

GOTHENBURG UNIVERSITY

Institution of political science

Campaigning with poetry, governing on prose

Experimental analyses of the effects of persuasive strategies in election campaigns, on fluctuation in political trust pre- and post-elections

Masters' Theses in Political Science, 30 hp
Autumn semester 2011
Elina Lindgren
Supervisor: Peter Esaiasson
Words: 16 165

Table of contents

Abstract

1. Introduction.....	5-6
2. Theory.....	6-7
2.1. Main premises.....	7-8
2.1.1. <i>Why use of persuasive strategies in election campaigns can be considered a possible explanation to the fluctuation in political trust from pre to post elections.....</i>	8-9
2.1.2 <i>Why parties use of persuasive strategies post-election can be considered to have alleviating effects on disappointment.....</i>	9-10
2.2. Predictions.....	10
2.3. Illustration of the theory.....	10-12
3. Research on political communication.....	13-14
4. Analytical framework.....	14
4.1. <i>Persuasive strategies.....</i>	15-16
4.1.2. <i>First-pattern methods: Persuasive terms.....</i>	16-17
4.1.3. <i>Second-pattern methods: Persuasive definitions.....</i>	17-18
4.1.4. <i>Additive strategies.....</i>	18
4.1.5. <i>Determinism.....</i>	19
5. Method.....	19-20
6. The experiment.....	20
6.1. <i>Experimental design.....</i>	20
6.2.1 <i>Variables.....</i>	20-21
6.2.2. <i>Control variables.....</i>	21
6.3. <i>Weaknesses.....</i>	21-22
6.4 <i>The stimuli.....</i>	22-23
6.4.1. <i>An ethical dilemma.....</i>	23-24
6.4.2. <i>Stimuli 1: Persuasive strategies pre-election.....</i>	24-26
6.4.3. <i>Stimuli 2: Persuasive strategies post-election.....</i>	26-28
6.4.4. <i>Post-experiment control.....</i>	29
7. Procedure.....	29-30
8. The experiment groups.....	30-31
9. Analyses and results.....	32
9.1. <i>H1: Persuasive strategies increase support and trust pre-election.....</i>	33
9.2. <i>H2: Negative information cause losses of support and trust post-election H3: Negative information cause losses of support and trust post-election to a higher degree if persuasive strategies were used pre-election.....</i>	34
9.3. <i>H4: Persuasive strategies post-election reduces losses of support and trust.....</i>	35
9.4. <i>H5: the effects of persuasive strategies post-election are weaker than the effects of persuasive strategies pre-election.....</i>	36
9.5. <i>H6: The effects of persuasive strategies post-election are weaker if persuasive strategies have been used pre-election.....</i>	36-37
9.6. <i>Summary: results H1 - H6.....</i>	38
9.7. <i>H7: Persuasive strategies increases fluctuation in political support from pre- to post-election.....</i>	39-41

9.8 <i>Summary: main findings</i>	41
10. Conclusions.....	41-43
11. Discussion.....	43-45
12. Future research.....	45-46
Appendix	

Tables and figures

Figure 1: <i>Predicted fluctuation from pre- to post-election</i>	12
Table 1: <i>Control of randomization</i>	31
Table 2: <i>The effects of persuasive strategies pre-election on voters' support and trust for Nya Partiet pre-election</i>	33
Table 3: <i>The effects of persuasive strategies pre-election on support and trust for Nya Partiet post-election</i>	34
Table 4: <i>The effects of persuasive strategies post-election on support and trust for Nya Partiet post-election</i>	35
Table 5: <i>The effects of strategies pre- and post- election, on support and trust for Nya Partiet post-election</i>	37
Table 6: <i>The effects of strategies on total fluctuation in trust and support from pre- to post-election</i>	40

Abstract

What accounts for fluctuation in political trust pre- and post-elections? The dynamic process of increased fluctuation in political trust around elections has been studied before, but the effects of persuasive strategies on this process have not yet been analyzed. In these theses I offer a theory to account for this process: that the fluctuation increases if parties' use persuasive strategies in election campaigns. Six hypotheses are put forward as arguments for the theory: *H1*) Parties' use of persuasive strategies pre-election generates more political support and trust than parties' use of non-persuasive strategies. *H2*) Negative information in media leads to losses of support and trust post-election. *H3*) Negative information in media causes higher losses if persuasive strategies were used pre-election. *H4*) Parties' use of persuasive strategies post-election reduces losses of support and trust. *H5*) Effects of persuasive strategies *post*-election are weaker than the effects of persuasive strategies *pre*-election. *H6*) Effects of persuasive strategies post-election are weaker if persuasive strategies have been used pre-election. These hypotheses reinforce the main hypothesis: *H7*) Fluctuation in political support and trust increases around elections, if political parties use persuasive strategies in the election campaign.

The results support four of the six first hypotheses, but disaffirm that persuasive strategies cause higher losses post-election, and that effects of persuasive strategies post-election are weaker if the strategies have been used pre-election. The empirical findings support the main hypothesis, that persuasive strategies increase fluctuation in support and trust pre- and post-election.

Key words: Persuasive strategies, political trust, political support, election campaigns, fluctuation

1. Introduction

In 2006, a Swedish conservative led coalition won the Swedish parliamentary election, replacing a long-term leftwing government. The rightwing party “Moderaterna” received strong support from voters, but shortly after the election the voters became disappointed. Opinion polls showed that a majority of the electorate supported the social democrats again. (Sifo: väljarbarometern, 2006, 2007). Despite this, in the election campaign of 2010 the voters became positive again, and the conservative government was reelected.

The example above visualizes a dynamic process of fluctuation in political trust from pre- to post-elections, a process that is frequently repeated in representative democracies. Adam Przeworski observes that voters, despite the fact that representative democracy inherits several limitations, generally have trust in the political system. According to Przeworski, the trust towards politicians and political parties tend to increase during election campaigns, a trust that turns into disappointment after the new government has been installed (Przeworski, 2009: 12, p. 71):

“Still, democracy incessantly rekindles our hope. We are perennially eager to be lured by promises, to put our stakes on electoral bets”. (Przeworski 2009: 12, p. 72)

In support of Przeworski’s observations, several systematic empirical studies find frequent evidence of a process of increased fluctuation in political trust from pre- to post-elections. Sören Holmberg, for example, pictures and analyses the process with case studies from Sweden (Holmberg 1999, p.110), and researchers such as Elin Naurin in Sweden and John Gastil in USA argues that people generally regard politicians as promise breaking (Naurin 2009, Gastil 2000). So why is this so? Why is this process repeated again and again? This is the question that drives these theses.

The theses offers a theory to account for the cyclical movements in fluctuation, but which instead of earlier research that offers post-election explanations¹ (Holmberg: 1999), also

¹ In “critical citizens” Holmberg discusses his results, and show that the political outcomes and economic situation post- election affects the trust, and that voters who evaluate public policies negatively post-election are more distrusting (Holmberg 1999, p. 114-115). With other words, the results indicate that short- term outcomes post- elections seem to have impact on post- election trust.

focuses on the pre-election functions in the process. The theory draws on philosophical theories of semantic strategies used in order to persuade an audience in ethical argumentation. The main presumption is that the fluctuation is driven by political rhetoric in election campaigns, and that the fluctuation increases if persuasive strategies are used. The prerequisite for this is that persuasive strategies increase support and trust pre-election, and that they in a second step decrease support and trust post-election. The argument for this is that parties' use of persuasive strategies in election campaigns increases voters' expectations and enthusiasm towards proposals to an extent that isn't realistic, and that the parties therefore "dig their own grave" concerning a stable support and trust.

If the decisions do not live up to the expectations that were generated before the election, the consequences would be disappointed voters post-election. If party's pre-election messages instead provide balanced information about the consequences of the proposal, it follows the theory that those parties' losses post-election would be smaller. In light of this theory, the parties face a trade-off. To win elections they need to persuade voters, but if they use persuasive strategies in the campaigns it might be to the cost of stable trust.

The theses start with a presentation of the theory. This section is followed by a short overview of previous research on rhetorical strategies, and a presentation of an analytical framework. The analytical framework follows by a presentation of the methods used and the experiment, and continues with analyses and conclusions. The empirical findings support the main hypothesis, that persuasive strategies increase fluctuation in support and trust from pre- to post-election, but the results disaffirm some of the other hypotheses.

2. Theory

The paper contributes to the research on political trust in the way that it uses semantic theories to explain the "mystery" of the dynamic fluctuation in political support and trust from pre- to post-election. The theory I offer is shortly that persuasive strategies in election campaigns increase the fluctuation around elections. The arguments behind this is that parties' use of certain rhetorical strategies in election campaigns increases voters' enthusiasm towards political proposals which generates support and trust pre-election, but causes losses of support and trust post-election. The theory does also suggest that the use of persuasive strategies post-election can reduce losses both for parties that used persuasive strategies pre-election and the ones that did not, but that the effects of persuasive strategies post-election are weaker than

what are the effects of persuasive strategies pre-election. The theory does manifest a dilemma for the parties: should they be vote-maximizers in first hand, or focus on getting loyal and trusting voters? According to the theory, what the persuasive parties gain in vote's pre-election - they will lose in trust post-election. The Net Gains for using persuasive strategies pre-election is therefore considered to be more or less zero.

2.1. Main premises

The theory rests on economic theories of democracy and rational choice (Downs: 1957), and it presuppose that voters are rational, utility-maximizing and calculating individuals who can be assumed to evaluate parties through the information they receive in election campaigns (Downs, 1957, p. 46-47). Parties, on the other hand, have two basic contradictive interests to consider, between which they have to make a trade-off. First, they have to maximize votes before an election, which mean that they need to appeal to as many voters as possible in the campaign. At the same time, they need loyal and trustful voters in a long term perspective (Downs, 1957), which prerequisite informative and realistic pledges (to prevent post-election disappointment). The vote winning aspect in political competition "forces" the political parties to "sell in" their proposals to the electorate before an election. If voters are rational and calculating, they can be considered to evaluate the different proposals from what personal gain these would generate. The party that wins the majority of the votes can therefore be assumed to be the party that most successfully sold in their pledges. My suggestion is that this will be to the cost of a stable trust.

I do theoretically suggest that the purpose of using persuasive strategies would be to vote maximize by generating support and trust pre-election, and that the strategies therefore also can be considered a possible explanation to the positive "trust-curve" pre-election.

If voters' post-election becomes exposed to negative information about the outcomes of a policy which they were not informed of when they voted, they can be assumed to feel disappointment. It would also be reasonable to believe, that the more enthusiasm the voters felt towards the proposal pre-election, the bigger will their disappointment be. Because of this, the theory does also suggest that persuasive strategies in election campaigns can explain the *negative* trust-curve post-election.

To be able to distinguish possible effects of persuasive strategies, I compare those effects to the effects of a non-persuasive strategy. The main prediction is that non-persuasive strategies

generates less enthusiasm pre-election, and therefore as a consequence also less disappointment post-election. A non persuasive strategy pre-election can therefore be considered as less effective in a vote-winning aspect, but more effective concerning the second goal, a stable and long term trust.

The theory is further developed to account for effects of use of persuasive strategies post-election. Post-election, persuasive strategies are assumed to be used in order to defend policies against negative information, and to reduce losses of support and trust. I theorize that the use of persuasive strategies post-election can alleviate the negative trust-curve post-election, though not avert it. The argument for this is that it should be more difficult to convince voters that a proposal is good, when they have been exposed to negative outcomes.

2.1.1 Why use of persuasive strategies in election campaigns can be considered a possible explanation to the fluctuation in political trust from pre to post elections.

The rhetorical strategies I suggest as explanation to the fluctuation in political trust from pre to post-election, is grounded in moral philosophical and social psychological theories of the meaning of language in ethical argumentation. These theories builds on a power perspective, and the standpoint is that the strategies are consciously used, by politicians and others, to change and redirect people's attitudes towards issues. With other words: "they are used as a tool to win an argumentation with ethical arguments" (Walton 2001 p. 37, Stevenson 1944 p. 243-252).

My conjecture is that these persuasive strategies would be effective tools for political parties to "sell in" pledges and win votes. The strategies allow politicians to rhetorically "hide" negative aspects of their decisions, and at the same time exaggerate enthusiasm. Therefore they would be especially useful in election campaigns where they can be used in order to persuade the voters' to vote for the certain party. I will later in the paper simply call these strategies for **P**.

If parties' campaigns with strategies that conceal negative aspects of their proposals, there is a risk that the voters will consider them as promise breaking post-election if they, as mentioned earlier, becomes exposed to information they regard as negative. The more persuasive rhetoric pre-election, the more effort would it require for the parties to live up to the expectations post-election.

The most successful strategy for achieving the second main goal, stable support and trust, would according to the previous argumentation therefore instead be to use a non-persuasive language, **N**, pre-election.

As a non-persuasive strategy, I refer to a strategy that means that the parties instead of “hiding” negative consequences of political proposals present them in an informative/realistic way, in which they are open with consequences that can be considered as negative. This strategy would as contrary to persuasive strategies be used in order to “convince” – not persuade or “over-speak”, the voters that positive effects of the certain policies are more important than possible negative aspects.

2.1.2 Why parties use of persuasive strategies post-election can be considered to have alleviating effects on disappointment.

I develop the theory above further by taking the effects of use of persuasive strategies post-election into account, which I from now on will refer to as (**P**), to explain the fluctuation in support and trust.

Holmberg (1999), examine possible post-election outcomes as explanation to the fluctuation, and his results indicate that what citizens´ regard as negative consequences post-election causes distrust. The theory in this paper suggests that pre-election factors are the main driving force, but it prerequisite the earlier findings of post-election consequences: that the trust declines post-election because of disappointment of outcomes of the proposal, put forward by the media. If there aren´t any consequences that the voters regard as negative, they wouldn´t become disappointed.

The main theory is that **P** are effective tools in election campaigns to vote maximize, but that this aggravates long term support and trust. I will now argue that these strategies can be used by politicians also post-election, to persuade voters that their policies are for the best. This time, the purpose would instead be to achieve the second rational choice goal, stable support and trust. The strategies are used to “justify” policy-outcomes, and defend them against negative critic. I argue that the most useful strategies post-election differs partly from the ones used pre-election. This will be discussed further in next section.

To be able to distinguish possible effects of persuasive strategies post-election, I do again compare the effects to the effects of a non-persuasive strategy. With the non-persuasive strategy, the party “confesses” that some of the consequences are negative, but try to convince

the voters that the positive consequences of the outcomes overshadow the negative. I will in the following sections refer to the post-election strategies to (P) respectively (N).

2.2. Predictions

The theory above leaves the parties with four different strategic options: **P(P)**, **P(N)**, **N(P)** and **N(N)**. The parties that choose to use persuasive strategies both pre- and post-election **P(P)**, wants to “have one cake and eat it too”. Their first priority is the first rational choice goal, to maximize their votes in elections. After the election, they also seek to uphold the second goal, a stable trust, and they use persuasive strategies again. This time they use them to “defend” their actions and alleviate disappointment. The parties that choose the second strategy **P(N)** concerns mainly about the first goal, to win votes. After they’ve won the election, they don’t put energy in keeping the voters trust to the same amount as do the **P(P)** party. The party that choose to use non-persuasive strategies pre-election and persuasive strategies post-election **N(P)** focuses on the second goal, to keep a stable trust. Before the election they use a language which the voters’ want misunderstand, and they present non-persuasive information. Since the voters are informed about more of the consequences before they vote, they want become as disappointed if they are exposed to negative information post-election. To further keep the trust, the party do also use persuasive strategies post-election, to convince the voters that their choices was good, necessary and for the best purpose. The argument for using the final strategy **N(N)** would be the same as for using **N(P)**. The rationality for using this strategy would be to use a sincere, non-selling strategy to generate stable trust in a long term perspective. It can also be the case that the party is doing so fine according to the opinion polls so they can afford to lower the expectations little to gain in long term².

2.3. Illustration of the theory – *predicted gains and losses of persuasive strategies pre- and post-election*

The figure below is a simple illustration of the theory, and the predicted gains and losses of persuasive strategies. The Y-axis measures political support and trust, and the X-axis shows time-points in the electoral process. On the middle of the X-axis there is a line that symbolizes “negative information”, which is considered to be the trigger to disappointment post- election.


² This was the case in the Swedish general election 1994, which often are referred to as the “crises-election”. The social democrats, who had a great advantage in the public opinion, did then chose to put forward proposals about cutting down the budget, to reduce the voters expectations (Premfors, 1998)

On the left side of the figure the predicted effects of **P** on political support and trust pre-election is shown, compared to **N**. This side symbolizes the election-day, in which as one can see, the support and trust is higher when **P** is used. The trigger to disappointment, negative information, is considered to happen a time after the election.

The right side of the figure shows the predicted losses of support and trust post-election for persuasive strategies compared to non-persuasive strategies. Since I extended the theory to also account for the effects of use of (P) post- election, I have on the right side of the figure presented the predicted gains and losses of the four combinations of strategies pre- and post-election on post-election support and trust. The first (bold) capital letters stands for pre-election strategy, the second (pale) letter in parenthesis stands for post-election strategy. According to the theory, the use of persuasive strategies post-election reduces losses of support and trust, though these effects are weaker than the effects of **P** pre-election. This is shown in the figure in the way that the distances between **N(P)** and **N(N)**, and **P(P)** and **P(N)** post-election are smaller than the distance between **P** and **N** pre-election. The last hypothesis is that the effects of persuasive strategies post-election are stronger if a party used a non-persuasive strategy pre-election. This can be distinguished in the figure by a comparison between the distance between **N(P)** and **N(N)**, and the distance between **P(P)** and **P(N)**.

Finally it should be mentioned that **P** and **N** symbolizes parties for which the rhetorical strategies are the only thing that differs. They both start on zero, and their proposals are the same. The same goes for the four post-election combinations **N(P)**, **N(N)**, **P(P)** and **P(N)**, where the negative critic against the decision is equal.

Figure 1: Predicted fluctuation from pre- to post-election



The theory can be summarized into the following hypotheses

H1) Parties' use of persuasive strategies pre-election generates more political support and trust than parties' use of non-persuasive strategies.

H2) Negative information in media, about the outcomes of the proposals, leads to losses of support and trust post-election.

H3) Negative information in media causes higher losses if persuasive strategies were used pre-election.

H4) Parties' use of persuasive strategies post-election reduces losses of support and trust post-election.

H5) Effects of persuasive strategies *post*-election are weaker than the effects of persuasive strategies *pre*-election.

H6) Effects of persuasive strategies post-election is weaker if persuasive strategies have been used pre-election.

H7) Persuasive strategies in election campaigns increase the fluctuation in political support and trust pre- and post-election.

3. Research on political communication in political science

Previous researchers in political science have studied the psychological effects of *framing* on people's perception of messages in media and political campaigns, and several studies shows that people tend to perceive and evaluate issues in accordance to how they are framed (Tversky and Kahneman 1981, Entman 1993, Iyengar 2010, Druckman and Chong 2007). In political science, the term framing does usually allude that logically equivalent information is presented in different lights (in a negative or positive way), such as: "Women's salary is now 90 percent of men's for the same job", compared to: "women's salary are still ten percent lower than men's for the same job". It can also mean a focus on one of two potential qualitatively different considerations concerning an issue, such as freedom or equality (Druckman and Chong 2001 and 2004, Tversky and Kahneman 1987).

According to Druckman and Chong (2007), there hasn't been much attention given in research to similarities and differences between framing and persuasive strategies. In both research on framing and persuasive strategies there is a basic underlying understanding that the strategies affects the listeners' attitudes towards the issues at question. A main difference that I experience between the two concepts of framing and persuasive strategies is that persuasive methods aim to change or redirect people's *beliefs* about certain issues. The strategies do therefore often include that the content of a term is *changed*. Framing is instead a way of *giving weight* to some arguments rather than others, by focusing on specific parts of issues and arguments, which leads the listeners to consider those arguments as the most important. This is in accordance to findings stressed by Nelson and colleagues (1997, p: 235-236), who argues that framing effects differ from persuasive strategies since they doesn't focus on changing believes but to point out the importance of peoples' already existing beliefs.³

³ I consider both strategies of framing and persuasion as important in political rhetoric. To be successful, politicians have to persuade the voters that their proposal is "good" and positive. They also need to convince the voters that the arguments in the proposal are of great importance and more important than

Some researchers on framing distinguish between “strong” and “weak” frames, where strong frames have the most meaningful impact on people’s attitudes. The strength increases if the frame is connected to a positive emotion or value that is generally accepted among the citizens (Druckman and Chong 2010 p. 116-117, and Shaffner et al 2010 p. 125-126), and which frame that can be considered strong does therefore vary, dependent of the audience and the context by which the audience are surrounded. The emotive meaning is in this light used as *a reason* for an argument. An example can be: “High taxes will lead to a more **“just”** society”. Since taxes are presented as equal to justice, the frame implicates that taxes should be evaluated as something good. I argue that the psychological mechanisms that are suggested to make a frame “strong”, the appeal to peoples’ emotions, are equal to the main mechanisms that are used in persuasive strategies. Strong frames can therefore be compared to what in political and ethical philosophy has been called “first-pattern methods”. These strategies can shortly be described as a strategy that uses general terms with strong emotive meaning in order to redirect people’s attitudes. These strategies will be defined further in next section.

Finally, the methods in studies of framing are mainly inductive and explorative, and the effects and strength of different existing frames on people are mostly empirically examined. To get a more theoretical understanding I chose to use persuasive strategies in the following experiment, since the research on persuasive strategies are mainly theoretical.

4. Analytical framework

This section presents an analytical framework that will be the tool for a construction of four fictive political messages, used as stimuli in the following experiment. The stimuli are used in order to measure the effects of persuasive strategies on voters support and trust for a party pre- and post-election. As framework I have used the political philosopher Charles Stevenson’s theoretical methods for persuasion that he presents in his book “Ethics and

other competing issues. I try to picture this with an example: If there is a political argumentation with two competing perspectives about the construction of a new freeway, one economical and one environmental, a successful “economic framing” -effect would lead the voters to regard the economical consequences as most important when they evaluate the parties’ proposals. With a successful persuasive strategy, the party that would win the argumentation would be the ones that succeed to make the voters evaluate one of the issues as the most morally good, or the one with the most positive consequences. With the use of the persuasive strategies they can change the voters’ attitudes towards the perspective, for example they can with the use of emotive terms persuade the voters that the **economical** arguments are “bad” and lead to negative consequences.

language”, which is basically a presentation of different methods/strategies for ethical argumentation and persuasion.

4.1. *Persuasive strategies*

When referring to persuasive methods in political communication, researchers can be suggested to mean methods of using words and the language, to influence, change and redirect people’s attitudes towards certain issues. Eduard Schiappa for example writes that “many arguments concerning definitions can be rhetorically analyzed”. (Schiappa, 2003 p. 3) He points at two parts of rhetorical analysis, first that it focuses on persuasion through symbolic means and the influence that symbols have on people. Second that it investigates how some persons persuade others with the use of one definition to the advantage of another. (Schiappa, 2003 p. 4)

Since persuasive strategies are semantically bounded, the definitions of words and terms play an essential part. The literature distinguishes between a definitions descriptive and emotive meaning.

Persuasive definitions does usually have a strong emotive meaning that consists, even when the terms descriptive meaning changes. “Democracy” should be a good example of a term with a strong positive emotive meaning, while “oppression” has strongly negative associations. Because of the terms strong emotive meanings, people usually accept or reject them independent of/without asking for, the descriptive meaning. (Stevenson: 1944, Aomi: 1985). I take an example when a policy tool aiming to split up the parental leave is discussed. The tool consists of a rule saying that a certain percent of the allowance are tied to the father. A term with a strong emotive meaning, such as “equality”, can be used to make voters positive towards the policy. As an argument against the policy one can say that it derogates “individual freedom”. The policy will then probably be associated to something negative.⁴

⁴ The strength of persuasive definitions can be explained further by taking into account that/if there exists a common public assumption of essentialism: the idea that every term has a fixed essence and that there is only one “true” definition of a term. (Walton 2001, p. 9). Walton illuminates the strength of this assumption with an eloquent example. The example is taken from an election pledge by Ronald Reagan. In the example, Reagan gives a pledge before the election, which he later change by redefining the content of two essential terms used in the pledge. He begins his pledge with promising a social security fund that will provide a safety net for the “truly needy”. When he later during the period wants to cut the program, he changes the definitions of *truly needy* and *safety net*. Because of the redefinitions of the terms, he didn’t have to say that he broke a promise. For those who listened, the pledge sounded the same. He would still provide a safety net for those who were “truly needy”. Only this was not the case, the safety net and the “truly needy” did no longer mean the same. (Walton 2001, p. 122)

Next section presents the main persuasive strategies which I use in the following experiment. It should be pointed out that the strategies presented below are oversimplified, and can therefore not be totally compared to the persuasive strategies presented by Stevenson. They are also to some extent accommodated to suit my analyses, and partly used in other ways than what Stevenson suggests in his book. Readers should be reminded that not all definitions are persuasive or used in order to change or redirect attitudes. For example, scientific definitions should be distinguished from political and ethical arguments. The difference from a persuasive definition is that the tendency for persuasion is diminutive, and also because it would be done by *reasoning*, not because of emotive or ethical judgments'. (Stevenson, 1944 p. 282-290)

The strategies

Stevenson does theoretically distinguish between two main patterns of persuasive methods, which he simply calls the first- and the second-pattern methods. My idea is that politicians mainly use first pattern strategies in election campaigns, and that the second pattern strategies are used post-election in order to “defend” the actions taken.

4.1.2. First-pattern methods: Persuasive terms

The first pattern method does basically mean the use of “persuasive terms”. Persuasive terms have a strong emotive meaning, but they are vague and the descriptive meaning is not specified. The emotive meaning does also remain even though the descriptive meaning varies, and such a terms emotive meaning can therefore be regarded as independent of the descriptive one. (Stevenson, 1944, chapter 5) I consider this strategy to be useful when a persuader wants to “hide” certain aspects of an action/proposal that might be perceived as negative.

Democracy, freedom, dictatorship and moral obligation are examples of persuasive terms. They have strong emotive associations, and they can be defined in many different ways. If the descriptive meaning is not closely specified, the audience can be considered to interpret the term due to their subjective comprehension, or to the general definition used in the social context by which they are surrounded. (Stevenson, 1944, chapter 5)

I suggest that first-pattern definitions could be successfully used by politicians in election campaigns to persuade voters to support policy-proposals. The strategy makes it possible for the politicians to “hide” less affirmative consequences. Since the term is not closely defined

before the election, the politicians can specify what they mean and even change the descriptive meaning during the mandate period, without risking to breaking any promises. I give an example from a Swedish context:

Sweden has a political context which is characterized by “social democratic movements” and ideas about common welfare. The term “labor party” is traditionally defined as a party that works for strengthening the workers’ rights. Voters can therefore be expected to in first hand associate labor-market policies with for example inventions of laws for strengthening protection of employments, laws that strengthens the influence of workers unions etc. Today other parties have started to use the term in their political rhetoric in other ways than this traditional one, and the descriptive meaning of the term has become extended. Before the parliamentary election of 2006 and 2010, a Swedish conservative party “moderaterna” used the term in their pledges, and they also called themselves for “the *new* labor party”. The descriptive meaning of the terms “new labor party” is quite vague, and “moderaterna” did neither pinned down more closely what they meant. The term was in other words open for interpretations, and it would be likely that some of the voters interpreted it in the “traditional” social democratic way. After the election of 2006, voters were able to distinguish the *new* descriptive meaning of the term, and some of its consequences. “Moderaternas” descriptive meaning was for example “*a party that provides job opportunities*”. The protection of workers’ rights that were earlier associated with the term has been more of a second-order preference. Seen in the light of Stevenson’s theories, Moderaterna used a first-pattern strategy. **1.** The term was at first hand emotive, and it was vague and open for different interpretations. **2.** They used a term, *labor party*, which in a Swedish context has a strong emotive meaning, and can be suggested to generally give positive associations. **3.** They didn’t clarify the descriptive meaning before the election. Finally, it did also turned out to be effective, since the party won the election.

Further, the first pattern methods do also include ***Metaphors***. Metaphors are usually strongly emotively associated, at the same time their descriptive meaning is very vague, which means that they are much open for interpretations. As an example, Stevenson uses the phrase: “*prisoned inside the grey wall of the pale public opinion*”. (Stevenson, 1944 p. 142-144)

4.1.3. Second-pattern methods: Persuasive definitions

A term is called a persuasive *definition* when a person use a persuasive term and connect it to a certain descriptive meaning, in order to change and redirect peoples' attitudes. In this pattern, the emotive meaning of the term is tied to a certain descriptive meaning, and it is therefore no longer open for interpretations. (Stevenson 1944:211) It lies in the nature of persuasive terms that people tend to keep their positive or negative attitudes towards it even though the descriptive meaning varies (the term is "good" or "bad" in itself). This means that people can be "forced" to reject an old descriptive meaning for the success of a newer one, if the hearer is convinced that the term is connected to that certain descriptive meaning that the persuader wants it to be. (Stevenson 1944, chapter 9).⁵

My hypothesis is that second pattern strategies can be used in political rhetoric both before and after political elections. It differs from first pattern methods, because it is used to "force" the voters to become positive towards a certain descriptive meaning of a term, which is specified in a proposal. By using a term with a strong moral and ethical emotive meaning, such as *freedom, justice, democracy, equality*, the voters are "forced" to accept any descriptive meaning of the term that the politicians present. This method appeals to the voters' consciousness, since a person who vote against the proposal would have to face her-/himself as a person with low moral principles. Many voters would most likely feel unwilling to vote in a way that would define them as *anti-democrats, to be against freedom, against justice, for oppression of minority-groups* and so on.

After the election, the strategies can be used to justify the consequences of a policy. Specifically it would be useful to justify actions towards which the voters are disappointed, convincing them that this was what the politicians said already in the pledge and therefore also what they themselves voted for.

4.1.4. Additive strategies

Except for the two main strategies presented above, I have chosen to use three more strategies. The first two are additive, which means that they are used to increase the persuasiveness of persuasive definitions and terms. The first strategy is **Additive words**, which are connected to persuasive definitions simply to make the term even more persuasive (Walton, 2001, p. 120). Examples of additive words are *truly, remarkable* and *very*. The

⁵ To judge if a definition is persuasive or not, it is important to take into account the context in which the definition is used. If the term is not emotively associated in the certain context, does not have an emotive meaning, it can't be used for persuasion.

second additive strategy is to use *Multiple persuasions*. This means that several vague terms with emotive meaning are used for the same persuasion. (Stevenson, 1944, p. 241)

4.1.5. Determinism - unavailability

The last of Stevenson's strategies that I am going to use is the strategy to use arguments referring to determinism. The use of the term "unavoidable" is, according to Stevenson, more or less generally accepted as *a reason* for an action. An avoidable action can be controlled by ethical judgments', because the actor "had a choice". Unavoidable actions cannot be, because whichever ethical judgments' there are, it doesn't matter because the actor *didn't* have a choice. (Stevenson, 1944, p. 310-318) Arguments in political rhetoric referring to "unavailability" and that "there are no other choices or alternatives", can be used as justifications for actions both before and after elections. Before elections they can be used to convince the voters to accept the proposal with the argument that because a certain development in a political area is determined, the politicians don't have any other choice than to act in this certain way. After the election it can be used to justify the decision against negative information – "*we had no choice*", or "*it would have happened sooner or later anyway*".

5. Method

To examine the effects of persuasive strategies I rely on the experimental method. I chose to do an experiment, since this enable an empirical comparison of the effects of persuasive and non-persuasive strategies.

According to Druckman and Chong, there are three standard methods for how to measure the magnitude of the impact of framing on public opinion. The first method is to compare the impact of two competing frames. The second alternative is to measure to which amount persons are influenced by frames, depending on how close to their own preferences the frames are. The third standard method is to use control groups that are provided with descriptive information, which mean scores are compared with the ones of the group that are exposed to the frames examined. (Druckman and Chong (2001), p. 109) I regard the third standard method to be most suitable for this experiment.

The main advantage with using a quantitative and experimental method in this study is that it can give indications of whether there are *general tendencies* that persuasive strategies increase fluctuation. This kind of experiment should also reflect a rather realistic election campaign, where voters in first hand communicate with politicians through short pledges in flyers, brochures and on television. A weakness with the use of an experimental method is that the results cannot be generalized to a larger population, since the participation is voluntary and therefore not representative. Another main weakness would be that an experiment is constructed; it is a simplified “ideal-type” situation, which can never be completely translated to the much more complex reality. If the experiment is well conducted, it should though be possible to show indications of patterns that can be interesting to analyze further.

6. The experiment

6.1. Experimental design

In experimental studies of framing effects it is common to use “real” frames. These are often frames that are found for example by counting key-words (Kellstedt 2003, and Shah et al 2002) in existing political campaigns or in news media (Arnold et. Al 1998, Gamson and Modigliani 1987 and 1989, Brewer 2003, Druckman and Chong, 2001).

For this experiment I did instead chose to create *fictive* stimuli's. I didn't consciously use existing persuasive strategies, but relied strictly on the semantic and ethic theories. This since the purpose is deductive, to test a theory of the effects of the certain theoretical strategies. The design used was a 2x2 factorial design, which basically mean that the participants are exposed to one of two different treatments at two times, to which they are responding separately. The effects of the persuasive stimuli are measured by a comparison to two non-persuasive stimuli.

6.2.1. Variables

The focal independent variables are “Pre-election strategies” and “Post-elections strategies”. These variables consist of two values, 1=persuasive strategies pre- respectively post-election, 0=non-persuasive strategies pre- respectively post-election, and it measures what stimuli the respondents in the experiment have been exposed to pre-election and post-election. They are both recodes of a variable called “experiment-group”, which consists of the values of the four different experiment-groups, **P(P)**, **P(N)**, **N(P)**, **N(N)**.

There are also four focal dependent variables. “Support pre-election” is measured by the question “*Given the information you have now, what is the probability that you will vote for Nya Partiet?*” which is asked after the respondents have taken part of the pre-election stimuli. “Trust pre-election” is operationalized by the questions “*Given the information you have now, what is your attitude towards Nya Partiet?*” and “*Given the information you have now, how big is your trust for Nya Partiet?*”, which are also asked after the respondents have taken part of the pre-election stimuli. “Support post-election” and “Trust post-election” are operationalized by the same types of questions, though they are asked after the participants have read the post-election stimuli.⁶

6.2.2. Control variables

To make sure that any effects of persuasive strategies on political support and trust would not actually be due to other factors, I did in the questionnaire asked questions which could be used to measure alternative explaining factors within the respondents. To control for the effects of these variables, I did a randomization-control. The control-variables I chose to use are gender, age, education, place of residence, political interest and general political trust. These are all examples of variables that are commonly used as control-factors in research on political trust.

The variable that measures “place of residence” is used because the political proposal concerns a city project, where there are tradeoffs in the budget between the inner-city and other areas. I do therefore regard it as important to control for the randomization of this factor, since the question whether a respondent live in the inner-city or not could affect their attitude towards the certain proposal.

Finally I used two variables that measures “Enthusiasm pre-election” and “Enthusiasm post-election”. Those are used to control if the persuasive stimuli worked as they should. The persuasive stimuli are supposed to exaggerate enthusiasm, and if they don’t I should consider the operationalization of the strategies as failed/weak. The variables are operationalized by the questions “*Given the information you have now, what is your attitude towards the proposal?*”, and “*Given the information you have now, how big is your trust for Nya Partiet?*”.

⁶ For more information about the operationalization of the variables, see appendix.

6.3. Weaknesses

Chong and Druckman (2001) shows that voters tend to focus on the most recent messages they've been exposed to, when there are different messages presented in different time periods. When different messages instead are presented at the same time, as before an election by competing parties, the framing effects can be reduced since they "take out" the effect of one another. This theses' exercises an experiment where respondents are exposed to only one political proposal. The fact that voters in reality are exposed to competing proposals' might decrease the effects of persuasive strategies in a real election process. Considering this, even if the experiment shows significant effects of persuasive strategies on political trust, this might not be the case in a real political environment.

To be able to examine the effects of persuasive strategies on fluctuation in political support and trust pre- and post-election, it was necessary to measure the attitudes before and after one election. Because of this, the suggested time period from when the first stimuli is supposed to take place and the time in which the second stimuli is written, cannot be longer than three years (when the new campaign starts). It would be realistic to assume that the fictive proposal that is used as stimuli, in reality would need many more years to become fully implemented (which will become clear later). If the respondents take this into account, they might be less affected by the negative critic in the second stimuli. This problem could in hindsight have been adjusted by the use of a proposal with more short-term consequences.

A third weakness is that the participants are exposed to the second stimuli, negative information, directly after they've been exposed to the pre-election stimuli. In reality, this could take more than a year. This is important to consider when taking part of the results. Because the respondents are exposed to the negative information immediately, they will probably remember the first stimuli much better, which increases their possibilities to critically compare the information with the proposal.

6.4. The stimuli

The core linchpin for a successful experiment is good stimuli, and it is therefore important to put time on the creation of these, think them through and make a thorough pre-testing. To increase the possibilities to create strong stimuli, I conducted a pre-survey before starting the experiment. The pre-survey was conducted on 12 persons, and it made it possible to test the stimuli and the questionnaires. After the participants had responded, they were told that they had been participants in a pre-survey, and that all comments on the questionnaires would be

valuable. Most of them agreed to this, which gave great perspectives on the material and allowed me to improve both the stimuli and the questionnaire before conducting the experiment.

The first treatment was used to examine the second hypothesis, if persuasive strategies increase political support and trust pre-election. This stimuli (**P** = persuasive strategies) was presented as a political proposal written in the form of a “flyer”. The persuasive stimuli was compared to a control flyer (**N** = non-persuasive strategies), where the proposal was presented without persuasive strategies, but with the same information. The second treatment meant to measure both hypothesis 3, that persuasive strategies pre-election cause more disappointment post-election, and hypothesis 4, that persuasive strategies post-election alleviates disappointment and distrust. The prerequisite for hypotheses 3 and 4 was that the voters are exposed to negative information concerning the political decision post-election. Therefore I presented these stimuli’s as an article that provided negative information concerning the decision. To be able to measure the fourth hypothesis, that persuasive strategies post-election alleviates disappointment, I constructed one stimulus in which the politicians were allowed to “defend” their action with persuasive strategies (P), and one where they answered to the negative information without using the strategies (N). The information given in the two articles was, as in the flyer, descriptively equal.

To reduce the risk that the respondents would evaluate the proposal because of ideological beliefs (I didn’t control for the randomization here), I wanted to make stimuli’s that weren’t to obviously connect to a traditional left-right scale. I also wanted the proposal to be a “new” one, to reduce the risk that the respondents would already have formed opinions concerning the issue. I have therefore tried to use/create a proposal by which we haven’t seen much of the consequences, with other words a proposal that haven’t yet been implemented. Finally I wanted to make the proposal to sound as realistic as possible, since I think that this would increase the chance that the respondents consider the proposal more carefully. Therefore I chose to use an existing proposal as inspiration. The inspiration was taken from a local project in Gothenburg, concerning a major rebuilding of parts of the areas around a river which runs around the city (Göta Älv). This project is mostly a vision today and far from implemented, and therefore the respondents can be considered uninfluenced by already existing outcomes.

An ethical dilemma

The fact that the fictive proposals that constitute the two pre-election stimuli are similar to an existing political vision, inherits an ethical dilemma. To be able to test the theory, it was necessary to present negative information in the two post-election stimuli, and if the respondents associate the fictive stimuli-proposal to the real one, the negative information post-election might have negative effects on the respondents' attitudes towards the real political proposal. To reduce the risk that the voters would form negative attitudes towards the real proposal, I did from the beginning inform them that all the texts that they were going to read was fictive and constructed for this particular masters theses.

The Persuasive stimuli's, as they were used in the experiment, are presented below together with explanations of how the analytical framework is used and which of, where and how the persuasive strategies are included. I chose to present the stimuli in their original form and language, Swedish, and not to translate them. The reason for this is because the words that are used as strategies could have a slightly different meaning in English. To distinguish the strategies in the persuasive stimuli in the presentation below, all terms and sentences that was used in accordance to the analytical framework, is underlined. To clarify which strategy that has been used where, I have presented a short overview of the analytical framework, in which all the strategies has been given a number. In the following texts, these numbers are put within parentheses at the end of every strategy, so the reader can easily go back to the overview and compare the numbers from the texts to find what strategy that has been used. The stimuli's are presented two and two, where the non-persuasive flyer is placed beside the persuasive flyer, and the non-persuasive article beside the persuasive.

Analytical framework – overview

1. First- pattern methods
 - 1a. Persuasive terms
 - 1b. Metaphors
2. Second- pattern methods (persuasive definitions)
3. Additive strategies
 - 3a. Ad-words
 - 3b. Multiple persuasions
4. Determinism (unavoidability)

6.4.1. Stimuli 1: *Persuasive strategies pre-election*

Since this is a flyer in an election campaign, I have mainly used first-pattern strategies in the persuasive text, which I, as mentioned in the analytical framework, regard as most suitable in purpose to persuade an audience towards an action that hasn't yet been taken.

A political flyer must be convincing, trustful, realistic and make the audience enthusiastic, at the same time. Through the persuasive flyer I have used general persuasive terms in order to give the voters positive associations. These are for example: "we take *responsibility*", "work for a *sustainable development*" and "we will create an *including and united* city, with *plurality of people* and activities". These are all first-pattern persuasive terms, since their descriptive meaning is not defined.

I have also used multiple persuasions where the same or more or less synonymous persuasive terms are repeated, such as "*development*" and "*restart*". There are some persuasive metaphors, such as: "*get away from old patterns*", "*keep pace*" and "*build bridges*", and examples of additive words that are used is "*invaluable*" and "*truly*". Finally, the flyer ends with a deterministic argument: "*we cannot wait any longer!*"

Persuasive proposal: pre-election

Nya Partiet

Vi tar ansvar (1a) för en hållbar utveckling (1a)!

Centrala Flodstaden. I områdena runt Floden Lång finns en enorm (3a) potential till utveckling (1a) av vår stad (1a), och vi har därför utarbetat en vision om ett "Centrala Flodstaden", där områdena runt Floden förenas (1a). Projektet kommer att generera nya bostäder för 30 000 personer, vilket minskar bostadslösheten i vår stad med 60 procent. Dessa ska bestå av olika boendestandard för att möjliggöra för personer med olika ekonomisk och social bakgrund att bo centralt. (2) Projektet främjar också både privat och kommunal verksamhet, och kommer att skapa minst 40 000 nya arbetstillfällen. I den nya stadskärnan kommer också finnas fina parker, offentliga utrymmen och en välfungerande kollektivtrafik, som alla stadens invånare kan ta del av. (2).

Nya möjligheter. Projektet innebär en nystart (1a, 3b) för staden och områdena runt floden ges utrymme att blomstra (1a, 3b) och utvecklas (1a, 3b). För att skapa en trivsamt miljö kommer till exempel bullriga och störande industrier att flyttas till mindre befolkade områden. Projektet handlar inte främst om att främja kommunens ekonomi utan framförallt om att komma bort från gamla mönster (1b) och skapa en verkligt (3a) hållbar stadsutveckling (1a) med nya möjligheter (1a).

Vi vill bygga broar. (1b) Idag delas Flodstaden av Floden. Genom vårt projekt kommer staden att enas (1a, 3b), och vi får en verkligt (3a) inkluderande (1a, 3b) stad med mångfald (1a, 3b) av såväl människor som verksamheter. Demokratiskt (1a) fattade beslut och projekt som förankras i folkviljan (1a) leder till bäst resultat för staden, och alla invånare kommer därför att bjudas in till öppna möten med våra representanter där de kan delta och bidra med ovärderliga synpunkter.

Om Flodstaden ska kunna hålla jämna steg (1b) med den internationella utvecklingen börjar det dra ihop sig (1b) till förändring. Vi kan inte vänta längre! (4)

Non-persuasive proposal: pre-election

Nya Partiet

Vi skapar centrala flodstaden

Vi har utarbetat en vision om en ny Flodstad, något som vi kallar projektet ”Centrala Flodstaden”. Vi vill slå ihop områdena runt Floden Lång till ett nytt och ungefär fyra gånger så stort city, som ska bestå av blandstad med både boende och arbetsplatser, kommunal service och privata bolag.

Vi vill bygga nya bostäder för runt 30 000 personer, med olika boendestandard och pris. Vi vill också satsa på att skapa fina parker, offentliga utrymmen och en välfungerande kollektivtrafik, för att ge alla invånare möjlighet att ta del av den nya staden, oavsett social och ekonomisk bakgrund. Den nya staden ska också skapa 40 000 nya arbetsplatser genom främjande av företagande och kommunal verksamhet. Till förmån för detta kommer en del äldre industrier att få flytta och lägga ner sin verksamhet.

Finansieringen av projektet sker genom att en del pengar flyttas från planerad upprustning av områdena Innanför och Utanför, och genom ett ökat skattepåslag. Med tanke på de nya bostäder och arbetstillfällen som projektet skapar, anser vi detta fullt kompenserat.

Projektet ska också förankras och utvecklas bland stadens invånare, och berörda i områdena kommer att bjudas in till öppna möten med politiker och andra verksamma i projektet.

6.4.2. Stimuli 3: *Persuasive strategies post-election*

The two post-election stimuli are written as news articles, which gives information about outcomes of the proposal that should be regarded as negative for most people. The politicians from the governing party are responding to the critic in both of the articles.

According to the theory should the most useful strategies post-election be second-pattern. The purpose with using these strategies is in first hand to reduce losses of support and trust, and to defend the outcomes of the proposals against negative critic. They can also be used to persuade the voters that the party did what they promised pre-election, and sometimes also that the actions was unavoidable and out of the hands of the politicians.

Second-pattern strategies give, as was presented in the analytical framework, a descriptive meaning to emotive terms, in order to convince the audience that the descriptive information is “good”. An example of when a second-pattern strategy is used in the article is when Akselsson defend the party against the critic that the city has become more segregated. In the

flyer the party claimed that “the new residents they were going to build should be characterized by different economic standards, to make it possible for people from different social and economic backgrounds to live in the city”. To justify the outcome, Akselsson specifies what they meant with this part of the proposal. He says that even though they promised “different economic standard of the residences”, it was: “never the party’s intention that it should be “half and half”, and that “20 percent of the new residences is rented apartments”, he “regard as positive”. Since the descriptive meaning of the term was not specified before the election, it was possible for him to use the second-pattern method to justify the outcome.

Except for second-pattern strategies, “Multiple persuasions” are used several times, when the politicians repeat same terms that they used in the proposal pre-election (*including city, responsibility and sustainable development*). Also the strategy to use determinism as a reason for negative outcomes was used several times. First, Akselsson uses it to defend the party against the critic towards the increased segregation. His argument is that “it is *unavoidable* today, that there are more cooperative apartments build”. Later he does also use the strategy when he says that “the development was “*unavoidable*”, otherwise the city “*wouldn’t have been able to follow the international development*”, and they wouldn’t had a “*sustainable development*”. Finally he does also use a negative metaphor, that if the party wouldn’t have done what they did, the city should still have been “*stuck in old patterns*”.

Negative article with persuasive strategies: post-election

Centrala Flodstaden tre år efter valet



Centrala Flodstaden tre år efter att projektet dragits igång

För tre år sedan startades verkställandet av projektet Centrala Flodstaden. Projektet var tänkt som en del i utvecklingen av Flodstaden, med en breddad stadskärna, fler bostäder och ökad tillväxt. Vi har träffat Ulrica Lindholme och Ulf Akselsson från Nya Partiet, båda aktiva i utformningen av projektet.

Unikt försök. Enligt Lindholme är projektet ett av de största urbana projekten i modern tid. Närmast unikt menar hon, är också att visionsarbetet drivits genom en kontinuerlig dialog mellan medborgare och politiker (1a). Per-Åke Svahn från medborgarinitiativet ”bevara Hamnen” är dock av en annan åsikt, och menar att deltagarnas inverkan på utformningen varit ytterst marginell. Enligt Lindholme var tanken med dialogen att inspirera politiker och skapa ett utbyte av idéer, själva besluten poängterar hon, måste alltid göras av politiker och tjänstemän, då det är de som har den övergripande helhetsbilden av kommunen. (2)

Visionen var att bostäder för runt 30 000 människor skulle byggas, och redan har byggandet av 8000 nya boenden påbörjats, berättar Ulf Akselsson. I visionen ingick att dessa områden skulle karaktäriseras av olika boendestandard, för att möjliggöra för människor från skilda ekonomiska och sociala bakgrunder att flytta in. (1a)

Nätverket ”Flodstaden - lika för alla”, som sedan 1999 arbetar för integration i regionen, kritiserar dock projektet, och pekar på att 80 procent av de nya bostäderna är villor, hus och bostadsrätter, vilket innebär att endast 800 av de 4000 är hyresrätter. Som en konsekvens av detta är de flesta i områdena höginkomsttagare. Akselsson tycker inte att detta är något problem, då förutsättningen aldrig var att det skulle vara hälften/hälften (2). Att det byggs flera bostadsrätter än hyresrätter är oundvikligt (4) idag menar han, och att 20 procent av boendena avsatts till hyresrätter ser han som positivt. Dessutom har fina parker och andra offentliga utrymmen skapats samtidigt som kollektivtrafiken förbättrats, och detta menar han möjliggör för alla stadens invånare att ta del av det nya centrumet.

Flera mindre företag och äldre industrier i områdena har lagts ner eller flyttats i och med upprustningen. Enligt Svahn från medborgarinitiativet har många förlorat sina anställningar genom processen. Lindholme menar dock att de förlorade arbetstillfällena kompenseras av nya, och att projektet i framtiden kommer att leda till många fler.

Utvecklingen av Flodstaden var enligt Akselsson nödvändig (4) för att Flodstaden ska kunna följa med i en internationell utveckling (1a), komma bort från gamla mönster (1b) och få en hållbar stadsutveckling (1a). Arbetet med Flodstaden har bara börjat, och vad staden kommer att bjuda på i framtiden återstår att se.

Negative article with non-persuasive strategies: post-election

Centrala Flodstaden tre år efter valet



Centrala Flodstaden tre år efter att projektet dragits igång

För tre år sedan startades verkställandet av projektet Centrala Flodstaden. Projektet var tänkt som en del i utvecklingen av Flodstaden, med en breddad stadskärna, fler bostäder och ökad tillväxt. Vi har träffat Ulrica Lindholme och Ulf Akselsson från Nya Partiet, båda aktiva i utformningen av projektet.

Unikt försök. Enligt Lindholme är projektet ett av de största urbana projekten i modern tid, och har drivits genom en kontinuerlig dialog mellan medborgare och politiker. Per-åke Svahn från medborgarinitiativet ”Bevara Hamnen” är dock av en annan åsikt, och menar att deltagarnas inverkan på utformningen varit ytterst marginell. Lindholme medger detta, men poängterar samtidigt att sådana här beslut bör fattas av politiker och tjänstemän.

Visionen var att bostäder för runt 30 000 människor skulle byggas, och byggandet av 8000 nya boenden har nu påbörjats, berättar Ulf Akselsson. I visionen ingick att dessa områden skulle karaktäriseras av olika boendestandard, för att möjliggöra för människor från skilda ekonomiska och sociala bakgrunder att flytta in.

Nätverket ”Flodstaden – lika för alla”, som sedan 1999 arbetar för integration i regionen, kritiserar dock projektet, och pekar på att 80 procent av de nya bostäderna är villor, hus och bostadsrätter, vilket innebär att endast 800 av de 4000 är hyresrätter. Som en konsekvens av detta är de flesta i områdena höginkomsttagare. Akselsson tycker inte att detta är något problem, då förutsättningen aldrig var att det skulle vara hälften/hälften.

Flera mindre företag och äldre industrier i områdena har lagts ner eller flyttats i och med upprustningen. Enligt Svahn från medborgarinitiativet har många förlorat sina anställningar genom projektet. Lindholme beklagar detta, men tror fortfarande att projektet på sikt kommer att leda till en bättre arbetsmarknad.

Enligt Akselsson har arbetet med projektet Centrala Flodstaden bara börjat. Vad staden kommer att bjuda på i framtiden återstår att se.

6.4.3. Control of the stimuli

To test whether the persuasive stimuli increased enthusiasm compared to the non-persuasive stimuli, I conducted two independent-sample t-tests⁷, with the dependent variables “*level of enthusiasm for the proposal*” pre- respectively post-election (scales that ranges between 0-1), and the independent variables “*strategies pre- respectively post-election*”.

The first analysis showed that the groups that were exposed to the persuasive stimuli pre-election was more enthusiastic towards the proposal pre-election (mean=0.77) than the ones who were exposed to the non-persuasive stimuli (mean=0.65). The effect size in terms of d was rather strong, 0.67, and the t-test showed significant differences between **P** and **N** ($t = -5.171$, $df = 237$, $p .000$, two-tailed). The second test showed that the groups that were exposed to a persuasive stimuli post-election also were more enthusiastic (mean=0.55) than the ones who were exposed to a non-persuasive stimuli (mean=0.48). The t-test showed that the differences between **P** and **N** were significant ($t = -2.453$, $df = 237$, $p .015$), and the effect size was $d = 0.32$, which is over the critical value of 0.2. From these results I draw the conclusions that the stimuli has worked as intended.

7. Procedure

To estimate a suitable number of respondents, I used the answers from a pre-survey on 12 persons. Because the effects in the pre-analyses turned out to be quite small, I decided to use a relatively large sample in the main survey (60 persons in each group, a total of 240 persons). This would increase the possibilities to get significant results, and reduce the risk of accepting a false Null hypothesis.

To be able to reach a diverse composition of respondents, I chose to conduct the experiment on the central station in Gothenburg. To increase the chance to get a randomized sample, I

⁷ Independent-sample t-tests are used to find out if the differences between two independent groups mean scores are significant. The critical t-value is determined from outside the chosen level of significance, and the number of degrees of freedom (number of observations-1). The t-value and the degrees of freedom (df) are in next hand used to calculate whether the differences between the groups are significant or not. The d -value can be seen as comparable to eta square in an ANOVA analysis. This value is used as a measure of the effect size of the stimuli, or more exactly, it gives a measure of the extent to which the mean scores for the two stimuli differ in terms of standard deviation. The spss-output does not provide a d -value, but it is possible to calculate this by using the mean standard deviations for the two groups. With the standard deviations for the two groups, it is possible to calculate the overall mean standard deviation. To do this, one should add the mean standard deviation for one of the groups to the other, and then divide this value by 2. By the mean standard deviation, it is then possible to count the d -value. The formula for counting the d -value is: $d = (x_1 - x_2) / \text{Mean SD}$, (d = the mean score of variable 1 subtracted with the mean score of variable 2, divided by the mean standard deviation). A d -value on 0.5 is considered rather strong, 0.8 is considered as strong, and values below 0.2 is considered as very small.

asked every person that I passed by if they wanted to participate, and I did also use a randomization chart in excel to randomize the groups.

The participants were asked if they wanted to participate in a study by answering a questionnaire, which would be the material to a master's theses about political communication. They were not informed about the fact that I conducted an experiment. The process of collecting material was rather frictionless, and I would estimate that 2 of 3 agreed to participate. My experience was that most of the ones that chose to participate appreciated it, and many of them were asking questions and wanted to discuss the proposals and share own experiences after they've finished the questionnaires.

The experiment started with an introduction questionnaire, in which the study was presented, and the respondents were informed about the conditions for their participation. They were told that they could choose to quit at any time, and that their answers was anonymous. The questionnaire continued with questions that aimed to measure control-factors. After the introduction questionnaire was completed, I introduced the respondents to the first stimuli which were followed by the second questionnaire. In this questionnaire I asked questions about support and trust for the party, and enthusiasm for the proposal, given the information in the flyer. The second step was to see what happened *after* the policy was implemented. The participants were then exposed to the second treatment – negative information, which followed by the third questionnaire in which they were asked the same questions, now given the information in the second stimuli. Finally they were asked to answer two concluding open question, were they could evaluate the stimuli with their own words.

8. The experiment groups

The participants were divided into four different groups, who were all exposed to the strategies in different combinations. These were: 1= persuasive stimuli pre-election and persuasive stimuli post-election **P(P)**, 2= persuasive stimuli pre-election and non-persuasive stimuli post-election **P(N)**, 3=non-persuasive stimuli pre-election and persuasive stimuli post-election **N(P)** and 4= non-persuasive stimuli pre-election and non-persuasive stimuli post-election **N(N)**.

Frequency analyses of the control-variables shows an overweight of people under 66, and persons with University-graduation, town-residents and politically interested. Except for this, the participants are rather equable distributed concerning age, gender and political trust.

To get a perspective on the group composition in this self-selected sample, I compared the descriptive to a sample that can be considered as more representative, the sample of 2010 “riks-SOM”-survey⁸ from Gothenburg University. The main differences as I experience, is that the level of education among the participants are more evenly distributed in SOM 2010, there are more persons over 50 and there are more people who comes from the suburbia or smaller municipalities than bigger cities. (For more information about the descriptive, see table 1 in appendix).

A control for the randomization showed that there are no significant differences between the four groups concerning the control factors, and the randomization seems to have turned out well. The variation in the dependent variables can therefore be considered as due to the stimuli.

Table 1: Control of randomization.

Control factors (number of participants)	Mean scores in every group				Grand mean (n)	P	F-quota (df)
	P(P)	P(N)	N(P)	N(N)			
Gender	1.51 (59)	1.50 (60)	1.52 (60)	1.45 (60)	1.49 (239)	0.962	0.1 (3)
Age	1.97 (59)	1.97 (60)	1.97 (60)	1.90 (60)	1.95 (239)	0.888	0.21 (3)
Level of education	3.41 (59)	3.22 (60)	3.48 (60)	3.17 (60)	3.32 (239)	0.208	1.53 (3)
Residence	2.85 (59)	2.67 (60)	2.77 (60)	2.57 (60)	2.71 (239)	0.662	0.53 (3)
Political interest	2.39 (59)	2.23 (60)	2.37 (60)	2.27 (60)	2.31 (239)	0.527	0.74 (3)
Political trust	3.05 (59)	2.73 (60)	2.90 (60)	2.78 (60)	2.87 (239)	0.247	1.39 (3)

Comments: The method is One-way ANOVA. Level of significance: 99.9% = $p < 0.001$, 99% = $p < 0.01$, 95% = $p < 0.05$, 90% = $p < 0.1$. The variables are: *gender, age, education, residence, political interest and general political trust*.

⁸ The SOM-institute (institute for research on society, public opinion and media) at Gothenburg university have since 1986 collected data for research and presented yearly reports and analyses of opinion and media trends. Riks-SOM 2010 covers a systematic probability-sample, the technique for sample-selection used by the national personal address-register from which the SOM-sample are taken, of 9000 persons in different ages who lives in different regions in Sweden.

9. Analysis and results

The paper started out with the question of what can explain the fluctuation of political trust pre- and post-elections. As an explanation I offered a theory to account for this process, that the use of persuasive strategies pre-election increases political support and trust pre-election, and also as a second step that they cause higher disappointment post-election.

9.1. H1: Persuasive strategies increase support and trust pre-election

The first question to be analyzed is whether parties that use persuasive strategies in election campaigns gain more support and trust from the voters before elections than what do parties that don't.

As we can see in table 2 below did the participants that were exposed to **P** pre-election score higher on support than those exposed to **N**. A one-way ANOVA shows that the differences between mean scores are significant ($F(1, 237) = 20.917, p .000, \eta^2 = 0.081$)⁹, and the effect size of **P** in terms of eta square was enough to be regarded as meaningful. A second ANOVA does also reveal that the mean scores on trust pre-election were significantly higher for **P** than for **N**, ($F(1, 237) = 19.822, p .000, \eta^2 = 0.077$), and the effect size in terms of eta square was the same as on support. Since the differences were significant, the results support the hypothesis that parties that use persuasive strategies in election campaigns receives more support and trust pre-election, compared to parties that use non-persuasive strategies.

Table 2: The effects of persuasive strategies pre-election on voters' support and trust for Nya Partiet pre-election.

Independent variable (strategies pre-election)			
Mean score (n)			
Dependent variables	P (n)	N (n)	Grand Mean (n)
Support pre-election	0.54 (119)	0.41 (120)	0.48 (239)
Trust pre-election	0.59 (119)	0.48 (120)	0.53 (239)

Comments: Method is one-way ANOVA. Level of significance: 99.9% = $p < 0.001$, 99% = $p < 0.01$, 95% = $p < 0.05$, 90% = $p < 0.1$. "Support pre-election" and "Trust pre-election" is standardized scales, which ranges from 0-1 (0=very low, 1=very high). The independent variable is "Strategies pre-election" and consists of two values, one that includes all respondents who were exposed to persuasive strategies pre-election (P pre-election) and one that includes all that were exposed

⁹ The F-value measures the variance between the groups which are due to the stimuli (the different conditions of the independent variable). This is calculated by taking the variance due to the manipulation (the variance in the dependent variable that occurs between the different experiment-groups) divided with the error variance (the variance within the groups, or the variance between different cases/individuals that would be interpreted as due to other factors than the independent variable). The smaller variation within group, and bigger variation between groups, the more significant would the results be. The lower the F-value is, the higher is the error variance compared to the variance between-groups. Whether the variance is significant or not is shown by p, and for the F-value to be interpreted as significant the significance should be on at least a 95% level (< 0.05). The numbers in parenthesis stands for "degrees of freedom" (df), which is measures of the number of observations that were counted in the calculation of the between-groups variance (the variance due to the stimulus) and the number of observations in the calculation of the error variance. The degrees of freedom are used when to calculate the value were the F-quota shows significant effects of the manipulation. Partial η^2 (partial eta square) is a measure of the strength of the relationship between the independent and the dependent variable, or with other words the strength of the effect of the independent variable on the dependent. This measure ranges between 0 and 1.

to a non-persuasive stimuli pre-election (N pre-election).

9.2. H2: Negative information decrease trust and support post-election, and H3: Negative information decrease trust and support post-election to a higher degree if persuasive strategies were used pre-election

The next step is to see if negative information cause losses of support and trust post-election, and also if persuasive strategies in election campaigns leads to lower mean scores on support and trust post-election, compared to non-persuasive strategies.

Table 3 shows that participants who were exposed to persuasive strategies pre-election still score higher on support and trust post-election compared to those exposed to non-persuasive strategies, and a one-way ANOVA showed that the differences were significant both on support ($F(1, 237) = 13.894, p .000, \eta^2 = 0.055$), and on trust ($F(1, 237) = 9.318, p .003, \eta^2 = 0.038$). The effect size of the stimuli was in terms of eta square (η^2) a little bit higher on support.

Since both groups scored lower on support and trust after they had been exposed to the second (negative) stimuli (Grand mean pre-election was 0.48 respectively 0.53, and Grand mean post-election was 0.34 respectively 0.38), the results support *H2*. Negative information decreases political support and trust post-election. The results do not support *H3*. According to this hypothesis would the participants who were exposed to persuasive strategies pre-election score lower on support and trust post-election compared to those who were exposed non-persuasive strategies. Instead do the analyses show the opposite - the respondents who were exposed to persuasive strategies pre-election scored significantly higher.

Table 3: The effects of persuasive strategies pre-election on support and trust for Nya Partiet post-election.

Independent variable (strategies pre-election)			
Dependent variables	P (n)	N (n)	Grand Mean (n)
Support post-election	0.39 (119)	0.29 (120)	0.34 (239)
Trust post-election	0.43 (119)	0.34 (120)	0.38 (239)

Comments: Method is one-way ANOVA. Level of significance: 99.9% = $p < 0.001$, 99% = $p < 0.01$, 95% = $p < 0.05$, 90% = $p < 0.1$. The independent variable is "Strategies pre-election", and the dependent variables are "Support post-election" and "Trust post-election", which are standardized scales that ranges from 0-1 (0=very low, 1=very high).

9.3. H4: Persuasive strategies post-election reduces losses of support and trust

The fourth hypothesis was that persuasive strategies can be used post-election to defend policy outcomes against negative critic, and reduces losses of support and trust. Table 4 below summarizes two independent-sample t-tests, which was used to analyze the effects of persuasive strategies post-election on political support and trust post-election. The independent variable is now “*Strategies post-election*”.

Table 4 shows that the participants exposed to (P) post-election score higher on support post-election compared to (N), and that these differences are significant ($t = -1.918$, $df = 237$, $p .056$). The effect size was in terms of d , 0.27. The table does also show that participants exposed to (P) post-election score higher on trust compared to (N), with significant differences ($t = -2.064$, $df = 237$, $p 0.040$). The effect size in terms of d was the same as on support, $d = 0.27$. Since the group that was exposed to persuasive strategies post-election scored significantly higher on support and trust compared to non-persuasive strategies, I draw the conclusions that persuasive strategies can be used to alleviate losses of support and trust post-election. The results do, in terms of the theory, indicate that persuasive strategies enable politicians to “defend” their policies when there is negative information about the outcomes post-election.

Table 4: The effects of persuasive strategies post-election on support and trust for Nya Partiet post-election

<i>Dependent variables</i>	Independent variable (<i>strategies post-election</i>) (n)	
	(P) (n)	(N) (n)
Support post-election	0.37 (119)	0.31 (120)
Trust post-election	0.41 (119)	0.35 (120)

Comments: Method is independent-sample t-test (two-tailed). Level of significance: 99.9% = $p < 0.001$, 99% = $p < 0.01$, 95% = $p < 0.05$, 90% = $p < 0.1$. Independent variable is “*strategies post-election*”, and the dependent variables are “*Support post-election*” and “*Trust post-election*”, which are standardized scales that ranges from 0-1 (0=very low, 1=very high).

9.4. H5: Effects of persuasive strategies post-election are weaker than effects of persuasive strategies pre-election.

The fifth hypothesis was that persuasive strategies have weaker effects post-election than pre-election. To find out if this was the case in the experiment, I have calculated the differences in mean scores between persuasive and non-persuasive strategies pre-election, and compared it to the differences between mean scores of persuasive and non-persuasive strategies post-election.

The mean score for the respondents who had been exposed to persuasive strategies pre-election was 0.13 units (0.54 – 0.43) higher on political support pre-election than the mean score for the participants who had been exposed to **N**, and the mean scores on political trust was 0.11 units (0.59 – 0.48) higher when the respondents had been exposed to **P**. The mean scores for the respondents who had been exposed to (**P**) post-election was only 0.06 units (0.37 – 0.31, and 0.41 – 0.35) higher both on political support and trust post-election than for those who had been exposed to (**N**). The differences between mean scores for persuasive and non-persuasive strategies are with other words twice as high pre-election than post-election, and since all between-group differences also have turned out to be significant, it seems to be the case that persuasive strategies have weaker effects when they are used post-election than what they have when they are used pre-election.

9.5. H6: Persuasive strategies post-election have weaker effects when persuasive strategies have been used pre-election.

To analyze whether the effects of persuasive strategies post-election are weaker when persuasive strategies have been used pre-election, two one-way ANOVA was conducted. Table 5 shows that the respondents who were exposed to persuasive strategies both pre- and post-election have the highest mean scores both on support and trust, compared to the other groups. The differences between **P(P)** and the other three groups were also bigger than the differences between the other groups (**P(P)** differed around 0.09 to 0.17 units from the other groups, both on political support and trust, compared to around 0.03 units differences across the board between the other groups). This indicates that the hypothesis that persuasive strategies post-election have weaker effects if persuasive strategies were used pre-election, does not function. The ANOVA analyses showed that the differences between some of the groups were significant, both concerning support ($F(3, 235) = 6.37, p .000, \eta^2 = 0.075$), and trust ($F(3, 235) = 5.22, p .002, \eta^2 = 0.062$), and a post-hoc Tukey's test revealed that the mean

scores for **P(P)** differed significantly from the mean scores for the other three groups, but that there were no significant differences between any of the other groups¹⁰.

The results that the differences between **P(P)** and **P(N)** were significant, but the differences between **N(P)** and **N(N)** were not, indicate that the effects of persuasive strategies post-election are effective mainly when they have been used pre-election, as contrary to the hypothesis. That significant differences occur between the two groups that were exposed to **P** pre-election, do also indicate that there might be an interaction-effect between persuasive strategies pre- and post-election. Two two-way ANOVA analyses did though show that there was nothing that indicated an interaction effect between persuasive strategies pre- and post-election. The analyses showed no significant effects, neither on political support: ($F(1, 235) = 1.09, p .297$) nor on trust: ($F(1, 235) = 1.69 p .195$), and the effect size was in terms of eta square low (0.005 respectively 0.007).

From these results I draw the conclusions that persuasive strategies post-election, in contradiction to what was claimed in *H6*, have *stronger* effects if the strategies have been used pre-election. The hypothesis that the effects should be weaker if the strategies were used pre-election is with other words not supported.

Table 5: The effects of strategies pre- and post- election, on support and trust for Nya Partiet post-election

<i>Independent variable: Strategies pre- and post-election (“experiment-groups”)</i>				
Mean score (n)				
<i>Dependent variables</i>	P(P) (n)	P(N) (n)	N(P) (n)	N(N) (n)
Support post-election	0.44 (59)	0.35 (60)	0.30 (60)	0.27 (60)
Trust post-election	0.47 (59)	0.38 (60)	0.35 (60)	0.33 (60)

Comments: Method is one-way ANOVA. Level of significance: 99.9% = $p < 0.001$, 99% = $p < 0.01$, 95% = $p < 0.05$, 90% = $p < 0.1$. Independent variable is “*experiment-group*”, and dependent variables are “*Support post-election*” and “*Trust post-election*” is standardized scales, which ranges from 0-1 (0=very low, 1=very high).

9.6. Summary: results of H1 – H6

¹⁰ **support:** **P(P)** and **N(P)** ($p .002$), **P(P)** and **N(N)** ($p .000$) **trust:** **P(P)** and **P(N)** ($p .077$), **P(P)** and **N(P)** ($p .012$), **P(P)** and **N(N)** ($p .002$), **Support P(P)** and **P(N)** ($p .143$), **Support P(N)** and **N(P)** ($p .592$), **Trust P(N)** and **N(P)** ($p .901$), **Support P(N)** and **N(N)** ($p .220$), **Trust P(N)** and **N(N)** ($p .582$), **Support N(P)** and **N(N)** ($p .908$), **Trust N(P)** and **N(N)** ($p .937$).

The analyses above were used to examine the first six hypotheses, which acted as the foundation for the main theory (that persuasive strategies increases fluctuation pre- and post-elections). The results of the analyses supported four of the six hypotheses: that persuasive strategies pre-election generates more support and trust pre-election compared to non-persuasive strategies, that negative information in media leads to losses of support and trust post-election, that parties' use of persuasive strategies post-election reduces losses of support and trust, and that the effects of persuasive strategies *post*-election are weaker than the effects of persuasive strategies *pre*-election. The hypotheses that negative information about the outcomes of the proposals leads to *lower* mean scores on support and trust if persuasive strategies were used pre-election, and that persuasive strategies post-election have weaker effects if persuasive strategies have been used pre-election, were disconfirmed.

Together, these results indicate that persuasive strategies are more of a winning strategy than what the theory suggested. The strategies turned out to increase support and trust pre-election, but they do not seem to cause higher distrust post-election¹¹.

¹¹ Even if persuasive strategies do not lead to lower mean scores on trust post-election, it can be the case that the differences between support and trust from pre- to post-election is higher for those who are exposed to persuasive strategies pre-election, than for those who don't. If this would be the case, parties would still have to do a trade-off between maximizing votes pre-election, and keep a stable trust post-election. To examine whether there were significant differences in loss of trust and support from pre- to post-election between the groups, I conducted two one-way ANOVA analyses, one with the dependent variable "*differences in support*", and one with "*differences in trust*". The analysis showed no significant differences between the groups neither concerning support ($F(3, 235) = 0.603$, $p .614$), nor trust: ($F(3, 235) = 0.668$, $p .573$), and the effect size was in terms of eta square very low ($\eta^2 = 0.008$, in both cases). The mean scores on differences was more or less the same between the groups, both concerning support ($\mathbf{P(P)} = 0.17$, $\mathbf{P(N)} = 0.18$, $\mathbf{N(P)} = 0.15$, $\mathbf{N(N)} = 0.15$), and trust ($\mathbf{P(P)} = 0.17$, $\mathbf{P(N)} = 0.21$, $\mathbf{N(P)} = 0.18$, $\mathbf{N(N)} = 0.17$). (The diff.variables are scales that ranges from 0-1). These results disaffirm the last aspect that could have indicated that parties that use persuasive strategies pre-election faces a trade-off between vote-maximizing, and keeping a stable trust.


9.7. H7: Persuasive strategies in election campaigns increase fluctuation pre- and post-elections

The phenomenon that was bringing about these theses was the dynamic fluctuation in political trust pre- and post-elections. If the experiment shows result that persuasive strategies, in comparison to non-persuasive strategies, increase fluctuation, it will be an indication that persuasive strategies have some impact on the process.

Figure 10 shows mean scores on total fluctuation in support and trust. The figure reveals that the biggest differences both on support and trust occurs between the groups that were exposed to persuasive strategies pre-election and the groups that weren't, and especially between **P(P)** and **N(N)**. This indicates that persuasive strategies in election campaigns increase fluctuation. Two one-way ANOVA analyses showed that there are significant differences between some of the groups, both on support: ($F(3, 235) = 5.019, p .002, \eta^2 = 0.060$), and on trust: ($F(3, 235) = 3.914, p .009, \eta^2 = 0.048$). To find out between which of the groups the differences were significant, two post hoc Tukeys' test were used. The test showed significant differences between **P(P)** and the both groups that were exposed to non-persuasive strategies pre-election, and between **P(N)** and **N(N)**, both on support and trust. It did not show significant differences between any of the other groups.¹² The main findings from the analyses would in light of these results be that the respondents who were exposed to persuasive strategies pre-election varies more from pre- to post-election, than what do the respondents exposed to non-persuasive strategies pre-election. This support the main hypothesis, that persuasive strategies increase fluctuation in political support and trust from pre- to post-election. The fluctuation for the different groups is visualized in the bar chart below.

¹² **Support:** **P(P)** and **N(P)** (p .026), **P(P)** and **N(N)** (p .006), **P(N)** and **N(N)** (p .065) **Trust:** **P(P)** and **N(P)** (p .083), **P(P)** and **N(N)** (p .034), **P(N)** and **N(N)** (p .076). **Support:** **P(P)** and **P(N)** (p .828), **P(N)** and **N(P)** (p .199), **N(P)** and **N(N)** (p .957). **Trust:** **P(P)** and **P(N)** (p .988), **P(N)** and **N(P)** (p .166), **N(P)** and **N(N)** (p .985).

Table 6: The effects of strategies on total fluctuation in trust and support from pre- to post-election.



Comments: Method is one-way ANOVA. Level of significance: 99.9% = $p < 0.001$, 99% = $p < 0.01$, 95% = $p < 0.05$, 90% = $p < 0.1$. The independent variable is “*experiment-group*”. The first dependent variable is “*total fluctuation in support*”. The second dependent variable is “*total fluctuation in trust*”. The variables were computed in the following way: “*pre-election support*” + “*differences in support from pre- to post-election*”, and respectively on trust. Both scales are recoded to absolute values, and are standardized from 0-1 (0=no fluctuation, 1=high fluctuation).

Earlier analyses have shown that the group that were exposed to persuasive strategies both pre- and post-election score significantly higher on support and trust post-election than the one that were exposed to persuasive strategies pre-election but *not* post-election. According to these findings, the most likely would be that the group that were exposed to persuasive strategies pre-election but not post-election **P(N)**, have the overall biggest fluctuation, and the group that were exposed to persuasive strategies both pre- and post-election **P(P)** have the *second* biggest.¹³

The analyses here did though show that **P(P)** have the biggest mean scores, and **P(N)** have the second biggest. The comparisons in these analyses are done “within-groups” instead of “between-groups” (the fluctuation-variable is a measure of the individual variances from pre- to post-election), and it is therefore possible that the differences in fluctuation between **P(P)** and **P(N)** are due to differences in mean scores between individuals pre-election that is not the results of the pre-election stimuli. It is possible to control if the mean scores for **P(P)** and **P(N)** pre-election are due to the pre-election stimuli, or if it can be suspected to be dependent on other factors, by a t-test. If the differences between **P(P)** and **P(N)** are significant, we can

¹³ I try to visualize this by a bar chart in which I used aggregated values. This is showed in the appendix.

suspect that there are more factors behind the groups mean scores pre-election, than just the stimuli. If there are not any significant differences, I will regard the results from the fluctuation analyses as due to the stimuli.

To be able to compare the mean scores of **P(P)** and **P(N)** pre-election, I dropped all other cases from the group-variable. The first t-test showed that the mean score on support pre-election for group **P(P)** was higher (mean = 0.57) compared to **P(N)** (mean = 0.51). The effect size in terms of *d* was 0.26, and the test showed no significant differences between **P(P)** and **P(N)** ($t = 1.337$, $df = 117$, $p .184$, two-tailed). The second test showed that the mean scores on trust pre-election also was higher for group **P(P)** (mean = 0.61) compared to **P(N)** (mean = 0.56), with an effect size on 0.25, in terms of *d*. The t-test showed no significant differences between **P(P)** and **P(N)** ($t = 1.408$, $df = 117$, $p 0.162$, two-tailed).

Since the differences were not significant, they should not be regarded as troublesome, and the results from the analyses of fluctuation can be assumed to be due to the stimuli.

9.8. Summary: main hypothesis

Concludingly, the results from the latest analyses support the main hypothesis - fluctuation in support and trust from pre- to post-election - increases if persuasive strategies are used pre-election. Whether persuasive strategies are used post-election or not doesn't seem to have any significant impact.

10. Conclusions

The main purpose with these theses was to contribute to the research on political trust, by using semantic theories to explain the “mystery” of the dynamic fluctuation in political support and trust from pre- to post-election. The theory I offered was shortly that persuasive strategies in election campaigns increase the fluctuation around elections, with the main arguments that persuasive strategies in election campaigns increase voters' support and trust pre-election, but cause higher losses of support and trust post-election. The findings from the analyses support the main hypothesis - the respondents who were exposed to persuasive strategies pre-election varies more from pre- to post-election, than what do the respondents who were exposed to non-persuasive strategies pre-election.

The results does also support the first argument for the main theory, *H1*, that parties that use persuasive strategies in election campaigns receives more support and trust pre-election, compared to parties that use non-persuasive strategies. The analyses do also support the pre-

requisite for losses of support and trust post-election, that negative information decreases political support and trust. The results do not support the second argument for why persuasive strategies would cause higher fluctuation than non-persuasive strategies: the hypothesis that participants who were exposed to persuasive strategies pre-election would score lower on support and trust post-election. In this aspect the analyses did actually revealed the opposite results - the respondents who were exposed to persuasive strategies pre-election scored significantly higher than those who were exposed to non-persuasive strategies.

The theory does, except for suggesting that persuasive strategies increases fluctuation, also manifest a dilemma for the parties, a dilemma that have been stressed by rational choice theorists since the days of Anthony Downs historical work “an economic theory of democracy” (1957). Should the parties focus on vote-maximizing and on winning elections in first hand, or working to receive loyal and trusting voters? According to my theory, what the persuasive parties gain in vote’s pre-election - they will lose in trust post-election, which suggests that the parties have to do a trade-off between these two competing goals.

The findings from the analyses do surprisingly disaffirm this. Persuasive strategies increases support and trust pre-election, but do not cause lower support and trust post-election compared to non-persuasive strategies. The conclusions are that the Net Gains for using persuasive strategies in election campaigns are higher than the Net Gains for using non-persuasive strategies, and these strategies should be considered as an overall winning strategy. For the parties that choose these strategies, there seem to be no trade-off between “vote-maximizing” pre-election and keeping a stable trust.

Thirdly, I did in the theory also suggest that persuasive strategies can be used post-election, to reduce losses of support and trust. Since the group that was exposed to persuasive strategies post-election scored significantly higher both on support and trust compared to non-persuasive strategies, the conclusions would be that this hypothesis is supported. In terms of the theory do the results indicate that persuasive strategies enable politicians to “defend” their policies against negative information post-election.

According to the theory should the effects of persuasive strategies be weaker when they are used post-election, compared to when they are used pre-election. The findings from the analyses go in line with this hypothesis, and the effects of persuasive strategies were twice as high pre-election than post-election. Finally the analyses also showed, in contradiction to the

theory, that the effects of using persuasive strategies post-election was stronger, rather than weaker, if the strategies had been used pre-election.

So concludingly, what have we learned? The main findings of the analyses are that parties that uses persuasive strategies pre-election increases fluctuation in support and trust from pre- to post-elections.

The analyses of the main hypotheses for why persuasive strategies would increase fluctuation in support and trust around elections, showed that the results were dependent of the first hypothesis, that persuasive strategies generate more support and trust pre-election. The fluctuation did not increase because persuasive strategies caused higher losses post-election. The second main result, that voters generally turns disappointed post-election if they are exposed to negative information about the outcomes of a proposal, is not very surprising. The theory suggested that the disappointment post-election would increase if the voters were exposed to persuasive strategies pre-election, with the argument that some of the core functions of the strategies (such as the use of persuasive terms open for different interpretations) would make the voters feel “lured” post-election. This was though not supported by the experiment.

11. Discussion

In a mediated world, with short messages and daily information from TV-commercials, news papers, advertisement pillars and broadcasting's, it would be reasonable to assume that it is more or less impossible for voters to perceive and critically consider all important political messages around them.

The political campaigns are to a large extent mediated, and the messages and pledges the voters receives in election campaigns is often general and very short, such as “*We will reduce the queues´ to medical care*”, “*we are the new workers party*” and “*we take responsibility for the nation*”. It is in the nature of the representative democratic system that parties are “vote-maximizers”, simply because they need to win elections to survive. In the competition about the votes, the communication between citizens and the politicians is a core function. In election campaigns there are many parties, and multiple messages and pledges to evaluate, and to stand out and win, the parties has to make those short, generalized, catching and persuasive. It would be reasonable to assume that this leaves many pledges rather open for interpretations. The indications that persuasive strategies do not imply a trade-off between

vote-maximizing and long-term trust, should also strengthen a presumption that these strategies would be used by politicians in real election campaigns, which gives some weight to the study.

I did in the theory distinguish between first- and second-pattern strategies, where first-pattern strategies were suggested to be the most successful pre-election. One of the core functions of first-pattern strategies is to convince an audience about something, by withholding the descriptive meanings of central terms. The persuasion appears when the central terms also have strong emotive associations. This enables different interpretations of the messages, and my idea was that this could have been an answer to Przeworski's findings, that voters feel "lured" by promises.

However, the analyses didn't support this, and persuasive strategies can in the light of this experiment not be seen as a reason to why voters feel "mislead". So why isn't this hypothesis supported? Maybe is it so that we are more competent to understand and critically evaluate political messages, and more eager to "read behind the lines", than what I expected. Or maybe is it just so that we are pleased to have representatives that make decisions, people who we can rely on and to whom we can assign the responsibility for the society.

The theory suggested second-pattern strategies as the most useful strategies post-election. With these strategies can the politicians specify "their" descriptive meaning of the persuasive terms that they used in the election campaigns. By adding a descriptive meaning to the terms, they can justify outcomes of the policies that the voters regard as negative.

The results of the analyses showed that persuasive strategies can be used post-election to reduce some of the losses of support and trust, but in contrary to the theory did the effects of persuasive strategies post-election appear to be *stronger* rather than weaker, when they had been used pre-election. An explanation to why persuasive strategies have more effect when they were used pre-election, might be that second-pattern strategies require that first-pattern strategies have been used earlier to be effectful.

It is important to consider that the situation in the experiment in many ways didn't reflect a real election-process. It is reasonable to assume that it in a real political process would take more than a year from the time when the voter becomes exposed to a policy-pledge, to the time when she becomes exposed to information about the outcomes. The respondents were in the experiment exposed to negative information more or less immediately after they were exposed to the proposal pre-election. When taking the reflections above into account, this

might be the reason to why the effects of persuasive strategies post-election are as strong as they are post-election. In reality, it would be doubtful that the voters remember the exact terms that were used in the pledges, and which might be required if the effects of persuasive strategies should be significant.

12. Future research

The analyses of these theses did not give a satisfying/complete answer to what causes the fluctuation in political support and trust pre- and post-elections. To examine the phenomenon further, it would be useful/interesting to follow the same party (a real or a fictive one) in a process that stretches over more than one election. This would enable an analysis of the long-term effects of persuasive strategies. What happens with the trust in next-election, when the voters have become disappointed one time already? This would be more of a study of what can be the answer to the question why people are "willing to become lured over and over again".

Another interesting "follow-up" would be to analyze the effects of persuasive strategies on voters' perception of political pledges, by examining how they interpret the proposals, and further how this affects political trust. The theory would in this case be that higher differences between a party's definition of a proposal and the voters' perception of this, causes higher disappointment post-election. Such a study could with advantages be done by an experiment. The participants could be asked to read and respond to different texts with political pledges, and give answers to how they understand the pledge. After they have been given their definition and evaluated the pledge, they would be asked to read and respond to a second text, which expresses the politicians' definition of the pledge. What do they think now, are they disappointed or satisfied? Have the politicians fulfilled their promise, or have they "lied"? Would the respondent trust the politicians next time they give a promise? This would enable analyses of what effects a "wrong interpretation" of a pledge can have on voters' political trust.

A third entrance could be to examine the differences and similarities between persuasive strategies and framing (according to Druckman and Chong 2007 "Framing theory", there hasn't been much attention given to this). Tomas E Nelson et al have started to do this in an article 1997 (Zoe M. Oxley and Rosalee A. Clawson "toward a psychology of framing effects", I "Political behavior" 1997, vol 19 no 3, p:221-246), but there should definitely be more to examine on this area. Except for examining the differences, it could be interesting to

develop a theory of how these strategies could complement each other, and also to examine real political proposals. Previous research has shown that framing and priming are used in political messages, but to what extent do politicians use the persuasive strategies that have been analyzed in these theses? Are they actually used by politicians, and what effects do they have in a real political environment?

List of references

- Przeworski, Adam (2009). "Selfgovernment in our times", in "Annual review of political science" 2009: 12
- Walton, Douglas (2001). "Argumentation advocacy: persuasive definitions and public policy arguments", in "The journal of the American Forensic Association" 2001: 37
- Naurin, Elin (2009). "Promising democracy: Parties, citizens and election promises". Gothenburg: Naurin, Department of political science at University of Gothenburg
- Holmberg, Sören (1999). "Down and down we go: Political trust in Sweden", in Ed. Norris, Pippa (1999) "Critical Citizens Global Support for Democratic Governance". Oxford: Oxford University Press
- Gastil, John (2000). "By popular demand: revitalizing representative democracy through deliberative elections". CA: University of California Press
- Stevenson, Charles L (1944). "Ethics and Language". New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Downs, Anthony (1957). "An economic theory of democracy". New York: Harper and Row, Publishers Inc.
- A Tversky and D Kahneman (1981). "The framing of decisions and the psychology of choice", In "Science", 1981: 211, no. 4481, p. 453-458
- Entman, Robert M (1993). "Projections of power: Framing news, Public Opinion, and US foreign policy". Chicago: University of Chicago Press
- Iyengar, Shanto (2010). "Framing research: the next step", in "Winning with words – the origins and impact of political framing" by Brian E. Shaffner and Patrick J. Sellers (2010). New York, London: Routledge
- Aomi, J (1985). "Persuasive definitions in social sciences and social thought", in E Bulygin, J.L Gardies, I. Niiniluoto (Eds) "Man, law and modern forms of life". Dordrecht: Reidel, p. 187
- Brewer, Paul A (2003). "The Shifting Foundations of Public Opinion about Gay Rights", in "Journal of politics" vol. 65, no. 4
- Druckman, James N, and Chong, Dennis (2007). "Framing public opinion in competitive democracies", in "American Political Science Review" 2007:101, No. 4
- Druckman, James N, and Chong, Dennis (2007). "Framing theory", in "Annual Review of Political Science" vol. 10, p.103-126
- Tomas E Nelson, Zoe M. Oxley and Rosalee A. Clawson (1997). "Toward a psychology of framing effects", In "Political behavior", 1997:19, no 3, p. 221-246

Kellstedt, Paul M. (2003). "The mass media and the dynamics of American racial attitudes". New York: Cambridge University Press

Schiappa, Eduard (2003). "*Defining reality: definitions and the politics of meaning*"

Druckman James N, and Chong, Dennis (2010). "*Dynamic public opinion: communication effects over time*", in "American Political Science Review" 2010: 104, No. 4

Druckman, James N. (2010). "Competing frames in a political campaign", in "Winning with words – the origins and impact of political framing" by Brian E. Shaffner and Patrick J. Sellers, (2010). New York, London: Routledge.

Brian F. Shaffner and Mary Layton Atkinson, (2010). "Taxing death or estates", in Brian E. Shaffner and Patrick J. Sellers, 2010, "Winning with words – the origins and impact of political framing". New York, London: Routledge.

Druckman, James N (2001). "On the limits of framing effects: Who can frame?", in "The journal of Politics" vol. 63 No. 4

Premfors, Rune (1998). "Reshaping the Democratic State: Swedish Experiences in a Comparative Perspective", in "Public Administration", [1998](#): 76, p. 141–159

Sifo: väljarbarometern, 2006, 2007.

Appendix

Table 1: Descriptive statistics about the participants, concerning the control-factors gender, age, level of education, residence, political interest and political trust. (%)

<i>Exp: masters theses</i>	<i>Exp: masters theses</i>	<i>SOM 2010</i>	<i>SOM 2010</i>
Gender		Gender	
<i>Female</i>	50.6	<i>Female</i>	53.2
<i>Male</i>	49.4	<i>Male</i>	46.8
Age		Age	
<i>Up to 25</i>	33.9	<i>16-29</i>	16.1
<i>25-45</i>	39.7	<i>30-49</i>	30.8
<i>46-65</i>	23.8	<i>50-64</i>	26.9
<i>66 and older</i>	2.5	<i>65-85</i>	26.3
Level of education		Level of education	
<i>Elementary school</i>	3.3	<i>Elementary school</i>	21.5
<i>Senior High school</i>	23.8	<i>Senior High school</i>	32.1
<i>Post-senior High school</i>	10.5	<i>Post-senior High school</i>	10
<i>University</i>	62.3	<i>University</i>	33.4
Place of residence		Place of residence	
<i>Village</i>	28.9	<i>Countryside or small town</i>	36.9
<i>Small town</i>	14.6	<i>Suburb to larger city</i>	33.2
<i>Suburb to larger city</i>	13	<i>Middle-sized or big city</i>	25.7
<i>Middle-sized or big city</i>	43.5		
Political interest		Political interest	
<i>No, I am not interested in politics</i>	12.1	<i>No, I am not interested in politics</i>	43.4
<i>Neither interested nor uninterested in politics</i>	44.4	<i>Yes, I am interested in politics</i>	55
<i>Yes, I am interested in politics</i>	43.5		
Political trust in general		Political trust in general	
<i>Very low</i>	7.5	<i>Very low</i>	9.6
<i>Rather low</i>	26.8	<i>Rather low</i>	40.4
<i>Neither low nor high</i>	38.1	<i>Rather high</i>	45.6
<i>Rather high</i>	26.8	<i>Very high</i>	2
<i>Very high</i>	0.8		

Comments: Method: Frequency analysis. Total number of participants (n=240). The part of the total number is presented in percentage. The variable "Gender" was operationalized by the question in the introduction questionnaire: "Are you female or male?" The response categories were: 1=Female, 2=Male. The variable age was operationalized with the question: "Which year were you born". The answers were coded into the following categories: 1= up to 25 years, 2=25-45 years, 3=45-65 years and 4=66 and over. Education was operationalized by the question: "what are your level of

education?”. The respond categories were: 1=not graduated from elementary school, 2=graduated from elementary school, 3=studies at senior high school, “*folkhögskola*” or equal, 4=graduation from senior high school, “*folkhögskola*” or equal, 5= post-- senior high school education, not including university, 6=studies at university, 7=graduation from university, 8=graduation from post-graduate studies. The variable is recoded into the following categories: 1-2->1 (elementary school), 3-4-> (senior high school, “*folkhögskola*” or equal), 5->3 (post-- senior high school education, not including university), 6-8->4 (University). For place of residence I asked the question: “*what are your place of residence?*”. The respond categories were: 1=countryside, 2=smaller municipality, 3=small town, 4=suburb, 5=medium or big city. The variable is recoded into following categories: 1-2->1 (minor village), 3->2 (small town), 4->3 (suburb), 5->4 (medium or big city). The variable political interest was operationalized by the question: “*Are you politically interested?*” The answering- categories were: 1=Yes, I am politically interested, 2=I am neither interested nor uninterested in politics, 3=No, I am not politically interested. The variable was recoded: 1->3, 2->2, 3->1. The variable political trust was operationalized by the question: “*How high is your trust in politicians and political parties in general?*” The respond categories were: 1=very high, 2=rather high, 3=neither high nor low, 4=rather low, 5=very low. The variable is recoded: 1->5, 2->4, 3->3, 4->2, 5->1.

Comments: The source is SOM 2010. The total number of participants (n=9000) Method: Frequency analyses of the variables gender, age, education, place of residence, political interest and political trust. The questions asked are as follows: *Are you female or male? What year are you born? What is your level of education? In what type of residential area do you live? How interested are you in general of politics? Generally, how big is your trust for politicians in general?*¹⁴

Operationalization of variables

Focal independent variables:

Experiment-group (strategies pre- and post-election). This variable consist of four categories, value 1= **P(P)** (persuasive strategies pre-and post-election), 2=**P(N)** (persuasive strategies pre-election, non persuasive strategies post-election), 3=**N(P)** (non persuasive strategies pre-election, persuasive strategies post-election) and 4=**N(N)** (non-persuasive strategies both pre- and post-election).

Strategies pre-election. This variable is a recode of the variable “experiment-group”. The variable is recoded into the categories: 1-2->1 (=persuasive strategies pre-election), and 3-4->0 (=non-persuasive strategies post-election).

Strategies post-election. This variable is a recode of the variable “experiment-group”. The variable is recoded into the categories: 1+3->1 (=persuasive strategies post-election), 2+4->0 (=non persuasive strategies post-election).

Focal dependent variables:

¹⁴ The categories differs somewhat between this experiment, and the SOM survey. I regarded most of them as enough to be able to make a general comparison with a more representative sample, that I was looking for. Because of this, I have only recoded the categories for some of the variables (education, political interest and place of residence)

Support for Nya Partiet pre-election. This variable is a scale which comes from the question from the second questionnaire: “Given the information you have now, how big is the probability that you would vote for Nya Partiet?”. The respondent placed herself on a scale between 0-10 (0=very small, 10=very big). The scale is standardized and goes from 0-1 (0=very small, 1=very big).

Trust for Nya Partiet pre-election. This variable is a scale that comes from an index of two questions from the second questionnaire: “Given the information you have now, what is your attitude towards Nya Partiet?” The respond categories were: 1=very good, 2=rather good, 3=neither good nor bad, 4=rather bad, 5=very bad and. The variable is recoded: 1->5, 2->4, 3->3, 4->2, 5->1. The second question is: “Given the information you have now, how big is your trust for Nya Partiet?” The respondents could here place themselves on a scale from 0-10 (0=very low and 10=very high) in both the questions. The scale is recoded: 0-1->1, 2-3->2, 4-6->3, 7-8->4, 9-10->5. The variable “trust for Nya Partiet pre-election” is standardized and goes from 0-1 (0=very low, 1=very high). Cronbachs alpha is good, 0.80, and the correlations are strong: 0.67.

Support for Nya Partiet post-election. This variable is a scale, and was operationalized by the question: “Given the information you have now, how big is the probability that you would vote for Nya Partiet in the next election?” The respondent could place herself on a scale from 0-10 (0=very small, 10=very big). The scale is standardized, and goes from 0-1 (0=very low, 1=very high).

Trust for Nya Partiet post- election. This scale is an index of two questions that were asked in the third questionnaire: “Given the information you have now, what is your general attitude towards Nya partiet?” The answering categories were: 1=very positive, 2=rather positive, 3=neither positive nor negative, 4=rather negative, 5=very negative. The variable was recoded into following values: 1->5, 2->4, 3->3, 4->2, 5->1. The second question were: “Given the information you have now, how big is your trust for Nya Partiet?”. The respondent could place herself on a scale from 0-10 (0=very small, 10=very big). The variable was recoded into the following categories: 0-1->1, 2-3->2, 4-6->3, 7-8->4, 9-10->5 (1=very low, 5=very high). Cronbachs alpha is 0.846, and the correlations between the questions are high, 0.734. The scale is standardized, and goes from 0-1 (0=very low, 1=very high).

Other dependent variables:

Enthusiasm towards proposal pre-election. This variable is a scale that was created by an index of two questions in the second questionnaire: “Given the information you have now, what is your general attitude towards the proposal?”, and “Given the information you have now, what do you think about the proposal?”. The respond categories were to the both questions: 1=very good, 2=rather good, 3=neither good nor bad, 4=rather bad, 5=very bad. These were recoded: 1->5, 2->4, 3->3, 4->2, 5->1. Cronbachs’alpha for the scale was 0.888 which can be considered good (the border value for internal consistency, that the questions measure the same, is 0.7). The correlations between the two questions are also strong, 0.799 of a value from 0-1. The scale is standardized, and goes from 0-1 (0=very low enthusiasm, 1=very high enthusiasm).

Enthusiasm towards proposal post-election. This variable is a scale that was created by an index of two questions in the second questionnaire: “Given the information you have now, what is your general attitude towards the proposal?”, and “Given the information you have now, what do you think about the proposal?”. The respond categories were to the both questions: 1=very good, 2=rather good, 3=neither good nor bad, 4=rather bad, 5=very bad. These were recoded: 1->5, 2->4, 3->3, 4->2, 5->1. Cronbachs alpha is good, 0.924 (over the critical value 0.7), and the correlations between the questions is strong, 0.859. The scale is standardized, and goes from 0-1 (0=very low enthusiasm, 1=very high enthusiasm).

“Diff.variables”

“Differences in support”

This variable measure the differences in support from pre- to post-election, and were computed by subtracting the variable “*Support pre-election*” with the variable “*Support post-election*”. The scale is standardized, and ranges from 0-1 (0=no difference, 1=complete difference).

“Differences in trust”

This variable measure the differences in trust from pre- to post-election, and were computed by subtracting the variable “*Trust pre-election*” with the variable “*Trust post-election*”. The scale is standardized, and ranges from 0-1 (0=no difference, 1=complete difference).

“Total fluctuation in support from pre- to post-election”.


This variable measures the total fluctuation in support from pre- to post-election, and was computed in the following way: “*pre-election support*” + “*Differences in support*”. The scale is recoded into absolute values, and it is standardized and ranges between 0-1 (0=low fluctuation, 1=high fluctation).

“Total fluctuation in trust from pre- to post-election”.

This variable measures the total fluctuation in trust from pre- to post-election, and was computed in the following way: “*pre-election trust*” + “*Differences in trust*”. The scale is recoded into absolute values, and it is standardized and ranges between 0-1 (0=low fluctuation, 1=high fluctation).

Aggregated values for total fluctuation - comparison with the results of the analyses of H7

Figure 3. Total fluctuation in support and trust, measured with aggregated values.



Comments: To calculate the total fluctuation for every group on support and trust pre- and post-election, I added the difference between the mean score on trust pre-election and post-election, to the mean score pre-election for every group.

Support:

P pre-election = 0.54, **P(P)** post-election = 0.44, **P(N)** post-election = 0.35

N pre-election = 0.41, **N(P)** post-election = 0.30, **N(N)** post-election = 0.27

Support pre-election + (Support pre-election subtracted with support post-election), gives:

Total variance for **P(P)**: $0.54 + (0.54 - 0.44) = \underline{\underline{0.64}}$

Total variance for **P(N)**: $0.54 + (0.54 - 0.35) = \underline{\underline{0.73}}$

Total variance for **N(P)**: $0.41 + (0.41 - 0.30) = \underline{\underline{0.52}}$

Total variance for **N(N)**: $0.41 + (0.41 - 0.27) = \underline{\underline{0.55}}$

Trust:

P pre-election = 0.59, **P(P)** post-election = 0.47, **P(N)** post-election = 0.38

N pre-election = 0.48, **N(P)** post-election = 0.35, **N(N)** post-election = 0.33

Trust pre-election + (Trust pre-election subtracted with trust post-election), gives:


Total variance for **P(P)**: $0.59 + (0.59 - 0.47) = \underline{\underline{0.71}}$

Total variance for **P(N)**: $0.59 + (0.59 - 0.38) = \underline{\underline{0.8}}$

Total variance for **N(P)**: $0.48 + (0.48 - 0.35) = \underline{\underline{0.61}}$


Total variance for **N(N)**: $0.48 + (0.48 - 0.33) = \underline{\underline{0.63}}$

Figure 4. The fluctuation in political support pre- and post-election.



Comments: Method is One-way ANOVA. The graph is created in excel, by using the mean scores for **P(P)**, **P(N)**, **N(P)** and **N(N)**, on political support and trust pre- and post election.

Figure 5. The fluctuation in political support pre- and post-election.



Comments: Method is One-way ANOVA. The graph is created in excel, by using the mean scores for **P(P)**, **P(N)**, **N(P)** and **N(N)**, on political support and trust pre- and post election.