

*EUROPEAN
PARTNERSHIP
WITH AFRICA*

A PARTNERSHIP OF VALUES




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Abstract

This thesis set out to understand how European rhetoric legitimises European intervention in development and coerces African leaders into the Eurocentric world order. This through analysing the discourse in four Africa-policies from Europe and comparing them

The aim of this thesis is to test the power relations within development cooperation. Partnership has become a keyword in these relations and it is both the framework for interaction as for development. But what does this partnership really consist of?

The methodology is based on a discourse analysis on how Sweden and EU use rhetoric to construct frameworks for their understanding of Africa as well as how they apply their ideologies in development discourse. Political argumentation is all about saying something to gain something. Policy documents can sometimes be perceived as simple documents that only holds general modalities and simple explanations of frameworks. But development is loaded with ideological convictions and so are policy documents.

The documents are analysed in three perspectives, *the political*, *the economical* and *the cultural*. Two key terms are also objects for study, *partnership* and *governance*. The rhetorical analysis is derived from the four arguments that Europe has used to legitimise intervention abroad since the colonial days; *The barbarity of others*, *Ending practices that violate the universal values*, *The defence of the innocent among the cruel others*, *Making it possible to spread universal values*.

Together, they form a framework for hegemonic and structural power with a web of values, intentions, punishments and ulterior motive to control Africa.

Keywords: Partnership, Governance, Barbarity, Development, Africa, Sweden, EU, Policy, Power.

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Introduction

We must all cultivate our garden

- Candide (Voltaire 1759)

Aid and development has been around for more than half a century. But what is development? That question is what makes up the entire discourse since the introduction of contemporary foreign aid. And what is the purpose and motive for development? That question has in turn governed policymaking.

Development Cooperation during the SAP's were signified by paternalism and blind faith in the constructed models that were engineered by others than those that in turn were affect by them, much like a parent giving money to a child. Well intent aid flow, undermined democracy and natural societal evolution and progress, as the donors and the Bretton Woods institutions tried to fill the role of opposition in the recipient countries. *"These double standards stem from not thinking of my people as adult, or as equal."* (Ofori-Atta 1998, 181).

Modern development cooperation was supposed to be a road away from that western paternalism and into a cooperation based on partnership and local ownership. Did it happen? Did the double standards go away? Did Africa come into control of its own faith?

1:1 Research problem

The aim of this thesis is to test power dimensions in the Europe-Africa relations.. When viewing Africa, Europe has, traditionally, three phases, observing Africa, interpreting Africa and formulate its own response. Observing and interpreting Africa is usually conducted through a construction and reconstruction of an already given narrative. For example, the British colonials had a predestined view of what a primitive African society looked like. All primitive societies were thought to be organised in clans with chiefs on the top, regardless of what the natives claimed. The consequence was that the British applied that kind of perception of society on any group of Africans they encountered (Nielsen 2002). This narrative is based on a system of power and legitimise intervention, involvement and even exploitation in/of Africa in particular. But is it applicable in the relations today?

- **How does Europe describe Africa as a narrative in modern relations?**

- **How does Europe justify and legitimise intervention in Africa?**
- **Why does Europe use this narrative?**

The first question is to understand how Europe views and interprets Africa. Strikingly often, Africa becomes generalised in ways that would be unacceptable for any European country for example. Too often, the entire continent seems to be mistaken for a country of its own. But it's not total ignorance that's the biggest problem. A given perception, based on believed good and insightful knowledge, can be even more devastating for the understanding of the African continent.

The second question deals with the how Europe legitimises and intervenes in Africa. Throughout history, Europe has legitimised its involvement in almost every corner of the globe with its effort to do good and spreading civilised, universal values. From the christening of the indigenous in Latin America to colonisation in Africa and Southeast Asia to the forceful assimilations of the aborigines in Australia, the same argument has been used, over and over again. Question is if it's still in use in contemporary understanding and responses to development cooperation?

The question *why* might be somewhat easy to guess but much harder to research and prove without being purely speculative. Most conflicts today that Europe is involved in are connected to resources like oil and natural gas as well as valuable minerals and metals. Not dwelling too much on the Clausewitzian theory, "*war is a mere continuation of politics by other means,*" (Gen. von Clausewitz 1832) it's possible to conclude that, natural resources are one desirable also in peaceful international relations. Whichever term that is used, relations or partnership, it implies mutuality. Which is why the question also can be reframed in: *What can Africa offer in return?*

1:2 Limitations and cases

The point of the thesis is to study European views on Africa. While there are about 45 countries in Europe and of which at least 10 have their own Africa policies or strategies. It would be a huge task to analyse all of them. To make matters worse, there are EU policy documents, strategies and agreement in abundance. Limitations are in order.

To study Europe, the selection of cases has to be both representative and comparable but also relevant for the study. Therefore, two cases are to be constructed based on the EU and Sweden. The European Union is an obvious choice for one of the cases. The EU has become

one of the largest single donors in the world and together with its member states; it's the single most important donor region. EU policies also have some influence on national policies and strategies (to different extents). The EU relations with Africa are based on agreements and negotiations. One of the early EU-ACP- agreements signed was the Lomé conventions in 1975. They were eventually replaced in 2000 by the Partnership Agreement, the so called Cotonou agreement. This agreement leads up to the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA). These ACP-partnerships plays a central role in European-African relations. These partnerships are agreements which emphasises trade and development. One of the various intentions with the agreements is to regionalise trade and trade-zones, creating similar regions like the EU in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific. Furthermore, the relations are also governed by various WTO-negotiations like the Doha-round which concludes rules of conduct in trade relations. The negotiations on climate change have also had important impact on the relations and while partnership implies mutuality and common goals, EU and Africa are seldom on the same side in these negotiations. These agreements can be seen as evidential to European interests in Africa for instance. But they also include other actors and they don't describe Africa in the same way as a narrative. The Cotonou-agreement consists of goals and rules but does little do describe problems or motives for development cooperation.

The second choice for a case is Sweden, a country with a long history of development cooperation in Africa, foremost based on solidarity and not so much involved in geopolitical strategies or the cold war. While political, as all aid are, the gains in trade, natural resources or strategic allies was of the same kind of interest. Sweden was and still is one of the largest donors in the world per capita as one of the few countries that reach the 0,75% of GDP-goal. And while Sweden has been a prominent actor in aid for decades, it's also part of Europe. It's representative in northern Europe, not least from the perspective of the Nordic countries. In 1995, Sweden became members in both the EU and OECD which makes an interesting comparison over time to see if the narrative has changed and in what direction. It was also early out when writing an all Africa policy in 1998. Sweden has in turn several strategies and policies that govern their relations with Africa. Perhaps the most important one is the Policy for Global Development (PGD) from 2002 that prioritises the development gain perspective on all Swedish foreign relations. This means that all relations and all agreements Sweden has, must lead to a better development, mostly aimed towards the developing world of course. The point was to stem the negative effects and harness the good from globalisation. Beside this

policy, several international conventions and strategies have had importance on development cooperation for Sweden, as for most donors, for example the PRSPs and the MDGs.

These two cases will hence be constructed from four different documents. They are structurally different, one case is a huge, multilateral organisation and one is a single state. But this study focus on the rhetoric, the narrative in their view of Africa in the European context, and in that sense, they are highly comparable.

1:3 Research material

It is important to know that all institutional policies, strategies and agreements come into being for a reason. There's often political pressure to achieve development in Africa, a pressure that originate in domestic politics'. This pressure also creates a narrative framework as motivation for its commitments. Solidarity groups for instance that has fundraising as main activity in Sweden, builds a narrative on how Africans suffers to appeal to private donors and to legitimise their work in Africa. While often building on true stories, their reports are narrow, targeted and subjective. Equally subjective are the neoliberal and right-wing think-tanks that draw a picture of the developing world as failed in all areas beside those situations created by foreign investments and economic growth. Another example is the universities and academics that study Africa and aid from a critical perspective. All scholars study the contemporary system critically. In fact, development cooperation is an area which is very sensitive to new ideas and systems, perhaps to sensitive and structures are changed frequently.

So, when institutions create strategies and policies for Africa, they are also a way to establish the institutional narrative to both pacify its antagonists and gain initiative. Leaving the documents open to interpretation.

The documents for the study have to official policies and describe a narrative of Africa as the only counterpart. There are two such modern documents in Sweden from 1998 respectively 2008. EU also boasts two such relevant documents from 2005 and 2007. These documents will comprise source material.

The documents are comparable in the sense that they all give a description of Africa and its partners. The purpose of the documents differ somewhat but their commonalities are that they have a narrative about Africa, they are aimed both towards the own organisation and the African counterparts. They contain both historic overviews and summaries on problem descriptions as well as suggestions for solutions and priorities. The ideology, narrative and

legitimation of intervention are what this study aims to explore and that makes them highly comparable.

1:4 Terms and abbreviations

There are a number of terms, words and abbreviations that needs some further explanation on what they mean and how they are used throughout this thesis. Some of the more important terms will be explained and discussed further in the following chapter. Terms that are discussed in the descriptive chapters 3-7 does not reflect the authors perception of the terms nor do they adhere to generalised text book definitions. They are often used arbitrary and that is way the ambivalence is using them in the thesis can seem confusing.

The ACP countries – Africa, Caribbean and Pacific countries – a group of developing countries and former colonies that the EU negotiates with regarding trade and development.

Barbarity – A frequently used term in the thesis theory. Barbarity refers to all things in Africa that aren't good or primitive according European civilisation. The term is thoroughly explained in the theoretic chapter.

BWI – The Bretton Woods Institutions – The IMF and World Bank.

The Contonou Agreement – was the agreement that replaced the Lomé agreements in 2000. The changes in the new negotiation was so great that it was decided to create a new agreement. New international trade rules was incorporated and it was agreed that a new agreement were to be in place in 2008. The most favoured nation principle were to replace the previous so liberal and low tariffs that the EU had towards the ACP's.

EPA – Economic Partnership Agreement – The previous rules of trade between the EU and the ACP-countries were bad for global competition and trade according to the WTO. So after the Contonou-agreements, the ACP-countries were to sign regional economic agreements, meant to be development friendly. They were supposed to be signed in 2007, but to process isn't ended yet. It is mostly African countries that is reluctant to signing the EPA's as they can bring harder stress on their economies.

Eurocentrism – A term further explained in the theory chapter. Referring to viewing everything from a European standpoint with Europe as blueprint of how everything should be.

Governance – Besides partnership, the second most important word in contemporary development discourse. Originally called Good Governance, it's now called governance, referring to all administration and controlling of state. The term is arbitrary and strikingly seldom explained or defined. But the word is a frequently used buzzword. In the thesis, governance is described and discussed from the way of looking at it in the relevant policy document.

Integration – Less arbitrary than most terms used in development discourse, integration is a term favoured by neoliberals. The consensus among them is that the fastest way to creating development and reducing poverty is to open up markets for free flows of international trade. A term that is often used when linking governance and partnership with development. In the thesis, integration is described and discussed from the way of looking at it in the relevant policy document.

Lomé Agreement – The initial agreements between Europe and the former colonies and developing states of the ACP. It was first introduced in the 1970's and renegotiated four times. Later replaced by the Cotonou agreement.

MDG's – Millennium Development Goals – The famous goals set by the UN to develop the world in the new millennia.

NEPAD – The New Partnership for Development – an African initiative to both meet the western donors halfway by showing commitment and responsibility to economic and political reforms. It was also a way to gain ownership and control in the development discourse.

OECD – Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development – was created in 1961 and replaced the similar organisation OEEC. An organisation for the developed countries in the world aimed at stimulating democracy and market economy.

Ownership – Closely linked to partnership and to many donors, the foundation for the partnership. The general idea is that the beneficiaries, the recipients of aid are to be in charge and have responsibility of the resources, projects and programmes. Ownership is also an arbitrary term used lightly in several meanings. In the thesis, ownership is described and discussed from the way of looking at it in the relevant policy document.

Partnership – One of the most common terms in contemporary development discourse. The word implies that it is a partnership between donors and beneficiaries. It also implies that

there is some kind of mutuality involved. The problem with the terms is its ambivalence and arbitrary use. It doesn't mean the same thing to all stakeholders. And there are no clear definitions, the only "rulebook" there are, is the Paris Declaration, which is open for interpretation as well and doesn't have support from major donors like the USA and China. In the thesis, partnership is described and discussed from the way of looking at it in the relevant policy document.

PGD – Politics for Global Development – a Swedish policy initiative aimed at having positive global development perspectives surging through all political areas in the Swedish government. Introduced for the first time in 2003 it was revised again in 2008.

SAP – Structural Adjustment Programmes – The economic reform programmes that were constructed in the 1980's.

WTO – World Trade Organisation – created in 1995 under the Marrakech Agreement, it replaced the former GATT which was created by the BWI.

1:4 Summary and outline of the study

Chapter 1 – Background, theory and methods. The first chapter starts with an historical background on development, values and European hegemony. It discusses various theoretical aspects and explains the use of methods.

Chapter 2 – Sweden 1998. The first policy takes its point of departure in the positive changes that was taking place all over Africa in the mid 90's. Democracy was spreading and conflicts ended. It was time for the African renaissance.

Chapter 3 – EU 2005. To institutionalise and create framework for their Africa relations, a strategy was agreed upon in 2005. It had a strong focus on the partnership relations.

Chapter 4 – EU – Africa 2007. The Joint Africa EU strategic Partnership is more or less a rewrite of the 2005 document. But what is interesting is the small differences and how rhetoric works in effect on Africa and the origins of the JAES.

Chapter 5 – Sweden 2008. The final policy shows a great change in what development is and it also shows what effects changes in political paradigms are.

Chapter 6 – Comparative discussion. The four policies and their arguments are compared and a common story is forming itself.

Chapter 7 – Final analysis and outlook. The final chapter tries to draw conclusions on what partnership and development is and if there could be any alternatives. The outlook also tries to establish some alternative perspectives for further research.

1. Background, theory and methods

The contemporary narrative in development discourse has its relevant background really begins in the 1980's. At which point the Washington Consensus came into being, the SAP's where the dominating development system and the cold war came to an end. However, the idea of development didn't start with the colonies new independence in the 1950's and 60's. Development and the historical background of the Eurocentric narrative are many centuries old.

1:1 Cradle of Civilisation

The basic idea of what development is can be traced to the Renaissance, when god given facts and truths were questioned from scientific and intellectual perspectives. The birth of modernity came together with a larger influence from some rich but non noble classes like the bourgeois in southern and western parts of Europe, or the rich land-owners in the north. The power of the Catholic Church was being questioned from kings and scholars and even from within. What happened was, besides some hundreds of years of war in Europe, was that a new, intellectual narrative as of why things were as they were surfaced. While religious explanations were satisfactory before and after to many, the power in a good scientific argument became significant in legitimising a world order and how power was distributed. This was the early modernity.

In 1492, Christopher Columbus (1451-1506) proved what so many already knew, the world was round. The new world was soon to be the arena for one of the longest and bloodiest development projects in history, the spread of civilisation. Born in 1484 Bartolomé de Las Casas (1484-1566) came to the first priest ordained in the new world in 1510. While initially being part of the Spanish colonisation of the Americas he turned against the practises in 1514. On the defending side was Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda (1489-1573) a philosopher and humanist. What now followed was a several decade long intellectual debate on the justifications and legitimacy to intervene in other cultures, later ended with what became known as the Valladolid Controversy in 1550.

The argument presented by Sepúlveda in defence of European colonisation and evangelisation is in rhetoric the same kind of argument that has been used ever since. Europe has both divine right and moral obligation to spread civilisation and the Christian faith. The intervention is

justified by 1. *Barbarity of others*. 2. *The responsibility to end practices that violate universal values*. 3. *The defense of the innocents among the cruel others*. 4. *Making it possible to spread the universal values, the evangelisation* (Wallerstein 2006). What's also interesting is the fact that the only reason that the argument exists is that Europe's right to global supremacy was questioned already in the 16th century.

The contemporary father of governance and modern political science, the humanist Niccoló Machiavelli (1469-1527) wrote his famous guide book to how to successfully rule a kingdom and stay in power, *The Prince*. Being a man of Renaissance his point was that no prince could rule without use of violence but that it should happen with a minimum. Power had to be justified not only by title and inherited rights but with legitimate rule (Machiavelli 1513 (1958)).

By the time for the enlightenment, the supremacy of the European world order has reached a critical moment. Marked by the publication of Voltaire's (1694-1778) book *Candide or Optimism* in which he satirised the optimistic determinism represented by Leibniz (1646-1716). The idea was that God had aligned the way in a perfect way and there was nothing to do but to go along for the ride. Everything was organised in a way that had created the best of all possible and conceivable worlds. When *Candide* travelled the world, chased by the Spanish Inquisition, discovering Eldorado, losing it again and ending his days, tending his fields, Voltaire described a world that was in no way perfect or organised in unquestionable systems (Voltaire 1759).

Where is this going? The common factor in these three much known passages in history are all about early ideas of development and can be linked to the contemporary discourse. By western logic, all interventions have to be justified. While the word barbarian isn't really politically correct, it doesn't change the fact that those that commit atrocities against their people are by modern standards barbarians. The international community has a responsibility to end such practises. Those that are the innocent victims of such atrocities have to be protected and finally, when peace has been restored, a democracy and market system has to be installed to ensure that it doesn't happen again. Furthermore, power has to be legitimate, not by inherited claims or taken by force without reason but by good governance and rule of law. There's sometimes a blind faith in market economy and its infallible ability to organise societies in the best way to create development and ending poverty.

As such, the legitimacy and justification of intervention outside of Europe has long historical ties. The gold and other valuable treasures that flowed from the colonies did of course help as an incentive to accept those arguments for those weak in faith (Wallerstein 2006).

1:1:1 Proving the Africans inferiority

By the same time that Voltaire ridiculed long dead mathematicians, another world famous scientist laid the foundation to modern biology, Carl Linnaeus (1707-1778) wrote his *Systema Naturea*. Among all the animals he named and classified, he divided the humans into four races and assigning them stereotypical properties. While perhaps not a typical racial biologist, he did introduce the term race and it marked the paradigm shift where not only civilisation defined others as inferior, but it was explained with biology (Eriksson Baaz 2005). By the late 18th century, Egyptology became highest fashion in Europe¹ and it paved the way for a series of other anthropological or semi-anthropological sciences like Orientalism. No one at the time, or even today would think the thought of introducing a subject called Occidentalism, the study of the West. But it wasn't a problem to be an expert on generalised ideas of the entire landmass from the Mediterranean to China. The knowledge and understanding of the orient was based in manipulated assumptions and ideals of what it ought to be and facts were usually interpreted in relation to that idea. It was constructed in an environment where the hegemony in Europe was dominating and believed to be superior to everything outside its borders. The point of dividing people into generalised terms as us and them usually don't very honourable reasons. The polarisation between people like us and people like them can make the orient more oriental and the west more western and strengthening the ideals associated with either pole. And as the construction of the other includes their subordination and underdevelopment it explains why the western values are better. And why the West should be superior has been given scientific truth (Said 1978).

By 1866, when Egyptology already was an aging science, Dr. David Livingstone (1813-1873) set out to find the source of the Nile. The adventures of Henry Morton Stanley (1841-1904) to find him became a compelling story that inspired more expeditions to explore and study Africa. Africa was more of a curiosity for most European leaders for the most part of the 19th century up until the 1880's of course. But the advocates for colonialism of Africa, like Leopold II of Belgium (1835-1909), used scientific societies in Europe to justify European

¹ Not least with the discovery of the Rosetta stone by Napoleons forces in 1799.

intervention (Wessling 1992). The knowledge Europe had about Africa at the time was rudimentary to say the least. A lot of how the African where was based on wild tales told by the few that actually had ventured there, full of monsters, cannibals and brave white adventurers.

1:1:2 The white man's burden

If the Orient had an inferior culture, Africa had almost none. This was the context applied on the sightings of discoverers like Stanley and Livingstone. What happened was that the Africans as a subject for study were a savage race (Mudimbe 1999). After all, it had been an accepted fact for already a century. Africans was perceived as something savage and childish, signified by playfulness, irresponsibility, impulsive and spontaneous often compared to European children or women. Savages were inferior versions of maturity, lacking in productiveness and ethics and moral. In that way, they were the charming and exotic savage, a blank sheet for the mature colonialist to raise and imprint on the moral codes (Eriksson Baaz 2005). A common propaganda tool was postcards from Christian missionaries in Africa trying to raise funds. They depicted Africans in very degrading and patronising ways while others showed those, saved by the missionaries, clothed and learning a trade on their way to become civilised. Parallels have been drawn with TV-commercials, showing Africans as passive and tragic victims (Stock 2004). But the Africans were also compared to other groups in Europe, the Jews, the Irish, prostitutes, working class, mental patients and criminals, inferior or despised groups in compared to the moral, well dressed and distinguished white European man. So the responsibility to save the savages from themselves fell on the white man's shoulders, the white man's burden.

1:1:3 We're all humans, but..

The Holocaust changed all that and racial divisions were entirely dismissed by all sciences. However, the heritage of colonial imperialism is still relevant in identity and how the other is constructed (Eriksson Baaz 2005). While the white man's burden was dismissed after the war and the colonies independence, it took on a new form, a white man's guilt.

Underdeveloped became a new way to describe the other. They are people like us but they are not as developed as us. Africa was still defined with a Western measuring stick. The term underdeveloped was the new word for "economical backwards". The dichotomy was now between the developed and the ones that were a little further down the line. The idea was that they can catch up with a little help. It was also in line with the introduction of the Universal

Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 (Rist 2002) and even more so with the two covenants in 1966. The subject of the African had changed from being the subordinated savage into poor, underdeveloped individuals.

1:2 Leading up to the modern-day


The story really begins shortly before the end of the cold war. The cold war, in relation to Africa, had resulted in fragile states, usually run by a dictator that seized power in a coup d'état or by rigging a one-party election. These dictators were supported by the two contesting world powers, the east and the west. The debt-crisis raged in the south. For decades, the western ideology had been anchored in the dichotomy between the capitalist west and the state centrism of the East. But the Soviet bloc was crumbling and revision of the western paradigm was in order. It was now, in the late 1980's that the Washington Consensus was conceived. The debt-crisis resulted in an alliance between the Reagan administration, Margret Thatcher in UK, Helmut Kohl in Western Germany and the Bretton Woods institutions. This was the institutionalisation of neoliberal ideology. And this alliance made it possible to strongly influence the discourse of the entire western world. It advocates development through market reform like unrestricted free trade, programs for fiscal responsibility, privatisation and foreign investments. At the centre for the implementation were the Bretton Woods institutions, the World Bank and IMF (Abrahamsson 2003, Batiuk 2008). It favours small government that only take care of the essentials and the importance of the strong rule of law. Freedom was the same as American values and American interest comes first. It became the core of Bush Ist foreign policy and re-accentuated again under Bush IInd but then with a strong security perspective (Pieterse 2004). But as the conflict between superpowers and the hegemonies disappeared into the worlds and most welcomed anticlimax, the priorities of the rest of the world changed. The Clinton administration viewed the growing gap between Africa and the rich world as mostly a security problem. But as the confidence in the Bretton Woods institutions were shaken in 1994² and there were new interest in bringing the African states under the western influence sphere, a new term was introduced, partnership. This notion spread quickly to European states like Great Britain and Sweden. At the same time, a new shift in leadership were taking place in many parts of Africa. At the end in the century there

² Later reaffirmed with the creation of WTO which purpose was to drive the world economy towards greater trade liberalisation and more or less made the Washington Consensus into international trading law (Batiuk 2008).

were growing frustration over the rigorous “one size fits all”-policies of the World Bank and IMF (Abrahamsson 2003). There were new ideas flourishing and the playing field for other values and definitions that those closely linked to one of the hegemonies could take root. And in 2000 a huge UN summit adopted the UN Millennium Declaration that constituted the Millennium Development Goals (MDG’s). In many ways this signifies that there were other universal values than the Washington Consensus. So even the neoliberals had to adjust.

1:2:1 Democracy

This was a period when the African democratisation was struggling to pick up momentum. As the cold war ended, the western states started to fill their policies with the advocacy of further liberalisation and favoured those state which introduced election, free press and market economies. African politicians were quick to follow. The criteria’s for what democracy was were dictated by western policy makers. Just as during the structural adjustment programmes, economic reforms were at the centre of those very criteria’s (Cheru 2002).



The few years after the cold war, the number of one-party and military states plummeted. In 1989 African states were dominated by different regime variants of dictatorships, military regimes and one-party states. Only 15% of all Sub-Saharan states were democratic or at least multi-party states. By 1995, the tables had turned. Every last one of the one-party states were gone and the military regimes were reduced to nine different states. In six years, 21 states introduced multi-party systems and seven countries became real democracies (The QOG Institute 2011).

The conditionality and aggressive modalities that were associated with the Washington Consensus most prominent creation, the Structural Adjustment Programme's (SAP) were very unpopular. So the rhetoric was changed into lean hegemony of mutual gain and terms like consultation, ownership and partnership. But it turned out that the long years under the Washington Consensus discourse, the Bretton Woods institution could relax. The package of neoliberal ideologies were so integrated that it was the only ruling logic in policymaking (Gould 2005). Not least as WTO was the dominant forum in which trade rules could be discussed and that the terminology there was dominantly neoliberal (Batiuk 2008). And in 2001 African leadership tried to take initiative with The New Partnership for Development (NEPAD). It stated that Africa has to take its own responsibility for development. But it also made concessions to the west and adopted the economic and political reforms that the west stipulated for development (Abrahamsson 2003).

What is observed is a combination between institutional, structural change and ideological, discursive power.

1:3 Arbitrary terms and their usefulness

There are a number of terms that appear in this thesis that will need some further explanation. One problem with many of these terms is that they are usually used in arbitrary ways and seldom explained, sometimes even contradictory. However, that might be their usefulness. Using terms that doesn't have concrete meaning or definition leaves more room for interpretation. Room that can be filled with, if not substance, at least a narrative, adapted to Eurocentric views. Terms featured in this part are terminology that is frequently used in the respective policy and they are used in the same arbitrary way in this thesis as they appear in the documents.

There are two major terms that appear frequently throughout the policies, partnership and (good) governance. They are in turn linked to each other and other terms through a series of other more or less arbitrary terms like ownership, regionalisation and integration. They are often contextualised with equally arbitrary used emotive and ideological terms like economic growth, democracy and human rights.

The issue is still development cooperation and aid, words that only describe a huge field of international and domestic financial relations, projects and strategies. However, the terms are used as verbs, something you do, something you can be perform or, given the right condition,

will grow naturally. Development as this living, growing creature has four basic features, directionality, continuity, cumulativeness and irreversibility. Growth has direction and purpose and it follow certain given stages, changing and evolving for each step. Each step being a result of the previous one, accumulating and maturing and when each step is complete, development is irreversible (Rist 2002). This can possibly come from technocratic views that development is something that can be put into place, that it is a matter of the poorly developed countries to catch up with the rest. Sort of staging economic growth, building capitalism in development steps as in W. W. Rostow's (1913-2003) *Stages of Economic Growth* (Mkandawire 2001). It can even be traced back to social-Darwinism, claiming that development is evolutionary stages from a certain condition to a next, higher level, placing the modern western state on top of the evolutionary ladder (Eriksson Baaz 2005). Even though these ideas have been dismissed for a long time, the heritage remains in full vigour within dominating neoliberal theories. Creating model western states and market capitalism are the goals for many donors like the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWIs) with development cooperation. This is the setting for how further arbitrary words comes into use.

1:3:1 Partnership

Partnership and governance has become the most frequently used terms in contemporary development cooperation and theory. The words imply joint cooperation and well executed administration of rule. The terms, in the way they are meant in contemporary discourse surfaced in the post- cold war optimism in the 1990's. Development in Africa had been uninteresting for a couple of decades and the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP) had been a failure. But when new leaders rose to power through peaceful and even multi-party elections, the interest was renewed and a growing optimism made the western donors show more faith in the African states themselves. Sometimes described as the African Renaissance it means that the African countries have the opportunity to build up their own economical and political development in their own terms (Cheru 2002). One of the tools for this new era in development cooperation has been "Partnership".

Partnership went hand in hand with ownership in order to implement new development strategies. Somewhat simplified, ownership means that the developing countries, the recipients, where to "own" the projects and programmes once installed in the country. Also associated with budget support or basket funding, recipient countries are supposed to be in charge of administrating aid and other funding. But ownership was still arbitrary and open for interpretation. Even in government-government partnership, ownership and forms of

partnership isn't all too clear to everyone involved. The partnership's quality is said to be dependent on the sharing of common, basic values and mutual understanding for legitimacy and responsibility of development. (Edgren 2003). Optimism in the 1990's made the western governments put more faith in the Africans and that they could do it for themselves. The level of self critique at the time isn't at least apparent in contemporary literature. But after formulating Africa's policies for decades, the optimism was met with new failures as the experience on creating own politics and own ideology was lacking (Mkandawire 2001). At least the kind of ideology that was favoured in Europe and USA. Donors soon fell back into old habits, the so called *donorship syndrome*. All initiatives came from the donors and they decided what were good values and good objectives for the beneficiaries (Edgren 2003). The paternalism never really left development cooperation.

So in Paris 2005, a guide map, the Paris Declaration, was introduced to make a common ground for the partnership where the developing countries takes ownership to create functions and targets for alignment and harmonisation (The High level fora on Aid Effectiveness 2005). Partnership forced the donors to reevaluate and rethink their practises in aid. Donors now had to align and harmonise with other donors and take the point of departure in priorities and policies made by the developing countries. However, that proved harder than anticipated and preferences kept sprawling within the donor community (Riddell 2007).

One dimension of the Paris Declaration is the equalisation of the power distribution between the rich donors and the poor developing countries. The developing country's ownership was heavily asserted in the Paris Declaration. In NEPAD, ownership, depoliticised development cooperation but it also in ways reconstructed the Washington Consensus within the African context. But as a power dimension, alignment was a way to transfer power over to the developing countries. Aid-conditionality should be created from the basis of a national development strategy. And the common framework which will be the basis of conditions has to be agreed on by both the partner and the donor's together (The High level fora on Aid Effectiveness 2005). So it can explain the need for a strong hegemony and extensive donor policy documents that frames the entire ideology of development.

But partnership is much more that just regulations on the relationship. Partnership has been loaded with values that is said to be shared, common or universal. These values isn't only governing the area of interaction between donors and recipients, they make the partnership a framework for all development dealings. So while the classical conditionality has been

criticised, new kinds, with friendlier faces appear in their stead. Partnership is in no way a new concept there are examples from the 1930's, 40's and 50's as well. But it seems that partnership is commonly introduced when the more powerful part in asymmetrical power relations feels threatened (Gould 2005).

Partnership doesn't create equality in relations when linked to common values. Too many values make it hard for developing countries to live up to the expectations while donors can resort to the *donorship syndrome*. This is when donors use their financial muscles to force recipients to change their development strategies (Edgren 2003).

1:3:2 Good Governance

Good governance is usually interconnected to other parts of the universal values like democracy and human rights. Definitions are illusive and arbitrary, often defined by Europeans standards and structures.

Governance is often claimed to be as old as civilisation itself. These kinds of claims are usually made to justify reform in state structures. The term can be traced to the birth of modernity in the days of Machiavelli and his arguments around how to best stay in power and the contemporary criticism of his conclusions (Foucault 1978). But in relevance, it's a term that surfaced in the development discourse in during the 80's. As mentioned above, governance was one of the ingredients in the Washington Consensus. The mainstream ideal was that governments were to be small and primarily facilitate economic growth and a few basic needs. Freedom of economic growth and expansion of global markets is synonymous with efficiency and too much government is a systemic fault. This notion of too much government, or slimming of governance, stems from neo-liberal logic, while the market is institutionalised on a global scale (Hettne 2009). But while national governance is to be limited and public sectors privatised, another neo-liberal movement goes towards a opposite position, governance as inclusive and enabling.

Governance is a broad concept covering all aspects of the way a country is governed, including its economic policies and regulatory framework, as well as adherence to the rule of law. Corruption--the abuse of public authority or trust for private benefit--is closely linked: a poor governance environment offers greater incentives and more opportunities for corruption.

(IMF 2011)

The point of the state is to either get out of the way or contribute to individual freedoms and development (Risse 2007). What happens here, in for example the EU, is limitation of governance through centralisation.

The other track of good governance is represented the OECD version that was established around 1993. It has strong ties to the World Bank definition but emphasise human rights, democracy and legitimacy of government. Social participation in development would render the legitimacy through democracy (Agere 2000). This position is represented by Sweden that sees the responsibility of governance as a stimulation factor of both democratisation and spread of markets.

These two examples of good governance summaries the usual definitions of what good governance should consist of. It is understood what the state does, it govern things. It's a way to introduce economy to the state and though no more restricted to national or regional borders, it has evolved to an overarching doctrine of how we understand modern political society (Foucault 1978).

Governance is European doctrine of how modern states should work. While good governance seldom is defined in detail. The modalities and the indicators of what good governance is have been constructed from the understanding of how the ideal state should work. And the blueprint for the ideal state is the Westphalian, European state. States that are considered to have succeeded in their implementation are applauded and rewarded with additional funds. In contrast to those that are considered failing in their commitments, they receive sanctions and other punishments.

1:3:3 Developing partnership-development in Sweden 1998-2008

Sweden introduced their Politics for Global Development (PGU) in 2003 which aimed at, foremost aligning all political areas to promote sustainable global development. It also emphasised that developing countries were taking more and more responsibility for managing their development which was something Sweden was to endorse. Development cooperation was to be in partnership with national politics and ownership, not instead of it (Skr. 2002/03:122 2003)!

Sweden was highly regarded in development cooperation among the developing countries. Not tainted by the colonial history and rather at the front in the struggle against colonial rule and apartheid, building its efforts on solidarity rather than pursuit of national interests.

Sweden stands out among other donors. But there are some serious concerns even here. Sweden has, as many donors, a tendency to take the position of opposition in the recipient country (Olukoshi 1997).

1:4 Theoretical framework

The background has already given a context for how the narrative and justifications has been constructed for hundreds of years and that it is constantly reinvented. It can be covered by three perspectives, the cultural, the political and the economical. These three perspectives are used to construct the narrative of European Universalism and superiority as well as the narrative of the other, the African. And to justify European intervention on the other, there are the four classic arguments, barbarity of others, ending barbaric practices, defence of the innocent others and spread of universal values. Barbarity in others and the universalism of European values are thus closely tied together. But what about the motive? Why does the narrative survive and becomes reinvented? There are three probable factors that are discussed, the Eurocentric structure in itself and the classical motives of power and money, the cultural, the political and the economical.

1:4:1 The cultural dimension – Eurocentric world view

According to Claude Levi-Strauss (1908-2009), common for all, or most, mythologies, there's always a mysterious outside land, a land of monsters and barbarians, a dangerous place to travel where you meet giants, sea-serpents and halfmen. That kind of mythology was pushed aside by science which in many ways took up the responsibility for defining the other. Modernity prevailed over tradition.

The Eurocentric world system needs stories of “the other”, those not within the system, those outside, the foreign elements. The construction of the other doesn't originate from its own actions and narrative. When a group of people settle in an area and stake out their land they call it theirs. The human mind seems to prone to organise everything and everything outside the land is “the others land”, the land of barbarians. Even if they - the barbarians - don't necessarily acknowledge that definition (Said 1978).

Europe on the other hand, is abstract as a homogeneous concept; everyone that lives there knows that. Europe does not have one religion, not one language, not a single set of political or moral values, not one kind of lifestyle and so on. Being a homosexual, clubbing hipster in Stockholm is as European as being a catholic housewife with five children in Barcelona. All

these are attributes that can be included in the concept of European. While Africa, just as diverse, has been assigned a set of attributes like being poor, brutal and corrupt. European has been experts at killing each other for thousands of years, corruption is common and Europe invented poverty. But still, these attributes are assigned to Africa.

Eurocentrism tells the narrative from a European perspective which means that Europe is centre and everything else is periphery. African history, culture and politics are only relevant in relation to Europe. Europe has cultivated the idea of being the crown of creation for a long time. In Voltaire's *Candide*, this notion was taken to its extreme by the main character and his friends. Candide believed that he lived in the best of all possible worlds where everything was divinely organised. Where some are the guiding light of what is good and what is evil (Voltaire 1759). Voltaire's ironic critique of his contemporary gives a window to the strong, Eurocentric belief that Europe was perfectly organised. The same idea still lingers in the European mind. We are the most developed and the most civilised entity in the world. Europe sets the standards for good governance and state modalities. Europe is the beacon of democracy and the upholder of Human Rights.

The basis of the Universal declaration of Human Rights was written in a post-World War II context, of which happened as a result of European politics. They mean more than only a set of values that any person can agree on. The argument that can be made is that they have given Human Rights- and democracy-movements tools to oppose oppressing governments (Wallerstein 2006).

Eurocentrism works through exclusion, everything that is representative of the other is per definition not European. It works even within Europe as show in the background. Africans was compared to groups that already exist in Europe, women, children, working class and despised ethnic groups. So even though violence, corruption and poverty exist within Europe, it is seen as something bad and excluded from being a European value. Violence, corruption and poverty exist in Africa to. But it's not only problems on the continent; it's attributes of Africa and African identity.

1:4:2 The political dimension - Power in the world system

Power is important in understanding both how and why Europe needs a narrative of Africa. Power can be divided into two elements, structural power and a discursive power. They work together to reinforce and recreate each other. As the hegemonic discourse moulds the historic bloc through its history, its values beliefs and security interests. As does the historic bloc

create the necessary institutions, rules and structures that can be used to spread the discourse (Abrahamsson 2003). It almost sound as a biological symbiosis.

But a perfect system of power is where the subject sustains the power through its own reasoning and actions, where the power is automated and anonymous. The hegemony of consenting to institutions and laws of society is created through power to discipline and punish those that are out of line. And the way we define them is a source of control. The logical way is for the subjects to conform or risk punishment. When institutions are created for the control of for example criminals or the insane, they are combined with a discourse. The discursive power changed, bodily punishment was no longer acceptable 19th century. So prisons became the premium form of punishment. But the prisons were hard to control and that had to lead to reform (Foucault 1975). The point is that hegemonies and structural powers intersect and with a change in hegemony comes change in the structural power.

Punishments is of course no way to found a mutual partnership. But in the now global discourse of development there are stigmas. It is hard to imprison nonconforming world leaders such as Robert Mugabe, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Hugo Chávez so they become pariahs. There are ways to evoke punishments on nations such as the embargo on Cuba and in the end war, like in Iraq. No leader wants this and ultimately it can result in death like in the case with Saddam Hussein (1937-2006) and Muhammar Khadaffi (1942-2011).

But the capitalistic world market system does of course provide strong benefits. It's the most effective system to date in creating wealth. And consumption has, as the first system ever, actually eradicated hunger in Europe. As consumption-based capitalism needs a world market to be able to sustain itself, the condition for such a system has to be created and entertained constantly. There are several ways to build up and raze the market in order to make it flourish. One way is for example to "open up" markets. As in liberalising those internal markets which were protected before by tolls or embargos. Capitalism has to expand in order to survive. And when there's no more room for it to expand, it shrinks and goes into crisis. The crisis is vital for capitalism to regenerate and shift into a new expansion phase (Wallerstein 2004).

1:4:3 The economic – Development and progress

The discourse of economic development in Africa usually starts with colonialism. In Marxist logic, imperialism was capitalistic but capitalistic accumulation was not incorporable with colonialism. Besides in the personal and economical interests of the European bourgeoisie. Capitalism should have imposed a European development line where heavy industry where

favoured over agrarian and creating a two-way export industry (Mudimbe 1999). The introduction of a two-way world market was a popular argument for colonisation of Africa and Asia but it never became reality (Wessling 1992). But everywhere colonialism occurred the result was an underdevelopment process. Parts of the capitalistic world system develop on the expense of the others. When non-western territory is integrated into the capitalist world, they are organised in a hierarchical capitalistic structure. And despite the wealth and potential in natural resources, the former colonies lack the structural capacity for autonomy and sustainable growth because their faith is ultimately determined by the developed countries (Mudimbe 1999).

Development has colonial roots and according to Marx; there lies a fundamental problem. Capitalism needs constant accumulation to sustain itself. One way to sustain that accumulation is to expand. So to extend the accumulation, capitalism expands into the colonies. But the division of labour and the basis of enriching the capitalist weren't present⁴. The easiest and cheapest solution was to chase the indigenous and settle with a cohort of slaves. The new ruling class had to adopt the methods and life of the dying feudal class in Europe (Marx 1867 (1969)). Marx didn't concern himself much with the conditions of the colonised peoples in the extent he was even aware of their existence. He thought that they might even be favoured by such development (Hettne 2009). But the point he made is important, the premise for capitalism to work isn't fully present in all corners of Africa. There are obstacles in everything from wars and conflict to corruption and informal markets that hinder capitalistic expansion. So for the capitalism to expand, the conditions must be fulfilled. There has to be a division of labour and private ownership to create capitalist accumulation, or as we call it today, economic growth.

Mudimbe objections to the Marxist are that they tend to be dogmatic in their explanations. On the other hand, the opposite, positivistic view of what happens to development with the introduction of capitalism can also be viewed as equally dogmatic. For the contemporary Swedish liberal, Johan Norberg, where ever global capitalism expands, good development follows. The idea is that capitalism brings with it a certain set of values that will be implemented when capitalism is established. And that the root of the problems we identify can be solved with freer trade and world markets where private ownership is a strong

⁴ The case Marx refers to is about the colonisation of Australia.

incitement for development. Capitalism is both the premise and the method for development (Norberg 2001). Norberg makes his argument with arbitrary numbers that don't add up and can't be compared. But it has an important point; capitalism is the foundation of what development is believed to be, an development imperative.

Development is ideological and that determines what the concept is infused with. And as seen above, neoliberalism has been absorbed in the dominating discourse. Even though Sweden itself has been an example of that there could be an alternative to a rapid economic growth and still strive for social equality. But the message from multilateral institutions like the World Bank is that neoliberal reforms are not only preferable, they are inevitable and unavoidable (Olukoshi 1997, 22), even unquestionable.

1:4:4 Intervention and barbarism

Eurocentrism, power and money are both motive and method for intervention in Africa. Ideology, power and profit are all viable driving forces while being "superior" in culture, politics and economy ensures control. Together they reinforce and validate each other in the same structural logic. Given that these are fundamentals in understanding how and why Eurocentrism works, there is still the question of how Europe justifies and legitimises intervention.

1:4:5 Intervention?

What constitutes as an intervention? According to Wallerstein, there are two basic forms of intervention, the economic and military. He focus on the military form of intervention and exemplifies with the war on Balkan and the invasion of Iraq (Wallerstein 2006). It could be argued that intervention happens in several other areas as well. Writing of history is such one example. Most of what is known about African history is known because of Europeans. In most primary schoolbooks in Europe, Sub-Saharan Africa seems to exist about 200 000 years ago when Homo Sapiens wandered out from Africa. Then, there was a short jump to the next period when Africa really appeared again, in the 17th century and the start of the transatlantic slave trade. Africa's passive role as a subject for Europe continued and the empires and kings of Africa in the 18th and the 19th century is named only if they fought with Europeans. Even throughout the 20th century, the prejudice of African as passive, nameless individuals was still present (Palmborg 2000). Promoting African culture could also be a form of intervention. Few African artists have had better international spread than Miriam Makeba (1932-2008). Being the continent known for its singing and dancing, very few artists actually make it outside

Africa without, as Miriam Makeba, moving to the west. Few African authors, few painters and few actors, becomes known outside Africa without moving to USA or Europe. But tourist art, masks and traditional dancing can be exported.

In this thesis, government intervention is particularly interesting.

1:4:6 The barbarity of other

Barbarity is the sum of the others values, beliefs and practises. It can be the most horrendous act like human sacrifice (Wallerstein 2006). But it can also be the patron-client relationship that define the African sense of community, but in European eyes comes across as nepotism and corruption (The Commission for Africa 2005).

It's hard for the believers in Europe's supremacy to confront the problem of when Europe violates the Universal Values. That argument is usually ignored (Wallerstein 2006). If they are discussed they are much more problematised and explain in deeper analysis than any issue in other parts of the world.

One way to see the occurrence of barbarity and threats is through the analysis of Risk society. This means that all man-made risks and external threats are part of calculations in a governance context. Threats are implanted issues in the world that doesn't exist yet. They can be used to foresee possible outcomes but also used for political reasons to manipulate public opinions (Beck 2007). This is however an extension of basic understanding of barbarity. Threats, risks, structural injustice and atrocities can be simplified and generalised as general barbarity. Barbarity can be divided into two groups, internal barbarism and external barbarism. Internal barbarisms are man-made threats and structures that originate, or at least are believed to originate in Africa. That includes wars, corruption, weak governance, genocide, poverty and such. The external barbarisms are either man-made or not, but they originate from the outside African society. That involves diseases like HIV/AIDS and malaria, the dept crisis, natural disasters and the likes.

1:4:7 The defence of the innocent among the cruel others

The Eurocentric belief is that if someone wants to live by the Universal Values, it is the responsibility of the European powers to make that possible. When barbarity is being practised, there are those that suffer. There are two main interventions to stop barbaric practises, development and humanitarian assistance. Development as intervention from the European perspective is the suspension of indigenious (bad) development in favour of a good

(Eurocentric). Humanitarian assistance deals with natural disasters and man-made crises and is meant to mitigate human casualties from the effects catastrophe and crises. The guiding principle for humanitarian assistance is the Humanitarian Imperative. All countries have a responsibility to look after the needs of civilians within their borders without discrimination. If they are unable to do that, it is the responsibility of other countries and organisations. That intervention must be, according to the humanitarian imperative, guided by the principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence (Wohlgemuth 2006). There are dilemmas and risks with humanitarian aid. There's a moral dilemma when helping the original perpetrators, like in the case with Rwanda 1994. There's a risk of sustaining or prolonging the conflict through mitigating the worst effects. Keeping quiet about the governments abuse of its people or risking the own operation. Or risking contributing to a war economy by having to bribe warlords in order to get to the needing (Slim 1997). But it's also a matter of justification for states to intervene. The attack on Iraq in 1990 and again in 2003 is such examples where it was justified with humanitarian reasons (Wallerstein 2006).

1:4:8 Ending practices that violate the universal values

When someone violates the universal values, there's an instant obligation to punish those that commit the crimes. To end barbaric practises, there is a need for intervention, a need that is understood to be moral. There are of course economic incentives underneath but it's the morality that is usually said to be what compel "us" to intervene (Wallerstein 2006). An oppressing power is what keeps development back. Muhammar Khadaffi almost seem like a Hollywood-crook now when his rule has come to an end. But the oppression can just as easily remain anonymous.

To uphold power, the ability to punish and ultimately use violence is crucial. The backbone of power is discipline. Institutions can use justice systems (or in the case of NATO military force, *writers remark*), to invoke physical punishments. Hegemony can invoke other psychological punishments in the form of stigmas (Foucault 1975) and the risk of becoming an international pariah. Crimes of humanity are regulated juridical. But they are also defined by our conceptions of what is bad or evil practises. Like Terrorism where Human Rights even was revoked for the interns at Guantanamo Bay. Genocide is on the other hand a relative term as they have to be acknowledged by the world community and the UN Security Council.

1:4:9 Making it possible to spread universal values

In the 17th century, it was the evangelisation of the gospel that was the spread of the universal values. Spreading of Christianity and the European values was closely connected. It meant installing European structures and constructing buildings from which the evangelisation could be spread (Wallerstein 2006). There are similarities in contemporary development discourse where copies of donor institutions and values are transforming the indigenous or even substitutes them

The modern rhetoric has become more refined as it is more controversial. To resolve the dilemma between intervention and the respect for the sovereign state is to say that sovereignty can only be respected if it emanates from its people. So it's connected with legitimacy of the regime. If the regime and its practises are sanctioned by its people, sovereignty of the state has to be respected. But sovereignty can also be bridged if it's requested by the state (Wallerstein 2006).

Intervention in the sense of spreading universal values is done by making and implementation of common decisions on common issues and problems, based on European values of course (Wallerstein 2006). So the instalment of Europe-like institutions, structures and systems can be understood as strive for spreading of the Eurocentric Universal Values. When the Pan-African movement morphed into OAU its objectives was to introduce a development breached from its former colonial masters and to present a third way between the two hegemonic blocs. It turned out that it wasn't so easy. African leaders had a hard time cooperating and the ideas of what development should be varied a lot (Francis 2006). But the colonial institutions were still the measuring stick. Many African states imitated both education and judicial systems that were created by the colonial powers.

By introducing Europe-like institutions and structures, the universal values, ergo the hegemony is allowed to spread.

1:4:10 What does Africa have to give back?

Why does Europe want Africa to develop? The reason is probably exactly what the EU says it is. There are the political dimension which includes issues of security, international relations and global threats. It's the cultural dimension which includes history, morality and values. And then there is the economic dimension that includes economic growth and access to natural resources. The hegemony and structures are adapted to the contemporary beliefs and needs. The problem in Europe is the realisation that it sometimes is conflicted and what's

more, it doesn't work. The development that Europe wants hasn't taken place, no matter how much we try.

1:5 Methods

The method chosen for this study is discourse analysis. Discourse analysis is a hard method to pinpoint and there seems to be as many definitions as there are practitioners. The aim of the thesis is to test power dimensions in the Europe-Africa relations. Understandable, they are many such dimensions. In this case, it will be the discourse that will be studied. For it to work, a discourse analysis of this kind has to assume that language has profound power in changing politics and culture (Bryman 2008). Foucault exemplifies in how punishment and justice systems has been practiced and changed since the Middle Ages. Not necessarily for humanitarian reasons, but for control and power. Evoking societal control has been preceded by a change in discourse (Foucault 1975). Therefore, controlling the discourse means controlling change and development.

There are four policy documents that have been chosen for this thesis. The reasons are that they are comparable and generalised. Together they form two cases, one for the regional Europe and one for the local, in this case, Sweden. The cases will show changes in time that will make it possible to see how the discourse has changed and perhaps, how it has merged with other discourses. Another interesting issue with change over time is what has been lost and abandoned along the way. Second, it will draw a picture of the contemporary hegemony in European views of Africa on what the different narratives shares in common. That can in turn be some degree be more generalised than a single case study.

The basis for the thesis is four policy documents, but what is a policy document? "Policy" seems to be a very elastic word but it has something to do with governance. A policy isn't a law and it doesn't have any jurisdiction, it's more broadly understood as a document of intent, what those in power intend that the administration to do. As it's often covers huge political areas such as foreign politics or development cooperation, room is left for the administration to decide the course of action, more or less, handing over power to them (Wennergren 2000). At the same time, when that which has hegemony in society creates a policy, it marks control, or at least the attempt to take control over the discourse. So even if the policy constructs loosely based frameworks for officers to work in, they are also bearers of the idealisation of a discourse that the policy makers want.

The introduction has shown how and why Europe described Africa in the past as well as how Europe justified and legitimised intervention then. The question is how Europe acts today. To test the theoretical framework, it would be interesting to see if there are modern equivalents to the narrative of Africa and the arguments for intervention. The analysis draws upon those theories and is organised in four parts. The first part is the Background and Point of departure. They explain some of the origins of each document as well as their points of departure, what kind of context they have been created in and what context they want to establish in the beginning. The second part is the analysis of the two key concepts, Partnership and Governance. These words are important in several aspects. They give hint about how and with what intentions Europe justifies and legitimise intervention in Africa. The third part is the three dimensions, the Political, the Economical and the Cultural. They draw a picture of both the narrative of Africa but also give clues to the intentions and motives that Europe has with intervention. The fourth part is the four arguments. They aim at showing how intervention is justified and legitimised.

To do that, a discourse analysis will be applied to each of the four selected documents to see if there are arguments that can be associated with the Eurocentric narrative and arguments. Each document has to be broken down into part that can be analysed using pointers and key rhetorical keys. Each document will be illustrated by one or more quotes that are representative for that document in every part. The quote is selected in terms of nomination/predication, rhetorical symbolism of the text, argument and perspective.

1:5:1 The three objectives of rhetoric

First of all, it's useful to remember the three main objectives in rhetoric, Logos, Ethos and Pathos. They tell us that the one that makes the argument, the writers in this case, wants us to do or think something. Question is what and why. The first objective **Logos** is to sway the public opinion through appealing to the logic and rationality of the listener/reader, political deliberation. Logos has *Probare*; rational conviction by sound argumentation in derivation of proof used to justification and legitimisation. Then there are *Docere*; the teaching and factual information to show the "objective reality". And third, *Monere*; reasoning through admonition or exhortation through authority or political control(Reisigl 2008). Logos might be the most commonly used rhetorical objective in modern mainstream politics. The second argument is **Ethos**, the creation of sympathy or moral authority for the speaker or the subject. Within Ethos there are *Conciliare*; generation of lasting impression of the listeners/readers habits through political advertisement. As well as *Delectare*; the pleasuring or entertainment of the

listeners/readers mind, convictions or egos. Ethos is important if the speaker doesn't have authority in its own. However, it's still present in the policy documents, perhaps as a way for the Swedish government and the EU to show some humility towards the readers as well as the African leadership. The third position is **Pathos**; the technique of rousing the listeners/readers interest by intense emotions or passion. It's easy to turn pathetic when using Pathos. There are *Movere*; inducing or provoking fierce and intensive emotions through instigation or political incitement. And there are *Miserato*; the moving to tears and compassion. Pathos is usually associated with dictators, like Hitlers long and emotional speeches (Reisigl 2008, Hägg 2002). But they are none the less present in contemporary political mainstream politics. The three objectives can be used as guiding tools to identify different arguments and their purpose. Depending on purpose and objective, certain objectives are used to different lengths. Logos can make up a bulk part of policy argumentation and it's often perceived as boring and uninteresting, or in rhetorical terms, *Genus Humilis* (Hägg 2002). It could also serve a purpose as something has to be said in order to achieve a goal but it can be so controversial that it has to be drowned in words. But there are also purposes in diverting attention to other parts where *Pathos* becomes useful. Interventions are often legitimised by a combination of all three objectives. By manipulating emotions and moral authority, listeners' or readers' can easier be convinced to accept the logos presented.

1:5:2 Politiolinguual method

To identify all players, their roles and attributes in the rhetoric an politilinguistic method will be applied, also understood as character nominations and predications. There are usually four such characters in political rhetoric, the 1: *I/WE*, 2: *Not those up or down there* (you, ours, those down there/here, 3: *those up there and*; 4: *Those out there*. The four characters are common in for example political populism (Reisigl 2008). In the case of the Swedish Government and the European Commission, they are the ones "Up there", they are in power. This means that they aren't critical of those in power, and it would be hard for them to be credible if they were. In the Reisigl description of the method there are two ways a character can be, included or excluded, it means that those included are them that has power and those that are friends with power. I/We and those that I/we want to protect or represent are excluded from power. In the case with the Swedish Government and the European Commission, the perspective must be seen in a different way. And reading the documents, it becomes obvious that there is need for a fifth category, the included others. So the revised politiolinguistic method looks like follows:

I/we – or The Hero! In this case, the Hero belongs to the included. Most narratives and certainly political ones are dependent on a righteous hero. In the cleverest political rhetoric, the hero plays a secondary role and the victims have the most focus. The purpose is twofold the hero's intentions aren't questioned in the face of the immense dangers and troubles that the victims are threatened by. And the hero comes across as more sympathetic and less self-righteous.

The included others – or Our brothers in arms! This group consists of those that the narratives hero wants to cooperate with. They are often institutions or powerful people in Africa which means that they belong to political, included elite.

The excluded others – Those down there! These are the victims, the weak and the innocents that need help and support. They yearn for freedom, democracy and human rights. There's often a difference between the included others and the excluded others. While the included others seems to have actions and agency of their own, the excluded others are usually passive victims in great much need of help from others. The common victims are children, women and very poor people.

Those up there – The Oppressors! While it's hard for the included to criticise power, they can at least criticise the abuse of power. Dictators, warlords and other enemies of democracy and human rights are common in this group in the Swedish policies. But in the European, the dictators and other leaders are not spoken of so much. Perhaps because of that some of those dictators had important parts in the talks between EU and AU. Or, they were simply deemed as uninteresting. Oppressors are often part of domestic or indigenous African threats caused by humans like warlords and conflicts, criminals, corrupt officials and so on.

That out there – External threats! The last group are global and external threats that don't originate in Africa or Europe, at least not according to the narrative. It's climate change, international terrorism, weapon trafficking and non-EU actors. These often serve as unifying threats. And while Europe has a huge part in causing climate change and weapon trade, these are factors that must be understood as excluded.

The rhetorical objectives and nomination/predication gives understanding for how an argument is constructed. The next step is to find and analyse the arguments that is part of the research questions.

1:5:3 Partnership and Governance

The first bulk of the analysis is partnership and governance. These two words are as said, very arbitrary. And depending of these words are defined, they make out parts of the narrative. They often belong to the “*I/we*” and the included others are tools, methods or principles that lays the foundation of cooperation and progression of development. The point of partnership and governance can also be understood as the positioning Sweden and EU in a role can legitimate an intervention through international convention or even contracts and agreements.

It’s easy to spot the arguments as partnership and governance are used often throughout all policy documents and thorough reading will find definitions of them. But as arbitrary terms they are open for discussion and definition. Those definitions are the one this part of the discourse analysis focus on. The idea of analysing these words is to study how they are used to legitimise European intervention.

1:5:4 Three dimensions

The concept of the three dimensions is purely organisational. That means that the cultural, political, and economical dimension is not recognised in the text in the same way as partnership and governance. They also lack the same theoretical framework that make up the four barbarity arguments. There are huge amounts of text material and information that has to be organised and there’s where the three dimensions comes in. But that doesn’t mean that they are insignificant in analysis. The cultural, political and economic dimensions are all about describing the European narrative of Africa as well as what kind of values Europe put forward as universal. In that way it shows how eurocentrism ties different narratives together and impacts the discourse with its own hegemony.

Finding quotations that is interesting for this analysis falls back both on the theoretical framework and the nominations/predications. Eurocentrism is dichotomy between what is considered African (the problem) and Europe (the solution). In the *cultural dimension*, it can be understood as the cultural narrative of describing “the other”, defining “their” attributes and abilities. But it is also inclusive as the policymakers want to legitimise their European values as belonging to the positive side of Africa and often connected through history and common standpoints. Culture focuses on the humanitarian views in the policy documents. It’s often connected to the Pathos, the emotional in the document. The *political dimension* focuses on the common political values, or understood to be universal values. However, the critique put forward by for example Wallerstein is that they are in no way universal values. It could

be argued that some fundamentals like the right to life and even democracy can be said to be universal for all human culture. But the political dimension looks into what Europe links those values to and what kind of content the Eurocentric narrative fills those values with. The third is the *economic dimension*. This dimension concerns the economic values and touches upon some of the motives behind the European intervention. Those motives can be seen in the light of the problems, possibilities and solutions that Europe identifies.

Together these three dimensions reveal which values and which narratives are most important to Europe and also who plays the most important parts.

1:5:5 The four arguments of Barbarism

The last analytical part is the four arguments of barbarism. The opposite of European as a paradigm is Barbarism in the dichotomy in which Europe divides the world. Everything that is perceived as bad is understood as non-European attributes. And everything that is development is signified with it belonging to Europe.

While the concept of “Barbarism” has old historical ties to Eurocentrism, it’s not a familiar term found in any present policy document written in Europe, why use that word? While no contemporary policymaker would call Africans for barbarians, whatever they actually thinks about the genocide in Rwanda, Charles Taylor, Joseph Kony or Robert Mugabe. In studying and comparing modern rhetoric with this backdrop of old concepts of justifying and legitimising intervention, it’s possible to test if the view of Africans has changed or only the words. It’s sometimes argued that to read a text that criticise other cultures, one only has to replace to word culture with race and you know what you’re reading. Or replace the word Muslim with Jew and you know what you’re reading. If it’s a real scientific method that has a real name, it’s not to the writers knowing. However, it’s a highly questionable method. While it aims at highlighting oppression by associating it with an oppression that is commonly acknowledged, it risks reducing factors and issues that are unique to its own circumstance. In other words, it’s a risk of comparing apples and oranges. The method used in this thesis should not be confused with the method described above. While the terminology can be said to belong to a very different oppression, it is still linked to relations between Europe and the “others”. It has also been shown in the background and theoretical part of this chapter to have more than just rhetorical ties. In fact, they share a close linkage back in time.

Question is; can the notion of the barbarism be found in the policy documents? Well, there are four basic arguments.

1:5:6 What is intervention?

There are several kinds of intervention. For example military intervention, humanitarian intervention and development cooperation. The word intervention does perhaps have a negative ring to it and it might come across as provocative to use it in terms of development cooperation. But the idea is simple. The world consists of sovereign nations, incidentally according to a European recipe. Any action in another state by a second state, organisation based in another state or a transnational organisation is an intervention, with or without permission from the state in question. This is the prerequisite for the definition of intervention in the thesis. While the definition can be discussed, the purpose for this thesis is to show that when an intervention is performed, it is usually justified and legitimised. One way to justify and legitimise it is through using an existing narrative and through that create, for example, a series of juridical prerequisites in agreements to perform it.

1:5:7 Barbarity of others

Barbarism can be two things, heinous acts of cruelty and uncivilised manner. While Europe should be experts on acts of cruelty, being the founder of the worst wars in human history, heinous acts are understood as barbaric and thus attributed the others. So is “uncivilised manner” like corruption for example or trafficking. The line can be drawn everywhere from simple cultural behaviour like circumcisions or ritual scarring to structural violence like extreme poverty and discrimination. Barbarism is something that isn’t European and thus performed by “the other”. The other can be a person, a people or a country, the point is that it isn’t inside Europe.

Barbarism of others is a mechanism highlighting threats which is paternalistic. “Because *they* do this thing, *we* have to help *them* in this way. And *they* have to respond this way.” Barbarism is threats of different kinds. While Wallerstein focus on violent threat staging (Wallerstein 2006), this thesis will also include various forms of structural violence like understanding poverty, climate change and lack of growth as forms of barbarity. Why? Because these factors are very prominent in the European narrative of Africa. The barbarism of others is often used to reinforce the narrative of Africa and in turn, justify intervention.

So, the predications of barbarians are general evilness consorting with drugs and weapons trafficking, corruption and power abuse. Some barbarians are those that still practise harmful traditions like FGM. Others are the warlords and dictators. The nomination is the naming of those involved in that sort of business, the oppressors and the external threats.

1:5:8 Ending barbarism

The point of development cooperation as an intervention is to root out these threats. This is the first argument for legitimising intervention. It includes what Europe propose to do to end barbarism and how to do it. This is the recipe for development according to Europe. It is usually constructed around the *I/we* and the *included others* nominations and predications. The argument is mostly focused at ending said barbarities like poverty, war and crime.

1:5:9 Defending the innocent others

“Her only crime was being born a woman.” A common sentence in using propaganda to justify intervention. The idea of barbaric others is that among them, there are people that are suffering the consequences and that they are innocent and victims. It might be a humanitarian thought to save victims of oppression, but question is, are they without agency? Do they choose their rescuer or do the rescuers choose them? Who deserves to be defended and who doesn't?

The paternalism in this argument is significant in terms of creating a Eurocentric world view. Africans are suffering beings without means and in great need of help. That is the image of the innocent other, the victim, the poor, the woman, the child. This argument will search the documents for how Europe defines the suffering others and what kind of help they are in need of, the nominations and predications are predominantly *those down there*. The argument is constructed to justify interventions.

1:5:10 Spread of the Universal values

The universal values are not necessarily confined to the Universal declaration of human rights or the European declaration of human rights. They are the set of values that is said to be common or universal in the documents. Human rights, democracy, growth and much more. The spread of the universal values isn't only the actual spread of values, it concerns the modalities of how said values are being spread. For example, neoliberal economics is treated as both values and modalities, growth is both the goal and the means. Introducing European structures is another modality. Because part of the Eurocentric world view is to replace other institutions and structures with their own. So if a political level is created in Europe, the correspondent level should be introduced in other continents as well. Europe is the measuring stick.

Normally, the nominations of the *I/we* and the *included others* are involved here. This is the final legitimisation of the agreement of intervention. Note that most agreements are concerned

with legitimising intervention in the weaker part. While some attempts are made in to intervene in Europe, or example in the strengthening of right for Africans in Diaspora, they are mostly inefficient.

1:5:11 Case study

This thesis is a case study, supposedly consisting of two cases. The first case is the country level, represented here by Sweden. The choice of Sweden has been under some consideration, as Sweden is a small country within the union but allegedly with a strong influence on policy making (Naurin och Lindahl 2007, DN Debatt). Furthermore, Sweden still maintains a good international reputation in development cooperation, both among donors and developing countries. Sweden also differentiates itself from most other donors, it was alliance free during the cold war and the colonial heritage in Sweden is minimal although not non-existing. Development aid in Sweden has been based on a solidarity paradigm which also separates Sweden from most other western donors. In conclusion, Sweden is both an integrated and independent actor in Europe. That makes it interesting to study.

EU is not a spokesman for the entire Europe, although it sometimes sounds like that in policy document. But, a considerable part of Europe's countries belong to the union and submit to its rules. There is a movement towards making EU into a European federation and within that discourse, eurocentrism is central. A common flag, president and foreign minister are parts of constructing a European identity and narrative of Europe as an entity. And while Russia has growing interests in Africa, the Eurocentric discourse is something that primarily has and still does belong to Western Europe.

1:5:12 Sources

Policymaking is a way to construct democratic legitimacy around a social and political hegemony through deliberations rather than elections. Policymaking includes several stakeholders in the process and can be seen as a way to legitimise governance, both on the national and global level. The proponents claim that it can be the best democratic alternative where voting simply isn't an option. The problem is, who to involve and who to exclude and who decides the issues? There are examples of how global institutions chose participants according to the answers they want. Another issue is the diffusion of power. Who are behind the actual views and statements and who are responsible when a policy document is a consensus between different stakeholders and those in power (Risse 2007)?

Swedish law have absolute demands on objectivity and impartiality in all public functions. That includes policy development in development cooperation (Wennergren 2000).

The documents that will be examined are the following:

- The Swedish Africa policy from 1998
- The EU strategy for Africa from 2005
- The joint Africa-EU strategic partnership from 2007
- The Swedish new Africa policy from 2008

One interview has been conducted to spread further light on the ulterior mechanism behind the policymaking. Notes from EU-AU Joint Parliamentary Assembly (JPA) on October 4th 2011, are used to exemplify the tone in deliberations between the EC and the ACP-countries.

The 1998 policy is the most extensive policy and will serve as a point of departure.

The 2005 EU strategy for Africa has divided into three parts, the Conclusions by the heads of State and Government meeting in the European Council in Brussels on the 15th of December, 2005. The second part is the communication from the commission to the council, the European Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee. That part is a summary of the third part, the Annex to the communication which is the most elaborate part.

1:6 In conclusion

Searching each document looking for evidence on what context each document is founded in, how they define partnership and governance, what kinds of values they highlight and how they argue in justifying and legitimising intervention, should paint a vivid picture of how the narrative of Africa is constructed. The documents are studied as a whole which means that any quote is an example and not taken randomly or out of context. They are representative of the policy documents.

The analysis will then continue to find the answers to the questions.

- **How does Europe describe Africa as a narrative in modern relations?**
- **How does Europe justify and legitimise intervention in Africa?**
- **Why does Europe use this narrative?**

These questions could be answered in various ways. Extensive interviews could be held with people responsible. Counting the quantity of keywords and comparing them. Looking at news

articles, debate articles or references of speeches held in parliaments. But nowhere does it compare as well as looking at policy documents. They compare well, they follow about the same structure and they are what must be considered the agreed upon dominant discourse within the particular power body.

The analysis has to be based on both methods and theory in order to find some answers to the questions. In particular *why* Europe describe Africa as a narrative. Justifications and legitimisations together with values and modalities proposed could hold some clues to answering that.

2. Sweden 1998 – Africa on the move

2:1 Background

The policy is in parts a result of two conferences in Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire (1997) and Saltsjöbaden, Sweden (1998) organised by a group popularly called “Partnership for Africa”. This group had the specific task of creating a framework for the new Swedish Africa policy in the face of a post-cold war era. Several African stakeholders and academics were part of this group and took part in the discussions (Karlsson, Foreword 1998).

For the millennium, there is reason to hope for an “African Renaissance”.
(Skr. 1997/98:122 1998, 5)

Mats Karlsson, who was the state secretary for International Development Cooperation at the ministry of Foreign Affairs in Sweden commented on that phrase shortly afterwards. He stated that the renaissance is already happening and that Africa is no way uniform. He continues that the *African’s liberation must be their own*. But it does in no way mean that the Africans should be left alone. The north has a responsibility to the scandalous past (Karlsson 1998). There are two important changes in the new policy in compared to previous development discourse, first; to nuance the view of Africa and second; transfer the responsibility for Africa’s development to the Africans.

The policy might have been a bit over optimistic when it comes to the assumptions made about the political development in Africa. But it was all about picking political points and showing that the Government understood (Odén, Interview on Swedish-Africa policies 2011).

2:2 Point of departure

Africa on the move is a historic document as it is the first time Sweden takes a thorough grip on the governments' politics on Africa. The aim of the entire policy is to develop a closer cooperation with Africa on equal terms, a partnership. The idea is to aim to;

Support African-led processes of change towards consolidated democracy and sustainable development, focusing particularly on the situation of the poor; Develop partnerships between Africa and the surrounding world; Strengthen the long-term exchange between Sweden and Africa.

(Skr. 1997/98:122 1998, 2)

It is time to change the view of Africa as it is going through considerable change. Democracy and economic reforms are gaining ground. There's a dawn for new African leaders that look to the best for the popular majority. There are new generations in the private sector and the academic world. Women begin to raise their voices. There's of course still a lot left to do, conflicts and violence, raging demographic growth, environmental degradation, spread of HIV/AIDS and corruption are still the blight of the continent (Skr. 1997/98:122 1998).

2:3 Partnership

There's an inbuilt uneven power distribution between donors and developing countries. This division has been a problem in development cooperation for a long time. And one of the purposes with the policy is to come to terms and tackle that very issue.

Obviously, the inequality that is inherent in the aid relationship cannot be eliminated all at once. But it can be tackled in various ways while, at the same time, contacts are extended into areas where mutual interest results in self-funding exchange.

(Skr. 1997/98:122 1998, 8)

The meaning of partnership is to come to terms with the inequality and uneven relations that Sweden has with the African countries through mutual gains. Another change is that objectives in cooperation have to be subjected to clarity and the means to obtain certain goals (Skr. 1997/98:122 1998, 8). But partnership is also infused with a set of common values.

Partnership should be seen as an attitude, in a form of co-operation that is based on a shared basis of values and mutual trust. Joint and clearly formulated objectives, conditions, obligations, roles and responsibilities are part of partnership. The aspiration should be to bring about increased equality and mutual respect in the relationship, in awareness of the fundamental inequality represented by the donor's upper hand in terms of resources.

(Skr. 1997/98:122 1998, 82)

Values have to guide the partnership but Africa and its leadership has to be in charge of its own policies. Europe won't direct development in Africa anymore. But on the other hand, they have to adhere to the Eurocentric values and prioritise them or the cooperation will be discontinued (Skr. 1997/98:122 1998, 9).

Partnership isn't a new notion, it was present in the development-debate already in the 70's but no one remembers that today (Odén 2011). It also signifies the discourse's sensitivity to fashions. But on the other hand, partnership has gotten a new meaning. It's a contract between donors and recipients that everyone has to commit to a series of values.

2:4 Governance

Sweden's definition of good governance lies close to the definition of how the Swedish model is understood to work. Open and transparent institutions with high popular participation, where media is free but civil society and the private sector has equal influence on the discourse. Democracy is pluralistic and the democratic vote is respected. The government won't involve itself in every detail of society like in labour conditions or cultural practices. All common freedoms are sanctified and guaranteed (Skr. 1997/98:122 1998).

The notion of good governance is central to all partnerships. It has particular relevance in Africa, with its young and deficient democratic structures. The Bank's guidelines for good governance from as early as 1991 cited such key areas as responsibility for the running of public services, public control of administration and strengthening of the rule of law and its institutions as crucial to the degree of success that the World Bank's inputs in a co-operating country could achieve. Since 1997, the key areas cited have also included corruption. Corruption has an adverse effect on partnership and should be combatted jointly by the co-operating country and the World Bank and IMF as well as other donors.
(Skr. 1997/98:122 1998, 75)

The Bank's slimmed state is growing and includes more and more areas for governance. While the bank's slimmed definition doesn't include extensive political values, democracy is interpreted as the base for governance.

2:5 The cultural perspective

The culture is mostly about the fabric of how the hegemony and institutions constitute themselves and situate themselves in a context. That includes history and actions of people as well as the understanding of Africa.

The new freedom is manifested in a growing number of newspapers and other news media, which are opening the way for a lively discussion of political issues. A plethora of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) of widely differing kinds are making their contribution to building up the culture of democracy. Nor, in the various countries' trade unions, has there been any delay in using the new, successively expanding freedom of action to vitalise their work and strengthen their position.

(Skr. 1997/98:122 1998, 19)

The new democratic culture has brought with it an end of backwards, totalitarian rule and lets free newspapers, NGO's and trade unions to flourish. Modernity has come to Africa. But there are still challenges.

The historical legacy and African traditions have a distinct importance for both the opportunities and the difficulties in the democratisation process. Hierarchies and hierarchic thinking still prevail in many places. Clans and other forms of collective often have a very strong position. The influence of the tribal-chief system has not disappeared.

(Skr. 1997/98:122 1998, 23)

So traditional culture provides obstacles for democratisation and can very well be considered barbarity. But the traditional society has its upsides to, from them; learning democracy is easy as there are traditions of powersharing and consensus (Skr. 1997/98:122 1998, 23).

The Swedish government wants to situate itself in the middle of Africa, in touch with the grassroots.

Government policy has been to take as its starting point the major changes under way in Africa, to break away from the stereotypes and to open the way for broader exchange between Sweden and Africa. Sweden's foreign policy and development co-operation has, in many ways, given us a close relationship with the African societies.

(Skr. 1997/98:122 1998, 7)

According to the government, the Swedish contacts with Africa originated in the 17th century with the Swedish trading post of the *Africa Company* on the Gold Coast, modern Ghana⁵. The Swedish mission was present in the Horn of Africa already in the 19th century and when

⁵ Sweden was involved in the Transatlantic slave trade but the scale was very small with less than 0,2% of the entire market, compared to Denmark that had around 1%. Sweden had probably been a larger player if it wasn't for financial problems and intrigues that stopped the *Africa Company*. It was not because any moral doubts that is usually put forward as the reason. Sweden managed to transport almost 10 000 slaves during the active years (Harrison 2007).

Ethiopia was invaded in the 30's, Sweden expressed great sympathy for the emperor when he later visited Sweden. The struggle for independence in Africa resonated in Sweden and led to increased interest. Kenya and Tanzania received Swedish support from the start. Sweden was later committed to the independence struggles in the Lusophone⁶ colonies and in the fight against apartheid in Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa. As a country with no colonial past and no strategic geopolitical interests, Sweden was able to mantle the role of impartial promoter of solidarity with the deprived African people (Skr. 1997/98:122 1998).

The Swedes are also affected by their relation with Africa in their work, spare time and privacy. The Swedes are also prone to solidarity with Africa and has great interests in the continent. Tourism is an increasing sector and around 500 Swedes move to Africa every year (Skr. 1997/98:122 1998).

Civil society which includes unions like LO/TCO, churches and solidarity groups like the Africa Groups of Sweden plays an important part in reinforcing the Swedish commitment to development cooperation and aid. They make up a great part of the stakeholders in the Swedish contacts with Africa. Likewise does Institutes like the Nordic Africa Institute and Universities like Gothenburg and Stockholm universities contribute to understanding of Africa and issues that developing countries struggle with (Skr. 1997/98:122 1998).

Sweden stands for dynamic democracy, equality, human rights and civil society. These are the values that Sweden wants to be associated with and it is these that the government wants to convey to the partners. The government speaks for Sweden and connects to other parts in the Swedish society that can legitimise the Swedish commitment for further development cooperation in Africa. Referring to The Nordic Africa Institute and universities gives the Government credibility. Connecting to civil society and popular movements like the unions, solidarity groups and churches contributes legitimacy.

2:6 The political dimension

Sweden's primary goal is democratisation of which the Human Rights are the centrepiece. And democracy has to stem from the grassroots.

For Africa, as for the other continents, people and their resources make up a major potential. Making good use of these resources and developing them further

⁶ Portugal's colonies, Guinea-Bissau, Kap Verde and Mozambique for example.

is important, and this can be done only if people themselves feel that they are integral to development. African democracy must have African roots and a face of its own that is recognisable to the African population. Democratisation needs democrats, schooled in an active civil society — often in fierce combat with the enemies of democracy.

(Skr. 1997/98:122 1998, 9)

An obstacle that is incorporated into the African democratisation is the preference for the British electoral system. Pluralistic structures are better and they are growing in numbers on the African continent. In a pluralistic society, popular and civil participation is important as it builds democracy from below. That strengthens the democratic forces both in society and in the governance (Skr. 1997/98:122 1998, 24).

A shared basis of values may consist of some of the conventions to which almost all countries are signatories. These relate to political and civil rights, equality between the sexes, the rights of the child, basic democratic rules, and social and economic rights. The intention is not to lash poor African countries with the moralist whip, but to establish a fundamental ethic to govern co-operation — an ethic that the players of partnership have decided to support in their international normative work.

(Skr. 1997/98:122 1998, 82)

This is a good example of where the universal values are used as a basis for creating a framework for legitimacy of intervention. While Sweden is clear with that morals shouldn't be forced, there's also a pressure on the African states to sign the covenant and declarations to prove their democratisation.

Gender equality is an overlooked perspective in the policy. Women are often pointed out as victims but also important stakeholders in the democracy process and in creating new growth. Equality is to permeate all levels of for a democratic and good governed society. This is intended and agreed upon at conferences such as the UN Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995 (Skr. 1997/98:122 1998, 25).

During the 1990s, important political and economic changes have taken place in Africa. A new generation of leaders have appeared, with new ideas about political and economic development. Democracy has gained a foothold and the democratisation process is continuing. The abolition of apartheid in South Africa represents a new start for the southern part of the continent. The 30-year civil war in Ethiopia has been settled and Eritrea has emerged, with new ideas about African self-reliance. The Mobutu regime has fallen, as one of the last bastions of outdated authoritarian rule. Several peace processes are under way, and respect for human rights is growing in many countries.

(Skr. 1997/98:122 1998, 80)

The African people are the ones that demands individual and political rights and they are at the forefront of creating the new political context. The end of apartheid is both an important inspiration and a political victory for the South African people. And for the Swedish government as it is concrete evidence for that international solidarity works⁷. But end of apartheid and democratic changed isn't only a result of pressure of donors (Skr. 1997/98:122 1998, 10-11, 19). It serves a legitimising purpose to pick up and align with an anonymous mass of "others". It serves a populist interest, the African people are 1 billion, and some of them are bound to agree with the Swedish government. But as most poor Africans in rural areas probably never have heard about Sweden, the question is who the Swedish Government refers to.

African leadership are changing and the new leaders with Nelson Mandela as role model are at the basis of Sweden's renewed view of Africa (Skr. 1997/98:122 1998, 11).

With this as framework, the responsibility for Africa's development seems finally ready to be put in African hands.

2:7 The economic dimension

The Swedish trade sector with Africa is on a very small scale and most connections are through the traditional political and development cooperation. But as a member of the European Union, Sweden obtained a new interface with Africa. The world economy is rapidly integrating and grows over national and regional boundaries with flows of goods and services, investments and capital. And the Government wants to include the *Swedish Business and Industry*⁸ more in development as it could benefit from increased contact with Africa. There's also a potential in using the private sector for development (Skr. 1997/98:122 1998, 5-7).

The economic hardships Africa is suffering under is partly caused by the dept-crisis and the inability to handle it, both from the African states and the international community. The structural adjustments, however rigid they are, are beginning to bear fruit in those countries that have committed most to them. The average growth was 5% in 1996-97 (Skr. 1997/98:122 1998, 9-10).

⁷ SIDA transferred a lot of aid to ANC among others during the fight against apartheid. Much was done in secret with the Swedish civil society as link.

⁸ Svenskt Näringsliv

Foreign aid to the developing world was consistent on 50 billion dollars while credits grew to \$ 250 billion in 1996. The problem is that the African states has had a hard time tapping into that flow of credits and are still dependant on aid to continue reform (Skr. 1997/98:122 1998, 7).

The private sector in Sweden has very little interests in Africa and isn't really a notable stakeholder. In fact, the African share of Swedish Export is just over 1%. But the Swedish government want to increase the presence of Swedish corporations in Africa like ABB, Ericsson and Volvo which already has some investments on the African markets. But African business climate has to develop for Swedish investments to pay off. Business development has to be focused on building infrastructure and institutional frameworks (Skr. 1997/98:122 1998, 65).

2:8 The four arguments

2:8:1 Barbarism

It's important to point out the persistence of threats to legitimise development intervention.

...immense problems persist. Armed conflict affects the population in several countries, and instability is severe in certain regions. Demographic growth is still rapid and the number of poor people is rising. Environmental degradation and the spread of AIDS are growing problems. Corruption is widespread, and resource conservation must be improved. The challenges for those wishing to lead Africa into a period of greater prosperity are great, but the desire to advance is very much in evidence.

(Skr. 1997/98:122 1998, 5)

This example is one of the introductory perspectives that the government has and summarises the argument pretty well. There are mentions of various internal and external barbarities like armed conflict, uncontrolled demographic growth, AIDS and corruption. All examples are localised to the African context. These are such severe crisis's that an intervention is necessary and that by those willing.

The enemies of democracy are many, the corrupt politicians and civil servants, military regimes and dictators, police and secrets services that torture and abuse people. Some dictators have fallen from power. Like Kamuzu Banda in Malawi, Mengistu in Ethiopia, Idi Amin of Uganda and Mobutu of DRC. Others cling to power through rigged elections or violence like the Zambian government, Moi of Kenya, and the military regime in Nigeria (Skr. 1997/98:122 1998, 10-16).

Poverty is one of the more frequent barbarities that are mentioned. The gaps between rich and poor are growing rapidly, both on country level as in continent level (Swedish Government 1998, 6). The growing population of poor people is a strain on the environment and when natural resources are extracted at a rapid pace. Demographic growth also leads to increased flows of refugees (Skr. 1997/98:122 1998, 10).

Corruption threatens all fabrics of society. Kenya has one of the strongest economies on the continent but corruption and income gaps has turned the economic growth down with -2% (Skr. 1997/98:122 1998, 13). But corruption doesn't have to be result of poverty or lack of resources. It's a result of political and economic cultures where greed is allowed to thrive. Corruption isn't unique for Africa but fragile societies are more sensitive to the effects. (Skr. 1997/98:122 1998, 28).

Corruption and nepotism have played a destructive role in the central government of many an African country. Deficient state legitimacy, authoritarian forms of government and the existence of parallel power structures (for example, in the state-supporting party) are a few of the factors that have caused widespread corruption. The high level of corruption in several African societies is an obstacle on the road to liberalisation. At the same time, corruption may also increase in the wake of economic liberalisation, for example in the struggle for power over enterprises that are privatised.

(Skr. 1997/98:122 1998, 27)

The worst backwards barbarity which is associated with the others is corruption. Corruption is the obstacle for all parts of development but mostly for achieving good growth that can equalise the social disparities. Corruption is also squandering with public means that comes from aid. This means that Swedish money that is stolen which explains some of the aversion (Skr. 1997/98:122 1998, 28).

Armed conflicts are the root of several other barbarities and they are fuelled by barbarities in a vicious circle. Uncontrolled and illicit flows of arms make it hard to mitigate conflicts and can also make them to spread like Sierra Leone and Liberia has experienced (Skr. 1997/98:122 1998, 15). Religious and ethnic tensions have contributed to igniting conflicts like in Sudan (Skr. 1997/98:122 1998, 17-18).

Other mentioned barbarities are; Growing social and economic gaps, death penalty, torture, tribalism and clan-systems, violence on women and children and child soldiers, usually as details in larger contexts of conflict and poverty.

2:8:2 Ending barbarism

Ending barbarity isn't enough as South Africa experience. Apartheid is gone but social deprivation persists, unemployment, crime and violence are rampant. Only by democratisation and institutionalisation of change and universal values can South Africa ensure development. They are on their way thanks to abundant natural resources, political awareness and high women participation (Skr. 1997/98:122 1998, 11). It's important that democracy isn't used as a cover up for authoritarian regimes to hide behind to act in their usual manner (Skr. 1997/98:122 1998, 19-20).

Today, 38 African nations have ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; at the beginning of 1990, only 23 had done so. The majority of African countries have also now signed the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the conventions on the elimination of racial discrimination and of all forms of discrimination against women; and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. Eighteen African nations have submitted reports to the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child.

(Skr. 1997/98:122 1998, 21)

The next step for the African states is to embark on the road the becoming real democracies with Eurocentric values as core standards. This is made possible by a integration on both regional and continental level. The OAU is taking more and more charge in the development towards the conformity to European standards.

The nature of African economies, the weakness of public institutions and the social relations in traditional, as well as modern, society contribute to an environment that is vulnerable to corruption. In the transition phase to the market economy, moreover, the risk of corruption may also increase. Here, a policy that is both socially responsible and directly aimed at corruption is required.

(Skr. 1997/98:122 1998, 27)

Africa has to transform to make way for development and market economy which means institutionalisation of the universal values.

African leadership is ultimately responsible for implementing policies and institutionalising values which have been drawn up in. Sweden is clear on that point but there are several ways to make the leaders commit and submit to what the international discourse demands.

◆ *Rewards for progress. Instead of the traditional plethora of conditions not been complied with and sanctions not applied, management by objectives should be introduced, with measurable, simple performance targets whose attainment is required for continued aid. One implication of co-operation in partnership should*

be that countries able to show good results from co-operation will be able to attract more resources.

(Skr. 1997/98:122 1998, 85)

One method for achieving this kind of partnership is realising that the carrot is better than the whip. But it's also combined with an incitement of conditionality. To gain something, the partners have to show results.

2:8:3 Defending the innocents

Conflict, ecological threats and population pressure contributes to the growing groups of refugees. 40% of all refugees in the world are located in Africa and most of them are impoverished women and children which make the refugee group's even more vulnerable (Skr. 1997/98:122 1998, 10).

Partnership is also aimed at strengthening the weaker party. This aim includes an idea of solidarity, as well as a realisation that an endeavour to bring about a more equal world is also in the long-term interest of the stronger party. Sweden should be able to protect Africa's interests in international contexts where the African states are not themselves represented, provided that these interests do not conflict with crucial Swedish foreign-policy aims.

(Skr. 1997/98:122 1998, 82)

Sweden wants to represent and protect their weaker partners where they can't reach. But it also means that Sweden knows Africa's interests. These interests are outlined through the whole policy by Sweden and they are also indicated by the premise for partnership. So question is, whose interest is Sweden going to represent again?

2:8:4 Spreading the universal values

Africa has to transform and that takes democratic, economic and social reforms. Many barbarities, threats and problems seem structural and inherently African.

Africa is in an era of transition. In this situation, support from the surrounding world is crucially important. Without continued democratic, economic and social reforms and progress, Africa will come to lag behind permanently, with long-term global consequences. With joint efforts, on the other hand, Africa's marginalisation can give way to mutually advantageous exchange.

(Skr. 1997/98:122 1998, 5)

The argument is that the surrounding world has to intervene if Africa shall have any hope for the future. It's not only a matter of giving support and aid and not even through investing anymore, Africa has to transform structurally. National development in Africa has been upgraded to a global concern.

The notion of democracy, even the version generally embraced by the West, does not lack roots in Africa. The ideal of freedom was no alien concept in the various traditional societies of the developing world, and the notion of democracy was central in the struggle for liberation that resulted in the independent nation-states of the present day. However, the focus was then on “power to the people”, rather than the individual’s freedom and democratic rights. It was a matter of liberation from the colonial power, development for the people, rather than of the individual’s freedom and rights. In the light of the current situation at the time, this focus was entirely natural.

(Skr. 1997/98:122 1998, 19)

But now it is time for the next step in Africa’s democratisation according to the Swedish Government. That is to fulfil the democratisation internally in continued struggle for individual democratic rights and freedoms (Skr. 1997/98:122 1998, 19).

2:9 Analysis

The inclusion of Africans as responsible for Africa’s development was the new thing. Sweden had no problem with finding examples of where the connection was already inclusive. But it was still paternalistic. Market economy was a buzzword for consumption capitalism. The market is an African invention if anything and buying things you don’t produce yourself has tradition as old as history. But opening up markets and integrating them into the capitalistic world system is something else. None the less, Sweden has decided that it is what the Africans wants.

Sweden holds its own election system over any other. By proposing its own system, the government puts themselves on moral high ground. The election system in Sweden has strong support in the public. Of course, any Swede would argue that the system is the best to date and therefore any intervention is justified.

Sweden wants to approach Africa and stand on its side. Therefore, Sweden needs African voices in the policy and African legitimacy. The problem with development and aid has for a long time been that intervention was paternalistic and meant changing African politics from the outside. So in order to legitimise intervention, African voices have to give their support.

There are two major values that are discussed throughout the policy; they are the respect for Human Rights and Democracy. They are often believed to be interconnected with each other as well as with other values such as equality, sustainable economic growth and good governance. The ball is in Africa’s court but it won’t be Tanzania or Namibia that will break

the cooperation because Sweden has violated the human rights. African leaders are invited to the table but they have to observe etiquette.

3. The EU 2005

3:1 Background

There are three parts in the European Strategy for Africa, the Conclusions by the heads of State and Government meeting in the European Council in Brussels on the 15th of December, 2005. The two latter parts was written by the European Commission (EC) and they will therefore be regarded as their words. Even though it's the EU strategy and the initiative came from the European Council under the leadership of the UK, the Commission did most of the work (Odén and Wohlgemuth 2009). So it's problematic to say that the words in the Communication and the Annex belong to any other than the EC. Therefore, there will be a differentiation between the words of the EC and the priorities of the EU.

The first part, the last part written, is the *Conclusions of Heads and state*. This part contains the conclusions the Council of ministers made. The section isn't very interesting for the sake of the thesis as it doesn't contain much of a narrative. Neither does it present any different opinions than the two second parts.

The second part is the *Communication from the commission to the council*, the European Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee. The section is more of a summary of the third part but has a narrative and sometimes frame the EC priorities.

The third and most elaborate part is the *Annex to the communication*. The likeliness that everyone will read the Annex is lower than that most stakeholders have strained schedules and might only read the commissions communication. And the commission are very selective in which information they pass on in the communication. One example is:

Sub-Saharan Africa's share of world trade has declined from 3% in 1950 to less than 2% today. A controlled and gradual increase in openness, first regionally and then towards the wider world, is therefore needed as a basis for a significant acceleration of growth and development. Given that Europe remains Africa's most important trading partner – for example, approximately 85% of Africa's exports of cotton, fruit and vegetables are imported by the EU – the EU has a key role in supporting these processes.

(European Commission (Annex) 2005, 50)

But in the Commissions communication to the Council and parliamentarians that information has turned into:

Europe and Africa are connected by strong trade links, making the EU the biggest export market for African products. For example, approximately 85% of Africa's exports of cotton, fruit and vegetables are imported by the EU.

(European Commission (Annex) 2005, 22)

The levels of world trade weren't mentioned in the conclusions made by the heads of state and government. But there are on the other hand, they conveyed an intense will to reevaluate the African states into equal trading partners. By:

Help to integrate Africa fully into the world trade system, by pressing for a successful outcome to the Doha Round of world trade talks that is ambitious,

(European Council of Heads of State and Government 2005)

Another part of the background to the Strategy-policy can actually be found in the Swedish Africa policy from 1998. It states that when the Lomé IV-agreement expired in 2000, the EU members had declared five guidelines to the new agreement, which of course became known as the Cotonou-agreement. The five guidelines were:

1. The partnership
2. Poverty alleviation focus and equality between sexes
3. Promotion of ACP countries in integration into global trade.
4. Simplifying and rationalising the instruments of economical and technical cooperation.
5. The ACP countries are to remain a cohesive group while.

(Skr. 1997/98:122 1998, 64-65)

Thus, the five pillars of the Cotonou-agreement from 2000 are the following:

1. *reinforcement of the political dimension of relations between ACP countries and the European Union;*
2. *involvement of civil society, the private sector and the non-State players;*
3. *poverty reduction, confirmed as a key objective within the context of the objectives and targets agreed at international level (in particular the MDG's);*
4. *an innovative economic and trade cooperation framework;*
5. *rationalisation of financial instruments and a system of flexible programming.*

(European Commission 2005, 8)

The pillars include every point that the EU members had agreed on, except one, regionalisation. But on the other hand, regionalisation seems to be the one point that has been most implemented of them all.

Another meeting in Cairo in 2000 between the EU and Africa hatched a new plan. (1) regional integration in Africa; (2) integration of Africa in the world economy; (3) promoting human rights, democratic principles and good governance; (4) peace building, conflict prevention, management and resolution; (5) sustainable development, poverty eradication, health, environment, food security, trafficking and culture. It was this meeting that in the end lead up to the European Councils initiative to create an EU strategy for Africa (Odén and Wohlgemuth 2009). This last plan is what came closest to the finished result in the strategy of 2005. But with all these guidelines and pillars, it was bound to be problems.

3:2 Point of departure

It seems like Africa, for some reason, has been waking up from its Cold War hibernation for a decade by now. But by now, NEPAD had been formed and the OAU was transformed into AU the year before.

Africa is on the move. International awareness of the situation in Africa has significantly improved in recent years and the continent is now giving sustained signs that today there is a real momentum for change. The birth of the African Union (AU) and NEPAD, the reinforced role of Africa's regional economic communities (RECs) and the emergence of a new generation of leaders at national level have changed Africa. It is also changing the relationship between Africa and Europe.

(European Commission (Communication) 2005, 22)

That the first sentence in the communication is the exact words as in the title for the Swedish Africa-policy is a mystery but might as well be a coincidence. But that the point of departure is approximately the same is not. The difference might be that the EC has more concrete and realistic evidence to found their initial assumptions on.

One Africa. While Africa has many faces, different histories and diverse needs, it has now collectively embarked on a path of political, economic and cultural integration of the entire continent, crystallised in the regional integration efforts [...] The EU strategy for Africa will therefore, for the first time, address Africa as one entity.

(European Commission (Communication) 2005, 23)

The EC is aware that it makes generalisation that is illogical and impossible as there's no way to summarise Africa's political, economic and cultural dimension in less than hundred pages. There's not really any point as abundant literature is available on the subjects. But the context of which the EC has drawn up in the document is the starting point of the entire EU Africa strategy (European Commission (Annex) 2005, 40-41).

The EU has also changed significantly, 10 new states has made the EU consist of 26 possible partners, the 25 countries and the EC. Donor coordination and aid effectiveness will therefore be central priorities on the European side (European Commission (Communication) 2005, 24).

3:3 The point of Partnership

EU bases its partnership on agreements. Two agreements are central focal points when it comes to formulating a policy towards Africa, the Lomé agreement from 1975 and the Cotonou agreement in 2000. These two agreements are signed with the ACP-countries and as one of those regions, they have great significance for Africa. But there are other agreements of inspiration; the TCDA, Euro-mediterranean partnership and the European neighbourhood watch which has, in the eyes of the EC anyway, been very successful in achieving its goals (European Commission (Annex) 2005, 57-58). The Cotonou-agreement is the model of which the strategy builds upon. Simply as the EC wants to push forward with its demands on Africa and create a framework for achieving the EC objectives. The relations with Africa are supposed to be governed by three principles.

3:3:1 Equality

The OAU transformed into AU, an organisation similar to the EU⁹. This has created a new more symmetrical institutional framework for EU – African relations (European Commission (Annex) 2005, 61).

Equality implies mutual recognition, mutual respect and the definition of mutual collective interests.

(European Commission (Annex) 2005, 61)

This is the initial understanding of what a partnership is. But what happens when the EU flexes its financial muscles?

3:3:2 Partnership

The EU wants to be more than a donor, it wants to be a political and commercial partner. And furthermore, an strategic ally on the global scene to work together on common goals and

⁹ Except that AU has better continental coverage than the EU. Morocco is the only country in Africa which isn't member of the AU. While only 25 of the 45 European states are member of the EU.

objectives such as more multilateral world order, fairer global development and promotion of diversity (European Commission (Annex) 2005, 61-62).

Its relations with Africa therefore not only encompass development issues, but also include broad, concrete and constructive political dialogue. The EU can offer Africa lessons learned from its experience of continental integration, regional and social cohesion, institution-building and policy development. This partnership must also be based on mutual responsibility and accountability, which includes the mutual respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

(European Commission (Annex) 2005, 62)

In this partnership, EU gives support, they can offer experienced lessons an continental integration (despite that OAU is almost as old as EU) and they can offer their help on the global scene for a better world order. What can Africa give in return?

3:3:3 Ownership

In the EU definition, Ownership means that EU shows support for AU and NEPAD's visions of good governance and implementation of human rights. This from the perspective that development policies cannot be imposed from the outside. Budget support should increasingly be the main mechanism for aid delivery.

This approach not only improves the ownership, efficiency and predictability of the support, but will also enhance a more mature policy dialogue leading partner countries to take their responsibility in terms of objectives, means and governance mechanisms.

(European Commission (Annex) 2005, 62-63)

So, AU and NEPAD can own their policies as long as they keep a mature dialogue on the premises for EU's partnership which means adhering to the Eurocentric values and modalities.

3:4 Good Governance

Good governance has long been central to the EU and EC in development. It is significant for the whole understanding of what is a society for the EC. A society can be founded on a series of measurable indicators that work together in an intricate machine. Governance is all about running the machine in a manner so it won't break.

One central element of the process of governance reform is the establishment and strengthening of credible national institutions, whether at central level – such as parliaments, the police and judiciary system or public financial management systems – or at local and regional level.

(European Commission (Communication) 2005, 27)

One part of governance is institutionalisation of power in a state. The ideal form of state is western states. But governance is more than just institutions, it is values to.

However, governance is not only about institutions, but also about appropriate policies and adequate legal and regulatory frameworks. The EU should therefore continue to promote transparency and effective exchange of information between authorities in order to fight corruption, money laundering and terrorism. The EU should also continue to promote the human rights and equal opportunities protect the vulnerable groups, especially women.

(European Commission (Communication) 2005, 27)

The EC links state modalities with values. Regulations, policies and legal frameworks are central. And the EU will do anything in its power to fight corruption, money laundering and terrorism. But this isn't a text that describes EU's standpoints on European crime. Values are obvious equally important in good governance. And the values EC convey are, except for protection of money and security; is Human rights, especially for women.

3:5 The cultural dimension

The cultural and historical ties between the EU and Africa must be important as they are often pointed out. EU and Africa are said to be tied together as they share a common past and values.

Europe's relationship with Africa is not new. It is deeply rooted in history and has gradually evolved from often painful colonial arrangements into a strong and equal partnership based on common interests, mutual recognition and accountability.

(European Commission (Communication) 2005, 22)

The colonial past isn't irrelevant. But it is over and gone, no traces remain, according to the EC. And the only thing that remains now is an equal partnership with mutual values. A good example of how barbarities made by Europeans are ignored or overlooked.

Africa's cultural diversity and linguistic heritage should be preserved by stimulating and protecting cultural production, promoting access to culture and supporting cultural industries, including by protecting authors' rights.

(European Commission (Annex) 2005, 100)

Culture is important for the EC. But not enough so that it gets more than a few notes. Even so, it's linked to production, access, industry and authors' rights. The economic view manifests itself.

Culture determines the way societies and economies function and is therefore crucial to the success of any development effort. Diversity is an asset, not an obstacle, as experience in the EU shows. In addition to providing support for various cultural programmes and exchanges, it is thus also necessary to take the cultural dimension into account in development processes and to promote indepth local, national, regional and continental inter-cultural dialogue.

(European Commission (Annex) 2005, 100-101)

Culture matters and as it seems, determines how societies and economies work. But as the EC already has determined, African societies and economies doesn't work satisfactory. So there must be something wrong with the culture? The EC wants to lift the EU as a good example and how good culture and values has made a continent that is as heterogeneous as Europe to come together. Question is; which region has more languages, Western Europe or Nigeria? The point is that EC want to make EU the role model and the preceding case for Africa to take after. The Eurocentric values are core in regionalisation and of course, regionalisation is starting to crystallise itself as a value of its own.

3:6 The political dimension

Regional integration has for some reason become very important for the EU. The European regionalisation that has taken place for a longer time was founded on the principles of keeping the peace in Europe and creating intra-regional trade flows to diversify industry. Protected markets also made some people richer, much richer. It also made everyone within the union more interdependent. This project has been built on, especially when introducing the Euro. This is a project that holds great political conviction in several of the larger European parties. So regional integration is in itself a real European value and therefore, it's not surprising that EC attaches so much importance to the concept. More so than for example in democracy.

Primary response for building democracy lies in the hands of Africa's people and of its ruling class. Governments and other public institutions need to increase their dialogue with civil society on policy issues to create more transparency and engagements on critical choices for development. They have to deliver what they have pledged.

(European Commission (Annex) 2005, 75)

So democracy has to be created by Africans and their rulers. The EC seems to have trouble understanding what democracy is and how it works. Its may be because the EC often confuse democracy as one modality of governance were the term often is used.

There is a strong linkage between the promotion of development and the promotion of democracy. It is clear that democracy cannot be created or imposed

by domestic elites or external actors but the promotion of sustainable socio-economic development can contribute to foster a greater demand for democracy. The appropriate role of external actors is therefore instead to support and encourage domestic efforts to build, strengthen and sustain democratic norms, procedures and institutions.

(European Commission (Annex) 2005, 76)

Besides the strange phenomenon of such contradictory texts next to each other, it's even more confusing that democracy can't be created or imposed from the outside or by domestic elites so external actors should support and encourage domestic efforts to build democracy.

3:7 The economical dimension

Economic growth is at the core of EC values. Economic growth is the premise for almost everything else and it is the single most prominent factor in the entire policy.

Without increased economic growth and private investment, few African countries will have the sustainable revenues they need to deliver basic social services such as education and healthcare. Boosting economic growth will thus be a key factor in achieving the MDGs. Indeed, to increase the chance of halving poverty by 2015, it has been calculated that Africa needs to achieve yearly average growth of at least 8%.

(European Commission (Annex) 2005, 81)

So growth is understood as the basis for the most basic values and goals. 8% is a number known from the much older Swedish policy to. It seems to be an arbitrary number that has been created somewhere and somehow got stuck. If Africa has had around 5% yearly growth since the mid 90's and by that time, needed to have 8% yearly growth annually. This would mean that Africa would need at least 10% economic growth from 2005 just to catch up to the initial predictions. Who can calculate a number like that?

There are many paths to growth. Recent evidence points to the sustainable exploitation of natural resources and agricultural development, and investment in human resources combined with the creation of a sound investment climate as central drivers of growth.

(European Commission (Annex) 2005, 46)

Incidentally, there are several resource-rich countries in Africa. And there is a market in Europe that already accounts for 85% of Africa's export in horticulture and agriculture (European Commission (Annex) 2005, 50). The EC seems to have identified three areas which are of great importance for future investments and industrial expansion. Natural resources are the first area, South Africa and Botswana has proven that it is possible to turn

natural resources into a sustainable flow of growth. Oil is one of the most effective natural resources in creating rapid growth as Equatorial Guinea has proven with an impressive 31,5% growth in 2004. The second area is energy and mostly in terms of hydropower. The Congo river could make Congo to the third largest producer of hydropower in the world. And Mozambique has already tapped in to this possibility. The third area is agriculture. But this sector is very sensitive and most African countries export a narrow range of commodities. So to unlock growth by agriculture would have to involve either large increases in output or diversification (European Commission (Annex) 2005, 46-48).

In eastern African countries like Kenya, Uganda and Ethiopia, diversification into non-traditional agricultural exports is being pursued with some success and in Kenya horticulture has become the fastest growing sub-sector in agriculture.

(European Commission (Annex) 2005, 48)

By the by, coffee, tea, cotton, exotic fruits and cut flowers are products that aren't very profitable to grow in Europe.

The premise for increased economic output for raw resources is an attractive investment climate.

Currently, the bulk of investments in Africa are domestic: around 80% against 20% for foreign investment. Unsurprisingly, there is a correlation between the stability and governance performance of a country and the investment climate. Issues related to transparency and accountability are often considered particularly important by investors.

(European Commission (Annex) 2005, 48)

The recipe for gaining more foreign investments is widespread economic reforms and dialogue with the business community like Uganda and Tanzania has done the last couple of years. It's also necessary to increase the regional integration and creating more harmonised markets which are more attractive to investors. It's also a good idea to create regional free trade areas to increase the intra-regional trade (European Commission (Annex) 2005, 48-49).

If infrastructure was improved to, intra-regional trade and export could increase even more (European Commission (Annex) 2005, 89).

3:8 The four arguments

3:8:1 Barbarism of others

A good story needs threats. Corruption, war, terrorism and crime are but a few examples of the two terrible barbarities that torments Africa. But what the EC does is pointing out harmful complex structures rather than specific cases and barbaric practises. So there are few examples of the barbarity of the others while big populations of others are threatened by bad structures. It doesn't negate the first argument; there must be *probare*, justification through proof and some kind of *ethos* or *pathos*.

Poverty as a kind of opposite to economic growth and stability, is one of the worst barbarities in the eyes of the EC. Poverty has many dimensions, one way to see it is to have lack of social nets and resources, making poor more vulnerable to threats.

Some 40% of all African survive on less than one dollar a day. Only six out of 10 African children go to primary school. Communicable diseases, in particular HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis, have hit Africa hardest and in 2004 alone AIDS killed over 2 million people in sub-Saharan Africa and affected another 3 million.

(European Commission (Annex) 2005, 94)

This part is really *miserato*, appeal to deep compassion, poverty kills! African poverty is real barbarity if anything. But what's missing is a perpetrator in the EC argumentation. Poverty is a structure and that is what needs to be addressed. Poverty can also be understood as the lack of income or poor working conditions.

the employment situation remains worrisome in most African countries. The vast majority of all new jobs for young labour market entrants in Africa are in the informal economy, with low productivity and income, poor working conditions, lack of career prospects and with little or no social protection. Women and ethnic minorities in particular continue to face disproportional difficulties on the labour market. At the same time, child labour remains a frequent phenomenon in many countries and constitutes an important income base for many families.

(European Commission (Annex) 2005, 52)

Informal markets are frequently pointed out as problematic issues as they aren't regulated. Without regulations, no control of markets. Informal economy might not be effective in generating growth, but it is blockading introductions of consumption capitalism. The third way to view poverty is through social disparities.

*While several African countries have managed to record impressive economic growth, a highly unequal distribution of income often prevents this growth from having a positive impact on poverty levels. There is therefore not necessarily any link between the overall prosperity of a country and its performance in terms of sustainable development, decent work opportunities and poverty reduction. The category of strikingly **unequal societies** includes many poor countries, such as Sierra Leone and the Central African Republic, but also wealthier countries like Lesotho, Botswana and South Africa. The most extreme case is Namibia, which has one of the highest levels of inequality in the world.*

(European Commission (Annex) 2005, 51)

This is where resources, growth and formal markets exist, but poverty persists; which is why barbarity persists.

War and conflict is the second barbaric focal point the EC has. Wars and conflict are also structural and complex and in the wake on conflict, there are a series of other barbarities.

Africa has two areas where conflict is deemed chronic, the Mano River area¹⁰ in West Africa and the line from Sudan/Horn of Africa and Eastern Congo. Both regions are dominated by fragile states and the conflict in West Africa is fuelled by natural resources such as diamonds and timber. The instability has caused a severe refugee crisis and spreads insecurity across the region. The conflicts in Sudan/Somalia/Uganda/Congo are caused by structural causes such as poor management of scarce natural resources, bad political governance, uncontrolled refugee flows, arms-trade and human trafficking (European Commission (Annex) 2005, 44-45).

“Over the last few decades, wars and violent conflicts in Africa have destroyed millions of lives and decades of economic development. Indeed [...] on average, countries in conflict suffer negative annual GDP growth of 2%. In addition, wars and conflict also provoke uncontrolled population movements, increased environmental pressure, destabilise the societies and governing structures of neighbouring countries and regions and often provide fertile breeding ground for terrorism and organised crime.”

(European Commission (Annex) 2005, 68-69)

The EU has an economic view even on war. The humanitarian impact poses a secondary factor to why the EU interests itself for conflict mitigation. The reason to war, according to the EU, is always violations of the universal values. War stands in the way for economic

¹⁰ Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone, the latter two have come further in their peace processes than they were in 2005.

development and growth. It affects areas like migration, environment and good governance negative.

Corruption, Crime and terrorism are the two areas where the EC has more of a traditional, barbarity and villain view of the issues. Africa has become a transit area for drugs, human trafficking, smuggling of natural resources and arms. Not only is Africa a source of drugs, the consumption is escalating and pose a serious threat to the continent (European Commission (Annex) 2005, 45-46). Terrorism exist both out there and within. Therefore, terrorism plays up the security issues in the policy. Terrorism is often disconnected from other heinous acts like war and armed conflicts which usually are explained by circumstances. Terrorism is not. It is mentioned that both Europe and Northafrica have experienced terrorism attacks. *September 11th*.

3:8:2 Ending barbarism

Poverty was, as established, one of the worst barbarities which the EU has to address all the time. Development is, after all, only for the poor countries were its warm.

The EU should therefore help to make basic social services available for the poorest people in Africa (MDGs 1-6), contribution to the establishment of a social safety net for the most vulnerable.

(European Commission (Communication) 2005, 30)

The MDG's has become a convenient set of priorities to work with. They are convenient as they are well defined and well sanctioned. The MDG's are also apparent apolitical. But the EC quickly fills the road map to fulfilment of the MDG's with strong ideology.

*For those countries still some way from reaching the MDGs the EU should focus its support in areas considered prerequisites for attaining the MDGs (**peace and security and good governance**), areas that create the economic environment necessary for achieving the MDGs (**economic growth, trade and interconnection**) and areas directly targeting the MDGs (**social cohesion, decent work, gender equality and environment**). These objectives should be supplemented, especially for those countries closer to the EU, by support for economic integration and political cooperation with the EU. Taken together, these measures constitute the EU's common, comprehensive and coherent response to Africa's development challenges.*

(European Commission (Annex) 2005)

The ideal is that Africans fight barbarism. They have the ultimate responsibility to end all barbaric practices. But the EC creates suggested frameworks everywhere. The EC applaud actions that are taken towards enforcing what they call, common values. It means creating

institutions with the mandate to meet the challenges and goals that have been set up by NEPAD for example. But what the EC picks up is the priorities that are important to them like liberalisation and opening of markets. And actors that the EC sympathise with are highlighted and those that don't come to the same results are either neglected or shamed.

Growth is the primary tool for ending barbarism. In this perspective, growth is both a value and modality, it's a goal and it is a premise for ending most other barbarities. It will cure poverty which is the root of conflicts, crime, inequality and more. And these are causes of conflicts, famines, and spread of diseases, climate change and environmental degradation. Together, they are all the major threats of economic growth. By ending them, through liberalisation reforms and private investments, economic growth can take place.

3:8:3 Defending the innocent

There are three things in Africa that are in need of protection, children, women and the environment. A lot of the EC argumentation, as seen above, is based on that Africans are victims and need help from the EU. The first step towards protecting them is by building strong institutions that has capacity to handle the problems.

The EU should ensure that gender equality is fully taken into account in all partnerships and in national development strategies including in poverty reduction strategies. In Africa women constitute the majority of both urban and rural poor. The EU should give priority to the elimination of illiteracy especially among girls and the promotion of their equal access to education, to investment in Sexual and Reproductive Health (SRH) in order to combat HIV/AIDS pandemic, to the reduction of maternal and child mortality, and to the participation of women in conflict prevention, peace building and reconstruction.

(European Commission (Annex) 2005, 79)

The gender perspective is to be taken into all partnerships and policies. But it is still the orphaned perspective. Gender and women rights are mentioned on seven places¹¹ throughout the entire document, and they are always exemplified as victims in broader perspectives.

The EU should also place particular emphasis on the promotion, respect and protection of children's rights and basic needs, as well as the promotion, respect and protection of women's rights and gender equality. [...] to promote reform, through supporting and rewarding those partners that show a clear commitment to common democratic values and to political reform.

(European Commission (Annex) 2005)

¹¹ The exact word count is Gender: 9 times, Women: 10 times. They most often appear in combination.

This is, incidentally, the fifth quote from the EU strategy for Africa that actually mentions gender. It's actually a coincidence as there are only seven possible paragraphs. But it also exemplifies that women are those that suffers at the hands of barbarism and often when the *ethos* arguments are used, women are stated as symbols of the suffering.

The EU is aware of that Africa has a lot of problems and more importantly, those that need help. As usually the most pronounced victims are the poor, women and children. And they aren't alone in needing help. Most support is aimed strengthening the governmental capacity and that dominates the modalities. There has to be someone in need of help to justify and intervention. But it doesn't say why the EU is the right one to interfere. For that, the EU needs to borrow credibility from the "small" allies.

3:8:4 Spread of the universal values

Regional integration is a key component for the EC to institutionalise the Universal Values and ensuring their establishment and survival. EC has the EU as role model for regional integration as seen above. There are also two other factors that contribute to the regionalisation movement. One is that markets become more coherent and access to other markets increase. This factor is mostly interesting in the EPA negotiations. The other factor is control. Regionalisation means bringing other countries together in structures were individual countries are seen and can be monitored individually.

*A second central prerequisite for sustainable development is **good and effective governance**. In this area too, Africa is showing signs of positive change. Together, African countries have signed up to a set of progressive values and principles of good governance. Some of them have even committed themselves to being regularly monitored in the framework of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), a unique tool for peer review and peer learning. The EU should launch a Governance Initiative that encourages participation in the APRM-process and provides support to African countries for implementation of APRM-driven reforms.*

(European Commission (Communication) 2005, 27)

The monitoring control is placed in the middle and conditionality is tied to the implementation of ARPM reforms. Somewhat similar to the panopticon, the system will become self supporting and countries will monitor and control each other in order to live up to the universal values.

Anchor countries are stakeholders that have leading roles as economic and political driving forces in their respective regions, South Africa and Nigeria. Their economies are two of the

strongest in Africa and they are the good examples the EC wants of advocates for regional and continental integration. Their presidents, Obasanjo and Mbeki have taken on roles as peace brokers. South Africa's investments in the Great Lakes region speaks for their interests in stability in that region to (European Commission (Annex) 2005, 44).

Success stories are needed for the sake of promoting further spread of the Universal values and solutions. *Ghana* is promoted as a country that exemplifies good governance and stability in Africa. They have achieved exactly what the EC hopes for, converting economic growth into tangible development. *The East African community* is the other example of how political stability and economic regionalization has been created even in the midst of neighboring conflicts in the Great Lakes region and Horn of Africa. Southern Africa is also an example that is brought forward which is a stable region with South Africa, Namibia, Botswana and Mozambique (European Commission (Annex) 2005, 42-43). With the exception of Zimbabwe¹² of course which serves as a warning example.

The EU doesn't intervene direct anymore. It prefers to go through African allies. Most African institutions that the EU refers to are control mechanism that's created to uphold different universal values. TDCA is aimed at turning trade into development and vice versa. APRM is a monitoring institution, working with making African governance more effective.

3:9 Analysis

The strategy is ended with something that looks like a paraphrase of the Commission for Africa, *Our Common Interest* (2005).

The EU strategy for Africa outlined in this communication, [...] constitutes the EU's response to the challenge of getting Africa back on the track of sustainable development and of meeting the MDG'sm by the target year of 2015. This is our common mission, and our common duty.

(European Commission (Annex) 2005, 117)

The Commission for Africa's argument was published in March the same year and those involved in the writing of the EU strategy was bound to have read it. The EC also seems to have picked up on some of the recommendations and the language used. But there are other

¹² At 2005, Zimbabwe's inflation had just started to accelerate and hadn't reached the bizarre levels it hit in 2007 and 2008. But it was already a pariah in the eyes of the west, not least because of the protectionist economy and the persecution of white farmers.

recommendations that are entirely disregarded. Like the suggestion that through the Doha-round, agree to dismantle the rich world's trade barriers for example (The Commission for Africa 2005, 142). That is silenced to death in the policy but obviously a demand that has long been put against the EU development and aid efforts.

What the EC hoped was that the strategy would form the basis for the Euro-Africa pact that was to be created in Lisbon 2005. The meeting was already decided and by passing the strategy, the EC had set the agenda. So the EC came prepared to the meeting and was able to speak for all of Europe.

4. JAES - EU and Africa 2007

4:1 Background

The Joint Africa-EU strategic partnership was created at the Lisbon Summit two years after the EU adopted its own strategy. The JEAS is, the name implies, a joint strategy which is suppose to create a framework for the Africa EU relations, their partnership. The document does however seem to be very similar to the Africa strategy from 2005.

What happened after the meeting in Cairo in 2000 was that the interests for Africa intensified from the EU side. The European Council took initiative to making a strategy for Africa, the 2005 strategy seen above. It was constructed without including Africa in the process and it became a very Eurocentric policy. This was of course met with protests in both Europe and Africa and it forced the EU to create another policy, the JAES together with Africa. The EU did however do its absolute best to include as much as possible from its own strategy (Odén and Wohlgemuth 2009).

4:2 Point of departure

Why the strategy was created and to what purpose isn't clearer but through the lip service made to the partnership.

Both sides have developed political strategies and policy documents to guide their cooperation, including the AU Constitutive Act and Strategic Framework 2004-2007 and the EU Africa Strategy of 2005. However, it is now time for these two neighbours, with their rich and complex history, to forge a new and stronger partnership that builds on their new identities and renewed institutions, capitalises on the lessons of the past and provides a solid framework for long-term, systematic and well integrated cooperation. There is now a need for a new phase in the Africa-EU relationship, a new strategic partnership and a Joint Africa-EU Strategy as a political vision and roadmap for the future cooperation between the two continents in existing and new areas and arenas.

(Lisbon Summit 2007)

The new strategic partnership was created to forge a new and stronger partnership. The new partnership has political vision for the future and is supposed to be seen as a road map. It was also created from having two previous strategies, the AU Constitutive Act and Strategic Framework and the EU Africa strategy, it would mean that the two documents has played part in the creation of the new partnership?

The problem is that it's not. This history was of course created in retrospect to fit the intentions at hand. The document is in most parts a rewrite of the EU Africa strategy, with better language. Values, goals and solutions are almost identical between the JAES and the EU Africa strategy up to some details.

So does the EC have the ear to the ground and written its original closely linked to the priorities and values of the AU?

In fact, the JAES are nothing like the AU document. But there are some points of that have importance for how the EU strategy, and subsequently, the JEAS, was constructed. And it might even hold the answer to why they have been written.

The AU Constitutive Act and Strategic Framework is what the name implies, an outlining of the AU and its mission. The AU Commission identifies several strategic areas for its transformation from OAU to AU. For example AU ownership of all institutional transformations, a realistic roadmap and appropriate mechanism and leadership at AU level, AUC. They also call for dialogue with external partners in order to ensure coherent and coordinated support (Commission of the African Union 2004, 16-17). What that means is however that the AUC wants more influence in the donor process and coordination of donors rather than to be coordinated by the external partners.

A variety of international donors have also expressed interest in supporting the work of the AU and more particularly the institutional development process of the AU Commission and the broader AU. This support will be integrated into a single framework so as to ensure that it is really effective. It is envisaged that some form of joint partnership agreement, managed by the AU Commission Resource Mobilisation Unit, will be worked out with a group of donors that agree to support the AU's institutional development.

(Commission of the African Union 2004, 35)

An embryo of what then became JAES appears and the purpose for the joint partnership was to coordinate donors. This was to happen through a chef de file from the donors to keep the contacts and be the link between AU institutions and the donors.

The AU is weak and some heads of state in Africa viewed the AU as nothing more than the old OAU. But with a common vision, the AUC hopes to create the same kind of commitment for AU as the EU enjoys from its member states. This brings the AUC to try and find values the new vision can rest on.

African should also exert its best efforts to contribute to democratic governance of world affairs, forge strategic alliances in order to advance the cause of equitable distribution of global wealth through just and fair remuneration of trade, absolute respect for human and peoples' rights, consolidation of peace, international security and global solidarity in order to face up to humanitarian crises.

(Commission of the African Union 2004, 45)

It found some familiar values. And to forge the unification, the AUC lined out some strategic objectives. For example, promote principles of rule of law, good governance and human security. And promotion of regional economic integration as foundation for irreversible integration of the continent (Commission of the African Union 2004, 48, 52). But the primary objective for the AU is the promotion of peace and conflict resolution. The AU is to transform into a peace project.

4:3 The Partnership of values

So the AUC ambition to have *some form of partnership agreement* grew into a beast which included top summits with officials, politicians and with a huge investment of time and commitment from the EU side. The partnership became more than just the formal framework for coordinating donors.

The partnership will be based on a Euro-African consensus on values, common interests and common strategic objectives. This partnership should strive to bridge the development divide between Africa and Europe through the strengthening of economic cooperation and the promotion of sustainable development in both continents, living side by side in peace, security, prosperity, solidarity and human dignity.

(Lisbon Summit 2007, 12)

The partnership is now a bond between Europe and Africa tied with common values and interests. Development in Africa is for it to catch up with Europe to be equal. To forge the partnership, the Lisbon summit agreed on four objectives. Together, they sum up both the universal values and some of the arguments for intervention.

This partnership and its further development will be guided by the fundamental principles of the unity of Africa, the interdependence between Africa and Europe, ownership and joint responsibility, and respect for human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law, as well as the right to development. In the light of this new partnership, both sides also commit themselves to enhance the coherence and effectiveness of existing agreements, policies and instruments.

(Lisbon Summit 2007, 13)

The agreement is hammering in the message that the partnership will be founded in common values and mutuality. For every time the message is repeated, some new perspective is added to further reinforce the joint standpoints of EU and Africa.

4:5 Governance

The main purpose of the document is to formalise the institutional transformation that the AUC wanted for the new AU. It even wrote a time plan for the stages that the institutionalisations were to take. For institutional transformation, the AUC points out three important components for what it actually is: *1. Institutional strengthening of the AU Commission. 2. Rationalisation of the institutional architecture. 3. Refinement of AU governance processes.* (Commission of the African Union 2004, 17). The third point is interesting as the EC would probably include the two first points in governance. But the AU has five principles of good governance.

- autonomy of the various organs. Participatory governance first and foremost calls for respect for the principle of autonomy. To this end, it is needful to endow the Commission of the African Union with the necessary capacity and flexibility to discharge its mandate (as an executive organ of the Union); respect the powers of the democratic control organs and ensure the independence of the future Court of Justice;

- Interdependence. This second principle is the corollary of the autonomy accorded to the various organs, which is not an end in itself; rather, it is a means to achieve responsible joint management of the African Union. The proper functioning of the Union indeed calls for a common will to move forward and for consensus on how best to accomplish the mandate enshrined in the Constitutive Act;

- Transparency. This is the key principle of good governance which should guide the participation of the various organs and be reflected in credible systems for information circulation, communication and joint analysis of financial reports;

- Competence. The joint management of the Union cannot be successful unless the various organs possess the requisite capacities for effective participation;

- Dialogue. Permanent dialogue will be necessary to build a vision, define together the strategies and priorities of the Union and determine at regular intervals, desirable changes in the integration process.

Respect by each of the stakeholders for the above listed principles should facilitate confidence building, strengthen ownership of the Union endeavour and enhance performance.

(Commission of the African Union 2004, 37)

This is different from how the EC defines governance; to the extent the EC defines it at all. The EU would concede to several of the points but goes further and links governance with how to govern a state or in this case, a continental union. The EC connects governance with implementation of policies and a charter of values. Something the AUC lacks.

Currently, the lack of a common vision on the above issues weakens Africa; thereby exposing it to all sorts of shocks and increasing its dependence on its Northern partners.

(Commission of the African Union 2004, 45)

The JAES confronts that lack of vision with a chart of values derived from the EU strategy for Africa.

The two continents will join efforts towards the enhancement of the effectiveness of the multilateral system and the promotion of the values of democracy, rule of law and human rights. In this regard, the Africa-EU strategic partnership will facilitate an open, intensive and comprehensive dialogue on all aspects and concepts of governance, including human rights, childrens' rights, gender equality, democratic principles, the rule of law, local governance, the management of natural resources, the transparent and accountable management of public funds, institutional development and reform, human security, security sector reform, the fight against corruption, corporate social responsibility, and institution building and development. This dialogue should help both parties to define the issues at stake, agree on common positions on issues of common concern and jointly undertake specific initiatives and actions.

(Lisbon Summit 2007, 23)

The values are really hammered in and repeated to absurd lengths. Besides acknowledging the AU desire for institutional transformation, the JAES add a long set of values to go with. Great efforts are put into making governance more than just a series of modalities for ruling a state.

4:5 The four arguments

The four arguments have been toned down in the JAES while the universal value perspective is constantly repeated. The argument which has lost most significance is the barbarity of others. It has been negated by two factors, the inclusion of the others and the focus on common ground. Accusations of barbarity aren't appropriate when forging partnerships and alliances.

4:5:1 Barbarism of others

The main areas of issues/barbarity can be summed up in conflict, crisis, instability, severe democratic deficit, and institutional weakness. But it has been boiled down to be about the crimes against the universal values in particular.

Issues relating to transnational organised crime, international terrorism, mercenary activities, and human and drugs trafficking, as well as the illicit trade in natural resources, which are a major factor in triggering and spreading conflicts and undermining state structures, are of particular concern.

It is also recognised that the illicit proliferation, accumulation and trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) and their ammunition, explosive remnants of war and the continued use of anti-personnel landmines, are all major common concerns, as is the issue of the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs).

(Lisbon Summit 2007, 22)

The “I/WE”-nomination includes Africa which has been *the other* in all preceding arguments. This means that focus of who are the barbarians has to be moved. Barbarians are faceless catastrophes or outcasts of society like criminals and terrorist.

4:5:2 Ending barbarism

While barbarism is mostly implied in the document, solutions are grand and long term. Besides the transformation of African institutions into versions of European models, the values have to be upheld.

Africa and the EU will also work together on a global level and international fora, [...] for the promotion and protection of human rights and international humanitarian law and for the effective implementation of international and regional human rights instruments. Both sides also commit themselves to fight impunity in all its forms. The most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole, especially crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide, should not go unpunished and their prosecution should be ensured by measures at both domestic and international level. In this context, the partners agree that the establishment and the effective functioning of the International Criminal Court constitute an important development for peace and international justice.

(Lisbon Summit 2007, 24-25)

The heaviest focus is on promoting peace and security. It could be viewed as concession to the AU which has conflict resolution as its main objective. But it's on the other hand the founding idea of the entire European Union.

The significant change is that the poverty perspective in the barbarity argument is gone. Trade and economic growth are still central driving forces for the partnership but it has lost the position as a value of its own.

4:5:3 Defending the innocent

The innocent, weak and defenceless hasn't changed. They are the poor, children, disabled, old and women.

Africa and the EU will also strengthen the inter-institutional fabric of their administrations to mainstream gender equality in all strategies, policies,

programmes and actions. They will address the entire range of women's rights and strengthen their efforts to eliminate illiteracy and to ensure equal access of girls to education, to fight the feminisation of poverty, to promote women in decisionmaking positions and peace processes, and fight sexual and gender based violence against women and early forced marriage, and work towards the abandonment of female genital mutilation and cutting (FGM/C) and other harmful traditional practices,

(Lisbon Summit 2007, 37)

Women has to be protected among the cruel others. This reference to women is almost a *miserato* argument. But more importantly, it points out the conflict between modernity and tradition. Tradition and savage behaviour is part of the understanding of *the other*, Africa, in the Eurocentric world view. It is the opposite to the understanding of European modernity. Sexual and structural violence are part of the European society as well, and the quote can be interpreted as these structures will be fought in Europe to. But that's chimera as it's in the same context as issues relating primarily to African women like FGM/C.

4:5:4 Spread of the universal values

The foundation is set for the partnership to address particular issues, which is already established, legitimisation for intervention. Barbaric practises are mostly implied throughout the document. The point of the partnership is in itself an implementation of spreading of values.

ii. To strengthen and promote peace, security, democratic governance and human rights, fundamental freedoms, gender equality, sustainable economic development, including industrialisation, and regional and continental integration in Africa, and to ensure that all the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are met in all African countries by the year of 2015.

(Lisbon Summit 2007, 16)

The values are to be strengthened and promoted; one goal is to ensure the performance of the MDG's. The MDG's are, as said before, in origin a set of fairly apolitical goals set to save and improve the basic life of poor people. But as in the EU strategy, they are fused with a set of indicative values.

The improvement of economic governance and the investment climate are essential elements to build Africa's economic strength and allow Africa to move away from continuous donor support and find its place in global markets. In this regard, the development of domestic markets and regional integration are key in creating larger and more integrated markets that, in conjunction with enhanced regulatory convergence, will help to attract investment, increase productive capacities and therefore foster sustainable economic growth and development.

(Lisbon Summit 2007, 27)

The economic perspective is still the essential element in this logic. It has links to both the EU and AU strategies and objectives. As seen in the AU strategy, the objective is to create interdependence and unity within Africa through trade. While economic growth is a modality and not a value per se in this perspective, the spread of market capitalism is meant to spread values that the JAES has lined out.

5. Sweden 2008

5:1 Background

The Swedish Africa policy from 1998 was deemed obsolete and a new was introduced in 2007/08. Four assignments were outsourced to five writers, of which one was African, Aderanti Adepoju who wrote about migration in SSA. Denmark's policy did also play some importance for the preparations. A background study was prepared and written by Bo Göransson, was to be the basis for the policy but it had very limited importance. The policy was then sent to the African ambassadors in Stockholm for comments (NAI 26 nov 2007, Odén, Interview on Swedish-Africa policies 2011).

The new policy has collected a significant amount of other policies it derived inspiration from. It has created *a forest of policies* as OECD called it in their review of the Swedish policies (Odén, Interview on Swedish-Africa policies 2011).

The documents that are most frequently mentioned and related to are the JAES and the Swedish *Policy for Global Development* (PGD). But documents like Contonou-agreement and the EPA's is mentioned as documents that govern the Swedish Africa policy.

5:2 Point of departure

The Swedish government takes its point of departure in the maturation of Africa. The new gained capacity in development and economic growth, the growing African self-determination. But also that Africa has grown in to an equal partner to the EU. The long Swedish tradition of close cooperation with Africa is also an important point of departure. The goal of the governments Africa policy is:

- *supporting the countries of Africa and their inhabitants in their efforts to foster peace, democracy, respect for human rights and economically, socially and environmentally sustainable development,*
- *helping Africa achieve full and active participation in global economic and political cooperation on common challenges, and*
- *broadening areas of contact between Sweden and Africa and thereby promoting Swedish and African interests.*

(Skr 2007/08:67 2008, 4)

In short, Sweden wants to spread the universal values in Africa, in order to make them catch up to us so that both Swedish and African interests are looked after.

5:3 Partnership

For some reason, partnership is hardly discussed in the policy. The Government pushes for cooperation, in particularly with the private sector, but Partnership with Africa is at a loss. Partnership is mentioned in relation to the EU-Africa partnership or in relation to Swedens membership in the EU.

Acting bilaterally, within the EU and through multilateral actors, Sweden must endeavour to promote deeper collaboration with Africa based on equal terms. Sweden seeks to achieve breadth in its relations with Africa – a partnership that rests on jointly developed goals and clear, mutually agreeable terms and conditions for cooperation.

(Skr 2007/08:67 2008, 21)

Sweden seeks an EC-Africa partnership but doesn't mention partnership in its own operations that is more often linked to cooperation. The Paris Declaration is mentioned as something that is implemented and the Government wants to put emphasis on African ownership and land focus. But Sweden seems to have developed scepticism towards partnership and the Paris Declaration.

By tradition, Sweden is a major bilateral and multilateral actor in the African health sector. The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness is more concerned with the public sector than private actors. Partly as a result of this, the integrated approach required in the health sector cannot be fully achieved, since important actors will be missing. An important task will therefore be to help bring about closer cooperation between all actors and to encourage change in activities undertaken at country level.

(Skr 2007/08:67 2008, 51)

The Paris Declaration is believed to stand in the way for privatisations and strengthening private actors in the health sector. These two examples are to only times that Paris Declaration is mentioned. It can only be speculated on why Partnership is overlooked, maybe the government decided that cooperation simply was a better word, or they want to be subjected to the modalities that Partnership brings.

The Government has chosen to classify cooperation partners in Africa to gain a clearer picture of the conditions and prospects for cooperation. Countries are accordingly divided into those with which Sweden plans to conduct long-term development cooperation, countries in conflict or post-conflict situations, and countries where Sweden is implementing alternative measures aimed at supporting human rights and democracy. In addition, there is a group of countries where long-term development cooperation is being phased out and replaced with selective cooperation, including actor-driven cooperation.

(Skr 2007/08:67 2008, 22)

This is one of the most significant changes that the government made in development cooperation when this policy was introduced. At least, this was what got most attention. Sweden has than a 100 partners. This was heavily criticised by both the DAC and furthermore by the recipients. When adapting to the Paris Declarations notions of aid effectiveness, having so many partners was not sustainable. In fact, the downsizing of the numbers of partners had already started but Gunilla Carlsson used it to score some political points and depict the new government as responsible and sound.

5:4 Governance

In contrast to the other policy documents, this one has notions of what is bad governance. This indicates that good governance is connected to a functions of a state and not an independent value in itself.

Independence, when it came in the 1950s and 1960s, left many countries impoverished and with a weak state apparatus. The political systems chosen were often characterised by top-down governance, abuse of power and excessive reliance on a planned economy, all of which prevented lasting development. The repercussions of the Cold War caused further havoc.

(Skr 2007/08:67 2008, 12)

The government does probably not mean that independence was bad for the African countries. But the path the independence movements set the countries on where obstructive for lasting development. Good governance according to the government is dependant of a democratic structure were those elected can be hold accountable.

Effective national parliaments that can vigorously represent their electorates and act as a check on the executive power are a precondition of democratic governance. Although significant progress has been made in this regard over the past 20 years, parliaments in Africa are generally weak and overly dependent on the executive branch which they were elected to supervise and hold accountable. Democracy requires increased faith in pluralism, yet in some countries, elements of earlier one-party thinking live on. This is often linked historically to the movements that once led these countries to independence.

(Skr 2007/08:67 2008, 14)

The government advocates pluralism as system for good democracy instead of the old one-party systems or one-party thinking. This is similar to the 1998 policy; Sweden holds its own system over any other.

5:5 The cultural dimension

The historic framework is more like a downsized version of the 1998 policy. Sweden has an unique tradition and history in development cooperation without colonial past and with an independent agenda. The cultural perspective isn't either more than lip service. Culture can very well be a framework for other long-terms relations and deepen the knowledge of each other.

This kind of cooperation is not only valuable in itself but also contributes to the fulfilment of foreign and aid policy goals with respect to human rights, democracy and poverty reduction. It also facilitates achievement of trade policy goals as well as integration policy goals such as greater ethnic diversity and enhanced intercultural dialogue. Greater knowledge and awareness of African countries' cultural and intellectual life can enrich our assessment of political, economic and social developments on the continent.

(Skr 2007/08:67 2008, 54)

This kind of valuable cooperation, which the government concludes in less than a page of the entire policy, has other benefits as well. It's linked to spread of values, goals and economic strategy with a twist. The whole concept is however so uninteresting for the Government that it's handed over to the NGO's.

5:6 The political dimension

The political framework that the policy is founded on is Policy for Global Development which impacts all policy areas, not only aid cooperation. The two main elements that govern the PGD are rights perspective and the perspective of poor people. The focal point is that policies are to be implemented on the principle of the freedom and dignity of the individual, regardless of where he or she lives (Skr 2007/08:67 2008, 21). This also comes to show the differences in the PGD from 2003 and the Communication on PGD from 2007, presented 12 days after the new Africa policy. The communication was the new government interpretation of the PGD.

The 2003 PGD has based the definition on universal rights and takes its point of departure from there.

The pursuit of equitable and sustainable development must be based on a rights perspective on development. This means that poor people are not regarded as recipients of aid, but as individuals and actors with the power, capacity and the will to create development.

Ratification of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and several subsequent human rights conventions has been almost universal. These

conventions therefore represent a common global foundation of values. A rights perspective is based on these common standards and norms.

(Skr. 2002/03:122 2003, 20)

But the 2003 PGD takes it one step further and extend those rights to full groups and the right to an identity, culture and sexual orientation and to oppose all kinds of discriminations. The PGD wants to make the individual into a subject and bearer of rights rather than object of measures (Skr. 2002/03:122 2003). The 2007 communication shares the same foundation of values, but emphasis the individual much more in a way that they are both subject and bearer. As the communication highlights the individual behind poverty, it also makes poverty into an individual problem. It also shows that rights aren't only for poor or discriminated people (Skr. 2007/08:89 2007).

This perspective is important because it defines the views the ideological view the government has on development and rights. The superior objective is still to fight poverty and create conditions for people to lift themselves out of poverty.

the Government has stated that development cooperation in all countries and sectors must be guided and informed by three priorities: 1) democracy and human rights, 2) the environment and climate, and 3) gender equality and the role of women. While all three priorities are ends in themselves, together they contribute to the over-riding goal of lifting countries out of poverty. Efforts should be made to strengthen quality, efficiency and results orientation in the planning, implementation and reporting of Swedish development cooperation.

(Skr 2007/08:67 2008, 22)

The three priorities can only be described as real strengths in Swedish society. Sweden is deemed as one of the most democratic and most equal societies in the world. Environmental and climate change is high on the agenda and not broadly politically challenged.

However, aid is only one – albeit a vital – part of the Government's total, active commitment to peace, global development and poverty reduction. Equally important is Sweden's political commitment, and that of private actors, to Africa's development. The Government is anxious to improve conditions for collaboration between government-sponsored cooperation and the Swedish business sector without however departing from the Swedish principle of non-tied aid.

(Skr 2007/08:67 2008, 22)

This is the example of the last important piece of the ideological puzzle. The government wants to bring in the private sector much more in development cooperation. The purpose isn't to tie aid, but still to gain something from it. An interesting dimension in this is that while

solidarity is a central concept in the policy of 1998, the words is completely gone in the 2008 policy.

5:7 The economical dimension

While fighting poverty and spreading universal rights are the central value perspectives, economic growth is the central solution.

Economic growth is a condition of sustainable development and the fight against poverty. Large parts of Africa have extensive resources and comparative advantages in terms of growth potential. Many countries are also pursuing macroeconomic and growth-generating policies which are increasingly contributing to and benefiting from the changing conditions. At the same time, tensions created by major social divides could threaten prospects for growth.

(Skr 2007/08:67 2008, 5)

This is a similar thought that is found in the EU strategy. Growth is the foundation for sustainable development and that can most effectively be created by investments in and exploitation of natural resources. The growth outcomes for the country must of course be invested in improving conditions for the population. Growth can otherwise be threatened.

There's truth in this view of what development can be. Botswana has invested in a large public sector in combination with sound fiscal policies that kept the country at an average 7,3% growth during the, for others, so devastating 70's, 80's and 90's. Mauritius has had 5,4% growth between 1980 and 1999 and that with its protected markets. The small island republic does also have one of Africa's most protected markets and has invested in a public welfare state (Mkandawire 2006).

This is however not what the Swedish Government had in mind. This policy might be to most ideology asserted yet. It has a clear liberalisation agenda and strongly favours the private sectors and entrepreneurship. In this sense, it's a kind of more naked version of the EU strategy.

A major reason why only a few African countries have succeeded in benefiting from globalisation is the presence of extensive trade restrictions, including tariffs, which not only make it difficult for people to augment their income but also increase the cost of everyday items of consumption. Trade-distorting subsidies, including export subsidies in the EU and other industrialised countries, can also result in African products being out-competed in domestic markets.

(Skr 2007/08:67 2008, 23)

Liberalisation and free trade are not only cornerstones in the Swedish trade policies; it's the overall principal for interpretation and implementation in every area.

If farmers are to deem it worthwhile to raise productivity, they must have secure local and international outlets for their products. Moreover, the world market for agricultural products must be reformed; subsidies and tariff barriers must be minimised so that African countries can participate more fully in international trade and access more outlets for their products. In some cases, developing countries may need a transitional period after entering into a trade agreement.

(Skr 2007/08:67 2008, 10)

Ideals, methods and principals are fitted in the perspective of liberalisation, privatisations and free trade. No matter what area it covers. How likely is it that small scale farming women in Africa will sell their corn or cassava on international markets and thereby liberating themselves? Can it be that there is something else that Sweden wants access to?

5:8 The four arguments

The Swedish Africa policy brings back the narrative of Africa. The government tells a story of their understanding of Africa. Values and modalities have to be anchored in reality and the government wants to show that they have understood the issues. But in general, the arguments hasn't changed much in comparison to other, now known, narratives of Africa.

5:8:1 Barbarism of others

There are still cruel others out there, driven by greed and general evil. The now familiar arguments focus on war and poverty issues. The terrible wars in Somalia and Darfur are brought out as examples. In the wake of war, there are death and displacement. War also induce violations on human rights, contribute to international crime and prevent economic growth (Skr 2007/08:67 2008).

Freedom House, the international organisation for democracy, has recently pointed to growing restrictions on freedom in 2007 in countries like Nigeria, Mali, Niger, Chad, Congo-Brazzaville and Malawi. The organisation notes, among other things, that ethnic friction and hostility in Africa are stirred up by political leaders in their pursuit of power and influence. Freedom of the press has also come under severe pressure in many parts of Africa, and countries like Somalia, Zimbabwe and Eritrea ended up at the bottom of the list in international surveys of press freedom.

(Skr 2007/08:67 2008, 14-15)

Barbarities, development issues, threats to freedom are huge in Sub-Saharan Africa and they are African attributes. But the policy does actually lift several examples that put European cruelty in the same context.

300 million Africans – almost every other person – have no access to clean water, with all that this entails in terms of health, poverty, etc. Almost three quarters of Africa's city dwellers live in slums, in conditions of severe poverty and polluted environments. The development of the chemical industry and the sale of chemical and electronic waste to Africa is already having severe repercussions on local ecologies and health.

(Skr 2007/08:67 2008, 11)

Sweden has domestic opinion to relate to and by lifting contemporary issues that have come to public attention, the government shows that it's aware of the problem and not blind to Europe's role as barbarians in Africa.

5:8:2 Ending barbarism

But the primary view is still to facilitate economic growth and favour private sector. One of the classic antagonisms is of course corruption.

Corruption is not only a direct hindrance to development and prosperity; it is also a significant factor in preventing people from having their rights respected and safeguarded. The fight against corruption is therefore crucial to the overall effort to strengthen democratic governance in Africa.

(Skr 2007/08:67 2008, 42)

Corruption is the adversary of everything from economic growth to democratic growth and basic human rights. The view has strong connections to the EU policy, some formulations are almost identical. But ending barbarity can mean opportunity.

In poor and conflict-stricken societies, private enterprise can not only promote growth and job creation but also contribute to the development of democratic governance and managerial expertise. Businesses are dependent on stable markets that provide conditions for sustainable trading. Business interests may well coincide with Swedish policy interests in the quest for development, peace and security in Africa.

(Skr 2007/08:67 2008, 57)

The Swedish corporation's social responsibilities (CSR) are highlighted as important factors for development. The government shows great trust in the Swedish corporation as their ethical attitude towards corruption as well as social and environmental responsibility.

5:8:3 Defending the innocent

Women are usually the centrepiece in the victim argument. And this policy is not different.

Some 750 million people live in sub-Saharan Africa. More than half are women and girls. They are over-represented among the poorest sections of the population and generally more vulnerable than men because of gender-variant conditions and unequal distribution of resources, power, influence and decision-making powers. Women make up 80 per cent of the workforce in agriculture and only one in three women in Africa have independent incomes outside agriculture. One in every 22 women in Africa die of pregnancy- or birth-related causes, [...]. Sexual violence, particularly in conflict-affected countries, and injurious customs such as genital mutilation and early marriage remain a reality for a very large number of women.

(Skr 2007/08:67 2008, 16-17)

The argument is strikingly similar to the equivalent argument in the JAES. But even if women are exemplified as the most vulnerable victims, some examples are made where women has strengths and are exemplified as stakeholders with their own initiative and ability.

5:8:4 Spread of the universal values

The purpose of the spreading values argument is to show that there is a need for the universal values and that the intervener can provide that need.

The freedom and rights of the individual lie at the heart of Sweden's policy for Africa. Opportunities which enable people to lift themselves out of poverty so they can contribute to sustainable development and participate fully in the building of African society, both economically and politically, must be encouraged. Across the African continent, there is a general need for improvements such as better health for women, men and children, longer school attendance and access to higher education, and more productive, diversified employment opportunities.

(Skr 2007/08:67 2008, 50)

Africans are both entitled to their rights, but they are mostly the object of measures, they are in need of improvements, luckily, there are forces that can provide it.

Africa needs to build its economic, commercial and industrial development on among other things further development and processing of natural resources. Just and peaceful exploitation of African raw material assets, where the returns benefit both state and citizens, is crucial to sustainable development in Africa. This is precisely the kind of area where Swedish enterprise can contribute to African development. Swedish business skills in sectors such as mining, forestry and energy correspond well to African needs.

(Skr 2007/08:67 2008, 57)

And so the circle is complete.

6. Final analysis

Where your people find a modicum of democracy, they are truly happy, and refuse to measure it by the same yardstick as they use with you. Oh well, they say, this is Africa, what can you expect? When aid is poured into my countries, often in the form of soft loans, grants, NGO funding, and so forth, there are no independent data gathering systems, so as to be able to genuinely assess success or the impact of the interventions. In the world of banking and finance, I imagine that operating without independent data gathering does not make sound common sense at all. To gather such data from governments to use to police them makes even less sense. Oftentimes, I have been saddened by attempts made by the Bretton Woods institutions to play the role of opposition or conscience to these governors of mine. The role of opposition is sacred in democratic systems, and must not be played by the international community. There is a necessary role for the opposition in guarding against the excesses of unbridled power.

(Ofori-Atta 1998, 190)

T.I.A... This is Africa

(DiCaprio 2006, in the movie Blood Diamonds)

Perhaps the problem isn't that Europe constructs value based frameworks on which the agreements are founded upon. Perhaps the problem is that the ideals of democracy, human rights and creation of economic growth in Africa aren't actually implemented in reality. Perhaps the problem is that the standards of partnership and good governance are only viable on paper and not in reality. Perhaps the real problem is the imbedded paternalism in the Europe-Africa relations.

6:1 How does Sweden and EU describe Africa as a narrative?

The four arguments on barbarity has been linked throughout the study to the argumentation on why intervention in Africa is legitimate and justified. Are they bad values? No, that is exactly the point. Based on humanistic values and everyone's individual, collective or cultural freedoms, they are values that are easy to like.

Hegemony and institutions, the discursive and structural powers, maintain and reinforce each other. It all falls under the logic of power under a capitalistic world system. A political hegemony governs how a state should be and how it should be governed. It also excludes any alternative to capitalism and therefore, adaptation to the system is, in the words of Olukoshi, inevitable and unavoidable. Paternalism and racism is deeply imbedded in this hegemony.

The first key to understand how that hegemony works, is understanding the motive, why does Europe want Africa to develop? There's a significant difference between the Swedish government in 1998 and the later bodies. While the 1998 policy is driven by a strong idea of solidarity, the later policies lack that kind of concreteness. They all have a poverty focus but why is poverty a problem? The 1998 policy explains it in terms of freedom and rights while the other policies have a common focal point on economic growth. It still doesn't explain why Europe wants Africa to develop.

The second key is the point in time and context. The 1998 policy came at a point when the lost decades of the 1980's and 90's gave way to democracy, economic stability and thus optimism. But by 2005, that optimism turned out to be a bit exaggerated. But what happened at that point is a paradox. The optimism in African potential was maintained; fast economic growth gave reason to that optimism. But the confidence in African owned development was low although the creation of AU is seen as something positive. During the decade of development discourse, the change is significant. Partnership and governance has become two major concepts. The paradigm of development has changed from poverty elimination through programs to creation of economic growth in order to extinguish poverty.

The third key is the new global interest for Africa. Europe has encountered new players in African politics. It has been called a *new scramble of Africa*, it has also been called, Africa's entry into Globalisation. The renewed Chinese, Indian and American interests in Africa seems to worry European policymakers. Those interests are implied as natural resources. In order to meet that competition, Europe falls back on established methods, common values, partnership and conditionality.

All policies are consistent on portraying Africa as a subject. Europe has a preconception of what Africa is, what Africa is expected to be. But what Edward Said wrote about Orientalism also goes for Africa, a sort of Africanism. And that image of Africa is only true in the Eurocentric idea world under certain conditions. That Europe is the centre and Africa is the periphery. There are certain attributes that are inherent African, corruption, wars, famine, lack of democracy, violations of human rights. Africa is poor and people are suffering. Africa is pristine, exotic and has great potential. Africans are victims but Africans can be made into bearers of their own future. As long as they are granted freedoms and rights.

All policies are declarations of intention based on ideology. The 1998 policy is clear with how ideology, Swedish solidarity, motivates and justifies intervention. But while the other three

policies are very ideological but they fail to give ideological reason for intervention. The idea is that development is created mainly by economic growth. And while not all problems in Africa like conflicts, famine and HIV/AIDS are not solved by increased economic growth, they prove obstacles for the same, in other words, they are obstacles for development.

Values are at the core of all four policies and they don't differ much. The main values are Human Rights and democracy and Europe wants to be the beacon of those values. And while supposedly values shared by the African counterparts, they are scarcely found in Africa. These common values are to be understood as the moral obligation for European leaders to spread them in parts of the world where they are withheld, thus an ideological motivation. But it seems contradictory that these common values are shared with the African counterparts, which allegedly, are the ones that withhold them from their peoples.

The 1998 policy was the first Swedish policy on Africa alone. And the 2005 policy was the first European Africa-policy. It could seem that they signify a tightened grip on Africa. But it is actually the opposite. When the European influence was strong in Africa, such policies were unnecessary. But when African politicians and new foreign powers like China threatened that influence, a new structure of dependence had to be created.

6:2 How does Europe justify and legitimise intervention in Africa today?

When Europe works within the development field it is ultimately rooted in a colonial context. Because of that it has often contained strokes of paternalism, arrogance and racism. Development as an idea is created from a western understanding of what it is to be developed and that those that isn't like us, or like us but 100 years ago, are underdeveloped and therefore in need of development (Hettne 2009).

All of the policies presented have been proven to be Eurocentric, both in understanding of the other and in rhetoric. Uniting them are the strong commitments to the universal values of Human Rights, Democracy and Equality. They all commit to ownership and good governance and at least three of them can be said to be totally dedicated to the idea of partnership. The last point which unites them is the orientation towards economic growth.


These three elements form the two pillars of Eurocentric ideology, the ultimate sanctity of the individual's rights and the enablement of capitalist expansion. Human rights, democracy and equality are interpreted in the context of the individuals rights, perhaps best explained in the

Swedish 2007 version of PGD, Global Challenges – Our responsibility. The enablement of capitalist expansion is well expressed in every policy. There's however a difference in how capitalism should be used. The Swedish government in 1998, which was social democrats, conveyed a kind of capitalism can be tamed, idea. In contrast, the 2008, rightwing government had more free markets and capitalism as almost universal solutions, a value in itself. The ghost of Washington Consensus walks the policy documents.

The 2005 EU strategy links development closely to economic growth which is said to be to premise for development. Without strong economic growth, there will be no development. It's always important to have a social redistribution of any possible gained wealth to assure development. Without that, there can be no economic growth. This is where it gets tricky.

When discussing the goals of achieving the MDG's, the EC lists a kind of unintentional line of development. The prerequisites for attaining the MDG's are peace and security and good governance. A good economic environment with economic growth, extensive trade and interconnection is necessary for achieving the MDG's. And when these two areas can be sustained, then it's possible to target the MDG's directly. They can in turn be targeted with perspectives like social cohesion, decent work, gender equality and environment. But if these perspectives can't be sustained, growth can't be sustained and poverty, social disparities can lead to insecurity and conflict.

In essence, the EC has a circular reasoning around development and economic growth. The objective is to have sustainable development in Africa. And sustainable development is dependent on economic growth. But for economic growth, there has to be development. So Africa has to develop more in order to achieve economic growth.



The same circular reasoning resonates thru all following policies. The faith in private sector is reinforced in the same way in the 2008 Swedish policy. It is claimed that Swedish corporations can create a foundation for democratic governance and decent work, equality and sanitation thanks to expertise and commitments to CSR. But democratic governance, stability and good investment climate has to exist before foreign corporation wants to establish themselves in Africa. Circular reasoning can reinforce arguments but also shows their logical weakness when it becomes so clichéd that the government actually suggests that small scale farmers will benefit from competition on the global market.

The understanding of development is also dominated by measurable indicators and that is how Europe, and the EC in particular, understands governance. States consists of a series of more or less complex modalities and systems. That means that modalities and systems can be removed or installed and thus create the aspired goals, a technocratic world view. This view isn't shared by either of the Swedish governments that have a stimulation view on governance.

6:2:1 Why does Europe want Africa to develop?

The issues of development and economic growth are of course interconnected and interdependent and EC understands that. But the ultimate reason to have development in Africa isn't obvious. Or rather, which is the whole point of having a policy document and not laws and directives, is that EC wants one thing but can't say it straight out. EU and Sweden

offers several things with their partnership; aid, investments, technology transfers and much more. But they won't ask anything in return. What does Africa have to give in return?

There are two factors which are only hinted at each document. The first factor is competition. The EU 2005 strategy and the 2008 policy both mention the new global players, China, India and Brazil. Their activities on the African continent are being followed with a growing concern. There's also older players like USA, Russia and Japan that has resumed their interest for Africa. This is because of the other factor, their interests are said to be motivated by Africa's natural resources (European Commission (Annex) 2005, 41, Skr 2007/08:67 2008, 6). A new race for Africa has started. But the European motives aren't expressed in the same way and Europe wants to come across as solely honourable.

While exploitations of natural resources are said to be an effective way to create a sustainable source of economic growth, neither policy wants to confess to wanting those resources. But in reality, the Europeans want to have access to those vital resources and to buy them cheap. But in order to get there, the EC needs to create a justification for the intervention in African markets and states. This is where the universal values and the four arguments come in.

6:2:2 The domination of Universal Values

There are two dominating Universal Values, Human Rights and Democracy. Furthermore, additional values are added and fitted into the superior divisions; like gender equality, peace and security, trade, interconnection, regional integration, liberalisation and so on. It has already been established that economic growth is seen as the perquisite for development of anyone of these values. The techniques for implementation of these values are governance. Just like hegemony and institutionalisation reinforce each other, so does universal values and governance.

Governance is the basis for how to run a state. But it's also understood as something more, the very purpose of the state, creating environment for people to enjoy their individual rights and for capitalism to thrive. Thus, governance is the answer to the challenges of barbarism.

6:2:3 Barbarity of others

The first argument differs between the four documents which might show the tendency for fashion sensitivity in development discourse. Barbarity is quickly influenced from other parts of European society like civil society, media or even lobby groups. It also shows that donor

priorities, or claimed priorities, are more founded on domestic pressure in Europe than actual situations in Africa.

Barbarities are most often linked to values and ideology, the enemies of democracy. Poverty and conflict are the most prominent barbaric structures. Typical barbaric activities are usually corruption, international crime and terrorism. At the same time, conflict with the other is about the conflict between tradition and modernity. African culture is old, traditional and backwards and opposite to modernity, the developed, secular, educated and enlightened world view.

6:2:4 Ending barbaric practise

Violations of the universal rights demand retribution and punishment. That is repeated in most documents. There are two sides to ending barbarity, the punishment and the replacement of system. Punishment can be related to prosecution of criminals but also to those that can't follow the requirements created by the partnership. Punishment and threat of punishment is vital for control. Partnership can be seen as a contract between donors and recipients which is said to be mutual. This mutuality is on the other hand constructed in a context where one partner is eternally stronger than the other. And while the partnership is mutual, dependency is one way, which can be the reason for why Europe doesn't want to confess to their interest in natural resources. Partnership in the context created in the policies can be compared to a prison with open doors. Everyone is free to leave the cell, but there are consequences. The monitor function can, exactly as Foucault said, be exchangeable. It doesn't matter who's in the monitor seat, control is exercised, no matter if it's the EU itself or the APRM, NEPAD or AU Commission. The same kind of control is exercised as the walls in the prison have been constructed by the Partnership. Remembering that EU-Africa partnerships are elitist projects, there's no deterrent from the monitors.

The other side to ending barbarity is the replacement of the system. Poverty shall be replaced with market economy with division of labour. Conflict shall be replaced with security and control. Dictatorships shall be replaced by democracy and so on. While the EC sometimes has a brilliant understanding of the dimensions of poverty, the alternative isn't necessarily as brilliant. Alternatives and solutions are governed by ideology and not holistic understandings of the problem.

6:2:5 Defending the innocent among the cruel others

There are three groups that are objects of protection, children, women and poor people. There are also the old, the young, mothers, the disabled and diseased, farmers, refugees, urban dwellers and unemployed. The argument is clever as it's extremely inclusive while keeping to elusive parameters.

The argument is at the same time also technocratic; those in need are those measurable. 40% of all Africans in SSA live under \$1 a day. Here are a certain number of people dying of AIDS, and a certain number displaced people and a certain number girls left out from education. The explanation is probably in the target group of the policies. They are meant to be read by politicians, officials, journalists, researches and non-governmental stakeholders. They have a need of relating to poverty in Africa and it's easier to do with numbers and simple facts.

The chivalric defence of the innocent and weak gives Europe the moral responsibility to help and to intervene. And to help them, it's necessary to replace systems and introduce solutions like economic growth.

6:2:6 Making it possible to spread the universal values

The African Union has been proclaimed of being a peace project, similar to the view of Europe on itself. And it is correct that no member in the EU has ever been in war with another member, yet. But no member has ever entered the union in conflict or instability. Europe's old view of itself is as the beacon of civilisation, the modern developed example.

All documents has this in common, the own systems superiority. Sweden holds the Swedish model in high esteem and thanks to international research; Sweden's democratic governance is one of the best in the world. The EU has itself as its model was regionalisation, peace and mainstreaming of policies and regional trade are ideal. Modalities and elements of state are measurable and exchangeable.

Donors want to swap the old systems and institutions in Africa for their own in order to ensure the spread of the Eurocentric values. The values are created in a European context and the institutions to uphold them are adapted to them. So to spread them in Africa, the same kinds of institutions are necessary.

6:3 Why does Europe describe Africa in this narrative?

All policies describe Africa as a situation from a context of history, problems, values, failures and successes. Policies are documents that are open for interpretation and discussion, stating intentions, values and goals. Africa is a very complex subject and impossible to describe in a correct way. Most policy makers stress that fact. So why is that context necessary?

The narrative is constructed to justify and legitimise intervention in Africa based on morals as well as political and economic dependency. Europe is the standard, the model of what the peak of development is, the goal. And there are several factors to why the Eurocentric narrative of Africa persists in these modern documents.

The first factor is the logic of the narrative itself. The narrative concludes that Europe is the model of what development are, Europe is developed, in contrast to Africa which is still developing. The fact that Africa has persisting problems that Europe don't have, proves that relation. And the logic of that conclusion is that it would be best to develop Africa until it resembles Europe. What leaders in Europe seem to forget is that Europe in the 20th century has developed on foundation of two things, the Marshal Plan and political antagonism.

The narrative itself, as discussed, is much older than aid and even colonialism in Africa. It mandates Europe to spread its light of humanitarianism in lesser fortunate parts of the world. In a sense, Europe is also trapped inside its own Eurocentric narrative.

The second factor is power! The narrative constructs an intricate web that makes Africa dependant, politically and economically. African leaders could use Europe, China, USA, India and Brazil against each other, getting the best deal from that competition. Europe, with all its conditionality's should be losing that game. Europe has a certain economic power over Africa. It is with pride the EU writes that it is Africa's biggest donor, having more than 60% of the total ODA¹³. Europe is also Africa's most important export-market. But that economic power could easily be diverted to for example China. Therefore, a political system of power has to complement the economic. Controlling the discourse means controlling those included in it. It is hard to believe that policymakers in Europe really care about gender equality in rural Africa, considering that it mostly gets lips-service and the plan for improving quality of life for poor women has a very insignificant role compared to boosting economic growth. But

¹³ ODA – Official Development Assistance

poor women do on the other hand play the important part of victims that justify Europe's intervention. But adopting general mainstream issues that dominate European political life, it quickly subdues European opposition.

The third factor is ideology. Strategies and policies are not only responses to the challenges that Africa face, they are responses to Chinese, Indian and American involvement on the African continent. This power has ideological reason. The Washington Consensus walks like a ghost through contemporary development discourse. The idea is to open markets and allow free trade and capital to flow, it's a development imperative. At the same time, an adaptation to the critiques of neo-liberal development has been made. MDG's, democracy and human rights has been picked up as values and combined with the neo-liberal development imperative. Making it sound like the Europeans only have philanthropic motives for their intervention. By placing the Eurocentric ideology in the context of the African narrative, intervention is justified. Most interventions are however not direct. They are linked to conditionality in aid and funding. The perfect system for control is that which monitors itself as Foucault said. Partnership can be viewed as a prison with open doors. It's voluntary to sit in the prison and everyone can leave when they choose. Problem is that there are consequences if you do. In the middle of this prison is monitoring functions. They are independent of power and only uphold the system. It is of course an immaterial prison but the context of Partnership acts the same way. This is when partnership and governance intersect and reinforce each other. The new world system is constantly being added to; previous African systems are being replaced with copies of European. This invokes even more control, much more control than Chinese roads and hospitals.

The policies shouldn't be dismissed as purely manipulative. They are written by people that genuinely believe in them and that really have a commendable interest for Africa's future.

6:4 Conclusions

This thesis isn't an argument for withdrawing development cooperation and aid, on the contrary. It discusses the problems with paternalism that make out the fabric of development discourse in Europe. The relation was compared to a parent that gives its child allowance. But as a parent, you don't want that allowance spent on alcohol and cigarettes. So you make conditions for it. And when you come into an argument, you use that allowance as a power tool, threatening to withdraw it. But development cooperation isn't parenting and Africa is not a child.

It was also discussed that perhaps the problem isn't the fact that Europe conditions its trade and aid with its own values of democracy and human rights. The problem might Europe doesn't enforce it reality. Ofori-Atta wrote that democracy in Africa isn't measured by the same yardstick as it is in Europe. The fundamental problem in this case is that democracy seems to be considered a series of instruments that can be installed for it to work.

The political leaders of Europe seldom celebrate their 30th anniversary in power¹⁴. Democracy doesn't work without a functioning opposition. But Europe creates partnerships with ruling elites and takes on the role of opposition, using aid and trade as leverage. When opposition finally grows strong enough to challenge power in African states, a system of power sharing is introduced like in Zimbabwe and Kenya. That solution might avoid violent conflicts, at least temporarily, but it also leaves countries without eligible opposition. When that opposition is missing, Europe takes its place, making demands on reforms and further hindering others to take on the role of opposition. This is then called Partnership. By using the term Partnership and filling its definition with a series of universal values, that situation is legitimised and reinforced further, making it hard for African countries to choose other partners.

Africa has in recent years become a very strategic region due to its rich resources, unexploited farmlands and potentially cheap labourers. Losing control over Africa means a serious risk of losing access to those resources. Europe's narrative has many spectra's. It is inherent racist and paternalistic. It is statistical and misinformed. It is philanthropic and idealistic. It is strategic and greedy. It is emotional and arbitrary. It is ideological.

Partnership with Africa could be created without these narratives, arbitrary terms and demeaning arguments. If Partnership was true, it would mean equal terms and mutual benefits, not only by transferring resources to Europe. It is a paradox that values should govern a partnership if the first value is democracy. A democracy has election and those standing for election have values from which they are elected. But since values that govern foreign policy has been defined in Europe, what kind of credibility does those elections have? Particularly seeing as those values has been infused with ideological pseudo-values.

¹⁴ Unlike Dos Santos, Angola (1979-), Obiang Nguema, Equatorial Guinea (1979 -), Muammar Khaddafi, Libya (1969 – 2011), Robert Mugabe, Zimbabwe (1980 -), Hosni Mubarak (1981 – 2011) or Paul Biya, Cameroon (1982 -).

If Partnership was true, it would be realised that Europe isn't the crown of creation and not the perfect model for what it means to be developed. The developed world contra the developing world suggests that development is something that can be finished. And that development is only for poor countries. But development is merely a movement in time and space and could equally mean a development towards anti-democracy, poverty and inequality.

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