the electorate. There are some regulations on how these meetings should be performed. These campaigns should, according to the guidelines, aim to maintain the well-being in the community between people, maintain peace and order and encourage cooperation that will bring development. It is further advised that

campaigns be focused on these issues and not on verbal exchanges of politics that have the aim of dividing people or transplanting hatred based on religion, education, ethnicity or economic status (Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania 1999b: 11). As can be seen, the peace, unity and harmony concepts are present and enforced through election regulations.

7.2 CCM Campaign

As the ruling party, CCM can devote large resources to mobilising people to vote for CCM candidates. To boost the mobilisation of voters in this election, the incumbent Member of Parliament for Kiteto toured the district together with women representatives for CCM's Women Organisation, *Umoja wa Wanawake wa Tanzania* (UWT) and the representative for CCM Youth Wing. In each village they visited, they organised rallies together with the local political leadership of that particular village. The rally in Sunya was the third on their tour; it was held in the centre of the village and gathered some 250 people.[151] After the local party secretary presented all the delegates, there is a welcome song performed by a choir. The content of the song is to get people to vote for CCM and to ridicule the opposition party in the village and its parliamentary candidate. He is implied not to be a friend of the people – since he does not live in the district but has his office at the guesthouse – and to be 'eating people's money and getting fat'[152]. One main slogan that is repeated over and over at the rally is '*panya ni panya, haikosi mkia*' (a rat is a rat and it does not miss its tail). The implication of this slogan is that CCM is large and strong enough not to be bothered with other parties. It gives a self-assuring meaning for the party members. There are also songs displaying positive connotations about CCM, portraying their MP as their parent, and the MP plays on this sentiment when he talks symbolically about the party and the family. As mentioned in chapter 6.1, it is commonly said, especially by elders, that CCM is like their mother or father and one cannot go against one's parent. The MP says

---

[151] When I spoke with one of the woman candidates, she did not think there were many people attending the rally. CCM has more members than attended the rally but a lot of people do not care about politics and/or they are attending to other more vital business like working their fields. Sometimes people come to listen to a politician who has not turned up and so people get tired of politicians and do not expect them to show up next time either, according to the candidate. On the other hand, according to the Ward Councillor there were 'a lot of people' at the meeting.
[152] He is supposedly plump.

that in no family can children be the head of family: 'Ears are not above the head or the neck above the head'. The hierarchy is obvious, meaning that children (the people) must respect their parents (politicians/leaders). However, within CHADEMA the situation is the opposite. Within that party children can be badly brought up, disobedient and oppose the elders, according to the MP. This implies that those who do not respect their elders are those in the opposition and therefore there is no order in that party since 'ears are above the head'.

There are no political speeches about manifestos, political programmes, what CCM is planning to do in the village or why CCM is a better party than CHADEMA. Also, there is no opportunity for the public to ask questions of the politicians. In other words, no political issues are discussed that would enable any voter to make a decision about how to vote. The responsibilities of a political party that Msekwa refers to above, especially the idea that the electorate should be able to compare policies and 'find [policies that are] more convincing than those of its opponent', are not present. The Member of Parliament is simply there to make sure that people will vote for CCM in the coming elections. He is convinced that they are going to win and that they do not have to resort to foul play like CHADEMA in order to win. To prove his case he refers to some statistics about the district. He says that there are 170 sub-villages in the district. In 141 sub-villages (83%) there is just one party represented, i.e. CCM. In only 29 sub-villages is there an opposition party. In Sunya Division, there are two sub-villages where there are opposition candidates: in Kichangani and Mnadani sub-villages. In the 48 villages in Kiteto District, CCM has no opposition in 31 villages (65%). In 17, there are different opposition parties like CHADEMA, NCCR-M and CUF represented. By taking up these statistics he shows the strength and domination of the ruling party, which implies the futile struggle of the opposition to gain power.[153] After this exercise, more singing and dancing commences. One group continues to parody the opposition party and their MP candidate, how he speaks and what the party does to get members. In addition, as an example to show how little the opposition has done to help the people in the village, the group refers to an example of the cholera epidemic and starvation in the village in spring 1999 when CHADEMA is said to have

---

[153] According to the election results from the District Council, there are opposition parties in 31 sub-villages and in 18 villages.

run away. This means that CHADEMA did not do anything to get food or aid to the villagers to put an end to the cholera situation. One woman even says that if CHADEMA won in any sub-village people should move away from there. As a contrast to this, the CCM Ward secretary talks about the roads that have been improved by CCM. The new doctor, who transferred from another village the same week, introduces himself at the meeting and says that people can come to him day and night. It was quite obvious that the purpose of bringing forth the doctor at the rally was so that the people would get the impression that it was due to the work of CCM that the doctor was there. In the end, the whole rally is rounded up by the Member of Parliament who urges people to vote for CCM. On the whole, the meeting was a well-orchestrated manifestation of CCM and its position as the leading party in the country.

On the following day the incumbent MP continued to a neighbouring village. To this rally, about 20 women and 35 men came. The rally resembles the previous day's rally but without singing or group performances. The chairperson for CCM Youth starts the meeting by telling the villagers where they have been and that in every village they have visited CHADEMA members have given up their membership and re-joined CCM.[154] The MP says that although there is a multiparty system, CCM has already won the election, and he repeats the facts about in how many villages CCM has no opposition. He further emphasises that CHADEMA does not have a president, so there is no-one to whom people can go with their complaints. Referring to the opposition parliamentary candidate, the MP says, 'He does not even have a house in Kibaya, so how can one trust a person or vote for a person who does not even live in the district?' He ends this short rally by saying that if people want to be sick or want to become ill, they should join CHADEMA. However, if they want to remain healthy, belong to a healthy party, they should vote for CCM.

---

[154]It was said in the meeting that so far some 300 CHADEMA members had returned their membership cards and rejoined CCM. CHADEMA members later heard that 120 membership cards from CHADEMA were returned at this particular meeting and people joined CCM. This is interesting in view of the fact that not that many people attended the rally.

Photo 11: CCM election campaign in Asamatwa
(Photo by author)

7.3 CHADEMA Campaign

The purpose of a political campaign is to make the electorate want to choose your party in a competition with other political parties on a (supposedly) even playing field. However, political parties in Tanzania do not have equal opportunities and equal resources available to them during elections.[155] In this local election, there is one opposition party present, CHADEMA, that challenges CCM's position in the village. In contrast to CCM, CHADEMA does not have any mobilisation assistance from the leadership at district level or from their Member of Parliament candidate as CCM has. Hence, the main difference between CCM and CHADEMA before the election is that CHADEMA did not have any public rallies as CCM did. Instead they had smaller house-to-house campaigns in three sub-villages, Kiegea, Mesera and Chang'ombe. The reason for this is that they do not have a candidate for the post of village chairperson, since he has was disqualified from running by the supervisors of the election due to failing to pay the development levy (see chapter 7.5.3 below). Much effort and time were instead put on travels to Kibaya with the appeal to the District Executive Director, who is the supervisor for the election in the district. I was invited to a gathering held by CHADEMA where women sang and some speeches were held.[156] The songs were about the purpose of the multiparty system

---

[155] CCM receives some 300 million TZS per month from the government for campaigns etc. while CHADEMA, which has 3 MPs in Parliament, receives 8 million TZS per month (interview with CHADEMA District Secretary).
[156] This gathering was more of a way for the opposition to present themselves to me as a researcher and was attended by some fifty people. I heard later that some in the local leadership of CCM considered that I was supporting the opposition since I interviewed them and spend some time

that gives freedom to people to vote for the party and leader they like. It is an individual choice. There were no songs about CCM or attempts to ridicule the ruling party candidate or MP. Finally, the women sang a tribute song about the two women competing for a seat in the village government.

Besides having difficulties in contesting the village chairperson post, CHADEMA also has difficulties presenting candidates in all seven sub-villages. Although they had candidates in all sub-villages, five out of seven candidates were disqualified since they did not fulfil the necessary qualifications. According to the local election supervisors, the WEO and VEO, those candidates who were not allowed to run had not paid the development levy, which was the most common reason for being disqualified. Hence, at this election CCM only has opposition in two out of seven sub-villages. In addition, CHADEMA had seven women candidates for the village government but three were disqualified. Out of thirteen male candidates, nine were disqualified. Thus, the opposition managed only to put forth four women and four men candidates to contest for seats in the village government (all from Nguu ethnic group). CCM on the other hand, had twenty candidates, eight women and twelve men (the majority from Nguu, and others from Kamba, Kaguru and Maasai).

7.4 Creating Pre-Election Consensus Among the Maasai in Engapune Sub-village[157]

Since the concept of decision-making through consensus is part of Maasai tradition, it is natural for the Maasai community to discuss the coming election in a meeting, where the focus is on the two parties, their pros and cons and deciding how to vote. The main concern during the meeting, which was attended by approximately thirty men but no women, is lack of knowledge about the standpoint of the opposition party and the reason for having a multiparty system. Many elders are concerned with whether they would be free to express in public that they belong to the opposition party without being harassed. Some elders ask the younger men to help them to understand the multiparty system and which party has made the best

---

talking with CHADEMA supporters. In reality, I spent far more time with CCM supporters and the election supervisors.
[157] At this meeting I was assisted by a Maasai friend who also is one of the woman councillors in the district.

achievements in the village. Others say they have not seen any poor performance of CCM so wonder why are some people changing party affiliation to CHADEMA.

There is great demand in the meeting to know and to discuss what the two parties have done for the villagers. The different speakers state that people should be free to choose whatever party they like but since they do not know anything about the opposition party, the common opinion is they should all vote for CCM. There are several elders who come back to this topic. During the discussion some speakers also start to talk about the coming election of Member of Parliament. Some get upset and emphasise that in this meeting they are discussing the village election and not the election of MPs and stress that, 'It is still long time before that election. Now we have to know what to do. Shall we vote for CCM or CHADEMA?' The sub-village leader and one candidate for village government make it clear again that in the village election everybody should vote for CCM since they do not know how CHADEMA is going to rule the village.

> We do not know CHADEMA. For example, if we elect CHADEMA at the sub-village election, we do not know its achievements. Hence, let us continue with CCM since we do not know how CHADEMA will develop us.
>
> (Sub-village chairperson)

However, it is stated that when they come to the election year 2000, those who want to vote for the CHADEMA MP candidate, should be free to do that, and those who vote for the CCM candidate should be free to do that. But in this election they should all consider CCM: 'Let us remain with CCM at the election day after tomorrow'. Some elders also emphasise that one should not just look at what party one is going to choose; one must also look at the qualification of the candidates from both parties. The sub-village chairperson brings up the issue that the opposition candidate in their sub-village (to which Engapune belonged at that time even though they had their own sub-village chairperson) has a field that is closing the access to water for Maasai and their cows. If one votes a person like that into a leadership position he will belittle the Maasai even more.

Several elders later drift into other matters concerning the harassment and stone throwing they are sometimes exposed to by the youth belonging to Nguu ethnic group. One man express his concerns that if one elects someone from that group one risks even more harassment. The village government candidate again tries to bring back the meeting to the topic of the election, saying that the other issues can be solved after the election when a meeting with all elders from the different ethnic groups can be summoned. However, the conflict issue between elders and youth, and the illicit liquor that causes this, is of more interest now and starts to take over the discussion. It is also decided that a meeting with all elders from the different ethnic groups must be summoned to discuss this problem facing them, especially the Maasai elders. The candidate for village government emphasises finally that there are very few Maasai in the village government and that very few are standing as candidates, which is a disadvantage for them. There are many more Maasai who know how to read and write and he hopes that there will be many more Maasai candidates in the next village election in order to increase the number of Maasai in the village government. This being said, the meeting ended with the consensus that everybody should vote for CCM in this election. After the meeting, men will tell their wives and those living in their homestead what has been decided and how they are going to vote. All eligible voters in respective homestead will follow the given directive.

7.5 The Sub-village Election

The first election to be performed is for the sub-village chairperson positions. The VEO and WEO supervise the election in all sub-villages; they visit all polling stations to see how the election is proceeding. At every polling station there are one or two teachers who run the election, control the names of the electorate and later participate in the counting of ballots. At each station there are also representatives from both parties. When the election process finally starts in Mnandani sub-village, somewhat delayed, the retiring sub-village chairperson opens it. He tells the electorate that his health situation prevents him from running this year and that he does not have the strength to do the work required of a sub-village leader. He hopes the election will be performed in a calm and peaceful way without any fighting between different party members. The VEO says a few words

and thereafter gives the floor to the CHADEMA and CCM candidates to introduce themselves to the electorate.

The CHADEMA candidate tells the people that they know him and that he stands here today since he has been asked to run for the post. He says that they have to elect not just a leader, but a good leader. This is crucial. Every person knows his pros and cons and now they are in an era of multiparty system where all parties are legal. The election is about electing a person who is going to sit in the village government and work there. He begs the elder men for their votes as his fathers and he asks the elder women for their votes as his mothers. He turns to the youth as their equal and asks for their votes.[158]

The CCM candidate enters the floor to introduce himself. He says that there is one thing he has to emphasise: 'One finger cannot squeeze a louse'. He belongs to CCM and therefore he belongs to the ruling party. In all other sub-villages, CCM has already won and if CHADEMA wins in this sub-village, where can they turn for help? He asks for the electorate's votes since one has to co-operate to get development.[159]

After the contestants have presented themselves and emphasised why they would make good leaders, the word is given to the teacher in charge of the election in the sub-village. He explains to the electorate that one should write the candidate's name and the name of the party on the ballot paper. Thereafter the election starts. He shouts out the names in the voters' register and people call out if they are present and are then allowed to get a ballot paper, write the name of the candidate and walk to the 'ballot box' (which is a plastic bag) to cast their vote. By the ballot box, the election supervisor and representatives for both parties supervise that correct procedures are followed. After the election, the appointed teachers count the votes in the presence of representatives for both parties. The VEO and WEO supervise this as well.

The election went quite smoothly, but the turnout was not very impressive and varied between the sub-villages. The average turnout was 46.5% in the election, with one sub-village having 30% and another 81% turnout. In the two sub-

---

[158] At this time some people applaud but the chairperson tells them it is not allowed to favour any contestant.
[159] At this point people start to laugh.

villages where the opposition had candidates, the turnout was also low with 40% in Kichangani and 56% in Mnadani (where the opposition won). On the other hand, in Kiegea 80% came to vote (with only 115 registered voters, compared to 750 in Mnadani) and as many as 41% voted against the CCM candidate. This was an exceptionally high figure despite talks afterwards that the opposition supervisor was not allowed to follow the whole counting procedure. Still, the general low turnout reflects the lack of interest in politics and the view that there was no reason to vote since CCM had already won in most sub-villages due to lack of opponents (see appendices III and IV).

Photo 12. Sub-village election in Mnadani sub-village.
(Photo by author)

7.5.1   Village government election

Two days after the sub-village election, the election for village chairperson and village government takes place. The election is to be held between 8am and 4pm but the procedure is delayed and does not start until two hours after schedule when all the candidates introduce themselves to the electorate. The election process itself is in chaos and it seems that there is some uncertainty regarding in what order to perform the election. After some discussion it is decided that the election of the seven special seats for women should commence the election. At this occasion there are twelve women candidates competing for the seven seats in

village government. After the women have introduced themselves to the electorate, voting starts. When the electorate has finished voting for the women candidates, the electorate is to cast their votes for men candidates (ten names) and finally vote for or against the single candidate for the village chairperson post. Since there are more candidates than seats available in the village government, the election is to be performed by secret ballot. However, casting a secret ballot is not possible since there are no screens available and many voters are illiterate and need assistance. The assistance is provided by the election supervisors who write the names of the contestants on the ballot paper. It seems that many of the voters do not know the names of the candidates and there is naturally a risk that the supervisor could write whatever name he pleased. Legitimate ballots also require a stamp from the village government or from the VEO in addition to a watermark. Ballot papers are however cut into smaller pieces and there are therefore ballots without a watermark, which should really be counted as invalid ballots. The 'ballot-box' is, as during the previous election, a plastic bag. There is therefore no way of ensuring that correct voting procedures are followed.

Photo 13: Presentation of male village government candidates
(Photo by author)

Photo 14: Presentation of women candidates for village government
(Photo by author)

7.5.2   Ethnic component

When studying the nomination of candidates and the election result, there is an ethnic bias when deciding who is being nominated and elected. It can also be seen which ethnic group is the most active in village politics and in the contest for village government positions. If we start by looking at CCM nominees, four out of seven nominated to sub-village chairperson post belong to Kaguru, two belong to Kamba and one to Nguu.[160] The main reason for this is, as discussed earlier, the collaborative voting between the Maasai, Kaguru and Kamba that works against the Nguu. Secondly, most Nguu households are in two sub-villages while Kaguru households can be found in all sub-villages. As a result, even though they are all within the same party, ethnic belonging determines who will be nominated. However, Nguu is the ethnic group that has most candidates to the village government. Out of twenty-nine candidates, nineteen belong to Nguu. Kamba has six candidates and only two belong to Kaguru and Maasai. The reason for this is that Nguu is the largest group in the village. They may also have the largest group of

---

[160] Before the election the distribution was the following: four Nguu, two Kaguru and two Kamba.

people who are literate and finally they seem to be more interested in politics and are therefore more active than other groups.

This is in sharp contrast to the Maasai. In the Maasai meeting, the village government candidate wanted more Maasai to run for a seat in the village government in order to increase their influence in the village. However, there are not many who have the necessary qualifications. Also, village politics might not be seen as being as important as their internal politics, where the traditional leader olaiguenani has the same status within the community as the MP has within politics. In addition, since the MP is Maasai, maybe the villagers put their faith in him instead of in the village chairperson and village government. Nevertheless, the election brought with it some major changes for the village government. The village government got eighteen new members. Only seven retained their seats, of which three were women. In addition, all sub-villages got new chairpersons. CHADEMA won one of the two sub-villages that they had candidates in. The division between the ethnic groups in the village government remained almost the same though: Nguu lost one seat (to 13), Kamba lost three (3) while Kaguru gained three (6) and Maasai remained with its two but through the position of the unofficial sub-village chairperson for Engapune, the Maasai have in reality three seats. Nguu has the majority of the seats in the village government and in the different committees and the ruling party CCM has 22 seats out of the 25.

7.5.3   Appeals

During the talks I had with the leadership of CHADEMA in Sunya, the main subject was their grievances with the election preparations. To start with, they had not received a detailed plan informing them about the dates when the election was to be executed. Therefore, CHADEMA had not been able to plan their campaigns and hold meetings. Secondly, the forms for applying as a candidate for the village government were distributed late to the CHADEMA party, giving them only two days to fill in the forms, while the CCM candidates received them much earlier giving them the stipulated seven days to fill in the applications. Thirdly, a candidate must know to read and write, but CCM candidates who could not read and write were not scrutinised as thoroughly as CHADEMA candidates. Finally, according to the

election law, all candidates must pay the development levy to qualify. However, the CHADEMA candidate for village chairperson suffers from polio and should therefore be exempted from paying this tax. Yet, the election law stipulates that candidates must show that they have paid the tax and therefore CHADEMA's candidate, Mr. Mzigo, was disqualified in this election.

This issue was at the centre in this election and CHADEMA supporters filed complaints at the district. The candidate even paid the tax retroactively to be able to participate in the election. What confused matters even more was a message from the District Electoral Commission giving go-ahead for all the CHADEMA candidates at village and sub-village leader positions. There were even two commissioners from the district coming to Sunya to deliver this message, but this new information was questioned by the Ward Executive Officer the following day. He said CHADEMA's candidate for village chairperson could not participate in the election since he paid his development levy ten days late. The ward councillor said that CCM would protest against the decision that CHADEMA be able to compete in the election again. They planned to appeal that the decision was not signed and stamped in Kibaya but in Sunya, and that it was the Acting District Executive Director who came to the village and not the District Executive Director (DED) himself. CCM politicians were upset that they may have to hold new elections since there are CCM candidates who have been denied candidacy on the same grounds as CHADEMA candidates. Thus, emotions ran high and the tension in the village built up rapidly when it was clear that CHADEMA contestants had lost all their appeals. The opposition talked about boycotting the election and the evening before the election, there were heated discussions going on between the two supporter groups but no fights broke out. However, CHADEMA supporters decided that they would vote againt the CCM candidate in those sub-villages where the opposition was without a candidate and in the village chairperson election.

7.6 Election Irregularities Reported by CHADEMA in Kibaya

In a study of the constraints and possibilities of consolidation of multiparty democracy, it is also important to include what kind of irregularities are reported by the parties that work against the consolidation of democracy. Given that the outcome of an election often depends on how transparent and fair the process

before the election has been, I will in this chapter present some of the reported irregularities by the opposition party CHADEMA in connection with the local elections in Kiteto District. The main topic discussed during an informal interview with CHADEMA district secretary was the irregularities during the election process, the campaigns and the voting procedure.

Registration of voters: First of all, the DED was accused of being biased. The district secretary wrote a letter[161] to him on 3 November where he reported all the irregularities that occurred during the preparation phase. Among the complaints were that CCM got information early about the registration of voters, while CHADEMA was not informed. Registration of voters started in secret and there was no information from the DED about dates and places for the election and other formalities. Further, CCM leaders instead of the VEO and other public servants handled voter registrations. Hence, since the registration of voters began on 10 August, CCM has benefited from having all information available while CHADEMA has not received the same treatment. Therefore, the District Secretary recommends that the election should be postponed to February 2000 to give the opposition equal rights and opportunities to have voter education and the seminars stated in the guidelines. As an effect of these irregularities during the voters' registration, 75% of CHADEMA members were excluded and did not register, according to the district secretary.imperfection

In Kaloleni sub-village in Kibaya, 32 members were excluded from voters' registration but were anyway given permission by the DED to vote in the sub-village election. However, when he was informed by the MP that this was not correct, they were not included in the voters register. In a letter dated, 30 November 1999, to the DED from CHADEMA, there is a list of 123 names of household heads in Olpoponyi sub-village who were not registered as voters. The reason is that the government civil servants who are supposed to register voters never visited Olpoponyi and some other sub-villages. There are other examples of similar undertakings and the CHADEMA District Chairperson Mr. I. Masiaya Olbula, said that in Partimbo ward, in Nalang' itomon where he ran as a candidate, only 96 people

---

[161] Letter filed as: Kumb No.CH/WNC/2/VIL II/31 'Dosari katika ratiba ya utekelezaji wa uchaguzi wa viongozi wa vijiji na mitaa za mwaka 1999- KITETO' (Flaw of the implementation schedule in the election of village and sub-village leaders in 1999-Kiteto).

were registered out of 800.[162] People also came and voted several times and there was a lot of fighting and quarrelling during the election.

Election performance: In Kimana village it was reported that the election supervisors refused to use the voters' register and instead transported CCM people from other villages there to vote. There was no control over the election process and apparently some of the voters were able to vote several times. One tactic used by CCM, according to the secretary, was voters having several pre-made ballot papers to put in the ballot box (or plastic bag). There was also the use of incorrect ballot papers. The official ballot papers have a watermark saying 'Tanzania Government' but these were during the election, as mentioned earlier, cut in half or in four pieces in order to produce more ballot papers. In this way, there was no control over how many ballots there are.

The chairperson for CHADEMA in Kimana, Mr. Mbambire Oloikurukur, filed a complaint to DED outlining the following irregularities:

- Although the campaigns were finished, CCM sang campaign songs during the Election Day, in the presence of the MP.
- Voters, who were not registered and came from other villages, were allowed to vote.
- The MP insulted the people by saying that those who vote for CHADEMA will not receive any assistance in the future [from the district].
- The election procedure was done without calling out the names according to the register, and voters could vote several times.

Additional reported irregularities were fights between groups of voters resulting in ballot papers being spread all over the ground enabling some to cast several votes at the same time. In another village the polling stations closed before 4pm leaving as many as 600 voters unable to cast their votes.[163] However, one of the most serious complaints I heard happened in Sunya and in Kiegea sub-village during the counting process. According to the CHADEMA supervisor in Kiegea, he was told to

---

[162] In the results from the District Council, there were 146 registered voters.

[163] These complaints were official complaints written in letters to District Executive Director. Some of these irregularities I heard also from other sources.

leave by the WEO since the counting procedure did not concern him since CHADEMA did not have any candidate in that sub-village. He was more or less forced away and also reported to me that ballots were burned.[164]

Vote buying: This is an issue much debated during elections and it is rather common practice to offer food and/or soft drinks and give out T-shirts during campaigns so as to attract people to meetings. However, this also creates an obligation to vote for the party one has received 'gifts' from. Additional forms of malpractice included preventing opposition sympathisers from vote. The district secretary for CHADEMA said it was common to hinder opposition voters by offering money or tempting voters to sell their registration cards. Since poverty is a fact of life here, many people will take the money instead of voting, diminishing the opposition turnout. This is therefore a common practice among the political parties in Tanzania for attracting voters.[165]

A different category of what could be seen as 'vote buying' is the giving allowances to workshop participants. The opposition MP candidate has an NGO that has workshops about democracy. He visited Sunya village a few months before the election in the capacity of democracy educator through his NGO. According to workshop participants, they received an allowance of 5000 TZS (6 USD) as compensatation for their economic loss (since they could have been at work or doing something else). [166] Even if he told the participants that he was there in the capacity of democracy educator and not in the capacity of a politician, it is debatable whether people separated his two roles. Since he is Member of Parliament candidate for CHADEMA, it is questionable whether he can facilitate democracy education without people connecting his actions to him as a politician. And since there are allowances given to people attending these workshops this can be seen as buying votes.

Hence, many respondents state that people in general feel obliged to vote for the politician or the party who has given you a 'gift'. Nevertheless, this can work in

---

[164] Considering the strong position of the opposition in that sub-village, the occurrence is not unbelievable. The difference was only 17 votes. I was told about this incident again three years later.

[165] ESAURP Election Monitoring Team observed that in no other election in Tanzania before 1995, were money and unrealistic promises used to bribe the electorate as in the election in 1995 (ESAURP 1996: 19). See also Mpangala (1994: 43)

[166] One of the positive issues with CHADEMA, according to some men, is that they receive allowances when they attend CHADEMA meetings. They feel that they have not wasted their time.

the opposite direction as well. The District Secretary for CHADEMA in Kiteto, Mr. Mashaka said that he was approached by people who had voted for him or the party and asked why they had not received any 'compensation'.

7.6.1   Election Report from the District Council

After the election, the DED compiles the election results and writes a summary of problems encountered during the election exercise. The district council estimated the number of eligible voters at 46 320 from the 21 different wards, 48 villages and 173 sub-villages in the district. Voter registration was done by going from house to house and was executed by different extension staff. The total number of registered voters was 45 953, i.e. almost the total estimate. The election was performed at different dates in the different villages depending on the time schedule set up by the election supervisors in their respective areas. However, the turnout of voters was not high. Of the totally registered voters of only 26 769, or 58% turned up to vote.

The difficulties experienced in the election process included transportation problems for the election supervisors out to the villages and sub-villages and financial problems in the overall implementation and supervision to ensure fairness. Necessary information was delayed due to lack of funds. As a result of the financial problems, the council put itself in debt in order to manage the election. Other problems had to do with conflicts between agriculturalists and pastoralists that prevented elections from taking place in some villages,[167] and there were many complaints from political parties, many of which did not have any grounds.

Lessons learned from this election by the district are that next time they must be given more financial resources and the method of registering voters must be changed. It is not advisable to register voters by going from household to household. Also education about democracy and the multiparty system has not reached down to the people out in the villages and sub-villages. Hence, efforts must be made available to spread information in a much better way (Halmashauri ya Wilaya ya Kiteto 1999).

---

[167] In four cases unsolved border conflicts left the status of some villages and sub-villages unclear. In four other cases appeals against the candidates left the sub-villages without a candidate.

When the election was over, I wanted to interview the DED about the election in his capacity of election supervisor. He excused himself for not having much time for the interview but he confirmed that all candidates who had not paid the development levy were immediately prohibited from running. He did not know the reason for the contradictory information arriving in Sunya where the opposition candidate was supposedly allowed to participate in the election. Due to the DED's busy schedule, the interview was short but before I left I saw a large pile of election posters in his office, some of which he generously offered to me. These posters are colourful and explain the election procedure in a simple way. There are six different posters that were supposed to be put up in all villages in the district so as to inform the electorate about election procedures. Still, I had not seen them anywhere in Kibaya, Sunya or in other villages I passed through. Hence, these posters that were supposed to inform voters about the election procedure were never put up in the villages. They had remained on a chair in the office of the head of the election supervision instead.

Photo 15: Examples of information posters[168]

---

[168] The poster on the left informs voters that the names of those who are running for a position in village government will be announced for citizens to read. It also says that if one is disqualified, one can complain to the election supervisor. The man in the front has passed the qualifications and he says that if he is elected he will co-operate with people to bring development.
The poster on the right informs voters about what obligations the election supervisor has before the election. The group of people in the picture says: 'This is the time to elect a good leader; we need

7.7 Opinions about CCM and CHADEMA

Are there then any major differences between the parties' policies, according to the people, that would convince them to choose one party over the other? What are the differences between CCM and CHADEMA besides their histories and political powers and capacity to mobilise voters? In an interview with the respective branch chairpersons, they responded:

> There are no differences; we are speaking about the same things. One of our heaviest duties is to make people equal so that they understand the issue of democracy. [CCM]

> Why are there many parties if you have the same politics?
> That is democracy to be two parties because if there is just one party, that is not democracy. To be many parties is like competition so that the citizens know which party will take them in a good direction.

The chairperson for CCM feels that one of his main duties is to mobilise and motivate the people to join his party, while the CHADEMA chairperson says he wants to discuss political issues with the villagers and explain democracy to them. So far he is not happy with the present situation and the way his party is treated in the ward and in the village by the ruling party. He said:

> There are thirteen parties in the country but the development of CHADEMA has not been successful here in the village. We have not been involved in meetings in the ward, so I have not seen any co-operation about democracy between our two parties.

Despite that, comparatively CHADEMA is more open than CCM, according to some youth. CHADEMA is more transparent in their politics and they value individual

---

a leader who can co-operate with the people towards development; we need a leader who is capable and who we can assist in the fight against corruption and to eradicate poverty' (my translation).

rights and freedom to a higher degree than CCM. The VEO (a CCM member) emphasises that the difference between the parties is that CHADEMA is not in favour of collecting money from the villagers for development issues. According to him, the policy of CHADEMA is that it is the duty of the government to see to the welfare of the people, i.e. people should not be forced to contribute with additional money contributions when they have paid their taxes. Some non-Maasai women agree and support the policy of the opposition in this case. They are apparently fed-up with money contributions for the special holidays – like *saba-saba*, *nane-nane* and Uhuru-torch[169] – in addition to paying taxes, development levies, school fees and collection of money for school desks. There is a general fatigue for all these money collections, which has led to a general contempt for politicians among the villagers. Women respondents are of the opinion that the lack of development in their village is explained by all money collections being grabbed by the politicians. At the same time people restrain from complaining. Questions about the reason for the collection or questions about the utilisation of previous contributions are not well received by the village leadership. People are afraid to speak out about these issues since they are going to be seen as opponents to the development of their village. Therefore, people continue to pay without questioning what the money will be used for. In addition, there is poor accountability regarding how money has been used, according to some men in Kiegea sub-village. Still, the reality of an opposition party in the village has changed the work of the VEO and the ruling party in that they have to be more accountable and not 'relaxed' since CHADEMA is watching over the work of village leaders. On the other hand, the parties are not yet treated on equal terms, which shows when visitors come to the village. When different village representatives are summoned to greet the visitors, the village leaders always ignore the representative for the opposition in their presentation. They are omitted as if they did not exist in the village, according to CHADEMA branch leader.

---

[169] Saba-saba is the day when TANU was formed, 7 July (1954). Nane-nane is the peasant's day, 8 August. Uhuru-torch is the torch of freedom that is passed every year through every district in Tanzania by CCM politicians and money is collected. This is not a very popular event anymore since the money collected goes to paying for a feast for specially invited guests and politicians from the district. School-fees for primary school were abolished in 2003.

Since the introduction of the multiparty system there are also those who feel that their village have become more divided along the party lines. Opposition sympathisers are discriminated against, for example, when it comes to loans to women's groups or distribution of food relief. It is also a common tactic by the ruling party to frighten potential opposition sympathisers by saying that they will not receive any assistance from the government since they belong to the opposition. Respondents say that the village leadership (the VEO but especially the WEO) gives benefits to CCM members only. Still, these dividing lines seem to be particularly accentuated before and during the election years. After the election life usually returns to normal.

7.8 Concluding Remarks

What materialises during the election is the way voters think about the special seats for women. After the seats for women are filled, women do not run for the remaining seats in the government, which are only contested by men. The election supervisors, candidates and voters never imagined that women could do this, since it was understood that there could only be seven women in the village government as has been stipulated by the number of special seats. Consequently, until it comes to light that women are allowed to run for the remaining seats, there will never be more than seven women in the village government. But it is not only at local level that women have difficulty being elected. It is in general difficult for women in Tanzania to get into parliament on their own merit.[170] First of all, there is a concept that a leader is a man and not a woman, especially among the Maasai. Secondly, women usually have more difficulty raising money for their campaigns.[171] However, workshops are run with the assistance of donors to assist women who want to compete for seats in parliament through different workshops.[172]Thus,

---

[170] In the pre-election nomination of CCM candidates for Parliament in 2005, one woman for CCM competed against the incumbent MP in Kiteto and received great support. However, the CCM NEC decided to nominate the incumbent. Further, there were others who won the party nominations in their districts but were dropped by NEC (www.ippmedia.com/cgi-bin/print.pl?id=47178).

[171] An article describes some of the difficulties women from the opposition parties have to raise money. In order to finance their campaigns, they have to borrow money from relatives and friends. Some receive money from their party while others cannot afford large campaigns and make only house-to-house campaigns ('Women and elections 2000: hopes and setbacks', by Karl Lyimo, *Business Times* website, 30 October 2000).

[172] The British Council, Tanzania Gender Network Programme (TGNP) and Tanzania Media Women's Association (TAMWA) organised a workshop in Morogoro in August 1999 under the title 'Morogoro

quotas of women into parliament and to local government seem to be necessary since otherwise there would be even fewer women with the opportunities to participate in decision-making processes.

According to the supporters of the opposition, the general negative opinions about CHADEMA are due to a lack of information and education. People are told that everything in their village is from CCM: the school, dispensary, water-pumps, communication radio etc. are said to be from CCM even if donors sponsored some implementations. This distorts the importance and power of CCM and works against the consolidation of multiparty democracy by giving all positive attention to the ruling party. It gives the impression that it is only CCM that can 'bring development'. Thus, when the ruling party's importance and achievements are put forth, the opposition party cannot show similar achievements. The opposition gives the impression of being passive and has remained unknown to the majority of rural people since their policies have not been seen in action. It works against the opposition that people do not know the history of the opposition and cannot find any common denominator. Further, at elections people also look at the parties' achievements during the last five years before deciding how to vote. Therefore, the opposition needs to build up a positive relationship with the electorate beforehand to win elections and gain leading positions so their policies can be seen in action.

It is precisely here that it becomes difficult for the opposition to turn the situation around. The fact that the electorate is looking back on what has been accomplished by the different parties can almost be seen as a 'catch 22' for the opposition parties. The opposition parties' present status works against them in a negative circle.

Figure 8: Negative circle of the opposition

It is difficult to get the voice of the opposition heard when the decisions are taken in the village government where the opposition parties have so few seats. It is therefore difficult to show the electorate what they have accomplished. But more importantly, and as mentioned earlier, people believe that government funds are CCM funds and that the opposition parties do not have the resources to provide services for developing the area. In other words, it is safer to continue to vote for the ruling party on the principle that you know what you have, but you do not know what you will get. As the Maasai say, they know too little about the opposition parties. They feel that they cannot turn their back on 'their' party that has 'been with them for many years'. Some ilmurran describe the relations with the parties: 'With the "CCM-cow" - we know what we have but we do not know what we will get with the "CHADEMA-cow". "CCM-cow" is giving little, not much, but at least something' (Maa.M5Y.Osi). Moreover, the information about the opposition is based on misinformation and rumours that create suspicion about its intentions. As pointed out earlier, the Maasai for example have received information on several occasions that CHADEMA only likes young people and the respondents cannot for this reason understand the aims of the party. An elder Maasai woman asked rhetorically, 'Can CHADEMA guide themselves without the *wazee* [elders]?' which emphasises again the importance of elders and the harmony in the society.

Then again, something that is interesting is that the CHADEMA Member of Parliament candidate (who is Maasai) is regarded as a better leader than the incumbent MP. Especially Maasai respondents say they would elect him if he belonged to CCM since he is more educated and a good speaker. There are opinions

that he gives good advice to people about what they can do to increase their income. But since he is a member of an opposition party and does not live in the district, this works against him. Yet in the parliamentary elections CHADEMA has performed very well and has in each election received considerable support in the district as a whole while losing out in the villages. Still, in Sunya village, the election results from 2000 show great support for CHADEMA in the election of the Member of Parliament. The opposition candidate won in four of the seven sub-villages but all together, CCM received the majority of the votes in the village. However, the difference between the two parties was only seventy-eight votes (767 versus 689). In the whole district, the opposition party managed to obtain 40% of the votes while the incumbent MP obtained 59%. This was, however, a highly disputable election and the opposition candidate told voters he would contest the result. However, the fee for an appeal in this election has increased from 15 000 TZS in 1995 to 5 million TZS and no appeal was submitted.

In the 2005 general election the incumbent MP achieved 56.3% of the votes while his opponent received 41.7%.[173] This shows that there is strong support in the district as a whole for the opposition, while at the same time CCM has power in all the sub-villages and villages in the district. My conclusion is that the strong support at district level for the opposition is more a vote against the incumbent MP as a person than for the party (CHADEMA) since his popularity in the district and especially in Kibaya was very low. His car was stoned during campaigns in 2000 and other cars mistaken for his got their windscreens shattered. Also, it can be seen in the election results that the opposition has more supporters among the non-Maasai villages in the district than in the Maasai villages.

One important and hindering factor for consolidation of democracy is the dishonest and unlawful practices before and during the election. Registration procedures that are not followed, vote buying and concealing of information were all part of the whole election process leaving much to be desired when it comes to consolidation of democracy.

---

[173] CCM obtained 30 483 votes and CHADEMA obtained 22 565 votes of total 74 632 registered voters (http://www.nec.go.tz/parliamentary_results.asp?menu=sub9&maintitle=Parliamentary).

When analysing the whole sub-village and village election process one can very clearly see the different organisational structures and capacities of the two parties where the ruling party has larger financial and logistical resources compared to the opposition. The opposition has not been in a position to inform the electorate about their party to the same extent as the ruling party has. CHADEMA has instead put their emphasis on appeals and could therefore not campaign. However, it is questionable whether the electorate becomes much informed even if they attend these rallies since the main topic at the two CCM rallies witnessed in Sunya ward was to ridicule the opposition. The rally had two purposes: first to mobilise the people to vote for CCM in the village election and second to function as a campaign tour for the MP from CCM for the election in 2000. The rally was not about policies or party programmes, it was about people and this is manifested on the importance of the *leader*. The ruling party portrays itself as the caring, nursing parent who takes care of its 'children' when they need help and who guides the 'family' towards development.

On the other side, we have the leadership of the opposition that is not present in times of distress – a fact that is mentioned by several of those interviewed. This is further emphasised in the CCM rally where it is asked where the opposition MP candidate was when people needed him and what he has done to develop the village. This view is quite revealing. Bearing in mind that CCM is the dominant party in the district and the country, it is still believed that regardless of what party is in the ruling position, people expect leaders from both parties to be ready to assist them when they need help. They expect the leaders to be aware of their problems and be ready to solve these problems for them. This perception diminishes the importance of the party system and puts focus on the character of the leader firstly, which in turn has implications for the party he represents. Thus, when the opposition party leader is absent and fails to assist the villagers, he diminishes his and his party's chances of winning elections. The opposition remains *unknown* as many respondents say. This also shows the lack of knowledge about the functioning of the multiparty system. There is a perception that both leaders have equal obligations (but not resources) regardless of which party is in power.

If I examine the 'conflict' between the two parties and the reason for the relatively strong position of the opposition party in Sunya, there seems to be an

additional dimension to it. One evening two men came to the guesthouse I was staying at to drink tea and talk about the election and about what had happened. Both men thought the threat of boycotting the election was typical of Wanguu and showed that they could never agree. That is the reason why Lengatei village[174] was divided into three sub-villages: the villagers could not agree with one leader. As a result, different clans within Nguu ethnic group now dominate these sub-villages in Lengatei. I made some further investigation into this matter and to the reason why Lengatei was divided. There are different versions of the reasoning, but what seems to be important is that there are relations built up through intermarriage between the clans in Sunya and Lengatei. That clan that split the village (and is now supporting the opposition party CHADEMA) had marriage relations with people in Sunya even before the multiparty system was introduced. When CHADEMA started to be established in the area, there was an opportunity through the multiparty system to compete for the power in the village. In the next stage, the marriage relations functioned as a conduit for spreading the opposition party to Sunya as well.

An alternative interpretation is that the clan that formed its own sub-village is also present in Sunya. By belonging to the same clan, which is to be as one family, the unity within the clan makes clan members in Sunya also to vote for the opposition. Hence, after the separation of Lengatei into several sub-villages and the introduction of the multiparty system, they found a new opportunity through joining an opposition party to compete for power positions in the village. Since those in Lengatei joined CHADEMA, their clan-members in Sunya also joined CHADEMA since they are all regarded as family.[175] What has become a fact in Sunya is the founding of what seems to be an unofficial sub-village called Juhudi. In this area CHADEMA has its branch office and most residents here are members of the party. Those who live there belong also to the Nguu ethnic group. Thus, if there is a connection here, then what might seem to be a struggle between two parties can

---

[174] Neighbouring village where CHADEMA won 13 seats in the village government in 1999 but no chairperson post.

[175] To confirm any connection of this kind, I would have had to include Lengatei in my research and focus on this question. Since this issue turned up rather late in the fieldwork, real confirmation of the circumstances could not be made. However, the issue is intriguing and seems to carry some truth.

in fact be a struggle for power positions between two different clans within Nguu using the multiparty system as a tool.

However, there are other agents contributing towards changes that can be seen as a process towards a more democratic society in the wake of the political changes. The next chapter will illustrate how the mobilisation by a donor agency of ordinary people outside the village government challenges the power structure and the political representatives. These examples of empowerment are small signs of democracy consolidation at local level.

8   TOWARDS EMPOWERMENT AND COGNITIVE CONSOLIDATION OF DEMOCRACY

> We have elected you and you are a person like we. We have
> elected you but now you are Bwana Mkubwa. But you are not!
> We want a leader who respects us elder men and women.
>
> (Maasai woman in Ilkusihi-Oiboir)

This chapter deals with different smaller cases that are connected to the political changes in the society and is especially related to the two villages where the research was conducted. The different cases present aspects of change where there are incitements of people starting to put pressure on their leaders. I will here present a few cases that exemplify the empowerment of villagers. These examples can be viewed as part of the consolidation of democracy where ordinary people start to question the actions of their leaders, a process starting at local level where villagers take charge of issues affecting their lives.

8.1 Empowerment of Maasai Women in Ilkuishi-Oiboir

When asking Maasai women and men about what has been the major change in their lives the last 5-10 years, one of the most striking and positive answers given in Ilkuishi-Oiboir is that these days women are attending the same political/public meetings as men. The women say that in the past they did not receive any information about the content of meetings: they only heard that there was to be a meeting but they were never informed about what had been discussed. Women were not even allowed to come near the meeting place and women could even be beaten by the men if they happened to come too close. However, the situation is quite different today and women participate in every village meeting, save for the traditional meetings as stated above. One of the reasons mentioned for the change in the public sphere is that the Kiteto District staff insisted that when they have

meetings in their village,[176] women must be present. And gradually, men brought their wives (to the meetings (01.Maa.W3E.Ilch). Today in Ilkuishi-Oiboir, it is common to see women standing in front of their men and addressing the meeting. This is a change supported by their husbands since they have realised that women have many good ideas (01.Maa.M2E.Eng).

Still, many women say that in spite of many changes in their society and in the relationship between men and women, they are not yet equal at a domestic level. As an example, after one meeting I was asked to drive some women back home since it was becoming late and they needed to get home to prepare dinner for their families. If they were late, their husbands might beat them. Still, there are women, and especially elder women, who have gained more acceptance from men to attend meetings since they are also those who have higher status in Maasai society compared to younger women. Younger women do not have the same status in the society or at meetings and feel uncomfortable speaking in front of elder men and women, and to criticise elders in public is still unthinkable. Also, while elder women can speak freely at meetings and are more equal in this arena than previously, they (women in general) are not yet equal to men in the domestic sphere, even if there are changes here as well. Women carry the main workload in the families and are exposed to occasional beatings (violent domestic abuse) (01.Maa.W3E.Ilch., 01.Maa.W3Y.Loo.). However, women have more say today about the utilisation of money in the family. There are more discussions between wives and husbands about when to sell a cow or maize, decisions that traditionally have been taken by husbands alone (01.Maa.M2E.Eng., 01.Maa.W3.1E.2M.Eng., 01.Maa.W3Y.Loo.). Women respondents say that they have a 'voice' and their husbands listen. Another contributing factor to increased co-operation is the influence of church activities. In the church, women and men are used to working together on different activities and participating in meetings together. So when the

---

[176] To work with gender equality was required by Sida who financed the LAMP project in the district. In 1995, the donor started with gender awareness workshops, i.e. *why* women should be included in the development activities and in the decision-making bodies funded by the programme. These workshops were aimed at villagers from different villages and ethnic groups in the district, local politicians and also at government staff. A district gender team comprising technical staff was formed and continued to conduct gender sensitising workshops in the villages, where they advocated that women must also attend the meetings, otherwise the meeting would be postponed. Over the years there have been several rounds of workshops with the goal of increasing different target groups' gender awareness, as well as the government staff's capacity and skills to integrate gender issues in their daily work.

district staff advocated for women to attend, it was quite natural for some of these men to have women present and for these women to speak in front of men.

Although Maasai women are often seen as being powerless and oppressed by their husbands, women have never been totally powerless (see Mitzlaff 1988 and Hodgson 2001) and have taken initiatives on their own. For instance, two men in Engarkah sub-village told me a story about a man living in their sub-village. This man was a drunkard and he did not own any cows and was unmarried. Women living in the sub-village felt sorry for him and came up with an idea of how to help him. They suggested their husbands that the men in the sub-village should buy the man a cow while the women could teach him how to take care of it. The men agreed and today this man has his own homestead, he has cattle and he has a wife thanks to the initiative taken by the women (01.Maa.M2E.Eng.).

Another example of women's power in the Maasai society happened in connection to a circumcision. At the celebration two men started to fight and ruined the circumcision celebration of a boy. The mother of the boy and other women were very angry and upset since this was a violation of good behaviour at this kind of celebration. The women joined forces and demanded compensation from the men involved. At first the men were not prepared to compensate the women but since the women could refer to customs and societal norms, the men could not deny them what they wanted. If the men had refused, they would have been socially disgraced and lost respect in their community. Hence, there are ways for women to exercise some form of command and get things their way.

The example below is a true story of women becoming tired of not being informed of what had happened with money the villagers had collected for their local school. This example of women's empowerment in Ilkuishi-Oiboir culminated in a village meeting where the actions of the village leader were questioned in public. This episode has surprisingly also led to greater empowerment and increased courage among men to criticise the village leadership. Men seem to have been too comfortable and too afraid of the village leadership to criticise it.[177]

---

[177] The gathering of this information was done by my interpretor Majuka while we were sitting in a grass-hut not far from the meeting.

Case I

In Ilkuishi-Oiboir the villagers had lost their confidence in their chairperson/ward councillor and VEO. The beginning of the confidence crisis had started some time earlier but had finally reached its peak and especially women felt that something had to be done. The villagers had contributed 500 000 TZS from each sub-village, i.e. 2.5 million TZS all together, for the construction of two teachers' houses and one classroom for the students. However, the construction work had gone very slowly and in the end the constructions stopped and villagers, and especially women, started to wonder why.

While the men in the village were used to following their leaders' opinions and were not in the habit of criticising their actions, the women, especially the elder women who recently had started to attend all sorts of meetings, were extremely upset and angry. The villagers had already held one meeting where the mismanagement of the money was brought up and where the women wanted to overthrow the village leader. At this first meeting a solution to the conflict was not reached and a new meeting was held a couple of weeks later. At this second meeting, the village chairperson chose to show the people what he had done for the village and all the improvements that he had brought and that their present actions were just a sign of ungratefulness. He tried to show his innocence by bringing up a lot of data on how the money was supposedly spent. However, many of the villagers were very upset and asked why he had not shown them this data before and how the money had been spent.

The women were disappointed because he did not apologise for his behaviour and one woman said that the village chairperson couldn't have spent all the money by himself, that he must have had assistance from other people. The chairperson defended himself by saying that it is thanks to him speaking to people from overseas that the village received the communication radio and other assistance. He said further that many European people come to his boma and give him many things and money, whereupon the villagers immediately asked him whether this money was for him or for the village, and how could they know how much money he has received if he does not show it to the people.

The chairperson felt cornered and tried again to portray himself as a good leader and that if they elect a new chairperson, how can they know that they can trust the new one. Further, since he is also the ward councillor, he threatens to quit that work as well if he was overthrown as chairperson. The discussions are heated and many people were very upset with his acts and his disrespect towards elders and the villagers.

One elder woman said:
It is we women who give birth to you and the language you have learned is from your mother. She has also given you education. But what kind of language are you using here? Now you are using what you have been taught

from us women to cheat us! You are cheating your mothers! Those contributions that we have given for the village development you have been using it for your own use.

Another woman said:
We do not need any further excuses and explanations about what you have been doing previously. Now you have been using 2.5 million shillings in a bad way and we are here to find out where the money has gone and that these should be paid back. This money was to be used by the whole village but you used it by yourself.

A third woman continued:
We have elected you and you are a person like us. We have elected you but now you are Bwana Mkubwa. But you are not! We want a leader who respects us elder men and women. You tell us that you have been doing this and this. You tell us that you have spent 500 000 on travels. Is this really common, and have you really spend everything on travels? We want you to respect us elders and that you say 'Shikamoo'to us, not the other way around.'[178]

The result of the meeting was that the village chairperson apologised for his behaviour and asked to remain as village chairperson. He gave the name of the VEO as his companion in this matter, but the VEO refused to apologise and was therefore removed from his duties. By the decision of the women, the village chairperson was given a warning. The men at the meeting wanted to replace the chairperson as well but the women said it was not their aim to do that, but that they would keep an eye on him in the future and if he did not change his habits, they would choose a new leader.[179] Again the women took this last decision and the men concurred.

This is an example of how women have been able to influence decision-making and stand in front of leaders and men and demand their rights as villagers. It is to the women's credit that the meeting took place and what came out of it. The men were afraid but 'we women put the thing out in the open and told the village leader that he has done a wrong thing' (01.Maa.W3E.Ilch). The

---

[178] *Shikamoo* is a respectful greeting in Kiswahili used to greet elders in Tanzania.
[179] In the village election in 2004, and in the 2005 election, the villagers elected a new village chairperson and ward councillor respectively.

actions taken by the women in the case above bear references to equity, accountability, transparency, empowerment and changed gender roles. This example touches on some of these democratic qualities but it can also be seen as an overall empowerment process of firstly women and secondly of all villagers, who together put pressure on the village leadership.

However, the way the situation was handled was according to Maasai cultural norms of conflict resolution. It was an impossible situation for the village leader, but the way the situation was solved by giving him a second chance shows the existing tolerance in the Maasai society where unity is important. Finally, what we must bear in mind is that the status of women in Maasai society has been (and still is in the eyes of many men) equivalent to that of a child. Only a few years ago it was unthinkable and improper, according to cultural norms, for Maasai women to participate in political meetings together with men and speak in front of men. Thus, the change that has occurred is really a major one.

However, this change has not taken place in every Maasai community as will be seen. In some Maasai communities women are still prohibited by cultural norms (or by their husbands) to participate in political meetings with the excuse that there are no one who could do the women's work if they attended a meeting. This situation is true for the Maasai community in Sunya, in Engapune sub-village, which differs radically from the Maasai in Ilkuishi-Oiboir. There are I propose, several explanations for these differences. Firstly, the Maasai in Ilkuishi-Oiboir live in a village where only Maasai live. Even if there are a few Rangi from Kondoa district living in the village, they do not participate in village politics. Hence, the village can be said to be a 'pure' Maasai village in contrast to the Maasai community in Sunya, which is the third largest of several ethnic groups in the village. Hence, they belong to a village of mixed ethnic composition where they are not in majority. Secondly, being the only ethnic group in Ilkuishi-Oiboir it is easier to agree upon how to develop the village, it is easier to collect money for different village issues and they are 'in charge' of their own lives in the village. In Sunya, the Maasai have two representatives in the village government and they are more dependent on what other people decide. They are, as one woman said, 'like branches drifting in a stream of

water'. They are not in charge of their own lives. Illiteracy among the Maasai also impedes their ability to have a say in the village government. The illiteracy factor in Ilkuishi-Oiboir though does not affect the composition of the village government since they are all Maasai and do not have to be as strict when it comes to the qualifications of reading and writing Swahili. Thirdly, the customary leadership in Ilkuishi-Oiboir is very strong and co-operates with the political leadership, as I have mentioned earlier. This system makes people more confident and secure in their identity and they can choose what to incorporate from the outside. The Maasai in Engapune do not have similar day-to-day contact with the customary leaders and as Sunya is not a Maasai village, there is no co-operation between the customary leaders and village leaders. Thus, as it is now the lives of the Maasai are affected by decisions made by other ethnic groups.

Consequently, since the Maasai in Engapune are not in a decision-making position, are a marginalised group compared with others and feel threatened and enclosed by the farmers in the village, their identity as Maasai and their traditional cultural norms have become important. The common identity and efforts to detach themselves from the rest of the village seem to be the driving force that keeps this small community together. Still, involuntary changes take place in their area that affect them; in the process they become more protective of their culture and their cultural norms, which might have had a negative influence on women not being allowed to participate in political meetings together with men. Further, the sub-village seems not to have very many young men or ilmurran living there, giving it a disproportionate old male population and therefore implicitly a more 'traditional'/conservative attitude towards women. In addition, men must see the benefits of having women participating in meetings before they can agree to this. As it is now, there is an opinion among many men that women do not have any knowledge at all and should not for this reason participate in meetings. All these different factors naturally have an effect on the possibility of consolidation of multiparty democracy. If not all citizens have the opportunity to participate in decision-making and be part of what is being decided, this works against the principles of democracy. The vulnerable situation of the Maasai in Engapune does not work in favour of consolidation since they already feel outside the society and not in

control of their own life situation. Hence, to include marginalised groups like these Maasai will take great effort and one might have to think of other solutions outside the existing formal democratic practices where for example literacy is considered as a prerequisite for being elected.

Since the Maasai are one of the marginalised groups in Tanzania with many societal changes happening in and around their communities, it has become important that implementations from 'outside' are discussed and harmonised into Maasai society without destroying or changing basic values of their culture. As a result, the co-operation between politicians, customary leaders and elders is beneficial for the community. But according to cultural norms, decision-making in the Maasai community is within the male domain that excludes women; therefore the main advantage of political leadership is that it makes it possible for women to be involved more actively in the political affairs of the community. Still, women do not have the same opportunities to influence decision-making as men for many reasons. As discussed above, women do not usually participate in meetings together with men; even if they from time to time can have common meetings, women's liberty to express themselves is not acknowledged and their opinions are ridiculed or simply neglected. Nonetheless, the political system gives women the opportunity to take an active part in village matters by giving them the opportunity run for and vote in elections for village government and the different village committees. Women's participation in politics is further supported in law by the setting aside of no less than 15% of parliamentary seats[180] for women; at village level it is stipulated at no less than a quarter.[181] Thus, party politics is a prerequisite and the only channel for women, in general but especially Maasai women, to be involved in and influence decision-making. It would be detrimental for women to only have to rely on customary leadership since the appointing of olaiguenani is purely men's business and women have little say in what has been decided, let alone being appointed to a decision-making post. Hence, the political system works in favour of Maasai women and gives women more opportunities to express their views in matters that normally have been considered men's domain. The political meetings give women another arena away from customs.

---

[180] Tanzanian Constitution, article 66.

[181] Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania (1999a).

There are definite pros and cons to the Maasai's dual leadership structure. First of all, on the negative side, to only have customary leadership would not be beneficial for Maasai women since they do not have any say in appointing them. Even if women benefit from this arrangement as community members, their fundamental human rights – the right to choose one's leaders and to be elected - would be denied. Then again, to only have politically elected leaders would indicate a breakdown of Maasai social organisation and culture, something no Maasai would want. In addition, to be subjected to a political leader from another ethnic group who has no 'co-operational obligation' to the customary leaders and elders is no perfect situation either. This leads to less information being transferred to the Maasai (due to illiteracy and poor knowledge in Swahili, or Maa in the case of the politicians) which in turn leads to diminished influence over village matters. The customary leaders give the society a form of stability in a changing world. At the same time, the political leadership gives women the right to vote and be elected and become part of a larger societal context with all the advantages that comes with it.

8.2 Empowerment of Villagers in Sunya

Historically villages in Tanzania have been very independent; the village is the lowest administrative unit and has the power to 'hold, purchase or acquire movable or immovable property and in its name can sue or be sued' (Max 1991: 154). Villages must have the following standing committees: financial, economic and planning, defence and security, social services and self-reliance. However, the village can also create new committees when deemed necessary. Examples are the specific TASAF-committees formed for the World Bank projects in Tanzania, as well as the village-based environmental committees in the village-based forest management programme LAMP in 1996. The environmental committees are responsible for applications from villagers who want to cut down trees for selling or for domestic use and collect fees for this. They are also responsible for the protection of the forest and the utilisation of its produce. If there are illegal logging practised, the committee, through the *Sungusungu*[182] are allowed to

---

[182] The Sungusungu is a traditional 'security organisation' usually in rural areas for protecting property or safeguarding peace in villages. Each sub-village in Sunya was to choose 10 individuals, of

apprehend the culprits and take them to court and collect fines. What makes these committees special is that the members are elected from the village assembly and not formed by people in the village government. In this way the committee becomes a committee outside the village government structure.

Each of the nine villages in the SULEDO[183] forest reserve elects environmental committees every four years. The election starts at sub-village level where two women and two men are elected, together with the sub-village chairperson, to form the sub-village environmental committee. From each sub-village committee one woman and one man are elected to form the village environmental committee. In Sunya there are seven sub-villages, hence seven women and seven men constitute the village environmental committee.

Finally, from each village, three people are elected to represent the village in the 'zone committee', which contains representatives from all nine villages in the forest reserve. At least one of these three must be a woman. However, to perform elections is not always an easy task, especially when you do not know what purpose the elected committee has. Below follows a case of an election of a new environmental committee in one very remote village called Loltopesi.

Case II

> Loltopesi was originally a Maasai village, but other ethnic groups have moved in. This
> village has previously had problems with a corrupt VEO who has worked against the district
> personnel that has tried to inform the villagers about the purpose of the village-based
> forest reserve, land laws and land rights. The VEO sabotaged several meetings by not
> dispersing information about them, but eventually he was fired and a village meeting was
> finally held.
>
> During the election of the environmental committee, several interesting things
> surfaced. First, several people did not know in which sub-village they lived and where its
> boundaries were in relation to the other sub-villages. Secondly, when the election was
> performed it was not an *election* as much as it was an *appointing* of representatives to the
> different posts. The stipulated qualifications for the candidates were to understand Swahili
> and that they must be devoted, hard working and honest. However, several of those

---

whom two were to be women, to make up the Sungusungu group. Hence, in Sunya there were 80 individuals chosen for this task.

[183] SULEDO is the name of the collective forest reserve constituting nine villages in three different wards – Sunya, Lengatei, and Dongo.

appointed were not present at the meeting. The poor participation of villagers and especially of women (6 out of 70), at this event also made it difficult to elect women representatives. Maasai women were not present at all. The election was extremely chaotic; the villagers had to say if they approved or disapproved the suggested people and whether the person was known in the village or not. In addition, the issue of who to appoint in the different sub-village, Maasai or non-Maasai, was brought up.

It was not until the 'election' was over that the secretary for the Zone Committee explained the role of the environmental committee, its responsibilities and powers to the villagers. He also informed them about the duties, responsibilities and powers of Sungusungu. This reversed practice did not puzzle only me: the villagers were even more confused since they had never heard about the duties of the environmental committee or what the Sungusungu was to do. This was an effect of the previous committee existing just in name; it never worked practically.

This example shows how a village secretary managed to undermine the functioning and purpose of an environmental committee for four years. When the new committee was to be elected, people still did not know why and what its purpose was. Moreover, there were many newcomers to the village who did not even know in which sub-village they lived. The number of newcomers increased before the general election in 2000 when four illegal sub-villages were created. Without consulting the Loltopesi village council (which is the normal procedure), politicians at ward and district level coerced the village council into establishing these sub-villages[184] that conveniently became CCM supporters. Also in some of the sub-villages CCM opened new party branches. One Maasai man recalled these events and said that 'suddenly there were CCM flags everywhere in the forest'.

Nonetheless, the foundation of the environmental committees has had positive effects when it comes to increasing equity between men and women. First of all, through the committee more women have become involved in decision-making processes and have in this way been empowered. The environmental committees decided to introduce 'gender-balance' of the two top positions within the committee. If the chairperson is a man, then the secretary has to be a woman and vice versa. It further became accepted that half of the environmental

---

[184] One of the illegal sub-villages was established in the protected project forest area, far away from water sources and the village centre. The District Forester was very upset and many feared that an illegal cutting of the protected but highly valuable ebony tree would start despite approved by-laws to prohibit this.

committee members should be women. This practice elevated the attention on women in politics that had positive effects for women's general participation in the other committees and in village matters.

The third case illustrates village resistance against decision taken by the village chairperson and village government. Leaders were living with the belief that they could act as they pleased since they were elected by the villagers. However, suddenly they met new attitudes, as this third case shows.

Case III

> Sunya forest is well-known for its large areas of ebony trees that are worth a lot of money, and this was something that one businessman from outside the district tried to take advantage of. The village leaders in Sunya traded a large area (100 acres) of ebony forest in exchange for a corrugated roof for the primary school in the village, worth 200 000 TZS. This was something that the villagers did not agree on, but the village chairperson said that since he and the government were elected, the villagers were supposed to do as they were told, and they had the right to sell the trees to the businessman. However, this was reported by the villagers to the District Forester who immediately took action and summoned a meeting with the village government and villagers. In this meeting, it was revealed that the village chairperson was given a large sum of money that had been put in the bank in Kibaya. This was most likely a bribe from the businessman to enable him to receive the forest area. The Maasai in the meeting said that if it was just a matter of getting money for a roof for the primary school, they could collect that money very easily. In the meeting, it was decided that the businessman's request for land should be denied.

The newly transferred responsibilities over the forest to the villagers in the beginning generated an enormous self-esteem and pride. Not least after some selected villagers went on a study tour to other districts[185] that already had implemented village-based forest management. On the study tour, villagers noticed what huge forest resources they had compared to the other smaller forest reserves they visited. Yet, illegal logging in the forest had been and still is a problem. To try

---

[185] The other districts were Babati and Singida districts that also were involved in the LAMP programme. Forest areas in these two districts are considerably smaller, something villagers from SULEDO commented on.

to curb illegal logging a meeting involving the district forester, the District Advisor and villagers took place in 1997.[186]

Case IV

> The villagers were concerned about the issue that there was still some illegal logging going on in their forest but they had not yet apprehended the culprits. Villagers found a pile of logs in the forest, which was taken to the nearest sub-village. However, there were some concerns that these logs might be stolen. A meeting was held, attended by the District Forester and the District Advisor, where the politicians spoke of the importance of the forest. The Ward Councillor was particularly concerned and ordered people to be on their guard: 'You should not sleep like hens with both eyes closed. Instead, you should sleep like ducks, keeping one eye open in order to guard the forest during nighttimes'. His advice was taken seriously and just a few days later, the culprit was caught. The Maasai in the area had posted young ilmurran to guard the logs and one night a suspicious figure on a bicycle came. The thief was too busy loading the logs on his bicycle to notice that he was being watched. He was caught in the act, tied with a rope and brought to the village by the warriors. And who was the culprit? Well, it was the Ward Councillor himself who had ordered people to be on their guard - and on their guard they were.

This was the first sign of empowerment and democratic consolidation, that people could catch a Ward Councillor and accuse him of stealing. His excuse was that he was not stealing the logs, he was just taking them to a more secure place. However, one might think that the Councillor was thrown out at once from politics, but he was not. He continued his work for four more years, although with a low profile. When the new election was held he lost his position.

8.3 Donor Influence

The influence of donors in empowering villagers is relatively obvious in Sunya, especially when it comes to the creation of the environmental committees in the different villages constituting the SULEDO forest area. These committees were not just gender balanced; they became a counterweight to the power of village leadership by questioning decisions concerning the environment. Hence, democratic change or increased democratic practices in these cases are not

---

[186] This episode was narrated to me by my wife who participated in the meeting as District Advisor.

primarily connected to the introduction of the multiparty system. Development partners implementing aid projects by democratic means, using democratic tools by including poor women and men, young and old, in a participatory manner, can have a direct impact on people's empowerment possibilities with an increased self-esteem that enables and encourages villagers to put demands on their leaders and consolidate democratic practices. An example of this is the LAMP programme. The aim of the programme is poverty alleviation and sustainable management of natural resources; one of the most important programme components is support for community empowerment and democratic development. This is done through increased grass-root democracy and people's participation in decision-making over the natural resources in the area for their livelihood. This form of direct involvement by a development partner to build up a democratic framework and practice is not done by political parties. Political parties have their different women's and youth groups but you still have to be a member of a party to participate. Development partners are also likely to deliver more often than political parties do, due to the backing they usually have of economic resources and the practice of concentrated efforts. More people tend also to turn up at meetings held connected to aid projects by a development partner than a political party since they are there with a specific aim – to assist people – while political parties might only be there to ask for support and votes.[187]

Villagers' participation in the donor programme has generated increased participation in political and local decision-making bodies, through the different committees. Even if the agenda for donors is to work on poverty reduction, the implementation principles work towards increasing villagers' participation in decision-making processes. This in turn empowers villagers in general in their connection to their village government, ward councillor and district council. Yet, how far and how fast a transition towards democracy and a consolidation of democratic practices go depends on what individuals hold decision-making positions. As I described in case II, it was the VEO who, by hindering the holding of meetings in the village, delayed democratic practices in the village. His actions

---

[187] One woman told me that they were tired of waiting for politicians or district staff who never turned up. But when donors say they will come, people usually turn up to these meetings.

denied villagers their democratic rights. But due to an honest and persistent district forester, the meeting took place in the end and the VEO was fired.

8.4 Concluding Remarks

The different cases described are examples of the positive aspects of change where villagers put pressure on and start to question the actions of their leaders. This is in my opinion a positive move in the transition towards a consolidated democracy in Tanzania, starting at the local level, where people take charge of questions affecting their lives. This is very clear in the episode where Maasai women forcefully questioned the actions of their village leader which also, paradoxically, encouraged men to be more courageous and critical. However, the Maasai in Engapune sub-village are not in a decision-making position in Sunya village due to their being a marginalised group compared with others, leading them to a sense of being threatened and enclosed by the farmers in the area. The common identity of being Maasai detaches them from the rest of the village and seems to be a driving force to keep the small community together, generating also conservative attitudes in the community. Then again, there are definite pros and cons for the Maasai to have a dual leadership structure. The customary leaders give the society a form of stability in a changing world while at the same time excluding women from taking part in customary decision-making. On the other hand, the party system gives women the right to vote and be elected and become part of a larger societal context with all the advantages that comes with it.

Among the non-Maasai groups the creation of the environmental committees had a positive effect regarding equal representation of men and women. This example of equal representation also spread to the formal committees in the village and the practice of equal representation elevated attention on women in decision-making and leading positions. The implementation of aid-projects through democratic means and the inclusion of the stakeholders as full-fledged parties in a participatory way, can have direct impact on people's empowerment with an increased self-esteem which can encourage them to put demands on their own leaders.

Democratisation through 'bottom-up' processes[188] like these cases is significant for the continuation and the consolidation of the democratic processes in Tanzania. These empowerment forces described must, however, have the opportunity to grow, be strengthened and expand in order for them to be part of the formal political empowerment process. This would enable a continued transition towards democracy and enhance the consolidation of democracy, which in this way can be strengthened and deepened. It is also essential that popular participation in decision-making processes, initiated through different aid projects, be supported by local authorities and staff. I consider it crucial that villagers, first of all, get support and feel they have the support from village and ward leaders and the district in the decision-making processes that affect their lives. There might otherwise be a risk that activities involving the population in decision-making fade away after an initial surge of participation and support from aid organisations and district staff. It is therefore vital that after aid organisations withdraw their assistance, the district continues to support people logistically, economically and morally through follow-ups, encouragements by positive feedback and through accountable and transparent practices.

The next chapter analyses the democratisation process in Tanzania through different themes that are important to reflect upon if we want to achieve consolidation of the Western form of democracy with a multiparty system at the centre. There are in my opinion several impeding forces at work for not making this anticipated transition as simple as it is sometimes portrayed (see Ottaway 2003, Carothers 2006). Some of these themes are most likely applicable to other newly democratised countries as well.

---

[188] By bottom-up processes I mean processes where decision to act is taken by the people themselves. Sometimes initiatives can be taken by outsiders or leaders on higher administrative levels but the process itself and the driving force are done by villagers. It is a matter of citizens opposing or questioning the actions of elected leaders.

9   FACTORS HAMPERING THE PROCESS TOWARDS THE CONSOLIDATION OF MULTIPARTY DEMOCRACY

The introduction of a multiparty system and the overall democratisation of decision-making in Tanzania has been a top-down project where villagers in many cases were taken by surprise by the multitude of political parties and by the logic behind their creation. It has therefore been the main purpose of this thesis to show, through the eyes of ordinary people, how they have comprehended this political change from a one-party to a multiparty system, as a way of answering the overall question of constraints and possibilities for the consolidation of multiparty democracy in Tanzania. An important feature in this dissertation has been to illustrate the multitude of factors, such as cultural perception of power and leadership, social organisations, communications, etc., which have implications for the consolidation of multiparty democracy. The findings of the research have crystallised into different core themes that interact and vary in importance over time and circumstances during the process of the transition to a multiparty system and towards consolidation of democracy. This chapter deals with these different themes that function as impeding factors in this process and to the idea of a multiparty system. The themes presented here are divided into the following categories: stability, cultural (including educational), and logistical/practical themes.

9.1 Stability Theme

> We are not educated so we do not know much about politics but we have heard about CCM since we were small and it was led by Nyerere. It has led the country in peace and we cannot choose any other party since we do not know where it would take us. We are not rich but we have peace.
>
> (02.Maasai men in Engarkah)

Tanzania is a rare exception in Africa: a peaceful nation where Independence was reached without a liberation war and where post-Independence has been peaceful (except for the war with Uganda 1978-79). Consequently, the peace and harmony concepts refer to the peaceful history of Tanzania and these three concepts are, as said, frequently used by politicians, at national as well as at local level, in reference to the legacy of Nyerere and the merits of the ruling party CCM. Unity refers to the existing Union with Zanzibar, a Union of two independent countries merged together by Julius Nyerere and Abeid Amani Karume in 1964. For Nyerere this was a voluntary union based on close political ties between TANU and ASP (Afro-Shirazi Party), a common language, common cultural traditions and geographical closeness between two independent countries that of 'free will decided to be one country' (Nyerere 1995: 80). One can argue that the use of these three concepts functions as a double-edged sword by both promoting peace and stability in Tanzania, and at the same time reinforcing the dominant position of the ruling party CCM against the other parties. This double-edged sword can be seen as a hindering factor for a broader consolidation of democracy where opposition parties would be seen to have a strong position and function as a counterbalance towards the ruling party and its politics.

It is true that Tanzania is an 'Island of peace', as it sometimes referred to, yet, peace, unity and harmony in Tanzania are not necessarily based on the pillars President Kikwete took up in his inauguration speech to the parliament (see chapter 5.6.4.1). In his speech, President Kikwete presented ten strategies for enhancing the sense of nationalism and patriotism. One can question the purpose of this. If a strong national identity exists among Tanzanians, why does the president have to put large efforts into enhancing these feelings? I consider the peaceful situation in Tanzania to be based on, or combined with, other rationalities than those presented in the speech. The ruling party is using an already peaceful context to promote political status quo through the use of the peace, unity and harmony concepts as being dependent on the Union with Zanzibar and a common national identity and CCM being the 'heir' of this union and the only guarantor for this (see fig. 9 below).

Figure 9: Correlation between peace, unity and harmony

9.1.1   National versus ethnic identity

The democracy concept, in its simplest form, means 'rule by the people'. However, as Sørensen correctly states, one has to define who the people are, what they should rule over and what constitutes 'rule' (Sørensen 1993: 1, Bratton and Van de Walle 1997: 11). Rustow suggests that 'the people cannot decide until somebody decides who are the people' (in Bratton and Van de Walle). Hence, according to this reasoning, democracy cannot be installed unless the inhabitants of a state share a sense of national unity. With regard to Africa's colonial history, the issue of national unity causes problems since 'boundaries of modern states seldom coincide with the sense of nationhood felt by its various peoples' (Bratton and van de Walle 1997: 11). Following this argument we could assume that where there is a sense of

nationhood and a common national identity, political pluralism without party bans should not cause any problems. People would be free to vote for the political party which best represents their interests, without jeopardising national unity. Hence, to have multiple parties and to avoid the trap of ethnically-based voting patterns, a sense of nationhood and common national identity must be established. This would make it possible to determine *who* the people are. On the other hand, as we have seen in the newly independent Tanganyika, Nyerere tried to shape nationhood in Tanzania by avoiding the multiparty system. According to him, the multiparty system was based on social and economic inequalities between people. Since he wanted to create unity and equity his only option was the one-party system (Kweka 1995: 61, Sadleir 1999: 288). He was afraid that in a plural political system different economic classes and ethnic groups would rally behind a particular political party representing only the interests of that particular group. The one-party system was consequently a way to avoid that, which in the multiparty system could have led to ethnically and class-based conflicts in Tanzania, conflicts that were a reality in other newly independent countries in Africa.

However, the main issue that seems to be a cause for concern today is a plausible break-up of the Union with Zanzibar as a consequence of the multiparty system and a possible president from the opposition party CUF in Zanzibar. It is implicated by the different Tanzanian presidents that without the Union with Zanzibar, the whole country would plunge into chaos. Still, I do not consider there is a general fear among the citizens on mainland Tanzania that a disintegration of the Union would lead to civil war or internal conflicts. Why? Firstly, many Tanzanians in the western part of Tanzania have no connections to the coast and are therefore not particularly interested in or informed of what is going on there. They have closer connections to Uganda and Rwanda and political developments there. Secondly, Tanzanians are in general afraid of conflicts and are 'harmony seekers'.[189] The cultural norm of harmony in the society means that signs of aggression in relation to each other are seen as something negative. Thirdly, due to the existence of more than one hundred ethnic groups in Tanzania, there is no single group large or strong enough to suppress any other group (see Kelsall 2003).

---

[189] Zanzibar is of course an exception in this case but my argument concerns mainland Tanzania.

This also makes it more difficult for politicians at national level to trigger conflicts for their own benefit (politicisation of group interest identity or politicisation of ethnicity, Nilsson 1999) and play ethnic groups against each other as a tool to gain more power or support.

Nevertheless, even though Tanzania is more peaceful than some of its neighbouring countries, (for example Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda and recently Kenya) the unity of the country, in my argument, has not been based on national identity and uniformity, i.e. that all citizens in Tanzania regard themselves to be Tanzanians first of all and their ethnic belonging as secondary.[190] My experience is that people's identification lies with their ethnic identify first and foremost, especially during elections when ethnic identity surfaces even among supporters from the same party, as was illustrated in chapter 7. But 'outwards' it is important to present a common view as if all saw themselves as Tanzanians. This is naturally more important for politicians and government officials. I therefore argue that the quest of removing identification based on ethnic belonging and creating identification based on national identity has not succeeded completely.[191] The unity has rather been based on the idea that everybody belongs to the only party in the country and therefore implicitly everybody should have the same political ideas, i.e. political homogeneity.

Assuming that unity is based on political homogeneity, the findings of the Afrobarometer reveal that a majority in eleven of twelve countries admitted that '"sometimes", "often", or "always" – one has to be careful of what you say about politics' (Afrobarometer, no. 60, May 2006: 22). What is significant in these findings is that in Tanzania political fear was most widespread together with countries like Zimbabwe and Mali. According to the Afrobarometer, in Tanzania 'people fear expressing politically incorrect opinions that diverge from the

---

[190] According to Takougang (1997: 53), despite decades of single-party rule in many countries it has not created a real sense of nationhood that has surpassed ethnic and religious identities.
[191] Here is a difference between Maasai and other ethnic groups. The latter groups are on a surface level following the ideology of Nyerere of national identity to a greater extent, but behind this, there is an identity based on ethnic belonging. For the Maasai, there is no discussion about this. Since Maasai society is not based on political, religious or central institutions, and has been transhumant, they have no traditional notion of a nation state. Cultural unity is even more important under such circumstances and it is less relevant to call themselves Tanzanians, even though Maasai are aware and know they are living in Tanzania.

widespread official ideology of the dominant party' (ibid). Hence, the findings seem to back up my analysis and my experience of political homogeneity.

Regarding the issue of national identity, my analysis in this matter differs from the results found in the Afrobarometer (no. 18, 2002). The report states that Tanzanians seem to lack ethnic consciousness or that it is only given secondary association. In comparison with other countries in the study, anywhere from one-half to one-third of people think of themselves in ethnic terms[192] (i.e. language or ethnic group). About three-quarters (76%) of Tanzanians identify themselves with their occupational identity, which is the highest in any Afrobarometer survey. Regarding national identity, the survey found that 93% of Tanzanians, both on the mainland and on Zanzibar are 'proud' or 'very proud' to be called Tanzanians. This figure is similar to levels in other African countries (ibid: 10-11). Still, at the same time, the survey finds that 89% of Tanzanians claim that they are equally proud of their group identity, which leads the survey to ask which identity is really the most important one. Tanzanians are asked the question: 'Let us suppose that you had to choose between being a Tanzanian and being an "X" (where X is the respondent's self-expressed identity group, which was inserted in the question). Which of these two groups do you feel most strongly attached to?' 74% chose being Tanzanian, while one-quarter chose their identity group. According to the study, the results differed much compared to other countries in Africa. In Mali a majority (64%) chose their sub-group identity and in Nigeria half of the population indentified themselves with their sub-group identity. The study concludes, in contrast to my findings, that Nyerere's effort to mould a national identity has borne fruit. Further, the political scientist Joel Barkan states in the report that 'the extent of a common perception of nationhood and the lack of ethnic considerations in politics is an important reason that Tanzania has been one of the most politically stable countries in the region and on the continent' (ibid: 11). In summary the survey states, 'Even though Tanzania is a very diverse society, its citizens exhibit high levels of national identity and low levels of ethnic consciousness. Most Tanzanians define themselves in terms of occupation rather than tribe, language or religion'

---

[192] Nigeria (48%), Namibia (46%), Mali (40%), Zimbabwe (36%) (Afrobarometer, no.18, 2002: 11).

(ibid: 2). This is no surprise since Nyerere promoted farming and even the party flag carries the symbols of a hoe and a hammer.

The findings are interesting but I do not fully agree; in support of my argument is the fact that the researchers themselves, first of all, are sceptical of their findings that diverge from the results from the other countries in the survey. Also, diverging results from my analysis relate to how the question is asked: 'Besides being Tanzanian, which specific group do you feel you belong to first and foremost?' which already pre-supposes that people identify themselves as Tanzanian. The government in Tanzania has put large efforts into building up national unity and discouraging sub-nationalism, which would make people reluctant to reveal the true picture to the researchers (ibid: 10). I think this last reflection is very true when it comes to Tanzania since it is seen as important to present a unified representation of nationhood towards other nations or visitors, especially for politicians and government employees. However, beneath this outer layer of nationhood, there is an identity based on ethnic belonging that is very strong. Naturally, identity varies with circumstances and depending on whom one encounters, but I would say ethnic identity is primary.

Although Tanzanians over the years have been connected more and more to each other, through the villagisation programme and through movements caused by 'pull and push' resettlements to find new and arable land, social ties or social capital has not been created between the different ethnic groups. When groups of people from different overpopulated or agriculturally depleted regions are competing for the same arable land, it leads to tension, followed by mistrust, prejudice and suspicion fuelled by misinformation and/or lack of information subsequently leading to poor co-operation and minor conflicts. Still, conflicts between different groups of peasants are seldom physical but lead to lack of trust and diminish the possibility for the building of social capital. On the other hand, physical confrontations seem to happen more often between peasants and pastoralists – caused by two different livelihood patterns – which often have fatal consequences. However, co-operation does occur as we saw in chapter 7 when three smaller ethnic groups decided to vote for a common political candidate from one of their own groups instead of a candidate from the dominant group in the village. This is, at the same time, evidence of ethnic consciousness, which also

came forth in the interviews where ethnicity in connection to the local election was evident. Hence, people do not generally sympathise or co-operate with each other across ethnic boundaries in their ordinary lives[193] and to an even lesser extent join forces with another group in order to suppress a third group in a violent manner. People in Tanzania, despite small conflicts and lack of social capital in a Putnamian sense (Putnam 1996), generally pursue a life in peace and harmony with fellow villagers.

The cultural norm of harmony in the society implies for example, that questions about identity are sensitive, and to avoid contradicting the political norm, an identity as Tanzanian is therefore displayed. Signs of aggression are also negative and to lose or cause someone to lose face should be avoided. People are therefore reluctant to manifest their complaints in loud protests or through fighting and generally let disputes pass without action, especially if disputes are with those higher up in the social hierarchy.[194] Consequently, people still identify with their ethnic belonging first of all, but 'outwards' it is important to display an image as if they all saw themselves as Tanzanians. And apparently this is something politicians are aware of and need to work on since new efforts are continuously planned to enhance nationalism and patriotism in Tanzania.

9.1.2   Unity within one party

Due to the rapid implementation of the multiparty system in Tanzania, there were genuine fears of internal conflicts and ethnic clashes in the first general election in 1995. At each election thereafter there have been riots where people have been killed and this is what people remember. What therefore troubles people today I would say, is *any* form of political violence and that the multiparty system has created a possible stage for this. Something that people realise and do not approve of is the political conflict on Zanzibar, which is by many seen as a result of the

---

[193] People from different ethnic groups do co-operate and marry each other. However, in my experience, there is too little of this co-operation to be able to say that ethnic identities become marginal, leaving the Tanzanian identity as the only option. Hence, the social capital and trust Robert Putnam discusses is not present to any great extent.
[194] Nevertheless, there are other actions possible besides physical actions: a villager could pay a visit to the local witch-doctor and hope she/he can assist in causing harm to a certain individual or family 'by putting a spell on them'.

multiparty system. That political tension with the accompanying violence is not wanted on the mainland. This view is very well understood by politicians from the ruling party, who use the political polarisation on Zanzibar as an example of what could also happen on the mainland if political polarisation is to continue and get out of hand. This worry is exemplified in the question posed to CUF's chairperson Lipumba about what the red colour of their party flag symbolises if not violence (see chapter 5.6.4.1).

In my research, the perceptions of CCM are closely connected to the maintenance of peace and harmony and many of the respondents say that the party has been ruling the country in a peaceful manner. One could therefore argue that people are led to believe that unity within one party (as it used to be) is the only solution to the continuation of peace, unity and harmony (stability). As a matter of fact, this is the actual political situation in Tanzania as CCM has received a higher number of votes at each election held and got 80% of the total votes in the last election.[195] The opposition parties are split and have no power in the parliament. The ruling party is portrayed as the true heir and guardian of the Union with Zanzibar and the stability in Tanzania depends on the existence of the Union. This argument feeds on (possibly assumed) fears among people of political polarisation and political differences. It may also create fear for the possibility of not only the disintegration of the Union, but also that this could be the spark initiating an internal struggle between ethnic groups on the mainland. People are implicitly to understand that without the power and the guidance of the ruling party, the present situation in the country might not have been or remain as peaceful as it is despite a multiparty system.

The multiparty system with several (mostly unknown) opposition parties is regarded by many respondents as something having to do with politicians and ex-politicians trying to get into the seat of power. The image people have of politics is about fighting (for power) and broken promises. The difference from the single-party system is that there are more parties making these promises today. In Tanzania, during the campaigns before elections, the tension in society rises, debates and discussions are heated and some minor clashes between supporters of

---

[195] On Zanzibar, CCM received 53.2% of the votes and CUF 46.1% according to official statistics from the National Election Commission.

different parties erupt. This is nothing people want and many are afraid that something atrocious (like in Rwanda and Burundi) could happen. The 'backlash' for democracy, or the multiparty system as it is more commonly referred to among the respondents, is that they do not connect it with anything positive - they simply do not have any positive connotations with the democracy concept, which is substantiated by the results of Afrobarometer survey below.

Country	Circa 2000	Circa 2002	Circa 2005	Change
Botswana	85	75	69	-16
Ghana	77	82	75	-2
Lesotho	40	50	50	+10
Malawi	65	64	56	-9
Mali	60	71	68	+8
Namibia	58	54	57	-1
Nigeria	81	68	65	-16
South Africa	60	57	65	+5
Tanzania	84	65	38	-46
Uganda	80	75	61	-19
Zambia	75	70	64	-11
Zimbabwe	71	48	66	-5
Afro mean	69	62	61	-8

(Adapted from Afrobarometer, no.60, 2006: 17)

Table 3: Support for democracy in African countries
Percent saying "Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government"

The result in the survey conducted by the Afrobarometer in 2005/2006 shows that the general trust for democracy in Tanzania has declined from 84% to 38% but still 61% in 2005 regard democracy as the most preferable form of government. However, quite a substantial minority (28%) of all respondents in the survey, report that they either don't know or don't care about the best form of government. The survey explains the low figure for Tanzania by the fact that a large number of respondents state that they do not know what system is best (58%) (Afrobarometer, no. 40, 2006: 1). This corresponds with the answers in my interviews where most people did not give any definition of 'democracy', or know why the multiparty system was implemented. On the other hand, compared with Zimbabwe and Zambia, who both reject one-party rule (88% and 86% of respondents respectively), only 44% say that they reject a one-party state in Tanzania (in table 4 below, the lowest figure of all countries in the survey) (ibid: 4). This can, however, be

compared with the results by Nyalali Commission where 77% of the respondents wanted to continue with the one-party system while 23% rejected it. Hence, there has been an increase of resistance against the one-party system of 20% since 1991, but still 56% seem to prefer it.

(Adapted from Afrobarometer, no. 40, 2006: 4)

Table 4: Rejection of one-party rule, 2005/2006 (percent disapprove)

Country	Circa 2002	Circa 2005	Change
Botswana	59	74	+15
Ghana	56	69	+13
Lesotho	31	59	+28
Malawi	64	68	+4
Mali	55	59	+4
Namibia	62	57	-5
Nigeria	59	67	+8
South Africa	67	62	-5
Tanzania	67	52	-15
Uganda	41	54	+13
Zambia	52	63	+11
Zimbabwe	55	76	+21
Afro mean	**55**	**63**	**+8**

(Adapted from Afrobarometer, no. 60, 2006: 21)

Table 5: Support for multiple political parties
Percent agree/ agree very strongly that "Many political parties are needed to make sure that [citizens of this country] have real choices in who governs them"

The survey concludes that Tanzanians seem to approve of the continued dominance of the ruling party CCM, which would be in line with my own results of the 'unknown' opposition and the unity with(in) one party. The report also states that there is large support for regular and honest elections for selecting leaders. Yet for the first time in Afrobarometer surveys, the support for multiparty competition is considerably weaker, even if a majority in every country find several political parties to be necessary to give people a real choice about who they want as their leader. Highest rates are given by Zimbabweans (76%) and Botswanans (74%) while only 52% of Tanzanians and 54% of Ugandans see this as important (Afrobarometer, no. 40, 2006: 4). The figure for Tanzania might also reflect the opinion from the interviews about the more 'identification based' relation to the ruling party in relation to the opposition and possibly also the perceptions about the ruling party as the only probable provider of resources.

9.2 Cultural and Educational Theme

The diminished support for multiparty politics, the still existing preference for one-party rule and extremely high support for President Mkapa[196] – with more than 80% of citizens in 2005 (Afrobarometer, no. 60, 2006: 34) – pave the way for the dominant position of CCM. In the Afrobarometer report it is pointed out that leaders in established democracies only reach this kind of support during national emergencies and therefore conclude 'that astronomical ratings are due, at least in part, to some combination of party dominance, press control, and uncritical citizenship' (ibid). As an example, the local election in Kiteto and in Tanzania as a whole was a landslide victory for the ruling party CCM. CCM won all village chairperson positions in Kiteto District in 1999 and in 2004. Hence, the dominance of CCM in the villages is overwhelming. This dominance is also seen in other regions with large Maasai populations. In 2005 parliament election, CCM candidates in Simanjiro and Hanang districts in Manyara region, recived 77% and 90% respectively of the votes. In Arusha region and Ngorongoro district, CCM's candidate was unopposed and in Monduli and in Longido CCM candidates received 96% and 93% of the votes respectively (www.nec.go.tz). The same dominance is shown in Tanga

---

[196] The other two leaders with the same level of support mentioned in the Afrobarometer are Yoweri Museveni of Uganda and Hifekepunye Pohamba of Namibia.

and Morogoro regions. These results show the strong position of the party through its long ruling of the country and its familiarity among the populace and perhaps due to an 'uncritical citizenship'.

The opposition, on the other hand is still striving for a position in those few places where it is well-known and familiar. After three general elections the opposition has not yet achieved this among the majority of the people, hence the negative circle of opposition parties.[197] This discrepancy is, to some extent, explained by the parties' different histories, but I have also argued in this thesis that there is another, 'deeper', cognitive factor behind this discrepancy as well. If we assume that the introduction of a Western form of multiparty system (as an integrated part of overall democracy transition) is the best organisational practice for electing leaders and securing human rights, a transition towards a pluralistic political system implies more than structural changes, e.g. founding of political parties and elections. It involves a 'cultural transformation' as well (Mmyua and Chaligha 1994; see also Etoung-Manguelle 2000), which is much deeper and concerns an 'internalisation' of the democracy concept, i.e. a 'cognitive' consolidation of democracy and the idea of the multiparty system. This requires massive efforts in education of the electorate. Structural and democratic change in a society based on hierarchical structures would also mean a comprehensive change in how people relate themselves with their leaders and the political parties and how they think about their role in society, the increased freedoms and responsibilities, etc.

The educational factor was already mentioned in the Nyalali Commission's report when they expressed their concern that citizens might not have understood why plural politics was suggested. The Commission assumed that multiparty politics could only thrive if 'rigorous educational campaigns are undertaken by the CCM government' (Mmuya and Chaligha 1992: 106). It was assumed that citizens must be made aware of their rights (and responsibilities) so that they can freely organise their own civil organisations within different fields, for example the development of rural areas. The educational undertaking in question cannot be anything else but

---

[197] Belonging to the opposition has already disqualified villagers from benefits provided by the government. One women's group in Sunya with members from the opposition party did not receive the same assistance as their sisters from CCM. Shopkeepers are from time to time threatened that their licences will not be extended if they do not vote for the ruling party.

massive considering the large population, number of villages, number of illiterates and the poor infrastructure in the country. These factors alone should be enough for democracy promoters to understand that a democratisation process and consolidation of the same cannot be anything else than a slow and, hopefully, a steady process over a longer period of time. Moreover, citizens need to have the opportunities, both time-wise and practically, to attend meetings and to influence decision-making. This is easier said than done, since in reality it is much more difficult to achieve due to the life-situation for most families in the rural areas. The three enemies Nyerere talked about, i.e. poverty, ignorance and disease, are still a reality.

However, the real stumbling blocks for consolidation of multiparty democracy are usually the politicians at various levels, who are used to their role as 'leaders' and to non-participatory practices. Thus, leaders need to re-think their new role as democratic leaders and evidence of the need to shape leaders' thinking are the workshops that have been conducted for VEOs where they were taught not to misuse their powers and mistreat their fellow villagers.[198] But a two-week's workshop for some selected representatives is not sufficient. As Ottaway states in chapter 1.1, many of the leaders in the third-wave democracies only use the rhetoric of liberal democracy and accept some of the formal democratic institutions, while in practice they have accomplished little in terms of increasing civil and political liberties. Furthermore, we cannot take for granted that people and leaders are willing or want to strive for the Western form of multiparty democracy which is promoted by the donor community. If there has not been any expressed wish from the leaders and population, then a consolidation process might become a manipulative or merely an educational process, as in the workshop mentioned above. An additional reason for the CCM's overwhelming victories in the elections has also to do with an inner and emotional feeling that people have towards the ruling party, as described in chapter 6. The history of CCM and its predecessor TANU and its founding father Julius Nyerere, gives the party a vast advantage over other parties.

---

[198] A total of 175 VEOs from four different districts in Kagera Region attended a two-week workshop that focused on good leadership and transparency, organised by the President's Office, Regional Administration and Local Governments Department (Mathias Byabato , *The Guardian*, 28 May 2004).

The consolidation of democracy has further to do with how individuals in non-literate cultures, like the Maasai, comprehend and understand new words and concepts (for example UDP, NCCR. TLP) as was discussed in chapter 6. Relating Ong's description of oral and written cultures to the educational factor, the words 'democracy' and 'multiparty system' are new words that are merely 'sounds' that have to be filled with function in people's actual lives or lived experiences to get a meaning. The way a sender communicates his or her information to a receiver is also crucial. Jürgen Habermas says that we can measure every oral expression in any given language by its volume and tone, but we can only understand the meaning of what is said when it is expressed in a language we understand, i.e. we understand the intention of the speaker. For us to understand the meaning of a verbal expression, we must enter a (real or imagined) exchange of communication with the sender (Eriksen and Weigård 2000: 34). To enable an understanding, the person explaining a concept has to put herself in the cultural and social context where the communication exchange takes part. Thus, when new words and concepts like democracy and multiparty system are introduced among the Maasai, we must take into consideration that these concepts are acknowledged cognitively differently than they are in a (Western) literate culture. These words are sounds that in order to be understood need to be contextualised. They need to be filled with content that is preferably positive. Hitherto these concepts have rather been about arguments, fighting, and a possibility for 'Big Men' to come to power or to 'fill their stomachs', especially from the Maasai point of view. On the other side, the orally acquired knowledge about CCM created a cognitive image and identity. Through the actions of CCM, the Maasai could then connect actions to cognitive images that created meaning and understanding.

Hence, these new concepts need to be included in people's ordinary lives as lived experience in competition with other already existing concepts. This is what I mean by cognitive consolidation. Politicians who are unknown and want to be elected need to be visible and their party's actions also need to be seen and experienced. It is required from the parties and opposition politicians to be visible and for villagers to see opposition politicians in their village and to witness some form of result from what opposition parties are doing for people. Therefore, it is also important for a president to tour the country to be seen and to assist the

population, for example during droughts. In this way the president (or any other political leader) connects with them. When people know a politician and his 'habits', it can be said they are relating to him and his actions, which is a guideline for people when they are electing a leader. The new opposition parties have, due to being unknown, difficulties getting supporters because people cannot relate to them through actions and lived experiences. And since the opposition parties are not the executors of assistance to people, this aggregates the negative circle of support as well.

If we analyse the Maasai perceptions of and relationship with the ruling party, it is quite an emotional, and in most cases rather deep, importance that is put on the party. The symbolic view of CCM as one's clan or mother/father puts the responsibilities of a guardian onto the party. It is expected by the Maasai but also by the other ethnic groups that the party perform the same duties as one's clan or mother/father. This is the reason why we get responses expressing disappointment when CCM has failed to 'help its children'. But in general, failure on the part of the party is sometimes blamed on the leaders within the party. The party as such is considered to have good ideas whereas it is the leaders who misbehave. As I discussed earlier in chapter 7, the incumbent MP in Kiteto is not regarded as a good leader while his opponent from the opposition party is seen as such due to his higher education and other qualifications. But since he is from an opposition party, the Maasai do not elect him. Still, the opposition MP candidate usually receives great support in the parliamentary election, which I see more of a vote against the incumbent MP who is not appreciated by many.[199] Yet, many have voted for him and people could argue that since generally it is the leaders who fail – not the party – it is better to try to change the leaders of your party than abandon it. If one would vote for the opposition, what is there to say that the leaders in the opposition are better? In addition, since opposition parties do not have any experience of holding

---

[199] In February 2008 a by-election was held in Kiteto due to the death of the incumbent MP. The preparations for the election were very violent and five politicians and one driver from the opposition camp CHADEMA were attacked by CCM followers with knives and machetes for allegedly disturbing a CCM campaign. The election was won by the new CCM candidate Benedict Ole Nangoro by 62.4% of the votes while CHADEMA's candidate obtained 36.4%. The turnout was however very low, only 46%, possibly due to the violence in connection with the by-election (http://www.ippmedia.com/cgi-bin/ipp/print.pl?id=109150;
http://www.ippmedia.com/cgi-bin/ipp/print.pl?id=109088;
http://www.ippmedia.com/cgi-bin/ipp/print.pl?id=108881;
http://www.ippmedia.com/cgi-bin/ipp/print-pl?id=108760).

leadership positions, respondents do not know how they are going to lead and from where their resources will come. This is precisely why a party's history becomes important, and in this respect the ruling party has a large advantage. It can trace its history to the de-colonisation of Tanganyika as the successor of TANU, which generates feelings of being 'children of CCM' or belonging to the same clan. This triggers the political familyhood of the party and juxtaposes it to the symbolic role of the clan. These connotations and feelings are part of the personal dimension connected to the party and to Nyerere as the 'Father of the Nation'. In my opinion, this also shows that the party might not have been seen by the Maasai, but also by others, as a political party and has instead symbolically been part of their own identity and ordinary life and the country's history.This uniform image which equalises CCM with the state, government and nation collides with the political organisational structure in the West where these are separated.

Regarding the Maasai identification of being one family - 'walking the same path'- their present 'identity' in the political sphere is non-negotiable, at least at the moment. Maasai do not want any conflicts in their society and therefore it is important for the whole community to 'walk the same path'. This means keeping the Maasai society together. In this concept, there is no place for different political opinions from different political parties. Almost all the Maasai vote for the same party so as to keep the unity in the community. And with the dual leadership system with one political and one non-political leader the unity is brought together by discussion and by the fact that the politician belongs to the ruling party. As one Maasai man in Loombenek said, 'The multiparty system is like someone comes to me and asks me to become his son when I already have a father. I cannot change my father to someone else'. Hence, party belonging is non-negotiable and seemingly permanent - CCM is Tanzania and as Tanzanian/Maasai you are CCM.

Some non-Maasai women in Sunya explored this issue and said that people are aware there are different churches but they know they all believe in one common Creator. Therefore, there are no conflicts between people belonging to different churches. However, when it comes to political parties, people know there are several parties but all parties want different things and it is these differences that will (could) lead to conflicts.

It is fitting here to introduce Friedrich Glasl (1999) and his theory of conflict escalation, which I see as quite relevant for how this concern among many of the respondents for conflicts can be interpreted:

> Having differences is the most natural thing in the world in human interaction; having differences doesn't mean there is conflict. Everything depends on how people handle those differences. The tension becomes a conflict when the people involved can no longer deal with it constructively[200].
>
> (Glasl 1999: 83)

The escalation of conflict through different escalation levels has some relevance to why the Maasai try to seek consensus. When decisions and arguments over differences in their community are solved through discussions, it leads to an agreement among people resulting in conflicts being kept at a low level. As illustrated in chapter 4, in Maasai society, where party politics do not exist, different viewpoints are listened to, argued against and vented until a decision that can function or is in accordance with Maasai norms and customs is reached. Therefore, in order to maintain harmony in the community all political elections are preceded by discussions on how to vote in order to reach consensus and confirm the harmony in the community. Hence, to vote is not an individual matter – it is a communal matter. Also, in the single-party system different viewpoints and perceptions were ideally discussed as one group within the party or parliament where no escalation of conflict happened due to the consensus principle and the existence of one party.

However, when multi-party politics is introduced, groups that would sympathise with different parties could potentially lead to an escalation of differences in the community due to clearly institutionalised viewpoints in the party system. On the other hand, differences between political parties is usually not solved (besides making a compromise) in similar fashion due to more segmented and hardened stances saturated by polemics, arguments and debates

---

[200] For example, in most cases where the system of 'majority rule' is practiced, people deal with the election results or votes constructively by accepting the outcome even though their party or ideas did not win.

whose sole purpose is to convince people to change their political colour. In Glasl's terms, this first level of escalation is termed 'hardening', which could be seen as a stage where differences can be solved through discussion. 'Co-operation is stronger than competitiveness' and 'parties and factions [are] not yet entrenched' (Glasl 1999: 104). Discussions and debates are open; this level exists within the one-party system or when differences in Maasai community are solved through consensus. At next level, the discussions are still open but different groups start to crystallise and arguments are used to attract and convince others to take one side to another: 'Differences are aired in arguments and polemics. Cunning verbal tactics are used: people pretend to argue rationally but are using verbal violence' (Glasl 1999: 130). At this level there is more than one political party competing for votes and support from people. Different groups start to be formalised with their supporters. Translating this to the Maasai society, this would mean a starting point towards a disintegration of their community into separate groups who have different opinions, which would be detrimental to their community and unity. Already at this level, respondents say that they would not socialise with the other group, brothers belonging to the different groups would not talk to each other and would no longer live in the same homestead (02.Maasai men in Engarkah).

The third level of escalation concerns differences that cannot be solved through verbal arguments. The standpoints of the different groups become more cemented and are no longer negotiable: 'Talking no longer helps so actions are called for' (Glasl 1999: 104). Empathy for the other side is lost and competitiveness has become a stronger factor than co-operation (ibid). This is a stage far from the consensus practice that is the ideal among the Maasai but also, I would say, among the general populace at large.[201] When the multiparty system was introduced, there was a general fear of an increase of conflicts in the society. One can most likely say that there was a fear of an escalation of conflicts from 1 to level 3 in Glasl's escalation model, due to there being several political parties.

---

[201] There are naturally conflicts of different types in Tanzania. Many conflicts circulate around land utilisation especially between farmers and pastoralists. Conflicts in connection with politics occur at elections when parties campaign, as when supporters of one party disturb a rally of another party (Zanzibar being a different case). However, in general people in Tanzania try to avoid open conflicts. To scream and shout in public would be to lose face.

The *raison d'être* of political parties is to thrive on differences and argue for their policies and try to convince people that they are better than any other party. Their sole purpose is to attract enough supporters so they can come to a ruling position. But since there are no clear ideological differences or clear political differences or party manifests that the electorate can relate to, politics becomes synonymous with competitiveness, fragmentation and diminishing the other. Hence, the latter aspects of rigid standpoints among political parties due to their political colour and beliefs cannot exist in a consensus based system – it would be against its purpose.

The escalation of conflicts is usually avoided when the community is homogeneous, like the village of Ilkuishi-Oiboir, where the Maasai are in the majority and can take decisions that are harmonised to their culture. However, illiteracy, poor infrastructure and access to reliable information can affect marginalised groups negatively, like the Maasai in Engapune sub-village. My interpretation of marginalisation is that vulnerability and dependency on others have protective effects on societies. One tries to stick to what is known. The new political system and other changes in the society are issues that this group of Maasai in Engapune cannot avoid but since they do not completely understand why things happen owing to language barrier, for example, or how they can influence changes, they become more protective of their way of life. In addition, they are not the only ones living in the village so changes and inputs from the outside cannot be adapted to their society as they would like. This is the major difference between Engapune and Ilkuishi-Oiboir: in Ilkuishi-Oiboir the Maasai are in the majority and they can discuss among themselves what to take in and how to assimilate different inputs from the 'outside'. Then again, this is not to say that different ethnic groups cannot live together. The Maasai and non-Maasai groups have lived together previously without major problems but nowadays the population increase squeezes people closer together in Sunya and that has implications for the Maasai.

Secondly, as the Maasai themselves say, they lack education and therefore few Maasai know to read and write Kiswahili, which really is a disadvantage in today's society. Without these fundamental qualifications, the Maasai are kept out of decision-making in the village. Even though the literacy rate among the Maasai

in Ilkuishi—Oiboir is probably not higher than in Engapune, they can ignore the literacy rule for village and sub-village government members since they are all Maasai and speak the same language. On the other hand, if more people from other ethnic groups continue to move in to Ilkuishi-Oiboir and choose to participate in the village governance and decision-making bodies of the village, they could easily outmanoeuvre the Maasai from the village government due to their better education and literacy levels. This fact is something that the Maasai in Ilkuishi-Oiboir might have to deal with in the near future. Yet, at the same time, the educational level and number of Maasai having an education will increase over time giving more individuals the formal qualifications for political positions.

To summarise, this chapter reflects on the large-scale educational undertaking that would be required if the Western form of multiparty system is to be consolidated. It would involve a 'cultural transformation' and what I call a cognitive consolidation of the idea of the multiparty system, as the ruling party has over the years been deeply embedded in the 'minds and souls' of the populace, and especially among the Maasai, who frequently refer to the ruling party as their clan, mother or father. What is important is that the idea of a multiparty system and democracy need to be filled with positive connotations and not be connected to conflicts and unknown political parties and politicians. In this respect, the 'democratisation process' becomes an educational undertaking.

9.3 Practical and Logistical Theme

As I see it, there are practical obstacles to raising consciousness about democracy and some cognitive or cultural differences that make the transformation from a one-party system not as easy as one would assume. First, the issue of raising people's consciousness that would increase their influence in the society as a whole renders some hindrances. I have mentioned the poor availability of newspapers in rural areas together with high illiteracy rates, especially among the Maasai, which hinder dissemination of information about democracy and the multiparty system via the written media. The adult literacy rate for women is 66.5% and 84% for men in Tanzania (Human Development Report 2002. In HDR 2008, the average literacy rate is 69%). In Kiteto District the overall literacy rate is estimated at 36% (Kiteto

District Council, 'Local Government Reform Programme, Annual Plan and Budget for Restructuring Process 2000-2001'). The literacy rates for the Maasai are much lower, and without any scientific data I would guess that the literacy rate might be as low as 5-10%. Few people have radios and news available on the radio is from the governmentally owned media. In addition, the poor road network makes it difficult for political parties to reach remote and rural areas by car and during the rainy season many areas are not accessible at all. Otherwise, information is spread by people who travel, visitors or at the local cattle market. Moreover, to communicate with the Maasai one has to know Maa, since the majority of Maasai people do not know Swahili. Consequently, information is obtained and spread orally by political leaders, elders or anyone who has been travelling since people seldom search information themselves, or have the opportunities to do so. Poor economic resources among the newly created parties and one-sided information dispersed by the ruling party are further inhibiting factors. This gives great possibilities for those in power to control the information flow. Information spread orally also tends to be distorted, increasing the risk of receiving incorrect information. It is true though, that the mass media is freer than previously and there are a number of privately owned newspapers, magazines and TV stations but there are still restrictions on what can be printed and aired. Since there is a general problem with transparency, people tend to be excluded from access to information, resulting in a widespread opinion of the opposition as a potential disrupting force of peace, unity and harmony in the country.

Finally, what practically also hinders the consolidation of multiparty democracy is how clean the elections are. As I have taken up in chapter 7.6.1, there were many complaints from the opposition party CHADEMA regarding the election in Kibaya. Neglecting to register opposition voters, different forms of vote buying and tampering with ballots are not consistent with democratic practices and work against the consolidation. As information about rules is important it is worrying when information is not distributed or is distributed too late and to little of it.

9.4 Concluding Remarks

I have in this chapter shown what in my view are three very important hampering factors in the process towards a consolidated democracy and a multiparty system in Tanzania. I have argued in this thesis that the ruling party and its leaders are using an already peaceful context to promote political status quo through the use of the concepts peace, unity and harmony. The ruling party has taken upon itself the role of a guardian of the peaceful situation in Tanzania and as the true heir and guardian of the Union with Zanizibar. Also, it is argued in the chapter the large educational undertaking necessary if the Western form of multiparty system is to be consolidated, not only in practice but also on a deeper 'cognitive' level. Finally, the practical and logistical challenges of informing the population about the multiparty system and democracy puts focus not only on the infrastructure in the country, but also on how and what information is spread and how widely it is distributed. I have further shown the cultural perceptions of multiparty system and its imagined conflict generating mechanism distancing respondents from accepting the practice wholeheartedly.

I will now in the next chapter summarise the main questions asked in the thesis. The chapter is followed by a chapter where I look at the future political development in Tanzania regarding my arguments about peace, unity and harmony and the possibilities and constrains for consolidating multiparty democracy. The chapter takes its startingpoint from the political development in Kenya and ongoing peacetalks between CCM and CUF on Zanzibar and Arendt Lijpharts discussion about consensual democracy.

10 MAIN CONCLUSIONS

The transition to and the consolidation of multiparty democracy has been, and still is to a large extent, a process faced with many challenges extending over several years. Yet, there is no process similar to the other among the countries setting out on the transition towards multiparty democracy in the early 1990s. The purpose of this study has therefore been to investigate and study the political transition that took place in one of these countries, namely Tanzania, initiating the overall question of this thesis:

> *What possibilities and constraints are there for the consolidation of multiparty system in Tanzania?*

By studying how villagers in two separate villages in Tanzania understand and respond to the introduction of multiparty democracy, I expect to achieve an understanding of the transition towards multiparty democracy in Tanzania and the aspects involved in the consolidation process. Hence, emphasis was on village level but as consolidation needs to take root in all social levels and groups, special attention was on the marginalised group of Maasai pastoralists. With this local perspective it has not been possible to draw general conclusions valid for all the different ethnic groups in Tanzania from this material alone. But I have together with other sources made comparisons between local and national level for an increased understanding of the transition process and the consolidation of multiparty democracy. Thus, the intention of this study is not to study political parties, the election law, electoral commissions or constitutional arrangement but to give attention to individual views. Before I answer this overall question I would like to start this chapter by answering the questions *what were the reasons for introducing multiparty system* and *how has this transition towards multiparty democracy been comprehended by people at village level?*

The transition process towards multiparty system in Tanzania has had many different components. First of all, despite the outcome of the Nyalali Commission showing a massive support for the one-party system (77%), the Commission recommended a change of the political system to a multiparty system. Julius

Nyerere had also changed his view and spoke often of the need to change the system that no longer seemed to work properly and that was abandoned even in East Europe. There was also an informal group of businessmen and others opposing the ruling party who received some support and encouragement from the donor community. The donor community on their side emphasised the need for political pluralism that should follow the already liberalised economy. Political pluralism would also lead to increased accountability and good governance to hinder aid money being mismanaged. When the one-party rule in East Europe collapsed and changed, there was no longer any incitement for Tanzania to remain with a one-party system. This, together with the political development in Europe, pressure from donors, Nyalali Commission's recommendations, internal opposition and Nyerere's political stand in this question, led to the transition towards a multiparty democracy.

What were the reactions then among the populace and how was this change comprehended in the villages? The findings reveal a state of initial surprise by rural residents who suddenly were faced with politicians from different parties claiming the government was poor and that they should vote for them instead. Lack of informed discussions and information in the rural population about the reason for changing the political system contributed to rumours of various kinds and suspicion towards the multiparty system. Respondents either claim not to have heard the democracy concept or did not know its meaning, or they were aware of the multiparty system but were not informed as to why it was introduced. Consequently, the atrocities in Rwanda and Burundi were believed by many to be caused by the multiparty system, i.e. people started to fight each other due to political differences. These views are not surprising since the one-party system was established by Julius Nyerere to avoid internal conflicts and to suddenly have several parties in the country, a consistent assumption would be that it must lead to conflicts. 'Proof' given to the population of the conflict-generating mechanism of the multiparty system were the elections on Zanzibar that have been challenged by the opposition party CUF, which after the 2000 election led to violent clashes and an exodus of residents from the islands of Pemba and Unguja, mainly to Kenya. These conflicts scared people on the mainland and gave motivation for CCM to portray itself as the only party capable of keeping peace, unity and harmony intact

in the country. Thus, the multiparty system has been met by people with caution, a political form that must be entered into carefully while keeping a watchful eye on the (still) unknown opposition parties and their qualifications. Nevertheless,   the multiparty system is a fact and as I wanted to find out what kind of effect it has had on village level, especially among the Maasai who have a customary leadership structure as well, this leads to the question:

> *What are the perceptions of and the relationship between Maasai customary leaders and politicians representing a political party, and how are people negotiating between these leaders?*

The dual leadership structure among the Maasai in Ilkuishi-Oiboir is a state of complementary roles where the Maasai political leader deals with relations outside the community and the customary leader (olaiguenani) deals with relations inside the community. This relationship is built upon a certain form of co-operation where the politician has to communicate with the customary leader if he wants the support of the community. Political decisions taken at district level are therefore more easily implemented at village level if decisions are accepted first by the customary leader and elders. If they accept what has been decided, the community will follow. If they oppose the decision, the politician is not in a position to receive acceptance from the population either. However, it is the politician's role to look for resources outside the community that could help them in their daily life. In this way, there is a mutual relationship between these two leadership positions. Still, there is a fundamental difference between being a politician and a customary leader, which has to do with how they are (s)elected. While the politician approaches the community in order to get their votes, it is the community who appoints the customary leader. These systems are entirely different and have relevance for the legitimacy of the leader, where the customary leader usually is more respected due to being part of Maasai culture and social organisation.

I find it interesting that this duality seems to function well at local level, which drives the community in one direction. Given that there cannot be two Maasai leaders who are of different opinions and who want to implement different

ideas in the community, decisions are in this way anchored in the community. The whole issue is about harmony, unity and peace. If there were major differences, these could lead to disagreements and poor co-operation within the Maasai community. This is something the Maasai want to avoid. Therefore, to have a politician who is Maasai and who would not co-operate with customary leaders and elders is a rather unlikely scenario. Yet, a politician from another ethnic group will not have the same relationship with the Maasai community, which means he/she does not have to seek acknowledgement from elders and customary leaders, possibly leading him/her not to have support of the same level as a Maasai politician might have.

According to cultural norms, decision-making in the Maasai community is within the male domain and excludes women. Even if it is not prohibited for women to attend political meetings today, the traditional taboo still persists resulting in their low attendance in political meetings as well. Yet, the main advantage of political leadership for women is that it makes it possible for them to be involved more actively in the political affairs of the community by having the possibility of being elected and being able to elect someone of their choice. The present political system gives women a political arena separated from customs.

What is further shown in the thesis is the difference between the two Maasai communities and their opportunities to influence or take part in village decision-making. Since Ilkuishi-Oiboir village is inhabited by Maasai only, they take decisions about various community issues themselves without or with just minor interference from others. On the other hand, the Maasai in Engapune sub-village, who are part of a multi-ethnic village, are dependent on how other people also vote in village matters. The Maasai in Ilkuishi-Oiboir do not have to know Swahili in order to have a seat in the village government, while this is necessary in Engapune. But with more people moving into Ilkuishi-Oiboir from other ethnic groups, the Maasai here could easily be ousted from village politics if other ethnic groups decided to participate. They could easily take over the village government even if they were a minority due to their probable higher educational level. Hence, a common stumbling block for the Maasai is the illiteracy factor that disqualifies many Maasai from seeking political positions although they are respected and highly valued individuals in their society. On the other hand, those who would not qualify for or

would be chosen for customary leadership can due to their education get access to leadership positions through the political system instead. This means that those who contest for political positions might not have the full support from and respect in the community, while those who have the respect might lack the education and competence to deal with modern political institutions. Further, what might be a disadvantage for the legitimacy of a politician is that the political organisation and administrative structure can be alien to many (especially women) and is something unfamiliar and not understood. The concepts and political terminology used are also unknown (and often in Swahili) contributing to a feeling of inferiority in relation to a politician compared to a customary leader. What one does not understand, one might ignore and pay less attention to.

After three general elections the opposition has not yet become a strong alternative to the ruling party. In fact, it is a common feature that political parties generally just become active and noticeable for the electorate in the preparations for the coming elections through political campaigns. Hence, there is a risk of democracy becoming superficial and the question of consolidation remains in the open if focus is not turned to the broader qualities of democracy as human rights, freedom of speech, judicial rights, accountability and so forth between elections. If we assume democratisation to take part outside urban areas as well, then we must unfortunately have to reckon with that the three enemies mentioned by Nyerere, i.e. poverty, ignorance and disease, are still a reality and are therefore playing an important part in how wide and 'deep' the consolidation of democracy will be. Therefore, the process of consolidation of democracy cannot be anything other than a slow and, hopefully, steady process over a certain period of time. Yet, political pluralism and the existence of an opposition is recognised as one of the most fundamental features for securing and consolidating democracy, leading to the final question:

What are the possibilities and constraints for the opposition parties to become a vehicle for political change?

The introduction of a multiparty system in Tanzania after almost thirty years of single-party rule puts great expectations and challenges on all the opposition

parties. Considering the short history of the multiparty system and the mushrooming of new political parties, the opposition parties not only have to compete against each other, they also have to compete against the ruling party CCM and its economic, logistic and governmental resources. The challenge for the opposition parties is to become known at grass-root level and be seen as an alternative to the ruling party by providing citizens with a believable option that can supply them with resources and 'development'. As most of the new parties are not results of grass-root and civic society movements but are formed by politicians and other influential individuals who lack broad links out to the civil society, this task is not easy. The existence of more than fifteen political parties in Tanzania has changed the political map giving ten different candidates for the presidency in the 2005 election and a wave of similarly named parties such as: Union for Multiparty Democracy, United People's Democratic Party, United Democratic Party, and Tanzania Democratic Alliance, just to name a few. The obvious problem for the consolidation of multiparty democracy is to have all these opposition parties, with almost identical labels and expect the voters to make a sensible choice between all these parties. It is just not possible.

Through the analysis of the findings there are three main hampering factors working against or making the consolidation of multiparty democracy not as straightforward as intended. I have categorised these factors into three themes: stability, cultural and educational and logistical and practical. One of the main arguments made is that the ruling party and its leaders on both national and local levels are frequently using the concepts peace, unity and harmony as prime values and existing conditions in the country created by the ruling party CCM and its founding father, Julius Nyerere. However, these concepts are not only used by CCM politicians to demonstrate the merits of their party, they are also used by ordinary villagers when they are referring to what CCM has done for the country. Hence, CCM takes and is given credit for the rather peaceful situation in the country and not only puts itself, but is also put by many, in the role of guardian of these values, a responsibility opposition parties would not be able to secure. This naturally has an effect on the consolidation of multiparty democracy when opposition parties remain small and are in no position to practise their politics. This leads to a

negative circle for the opposition parties where they remain unknown to the electorate.

Consolidation of multiparty democracy is not only a matter of having several parties and performing regular multiparty elections. Consolidation has also to do with a 'cognitive' consolidation of democracy which would require large educational efforts if the Western form of multiparty democracy is to be consolidated. As Mmuya and Chaligha say, this is a matter of 'cultural transformation' where an 'internalisation' of the Western form of multiparty democracy plays an integral part in the consolidation. What is at the centre here is the creation of an awareness of individual rights and responsibilities connected to democracy but also the obligations of elected leaders. As large parts of rural populations are illiterate, the educational efforts to inform are on a large scale and need to be sustained over a long time. Thus, a consolidation would call for a change in attitudes by the population and significant challenges for democracy promoters. This goes hand in hand with the practical and logistical challenges of informing the population. Since the infrastructure, i.e. the road network, is poor especially in the rural areas, it is expensive and difficult for opposition parties to cover all parts of the country. Usually they need to limit their efforts to certain easily reached districts and wards. Poor infrastructure affects also what information is spread and how widely it is distributed. There is therefore a possibility that incorrect information reaches people, especially during campaigns before elections.

The democratisation theory supported by donors portrays a consolidated transition to be characterised by an active and participating 'civil society', together with opposition parties who defend the actions of the government. They have ideally the possibility, without harassment or other restrictions, to oppose the opinion of government in the parliament or to campaign against the ruling party in order to try to change the government through a competitive, free and fair election. The society is characterised by a multitude of independent media, and a fair and non-corrupt judicial system. The economic system is based on liberal market economy. There would also be new social groupings in the society, countervailing the power of old elites. With all these factors in place this could then be seen as a 'deep transition' (Ottaway 2003: 165) and apparently a fairly

consolidated transition. This transition is what ideally should take place but as Ottaway states, this model is based on the final stages of democracy transition in Latin America and Southern Europe. These regions have consolidated bureaucratic states and complex economies and, therefore, the model applies poorly in African countries where the existence of the state is superficial (Ottaway 1999: 130). Thus, democracy transition and the consolidation of multiparty democracy in Africa relates poorly to the theories and a transition seems therefore to imply a long and winding road towards a pluralistic society.

This picture pre-supposes that those who are the target groups for a democratisation have the same 'map' as those who promote it. However, the findings in my thesis show that democracy as a concept is simply equalised with multiparty system and hitherto the experience does not seem to have been overwhelmingly positive according to the respondents. Instead, the multiparty system has been met with scepticism due to its conflict-generating potential between different ethnic groups as in the neighbouring African countries. Hence, the democracy and multiparty system in Tanzania is still, to a large extent, functioning as 'an empty shell' of electoral democracy. Also, there are several aspects binding people very closely to the ruling party in an emotional way, through 'symbolic bonds' referring to the party as part of one's family. Besides belonging to the same national family despite ethnic belonging, the party and its politicians are there for life, as one's parents, whom one can neither chose nor abandon. If the party is regarded as a parent who looks after you, then you accept your dependency on them and will accept their decisions. This notion could further be linked with the traditional perceptions of Maasai leadership who are appointed for life, which has an impact on the understanding of the modern political leadership. This perception has very little to do with democracy and the 'democratisation process' becomes an educational undertaking.

To conclude, there are still several constraints for consolidating multiparty democracy as pointed out, but what are the possibilities of the opposition parties to become a part of consolidating multiparty democracy? Tanzania has today a functioning party system but still of the eighteen opposition parties there are only four – CUF, CHADEMA, TLP and UDP – that can be said to be more fundamentally rooted among the electorate than the other parties. And out of these four,

CHADEMA and especially CUF dominate the opposition. Although NCCR-Maguzi held a leading position in the first election in 1995, it has, after Mrema´s move to TLP, almost vanished. The political 'landscape' is not yet complete, which probably results in this weak position of the opposition. The electorate might therefore lack trust in the opposition or cannot see them being a reliable alternative or posing a real challenge to the ruling party. Still, CUF is the only party that has in reality beaten CCM on Zanzibar and it is at present the only political party that poses a threat to CCM on Zanzibar. On the mainland the situation is different and it seems that it is more difficult for the opposition parties to forge a common platform against CCM. Hence, the possibilities for the opposition parties to play a part in the consolidation of multiparty democracy in Tanzania are in place, but as many of the opposition parties have no support base among the people, they remain very small and insignificant at national level. Still, they can very well play an important role at local level by keeping the question of democracy alive and on their agenda. However, the last years' scandals – where Prime Minister Edward Lowassa and two ex-ministers had to resign due to their dealings with the highly controversial energy deal with Richmond Development Corporation[202] – could have a negative effect on people's trust in CCM and the government. But then again, if the government acts swiftly and firmly, it can strengthen its position.

The main claim I make in this thesis is that the ruling party and its leaders are using a peaceful context to promote the political status quo through the use of the concepts peace, unity and harmony, concepts that are also used by villagers to praise CCM's historic role in Tanzania. The population is to believe that the peaceful situation in Tanzania is a legacy of Nyerere and the rule of CCM and it can only be preserved by them. The existence of these three qualities contributes to the general development of the country. A nation in peace, national unity and with harmonious internal and external relations is more receptive to socioeconomic development than nations lacking one or more of these qualities. Yet, all this is apparently guaranteed by the ruling party CCM, acting as the guardian and protector of these three qualities. However, as there has not previously been any element of party competition present, citizens are today divided into different

---

[202] 'Fate of Richmond culprits out soon', by Lydia Shekighenda, *The Guardian*, 18 March 2008.

segments of supporters for the different political parties, giving an impression of disharmony and an increased risk of jeopardising the existing peace, unity and harmony. From CCM's perspective, this has to be avoided and through promoting CCM as a guarantor for these values, patriotism and nationalism appear as convenient sentiments to work with in this 'struggle' to keep everybody 'under the same shade'.

In the final chapter, I want to take the essence of this thesis one step further and speculate about what political future lies ahead for Tanzania regarding my main arguments about peace, unity and harmony and the possibilities and constraints for consolidating multiparty democracy. The chapter has been influenced by two factors: firstly - the post-election conflict in Kenya with more than 1000 people dead and some 300 000 people displaced after the disputed election results of the December 2007 presidential and parliamentary elections. The aftermath of this resulted in a coalition government in Kenya and this caused the opposition parties in Tanzania, and especially in Zanzibar, to ask for a similar solution to the political stalemate between CCM and CUF in Zanzibar after the 2000 general election. Secondly - the writing of Arend Lijphart about consensual democracy posed against the Westminster form of governance. Lijphart has written extensively about this subject and I use his arguments to develop thoughts around the political development in Tanzania and Zanzibar. Hence, the chapter revolves around the possibility of a similar negative development in Tanzania as in Kenya in the future if (when) the opposition parties in Tanzania decide to form coalitions and in the process manage to become a threat to CCM and its power position. Is this form of development possible on mainland and would a disputed election lead to conflicts similar to the events in Kenya or those in Zanzibar?

11 WHAT'S NEXT - CONSENSUAL DEMOCRACY?

The conflict on Zanzibar between the two equally sized political parties CCM and CUF has led to confrontations on several occasions. CUF in Zanzibar has lost disputed elections, which makes this case similar to the crisis in the Kenyan 2007 presidential election where the opposition was denied victory. In both cases, negotiations have taken place to try to solve the stalemate and try to reach some form of shared governance. The development in Kenya resulted in a newspaper article in 1 March 2008[203], where the opposition parties in Tanzania recommended that President Kikwete emulate the example of Kenya in solving the present deadlock on the reconciliation talks (*muafaka*)[204] on Zanzibar between CCM and CUF. A representative for CHADEMA, Mr. Komu, said Kikwete must find a permanent solution to the stalled muafaka claiming that delays might plunge the country into a crisis similar to Kenya. According to Mr. Komu, since the situation on Zanzibar resembles the situation in Kenya with two strong political groups, the best solution for Zanzibar would be to form a coalition government. This was also the intention of the reconciliation talks. Hence, the question of coalition government can be said to deal with two different models of democratic governance, i.e. the existing Westminster (majority rule) model of democracy and the consensual model of democracy discussed by the political scientist Arend Lijphart (1999).

The main difference between these two models of democracy is that while the Westminster model of democracy concentrates executive power in the hands of one party and bare-majority cabinets, the consensual model builds its governance on letting most of the major parties take part in the execution of power in a broad-based coalition (Lijphart 1999: 34). In societies where there is a tendency for large tensions between different groups of people, the proportional system (consensual model) has clear benefits compared to the majority model by the modelling of broad representation of groups and interests (Linde and Ekman 2006: 177). The

---

[203]'Emaluate Kenya on CCM, CUF talks, opposition tells Kikwete', by Felister Peter 1 mars 2008, www.ippmedia.com.
[204] The Peace Accord (muafaka) between CCM and CUF was signed on 10 October 2001, following the violent clashes after the general election in December 2000 where at least 35 people were killed and over 1000 people fled to Kenya (*THE EASTAFRICAN*, Monday 20 October 2003, http://www.nationaudio.com/News/EastAfrican/20102003/Regional/Regional58.html).

characteristic of the consensual model of democracy is the effort of creating a system of power sharing between several political actors or political groups by negotiations, compromises and deliberation (ibid). The consensual principle is to let all or most of the important parties share executive power in a broad coalition.

Lijphart (1999) has made a comparison between consensual democracy and Westminster democracy of thirty-six countries[205] and their political performances. He uses Switzerland and Belgium as examples where a consensual democracy model is used and where both countries have multiparty systems without any party that comes close to majority status. For Tanzania and Kenya this study is interesting since they presently have a political system inherited from the British Westminster model where the main characteristic is the system of 'first past the post', i.e. the candidate with the majority of the votes or with the largest minority of the votes wins (Lijphart 1999: 15). This system tends to produce highly disproportional results when the winner gets a high number of seats in the parliament compared to the percentage of votes. Thus, this poses the intriguing question regarding the political conflict in Kenya and the situation in Zanzibar: would Kenya have been better off with a consensual model of democracy instead? Would a consensual model have inhibited the political conflict and the following turmoil among supporters of the two parties? And would a strong opposition, not only on Zanzibar but on Tanzania mainland as well, lead the country to develop a similar conflict to that Kenya has experienced? The main point made in this thesis about the 'cultural' transformation, or 'cognitive' consolidation of democracy as I have chosen to call it, triggers the question of whether the consensual democracy model advocated by Lijphart would be more appropriate for Kenya and Tanzania than the present competitive majority system - a system that might be more adapted to the existing cultural and cognitive mind-set of the different ethnic groups in the country practising consensual decision-making.

The political scientist Rupert Emerson argued in his book *From Empire to Nation* (1960) that even if there are differences between people in Asia and Africa, 'their native inclination is generally toward extensive and unhurried deliberation aimed at ultimate consensus. The gradual discovery of areas of agreement is the

---

[205] Most of the countries included are OECD countries. Those outside are Costa Rica, Colombia, Israel, Venezuela, Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica, Botswana, Barbados, Bahamas, Mauritius, India, and Papua New Guinea.

significant feature and not the ability to come to a speedy resolution of issues by counting heads' (quoted in Lijphart 1999: 308). Lewis (1965, in Lijphart 1999) emphasised that the custom by Africans to come to a decision by discussion very much resembles the way coalitions function and is a well-known practice. Manglapus (1987, in Lijphart 1999: 308) even describes the non-Western democratic procedure as a '"consensual process" based on a strong "concern for harmony"' (Lijphart 1999: 308). Finally, Lijphart takes up the viewpoint of Nigerian scholar Adebayo Adedeji who stresses that African traditions dislike exclusion and that institutionalised opposition has never been part of African traditional governance system: 'Traditionally politics for us has never been a zero-sum game' (quoted in Lijphart 1999: 308). Hence, there are culturally applicable arguments in favour of a consensual form of democracy in Africa, or in this case Kenya and Tanzania.

Arguments against the majority rule being undemocratic comes from the Nobel Prize winner in Economics, Sir Arthur Lewis, who has argued that the majority rule is undemocratic by its practice of exclusion, since the primary meaning of democracy, according to Lewis, is that 'all who are affected by a decision should have the chance to participate in making that decision either directly or through chosen representatives' (quoted in Lijphart 1999: 31). He gives also an additional meaning of democracy where 'the will of the majority shall prevail' (ibid). Lewis asserts that if the content of these meanings is that the winning parties end up making all the governmental decisions and the losers end up criticising decision without the possibility to govern, then the two meanings of democracy are incompatible. The practice of excluding the losing group from participation in decision-making clearly violates the primary meaning of democracy. Hence, while the Westminster model of democracy concentrates executive power, the consensus model builds on broad-based coalition, which I imagine would be closer to the cognitive image of decision-making in African societies, but with the major difference that it allows women to take part in politics and decision-making processes.

Since democracy is equated with majority democracy models, both in theory and in practice, this has worked against consensual democracy models. It has not been recognised in the field of political science as an alternative and equally legitimate model of democracy, according to Lijphart (1999). Majority democracy

assumes that there are two parties or two opposing blocks of parties competing to rule and alternate in the rule of the country. A strong political opposition is regarded as the core element of this democracy model where the sole purpose for the political parties is to 'become the government' (Lawson in Lijphart 1999: 7). The result of this practice has been termed by the political scientist, Douglas W. Rae (1967, in Lijphart 1999) 'manufactured majorities', majorities that 'are artificially created by the electoral system out of mere pluralities of the vote' (Lijphart 1999: 14).

This model of government in Tanzania explains partly the dominant position of the ruling party CCM in the parliament as there are no strong or equally sized opposition parties, which seems to manifest and secure the dominant position of CCM in parliament for many years to come. The majority democracies in the examined countries by Lijphart have equally sized political parties (like in Britain) and even if ten or fifteen years pass between changes of government, it usually does take place. This creates very solid and efficient governments where voters tend to be concentrated in the middle of the right-left scale. An exclusion of other political parties from power is not regarded negatively since this model is usually practised in homogeneous societies where the electorate stays close to the political centre (ibid: 32). Hence, the majority should govern while the minority should oppose and wait until next election where it can defeat the ruling majority and itself become the majority. However, the Westminster democracy model is, according to Lijphart, less functional in societies that are not homogeneous, where the policies of the major parties tend to differ to a large extent and where voters' loyalties are often more fixed, reducing the opportunities for the main parties to alternate in exercising governmental power. Thus, in societies divided along religious, ideological, linguistic, cultural, ethnic or racial lines, with their own political parties, interest groups etc., the flexibility necessary for Westminster democracy model is less likely. Lijphart argues that under these circumstances majority rule is not only undemocratic but also dangerous since minorities that are constantly kept out of decision-making processes and political participation, will feel excluded and discriminated against and can lose trust in the existing regime (as would seem to be the case in Kenya) (ibid). In contrast, the consensus model tries to share, disperse, and restrain power in different ways, but the main

principle is to let most of the important parties share the executive power in a broad coalition (ibid: 34).

How can this be related to the political situation in Tanzania with *de facto* one-party rule and a society with different religious, ethnic and linguistic groups? The present political system in Tanzania is conducive to preserving peace, unity and harmony between citizens, irrespective of ethnic or religious belonging and through a strong government that is stable and with a parliament dominated by CCM. The stability is naturally something wanted by the population and it is being delivered by the present form of government (system). Thus, the present form of Westminster (majority) government is not likely to be abandoned since this keeps the peace, unity and harmony in the country intact. However, this works only as long as CCM is as dominant as it is now. Should opposition parties manage to form a strong coalition, they could become a challenge to the ruling party, leading to polarisation between the government and the opposition hardening also and a peaceful outcome of a nationally disputed election could be at risk. But is this scenario realistic?

Reading the inauguration speech of President Kikwete, one gets the impression that there are constantly many existing conflicts in Tanzania that jeopardise the stability of the country and these need to be restricted by different strategies (enhancing patriotism and nationalism through national service, changed school curriculum and through culture and sports). These strategies may also be seen as a way of stopping any development of political conflicts from becoming ethnic, but at the same time this also has the effect of diminishing political space for the opposition. I therefore find the strategies and actions taken by President Kikwete somehow puzzling as these strategies seem to be rooted in the following ideas: (1) Tanzanians identify themselves primarily with their ethnic belonging, which would negate the achievements made by Nyerere and explains the planned strategies; (2) peace and stability cannot be taken for granted and can only be guaranteed by a strong government and through enforcing national unity with the tools of patriotic and nationalistic sentiments; (3) opposition parties without nationalism and patriotism on their agenda can be seen as a threat towards political stability in the country, which would make their existence more difficult unless they also include these on their political agenda; and (4) opposition parties

criticising the ruling party can be viewed as being unpatriotic and not supporting peace and national unity but being in favour of disorder.

I am certain that part of the ruling party's overwhelming victory has its explanation in the insecurity felt by many in the rural areas concerning the multiparty system and its implicitly conflict-generating mechanism. The response has been to vote for the ruling party since it seems to be the only party that can guarantee peace, harmony and unity in the country. Besides CCM being a party known by all people and sharing a common history, CCM is also seen as a guarantor of a peaceful society in addition to having the economic resources other parties lack. Owing to CCM's historical bond with Nyerere, those loyal to the ruling party and its politicians, implicitly interpret support of opposition parties as a betrayal of what the ruling party stands for, i.e. the values of the Father of the Nation, national unity, peace and harmony.

The plurality of ethnic groups in Tanzania is less conducive to strong formations of ethnically based political parties, adding to a less likely development of major conflicts on the mainland. Smaller clashes between party supporters are a fact but I cannot see a similar development as in Kenya with several thousand dead as a result of a disputed election on mainland Tanzania. On the other hand, a transition from the Westminster model to consensual democracy would lead to increased proportion of opposition seats in the parliament and to a system where opposition groups are included in power-sharing from the start. This would be more attuned with African consensus culture and conflict resolution and would be easier for the citizens to relate to where the polarisation of people in segmented political groupings would be avoided. Conflicts are contained by incorporating all groups and by this keeping everybody under the same shade.

Whatever political system is in practice in Tanzania, stability of the country is the prime objective. The muafaka negotiations have however not yet led to any concrete actions or changed politics or increased cooperation between the ruling CCM and CUF. The next election in 2010 will therefore be the litmus test for the stability of Zanzibar and the Union. It will be a test for Tanzania, of CCM's will to peacefully resolve the political stagnation in Zanzibar and to let the opposition party CUF be made partner. Or will CUF peacefully manage to take over the

government of Zanzibar by its own force? How far has the consolidation of democracy in Tanzania proceeded?

12 APPENDICES

Appendix I: The Union Presidential multiparty election outcomes 1995, 2000, and 2005 as percentage of total votes including Zanzibar

Candidate	1995*	2000**	Candidate	2005***
B.Mkapa CCM	61,8 (4 026 422)	71,7 (5 863 201)	J. Kikwete CCM	80,3 (9 123 952)
I. Lipumba CUF	6,4 (418 973)	16,3 (1 329 077)	I. Lipumba CUF	11, 7 (1 327 125)
A. Mrema NCCR	27,8 (1 808 616)	7,8 (TLP) (637 115)	A. Mrema TLP	0,75 (84 901)
J. Cheyo UDP	4,0 (258 734)	4,2 (342 891)	J. Cheyo UDP	Not particip.
			F.Mbowe CHADEMA	5.9 (668 756)

* Voter turnout 76.7%   Source: http://africanelections.tripod.com/tz.html
** Voter turnout 84.4%
*** Voter turnout 72.4%

1995 National Assembly Election

Party	Number of votes	% of votes	Number of seats 232 (269)*
CCM	3 814 206	59,2	186 (214)
CUF	323 432	5,02	24 (28)
NCCR-Mageuzi	1 406 343	21,8	16 (19)
CHADEMA	396 825	6,2	3 (4)
UDP	213 547	3,3	3 (4)
TPL	27 963	0,4	-

*232 members are directly elected. The figures in parentheses reflect the distribution of seats when both the directly and indirectly elected seats are combined (excluding the 5 Zanzibar delegates and Attorney-General)

Source: http://africanelections.tripod.com/tz.html

2000 National Assembly Election

Party	Number of votes	% of votes	Number of seats 231 (295)*
CCM	4 628 127	65.2	202 (258)
CUF	890 044	12.5	17 (22)
NCCR-Mageuzi	256 591	3.6	1 (1)
CHADEMA	300 567	4.2	4 (5)
UDP	315 303	4,4	3 (4)
TPL	652 504	9.2	4 (5)

*231 members are directly elected. The figures in parentheses reflect the distribution of seats when both the directly and indirectly elected seats are combined.

Source: http://www.eisa.org.za/WEP/tan2000resultsp.htm

http://africanelections.tripod.com/tz.html

2005 National Assembly Election

Party	Number of votes	% of votes	Number of seats 232 (323)*
CCM	7 579 897	70,0	206 (275)
CUF	1 551 243	14,3	19 (31)
NCCR-Mageuzi	239 452	2,2	-
CHADEMA	888 133	8,2	5 (11)
UDP	155 887	1,4	1 (1)
TPL	297 230	2,7	1 (1)

*232 members are directly elected. The figures in parentheses reflect the distribution of seats when both the directly and indirectly elected seats are combined.

Source: The Parliament of Tanzania,

htpp://www.bunge.go.tz/bunge/Assembly2.asp?termCode=2000-

2005http://africanelections.tripod.com/tz.html

Appendix II: Terms of Reference for the Nyalali Commission [206]

1. To co-ordinate the views which are being expressed by the public in the current debate on whether to retain the present one-party political system in Tanzania, or to introduce a new multiparty system.

2. To consider and make recommendations regarding the necessity, advisability and prudence of either retaining the present one-party system or changing to a multiparty system, and the consequences of adopting either option.

3. To consider and identify any possible advantages and disadvantages that might follow as a result of changing the present political system, particularly with regard to the stability of the Union, the unity of the people of Tanzania, and the peace and solidarity now existing among the people, irrespective of their tribe, religion, colour or sex.

4. To consider and recommend appropriate constitutional and legal, as well as political, strategies for protecting the nation against any political or security problems which might arise as a result of either retaining the present one-party political system or adopting a new multiparty system.

5. To consider and recommend suitable strategies for expanding and strengthening the practice of democracy in the country, irrespective of which political system is adopted.

6. To consider and recommend any amendments which should be made in the provisions of the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, as well as the Constitution of Zanzibar, and any other law, or any modifications in the country's political culture.

7. To consider and identify any problems that might arise with regard to Zanzibar's place in the Union, in case it is decided to change the political system; and whether it would be in the best interests of Zanzibar to implement such changes in the political system, having regard to Zanzibar's bitter political memories.

<div align="right">(Msekwa 1995: 5)</div>

---

[206] It is worth noting in the terms of references the expressed concern for possible internal conflicts between the different ethnic groups, break up of the Union and disruption of peace in the country when any change of the system was recommended.

Appendix III: Sub-village and Village election results in Sunya Village in October 1999

Sub-villages	Registered voters	Ballots	Percent	Result	CCM	CHADEMA
Kitchangani	417	168	40%	CCM 110 / CHADEMA 58	65.5%	34.5%
Ibutu	245	75	30,6%	CCM 67 / NO votes 8	89,3%	10,7%
Chang'ombe	203	113	55,6%	CCM 112 / --------------	99%	----------
Mnadani	750	421	56%	CCM 140 / CHADEMA 274	33,2%	65%
Kiegea	115	93	80,8%	CCM 55 / NO votes 38	59%	41%
Lendolu	74	42	56,7%	CCM 34 / NO votes 8	81%	19%
Mesera	233	142	61%	CCM 85 / NO votes 57	59,9%	40,1%
Total	**2037**	**1054**	**51,7%**	**CCM 603**	**57,2%**	**42%**

Note: I have counted NO votes in those sub-villages with only one party contesting as votes for CHADEMA. CHADEMA's candidates in these sub-villages were not allowed to participate.

Village Chairperson Election Results from Sunya Village in 1999

	RESULT	PERCENT
Registered voters	2837	
Ballots	737	26 %
CCM	413	56 %
NO-VOTES	316	42. 9 %

Appendix IV: Sub-village/village government chairperson election, Kiteto District, November 2004

Sub-village chairperson

PARTY	SEATS
CCM	186 (97%)
CHADEMA	3
CUF	1
TLP	1
NCCR	0
UMD	0
TOTAL	191

Village government chairperson

PARTY	SEATS
CCM	51 (100%)
CHADEMA	0
CUF	0
TLP	0
NCCR	0
UDM	0
TOTAL	51

Appendix V: Question guide

I have used different question guides depending on what phase the fieldwork was in at that particular period and who I was to interview. In the beginning it was important for me to comprehend the life situation of people in the two villages and to get an understanding of what kind of problems were particular to their respective environments, how they utilized their land, what crops they cultivated, the health situation in the village and so on. Later on the questions were more focused on political issues and the same question guide, with some variations, was used in the two villages and when interviewing people in leadership positions and ordinary people. I usually started all interview sessions by explaining the purpose of my research before starting the interview with a few questions of more general character. Especially among the Maasai I found it easier to start with questions about their culture since this was something respondents liked to talk about. At the end of the interview session I always invited respondents to ask me questions and I often received questions for example about how people lived in Sweden, who took care of elder people, did we have clans, or what kind of political system did we have in Sweden. It was very rewarding to have these discussions in many ways and it could sometimes also lead back to questions I had asked earlier.

Below are examples of topics and questions used in the different questions guides. I have tried to compile the questions under suitable topics but in an interview session it is not always possible to follow a specific order of questions depending on how respondents answer the questions.

- Background information
  Name, ethnic group, clan. How long have you lived here? Where do you come from? Why did you move here? Are you a member of a committee or a party? What are your daily activities this time of year?

- Perception of the area
  How would you describe this area for a person who has never been here? What are the strengths and weaknesses of this area? Is there anything that should be improved?

- Social organisation
  Please tell me about women's and men's roles in your ethnic group. Who is responsible for what, division of labour, the inheritance system, existence of possible clans and their function in the society. What function does the clan system have today? How is it used, when is it referred to and why? Are there any clan that have a higher status than other clans? What responsibilities do elders have? What role does ilaiboni have? Are there elders who have more say than others in public meetings? How are decisions taken in Maasai society? How are women participating in decision-making? Has there been any change in Maasai society regarding decision-making? What is the relationship between customary leadership and political leadership? Are there any negative aspects of having elders being part of the decision-making? What role does olaiguenani have in the Maasai society? What are his main responsibilities?

- Cattle
  For what different purposes do you have cows? Who controls the products of cows? How do women get cows? Who decides if a cow is to be sold or slaughtered? Who decides where the cows shall graze? Have you had any conflicts with other farmers about water or grazing areas? Have you had any conflicts with Maasai?

- Land utilisation and land rights
  How is the availability of farmland, pasture, water, firewood? What is the procedure to get land? How much land can one person be given from the village government? Can you sell and buy land? Who has control over the yields? Who inherits land in your family/ethnic group?

- Perception of democracy/multiparty system
  What is democracy according to you? Is there any education about democracy issues taking part in the village? What is the multiparty system and why was it introduced in Tanzania? Have you seen any effects of the introduction of a multiparty system here in your village? What does CHADEMA mean to people? What connotations does the party have? What does CCM mean to people? What connotations does the party have for people? How can you influence decision-making in the village?

- Village political system
  How many seats are there in the village government? How often does the village government meet? What are the responsibilities of the village government/village chairperson/secretary? How is the co-operation in the village and in the village government between CCM and CHADEMA? What is the relationship between olaiguenani and the political leader?

- Leadership
  What characterises a good leader? How do you elect a good leader? Is ethnic or clan belonging important when you elect a leader? What do people mean when they say that they respect the leader? At what stage is olaiguenani appointed and by whom? Does olaiguenani need the political leaders? What leader/leaders are most important for people and for their development?

- Development
  What is development? How can you get this development? Has there been any change whatsoever of individual or village development concerning water, healthcare, food situation and education? What is a good life according to you? What kind of changes have you experienced the last five to ten years?

Appendix VI: Linear versus Circular Model of the Research Process

13 LITERATURE AND BIOGRAPHY

Abrahamsen, Rita (2000): *Disciplining Democracy: Development Discourse and Good Governance in Africa*. Zed Books, London.

Ake, Claude (2000): *The Feasibility of Democracy in Africa*. Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa.

Alasuutari, Pertti (1995): *Researching Culture, Qualitative Methods and Cultural Studies*. SAGE Publications, London.

Allison, Brian, Owen, Alun, et al. (1996): *Research Skills for Students*. Kogan Page, London.

Bagenda, Prince (1994): The Ruling Party and the Transition to Multiparty System in Tanzania. In Mmuya, Max, ed. (1994): *The Functional Dimension of the Democratisation Process: Tanzania and Kenya. With Some Experiences From Former Eastern Europe*. Dar es Salaam University Press.

Bamgbose, Ayo (2000): *Language and Exclusion: The Consequences of Language Policies in Africa*. Lit Verlag, Hamburg.

Boglind, Anders, Eliæson, Sven and Månson, Per (1993): *Kapital, Rationalitet och social sammanhållning. En introduktion till klassisk samhällsteori*. Tredje omarbetade upplagan. Prisma, Stockholm

Bratton, Michael, and Van de Walle, Nicolas (1997): *Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective*. Cambridge University Press.

Campbell, Horace (2000): Vision of Leaders in the 21st Century: The Nyerere Legacy. In Othman, Haroub, ed. (2000): *Reflections On Leadership In Africa Forty*

Years After Independence: *Essays in Honour of Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere, on the Occasion of his 75th Birthday*. VUB University Press.

Carothers, Thomas (2006): *Confronting the Weakest Link: Aiding Political Parties in New Democracies*. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C.

Chabal, Patrick, and Daloz, Jean-Pascal (1999): *Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument*. The International African Institute, James Currey, Indiana University Press.

Chambers, Robert (1983): *Rural Development: Putting the Last First*. Longman.

Cliffe, Lionel (1969, 1997): From Independence to Self-reliance. In Kimambo I., and Temu, A. J, ed. (1969, 1997): *A History of Tanzania*. Reprinted for the Historical Association of Tanzania, Kapsel Educational Publications.

Cohen, P. Anthony (1993): *The Symbolic Construction of Community*. Routledge.

Cowen, Michael, and Laakso, Liisa, ed. (2002): *Multiparty elections in Africa*. Oxford: James Currey, New York: Palgrave.

Diamond, Larry (1999): *Developing Democracy*. Towards Consolidation. The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore.

Diamond, Larry, Plattner, Marc F., Chu, Yun-han, and Tien, Hung-mao, ed. (1997): *Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies: Regional Challenges*. The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Dzimbiri, L. Ngware, S., and Ocharo, R. M. (2000): *Multipartism and People's*

Participation: Case studies from Kenya, Malawi, Tanzania. TEMA Publishers Company Ltd., Tanzania.

Dzimbiri, L. Ngware (2000*): <u>Multipartism: Dynamic Transition in Malawi</u>*. In Dzimbiri, L., Ngware, S. and Ocharo, R. M. (2000): *Multipartism and People's Participation: Case studies from Kenya, Malawi, Tanzania.* Eastern and Southern African Universities Research Programme (ESAURP), TEMA Publishers Company Ltd., Tanzania.

Elgström, Ole and Hydén, Göran, ed. (2002): *Development and Democracy: What have we learned and how?* Routledge, London.

Eriksen, Erik Oddvar, and Weigård, Jarle (2000): *Habermas Politiska Teori.* Studentlitteratur.

Etounga-Manguelle, Daniel (2000): <u>Does Africa Need a Cultural Adjustment Programme?</u> In Harrison, Lawrence E., and Huntington, Samuel P., ed. (2000): *Culture Matters*: *How Values Shape Human Progress.* Basic Books.

Filosofielexikonet (1988): *Filosofer och filosofiska begrepp från A till Ö.* Forum.

Finnegan, Ruth (1988): *Literacy and Orality: Studies in the Technology of Communication.* Basil Blackwell Ltd., Oxford.

Finnegan, Ruth (1992): *Oral Traditions and the Verbal Arts. A Guide to Research Practices.* Routledge, London.

Flick, Uwe (1998): *An Introduction to Qualitative Research.* SAGE Publications, London.

Glasl, Friedrich (1999): *Confronting Conflict: A first-aid kit for handling conflict.* Hawthorn Press.

Goody, Jack (2000): *The Power of the Written Tradition*. Smithsonian Institution Press, Washington and London.

Gonzalez, David (2000): Who Leads to Where? African Leadership into the 21st Century. In Othman, Haroub, ed. (2000): *Reflections On Leadership In Africa Forty Years After Independence: Essays in Honour of Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere, on the Occasion of his 75th Birthday*. VUB University Press.

Hadenius, Axel (2002): Transition to Democracy: Pros and cons of the Rustow-Lijphart elite approach. In Elgström, Ole, and Hydén, Göran, ed. (2002): *Development and Democracy: What have we learned and how?* Routledge, London.

Harrison, Lawrence E., and Huntington, Samuel P., (ed) (2000): *Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress*. Basic Books.

Held, David (1995): *Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance*. Polity Press.

Held, David (2002): *Demokratimodeller: Från klassisk demokrati till demokratisk autonomi*. Andra upplagan, Daidalos.

Hodgson, Dorothy L. (2001): *Once Intrepid Warriors: Gender, Ethnicity, and the cultural politics of Maasai development*. Indiana University Press.

Huntington, Samuel P. (1991): *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. University of Oklahoma Press, Norman.

Hydén, Göran (1968): *TANU YA JENGA NCHI: Political Development in Rural Tanzania*. Berlingska boktryckeriet, Lund.

Hydén, Göran (1994): In the Transition to Multiparty Democracy. In Mmuya, Max, ed. (1994): *The Functional Dimension of the Democratisation Process*:

Tanzania and Kenya. With Some Experiences From Former Eastern Europe. Dar-es-Salaam University Press.

Hydén, Göran (1998): *Demokratisering i tredje världen*. Studentlitteratur.

Karvonen, Lauri (1997): *Demokratisering*. Studentlitteratur, Lund.

Kimambo I. N., and Temu, A. J., ed. (1969, 1997): *A History of Tanzania*. Reprinted for the Historical Association of Tanzania, Kapsel Educational Publications.

Kweka A. N., (1995): One Party Democracy and the Multiparty State. In Legum, Colin, and Mmari, Geoffrey, ed. (1995): *Mwalimu, The Influence of Nyerere*. Britain-Tanzania Society.

Legum, Colin, and Mmari, Geoffrey, ed. (1995): *Mwalimu, The Influence of Nyerere*. Britain Tanzania Society in association with James Currey, Mkuki na Nyota, Africa World Press.

Lijphart, Arend (1999): *Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries*. Yale University Press.

Linde, Jonas and Ekman, Joakim (2006): *Demokratiseringsprocesser. Teoretiska ansatser och empiriska studier*. Studentlitteratur

Lumumba-Kasongo, ed. (2005): *Liberal Democracy and its Critics in Africa: Political Dysfunction and the Struggle for Social Progress*. CODESRIA Books, Dakar, in association with ZED Books, London.

Lumumb-Kasongo, Tukumbi (2005): The problem of liberal democracy and democratic process: lessons for deconstructing and building African democracies. In Lumumba-Kasongo, ed. (2005): *Liberal Democracy and its Critics in Africa:*

Political Dysfunction and the Struggle for Social Progress. CODESRIA Books, Dakar, in association with ZED Books, London.

Lwaitama A. F. (2000): <u>Presidential Oratory for the Pan-African Cause: The Nyerere Harangues</u>. In Othman, Haroub, ed. (2000): *Reflections On Leadership In Africa Forty Years After Independence: Essays in Honour of Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere, on the Occasion of his 75th Birthday*. VUB University Press.

Maguire G. Andrew (1969): *Towards 'Uhuru' in Tanzania: The Politics of Participation*. Cambridge University Press.

Maliyamkono, T. L. (1995a): *The Race for the Presidency: The first multiparty democracy inTanzania*. Tema Publishers Company Ltd., Dar es Salaam.

Maliyamkono, T. L. (1995b): *Who Votes in Tanzania and Why*. TEMA Publishers Company Ltd., Tanzania.

Maliyamkono, T. L., ed. (2000): *The Political Plight of Zanzibar*. TEMA Publishers Company Ltd., Tanzania.

Marshall, Catherine, and Rossman, Gretchen B. (1999): *Designing Qualitative Research*. SAGE Publications, 3rd edition, Thousand Oaks, California.

Martin, Henri-Jean (1994): *The History and Power of Writing*. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago.

Max, John A. O. (1991): *The Development of Local Government in Tanzania*. Educational Publishers and Distributors Ltd. Dar-es-Salaam.

Mboline, Milline (1995): <u>Structural Adjustment and Rural Development in Tanzania: The Case of Makete District</u>. In Simon, David, Van Spenge, Wilm, Dixon, Chris, and Närman, Anders ed, (1995): *Structurally Adjusted Africa: Poverty, Debt and Basic Needs*. Pluto Press.

McCracken, Grant (1988): *The Long Interview*. Qualitative Research Methods Series, Volume 13, SAGE Publications.

Mmuya, Max, and Chaligha, Amon (1992): *Towards Multiparty Politics in Tanzania: A Spectrum of Current Opposition and the CCM Response*. Dar es Saalam University Press.

Mmuya, Max, and Chaligha, Amon (1994): *Political Parties and Democracy in Tanzania*. Dar-es-Salaam University Press.

Mmuya, Max, ed. (1994): *The Functional Dimension of the Democratisation Process: Tanzania and Kenya. With Some Experiences from Former Eastern Europe*. Dar es Salaam University Press.

Mmuya, Max (199x): *Government and Political Parties in Tanzania: After the 1995 General Elections*. *Facts and Figures*. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.

Mmuya, Max (1998): *Tanzania Political Reform in Eclipse: Crises and Cleavages in Political Parties*. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.

Mpangala. G. P. (1994): <u>The Organization and Management of the 1990 Parliamentary Elections</u>. In Mukandala, Rwekaza S., and Othman, Haroub, ed. (1994): *Liberalization and Politics. The 1990 Election in Tanzania*. Dar es Salaam University Press.

Mpangala P. Gaudens (2000): *Major Issues in Tanzanian Economic History II*: *State Policies and the Question of Transformation of Peasant Agriculture Through a Hundred Years, 1891-1990*. Institute of Kiswahili Research, Dar es Salaam.

Msekwa, Pius (1995): *The Transition to Multiparty Democracy*. TEMA Publishing.

Mukandala, Rwekaza S., and Othman, Haroub, ed. (1994): *Liberalization and Politics: The 1990 Election in Tanzania*. Dar es Salaam University Press.

Munck, Ronaldo, and O'Hearn, Denis, ed. (1999): *Critical Development Theory*. Contributions to a New Paradigm. Zed Books.

Mung'ong'o, Claude, and Loiske, Vesa-Matti (1995): <u>Structural Adjustment Programmes and Peasant Resonses in Tanzania</u>. In Simon, David, Van Spenge, Wilm, Dixon, Chris, and Närman, Anders, ed. (1995): *Structurally Adjusted Africa*: *Poverty, Debt and Basic Needs*. Pluto Press.

Ndagala, Daniel Kyaruzi (1982): *Nomadic Peoples,* no 10, April 1982. "Operation Imparnati: The Sedentarization of the Pastoral Maasai in Tanzania".

Ndagala, Daniel Kyaruzi (1992): *Territory, Pastoralists, and Livestock: Resource Control among the Kisongo Maasai*. Gotab, Stockolm. Uppsala Studies in Cultural Anthropology, 18.

Nilsson, Anders (1999): *Peace in Our Time: Towards a holistic understanding of World society conflicts*. PADRIGU, Göteborg University.

Nyerere, K. Julius (1995): *Our Leadership and the Destiny of Tanzania*. African Publishing Group.

Olson, David R., and Torrance, Nancy, ed. (1991): *Literacy and Orality*. Cambridge University Press.

Omari, C. K. (1995): <u>*The Management of Tribal and Religious Diversity*</u>. In Legum, Colin, and Mmari, Geoffrey, ed. 1995: *Mwalimu, The Influence of Nyerere*. Britain-Tanzania Society, in association with James Currey, Mkuki na Nyota, Africa World Press.

Omari, C. K., ed. (1997): *The Right to Choose a Leader: Reflections on the 1995 Tanzanian General Election*. Dar es Salaam University Press.

Ong. Walter J. (1977): *Interfaces of the Word: Studies in the evolution of consciousness and culture*. Cornell University Press.

Ong, Walter J. (1991): *Muntlig och skriftlig kultur*. Teknologiseringen av ordet. Anthropos, andra upplagan, Göteborg.

Othman, Haroub (1995): The Union with Zanzibar. In, Legum, Colin, and Mmari, Geoffrey, ed. (1995): *Mwalimu, The Influence of Nyerere*. Britain Tanzania Society in assiciation with James Currey, Mkuki na Nyota, Africa World Press.

Othman, Haroub, ed. (2000): *Reflections On Leadership In Africa Forty Years After Independence: Essays in Honour of Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere, on the Occasion of his 75th Birthday*. VUB University Press.

Ottaway, Marina (1999): *Africa's New Leaders: Democracy or State Reconstruction?* Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Ottaway, Marina (2003): *Democracy Challenged: The Rise of Semi-Authoritarianism*. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Pietilä, Tuulikki, Ojalammi-Wamai, Sanna, and Laakso, Liisa (2002): Elections at the Borderland: Voter Opinion in Arusha & and Kilimanjaro Tanzania. In Cowen, Michael, and Laakso, Liisa, ed. (2002): *Multiparty elections in Africa*. Oxford: James Currey, New York: Palgrave.

Putnam, D. Robert (1996): *Den fungerande demokratin*: *Medborgarandans rötter i Italien*. SNS förlag.

Rigby, Peter (1992): *Cattle, Capitalism, and Class*: *Ilparakuyo Maasai Transformations*. Temple University Press, Philadelphia.

Sachs, Wolfgang, ed. (1992): *The Development Dictionary: a guide to knowledge as power*. Zed London.

Sadleir, Randal (1999): *Tanzania, Journey to Republic*. Radcliff Press, London.

Saitoti, Tepilit Ole, and Beckwith, Carol (1991): *Maasai*. Harvill.

Sannerstedt, Anders (1994): <u>Teorier om demokratisering.</u> In Sannerstedt, Anders, and Jerneck, Magnus, ed. (1994): *Den moderna demokratins problem*. Studentlitteratur.

Sannerstedt, Anders, and Jerneck, Magnus, ed. (1994): *Den moderna demokratins problem*. Studentlitteratur.

Sardar, Ziauddin (1999): <u>Development and the Locations of Eurocentrism</u>. In Munck, Ronaldo, and O'Hearn, Denis, ed. (1999): *Critical Development Theory: Contributions to a New Paradigm*. Zed Books.

Sida and Swedish Bilateral Development Cooperation in Africa (1997): *Development and Partnership*.

Simon, David, Van Spenge, Wilm, Dixon, Chris, and Närman, Anders, ed. (1995): *Structurally Adjusted Africa: Poverty, Debt and Basic Needs*. Pluto Press.

Sørensen, Georg (1993): *Democracy and Democratization*. Westview Press.

Southall, Roger, and Melber, Henning, ed. (2006): *Legacies of Power: Leadership Change and Former Presidents in African Politics*. Nordiska Afrika Institute.

Southall, Roger (2006): Troubled visionary: Nyerere as a former president. In Southall, Roger, and Melber, Henning, ed. (2006): *Legacies of Power*: *Leadership Change and Former Presidents in African Politics*. Nordiska Afrika Institute.

Spencer, Paul (2004): *The Maasai of Matapato: A Study of Rituals of Rebellion*. Routledge.

Spicker, Paul, Leguizamón, Sonia Alvarez, and Gordon, David, ed. (2007): *Poverty: An International Glossary*. ZED books in association with CROP, 2nd edition.

Strauss, Anselm, and Corbin, Juliet (1998): *Basics of Qualitative Research: Techniques and Procedures for Developing Grounded Theory*. SAGE Publications, Thousand Oaks, California.

Takougang, Joseph (1997): The 1992 Multiparty Elections in Cameroon. Prospects for Democracy and Democratization. In Udogu, Emmanuel Ike, ed. (1997): *Democracy and Democratization in Africa, Towards the 21st century*. Leiden.

Temu A. J. (1969, 1997): The Rise and Triumph of Nationalism. In Kimambo, I. N, and Temu, A. J., ed. (1969,1997): *A History of Tanzania*. Reprinted for the Historical Association of Tanzania, Kapsel Educational Publications.

Tordoff, William (1993): *Government and Politics in Africa*. MacMillan, 2nd edition.

Van Donge, Jan Kees (1995): Zambia: Kaunda and Chiluba: Enduring patterns of political culture. In Wiseman, John A., ed. (1995): *Democracy and Political Change in Sub-Saharan Africa*. Routledge.

Von Mitzlaff, Ulrike (1988): *Maasai Women*: *Life in a Patriarchal Society. Field Research Among the Parakuyo, Tanzania*. Trickster Tanzania Publishing House.

Wiseman, John A., ed. (1995): *Democracy and Political Change in Sub-Saharan Africa*. Routledge.

Wolf, Eric (1997): *Europe and the People Without History*. University of California Press.

Udogu, Emmanuel Ike, ed. (1997): *Democracy and Democratization in Africa, Towards the 21st century*. E. J. Brill, Leiden.

Århem, Kaj (1985): *Pastoral Man in the Garden of Eden: The Maasai of the Ngorongoro Conservation Area, Tanzania*. Uppsala research Reports in Cultural Anthropology.

Newspapers articles

Business Times, Monday 30 October 2000: Women and elections 2000: hopes and setbacks, by Karl Lyimo.

Business Times, Friday 10 November 2000: Prospective voter majority ignore policies, by Aloyce Menda.

Business Times, Friday 10 November 2000: CUF: why, and how, it lost in Elections 2000, by Emmanuel Mugambira.

Daily News, Tuesday 21 November 2000: Mkapa slams West, by Lucas Liganga.

The Guardian, Monday 9 December 1996: When Tanganyika gained *uhuru*: A political story, by William Shao.

The Guardian, Thursday 29 May 1997: Master parliamentary skills, Mkapa tells MPs, by Lwaga Mwambande.

The Guardian, Monday 25 September 2000: <u>No bloodshed, Lipumba promises,</u> by Guardian reporters.

The Guardian, Thursday 10 May 2001: <u>CCM will continue to win in elections, says Mangula,</u> by Lwaga Mwambande.

The Guardian, Monday 30 October 2000: <u>Vote Counting Starts After Peaceful Elections,</u> by the Guardian Election Team.

The Guardian, Friday December 2001: Rose Ikombe.

The Guardian, Tuesday 6 April 2004: <u>Need for democracy comes from the people</u>, by Sydney Kwiyamba.

Programme Documents

The United Republic of Tanzania (1998): <u>Local Government Reform Programme</u>. Policy Paper on Local Government Reform. Dar es Salaam.

Reports and studies

Afrobarometer Working Papers, no. 18, March 2002: <u>Uncritical Citizens or Patient Trustees? Tanzanians' Views of Political and Economic Reform</u>, by Amon Chaligha, Robert Mattes, Michael Bratton, and Yul Derek Davids. <u>www.afrobarometer.org</u>.

Afrobarometer Working Papers, no. 40, Revised November 2006: <u>The Status of Democracy, 2005-2006: Findings from Afrobarometer Round 3 for 18 Countries</u>. <u>www.afrobarometer.org</u>.

Afrobarometer Working Papers, no. 60, May 2006: <u>Where is Africa Going? Views from Below</u>. <u>A Compendium of Trends in Public Opinion in 12 African Countries,1999-2006</u>, by the Afrobarometer Network. Compiled by Michael Bratton and Wonbin Cho, <u>www.afrobarometer.org</u>.

Demokratirådets rapport 2000: <u>Demokrati utan partier?</u> SNS Förlag.

ESAURP (1996): <u>Evaluation Report of the 1995 General Elections in Tanzania.</u> Tema Publishers Company Ltd., Dar es Salaam.

Forest Trees and People, no. 46, 2002.

Human Development Report 2002.

Institute of Curriculum Development (1988): *East Africa From 1850 to the Present*. Secondary History Book Two, Dar es Salaam University Press.

LAMP/SCAPA Gender Guideline (1999): <u>How to Intergrate Gender in Natural Resources Management.</u> Final version April 1999, Orgut Consulting AB.

LAMP Booklet Series. <u>Building a future with our forests. Experiences of community based forestry.</u>

Maghimbi, S., and Manda, P. (1997): <u>Poverty and Gender Division of Labour among the Maasai of Simanjiro District.</u> Research Report submitted to REPOA, March 1997.

Odner Knut, (1978): <u>Baba, have you lost your way?</u> Ethnic Communication During Change in Mode of Production, Kenya Maasai. Institute of Social Anthropology, Oslo, 1st Internordic Conference on Marxist Anthropology Uppsala, 5-7 May 1978.

Sida (1999): <u>Follow-up Programme 1998-2000 for Local Management of Natural Resources Programme</u>. Report from Fourth Semi-Annual Mission, September/October 1999. HJP International Ltd.

Water Resources and Supply Study for Kiteto District, July 1996.

Governmental Publications

Government of the United Republic of Tanzania (1996): <u>Land Management and Environmental Programme 1996-1999.</u> The District Sub-Programme, vol. 2C. Land Management Programme (LAMP) Kiteto District.

Halmashauri ya Wilaya ya Kiteto (1999): <u>Taarifa na Matokeo ya Uchaguzi wa Wenyeviiti wa Vitongoji na Vijiji, Mwaka 1999</u>. Wizara ya Tawala za Mikoa na Serikali za Mitaa.

Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania (1999a): <u>Taratibu za Uchaguzi wa Viongozi wa</u> <u>Vijiji, Vitongoji na Mitaa za Mwaka 1999</u>. Dar es Saalam.

Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania (1999b): <u>Mwongozo Kuhusu Uchaguzi wa Viongozi wa Ngazi za Vijiji, Vitongoji na Mitaa Utakaofanyika Mwezi Novemba, 1999.</u> Wizara ya Tawala za Mikoa na Serikali za Mitaa. Dodoma.

Kiteto District Council (2001): <u>Data Analysis Result Report for Council Service Provision. Regional Administration and Local Government</u>. The United Republic of Tanzania, President's Office.

Kiteto District Council (2001): <u>Local Government Reform Programme</u>. Executive Summary Annual Plan and Budget for Restructuring Process, 2000-2001.

Internet sources

Kelsall, Tim (2003): <u>Governance, democracy and recent politcal struggles in Mainland Tanzania.</u> Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, vol. 41, no. 2 (July 2003), 55-82. Frank Cass, London. (http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t713720447~db=all~tab=sample).

http://www.tanzania.go.tz/administration.html#Local%20Authorities

http://www.parliament.go.tz/bunge/bunge.asp

http://web.amnesty.org/library/print/ENGAFRA560032001

http://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/Tanzania/zanza0402.htm

http://africanelections.tripod.com/tz.html

http://www.nbs.go.tz/Village_Statistics/PDF_files/Table_Manyara.pdf

Makamba blames Chadema for chaos in Kiteto campaign rally: 20 February 2008, by Angel Navuri. http://www.ippmedia.com/cgi-bin/ipp/print-pl?id=108760

Kiteto campaign violence irks Tendwa: 22 February 2008, by Felister Peter. http://www.ippmedia.com/cgi-bin/ipp/print.pl?id=108881;

Kiteto by-election generally peaceful: 25 February 2008, by Simon Mhina. http://www.ippmedia.com/cgi-bin/ipp/print.pl?id=109088;

CCM wins Kiteto seat: 26 February 2008, by Simon Mhina. http://www.ippmedia.com/cgi-bin/ipp/print.pl?id=109150;

www.tanzania.go.tz/census/districts/kiteto.htm

Carothers, Thomas (2002): *The End of the Transition Paradigm*. Journal of Democracy, vol. 13, no. 1, January 2002. National Endowment for Democracy and The Johns Hopkins University Press.

http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_democracy/v013/13.1carothers.pdf

Carothers, Thomas (2007): *A Quarter-Century of Promoting Democracy*. Journal of Democracy, vol. 18, no. 4, October 2007. National Endowment for Democracy and The Johns Hopkins University Press.

http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_democracy/v018/18.4carothers.pdf

http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_democracy/v018/18.1carothers.pdf

Lijphart, Arend (1991): *Constitutional Choices for New Democracies*. Journal of Democracy, vol. 2, no. 1, Winter 1991. National Endowment for Democracy and The Johns Hopkins University Press.

http://muse.jhu.edu.ezproxy.ub.gu.se/journals/journal_of_democracy/v002/2.1lijphart.pdf

Lijphart, Arend (2004): *Constitutional Design for Divided Societies*. Journal of Democracy, vol. 15, no. 2, April 2004. National Endowment for Democracy and The Johns Hopkins University Press.

http://muse.jhu.edu.ezproxy.ub.gu.se/journals/journal_of_democracy/v015/15.2lijphart.pdf

Rustow A. Dankwart (1970): *Transition to Democracy*. Toward a dynamic Model. Comparative Politics, vol. 2, no. 3, April 1970, 337-363.

http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.ub.gu.se/stable/421307