



GÖTEBORGS UNIVERSITET
Programme of European Studies

LIBERTY, EQUALITY, EXCLUSION
-
**SVERIGEDEMOKRATERNA AND LIBERAL ANTI-IMMIGRANT
FRAMES IN WESTERN EUROPE**

Master thesis in European Studies
Spring 2010
Author: Anton Jansson
Menthor: Abby Peterson

Title: Liberty, Equality, Exclusion - Sverigedemokraterna and Liberal Anti-Immigrant Frames in Western Europe

Author: Anton Jansson

Mentor: Prof. Abby Peterson

Semester: Spring 2010

Pages: 66

In this thesis, I firstly present my view on how to define the anti-immigrant party family in Western Europe. I argue for a broad grouping including parties sharing resentment towards immigration and multiculturalism as central contents of their politics even though they have different origins and partially different ideologies. To assert that anti-immigrant parties are right-wing authoritarian and ethnonationalist is not always accurate; instead parties use frames that work in specific country contexts.

Secondly, I analyse the anti-immigrant frames used by *Sverigedemokraterna* and claim that it is possible to see a diffusion of the liberal frames used by the Dutch *Lijst Pim Fortuyn*. *SD* is increasingly claiming to stand up for e.g. secularism, freedom of speech, gender equality and LGBT rights against perceived threats from immigrant groups in general and Muslims in particular. These themes, almost exclusively related to immigrants, are combined with themes like costs and perceived criminality of immigrants.

This diffusion of liberal frames to the national conservative *SD* can be at least partially understood by the fact that Sweden and the Netherlands are both liberal countries. It can be seen as confirmation of the argument that anti-immigrant parties with different ideologies can be grouped as a family.

Keywords: *Sverigedemokraterna*, anti-immigrant parties, immigration politics, multiculturalism, nationalism, Sweden, right-wing populism, *Lijst Pim Fortuyn*, liberal values, frame.

CONTENTS

1. INTRODUCTION	1
1.1 Outline of the study	1
1.1.1. A two part study	1
1.1.2. Research problem	2
1.1.3. Purpose	3
1.1.4. Key questions to be addressed	3
1.1.5. Disposition	3
1.1.6. Relevance	4
1.1.7. Limitations	5
2. BACKGROUND.....	6
2.1. History of the anti-immigrant party family in Western Europe	6
2.2. Sweden and Sverigedemokraterna: an introduction.....	7
2.3. Explanations of the emergence in Western Europe	9
2.4. Explanations of the non-emergence in Sweden	10
3. PREVIOUS RESEARCH	12
3.1. The anti-immigrant party family	12
3.2. Sverigedemokraterna	12
4. THEORETICAL TOOLS: FRAMES, DIFFUSION AND TRANSLATION	14
4.1. Frames	14
4.2. Diffusion and translation.....	15
5. PART ONE: THE ANTI-IMMIGRANT PARTY FAMILY	17
5.1. A party family or not?.....	17
5.2. Some theoretical considerations of the party family	19
5.3. Ethnonationalism and the immigration issue	21
5.4. Immigrants as a threat to liberal values	23
5.5. Conclusions of part one	25
6. PART TWO: <i>SVERIGEDEMOKRATERNA</i>.....	28
6.1. Methodological Considerations	28
6.1.1. Qualitative text analysis.....	28
6.1.2. Material	30
6.1.3. Temporal scope	31
6.1.4. Validity, reliability and intersubjectivity.....	32
6.1.5. Scheme of analysis	33
6.2. General anti-immigrant frames	36
6.2.1. National identity	36
6.2.2. Criminality	37
6.2.3. Costs	37
6.2.4. Other.....	38
6.3. Liberal anti-immigrant frames.....	39
6.3.1. Ethnic or civic nationalism?.....	39
6.3.2. Democracy and freedom of speech.....	40

6.3.3. Individual freedom	41
6.3.4. Secularism	42
6.3.5. Gender equality and the rights of women	44
6.3.6. LGBT.....	46
6.4. Conclusions of part two	49
7. INTEGRATED CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION	51
7.1 Integrated conclusions of the thesis.....	51
7.2. Discussion and suggestions for future research	53
SUMMARY	55
SAMMANFATTNING	56
BIBLIOGRAPHY	57
Literature	57
Sources	60
General sources	60
Press releases	61
Other	62
Websites	62
Dictionaries	62

TABLES AND FIGURE

Table 1. Anti-immigrant parties in Western Europe.....	7
Table 2. Election results of <i>Sverigedemokraterna</i> in the 21 st century.....	9
Table 3. Scheme of analysis.....	33
Figure 1. The political conflict dimensions in Western Europe	19

1. INTRODUCTION

In September 2010, there is a general election in Sweden. It is already clear that this election will be historical in some way. There are now two blocs, two government alternatives, standing against each other long before the election day. If the sitting right-wing coalition wins, it will be the first time in modern Swedish history a right-wing government has remained in power after a full term. If the left-wing coalition wins, the Swedish left and green parties will for the first time have ministers in office. But, a third possible historical occurrence is complicating this picture. Many opinion polls have shown that the anti-immigrant party *Sverigedemokraterna* (*SD*) may reach the electoral threshold and enter national parliament for the first time. None of the other parties seem to want to have anything to do with the newcomers, which – if *SD* succeeds – may complicate the possibilities of forming a government. *Sverigedemokraterna* has its roots in neo-fascism and even though it has gone through great changes since it was founded, it is still not generally regarded as a politically acceptable party. It remains to be seen if *Sverigedemokraterna* succeeds in its effort to gain enough votes to make a serious breakthrough in 2010, but it is clear that even though *SD* might still be stigmatised in the eyes of the establishment, it is no more the marginal extremist movement that it was only about a decade ago.

For many Swedes, a breakthrough of *SD* would be something quite shocking. In an international perspective however, the fact that Sweden does *not* have an openly anti-immigrant party in parliament is what could be regarded as surprising. In many Western European countries, including Sweden's three neighbouring countries, anti-immigrant parties are established electoral forces, and in some cases they have also been part of or at least supported governments.

1.1 Outline of the study

1.1.1. A two part study

It should be pointed out from the beginning that this is a two part study. The focus on the thesis is on the second part, which is an empirical text analytical study of the anti-immigrant frames¹ used by *Sverigedemokraterna*. My interest is, however, to also discuss anti-immigrant politics as a Western European phenomenon, and I argue that in order to understand *Sverigedemokraterna* it is

¹ I introduce the concept "frame" in chapter 4.1. Suffice it to say now that I use the word "frame" to denote a way of conceptualising a political issue or political struggle.

relevant to connect the party to other parties and trends within what I have called the anti-immigrant party family in Western Europe. Since the discussion of this party family is lively, and researchers disagree over how to label and understand them, it is important to position oneself here. Therefore I also, in part one, conduct an analysis of the party group based on a literary review of some major contributions to the understanding of the party family, focusing on the development in the 21st century. This is then used also as a springboard for part two.

1.1.2. Research problem

The last few decades have seen a wave of new anti-immigrant political parties often conceived as being radical right wing reaching electoral success throughout Western Europe. This party group can be seen as heterogenic in that the parties have different origins and in part different ideologies, but at least have one thing in common, namely that they nowadays pursue politics which is directed against immigration and multiculturalism.²

Parties of this anti-immigrant party group are often assumed to be right-wing in an authoritarian and anti-liberal way, occupying one end of a socio-cultural conflict dimension where the other is liberal and progressive. This has been due to a focus on things like national identity, law and order and traditional values. There has however been a trend in recent years that immigrant scepticism is increasingly framed within a liberal discourse, and anti-immigrant parties have been stressing issues normally associated with the liberal end of the socio-cultural conflict dimension. Such issues include for example gender equality, freedom of speech and individualism.

Immigrants and immigrant cultures have then been represented as more collectivist, conservative, patriarchal and intolerant, and therefore accused of being a threat to Western democracy. This has been a successful strategy for some parties, with the more famous examples being *Lijst Pim Fortuyn* (LPF) in the Netherlands, and *Fremskrittspartiet* (Frp) in Norway.³

Firstly, this evolution amplifies the heterogeneity of the party group that is often seen as radical right, which calls for an updated understanding of the party family of anti-immigrant parties. Secondly, successful political frames travel – a fact that has been seen earlier in relation to anti-immigrant parties.⁴ The question is to what extent we are able to find proof of a cross-national diffusion of such liberal anti-immigrant frames. The parties mentioned as examples above have

² Fennema 2005. It should be stated that "multiculturalism" is used in a very general way in this thesis. Not as a specific policy regime, but rather as the opposite of perceived national homogeneity.

³ Akkerman & Hagelund 2007

⁴ Rydgren 2005b

more liberal roots than most of the other anti-immigrant parties in Western Europe. It could therefore be suggested that this trend is mostly to be found in liberally rooted parties, but this should not be taken for granted without empirical study.

Sweden is an interesting case to study. On one hand it might be wise for an anti-immigrant party to tone down the ethno-national and authoritarian aspects of their rhetoric and stress civic and progressive dimensions, more compatible with the Swedish context.⁵ On the other hand *Sverigedemokraterna*, the leading but still small anti-immigrant party in Sweden, is one of the parties connected to this party family with a neo-fascist background, which could restrain its possibilities of adapting liberal frames.

1.1.3. Purpose

The purpose of the study is to contribute to the understanding of the group cohesion of anti-immigrant parties in Western Europe, and to the evolution and cross-national diffusion of political ideology and rhetoric within the group of anti-immigrant parties.

The purpose is also to explore and better understand the content and evolution of the frames that *Sverigedemokraterna* uses to criticise immigration and multiculturalism.

1.1.4. Key questions to be addressed

Part one

- How can the political parties in Western Europe who resent immigrants and multiculturalism be defined as a group?

Part two

- What general anti-immigrant frames is *Sverigedemokraterna* using?
- To what extent is *Sverigedemokraterna* using liberal anti-immigrant frames?
- Are there signs of changes over time?
- If so, how can we understand these changes?

1.1.5. Disposition

The thesis starts with a background chapter which summarises the evolution of the anti-immigrant party group in Western Europe and Sweden, together with some reasons behind these

⁵ Rydgren & van Holsteyn 2005:58

parties' relative success – or, in the case of Sweden, non-success. Following that, I very briefly give an account of some previous research about the party family in general and *Sverigedemokraterna* in particular. After this, I present some theoretical concepts – frames, diffusion and translation – that I will use later in my study

The analytical section of this thesis follows then in two parts. The first part consists of a discussion and analysis of the anti-immigrant party family in Europe based on a literary review. Here I go into more detail into previous research and present my view on how this party family should be defined. The second part departs from the discussion in the first, and is an empirical case study of the main Swedish anti-immigrant party, *Sverigedemokraterna*, the anti-immigrant frames it uses and how these have changed over the last nine years. An introductory note in part two is an elaboration of the methodological considerations needed to carry out my empirical study.

In the last chapter I first integrate the two parts, by looking again at the general phenomenon of anti-immigrant parties in light of my empirical study and draw some general conclusions. Second, I present a brief discussion which touches on related issues and aims to point out a few ways ahead.

1.1.6. Relevance

There is a relevance dimension to all research. That a study can be done does not automatically mean that it should be done. Here it is of uttermost importance to be aware of, and position oneself in relation to previous research so as to contribute with something.⁶ One can also discuss relevance in terms of intra- and extra-academical relevance. Intra-academical relevance has to do with the research community, if it contributes and adds to, instead of just repeating, previous research. It is also positive if social science research has some extra-academical relevance; that it is of significance for the society in general.⁷ The understanding of the relevance of my study will hopefully grow throughout the text, as I go through previous research, but let me shortly present why I find it relevant:

Concerning the intra-academical relevance: The ideational features of anti-immigrant parties are of course written about, but as Mudde points out in his study of the ideology of the party family,

⁶ Esaiasson et al. 2007:19; Marshall & Rossman 2006:11

⁷ Marshall & Rossman 2006:33-36

not very much – and not so much from an international perspective.⁸ The evolution of anti-immigrant politics in the direction of more liberal framing of immigrant critique is seldom thematised in connection with the understanding of the anti-immigrant party family. While interest in *Sverigedemokraterna* is considerable in Swedish society, there is little written about the party and its ideological content academically. An empirical in-depth study of how the party frames its anti-immigrant politics is thus motivated, especially out of the new perspective of anti-immigrant politics as a defence of liberal values.

The extra-academical relevance is motivated by the fact that these parties are often seen as a challenge to today's Western democracy, because of the exclusionary and xenophobic dimensions of their politics.⁹ I mentioned that interest in *SD* is great in Sweden, and the party is very much seen as a threat to the existing political order in the country; all other parties publicly distance themselves from it. The ideational evolution of the parties may only be one reason to understand its emergence, but still very much worth studying, not least because of the fact that it is election year in Sweden.

1.1.7. Limitations

The geographical limitation is Western Europe. This is mainly because it is a very common classification. There are of course related parties with xenophobic content in Eastern Europe and the rest of the world, but the immigration history and the kind of anti-establishment and anti-immigrant politics pursued in the Western European countries make it reasonable to treat the parties from this area as a family. I also wanted to avoid the common mistake of claiming to treat Europe but only include Western European examples.¹⁰

The focus of my study is not on explaining why these parties exist or why they have been successful or not. A study like this can maybe contribute to such an understanding, but I do not ask these questions myself here. There are many theories about the emergence and success and I have included a summary in the following background chapter.

I do not assess whether the frames that I present are reasonable or the claims that I analyse are true or false, it is also not a normative study about multiculturalism. My interest is rather on the discursive level of the anti-immigrant parties in general and *Sverigedemokraterna* in particular.

⁸ Mudde 2000:18-19

⁹ See for example Betz 2004; Betz 2005.

¹⁰ See for example Schain et al. 2002; Rydgren & Widfeldt 2004.

2. BACKGROUND

2.1. History of the anti-immigrant party family in Western Europe

The historical narrative of the new movement of anti-immigrant parties typically starts in France. The French *Front National (FN)*, under the leadership of Jean-Marie Le Pen was the first of the populist right parties to have great success in national elections in Western Europe. Founded in 1972, *FN* lacked electoral success in its first decade, but after a few promising achievements in local elections it had a major breakthrough in the national election of 1984, reaching about 11% of the votes. The greatest success of Le Pen, still leader of the party, is the sensational result in the presidential election of 2002, when he beat the left wing candidate Lionel Jospin and reached the second round where he was facing – and losing to – Jacques Chirac.¹¹ Another famous case is Austria, where the Jörg Haider-led *Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ)* won 27% of the votes in the election of 1999 and entered the national government in the beginning of the following year, resulting in the rest of the governments of the EU refusing to cooperate with the Austrian government.¹² In Belgium, we have the example of *Vlaams Blok*, which the Court of Cassation found to be violating a law against racism in 2004.¹³ *Vlaams Blok* then changed its name to *Vlaams Belang*, dropped some of the more controversial content of its program and has continued to be a part of the Flemish political landscape. In Scandinavia *Dansk Folkeparti* in Denmark and *Fremskrittspartiet* in Norway have been successful. In the Netherlands, there have been a couple of parties known for their charismatic leaders in the 21st century, namely *Lijst Pim Fortuyn (LPF)*, which got its name from its leader, who was murdered shortly before the election in 2002, and more recently, *Partij voor de Vrijheid*, whose leader Geert Wilders has been prosecuted for incitement to racial hatred and discrimination. In Italy, different parties of the right more or less rooted in fascism have been strong political forces, for example one of the parties merging to become what is today the governing party *PdL*, *Alleanza Nazionale*, was followers to the post-fascist party *MSI*.¹⁴

Without going into detail in each country and party, I present here a table which aims at giving a cursory overview of parties normally associated with the anti-immigrant wave across Western

¹¹ For an elaboration of the *Front National* case with explanations of their success, see Rydgren 2004.

¹² Riedlsperger 2004

¹³ Erk 2005. Vlaams Blok = Flemish Bloc, Vlaams Belang = Flemish Interest.

¹⁴ See Widfeldt 2004; Betz 2004; Petterson 2009 for general summaries of the evolution of the phenomenon.

Europe. The table is not exhaustive, and parties included are those who have been significant in the 21st Century.

Table 1. *Anti-immigrant parties in Western Europe.*¹⁵

Country	Party	Best election result (year)
Austria	FPÖ	26,9% (1999)
	BZÖ	10,7% (2008)
Belgium	Front National	2% (2003 & 2007)
	Vlaams Belang ¹⁶	12% (2007)
Denmark	Dansk Folkeparti	13,8% (2007)
Finland	Perussuomalaiset/Sannfinländarna	4,1% (2007)
France	Front National	15% (1997)
	Mouvement pour la France	1,2% (2007)
Greece	Laikós Orthódoxos Synagermós	5,6% (2009)
Germany	NPD	1,6% (2005) ¹⁷
	DVU	1,2% (1998)
Italy	Alleanza Nazionale ¹⁸	15,7% (1996)
	Lega Nord	10,1 (1996)
Netherlands	Lijst Pim Fortuyn	17% (2002)
	Partij Voor de Vrijheid	5,9% (2006)
Norway	Fremskrittspartiet	22,9% (2009)
Sweden	Sverigedemokraterna	2,9% (2006)
Switzerland	Schweizerische Volkspartei	28,9% (2007)
United Kingdom	British National Party	1,9% (2010)

2.2. Sweden and *Sverigedemokraterna*: an introduction

In the early 1990s, Sweden had a party that was sometimes connected to the new radical right movement in Europe called *Ny demokrati*.¹⁹ It was similar to its Scandinavian counterparts in that it was a liberal anti-tax populist party who could be said to have picked up its anti-immigrant rhetoric along the way. The party had quick success, entering the Swedish parliament in 1991 – the same year that it was founded – with 6,7% of the votes and 25 mandates. The demise of *Ny*

¹⁵ Table 1 is an updated version of a similar table in Widfeldt 2004. Some parties whose significance has diminished have been left out, but some newer parties have been added. Pettersson 2009 has also been of help determining the situation five years after Widfeldt. For newer election results I have used the respective sites of the parties on the English version of Wikipedia, and the website <http://www.bundeswahlleiter.de>. (URLs in bibliography).

¹⁶ The predecessors Vlaams Blok gathered 11,6% as its best result in 2003.

¹⁷ It should be pointed out though, that in 1969 NPD reached 4,3% of the vote.

¹⁸ Dissolved in 2009, when it merged with Silvio Berlusconi's party *Forza Italia* into the new party *PdL*.

¹⁹ "New Democracy" is the English translation of the party name. Kitschelt includes it in his classical study rather hesitantly. Kitschelt 1995:121.

demokrati was also quick, in 1994 it failed to defend its seats in the parliament and in 2000 it was dissolved.²⁰

At the time of *Ny demokrati*'s success, *Sverigedemokraterna* was a peripheral and fairly new party with strong connections to anti-democratical Nazi and fascist groups.²¹ It was founded in 1988 as a successor of *Sverigepartiet*, which in turn was a fusion of two groups: *Framstegspartiet* and *Bevara Sverige Svenskt*.²² In the second half of the 1990s *SD* worked hard on becoming respectable and disassociating itself from open racism and fascism. In 1996 a prohibition of uniforms was introduced and three years later the party officially disassociated itself with Nazism. Controversial issues like the death penalty and a total prohibition of abortion has also been taken away from the party programme. Another notable change made to fit into the Swedish mainstream is the changing of the party symbol from the Swedish flag as a burning torch to a hepatica.²³ The current party leader since 2005 is Jimmie Åkesson, born in 1979, who speeded up the modernisation process of the party, and who has been described as having a “smart appearance, [...] low-key but confident and reasoned style and [a] ‘clean’ background”.²⁴

The French *Front National* was very influential for the party, even though it has later very much seen the Danish *Danske Folkeparti* as a source of inspiration.²⁵ *SD* calls itself a centre party, and even though economical issues are toned down, it likes to associate itself with the Swedish social democratic tradition and the idea of *Folkhemmet*.²⁶ At the same time it is value oriented and see its roots also in national conservatism; the most central issues circle around national identity and opposition to immigration.²⁷ I will go more into detail on some ideological issues in my analysis, but suffice it to say right now that *Sverigedemokraterna* has generally been regarded as a conservative right-authoritarian party.²⁸ It tends to be most popular among young men without higher education.²⁹

²⁰ Rydgren 2005a:ch.3

²¹ Rydgren 2005a:118, this brief history of the party is based on Rydgren 2005a:ch.5; Widfeldt 2008; Mattsson 2009.

²² The names in English respectively: “The Sweden Party”, “The Progress Party” and “Keep Sweden Swedish”, the latter is a slogan that was also used by *SD* for a long time.

²³ Five of seven of the Swedish political parties in the parliament have a flower as symbol. The torch was a direct translation of the former symbol of the British National Front, and similar to the symbol of French *Front National* and the Italian fascist party *MSI*. The change was made as late as 2006.

²⁴ Widfeldt 2008:271

²⁵ Rydgren 2005a:118

²⁶ *Folkhemmet*, in English “the people’s home” was a concept of the Swedish social democracy denoting community and togetherness of the whole of the Swedish society. See Berman 2006:163-167.

²⁷ *Sverigedemokraterna* 2005a

²⁸ Rydgren 2005a:124

²⁹ Holmberg 2007

Compared to many other anti-immigrant parties in Western Europe, *Sverigedemokraterna* is still a small party. Only in the 2000s has it started to gain some influence in politics. Still, it has never been part of the national parliament. Between the elections of 2002 and 2006 it doubled its share of voters from 1,44% to 2,93% but this result was still a good per cent away from the Swedish election threshold of 4%. However, many opinion polls have shown that *SD* may be above the threshold in the upcoming election in 2010. Its best result in the opinion polls from the leading Swedish opinion institute SIFO is 5,8%, which it reached in November 2009.³⁰ Even though *SD* failed to enter the national parliament in 2006, the election year could still be seen as a success as it gathered significant support in many municipalities. Its best result was in the southern Swedish town of Landskrona, where 22,26% of the electorate supported *SD*. All in all, it won seats in about half of the 290 Swedish municipalities.

Table 2. Election results of *Sverigedemokraterna* in the 21st century.³¹

Year	Swedish Parliament	European Parliament	Church Assembly
2001			0,8%
2002	1,4%		
2004		1,1%	
2005			1,7%
2006	2,9%		
2009		3,3%	2,9%

2.3. Explanations of the emergence in Western Europe

There has been a great deal of theorising about why the anti-immigrant parties have emerged, and have been successful (or not) in elections. Normally the explanations are divided into two groups, one consisting of *demand-side* factors, and one of *supply-side* factors. The former departs from macrostructural societal processes, while the latter focuses on the parties themselves and on political opportunity structures. I will try to briefly summarise the most common explanations.³²

First, some demand side factors: Different types of transformations of the Western European societies, that is, the loss of power of structures like class and religion or the restructuring of the labour market because of globalisation, may have led to feelings of insecurity among voters who have then turned to ethnic nationalism. The “single issue thesis” points to increased immigration

³⁰ SIFO 2009

³¹ Table 2 is based on Mattsson 2009:35, and completed with the latest results from the article about *Sverigedemokraterna* on the Swedish version of Wikipedia.

³² Eatwell 2003 and Rydgren 2007 both do more in depth summaries of the research on how to explain the emergence and my summary is based on them.

as such to be the explanation, which can be related to xenophobia and “ethnic competition”. Political discontent can also be seen as a reason, then it is claimed that voting for anti-immigrant parties is mainly a vote *against* the establishment, and not so much a positive vote on the best perceived contender.

Second, some supply side factors: Here political opportunity structures (POS) is often thematised. POS refers to a broad set of resources or factors that are external to a party or movement, but help to shape the success of it, opening up spaces for new parties. The convergence of existing parties on the political left-right scale, and realignment processes tied or not tied to that convergence, are two such structures. If media and the existing political parties are acknowledging new parties and treat them as equal or refusing them to participate is another. The electoral system of a country is a third; high electoral thresholds and majority voting systems make it harder for new parties to establish themselves. The national tradition is another factor. Various national traditions or cultures can enable or disenable a party to enter the mainstream.³³ Party organisation and leadership is another supply side factor. How well a party is organised and how solid a base the party has is important, and the significance of a charismatic leader is also sometimes stressed. Then of course the message of the parties is of uttermost importance for their success. How do parties manage to attract voters? The ideology and discourse, the content of the parties’ programmes and the framing of their message play a vital role here. My aim with this thesis is not to explain the emergence of the parties, but this last dimension is closest to the content of my study.

2.4. Explanations of the non-emergence in Sweden

As we have seen, the Scandinavian countries of Denmark and Norway both have successful anti-immigrant parties. That no such party has established itself permanently in Sweden can be explained in different ways.³⁴ On one hand, the Swedish people are not devoid of xenophobic and anti-immigrant attitudes, and there is also scepticism against the political establishment, typical undercurrents for parties with a populist strategy to exploit. Party identification is also less strong than before. On the other hand, the convergence in the political space has not been as significant in Sweden as in other countries, and the socio-economic conflict dimension has been of greater importance than elsewhere, two reasons as to why it has been harder for new parties to establish themselves. There has also been no party strong enough to mobilise voters since *Ny*

³³ The Nazi past in Germany, and the effort to disengage the country from its racist past could be one such example, explaining why no anti-immigrant party has established itself in the federal politics.

³⁴ I mainly use Rydgrens argumentation from 2005 in this paragraph. See Rydgren 2005a:131-134.

Demokrati and the extra-parliamentarian and extremist roots of *Sverigedemokraterna* means that it is not perceived as a decent alternative in the eyes of many voters. The relatively low degree of politicisation of the immigration issue by the established parties may also explain the non-emergence of a successful anti-immigrant party in Sweden³⁵

³⁵ Dahlström & Esaiasson 2009

3. PREVIOUS RESEARCH

3.1. The anti-immigrant party family

Since part one of my study is a literary review and analysis I will go more into detail on previous research there, referring, highlighting and discussing some of the more important contributions. Research that addresses anti-immigrant parties as an international (or Western European) party group are very often monographs with case studies about specific parties and/or countries, with a more general introduction and/or conclusion.³⁶ Jens Rydgren, apart from being the editor of a couple of these monographs, has written about this as an international phenomenon, for example about cross-national diffusion of successful concepts, and a more general assessment of the party family and the research about it.³⁷ Cas Mudde has written about the ideology of the party family, focusing on five parties from three countries.³⁸ Hans-Georg Betz is another notable scholar who has tried to take a wider grip of the family.³⁹ Herbert Kitschelt's study from 1995 entitled *The Radical Right in Western Europe* is a classic in the field and the study from which I depart in part one of my analysis. The rise of liberal values in anti-immigrant politics has mainly been written about by two authors, who I also will use extensively later, namely Tjitske Akkerman and Anniken Hagelund.⁴⁰

3.2. Sverigedemokraterna

There has been a remarkable productivity of journalists writing about *Sverigedemokraterna* during recent years, during which time many books have been released. Mainly these books have been broad reviews about the party, including history, ideology, important persons and current political activities, building on different empirical materials.⁴¹ There is less written about *Sverigedemokraterna* academically so far. Jens Rydgren has written broadly about right-wing populism in Sweden, and then included *Sverigedemokraterna*, its ideological content and the Swedish political opportunity structures allowing (or not) for its success.⁴² Anders Widfeldt has written about the history of

³⁶ Rydgren 2005c; Rydgren & Widfeldt 2004; Merkl & Weinberg 2003; Schain et al. 2002

³⁷ Rydgren 2005b; Rydgren 2007

³⁸ Mudde 2000. His rather narrow sample is the reason as to why his study is not very central in part one of my paper.

³⁹ Betz 2005; Betz 2004; Betz & Johnson 2004

⁴⁰ Akkerman 2005; Hagelund 2005; Akkerman & Hagelund 2007, cf. Betz & Meret 2009 about this in connection with Islam.

⁴¹ A few examples: Mattsson 2009; Orrenius 2010, collected coverages from the daily newspaper *Sydsvenska dagbladet*; Bengtsson 2009, a monograph written by journalists and political scientists focused on how to "take the debate" with *Sverigedemokraterna*.

⁴² Rydgren 2005a

Sverigedemokraterna with a focus on the necessity of organisational and ideological change on the road from an extremist background to the mainstream politics.⁴³ Holmberg have written about *SD* and the Swedish voters, showing who votes for the party and that *SD* is by far the least popular party if the whole electorate is allowed to utter its meaning.⁴⁴

⁴³ Widfeldt 2008

⁴⁴ Holmberg 2007

4. THEORETICAL TOOLS: FRAMES, DIFFUSION AND TRANSLATION

4.1. Frames

Jens Rydgren uses the term "master frame" when discussing the international spreading – or cross-national diffusion – of the successful concept of *Front National*.⁴⁵ Rydgren has adopted the idea of frames from the social movement researchers Snow and Benford, who see frames as interpretative schemata which help to structure, simplify and condense the world, and to render it meaningful.⁴⁶ To attract adherents a movement must use frames that are attractive to individuals in a given society. A political party in Western Europe after the Second World War will find it tough – to say the least – to reach the mainstream with openly anti-democratic values and biological racism, which was the earlier framework of xenophobic and radical right wing political movements. The new master frame of *Front National* consisted instead of the related but democratically more compatible combination of anti-establishment populism and ethnopluralism.⁴⁷

A master frame is a broader discursive structure where a movement or a political party could be understood to fit in. I will use the word frames in a more general way, to denote a way of conceptualising a political issue or a political struggle. Snow and Benford also talk about frames as the "sets of beliefs and meanings that inspire and legitimate the activities and campaigns"⁴⁸ of social movements, or in my case, political parties. One could understand a frame to be somewhere in between the concepts of discourse and rhetoric, the former being an ontologically existing entity which governs how individuals can understand and behave in the world, leaving little space for agency, and the latter more a way to convince an audience.

I will talk about liberal anti-immigrant frames in this thesis, as a way of connecting a defence of certain liberal values to opposition of immigration and multiculturalism. When talking about liberal and conservative the first association is to ideology. I use the term frames, and framing, because it offers a more dynamic way of looking at the relation between organisations and followers, parties and voters, than would be the case for ideology. Firstly because frames can include other things than pure ideological content, one example is that Rydgren talks about

⁴⁵ Rydgren 2005b. The concept of frames in regards to anti-immigrant parties is used by other researchers as well, see for example Hagelund 2005:163; Betz & Meret 2009:313; Widfeldt 2008:272-273.

⁴⁶ Benford & Snow 2000:614; Rydgren 2005b:426

⁴⁷ Rydgren 2005b, I come back to this in part one of the study (chapter 5).

⁴⁸ Benford & Snow 2000:614

populism as an important ingredient of the *Front National* master frame, which could be considered as a political form or style, rather than an ideological feature.⁴⁹ Another example can be that fear, for example, can be of importance in the framing of anti-immigrant political parties, without being an ideological component. Secondly, because my goal is not first and foremost to define whether the content of a political party's proposed politics is widely and coherently accepted as being "liberal". The actual goal may or may not be regarded as liberal; it is more a question of how an issue is interpreted and parcelled. And a liberal framing is possible even when a political movement or party is not considered having a liberal origin in such a way that it is possible to talk about this party having a coherent liberal ideology.

There are always "frame alignment processes" going on in the interaction between a movement and its supporters, to better fit contextual transformations or new political aspirations.⁵⁰ The individual can of course adapt to the rhetoric and values of an organisation, but there are also constant activities on the part of the organisation in order to be synched with and attract potential followers. This also goes for political parties and voters. There are different frame alignment processes, such as frame bridging (outreach of an organisation to connect certain grievances or experienced problems to their cause), frame amplification (the stress on certain beliefs and values) or frame transformations (changing old understandings and meanings).⁵¹

4.2. Diffusion and translation

Diffusion can be seen as a flow of practices or ideas among actors within a larger system or a term encompassing contagion and mimicry, or adoption of ideas which have proved themselves successful in one context.⁵² Snow and Benford have also connected their concept of frames to how organisations and political struggles "cluster temporally in a cyclical fashion".⁵³ That is, certain grievances and certain possible political issues can be represented in different ways in different temporal and spatial contexts, but often there is congruence, stemming from a diffusion of the frames of one successful movement in the "cycle" to others. This exact thought is what Rydgren builds on when he analyses the "master frame" of *Front National*.⁵⁴ Successful frames in one country can travel to other countries where there are conditions for a similar evolution. For a

⁴⁹ Mudde 2000:13

⁵⁰ Snow et al. 1986

⁵¹ Snow et al. 1986:467-476; Benford & Snow 2000:624f.

⁵² Strang & Meyer 1993:487; Rydgren 2005b:429-430

⁵³ Snow and Benford 1992:133

⁵⁴ Rydgren 2005b:429-430. Rydgren discusses possible ways of *how* diffusion takes place and for example he points out that the Internet has facilitated diffusion processes very much, but it is not what is important, and not really part of his study, and neither of mine.

frame to be successful in a new context it needs to strike a responsive chord – there has to be cultural linkages between contexts. Firstly, this means that there need to be *empirical credibility* of the problem designation also in the new context; the representation of problems must be understandable and reasonable. Secondly, a *narrative fidelity* is needed, that is, the amplified values, beliefs and so forth must be relevant in the new context as well, and the rhetoric used must be understood.⁵⁵

A responsive chord does not mean, however, that everything has to be identical, there are certain “translations” going on. All frames are shaped in accordance with the political culture and the cultural climate of the new context.⁵⁶ Or, in the words of Rydgren:

it should be emphasized that diffused ideas and practices are always being actively modified or even ‘translated’ to a greater or lesser extent by adopters in order to fit the unique political and cultural context in which they are embedded.⁵⁷

Rydgren takes as an example here that even though *Front National* was influential in Scandinavia, one of its most important issues, abortion, which they ardently opposed, is toned down in secular protestant Scandinavia.

⁵⁵ Snow and Benford 1992:138-141; Rydgren 2005b:430; Strang & Meyer 1993:490-492

⁵⁶ Snow and Benford 1992:148-149

⁵⁷ Rydgren 2005b:431

5. PART ONE: THE ANTI-IMMIGRANT PARTY FAMILY

When talking about the political parties that I have chosen to call anti-immigrant parties, one comes across the interesting paradox that the literature and the researchers on this phenomena more or less agree on which parties to include in the research, but that there is no widespread consensus on neither the core definition of nor the ideological characteristics connecting the parties included.⁵⁸ Or, as Merkl put it in the introduction to one monograph he edited, “experienced analysts still disagree on categorization, labels and boundaries between its different manifestations.”⁵⁹ And while this thesis may not be the suitable context to settle the disputes, I find it relevant to position myself in the debate, criticising and pointing out a few things and discuss the grouping on the basis of recent development. The question I posed in the introduction is rather broadly formulated, so as to enable a fairly wide discussion:

- How can the political parties in Western Europe who resent immigrants and multiculturalism be defined as a group?

5.1. A party family or not?

The group of parties associated with anti-immigrant politics in Western Europe is far from monolithic. In table 1 I presented the most important of the parties usually included in the anti-immigrant party family. One thing that we have to elaborate on is the fact that they are mostly treated as a group, by me and by others, and – as we will see later – most of them clearly draw inspiration from one another, does not mean that they are all one and the same. Some of the parties have a neo-fascist heritage in one way or the other, even though this is often toned down due to the stigmatisation this can cause. This is the case for, among others, the French *Front National*, the Flemish *Vlaams Belang*, the *British National Party*, *Sverigedemokraterna*, and the now defunct Italian *Alleanza Nazionale*. *Fremsskrittspartiet* in Norway and its Danish namesake, out of which the present *Dansk Folkeparti* grew, were both founded as socio-economically liberal anti-tax populist parties in the 1970s. For both parties, immigration and nationalism were not important issues at first, and caught on in importance only in the 1980s. The Austrian *FPÖ* and *BZÖ* have their roots in national liberalism, and the third *Lager* of Austrian politics.⁶⁰ In the neighbouring Alp country of Switzerland, *SVVP* is another old party having been transformed from more

⁵⁸ Rydgren 2007:242

⁵⁹ Merkl 2003a:4

⁶⁰ The other two *Lagers* are the socialist and the catholic-conservative; see Riedlsperger 2004.

liberal-conservative roots.⁶¹ As we will see the *Lijst Pim Fortuyn* was based on the very liberal world view of its leader Pim Fortuyn, and the present Dutch *Partij voor de vrijheid* has grown out of liberal roots, with a leader, Geert Wilders, who was earlier an MP for another liberal-conservative party, *VVD*.

My reason to group these parties is at a first glance very pragmatic. It is because I build on earlier research and follow the paths of experts in the field. The parties I discuss here are generally mentioned in the contemporary research as examples of the anti-immigrant party group. Secondly, and more importantly, I also argue that there is a minimal commonality among the parties, which is that they are all anti-immigrant, by which I mean that they are adversely disposed to immigration and multiculturalism in some way, promoting exclusion and some kind of homogeneity within the nation state. There has been reluctance by some researchers to call the party group “anti-immigration”, because of the treatment of the ‘foreigner question’ has been too complex,⁶² and that the immigration issue is far from the only reason for voters to turn to the parties.⁶³ Still, even though some may hesitate to call the immigration issue their *raison d’être*,⁶⁴ the anti-immigrant stance is, when looking at earlier research (and mass media) without doubt their present *sine qua non* for being associated with one another.⁶⁵ Exclusionism is central, and immigrants are the out-group which is being excluded.⁶⁶

This is also one of the reasons⁶⁷ why I have chosen the label “anti-immigrant” parties rather than one of all the other on the smorgasbord of party family names out there.⁶⁸ I go with the earlier researchers which have used “anti-immigrant”,⁶⁹ rather than the ones choosing “anti-immigration”,⁷⁰ because “immigrant” can signify both a person who moves in to a country and a person who already lives there and may be a citizen, but still perceived as an outsider due to the belonging to “another culture” (second- and third-generation immigrants are also nominally if

⁶¹ In the 1990s, *SVP* were not included in the party family at all, but a turn to more immigrant sceptic politics under the leadership of Cristoph Blocher qualifies them according to many observers. See for example Widfeldt 2004. In recent years they have attracted international attention as xenophobic with their election poster of white sheep kicking out a black sheep, and by being the largest Swiss party pushing for the minaret ban in 2009.

⁶² Betz & Johnson 2004:318

⁶³ Mudde 1999.

⁶⁴ Mudde 1999:182

⁶⁵ Rydgren & van Holsteyn 2005:51; Fennema 2005:1

⁶⁶ Betz 2004

⁶⁷ The other being that I find the label “right” problematic, see below in chapter 5.5.

⁶⁸ Some examples out of my bibliography: Extreme right (Mudde 1999;2000; Eatwell 2000;2003; Ignazi 2002), Extreme right wing populist (Rydgren 2005b), Nativist (Betz & Meret 2009), New right radical parties (Minkenberg 1997), Populist right (Widfeldt 2008), Radical populist right (Betz & Johnson 2004), Radical right (Rydgren 2007), Radical right-wing populist (Betz 2005), Right-wing populist (Hagelund 2005)

⁶⁹ van der Brug et al. 2000; Fennema 2005; Dahlström & Esaiasson 2009


⁷⁰ Akkerman 2005; Akkerman & Hagelund 2007

not logically immigrants). “Anti-immigrant” thus captures both the immigration and the national homogeneity issue.⁷¹

5.2. Some theoretical considerations of the party family

One of the more famous and influential studies of the new anti-immigrant populism is Herbert Kitschelt’s *The Radical Right in Western Europe* from 1995. Kitschelt claims that the political space in which parties compete in Western Europe must be two-dimensionally understood. That means that there is not only an economical dichotomy between left (redistributive/socialist) and right (free-market/capitalist), there is also a cultural dichotomy spanning between libertarian and authoritarian positions. (see figure 1). I will call these two dimensions the *socio-economical* and the *socio-cultural* conflict dimensions.⁷²

Figure 1. The political conflict dimensions in Western Europe⁷³



The main political cleavage in advanced industrial capitalist Europe is, according to Kitschelt, the cleavage between *left-libertarian* and *right-authoritarian* politics. On one extreme, there is a position embracing economically left and politically and culturally libertarian values, on the other there is a position which stands for economically right and politically and culturally authoritarian values.

⁷¹ And I do not agree with Mudde, who rejects similar labels on the ground that “immigration issue” is not the only ideational content or reason to vote for the parties, see Mudde 1999:182-183. He may be right, the parties may for example address other issues as well, but I still find the label useful when looking at the parties as an international group, it is then what *combines* them that is interesting.

⁷² Kitschelt, 1995:ch.1

⁷³ This is a simplified version of a model of the political space that Kitschelt uses in his study. Kitschelt 1995:15

The competition between parties is thus neither purely horizontal, nor vertical, but diagonal from the left upper corner to the right lower corner in his model (see figure 1). The horizontal, traditional left-right cleavage is a question of socialism versus capitalism, where, very roughly, expansion of the welfare state stands against free market competition. The vertical socio-cultural conflict dimension includes more value and identity oriented issues, such as gender equality and family values, multiculturalism and individualism.⁷⁴

Kitschelt has an idea of something which he calls the “master case” of the European radical right. He argues that the cleavage between left-libertarian and right-authoritarian is historically contingent, but holds for modern industrial capitalist Europe.⁷⁵ Because of that, what he calls the radical right has to position itself as right-authoritarian, combining neo-liberal appeals with focus on anti-immigrant and other authoritarian positions in order to be successful.⁷⁶

Kitschelt has attracted criticism from other scholars. Not least because of his focus on the necessity of an economically rightist position. Cas Mudde writes that this focus is peculiar for two reasons, firstly because of the fact that for anti-immigrant parties, economy is at best a secondary issue, and secondly because of the fact that most anti-immigrant parties have developed a *welfare chauvinist* economic programme, meaning that they are generally positive towards welfare state provisions, but want to limit those to the “own people”.⁷⁷ Rydgren points out that one error of Kitschelt was that he based his analysis on the attitude of the voters and not on the parties’ actual political program. In addition to that he remarks that the attacks on the “big state” by many anti-immigrant parties have been more populist than neo-liberal.⁷⁸ Kitschelt’s model could be criticised because of these reasons, and also in other ways. But still, it is interesting to bear it in mind, because it is an often-referred to and is an important contribution to the field, but also as it can help as a tool in a discussion, shedding light on political-ideological conflict lines in Western democracies.

⁷⁴ Kitschelt 1995:20. It should be stated here that I in this thesis more or less use “libertarian”, which is the word Kitschelt uses and “liberal” values as signifying the same thing, a permissive and progressive view of society in contrast with a authoritarian and traditional.

⁷⁵ Kitschelt, 1995:19. It must also be pointed out to Kitschelt’s defence that he does not mean that all anti-immigrant parties *have to* be right-authoritarian, only that this is the “master case”, the recipe for success. See Kitschelt 1995:89.

⁷⁶ Success is of course also dependent on other things. One such thing is the convergence of the other parties, which could be explained with the help of figure 1. Firstly, there is a populist dimension to this. If the main parties are cooperating, moving towards the middle and can be seen as being very much alike, a contender party could gain votes on its positing itself as the only real alternative. Secondly, if the polemic on the left-right scale is low there is an increased importance of immigration matters and other socio-cultural themes *vis-à-vis* socio-economic themes. Or, to frame it spatially: When the horizontal dimension loses its importance, the vertical wins. Kitschelt 1995:25, 124ff., cf. Rydgren 2007:253f.; Eatwell 2003:58; Rydgren 2005b:421.

⁷⁷ Mudde, 1999:189

⁷⁸ Rydgren 2007:245; Eatwell 2000:422

Jens Rydgren has proposed a narrower definition of the commonalities of what he calls the radical right, avoiding socio-economical aspects. He argues that the emergence of these parties is to be explained by a new right wing “master frame”, which has undergone a process of cross-national diffusion.⁷⁹ This master frame combines ethnonationalist xenophobia with anti-establishment populism, evolved in the French *Front National* and spread throughout Europe after the party’s electoral breakthrough in 1984.

The new radical right-wing parties share an emphasis on ethno-nationalism rooted in myths about the distant past. Their program is directed toward strengthening the nation by making it more ethnically homogeneous and by returning to traditional values. They generally view individual rights as secondary to the goals of the nation. They also tend to be populists in accusing elites of putting internationalism ahead of the nation and of putting their own narrow self-interests and various special interests ahead of the interest of the people. Hence, the new radical right-wing parties share a core of ethno-nationalist xenophobia and antiestablishment populism.⁸⁰

But even though we have seen that Rydgren criticises Kitschelt, he still finds that the correct label for the parties are “right” and that this is because of the fact that there is an authoritarian dimension common to them, and he states that: “The new radical right is right-wing primarily in the socio-cultural sense of the term.”⁸¹ In this way, it is not only asserted that the anti-immigrant parties by default subscribe to authoritarian values, but also that authoritarian values are to be labelled “right”, which is a very common feature.

5.3. Ethnonationalism and the immigration issue

Of course, one could differentiate between nationalism and immigrant scepticism, but nevertheless, those dimensions are tightly interwoven and important parts of the ideology of the anti-immigrant parties.⁸²

The ethnonationalist xenophobia dimension in Rydgrens “master frame” is based on the doctrine of ethnopluralism, elaborated through the French intellectual movement *Nouvelle Droite*, and often associated with terms like “new racism” or “cultural racism”.⁸³ Ethnopluralists do not perceive humanity as consisting of hierarchically ordered biological “races”, but believe that there are

⁷⁹ Rydgren 2005b

⁸⁰ Rydgren 2007:242, cf. Ignazi 2002:25, 35

⁸¹ Rydgren 2007:243

⁸² Mudde 2000:169-173

⁸³ Rydgren 2005b:427; Minkenberg 1997:72

distinctly disparate ethnic groups, that are equal but still ontologically different from one another. The different ethnic groups, often conceived of as nations, should have a right to independence and to govern themselves. However, different nations should not be mixed but live separated from each other. According to this perspective, mixing different ethnicities leads to social tension and criminality and in the long term to cultural extinction. This world view also allows for xenophobes and nationalists to stress the importance of cultural homogeneity and put its “own people first” and at the same time denounce racism.

Even though not everyone thematises the political-philosophical idea of ethnopluralism, there is a widespread agreement among authors commentating on anti-immigrant parties that the ethnical issue is central to the party family. Hans-Georg Betz states that the anti-immigrant parties have an “ethnocratic” ideal, and elaborates that: “The notion that some groups cannot become members of the community because of their ethnic origins or cultural background is central to an ethnocratic conception of society.”⁸⁴

I earlier introduced the anti-immigrant stance as the *sine qua non* of the parties of the anti-immigrant party group. Less immigration, especially from non-Western European countries, and tougher demands on the inhabitants with an immigrant background to assimilate and adapt to the national homogeneity is seen to be crucial to the well-being of the nation state. There are different reasons to be critical against immigration and multiculturalism that are often repeated by these parties, mainly four recurring themes.⁸⁵ First, they are seen to be a threat to the (ethno-) national identity of the nation state. Second, immigrants are perceived as a major cause of criminality and other forms of social instability. Third, immigrants are thought of as causing unemployment, “taking the jobs” from the native population. Fourth, they are seen to be preying on the welfare system of Western democracies, increasing the cost for welfare states. In connection to the discussion on the “single-issue thesis” for the success of anti-immigrant parties, Eatwell stresses that the themes of law and order, unemployment and welfare are often thematised, connecting problems in these areas to immigrants.⁸⁶ Or, in other words immigrants are framed to be, not only threat to the national identity, but also to be causes of criminality, less labour security and loss of welfare.

⁸⁴ Betz 2005:36, cf. Betz & Johnson 2004:320ff.

⁸⁵ Rydgren 2007:244

⁸⁶ Eatwell 2003:49

All of these reasons to be critical against immigration and multiculturalism fit in with the idea of the anti-immigrant parties being authoritarian. To these reasons however, is another dimension increasingly added, namely that immigrants constitute a threat to the liberal values of Western democracies.

5.4. Immigrants as a threat to liberal values

Even though Kitschelt's model has been influential, we have seen critique of it on economical grounds – that his assertion of the socio-economical position of the new anti-immigrant parties is skewed. On the socio-cultural conflict dimension it is almost always asserted that anti-immigrant parties are among the most conservative and authoritarian. This is not false, but increasingly the “threat” from immigration is seen to be a threat to modern liberal and democratic values, which would be more associated with the other end of the socio-cultural spectrum.

Lijst Pim Fortuyn was the most flagrant example of how one anti-immigrant party sticks out from the crowd in this regard. It is also a very special case in many ways. *LPF* was founded just a few months before the national election in 2002 by Pim Fortuyn, a former sociology professor, who was dismissed as a candidate by the party *Leefbaar Nederland* after a controversial statement about Islam. The charismatic Fortuyn very quickly achieved widespread support, but was murdered just nine days before the election. Still, *LPF* attracted 17% of the votes, ending up as the second largest party in parliament, and joined a coalition government.⁸⁷ The coalition government fell after less than a year, and fall did also *LPF*, who decided to dismiss itself in 2008.

Even though some aspects of the party's politics could be regarded as authoritarian, such as tougher crime fighting as an important issue, *LPF* was no typical right-authoritarian party. Pim Fortuyn himself was an outspoken liberal, and the party put “no emphasis on traditional morality”.⁸⁸ Pim Fortuyn instead framed immigration, and above all “Islamization” as a threat to the liberal values of the Western world, and of the Netherlands in particular. Some of those values that were stressed and seen as being under attack from the assumingly more conservative immigrants were freedom of expression, individual autonomy, secularism and the emancipation of women and homosexuals.⁸⁹

⁸⁷ See Lucardie & Voerman 2003 for a description of the course of events in 2002.

⁸⁸ Pennings & Keman 2003:62

⁸⁹ Akkerman 2005:341, 346; Rydgren & van Holsteyn 2005:49; Lucardie & Voerman 2003:3

Not even in the narrow definition of what constitutes the anti-immigrant parties proposed by Rydgren is it clear that the *Lijst Pim Fortuyn* was one. That is because it has been argued that *LPF* was not even ethno-nationalist.⁹⁰ On the one hand, it used a fierce anti-immigration rhetoric and the failure of multiculturalism as one important theme. Pim Fortuyn, who called himself a “liberal patriot”, wanted to close the borders for new immigrants and stressed how important it was for immigrants to learn Dutch and thoroughly adjust to the Dutch society. But on the other hand there were few references to any glorious past of the Dutch nation, and Pim Fortuyn argued that fully integrated immigrants were as Dutch as autochthons. This has led commentators to call the nationalism of *LPF* civic nationalism, which means that the framing of the threat from immigrants was not one based on the ethnic composition of the Dutch people or nation, but on the civic virtues of Dutch society.

But even though *LPF* does not easily fit in with the predominant definitions of what constitutes the anti-immigrant party family it is very often included in the research. Rydgren and van Holsteyn argue that *LPF* was to be treated as a “functional equivalent”. The party may have lacked ethno-nationalism and authoritarian views on society, but it drew on xenophobia and anti-establishment populist rhetoric, and voters turned to the party for mainly the same reasons as voters in other countries who voted for anti-immigrant parties, the party filled the same “electoral need”.⁹¹

Not only in the Netherlands are these liberal anti-immigrant frames important features of politics. The Norwegian *Fremskrittspartiet* frames immigration scepticism in a similar way to that of Pim Fortuyn, “defending liberal values – human rights, liberty, individualism and gender equality – against immigrant cultures represented as collectivist, authoritarian, patriarchal and honour-bound”.⁹² The culture of immigrants has been problematised by *Frp*, partly in line with the general normal anti-immigrant frames (i.e. that immigrant cultures are to blame for crime), but also in other ways. The theme of the supposed lack of women’s rights in immigrant cultures has been recurring, and advocated as a reason to tighten immigration and force assimilation into Norwegian society.⁹³

⁹⁰ Pennings & Keman 2003:62; Rydgren & van Holsteyn 2005:41; Akkerman 2005

⁹¹ Rydgren & van Holsteyn 2005:41

⁹² Akkerman & Hagelund 2007:214

⁹³ Hagelund 2005:155-163

The liberal framing of immigrant adverseness is very much connected to an increasing politicisation of Islam in Europe.⁹⁴ In recent years, Islam and European Muslims have been the focus of heated debates throughout Western Europe. The passed referendum on a minaret ban in Switzerland in 2009 and the predicted⁹⁵ ban on burkas and niqabs in Belgium and France are two examples of policy outcomes in one way or another directed against Muslims. Even where there has been no such political outcomes, there has been widespread debates about mosques, headscarves, religious schools, the role of women among Muslims, and the ever present issue of “Muslim terrorism” after September 11th. These debates are in no way limited to outspoken anti-immigrant parties, but they have picked up the issue and are now using it throughout Western Europe. Partly, this is done with references to centuries-old Christian traditions, but even more often this has been a useful tool for anti-immigrant parties to “put themselves forward as defenders of fundamental liberal values, such as individualism, secularism and gender equality.”⁹⁶ Islam is then often represented as a monolithic and unchangeable undemocratic, oppressive and backward religion (often even as an ideology), by its very nature incompatible with the European democracy. The threat of “Islamization” seems to be a very potent frame for anti-immigrant parties to use, and not least this was the case for Pim Fortuyn. I already mentioned the centrality of this idea in his rhetoric, and this frame suits his more civic version of nationalism very well, since there is no need to evoke ethnic arguments to oppose immigrants when “Islamization” is the represented problem.

That *Lijst Pim Fortuyn* could be seen as an outsider, or an incomplete version of a classic “radical right” party,⁹⁷ may even have been a strong reason for its success. Rydgren and van Holsteyn write that: “In order to mobilize anti-immigration sentiments, the immigration issue would first have to be detached from ethno-nationalism, framed in other terms, and then be put high on the political agenda – which is exactly what Pim Fortuyn did.”⁹⁸

5.5. Conclusions of part one

What the flash party *Lijst Pim Fortuyn* has taught us, is firstly, that for an anti-immigrant party to be successful it does not have to frame its political quest in an ethno-nationalist way. Those ideas may even be contra-productive in an increasingly globalised Western Europe, where the concept

⁹⁴ Betz & Meret 2009

⁹⁵ As of 2010-05-16 these bans were not yet finally decided on.

⁹⁶ Betz & Meret 2009:313

⁹⁷ Betz for example writes that the Netherlands “never experienced the emergence of a genuinely populist radical right” in an article which includes a broad sample of parties. Betz 2004:2

⁹⁸ Rydgren & van Holsteyn 2005:42

of the “ethnically homogenous” nation is in decline. The second lesson to be learned is that it does not have to be that anti-immigrant parties by necessity embrace a classical authoritarian view of society, focusing on the collective and on traditional values. This has been an important part of the discussion about anti-immigrant parties, and the reason to why the party group so often is rewarded with labels including the word “right” even though they are not right in the socio-economical sense of the word.⁹⁹ Instead, permissive liberal issues such as individual freedom and gender equality can be powerful tools for building an anti-immigrant framework.

I am not stating that anti-immigrant parties are in a process of becoming full-fledged libertarians, or that it has been totally wrong to call the group authoritarian. The point is rather that the socio-cultural conflict dimension needs to be put into question when it comes to conceiving this party family, because of the fact that an anti-immigrant political party does not have to coherently embrace all values on one end of the spectrum. It is perfectly possible to be radically permissive in regards to the equality of sexual minorities and women and very strict concerning immigration.

This means that Rydgren’s “master frame” needs to be rethought. While anti-establishment rhetoric may always be a potent frame for parties which are seen as threatening mainstream political life, ethno-nationalism is not needed to build a case against immigrants. The label “right” for the party group might not be convincing either. First, because right is mainly associated with the socio-economical conflict dimension and here the parties have different positions and are not at all gathered at the right end of the spectrum. Second, because of the above-mentioned questioning of the socio-cultural conflict dimension in connection with anti-immigrant parties as a family; even though one would want to label authoritarian positions as “right” independent of the socio-economical dimension, an anti-immigrant party does not have to coherently embrace these. It creates unnecessary confusion when there are articles written where the nostalgic and ethnocentric ideology of the “radical populist right” is stressed, but *LPF*, who did not subscribe to these ideational features, is included.¹⁰⁰ Another example of this is that even though Rydgren hesitates as to whether *LPF* and *Fremskrittspartiet* should be included in the party family he still includes them in his research about it.¹⁰¹ Or, a third: Ignazi writes about “references to fascism” and stresses the centrality of the ethnic community and anti-liberal ideology of what he calls the extreme right, and then he mentions in a footnote the puzzle that the Scandinavian parties – which he has included in his article – do not easily fit into the family.¹⁰²

⁹⁹ Rydgren 2007:242-243; Ignazi 2002:35; Betz & Johnson 2004; Betz 2005

¹⁰⁰ Betz & Johnson 2004

¹⁰¹ Rydgren 2008:738; Rydgren 2005c; Rydgren & van Holsteyn 2005

¹⁰² Ignazi 2002:25, 35, 37

Conclusively, I argue for a broad understanding of an anti-immigrant family of parties opposing immigration and multiculturalism, instead advocating stricter immigration policies and a homogenous nationalism of some sort, be it civic or ethnic. This is because of the centrality of these above-mentioned issues of the parties normally associated with the group. It is also because of the fact that voters seem to have turned to *LPF*, often put on the margins in the anti-immigrant party family, for mainly the same reasons as they turned to anti-immigrant parties in other countries. Instead of hesitating to if some parties which are clearly anti-immigrant should be included as “really” being part of the family, it is better to include them, and then if needed illuminate the heterogeneity of origins and ideology of the parties. It might for example be reasonable to divide the party group in sub-groups, as some researchers also do.¹⁰³

For the case of anti-immigrant politics, the question seems to be one of finding frames that works, frames that combine empirical credibility with narrative fidelity – a credible problem designation and rhetoric based on suitable values and beliefs – and this is largely determined by the national context and tradition, together with the origins of the party. This is why *LPF* surfaced and had such success in the Netherlands, a country known for liberalism and tolerance.

¹⁰³ See for example Fennema 2005

6. PART TWO: *SVERIGEDEMOKRATERNA*

The analysis of the *Lijst Pim Fortuyn* on the part of Rydgren and van Holsteyn ends with the conclusion that *LPF* showed that one may mobilise anti-immigrant sentiments in other ways than within an authoritarian and ethno-nationalist framing, and the phrase: “It remains to be seen if this will influence actors elsewhere, and start new processes of cross-national diffusion.”¹⁰⁴ This is exactly what I am interested in doing in this thesis. I have chosen to study if one can see any evolution of liberal frames used by *Sverigedemokraterna*. On the one hand it is a conservative party with a neo-fascist background, on the other hand, a too conservative message may not be attractive to potential voters in Sweden. The questions I posed in the introduction were:

- What general anti-immigrant frames is *Sverigedemokraterna* using?
- To what extent is *Sverigedemokraterna* using liberal anti-immigrant frames?
- Are there signs of changes over time?
- If so, how can we understand these changes?

6.1. Methodological Considerations

6.1.1. Qualitative text analysis

Benford and Snow write about how frames are constructed in the relation between a social movement and its adherents, or in this case a political party and its voters. There needs to be “a shared understanding of some problematic condition or situation they define as in need of change”.¹⁰⁵ The problem of representation, how a societal problem is identified and framed, is thus central to any political organisation and text analysis is a common way of studying political ideas.¹⁰⁶ Textual sources like ideational documents, party programmes and debate articles express the problem representations of a political movement or party.

That the analysis is qualitative means that it is a question of interpretation on the behalf of the researcher. This is because of the fact that the importance does not lie in the exact numbers of a theme or word in a text, but in the meaning which can be drawn from it based on the cumulative

¹⁰⁴ Rydgren & van Holsteyn 2005:58

¹⁰⁵ Benford & Snow 2000:615

¹⁰⁶ Bergström & Boréus 2005; Esaisson et al. 2007:ch.12

and contextual understanding of the researcher. Recurring themes can of course be of importance, but single events can also be very significant. In this empirical study, I have drawn inspiration from what Söderfeldt has called “genetic idea analysis”, which he defines thusly:

Genetic analysis of ideas and arguments means trying to prove to what extent found elements of thought are in accordance with that what earlier thinkers or current of ideas have pronounced.¹⁰⁷

The interpretation that I do in my analysis of the material has to be founded in previous research; it has to have a “cumulative affiliation”, which in my case is elaborated on in connection with my scheme of analysis.¹⁰⁸ Then the contextual understanding of the material is also important. This contextual understanding is based on the prejudice of the researcher,¹⁰⁹ the background to the study and references to other relevant research.¹¹⁰ That the idea analysis is “genetic”, which means focused on searching for the relation between ideas, fits well with my idea of a possible diffusion among anti-immigrant parties.

The actual process has been one of reading and re-reading the material. On first readings, I have tried to get a more general grip of the ideational content. On second readings, I have used my scheme of analysis, highlighting in the texts and making notes along the way. This has left me with a processed material out of which the text in my analysis here below has been formulated. The analysis is presented in two steps. In the first part, following my first research question, I have focused on the framing of immigration and immigrants as a “problem” in general, following common frames evoked when criticising immigrants presented in the background chapter. Here, I have looked broadly at the anti-immigrant dimension of the political content of *Sverigedemokraterna*. In the second part, I have gone into more detail into the more novel reason to be adversely disposed to immigrants: That they are a threat to the liberal values of Western democracy. This is the main interest of the thesis and articulated in research question number two.

I have included a dimension of change in my research question. I include change under respective headline. Change has occurred when I find something in a later material that was not there earlier, or the other way around, when some aspects have disappeared or are very much toned

¹⁰⁷ Söderfeldt 1972:126

¹⁰⁸ See below, chapter 6.1.5.

¹⁰⁹ In the positive, Gadamerian understanding of the word prejudice, as previous knowledge, not as illegitimate bias. Swedish: *förförståelse*.

¹¹⁰ Söderfeldt 1972:127-129

down. The clearest change of course is to be noted when comparing corresponding material – which themes and formulations appeared or disappeared in the update of the party program? But it is also of importance when a new idea or frame turns up, even though I have no equivalent earlier material. This is also related to my material. *SD* was not allowed to publish debate articles in the main Swedish newspapers in 2001, therefore I cannot compare a debate article from 2009 in that way, but I can still discuss its relation to the other material.

6.1.2. Material

The selection of what material to use in idea analysis is important, but something that each researcher has to decide on and motivate in relation to his or her own study.¹¹¹ I am interested in how the anti-immigrant politics of *Sverigedemokraterna* is presented publicly. My concept of frames is that they are something connecting the party and the potential voter, and therefore officially presented material is interesting. A few different sources have thus been of interest. Firstly, I have used material from the party where it describes its ideology and political principles, which is common when studying the ideational content of political parties: The party and principle programs,¹¹² election manifestos from the Swedish parliamentary elections of 2002, 2006, and the political guidelines for the election of 2010,¹¹³ together with manifestos of the church assembly elections. Different “idea documents” describing the party’s position on specific political issues are also included.¹¹⁴ I have also studied information on the homepage of the party.¹¹⁵ Secondly, I have used sources that are published in or directed to mass media.¹¹⁶ Debate articles by leading *SD* politicians are one source here. I restricted the media content to articles written by *SD* politicians themselves, and included no articles written *about* the party, so as to avoid possible interpretations or biases on part of journalists. The other source is press releases from the party. Those press releases are directed to the public (even though not all of them reach it), and give a

¹¹¹ Bergström & Boréus 2005:36-37; Esaiasson et al. 2007:248-249

¹¹² The party program from 2002 is an updated version of the one from 1999, with a few small changes, of which I have noted one in my analysis. The principle program from 2005 is an updated version of the one that was written in 2003, but the only change in it is that an endorsement of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was included. See *Sverigedemokraterna* 1999; 2002a; 2003; 2005a.

¹¹³ Even though there was no adoption of an official election manifesto when this was written (May 2010), the party presented some “political guidelines that *Sverigedemokraterna* work for and run on.” These guidelines clearly build on the earlier election manifestoes. See <http://www.sverigedemokraterna.se/valet-2010>.

¹¹⁴ The party programs of 1999 and 2002 were long documents including positions on many issues. The principle program of 2003 is a much shorter document, and after the adoption of this, *SD* has instead adopted these different idea documents.

¹¹⁵ <http://www.sverigedemokraterna.se>.

¹¹⁶ The importance of mass media for anti-immigrant parties is increasingly stressed in research on the phenomenon. See for example Koopmans & Muis 2009.

good overview of the political activities of the party and of the frames it uses in relation to certain political events and issues.

Three sources that I considered but excluded were: web logs of *SD* politicians, since they are of a more personal and a more ephemeral nature; the party newspaper *SD-kuriren* since this is more intern than the sources communicated to the broader public;¹¹⁷ and televisionised debates, since I thought it better to limit the material to purely textual sources.¹¹⁸ Had I included the two former sources, it would have meant that my already comprehensive material would have been huge, which would have posed more questions in regards to validity.

The material has been gathered in a combination of ways, through the party homepage and through contact with party representatives and through browsing in media archives. I have also thoroughly considered the bibliographies of other people writing about *SD* as a kind of “double check”.

There is an obvious and inevitable bias in the material, given the fact that I have been interested in the period from 2001 up until today, and that is that the material has evolved as *Sverigedemokraterna* as a party has evolved. At the start of the new millennium, *SD* was a more peripheral and extremist party. Consequently, it had a smaller organisation producing lesser material directed to the public and were not given time in media, especially not as a real contender. However I still consider that the media appearances (that I lack from the earlier years) are of interest and, as I mentioned earlier, it can be analysed in relation to my other material.

6.1.3. Temporal scope

The time span of my material is from 2001 up until 2010.¹¹⁹ This is because of the fact that a logical starting point would be before the breakthrough of Pim Fortuyn in Dutch politics. This does not mean however, that I compare *SD* in a point A-point B way, before and after Fortuyn. The material would not allow for that because there is not an exactly corresponding material in

¹¹⁷ This is not to say that the party paper is secret in any way. On <http://www.sd-kuriren.se> one can follow the paper and download earlier issues. (A parenthesis is that after browsing the issues of the actual period my impression is that mainly the same frames are used, only sometimes put more bluntly, and in some cases extreme.)

¹¹⁸ *SD* is in no way as represented in television as other parties, but Jimmie Åkesson has had the opportunity to debate against party leaders on three occasions: Against Lars Leijonborg of the liberal *Folkpartiet* in 2004, against Mona Sahlin of the social democrats in 2007 and against Maud Olofsson of the centrist *Centerpartiet* in 2009.

¹¹⁹ The party program written in 1999 has been included. This is because it was valid until it was updated in 2002, and thus relevant to assess change during my time period.

2001 and 2010. A possible change will also have taken place over time, as a process more than as a switch.

6.1.4. Validity, reliability and intersubjectivity

The question of validity – are we measuring what we claim that we measure? – is omnipresent in empirical social sciences.¹²⁰ Validity is nothing that one clears in a couple of paragraphs, but is a vital part of all empirical studies. Still, I wanted this heading to point out a few things. The argumentation in connection to my scheme of analysis is important here. As I already have pointed out, working cumulatively is important, because it means that I rely on more experienced researchers. This does not, however, take away my own responsibility, and the indicators of what I see as reasonable to discuss as liberal frames are ultimately a result of my own processing of previous research; this is why there is a fairly long argumentative discussion in connection with the presentation of my scheme of analysis.¹²¹ Validity is also a question of theoretical concepts; therefore the earlier discussion of my theoretical tools should also contribute to the validity dimension of the thesis. There I (hopefully) made it clear that I am not trying to measure a coherent ideology of *SD*, but I see frames as a way of connecting certain things to a political cause. In this case, liberal anti-immigrant frames mean the connections of a defence of liberal values to opposition of immigration and multiculturalism.

Reliability – the absence of random errors – is of lesser importance in qualitative research, but I would still like to comment briefly. Negligence on the part of the researcher could be a source of inadequate reliability. An endeavour to be as meticulous as possible and the fact that I have read and re-read my material so as to not miss or overstate something should have minimised the risk of unnecessary and random “errors” or implausible interpretations.¹²²

Intersubjectivity, or intersubjective verifiability, is another aspect of research. In its purest form it means neutrality of the language of observation: If the same material is processed with the same tools the results should be the same, regardless of who did it. This is an ideal which is more controversial in qualitative social science research, which is reflexive and interpretative and thus dependent on the researcher, in its very nature. Still, this does not mean that different researchers should come to totally different conclusions. It is therefore important that the study is

¹²⁰ Esaiasson et al. 2007:63

¹²¹ Esaiasson et al. 2007:66-67

¹²² Bergström & Boréus 2005:35; Esaiasson et al. 2007:70-71

transparent and well-founded. This can be reached by an explicit argumentation and an analysis reinforced by frequent references to and citations from the material.¹²³

6.1.5. Scheme of analysis

I analysed my material with the help of a scheme of analysis that I have elaborated with help from previous research, so as to reach cumulative affiliation.¹²⁴ The presentation of my analysis following below is roughly structured along these lines. I present my scheme of analysis in a table, followed by an explanatory recapitulation of some of the themes I already mentioned in part one.

Table 3. Scheme of analysis

General frames	National identity (traditions)
	Criminality (social instability)
	Costs, (welfare chauvinism)
	Unemployment ¹²⁵
	Other
Liberal frames	Ethnic or civic nationalism, (boundaries of belonging)
	Democracy and freedom of speech
	Individual freedom (freedom of choice)
	Secularism (Enlightenment)
	Gender equality, rights of women
	LGBT (sexual minorities)

The four general frames are based on Rydgren, but are to be found in the work of many researchers.¹²⁶ That this first part is general also means that I opened up for a headline named “Other”, so as not to exclude possible frameworks that has not been central in previous research. It should be pointed out that “National identity” is not a perfect category. This is because of the fact that also the liberal values can be seen as part of the national identity. Therefore I tried to focus on national tradition and culture here and kept this short. The liberal frames are mainly based on earlier researchers writing about *LPF* and – to a lesser extent – *Fremskrittspartiet* and will be elaborated on here.

¹²³ Bergström & Boréus 2005:36, cf. Esaiasson et al. 2007:24. Regarding citations: I have chosen not to include the Swedish original wordings, out of reasons of readability and space (except for a few cases where I thought it plausible to present the original words). The translations have been done by me, in consideration with a couple of different dictionaries, and when in doubt, consultation with my native-speaking mentor. For the Swedish reader wanting to assess my translations, most of the material is readily available on the Internet, and URLs are included in the bibliography.

¹²⁴ Söderfeldt 1972:127-129

¹²⁵ I later included this under the headline ”Other” since it turned out to be of lesser importance.

¹²⁶ Rydgren 2007:244, cf. Eatwell 2003:49

The civic nationalism of *Lijst Pim Fortuyn* was a very different component of the politics of Pim Fortuyn in comparison with most anti-immigrant parties. The question of ethnic or civic nationalism is maybe more of a philosophical issue than a political issue, and this ideal typical distinction is not totally satisfying,¹²⁷ but civic nationalism and the possibility of inclusion is very often tied to the question of *LPF* not being the typical authoritarian and ethnocratic party, and therefore included here.¹²⁸ Under this headline I discuss ethnopluralism and possibilities of inclusion, the boundaries of belonging to the Swedish nation.

Regarding democracy and freedom of speech, Tjitjske Akkerman accentuates how Pim Fortuyn was referring over and over again to principles of Western democracy, for example freedom of speech, and positing this against immigrants.¹²⁹ All of these principles are not clearly liberal values in the meaning of standing in opposition to authoritarian values on a socio-cultural conflict dimension; this is especially true for democracy, which is generally embraced by parties from right to left. The usage of a democratic frame is thus beneficial for all political parties, and not least for populist parties who have been “successful in marketing themselves as champions of ‘true’ democracy and defenders of the values and interests of ordinary people.”¹³⁰ It is still interesting to briefly look at this from the perspective of the usage of this framework in relation to anti-immigrant politics, because of the frequent references to it in previous research.¹³¹

The rights and the autonomy of the individual and freedom of choice are typical liberal values and dimensions included in the rhetoric of Pim Fortuyn, who feared that the “Islamization” of the Netherlands “would leave little room for freedom of expression [and] individual autonomy.”¹³² Authoritarian positions normally stress collective identities such as the family and the nation and a focus on the individual would thus mean a dangerous fragmentation of the society as a whole.¹³³ Individual freedom contra collectivism in the frames evoked by *SD* is therefore included.

Secularism was an issue defended by Pim Fortuyn. Even though there were some references to a Judaeo-Christian heritage in the party’s rhetorics, the *LPF* mainly “instead of referring to

¹²⁷ See for example Johansson Heinö 2009:131-139.

¹²⁸ Pennings & Keman 2003:62; Akkerman 2005:345-346

¹²⁹ Akkerman 2005:passim

¹³⁰ Betz & Johnson 2004:312

¹³¹ See also Betz & Meret 2009.

¹³² Akkerman 2005:341

¹³³ Rydgren 2007:242, 245

Christian values [...] promoted a secular Enlightenment framework.”¹³⁴ Pim Fortuyn advocated a secular society, inspired by the French concept of *laïcité*.¹³⁵ He found the separation of the church and the state important, and that this neutrality should be strictly enforced in that expressions of the freedom of religion should be banned in public. This was connected to immigration, or more particular, Islam; the party for example wanted bans on head scarves in schools and for civil servants.¹³⁶

Lijst Pim Fortuyn and *Fremskrittspartiet* referred and refer to the importance of women’s rights, emancipation and the equality of men and women in society in general, which is not traditionally an authoritarian position.¹³⁷ Many aspects could be related to this, such as family laws, violence against women, the right to abortion, and also genital mutilation and enforced marriages.¹³⁸

One of the more original political issues that Pim Fortuyn thematised during his time as an anti-immigrant politician was the rights of sexual minorities.¹³⁹ This was of course not surprising, given that Fortuyn himself was homosexual, and given the fact that the Netherlands is one of the more liberal countries when it comes to LGBT rights; it was for example the first country to accept same-sex marriages in 2001. What was unusual though, was the coupling of this issue with anti-immigrant positions. This is a typical liberal issue on a socio-cultural conflict dimension which hardly lets it combine with traditional authoritarian values of the right, and thus very interesting to look at.

As expressed in the research questions, my main interest is in the usage of liberal values in connection with resistance against immigration and multiculturalism, i.e. liberal anti-immigrant frames. However, to understand this, I also refer the general standpoints of *SD* in regards to the issues of the scheme of analysis as a background to better understand the meaning of any possible liberal framing.

¹³⁴ Akkerman & Hagelund 2007:203

¹³⁵ Benhabib 2004:129

¹³⁶ Akkerman 2005:337, 349-50

¹³⁷ Akkerman & Hagelund 2007:passim

¹³⁸ Hagelund 2005:159; Akkerman 2005:344; Akkerman & Hagelund 2007:197, 204, 214

¹³⁹ Pennings & Keman 2003:63; Rydgren and van Holsteyn 2005:49; Akkerman 2005:341

6.2. General anti-immigrant frames

6.2.1. National identity

Sverigedemokraterna is first and foremost a nationalistic party. A typical formulation:

The primary goal of the politics of *Sverigedemokraterna* is to reinstate a common national identity and thus also a strong inner solidarity in Swedish society.¹⁴⁰

Following this, immigration is of course very much a question of the erosion of Swedish culture and identity. In the immigration policy program, adapted in 2007, it is stated in the beginning that “an all too great immigration has come to threaten the Swedish national identity and cohesion in the country in a serious way.”¹⁴¹ Integration and multiculturalism are thoroughly negative words, and *SD* promotes assimilation of immigrants, and stresses the centrality of Swedish traditions, values, and laws.¹⁴² “Let Sweden remain Sweden”, a version of the more fascist associated “Keep Sweden Swedish” is also one of the demands of the election manifesto of 2006 and the political guidelines of 2010.¹⁴³ Even though this has changed from a more broad call to a question of cultural policy, in both cases there is a connection between Swedish identity and tradition as opposed to multiculturalism and immigrants. In the principle program, nationalism is the issue that has the biggest coverage. *SD* also politicises the issue in connection with day-to-day issues when possible. One example of this is the defence of traditional school closing days in churches, whose cancellations are seen as a sign of a loss to multiculturalism and of Swedish cultural heritage, causing party leader Åkesson to state that “the multicultural societal system demands that we Swedes renounce our identity and our traditions.”¹⁴⁴ Another is the example of a man with an immigrant background who did not want to shake hands with a female boss, did not get the job, and for this was granted a compensation for discrimination. This was framed by *SD* as a support for violation of the norms and social codes of Swedish society.¹⁴⁵ I can not say that I have noted a great change to be reported here.¹⁴⁶

¹⁴⁰ Sverigedemokraterna 2007a

¹⁴¹ Sverigedemokraterna 2007a

¹⁴² Sverigedemokraterna 2007a

¹⁴³ Sverigedemokraterna 2006a; 2010e

¹⁴⁴ Sverigedemokraterna 2009d, cf. Sverigedemokraterna 2007b; 2007c; Åkesson 2009

¹⁴⁵ Sverigedemokraterna 2010i

¹⁴⁶ If there is a change, it is connected to the *content* of the national identity. I mentioned in chapter 6.1.5. that also liberal values can be seen as part of the national identity, and an increasing usage of liberal frames as Swedish values would thus mean a qualitative change of the national identity.

6.2.2. Criminality

One of the central political issues for *SD* is criminality, and the framing of immigration scepticism in terms of social instability, insecurity and criminality – blaming those issues on immigration and a multicultural society – has been a constant tenet of *SD*. In the election manifesto of 2006 and political guidelines of 2010 there is a formulation that immigration and integration policies have caused “criminality and increased tension”.¹⁴⁷ This is also mentioned in the immigration policy program. This frame has been amplified over the years, in that it is more directly and explicitly thematised under headlines concerning immigration, but earlier documents are not totally devoid of connecting immigrants and criminality, only not as explicit.¹⁴⁸ When party leader Jimmie Åkesson has been able to write about Muslim immigration he is using a similar frame, that is, coupling Muslims with violence and criminality, stating that Muslims have another view on the use of violence, that Muslim men are highly overrepresented among rapists, and that immigration has led to “social problems, criminality and an increasing hostility against Swedishness.”¹⁴⁹ This criminality frame is also frequent in the press messages, examples hereof are when Åkesson called for plain talk about the cultural dimension of rapes, the demand of a tougher stance to fight riots in the immigrant-dense district of Rosengård in Malmö, and the campaign against “Swede-hostility”¹⁵⁰ launched by the party’s youth organisation *SDU* after the beating of a young girl by an “immigrant gang” in the town of Södertälje.¹⁵¹ With criminality frame, I mean the inclination to connect the complex question of criminality to immigration as a general phenomenon, reducing it to be solely a cultural problem, or in the words of Snow and Benford, “simplifying and condensing the ‘world out there’”.¹⁵²

6.2.3. Costs

Frequently used by *Sverigedemokraterna* is an economic frame, within which *SD* emphasises costs related to immigration. This has to do with the “welfare chauvinism” that many anti-immigrant parties are using.¹⁵³ In the immigration policy program it is stated that immigration has carried “great economical costs which inevitably have had a negative impact on Swedish economy and have thereby put the general welfare system to the test.”¹⁵⁴ In the principle program it is also stated that one of the reasons as to why the party was founded was the economical threat to

¹⁴⁷ Sverigedemokraterna 2006a; 2010a

¹⁴⁸ Sverigedemokraterna 2002a; 2002b

¹⁴⁹ Åkesson 2008; Åkesson 2009

¹⁵⁰ Swedish: *Svenskfientlighet*

¹⁵¹ Pressmeddelande 2009c; 2008l; 2008g respectively.

¹⁵² Benford & Snow 2000:614

¹⁵³ Mudde 1999:189; Rydgren 2007:244

¹⁵⁴ Sverigedemokraterna 2007a

Sweden that immigration policy constituted.¹⁵⁵ All election manifestos have also framed immigration in economical terms.¹⁵⁶ That illegal immigrants get health care for free, while Swedish tax-payers have to pay has been an important issue for *SD*.¹⁵⁷ The party has also called for investigations of the costs of immigration in the local and regional electorates where it is represented.¹⁵⁸ The prevailing political issues of personal and state economy are emphasised in *SD* politics. By using an economic frame *SD* is, as Snow and Benford have described it, bridging certain common grievances to its cause.

6.2.4. Other

Rydgren also mentions that one common view on immigration is that immigrants are taking the jobs of the native population. This can be found in the anti-immigrant frames of *SD*, but is not as big an issue as the above-mentioned. *SD* is opposing labour migration, and sees immigration in general as destroying for Swedish workers. Special treatment, in form of affirmative action to integrate immigrants on the labour market is also rejected by *SD*, framed as discrimination and as “Swede-hostility”.¹⁵⁹

I mentioned how the youth organisation of *SD* was also using the concept of “Swede-hostility”, a kind of “frame transformation”. In this way it defends itself from the common accusations of *SD* being racist by stating that the immigrants are the ones that are racists. Another frame that *Sverigedemokraterna* uses to prove that it is not the racist party that many accuse it of being is its present-day ardent position on anti-Semitism, which it is condemning. Since 2008 it repeatedly thematises this in its press communication, pointing out that Muslims stand for increasing anti-Semitism in Sweden. In the words of party leader Åkesson “The evidence that the new anti-Semitism as well as the growing Swede-hostility is intimately connected to the Muslim immigration is overwhelming.”¹⁶⁰

¹⁵⁵ Sverigedemokraterna 2005a

¹⁵⁶ Sverigedemokraterna 2002b; 2006a; 2010a

¹⁵⁷ Sverigedemokraterna 2008k; 2010h

¹⁵⁸ Sverigedemokraterna 2008a; 2008b

¹⁵⁹ Sverigedemokraterna 2009a

¹⁶⁰ Sverigedemokraterna 2010j, cf. Sverigedemokraterna 2008c; 2008i; 2008j

6.3. Liberal anti-immigrant frames

6.3.1. Ethnic or civic nationalism?

The long background chapter from earlier party programmes of *Sverigedemokraterna* – explaining the origins of the Swedish people beginning at a time when the ice sheets melted away from Scandinavian peninsula¹⁶¹ – has disappeared, but the importance of some kind of homogeneity of the Swedish nation are dominating its ideational documents and programs.

One controversial issue regarding the boundaries of Swedishness was the question of adoption, and the fact that *SD* wanted a stop for all adoption of extra-European children, which could be, and was often, interpreted as being racist. This was a formulation in the party program from 1999 that was dropped in the slightly updated program of 2002.¹⁶²

What was new in the principle program of 2003 compared to earlier party programs was that it included a formulation which was later amplified and put in the beginning of the immigration policy program, namely “open Swedishness”. It should be possible for immigrants to merge with the Swedish nation, even though “[a]ssimilation is a long and difficult process [...] which can take many generations to complete.”¹⁶³ This may be interpreted as something pointing to the fact that *SD* has an idea of the construction of nationality as opposed to seeing it as something almost ontologically existent.¹⁶⁴

One can observe a slight change in regards to the concepts of ethnicity and ethnopluralism even after 2003. A few citations from the principle program composed in 2003: “Let all peoples be masters of their own houses.”; “If every person is unique, then every such [autochthonic] community is also unique – in particular the nation”, and:

¹⁶¹ *Sverigedemokraterna* 1999; 2002a

¹⁶² *Sverigedemokraterna* 1999; 2002a. Still, *SD* wants a stricter regulation of adoptions; the argumentation is now based on the potential rootlessness of adopted children. See *Sverigedemokraterna* 2004b.

¹⁶³ *Sverigedemokraterna* 2007a

¹⁶⁴ This position, that it through assimilation in principle is possible to “become” Swedish, is heavily criticised by the party *Nationaldemokraterna* (*ND*), who was founded by displeased *SD* members in 2001. The idea that immigrants should “adapt” to the Swedish society is an abomination for *ND*, who are openly ethnopluralist and want immigrants to keep their culture until they go home, see <http://www.nd.se/faq/fraga.asp?fragaID=45>. That three of seven *SD* candidates in the immigrant dense town of Södertälje in 2010 are chaldean immigrants was also heavily criticised in an article on the website of *ND* entitled “The Middle East candidates of *SD* and the ethnopluralism of *ND*”. See Suk 2010.

the common identity [...] presupposes a high degree of ethnical and cultural similarity among the population. Out of this follows that the nationalistic principle – the principle of one state, one nation – is foundational for the politics of *Sverigedemokraterna*.¹⁶⁵

In the immigration policy program penned in 2007, which also considers ideas of national identity and can thus be interesting to compare, the ideas of the nation or the people as a monolithic entity are toned down, references are rather to the more diffuse Swedish identity. The idea of “ethnical similarity” is also nowhere to be found. Instead, *SD* is here condemning “racism and doctrines where the ethnical origins counts as the only or essential criteria for belonging to a nation.”¹⁶⁶ It is important to point out though, that both the principle program and the immigration policy program are still working and valid, which means that I can not make too firm conclusions here.

When there was an update on the website of *SD* and the information about the party was cut down, the very ethnopluralist formulation “As nationalists we believe that every people has the right to autonomy and survival as a people” (nowhere to be found in my other material) disappeared.¹⁶⁷ Conclusively, *Sverigedemokraterna* seem to less and less formulate itself in terms which could be related to an ethnopluralist world view, and it has made the boundaries of belonging to the Swedish nation more porous.

6.3.2. Democracy and freedom of speech

Sverigedemokraterna has for a long time framed its existence to be a struggle for democracy and freedom of speech. “*Sverigedemokraterna* sees every restraint of political freedom of opinion, freedom of speech and freedom of assembly as a threat to democracy”¹⁶⁸ is a formulation from the party programs of 1999 and 2002, and similar wordings were also included in the election manifesto of 2002.¹⁶⁹ Not surprisingly, this has been used when *SD* has seen limits to its own political work, for example when principals have refused to let *SD* come to their schools or when *SD* meetings have been disturbed by left wing activists.¹⁷⁰

¹⁶⁵ *Sverigedemokraterna* 2003; 2005a. As I pointed out earlier, the program from 2005 was written in 2003, but updated with an inclusion of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

¹⁶⁶ *Sverigedemokraterna* 2007a

¹⁶⁷ The website was visited 2010-04-16 and 2010-05-04. See *Sverigedemokraterna* 2010b; 2010c.

¹⁶⁸ *Sverigedemokraterna* 2002a

¹⁶⁹ *Sverigedemokraterna* 2002b

¹⁷⁰ *Sverigedemokraterna* 2006d; 2008h

Democracy and freedom of speech have also in recent years been used as a framework for criticising Islam, in relation to well-known occurrences such as the Muhammad caricatures and Geert Wilders' controversial film about Islam, 'Fitna'.¹⁷¹ The most recent example is when the Swedish artist Lars Vilks was attacked at Uppsala University when lecturing about freedom of speech and art, showing a film with naked homosexual men in Muhammad masks. Jimmie Åkesson then uttered that it is "unacceptable that immigrated extremist groups can silence artists and critics" and that:

For us Sweden democrats it is tremendously important to stop the Islamization of Swedish society and guard democracy and freedom of speech. In our Sweden Lars Vilks is welcome to lecture any time he wants.¹⁷²

Immigration and Islam is thus framed as threats to democracy and freedom of speech. The value defended is the "right to be critical against religions", a typical secularist Western modern value. Since these values have been embraced for a long time I can not claim that I see any significant change here.

6.3.3. Individual freedom

Sverigedemokraterna views "the interests of the nation as standing over the special interests of individuals or groups".¹⁷³ Collectives in the forms of family and nation are central to its ideology, which is clear in the principle program:

Sure every man is unique, but at the same time we are also more or less similar to one another. We are all dependent on communities, people who resemble us in different ways and with whom we can identify. *Sverigedemokraterna* holds that it is first and foremost the family and the nation that give us the possibilities to reach this.¹⁷⁴

The party has also lamented "excessive hedonism and individualism" as having created insecurity and rootlessness.¹⁷⁵ Individualism is thus generally seen as something negative, and freedom is not very much embraced by the party. A very small, but interesting change can however be noted when looking at the political guidelines of 2010. In the newly written part it is stated that there are threats "against the freedom and security of Swedish women", and that these threats are misogynist religious and cultures. I will discuss more about gender issues later, but we can note

¹⁷¹ See for example *Sverigedemokraterna* 2006b; 2006c; 2008d; 2010g.

¹⁷² *Sverigedemokraterna* 2010k

¹⁷³ *Sverigedemokraterna* 2004a

¹⁷⁴ *Sverigedemokraterna* 2005a

¹⁷⁵ *Sverigedemokraterna* 2004b; 2005b

now that the fact that it is the *freedom* of women that is in danger is a new element in the *SD* frames. In the same chapter there is also a reference to the voluntary life choices of men and women, a very novel rhetoric.¹⁷⁶ There is one similar rhetorical figure in the rewriting of the immigration policy guideline; it starts with the formulation: “In our Sweden freedom and openness are given”¹⁷⁷

All in all we can conclude that the collectivist nationalistic *Sverigedemokraterna* traditionally rarely uses a liberal discourse about freedom but that there are small signs of this in the most recent anti-immigrant frames; in the threat to women from misogynist religions and cultures, and as a general introduction to what characterise Sweden in the immigration policy guidelines.

6.3.4. Secularism

At the turn of the millennium the Church of Sweden was separated from the state, and even though there is still some legislation regulating that the church shall be Lutheran and democratic the former state church governs itself independently. There are elections to the church assembly in Sweden every fourth year, in which *Sverigedemokraterna* has taken part and has had small but increasing success (see table 2) with a very conservative programme, stressing that the church should carry Swedish traditions.

Sverigedemokraterna is, as we have seen, ardent defenders of Swedish traditions and among those, Christian traditions are found. In the principle program, it is stated that religion, together with language, is important to get a complete understanding of the concept of the nation.¹⁷⁸ The school closing days in churches have already also been mentioned as important, the argument here is that Sweden has been a Christian country for more than a thousand years, and that being in churches and singing traditional church hymns in the summer closing days is a cultural heritage linking today’s pupils with former generations.¹⁷⁹ In the immigration policy program from 2007, it is stated that there is a risk that religious free schools without connection to Swedish tradition create segregation, and that support to religious private schools is only to be given to those “resting on a Judeo-Christian foundation”.¹⁸⁰ In this way, one can see that immigration scepticism

¹⁷⁶ Swedish: *linsval*. Sverigedemokraterna 2010d. It should be pointed out though, that the voluntary life choices, in the *SD* version, are founded in the natural differences between women and men, and that the choices are in that way gender determined. See more below in chapter 6.3.5.

¹⁷⁷ Sverigedemokraterna 2010a. Swedish: *I vårt Sverige är frihet och öppenhet självklarheter*.

¹⁷⁸ Sverigedemokraterna 2005a

¹⁷⁹ Sverigedemokraterna 2007b

¹⁸⁰ Sverigedemokraterna 2007a

is put in a Christian, and not a liberal, framework in that immigration is causing an erosion of the religious traditions and is thus destroying the connection to Swedish cultural heritage.

This view, that (non-Christian) immigration is framed as a danger to Swedish traditions, is however to be complemented with an actual change over the years, a move towards a more secularist liberal framework. Firstly, when comparing the election manifestos to the church assembly elections of *SD* in 2001, 2005 and 2009, there is one important change. In 2001, this was one of the demands of the party: “*Sverigedemokraterna* wants the Church of Sweden to once again become state church.”¹⁸¹ The manifestos of the two following elections are devoid of this demand, and instead it is added that *Sverigedemokraterna* is a “non-confessional party”.¹⁸² That is, nowadays it is advocating the more liberal view of a separation of church and state.

For this study this mainly becomes interesting in that the change to becoming non-confessional in 2005 allows *Sverigedemokraterna* to use secularist liberal frames in its criticism of Islam. In connection to the Danish Muhammad cartoon controversy *SD* published a drawing of Muhammad on its homepage. Richard Jomshof, a leading *SD* politician and then chief editor of the party newspaper, then said that they did not mean any harm by publishing it and that “if Muslims are exasperated by this drawing it shows that the whole thing about the Muhammad drawings is just an excuse for Muslims to attack the secular Western world.”¹⁸³ In a debate article about Muslims in *Aftonbladet*, Jimmie Åkesson compares Christianity and Islam:

[It is assumed that] one will be able to tame Islam in the same way that secular forces since centuries have tamed Christianity and bundled it off to the private sphere. Islam is however different to Christianity in many essential ways, for example in regard to the distinction between spiritual and secular power.¹⁸⁴

This argument holds that the difference between Christianity and Islam is mainly their differing qualifications in their ability to fit in to the secular society. The former religion is nowadays in the private sphere, the latter can not be confined to it, according to Åkesson. He is also here embracing the Enlightenment, saying that “Islam and the Muslim world has actively rejected the Enlightenment and humanism.”¹⁸⁵ He goes on to state that Swedish society has been more adapted to Islam than vice versa, and refers to alleged problems with Islam such as gender

¹⁸¹ *Sverigedemokraterna* 2001

¹⁸² *Sverigedemokraterna* 2005b; *Sverigedemokraterna* 2009b

¹⁸³ *Sverigedemokraterna* 2006c

¹⁸⁴ Åkesson 2009

¹⁸⁵ Åkesson 2009

segregation in swimming halls, fundamentalism and radicalisation among Muslim youth, death threats against artist depicting Muhammad, and the overrepresentation of Muslims in committing rapes.

SD has changed from wanting the Church of Sweden to be tied to the state, and is now a non-confessional party. It still stresses the importance of Christian traditions for Swedishness, but it can now invoke the liberal secularist principles to criticise Islam, which can not, according to *SD*, unlike Christianity separate worldly and religious authority, which results in a framework which positions Islam as a threat to the secular values of Swedish society.¹⁸⁶

6.3.5. Gender equality and the rights of women

In Sweden, known for being leading in questions about women's rights and political and labour market participation,¹⁸⁷ *Sverigedemokraterna* is the most conservative party when it comes to questions relating to family policy and women's emancipation. It regards the traditional nuclear family as the foundational unit of society. In the idea document about family policy, adapted in 2004 and still working, it is stated that men and women shall have the same rights and possibilities, but it is also stated that: "Men and women are not created equal though and can therefore in different contexts have different points of departure and do things differently"¹⁸⁸ and that they rather complement each other. The "increased variability in the relations between men and women" has created insecurity and alienation for many children, and *SD* is proposing measures to make it easier for mothers to take care of their children at home.¹⁸⁹ *SD* also has a more restrictive abortion policy than all of the parties represented in the Swedish parliament.

At the same time as many see *SD*'s politics as anti-feminist,¹⁹⁰ the party has at times explicitly condemned repression against women, which then traditionally has been directed against immigrants. For example, the family policy document mentioned above, states that enforced marriages, "commonly existent in some immigrant groups", should be fought and punished harder; the same formulation also exists in the election manifesto of 2006.¹⁹¹ Locally, *SD* has loudly opposed things like gender segregated swimming education and support to "burkinis", swimming suites covering the entire body, and then framing this as misogynist practices that

¹⁸⁶ Sweden is one of the least religious countries in Western Europe. See Halman et al. 2005:72, 125.

¹⁸⁷ Inglehart & Welzel 2005:276, 283

¹⁸⁸ *Sverigedemokraterna* 2004b, cf. *Sverigedemokraterna* 2005a

¹⁸⁹ *Sverigedemokraterna* 2004b

¹⁹⁰ Regnér & Wingborg 2010

¹⁹¹ *Sverigedemokraterna* 2004b; 2006a

consolidate the repression of women which exists in other cultures than the Swedish.¹⁹² When an imam participated in the traditional opening of parliament in 2007, party leader Åkesson called this “an insult against Swedish women” and pointed out that this imam was a misogynist who was positively inclined to polygamy, enforced marriages and stood for “Muslim cultural imperialism”.¹⁹³

The most obvious change over the years can be noticed when looking at the election manifesto of 2006 and the political guidelines of 2010. In the part about family policy there are some changes in that the rhetoric about the nuclear family, traditional marriage, and the dangers of the “variability in the relations between men and women” are toned down.¹⁹⁴ But most interesting is that one new political guideline is introduced, namely: “Gender equality and increased security for the women of the country”, which is a completely new issue for *SD*. It can be seen as a “frame transformation” of the concept of gender equality, because it is stated that men and women are different and that feminist doctrines that are “extreme and turned against reality” dominate the debate in contemporary Sweden, and because one of the issues is that the support to gender pedagogy should be cut. But it is still of significance that *Sverigedemokraterna* explicitly lifts the “freedom and security” of women, and, above all, that it is using the wording “gender equality”,¹⁹⁵ which is nowhere to be found in my entire material before these guidelines were introduced. The problem representation here is clearly connected to immigration:

In today’s Sweden, misogynist religions and cultures are advancing. In today’s Sweden the movement of women is restricted by insecurity. In today’s Sweden more rapes are reported than in any other European country. In today’s Sweden human traffickers and pimps can exploit women almost without risk.¹⁹⁶

Apart from the demand where *SD* opposes tax money to gender pedagogy, there is one relating to trafficking, rape, and violence against women, and one demand which is formulated “An increased support to exposed immigrant women through an attack on enforced marriages and honour related and religious repression.”¹⁹⁷

This is a clear case of a frame alignment process, where *Sverigedemokraterna* has changed to now invoking a liberal frame (gender equality) for its case against immigration and immigrant cultures.

¹⁹² Sverigedemokraterna 2008e; 2008f

¹⁹³ Sverigedemokraterna 2007d

¹⁹⁴ Sverigedemokraterna 2006a; 2010f

¹⁹⁵ Swedish: *Jämställdhet*.

¹⁹⁶ Sverigedemokraterna 2010d

¹⁹⁷ Sverigedemokraterna 2010d

Following Snow et al a little bit further here, this alignment process can be seen as containing two dimensions. Firstly, they write about “frame transformation” that:

The process, causes and values that some SMOs [Social Movement Organisations, in my case political parties] promote, however, may not resonate with, and on occasion may even appear antithetical to, conventional lifestyles or rituals and extant interpretive frames. When such is the case, new values may have to be planted and nurtured, old meanings or understandings jettisoned, and erroneous beliefs or “misframings” reframed.¹⁹⁸

There is a reframing, or frame transformation, here, in that gender equality is a question about freedom and equal treatment, which in *SD*:s party program means freedom to evolve according to the postulated biological differences. Following this idea, the only social influence of gender relations that *Sverigedemokraterna* acknowledges is the one from the state, which in the eyes of *SD* promotes extreme feminism and questioning of gender roles. Consequently, equal treatment for *SD* means no affirmative action.¹⁹⁹ Gender equality in Sweden is an issue connecting all established parties,²⁰⁰ and to promote something antithetical to this “ritual” of mainstream Swedish politics could be causing problem for *SD*. This is a solution to have the cake and eat it; that is, being nominally for gender equality but define it in a way that suites its more traditional values. Secondly, this is a case of frame amplification, stressing a value, equality, to use as “a springboard for mobilizing support”, in this case against immigrants.²⁰¹ Conclusively, this stated repression of women in immigrant cultures is nothing completely new, but it has never been an important issue of its own before, which it is now when it is highlighted as a “gender equality” guideline for the coming election.

6.3.6. LGBT

Sweden is, together with the Netherlands, one of the countries in the world with the most liberal LGBT rights.²⁰² The acceptance of homosexuality is the highest in Europe in Netherlands, followed by Sweden.²⁰³ This is also more or less a consensual issue among the established Swedish political parties – for example only *KD*, the Christian democrats stand out, for example by being the only party opposed to same sex marriages.

¹⁹⁸ Snow et al. 1986:473

¹⁹⁹ Similar to how *Fremskrittspartiet* has made ”no special treatment” as basis for their policies of gender equality. Akkerman & Hagelund 2007:207-210

²⁰⁰ Even the Swedish Christian democrats *KD*, considered the most conservative party in the parliament, embraces gender equality. See chapter 3 in their principle program. Kristdemokraterna 2001.

²⁰¹ Snow et al. 1986:469

²⁰² ILGA, International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association has a wide collection of LGBT legislation around the world available on their homepage: <http://www.ilga.org>.

²⁰³ Halman et al. 2005:108

Sverigedemokraterna also has conservative standpoints regarding these issues, but there have been some changes over the years. The centrality of the traditional nuclear family with a man and a woman is stated over and over again in the party's material. In the idea document about family policy it is stated that "*Sverigedemokraterna* believes that marriage shall be reserved for couples consisting of a man and a woman."²⁰⁴ In the same document it is said that the party opposes the right of lesbians to be artificially inseminated, because of the children's right to a father and a mother. The opposition to the right to artificial insemination of lesbians and same-sex couples is also included in the election manifesto from 2006, but dropped from the guidelines for the election of 2010, which has nothing explicitly stated at all concerning LGBT issues.²⁰⁵ This silence, and the silence of the working principle program is all the more interesting when comparing to how homosexuality was thematised earlier. In the former party program there was a headline entitled "sexual deviance",²⁰⁶ under which it was stated that: "The glorification of the homosexual lifestyle in e.g. mass media creates unsound reference frames for young people".²⁰⁷ Here, same-sex marriage was not an issue, but *SD* even opposed registered partnership of homosexual couples.

At the end of March 2010, at about the same time as the LGBT-silent political guidelines were adopted, something even more interesting occurred. In *Aftonbladet*, Jimmie Åkesson and second vice-chair Carina Herrstedt published a debate article which was entitled "SD – a party for LGBT persons",²⁰⁸ which was a reply to a debate article that accused *SD* of having the worst politics for families and sexual minorities in Sweden.²⁰⁹ In the article, Åkesson and Herrstedt admitted and regretted that "individual representatives for our party, on single occasions" had uttered improper statements about homosexuals as a group,²¹⁰ but underlined that such derogatory attitudes had no foundation in the party's political programs. They also claimed that support for *SD* might even be greater among LGBT persons, despite the "stereotypes" about the party.²¹¹ The answer as to why support of *SD* had increased in this group, according to Åkesson and Herrstedt, was the

²⁰⁴ *Sverigedemokraterna* 2004b

²⁰⁵ *Sverigedemokraterna* 2006a; 2010d; 2010f

²⁰⁶ Swedish: *sexuellt avvikande*.

²⁰⁷ *Sverigedemokraterna* 2002a

²⁰⁸ Åkesson & Herrstedt 2010

²⁰⁹ Regnér & Wingborg 2010

²¹⁰ The most famous single occasion when an individual representative uttered something like this was when party secretary Björn Söder wrote about the annual pride march in Stockholm in his web log in 2007, using phrases like "perverse atrocities". See Söder 2007.

²¹¹ In this, they referred to an Internet poll at the website of the Swedish LGBT magazine *QX*. At the day of the publication of the debate article, *QX* published an article on their homepage pointing out the uncertainty of such polls and saying that according to better polls, the support for *SD* is probably lower among LGBT persons. See Voss 2010.

“strong anxiety” about mass immigration and the hate against homosexuals which goes hand in hand with the increasing “Islamization” of Swedish society.

When Sweden’s largest Muslim youth association invites the extreme imam Sheik Abdullah Hakim Quick, who thinks that homosexuals should be executed, as a speaker then we understand that homosexuals look around for a defender of Western, democratic values. There *Sverigedemokraterna* plays a unique and very important role in society.²¹²

This is a very clear example of how *SD* uses a debate and turns it into an issue about immigration, and a very clear example of a liberal anti-immigrant frame. The problem for homosexuals is not *Sverigedemokraterna*, who has a foundational “respect for sexual minorities” – the problem is immigrants in general and Muslims in particular, who, according to Åkesson and Herrstedt, are against the rights of LGBT persons.

Not as central, and not as noted as the former article, but interesting and roughly along the same lines was an article by Erik Almqvist, leader of the youth organisation and a notable *SD* politician, published on the internet debate site *Sourze*.²¹³ In this article, Almqvist accuses RFSU (the Swedish Association for Sexuality Education) for stigmatising LGBT persons by always standing for an extreme and spectacular form of homosexuality; in this way he presents RFSU as the very source of the “Othering” of homosexuals in society. *SD*, Almqvist argues, sees homosexuals as normal persons who should be treated as everybody else. RFSU is one threat to *SD*:s view of LGBT persons as normal individuals, but a bigger threat is presented towards the end of the article: “the Muslim groups [...] with an even more distasteful agenda: to repress and punish those with another sexual orientation than heterosexual.”²¹⁴ The rights of homosexuals to be normal and treated as everybody else is thus taken as a reason for pointing out the threat from Muslims, another example of how hostility against immigrant groups is framed in liberal terms.

Liberal anti-immigrant frames means positioning the immigrant out-group as not fitting in with liberal Western democracy, and the evolution of *SD* in regards to LGBT issues can be seen as an example of this. Conclusively, the open opposition to “sexual deviance” on the part of *SD* disappears gradually between 2002 and 2010, and even though it definitely can be questioned whether *Sverigedemokraterna* actually is pursuing LGBT friendly politics, in 2010 it presents itself as a party for LGBT persons. By doing this, it tries to put itself inside the mainstream of Swedish

²¹² Åkesson & Herrstedt 2010

²¹³ Almqvist 2010

²¹⁴ Almqvist 2010

political culture, and thus has the possibility of framing immigrants in general and Muslims in particular as being the real threat to LGBT persons.

6.4. Conclusions of part two

When Anders Widfeldt wrote about *Sverigedemokraterna* in 2008, he named his article “Party change as a necessity”.²¹⁵ He then mainly focused on how *SD* had moved away from its more extremist racist roots by embracing democracy and dropping references which could be seen as biological racism. After my study, I argue that change is an on-going process, which does not end with the split from the anti-democratic fascist past. Change is internationally influenced by diffusion processes, with adoption and translation of successful frames.

To summarise what we have seen in the analysis: First, *Sverigedemokraterna* is frequently using economic and criminality anti-immigrant frames, connecting immigrants to increased criminality and costs for the welfare state. It is also using national tradition frames and to a lesser extent blame unemployment on immigrants. There are small tendencies that the criminality frame is amplified, but otherwise, these “general frames” have been fairly constant. Second, concerning the liberal frames, we can see that *SD*, since 2001, has come out as a secularist non-confessional party, it continues to use appeals of democracy and freedom of speech, it is to a lesser extent using references to the ethnical homogeneity of the people and now includes the idea of “open Swedishness”. Most recently, it has embraced gender equality as a political guideline and then uses the appeal to the “freedom” of women, and it has publicly stated that it is a party for LGBT persons. To this we can also add that *SD* now repeatedly condemns anti-Semitism publicly.

Secularism and Enlightenment ideals, freedom in general and freedom of speech in particular, gender equality, and the possibility for homosexuals to live as normal individuals – all of these issues have been conceptualised as being under threat from immigrants in general and Muslims in particular. Anti-Semitism is also seen mainly as an immigrant problem. These are what I call liberal anti-immigrant frames, which means that the values of Western liberal democracy, and not first and foremost the ethnic homogeneity of the people, need to be defended by nationalists.

I am in no way trying to say that *Sverigedemokraterna* has turned upside down and have become a thoroughly liberal party. It is still a nationalistic and value conservative party when comparing its positions to other Swedish parties, and it still uses the common criminality, welfare chauvinist

²¹⁵ Widfeldt 2008

and national tradition frames in its critique of immigrants. The defence of liberal values by *SD* is also almost exclusively related to immigrants, as a reason to restrict immigration and force assimilation. But the interesting thing here is that the frames that the party uses to motivate its politics have changed.

If we are to understand this with help from the concepts of framework, diffusion and translation, we can note a few things. The successful liberal frames of Pim Fortuyn can be seen as having been diffused to the Swedish context where some ideas have been adopted by *SD*. There are responsive chords in the Swedish society.²¹⁶ Firstly, there is *empirical credibility* in that as in most Western European countries, there has been a considerable immigration both from neighbouring and non-European countries during the last decades,²¹⁷ which has caused debate about integration and multiculturalism, not least in relation to the Muslim population. Secondly, there is also a *narrative fidelity*, given the cultural linkages of the societies; they are among the most liberal and progressive countries in Western Europe, and pride in civic virtues are more important than ethnically or historically framed national pride.²¹⁸ One translation that can be noted is of the framing of immigrants as a threat to women and sexual minorities, which is translated not to adapt to the country but the party context. In *SD* the question is not so much of emancipation of women and sexual minorities. While a stress on for example gender equality frame may fit in with the Swedish cultural context, for a value conservative party like *SD* to thematise it, it had to be transformed. *SD*, which has an extreme right background and is value conservative, still stands for the centrality of the family consisting of a man and a woman, opposing same-sex marriage, and issues such as affirmative action and gender pedagogy.²¹⁹ Highlighting these issues on the part of *SD* has not been a case of advocating emancipation, rather as framing immigrants (Muslims in particular) as a worse, or the “real” threat.

We can conclude that it seems as if *Sverigedemokraterna* oscillates between a defence of liberal values which seems to be growing as a successful frame internationally and provide narrative fidelity in the Swedish context on the one hand and its national conservative identity on the other. As it is still a rather small party, it will be interesting to follow its evolution further.

²¹⁶ Snow and Benford 1992:138-141

²¹⁷ Both countries have a population of around 20% either foreign-born, or with two foreign-born parents. Own calculations based on the websites of the official statistical bureaus: <http://www.statline.cbs.nl> and <http://www.scb.se> (URLs in bibliography).

²¹⁸ Halman et al. 2005:30, 69, 101, 108; Rydgren & van Holsteyn 2005:58

²¹⁹ Sverigedemokraterna 2010d

7. INTEGRATED CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION

7.1 Integrated conclusions of the thesis

I have used a genetic idea analysis in my study of *Sverigedemokraterna*, which has shown the relationship between the anti-immigrant frames of *SD* and ideas put forward by the Dutch *Lijst Pim Fortuyn*,²²⁰ a flash party defending liberal values and therefore often seen as a kind of outsider in the anti-immigrant party group that is often regarded as radical right and authoritarian. It should be pointed out that the main interest has not been to ascribe the ideas solely to, or being born in, *LPF*, or showing that *SD* themselves have mainly been directly influenced by *LPF*. The diffusion of a framework which sees immigrants as a threat to liberal values from the Netherlands to Sweden has, however, taken place as issues promoted by Pim Fortuyn have been increasingly adopted by the national conservative *SD*.

To return to the question of the anti-immigrant party group, I think that my empirical study in part two has contributed to my claim that it is reasonable to group parties who articulate opposition against immigration and multiculturalism as a central message and content of their politics. Even though it can be doubted whether parties like *LPF* or *Fremskrittspartiet* would belong to a group of parties labelled “extreme” or “radical” right, it makes sense to conceive of a group where both these and parties like *Front National* and *Sverigedemokraterna* are included. This is because, as I earlier pointed out, that an opposition to immigration and the question of some kind of national cohesion excluding perceived out-group cultures are central to their message. It is also because of the fact that voters seem to have turned to *LPF* for mainly the same reasons as they turned to anti-immigrant parties in other countries.²²¹ Finally, as my empirical study has confirmed, the anti-immigrant frames used by Pim Fortuyn can diffuse, or be translated to parties with a more authoritarian ideology, which shows a connection between these parties. Even though there are more ideological features to anti-immigrant parties than opposition to immigration and multiculturalism, these are central, and it seems like as if the successful anti-immigrant frames that are available are too desirable to resist, they only have to be translated and transformed to fit the national and/or party context.

²²⁰ And to a lesser extent the Norwegian party *Fremskrittspartiet*.

²²¹ Rydgren & van Holsteyn 2005:41

It should again be pointed out that the defence of liberal values as we saw it in the *SD* version was almost exclusively related to immigrants. This means that it should not be perceived as profound ideological change, but as Hagelund pointed out concerning *Fremskrittspartiet*, rather a pragmatic approach of sampling issues which seem relevant and using them as reasons for the party's general point of view,²²² or as I put it earlier, finding frames that work. This could also be seen as an ongoing struggle for, as Hagelund put it, becoming "decent" in the eyes of the public; parties need to position themselves just inside the borders of the mainstream and use frames which are not immediately conceived of as anti-liberal.

Another point that I made in part one which was reconfirmed in the study of *Sverigedemokraterna* in part two was the centrality of Islam in connection with the liberal anti-immigrant frames. Critique against Islam has had a successful diffusion as a potent framework for anti-immigrant parties for different reasons. Firstly, it is easy to connect with larger global narratives connected to the war against terrorism. Secondly, as we have seen in the case of *SD*, authoritarian and traditional values as well as liberal and modern values can be used in relation to Islam. Islam can thus be presented as an important source of criminality, putting forward calls for stricter enforcement of law and order and as a threat to national traditions in different forms, but also as inherently and necessarily oppressing women and homosexuals, and being backward, refusing to accept Enlightenment and secular values. Thirdly, because of this it is flexible and can be translated into different contexts, meaning that liberal and/or authoritarian values can be amplified. We have also seen how both *Sverigedemokraterna*, who are now very Israel friendly and condemns anti-Semitism, and the British National Party, with a party leader who has denied the holocaust,²²³ have increasingly been directing their political cause against Muslims. Fourthly, because critique against Islam is legitimate in a way that racism or ethnopluralism is not. This also has different dimensions. One is that if critique is directed against Islam as a religion or ideology, it could be argued that it is not at all racist (because it is not a question of ethnicity or race) or for that sake directed against individuals (it is common to say that one has nothing against individual Muslims, but Islam as an ideology). Another is that surveys have shown that most Europeans are inclined to be sceptical of Islam.²²⁴ It is also legitimate because of the fact that in many countries, even mainstream parties are publicly critical to Islam in some way. The proposed ban on burqas and niqabs in Belgium and France, for example, is widely supported, and not an issue confined to the anti-immigrant parties.

²²² Hagelund 2005:158

²²³ Pelling 2010

²²⁴ World Economic Forum 2008

7.2. Discussion and suggestions for future research

What I have done in the empirical part of this study is to analyse the frames used by *Sverigedemokraterna* in connection to immigrants. It must be said that this has been made at a fairly early stage. *SD* is, if not an embryonic or peripheral party, still a party outside the mainstream of Swedish politics, some of the changes I noted in my analysis only occurred during the time I conducted my study, and it remains to be seen if this process of change towards a more liberally framed immigrant critique will be accelerated or halted.

In a first step, research needs to be conducted after the parliamentary election in Sweden in 2010. Then it will be possible to see if *Sverigedemokraterna* was successful and if so, to analyse the reasons behind its success. How *SD* has framed its immigrant critique will be one of many dimensions in assessing its possible success in the election, and the frames must then be studied together with voter preferences and the possibility for *SD* to be seen and heard in the media. We do not know yet how much stress that will be laid on liberal anti-immigrant frames in its campaign, or how this will be received by the Swedish voters.

In a longer perspective, the evolution of *Sverigedemokraterna* will also be interesting to follow. The (admittedly) minor turn towards a liberal framework is not without contradictions. For example, it will be hard for *SD* to continue to claim that it is a party for LGBT persons, while at the same time being the least permissive party in actual propositions concerning LGBT issues and having a party secretary who has publicly spoken out against the pride festival.²²⁵ It is also interesting to note how the changes affect the party organisation and matriculation register; already many former members have been excluded from the party,²²⁶ and *SD* will have to balance its identity as the only real value conservative party in Sweden with a too sharp turn in the direction of liberal values.

In this thesis I have empirically focused on only one country and one party and have shown that cross-national diffusion may take place between anti-immigrant parties with different ideological backgrounds. My aim has not been to generalise, but it could be suggested that this diffusion may take place on other routes than the one between the Netherlands and Sweden. It would therefore be very interesting to see to what extent similar changes have taken place in other parties which have the same ideological background as *Sverigedemokraterna*, but have another cultural context,

²²⁵ Söder 2007

²²⁶ Orrenius 2010:49-57

and what translations have then needed to be executed. This goes firstly for Western Europe, but also for countries in Eastern Europe, which for example do not have notable Muslim immigrant groups but xenophobic and right-wing parties. Here is a field of future empirical research, which would gain from being conducted in an international comparative way.

I have discussed how anti-immigrant parties have used liberal frames to oppose immigration and multiculturalism, and we have seen in the case of *SD* that liberal values are almost exclusively related to the immigration issue. But this is not in any way restricted to this party family.

Johansson Heinö has written about “conditioned tolerance” as a liberal critique of non-liberal phenomenon associated with multicultural societies and as demands for adaptation to certain aspects of the liberal Western democracy. He sees *Lijst Pim Fortuyn* as an example of this, but also liberal parties which could not be considered as anti-immigrant, like *Venstre* in Denmark, *VVD* in the Netherlands and the Swedish *Folkpartiet*. The difference between the anti-immigrant parties and the liberal parties promoting “conditioned tolerance” is that the latter do not combine this with an idea of national homogeneity to the same extent, and that they can often demand adaptation and concurrently push for increased immigration, instead of using liberal frames as a reason for exclusion and closing borders.²²⁷ This could be taken as a proof of the fact that demands for adaptation to liberal Western values are not necessarily used as exclusionary and anti-immigrant. On the other hand the question can be raised to what extent for example a ban on headscarves is a liberal emancipative arrangement, which it is often said to be; a question that of course is to be assessed out of certain definitions of liberalism, and in different national context regarding the relations between religious life and political life.²²⁸ There are interesting normative discussions regarding liberal democracy along the lines of universalism versus multiculturalism and how the notion of “equality” should be implemented in society. Such discussions have of course been held for a long time,²²⁹ but they will not diminish in significance if anti-immigrant parties which have long been regarded as anti-liberal will increasingly frame their immigrant critique as a defence of liberal values. One question is if liberal parties move more in the direction of the anti-immigrant parties and seek to cooperate or search for ways of clearly showing the boundaries between them.

²²⁷ Johansson Heinö 2009:10, 88-102

²²⁸ See Benhabib 2004:127-134. *SD*, or any other Swedish party, has not made the Muslim headscarf an important political issue, but if they will, it will be interesting to see how the *laïcité* based arguments from France (and Pim Fortuyn) will be translated.

²²⁹ Johansson Heinö 2009; Benhabib 2004

SUMMARY

In this thesis I conduct a two part study, which has the aim of contributing to the understanding of the anti-immigrant party group in Western Europe, the evolution and diffusion of the political message within it, and to the anti-immigrant “frames” of *Sverigedemokraterna*.

In part one, I present my views on how to define the anti-immigrant party family. I argue that it is reasonable to group parties that share resentment towards immigration and multiculturalism as the most central part of their politics even though they have different origins and partially different ideologies. Some researchers have hesitated to include *Lijst Pim Fortuyn* or *Fremskrittspartiet* in the family, because they do not fit in with the assertions that anti-immigrant parties are ethnonationalists and radically right-wing in an authoritarian anti-liberal way, occupying one end of a socio-cultural conflict dimension where the other is liberal and progressive. I argue that the usage of this authoritarian-libertarian model to explain party family cohesion is not optimal, since an anti-immigrant party does not have to embrace all of the values connected to one end of the conflict dimension. Instead, anti-immigrant politics is a question of using frames that work in a specific country context.

In part two, I ask which anti-immigrant frames are used by *Sverigedemokraterna* and to what extent it could be possible to map a diffusion of liberal frames from *LPF* to *SD*. I answer these questions with the help of a text analysis of material where *SD* publicly presents its message. I find that costs, criminality and national identity were common and fairly constant general frames used by *SD* to motivate opposition against immigration and multiculturalism. Regarding liberal anti-immigrant frames, I find that since 2001 *SD* has come out as secularists, is to a lesser extent using references to the ethnical homogeneity of the people, instead including the concept “open Swedishness”. It has adopted gender equality as a political guideline and stated that it is a party for LGBT persons. It is also repeatedly condemning anti-Semitism. Secularism, freedom in general, and freedom of speech in particular, together with gender equality, and the possibility for homosexuals and Jews to live normal lives – all of these issues have been conceptualised by *SD* as being under threat from immigrants in general and Muslims in particular. Its defence of these liberal values is almost exclusively connected to immigrants. Even though *SD* is a national conservative party with roots in neo-fascism, it has adopted and translated frames used by the more liberal *LPF* in the Netherlands. This could be understood to stem from the fact that both countries are liberal. This diffusion, I argue, is also a confirmation of the fact that parties with different backgrounds should be included in the same party family.

SAMMANFATTNING

Jag genomför i den här uppsatsen en tvådelad studie, med syftet att bidra till förståelsen av en invandrarkritisk partifamilj i Västeuropa, utvecklingen och spridningen av politiska budskap inom denna samt de invandringskritiska tolkningsramar som används av *Sverigedemokraterna*.

I del ett presenterar jag min syn på hur man kan definiera den invandrarkritiska partifamiljen. Jag menar att det är rimligt att gruppera partier som delar motstånd mot invandring och mångkultur som en central del av sin politik, även om dessa har olika ursprung och delvis olika ideologier. Vissa forskare tvekar att inkludera *Lijst Pim Fortuyn* och *Fremskrittspartiet* i den här partifamiljen, på grund av att de inte passar in i antaganden om att invandrarkritiska partier är etnonationalister och radikalhöger i betydelsen auktoritära och anti-liberala, vilket betyder att de skulle befinna sig i ena ändan på en tänkt sociokulturell konfliktlinje där den andra ändan är liberal och progressiv. Jag menar att användandet av den här auktoritär-liberal-konfliktlinjen inte är optimal för att definiera partifamiljen eftersom ett invandrarkritiskt parti inte måste omfatta alla värderingar i en ända av den. I stället handlar invandrarkritisk politik om att hitta tolkningsramar som passar i specifika nationella kontexter.

I del två undersöker jag vilka invandrarkritiska tolkningsramar som används av *Sverigedemokraterna*, och i vilken grad man kan se en spridning av liberala tolkningsramar från *LPF* till *SD*. Jag besvarar mina frågeställningar med hjälp av textanalys av officiellt material från *SD*. Jag kommer fram till att kostnader, kriminalitet och nationell identitet var vanliga och relativt konstanta tolkningsramar för att motivera motstånd mot invandring och mångkultur. Gällande mer liberala invandrarkritiska tolkningsramar, framkommer att *SD* sedan 2001 har blivit sekularister, att de mindre betonar etnisk homogenitet och i stället inkluderar konceptet ”öppen svenskhet”. De har antagit jämställdhet som en politisk riktlinje och hävdar att de är ett parti för HBT-personer. De fördömer också anti-semitism. Sekulära principer, frihet i allmänhet och yttrandefrihet i synnerhet, jämställdhet och möjligheten för homosexuella och judar att leva normala liv – alla dessa frågor har framställts som varande under hot från invandrare generellt och muslimer specifikt. Partiets försvar för dessa liberala värderingar är nästan uteslutande sammanbundet med invandrare. Även om *SD* är ett nationalkonservativt parti med rötter i nyfascism, så har det antagit och översatt tolkningsramar som använts av mer liberala *LPF* i Holland. Detta kan förstås som delvis beroende på att det är två värderingsmässigt liberala länder. Den här spridningen, menar jag, är även en bekräftelse på att det är rimligt att gruppera partier med olika bakgrund i en och samma partifamilj.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Literature

- Akkerman, T. (2005). Anti-immigration parties and the defence of liberal values: The exceptional case of the List Pim Fortuyn. *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 10(3), 337-354.
- Akkerman, T., & Hagelund, A. (2007). 'Women and children first!' Anti-immigration parties and gender in Norway and the Netherlands. *Patterns of Prejudice*, 41(2), 197-214.
- Benford, R. D., & Snow, D. A. (2000). Framing processes and social movements: An overview and assessment. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 26, 611-639.
- Bengtsson, H.A. (ed.) (2009). *Högerpopulismen: en antologi om Sverigedemokraterna*. Stockholm: Premiss.
- Benhabib, S. (2004). *Jämlikhet och mångfald: demokrati och medborgarskap i en global tidsålder*. Göteborg: Daidalos.
- Bergström, G., & Boréus, K. (2005) Samhällsvetenskaplig text- och diskursanalys. In G. Bergström & K. Boréus (eds.), *Textens mening och makt: metodbok i samhällsvetenskaplig text- och diskursanalys* (pp.9-42). Lund: Studentlitteratur.
- Berman, S. (2006). *The primacy of politics: Social democracy and the making of Europe's twentieth century*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Betz, H. (2004). Exclusionary populism in Western Europe in the 1990s and beyond: a threat to democracy and civil rights?, United Nations Research Institute for Social Development: Identities, Conflict and Cohesion Program Paper Number 9.
- Betz, H. (2005). Against the system: Radical right-wing populism's challenge to liberal democracy. In J. Rydgren (ed.), *Movements of exclusion: radical right-wing populism in the Western world* (pp. 25-40). New York: Nova Science.
- Betz, H., & Johnson, C. (2004). Against the current--stemming the tide: the nostalgic ideology of the contemporary radical populist right. *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 9(3), 311-327
- Betz, H., & Meret, S. (2009). Revisiting Lepanto: the political mobilization against Islam in contemporary Western Europe. *Patterns of Prejudice*, 43(3), 313-334.
- Dahlström, C, & Esaiasson, P. (2009). The immigration issue and anti-immigrant party success. Is Sweden the odd case out? University of Gothenburg: QoG Working Paper Series 2009:30
- Eatwell, R. (2000). The rebirth of the 'extreme right' in Western Europe? *Parliamentary Affairs*, 53(3), 407-425.
- Eatwell, R. (2003). Ten theories of the extreme right. In P. Merkl, & L. Weinberg, (eds.), *Right-wing extremism in the twenty-first century* (pp. 47-73). London: Frank Cass.
- Erk, J. (2005). From Vlaams Blok to Vlaams Belang: The Belgian far-right renames itself. *West European Politics*, 28(3), 493-502.
- Esaiasson, P., Gilljam, M., Oscarsson, H., & Wängnerud, L. (2007). *Metodpraktikan: konsten att studera samhälle, individ och marknad*. Stockholm: Norstedts juridik.
- Fennema, M. (2005). Populist parties of the right. In J. Rydgren (ed.), *Movements of exclusion: radical right-wing populism in the Western world* (pp. 1-24). New York: Nova Science.
- Hagelund, A. (2005). The Progress Party and the problem of culture: Immigration politics and right wing populism in Norway. In J. Rydgren (ed.), *Movements of exclusion: radical right-wing populism in the Western world* (pp. 147-164). New York: Nova Science.
- Halman, L., Luijckx, R., & van Zundert, M. (2005). *Atlas of European values*. Leiden: Brill.

- Holmberg, S. (2007). Sverigedemokrater – Vilka är dom och vad vill dom? In S. Holmberg, & L. Weibull (eds.), *Det nya Sverige: trettiosju kapitel om politik, medier och samhälle: SOM-undersökningen 2006* (pp.159-167). Göteborg: SOM-institutet, Göteborgs universitet.
- Ignazi, P. (2002). The extreme right: Defining the object and assessing the causes. In M. Schain, A.R. Zolberg, & P. Hossay (eds.), *Shadows over Europe: the development and impact of the extreme right in Western Europe*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Inglehart, R., & Welzel, C. (2005). *Modernization, cultural change, and democracy: the human development sequence*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Johansson Heinö, A. (2009). *Hur mycket mångfald tål demokratin?: demokratiska dilemman i ett mångkulturellt Sverige*. Diss. Göteborg: Göteborgs universitet, 2009. Malmö: Gleerups.
- Kitschelt, H. (1995). *The radical right in Western Europe: a comparative analysis*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Koopmans, R., & Muis, J. (2009). The rise of right-wing populist Pim Fortuyn in the Netherlands: A discursive opportunity approach. *European Journal of Political Research*, 48(5), 642-664.
- Kristdemokraterna (2001). *Principprogram*. Retrieved from <http://kristdemokraterna.se/VarPolitik/Principprogram>, 2010-05-17
- Lucardie, P.M., & Voerman G. (2003). From challenger to government partner without a party: the List Pim Fortuyn. Paper presented at the European Consortium for Political Research Conferentie, Marburg, 19-21 september 2003.
- Marshall, C., & Rossman, G.B. (2006). *Designing qualitative research*. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: SAGE.
- Mattsson, P. (2009). *Sverigedemokraterna in på bara skinnen: reportage*. Stockholm: Natur & kultur.
- Merkel, P. (2003). Introduction. In P. Merkel, & L. Weinberg, (eds.), *Right-wing extremism in the twenty-first century* (pp. 1-22). London: Frank Cass.
- Merkel, P., & Weinberg, L. (eds.) (2003). *Right-wing extremism in the twenty-first century*. London: Frank Cass.
- Minkenbergh, M. (1997). The new right in France and Germany: Nouvelle droite, neue rechte, and the new right radical parties. In P. Merkel, & L. Weinberg (eds.), *The revival of right-wing extremism in the nineties* (pp.65-90). London: Frank Cass.
- Mudde, C. (1999). The single-issue party thesis: Extreme right parties and the immigration issue. *West European Politics*, 22(3), 182-197.
- Mudde, C. (2000). *The ideology of the extreme right*. Manchester: Manchester Univ. Press.
- Orrenius, N. (2010). *Jag är inte rabiat, jag äter pizza: en bok om Sverigedemokraterna*. Stockholm: Månocket.
- Pelling, Jon (2010). Högerextrema BNP slåss mot Labour. In *Svenska Dagbladet* 2010-05-03.
- Pennings, P. & Keman, H. (2003). The Dutch parliamentary elections in 2002 and 2003: The rise and decline of the Fortuyn movement. *Acta Politica*, 38, 51-68.
- Petterson, H. (2009). *Högerpopulismen i Europa*. In H.A. Bengtsson (ed.), *Högerpopulismen: en antologi om Sverigedemokraterna* (pp.59-94). Stockholm: Premiss.
- Regnér Å., & Wingborg M. (2010). SD:s familjepolitik extremast i Sverige. In *Aftonbladet* 2010-03-17.
- Riedlsperger, M. (2004). Jörg Haider och det österrikiska ”frihetspartiet”: Uppgång och fall? In J. Rydgren & A. Widfeldt (eds.), *Från Le Pen till Pim Fortuyn: populism och parlamentarisk högerextremism i dagens Europa* (pp.69-95). Stockholm: Liber.
- Rydgren, J. (2004). Nationella fronten: Etnisk nationalism och politiskt missnöje i Frankrike. In J. Rydgren & A. Widfeldt (eds.), *Från Le Pen till Pim Fortuyn: populism och parlamentarisk högerextremism i dagens Europa* (pp.28-68). Stockholm: Liber.
- Rydgren, J. (2005a). *Från skattemissnöje till etnisk nationalism: högerpopulism och parlamentarisk högerextremism i Sverige*. Lund: Studentlitteratur.

- Rydgren, J. (2005b). Is extreme right-wing populism contagious? Explaining the emergence of a new party family. *European Journal of Political Research*, 44(3), 413-437.
- Rydgren, J. (ed.) (2005c). *Movements of exclusion: radical right-wing populism in the Western world*. New York: Nova Science.
- Rydgren, J. (2007). The sociology of the radical right. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 33(1), 241-262.
- Rydgren, J. (2008). Immigration sceptics, xenophobes, or racists? Radical right-wing voting in six West European countries. *European Journal of Political Research*, 47, 737-765.
- Rydgren, J., & van Holsteyn, J. (2005). Holland and Pim Fortuyn: A deviant case or the beginning of something new? In J. Rydgren (ed.), *Movements of exclusion: radical right-wing populism in the Western world* (pp. 41-65). New York: Nova Science.
- Rydgren, J., & Widfeldt, A. (eds.) (2004). *Från Le Pen till Pim Fortuyn: populism och parlamentarisk högerextremism i dagens Europa*. Stockholm: Liber.
- Schain, M., Zolberg, A.R., & Hossay, P. (eds.) (2002). *Shadows over Europe: the development and impact of the extreme right in Western Europe*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.
- SIFO (2009). Väljarbarometern november 2009. Retrieved from <http://www.tns-sifo.se/rapporter-undersokningar/valjarbarometern?year=2009>, 2010-04-09.
- Snow, D. A., Rochford, B., Worden, S. K., & Benford, R. D. (1986). Frame alignment processes, micromobilization, and movement participation. *American Sociological Review*, 51(4), 464-481.
- Snow, D. A., & Benford, R. D. (1992). Master frames and cycles of protest. In A.D. Morris & C.M. Mueller (eds.), *Frontiers in social movement theory* (pp.133-155). New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.
- Strang, D., & Meyer, J.W. (1993). Institutional conditions for diffusion. *Theory and Society*, 22, 487-511.
- Suk, V. (2010). SD:s mellanösternkandidater och ND:s etnopluralism. Published on ND.se 2010-04-18. Retrieved from <http://nd.se/nyheter/dokument.asp?dokID=1134>, 2010-05-19.
- Söder, B. (2007). Kulmen nådd på perversiteterna. Web log post, 2007-08-05. Retrieved from <http://www.sdkuriren.se/blog/index.php/soder?blog=8&page=1&disp=posts&paged=29>, 2010-04-16.
- Söderfeldt, B. (1972). *Statsvetenskapliga metoder*. Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell.
- van der Brug, W., Fennema, M., and Tillie, J. (2000). Anti-immigrant parties in Europe: Ideological or protest vote? *European Journal of Political Research*, 37(1),77-102.
- Voss, J. (2010). Sverigedemokraterna söker HBT-stöd. Published on QX.se 2010-03-30. Retrieved from <http://www.qx.se/samhalle/13726/sverigedemokraterna-soker-hbtstod>, 2010-04-16.
- Widfelt, A. (2004). Introduktion: Den radikala högerpopulismen – en etablerad politisk kraft. In J. Rydgren & A. Widfeldt (eds.), *Från Le Pen till Pim Fortuyn: populism och parlamentarisk högerextremism i dagens Europa* (pp.9-27). Stockholm: Liber.
- Widfeldt, A. (2008). Party change as a necessity – the case of the Sweden Democrats. *Representation*, 44(3), 265-276.
- World Economic Forum (2008). *Islam and the West: Annual Report on the State of Dialogue. January 2008*. Retrieved from http://www.weforum.org/pdf/C100/Islam_West.pdf, 2010-05-21.

Sources

General sources

- Almqvist, E. (2010). RFSU sprider fördomar om HBT-personer. In *Sourze*, 2010-03-31. Retrieved from http://www.sourze.se/RFSU_sprider_f%C3%B6rdomar_om_HBT-personer_10706518.asp 2010-04-16.
- Sverigedemokraterna (1999). *Partiprogram 1999*.
- Sverigedemokraterna (2001). *Fädernas Kyrka i Sveriges land - Sverigedemokraternas kyrkliga valmanifest 2001*. Retrieved from <http://www.fadernaskyrka.se/index.php?action=fullnews&id=8>, 2010-05-17.
- Sverigedemokraterna (2002a). *Partiprogram 1999 med justeringar 2002*.
- Sverigedemokraterna (2002b). *Sverigedemokraternas valmanifest 2002. Trygghet, omtanke, tradition*.
- Sverigedemokraterna (2003). *Sverigedemokraternas principprogram 2003*.
- Sverigedemokraterna (2004a). *Demokratisk Utveckling*. Retrieved from <http://sverigedemokraterna.se/2010/04/29/demokratisk-utveckling/>, 2010-05-17.
- Sverigedemokraterna (2004b). *Familjepolitik*. Retrieved from <http://sverigedemokraterna.se/2010/04/29/familjepolitik/>, 2010-05-17.
- Sverigedemokraterna (2005a). *Sverigedemokraternas principprogram 2005*. Retrieved from <http://sverigedemokraterna.se/vara-asikter/sverigedemokraternas-principprogram-2005>, 2010-05-17.
- Sverigedemokraterna (2005b). *Trygghet och tradition - Sverigedemokraternas Kyrkopolitiska manifest 2005*. Retrieved from <http://www.fadernaskyrka.se/index.php?action=fullnews&id=9>, 2010-05-17.
- Sverigedemokraterna (2006a). *Valmanifest Sverigedemokraterna 2006*.
- Sverigedemokraterna (2007a). *Invandringpolitiskt program*. Retrieved from <http://sverigedemokraterna.se/vara-asikter/sverigedemokraternas-handlingsprogram/invandringpolitisk-program/>, 2010-05-17.
- Sverigedemokraterna (2009a). *Riktlinjer för Sverigedemokratisk arbetsmarknadspolitik*. Retrieved from <http://sverigedemokraterna.se/2010/04/29/riktlinjer-for-en-sverigedemokratisk-arbetsmarknadspolitik>, 2010-05-17.
- Sverigedemokraterna (2009b). *Trygghet och tradition - Sverigedemokraternas Kyrkopolitiska manifest 2009*. Retrieved from <http://www.fadernaskyrka.se/index.php?action=fullnews&id=87>, 2010-05-17.
- Sverigedemokraterna (2010a). *En ansvarsfull invandringpolitik*. Retrieved from <http://sverigedemokraterna.se/valet-2010/en-ansvarsfull-invandringspolitik>, 2010-05-17.
- Sverigedemokraterna (2010b). Info om Sverigedemokraterna. Retrieved from <http://www.sverigedemokraterna.se/info> 2010-04-16.
- Sverigedemokraterna (2010c). Info om Sverigedemokraterna. Retrieved from <http://www.sverigedemokraterna.se/info> 2010-05-04.
- Sverigedemokraterna (2010d). *Jämställdhet och ökad trygghet för landets kvinnor*. Retrieved from <http://sverigedemokraterna.se/valet-2010/jamstalldhet-och-okad-trygghet-for-landets-kvinnor>, 2010-05-17.
- Sverigedemokraterna (2010e). *Låt Sverige förbli Sverige*. Retrieved from <http://sverigedemokraterna.se/valet-2010/lat-sverige-forbli-sverige>, 2010-05-17.
- Sverigedemokraterna (2010f). *Slå vakt om familjen*. Retrieved from <http://sverigedemokraterna.se/valet-2010/sla-vakt-om-familjen>, 2010-05-17.

- Åkesson, J. (2008). 'Vi vill värna svensk kultur'. In *Dagens Nyheter*, 2008-02-26.
- Åkesson, J. (2009). 'Muslimerna är vårt största utländska hot'. In *Aftonbladet*, 2009-10-19.
- Åkesson, J., & Herrstedt, C. (2010). SD – ett parti för hbt-personer. In *Aftonbladet*, 2010-03-30.

Press releases

- Sverigedemokraterna (2006b). SD-Kuriren publicerar första Muhammedteckningen i Sverige, 2006-02-03.
- Sverigedemokraterna (2006c). Muhammedteckningar polisanmäls, 2006-02-09.
- Sverigedemokraterna (2006d). Sverigedemokraterna föreslår grundkurs i demokrati för landets rektorer, 2006-05-18.
- Sverigedemokraterna (2007b). Sverigedemokraterna tar strid för traditionella skolavslutningar, 2007-02-15.
- Sverigedemokraterna (2007c). Sverigedemokraterna i Malmö tar strid för traditionella skolavslutningar, 2007-02-20.
- Sverigedemokraterna (2007d). 'En skymf mot Sveriges kvinnor', 2007-09-18.
- Sverigedemokraterna (2008a). Sverigedemokraterna tillsätter egen utredning kring Bromöllas invandringskostnader, 2008-01-11.
- Sverigedemokraterna (2008b). Sd vill upprätta mångkulturellt bokslut i Region Skåne, 2008-01-24.
- Sverigedemokraterna (2008c). Sverigedemokraterna i Malmö vill motverka antisemitism, 2008-01-25.
- Sverigedemokraterna (2008d). Sverigedemokraterna uppmanar till stödköp av danska varor, 2008-03-19.
- Sverigedemokraterna (2008e). Sverigedemokraterna kräver svar om könssegregerad undervisning, 2008-04-09.
- Sverigedemokraterna (2008f). Sd Malmö kräver svar om gettofiering och muslimska baddräkter, 2008-04-22.
- Sverigedemokraterna (2008g). Sverigedemokratisk Ungdom lanserar kampanj mot svenskfientligheten, 2008-09-18.
- Sverigedemokraterna (2008h). Sten Andersson (Sd) kräver svar om mötesfriheten i Malmö, 2008-10-18.
- Sverigedemokraterna (2008i). 'Svenska kyrkan har inte släppt antisemitismen', 2008-10-24.
- Sverigedemokraterna (2008j). Sverigedemokraterna anordnar manifestation mot antisemitism, 2008-11-07.
- Sverigedemokraterna (2008k). Sverigedemokraterna motsätter sig avgiftsfri tandvård till illegala utlänningar, 2008-11-26.
- Sverigedemokraterna (2008l). 'Inför möjligheten att utfärda undantagstillstånd!' - Sverigedemokraterna kräver skärpt lagstiftning efter nya upplopp på Rosengård, 2008-12-19.
- Sverigedemokraterna (2009c). Dags att tala klarspråk om våldtäkterna!, 2009-04-28.
- Sverigedemokraterna (2009d). Jimmie Åkesson: 'Lägg ner DO!', 2009-06-06.
- Sverigedemokraterna (2010g). Jimmie Åkesson beklagar rättegången mot Geert Wilders och hoppas på en friande dom, 2010-01-20.
- Sverigedemokraterna (2010h). 'Det är hög tid att Göran Hägglund visar att han är en politiker som menar vad han säger' – Jimmie Åkesson utmanar Hägglund på debatt om gratis vård till illegala invandrare, 2010-01-30.
- Sverigedemokraterna (2010i). Jimmie Åkesson: 'Avveckla Diskrimineringsombudsmannen!', 2010-02-10.

Sverigedemokraterna (2010j). 'Mona Sahlin förvärrar situationen genom att blunda för verkligheten bakom den nya antisemitismen', 2010-03-08.

Sverigedemokraterna (2010k). Sverigedemokraterna kräver skarpare straffpåföljder efter ny muslimsk attack mot Vilks, 2010-05-11.

All press releases can be downloaded from:

<http://www.mynewsdesk.com/se/pressroom/sverigedemokraterna> (as of 2010-05-17)

Other

Websites

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alleanza_Nazionale, 2010-05-17.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_National_Party, 2010-05-17.

<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bzö>, 2010-05-17.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dansk_Folkeparti, 2010-05-17.

<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fpö>, 2010-05-17.

<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fremskrittspartiet>, 2010-05-17.

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Front_National_\(Belgium\)](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Front_National_(Belgium)), 2010-05-17.

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Front_National_\(France\)](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Front_National_(France)), 2010-05-17.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Laikos_Orthodoxos_Synagermos, 2010-05-17.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lega_Nord, 2010-05-17.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mouvement_pour_la_france, 2010-05-17.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Partij_voor_de_Vrijheid, 2010-05-17.

<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Perussuomalaiset>, 2010-05-17.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schweizerische_Volkspartei, 2010-05-17.

<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sverigedemokraterna>, 2010-05-17.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vlaams_Belang, 2010-05-17.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vlaams_Blok, 2010-05-17.

<http://statline.cbs.nl/StatWeb/selection/?DM=SLEN&PA=37325ENG&LA=EN&VW=T>,
2010-05-19.

<http://sv.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sverigedemokraterna>, 2010-05-18.

<http://www.bundeswahlleiter.de/>, 2010-05-17.

<http://www.ilga.org>, 2010-04-29.

<http://www.nd.se/faq/fraga.asp?fragaID=45>, 2010-05-19.

http://www.scb.se/Pages/TableAndChart_26041.aspx, 2010-05-19.

<http://www.sd-kuriren.se>

<http://www.sverigedemokraterna.se>

<http://www.sverigedemokraterna.se/valet-2010>, 2010-05-15

Dictionaries

Norstedts engelska ord. <http://www.ord.se>

Petti, V. (ed.) (2000). *Norstedts stora svensk-engelska ordbok = Norstedts comprehensive Swedish-English dictionary*. Stockholm: Norstedts ordbok

Tyda.se. <http://www.tyda.se>