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The gender gap in African political participation:
Individual and contextual determinants

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Abstract: The aim of this paper is to analyze the factors underlying the gender gap in African electoral and inter-electoral political participation. Drawing on new data covering over 27,000 respondents from 246 regions in 20 emerging African democracies, the empirical findings suggest that while there is a gender gap in both voting and inter-electoral participation, the latter is larger. Whereas several of the investigated individual and contextual characteristics are found to be important determinants of participation, they explain only a very modest share of the observed gender gaps. We do find, however, that gender gaps in education are negatively correlated with female inter-electoral participation and that gender gaps in employment are negatively related to female voting. Interestingly, and contrary to suggestions in previous research, there is no evidence that religiosity at the individual or community level increases the gender differences in political activity.

JEL classification: D01, D72, J16, O12, O55.
Keywords: Political participation, Gender gap, Africa, Afrobarometer.

1 Introduction

Political participation tends to be unequally distributed across citizens (Bartels, 2005; Brady et al., 1995; Griffin and Newman, 2005; Isaksson, 2010; Lijphart, 1997; Verba et al., 1995). Since this may affect what policy issues are brought to the agenda, it could have far-reaching consequences for policy (see, e.g., Bartels, 2005; Gilens, 2005; and Griffin and Newman, 2005), potentially reinforcing existing economic and social inequalities. Hence, broad-based political participation, or citizen acts to influence the selection of and/or the actions taken by political representatives, is important due to its intrinsic democratic value as well as from an inequality perspective. The present paper investigates the gender gap in African political participation. Can gender inequality in political participation be explained by individual observable characteristics, such as women being less educated and knowledgeable about the political process, or is it attributable to gender variation in participatory norms and unequal access to political networks? Given that gender differences in participation could reproduce gender inequalities in other domains, understanding this participatory inequality is central. Considering the millennium development goal to promote gender equality and empower women, the issue is arguably particularly pertinent in the emerging African democracies, where resources are scarce and women often suffer from severe inequalities in important dimensions such as health and education (World Bank, 2011).

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Drawing on data covering more than 27,000 respondents from 246 regions in 20 African countries, our aim is to examine what factors underlie the gender gap in African electoral and inter-electoral political participation, evaluating the relative explanatory power of commonly suggested individual and contextual determinants of participation, and of gender variation in their distributions and effects. The empirical findings suggest that while several of the individual and contextual characteristics variables considered are important determinants of general political participation, differing observable characteristics between men and women explain only a modest share of the gender gap in participation. Interesting in the sense that it conflicts with common suggestions in previous literature, it turns out that religiosity, both at the individual and contextual level, does not seem to increase the gender gap in inter-electoral participation.

In Western countries, the traditional gender gap in political participation – with women being less likely to participate politically – is in the process of closing (Inglehart and Norris, 2000; Norris, 2002). Leading explanations of the gender gap focus on structural differences in individual resource endowments, often viewing female employment as the crucial factor (e.g., Iversen and Rosenbluth 2008; Ross 2008), and on cultural differences, often with religion as main focus (e.g., Norris and Inglehart 2004; Norris 2009).

The sparse evidence available for developing countries, on the other hand, indicates that there are still important gender differences in mass political participation. A number of recent studies exploring the patterns of political participation in Africa note that women tend to vote and participate politically in between elections to a lesser extent than men (Bratton, 1999; Bratton and Logan, 2006; Bratton et al., 2010; Kuenzi and Lambright, 2010; Isaksson, 2010), yet we have little knowledge about what factors underlie this important inequality.

To understand the gender gap in African political participation there is first of all reason to go beyond individual determinants of participation and consider the contribution of contextual influences. Taking into account peer effects and participatory norms, we anticipate that not only, say, the individual's level of education matters for participation, but also the average educational level of men and women in the surrounding area. That is, we want to investigate whether key individual level determinants of political participation also have important aggregate level effects.

Second, there is a need to allow for gender differences in the effects of central determinants of participation. Just as gender variation in the *distribution* of a variable could contribute to the gender gap in political participation, so could gender variation in the *effect* of

a variable. Even variables that do not necessarily differ between men and women, e.g., individual or community level religiosity, could contribute to the gender gap in participation if their effects vary with gender. Hence, when exploring the gender gap in African political participation, we should allow for gender variation in both the distributions and the effects of key individual determinants of participation, and seek to evaluate their respective contribution to the gender imbalance.

To our knowledge, this is the first study focusing exclusively on exploring the factors that underlie the gender gap in African mass political participation, assessing the explanatory power of both individual and contextual determinants of participation, and of gender variation in their distributions and effects. The results will hopefully help us understand the basis of existing gender disparities in terms of democratic engagement.

2 Understanding the gender gap in political participation

Literature on the determinants of political participation often focuses on the role of resources, motivations, and recruitment networks. With respect to the gender gap in political participation, it is not unreasonable to assume that resources relevant for political participation, e.g., education and information, are differentially available to men and women, that motivational forces stimulating engagement, e.g., participatory norms, differ between the genders, and that women and men have unequal access to recruitment networks. In this section we discuss possible determinants of the gender gap in participation implied by the literature on the general determinants of participation and by previous studies specifically addressing gender variation in the same. Whereas some of these factors operate at the individual level, others are more appropriate to address at the contextual level.

2.1 Individual determinants

At the individual level, previous studies of gender variation in political participation have stressed the role of structural inequalities in individual resource endowments and employment, and of cultural differences originating in religious affiliations. The former perspective focuses on the traditional role of women in the family and the labor market, the idea being that gender gaps in other areas of society hinder women's participation in politics. If political participation is costly, and the resources relevant for meeting these costs are differentially available between the genders, this could give rise to gender differences in political participation. The conventional finding that citizens with low incomes and little education participate less than their richer and more educated counterparts (see, e.g., Verba

and Nie, 1972; Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980; Brady et al., 1995, and Verba et al., 1995) does not necessarily seem to apply when studying political participation in developing countries.[1] Studies of political participation in Africa, Asia, and Latin America suggest that whereas education is often (but not always) positively associated with participation, poor people participate politically no less (if anything, they seem to participate more) than more well-off citizens (Bratton, 1999, 2008; Yadav, 2000; Krishna, 2002, 2008; Bratton and Logan, 2006; Booth and Seligson, 2008; Bratton et al., 2010; Kuenzi and Lambright, 2010; Isaksson, 2010). Nevertheless, individual resource differentials seem highly relevant to consider when trying to understand a gender gap in political participation.

Education helps the individual develop the human capital needed to meet the costs of participation, but it also affects what people he/she comes in contact with and thus what participatory norms and networks he/she will face (La Due Lake and Huckfeldt, 1998). Hence, in terms of explaining a gender gap in participation, the influence of a gender gap in education is likely to go beyond that of gender variation in human capital.

A similar story applies to employment – a factor often pointed out as central for female participation. Employment is thought to positively impact the individual resource base relevant for political participation (e.g., economic standing and human capital acquisition), access to recruitment networks, and motivational factors stimulating engagement (Schlozman et al., 1999; Norris, 2009). Studying political participation in the US, Schlozman et al. (1999) find that women lack these participatory factors relative to men since women are less likely to be employed, work full time, and hold high-level jobs. Women who are full-time homemakers have their traditional gender roles reinforced, the argument goes, and domestic isolation hinders activism since women are cut off from political discussion and networks (Schlozman et al., 1999). Female labor force participation, on the other hand, is argued to make women informed about their interests and more capable of acting on them (Iversen and Rosenbluth, 2008). Through processes of socialization in the work place, leaving home and joining the paid labor force is suggested to affect women's views and identities (Ross, 2008).[2]

The focus on structural inequalities in individual resource endowments and employment has been challenged by a cultural perspective focusing on religious traditions and their impact

[1] Nor, in fact, when comparing across Western democracies other than the US (see Verba et al., 1978; Norris, 2002)

[2] Paid employment is, however, also time consuming (Isaksson 2010; Schlozman et al. 1999), meaning that working full-time may take time away from being politically active.

on attitudes toward gender equality in attempts to explain the relatively low number of women engaged in politics (Norris, 2009). The argument is that religious traditions affect social values, which in turn are crucial for the role of women in politics (Inglehart and Norris, 2003a). Put differently, religion is thought to affect gender-specific participatory norms and thus the motivational factors stimulating engagement. It is not uncommon to single out Islam as particularly important in this context (Inglehart and Norris, 2003a,b; Blaydes and Linzer 2008). In the words of Inglehart and Norris (2003a, p. 71), "an Islamic religious heritage is one of the most powerful barriers to the rising tide of gender equality." Critics, however, point to the important variation within the cluster of Muslim countries (e.g., Charrad 2009; Rizzo et al. 2007). Nevertheless, studying political participation in Africa, Bratton and Logan (2006) find that while there is no participatory gap between Christian and Muslim men, there is a significantly larger gender gap in participation between Muslim men and women than between Christian men and women.

2.2 Contextual determinants

Turning to contextual determinants, several empirical studies suggest a positive influence of social capital and participatory norms on political participation (see, e.g., La Due Lake and Huckfeldt, 1998; Knack and Kropf, 1998; Krishna, 2002; Norris, 2002; and Gerber et al., 2008). Social capital, often understood as the social networks and norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from connections among individuals (Putnam, 2000), is described as the glue binding citizens together so as to enable collective action as well as the gear that directs citizens toward political activity (Krishna, 2002). It is suggested that individuals through repeated interactions with the surrounding social network – family, friends, colleagues, community members, etc. – learn civic norms that stimulate participation, and that this can constitute a powerful motivation for participation (Knack and Kropf, 1998; La Due Lake and Huckfeldt, 1998).

Given the suggested importance of norms and networks, there is seemingly good reason to believe that contextual factors could be important for explaining a possible gender gap in participation. First of all, we anticipate that gender-specific participatory norms might vary across regions depending on systematic regional variation in the individual level determinants of participation discussed above. It has, for instance, been argued that once a sufficient number of women have entered into the paid labor force, this will stimulate female political participation (e.g., Andersen, 1975; Iversen and Rosenbluth, 2008; Ross, 2008; and Schlozman, 1999). Chhibber (2002) argues that since both paid employment and political life

take place in the public sphere, more women working will also imply a more woman-friendly political sphere. According to Iversen and Rosenbluth (2008), "as women enter the labor market, they become part of networks and organizations (such as unions) where they are more likely to be exposed to political discussion and advocacy, which in turn encourages interest and involvement in politics" (p. 486). More women entering the labor market is also argued to have political consequences since the increased density of working women increases the likelihood for women's organizations (Ross, 2008). Against this background, it seems reasonable that individual level factors will have aggregate effects; if a sufficient number of women get an education and become involved in paid employment, it should affect the participatory norms applying to women.

Similarly, it has been suggested that religious traditions shape attitudes both at the individual and societal levels (Norris and Inglehart, 2004; Norris, 2009). Norris (2009) specifically proposes that both the individual Muslim identity and living in an Islamic society – even as, say, a Christian or a non-believer – strengthen traditional gender norms. According to this line of reasoning, not only individual religious affiliation but also the level of religiosity in society could potentially affect political participation.

Moreover, access to recruitment networks seems appropriate to consider at the contextual rather than the individual level. Studies focusing on the role of recruitment networks tend to evaluate the importance of involvement in political and non-political organizations like trade unions and community groups, which they argue act as mobilizing agencies that provide networks of recruitment for political participation and help citizens develop skills relevant for political participation (Verba et al., 1995; Bratton, 1999; Norris, 2002; Bratton and Logan, 2006; Kuenzi and Lambright, 2010). Unequal access to such networks could potentially be an important factor for explaining the gender gap in participation. However, since endogeneity concerns make it problematic to explain individual political participation by the individual's connection to recruitment networks,[3] we will instead try to capture systematic regional variation in access to recruitment networks.

An issue important to keep in mind concerns a motivational factor often pointed to in studies of African democratic behavior – namely, material incentives related to clientelist

[3] Involvement in non-political organizations is likely to help people develop skills that facilitate political participation; to introduce people to political networks; and to foster civic-mindedness, making people more likely to participate politically. However, it might also be that civic-minded individuals who are more likely to participate politically are more likely to join these organizations, or that political participation teaches a person skills relevant for non-political involvement and introduces him/her to networks that promote participation in non-political organizations (see the discussion in Brady et al., 1995; Verba et al., 1995; Norris, 2002).

offers from rulers who exchange personal favors for political support (see, e.g., Wantchekon, 2003; Christensen and Utas, 2008; Lindberg and Morrison, 2008; and Vicente, 2008). It has been suggested that clientelist offers stimulate political participation (Christensen and Utas, 2008; Vicente, 2008), but also that the impact of clientelism may have an important gender dimension; common clientelist promises (e.g., government jobs) are often directed to men and might thus not be equally available to women (Wantchekon, 2003).

To sum up, we anticipate that the gender gap in African political participation can be explained 1) by taking account of individual as well as contextual variation in the key determinants of political participation, and 2) by considering gender variation in not only the distribution but also the effects of these determinants. In the next section we discuss how to empirically evaluate the relative importance of these mechanisms.

3 Data and empirical setup

To investigate what factors underlie possible gender differences in African political participation, we use new data from the Afrobarometer survey. The Afrobarometer is a multi-country survey project collecting data on political and economic attitudes and behavior of African citizens. As such, it provides a unique opportunity to study the gender gap in African political activity in a large multi-country sample. Round 4 of the Afrobarometer, conducted in 2008-2009, covers over 27,000 respondents from 20 African countries – Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. The country samples range from 1,200 to 2,400 respondents and are representative of each country's voting age population.[4]

3.1 Dependent variables

As dependent variable we consider electoral as well as inter-electoral political participation, i.e., voting and political activity taking place between elections. Thinking of political participation as citizen acts to influence the selection of and/or the actions taken by political representatives, it is a multidimensional concept that encompasses a wide and heterogeneous set of activities; on top of voting, citizens can work in election campaigns, engage in the local

[4] It should be noted that the Afrobarometer is not meant to be generalized to all of Sub-Saharan Africa. The selection of countries is biased toward countries that have undergone some degree of political liberalization, meaning that authoritarian regimes and countries in conflict are under-represented (for further details on the Afrobarometer sampling procedures and survey methods, see Bratton et al., 2005, and the Afrobarometer Network, 2007).

community, contact political leaders, attend demonstrations, etc. (for further discussion see, e.g., Verba et al., 1995; and Lijphart, 1997). Since we are interested in political participation in Africa, where political activity often takes place informally (Hirschmann, 1991; Bratton et al., 2005), capturing both electoral and inter-electoral political participation should be especially important.

To capture electoral participation, we create a dummy variable taking the value one if the respondent reports to have voted in the last national election, and zero otherwise. Those who report to have been too young to register to vote are excluded from the estimation. To measure inter-electoral participation, we use a dummy for whether the respondent "got together with others to raise an issue" in the past year. This participation measure has several attractive properties: first, it is rather universal in the sense that it does not require any particular institutional context (as opposed to, e.g., having attended a village meeting), making it suitable for country comparisons; second, it is arguably a more active form of participation than voting, thereby broadening the types of political participation that we capture; and third, it is a relatively common activity (compared to, e.g., the alternative measure of having attended a demonstration).

3.2 Explanatory variables

On top of the gender dummy, which is our main explanatory variable, and some basic individual controls (age in years, age squared and a dummy for living in a rural area), our selection of independent variables is based on the discussion in Section 2, and thus includes individual level resources, employment and religious affiliation, and contextual (region) level averages of these. Since our sample is limited to 20 countries, we control for country level variation using country fixed effects.[5]

With respect to the individual resource base, we measure the individual's educational attainment using dummies indicating whether the respondent's highest level of education is at the primary, secondary, or post-secondary level (using respondents with no schooling as the reference category). To capture economic standing, we follow Bratton et al. (2005) and create a "lived poverty index" covering how often, if ever, the respondent's family has gone without enough food, clean water, medicines/medical treatment, and fuel relative to other respondents

[5] Studies trying to explain country level variation in participation include institutional approaches pointing to the importance of political institutions for determining country variation in electoral turnout (see, e.g., Jackman, 1987; Lijphart 1997; Norris, 2002; Kostadinova, 2003; Fornos et al., 2004; Kuenzi and Lambright, 2007; Lindberg, 2004; and Iversen and Rosenbluth, 2008).

in the same country (see Table1). To capture information access, we include a dummy for owning a radio. While there is also information about how often the respondent listens to news on the radio, radio ownership should, conditional on controls for economic standing, be less endogenous in that it better captures the respondent's access to, rather than interest in, information. Turning to employment, we use an indicator variable equal to one if the respondent has paid part- or full-time employment.[6]

To capture religious affiliations, we use a set of dummies indicating whether the respondent is an active member of "a religious group (e.g., church, mosque)," with separate dummies for being of Christian, Muslim, or some other faith. Non-religious or non-active members serve as the base category. While membership in religious groups may enhance the social capital and network of the respondent, so can membership in other community groups. However, since individual membership in non-religious community groups is likely to involve greater endogeneity than does religious affiliation (at least with respect to raising issues in the sense that if you want to raise an issue you may seek membership in community groups), we proxy for the availability of such recruitment networks with the share of the other respondents in the respondent's your region who are members of a non-religious community group.

To account for contextual variation, in line with the discussion in Section 2, we also aggregate the individual level variables by taking averages at the region level for each respondent excluding his or her own observation. While we might have captured more of the geographical variation by aggregating to the lower district level, the district sample sizes are small and hence also yield less precise estimates.[7] Moreover, considering the suggested wide-reaching effects of women taking part in education and employment (see the discussion in Section 2), implying that gender gaps in these variables may reproduce gender gaps in political participation, we also split the region level education and employment averages by gender.

[6] We have also tried running estimations where we consider part- and full-time work separately, but since it did not provide any additional insights we merge the two employment categories in the benchmark setup.

[7] There are in total 246 regions, each with an average of 112 observations, as compared to 1,689 districts with an average of 16 respondents in each.

3.3 Estimation strategy

3.3.1 Probit estimations

Given our binary dependent variables, we initially run probit regressions on a pooled sample consisting of both men and women, of the form:

$$(1) \qquad \Pr(y_i = 1) = \Phi\left(\alpha_c + \delta \cdot D_i + \mathbf{X}_i \cdot \boldsymbol{\beta} + \mathbf{Z}_i \cdot \boldsymbol{\gamma}\right),$$

where y_i is our dependent variable, α_c are country fixed effects, D_i is a dummy for being female, $\mathbf{X}_i$ is a vector of individual explanatory variables (resources, information, employment, and demographic controls), and $\mathbf{Z}_i$ is a vector of region level variables derived as aggregates from the other individuals within the region. By inspecting the marginal effect of being female rather than male (at the mean of all other explanatory variables), we assess to what extent the possible gender gap in participation can be explained by differences in the included variables. While the regional context does not vary across men and women, and hence should not affect the size of the gender gap, regional averages are included as a benchmark test of the hypothesized importance of contextual variables for participation.

Expecting that there may not only be gender differences in the concerned variables, but also in their *effects*, in a next step we relax the pooling assumptions of equality of parameters for men and women. An issue often overlooked in this context (Ai and Norton, 2003) is that when using probit regression, the introduction of interaction terms, for instance in order to let parameters differ between the genders, results in marginal effects that are difficult to interpret, as marginal effects differ both due to changes in parameters and changes in the expected probability of participating. This is especially problematic when one variable is introduced in several interaction terms at once, which would be the case with our gender dummy. In fact, not only are the significance levels of interaction term parameters incorrect for the marginal effects, not even the sign of the parameter needs to be the same as that of the difference in marginal effects. For this reason, we estimate the above equation for men and women separately using a linear probability model (i.e., an OLS on a binary dependent variable)[8] of the form:

$$(2) \qquad y_i = \alpha_c + \mathbf{X}_i \cdot \boldsymbol{\beta} + \mathbf{Z}_i \cdot \boldsymbol{\gamma} + D_i \cdot \left(\alpha_c^F + \mathbf{X}_i \cdot \boldsymbol{\beta}^F + \mathbf{Z}_i \cdot \boldsymbol{\gamma}^F\right) + \varepsilon_i,$$

[8] As shown in Table A1 in the Appendix, we get very similar results if instead running probits and estimating the marginal effects at each sub-sample's mean of the independent variables.

where notations are the same as in equation (1). An *F* superscript denotes parameters of interactions with the female dummy.[9] In all the regressions above, we cluster the standard errors at the regional level, and use weights to ensure that equal weight is given to each country independent of sample size and that each country's sample is nationally representative.

4 Results

As can be seen in Table 3, the gender gap in political participation varies across countries as well as between the different forms of participation. The gender gap in electoral participation is smaller than that in inter-electoral participation, and is not present in all surveyed countries. In fact, in six of the countries, the share of women who vote exceeds that of men, although except for in Botswana these "reverse" gender gaps are not statistically significant. Turning to inter-electoral participation in terms of joining others to raise an issue, on the other hand, participation rates are consistently significantly lower among women, the difference being more than five percentage points in all countries except Namibia and as high as 24 percentage points in Ghana.

4.1 Pooled regressions

4.1.1 Electoral participation

Table 4 shows the marginal effects of probit regressions of our voting dummy, using a sample of both men and women under the pooling assumption of equal parameters. In a naïve estimation, controlling only for country fixed effects, age, and rural settlement (Column 1), women are 3.4 percentage points less likely than men to vote.[10]

Introducing the individual resource variables (Column 2) brings only a modest reduction of the gender gap. Moreover, and in line with previous findings for Africa (see Isaksson, 2010), whereas information access, here proxied by radio ownership, is positively related to voting, education and poverty are not. This seems to indicate either that a lack of resources in terms of education or money does not constrain participation to any larger extent, or that the

[9] We will present the results from these estimations by running each regression once for each gender (in which case the gender interactions will of course be dropped), and once in a pooled estimation to determine the differences in parameters between men and women (given by the interaction parameters).

[10] Whereas the survey sampling procedure has made sure that there are no gender differences in any of these geographic variables, there is an age difference across the sampled men and women. Not controlling for this age difference increases the average gender gap to 4.7 percentage points.

enabling effect of resources is obscured by some motivational factor (e.g., clientelism) correlated with resource endowments.

Column 3 introduces the employment variable and Column 4 the dummies for being an active member of a religious group. Both employment and religious membership may help build social capital and break domestic isolation, exposing individuals to new sets of norms and recruitment networks. In line with this, both come out positively related to voting. However, whereas employment implies a rather modest increase in voting, being an active religious believer increases the propensity to vote by around 4-6 percentage points for Christians and Muslims, and by approximately 8 percentage points for those of some other faith. Again, however, these variables seemingly do very little to explain the gender gap (if accounting for religiosity, the unexplained gap if anything becomes larger).

Introducing the regional averages of the individual level variables (excluding the own observation) in Column 5,[11] we see that, contrary to the individual estimates, living in a region with a high share of active Christians or Muslims is negatively related to voting (the difference between Christians and Muslims is not statistically significant). Hence, while being religiously active – Christian, Muslim or of some other faith – increases the likelihood that one will vote, living in a more religious society seems to have the opposite effect. Most of the regional resource and employment measures are, on the other hand, not significantly related to individual voting, and living in a region with a higher share of people with primary education is in fact associated with a lower probability to vote, possibly reflecting less mobilized voting (as opposed to autonomous participation, see Bratton et al., 2005) in regions where people are more educated. The positive (but only weakly statistically significant) correlation between individual voting and the share of other people in a respondent's your region engaged in some non-religious community group could possibly support the importance of access to recruitment networks.

4.1.2 Inter-electoral participation

Turning to inter-electoral political participation, Table 5 presents the marginal effects from probit regressions of the dummy on whether the respondent "got together with others to raise an issue." Controlling for country fixed effects, age, and urban-rural variation (Column 1), women have an approximately 12 percentage points lower participation rate than men.

[11] As mentioned earlier, considering that the region averages do not vary across men and women, and that an equal number of men and women have been sampled in each region, we do not expect the gender parameter to change due to the introduction of regional level averages.

Unlike in the voting regressions, the individual resource variables (Column 2) are statistically significant and reduce the size of the observed gender gap, albeit quite modestly. The importance of education and access to information for inter-electoral participation is evident; the presented effects are large and highly statistically significant. Poverty, on the other hand, is in line with previous findings for Africa (Isaksson, 2010) positively correlated with inter-electoral participation, which is potentially explained by a higher motivation. All these effects remain stable throughout the different specifications in Table 5.

Employment and religion are again positively related to participation (Columns 3 and 4), the sizeable effects presumably pointing to the importance of socialization and networks for inter-electoral political participation. Once more, however, they do little to explain the gender gap observed in Column 1. If anything, taking account of individual religiosity makes the unexplained gender gap even more pronounced.

When adding the region level averages (Column 5), our findings again indicate that living in a region with a high share of active Christians or Muslims is indeed negatively related to participation in the pooled sample. However, we cannot yet determine whether this is due to gender-specific effects. Just as for voting, the regional resource and employment measures tend not to be significantly related to inter-electoral participation. The strong positive correlation between individual participation and the share of other people in the respondent's region engaged in non-religious community groups, however, seemingly points to the important role of networks for inter-electoral participation.

To sum up the results so far, we can note that the gender gap in political participation is considerably larger for inter-electoral participation than for voting. Arguably, the former – here measured in terms of how often the respondent gets "together with others to raise an issue" – constitutes a more active form of political participation. Moreover, and as opposed to voting, it takes place in groups rather than individually, and hence the importance of having access to a political network should presumably be greater. Whereas several of the included individual and regional explanatory factors stand out as important determinants of participation, as it turns out, they do relatively little to explain the observed gender gaps in electoral and inter-electoral political activity. Hence, gender inequality in participation can seemingly not be explained simply by women being, e.g., less educated.

Given that we are unable to explain the gender gap in political participation by looking at differences in individual and regional characteristics alone, we now turn our attention to potential differences in the parameters of these variables.

4.2 Gender-specific regressions

4.2.1 Voting

Columns 1-2 of Table 6 present the results from gender-specific linear probability models of voting, including both the individual level variables and their regional averages. As noted in Section 3, we get very similar results if instead running probits (see Table A1), and using a linear probability model allows us to estimate the size and statistical significance of the differences in parameters between men and women. These differences are presented in Column 3.

As it turns out, the individual level resource, employment, and religion variables all come out with parameters very similar to the marginal effects in Table 4, and with no statistically significant differences between men and women. One can note, however, that the relation between labor market participation and voting is larger and only statistically significant for women, possibly pointing to the importance of breaking their domestic isolation. Furthermore, considering that the positive associations observed between individual religiosity and voting apply to both women and men (if anything, they tend to be stronger for women), the results do not support the idea that religious norms reinforce gender inequality and thus work against female participation. Rather, they point to possible positive effects of religious activity, such as an increased social network.

Turning to the contextual variables, the parameters of the region level resources, employment, degree of religiosity, and access to recruitment networks are again in line with the estimates in Table 4. Most importantly for our purposes, however, they are similar for men and women, suggesting that they are of limited importance for explaining the gender gap. Since it has been suggested that female political participation is negatively affected by traditional norms in more religious societies, the parameters of the regional religiosity variables are of special interest. Considering that we observe no statistically significant difference between the female and male parameters on the regional religiosity variables, our results do not support this claim.

As argued in Section 2, there may also be reason to believe that women's political participation depends on the capabilities of and interactions with other *women* in society, and the participation of women in other areas of society may help advance women's participation in politics. Hence, in Columns 4-5 of Table 6 we introduce gender-specific regional averages

for education and employment[12] (with the corresponding differences in parameters presented in Column 6). With gender-specific regional education averages, we can note that the parameters of the average levels of secondary schooling differ significantly across the male and female sub-samples. Whereas in the male sub-sample they are not statistically significant, in the female sub-sample both the average level of male and female secondary schooling come out significantly related to voting, but with opposite signs. Interestingly, while higher education among males in the region appears to stimulate female voting, higher education among other women in the region is negatively related (albeit only weakly statistically significant) to female voting. Again, an interpretation could be that this reflects less mobilized female voting (as opposed to autonomous participation, see Bratton et al., 2005) in regions where women are relatively educated, and more mobilized voting among women when men have more education than them, i.e., when there is a large gender gap in education.

When it comes to gender-specific regional employment, previous literature has (as discussed in Section 2) pointed to the importance of women's labor market participation in (re-)shaping gender roles. As in the case of education, neither the male nor the female regional employment rates are significantly related to individual voting in the male sample. In the female sub-sample, on the other hand, both average male and female employment are significantly associated with voting. Interestingly, whereas high male employment is negatively related to voting among women, high female employment is, in line with theories on the importance of women's labor market participation, positively related (although only statistically significant at the 10 percent level). Since women generally do less paid work, a higher level of employment among women indicates a smaller gender gap in employment, and a higher level of employment among men indicate a larger gap. Hence, our results suggest that a smaller gender gap in employment is positively related to female political participation, but there is no such relationship for men. To the extent that the employment gap reflects and reinforces gender norms in society, this may be interpreted as evidence of effects of the prevailing gender roles.

4.2.2 Inter-electoral participation

Turning to inter-electoral political participation, Table 7 presents the results of gender specific linear probability estimations of our *raised_issue* dummy. As in Table 6, Columns 1 and 2

[12] These are two variables that display clear gender variation and for which we motivate the division into separate averages in Sections 2 and 3. For the sake of completeness, we have done the same for all individual level variables, but without any gain in insight. These results are available upon request.

present the results from estimations including the individual characteristics and regional level averages for the male and female sub-samples respectively, and Column 3 presents the differences in parameter estimates between men and women. Again, the role of individual resources for political participation is very similar across men and women. The exception is information; while owning a radio has a positive and statistically significant parameter in both sub-samples, it is about twice as large for men than for women. Hence, not only do women less frequently have access to information (see Table 2), owning a radio does not seem to stimulate participation to the same extent. One obvious explanation could be that men listen more to the radio than do women when the household possesses one. However, the difference between men and women reporting to frequently get news from the radio in the sample is small: 94 percent for men versus 90 percent for women owning a radio. Another explanation could be that the issues raised by men are different from those raised by women, and that the information obtained from a radio may be more relevant for men. Yet, with the data at hand we can only speculate as to whether this is true or not.

Furthermore, there are no statistically significant gender differences in the parameters of the individual employment and religious affiliation variables. Hence, again there are no signs of individual religiosity holding women back from inter-electoral participation (if anything, the positive parameters on the individual religion variables are larger for women). In all, the results for the individual level variables are in line with those of Table 5 (and remain stable in Columns 4-5).

Moreover, turning to the contextual variables, the parameters of the region level resources, employment, degree of religiosity, and access to recruitment networks in Columns 1-2 are also in line with the estimates in Table 5, with no statistically significant parameter differences between men and women. Hence, again we find no support for the idea that living in a more religious society affects female participation more than male participation.

Introducing the gender-specific regional averages for employment and education in Columns 4-5, the picture remains largely unchanged; only for the gender-specific regional levels of primary education do we observe statistically significant parameter differences between the genders. Contrary to what we saw for voting, there is a negative correlation between men's education and women's probability of joining others to raise an issue, and although the parameter of the average level of female primary schooling is not statistically different from zero in the individual sub-samples, it is significantly larger in the female compared to the male sub-sample. Conditional on the average level of education of women in

the region, having a higher level of male education (i.e., a gender gap in education) may reflect the existence of traditional gender norms speaking to the disadvantage of female political participation. Furthermore, using gender-specific regional employment averages, there are still no statistically significant differences in employment parameters across the male and female sub-samples.

To sum up, comparing the effects of individual and region level variables on electoral and inter-electoral political participation, the parameters differ relatively little between men and women. One of the most interesting results in line with this concerns the effect of religion. As discussed, religion, and in particular Islam, has been suggested to reinforce traditional gender norms in society, thereby hindering change toward gender equality. What we observe here though is a relatively strong *positive* correlation between individual religious affiliation (irrespective of faith) and political participation. At the regional level, there is some evidence that living in a community where more people are members of religious groups has a negative effect on political participation, but there is no evidence that this association is different for women than for men. Hence, we find no support for hypotheses that living in more religious societies increases the gender gap in political participation. We have also found evidence that for women, a larger gender gap in employment seems to affect female voting negatively, while men were less affected. For inter-electoral participation, we observe a similar pattern for education.

5 Conclusions

This paper explored the factors underlying the gender gap in African electoral and inter-electoral political participation. We argued that to try to understand the gender gap noted in some previous studies of African political activity, we need to go beyond individual determinants of participation and consider the contribution of contextual influences, as well as allow for gender differences in both the distributions and the effects of the central determinants.

Commonly suggested determinants of political participation include individual resources relevant for meeting the costs of participating, motivating factors such as a will to conform to participatory norms, and access to political recruitment networks. In line with these general determinants, a lack of individual resources, low levels of female employment (in turn affecting women's resource endowments, participatory norms, and access to recruitment networks), and the role of religion (especially Islam) as a carrier of traditional gender roles

have all been put forward as important factors explaining lower political participation among women. Our empirical estimations incorporate these factors as individual level determinants and region aggregates, and allow for gender variation in their effects.

Empirical analysis of a new and comprehensive data material, covering political and economic attitudes and behavior of over 27,000 respondents across 20 African countries, suggests that while there is a gender gap in both electoral and inter-electoral participation, the gender gap in the latter, i.e., in political participation taking place in between elections, is considerably larger. Compared to voting, getting "together with others to raise an issue" – our measure of inter-electoral participation – takes place in groups rather than individually and arguably constitutes a more active form of political participation. As such, it presumably requires more in terms of inputs, motivations, and access to political networks, presumably working to the disadvantage of women.

While several of the individual and contextual variables considered stand out as important determinants of general political participation, differing observable characteristics between men and women were found to explain only a very modest share of the gender gap in participation. The role of religion is particularly interesting though. First of all, we observed what appears to be a two-fold effect of religion, with individual religiosity being positively related to participation – presumably reflecting better access to political networks – and living in a religious society seemingly having a negative effect. Second, and contrary to suggestions in previous literature, we find no support for religiosity – neither at the individual nor at the contextual level – increasing the gender gap in electoral or inter-electoral participation. Allowing the effects of variables to differ between the genders strengthened this view; the observed positive effects of individual religiosity were highly similar for women and men. Likewise, the effect of living in a more religious community – whether Muslim, Christian, or other – was no different for women than for men.

Furthermore, women's voting tended to be positively correlated with women's regional labor force participation, but negatively correlated with the labor force participation of men, while men's probability to vote seemed unaffected by the regional labor market. This indicates that female voting may be negatively affected by a larger gender gap in employment, presumably pointing to the impact of community gender norms. Similar results are found for education for inter-electoral participation.

To conclude, our findings indicate that differing observable characteristics between men and women explain only a very small share of the gender gap in political participation. Hence,

the gender inequality observed in African political participation, which for inter-electoral participation is quite substantial, can seemingly not be explained simply by differing characteristics such as women being less educated or participating less in the labor market. The fact that the lion's share of the observed gender gaps remains unexplained in spite of controlling for a wide range of commonly suggested individual and contextual determinants of political participation suggests that some other factor is at play. The often suggested role of religion as reinforcing traditional gender roles does not seem to help explain the gender gap in participation. Rather, the strong positive associations observed between individual religiosity and political participation seem to indicate that religious affiliations provide access to political networks stimulating participation, among women as well as among men. The effect of the gender gap in employment – which was found to affect male voting positively and female voting negatively – may point to the impact of norms on gender roles. There is a need for future research to dig further into these factors. To address the millennium development goal of promoting gender equality and empowering women in the emerging African democracies, we need to better understand why the political participation of women lags behind that of men.

Tables and figures

Table 1. Variable descriptions.

Variable name	Description
voted	Voted in the last national election (dummy)
raised_issue	Joined others to raise an issue during the past year
female	Female dummy
poverty_index	A poverty index with mean zero and standard deviation one within each country, higher values meaning that you are poorer. Constructed as the first principal component of the answers to, 'Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or anyone in your family gone without: (a) enough food to eat, (b) enough clean water for home use, (c) medicines or medical treatment, (d) enough fuel to cook your food?', with response categories ranging from 0 for 'never' to 4 for 'always' for each item.
primary	Completed primary (only) dummy
secondary	Completed secondary (no tertiary) dummy
tertiary	At least some tertiary education dummy
own_radio	Dummy for owning a radio
employed	Working part or full time dummy
christian	Dummy for being an active Christian
muslim	Dummy for being an active Muslim
other_religion	Dummy for being active in another religion
community_group	Dummy for being a member of a voluntary association or community group
*reg_**	Region average of *, excluding own observation
*reg_f_**	Region average of * among women only, excluding own observation
*reg_m_**	Region average of * among men only, excluding own observation
age	Age of respondent
age2	Age squared (scaled by a division by 100 in order to make regression parameters larger)
rural	Rural dummy

Table 2. Summary statistics.

	Full Sample				Male		Female	
	Mean	Sd	Min	Max	Mean	Sd	Mean	Sd
Dependents								
raised_issue	0.54	0.5	0	1	0.61	0.49	0.48	0.5
voted	0.77	0.42	0	1	0.79	0.41	0.74	0.44
Individual Resources								
poverty_index	-0.01	1	-1.99	4.24	-0.02	1	0.01	0.99
primary	0.36	0.48	0	1	0.36	0.48	0.36	0.48
secondary	0.21	0.41	0	1	0.24	0.43	0.19	0.39
tertiary	0.05	0.21	0	1	0.06	0.23	0.03	0.18
own_radio	0.71	0.45	0	1	0.79	0.41	0.64	0.48
Religion								
christian	0.37	0.48	0	1	0.34	0.47	0.39	0.49
muslim	0.07	0.26	0	1	0.08	0.28	0.06	0.24
other_religion	0.01	0.12	0	1	0.01	0.12	0.02	0.12
Employment								
employed	0.34	0.47	0	1	0.41	0.49	0.28	0.45
Regional Resources								
reg_poverty_index	0.01	0.32	-1.03	1.52	0.01	0.32	0.01	0.32
reg_primary	0.36	0.15	0	0.9	0.36	0.15	0.36	0.15
reg_secondary	0.21	0.16	0	0.82	0.21	0.16	0.21	0.16
reg_tertiary	0.04	0.06	0	0.51	0.04	0.06	0.04	0.06
reg_own_radio	0.71	0.12	0.14	1	0.71	0.12	0.71	0.12
Regional Labor Market								
reg_parttimejob	0.15	0.11	0	0.68	0.15	0.11	0.15	0.11
reg_fulltimejob	0.18	0.12	0	0.71	0.18	0.12	0.18	0.12
Regional Religion								
reg_christian	0.36	0.23	0	1	0.36	0.23	0.36	0.23
reg_muslim	0.07	0.13	0	1	0.07	0.13	0.07	0.13
reg_other_religion	0.02	0.04	0	0.29	0.02	0.04	0.02	0.04
Regional Networks								
reg_community_group	0.24	0.13	0	0.86	0.24	0.13	0.24	0.13
Control Variables								
female	0.5	0.5	0	1	0	0	1	0
age	36.35	14.46	18	110	37.8	15.14	34.89	13.6
age2	15.31	12.81	3.24	121	16.58	13.73	14.02	11.67
rural	0.62	0.49	0	1	0.62	0.49	0.62	0.49
N	26,546				13,324		13,222	

Table 3. Nationally representative (weighted) summary statistics of male and female political participation, by country (countries sorted by size of gender gap).

	Voting					*Raised issue*			
Country	*Male*	*Female*	*Gap*	*Gap s.e.*	*Country*	*Male*	*Female*	*Gap*	*Gap s.e.*
Nigeria	0.713	0.578	-0.135	0.022	Ghana	0.657	0.419	-0.238	0.031
Burkina Faso	0.814	0.689	-0.125	0.028	Nigeria	0.519	0.311	-0.207	0.021
Zimbabwe	0.704	0.590	-0.114	0.032	Mali	0.757	0.554	-0.204	0.029
Kenya	0.880	0.771	-0.109	0.030	Benin	0.702	0.505	-0.197	0.030
Mali	0.839	0.736	-0.103	0.026	Kenya	0.708	0.527	-0.180	0.035
Uganda	0.784	0.683	-0.101	0.024	Burkina Faso	0.726	0.550	-0.176	0.030
Madagascar	0.738	0.645	-0.092	0.035	Liberia	0.720	0.551	-0.169	0.031
Zambia	0.678	0.596	-0.082	0.033	Uganda	0.637	0.473	-0.164	0.024
Ghana	0.925	0.884	-0.041	0.021	Tanzania	0.765	0.605	-0.160	0.030
Liberia	0.835	0.807	-0.028	0.028	Zambia	0.553	0.434	-0.119	0.032
Tanzania	0.911	0.882	-0.028	0.022	Madagascar	0.604	0.493	-0.112	0.036
Mozambique	0.810	0.787	-0.023	0.033	Zimbabwe	0.569	0.479	-0.090	0.032
Benin	0.934	0.912	-0.022	0.017	Botswana	0.618	0.529	-0.089	0.030
Namibia	0.788	0.788	0	0.028	Lesotho	0.684	0.595	-0.088	0.029
Malawi	0.820	0.826	0.006	0.029	Mozambique	0.662	0.580	-0.082	0.033
Lesotho	0.642	0.66	0.018	0.030	Malawi	0.763	0.685	-0.078	0.030
Senegal	0.792	0.817	0.025	0.027	Senegal	0.651	0.573	-0.078	0.031
South Africa	0.729	0.756	0.027	0.023	Cape Verde	0.356	0.289	-0.067	0.029
Cape Verde	0.837	0.867	0.030	0.023	South Africa	0.419	0.355	-0.065	0.024
Botswana	0.637	0.707	0.070	0.031	Namibia	0.342	0.325	-0.017	0.028
Average	0.790	0.749	-0.041		*Average*	0.621	0.492	-0.129	

Table 4. Pooled sample voting regressions (probit marginal effects). Dependent variable: *voted*.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
female	-0.034***	-0.029***	-0.032***	-0.036***	-0.030***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Resources					
poverty_index		0.002			0.003
		(0.003)			(0.003)
primary		0.005			0.008
		(0.008)			(0.008)
secondary		0.006			0.004
		(0.011)			(0.010)
tertiary		-0.020			-0.016
		(0.018)			(0.018)
own_radio		0.035***			0.032***
		(0.007)			(0.007)
Employment					
employed			0.015**		0.013*
			(0.007)		(0.007)
Religion					
christian				0.044***	0.046***
				(0.007)	(0.007)
muslim				0.055***	0.054***
				(0.011)	(0.011)
other_religion				0.076***	0.071***
				(0.017)	(0.018)
Regional Resources					
reg_poverty_index					-0.026*
					(0.014)
reg_primary					-0.190***
					(0.050)
reg_secondary					-0.039
					(0.056)
reg_tertiary					-0.196
					(0.127)
reg_own_radio					-0.015
					(0.044)
Regional Employment					
reg_employed					-0.018
					(0.043)

continued …

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
… continued					
Regional Religion					
reg_christian					-0.116**
					(0.047)
reg_muslim					-0.152**
					(0.062)
reg_other_religion					0.020
					(0.105)
Regional Networks					
reg_community_-group					0.105*
					(0.061)
Additional Controls					
age	0.021***	0.020***	0.020***	0.020***	0.019***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
age2	-0.017***	-0.017***	-0.017***	-0.017***	-0.016***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
rural	0.048***	0.052***	0.050***	0.048***	0.041***
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Country fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Observations	23,624	23,624	23,624	23,624	23,624

Notes: Clustered (by region) standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Observations are weighted using combined within×across country weights. The within-country weights adjust the samples to be nationally representative. The across-country weights adjust all country samples to the same size.

Table 5. Pooled sample voting regressions (probit marginal effects). Dependent variable is *raised_issue*.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
female	-0.123***	-0.102***	-0.117***	-0.133***	-0.110***
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Resources					
poverty_index		0.028***			0.025***
		(0.006)			(0.005)
primary		0.070***			0.061***
		(0.010)			(0.010)
secondary		0.104***			0.090***
		(0.014)			(0.013)
tertiary		0.191***			0.173***
		(0.018)			(0.017)
own_radio		0.074***			0.070***
		(0.009)			(0.009)
Employment					
employed			0.049***		0.031***
			(0.010)		(0.009)
Religion					
christian				0.179***	0.165***
				(0.012)	(0.012)
muslim				0.152***	0.169***
				(0.020)	(0.018)
other_religion				0.128***	0.123***
				(0.036)	(0.038)
Regional Resources					
reg_povetry_index					0.015
					(0.023)
reg_primary					-0.104
					(0.077)
reg_secondary					-0.140
					(0.088)
reg_tertiary					0.255*
					(0.153)
reg_own_radio					-0.123
					(0.083)
Regional Employment					
reg_employed					0.004
					(0.068)

continued …

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
… continued					
Regional Religion					
reg_christian					-0.127**
					(0.065)
reg_muslim					-0.241***
					(0.090)
reg_other_religion					-0.300
					(0.224)
Regional Networks					
reg_community_-group					0.520***
					(0.087)
Additional Controls					
age	0.017***	0.016***	0.016***	0.017***	0.014***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
age2	-0.016***	-0.014***	-0.015***	-0.016***	-0.013***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
rural	0.076***	0.106***	0.081***	0.077***	0.086***
	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.011)
Country fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Observations	26,346	26,346	26,346	26,346	26,346

Notes: Clustered (by region) standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Observations are weighted using combined within×across country weights. The within-country weights adjust the samples to be nationally representative. The across-country weights adjust all country samples to the same size.

Table 6. Gender-specific OLS estimations. Dependent variable: *voted*.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Sample:	Male	Female	Diff (2-1)	Male	Female	Diff (5-4)
Resources						
poverty_index	0.005	-0.001	-0.007	0.005	-0.001	-0.006
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.006)
primary	-0.002	0.011	0.013	-0.002	0.011	0.013
	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.014)
secondary	-0.008	0.002	0.010	-0.008	0.003	0.011
	(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.019)
tertiary	-0.019	-0.029	-0.010	-0.019	-0.028	-0.009
	(0.022)	(0.029)	(0.034)	(0.023)	(0.029)	(0.034)
own_radio	0.035***	0.026***	-0.009	0.035***	0.026***	-0.009
	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.014)	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.014)
Employment						
employed	0.011	0.024**	0.013	0.011	0.024**	0.013
	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.012)
Religion						
christian	0.037***	0.057***	0.020	0.037***	0.057***	0.020
	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.013)
muslim	0.049***	0.045**	-0.005	0.049***	0.045**	-0.004
	(0.013)	(0.018)	(0.021)	(0.013)	(0.018)	(0.021)
other_religion	0.052**	0.094***	0.042	0.052**	0.095***	0.043
	(0.023)	(0.033)	(0.042)	(0.024)	(0.033)	(0.042)
Regional Resources						
reg_poverty_index	-0.019	-0.036*	-0.018	-0.019	-0.035*	-0.016
	(0.015)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.018)
reg_primary	-0.118**	-0.210***	-0.093			
	(0.050)	(0.063)	(0.064)			
reg_m_primary				-0.066	-0.155***	-0.089
				(0.056)	(0.058)	(0.063)
reg_f_primary				-0.050	-0.077	-0.027
				(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.064)
reg_secondary	-0.018	-0.019	-0.001			
	(0.067)	(0.071)	(0.072)			
reg_m_secondary				-0.034	0.125**	0.159**
				(0.067)	(0.063)	(0.078)
reg_f_secondary				0.018	-0.151*	-0.168**
				(0.071)	(0.078)	(0.083)
reg_tertiary	-0.226	-0.203	0.023			
	(0.166)	(0.140)	(0.129)			
reg_m_tertiary				-0.195	0.006	0.202
				(0.152)	(0.155)	(0.145)
reg_f_tertiary				-0.018	-0.208	-0.190
				(0.237)	(0.198)	(0.181)
reg_own_radio	0.013	-0.061	-0.074	0.015	-0.067	-0.082
	(0.052)	(0.060)	(0.070)	(0.053)	(0.062)	(0.073)

continued …

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Sample:	Male	Female	Diff (2-1)	Male	Female	Diff (5-4)
Regional Employment						
reg_employed	-0.022	-0.057	-0.035			
	(0.044)	(0.048)	(0.053)			
reg_m_employed				0.011	-0.141***	-0.152***
				(0.051)	(0.053)	(0.053)
reg_f_employed				-0.037	0.098*	0.135**
				(0.055)	(0.057)	(0.057)
Regional Religion						
reg_christian	-0.081*	-0.124**	-0.043	-0.079*	-0.130**	-0.052
	(0.047)	(0.055)	(0.049)	(0.047)	(0.053)	(0.049)
reg_muslim	-0.126*	-0.125**	0.002	-0.129*	-0.108*	0.021
	(0.067)	(0.060)	(0.068)	(0.067)	(0.059)	(0.067)
reg_other_religion	-0.053	0.028	0.082	-0.060	0.054	0.114
	(0.099)	(0.123)	(0.129)	(0.101)	(0.123)	(0.137)
Regional Networks						
reg_community_-	0.066	0.118*	0.051	0.067	0.108	0.040
group	(0.060)	(0.069)	(0.068)	(0.059)	(0.069)	(0.066)
Additional Controls						
age	0.018***	0.022***	0.004*	0.018***	0.022***	0.004*
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
age2	-0.015***	-0.019***	-0.004*	-0.015***	-0.018***	-0.004
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
rural	0.034***	0.043***	0.009	0.034***	0.043***	0.009
	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.014)
country×gender	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
fixed effects						
Observations	12,014	11,610		12,014	11,610	
R-squared	0.090	0.106		0.090	0.107	

Notes: Clustered (by region) standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Observations are weighted using combined within×across country weights. The within-country weights adjust the samples to be nationally representative with respect to gender, region, urban-rural distribution, etc. The across-country weights adjust all country samples to the same size (N=1200). Columns 3 and 6 present the differences in OLS estimates of the gender-specific estimates in Columns 1-2 and 4-5 respectively. Standard errors of differences given by pooled regressions with a full set of interactions between gender and each variable.

Table 7. Gender specific OLS estimations. Dependent variable: *raised_issue*.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Sample:	Male	Female	Diff (2-1)	Male	Female	Diff (5-4)
Resources						
poverty_index	0.022***	0.022***	0.000	0.022***	0.022***	-0.000
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.007)
primary	0.049***	0.058***	0.009	0.049***	0.058***	0.010
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.016)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.016)
secondary	0.083***	0.073***	-0.010	0.082***	0.073***	-0.010
	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.021)	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.021)
tertiary	0.162***	0.157***	-0.005	0.162***	0.157***	-0.005
	(0.021)	(0.027)	(0.030)	(0.021)	(0.027)	(0.031)
own_radio	0.082***	0.044***	-0.038***	0.082***	0.045***	-0.037***
	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.014)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.014)
Employment						
employed	0.027***	0.031***	0.004	0.028***	0.031***	0.003
	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.014)
Religion						
christian	0.143***	0.161***	0.018	0.143***	0.161***	0.018
	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.016)
muslim	0.152***	0.158***	0.006	0.152***	0.158***	0.006
	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.026)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.026)
other_religion	0.093**	0.135***	0.042	0.094**	0.136***	0.042
	(0.041)	(0.047)	(0.044)	(0.041)	(0.047)	(0.044)
Regional Resources						
reg_poverty_index	-0.001	0.026	0.027	0.002	0.027	0.025
	(0.022)	(0.025)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.024)	(0.021)
reg_primary	-0.045	-0.144*	-0.099			
	(0.069)	(0.085)	(0.065)			
reg_m_primary				0.056	-0.187**	-0.243***
				(0.079)	(0.089)	(0.072)
reg_f_primary				-0.099	0.044	0.142**
				(0.075)	(0.084)	(0.071)
reg_secondary	-0.141	-0.124	0.017			
	(0.086)	(0.089)	(0.074)			
reg_m_secondary				-0.052	-0.130	-0.079
				(0.117)	(0.125)	(0.088)
reg_f_secondary				-0.078	0.003	0.081
				(0.111)	(0.108)	(0.090)
reg_tertiary	0.240	0.213	-0.027			
	(0.160)	(0.155)	(0.159)			
reg_m_tertiary				0.100	-0.006	-0.107
				(0.194)	(0.241)	(0.173)
reg_f_tertiary				0.151	0.189	0.038
				(0.209)	(0.259)	(0.187)
reg_own_radio	-0.084	-0.127	-0.043	-0.065	-0.112	-0.048
	(0.083)	(0.086)	(0.082)	(0.081)	(0.087)	(0.081)

continued …

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Sample:	Male	Female	Diff (2-1)	Male	Female	Diff (5-4)
Regional Employment						
reg_employed	-0.049	0.039	0.088			
	(0.062)	(0.074)	(0.063)			
reg_m_employed				-0.125*	-0.066	0.060
				(0.075)	(0.084)	(0.074)
reg_f_employed				0.104	0.118	0.014
				(0.084)	(0.103)	(0.094)
Regional Religion						
reg_christian	-0.084	-0.144**	-0.060	-0.102*	-0.165**	-0.063
	(0.061)	(0.071)	(0.063)	(0.060)	(0.073)	(0.061)
reg_muslim	-0.195**	-0.222**	-0.027	-0.189**	-0.215**	-0.026
	(0.092)	(0.092)	(0.086)	(0.089)	(0.091)	(0.087)
reg_other_religion	-0.354*	-0.147	0.206	-0.338*	-0.192	0.146
	(0.182)	(0.258)	(0.177)	(0.186)	(0.275)	(0.187)
Regional Networks						
reg_community_-group	0.443***	0.451***	0.007	0.447***	0.441***	-0.006
	(0.076)	(0.102)	(0.101)	(0.076)	(0.104)	(0.100)
Additional Controls						
age	0.012***	0.014***	0.002	0.012***	0.014***	0.002
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
age2	-0.010***	-0.013***	-0.003	-0.010***	-0.013***	-0.003
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
rural	0.086***	0.069***	-0.016	0.084***	0.069***	-0.015
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.014)
country×gender fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Observations	13,238	13,108		13,238	13,108	
R-squared	0.129	0.104		0.130	0.105	

Notes: Clustered (by region) standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Observations are weighted using combined within×across country weights. The within-country weights adjust the samples to be nationally representative with respect to gender, region, urban-rural distribution, etc. The across-country weights adjust all country samples to the same size (N=1200). Columns 3 and 6 present the differences in OLS estimates of the gender-specific estimates in Columns 1-2 and 4-5 respectively. Standard errors of differences given by pooled regressions with a full set of interactions between gender and each variable.

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APPENDIX

Table A1. Marginal effects from probit and coefficients from OLS for men/women and both dependents.

Dependent:	*voted*				*raised_issue*			
Sample:	Men		Women		Men		Women	
Estimation:	Probit	OLS	Probit	OLS	Probit	OLS	Probit	OLS
poverty_index	0.005	0.005	-0.001	-0.001	0.024***	0.022***	0.024***	0.022***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)
primary	0.002	-0.002	0.010	0.011	0.054***	0.049***	0.063***	0.058***
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.012)
secondary	-0.000	-0.008	0.005	0.002	0.090***	0.083***	0.079***	0.073***
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.019)	(0.017)
tertiary	-0.015	-0.019	-0.022	-0.029	0.164***	0.162***	0.167***	0.157***
	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.027)	(0.027)
own_radio	0.034***	0.035***	0.027***	0.026***	0.090***	0.082***	0.048***	0.044***
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.010)
employed	0.009	0.011	0.021**	0.024**	0.030***	0.027***	0.035***	0.031***
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.012)
christian	0.034***	0.037***	0.057***	0.057***	0.151***	0.143***	0.173***	0.161***
	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.014)
muslim	0.054***	0.049***	0.046**	0.045**	0.157***	0.152***	0.171***	0.158***
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.021)
other_religion	0.054**	0.052**	0.091***	0.094***	0.093**	0.093**	0.143***	0.135***
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.028)	(0.033)	(0.040)	(0.041)	(0.047)	(0.047)
reg_poverty_-index	-0.018	-0.019	-0.033*	-0.036*	0.001	-0.001	0.031	0.026
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.024)	(0.022)	(0.027)	(0.025)
reg_primary	-0.146***	-0.118**	-0.232***	-0.210***	-0.042	-0.045	-0.158*	-0.144*
	(0.053)	(0.050)	(0.069)	(0.063)	(0.075)	(0.069)	(0.092)	(0.085)
reg_secondary	-0.034	-0.018	-0.040	-0.019	-0.139	-0.141	-0.128	-0.124
	(0.061)	(0.067)	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.093)	(0.086)	(0.099)	(0.089)
reg_tertiary	-0.211	-0.226	-0.184	-0.203	0.249	0.240	0.269	0.213
	(0.147)	(0.166)	(0.133)	(0.140)	(0.172)	(0.160)	(0.177)	(0.155)
reg_ownradio	0.027	0.013	-0.054	-0.061	-0.087	-0.084	-0.146	-0.127
	(0.053)	(0.052)	(0.061)	(0.060)	(0.092)	(0.083)	(0.095)	(0.086)
reg_employed	0.001	-0.022	-0.044	-0.057	-0.041	-0.049	0.042	0.039
	(0.050)	(0.044)	(0.054)	(0.048)	(0.070)	(0.062)	(0.080)	(0.074)
reg_christian	-0.088*	-0.081*	-0.148**	-0.124**	-0.102	-0.084	-0.144*	-0.144**
	(0.049)	(0.047)	(0.059)	(0.055)	(0.066)	(0.061)	(0.079)	(0.071)
reg_muslim	-0.145*	-0.126*	-0.156**	-0.125**	-0.230**	-0.195**	-0.234**	-0.222**
	(0.078)	(0.067)	(0.068)	(0.060)	(0.102)	(0.092)	(0.101)	(0.092)
reg_other_ -religion	-0.049	-0.053	0.076	0.028	-0.412**	-0.354*	-0.167	-0.147
	(0.114)	(0.099)	(0.156)	(0.123)	(0.205)	(0.182)	(0.271)	(0.258)
reg_commu-nity_group	0.085	0.066	0.126*	0.118*	0.531***	0.443***	0.496***	0.451***
	(0.067)	(0.060)	(0.075)	(0.069)	(0.087)	(0.076)	(0.113)	(0.102)
age	0.017***	0.018***	0.022***	0.022***	0.013***	0.012***	0.016***	0.014***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
age2	-0.014***	-0.015***	-0.018***	-0.019***	-0.011***	-0.010***	-0.015***	-0.013***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
rural	0.037***	0.034***	0.044***	0.043***	0.094***	0.086***	0.075***	0.069***
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.012)
Country fixed _effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Observations	12,014	12,014	11,610	11,610	13,238	13,238	13,108	13,108

Note: Clustered (at region level) standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.