CIVIL SOCIETY REGIONALIZATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

The Cases of Trade and HIV/AIDS

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To Maria and Medea

Abstract

This dissertation investigates civil society regionalization, that is, the transnational regional process where people engage in co-operation within diverse types of regionalist civil society frameworks. The point of departure is the study of 'new regionalism', which refers to the wave of regional integration globally since the 1980s. Compared with the state-centric first wave of regionalism of the 1950s and 1960s, the 'new regionalism' involves a broader range of actors. Besides inter-governmental organizations (RIGOs), market actors and civil society organizations (CSOs) also play important roles in regional integration. Hence, CSOs have engaged in various regionalization processes, partly independently of state-driven regionalism, and play different roles in so-called regional governance. In Southern Africa, this trend is particularly pronounced. The research community is not ignorant of the regional processes sweeping the world. However, whilst the current regionalism studies undoubtedly contributes to a deeper understanding of regional processes, important gaps remain, in particular the relatively scant emphasis given to civil society.

The overarching aim of this dissertation is therefore to analyse the dynamics of civil society regionalization in Southern Africa, both empirically and from a theoretical perspective. More specifically, the study poses three, interrelated, research questions:

- How is civil society regionalization influenced by RIGOs and donors?
- What is the composition of civil society on the regional level and how do CSOs relate to each other in the process of regionalization?
- What are the motivations for regionalizing among CSOs?

Adopting a qualitative case study approach, two separate but related studies are conducted on two embedded cases, i.e. civil society regionalization in the trade and the HIV/AIDS sectors. The dissertation draws on semi-structured interviews as well as written primary sources.

The study finds that CSOs can be more active in regional governance than has previously been conceptualized and can contribute to regional policy-making and service provision. Additionally, CSOs are active in terms of constructing regionalization through framing issues and, to a less extent, making identities 'regional'. They should therefore be taken more seriously in regionalism studies as actors in their own right. Furthermore, the thesis enhances knowledge of the heterogeneous nature of civil society regionalization, for example finding that CSO engagement with regional governance is more multi-faceted then commonly perceived. 'Going regional' is only partly an autonomous process and also has to be understood as under the influence of the deeper statist and capitalist social structures marking the regional order in Southern Africa. In this vein, the dissertation shows the power dynamics inherent in CSO participation in regional governance, where some CSOs are included and others excluded. The study also finds that regional donor funds do indeed facilitate regionalization, but through their market-orientation and volatile funding preferences donors also create a vulnerable financial situation for CSOs, as well as shaping their development agendas. Lastly, the thesis shows that CSO regional issue-framing and identity-making often centre around RIGOs as perceived 'regional' actors, which in turn spurs 'going regional'.

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A Few Words of Gratitude

Writing a dissertation is a very lonely process. Many hours are spent alone in the office, writing, reading, thinking and drawing figures in front of the computer or in an armchair, besides the time spent in holiday cottages, in hotels, in taxis, on trains, buses and airplanes, in restaurants and, not least of all, in front of interviewees in the field. However, while I might be the sole person responsible for this project, it would not have been possible without the support of many others. I am very grateful for the encouragement, logistical support, financial assistance, intellectual guidance, and emotional and moral support of family, friends, colleagues, civil society activists and financiers.

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Abbreviations

AA	Action Aid
AFRICASO	African Council of Aids Service Organizations
AFRODAD	African Forum and Network on Debt and Development
AFS	Africa Social Forum
AGS	Africa Groups of Sweden
AIDC	Alternative Information and Development Centre
ANGOC	Asian NGO Coalition for Agrarian Reform and Rural Development
ANSA	Alternatives to Neo-liberalism in Southern Africa
APF	Anti-Privatization Forum
ARASA	AIDS and Rights Alliance for Southern Africa
ASCCI	Association of SADC Chambers of Commerce and Industry
ASEAN	South-East Asian Nations
ASEM	Asia-Europe Meeting
AU	African Union
BOCONGO	Botswana Council of Non-Governmental Organizations
CAF	Charities Aid Foundation
CARICOM	Caribbean Community
CBO	community-based organization
CBTA	Cross-Border Traders Association
CCM	Conselho Cristão de Moçambique
CCS	Centre for Civil Society
CCT	Coxian Critical Theory
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
COM	Council of Ministers
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
COSATU	Congress of South African Trade Unions
CSO	civil society organizations
DFID	Department for International Development
DHAT	Disability HIV and AIDS Trust
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EAC	East African Community
EC	European Commission
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EJN	Economic Justice Network
ELS	Employment and Labour Sector
EMG	Environmental Monitoring Group
EPA	Economic Partnership Agreement
ESA	Eastern-Southern Africa

EU	European Union
FANR	Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources
FOCCISA	Fellowship of Christian Councils in Southern Africa
FTA	free trade area
FTAA	Free Trade Area of the Americas
GEAR	Growth, Employment and Redistribution Programme
GIZ	German Agency for International Cooperation
GTZ	German Technical Cooperation
HAS	Hemispheric Social Alliance
HIVOS	Humanist Institute for Development Cooperation
HR	human rights
ICBT	Informal Cross Border Trade
ICM	Integrated Committee of Ministers
ICT	information and communications technology
IGD	Institute for Global Dialogue
IESE	Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Económicos
IFI	international financial institution
IDEA	International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
IGO	inter-governmental organization
ILO	International Labour Organization
ILRIG	International Labour Resource and Information Group
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INGO	international non-governmental organization
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IR	international relations
IS	Infrastructure and Services
LGBT	lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender
MEJN	Malawi Economic Justice Network
MCLI	Maputo Corridor Logistics Initiative
MDC	Maputo Development Corridor
MDG	Mozambican Debt Group
MERCOSUR	Mercado Común del Sur
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NAPSAR	Network of African People Living with HIV for Southern African Region
NCA	Norwegian Church Aid
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NEPRU	Namibian Economy Policy Research Unit
NGO	non-governmental organizations
NGDO	non-governmental development organization
NRA	New Regionalism Approach
OAU	Organization for African Unity

OIC	Organization of the Islamic Conference
ORIT	Inter-American Regional Labour Organization
OSISA	Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa
PAAR	People's Agenda for Alternative Regionalisms
PATAM	Pan African Treatment Access Movement
PF	Partnership Forum
PLWHA	people living with HIV and AIDS
PPP	public-private partnership
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
QCA	qualitative comparative analysis
RAANGO	Regional African AIDS NGOs
RATN	Regional Aids Training Network
RBA	Rights-Based Approach
RCSO	regional civil society organization
REC	Regional Economic Community
RIGO	regional inter-governmental organization
RISDP	Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan
RMT	Resource Mobilization Theory
RNE	Royal Netherland Embassy
RPO	Regional Poverty Observatory
RPRF	Regional Poverty Reduction Framework
SACBTA	Southern African Cross Border Traders Association
SACU	Southern African Customs Union
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SADC-CNGO	SADC Council of Non-Governmental Organizations
SADC-PF	SADC Parliamentary Forum
SAfAIDS	Southern Africa HIV and AIDS Information Dissemination Service
SAFCEI	South African Faith Communities' Environment Institute
SANASO	Southern African Network of AIDS Service Organizations
SANGONET	Southern African NGO Network
SAP	Structural Adjustment Programme
SAPA	Solidarity for Asian Peoples' Advocacy
SAPP	Southern African Power Pool
SAPSN	Southern African Peoples' Solidarity Network
SARDC	Southern African Research and Development Centre
SASF	Southern African Social Forum
SAT	Southern African Aids Trust
SATAWU	South African Transport and Allied Workers Union
SATUCC	Southern Africa Trade Union Coordination Council
SEATINI	Southern and Eastern African Trade Information and Negotiations Institute

SECC	Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee
SEG	SADC Employers Group
SHDSP	Social and Human Development and Special Programmes
SIDA	Swedish International Development Co-operation Agency
SMO	social movement organization
TAC	Technical Advisory Committee
TAC	Treatment Action Campaign
TAN	transnational advocacy network
TEIA	Forum Nacional das Organizações Não Governamentais em Moçambique
TIFI	Trade, Industry, Finance, Mining and Investment
TUCA	Trade Union Confederation of the Americas
UNAC	União Nacional de Camponeses
WSF	World Social Forum
WTO	World Trade Organization
ZCC	Zionist Christian Church
ZIMCODD	Zimbabwe Coalition on Debt and Development

1
Introduction

Since the late 1980s processes of regionalism have intensified across the globe. This new wave of regional integration is often referred to as 'new regionalism', to distinguish it from the 'old regionalism' of the 1950s and 1960s (e.g. Fawcett and Hurrell 1995; Fawcett 2005; Hettne 1999, 2005; Söderbaum 2004). Many parts of the world are today involved in regionalist schemes in which states but also non-state actors reach out from their local and national domains and 'go regional' to solve common problems related to, for example, trade, security, the environment and development. The number of regional inter-governmental organizations (RIGOs) is multiplying and they are enjoying increasing prominence in international relations. The expansion and transformation of existing regional organizations such as the European Union (EU) and the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), and emergence of new regional groupings, for example the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the African Union (AU), has led to a revival of the study of regionalism in the academic community (O'Brien and Williams 2010: 46).

Africa is no exception. In line with the 'new regionalism', African countries have also been keen to foster formal, institutionalized regional co-operation in order to enhance regional integration and development (Farrell 2005). Following the historical trend of regionalism, African countries have experienced two waves of regionalism, with important differences (Bøås 2001: 29). The first wave emerged in the 1960s and was associated with decolonization and Pan Africanism, manifested in the establishment of the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) in 1963 (ibid). In this period, a range of regional schemes was established in order to combat on-going European exploitation of the continent's resources and to achieve political unity. Since most of these regional arrangements largely concerned economic co-operation they were, and still are, often referred to as Regional Economic Communities (RECs). The earliest of these were the East African Community (EAC), which dates from 1967, and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), formed in 1975 (Ajulu 2005). Another significant attribute of the first wave was the strong focus on state actors (Grant and Söderbaum 2003).

The second wave of African regionalism started in the early 1990s, partly as a counterforce to the uncertainties of economic globalization (Bøås 2001). One important concrete incentive was the Abuja Treaty in 1991, which was adopted at

the 27th summit of the OAU and called for a strengthening of the existing and establishment of new RIGOs on the continent (Ajulu 2005: 20). Hence, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) was formed in 1992 and the EAC was revived in 1999 after lying fallow for more than two decades. The regional integration process gained further momentum after 2001, when the Treaty of the African Union was signed and the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) was launched (Farrell 2005). In addition, many RIGOs such as the SADC underwent major organizational restructuring. One important novelty about the new regionalism in Africa is that the institutional agendas and strategies assigned to sub-regional institutions have broadened to include social, politico-strategic and other concerns besides traditional economic integration (Bach 2005: 179). Although trade still dominates the regional agendas, some new issues have caught the attention of African regional policy-makers, such as the environment, security, poverty reduction and HIV/AIDS.

Most importantly, the 'new regionalism' in Africa involves a broader range of actors when compared with the state-centric first wave of regionalism. Hence, besides states, market actors and civil society organizations (CSOs) also play important roles in regional integration. According to two scholars, the new regionalism in Africa is marked by 'intense and multi-dimensional processes of regionalization' (Grant and Söderbaum 2003: 1), where multiple state and non-state actors are linked together in multifaceted networks and coalitions, together creating complex regionalization patterns (ibid). Hence, CSOs have engaged in various regionalization processes independently of state-driven regionalism and they play different roles in so-called regional governance, with different objectives, work strategies and relationships with state actors.

In Southern Africa, this trend is particularly pronounced. There are clear signs of spontaneous cross-border activities by groups within civil society, and various regional civil society networks are emerging (Odén 2001: 86, 95). One major stakeholder in civil society regionalization notes that 'recent […] experiences have demonstrated and confirmed increasing links within regional civil society organizations and a growing awareness of the need to build regional solidarity to address common interests' (SADC-CNGO 2005). Similarly, according to Trust Africa, a major African donor, there is an 'exponential growth of non-state actors and the emergence of transnational civil society in Africa', including at the sub-regional level in Southern Africa (Trust Africa 2008: 16). These observations are backed up by a quantitative study of the regional engagement of CSOs listed in South African and Zimbabwean civil society directories, which was carried out within this research project. According to the study, a large number of CSOs show regional interest. In the economic development sector, 24% of South African CSOs claim to be regionally active. The corresponding figures for the HIV/AIDS, environment and community development sectors are 15%, 25% and 18% respectively. In Zimbabwe, the figures for CSO regional engagement in the HIV/AIDS sector are 22%, 17% for the education sector, and 34% for the human rights sector. Some important examples of CSOs engaged on the regional level are the SADC Council of Non-Governmental Organizations (SADC-CNGO), the

Southern African Peoples' Solidarity Network (SAPSN), the Southern and Eastern African Trade Information and Negotiations Institute (SEATINI), the Southern Africa HIV and AIDS Information Dissemination Service (SAfAIDS) and the AIDS and Rights Alliance for Southern Africa (ARASA). These organizations and others will be analysed in depth in chapters 4 and 5.

The research community is not ignorant of the regional processes sweeping the world, including Africa. In fact, regionalism has become an academic growth industry in many social science specialisms. Most global regions are covered in the plethora of studies dealing with this topic, which come from a wide range of theoretical and disciplinary viewpoints. Indeed, the volume of regionalism studies is overwhelming, and even if the majority of those studies concern regionalism projects in the global North, for example the EU and NAFTA, more and more scholars are devoting themselves to regional processes in the global South, including Africa (Söderbaum 2004). Whilst the current literature undoubtedly contributes to a deeper understanding of regional processes, important gaps remain. In particular, the relatively scant emphasis given to civil society in studies dealing with regionalism would, unfortunately, seem to suggest the low relevance of civil society in this context. When civil society is raised in such studies, if at all, it is mainly in the context of state-led regional frameworks and regional organizations. This is regrettable because, as this thesis elaborates, civil society can be a dynamic and relatively independent force at the regional level and deserves analysis in its own right.

In Southern Africa in particular there is a lack of understanding of the dynamics of civil society regionalization and of what forces and circumstances have driven CSOs to 'go regional'. In fact, most of the time scholars dismiss the role of civil society in regional integration as insignificant or even non-existent (e.g. Peters-Berries 2010; Matlosa and Lotshwao 2010; Pressend 2010; Landsberg 2012), contrary to the many empirical signs of this process described above. A recent authoritative book on region-building in Southern Africa, for example, devotes only a few paragraphs to the role of CSOs. When CSOs are mentioned they are either lumped together and ruled out as weak and fundamentally marginalized in regional processes, superficially described without any further analysis or in a wishful manner, or called upon to participate in conflict resolution, improvement of human security and democratization in the region in some distant future (Saunders et al 2012). There is hardly any research about the ways in which civil society has regionalized, including the types of co-operation strategies being built, the dynamics within regional civil society, the internal motivations of CSOs to engage regionally, or the external relationships between CSOs and other actors, such as states and donors. It is argued here that the general neglect of civil society in regionalism is at least partly a theoretical and methodological problem. There is therefore also a need to develop the ways we theorise and study civil society at the regional level. In particular, it is important to link civil society to regionalism theory, as well as to recognize that civil society logics are intimately dependent upon the socio-economic and political-structural contexts within which they are played out.

1.1 Research on Civil Society Regionalization

The literature on regionalism in Africa and elsewhere places considerably less emphasis on civil society than it does on state-led and market-led regionalization. Generally, the role of civil society in regional processes receives little systemic analysis and is in fact often neglected when studying regionalism (Van Langenhove 2011: 89). Mainstream and rationalist schools of regionalism, such as neo-realism, neo-liberal institutionalism and regional economic integration, have had a profound impact on the research field. For example, neo-realists analyse the formation of regions as 'miniature anarchies', i.e. the international anarchical system manifested on a regional level (Buzan and Wæver 2003), in a process solely driven by states. Regionalism occurs when the distribution of power (according to the 'balance of power logic') opens up for alliance formation in order to counter the power of another state or group of states within or outside the region (Söderbaum 2004). Neo-liberal institutionalists study the creation of regional, supra-national state institutions as a response to increasing economic regional interdependence. The process of formal regional co-operation creates more and more institutions in more and more sectors, weaving an institutional net in the region which is expected to spill over onto more politically sensitive areas such as security. As with the neo-realist understanding, states are seen as the most prominent actors in this process and are induced to co-operate and solve common problems only if this increases the level of national prosperity (Hurrell 1995: 59-62). Lastly, another important version of regionalism deals with regional economic integration in terms of so-called open regionalism. Here, regionalism is seen as an economic project whose primary objective is to promote the consolidation of global free trade between states (Odén 1999: 174-175).

It is without doubt that neo-realist and neo-liberal studies of regionalism have generated important insights into regionalization processes around the world. However, in the mainstream rationalist versions of regionalism states are considered the principal agents and only limited attention is given to non-state actors such as civil society organizations. The recognition of civil society at the regional level as either superficial or non-existent is ontologically related to the fact that many regionalism studies, particularly in Africa, depart from a state-centric worldview (Söderbaum and Taylor 2008; Godsäter and Söderbaum 2011). This is both an empirical and a theoretical problem, and more empirical data are needed, as are new theoretical tools.

At the same time, regardless of whether the focus is on states or civil society in regionalization processes, another problem with most research output is the lack of interest in agency in region-building. In fact, this has been a blank spot in most regionalism studies. Hence, knowledge of the 'who' in regional integration is rather incomplete (Neumann 2003).

The New Regionalism Approach (NRA), which is a reflectivist and critical perspective towards the study of regionalism,[1] takes the above criticisms seriously. It conceptualizes regional integration as a multi-dimensional process which embraces economic, political as well as cultural and social aspects, going beyond free trade arrangements and security regimes, and as driven by a variety of region-building actors: state as well as non-state (Farrell 2005: 8; Söderbaum 2004: 28-29). The NRA, then, focuses on the dynamics that shape the regionalization processes. Regions are not considered homogenous and unitary entities, but are constantly reconstructed in the process of regionalization by all the actors involved, state as well as non-state (Reuter 2007: 83). The NRA is based on a triangle of regionalizing actors, broadly grouped in terms of states (governments), markets (business) and civil society (Söderbaum 2002), and the latter is given a prominent role in regionalization processes. In fact, even though states can be seen as the main actors in the process of building regions, civil society actors such as business networks, churches, unions and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are highly important in developing regional projects and visions (Van Langenhove 2011: 92). One of the most prominent architects of the NRA, Björn Hettne, even claims that 'cultural and social networks are developing more quickly than the formal political co-operation at the regional level' (1999: 10), which implies that regionalism presupposes the growth of a regional civil society (ibid). Regionalism, then, is considered more comprehensive and dynamic than inter-state action, and is not reduced or limited to the dynamics of intergovernmental regional organizations. Referring to the new regionalism in Africa and elsewhere as qualitatively different when compared with earlier regional processes, one commentator concludes that '[b]orrowing from the jargon [of] Internet users, one may say that regions are transitioning from a 1.0 phase dominated by technocrats to a 2.0 stage characterized by horizontal networks, alternative models and citizens' contestations' (Fioramonti 2012: 159).

However, as for regionalism studies in general, there are important gaps in the study of the proclaimed multi-dimensionality and diversity of the new regionalism (Söderbaum 2004: 35), particularly with regard to the involvement of civil society. With the words of Hettne, 'civil societies are still generally neglected in the description and explanation of new regionalism' (2005: 555). When studying regionalization processes it is important to emphasize agency and actors more, as well as to bring in ideational forces such as identity and ideology, and hence shedding light on the 'sociology of regionalism' (Söderbaum 2002: 38). All in all, according to Söderbaum, 'we need detailed (theoretically informed) empirical studies in concrete historical cases on the strength of state, market and civil society regionalisation as well as the relationships between these actors and processes' (ibid: 49).

Scholars have recently begun to study civil society regionalization in different parts of the world more systematically (e.g. Acharya 2003, Curley 2007, Gilson 2011a and Igarashi 2011 on East/Southeast Asia; Korzeniewicz and Smith 2005, Grugel 2006, Ruiz 2007 and Saguier 2007, 2011 on Latin America; Hinds 2008 on

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1 For an overview of the NRA, see Hettne et al. (1999), Söderbaum and Shaw (2003), Söderbaum (2004), Farrell (2005) and Van Langenhove (2011).

the Caribbean; Reuter 2007 on the Baltic region; Landsberg 2006, 2012 and Söderbaum 2007 on Southern Africa; Kimani 2007 and Godsäter 2013a on East Africa; Godsäter and Söderbaum 2011 on East and Southern Africa; Schulz 2011 on the Middle East; and Olivet and Brennan 2010 on Latin America, Southern Africa and Southeast Asia). This especially relates to reflectivist and critical scholarship, and often somehow related to the NRA, though the number of such studies remains limited. Yet, despite contributing important insights into civil society regionalization, the research output suffers from several shortcomings which, on an overall level, relate to the fact that most research on civil society regionalization is affected by the state-centrism inherent in regionalism studies, including the NRA. Civil society regionalization is generally discussed in the context of state-led regional frameworks, with arguments that this process is ultimately determined by the behaviour of external actors such as RIGOs. When the regional dimension of civil society is studied, it is often understood in terms of the marginalization of CSOs in regional governance. Consequently, most studies dealing with civil society regionalization focus on how civil society actors (lack) influence, and (fail to) make their voices heard within state-led regional organizations. This tendency is most pronounced in the African context, but applies elsewhere.

Kimani, for example, paints a dark picture when studying environmental governance in East Africa. He claims that the nature of regional collaboration within the EAC is inherently state-centric and concludes that 'environmental NGOs had limited success in forging [regional] links with one another' (2007: 135-136). Furthermore, Kimani argues that in those instances when CSOs do try to interact with states in regional environmental governance, there is a tendency for domination and subordination by the state and constructive two-way engagement is not taking place (ibid 135). Landsberg is equally pessimistic about civil society involvement in regionalism in Southern Africa and deems it marginal at best. He claims that civil society actors have not seriously influenced the regional agenda, concluding that '[r]egional civil society remains for all practical purposes demobilized and highly ineffective' (2012: 74). Similarly, Grugel (2006) and Ruiz (2007) discuss the formation of regional coalitions and networks around inter-state regional governance frameworks in Latin America, such as the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), the Summit of the Americas and Mercado Común del Sur (MERCOSUR), and the different strategies used for influencing regional policy-making. They argue that institutional obstacles within these frameworks and the exclusion of most CSOs in trade and economic development negatively affect the regionalization of civil society.

RIGOs and their member states can also play a role in facilitating civil society regionalization, both indirectly and directly, even though such support is still marked by domination and control. Curley, for example, argues that the emergence of regional civil society in East Asia is partly generated by the provision of region-wide focal points by regional economic and security institutions such as the ASEAN Regional Forum and the East Asia Summit, where CSOs consolidate regionally and direct their advocacy and campaign activities in parallel sessions (2007). States in the region have also more directly facilitated civil society regionalization by, for

example, creating and supporting the ASEAN People's Assembly, a regional forum for both government officials and NGOs (Acharya 2003). Similarly, Igarashi analyses the inclusion and exclusion of CSOs in ASEAN-led regional governance in Southeast Asia and concludes that the creation of the ASEAN Charter, where the role of civil society in regional integration is acknowledged, has greatly facilitated CSO involvement (2011). Lastly, in the Caribbean, even though civil society access to the regional trade-related policy-making space within the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) is heavily managed by states, which use the expertise of (some) technically-oriented CSOs for strategic reasons, nevertheless state-led regional governance has opened up avenues for regional CSO activism (Hinds Harrison 2008).

Moreover, in terms of external state actors influencing civil society regionalization, some studies specifically bring up the role of foreign donors. It is argued that financial support from foreign donors is important for developing regional civil society co-operation, for example in the Caribbean and East Asia, considering the financial resources that are needed for CSOs to 'go regional' (Hinds Harrison 2008; Curley 2007). However, writing from a Latin American perspective, Korzeniewicz and Smith (2005) warn that regional networks can easily become dependent on donors, who tend to shape development agendas. Additionally, regional activities are more difficult to sustain. Hence, donors can facilitate the regionalization of civil society but at the same time risk dominating the process.

All of the above observations are important research contributions, which this thesis will build on, but they also need to be challenged. The current literature on civil society regionalization suffers from three shortcomings. Firstly, it is indeed crucial to highlight the role of external state actors when studying civil society regionalization and to increase awareness of the ways in which RIGOs and donors affect the propensity of CSOs to 'go regional', for example in terms of creating platforms for regional mobilization and deploying funds for regional activities, but also in potentially dominating and obstructing regional civil society co-operation. Many of the above studies have contributed important insights in this regard and this thesis will certainly develop this knowledge further. This will be analytically discussed in section 2.6 and 2.7. However, most studies fail to make explicit the underlying social structures that affect civil society regionalization and its relation to RIGOs and donors is discussed in a rather vague and non-theoretical fashion. This is related to the fact that most studies on civil society regionalization fail to link understanding of this process to a particular theoretical framework. This thesis tries to pin down the deeper social structures from which the domination of state actors in civil society regionalization originates. In fact, it is argued that RIGOs and donors are as much affected by these deeper structures as CSOs themselves. The notion of 'deeper social structures' refers to the underlying principles of social order which shape all relations of people on a global scale.[2] These systemic patterns, for example, open up or constrain the possibility of CSO participation in global governance schemes (Scholte 2011: 335). Statist and capitalist social structures are

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2 Social structures can also operate on other scales. For example, many indigenous cultures have structures that do not operate beyond local spaces.

specifically important here, having a great bearing on global and regional governance processes (Scholte (2011), as will be analytically discussed at length in sections 2.3.1 and 2.5.

Secondly, what also unites much of the research output related to civil society regionalization to date is a narrow focus on the nature of a few specific regional civil society actors. Many of these studies are fairly descriptive, focusing on the organization and advocacy strategies of regional networks and coalitions. For example, Gilson examines the nature of transnational advocacy networks in East Asia and the means and targets of regional advocacy through the examples of Forum-Asia and the Asian NGO Coalition for Agrarian Reform and Rural Development (ANGOC) (2011a). In the same vein, Saguier (2011) analyses the dynamics of the mobilization and rights-demanding practices of the labour movement in the Americas, focusing on the Inter-American Regional Labour Organization (ORIT), which later transformed into the Trade Union Confederation of the Americas (TUCA). Many studies also tend to focus on one aspect of the regionalization of civil society: namely the more 'radical' regional CSOs, referred to as 'counter-hegemonic forces' (Olivet and Brennan 2010: 112), 'counter-hegemonic resistance' (Saguier 2007: 252) or 'alternative regionalism from below' (Igarashi 2011: 2), such as the Hemispheric Social Alliance (HSA) in the Americas, Solidarity for Asian Peoples' Advocacy (SAPA) in Southeast Asia, and SAPSN in Southern Africa. These studies neglect the heterogeneity of regional civil society co-operation. According to one commentator, this results in generalization eventually clouding the complexities of regional civil society (Söderbaum 2007). One important exception is Korzeniewicz and Smith (2005), who show the divergence between so-called 'insider' and 'outsider' regional networks in regional governance in Latin America. In line with this thinking, the thesis argues that CSOs play many different roles in regionalization in general and regional governance in particular. Some are more active and successful than others, and different strategies are deployed for different ends. The more radical orientation is but one of many different civil society approaches to regional governance. The often conflictual relations between CSOs on a regional level also affect the process of civil society regionalization. This will be analytically discussed further in section 2.8.

Thirdly, equally important to a structural perspective is the study of CSOs as conscious actors in regionalization. This implies taking into account the emergence of shared norms and cultural meanings that underpin networking in regional integration processes (Keck and Sikkink 1999: 100). In fact, in the wider field of International Relations (IR) ideational forces such as issue-framing, knowledge production and identity-making are widely acknowledged as important to understanding how and why transnational/international state and non-state actors are formed, how they take certain kinds of action, and how efficient they are (e.g. Wendt 1994; Melucci 1995; Keck and Sikkink 1998). Reuter (2007), for example, studies in depth the motivations behind CSO participation in regional networks and coalitions in the Baltic region. She accounts for 'the image of the developing regional civil society as seen through the eyes of the actors directly involved in it' (ibid: 21). Furthermore, Gilson (2011a) discusses the influence of the perception of

an East Asian 'region' and 'Asian' identity and values in the formation of regional networks such as Forum-Asia and ANGOC. However, research on CSO agency in regional processes is generally weak. This implies that studying CSOs as conscious actors in regional processes, the motivations behind their regionalizing, and how they use ideational resources to consolidate regional formations is on the whole under-researched so far, and those studies, such as Gilson (2011a), that do touch on this important aspect fail to reach a deeper level. This will be analytically discussed at greater length in sections 2.9 and 2.10.

1.2 Aim and Research Questions

The overarching aim of this thesis is to analyse the dynamics of civil society regionalization in Southern Africa, both empirically and from a theoretical perspective. This is done by building on existing research on civil society regionalization in Africa and elsewhere and through the collection of new empirical data. The focus is on the regional agency of CSOs and how this is influenced by their interaction with external actors such as the SADC and donors. The main research question is: *What dynamics have marked the regionalization of civil society in Southern Africa?* This implies analysing what forces have shaped the nature of civil society regionalization. 'Dynamics' refers to the process whereby CSOs create and shape regionalization, while at the same time being influenced by social structures. Hence, 'dynamics' involve both agency and structure, which are considered intimately related in the process of civil society regionalization. More specifically, this is understood in terms of viewing social structure as a phenomenon of levels, as will be further discussed in section 2.4. Generated from three gaps in the current literature on civil society regionalization discussed above, this thesis will pose three sub-research questions, which fall under the above main question.

Firstly, as highlighted by many contemporary studies on civil society regionalization, the influence of external actors such as RIGOs and donors, for example related to regional governance, is a crucial element of civil society regionalization. The thesis aims to deepen knowledge about the relationship between, on the one hand, CSOs and RIGOs and, on the other hand, CSOs and donors in the regionalization process, and more specifically how RIGOs and donors affect civil society on a regional level. This also involves linking these relationships to the deeper social structures of statism and capitalism, something which is ignored by most current studies. Hence, the first research question is: *how is civil society regionalization influenced by RIGOs and donors?*

Secondly, as discussed above, most research on civil society regionalization ignores the heterogeneity of this process. This thesis, in contrast, assumes that civil society is inherently complex and, regardless of which level of collective action is focused upon, cannot be generalized or reduced to a specific type of actor, which most current studies do. The thesis aims to account for and understand the complexity and heterogeneity of civil society regionalization, including regional intra-civil society relations. This also includes analysing the different roles that CSOs play in regional governance. Hence, the second research question is: *what is*

the composition of civil society on the regional level and how do CSOs relate to each other in the process of regionalization?

Thirdly, in contrast to most studies on civil society regionalization, which often view CSOs as passive objects, this thesis treats CSOs as subjects consciously and actively involved in constructing regionalization, albeit within existing deeper social structures. Hence, the relation of civil society to formal regionalism and donors will be studied partly from the point of view of CSOs themselves. This thesis, therefore, aims to enhance understanding of the agency of CSOs in terms of the motivations for 'going regional'. The third research question is therefore: *what are the motivations for regionalizing among CSOs?*

As will be shown throughout the thesis, civil society regionalization is very complex and there are many different dimensions of this process. Therefore, in order to be able to answer the above three research questions they need to be further operationalized. During the research process of reading relevant literature and collecting and analysing empirical data, and influenced by methodological cross-feeding between theory and data, 11 dimensions of civil society regionalization have been identified. These dimensions, as well as the research process behind their evolution, are discussed further in chapter 2.

Apart from the above primary, empirical, aims, this thesis also contributes to the larger theoretical debate on regionalism and international relations in general, and to the discussion on civil society regionalization in particular. More specifically, the thesis aims to develop and streamline a number of dimensions of civil society regionalization, both structural and actor-oriented, as well as their inter-connection, and to enhance theoretical understanding of this process. Even if this theoretical advancement is primarily directed at understanding civil society regionalization in Southern Africa, it also strives to contribute to the theoretical development of regionalism research in general and the NRA in particular.

To end this section, in conjunction with the discussion of the aim and research questions, a few words will be said about the general contributions of this thesis to the understanding of civil society regionalization. This thesis shows that when analysing civil society regionalization it is important to take CSO agency seriously into account, even if it is true that regionalism tends to be state-centric. In this regard, the thesis provides important input into the understanding of the active role played by (some) CSOs in regional governance. Contrary to many previous studies, CSOs can be more active in regional processes than has previously been conceptualized, and they contribute to regional policy-making and service provision. Additionally, one major contribution of this thesis is to show that CSOs are highly active in constructing regionalization in terms of framing issues and making identities 'regional' in scope, and should therefore be taken more seriously in regionalism studies as actors in their own right. Regional civil society gatherings are especially important for regional issue-framing and identity-making. In fact, there are indications that CSOs play a more significant role in constructing regions and creating a regional awareness than states involved in regional integration.

Another major contribution of this thesis is to show that CSO participation in regional governance, regional issue-framing and the construction of identities is greatly influenced by deeper statist and capitalist social structures, of which regional governance and donor funding are two manifestations. Hence, CSO regional engagement is only partly an autonomous process and also has to be understood as under the influence of these structures. In this vein, firstly, this thesis contributes to enhanced understanding of the power dynamics inherent in CSO participation in regional governance. The decision of states to include certain CSOs and exclude others ultimately stems from the dominant neo-liberal discourse. Secondly, the thesis contributes to deepened knowledge about the effect of donor funding on civil society regionalization. Regional donor funds indeed facilitate this process, but through their market-orientation and volatile funding preferences, influenced by the neo-liberal discourse, donors can also create a very vulnerable financial situation for CSOs, as well as shaping their development agendas. Thirdly, the thesis shows that CSO regional issue-framing and identity-making often centre around RIGOs as perceived 'regional' actors, which in turn spurs 'going regional'. RIGOs, then, help to foster civil society regionalization and are not necessarily 'weak' in terms of supporting regional integration, as is often perceived in regionalism studies. On the other hand, influenced by statism, some CSOs tend to adopt a national discourse that plays against strengthening regional awareness. In fact, the thesis shows that regional identity-making is not as important for civil society regionalization as originally expected. Through the above three points, this thesis contributes to the understanding of the interplay between structure and agency inherent in civil society regionalization.

Lastly, the thesis makes an important contribution to enhancing knowledge of the heterogeneous nature of civil society regionalization. CSO engagement with regional governance is more multi-faceted than commonly perceived in regionalism studies. The roles played by CSOs in regional governance are often reduced to 'insider' and 'outsider' strategies in the literature but, in fact, civil society on the regional level is more diverse than that. The thesis also contributes to an often overlooked aspect of civil society regionalization: the relations between CSOs involved in this process, which should be understood as conflictual and based on ideological rivalry and resource-based competition.

1.3 Conceptualizing Regional Integration and Civil Society

In this section, key concepts related to civil society regionalization will be discussed, namely: region; regionalism; regionalization; regional governance; and civil society. The discussion of the latter will include a few words about three important types of CSOs; NGO, social movement and network as well as a definition of 'regional' CSO.

1.3.1 Region

In a broad sense, a region is frequently understood in terms of a macro or world region that is a territorial unit between the national and global levels. Yet, regions can also be referred to as micro-regions existing between the national and the local level, and are either sub-national or cross-border. In mainstream rationalist thinking, regions are taken for granted and are often seen as inter-state regional frameworks (Söderbaum 2005). Hence, the perception of the region by state and non-state actors involved in regionalization is often linked to the geographical area covered by the main RIGO in the region. This has to do with the general tendency to talk about the region using states as a point of reference (Van Langenhove 2011: 66).

However, if regionalism is understood as a multi-dimensional process and it is argued that patterns of regionalization do not necessarily coincide with the borders of states, then the rationalist understanding of region is a little blunt. In line with the NRA, regions cannot merely be seen as formal regional organizations and pre-given entities 'out there', but are rather understood as socially constructed by different regional players in the process of regional and global transformation (Farrell 2005: 8). In the words of one commentator, 'there are no 'natural' regions, just as there are no 'natural' nations' (Reuter 2007: 84). This implies that the region is constantly contested and renegotiated by different types of actors in a dynamic process of change. Therefore, regions are heterogeneous, with unclear geographical delimitations. In fact, it is the *idea* of the region which is most important, constructed by various types of actors, and driven by certain interests or forces (Van Langenhove 2011: 88). Therefore 'it is because they [regions] are being talked about that they start existing' (ibid: 65).

Hence, a region is always constructed through discourse and building regions should, in consequence, be seen as discursive practices allowing regions to come into existence as institutionalized facts, which is sometimes labelled 'regionification' (e.g. Van Langenhove 2011). Hence, regions only exist or come into being if they are recognized as 'regions' by people, often through states, organizations or other regions. Therefore, in order to understand the making of regions it is important to study the people who speak about regions, for example in terms of why and when references to regions are made (ibid: 65-78). This presumption is taken seriously by this thesis, giving importance to how state actors, donors and CSOs understand regionalization and the meaning they give to it in the construction of 'Southern Africa'.

1.3.2 Regionalism

Regionalism is an ambiguous term and the debate on its definition has not reached consensus. There are some common denominators, however. First of all, geographical proximity and contiguity distinguish regionalism from other forms of organization and integration below the global level (Hurrell 1995: 38). Secondly, on a broad level, regionalism can be conceptualized as a general phenomenon of regional integration in a specific world region (Söderbaum 2002). Thirdly, more specifically, regionalism can be referred to as specific formal regional projects

driven by state, civil society and/or market actors. Related to this is the important separation between regionalism as description and as prescription. Where the former empirically accounts for a certain regional project, the latter implies some kind of moral position regarding how international relations are best organized that is advocated by policy-makers, CSOs and/or researchers. Here, the states in a specific region *should* put aside their national agendas and embark on regional co-operation for the sake of development, security, trade or some higher good (Hurrell 1995). This implies that regionalism can be an ideological regional project of constructing a regionalist order in a particular part of the world for a higher good (Farrell 2005).

1.3.3 Regionalization

Related to the concept of regionalism is regionalization, which in a general sense refers to the process of growing social and economic integration within a region. According to many scholars, the process of regionalization has an economic flavour and is understood in terms of increased intra-regional trade (Farrell 2005). However, this is only one of many aspects of the process in which a certain geographical area acquires a distinctive regional character. In this vein, Hettne (1999) describes regionalization in terms of five levels of 'regioness', which implies that a region can be more or less of a 'region' due to the depth and breadth of the regionalization process. At the first level, the region is seen as a geographical unit delimited by natural barriers and marked by certain ecological characteristics. At level two, the region as social system implies increased social contact and trade transactions between human groups. Level three implies organized co-operation in the cultural, economic, political and/or military fields and the region is defined by membership of a regional organization. Region as civil society, level four, takes shape when the organizational framework in place at the regional level promotes social communication and convergence of values and ideas across the region, creating multi-dimensional regional co-operation. Lastly, at the fifth level of regioness the region has become an acting subject in its own right, with a distinct regional identity, legitimacy and structure of decision-making; hence the creation of a new political entity on the regional level. These five levels of regioness can be understood as five phases in the process of regionalization in which a region 'becomes' a region (Van Langenhove 2011: 81).

Hence, one important new dimension of regionalization, at least in terms of the fourth and fifth levels of regioness, relates to increasing flows of people, the development of complex social networks in which ideas and identities are diffused across the region, and the creation of a transnational regional civil society (Hurrell 1995: 40). This is commonly conceptualized as 'from below' and implies a regional process where people engage in co-operation within diverse types of regionalist civil society frameworks, partly beyond the conscious regional policies of groups of states (Farrell 2005: 8). In this thesis regionalization is primarily referred to as the process of formation of a regional civil society.

In line with Reuter (2007), civil society regionalization is not referred to as an absolute process whereby national civil societies in their entirety are structurally transformed and becomes 'regional', but rather a process creating additional,

regional structures in which CSOs participate alongside the 'national'. This implies that the regional is interwoven and closely related to other levels and scales, not least to the national level. Although it is often possible to identify a distinct 'regional' arena, activities on the 'national' and 'regional' levels are intimately interconnected. As will be shown in the empirical chapters, even if CSOs engage regionally, they are still often active within a national context. The focus in this thesis is on those CSOs that strongly orient themselves towards the region and the means of doing that. These CSOs are referred to as 'regional' CSO´s, or RCSOs, which will be discussed in the section on civil society below.

1.3.4 Regional Governance

As in the case of globalization, regionalization cannot take place without governance arrangements that promote the process (Scholte 2005: 140). On a general level, governance refers to 'a process whereby people formulate, implement, enforce and review rules to guide their common affairs' (ibid). It denotes rules, structures and processes providing some measure of regulation, by various actors, over specific areas of activity and working towards certain objectives (Armstrong and Gilson 2011: 1). Governance is normally used in three broad contexts. First, international governance relates to a process where the prime actors are states and the objectives relate to the regulation of inter-state relations. Second, global governance involves state, inter-governmental as well as non-state actors, since it is concerned with the regulation of broad areas of interaction and has more complex objectives. Thirdly, regional governance is a subset of global governance involving state, inter-state and non-state actors, which is applicable to a specific region (Armstrong and Gilson 2011: 2-3). Hence, even though much governance happens through government, and applied to the regional level this means RIGOs (Scholte 2005: 140), global and regional modes of governance are not necessarily dependent on or controlled by states. This implies a different system of rule, with diffusion of some power away from states to, for example, NGOs, which are increasingly present within various governance structures (Grugel 2004: 32-33).

Governance, then, provides an opportunity to get out of the conceptual prison of state-centrism and think in terms of more complex and multi-level modes of governance instead of national government. Governance implies that the nation state is being reorganized and that non-state actors assume many responsibilities and functions traditionally reserved for the state (Godsäter and Söderbaum 2011). Therefore, regional governance should be conceptualized as the result of an on-going interaction between state actors, CSOs and private firms on a regional level in which regional development, and related practices and policies, is constantly negotiated (Shaw et al 2003: 198-199).

Söderbaum (2004b) has conceptualized two variants of regional governance in Africa: sovereignty-boosting and neo-liberal. In sovereignty-boosting regional governance, political leaders use regional governance to strengthen their regimes and the sovereignty of the state, which may or may not promote the development interests of the broader public. This means engaging in a rather rhetorical game of

signing various regional documents such as free trade agreements and water protocols in order to praise the values of regionalism, which in turn enables political leaders to increase legitimacy for their often authoritarian regimes (ibid: 425-426). Neo-liberal regional governance emphasizes regional economic integration which is market-driven and outward-looking, in which obstacles to the free movement of goods, services, capital and investment within the region and to the rest of the world should be removed. The welfare and development ambitions of the state are side-lined and poverty reduction is limited to economic growth in which development projects must be profitable. The role of regional institutions is merely to facilitate trade through various liberalization schemes (ibid: 423, 425). In essence this type of regional governance is policy-driven, state-centric and excludes civil society and the 'common man' (Shaw et al 2003:199). These two types of regional governance are highly applicable to Southern Africa, as will be discussed in chapter 3.

1.3.5 Civil Society

Having been in an academic blind spot for most of the 20th century, the quite old concept of civil society was dusted off in the 1980s and since then has been used frequently in the social sciences and, in fact, has moved to the centre of the international stage in the last 15 years (Muukkonen 2009; Edwards 2009). A number of reasons can explain this development, such as the fall of communism leading to a democratization of society in the former East, the popular uprisings against dictatorial states in Latin America, and the rapid rise of NGOs all around the world (Edwards 2009). The historical genealogy of the concept of civil society will be discussed further in the next chapter. For now, the task is to arrive at a tentative definition.

There are a rich variety of definitions and meanings of 'civil society' and there is still no international or interdisciplinary consensus around the overall research questions in civil society studies (Scholte 2000, 2002; Muukkonen 2009). The different meanings of civil society reflect the fact that the state, society and the basic institutions of society are framed in vastly different terms by different research traditions (Muukkonen 2009: 685). According to one scholar, 'cited as a solution to social, economic and political dilemmas by politicians and thinkers from left, right and all perspectives in between, civil society is claimed by every part of the ideological spectrum as its own' (Edwards 2009: 2). However, some common denominators can be distilled. In the widest possible terms, civil society is a sector that exists between other established or basic social institutions (Muukkonen 2009: 684). In slightly more detail, civil society is often loosely defined as the public realm and the associational life existing between the state and the private sector. From this perspective civil society is seen as an arena where different associations can express their interests and engage with the state. Although not always conceptualized in this way, civil society is generally considered to be distinct from the state (e.g. Sjögren 1998; Söderbaum 2007; Scholte 2002).

Assuming the basic understanding of civil society highlighted above, my conceptualization of this ambiguous term stresses the in-built heterogeneity of this arena due to social conflicts between the involved actors, influenced by critical

theoretical accounts of civil society (e.g. Cox 1999; Gill 2008). Actors within civil society can also be an obstacle for development, serving the needs of donors and political and economic elites rather than local communities (Godsäter and Söderbaum 2011). Based on this, the following definition of civil society is arrived at, which will be elaborated upon in the next, theoretical, chapter: an associational, heterogeneous and conflict-ridden sphere between the state and market sectors, where people act collectively within different types of associations for different ends, more or less in engagement with the state and sometimes for narrow material gains, which ultimately creates ideological and resource-based conflicts. This analytical conceptualization of civil society also has a descriptive element. Civil society includes a rich variety of actors such as NGOs, networks, community-based organizations, interest groups, trade unions, social movements, faith-based organizations, academic institutions, clan and kinship circles, lobby groups, youth associations, business organizations and more, which in this thesis are referred to as civil society organizations (CSOs).

A few words need to be said about the most relevant types of CSO actor on a regional level: 'NGOs', 'social movements' and 'networks'. Starting with NGO, as for the concept of civil society, there is no universal characterisation of what it is and what it (should) do (Fowler 2011: 43). Nevertheless, a tentative definition is presented here, drawn from Vakil (1997): 'self-governing, private, not-for-profit organizations that is geared to improving the quality of life of disadvantaged people' (ibid: 2060). The latter has led some commentators to speak of 'non-governmental development organizations' (NGDOs), being formally labelled 'developmental' by the advent of foreign aid (Fowler 2011: 43). Hence, one important additional dimension of the NGO is the utilization of donor funds as a basis for its existence (ibid: 44-45). However, the 'positive' characterization of NGOs, ascribing them with developmental potential, does not go uncontested. The sometimes self-seeking agendas of NGOs and their use as instruments by governments to control civic actors have given rise to a range of related acronyms such as BRINGO (Briefcase NGO), MONGO (my own NGO) and GONGO (governmental NGO) (Fowler 2011: 43-44). Hence, sometimes driven by the same economic interests as market actors, the not-for-profit dimension of NGOs will be problematized in this thesis, as well as their self-governance, since NGOs and other parts of civil society are often intimately connected with state and donor actors, in many regards being controlled by the latter.

Furthermore, Vakil (1997) mentions one important descriptor of NGOs relevant for this thesis, namely orientation, referring to the type of activities NGOs engages in. NGOs engaged in development activities support the capacity of local communities to provide for their own basic needs. For membership organizations, the beneficiaries are the organization's members themselves. Service providers are NGOs that act as intermediaries in delivering various types of social services to other organizations, or directly provide services to people on the local level for example related to housing, education and health care. An advocacy orientation refers to a striving to influence policy or decision-making related to particular issues and to mobilize support for these claims among other organizations or the wider

public. Lastly, a research orientation implies the intention to conduct research on topics related to development and provide this to various stakeholders. Needless to say, one and the same NGO can perform many of the above functions at the same time.

The 'social movement' is an informal network made up of a multiplicity of individuals and organizations, oriented towards social change and engaged in political and social conflicts, often on the basis of shared collective identities. Social movements often adopt confrontational and disruptive tactics. In order to capture the attention of the public and to put pressure on policy-makers for certain ideological causes, they have to amplify their often marginalized voices through challenging law and order. This implies an unusual form of strategy, often linked to protest, which connotes non-conventional forms of action such as civil disobedience. Social movements tend to become more and more institutionalized, hence the popular term social movement organization (SMO). SMOs are increasingly organized on the transnational level, have acquired a good deal of material resources and a certain public recognition, and tend to replace protest with lobbying and less contentious methods (Della Porta and Diani 2011: 69-74).

Furthermore, a 'network', in its broadest terms, is defined as a formal or informal structure that link individuals or organizations that share a common interest connected to a certain issue and/or who are united around specific values or ideologies (Perkin and Court 2005: 2). Of special interest in this thesis are civil society networks, especially advocacy and facilitating networks. The former contains CSOs that have come together to seek to influence a certain policy process. This network is often based on shared values. The other type of network, the facilitating network, helps members carry out their activities more efficiently, for example through offering certain resources and technical assistance (ibid: 10-11). Networks are often formally organised as NGOs, hence the term networking-oriented NGO is appropriate (Vakil 1997: 2063). However, as shown above, social movements are also a type of network, but one where collective identity and collective contentious actions are more important.

Lastly, a few words on regional CSOs (RCSOs) are warranted, since this type of organization is the focus of this thesis. This applies to all the sorts of CSOs mentioned above - NGOs, social movements and networks - whose activities are strongly oriented towards the region and who have created regional structures across national borders. In more detail, drawing on Scholte (2005), five criteria for CSOs to be called regional are proposed. First, CSOs with an organizational form that is regional in character, for example having offices or members in several countries in the region, are considered regional. Second, regional organizations deal with cross-border issues that are constructed as having a regional scope, for example HIV/AIDS and trade. Third, CSOs that somehow engage with state-led regional governance, for example via RIGOs, can be said to be regional. This implies performing regional governance, and acquiring regional policy-making and service-providing functions, but also contesting and resisting formal regional institutions. Fourth, regional CSOs are motivated by sentiments of transnational, regional solidarity and have developed supra-territorial or non-territorial identities that are

somehow related to the region. Fifth, regional CSOs tap into and depend on the availability of donor funds deployed for regional activities. The CSOs involved in this study, presented in sections 4.1 and 5.1, more or less fulfil these criteria. However, it should be noted that some CSOs are weaker on one or a few of these criteria. As will be discussed in section 6.3, many CSOs are particularly weak in terms of the identity aspect.

1.4 Questions of Methodology

In this section, the most important methodology-related issues concerning this thesis are discussed. First, the epistemological view of the thesis is addressed, followed by a discussion on research design; case selection; research techniques and material; and challenges related to the research process.

1.4.1 Epistemological View

Epistemologically, this thesis is influenced by qualitative methodology in general and in particular some aspects of interpretive hermeneutical and phenomenological approaches are important sources of inspiration. It should be underlined, though, that this study is not, by any means, an outright hermeneutical or phenomenological study. The core of qualitative research is the urge to *understand*, rather than explain, some social phenomena. In contrast to positivist methodology, the research process is not considered equivalent to causal explanations, since the aim is to (deeply) understand a few, isolated cases (Helenius 1990). 'Understanding', in a hermeneutical vein, implies that the researcher picks up the meaning of the research object, 'rather than mechanically mirroring it' (Alvesson and Sköldberg 2000: 68). In fact, from a hermeneutic perspective it is impossible for any researcher to discover the 'truth' about something, which is important in positivist explanatory studies, or to escape interpretation, since both 'natural and cultural sciences are […] irrevocably marked by interpretations all the way to the level of data' (ibid: 57). Furthermore, qualitative methodology adopts a holistic approach when researching various social phenomena. This implies that the studied people, social groups and settings are viewed as a whole and, in consequence, not reduced to independent, dependent or other types of 'variables' (Taylor and Bogdan 1998: 8). This research project, then, analyses different *dimensions* rather than clearly distinguished causes and outcomes of civil society regionalization. Interchangeably with dimensions, the thesis sometimes uses the concept of *forces* which shape civil society regionalization. The particular dimensions/forces of/behind civil society regionalization studied in this thesis will be discussed at length in the next chapter.

More particularly, this study is epistemologically influenced by qualitative thinking in three specific ways. Firstly, in line with the phenomenological perspective, it emphasizes understanding of a particular social phenomenon, in this case civil society regionalization, from the perspective of the actors involved. This implies capturing how those actors experience and construct their reality and what meaning is given to it (ibid: 3, 11). Accordingly, this study tries to see regional

integration through the eyes of CSOs themselves, even though this is a difficult endeavour considering the fact that the researcher's ability to understand his field is always limited by his or her own interpretations. Secondly, in a hermeneutical vein, theory and empirical data are seen as intimately interconnected and gradually developed during the research process in a mutually affecting manner moving towards deeper and deeper understanding of civil society regionalization. This means an alternation between empirically-informed theories and theoretically-influenced empirical data, leading to both an expansion of the empirical area of application and the development of new theories (Alvesson and Sköldberg 1992: 41-47). Thirdly, this project shares with the hermeneutical approach the claim that researchers always carry around particular frames of reference, i.e. pre-understanding, when doing research and inevitably make their (new) interpretations along those pre-conceptual lines. Yet, in contrast to some positivist thinking, such pre-understanding is not necessarily an obstacle towards knowledge production but an important tool in the research process in order to make sense of the object of study (Alvesson and Sköldberg 2000: 68). Pre-understanding in relation to this project will be discussed further in section 1.6 below.

The research design adopted in this thesis, discussed in the next section, stands in sharp contrast to a positivist, explanatory methodology manifested by induction and deduction. In the case of induction, this type of method seeks to extend empirical data to form general explanations, aiming for the maximum possible representativity. However, an empirically biased method only 'distils a general rule (theory) out of a number of observations; what is coming out then will only be a concentrate of what is already contained in the observations themselves' (Alvesson and Sköldberg 1992: 41). This means that qualitatively the derived theory is not much more than a summary of the empirical data. On the other hand, hypothetico-deduction, whereby theories, after being tested on some objective, empirical reality 'out there', either become falsified and thrown away, or verified, can be criticized in a similar manner. Deduction, being theoretically biased, seems to predict what is supposed to be explained. Hence, deduction can be seen as a rather speculative and authoritarian method, not giving empirical data enough attention (ibid).

It is argued here that induction or deduction on their own make it difficult to get a deeper understanding of a complex social phenomenon such as civil society regionalization in Southern Africa. For example, it is difficult to deliver a causal explanation for civil society regionalization since distinguishing between the cause and effects of this process, important for positivist studies, is very complicated. In other words, it is difficult to separate what causes this complex process from the actual process itself. For example, the 'causes' of civil society regionalization partly come from the participating CSOs themselves and cannot only be linked to 'external' actors and social structures. Therefore, to use positivist vocabulary, it is difficult to pin down any clearly delimited independent and dependent variables in this study, since they are intertwined. In fact, as already indicated, this thesis refrains from using the term 'variable', due to its positivist connotations, and does not intend to explain the process of civil society regionalization.

1.4.2 Research Design

The qualitative case study approach is often used to generate in-depth understanding of the complexity and particular nature of social phenomena (Yin 2009; Bryman 2012), which applies to the research problem in this thesis. The overall research method deployed in this thesis is a variant of the qualitative case study, i.e. the exploratory case study which fits situations where new social phenomena that have been poorly studied before (Yin 1993) such as civil society regionalization in Southern Africa, are targeted. Since comprehensive theories for understanding the phenomenon under scrutiny is either missing or inadequate, the exploratory case study seeks to develop new conceptual categories (Merriam 1994), as is the case of this thesis.

On the whole, the qualitative case study approach is recommended in research situations where the boundaries between the phenomenon (civil society regional co-operation in Southern Africa) and the context in which the process takes place (the statist and capitalist world order) are blurred (Yin 2009: 18). The case study is also appropriate in the sense that it allows for cross-fertilization between theory-building and empirical analysis (Söderbaum 2002: 3), which is necessary in a project such as this when the task at hand is to deeply understand civil society regionalization. This implies that the collection of data is guided by specific research questions and theoretical concerns, which in turn are refined during the research process. Hence, 'case study researchers can be associated by both theory generation and theory testing' (Bryman 2012: 71), which go hand in hand during the process. In this vein, scholars argue that the case study method enjoys a high degree of flexibility in the sense that it allows for the identification of new factors and hypotheses during the gradual exploration of the research field (George and Bennett 2005): 'When a case study researcher asks a participant 'were you thinking X when you did Y', and gets the answer, 'No, I was thinking Z,' then if the researcher had not thought of Z […] she may have a new variable demanding to be heard' (ibid: 18). The flexibility inherent in doing case study research was an important reason why this method was used in this project.

In line with the qualitative research tradition discussed above, by emphasizing interpretation rather than cause and effect the case study approach also has a different and broader understanding of causation. Intensive analysis of a single case means searching for generative mechanisms that are somehow responsible for certain regular events in a particular social context and how these mechanisms operate (Bryman 2012: 74). This stands in sharp contrast to 'proving' the connection between certain processes which are reduced to clearly identifiable dependent and independent variables. In this vein, this project wants to tease out different dimensions of civil society regionalization and study how they hang together. However, a limitation of case studies is that they can make only tentative conclusions on how much a certain factor affects the social phenomenon under scrutiny: in this project, how strong a particular dimension of civil society regionalization is. On the other hand, case studies are strong in terms of assessing whether and in what ways a certain factor matters (George and Bennett 2005).

Consequently, the task of this project is not primarily to measure how strong the various forces of civil society regionalization are, even though this will be briefly discussed in section 6.2, or to make some kind of ranking list. Linked to this point, case study research, as in this research, is primarily interested in exploring the conditions under which specific social processes, such as regionalization, occur and the mechanisms behind this (ibid).

More specifically, this thesis applies an 'embedded case study design' (Yin 2009: 50) where the same single-case study involves two or more distinct subunits, or sub-cases, which can then be compared. Other scholars refer to this as 'within-case analysis' (e.g. George and Bennett 2005). Bryman argues for the power of comparison in case study analysis, claiming that we can understand a social phenomenon better if it is compared with one or more similar cases. Also, by contrasting and cross-relating two or more cases, theory building can be improved, since the researcher is in a better position to establish the circumstances in which a theory will hold (2012: 72-74). In this project, within the overall case of civil society regionalization in Southern Africa, two separate, but related, studies are conducted on two embedded cases, i.e. civil society regionalization in the trade and the HIV/AIDS sectors (the choice of these two sub-cases is discussed further in the next section), which are then compared.

There are many different types of 'comparison' for different purposes and using different methods. Often, case-oriented comparative methods are causal-analytic and seek to formulate explanations of specific historical outcomes or certain empirical phenomena. This implies analysing causal mechanisms across sets of comparable cases (Ragin 1987: 34-35). George and Bennett, two authoritative scholars in the field of comparative case study analysis, refer to this approach as structured and focused comparative method (2005), which is essentially explanatory and theoretically-driven (Teorell and Svensson 2007). Guided by a well-defined theoretical objective, this type of comparison employs a set of pre-defined variables of theoretical interest for purposes of explaining the social phenomena of which a group of cases are instances. In more detail, influenced by the statistical research model, the structured and focused comparison asks a set of standardized questions, stemming from the pre-defined variables (George and Bennett 2005: 69), in order to 'decipher important causal patterns' (Ragin 1987: 35). Some examples of this approach are qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) and controlled comparison (George and Bennett 2005).

The type of comparison adopted in the project is referred to as 'unstructured comparison'. Each of the two embedded sub-cases (trade and HIV/AIDS) is first studied individually (chapters 4-5), where they are allowed to 'speak for themselves'. Then, in chapter 6, they are unsystematically contrasted and compared, based on the 11 dimensions of civil society regionalization. The value of comparison in this unstructured way is to discover broader patterns of, and achieve deeper insights into, the overarching case of civil society regionalization as well as to enhance the generalizability of the findings (e.g. Merriam 1994). Contrary to the structured and focused comparative method, which tends to downplay the interpretive side of comparative work (Ragin 1998: 35), the 'unstructured

comparison' delivers in depth and detailed knowledge, while at the same time permitting theory generation (Weissmann 2009: 18). Unstructured comparison is in line with the hermeneutic influence on this thesis. Moreover, taking into consideration the exploratory nature of this research project, the 'variables', or rather dimensions of civil society regionalization, are not defined beforehand in order to permit an open-ended approach towards different possibilities for understanding this process. The structured, focused comparison does not provide such flexibility. By consequence, the analytical framework is rather loosely structured and developed during the process. In fact, 'comparison' was carried out throughout the research process in order to enhance understanding of the research problem and is not the end product. This makes for a poor fit with the focused and structured comparison which applies rigorous methods and strictly structured comparisons based on a number of pre-defined variables in order to explain the phenomena under scrutiny.

The case study approach has been used extensively in the study of civil society actors, particularly social movements, in terms of understanding why these actors form and how they operate and evolve (e.g. Snow and Trom 2002). In more detail, the defining general characteristics of case studies are: (a) investigation and analysis of an instance or variant of some bounded social phenomenon that (b) seek to generate a richly detailed and 'thick' elaboration of the phenomenon studied through (c) the use and triangulation of multiple methods or procedures that include but are not limited to qualitative techniques (ibid: 147). To add to this list, (d), case studies have theory-developing ambitions and aim for theoretical generalisations (Yin 2009: 35-40). This study fits these criteria well. Firstly, all case studies are bounded in place and time (Snow and Trom 2002: 147). In this study, civil society regionalization as a social phenomenon is limited to the Southern African region and only involves a certain number of regional CSOs and their national members and partners in two specific issue areas: trade and HIV/AIDS. It is also bounded in time, in the sense that the study primarily covers the regional activities of CSOs during a period of four years, i.e. 2008-2012, during which the empirical data was collected, even if references are also made to activities taking place before this time period. This will be further elaborated upon in the next section.

Secondly, and already mentioned above, case studies strive to produce a holistic understanding of the phenomenon under investigation. This means not only enhancing knowledge of the nature of the phenomenon itself but also its embedded and contextualized character (ibid: 149-150). In terms of this thesis, civil society regionalization cannot be properly analysed without understanding how the actors involved in the process, i.e. CSOs, make sense of and construct the regionalization process, according to their own perspectives, within the overall context of the statist and capitalist world order. This will be elaborated upon at length in chapters 4 and 5.

Thirdly, such an endeavour is only made possible through a problem-oriented approach in terms of research design, whereby the research problem determines the choice of research techniques. Case study researchers favour qualitative methods, such as participant observation and interviewing, because they are particularly useful in terms of the intense examination of a case (Bryman 2012: 68). In this thesis, the research techniques are carefully selected according to their capacity to aid

understanding of civil society regionalization. This will be accounted for in section 1.4.4.

Fourthly, the case study method also allows for generalizing from the specific case study results to a more general theoretical level. However, it is important to distinguish between statistical and analytical generalization, the former often being used in quantitative studies to generalize from a sample of a population to the whole population. In terms of case studies, the mode of generalization is analytical generalization in which previously developed theories regarding similar case studies are compared with the empirical results from the present investigation. If several cases support the same theory, replication can be claimed (Yin 2009: 38-39). The theoretical framework generated in this thesis is foremost a theory about the case of civil society regionalization in *Southern Africa*. However, there are important reasons to believe that the conceptualization of this case can possibly be applied to civil society regionalization more widely, especially in regions in the global South, discussed next.

As was highlighted above when current civil society regionalization research was discussed, there are many similarities between Asia, Latin America and Africa. For example, these include the existence of RIGOs around which a lot of regional civil society activities centre and the strong involvement of donors in supporting regionalization. The donors are also often similar, since they work across regions. In all of the above regions, regional CSO co-operation is ultimately built on and derives from national civil societies, which have evolved along quite similar lines. Since the 1980s, the number of NGOs has increased dramatically in all three regions due to economic liberalization, democratization and the availability of donor funding. The majority of these CSOs, regardless of whether they are community organizations working on a local level or professionalized national NGOs, perform a service delivery function at the expense of a political role advocating for human rights, democracy, state provision of basic social services and the like. It should be noticed, though, that Latin American civil societies generally have a stronger element of contentious politics, due to a history of social uprisings and demand for democratic transformation and citizenship rights by social movements. However, due to the tendency of the state to dominate and control civil society and the weakness of the institutionalized political channels available for CSOs to influence policy-making, CSOs in Latin America generally lack real, sustainable impact on government policy, especially in the economic domains. This tendency is even more pronounced in sub-Saharan Africa and Asia. Furthermore, the existence of a broad range of different types of CSOs in all three regions, even though service-providers dominate, makes civil societies quite heterogeneous. The exception to this rule is those centralized, authoritarian countries, mostly in Asia but also Africa, where CSOs which are not legitimized by the state are forbidden. Lastly, civil societies in all three regions suffer from democratic deficits, where many CSOs are urban-based and elite-driven, fail to represent marginalized people, lack autonomy due to dependence on donor and state resources, lack financial transparency and show corruption tendencies (Opoku-Mensah 2008; Obadare 2011; Grugel 2006; Serbin and Fioramonti 2008; Dagnino 2011; Schak and Hudson 2003; Tandon and Kak

2008). Due to the above similar general understandings of civil society in the global South, the theoretical perception of regionalization of civil society adopted in this thesis can possibly be compared with and analytically generalized to other regions. On the whole, the theoretical framework developed in this thesis wants to contribute to the overall understanding of and debate about civil society regionalization within regionalism studies by accounting for the (often overlooked) case of Southern Africa.

The remaining part of this section discusses in more detail how the theoretical framework has evolved and the relationship between empirical data and theory in the research process. Case study inquiry theoretically never starts from scratch. It benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions, generated from existing theories in the research field, to guide further data collection and analysis (Yin 2009: 18). In other words, 'the complete research design embodies a 'theory' of what is being studied […and] will provide surprisingly strong guidance in determining what data to collect and the strategies for analysing the data' (ibid: 36). In this thesis, a number of potential dimensions of civil society regionalization were generated from the existing civil society literature in order to steer the collection of data. In other words, a theoretical pre-understanding of civil society regionalization was used as a tool for collecting, structuring and analysing the empirical evidence. In turn, the latter allowed for further development of the theoretical framework throughout the process. After each field study, the theoretical framework was modified in light of the new empirical insights. The new empirical and theoretical insights were used, in turn, to dig deeper into the field and ask better-informed questions about civil society regionalization during the next field trip. This involved discarding some potential dimensions of civil society regionalization originally included in the framework, as well as including new and refining old ones. This will be discussed further in section 2.4. In this way, a theoretical understanding of civil society regionalization was gradually developed during the research process.

A few more words on the role of empirical data in relation to theory are also warranted. The empirical chapters (4 and 5) should be seen as both an illustration of and the empirical foundation for the framework. Consequently, the framework is, on the one hand, the result of the empirical investigation but, on the other hand, the empirical data is a manifestation of the framework. Once again, this is the result of the research process being hermeneutically inspired, whereby data and theory are gradually developed, hand in hand. The theoretical framework presented in chapter 2 can be seen as the end product of this process, as a theoretical attempt to understand the dynamics of civil society regionalization in Southern Africa. Hence, the theoretical framework is not only an organizing tool for bringing order to the empirical data, even though it has indeed been used in this fashion for the analysis of civil society regionalization. The framework is the result of intense, process-oriented research over several years and has undergone many revisions over time. Some more notes on the role of 'theoretical framework' in this thesis will be given in the opening section of chapter 2.

1.4.3 Case Selection

The justification for the choice of the Southern Africa region as the overarching case of civil society regionalization is both empirical and theoretical. In terms of the former, the focus on Southern Africa is justified due to the distinct history of civil society interaction in this part of the world during de-colonization, the recognized and quite distinct overall regionalization dynamic, and the multitude of state forms with different links to their respective civil societies. The most comprehensive understanding of 'Southern Africa' covers the SADC group of countries, i.e. (currently) Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. This list has changed over the years, hand in hand with growing membership. In line with a mainstream state-centric understanding of regions, this is the most conventional delimitation of Southern Africa in current research, but there are also other informal and dynamic sub-regions within this definition. Civil society interactions do not always follow the membership of inter-governmental regional organizations. Therefore, in line with the social constructivist argument above that the hegemonic conceptualization of regions is always in flux and constantly contested, the above definition of Southern Africa should not be taken for granted and may be challenged and revised during the research process.

The choice of Southern Africa is further motivated by the fact that, compared with other regions, there is a lack of studies on African regionalism in general and civil society regionalization in particular. Mainstream, rationalist regionalism theories have mostly been developed in a Western European context and when exported and applied to other non-European regions the main focus has been on North America and the Asia-Pacific (Söderbaum 2002: 25). As shown above, the emerging research output in terms of civil society regionalization partly follows this trend. In comparison with for example South-East Asia and Latin America, which get increasing attention, there are still few studies on civil society regionalization in African sub-regions. The southern part of Africa is particularly under-researched in this sense. This greatly warrants a thorough study on civil society regionalization in Southern Africa.

Furthermore, choosing the most suitable kind of sub-cases for analysing the overall case of civil society regionalization in Southern Africa is not easy. George and Bennett bring up two important criteria for case selection. Firstly, the cases should be of relevance to the research objective of the study and, secondly, provide variation (2005: 83). Before further discussing these two points in relation to this thesis, it should be noted that the choice of cases is made on empirical grounds and assumes the generally accepted issue areas, also referred to as 'sectors', among CSOs, donors and policy-makers on the development scene. Among a vast number of such sectors, the trade and HIV/AIDS sectors were chosen.[3] In terms of the first

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3 The words 'sector', 'case' and 'sub-case' are used interchangeably throughout the thesis. This implies that, when it is not otherwise stated, 'case' is referred to as the trade or HIV sector, forming the two sub-cases within which the overarching case of civil society regionalization in Southern Africa is analyzed.

criterion above, these sub-cases are considered most suitable for studying the overall case of civil society regionalization in Southern Africa in which they are embedded. In these cases, organizational and issue-related boundaries are particularly solid, which makes it easy to tease out relevant CSOs. Regional co-operation in these sectors also appears to be rich, a prerequisite to understanding regional co-operation. As indicated above, according to my database study, CSOs dealing with HIV/AIDS and economic development (of which trade is central) issues in particular 'go regional'. As will be shown later in the thesis, the involvement of donors in these sectors is also high. In fact, donor support to civil society regionalization generally tends to focus on CSOs dealing with HIV/AIDS and trade issues. Hence, in order to capture the CSO-donor dynamics, these sectors are a good choice. CSOs related to HIV/AIDS and trade also tend to be fairly involved in regional governance, which is important due to the fact that this thesis has great interest in RIGO-civil society relations. Furthermore, in terms of the second criterion, variation, these sectors seem to be rather heterogeneous, with representation from different types of CSO, such as advocacy and service-providing NGOs and social movements. The different configurations of regional civil society in the two issue areas, producing different forms of regionalization dynamics, facilitate comparison. This is also related to the fact that CSOs seems to play different roles in regional governance in the trade and HIV/AIDS areas respectively. All in all, these sub-cases share some fundamental common features, such as the type of actors involved and the strategies used for regional co-operation, but nevertheless display reasonably different regionalization dynamics, which makes them what Yin calls 'logical subunits' (2009: 50).

Furthermore, in terms of the theoretical rationale for the choice of these sub-cases, one serious gap in the study of civil society regionalization is neglect of the internal motivations of CSOs to engage regionally. The choice of the HIV/AIDS and trade sectors is warranted by the importance of ideas, such as issue-framing, within civil society regionalization in these sectors. In order to be able to contribute to NRA theory-building and to strengthen theoretical understanding of the role of non-state actors in the study of regionalization, regional CSOs in the trade and HIV/AIDS sectors provide important empirical data about issue-framing and, to a less extent, identity-making.

Lastly, within this case study, focus is delimited to 16 specific RCSOs in the trade and HIV/AIDS sectors. The intention has been to cover all CSOs that, in the sense discussed above, are 'regional' in these sectors, and in the end the study has boiled down to these 16. Hence, the sample is exhaustive in this regard. Yet, there might still be other CSOs in the trade and HIV/AIDS sectors that would qualify for participation in this project but have not been discovered. The empirical chapters focus on these 16 CSOs, which gives certain regularity in the empirical analysis. To recapitulate, these CSOs, more or less, have a regional organization, deal with cross-border regional issues, engage with regional governance, are motivated by regional identities, and use regional donor funds. The regional engagement of these CSOs will nevertheless by problematized in section 6.3. Focusing on regional CSOs obviously excludes a number of CSOs which do work on a regional level. There are many local and national CSOs which have some sort of regional engagement.

However, these CSOs generally only fulfil one or a couple of the above criteria and do not, then, qualify for this study. These CSOs are firmly based on a national or local level and their main geographical sphere of operation is demarcated by the national borders of their country, or possibly a particular sub-region or local setting within that country. Besides their local and national activities, they occasionally engage outside national borders. Such engagement can take many forms, such as lobbying state actors in other countries within the context of a regional campaign, influencing regional policy-makers such as the SADC, participating in regional conferences, and networking with partners in other parts of the region in order to exchange information and experiences. Some of these regionally-active national CSOs are members or partners of the regional CSOs featured in this study, and as such, are included in the study. However, they are primarily targeted in terms of how they understand the regional CSOs they are related to, as well as regionalization of civil society more broadly, and not in their own right.

Snowball sampling techniques were used for choosing the 16 RCSOs. Snowball sampling is often used in studies when the possible research objects are rather unknown to the researcher, which is the case in an explorative study such as this one. Often one or a few key individuals are asked to name others who are likely candidates for the research (Bernard 2000: 179). In this case, a few important researchers and representatives of CSOs and donors known for being well-acquainted with civil society activities in the region and in a good position to pinpoint the regional key players were targeted early in the field studies. During the process, one contact led to another, and the 16 regional CSOs in the trade and HIV/AIDS areas were gradually identified, as well as their most regionally active national members and partners. Reading evaluations, statements, workshop reports, annual reports and other documents related to regional civil society work also helped in this singling-out process.

Lastly, a few words have to be said about the choice of donors to include in this study. The most important donors on the regional scene in the trade and HIV/AIDS sectors, i.e. those donors most active in terms of providing regional funds, have been targeted. These donors, 13 in total, are listed in sections 4.3.2 and 5.3.1. In the process of selecting these donors, the snowball sampling technique was also used in the manner described in the previous paragraph. Parallel to this, the donors of the 16 chosen RCSOs were identified and a clear pattern emerged. The targeted 13 donors were the ones appearing most frequently as funders.

1.4.4 Research Techniques and Material

In line with the multi-methodological approach of the case study, it is crucial to select and design a variety of appropriate data-gathering techniques, especially when studying a complex social phenomenon such as civil society (Heinrich 2004). No single method can provide all the information required to understand civil society regionalization in Southern Africa. Furthermore, for a valid and comprehensive analysis of the regionalization of civil society, a variety of perspectives need to be included: insider views, i.e. CSOs themselves, as well as external stakeholders such as donors and RIGOs, and outsider views, such as other researchers (ibid: 25-26).

Due to the eclectic combination of data-collecting methods, the material in this thesis is both of a primary and secondary nature. The main primary sources are interviews and various documents from CSOs, RIGOs and donors, such as annual reports, policy documents, information brochures and internet resources. The main secondary sources consist of academic books and articles, research reports, newsletters (often electronic) and evaluations. As already mentioned, in general there is a lack of research and hence reliable data on regionalism in Southern Africa and civil society regionalization in particular. Therefore, most data had to be collected by the researcher himself, which is one of the factors that make this case study explorative.

Besides a pilot research trip to Southern Africa in 2005, the bulk of the field research took place during two major trips in 2008 and 2009. A few supplementary interviews were also conducted in Sweden and Norway in 2012. In terms of countries visited during the field trips, South Africa was always selected as a base and one or more of the following countries were visited: Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Botswana. The reason for the frequent trips to South Africa is that most regional CSOs, as well as donors and research institutes that deal with civil society regionalization, are based in Johannesburg, Pretoria and Cape Town. In fact, the Johannesburg-Pretoria area can be seen as the hub of civil society regionalization in the region. However, Harare also hosts the headquarters of some important RCSOs in the trade sector, and therefore a visit there was warranted. Mozambique was chosen because some important national members of regional networks are based there, as well as to explore the geographical and language-based power dynamics between CSOs from South Africa and non-English speaking CSOs from other countries. Botswana, finally, hosts the main RIGO in Southern Africa, the SADC, as well as a couple of regional CSOs.

In order to collect in-depth qualitative empirical data, 64 semi-structured interviews were carried out with representatives from 16 regional CSOs in the trade and HIV/AIDS issue areas, some of their national members and partners, other regionally active CSOs, various SADC institutions, research institutes, and 13 foreign donors involved in regional integration. Also, some complementary information was received through e-mail. Semi-structured interviewing suited this research project well. This type of interview technique is generally used in qualitative studies and in the field of social movement/NGO research in particular, where the goal is to explore and/or interpret complex social events and processes (Blee and Taylor 2002: 93) such as civil society regionalization. Semi-structured interviews are particularly useful for understanding social movements and NGO mobilization from the perspectives of the actors themselves (ibid: 92), which in this study is an important aspect of civil society regionalization. In brief, semi-structured interviewing assumes an interview guide with a list of questions and topics that needs to be covered, but at the same time gives the interview subjects scope to express themselves in their own terms (Bernard 2000: 191). This balance between control and flexibility is crucial in a hermeneutically-inspired qualitative study such as this one, when certain forces behind civil society regionalization are explored at

the same time as allowing for CSOs to interpret these forces in their own terms and to add more aspects of 'going regional'.

In order to further analyse the various aspects of regionalization of civil society in Southern Africa, a document search was conducted. There is a rich flora of primary civil society, RIGO and donor written material. Reports and participant lists from regional civil society, donor and SADC workshops, conferences and campaigns, e-mail communication, regional CSO e-mail lists, CSOs' and donors' annual reports, strategic plans, evaluations and statements were collected and analysed (see the reference list for further details). This material has been a great complement to the interviews in terms of delivering background information, validating claims by interviewees, filling gaps in their stories about regional co-operation, and for covering those CSOs that were not possible to get a hold of for an interview or were discovered too late in the research process to be interviewed.

Lastly, a small statistical analysis of CSO directories in South Africa, Tanzania and Zimbabwe was carried out in order to present figures about the percentage of CSOs regionally active in relation to the total number of CSOs listed. This gives an indication of the magnitude of the regionalization process. The databases were PRODDER in South Africa, the CSO Directory in Tanzania, and Kubatana in Zimbabwe.[4] In total, 3941 CSOs from various sectors were counted and analysed, i.e. 1386 in South Africa, 2305 in Tanzania and 250 in Zimbabwe. The targeted sectors were 'Economic development', 'Environment', 'Education', 'HIV/AIDS', 'Community development', 'Health' and 'Human rights'. Various regional characteristics of CSOs were analysed in terms of the information given in the databases. More specifically, CSOs listed as having 'regional' geographical scope, activities, target groups and/or objectives were counted as regionally engaged. The results of this study were briefly presented at the beginning of this chapter and discussed further in section 6.2.

Studying civil society regionalization in Southern Africa has generally been quite easy, despite some challenges discussed below. I have had good access to the field and the targeted CSO and donor representatives, as well as scholars, have generally been willing to be interviewed and to provide requested documents such as annual plans, evaluations, statements and reports. This relates to, firstly, a widespread interest in the topic of civil society regionalization among the interviewees, which partly has to do with the lack of research in this area. Most stakeholders in civil society regionalization tend to support research in the field and believe that enhanced knowledge can help strengthen regional co-operation among CSOs. Secondly, due to extensive travelling in the region over the years, I have established a widespread network of social contacts within civil society in several countries, but also with donors and staff members at the SADC Secretariat. This has made me acquainted with the field and helped me to get connected with the interview subjects and receive written material.

To end this section, a few words on reliability and validity are warranted. Regarding reliability, referring to the extent to which the researcher gets the same

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4 See http://www.prodder.org.za/, http://www.csodirectory.or.tz/ and http://www.kubatana.net/html/dir/dir_cont.asp for further details about these directories.

answers when measuring something more than once during the same conditions (Bernard 2000: 47), the research process has been conducted in a transparent manner. The research methods, material and analytical steps have been documented during the process and are presented in this and later chapters. As for the interview material, which forms the bulk of the empirical data, the interviewees all agreed to be taped and referenced in the thesis and are listed by name and affiliation at the end of the thesis. It is easy, then, for other researchers to verify the results presented here if such inquiries arise.

As for validity, on a more general level this means the accuracy of research instruments, empirical data and analysis in terms of whether one measures what is supposed to be measured (ibid: 46). In this study, the empirical data, of which the bulk constitutes interview material, are considered highly valid. Only people well-acquainted with the field have been targeted. In terms of CSOs, most interviews involved the director and/or staff members in charge of regional programs, people who are in a very good position to represent the regional work of their organization. The latter also applies to donors, whose heads of regional program were mostly interviewed. Lastly, even though no interviews were held with high-level, senior officials at the SADC Secretariat, those interviewed have nevertheless shown great insight into SADC-CSO relations connected to trade and HIV/AIDS. The interviews with SADC staff have generally also been marked by a remarkable openness, which has helped me a great deal to understand the behaviour of the SADC *vis-à-vis* civil society.

In terms of case study analysis in particular, validity is often referred to in terms of internal and external validity. The former implies the trustworthiness of establishing a causal relationship whereby certain conditions are believed to lead to other conditions. This type of validity foremost applies to explanatory case studies (Yin 2009: 40), for example related to structured, focused comparison discussed above, and not to qualitative types of case study like this thesis. External validity means defining the domain to which a case study's results can be generalized (ibid) and is important to this study. This was discussed above in relation to the analytical generalization of the theoretical framework. To recapitulate, this research project is not positivist in nature and therefore does not believe that research results can be measured against some universally applicable laws 'out there', governing all types of international relations, and which if they pass this test can be generalized beyond the immediate social context. Therefore, strictly scientifically speaking, at least in the terms of positivist research the results of this study cannot be generalized to other world regions outside Southern Africa and not even to outside the two particular sub-cases. However, for reasons discussed above, this thesis can talk for the case of civil society regionalization in Southern Africa as a whole. As also discussed above, this case may be representative of regionalization processes in other world regions. Of course, in order to gain more general validity, the theoretical framework has to be tested in other world regions and further developed. The thesis is one step in the gradually increase of knowledge about the role of civil society in regionalization processes.

Related to this, this thesis is important to the larger theoretical debate on how civil society regionalization can be understood. The results show that civil society regionalization can, in instances such as the trade and HIV/AIDS sectors in Southern Africa, be more complex and multi-dimensional than has been argued so far. It remains to be seen if the dimensions of civil society regionalization outlined in the theoretical framework in this study can help to develop the understanding of civil society regionalization more generally, though the prospects are promising.

1.4.5 Challenges Related to the Research Process

The main problem in terms of access to interview subjects and written primary material has been the SADC. Due to the state-centric nature of the SADC and also suspicion towards researchers, it was difficult to reach relevant staff members. Only four officials, on a mid-range level, agreed to participate in an interview, although the small amount of information given by them has been extremely useful. Equally disturbing has been the reluctance of the SADC Secretariat to provide me with key documents, such as budgets and annual reports, which made it challenging to verify certain arguments, for example the emphasis put on trade in comparison with social issues such as HIV/AIDS in terms of allocation of resources. In most facets, the SADC is a relatively closed organization, and to recall one of the interviewees at its Secretariat: 'SADC don't want to interact with people, even though they don't put it that way. SADC has no interest in interacting with researchers and CSOs […] If it is convenient for you, we are really too busy and just don't have time for you'.[5] This reluctance to engage with the research community was greatly felt and it was only through being recommended by the director of the Southern African Trust, which previously funded the SADC Secretariat, that I gained an entry-point there.

In regards to methods, the project has not in the end fully lived up to the ambition of using a variety of research techniques. The bulk of the empirical data stems from interviews and documents. Late in the research process it was necessary to abandon participant observation at regional forums due to time constraints. Unfortunately, then, it was not possible to attend important regional civil society forums such as the SADC Civil Society Forum, the Peoples' Summit, the SADC HIV/AIDS Partnership Forum or regional partnership meetings of regional networks, discussed in chapters 4 and 5. For observing CSOs in action, those meetings would provide excellent opportunities to better grasp intra-civil society interaction on the regional level, as well as issue-framing and identity-making. The original ambition was to also conduct a major survey of the regional engagement of CSOs, but this was reduced to a minor database study. Hence, the quantitative element of this research project, i.e. a more in-depth study of the scope of civil society regionalization on a general level, has unfortunately been downplayed. However, a few comments will still be made about the scope of this process in section 6.2.

Furthermore, some key RCSOs, i.e. RATN, SACBTA, SEG and ASCCI (discussed in chapter 4 and 5), were discovered late in the research process and

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5 Ncube, interview, 8 December 2008

therefore not interviewed. Instead, the thesis relies on written documents from these organizations and secondary sources such as external evaluations. However, one important regional civil society actor in the trade field, Trade Law Centre (TRALAC) was unfortunately detected too late in the project and therefore not included. Based in Stellenbosch, South Africa, TRALAC is a capacity-building organization which develops trade-related capacity in East and Southern Africa (TRALAC 2013). The same applies to the Disability HIV and AIDS Trust (DHAT), a regional NGO based in Harare, Zimbabwe. DHAT promotes the rights and capacity building of persons with disabilities infected and affected by HIV and AIDS in Southern Africa and has programmes in nine countries (DHAT 2013).

1.5 Delimitations

In this section, the 'outer limits' for the study of civil society regionalization in this thesis will be discussed; in other words, what specific aspects of this process have been studied and what have been left out. As previously stated, the process of civil society regionalization is highly complex, and in order to fully capture the complexity of the process a wide range of dimensions could be analysed. However, it would be impossible to cover all of these aspects in a limited project such as this and hence some kind of delimitation is warranted. This is not an easy thing. As will be explained further in the next chapter, the research focuses on 11 specific dimensions of civil society regionalization related to the relationship between CSOs, RIGOs and donors, to intra-civil society relations, and to the internal motivations of CSOs. The scientific process behind choosing these dimensions in particular will be discussed in section 2.4. Even though the research is limited to these areas, covering a number of dimensions of civil society regionalization and focusing on both structure and agency, they are enough to present a comprehensive picture of this process which is broader and deeper than previous research in the field.

In line with Reuter (2007: 37-38), it is important to distinguish between the 'content' and 'process' of civil society regionalization, where the former denotes the regional activities of CSOs and the extent to which they reach their goals and the latter the dynamics behind 'going regional', even though the two are related. The focus of this thesis is not on the content of civil society regionalization as such, even though regional CSO strategies will be discussed, albeit only in terms of the means of regionalizing and not in terms of the quality of these strategies for reaching certain development goals. The prime purpose is to study the dynamics of civil society regionalization in terms of the forces behind CSOs working regionally, not how 'successful' CSOs are in influencing SADC policy-making, or in delivering services on the regional level or the like, although the success of CSOs will briefly be discussed in sections 6.2 and 6.3. However, as will be shown, inclusion or exclusion in regional governance affects the regional consolidation of CSOs, which in turn relates to what CSOs do and how they do it.

Obviously, in the selection of which dimensions of civil society regionalization to study, important ones are left out, of which three are specifically worth mentioning: the roles of language, mass media, and information and

communications technology (ICT). To start with, one strand of the study of new regionalism focuses on the role of shared domestic characteristics for regional integration, for example commonalities of ethnicity, race, religion, culture, history and language (Hurrell 1995: 66). In this vein, Hettne refers to the social cohesiveness of a particular region as important for region-building (2005: 544). In terms of language, a commonly-spoken language can play a big role in region-building. In the case of Southern Africa, colonized by three colonial powers in the past, linguistic social cohesion is weak. Even though English is the regional *lingua franca*, French and Portuguese are spoken in several countries, for example French in the DRC and Mauritius, and Portuguese in Angola and Mozambique. Such linguistic divergence and the domination of English as the prime medium of communication might negatively affect civil society regionalization. In particular, Mozambican and Angolan CSOs could possibly be excluded within regional co-operation, to the benefit of CSOs coming from English-speaking countries. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to address such regional power dynamics related to language and this dimension of civil society regionalization is not studied, although a short discussion of the role of language for civil society regionalization is nevertheless held in section 7.3.

The role of media is another important aspect of civil society regionalization not directly studied in this thesis. Drawing on John B. Thompson (1995), Thörn distinguishes two different ways in which media can influence the construction of transnational networks: through mediated interaction and mediated quasi-interaction. The former implies communication across distance through the use of various technical media such as letters, telephones and the internet, and the latter refers to modern mass media (2009: 197). Through the introduction of modern ICT, mediated interaction between CSOs has greatly improved. In fact, ICT is now an essential component of the work of CSOs and has had a big impact on the growth of civil society around the world (Hajnal 2002a). ICT includes the internet, e-mail, videoconferencing, and mobile telephones, as well as new technological developments related to social media. These include online platforms such as blogging, Facebook and Twitter, which are used for various forms of social interaction (ECOSOC 2010). These modern technologies not only play an important role in shaping NGOs, networking and building civil society coalitions, but also in terms of empowering CSOs in service delivery and advocacy, making their work much cheaper and more efficient. In terms of advocacy, ICT has contributed towards the transformation of NGOs into important actors in international politics, able to influence state policy-making in a number of issue areas (Hajnal 2002b: 244). It is without doubt that ICT also plays an important role on a regional level, for example in Southern Africa, by facilitating the consolidation of regional NGOs and networks, making regional service delivery more efficient and improving regional advocacy, for example towards the SADC. However, this important area also falls outside the scope of this thesis.

The same applies to the role of modern mass media in regional integration processes. Disseminating ideas of regionalism and integration, how regional bodies work and how ordinary people can benefit from regional integration, various types

of mass media such as newspapers, radio and TV can add to the creation of greater regional consciousness in a particular region (Nyabuga 2011: 133). This can be another important potential force affecting the regionalization of CSOs. Spreading ideas about the region, mass media can have an influence on the work of CSOs in Southern Africa, creating a willingness to extend their work beyond national borders. The extent to which media houses throughout Southern Africa advance the idea of regionalism, or stick to reporting on local and national issues, and how this impacts on the regional consolidation of CSOs is beyond the immediate scope of this thesis. However, when discussing remaining research questions in section 7.3, discussion about the role of ICT and mass media in civil society regionalization will be briefly taken up again and related to the empirical findings of the thesis.

The reasons behind the exclusion of the above important dimensions of civil society regionalization in this study are mainly methodological. It would not have been enough to simply add a few questions about language, ICT and media to the interview questionnaire. The complexity of these issues would require new types of analytical objects, new research techniques and more travelling in the region, which the time frame of this study has not allowed. In terms of studying the role of language, additional interviews with CSOs from Angola and French-speaking countries such as the DRC and Mauritius would have been necessary, as well as participant observation at regional civil society forums to observe language dynamics in the interaction between CSOs from different parts of the region. It would also have been necessary to study the extent to which various (English) CSO documents are translated into other languages. In terms of media, new stakeholders such as media houses, newspapers, radio stations and TV stations would have been important to interview, as well as analysing news coverage in the region, to get a feel for how engaged media is in regional issues, to what extent they spread a regional consciousness, and how this affect CSOs. Related to this is the need to study the media strategies of CSOs and their appearance in the media. Similarly, the ICT issue would require additional interviews with staff members acquainted with the usage of internet-based communication by their CSO, as well as observing and analysing ICT habits and policies in the organization.

1.6 Reflections on the Role of the Researcher

In this section I will reflect on my background as a researcher, why the project was initiated in the first place and how my preconceptions, perspectives and experiences have affected the nature of the research process. In general, the researcher never conducts research in a social vacuum but always brings his or her predispositions into the research process, which stem from his or her particular social background and past experiences. In my case, the previous ten years of being active in the Swedish solidarity movement greatly influenced my interest in the topic of civil society regionalization and also, somehow, the scientific choices made during the research process. Through my engagement in the Africa Groups of Sweden (AGS) I became aware of the serious development challenges in Southern Africa and the unequal power relations between this region and countries in the North. In the

process, I gradually developed a belief in the power of collective action for social and economic change, which eventually steered my attention to intra-African cooperation and belief that Africans must find their own solutions to African problems through regional/continental economic self-reliance. Combined with my view on civil society as a perceived positive force for development, interest in regional African co-operation made me curious about the extent to which CSOs build regional networks and coalitions for information-sharing, exchange visits and collective advocacy, and in the dynamic inherent in this process. Out of this curiosity, this research project was born.

My background as a Swedish civil society activist obviously equipped me with certain preconceptions which influenced my perception of 'NGOs' and 'popular movements' and also how the research was carried out. The initial idea I had of civil society was that this sphere of collective action was predominately made up of 'positive' forces for development. This meant that I originally searched for membership-based, formal and urban organizations with a strong commitment to pro-poor development, which made me blind to other parts of civil society active on the regional level. For example, it was only quite late in the process that I discovered loosely organized informal traders' groups, which had started to be active on a regional level. Even later in the process I discovered business-oriented NGOs, dealing with development issues but from a private sector and market-oriented perspective, and also rather active on a regional level. However, due to this late discovery, no interviews were carried out with these important regional actors and I had to rely on written sources.

In line with hermeneutic thinking, my preconceptions of and experiences from civil society work also helped me design and carry out research in the region. In fact, being active in a Swedish NGO operating in Southern Africa, and frequently travelling in the region, provided me with insights into not only civil society dynamics in the region but also regional processes more broadly. This insight was greatly enhanced by three previous undergraduate studies on civil society regionalization, including a short field trip to the region in 2002/2003. When starting this project I already had ideas about the forces behind civil society regionalization.

Furthermore, my original normative picture of 'progressive' civil society has been greatly challenged during the research process. The interviews and collection of written empirical data have made me problematize civil society on the regional level, realizing that this is a highly heterogeneous process with a broad range of actors, pursuing different goals and using different tactics. There is nothing inherently 'progressive' about civil society and my contention now is that CSOs are neither good nor bad; they only play different roles in regionalization. For example, regardless of their development agenda and the issues dealt with, performing service delivery, representing business interests, or advocating for social and economic justice, NGOs, social movements and other types of CSOs are partly driven by an urge to attract donor funds for economic (and sometimes personal) ends and often represent an elite group of people. Therefore, civil society should be seen as a neutral concept.

On an overall level my research is not neutral and value-free. In fact, as will be further discussed in the meta-theoretical section in the next chapter, there is no such thing as objective, value-free research, in line with critical theoretical reasoning (Cox 1993). All research is somehow normative in the sense that the lenses through which the researcher comprehends the world are coloured by certain perspectives and agendas, even if these are sometimes 'hidden' to the research audience and even to the researcher him/herself. It is important, however, to be aware of these hidden agendas and values in order to create an open research process which can be easily evaluated. In my case, I do see my study as part of a higher normative project to advance sustainable, equitable and pro-poor regional development in Southern Africa. Regional civil society co-operation is an important means for that and my research aims to contribute to strengthening this process. However, as already indicated in the previous section on delimitations, even though I believe social science research can and should change the world, improving the social and economic situation of people in the South, I do not specifically study the 'success' of regional CSOs in Southern Africa in this regard. I am primarily interested in the process of regional interaction and not the results of the activities of CSOs as such. However, by making these actors more aware of the regional scene and what circumstances have influenced their work, I hope to contribute towards improved regional co-operation in the HIV/AIDS and trade sectors as well as more broadly, across ideological divides, and help CSOs to better complement each other in the common quest for development.

1.7 Outline of the Thesis

Chapter 2 starts with a discussion of the meta-theoretical foundations of this thesis in terms of the relationships between theory and practice, material and ideational, and structure and agency respectively, and argues that a social constructivist understanding of these relationships is important. Thereafter, an extended conceptual discussion of civil society, including its genealogical development, current debate (including the transnational/global level), the application of the concept in Africa and the conceptualization of civil society in this thesis is held. Arguing that most theoretical understanding of civil society lacks an interest in the agency of CSOs, the chapter then brings in social constructivist thinking, which highlights ideational mechanisms such as issue-framing and identity-making. The chapter also argues that the centrality of statist-capitalist social structures related to world order is important to understand civil society regionalization, in line with critical theoretical theory-building. The chapter then presents the theoretical framework, which is built on five types of organizational relations: inter-organizational relations between IGOs and CSOs, between donors and CSOs, and between CSOs; and intra-organizational relations in terms of issue-framing and identity-making. The bulk of the chapter is devoted to discussing these five types of relations in detail, further operationalized into 11 dimensions of civil society regionalization.

Chapter 3 situates the process of civil society regionalization within the statist-capitalist social order in Southern Africa. The chapter shows how deeper statist and

capitalist social structures, emanating from the world order, are manifested in widespread state authoritarianism, neo-liberalism and state domination of civil society on a national level and SADC-led sovereignty-boosting and neo-liberal regional governance on the regional level.

In chapters 4 and 5, the two empirical chapters, the 11 dimensions of civil society regionalization are analysed in terms of the trade and HIV/AIDS sector respectively. The chapters are structured in a similar way. In essence, they discuss the influence on civil society regionalization firstly of the interaction between CSOs and SADC, CSOs and donors, and between CSOs (the first 7 dimensions), and, secondly, the internal motivations of CSOs to 'go regional' in terms of issue-framing and identity-making (the last 4 dimensions).

In chapter 6, the two cases of civil society regionalization in the trade and HIV/AIDS sectors are compared in order to present a more overall picture of civil society regionalization in Southern Africa. The chapter, firstly, discusses the dynamics of civil society regionalization, analysing similarities, and to a less extent differences, between the cases in terms of SADC-CSO relations, donor-CSO relations and intra-civil society relations, including a categorisation of CSOs active on the regional level, as well as the internal motivations of 'going regional' related to issue-framing and identity-making. Secondly, the chapter will discuss the strength of CSO regional engagement. It will be argued that in terms of the sample of CSOs in this study and the specific five ways in which CSOs can be considered 'regional', civil society regionalization is quite a strong process. However, there are also many problems related to 'going regional', discussed last.

In chapter 7, the concluding chapter, the research results are recapitulated. The main arguments of the thesis are first summarized, followed by a summary of the main findings related to the three research questions. The main contributions of the thesis to the study of civil society regionalization, including theoretical implications, are then discussed, followed by a section on remaining research questions.

2
Theoretical Framework

This thesis concerns civil society at the regional level in Southern Africa. The way civil society regionalization is empirically studied ultimately depends on the theoretical lens through which this process is viewed. A few clarifying notes on 'theoretical framework' are warranted here. This is a concept that has different meanings, which correspond to the particular epistemological foundations of the research project at hand, as discussed in section 1.4.1. In a simplified way, in a positivist setting where certain social phenomena are 'explained', the theoretical framework is seen as a number of propositions which are tested in light of certain empirical results and proved true or false (as in the case of deductive research), or as generated from or being a generalization of empirical data (as in inductive research). In hermeneutically-inspired qualitative research such as this project, 'theoretical framework' has another meaning. It is an organizing tool which guides data collection but can undergo gradual changes during the research process. Hence, the framework should be seen as an analytical instrument for deeper understanding of a social phenomenon, which in this thesis is civil society regionalization. Therefore, *analytical framework* will be used synonymously with theoretical framework throughout the thesis.

This chapter contains 11 sections. In section 2.1, a short specification of the meta-theoretical points of departure will be set out. In section 2.2 the concept of civil society will be discussed, including the historical evolution of the concept and its application to the global arena, as well as to Africa. The thesis will also be positioned within this theoretical landscape. Section 2.3 discusses the important roles of social structure and agency for understanding civil society regionalization, including a few words on the theoretical influences of this thesis. In section 2.4, the overall analytical framework is presented, made up of five types of organizational relations: inter-organizational relations between RIGOs and CSOs; inter-organizational relations between donors and CSOs; inter-organizational relations between CSOs; intra-organizational relations in terms of issue-framing; and intra-organizational relations in terms of identity-making. After briefly discussing the overall statist and capitalist social structures marking the world order, which deeply influence all social phenomena, including civil society regionalization, in section

2.5, the five types of organizational relations are discussed in detail in sections 2.6 to 2.10. Section 2.11 concludes the chapter.

2.1 Meta-Theoretical Point of Departure

In this section, the meta-theoretical foundations of this thesis will be elaborated. Before turning to the actual theoretical framework, the thesis' overall understanding of three important meta-theoretical issues will be outlined: the relations between theory and practice, between agency and structure, and between the material and ideational. Three sub-sections below will be devoted to these, including a short discussion of the implications for studying the regionalization of civil society in Southern Africa. The meta-theoretical discussion will inform and guide the later construction of the theoretical framework in terms of providing the necessary criteria for the theoretical choices behind the framework.

2.1.1 The Relationship between Theory and Practice

One central ontological concern within IR regards the relationship between theory and practice, i.e. to what extent and how researchers can make theoretically-informed truth claims about social reality (Scholte 1993). Positivist and rationalist strands within IR, for example neo-realism and neo-liberal institutionalism, aim to study international relations objectively and dispassionately, and claim that it is possible to separate facts from values (Steans et al 2010: 6). Since research objects are considered independent of the researcher, the derived knowledge is precise and value-free (Scholte 1993: 140). On the other hand, post-positivist and constitutive positions claim that such 'scientific' study of IR is impossible, since our social position as researchers and our norms and values inform our ontological views. This thesis rejects the positivist claim that objective theories can be crafted in order to understand and explain reality 'out there'. Therefore, meta-theoretically this thesis places itself on the constitutive/post-positivist side of the ontological divide within IR theory.

In line with Cox (1993), it is argued that there is no such thing as objective, value-free theory created in a social and historical vacuum. In fact, all theories, including this theoretical framework, originate in specific historical and social contexts and are therefore biased towards studying specific aspects of reality and missing out others. This means that theories are always loaded with values and driven by specific agendas. In the words of Cox, 'theory is always for someone and for some purpose […and we] need to know the context in which theory is produced and used' (ibid: 1). Since theories are always tendentious, 'facts' cannot be separated from theory. Our theories about the world around us constitute that world. It is claimed here that what we do as researchers always has an effect of changing, or maintaining, reality in one way or another. In line with Scholte (1993), an exploration of theory is therefore also by extension an exploration of politics: 'Academics, as actors, and their theorizing, as an activity, are involved in the dynamics of continuity and change no less than any other group of persons and their actions' (ibid: 142). Important tasks for the researcher are therefore to reflect on his

or her theoretical standpoint, to be conscious of preconceptions about the study objects, and to ponder the overall objectives of the research being carried out. My position as a researcher was briefly elaborated upon in section 1.6 above.

The meta-theoretical ontological claim that theory-building is part of constructing reality obviously has important implications for the research conducted, for example in terms of why we study international relations in the first place. Are we hoping to effect positive changes or can we do no more than gain a better understanding of problems related to 'the human condition on a global scale' (Steans et al 2010: 8-9)? While positivists focus on discovering generalizable 'laws' of IR, many post-positivists, an approach which this thesis adheres to, focus on normative dimensions (ibid: 8). In this vein, Cox distinguishes between two types of theory: problem-solving and critical theory. The former aims to reproduce the current world order and preserve the *status quo*; the latter wants transformation of that very same order, which is deemed highly unjust (Cox 1993). The way civil society regionalization in Southern Africa is understood in this thesis has to be viewed in this context. The thesis shares the emancipatory motives of critical theory. Studying civil society regionalization can potentially support civil society actors in their endeavour to solve fundamental development and help to change the highly unjust regional statist-capitalist order in Southern Africa. All in all, in a Coxian sense this thesis inserts itself in critical theory. The focus on the 'sociology of regionalism' (Söderbaum 2002: 38) in this thesis, highlighting the agency of civil society actors, will also help in reproducing an image of CSOs as active participants in regionalization processes, contrary to a state-centric, structuralist view of the same phenomenon which treats CSOs as passive actors whose agency is constrained by states.

2.1.2 Agency-Structure Relations

Another important meta-theoretical point of departure for theorising about the regionalization of civil society is the conviction that structure and agency are deeply interrelated. However, in academia there is still a very unfortunate dividing line between structural-oriented theories on the one hand and actor-oriented theories on the other. For example, while customary in many neo-realist and critical-theoretical accounts of global civil society as well as in the structurally-informed approach of much regionalism research, including the NRA (e.g. Söderbaum 2004), it is not enough to treat civil society regionalization as determined by overall social power structures related to world order. However, it is equally wrong to analyse the transnationalization of civil society only from the actors' points of view, something which is inherent in much social constructivist and liberal research, for example that related to the study of 'transnational advocacy networks' (TANs) (e.g. Keck and Sikkink 1998).

The question of causal links between structure and agency has divided academia into two broad groups. One group, dealing with 'actionalism', stresses that social change is ultimately the result of deliberately-pursued actions by individuals, pressure groups, firms and governments. On the other hand, the 'structuralist' camp claims that the course of social change is imposed on agents because social conditions and their transformation exist independently of the actions of agents.

Here, the power of particular structures is seen as totalizing and as removing agency altogether (Lewis 2010; Scholte 1993: 110). Therefore, in terms of empirical studies within IR, many recent works tend to emphasize and privilege either structure or agency, separating and isolating agency from structure and *vice versa*. For example, an analysis that focuses on structures tends to look for enduring patterns in social outcomes, and studies biased towards agency often emphasize concrete historical situations where agents try to shape the social world. Studies combining the structure and actor perspectives are in a minority (Lewis 2010: 9-10).

Yet, '[contrary to] the deeply entrenched habit in traditional social enquiry of separating action and order [...] the distinction between action and order is [...] ultimately only an analytical separation' (Scholte 1993: 130). Both agency and structure are important in any social process, including civil society regionalization. Being intertwined in reality, the one cannot be reduced to the other. This is in line with the constructivist understanding of the mutual dependency of, rather than the opposition between, agency and social structures (Söderbaum 2002: 40; see also Wendt 1994). Applied to regionalism, constructivists argue that regional integration can only partly be understood as part of broader social structural processes related to the dynamics of the world order, in line with the thinking of, for example, Hettne (1999, 2005). At the same time, regional integration is constructed through discursive processes: 'It is because it is being talked about – by citizens, academics, politicians, etc. – that it becomes realized' (Van Langenhove 2011: 74). In this thesis, therefore, one central line of inquiry is how CSOs, but also SADC and donor representatives, conceptualize and 'talk about' regionalization, for example in terms of issue-framing and identity-making.

It is argued here that neither structure-oriented nor actor-oriented theory on its own can understand the complex process of civil society regionalization. Instead, we need a combination of actor and structure-oriented components within the theoretical framework. Most importantly, studying the *dynamics* of civil society regionalization, which is the main aim of this thesis, implies focusing on the inter-linkage between social structure and CSO agency in this process. However, this thesis will not give equal importance to agency and structure. Indeed, the study of civil society regionalization needs to assume the various social structures in which CSOs operate. As will be discussed in section 2.4, social structures are conceptualized as levels of social structure, of which the overarching level is the capitalist world system, which deeply affects agency on each level (Prendergast 2004). Even though social structures, crucial for determining civil society regionalization, are given great importance; they are only the starting and not the end point of this analysis. The focus in this thesis is not on the structures *per se* but on how CSOs are influenced by, navigate within, relate to and act upon these structures. CSO agency is never completely autonomous and must be understood in relation to the various levels of social structure. Additionally, this thesis does not deny the effect social agency has on the reproduction and transformation of social structures, in line with the so-called structuration perspective.[6] Indeed, as indicated

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[6] There are many different ways of conceptualizing the relation between agency and structure in social processes. Perhaps most famous is the so-called 'structuration model' of Giddens. According to this perspective, human agency and

in section 1.7, CSOs in this study can hopefully affect the isolationist, marginalizing and oppressive tendencies of statist and capitalist social structures. However, once again, the focus in this thesis is on the ways in which regional CSOs act within the regional order in Southern Africa, and not how this order is affected by such agency. The understanding of the relationship between structure and agency in relation to the topic of this thesis will be further clarified in section 2.4.

2.1.3 Material-Ideational Relations

Apart from the relationship between theory and practice and agency-structure, another important meta-theoretical area to discuss, and one highly relevant to this study, is the relationship between material and ideational perceptions of the world. According to the materialist view, the most fundamental driving forces behind all types of social relations are material, political and economic factors such as natural and financial resources, military power and technology. In studying civil society agency, focus has historically been put on the material interests of various actors, which will be further discussed in the next section. The idea that civil society actors are driven by material incentives and are rational actors engaged in instrumental action to secure material resources has in fact dominated the civil society field for a long time. On the other hand, idealists view the most fundamental aspect of society as social consciousness. This implies that ideas, identities, ideologies and norms ultimately define our (material) interests (Barnett 2005). In fact, 'knowledge' and material 'facts' are socially constructed by our perceptions of them. Recently, scholars investigating civil society dynamics have begun to appreciate the role played by ideational forces, which is most apparent in research related to social movements and transnational advocacy networks (discussed in section 2.3.2). Most often, however, materialist and idealist understandings of the world in social research don't communicate. Material arguments tend to accord only limited importance to cultural aspects of social relations, whereas for idealists social processes are seen as producing material effects (Scholte 1993).

Influenced by constructivist thinking, this thesis tries to move away from dichotomization of the material and ideational. Instead of taking actors' preferences as given, as rationalists tend to, constructivists ask how these preferences have been created and how they might change (O'Brien and Williams 2010: 36), which makes them more process-oriented. Hence, constructivists focus on the processes in which *both* (material) interests and identities are created, and try to understand the co-constitutive link between material incentives and actors' identities and interests (Hurrell 1995: 65, 72). In the words of Wendt, '[c]onstructivists are interested in the construction of identities and interests and, as such, take a more sociological than economic approach to systemic theory' (1994: 384-385). For Wendt, this implies

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social structures should not be seen in opposition but as mutually dependent. Social structures and human agency are seen in terms of a dialectical process whereby the meaning that human beings give to the world become institutionalized and turned into social structures, which in turn become part of the meaning-system employed by the actions of individuals. Social structures are both constituted by human agency and at the same time the very medium of this constitution. From a structuration perspective, then, structure and agency are treated merely as different dimensions of social relations, intimately connected with each other, the one simultaneously causing and being caused by the other (1997).

that states and other actors in the international arena are not exogenously given but are constructed by their interaction (ibid: 385). Applied to regionalism, the constructivist understanding of the intimate relationship between the material and ideational implies that regionalization, for example, can be seen as both an instrument to take advantage of certain material opportunities (such as donor funds for regional co-operation), as well as creating bonds of community and identity (Söderbaum 2002: 43).

Studies of social processes such as civil society regionalization cannot then be based on either materialist or idealist premises; they have to include both. The often-researched material forces shaping international relations must be coupled with an appreciation of the workings of ideational forces in forming transnational (regional) civil society coalitions, movements and networks.

2.2 Civil Society in Theoretical Perspective

In this section the concept of civil society will be scrutinized from a number of different angles. First, a short historical account of civil society will be given, followed by a section on how the concept is understood today in terms of theories related to civil society as part of society, civil society as a kind of society, and civil society as a public sphere, including the transnational level. Thirdly, civil society in an African context will be discussed, followed by an account of this thesis' position.

2.2.1 The Genealogy of the Concept of Civil Society

The term 'civil society' has a long history (van Rooy 1998; Grugel 2000) and its roots can be dated back to antiquity. Originally a European concept, it spread to America in the 18th century, but only to the rest of the world over the past 30 years (Edwards 2009; Muukkonen 2009). The deepest roots of civil society in Europe stem from the removal of the centralized authority of Rome and the placement of power in several different hands (Hall 1995: 4). This stimulated recognition that life is lived in different social spheres, with their own internal logics and different sets of legal rights and obligations, and a distinction between the 'private', or domestic, and the 'public' gradually developed (Ehrenberg 2011: 15, 17).

The first concept resembling civil society as we know it today was the Latin notion of *civilis societas,* which appeared in European thinking around 1400. It signified the company of men who fulfilled their public and social roles, governed by certain norms of how to live together in a civilized way (van Rooy 1998: 7). Hence, civil society was considered different from private society, but at the same time indistinguishable from political society, i.e. the 'state'. Both civil society and the state referred to a type of political association which governed social conflicts by applying certain rules (Edwards 2009: 6). In fact, in the Roman tradition the state was seen as an instrument of civil society to serve the community's interests (van Rooy 1998: 7). This thought was developed during the later Middle Ages, when civil society was seen as politically-organized commonwealths, a type of civilization where people lived in associations ultimately protected by the state (Edwards 2009: 7), or 'Leviathan' in Hobbes' words. In fact for Hobbes, writing in the mid-17th

century, due to the inherently violent and egoistic nature of humankind resulting in a constant threat of civil war and barbarism, 'civil' society was not possible without a sovereign power which coerced inhabitants to interact with each other in a peaceful manner (Ehrenberg 2011: 19). However, heralding the later modern conceptualization of civil society as a self-governed social sphere, Hobbes also underlined that the state should only intervene in the self-interested affairs of the members of civil society if social order was threatened (ibid).

Between 1750 and 1850, the conceptual history of civil society took a new turn, spearheaded by Enlightenment thinkers such as Locke, Ferguson and de Tocqueville. They viewed civil society as a defence against the authoritarianism inherent in despotic rule by the state. Through voluntary associations, citizens could protect themselves from the perceived risk of state intrusion on newly-realized individual rights (Edwards 2009: 7). These rights were seen as natural, in the sense that they were pre-political, predating the state (Ehrenberg 2011: 20). In fact, contrary to Hobbes, for Locke society was seen to exist before government, which was only possible through the consent of the citizens (van Rooy 1998: 9). Civil society was then seen as a self-regulating social sphere of private striving, separate from the state, whose members were first and foremost self-interested economic persons. However, in order to counterbalance the unrestricted individualism resulting from capitalist development, for Ferguson and other moral philosophers ´civil´ society meant 'polite and refined behaviour' (ibid), which heralded the modern normative understanding of civil society. It was believed that voluntary associations would foster constructive social norms, such as trust and cooperation, for the benefit of society as a whole (Edwards 2009: 7). It was underlined, however, that the creation of the social glue that holds society together was in the hands of civil society itself, and not the state. The minimum role of the state *vis-à-vis* civil society was to protect and structure, i.e. to facilitate, the economic activities of members of civil society through the design and enforcement of the 'rule of law' (Edwards 2009; Ehrenberg 2011). According to one scholar, this implied that '[t]he material processes of social life were replacing the political community and sovereign power as the constitutive forces of civil society' (Ehrenberg 2011: 20). For the first time in history, political philosophers talked about a new distinct dimension of social life: the economy (van Rooy 1998: 9). Organized by economic forces, civil society was more economic and social than political. Another great break with earlier conceptions of civil society was the line drawn between civil society and the state (ibid: 8).

At the beginning of the 19th century critics appeared in the civil society debate, starting to question the normative conceptualization of an autonomous civil society. Hegel paved the way for this critical tradition, arguing that this type of civil society generated selfish and self-interested individuals, nurturing social inequality and conflict between different economic and political interests. Civil society was not automatically a service to the common good. The latter, in fact, required interference by the state to guarantee that civil society remained 'civil', not state abstinence as the Tocquevillians claimed (Ehrenberg 2011; Edwards 2009; van Rooy 1998). More particularly, the role of the state was to harmonize competing interests in civil

society (van Rooy 1998: 10) and to 'transcend civil society's particularism' (Ehrenberg 2011: 22). Marx developed this argument, claiming that civil society and its various associations was one of many instruments, including the state apparatus, for the ruling class to further its interests and to exploit the working class. Civil society dynamics were ultimately viewed within the overarching capitalist order. However, contrary to Hegel, who put his hope on the state to transform civil society and restore order, for Marx such transformation could only take place if its material base in private property was uprooted, which required working class revolution (Edwards 2009: 8; Ehrenberg 2011: 22).

By the middle of the 19th century, debate about civil society had died out. But in the 1930s Gramsci revived it and carried on the critical civil society tradition of Hegel and Marx, adding culture and ideology to the materialistic understanding of civil society. Following Marx, Gramsci understood civil society and the state within the framework of the overall capitalist system. Equally, civil society was seen as an instrument for dominant social groups to reproduce the capitalist system through the dominance and control of certain institutions and organizations, such as liberal political parties, private associations, labour organizations and trade unions. However, Gramsci believed that it was the workings of ideology and culture which were the most important processes at play. Civil society, but also schools, media and households in wider society, were seen as manufacturing consent among citizens for capitalist norms and ideals, which in the end foremost benefitted the ruling elites (Cohen and Arato 1992: 137-143). Hence, according to Gramsci, power resided in the production of ideas and ideology, not so much in the production of commodities by private business or the production of violence by the state. Cultural hegemony, not force, was the weapon of the political and economic elites to stay in power and further their interests, resting on the practice of every-day socialization (Chambers 2002: 90-91). However, civil society was also the site of rebellion by so-called counter-hegemonic forces against the capitalist cultural hegemony; it was a sphere where battles for and against capitalism were fought. These battles concern material, ideological and cultural control over society as such, including the state (Edwards, 2009: 8; van Rooy 1998: 10).

In the 1960s the Gramscian perception of civil society as an arena of contestation was developed further by political philosophers such as Arendt and Habermas and transformed into a theory of the public sphere. The public sphere meant 'the shared experiences of social and political life that underpinned public deliberation on the great questions of the day' (Edwards 2009: 9). Habermas, one of the leading figures in the critical theoretical school, combined the Gramscian emphasis on domination in civil society with the liberal tradition of seeing civil society as guarding personal and associational autonomy (ibid). For him, the public sphere implied a spatial concept: the arena where meanings are articulated, distributed and negotiated, as well as the collective body constituted by this process. Considering the risk of being 'colonized' by state and market actors residing in the economic and administrative systems, a healthy public sphere must be regulated from above against the public authorities themselves (Habermas 1989).

In the 1980s, against the backdrop of political upheaval against totalitarian socialist regimes in Eastern Europe, the debate about civil society took yet another turn and started to appear centre stage in social science. According to Keane, 'the old topic of civil society and the state is again becoming a vital theme in European politics and social theory' (1988: 1). The popular mobilization for democracy was seen by both scholars and political activists as a resurgence of civil society. Civil society was seen both in a normative way, in terms of building a new type of society built on liberal democratic norms, and in an analytical way, as the social space where contestation against totalitarianism took place (Edwards 2009; van Rooy 1998). Such conceptualizations echoed both liberal ideas about the good society and Gramscian ideas about power struggles. Furthermore, in the 1990s, the civil society concept was exported to Africa, where a strong civil society was seen by liberal scholars as a prerequisite for democratization. This will be elaborated upon further in the later section on civil society in Africa.

2.2.2 Civil Society in Contemporary World Politics

Drawing on Edwards (2009), three contrasting contemporary theoretical schools related to civil society can be distilled from the above historical account: civil society as part of society, focusing on associational life; civil society as a kind of society, characterized by positive norms and values; and civil society as public sphere, where power politics are played out and progressive politics are nurtured. The first two strands are to be seen within the overall liberal theoretical framework of thinkers such as de Toqueville and Ferguson and the latter is influenced by the Marxist tradition, particularly the critical theoretical thinking of Gramsci and Habermas. These three perspectives also have different ideas about the international or global level of civil society.

Civil society as part of society is strongly influenced by de Tocqueville's ideas and often goes under the name of the neo-Tocquevillean perception of civil society. Civil society is often referred to as the 'third' or 'non-profit' sector by proponents of this version of civil society such as Salamon (Salamon et al 2004). It is distinct and separate from states and markets, containing all associations and networks between the family and the state in which membership and activities are voluntary. The latter implies that membership is consensual, rather than enforced by legal requirements or ethnic, religious or cultural norms, and that voluntary means are used to reach associational goals (Edwards 2009: 20). Furthermore, there is a sense of 'anti-politics' among third sector scholars, who argue that civil society can and should organize and govern itself without state intervention. Civil society should be guarded against the 'corrupting influence of politics on associations' (ibid: 26), which are seen as independent of political interests. In fact, such independency is crucial for fostering general trust and tolerance in society across different political camps and promotes common (read liberal democratic) interests (ibid). Despite the analytical distinction between civil society and the market, in practice the boundaries between the third and the market sectors are nevertheless blurred. In fact, some neo-Tocquevilleans such as Gellner argue that business cannot be separated from civil society, which is seen as including private economic institutions (Gellner

1995). Even though some proponents exclude profit-seeking activities by individual enterprises, business associations are often included as still not for profit-based despite representing business interests (Edwards 2009: 29).

Third sector scholars view the transnational level of civil society as yet another layer of associational life and, unlike the second civil society camp discussed below, do not see it as a novel, analytically distinct site of civil society where new global norms are created. For third sector scholars this new layer of associational life is constituted by international NGOs (INGOs) and NGO networks. According to one important scholar in this area, Salamon, the market is seen as the overriding organizational principle of all three spheres, including the third sector (Salamon et al 2004). The transnational dimension of civil society, where INGOs are the most important players, is seen as the social counterpart to the processes of economic globalization, liberalization, privatization and the growing mobility of capital and goods. In essence this means that it is performing the functions necessary to facilitate economic globalization and make it more humane in terms of mitigating the unavoidable negative effects (ibid). Hence, CSOs on a national as well as international level are seen as carrying out important service delivery functions, complementing state actors in their quest to facilitate transnational markets. Due to the reduction of the welfare state, and in the absence of strong national public sectors as well as of a global state, national and international NGOs help deliver vital human services such as health, education and aid to the poor, often in partnership with the state, International Governmental Organizations (IGOs) and the market (ibid).

Proponents of civil society as a kind of society, on the other hand, understand civil society as a desirable social order where the norms of tolerance, non-discrimination, non-violence, trust, co-operation, freedom and democracy prevail. Hence, this view of civil society is highly normative and prescriptive. Ideally, civil society is an institutionalization of 'civility', a kind of society where the underlying rationale for all institutions is to reproduce such positive social norms (Edwards 2009). One of the strongest proponents of the link between civil society and civility is Edward Shils (1991), who ascribes civility as the virtue of civil society. According to him, 'the virtue of civil society […] is the readiness to moderate particular, individual and parochial interests and to give precedence to the common good' (ibid: 16). Hence, civil society is understood in terms of the 'good society' and as more of a moral goal than an empirical reality. Robert Putnam is another important example of an advocate of the good society, arguing that the key to harmonious social relations and democracy is the development of social capital in civil society. The argument goes that engaging in various associations, regardless of the nature of these associations, builds up mutual trust and a willingness to work together for the common good, i.e. social capital. This social capital spills over to the political sphere, legitimizing and boosting trust in political institutions, which in the end fosters a democratic society (1992).

At the transnational level, these ideas are manifested in the debate about 'global civil society', including by scholars such as David Held, Mary Kaldor and Richard Falk. Global civil society is seen as a mechanism by which universal norms related

to human rights, peaceful conflict resolution and international co-operation are developed and spread worldwide. Global civil society is often discussed within the global governance framework and, more specifically, in relation to how international institutions can be democratized. The most influential project for improving global governance is the cosmopolitan democratic model proposed by David Held and others (e.g. Held 1995; Falk and Strauss 2001; Falk 2002; 2006; Archibugi 2004). The model involves three steps: first, the creation of regional parliaments and the extension of their authority and improved representativity; second, the improvement of global human rights conventions, which should be implemented and enforced by all states and monitored by an international court of human rights; and, thirdly, democratic reform of international institutions, such as the UN, involving members of global civil society (Held 1995: 270-273). In addition, global governance institutions are seen as important to facilitate and support the development of global civil society. In the words of Archibugi, 'cosmopolitan democracy […] offers a working frame within which the diversity of areas which […] global movements are working on can be connected' (2004: 451). Falk and Strauss go even further, proposing a global parliament to enforce the cosmopolitan democratic law whose authority would stem directly from the global citizenry (Falk and Strauss 2001).

Besides the important concrete task of making international institutions more democratic, some proponents also give global civil society a deeper meaning in itself, spearheading more fundamental world democratization 'from below'. According to Mary Kaldor, 'global civil society […] is about the process through which groups, movements and individuals can demand a global rule of law, global justice and global empowerment' (2003: 12). This argument is concerned with forms of political action and organization outside of the state, international institutions and (statist) international law. Perhaps the most prominent advocate here is Richard Falk, who calls for a globalization from below through the activities of transnational social movements. This is seen as an alternative to the hegemonic economic globalization from above imposed by elites on behalf of capital (Falk 2002: 170-171). Being highly normative, proponents of global civil society put great importance on the democratizing capacity of global civil society and the promotion of global social justice. CSOs are seen as fomenters of democratic ideas and therefore global civil society is accorded a positive moral mandate (Van Rooy 1998: 15).

Lastly, theories of civil society as public sphere emphasize the diversity of civil society as an arena of argumentation and deliberation as well as collaboration between different societal interests and opinions. For the public sphere to thrive, all viewpoints, voices and interests have to be represented, not only the 'neutral' liberal democratic, market-oriented, apolitical ones connected to nurturing the good society. If certain perspectives are excluded or silenced, the public sphere can never be 'public' in the true sense of the word (Edwards 2009: 64). In consequence, this makes civil society a contested and conflictual, rather than homogenous, space (Grugel 2006: 213). Furthermore, theories of the public sphere often return to the practice of politics, a process in which members of civil society take part in shaping the type of society they want and influence decision-making that affects their lives.

Influenced by Gramsci, this implies that public sphere theorists acknowledge that political conflict is an inevitable part of social life and greatly affects the dynamics of civil society. In fact, public sphere theorists often criticize other conceptions of civil society for ignoring political processes in civil society. They see civil society as a political phenomenon, which implies, for example, another view on which actors are emphasized in the public sphere: service providers are remitted to the not-for-profit sector of the market place. Contrary to the previous two understandings of civil society (except some more radical liberal proponents of globalization from below), and in particular contrary to third sector proponents, theories of the public sphere acknowledge the role played by civil society in social change (Edwards 2009: 67-69).

On the global level, public sphere proponents talk about potential global public spheres, such as the World Social Forum process (Edwards 2009: 66), which for some theorists resembles something like a Gramscian counter-hegemonic arena on a global level (Katz and Anheier 2006). Civil society as a global public sphere is often understood within the framework of the prevailing capitalist world order. Critical theorists such as Robert Cox and James Mittelman acknowledge the increasingly important role of civil society actors in both reproducing and challenging the world order. In terms of the former, Cox argues that INGOs are important instruments for spreading the neo-liberal agenda throughout the world and strengthening the current capitalist social order (Cox 1999). State and market support to certain INGOs is used to make them conform to the present neo-liberal world order and help maintain a social and political *status quo*. These INGOs have gained a hegemonic status in global civil society (ibid: 11). Various international institutions are also important in this sense, manufacturing consent in global civil society around certain neo-liberal values (Mittelman and Chin 2000: 169). However, seeing it as highly unjust, parts of transnational civil society also contest the current world order. This takes the form of the creation of openly declared forms of resistance to neo-liberal state and inter-state structures by contemporary social movements fighting for an alternative world order (Cox 1999: 11). In order to gain power, according to Mittelman, such counter-hegemonic forces transcend national borders and create transnational coalitions (Mittelman and Chin 2000: 169; see also Underhill, Higgott et al. 2000). The World Social Forum is one important venue for this. All in all, critical theorists view transnational civil society as an arena of global power-struggles. The global capitalist system creates deeply diverging interests between different CSOs, which results in very complex internal dynamics within an inherently heterogeneous global civil society (Cox 1999).

2.2.3 Civil Society in Africa

Most concepts and theories used in studies on civil society in non-European world regions have been developed within a Western context and are to a large extent influenced by liberal mainstream thinking. The ideas of civil society as a part and a kind of society are often conflated and dominate the debate outside Europe, at the expense of civil society as public sphere. In the words of Edwards, '[i]t is Alexis de Tocqueville's ghost that wanders through the corridors of the World Bank, not that

of Habermas or Hegel' (2009: 10). The story goes that a healthy associational life lays the foundation for a stable democracy, a defence against dominance by any one group and a barrier to anti-democratic forces, which in the end will produce the 'good society' (Edwards 2009). In this vein, civil society is viewed as the home of democratic virtues and the state as the 'embodiment of evil' (Dagnino 2011: 123). This goes hand in hand with a global process of neo-liberalization, which implies the transfer of the state's social responsibilities to civil society groups and the private sector. These are transformed into service providers, and citizens become clients and consumers. Donor agencies play a big role in this process, and the idea of promoting civil society in developing countries has in fact become an important part of policy-making related to foreign aid. As state provisions are reduced, strengthening civil society has become a way of fostering social cohesion, alongside supporting market reform and economic growth (Grugel 2000: 90-91):

> As for the European Commission, "strengthening the networks drawn from civil society" […], developing "associational life" in recipient countries, and "empowering civil society" are phrases used increasingly by all donors to describe the kind of development policies they wish to support (ibid: 94).

All in all, according to another commentator, the role of NGOs in the South is to 'make the world safe for global capitalism' (Rieff 1999 :12).

Hence, civil society in the South is conceived of in a selective and exclusionary way and, besides including those actors that spread democratic virtues in society, it foremost recognizes actors that are able to carry out developmental service-providing tasks, i.e. the 'third sector', marginalizing social movements for example (Dagnino 2011). In fact, because of their supposed cost-effectiveness in reaching poor and marginalized people in less developed countries, NGOs, alongside private companies, are seen as not only the necessary but also the preferred channel for service provision, substituting for the state, which is often considered inefficient. In line with the market-oriented world view of the third sector perspective, NGOs, contracted by the state, are seen as providers of social services, and poor people as consumers operating on the development market (Hulme and Edwards 1997): 'The overall result has been a reductive identification of civil society with NGOs or the third sector' (Dagnino 2011: 128-129).

Mainstream analysts of civil society in the South thus tend to concentrate on less contentious forms of collective action that give priority to consensual issues and agendas. Social conflict is not an important area of study, since civil society is perceived to act in accordance with broadly defined goals that are accepted by a large portion of the public (Della Porta and Diani 2011: 70). Hence, empirical research in the South has so far predominately concentrated on assessing the size and levels of associational activity, assuming that a quantitative expansion triggers democratization (Dagnino 2011: 124).

Africa, where civil society made its debut in the academic discourse in the early 1980s (Obadare 2011), is not an exception to the above argument. Today there is a large interest in creating civil society theories 'with distinctly African flavours' (Edwards 2009: 35), even though the Western liberal bias shines through. In line with the above, the dominant liberal viewpoint understands civil society in Africa as

both a part of and a kind of society. This implies focusing on the autonomy, sovereignty and civility of civil society. According to such thinking, civil society is inherently autonomous and has to be understood in terms of its qualities in itself and not in relation to the state (Azarya 1994: 83). One important role of civil society is to legitimate the state, whose popular support is partly generated through political parties and partly through civil society organizations (Bratton 1994). Furthermore, civil society is given an important role in development, as will be shown in section 3.2.2. In line with the conceptualization of civil society as a consensual sphere of action, liberals appeal for partnerships between civil society, market and state actors in the building of consensual approaches towards development. This often implies that CSOs and market actors co-operate with the state in delivering various types of social services to people in need and also in supporting business development (Howell and Pearce 2001: 17, 25). Furthermore, only organizations with a democratic (read Western liberal) normative potential, striving towards the 'common good' in society, socializing citizens about civil virtues related to liberal democracy,[7] and contributing to social cohesion and hence democracy can be considered part of civil society, ruling out, for example, the ethnically and religiously-based organizations prevalent throughout Africa (Chazan 1999: 111). The latter are seen as primarily defending their members' cultural, religious or economic interests, instead of working for the common societal good (Edwards 2009: 38).

However, the liberal concept of civil society has been contested by some African (and also Western) social scientists who in some respects adhere to the Marxist and critical theoretical traditions. Even though they do not explicitly refer to African civil society as public sphere, many arguments resemble such an understanding of civil society, as will be shown below. According to them, the liberal idea of an 'autonomous' civil society inherent in the conceptualization of civil society as part of society is a myth. Civil society cannot be seen in isolation, only in connection to the corresponding state within the overarching capitalist system. In their view, liberals fail to recognize how powerful state actors shape civil society (Mamdani 1995; Kasfir 1998). In more detail, these scholars view civil society as inherently conflictual and contradictory, where different civil society actors penetrate the state differently and *vice versa*. Therefore, the relationship between the state and civil society is seen as bilateral and not as one-sided where civil society per definition controls the state. There is a tendency among liberals to idealize civil society, conceptualizing it as homogenous and in-built democratic (Sjögren 1998) and promoting a harmonizing vision of civil society badly rooted in social reality (Howell and Pearce 2001: 33). This is in line with the view of civil society as a kind of society. According to Mahmoud Mamdani, one prominent voice in the debate, '[t]his tendency involves nothing less than a one-sided anti state romanticisation of civil society' (Mamdani 1995: 603). Another scholar concludes that:

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[7] In terms of the virtues of civil society, Shils claims that 'the institutions of liberal democracy 'embody' civility' (1991: 11).

> it makes no sense to lump all non-profit organizations into a single category of 'associational life', from the Ford Foundation to a burial society in South Africa, or to fixate – as the foreign aid community has done – on NGOs as the most important type of association among so many (Edwards 2009: 24).

In particular, this critique informs a rejection of the mainstream stress on consensus and influence rather than conflict and power (Howell and Pearce 2001: 33). This critical perspective on civil society also permeates the view on development. In contrast to the mainstream focus on partnership, critical scholars emphasize the embedded power relationships and inequalities that make development an often conflictual rather than consensual process (ibid: 17).

On the whole, civil society is seen by the critics as an arena riven by the inequalities and exploitation generated by capitalism (ibid), based on competition between CSOs with different objectives, strategies and relations to state and market actors (Habib 2004). Foreign donors are also part of this process as they 'bring in funds and consultants to shape civil society according to their own agenda' (Muchie 2003: 71). Furthermore, the power and exploitation often associated with the neo-patrimonial African state is also found in civil society. This implies that rent-seeking actors aiming for personal enrichment and political influence, something often associated with the African state, can also be found in civil society. Driven by the economic self-interest and material gain created by capitalist forces, and fuelled by donor funds, actors within civil society in Africa become what some scholars refer to as 'briefcase NGOs' (e.g. Dicklitch 1998; Michael 2004; Shivji 2007). The dichotomization of the state as inefficient, authoritarian, rent-seeking and coercive and civil society as peaceful, transparent, democratic and accountable that is claimed by the mainstream perspective is in fact a myth which reflects the liberal normative investment in building the 'good society' in Africa (Obadare 2011: 189). Using empirical examples from a few countries, civil society in Africa will be further discussed and problematized in chapter 3.

Some critics go even further and renounce civil society as a concept because of the dangers of misapplying Western political constructs such as 'social class' and 'civil society' to African circumstances (Obadare 2011: 185). In fact, one of the major reasons why civil society in Africa is widely misunderstood is the fact that Western political thought has dominated debate on the topic (Godsäter and Söderbaum 2011). In addition to its cultural and historical specificity, the utility of civil society is questioned in the light of sub-Saharan Africa's unstable social and political processes. According to one scholar, problematizing civil society theorising in Africa, in comparison with 'the long Africanist flirtation with class analysis, [where] you often 'find' what you go looking for if you try hard enough […] in the case of civil society, I would argue that there is even less reality out there than with 'classes'' (Callaghy 1994: 250 in Obadare 2011: 185). For example, since African associational life is dominated by ascriptive groups it is incompatible with Western ideals of civil society as being founded upon voluntariness. Furthermore, the focus on urban-based associations such as NGOs in mainstream civil society analysis excludes rural and community-based associations that have stronger linkages to the majority of the African population, who live in villages and depend on the land for

their subsistence. Hence, the quite active associational life in rural areas is largely ignored. In fact, it is claimed that the contemporary NGOs and social movements in Africa favoured by civil society scholars of all ideological inclinations play less of a role in development, since they are undermined by their lack of peasant base and heavy reliance on external, Western funding (Obadare 2011: 185, 190; Mamdani 1995). All this implies that 'civil society', or whatever you want to call associational life in Africa, cannot be ruled out as immature or non-existing, as liberal scholars such as Chazan (1999) claim, and as in need of being 'developed' through for example foreign aid in order to better match Western ideals. Instead, critics argue that associational life in Africa has to be understood with new concepts and theories developed from within the African context.

Even though the above questioning of the validity of applying the concept of civil society to African realities is taken seriously in this thesis, it is nevertheless argued that civil society is still a useful concept for understanding the regionalization of non-state actors in Southern Africa, and that its meaning can be adapted to African circumstances. As one scholar puts it, 'the key question is not 'does civil society exist in Africa?' (it does), but 'what are African associations actually doing?'' (Edwards 2009: 38). In line with Obadare (2011), notwithstanding the great prevalence of ethnic and kinship-based associations, especially in the rural areas, a variety of other institutions also exist in Africa for protecting and advancing broader collective interests. The increasing number of development NGOs, discussed further in chapter 3, is a fact in African social life, regardless of their being foreign constructs and primarily residing in urban areas beyond the reach of the majority of the African (rural) population. Civil society is a useful concept for understanding this reality. Hence, both Western-oriented NGOs and ethnic and kinship-based groups 'fit' in civil society and are not necessarily mutually excluding. It needs to be underlined that, as the ones most active in regionalization, this thesis focuses on NGOs, social movements and networks, even though other types of actors such as informal traders' groups are also part of this process.

Another dimension of the misconception of civil society in Africa is the fact that a great deal of civil society research is based on the notion that civil society operates and consolidates on a 'national' basis (i.e. state-civil society interaction at the domestic level). This notion must be transcended in order to escape the Western bias and also to provide a perspective beyond the African national government – to accommodate changes in politics and the world order and to better account for African civil society on the supra-national regional level. This critique does not only concern studies of African politics but is equally applicable to other parts of the world. As Scholte explains:

> In earlier Lockean, Kantian, Hegelian and Gramscian formulations, 'civil society' related to *western* politics in a *national* context. However, talk of civil society today circulates all over the world and is sometimes applied to political practices (such as kinship networks in Africa and so-called Civic Fora at the local level in Thailand) that derive largely from non-western traditions. Moreover, in contemporary politics civil society associations often oper-ate in regional and global spheres as well as local and national arenas. Conceptions of 'civil society' need to be recast to reflect these changed circumstances (2002: 146).

In other words, civil society is not hermetically sealed from the external environment. On the contrary, civil society activities at different levels tend to be tightly connected, in Africa and elsewhere. There can be competition between activities at different levels, but what happens on one level is not necessarily an obstacle to activities on another. Rather, civil society regionalization may occur in order to achieve goals that otherwise cannot be achieved, or as a means to strengthen national goals. The multiplicity of interactions between national, regional and other transnational level interactions are further analysed in this thesis.

Lastly, another great weakness in the current literature on civil society in Africa, both in terms of mainstream liberal and critical perspectives, is the lack of attention given to the actors within civil society; i.e. to CSOs themselves. The liberal account of African civil society is imbued with wishful thinking about the 'good society', giving CSOs a moral obligation to produce democratic norms in society, and ruling out those CSOs that do not match such normative criteria. Influenced by the third sector approach, liberals also tend to generalize civil society as an autonomous sphere apart from the state and reduce it to certain functions; besides creating democratic norms in society, it is also legitimating and keeping the state in check, as well as providing social services. Inherent in such a conceptualization is the tendency to treat civil society as a 'collective noun, the sum of all the organizations we feel are responsible for bringing civility closer to home' (van Rooy 1998: 15), meaning that CSOs are devoid of individual, and often contradictory, agency. This implies that liberals tend to understand civil society as a metaphor for 'space', a specific sphere where certain functions are performed. Furthermore, often the notion of space provides a way of categorizing CSOs in Africa and elsewhere according to their functions and organizational type, viewing civil society in rather descriptive terms (ibid: 20). Critical accounts fall in the same generalising trap, albeit viewing civil society as more heterogeneous than liberals. There is a tendency by critical theorists to reduce the functions of CSOs to either reproducing or contesting the capitalist order, and to be blind to all other types of relationship to capitalism between these two extreme poles. Similarly to liberals, African civil society is seen by critical scholars as a space for action where battles over the capitalist system are played out, but the actual agency of CSOs is poorly analysed in terms of the strategies used, the rationale behind certain types of action, and the mechanisms behind group formation.

All in all, liberal and critical theories of civil society in Africa reflect a more general deficit in civil society theory-building: 'a large-scale unwillingness in the literature to look at the dynamics among and within organizations' (van Rooy 1998: 19). This implies a lack of understanding of the processes in which organizations and networks are created, for what purposes and by what means. Commenting on the debate about global civil society in particular, Keck and Sikkink challenge liberal as well as critical perspectives for ignoring the issue of agency (1998). They conclude that: '[w]e lack convincing studies of the sustained and specific processes through which individuals and organizations create […] something resembling a global civil society' (ibid: 33). One particular blind spot is the dynamic construction of group identities (Healy and Macdonald 1997: 12) and how this informs CSO actions.

2.2.4 The Conceptualization of Civil Society in this Thesis

The theoretical framework developed in this thesis seeks to transcend the conventional (especially in Western and liberal thinking) conceptualization and of civil society as open and autonomous and as engaging in constructive dialogue with the state for the mutual benefit of society as a whole. As one important scholar in the civil society field claims, the conventional three-sector model of society, where states, markets and CSOs are seen as 'hermetically sealed' from each other, is 'nonsense' (Edwards 2009: 24). Furthermore, the homogenising tendency of the mainstream perspective, and the corresponding reduction of civil society to NGOs, is questioned here.

The understanding of civil society in this thesis is greatly influenced by the critical view of civil society as public sphere in general and critical Africanist scholarship in particular. There is a need to problematize civil society (and state action) in Africa, and to embrace a theoretical perspective that allows for the possibility that civil society contains an internal series of paradoxes and conflicts. What on the surface may appear 'egalitarian' civil society behaviour may not always prove to be so upon deeper analysis. Therefore, civil society is seen here as a heterogeneous field of different and sometimes conflicting views and functions, including for example competing roles in regional governance. In the end these create social conflict, for example in terms of ideological rivalry and competition for material resources. Furthermore, it is claimed that civil society and the state are always mutually constitutive. The notion of civil society as a terrain of conflict and therefore of politics by necessity includes an integral relationship with the state. Therefore, civil society actors may be involved in complex, rather than simple and straightforward, relationships with other types of state and market actors, which may blur the distinction between civil society actors and others. At the same time, external actors play an important role in the promotion of civil society in Africa, indeed a more powerful role than that observed in Western civil society. These points will be elaborated at length when the theoretical framework is constructed in sections 2.6-2.10 below.

Lastly, and most importantly, civil society must also be seen as a social phenomenon existing on different levels, of which the national is but one level on which civil society is manifested. As is shown throughout this thesis, many activities related to civil society indeed take place on the transnational/regional level.

2.3 The Importance of Social Structure and Agency for the Study of Civil Society

As indicated in the previous section, the role of agency in the understanding of civil society is often missing in contemporary analysis. This thesis attempts to somewhat fill this gap. Civil society actors must be studied in their own right and not only in terms of the functions they perform with regards to, for example, substituting for the reduced welfare state or contesting the capitalist order. This implies the importance of understanding how CSOs are formed and by what means; i.e. the process of group

formation, in line with social constructivist scholars such as Keck and Sikkink (1998). If we do not deepen the understanding of the construction of civil society actors, in line with social constructivist thinking, it is then difficult to comprehend internal civil society dynamics and civil society's relation to external actors; key focus areas of this thesis. However, as indicated earlier, CSO agency never takes place in isolation but is always influenced by social structures. Conflicts and battles within the arena of civil society, as well as the complex relations between civil society and state and donor actors respectively, are ultimately influenced by the underlying capitalist and statist social structures. Hence, the understanding of civil society dynamics, regardless of whether they are taking place on the local, national, regional or global level, needs to take into account the operation of these structures. This is something that is recognized by critical theoretical perspectives on civil society, touched upon in the previous, and discussed further in this, section.

Hence, having paved the conceptual way for understanding civil society regionalization in terms of discussing 'civil society' in the previous section, this section will, firstly, dwell on the importance of social structures and agency. Secondly, linked to these discussions it will outline the general theoretical influences of this thesis.

2.3.1 Social Structure

Social structures establish a fundamental ordering framework for the actions of and interrelations between actors on various societal levels, in the sense that they influence how actors understand their interests and identities. Social structures affect international actors just as much as they affect local and national ones. Therefore, in a globalized world, social structures are seen as features of the world order (Scholte 1993). Actors are normally, but not always, affected by social structures in different ways. Being a state or non-state actor, the class or gender a certain actor represents, and the values and ideologies adhered to; determine its position within those social structures (Scholte 2011). Therefore, it is argued here that studying civil society, including the regional level, without relating it to overarching social structures is difficult.

The important role of social structures in international relations is addressed by a range of different theoretical schools, of which neo-realism and critical theory are highlighted in this thesis.[8] Neo-realists conceptualize power structures within the auspices of a state-centric anarchic world order in which states are seen as the most powerful actors, pursuing their material interests *vis-à-vis* other states, with some states dominating others because of greater military and economic strength (e.g. Waltz 1988; Gilpin 1987). According to one commentator, states 'continue to run the world' (Hawthorn 2000: 196). On the other hand, critical theory emphasizes global capitalist structures, where some privileged classes, states and CSOs dominate other less privileged ones due to the mechanisms of the capitalist world

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[8] There are other theoretical schools addressing other dimensions of power structures in the world order. For example, critical feminists highlight gender as a specific form of structural inequality reproduced by patriarchal institutions and ideologies (e.g. Whitworth 1994; Tickner 2001) and post-colonial theories address power relations based on race and ethnicity (e.g. Krishna 2009; Inayatullah and Blaney 2004).

order. Inter-state hegemony plays an important role in this process, in which international institutions and hegemonic states set the rules for the maintenance of the world order (e.g. Gill 2008; Cox 1996).

Neo-realism has two major shortcomings: the focus on states as the only actors that matter in world order, and the narrow perception of hegemony and power structures. In terms of the former, it is only recently that neo-realists have started to acknowledge the existence of transnational civil society organizations and their ability to shift political issues partly away from the state (Lamy 2005: 219). However, this is greatly downplayed in their analysis of the world order and is far from representing a theory of global civil society. Secondly, neo-realists have a strict territorialist approach to power which reduces hierarchies in world affairs to relations between countries, for example in terms of north-south divides, bipolar camps, and the hegemony of a leading state (Scholte 2012). Hence, neo-realists focus on the relational power of hegemonic states (Strange 1994: 24). Instead, it is argued in this thesis that international relations are governed by structural power which ultimately emanates from the capitalist system. In terms of interaction within global and regional governance frameworks, for example, structures of power need to be understood more broadly than in traditional realist paradigms (e.g. Scholte 2011, 2012; Godsäter and Söderbaum 2011). In line with Strange (1994), structural power is conceived of as the power to shape the structures of the global political economy within which not only states and their international institutions but also economic enterprises, civil society organizations and social groups such as classes operate. This implies a more multi-faceted understanding of social structures in world politics besides state power that takes seriously the multitude of different types of state and non-state actors in global politics which are operating on a range of different levels.

Critical theory, especially 'Coxian Critical Theory' (CCT), influenced by the writings of Robert Cox (e.g. Leysens 2001, 2008), delivers such a broad understanding of structure. According to CCT, 'structure' is perceived in terms of 'historical structure', a kind of social meta-structure related to a particular historical epoch (the current one being modern capitalism). Historical structure is often referred to as a framework for action, implying that all social action has to be understood within this structure (Leysens 2008: 48). Any historical structure is made up of three interrelated components: material capabilities, ideas, and institutions. Material capabilities depict the productive, and also destructive, potential of the historical structure in terms of the overall technological and organizational capabilities, natural resources, industries, armament and wealth that manage these (Cox 1981). This aspect of historical structure is not directly relevant for this thesis and will not be further discussed. On the other hand, ideas and institutions are highly relevant here. There are broadly two kinds of ideas: inter-subjective meanings, and collective images of social order. The former implies commonly-shared popular notions and social discourses of the nature of social relations, for example the notion that people are organized and commanded by states (ibid)[9] or the ideology of 'free

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[9] Referring to the 'state' as an idea and not a fact, contingent with a particular historical era, one commentator argues that 'the historical structures of the feudal manor and the fief that confronted serfs and lords in mediaeval times appeared as

trade' inherent in the neo-liberal discourse (Leysens 2001: 225), that influence habits and expectations of behaviour. Collective images of social order are more specific notions held by different popular groups, which may differ and stand in opposition to each other (Cox 1981). However, this understanding of 'ideas' is not used in the theoretical framework to come. Hence, in this thesis, when discussing structural influence on civil society regionalization, ideas in terms of more general inter-subjective meanings are referred to. Lastly, in CCT institutions, often linked to the state, are seen as instruments for maintaining a specific hegemonic order, promoting and reproducing particular images of this order. Institutions always reflect the prevailing power relations inherent in the world order (ibid). International institutions linked to IGOs are particularly important. The dominant ideas and institutions, derived from the current capitalist mode of production, determine the general forms of behaviour for states and those forces of civil society that act across national boundaries (Cox 1983). In essence, together with material capabilities (not discussed here), ideas and institutions make up the structure of the current hegemonic world order (Taylor 2001), which will be discussed further in section 2.5.

From the above it should be evident that CCT's understanding of social structure is more eclectic than the one delivered by neo-realists and more suitable for this thesis. CCT's understanding of structure implies acknowledging both state and non-state actors, even though the former is seen as most prominent. In highlighting institutions and ideas it also brings up both material and ideational structural aspects of world order. This is in line with the meta-theoretical understanding of the relationship between the material and ideational discussed in section 2.1.3.

2.3.2 Agency

The power of social structures is indeed important to include in the understanding of international relations. However, actors themselves and their actions greatly matter (Scholte 2012), something which is largely overlooked by critical theorists and other structurally-oriented scholars such as Wallerstein (2004a, 2004b). Critical theorists such as Cox do not get to the internal motivations behind the formation of various transnational civil society alliances (Grovogui and Leonard 2008) and therefore devote little attention to how civil society actors actually operate. In the social constructivist camp it is widely argued that CSOs, such as TANs, do not emerge solely in connection with structural changes of some sort but are also actively created by people themselves (e.g. Keck and Sikkink 1998). The actor-perspective is therefore paramount. This implies that the study of how actors are formed, in this thesis regional CSOs, and the process around this formation is important. There are several theories which focus on civil society agency, of which two are highlighted here: Resource Mobilization Theory (RMT) within broader social movement research; and social constructivist theories dealing with the ideational construction of so-called new social movements and transnational advocacy networks.[10]

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real and as enduring as do our modern historical structures of the nation-state and interstate system' (Gale 1998: 271, quoted in Taylor 2001: 17).

[10] The Political Opportunity approach is another theory which emphasizes civil society agency, particularly with regards to social movements. This approach studies how social movements and other CSOs strategically use the limitations and

The idea that civil society actors are driven by material incentives and are rational actors engaged in instrumental action to secure material resources is an essential point of departure for RMT (e.g. McCarthy and Zald 1977; Jenkins 1983). RMT examines the variety of resources that must be mobilized for social movements and other collective actors to be sustained, and the flow of resources toward and away from specific social movements is conceptualized in terms of the liberal idea of supply and demand (McCarthy and Zald 1977). It is argued that collective actors differ in terms of the resources they command, their ability to make resources available, and how skilled they are in using their resources effectively (Klandermans and Staggenborg 2002: x). This explains why certain movements persist and others perish. All in all, agency is understood as a rational and adaptive response to the benefits and costs of different types of action (Buechler 1995; Jenkins 1983), for example what resources should be mobilized from whom and what tactics should be used to achieve what objectives. However, RMT has been widely criticized for an obsession with material resources and a one-dimensional view of CSOs as first and foremost rational actors acting in accordance with the utilitarian economic model, neglecting norm creation, identity-making and other cultural processes (e.g. Fantasia and Hirsch 1995; Buechler 1993; Taylor and Whittier 1995; Klandermans and Staggenborg 2002). According to Fantasia and Hirsch, 'resource mobilization has not been of much use in understanding the subjectivity and inter-subjectivity of movement participants or the cultural dynamics of movement processes' (1995: 144). As others have pointed out, in fact '[s]ymbols, rituals, patterns of affective orientation, values, discourse, and language - to mention only a few elements of culture - have always been part and parcel of social movements' (Johnston and Klandermans 1995: 20).

RMT is at odds with the meta-theoretical constructivist approach towards agency adopted in this thesis, which is informed by the inter-linkage between material incentives and ideational forces such as norms and identities. As underlined above, while not denying that material interests exist, these are also always interpreted and given meaning by social actors. Indeed, actors' interests, motives, ideas and identities are not necessarily exogenously-given and structurally-determined (for example by foreign donors), which more materialistically inclined theories such as RMT and critical theory claim, but are also socially constructed by reflective actors (e.g. Söderbaum 2002; Buechler 1995; Taylor and Whittier 1995).

Even though material aspects such as the availability of donor funds and the behaviour of international institutions do indeed affect the transnational mobilization of civil society, constructivists argue that ideational forces are equally important to understanding how and why actors are formed, what kinds of action are taken, and how efficient these actions are (e.g. Wendt 1994; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse 2002). This directs attention to the role of ideas, norms, identities and social understanding in shaping actor behaviour (O'Brien and Williams 2010: 36; Chandler 2004: 30). This is in line with CCT which, as was shown in the previous section, acknowledges the role of ideas in the reproduction of the world order. However, due

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opportunities of existing political structures, for example the composition of the formal political architecture in a particular country, to reach their goals, and how this affects their internal consolidation (e.g. Tarrow 1998; Meyer 2004).

to the general neglect of studying CSO agency in terms of CCT, it fails to account for the specific ways in which overall ideas related to, for example, neo-liberal norms are incorporated into CSO agency and inform the consolidation of transnational networks and coalitions.

Moving on, in studies about social movements and transnational advocacy networks the roles of issue-framing and identity-making have particularly enjoyed increasing theoretical recognition (Buechler 1995: 441; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse 2002) and here these are considered important dimensions of civil society regionalization. In the words of two scholars, 'transnational civil society ultimately emerges, consolidates and operates in a process governed by collective identity creation and construction of common values' (Risse and Sikkink 1999: 14).

In more detail, the act of 'framing' is an important social act in all sorts of communication and social relations. Individuals make sense of the world by applying frames to situations they encounter, most often unconsciously (Johnston and Klandermans 1995: 8). In the words of one commentator, frames are 'interpretive schemata that enable participants to locate, perceive, and label occurrences' (Johnston 2002: 64). In terms of collective actions, framing exercises are often conscious and highly strategic actions by CSOs (Johnston and Klandermans 1995: 8) to create and recreate meaning of what they know and how they should act (Finnemore and Sikkink 2001: 409). More specifically, 'issue-framing' implies portraying issues in a thoughtful way in order to successfully mobilize people around certain causes and persuade policy-makers to make policy reforms (Risse 2002: 268).

Identities, secondly, are consciously constructed and manipulated by collective actors in order to justify and boost their actions (Fine 1995: 132). Hence, the starting-point for analysing the role of identity-making for civil society regionalization is the social constructivist argument that social identities, be they individual or linked to social groups, are not pre-socially given or existing in some objective reality. Instead, identities emerge in social processes whereby people gradually make sense of who they are and what they want. This requires that studies about social identities take the self-understanding of social actors seriously (Risse 2010: 20). In fact, identity-making is partly an autonomous process that provides much of the basis for the choice of action on behalf of various actors. According to one scholar, 'people engage with one another in society not only to obtain resources […] but also to discover who they are, where they belong and what they might become' (Scholte 2005: 146-147; see also Söderbaum 2002). At the same time, self-discovery is intimately connected with material interests, in line with the meta-theoretical foundations of this thesis. Linked to regionalism, 'regional identity' is not, then, something people possess but rather an instrument used in certain regional discourses, often in order to gain certain material benefits (Van Langenhove 2011: 73). All this implies that a social constructivist approach to the study of identities does not deny that rational choice is relevant. Therefore, 'the significant question is […] how identities and interests interact with each other' (Risse 2010: 21). Drawing from the above, in terms of agency two specific motivations for CSOs to regionalize are highlighted in this thesis: issue-framing and identity-making.

Lastly, it should be underlined that, in line with the meta-theoretical understanding of the interconnection between structure and agency in this thesis, even if partly an autonomous process, issues are never framed and identities never constructed apart from social structure. Instead, as will be evident when studying civil society regionalization, issue-framing and identity-making are heavily influenced by the dominant ideas in the current world order related to neo-liberalism and statism, discussed further in section 2.5.

2.3.3 Discussing the Theoretical Influences on this Thesis

It should be further clarified why and in what ways the understanding of civil society regionalization is derived from the two, different but nevertheless related, theoretical traditions of critical theory and social constructivism. When understanding a specific social phenomenon such as civil society regionalization, individual theories on their own are poorly equipped to account for this complex phenomenon, which warrants a multi-theoretical approach. A few words must now be said about the compatibility of these two at first glance different theoretical traditions.

Social constructivist concepts of issue-framing and identity-making and critical theoretical concepts of hegemonic world order do not need to be mutually exclusive, but can in fact complement each other in painting a rich picture of civil society regionalization. To continue with the art metaphor, critical theory provides the background colours, in terms of the capitalist and state-centric deeper social structures, with which the surrounding landscape is painted. In the forefront of this landscape, various figures are painted with brighter colours, which represent those actors linked to and involved in civil society regionalization, such as RIGOs, donors and CSOs. The movements of the figures in the picture, influenced by the specificity of the landscape, correspond to the ways RIGOs, donors and CSOs behave in relation to regionalization. In other words, critical theorists provide the overall social structures for understanding civil society regionalization and social constructivism adds a complementary actor-perspective, showing how regional institutions, donors and CSOs form and act within the state-centric and capitalist social order, in line with the meta-theoretical understanding of the relationship between structure and agency. Lastly, both theoretical strands acknowledge the role of ideas in their interpretation of international relations, albeit in different ways, as discussed in sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2. CCT studies how dominant, general perceptions about various social phenomena play an important role in reproducing the world order, and social constructivists study how specific norms, values and identities inform internal CSO processes. Of course, as will be shown throughout this thesis, these two aspects of 'ideas' are intimately related, particularly in terms of how 'grand ideas' on a world order level affect how individual CSOs frame issues and construct identities, in line with the model of levels of social structure presented in the previous section.

A theoretical account of a complex social phenomenon such as civil society regionalization benefits from acknowledging structural *and* actor-oriented as well as material *and* ideational dimensions, as discussed in sections 2.1.2 and 2.1.3. Hence, the understanding of civil society regionalization cannot be reduced to one single

dimension based on one particular theoretical perspective since, presumably, there is no single theory equipped with concepts to address all the above dimensions. It needs to be underlined, though, that this thesis does not intend to present several, separate explanations of the social phenomenon under scrutiny but one holistic picture.

Lastly, this project is not the first one to try to merge critical theoretical and social constructivist thinking. There are many other examples of such endeavours, of which perhaps the critical constructivist tradition in regionalism studies is the most obvious (e.g. Söderbaum 2002). One commentator argues that critical theory can even be seen as a radical variant of social constructivism (Woods 2005: 336) and others suggest that critical theorists who seek to critique or change the existing system can advantageously use constructivist approaches which stress the shifting nature of social reality (O'Brien and Williams 2010: 37). Still other scholars claim that social constructivism and critical theory are not only compatible but also mutually reinforcing, having similar intellectual roots:

> [c]ontrary to the claims of several prominent critical theorists of the Third Debate, we argue
> that constructivism has its intellectual roots in critical social theory, and that the construc-
> tivist project of conceptual elaboration and empirical analysis need not violate the principal
> epistemological, methodological or normative tenets of critical international theory (Price
> and Reus-Smit 1998: 259).

The elements of the analytical framework, discussed in sections 2.6-2.10, have to match the meta-theoretical propositions about the relationship between structure and agency and the material and ideational respectively. In other words, the framework has to be able to account for material, ideational, structural and actor-oriented dimensions of civil society regionalization. As will be made clear next, the 11 dimensions meet these criteria well, focusing on the capitalist statist social structure as material and structure-oriented, and issue-framing and identity as ideational and actor-oriented.

2.4 An Analytical Framework for Understanding Civil Society Regionalization

As stated in section 1.2, studying the dynamics of civil society regionalization and answering the three research questions implies understanding the *interconnection* between structure and agency in this process. This will conceptually be done in this section, building on the discussions of social structure and agency, respectively, in the previous section. To begin with, in line with the thinking of CCT, agency is not perceived as being *determined* by social structures (Leysens 2008: 48), as structuralists such as Wallerstein claim (2004a, 2004b), but still as *under the influence* of structure. In the words of one commentator, 'while [structures] constrain human action, they can be transformed by human action (Leysens 2008: 48). This implies that CSO agency is to some degree an autonomous process and can partly be understood in terms of internal, intra-organizational mechanisms, in line with social constructivist thinking, but is nevertheless affected by structure.

In more detail, the relationship between agency and structure is understood in terms of conceptualising social structure as a phenomenon of levels (Prendergast 2004). This means that 'social structures are nesting series with successive levels of more and more encompassing structures' (Blau 1981: 12), which implies that agency is never untouched by structure (Prendergast and Knottnerus 1994: 5). In the social sciences, there are many models of levels of social structure (Prendergast 2004), of which the one adopted by Prendergast and Knottnerus (1994) is used here. In this model, the structural influence of agency operates down six levels of social structure which, from highest to lowest, are shown below. The bold third and fourth levels indicate that these are the focus for understanding civil society regionalization. The specific types of relations analysed in this thesis have also been added to the model.

- the world system (1);
- societal stratification (2);
- **inter-organizational relations (3);**
    - Inter-organizational relations between RIGOs and CSOs
    - Inter-organizational relations between donors and CSOs
    - Inter-organizational relations between CSOs
- **intra-organizational relations (4);**
    - Intra-organizational relations: CSOs and issue-framing
    - Intra-organizational relations: CSOs identity-making
- social networks (5);
- social relationships (6)

Social relationship is the fundamental unit of analysis in the sense that it builds up each level, regardless of what type of actor is relevant (for example states, CSOs and individuals), and the structural principles guiding agency carry over into subsequent levels. In other words, the pressures and constraints imposed by a higher on a lower level are always interpreted and managed through social relationships, in line with social constructivist thinking: 'The social relationship, then, is the point where 'agency' and 'structure' converge' (ibid: 6). This implies that agency, in this thesis primarily in terms of CSOs, has to be understood in relation to the different levels of social structure. Furthermore, social networks are collections of connected social relationships; inter-organizational and intra-organizational relations depict social relations between and within different types of organizations respectively; societal stratification implies the ways in which whole societies are structured, for example in terms of class; and the world system means the economic, political and social relations across societies (ibid: 9, 11, 12, 16). Since the world system, inter-organizational relations and intra-organizational relations are specifically relevant for understanding civil society regionalization in this thesis they will now be addressed at more length.

The highest level, the world system, is the largest unit of structural analysis. In other words, it is the deepest and most fundamental level of social structure, understood in terms of *global social structure* equivalent to the capitalist world system in Wallerstein's terms (ibid: 16). This resembles CCT's 'historical structure' discussed above. However, marking the deviation from structuralist thinking in this thesis, and leaning towards CCT, the concept of world system is here substituted by the concept of *world order*. World order is more attentive to the agency of various

types of actors, in terms of reproducing or challenging the order, than the strucuralist understanding of world system. It should be noted that the world order is also manifested on a regional level, creating specific regional orders with particular regional dynamics. In Southern Africa this is characterized by state-centric and neo-liberal politics, of which current regional governance is one important expression, and the dominance of one country: South Africa. In essence, the world order, and its regional manifestation in Southern Africa, forms the structural context in which civil society regionalization takes place. This will be discussed further in section 2.5 and chapter 3 respectively.[11]

The focus in this thesis is on structural levels 3 and 4, i.e. inter-organizational and intra-organizational relations respectively. In terms of the former, the deeper statist and capitalist social structures emanating from the world order inform social relations between RIGOs and CSOs, between donors and CSOs, as well as between CSOs on a regional level. These three types of inter-organizational relations are highlighted on this structural level. This has profound effects on civil society regionalization in seven different ways: RIGO issue preferences; RIGO focal-point creation for CSOs; CSO inclusion and exclusion in RIGOs; CSO dependency on regional donor funds; donor influence on CSO regional agendas; CSO ideological rivalry; and CSO competition for donor funds. These seven dimensions of civil society regionalization will be further discussed in sections 2.6-2.8 and empirically analysed in the first part of chapters 4 and 5 in terms of the cases of civil society regionalization in the trade and HIV/AIDS sectors in Southern Africa respectively.

The inter-organizational structural level in turn affects social relations and agency within regional NGOs and networks on an intra-organizational structural level, in which the construction of regional issues and identities are emphasized here. These two types of intra-organizational relations are highlighted on this structural level. This affects civil society regionalization in four different ways: CSO regional issue-framing; CSO construction of regional target groups; CSO positive regional identity-making; and CSO exclusive regional identity-making. These four dimensions of civil society regionalization will be further accounted for in sections 2.9-2.10 and empirically analysed in the second half of chapters 4 and 5.

These five types of social relations and the related dimensions of civil society regionalization inform the structure of the analytical framework and the analysis of civil society regionalization in the empirical chapters. Organizing the empirical analysis in chapters 4-5, they will first be discussed at length in sections 2.6-2.10. They are summarized and connected with the research questions in table 1 below.

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[11] Social stratification, which makes up the second level in the Prendergast/Knottnerus framework, is indeed important to account for in order to understand the inter-organizational relations between RIGOs and CSO, between donors and CSOs, and between CSOs, as well as intra-organizational relations within CSOs, but is nevertheless neglected in the further discussion of civil society regionalization in Southern Africa. It is beyond this project to explicitly study the effect of social inequalities based on class, gender and race in the analysis of regionalization of civil society, for example in terms of how social affinity determines CSO inclusion and exclusion in regional governance and has an impact upon relations between CSOs with different social backgrounds. Taking societal stratification into consideration would indeed deepen the understanding of these and other dimensions but is left out in the analytical framework. Consequently, in this sense, this thesis has partly departed from the Prendergast/Knottnerus framework, which is nevertheless still in its partial form very valuable for understanding civil society regionalization.

Table 1: Analytical framework for understanding civil society regionalization

	Definition	Related dimensions of civil society regionalization	Related research question
Inter-organizational relations between RIGOs and CSOs	The role of RIGOs for civil society regionalization	• RIGO issue preferences • RIGO focal-point • CSO inclusion and exclusion in RIGOs	Rq1: How is civil society regionalization influenced by RIGOs and donors?
Inter-organizational relations between donors and CSOs	The role of donors for civil society regionalization	• CSO dependency on regional donor funds • Donor influence on the CSO agenda	Rq1: How is civil society regionalization influenced by RIGOs and donors?
Inter-organizational relations between CSOs	The role of intra-CSO relations for civil society regionalization	• CSO ideological rivalry • CSO competition for donor funds	Rq2: What is the composition of civil society on the regional level and how do CSOs relate to each other in the process of regionalization
Intra-organizational relations: CSOs and issue-framing	The role of regional issue-framing for civil society regionalization	• Regional issue-framing • Construction of regional target groups	Rq3: What are the motivations for regionalising among CSOs?
Intra-organizational relations: CSOs and identity-making	The role of regional identity- making for civil society regionalization	• Positive regional identity-making • Exclusive regional identity-making	Rq3: What are the motivations for regionalising among CSOs?

Before closing this section, a few methodological words have to be said about how the particular 11 dimensions of civil society regionalization were evolved. As indicated in section 1.4.1, inspired by the hermeneutic tradition this thesis is both empirically and theoretically informed. Based on my early critical theoretical reading during the research process, which came to inform one of the theoretical points of departure of the thesis, the role of external actors such as RIGOs and donors, linked to capitalist and statist social processes more generally, came to be seen as an important force behind civil society regionalization. Equally important, when reading the social constructivist literature on the creation of social movements and transnational advocacy networks I realized that the internal motivations of CSOs themselves, particularly in terms of ideas and identities, could also play an important role in civil society dynamics on a regional level. Hence, when doing fieldwork I had a vague pre-understanding of the role of RIGOs and donors, as well as of ideas and identity-making, in regional civil society co-operation in Southern Africa, but not of in what particular ways this occurred. I asked rather open questions about this during interviews with CSOs, donors and the SADC and certain aspects crystallized bit by bit.

The centrality of the SADC and donors for civil society regionalization, through their setting of the overall regional agendas in the trade and HIV/AIDS sectors, their control of which CSOs are in and out in regional governance, and their funding of certain CSOs but not others, soon became an important theme. The SADC and donors also seemed to play an important role in financing and facilitating civil society networking on a regional level, creating concrete points for interaction. Many interviewees also spoke about the destructiveness of material incentives, in terms of attracting donors funds for economic personal gain, and how this made

CSOs active on a regional level be at risk of imploding. Another important theme that evolved during the research process was the role of a regional understanding of issues related to trade and HIV/AIDS, as well as cross-border understanding of identity based on certain social traits which members of some regional networks had in common, such as Christianity, being HIV/AIDS-positive, and the experience of being informal traders. Yet other regional CSOs identified themselves against regional target groups such as the SADC. Lastly, due to the quite different regional understanding of issues between CSOs on the regional level, who were approaching the SADC in different ways and using a variety of strategies, as manifested by the existence of rival civil society regional forums, it gradually became clear that civil society regionalization was a quite heterogeneous process.

The above themes evolved during fieldwork and informed further reading linked to global and regional governance, global civil society, civil society in Africa, social movements, and transnational advocacy networks, as well as the role of foreign donors in Africa. In fact, a thorough theoretical review was carried out, divided into different phases of the research process, between and after field trips. The review was essential in order to answer the three research questions presented in the previous chapter and to distil the particular dimensions of civil society regionalization under scrutiny in this thesis.

Certain sub-themes related to power relations between CSOs and RIGOs, and CSOs and donors, as well as issue-framing and identity-making emerged in the literature which corresponded to my empirical understanding. For example, when studying international governance texts, it became clear that state actors greatly affect the operations of CSOs in ways that spoke to my own empirical understanding, for example through deciding the specific issue-areas related to governance, through including certain actors in international institutions and excluding others, and through acting as international focal points for international civil society meetings. This informed the first three dimensions of civil society regionalization: issue-preferences, inclusion and exclusion, and focal point creation. Furthermore, reading about the role of donors in Africa in infusing a market logic to the development work of CSOs and in influencing the creation of 'briefcase NGO' shed light on my empirical understanding of the donor dependency of civil society regionalization, and hence the dimensions of civil society regionalization related to dependency on regional donor funds and donor influence on regional civil society agendas. The social constructivist literature on TANs and social movements gave me further insights into the different ways in which identity and issue-framing can play a role in civil society regionalization. In terms of the former, coupled with the centrality of RIGOs in regional governance, it gave birth to the regional issue-framing and regional target groups dimensions, where RIGOs formed a backdrop to the understanding of 'regional' issues and acted as regional targets for advocacy. The dimensions of civil society regionalization related to intra-civil society relations sprung from a critical theoretical reading of the dynamics of global civil society, highlighting CSO ideological and resource-based competition.

It should be underlined that the texts building up these 11 dimensions of civil society regionalization outlined in sections 2.6-2.10 do not necessarily formally

ascribe to the critical theoretical or social constructivist traditions, even though most do somehow relate to these. However they are used in their position as important contributions to the understanding of different aspects of civil society regionalization and in the construction of the 11 dimensions. The texts deal with important elements of the dominating role of state actors and donors in international governance, as well as issue-framing and identity-making, which are vital for constructing the theoretical framework.

2.5 The Statist-Capitalist World Order

Even if the focus in the analysis of civil society regionalization is on levels 3 and 4 in the Prendergast/Knottnerus framework, some words first have to be said about the highest structural level, i.e., the world order, which, as was shown in the last section, fundamentally orders social relations on all other, lower structural levels. It is therefore not possible to comprehend the relations between RIGOs and CSOs, between donors and CSOs, and between CSOs, as well as relations within CSOs, without taking the deeper statist and capitalist social structures inherent in the world order into account. This is the task in this section.[12]

In broadest terms, 'world order' is here understood as a social order that is global, formed by structural and ideational conditions in terms of the material interests, political power relations, military capacity and discursive control that shape transnational interaction between various state and non-state actors (Hettne 2002, 2005). More specifically, it is understood in line with the CCT. According to this thinking, the world order is maintained not only through coercion by dominant states in terms of materialist power, i.e. military might and economic dominance, but also by consent. This implies that the dominant actors in the international system, to a large extent powerful states but also multinational corporations, manage to generate broad support for a world order that suits their interests (Hobden and Wyn-Jones 2005: 239). Consent is produced by the operation of cultural hegemony whereby dominant states disseminate ideas and ideologies in order to uphold the prevailing order (Woods 2005: 336-337). As indicated in section 2.3.1, multilateral institutions also play a vital role in consolidating hegemony and 'propagate and ensure the continuation of a particular hegemonic project by the mediating and legitimising function that they perform' (Taylor 2001: 18). In essence, the current hegemonic project is statist and capitalist, and these two features will now be discussed.

CCT's perception of the world order privileges the interstate system (Saad-Filho and Ayers 2008: 116). Even though '[a] hegemonic world order is not *only* an inter-state system' (Leysens 2001: 225, my emphasis), according to Cox, 'the crucial role [in world order], it turns out, is played by the state. [S]tates […] create the conditions in which particular modes of social relations achieve dominance' (1987:

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[12] However, the focus in this project is not on world order *per se*. In other words, this is not, by any means, a study about world order. World order is only included in the analysis of civil society regionalization because of its (indirect) fundamental influence on this process in terms of the deeper statist and capitalist social structures. Linked to this, the project is indeed theoretically influenced by CCT and its world order framework, but should not be seen as formally belonging to this research tradition. Hence, this study does not qualify as being a 'critical theory of civil society regionalization', so to speak, fully applying the CCT framework and method to this topic.

399). Hence, one important element of the world order is statism. In more detail, statism is a deep social structure that profoundly affects the action of various actors on all levels of society. Statism implies that the regulatory operations of territorial national government determine most forms of societal governance. To a great extent, then, the formulation, implementation, monitoring and enforcement of societal rules take place directly through the state and through inter-state relations (Scholte 2005: 186). Statism is intimately linked to the ideology of nationalism, deeply affecting identity-making across the globe in terms of constructing identity as national. The prevailing identity structure in the current world order is linked to the nation state (ibid). Hence, nationalism, linked to the general notion that the state offers people the best organising principle, is a powerful idea important for the reproduction of the state-centric element of the world order.

In terms of international institutions, the statist legacy is a powerful feature (e.g. Vale 2003; Scholte 2011). The state retains a significant degree of importance and is given a central role in creating and maintaining global governance (Higgott et al 1999: 1; O'Brien and Williams 2010: 426). Therefore, according to one scholar, '[u]nder statist governance, macro-regional and global regulatory mechanisms are small in scale […] and fall more or less completely under the thumb of country governments' (Scholte 2005: 186). Furthermore, in contemporary global and regional governance frameworks, CSOs are greatly affected by processes dominated by states and IGOs, for example in terms of being facilitated to or obstructed from participating in international policy-making forums (Bowden 2006; Grugel 2004; Boli and Thomas 1999: 29). In Grugel's words, 'one cannot escape the centrality of the state […State] institutions are mainly vigorous [and] [t]he space for civil society activism is not neutral terrain but is shaped by […] states' (2004: 38). On the whole, then, IGOs find it difficult to include civil society in various ways (Scholte 2011: 336). Hence, in line with CCT, the hegemonic international institutions are important instruments for maintaining a state-centric world order and reproduce the prevailing power relations between states and CSOs.

Capitalism is another fundamental social structure deeply embedded in the contemporary world order. Capitalism is here understood as 'a circumstance where social relations are pervasively and thoroughly oriented to the accumulation of surplus' (Scholte 2011: 338), which, in short, implies that wealth is owned privately and that market principles determine the organization of economic life (Heywood 2011: 84). In the contemporary world order, practices, ideologies and policies based on capitalist thinking pervade a wide range of social, economic and political life and have become more or less institutionalized and 'mainstream' (Gill 2008). Since the 1980s the latest stage and contemporary form of capitalism has been neo-liberalism (Bond 2005; Ayers 2008; Gill 2008), a world-wide ideology which promotes the free market as the principal form of governance. In more detail, neo-liberalism is closely related to the 'project' of economic globalization and entails market efficiency, discipline and confidence; economic policy credibility and consistency; and limitation on democratic decision-making processes (Gill 2008: 138). These dominant neo-liberal ideas are cemented across the globe, including in Southern

Africa, are more or less referred to as 'common sense', and play an important role in reproducing the capitalist world order.

Neo-liberal ideology is institutionalized at the macro-level by various regional and global governance frameworks (Gill 2008: 138) and fundamentally affects civil society dynamics and state-civil society complexes (ibid: 139). In line with CCT, this is related to the fact that capitalism deeply shapes the rules that govern relations between most actors in the world order (Scholte 2011: 338). Various multilateral institutions and IGOs form an important part of global and regional governance frameworks. In the neo-liberal era of globalization, some categories of non-state actors are closely integrated into the process of governance, which, as was indicated above, revolves around states. This implies that some state authority is passed on to firms, business associations, NGOs and INGOs in order to reproduce the system of capitalist accumulation in a new, globalized condition. In this process, some non-state actors are actively supported and even created by states, donors and business to act as instruments to secure Western states' dominance of the world order and to further the neo-liberal project (Higgott et al 1999: 6). In many regards, socialized into the dominant neo-liberal market model and being used for 'stabilizing the social and political *status quo*' (Cox 1999: 11, original emphasis), civil society can be seen to reflect the dominance of state and corporate economic power (ibid: 10). On the whole, international institutions within global and regional governance frameworks are important instruments for serving the current capitalist hegemonic world order. One commentator concludes that the current world order 'is the consequence of a 'fit' between ideas/ideology (support for 'free' trade) [and] institutions (International Monetary Fund)' (Leysens 2001: 225).

Hence, hegemony is not only state-based but also involves transnational social forces which control the capitalist mode of global production (Leysens 2008). In fact, since state policy-making within global governance often reflects the preferences of powerful corporate elites, 'states and markets have to be understood as two different expressions of the same configuration of [capitalist] social forces' (Higgott et al 1999: 6). In more detail, in line with CCT, these social forces can be conceptualized in terms of a transnational managerial class, which reflects global corporations, national industries, global finance, government agencies and an established highly-skilled workforce (Leysens 2008: 57). At the same time, many social groups are underprivileged in the world order and disadvantaged by neo-liberal globalization, such as semi-skilled and contract workers in the core states and industrial workers, state employees, peasants and urban dwellers in peripheral states (ibid). Hence, the current world order is fundamentally maintained by structural social inequalities not only based on class, as showed above, but also race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation and other social groups. This creates power relations where some actors dominate others, which is determined by the structural position of these actors in the world order (Scholte 2011).

In terms of civil society participation in global governance, CSOs represent different social groups, residing in different parts of the world, and which, because of social inequalities, are not equally successful in governance processes. It is mostly CSOs representing privileged classes, often somehow linked to the

transnational managerial class, that are included in the global governance framework, even if they are still being instruments for the reproduction of the capitalist world order as discussed above. Hence:

> civil society engagement of global governance agencies has widely manifested and reinforced class hierarchies. Thus professional and wealthy social circles have generally obtained greater accountability from global governance through CSOs than underclasses (ibid: 337).

However, being dissatisfied with the current social order, subordinate classes are potential challengers to the neo-liberal ideology and might constitute a basis for a 'counter-hegemony' (Leysens 2008: 58). Organized across borders, these social forces are sometimes referred to as global social movements (GSMs). GSMs attempt to alter the prevailing taken-for-granted neo-liberal assumptions of the current world order and to change policy outcomes. For example, they demand democratic accountability at the international level (Higgott et al 1999: 4). Even though social stratification *per se* is not included in the analysis, the *hegemonic struggle* between CSOs derived from different social groups, which emanates from global social inequalities, is nevertheless part of my analytical framework. Hence, the ways in which different types of CSO relate differently to the neo-liberal ideological project and hegemonic international institutions are important to include in the study of civil society regionalization.

The influence of the statist and capitalist social structure on civil society regionalization, in terms of how hegemonic ideas related to statism and neo-liberalism and hegemonic international institutions affect the relations between IGOs and CSOs, between donors and CSOs, and between CSOs, as well as within CSOs, will be further conceptually discussed in the next five sections.

2.6 Inter-Organizational Relations between RIGOs and CSOs

The overall analytical framework for understanding civil society regionalization was outlined in section 2.4 (summarized in table 1) in terms of five types of social relations, i.e. inter-organizational relations between RIGOs and CSOs; inter-organizational relations between donors and CSOs; inter-organizational relations between CSOs; intra-organizational relations in terms of issue-framing; and intra-organizational relations in terms of identity-making. In this and next two sections, the inter-organizational relations will be discussed in more detail. More specifically, in the current section this involves the ways in which the statist and capitalist social structure affects relations between RIGOs and CSOs in terms of RIGO issue preferences, RIGO focal-point creation for CSOs, and CSO inclusion and exclusion in RIGOs. In section 2.7, the dimensions of civil society regionalization related to donor-CSO relations will be discussed, namely: CSO dependency on regional donor funds, and donor influence on CSO regional agenda. Lastly, in section 2.8, the relationship between CSOs will be discussed, reflected in two ways: CSO ideological rivalry, and CSO competition for donor funds.

2.6.1 RIGO Issue Preferences

In order to protect their economic, financial, security and other primary interests, in line with the reproduction of the statist and capitalist world order, states and IGOs often control the access of civil society to international policy-making processes and dominate global governance frameworks. This partly implies that state actors decide which policy-making issue-areas CSOs can be involved in (Bowden 2006; Grugel 2004). In some policy areas IGOs offer extensive opportunities for engagement, whereas in other areas CSOs are closed out (Jönsson et al 2012). The nature of these dynamics is ultimately determined by the capitalist social structure. Hence, most CSOs are barred from more sensitive policy areas such as security and trade (Bowden 2006; Grugel 2004) as well as finance (Jönsson et al 2012), in order to retain power in the hands of states and business for the furthering of the statist and capitalist world order, while more are included in social policy-areas such as health and labour (ibid). In terms of the latter, in line with the dominant neo-liberal ideas, outsourcing of service provision to civil society and mitigation of the negative effects of economic globalization for poor people are important for the world order to function smoothly. The neo-liberal discourse also affects what more specific policy issues within trade, health and other areas are prioritized by IGOs. For example, IGOs are generally reluctant to adopt issues connected with the so-called Rights-Based Approach (RBA) because many of their member states resist the proliferation of the human rights framework (Schmitz 2012), which can threaten their power.[13] In addition, more resources are generally invested into trade and finance-related institutions than into those dealing with social issues. All in all, the nature of the agendas driven by IGOs, in terms of the focus on certain broad issue areas as well as on more specific policy issues at the expense of others, paves the way for which CSOs are included and excluded in various governance institutions, discussed below.

Furthermore, in order to guard themselves from those parts of global civil society which challenge the statist and capitalist world order, for example in terms of the operations of global governance institutions, demands such as institutional democratic reform and incorporation of social issues into governance agendas are absorbed and written into the official documents, policies and procedures of IGOs. However, this is only a strategic game in which the rhetoric of IGOs changes but in reality capitalist and neo-liberal principles still determine the substance of their actions (Paterson 2009: 47). An example is in terms of implementation, where emphasis is put on problem-solving projects and programmes that deal with business, wealth creation, market facilitation, trade integration, economic development and service delivery. In effect, this implies that various civil society demands for social and economic justice and democracy are hi-jacked and tuned-in with the capitalist discourse (ibid: 53). In turn, this greatly affects who is included

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[13] The RBA to development seek to frame poverty and other social issues in the language of international human rights standards. From this perspective, poverty is not primarily due to lack of resources, but is a result of discrimination and the political decisions of policy-makers. The role of external actors such as donors and their CSO recipients is no longer to substitute for absent government services but instead to focus on mobilizing individuals and the legal system to hold the state accountable for delivering social services (Schmitz 2012: 1).

and excluded in international governance-related policy-making and project implementation.[14]

In relation to civil society regionalization, in sections 4.2.1 and 5.2.1 the regional governance agendas related to trade and HIV/AIDS respectively will be analysed. The task at hand is to study the extent and ways in which the regional governance agenda focuses on certain issue-areas and neglects others, and how this might influence CSO participation in regional governance and, ultimately, regional CSO consolidation.

2.6.2 RIGO Focal Point Creation for CSOs

As we saw above, state domination can effectively bar CSOs from inter-governmental meetings and forums. However, this marginalization can also be an incentive for international civil society action. Hence, inter-governmental forums, even if rather closed, can act as focal points around which parallel international civil society platforms can emerge (Florini 2000). The very act of gathering alongside global and regional governance institutions means that state agencies can have a strong influence on civil society networking in terms of the ability to perform and operate (Gilson 2011a: 134). One commentator concludes in relation to international organizations that 'the fact remains that as the constitutive elements and ultimate enforcers of those regimes, states remain the central actors – and the focal point for transnational action' (Santa Cruz 2004: 28). Furthermore, IGOs can have a more direct role in facilitating transnational civil society networking when arranging and in other ways supporting international civil society conferences and meetings, as well as multi-stakeholder forums involving both state and non-state actors.

The creation of regional focal points linked to RIGOs, facilitating civil society regional co-operation, can be an important dimension of civil society regionalization. This will be empirically analysed in sections 4.2.2 and 5.2.2.

2.6.3 CSO Inclusion and Exclusion in RIGOs

States not only determine in what policy areas CSOs can have an influence, but also decide in which specific institutions CSOs can have a say, in order to protect the statist and capitalist hegemony. Hence, IGOs decide which actors to include and exclude in policy-making processes in various institutions (Gilson 2011a: 13). When they open up to non-state actors in various deliberations, IGOs are generally very selective in terms of who to involve, and rarely operate without limitations on the

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[14] In terms of the trade arena, relevant for this thesis, Paterson argues that the World Trade Organization (WTO) deliberately involves certain CSOs at the expense of others. Certain partner-CSOs are used to legitimize the capitalist ideology and procedures of the WTO, especially market-oriented NGOs (Ma-NGOs), for example in terms of drafting official documents, give policy advice and carrying out programmes. Ma-NGOs are created by corporations to campaign for their interests in important global policy-making institutions in the trade arena, such as the WTO. In most respects, the WTO has focused its NGO engagement on partner and Ma-NGOs. On the other hand, so-called alter-globalization NGOs, demanding greater transparency and social participation in global governance, are formally excluded from policy-making, implementation and monitoring processes within the WTO and are unable to put their issues on the negotiating table due to only being granted accreditation status in forums far from decision-making bodies (2009: 43, 52-53).

participation of those actors. Civil society participation is often strictly formalized through an accreditation system. Actors are involved in terms of their usefulness to the international organization in question, for example in delivering various types of expertise and as providers of information and policy alternatives (Jönsson et al 2012; Boli and Thomas 1999), serving the interests of states. In the words of Dupuy et al, '[s]tates are gatekeepers for NGOs; they regulate the barriers to entry, affect the cost of operations and organization […and] establish the specific issues that NGOs can work on' (2012: 9).

In terms of which institutions of a particular IGO CSOs are allowed to participate in, according to Jönsson et al non-state actors' access is much higher in monitoring and enforcement, implementation and policy formulation institutions such as committees, secretariats and courts than in decision-making forums such as councils of ministers and summits, which are dominated by the traditional state model of representation (2012), in line with the statist social structure. This is related to the fact that state officials often invoke a traditional discourse of sovereign statehood in order to exclude civil society initiatives from influencing international organizations (Scholte 2011: 336). The consequence of this is that shallow forms of civil society involvement are more common than deep and influential forms of participation (Jönsson et al 2012).

Furthermore, the centrality of capitalism in global relations has far-reaching implications for which CSOs are involved in regional and global governance (Scholte 2011). Those actors that work within the parameters of the rules of capitalism and hence legitimate the current world order, for example by accepting private property rights, monetized social relations, the market-based economy, and offering instrumentalist ways of 'solving problems', are most successful (ibid). They are used as instruments by international institutions to reproduce the current hegemony. Drawing on Cox (1993), problem-solving means, for example, offering solutions to correct dysfunctions in the current world order such as market failures, malfunctioning political institutions and lack of social services for poor people in the South. On the other hand, civil society actors that seek structural transformation of the current capitalist system remain at the margins of global politics (Scholte 2011). Hence, business associations, orthodox trade unions, mainstream think tank organizations and reformist NGOs are more involved in regional and global governance than counter-hegemonic anti-capitalist social movements, peasant groups and radical environmental movements (Jönsson et al 2012).

Applied to the regional level, the extent to which the inclusion and exclusion of CSOs in regional institutions affects civil society regionalization will be analysed in sections 4.2.3 and 5.2.3. Being included in regional governance can strengthen the operation of CSOs, whereas excluded ones might be weakened, which affects overall regionalization.

2.7 Inter-Organizational Relations between Donors and CSOs

2.7.1 CSO Dependency on Regional Donor Funds

Being influenced by the hegemonic neo-liberal discourse, CSOs are moulded into an economistic way of thinking, based on a neo-liberal understanding of development, issues based on economic growth, and outsourcing of service-provision to 'private' civil society actors (Mittelman and Chin 2000). Donors play an important role here. CSOs in the South are greatly dependent on donor funds for their operation, a fact well-known in the academic world (e.g. Fowler 2011; Bob 2005; Michael 2004) and which results in donor agencies dictating the procedures and forms of fund-giving in line with the hegemonic capitalist discourse (Michael 2004). Hence, market principles are increasingly the basic organizing principles of civil society (Dagnino 2011) and CSOs are forced to adopt an economistic rationale in their development work that is based on supply and demand and the accumulation of capital, even though on paper development is a non-profit domain (Bob 2005).

Donor dependency and the socialization of neo-liberal, market-oriented and profit-oriented thinking can create organizations that merely serve as instruments for narrow private economic gains. Even if so-called 'briefcase NGOs' may fulfil certain functions, their main purpose is to extract resources from those (donors) willing to pay. The quest to make money also leads to NGOs being professionalized and increasingly headed by members of the middle class (Godsäter and Söderbaum 2011).

Applied to the regional level, the availability of donor funds for regional activities, as well as the neo-liberal socialization of CSOs by donors, can possibly affect civil society regionalization. The effect of donor dependency on CSOs working on the regional level will be studied in sections 4.3.3 and 5.3.2.

2.7.2 Donor Influence on the CSO Agenda

CSO-donor relations are fundamentally shaped by the statist and capitalist world order. CSOs in the South are greatly dependent on donor funds for their operation and, in line with critical theoretical thinking, such donor dependency is used to uphold and reproduce the current dominant capitalist social structures. The relationship between donors and their CSO-recipients is therefore best characterized by a power asymmetry in which the former have the upper hand (Bob 2005). This implies that the neo-liberal agendas and goals of the dominant partner in the relationship, the donor, are forced upon the receiving partner, the CSO, and accountability procedures are geared toward the needs of donors rather than local needs. In that way, and linked to the previous section, donors are crucial for socializing CSOs into the neo-liberal/capitalist discourse (Katz 2006) in terms of determining what type of development agenda is furthered and what type of development issues addressed. In other words, the aid channel is the 'transmission

belt of a dominant discourse tied to Western notions of development' (Tvedt 2004, 140 quoted in Katz 2006, 335).

Furthermore, due to the workings of the capitalist global order, the distribution of donor funds does not benefit all types of CSOs equally. Those CSOs that buy into the neo-liberal agenda and adopt problem-solving strategies are more successful in fundraising than CSOs that challenge the current neo-liberal order using contentious methods. However, there are also donors who are challenging power relations between donors and recipients and the mainstream problem-solving rationale behind development work, even if they are in a minority. These alternative donors adopt what some scholars call an 'accompaniment approach', based on a deep commitment to the processes of social change. Accompaniment donors want structural change of the world order and seek to identify shared, counter-hegemonic interests between people from the South and North (Macdonald 1994).

The extent to which donor influence of CSO agendas is an important dimension of civil society regionalization is an open question. Donor funding can influence the nature of CSOs' regional work and in extension also the composition of regional civil society. This will be analysed in sections 4.3.4 and 5.3.3.

2.8 Inter-Organizational Relations between CSOs

2.8.1 CSO Ideological Rivalry

The capitalist world order creates deeply diverging interests between different CSOs, which results in very complex internal dynamics within an inherently heterogeneous global civil society. As already indicated, CSOs have different functions in global politics, either reproducing or challenging the capitalist system, and correspondingly different relations to state and market actors (Cox 1999). This is a profound aspect of the global governance process where the global statist capitalist order indirectly ascribes different roles for CSOs to play in global governance institutions (Buckley 2012). According to Armstrong et al (2004), three such roles can be discerned: civil society as a partner in global governance, taking part in service provision, project implementation and policy development; civil society as legitimating global governance, making IGOs legitimate and accountable to the public; and civil society as contesting global governance, questioning the current global order and seeking structural change. In the end, the heterogeneous nature of global civil society creates tension between CSOs with different ideological inclinations and different functions (Cox 1999; Buckley 2012).

Applied to the regional level, it is interesting to find out how heterogeneous civil society regionalization is and what role intra-civil society ideological rivalry plays in civil society regionalization. This will be analysed in sections 4.4.1 and 5.4.1.

2.8.2 CSO Competition for Donor Funds

Ideological rivalry and power asymmetry is only one dimension of intra-civil society relations. The need to raise donor and other types of funds adds to intra-civil society tensions, since CSOs are forced to compete for scarce resources (Cox 1999). Since organizational maintenance and material survival deeply affects agency within civil society, relations between CSOs are characterized by economic competition. This is manifested in struggles related to donor resource mobilization (Bob 2005: 194). According to one commentator, this is not strange considering the capitalist world order in which CSOs operate: 'just as in the world economy, where local contractors must meet the demands of multinational corporations, local insurgents vying […] against one another for scarce international assistance' (ibid: 21).

Resource competition between CSOs is related to ideological rivalry and can deepen divisions within civil society on the regional level. This effect on civil society regionalization will be further discussed in sections 4.4.2 and 5.4.2.

2.9 Intra-Organizational Relations: CSOs and Issue-Framing

Leaving the inter-organizational structural level, this and the next section will focus on the role played by intra-organizational relations in the analytical framework. More particularly, the motivations of CSOs to 'go regional' in terms of issue-framing and identity-making will be discussed, and in turn related to the inter-organizational level discussed in the previous three sections. The first two dimensions of civil society regionalization linked to intra-organizational relations are regional issue-framing and the construction of regional target groups, which will be discussed in this section. In section 2.10 positive identity-making and exclusive identity-making are discussed. The second section ends with a few words about the role of international civil society events for both issue-framing and identity-making.

2.9.1 Regional Issue-Framing

As indicated above, being weak in material terms in relation to state actors, the greatest tool for CSOs to attempt to influence various policy-making processes on a local, national, regional or global level is information and knowledge. Civil society networks and campaigns that manage to provide information that would not otherwise be available, from sources that are normally not heard, and make it comprehensible and useful to activists, publics and those in power tend to be powerful (Keck and Sikkink 1998). The power of knowledge is linked to the amount of and type of knowledge an organization possesses, of which two crucial aspects are expertise and experiential evidence. Expertise is often related to rarity, i.e. unique knowledge about a specific issue that is sought after by policy-makers and the general public and therefore is often referred to as technical expertise, which in turn often draws on the legitimacy of the academic and political world (van Rooy 2004: 81). Experiential evidence, on the other hand, draws from the legitimacy of the grassroots. Organizations with close links to the field derive their knowledge

from direct experience of people's own understandings of poverty, gender inequality, environmental problems and other issues (ibid: 92). Possession of knowledge helps strengthening CSOs active internationally and adds to their consolidation.

However, the possession of knowledge in itself does not necessarily explain the degree of success for transnational civil society action, for example in terms of regional advocacy campaigns. In order to influence policy-makers and the general public, and to successfully consolidate as NGOs and networks, knowledge claims have to be framed in strategic ways (Keck and Sikkink 1998). Here, issue-framing comes into the picture. Issue-framing implies the ways in which CSOs render events or occurrences meaningful to their target groups (such as policy-makers), members and partners by organizing experiences and guiding action in a certain pedagogical and sometimes provocative way. This means bringing complex issues to the public agenda by framing them in innovative ways (ibid).

For issue-framing to lead to collective action and possibly policy change (McAdam et al 1996) two things are required. First, issue-framing must communicate the conviction that it is possible to change some undesirable conditions through collective action. Issue-framing, then, 'suggest[s] not merely that something can be done but that 'we' can do something' (Gamson 1995: 90). Secondly, if this 'we' is a transnational network or NGO that targets a transnational audience, issue-framing has to build on 'transnational' notions of development, trade, HIV/AIDS, the environment etc. In fact, most importantly, it is argued in the social constructivist camp that the ability to frame issues as transnational can partly explain the formation of transnational networks. Linked to this, if the issues dealt with are framed in ways that resonate well with already existing transnational agendas, issue-framing is an even stronger incitement for transnational action. CSOs are likely to be influential in issue areas where the values in question coincide with national and regional state and public interests (Keck and Sikkink 1998).

In terms of the regional level, issue-framing as a force behind civil society regionalization will be further analysed in sections 4.5.1 and 5.5.1. This implies studying the extent to which CSOs active on a regional level frame their issues in a regional setting and adhere to regional agendas, and how this is informed by hegemonic ideas and international institutions.

2.9.2 Construction of Regional Target Groups

Issue-framing can be linked to some sort of injustice in the sense that moral indignation is felt over something. When the source of feelings of injustice are linked to clearly identifiable persons or social actors, such as states or corporations, who are accused of bringing harm and suffering to some parts of the population or the environment, this can spur collective action. The more concrete the target is, the more likely this will spur collective action. The ability to link these concrete targets to broader socio-economic forces, bridging the concrete and the abstract, is also important for mobilizing success (Gamson 1995 90-92).

Hence, issue frames are often adversarial: some 'we' stands in opposition to some 'they' who are responsible for certain injustices and/or have the power to make

a change (ibid: 101). If issue-framing is codified in resolutions and other policy frameworks, advocacy success can increase further (van Rooy 2004: 95-97). This is often manifested in so-called 'shaming', whereby CSOs remind state actors of their obligations and demand that they live up to certain norms and realize implementation of policies and programs (Risse 2002: 268). Most importantly here, if the perceived target is an international actor this can spur transnational civil society activities. Furthermore, if international targets are framed and shamed in adversarial ways, this can lead to the construction of an exclusive, resistance type of identity, discussed below.

In terms of the regional level, if the target group of advocacy campaigns and lobbying is understood in terms of regional policy-makers and is framed as responsible for regional injustices this can facilitate regional civil society consolidation and action. This dimension of civil society regionalization will be further discussed in sections 4.5.2 and 5.5.2.

Lastly, since it is not possible to 'stand apart from the prevailing order', social activities such as issue-framing must be located within the context of the whole (statist and capitalist) system (Leysens 2008: 40). Hence, issue-framing and target-group construction are not autonomous processes, taking place in isolation, but are deeply informed by hegemonic statist and neo-liberal ideas, as well as the power relations within international institutions, related to the world order. Since CSOs relate differently to neo-liberal ideology and hegemonic international institutions, based on their different positions in the global social hierarchy, they play different roles in the world order. Some CSOs serve to legitimize the prevailing world order and others contest it 'because of a dissatisfaction with the prevailing order' (Cox 1987: 403). These processes can fundamentally affect civil society regionalization, which will be discussed throughout chapters 4 and 5.

2.10 Intra-Organizational Relations: CSOs and Identity-Making

2.10.1 Positive Regional Identity-Making

In terms of identity, the focus of this thesis is on group identities, which are often referred to as collective identities. Here people recognize themselves and are recognized by others as part of broader groupings (Della Porta and Diani 2006: 91). Sometimes collective identity is defined in reference to some social trait, such as class, religion, gender, ethnicity or sexual orientation. This type of identity can be quite strong. However, identity can also be more loosely based on shared orientations, values, attitudes, world-views and lifestyles without members of the group sharing a particular social trait (ibid: 92). More specifically, collective identity is 'an interactive and shared definition produced by several individuals (or groups at a more complex level) and concerned with the orientations of action and the field of opportunities and constraints in which the action takes place' (Melucci 1995: 44). This implies that collective identity is always constructed through interaction between members of the group (Taylor and Whittier 1995: 172). At the same time as

the evolution of collective action produces and reproduces collective identity, collective identities also guide collective action. The two are intimately connected (Della Porta and Diani 2006: 93). It should also be emphasized once more that identity-making is often instrumental, in the sense that identities are forged in order to safeguard certain material interests, for example seeking donor funds.

Furthermore, it is argued here that collective identity is often linked to territorialism as the prevailing structure of social space, which is linked to the statist social structure (Scholte 2005). This means that collective identity is spatially dependent in the sense that it is based on a distinct territory, be it the 'local', 'national', 'international', 'regional' or 'global'. However, collective identity can also be formed on a supra-territorial basis that transcends territorial boundaries, as in the case of transnational class, religious, gender and ethnic solidarity. In this vein, Scholte (2005) highlights three types of collective identity relevant for this thesis: national, supra-national and non-territorial. In the case of national identity, the basis of identity is nationalism. This implies a situation where people construct their being and belonging first and foremost in terms of national affiliation and a national territorial pattern of social space. Claims are made to the difference and uniqueness of one national group *vis-a-vis* the rest of humanity (ibid: 147-148). Important manifestations of the structure of nationalism are the construction of states, firms and also CSOs as 'national' organizations. Hence, the idea of nationalism goes hand in hand with statism (ibid: 225), fundamentally affecting CSO identity-making.

In the second case, supra-national identity implies an idea of nationhood 'above' the nation-state, often constructed on a basis of a supra-state macro-region. Shared experiences of, for example, the slave trade, colonialism, common cultural heritage and/or religion are claimed to provide deep historical roots for the supra-national, regional identity. However, this type of identity still rests on the notion of territoriality as well as statism, albeit stretched above any one nation-state (ibid: 236-237).[15] On the whole, the first two examples of identity are influenced by the hegemonic idea of the nation-state as the primary instrument for ordering social relations inherent in the current world order.

Lastly, whereas territorial identities based on nationalism or supra-nationalism are linked to a particular geographical area, other aspects of being, such as class, religion and gender, are not bound to territorial location. Constructing the self and group affiliations in terms of class interests, religious beliefs or being a woman, non-

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[15] 'Regional identity' has become a catchphrase in academia since the 1980s, not the least in regionalism studies, and has been recognized as an important element in the making of regions (e.g. Hettne 1999; Katzenstein 2005; Slocum and Van Langenhove 2005). It has been argued that belonging to a specific region may raise a sense of identity that challenges hegemonic national identity narratives (Paasi 2009). It is argued that regional identity is becoming a new identity structure that affects how people and organized actors view their belonging. In the EU in particular, a regional identity is emerging hand in hand with increased regional integration, which has become the object of intense scholarly debate and benchmarking by policy-makers (Katzenstein 2005: 77; Slocum and Van Langenhove 2005; Risse 2010; Paasi 2009). Furthermore, even though the literature on regional identity focuses on Europe (Slocum and Van Langenhove 2005: 148), other world regions are beginning to register on researchers' radar. In Asia, for example, and within ASEAN in particular, it is claimed that the presence of a common cultural heritage has facilitated the emergence of regional identity (Böås and Hveem 2001: 123) and that discourses of 'the Asian way' and 'Asian values' are used for political purposes (Katzenstein 2005: 79), for example in terms of building a foundation for states-led regionalism.

territorial identities transcend territorial place, distance and borders to encompass people all around the world (ibid: 149).[16]

Inherent in the construction of collective identity is the maintenance of boundaries between 'we' and the 'other'. Collective identity cannot occur in the absence of a 'we' characterized by a particular social trait or adherence to some specific values and principles. This is referred to as a positive identity (Della Porta and Diani 2006: 94). In terms of networks, common in regionalization processes, their strength can come from relationships among the networked organizations producing one coherent 'voice' based on some social traits, representation of a particular constituency and/or some common principles and goals. The voice of the network, then, is not the sum of all the individual voices in the network, but the product of an interaction of voices, and is also different from any single voice of a network member (Keck and Sikkink 1998).

Most importantly, the social sphere in which identity is formed ultimately affects on what level CSO action is taking place. In other words, adherence to national, supra-national or non-territorial collective identity determines the spatial nature of agency. Hence, when having a national identity, NGOs, networks and social movements tend to focus their activities on a national level, while a supra-national identity warrants macro-regional action, and a non-territorial identity spurs transnational action, which can be global but also regional.

One important aspect of transnational collective identity is the concept of 'solidarity'. When civil society activists share an understanding of their collective actions as being an act of solidarity with the suffering of some oppressed, distant or not so distant, group or section of the same social constituency, this can effectively add to the consolidation of collective identity (Thörn 2009: 207-208). If these oppressed groups reside in neighbouring countries in a particular region this can spur regional mobilization in support of those groups.

In terms of the regional level, it is interesting to find out to what extent and how collective identities, built on common social traits, shared values, world-views, lifestyles and/or other types of common experiences of actions, are linked to the 'region' and in what ways this can generate and affect civil society regionalization. The identity dimension of civil society regionalization will be discussed in sections 4.6.1 and 5.6.1.

2.10.2 Regional Exclusive Identity-Making

One variant of identity is exclusive identity-making. This implies a strong negative identification of the 'other'. That other is framed and shamed as responsible for some bad conditions and hence is a target for social mobilization in order to improve

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[16] One important example of non-territorial identity-making is the voting-patterns among worker representatives at International Labour Organization (ILO) conferences. In a recent study it was shown that worker representatives often vote together with worker representatives from other countries and against the national position of their home state. In fact, workers are guided by interests, values and beliefs that are in line with their transnational class identity and not their national identity (Koenig-Archibugi 2012). The extent to which non-territorial identity-making, in line with community-building between workers in the ILO, as well as construction of regional identities also affect regional consolidation of CSOs in Southern Africa will be discussed in the latter half of chapters 4 and 5.

these conditions. The 'we', who is strongly separated and excluded from the identification of the 'other', is often referred to as an exclusive identity (Della Porta and Diani 2006: 94). This type of identity-making thrives from feelings of exclusion and alienation, coupled with a righteous sense of self, and is intimately linked to a more extreme form of issue-framing which depends on the construction of regional targets in adversarial ways. One important example of an exclusive type of identity is what Castells refers to as the identity of resistance, often adopted by social movements and more critical parts of civil society, which constructs forms of collective resistance against what is perceived as unbearable oppression and injustices: 'The exclusion of the excluders by the excluded' (2010: 9) is a very strong type of identity. It is argued here that a strong positive identity can spur collective action, but this is even more so for groups with a strong exclusive resistance identity. Hence, making the definition of both the actor and its adversaries more precise in the identity-making process, exclusive identities for resistance often provide stronger incentives for action (ibid: 103).

Exclusive identity-making is intimately linked to the construction of adversarial target groups and shaming, discussed in section 2.9.2, and similarly must be understood in terms of constructing alternative images of social order, in opposition to the mainstream ideas of the statist and capitalist world order. Hence, a resistance type of identity-making 'can form the basis for the emergence of an alternative structure' (Leysens 2008: 49).

In terms of the regional level, if the identity-making process of CSOs is linked to a strong feeling of exclusion from and even resistance to a regional 'other', for example a RIGO accused of certain injustices, this can possibly strengthen regional action further. The extent to which this dimension of civil society regionalization is important will be discussed in sections 4.6.2 and 5.6.2.

2.10.3 Issue-Framing and Identity-Making at Regional Events

International events such as conferences, protest campaigns and workshops where CSOs meet intensively and their members are frequently activated are important venues for both issue-framing and identity-making. International events serve as arenas for what Fine calls the 'staging of culture' (1995: 133), i.e. the framing of core issues, the interpretation of material interests and the construction of a group identity. At these events, the reconstruction of social actors and the constitution of group identities and ideas are strengthened through various types of collective action (Klandermans et al 2002: 337-338). Contentious events are particularly strong venues for issue-framing and identity-making, i.e. a series of protest events, civil disobedience campaigns and boycotts where specific rituals are continually performed, for example in terms of demonstrations or speeches. Here the uniqueness and difference of the collective actor is demonstrated in terms of communicating a certain world vision or demonstrating a basic historical experience (Della Porta and Diani 2006: 109).

The extent and ways that regional events affect the regionalization of civil society in terms of framing issues in a regional setting and constructing and reconstructing regional identities will be addressed in sections 4.5, 4.6, 5.5 and 5.6.

2.11 Conclusions

The first part of this chapter discussed the theoretical foundations for understanding civil society regionalization. It began with a discussion about the meta-theoretical foundations of this thesis, in terms of the relation between theory and practice, agency and structure, and the material and ideational, before moving on to discuss the concept of civil society, both in historical and contemporary terms and with a focus on both global and African civil society. A key section then discussed the importance of bringing social structures from critical theoretical approaches and agency from social constructivist theory into an understanding of the dynamics of civil society, something which is largely missing in much research. In terms of social structure, CCT understands this in terms of historical structure, and as made up of material capabilities (not included in the analysis of this thesis), ideas and institutions generated by deeper statist and capitalist social structures. Hence, ideas related to nationalism and neo-liberalism, as well as state-centric and neo-liberal transnational institutions, are important components of the current hegemonic world order. These processes fundamentally influence civil society dynamics on a global level. A social constructivist understanding of agency is equally important for grasping civil society processes, especially the internal mechanisms related to issue-framing and identity-making. Most importantly, structure and agency are interconnected in the sense that the former influences the latter. This implies that civil society regionalization must be conceptualized within deeper statist and capitalist social structures emanating from the world order.

In order to make sense of this, a model by Prendergast and Knottnerus (1994) was introduced which understands social structure as a phenomenon of levels, where statist and capitalist forces travel down a structural ladder from the world system on the highest level to social relationships on the lowest level. In between, structural levels related to inter-organizational and intra-organizational social relations respectively form the backdrop of the analytical framework for understanding civil society regionalization.

After a brief discussion of the current statist and capitalist world order, i.e. the highest structural level affecting social agency on all other levels, the analytical framework for understanding civil society regionalization was further elaborated. To begin with, the framework discussed to what extent statist and capitalist social structures affect the regionalization of civil society on an inter-organizational level. This means analysing RIGO-civil society, donor-civil society and intra-civil society relations on a regional level. In more detail, this implies studying how the nature of regional governance agendas, prioritising certain issues at the expense of others, the creation of regional civil society platforms around RIGOs, and the inclusion and exclusion of CSOs in regional institutions facilitates and/or obstructs the regional consolidation of RCSOs. The provision of donor funds for civil society regionalization is equally important to study, and related to this is the issue of the extent and ways in which donor agendas affect the regional work of CSOs. Lastly, the potential of statist and capitalist social structures to divide regional civil society

was discussed, and it was highlighted how this ultimately affects the regionalization of civil society.

Furthermore, the intra-organizational structural level is equally important in the analytical framework for understanding the regionalization of civil society in this thesis. Hence, the formation and consolidation of regional networks, organizations and campaigns possibly stems from the internal motivations of actors themselves, albeit influenced by statist and capitalist social structures. Civil society agency is intimately linked to the inter-organizational relations between IGOs and CSOs, between donors and CSOs, as well as between CSOs, which in turn are heavily influenced by the ideas and international institutions making up the hegemonic world order. It has been highlighted that issue-framing and identity-making can be strong dimensions of the regionalization of civil society and are important to study in a regional setting. Firstly, framing issues in a transnational/regional setting and linking up with regional agendas can spur CSOs to 'go regional'. Secondly, regional work can be strengthened further if the targets of CSO activities are regional policy-makers. One aspect of this is to use the shaming strategy, urging an IGO to live up to certain commonly-agreed norms and policy documents. Thirdly, constructing positive identities based on some shared principles or social traits can be another strong dimension of civil society regionalization, if those identities are somehow tied to the supra-national/regional or non-territorial levels. If such identity-making also has an element of, fourthly, exclusion, i.e. resisting a perceived regional 'enemy', the resulting exclusive identity can add further to the propensity to 'go regional'. Lastly, intense physical meetings during regional conferences, workshops and protest events can be a powerful tool for issue-framing and identity-making and hence the consolidation of regional networks and NGOs.

Having set the theoretical and conceptual stage for the understanding of civil society regionalization, before this process is empirically scrutinized in detail, the regional manifestation of the world order in Southern Africa will discussed. It is crucial to first account for the overall statist and capitalist dynamics on the regional level before CSOs going regional can be analysed, since the former fundamentally influences the latter, in line with the conceptualization of structure as a phenomenon of levels.

3
The Statist-Capitalist Regional Order in Southern Africa

Having addressed the highest level of the statist-capitalist social structure - the world order - in section 2.5, this chapter will discuss its regional manifestation in Southern Africa. The regional order can be seen as a lower level of world order, albeit with its own distinctiveness. It should be noted that neither the CCT- nor the Prendergast/Knottnerus frameworks explicitly include the regional level. However, in terms of the former framework it is nevertheless suitable for the incorporation of this level. World regions indeed consist of capitalist social forces and states and are located within a world order (Leysens 2001: 228). Furthermore, understanding the world system as the economic, political and social relations across societies, Prendergast and Knottnerus (1994: 16) do not further specify what 'across societies' means. Due to the world-wide trend of regionalism, international relations also specifically occur on the regional level. Therefore their framework, it can be argued, lends itself to the inclusion of the regional level, even though the region does not explicitly feature in the model. In a similar vein, Björn Hettne argues that the statist and capitalist social structures inherent in the world order are manifested on many different levels, of which the regional is one. Hence, according to him, it is possible to talk about specific regional social orders (2002, 2005) at the same time also being part of the world order.

Southern Africa qualifies as a regional hegemonic order with a distinct state-society regional complex, in line with the conceptualization of CCT (Leysens 2001), taking into consideration the neo-liberal hegemony, the evolving regional political economy and state domination (particularly South Africa) which mark the region. Hence, the regional order in Southern Africa 'replicates the ideas/ideology of the current global hegemonic order' (ibid: 231). In other words, being embedded in the statist and capitalist world order, the regional order in Southern Africa shares many of its features.

The lower levels of social structure discussed in sections 2.6-2.10 sequentially originate from this regional order, in line with the idea of social structure as a phenomenon of levels. Therefore, before we consider civil society regionalization in Southern Africa in chapters 4 and 5 we need to account for the overall structural

context in which this process takes place. More specifically, in terms of the statist social structure, the regional order is marked by authoritarian state politics, state domination of civil society, and sovereignty-boosting regional governance, which will be discussed in sections 3.1.1-3.1.3. In terms of the capitalist element, neo-liberal economics, problem-solving civil society and neo-liberal regional governance are discussed in sections 3.2.1-3.2.3. A last concluding section rounds up the chapter.

3.1 Implications of the Statist Social Structure

In this section, the implications of statism in Southern Africa will be discussed. First, the authoritarian African state and, secondly, its dominating tendencies *vis à vis* civil society and how this affects the latter. Thirdly, an account of regional governance in Southern Africa will be made in terms of its sovereignty-boosting element.

3.1.1 The Authoritarian State

The literature on the post-colonial African state is rich. With few exceptions, states in Africa are considered highly problematic in a democratic sense (Freund 2010). The African state has been characterized by high levels of authoritarianism (Nwabueze 2003), despite the democratization that has been taking place in many countries during the last two decades: 'Africa is still far from being a bastion of democracy […Political elites] support pluralism because it is a method of retaining or gaining power' (Thomson 2010: 247). African states are highly centralized in the sense that power has accumulated in the executive branch, often within the office of the president, king or prime minister, at the expense of parliaments and judicial branches. Individuals belonging to the executive, on local and national levels, tend to dominate and monopolize formal politics within society. To a large extent, then, African governments have developed a monopoly over political decision-making within their countries. Often, the centralization of the state is related to 'neo-patrimonialism', whereby power is concentrated in the personal authority an individual leader. On a national level this is the head of state. For neo-patrimonial leaders, the various concerns of the state are seen as their own personal affairs (ibid). This is often manifested by the extraction of resources from the state for personal enrichment. State resources are also deployed as an instrument to maintain support and legitimacy for the regime through nurturing key political, administrative and economic allies (Söderbaum and Taylor 2008: 22).

Moreover, in order to maintain the concentration of power in the hands of the political elite, opportunities for organized opposition, for example through opposition parties, are limited. This also includes restrictions for and manipulation and co-option by the government of actors within civil society such as labour unions, professional groups and other voluntary associations. In the process of centralization the state therefore enjoys a superior position *vis à vis* civil society, whose members are increasingly constrained. For example, CSOs are often denied the possibility of providing advice and feedback on policy or of suggesting

alternative approaches in various sectors (Thomson 2010: 122-123). The political elite within the authoritarian state sometimes use less civil ways to maintain power: '[t]he state takes on the peculiar character of an instrument for the domination, oppression and repression of the people […] by a regular, systematic application of organized force' (Nwabueze 2003: 353-354). In fact, state elites even consciously create disorder in society in order to maintain power (Freund 2010: 52).

As in other parts of Africa, Southern African states have fostered a regional political culture of authoritarian rule and the dominance of personal rulers is strong, which is a great obstacle towards deepening regional integration in the SADC (Peters 2011: 165). Authoritarianism and the centralization of the state have cemented a regional order based on states. In such a statist regional order, the prime objective for states and corresponding political elites is to exercise control over their sovereign affairs and maximize the 'national interest' (Vale 2001, 2003), which often equals the political and economic interests of the ruling elites.

Similar to the world order at large, an important element of the state-centric regional order is the widespread nationalist and statist notion of community in the region, promoted and cemented by political leaders, which has created a national identity structure. Southern African states invest little time in developing strategies for creating regional consciousness among the region's citizens or promoting a sense of regional identity (Williams 2006), and the question of free movements of people and people-centred regional citizenship is not a priority for the political elite in the region (Radebe 2008). States see migration mainly through security lenses, and regional policy-making linked to facilitating the movement of people is overshadowed by protectionist immigration laws on a national level and the widespread criminalization of foreign migrants in most states in the region (Matlosa 2006). Due to the lack of commitment by political elites to supporting regional citizenship and identity-making for people in the region, 'the forging of a regional consciousness is likely to take place at a glacial pace if at all' (Kornegay 2006: 45).

On the whole, then, the understanding of identity in Southern Africa is limited to, and dominated by, the states of the region. According to one scholar, 'the interpretation of regional community in SADC remains a prerogative of the narrow interests of regional elites [...] which implies that states provide the only path to regional community' (Blaauw 2007: 230). Additionally, the lack of common political and democratic values in the region among political elites plays against the promotion of regional community and citizenship from above (Peters 2011: 165). One commentator concludes that the 'means of promoting a sense of regional identity, loyalty, homogeneity, and participation is not available to Southern Africa' (Schoeman 2001: 153). Furthermore, the predominant perception of regional community-building in Southern Africa as based on the community of states is spread throughout society (Radebe 2008: 28). Nationalist notions among citizens and CSOs in the region are common, and the concepts of the nation-state and national identity have become an integral part of their identities (ibid: 49). According to one scholar, this implies a separation of 'the people from their shared

history and their shared concerns' (Vale 2003: 114).[17] According to a major survey about popular attitudes towards migration in the region, the Southern African Migration Project, the majority of people interviewed saw the migration of people more or less as a problem. Therefore, the study concludes that any sense among people of regional solidarity with other countries in the SADC is absent (Williams 2006: 12). Another national survey undertaken in Lesotho, Zimbabwe and Mozambique indicated that 62% of people agreed with the importance of a national border to separate their country from others (Leysens 2001: 228). One tragic implication of these nationalist and statist notions is widespread hostility towards foreigners in most countries in the region, not the least in South Africa and Zimbabwe, where suspicion towards foreigners and xenophobic stereotypes are ripe in society (Matlosa 2006). Two scholars conclude that identification with the SADC as a regional community is underdeveloped among the populations of the region (le Pere and Tjönneland 2005: 45). The extent to which national and statist notions of identity affect the regionalization of civil society will be discussed in section 6.3.

3.1.2 State Domination of Civil Society

The statist deeper social structure in Southern Africa has greatly influenced state-civil society relations, to the detriment of CSOs. Many governments in the region have an innate distrust of civil society and often undermine its ability to play a meaningful role in democracy and development. According to one scholar, 'the relationship between national NGOs and national governments is acrimonious at best' (Blaauw 2007: 246). In Mozambique, for example, the space for influencing policy is limited by the state. The state is dominating in its interaction with civil society and there is widespread manipulation of civil society, for example in terms of taking sides in party political disputes, and *ad hoc* informal consultation with (some) CSOs in policy-making without any real commitment to the provision of policy influence to civil society more broadly (FDC 2007). In Tanzania as well, the culture of authoritarianism is entrenched in wider society and the government controls all society's activities. This fundamentally affects state-civil society relations (Ndumbaro and Kiondo 2007). When NGOs challenge the Tanzanian government for political space, in terms of advocating for policy change and human

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[17] There are signs of regional community-building and identity-making from below in Southern Africa. Scholars point to the fact that, despite being separated by national borders, many communities in Southern Africa share a common history, cultural heritage, language, religion and other social bonds due to migration and cross-border trade. Common ethnic groups, church communities, traders and migrant workers have established cross-border linkages and solidarity networks outside of the state arena (e.g. Vale 2004; Matlosa 2006). One important example of regional community-building from below is the Zionist Christian Church (ZCC), an African multi-ethnic movement spread over a large part of Southern Africa which has some 6 million members, mainly poor people from townships and villages in rural areas. The ZCC is considered to be 'one of the region's fastest growing grassroots, transnational social movements' (Radebe 2008: 48) and 'formed beyond the frontiers of the Southern African states' (Blaauw 2007: 262). Its symbolic gestures, such as ZCC badges and hats, shared doctrines of peace, love, unity, reconciliation, productivity and hard work, and regional events such as the Easter Festival in South Africa, transcend national boundaries and construct regional communities on the basis of cultural, religious, social, and not national, ties. Regional networking within the ZCC community also spills over to non-religious areas (Radebe 2008). In terms of regional integration, James Mittelman claims that these and other 'cross-border flows that are truly bottom-up [...] constitute a significant bottom-up pressure for regionalism' (1999: 197).

rights, government suspicion of NGOs is expressed in overt and less overt ways (Michael 2004). In Zimbabwe, this tendency is even more pronounced. Contrary to the Mozambican situation, where advocacy activities are at least allowed by law, Zimbabweans do not have the freedom to form and participate in civic groups and associations as they wish. Furthermore, many CSOs have been severely restricted in their activities due to repressive legislation that governs civil society, for example in terms of criminalizing activities such as popular meetings that would allow citizens to participate in governance processes. The implication of this is that there is very little civil society participation in the development of public policies (Sachikonye et al 2007: 54-55). As will be discussed in the last section of this chapter, the negative attitude of states towards civil society spills over to the regional level and the SADC.

3.1.3 Sovereignty-Boosting Regional Governance

The statist social structure also deeply affects the regional integration process in Southern Africa. Historically, regionalism in Southern Africa has been the preserve of states and governing elites, and popular participation in regional integration frameworks has been very weak (Tsie: 2001: 132). The SADC, as the current main manifestation of regionalism and the most important RIGO in Southern Africa, is deeply state-centric and elite-driven (Matlosa and Lotshwao 2010: 52) and a good example of sovereignty-boosting regional governance.[18] Before this is discussed further, a few general words about the SADC as a regional organization are warranted.

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) was formed in 1992 and is the prime RIGO in Southern Africa. As of 2013 it has 15 members, namely Angola, Botswana, the DRC, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The headquarters are based in Gabarone, Botswana. The most important SADC institutions are: the Summit of Heads of State or Government; the Council of Ministers; the Ministerial Clusters; the Standing Committee of Officials; the Secretariat; the SADC National Committees; the SADC Tribunal and Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation. The institutions relevant for this thesis are briefly discussed below (Oosthuizen 2006).

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[18] The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) is another important RIGO in the region with Burundi, Comoros, DRC, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Seychelles, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe as member states. The regional Secretariat is situated in Lusaka, Zambia. The overall aim is to achieve sustainable economic and social progress in all member states through increased co-operation and integration in various fields of development. According to the home page, COMESA's current strategy can be summed up with the words 'economic prosperity through regional integration' (COMESA 2013). However, due to the little engagement with COMESA by the targeted CSOs in this thesis, it will only sporadically be included in the discussion in chapters 4 and 5. For the same reason, another RIGO, Southern African Customs Union (SACU) is left out in the empirical analysis. SACU is a customs union between Boswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland with a regional secretariat situated in Windhoek, Namibia. It aims to facilitate trade in terms of maintaining the free interchange of goods between member countries. It provides for a common external tariff and a common excise tariff to this customs area. SACU also wants to be a vehicle for deeper development integration within the broader Southern African region (SACU 2013).

The Summit is the SADC's supreme policy-making institution. It consists of the heads of state or government of all members states, meeting at least once a year. The Summit is responsible for the overall policy direction and control of the organization and takes decisions by consensus. The Council of Ministers (COM) consists of one minister from each member state, normally the one responsible for foreign affairs, and meets at least four times a year. The COM reports and is responsible to the Summit, advising the latter on policy issues and further development of the organization, for example recommending to the Summit the approval of protocols and treaties. The Secretariat is the SADC's principal administrative and executive institution. Among its chief tasks are strategic planning and policy analysis; monitoring, coordinating and supporting the implementation of SADC programmes; implementation of the decisions of supreme decision-making bodies; and general promotion of the SADC. The Secretariat is headed by the Executive Secretary and under him/her are two Deputy Executive Secretaries responsible for regional integration and finance and administration. The work on regional integration is divided into a number of Directorates. The TIFI Directorate encompasses the sectors of trade, industry, finance, mining and investment; the IS Directorate the infrastructure and services sectors; the FANR Directorate the food, agriculture and natural resources sectors; the SHDSP Directorate the social and human development sectors and special programmes; and the Directorate of the Organ the peace, security and defence sectors (ibid). Since the trade sector is one of the focuses in this thesis, a few more words about TIFI is warranted. TIFI's main functions are to facilitate the implementation of the trade protocol, to analyse and promote macroeconomic policy convergence in the region, to initiate industrial-development promotion policies, to promote the development of mining, and to promote efficient and development-oriented financial sectors.

Lastly, and based in Windhoek, Namibia, the Tribunal is the SADC's supreme judicial body. The prime tasks of the Tribunal are to make sure that the Treaty and corresponding protocols are adhered to and to deal with disputes related to their interpretation. However, the Tribunal also has a broader mandate to protect the interests and rights of SADC member states as well as their citizens and to adjudicate disputes between states, natural and legal persons. The implementation of decisions is subordinated to the member states through the Summit (ibid).

The SADC Treaty was signed in 1992, formally establishing the SADC as a regional legal entity. It is not an overstatement to say that the SADC agenda was originally very ambitious. According to the SADC Treaty, the (quite diverse) objectives of the SADC are to:

       a)   achieve development and economic growth, alleviate poverty, enhance the standard and quality of life of the people of Southern Africa and support the socially disadvantaged through regional integration;

       b)   evolve common political values, systems and institutions;

       c)   promote and defend peace and security;

       d)   promote self-sustaining development on the basis of collective self-reliance, and the interdependence of Member States;

e)   achieve complementarity between national and regional strategies and pro-
     grammes;

f)   promote and maximize productive employment and utilization of resources of
     the Region;

g)   achieve sustainable utilization of natural resources and effective protection of
     the environment;

h)   strengthen and consolidate the long standing historical, social and cultural af-
     finities and links among the people of the Region (SADC 1992).

Also referred to as the SADC common agenda, these objectives have given the
SADC a strong focus on regional economic integration, as well as on opening up
new political areas such as peace, security and the promotion of democracy (le Pere
and Tjönneland 2005).

Furthermore, the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) was
adopted in 2003 and is often referred to as the SADC's main plan for realizing and
implementing goals related to socio-economic development in the SADC Treaty
(ibid). The RISDP 're-affirms the commitment of SADC Member States to good
political, economic and corporate governance entrenched in a culture of democracy,
full participation by civil society, transparency and respect for the rule of law'
(SADC 2003a), signalling the importance put on implementing the plan in a
democratic way and involving non-state actors. In 2007, in order to make the SADC
more efficient, four priority areas were approved: peace and security co-operation as
a pre-requisite for economic integration; trade and economic liberalization through
progressive market integration; infrastructure in support of regional integration; and
special programmes, for example food security, gender equality and HIV/AIDS
(Giuffrida and Muller-Glodde 2008). In terms of the latter, realizing that HIV/AIDS
had become a real threat to widespread development, in 2003 the SADC took on the
challenge of combating the pandemic, which was to be addressed in all SADC
activities. Therefore, a HIV/AIDS Unit within the SHDSP Directorate was formed
the same year, responsible for implementing the special programme on HIV/AIDS,
for mainstreaming HIV/AIDS in the SHDSP directorate, and for supporting other
directorates in their HIV/AIDS work, as well as for overall HIV/AIDS policy
development and harmonization within the SADC (Oosthuizen 2006).

Leaving the organizational nature of the SADC, since the overriding motivation
for regional governance in Southern Africa is for leaders to maintain the existing
statist order, to a large extent the pursuit of regional integration in the SADC in
practice centres on member states exerting their specific national interests and goals.
The national rationale for regional integration is clear. In the words of two scholars,
'planning and budgeting of key regional integration programs are an imminent
political, interest-led process of negotiating and agreeing in order to add value and
visible benefits to the ongoing national plans and programs' (Giuffrida and Muller-
Glodde 2008, 21). Hence, 'national sovereignty becomes paramount […and is] a
powerful tool in international relations and the way states relate to each other at
regional levels' (Matlosa and Lotshwao 2010: 46). SADC leaders tend to use
regional governance to strengthen their regimes and the sovereignty of the state. It is

not a coincidence, therefore, that the weakest states in Southern Africa are members of many more African inter-governmental regional organizations than relatively stronger states such as South Africa and Namibia (Söderbaum 2002). In many respects, therefore, the SADC is a good example of sovereignty-boosting regional governance.

Furthermore, despite a restructuring of the SADC from 2001 onwards which attempted to give more supra-national powers to the Secretariat (at least on paper), member states still seem reluctant to give up national sovereignty and to transfer policy-making to the regional level (le Pere and Tjönneland 2005; Mulaudzi 2006). To a large extent, decision-making power is centralized in the Heads of State and Government (Matlosa and Lotshwao 2010: 46). Even though members, at least formally, have ceded some policy-making powers to a few SADC institutions, such as the Secretariat and the Tribunal, it is more correct to speak of 'change in the locus and context of exercising sovereignty, rather than a loss of sovereignty' (Oosthuizen 2006, 162). In reality, most SADC institutions, including the Secretariat, are controlled by direct representatives of member states, and those not controlled in this way, such as the Tribunal, have no real authority.[19] On the whole, the interests of individual member states are supreme in the SADC and 'member states to a large extent still control the [SADC-led] process of regional integration' (Afadameh-Adeyemi and Kalula 2011: 20).

The negative consequences of this for deeper regional integration are many. For example, since member states make sure that they refer to the principle of national sovereignty in all SADC policy documents (Matlosa 2006), the various regional policy documents signed by the member states are in practice not binding, which results in a lack of political commitment to implement agreed conventions, norms and standards. Additionally, SADC member states hardly put any effort into translating regional protocols, declarations and codes of conducts into practice, which requires legal reforms (Matlosa and Lotshwao 2010: 47-48; Malaudzi 2006: 12). Lastly, the consensus model of deliberations practiced in SADC decision-making organs such as the Summit ensures that the SADC is a traditional inter-*governmental* body as opposed to a supra-national entity (Blaauw 2007: 194). On the whole, the unwillingness of SADC member states to share sovereignty and

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[19] One sign of the reluctance of member states to pass decision-making power to the supra-national level was the decision to suspend the activities of the Tribunal at the SADC Summit in Windhoek, Namibia, in August 2010. The Secretariat was commissioned to review the mandate of the Tribunal in terms of its operations, role and responsibility, jurisdiction and power to review the decisions of domestic courts (Afadameh-Adeyemi and Kalula 2011). The controversy around the suspension the Tribunal was preceded by the refusal of the Zimbabwean regime to recognize the Tribunal's ruling against the country in what is known as the Campbell case. The Tribunal reported Zimbabwe's failure to comply with its decision to the Summit, but instead of putting sanctions on Zimbabwe, the Summit decided to stop the Tribunal (ibid: 16). At the extraordinary Summit in Windhoek in May 2011, the findings of the Secretariat's report were largely ignored and the Summit instead decided to uphold the suspension of the Tribunal until May 2012 in order for the SADC Ministers of Justice to amend the legal instruments of the SADC (Peters 2011: 164). The suspension of the Tribunal has caused a crisis for the Tribunal, since its credibility and independence are being questioned (Afadameh-Adeyemi and Kalula 2011). On a deeper level, the Tribunal crisis poses serious questions regarding how ready the SADC actually is for supra-national regional integration. As some scholars argue, since the Tribunal is the only institution that does not report to the Summit, member state compliance with its decisions is the true test for the transfer of powers to supra-national institutions within the SADC (ibid: 2011: 20).

promote regional citizenship from above, as also discussed above, are great impediments for building a common regional community in Southern Africa. This fundamentally affects the relationship with civil society.

The SADC frequently and strongly proclaims the need to involve civil society in regional integration. The need to forge partnerships with CSOs is addressed in the SADC Treaty:

> SADC shall seek to involve fully, the people of the Region and non-governmental organisations in the process of regional integration […] SADC shall co-operate with, and support the initiatives of the peoples of the Region and non-governmental organisations, contributing to the objectives of this Treaty in the areas of co-operation in order to foster closer relations among the communities, associations and people of the Region (SADC 1992: §23)

Subsequent amendments to the Treaty in 2001 also make reference to the role that civil society such as NGOs and worker's organizations should play in regional integration efforts (Blaauw 2007: 207). However, this and other proclamations are mainly rhetorical statements which are not materialized in reality. In line with the discussion in sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2, since the SADC is built on political state systems where democracy has not matured, as in other parts of Africa, it is not part of the member states' and the SADC's political culture to interact with non-state actors.[20] The SADC is largely driven by power politics and logically does not voluntarily give up that power to the benefit of CSOs.[21]

In more detail, the role of civil society within the SADC is not yet clear. The Treaty fails to define exactly what status civil society has in the envisaged partnership (Balule 2009). The SADC has not defined any clear criteria for interaction with civil society and it is uncertain which CSOs can actually qualify for co-operation.[22] The SADC has failed to develop concrete overall modalities and mechanisms for collaboration with civil society (Balule 2009). For example, there is not yet a formalized SADC participatory framework which takes into consideration all the possible avenues for public participation in the SADC (Nzewi and Zakwe 2009: 43). To conclude, 'civil society involvement and participation is limited in a structural way'.[23]

It is widely recognized by civil society and academic commentators that civil society is in practice deliberately marginalized in SADC-led regionalism and that consultation with CSOs in various sectors is more or less minimal, if not non-existent.[24] In fact, the SADC itself is very honest about the reluctance to engage with CSOs. According to one SADC representative, the SADC has no interest in interacting with researchers and CSOs. Interaction and consultation only takes place when it is meaningful and advantageous for the SADC: 'If it is convenient for you,

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[20] le Pere, interview, 27 November 2008

[21] Ncube, interview, 8 December 2008

[22] le Pere, interview, 27 November 2008

[23] Barnard, interview, 26 November 2008

[24] e.g. Osei-Hwedie, interview, 5 December 2008; le Pere, interview, 27 November 2008; Ashley, interview, 17 December 2009; Landsberg 2006; SADC-CNGO 2009a

we are really too busy and just don't have time for you. SADC is a closed institution that has not prioritized to work with civil society'.[25] All in all, according to Matlosa and Lotshwao, '[t]he integration agenda still remains state-centric, elite-dominated and exclusionary. Ordinary people still remain objects, and not subjects, in a regional project ostensibly aimed at improving their lives' (2010: 49). Hence, the statist social structure has deeply influenced SADC-led regional governance. In other words, the SADC is an important regional institution for reproducing a statist regional order in Southern Africa.

3.2 Implications of the Capitalist Social Structure

In this section, the capitalist social structure in Southern Africa will be discussed, firstly in terms of the general neo-liberalization of the region, which has resulted in, secondly, a largely problem-solving civil society. Thirdly, the implications of the capitalist social structure for regional governance will be addressed.

3.2.1 The Neo-liberal Project

Besides statism, capitalism, manifested by the neo-liberal discourse, has made substantial imprints on social order in Africa. In order to further strengthen the hegemonic world order, peripheral regions are gradually integrated into the world economy and Africa is not an exception to this. In fact, quite the contrary is true. Africa is at the forefront of the globalized project of neo-liberal reform and has undergone extensive and protracted neo-liberal social engineering during the past 30 years (Harrison 2010). Despite many experiments with alternative political systems in Africa after independence, of which Nyerere's African Socialism in Tanzania is perhaps the most famous example, most African countries eventually resorted to market capitalism (Thomson 2010: 44), in line with the global hegemonic idea of the 'free-market'. Even if many governments initially wanted to control market forces, and therefore developed state capitalism in which the regime encouraged private enterprise but in many ways retained control over the market (ibid), widespread neo-liberal privatization and liberalization gradually gained a stronghold in many countries. In fact, the rigour and persistence of these reforms on the continent is a good example of what one scholar calls 'scientific capitalism' (Ferguson 1995). Driven by international financial institutions (IFIs) such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), as well as foreign donors, the neo-liberal economic and political packages of trade liberalization, the privatization of national assets and resources, the commodification of social services and the marketization of goods and services have become intrinsic in policy-making in African states. At the same time, a large part of the African political, economic and intellectual elite has voluntarily accommodated this neo-liberal discourse (Shivji 2007), gradually joining the transnational managerial class. To a large extent, the implementation of neo-liberal reform has been mandatory for African states subject to the World Bank's

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[25] Ncube, interview, 8 December 2008

Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) and has left them with little choice to embark on alternative economic frameworks. According to one scholar, 'the extent of interventions to promote the putative free market has been remarkable over the past 30 years […] and place the highest priority on freedom of manoeuvre for private capital' (Fine 2010: 73). Furthermore, neo-liberal reforms have been infused with social programmes to ease difficult neo-liberal transitions. In essence, this means providing safety nets for weak parts of the population that lose out during the shift to a neo-liberal political economy (Harrison 2010: 102), in line with the dominant problem-solving rationale. Civil society plays an important role here, as will be discussed in the next section.

The global neo-liberal pressure is particularly strong in Southern Africa. Neo-liberal reforms have taken place in almost all countries in Southern Africa, often through external coercion. Many states in the region have been forced to implement SAPs and the successor programme, Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), which have imposed upon them neo-liberal economic reform packages under the supervision of IMF and the World Bank. At the same time, there is a big element of free will in the neo-liberal adoption. Many states have voluntarily adjusted their domestic economic policies in line with changing global economic conditions in order to better benefit from economic globalization. One good example is the South African pro-market Growth, Employment and Redistribution Programme (GEAR). The neo-liberal reforms, as in the rest of Africa, mean trade liberalization, the privatization of public enterprises, currency devaluation, price decontrol, the reduction of state expenditure, achieving real interest rates and maintaining macroeconomic stability in order to create the foundations for market-led development and integrate the regional economies into the world capitalist system (Tsie 2001; Kanyenze et al 2006). Neo-liberal reforms have great implications for the evolution of civil society in the region, including the regionalization of civil society, which will be discussed later.

Besides the neo-liberal stronghold, another striking feature about the Southern African region is the economic dominance of South Africa (Tsie 2001; Odén 2001). The widespread and deep neo-liberal economic reforms in the region since the beginning of the 1980s can be seen as the latest stage in the historical evolution of a regional capitalist political economy in Southern Africa that revolves around that country. During the colonial era, a form of regional capitalism emerged that was based on structural integration between South Africa, the centre, and the neighbouring states, which became peripheral service economies. The regional political economy has gradually been constituted and integrated through production, capital transport and labour patterns. South African investments in regional infrastructure, mineral production and cash crops throughout the region, in combination with labour migration, tied the entire region together into a system that reinforced the interests of South African mining and plantation capital (Söderbaum 2002: 64-65). Since then, economic development has been marked by uneven penetration of capitalism in the region and South Africa remains the key locus of capital accumulation in the region (Matlosa 2006: 5).

The historical polarized patterns of accumulation ensure that the rest of the SADC economies remain dependent on South Africa for trade routes, food imports, labour migration, foreign investment and a number of manufactured goods. In the current regional political economy, the economies of individual countries such as Mozambique and Zimbabwe are connected to and deeply affected by regional processes revolved around South African capital.[26] The GNP of South Africa is four times that of the other SADC members combined, and South African business completely dominates trade in the region (Blaauw 2007: 43). On the whole, regional economic integration in Southern Africa is highly asymmetric, where there is a heavy dependence on the export of primary commodities for weaker economies against the import of basic goods and services from South Africa. In this unequal exchange of goods, weaker countries suffer because they cannot compete in the current market-driven regional order (Pressend 2010). The extremely asymmetrical trade flows 'clearly reveal that South Africa is a semi-industrialised country juxtaposed to a backward, underdeveloped periphery which is nevertheless of paramount importance to its future growth and prosperity' (Tsie: 134). The tendency, then, is that South Africa plays a dominating role, hindering regional development instead of acting as the regional motor from which all parts of the region can benefit (Odén 2001). In the words of one scholar, 'in the affairs of the region, South Africa continues to dominate' (Vale 2003: 137). In fact, this has created hostility among other member states, fearing that South Africa will re-colonize the region (Mulaudzi 2006: 15). The implications of South African dominance for civil society regionalization will briefly be discussed in section 6.1.3.

One important implication of the capitalist social order in Southern Africa for ordinary people is the evolving informal sector. The privatization or dismantling of industries as a consequence of SAPs have caused widespread unemployment in the region and left urban dwellers with no other source of income. Forgotten by the state and untouched by development policy, in order to secure livelihoods many poor people often resort to informal economic activities, of which Informal Cross Border Trade (ICBT) is one good example (Matlosa 2006: 9; Mijere 2009). Here, informal traders buy their goods in informal markets and travel with their goods between states (IOM 2010a). According to some new studies, the informal sector in fact employs the largest proportion of the total labour force, and ICBT forms a substantial percentage of economic activity in the Southern African economy, albeit highly undocumented (e.g. Matlosa 2006; IOM 2010a; Mijere 2009; SARDC 2008). In fact, ICBT could possibly make up almost 40% of total trade in the region (SARDC 2008).[27]

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[26] Castel-Branco, interview, 24 November 2008

[27] Even if not formally included in the analysis of civil society regionalization, a few words can be said about the vast social inequality in the countries of the region, another capitalist and statist legacy. This fundamentally affects the life of ordinary people in Southern Africa. To start with South Africa, the class differences between employers and employees and between those with formal labour contracts and those who sell their labour on an informal basis are vast. This is strongly correlated with class and income. Households in the richer half of the population have members with jobs, while many households in the poorer half of the population do not, or are dependent on very low-paid workers – mostly farmworkers and domestic workers – and/or remittances or pensions (Seekings 2003). Furthermore, in Mozambique, besides capitalism, statism is an important force behind social stratification. The interconnections between the state,

3.2.2 Problem-Solving Civil Society

Since the late 1980s, civil society has indeed become one of the leading concepts in African development, expected to help in both improving the quality of the African state and contributing to development and democratization (Opoku-Mensah 2008: 75).[28] According to one scholar '[w]hen NGOs emerged in the 1980s and 1990s to play a central role in development they were greeted as a 'magic bullet', the panacea to failed top-down development' (Hearn 2007: 1096). In line with the prevailing neo-liberal discourse, this reflects that the state is blamed for lack of development in Africa. The failure of African governments, their institutions and structures in addressing the problems of welfare, poverty and human development has paved the way for NGOs to take the place of the state (Dibie 2008: 2). This goes hand in hand with a period of widespread political liberalization in Africa, which has also legitimized civil society as a relevant arena for democratization (ibid).

Providing social services to poor and marginalized areas, but also improving policies related to the facilitation of market forces, non-state actors such as NGOs and business associations have become important partners to states, hand in hand with the shrinking of public sectors and the dismantling of welfare systems. To a large extent, social welfare and the provision of basic needs and services to the community are assigned to NGOs and are no longer the responsibility of the state or the private sector (Shivji 2007: 40). According to one commentator, NGOs 'were born in the womb of neo-liberalism […and] are inextricably imbricated in the neo-liberal offensive [...] playing the role of ideological and organizational foot soldiers of imperialism, however this is described' (Shivji 2007: 40, 29). Hence, the function of civil society in Africa is greatly influenced by the neo-liberal project.

In most regards, African NGOs generally buy into the mainstream problem-solving agenda inherent in the prevailing global neo-liberal ideology, in which development problems inherent in the dysfunction of the social order, such as lack of services and the malfunction of certain political structures and markets, are to be 'solved' by state-NGO partnership, as discussed in section 2.5. Hence, civil society in Africa is focusing more on meeting immediate societal needs than on having political functions in terms of influencing the overall policy environment on a deeper level through lobbying and advocacy and addressing the root causes of development problems. Therefore, civil society plays a weak role in public policy-

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society and the ruling party (Frelimo) have been central to the formation of a vast social hierarchy. The party is not only the dominant political force in Mozambique but also a very public and powerful organization which spans the entire nation. The state party provides a hierarchy of government and party posts on national, provincial and local levels, with corresponding ascending benefits in salary, power and opportunities for enrichment. Hence, Frelimo's structure provides a layered form of social stratification based on class, with a 'ruling class' and a hierarchy of interlinked lower social classes whose political influence and income depend on their position in the party structure (Sumich 2010).

[28] Civil societies in Africa are gradually expanding, both in number, scope and in terms of influence over development processes on the continent. During the last 25-30 years, the number of NGOs has increased dramatically in Africa (e.g. Hearn 2007; Michael 2004). One scholar goes as far as calling the growth of NGOs 'explosive' (Dibie 2008). In fact, it is claimed that of all regions in the South, Africa is the one which has experienced the most pronounced proliferation of NGOs (Michael 2004: 7). In Tanzania, according to one study from 2007 there were about 58,000 registered CSOs (Ndumbaro and Mvungi 2007), in South Africa 101,000 (Swilling et al 2004) and in Kenya in 2005 there were amazingly 350,000 registered CSOs (Kanyinga and Mitullah 2007). These numbers have most certainly increased since then.

making (Opoku-Mensah 2008). Furthermore, due to their incorporation into the overall neo-liberal ideology, the model for the successful NGO is the corporation. The success of an NGO is to a large extent measured by its efficiency, a criterion borrowed from the corporate sector. According to one commentator, 'NGOs are ever more marked and judged against corporate ideals' (Shivji 2007: 33). Therefore, the strategic planning of an organization is often tied to log-frames in which development interventions are tabulated and quantified (ibid).

As is the case of Africa at large, civil society in Southern Africa largely plays a problem-solving role and is generally active in poverty alleviation through providing various social services to the poor, filling the service-provision gap of the state. In Tanzania, for example, the charitable and voluntary dimensions dominate the character of CSOs, which are often referred to as welfare organizations (Ndumbaro and Kiondo 2007; Michael 2004). CSOs here play a heavy role in service delivery, foremost related to gender, the environment, education and health, but lack engagement with the wider issues of the root causes of underdevelopment and are rather absent in advocacy work (Michael 2004). Similarly, in Mozambique CSOs are by far more committed to providing services, sometimes as an extension of public administration services, than to participating in political life. Service provision is mostly related to the sectors of development and housing, health, the environment, social services and culture, education and recreation. In general, CSOs have a weak lobby and advocacy capacity, and resorting to more radical contentious forms of struggle such as strikes, demonstrations and petitions is virtually unknown in Mozambique (FDC 2007). Most South African CSOs are also engaged in service activities, which is partly due to the fact that the South African government since 1994 has bolstered its relationship with civil society in policy development and implementation, and has welcomed dialogue and cooperation (Swilling et al 2004: 117), in line with the political, but also economic, liberalization in the country. At least parts of civil society are considered to be a partner in development, and civil society is perceived as an extension of the service delivery and policy-making capacity of the state. In addition, civil society is somehow encouraged by the government to perform a watchdog role, pushing the state to deliver what it has promised. However, this liberal attitude towards civil society only applies to those sections of civil society that buy into the current overall macro-economic government policy in the country in terms of privatization, trade liberalization, limited state intervention in the economy and the rationalization of public services. The dynamics of the capitalist social structure have also created critical NGOs and social movements that challenge and contradict government policy, for example in terms of the privatization of water and market-based land reform, and which demand increased and improved public service delivery to the poor. These actors are often seen as enemies by the state, and *vice versa*. Often, contentious strategies such as demonstrations, civil disobedience and mass mobilization are used outside of the formal and accepted ways of interacting with the state (Ranchod 2007).

Funding NGOs, donors play an important role in the 'neo-liberal offensive' in the region. Being highly dependent on the prevailing (neo-liberal) donor agenda when designing their development programmes, NGOs are becoming increasingly donor-

driven (Shivji 2007). In other words, 'NGOs are set up to respond to whatever is perceived to be in vogue among the donor-community at any particular time' (ibid: 32). Therefore, many African NGOs are seen merely as an extension of the dominant donor aid agenda and as agents of Western interests. One commentator concludes that many NGOs have become 'local managers of foreign aid money, not managers of local African development processes' (Hearn 2007: 1107). In Mozambique, most CSOs have emerged as a result of donor funding and generate 70% of their income from foreign donors (FDC 2007). CSOs are drawn into sectors where there is a lot of money at the time. As a result they adopt the agenda of their donors and the working strategies donors put forward to the CSOs, meaning they are tied into the guidelines and discourse of the donor.[29] Similarly, in Tanzania, almost half of CSO revenues come from donors (Ndumbro and Kiondo 2007) and in Zimbabwe most CSOs rely mainly on donor funding (Sachikonye et al 2007).

As indicated in section 2.2.3, deeply influenced by the capitalist social structure, civil society in Africa has become 'the place to make money' (Hearn 2007: 1102), generating briefcase NGOs driven primarily by economic self-interest, material gain and careerism, rather than by altruism (e.g. Dicklitch 1998: 8; Michael 2004; Shivji 2007). These NGOs are led by representatives from the economic and political elites, not infrequently former government bureaucrats who joined or started NGOs when donor funding was being directed there (Shivji 2007: 321). This deeply affects questions of accountability and legitimacy for CSOs. In Mozambique, for example, CSOs are considered less democratic due to weak transparency, the lack of a culture of accountability, and weak public confidence in CSOs that have a limited role in promoting social capital at the grassroots level (FDC 2007). In Zimbabwe, likewise, accountability to the grassroots has been a problem for CSOs. Some of them have failed to account for funds they have obtained, many CSO leaders are accused of corruption, and several CSOs lack legitimacy due to limited grassroots participation in their activities (Sachikonye 2007: 66). In Tanzania it is claimed that 'some people treat NGOs as their private property and, in this sense, are limited in membership' (Ndumbro and Kiondo 2007: 29). In one study it was found that at least 5% of registered NGOs are 'pocket organizations', mainly established to cater for private interests. Many NGOs also show low levels of transparency, and many organizations are reluctant to disclose their revenues and expenditures (ibid: 37). The (lack of) legitimacy of civil society on the regional level will be briefly discussed in section 6.3.

3.2.3 The SADC and Neo-liberal Regional Governance

Regionalism in Southern Africa has to be seen within the context of regional economic neo-liberalism and economic globalization (Söderbaum 2002), besides being deeply affected by the statist social structure discussed in section 3.1.3. As indicated in the opening paragraph of this chapter, regionalism in Southern Africa and other African sub-regions should be seen as a regional manifestation of the current neo-liberal global architecture and is often referred to as 'open regionalism'

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[29] Castel-Branco, interview, 24 November 2008

(Harrison 2010). This signifies the ambition to synchronize regional market integration with economic globalization (Söderbaum 2002: 78).

Consequently, the SADC is largely driven by the neo-liberal logic, in which trade is highly prioritized (Söderbaum 2002), and a true version of neo-liberal regional governance. In more detail, this implies emphasizing regional economic integration which is market-driven and outward-looking, in which obstacles to the free movement of goods, services, capital and investment within the region and to the rest of the world should be removed (ibid: 75). Hence, free trade areas, such as the one the SADC launched in 2008, constitute stepping-stones towards regional and inter-regional free trade (Söderbaum and Taylor 2008: 25). In most aspects, then, the neo-liberal type of regionalism the SADC supports today is greatly influenced by the global free trade paradigm (Pressend 2010). In fact, this is so entrenched among SADC leaders that 'rarely are the nature of free trade and its assumptions challenged' (ibid).

Neo-liberal regional governance is more concretely manifested in a number of ways. For example, the emphasis on so-called 'development corridors' is claimed by the SADC to bring globalization to Southern Africa and at the same time enhance regional economic integration (Söderbaum and Taylor 2008: 25). The best example is the Maputo Development Corridor (MDC), initiated by the SADC as an important regional development project to reconstruct, revitalize and formalize economic cross-border relationships between Mozambique and South Africa, even though it also aims to gradually benefit Swaziland, Botswana and Zimbabwe. The basic idea behind the initiative is the implementation of a large number of investment projects related to infrastructure and economic development in order to foster cross-border trade. Most important is the rehabilitation of the road and rail links between Maputo and the Gauteng area in South Africa (Söderbaum and Taylor 2008; Mulaudzi 2006). In terms of organization and implementation, the MDC lies formally outside the SADC framework, even though it co-operates with the IS Directorate on infrastructure-related projects. The MDC is frequently referred to in various SADC policy documents. For example, among the chief principles guiding the RISDP is that implementation should take place within the context of existing development corridors in the region (SADC 2003a). The most important institution for the coordination of MDC-related projects is the Maputo Corridor Logistics Initiative (MCLI), an independent membership organization comprised of private investors, service providers and public actors (Söderbaum and Taylor 2008: 47).

Furthermore, the 'openness' of neo-liberal regional governance in Southern Africa is manifested by the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) between the EU and the SADC. EPAs refer to contractual and reciprocal trade, development and cooperation agreements negotiated between the EU as one party and six regional groups of African, Caribbean and Pacific countries as the other party (Shilimela 2008). On a more general level, EPAs are said to foster the integration of SADC countries into the world economy in terms of trade and private investment. Hence, the EU-SADC co-operation aims at 'enhancing the productivity, supply and trading capacity of the [SADC] countries as well as their capacity to attract investment […] strengthening trade and investment policies' (Lorenz 2011: 5).

Therefore, one important role of regional institutions related to the SADC is to facilitate trade through various liberalization schemes, since the private sector is seen as the driving force behind regional development (Söderbaum 2002, 2004b: 423, 425). As a result, one main task of the SADC is to facilitate the movement of goods and capital by the removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers (Matlosa 2006 7-8). However, it is mainly elites and corporations that benefit from trade liberalization, to a large extent those residing in South Africa, at the expense of, for example, informal traders. This will be further discussed in section 4.2.3. Regional free trade pushed by neo-liberal regional governance frameworks is mainly, but not only, in the interests of South African capital, especially those sections that are globally integrated and therefore benefit the most from open regionalism (Leysens 2001).

In line with the emphasis put on the reduction of the state in order to boost the private sector, the welfare and development ambitions of the state are increasingly rolled back and poverty reduction is reduced to economic growth in which development projects must be profitable. Therefore, in order to build consent among state and non-state actors in the region around a regional order that mostly benefits South African capital, according to one scholar South Africa, as the political-economic hegemon, has pushed the SADC to adopt a 'universalist [development] language used in SADC documents […] to compensate, reward or simply placate the subordinate/marginalized social forces' (Leysens 2001: 232) which lose out from the current hegemonic regional order. In line with the overall neo-liberal agenda of easing the pain of economic restructuring, pushed by South Africa the SADC has therefore designed some corrective measures to mitigate the negative consequences of regional integration for poor people (Mittelman 1999; Kanyenze et al 2006) such as the spread of HIV/AIDS, environmental degradation and the informalization of the economy, discussed further in sections 4.2.1 and 5.2.1. However, the developmental rhetoric of the SADC hides a hegemonic capitalist order dominated by South Africa (Leysens 2001). With the focus on market-integration, the SADC in practice puts little emphasis on social issues, despite the inclusion of various social charters in integration agreements (Mittelman 1999). In other words, 'in rhetoric […] there appears to be some degree of commitment to the idea of taming the market and embracing developmentalism. In practice, the evidence seems to point in a different direction' (Ajulu 2007: 37).

The neo-liberal inclinations imply that the SADC views business as particularly important in the process of regional integration (Matlosa 2006 7-8). Through public-private partnerships (PPPs), business in the region is playing a critical role, for example in building infrastructure, in the promotion of the SADC region as an investment centre and in job creation (Blaauw 2007: 205). Hence, of the regional non-state organizations associated with the SADC, either informally or through a formal agreement, the majority are business related (ibid).[30] Furthermore, even though policy-making and social programmes related to HIV/AIDS, gender, the protection of workers' rights and environmental education are quite weak and suffer

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[30] Gilson (2011b) and Ameli (2011) have observed the same trend in civil society engagement with regional governance processes related to the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) respectively. Here, business-related groups have better access compared with development-oriented NGOs and social movements.

from poor implementation, they do involve collaboration with certain service-providing and research NGOs active in these areas. Such CSOs engage with regional interstate frameworks on a consultative basis, mainly in order to solve joint problems related to, for example, policy development and the lack of social services, as will be further discussed in chapters 4 and 5.

On the whole, the SADC as a regional institution serves the purpose of legitimizing and reproducing a capitalist regional order dominated by South Africa.

3.3 Conclusions

This chapter has shown the ways in which the deeper statist and capitalist social structures connected to world order affect states and civil societies in Southern Africa in general terms. State politics are heavily authoritarian and revolve around protecting the 'national interests', often similar to the material interests of the political elite, and the privatization and marketization of the public sector. The latter is a result of the great impact of neo-liberalism in Africa over the past 30 or so years, exported by IFIs and donors and often embraced by economic and political elites. In Southern Africa statism in particular has informed the development of a regional order based on states in which nationalist and statist notions of community are widespread among both policy-makers and 'ordinary people' in the region. Neo-liberalism is also deeply entrenched and should be seen as the latest phase in the historical evolution of a capitalist regional political economy centred on South Africa. State authoritarianism and neo-liberalism have had fundamental effects on civil society in Southern Africa. This implies that CSOs are generally repressed and pacified in order not to contest the power hold of regimes in the region and are used to cover up for the shrinking public sector, taking on service-providing functions.

These processes are highly reflected in the SADC, which is a good example of sovereignty-boosting and neo-liberal regional governance. In terms of the former, SADC members often use the organization to promote and protect their (national) interests, resulting in a weak SADC-led formal regional economic and political integration process, not to mention shallow interest in advancing regional identity-making and citizenship. The state-centric nature of the SADC also results in a general exclusion of CSOs in regional governance frameworks. Deeply affected by the capitalist social structure, SADC-led regional governance entails supporting market-led integration, liberalizing regional trade and facilitating the movement of goods in the region. This, in turn, informs the nature of interaction with those few CSOs that are targeted, favouring service-providing and business-oriented organizations. This is even more evident when narrowing down the focus to the trade and HIV/AIDS sectors in the two chapters to come.

All in all, Southern Africa is a good example of a statist-capitalist regional hegemonic order in a Coxian sense. Popular notions of the centrality of the state and national community-building, as well as the neo-liberal discourse, are widespread in the region, including among policy-makers and CSOs. Promoting the statist and neo-liberal ideas, regional institutions related to the SADC are equally important in this regard, serving the function of maintaining the current regional order.

4
Civil society Regionalization in the Trade Sector in Southern Africa

The analysis now moves from the highest structural level, i.e. the world order discussed in section 2.5 and its regional manifestation in Southern Africa discussed in the last chapter, to the third and fourth level in the Prendergast-Knottnerus model of levels of structure. As was shown in the previous chapter, structure matters. This was very clear when analysing the state of states and CSOs in Southern Africa, including the (sovereignty-boosting and neo-liberal) nature of regional governance. Most importantly, it was shown how states dominate civil societies in the region, and the problem-solving character of the latter, due to the statist and capitalist social structure. This has also made a deep imprint on civil society regionalization in the trade and HIV/AIDS sectors, which will be discussed in this and next chapter respectively. More specifically, the statist and capitalist world order, and its regional manifestation in Southern Africa and elsewhere, informs the inter-organizational relations between RIGOs and CSOs, between donors and CSOs, and between CSOs, which in turn influence the intra-organizational relations within CSOs in terms of issue-framing and identity-making, in 11 different ways, as discussed in section 2.4 and summarized in table 1. This chapter will focus on how these dynamics are played out in the trade sector in particular.

The chapter is structured as follows. After a general description of the CSO objects of analysis, section 4.2 discusses inter-organizational relations between the SADC and CSOs, followed by a discussion of inter-organizational relations between donors and CSOs, and inter-organizational relations between CSOs, in sections 4.3 and 4.4 respectively. Section 4.5 highlights intra-organizational relations within CSOs in terms of issue-framing and section 4.6 analyses the same type of relations but with a focus on identity-making. Accordingly, the prime focus of the last two sections is on the RCSOs themselves and their agency, albeit within the statist-capitalist social order. A concluding section rounds up the chapter.

4.1 Key RCSOs

In this section, the CSO objects of analysis in this chapter, i.e. the 11 regional NGOs and networks related to trade, will be briefly presented. For and overview of their members and partners in the region, see tables 3-12 in the Appendix.[31] Later on, in section 4.3.2, the donors relevant for this study will be described.

The Association of SADC Chambers of Commerce and Industry (ASCCI) is a non-profit private sector regional network, based in Gaborone, Botswana, which brings together 18 national chambers of commerce organizations, trade associations, employer organizations and confederations of industries from all SADC states. ASCCI aims to facilitate the effective participation of organized business in the SADC and to enhance the role of the private sector in regional integration. Its driving principles are private sector growth, an improved business and investment climate, and development of a free market economy system in the SADC (ASCCI 2012a). In terms of the analytical distinction between different types of network, discussed in section 1.3.5, ASCCI is a good example of a facilitating network with an advocacy element.

The SADC Employers Group (SEG) is a network of 11 national employers' organizations in Southern Africa. The secretariat is currently hosted by one of the members, the Business Unity South Africa (BUSA), in Johannesburg in South Africa. SEG seeks to be a leading regional private sector organization that supports socio-economic development. Moreover, it aims to improve the trading and investment environment in the region, to strengthen relationships between members, and to participate in regional policy-making (SEG 2010). SEG is an example of a combination of a facilitating and advocacy network.

The SADC Council of Non-Governmental Organizations (SADC-CNGO) is a regional civil society network made up of 15 national networks of NGOs, from all SADC countries, with a secretariat in Gaborone, Botswana. SADC-CNGO seeks to influence development policies in the SADC, to accelerate their implementation, and to advance NGO interests and perspectives, and more specifically to create conditions that favour people-centred regional economic integration. SADC-CNGO wants to coordinate and provide leadership to civil society in the region and to improve capacity to engage with regional integration and development issues within the SADC (SADC-CNGO 2009a). SADC-CNGO is a combination of a facilitating and advocacy network.

The Southern African Research and Development Centre (SARDC) is a regional resource centre based in Harare, Zimbabwe, with a satellite office in Mozambique, which produces and disseminates information about development processes and regional integration in the SADC region to various state and non-state actors. SARDCs research concerns regional trade and development issues (SARDC 2012). In terms of the analytical distinction between different types of NGOs discussed in section 1.3.5, SARDC is a combination of a service providing and research NGO.

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[31] Information about the members of Zambia CBTA has not been obtained and this organization is therefore left out in the Appendix.

The Southern and Eastern African Trade Information and Negotiations Institute (SEATINI) is another regional research/training/lobby group, with a similar outlook to SARDC. SEATINI works in 21 countries in the Southern and Eastern African region, with regional headquarters in Harare, Zimbabwe, and a national office in Kampala, Uganda. SEATINI tries to strengthen the capacity of policy-makers, CSOs and the media to play a more effective part in global, regional and national trade and financial processes. SEATINI monitors developments in the trade area, undertakes research related to trade and development, and disseminates information to the public (SEATINI 2009). SEATINI is a broad NGO in terms of its activities and has elements of service provision, research and advocacy.

Another regional research and training centre is the Trade and Development Studies Centre (Trades Centre), based in Harare, Zimbabwe. Trades' aim is to analyse trade and development issues from the perspectives of Southern Africa's poor communities and to explore the implications of the various international, regional and bilateral trade agreements. More specifically, Trades carries out policy-relevant training, research and analysis for government, private and civil society actors, particularly focusing on the nexus between trade and development, aid and development, and poverty alleviation and welfare (Trades Centre 2012). Trades Centre is mix of a service providing and research NGO.

The Southern Africa Trade Union Coordination Council (SATUCC) is a regional network of 18 trade union federations in the SADC and is based in Gaborone, Botswana. SATUCC's aim is to strengthen solidarity amongst trade unions in the sub-region and to give voice to labour issues at the regional level. SATUCC is a platform for trade unions and workers to engage with and influence policies nationally and regionally through the active and effective participation of affiliate national federations (SATUCC 2011). SATUCC is a good example of an advocacy network.

The Southern African Peoples' Solidarity Network (SAPSN) is also heavily involved in trade, labour and social rights issues and fights for an alternative development and regional integration agenda. The secretariat is currently hosted by the Malawi Economic Justice Network (MEJN) in Lilongwe, Malawi. The SAPSN network involves 26 CSOs from nine countries in the region, such as trade unions, social movements, CBOs and NGOs. SAPSNs mission is to mobilize regional solidarity, to build members' capacities, and to support people-based regional co-operation in the fight against the debt crisis, global trade injustices and neo-liberal policies. SAPSN regularly holds regional workshops and produces evidence-based research (SAPSN nda). SAPSN is another example of an advocacy network.

The Economic Justice Network of FOCCISA, the Fellowship of Christian Councils in Southern Africa (EJN) is the most important ecumenical regional network, involving 11 national councils of churches in Southern Africa. The head office is in Cape Town, South Africa. EJN wants to strengthen the commitment of the church in advocacy work on economic justice, lobbies national and regional policy-makers such as the SADC on trade-oriented issues such as EPA and ICBT, and acts as a catalyst for engaging people in the promotion of just economic and social structures in the region (EJN 2012a). EJN is also an advocacy network.

The Zambia Cross-Border Traders Association (CBTA) is a membership organization of informal traders, based in Lusaka, Zambia. The main focus lies in Zambia, but CBTA is also active in Eastern and Southern Africa, with 40 branches throughout the region. The aim of CBTA is to represent informal traders in negotiations with government and regional institutions and to provide social assistance to informal traders (Nchito and Tranberg Hansen 2010: 171, 173). CBTA is a combination of facilitating and advocacy network.

Until recently, CBTA was the main organization for advancing the interests of informal traders in the region. However, in 2012 the Southern African Cross-Border Traders Association (SACBTA), a more pure *regional* organization, was formed in order to strengthen the regional representation of informal traders. The SACBTA is a membership organization with five national cross-border traders associations as members. The regional secretariat is hosted by the SADC-CNGO in Gaborone, Botswana. The overall objective is to protect the rights of informal traders through, for example, engaging with and influencing national and regional policy-makers, building the capacity of national members, and promoting networking (SACBTA 2012). As for CBTA, SACBTA is also a combination of facilitating and advocacy network.

4.2 Inter-Organizational Relations between the SADC and CSOs

This section will discuss how the statist-capitalist informed social relations between SADC institutions and various RCSOs influence civil society regionalization in the trade sector in three different ways. First, the trade-related issues prioritized in the SADC agenda and how this affects the regional work of CSOs is targeted. Secondly, focus is put on the direct and indirect creation of regional platforms for CSO collaboration. Thirdly, intimately related to the SADC's issue preferences, the inclusion of certain CSOs and the exclusion of others in various SADC institutions will be analysed in terms of how this affects civil society regionalization.

4.2.1 SADC Issue Preferences

As indicated in the last chapter, the SADC-type of regional governance is inherently neo-liberal and market-oriented, with a great focus on fostering regional economic co-operation in general and trade integration in particular. Hence, despite grand declarations about fostering regional social and economic equity and human rights in various regional documents, such as the SADC Treaty and RISDP, in reality the main focus is on trade (Peters-Berries 2010; TRALAC 2012). However, it has not been possible to scrutinize this trade bias further in terms of the actual resources spent on trade-related activities in comparison with other areas, since the SADC budget is a restricted document and not made public. This includes the budgets for the Secretariat and the various directorates, as well as money spent on specific projects and programs.[32] It is quite clear that SADC leaders do not want to lose pace

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[32] Tali, e-mail communication, 22 May 2012

in terms of achieving trade integration or compromise the idea of regional free trade. One important component of RISDP is the 15-year framework for intensified regional economic integration, which sets time-bound targets for the trade-driven regional integration approach of the SADC (Peters 2011: 146). According to the framework, the plan is to have a Free-Trade Area (FTA) by 2008; a SADC customs union by 2010; a SADC common market by 2015; a SADC monetary union and central bank by 2016; and a regional currency by 2018 (SADC 2008a).

So far, only the first target has been achieved. The FTA was launched in August 2008 (TRALAC 2012), coupled with a lot of prestige on behalf of SADC leaders, and is considered the most important event in the history of the SADC (Salomao 2008). Under the FTA, member states are supposed to liberalize trade through removing tariffs and other non-tariff barriers and facilitate trade by providing a framework for improving the movements of goods in the region (SADC 2008a). However, significant challenges have emerged in the trade integration process, for example related to the reduction of trade barriers, which contributed to the failure to launch the SADC Customs Union in 2010 (TRALAC 2012). Despite the challenges, trade integration is at the heart of SADC-led neo-liberal regional governance and challenging this agenda therefore means contesting the foundation of the SADC. As will be shown below, those who do are excluded or co-opted.

Due to the dominance of neo-liberal regional governance in Southern Africa, manifesting the capitalist regional order discussed in the previous chapter, in the trade integration agenda important social issues connected to trade, such as the free movement of workers, ICBT and labour rights, are downplayed. In regard to the free movement of workers, a protocol on the facilitation of movement of persons was adopted by the SADC in 2005 with the overall objective of developing regional policies eliminating obstacles to such movement (SADC 2005). However, by September 2011 only five of the required nine governments had signed and ratified the protocol, which means that it has not yet come into force. Furthermore, the protocol in itself is accused of not really providing for the actual movement of people in a deeper and broader sense of the word (Williams 2006: 11). One scholar concludes that 'there does not appear to be any consciously articulated policy momentum towards nurturing an environment favourable to free movement of people' (Kornegay 2006: 46).

Furthermore, in terms of ICBT, this is not taken seriously by the SADC. Most trade-related policy-makers at national and regional levels continue to ignore the informal dimension of trade, partly due to its perceived illegal character and the consequent perspective that it should not be facilitated (e.g. SARDC 2008; Makombe 2010; Mwaniki nd; Masango and Haraldsson 2010). This is despite the fact that ICBT is an important instrument for efficient poverty-alleviation in the region, since it creates livelihood opportunities for a great number of poor people (e.g. Masango and Haraldsson 2010). However, the linkage between informal trade and development falls outside the remit of traditional trade-related policy making. According to the TIFI representative, the SADC considers trade integration ultimately to be about goods.[33]

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[33] Kuzvinzwa, interview, 11 December 2009

The SADC's overall policy document, the SADC Treaty, does not mention informal trade or the informal economy more broadly in any way. In terms of RISDP, it is briefly stated that the informal sector should be acknowledged and taken on board in regional integration, both in terms of trade liberalization and actual production (Southern African Trust 2008: 9). However, in terms of more specific regional policy documents related to trade 'the ICBT sector continues to be marginalized' (ibid). For example, the important SADC Protocol on Trade does not address the social dimension of trade and ignores ICBT issues (Makombe 2010). Even if the provisions of the protocol are relevant and important for informal traders, addressing issues of high relevance to them such as transportation, exemption from customs, customs legislation, import and export restrictions etc., it does not recognize the sector or respond to its needs (ibid). This has to do with the fact that the measures for facilitating regional trade are only designed for established companies and by consequence are of little relevance to informal traders. One important study concludes that 'the SADC trade protocol does not benefit ICBT in any significant ways, if at all' (SARDC 2008). Similarly, according to SACBTA, at an overall SADC level 'regional economic policies are not conducive to informal cross border trade' (2012: 5). Since the Trade Protocol is essentially premised on the free trade paradigm (Pressend 2010), this and other policy documents related to trade are not deliberate policies on ICBT but on established business. It is argued that there is a need to come up with a separate policy framework which specifically targets ICBT (SARDC 2008).

Lastly, in terms of labour issues, according to the former general secretary of SATUCC, to a certain extent the SADC has put instruments in place in order to promote regional labour standards. One major achievement is the Charter of Fundamental Social Rights in the SADC, adopted in 2003, which among other things aims to promote the establishment and harmonization of labour policies and measures that facilitate labour mobility, social security schemes and regulations relating to health and safety standards at work places across the region (SADC 2003b). However, as is the case for movement of people and ICBT, implementation lags behind.[34] It is very uncertain how seriously SADC members take the rhetorical emphasis put on social issues such as labour rights in practice. For example, social issues tend to be downplayed in key SADC policy-making institutions such as the previously existing Integrated Committee of Ministers (ICM).[35] Since no guidelines exist in terms of which ministers should attend ICM meetings, ministers of finance and trade dominate the structure at the expense of social sector ministers, who are marginalized (SATUCC nd).

It is argued here that the general ignorance of the SADC towards the more social aspects of trade ultimately boils down to the state-centric and capitalist regional order. Despite grand declarations on the importance of involving CSOs in regional

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[34] Katchima, interview, 8 December 2008

[35] ICM is the old name of the current Sectoral and Cluster Ministerial Committee, but the functions are the same. The Committee consist of ministers from each SADC member state and is responsible for overseeing the activities of the core areas of integration, monitoring and controlling the implementation of the RISDP, as well as providing policy advice to the Council.

integration, including the trade area, the ignorance of ICBT and other social dimensions of trade in practice partly relates to the fact that SADC policy-makers invoke a traditional discourse of sovereign statehood in order to dodge social issues and avoid serious interaction with CSOs that might compromise the market-oriented neo-liberal agenda. In the words of the director of SADC-CNGO, 'SADC, through the Secretariat, continues to hide behind sovereignty of member states' (SADC-CNGO 2010e: 5). Ignoring ICBT and other social aspects of trade profoundly affects SADC-civil society interaction, addressed in section 4.2.3.

However, it should be noted that during the past few years increased attention has been given to social issues. For example, the SADC has shown a growing interest in the ICBT-sector and opened up for interaction with relevant CSOs. First of all, in 2011 the SADC Labour Ministers adopted a Protocol on Workers in the Informal Economy, which one prominent commentator considers a major breakthrough in terms of officially recognizing workers in the informal economy, including informal traders.[36] It remains to be seen how seriously the member states take this protocol in terms of implementation. In 2011 the SADC also adopted a SADC Advocacy Strategy on Informal Cross-Border Trade, which provides a clear policy area for creating an enabling environment for informal cross-border traders (SADC 2011a). An action framework has since been developed but is yet to be implemented (SACBTA 2012: 4). Only time will tell if these developments represent a paradigm shift in the SADC's view on regional trade integration to the benefit of informal traders and workers.

The link between poverty eradication and trade is also gaining increased attention, albeit in a problem-solving fashion. One example is the SADC's arrangement of an International Conference on Poverty and Development in Mauritius, which SADC leaders, donors and a few international leaders participated in. The conference aimed to forge regional consensus on the key elements of poverty eradication. It also sought to develop an Action Plan on Poverty and Development, outlining a series of specific tasks and actions and monitoring and evaluation mechanisms (SADC 2012a). The most important outcomes of the conference were the SADC Declaration on Poverty Eradication and Sustainable Development, the Regional Poverty Reduction Framework (RPRF), and the establishment of a new institution, the SADC Regional Poverty Observatory (RPO).

In the Declaration, SADC leaders acknowledge that, despite great efforts to achieve economic development, more than 40% of the SADC population still lives in extreme poverty. In line with overall neo-liberal regional governance, the linkage between poverty eradication and the standard strategies of economic growth, regional trade liberalization and promotion of business are emphasized throughout in the Declaration. Nevertheless, trade is not the only prescription for combating poverty; providing various social services, promoting education, and achieving food security are also highlighted (SADC 2008b). What is most interesting is the focus on implementation and practical work on poverty eradication and the new regional framework for this. The RPRF articulates key intervention areas, strategies, and activities and functions as the key implementation mechanism of the RISDP in terms

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[36] Horn, e-mail communication, 24 July 2012

of operationalizing poverty eradication. The RPRF also constitutes the basis for indicators to measure poverty and poverty reduction within the RPO (SADC 2008c). Most importantly, the RPRF and RPO are signs of growing determination to match the rhetorical commitments to poverty eradication and development in the region with practical work on the ground. The RPO institutional framework will be discussed further in the next section.

To conclude this section, SADC issue preference is an important dimension of civil society regionalization, even though it plays a more indirect role. It is argued that the SADC's conceptualization of trade, focusing on the neo-liberal aspects of regional trade integration, such as trade liberalization, facilitation of formal trade, and private sector development at the expense of social aspects of trade, i.e. ICBT and labour rights, greatly determines which CSOs to interact with in the trade sector and to what extent their policy proposals are taken seriously. Hence, determining the overall regional trade agenda, SADC issue preferences lay the foundation for which CSOs are included and excluded in regional governance, which in turn greatly affects the regionalization of civil society, discussed in section 4.2.3.

4.2.2 SADC Focal Point Creation

The SADC is an important focal point around which CSOs consolidate regionally. The SADC has also played a more direct role in terms of facilitating regional civil society co-operation. These two points will now be discussed. In terms of the former, a number of civil society meetings running parallel to the annual SADC Summit have been held since 2000. In fact, there are two different such meetings: the SADC Civil Society Forum and the Peoples' Summit. The Forum is organized by the SADC-CNGO and principally involves NGOs, church groups and trade unions. In recent years it has been run in collaboration with EJN and SATUCC. The overall aim is to improve regional collective civil society engagement with the SADC and to influence SADC leaders in order to enhance regional development (Osei-Hwedie 2009). The first Forum was held in conjunction with the SADC Summit in Gaborone, Botswana, in 2005; the second one in Maseru, Lesotho, in 2006; the third one in Lusaka, Zambia, in 2007; the fourth one in Johannesburg, South Africa, in 2008; the fifth one in Kinshasa, DRC, in 2009; and the sixth one in Windhoek, Namibia, in 2010. In 2011, the seventh Forum was supposed to be held in Luanda, Angola, but due to reasons explained below was moved to Johannesburg, South Africa. In 2012, the Forum was held in Maputo, Mozambique.

The Peoples' Summit, organized by SAPSN, has also been held in relation to the SADC Summits above. The first meeting occurred in 2000 but the process immediately waned and was only restarted in 2006. Since then, the Peoples' Summit has taken place every year. The Peoples' Summit has a more radical agenda when compared with the Forum and attracts a different clientele: principally social movements and advocacy-based CBOs and NGOs. The Summit aims to transform and reclaim the SADC for the people and to achieve people-centred regional integration, which is manifested in the so-called 'People's Declaration', issued at the

end of every meeting and delivered to the SADC Summit.[37] Even though the Forum and Summit have different objectives and relate differently to the SADC, they are nevertheless both centred on the latter. In other words, as the prime target group for both the Forum and the Summit, to a large extent the SADC has informed their creation. This will be further discussed in the next section. In conjunction with each Forum and Summit, preparatory as well as evaluation meetings have also been organized by the arranging organizations: for example, there was a post-forum feedback meeting in Namibia in 2010 where outcomes of the Forum and the way forward were discussed (SADC-CNGO 2010c).

Regarding more direct facilitation of civil society regionalization, through the RPO the SADC has created a platform which facilitates regional state-donor-civil society co-operation around poverty and development issues, including the social aspects of trade. The RPO was formally established after a decision at the SADC Summit in August 2010. It acts as a forum where all stakeholders working in poverty eradication at the national and regional levels, i.e. civil society, business, government and foreign donors, periodically meet to evaluate and monitor the implementation of the objectives, targets and actions that have been specifically assigned to public and private sectors within the RPRF (SADC 2008c). The RPO is located in the Policy Planning and Resource Mobilization Directorate within the Secretariat, and is often referred to as the RPO Unit. The RPO Steering Committee provides direction to the RPO and plays an advisory role. It consists of one senior official from each member state, five representatives from the regional apex civil society organizations, three experts on poverty and development, and two representatives from the donor community. The Regional Stakeholder Forum, made up of all relevant stakeholders, is also convened every two years to deliberate on trends on poverty and development (ibid). The RPO process has generated a number of possibilities for regional civil society consolidation.

Emphasizing the participatory nature of the RPO, according to the SADC it 'is designed as a multi-stakeholder forum because it has been observed that the involvement of all key stakeholders is key to the success of programs aimed at eradicating poverty in the region' (SADC 2012b: 5). Therefore, the planning process leading up to the creation of the RPRF and the RPO was marked by consultation with civil society,[38] creating a number of regional planning meetings for CSOs to join hands. For example a major regional conference for member states, SADC officials and CSOs was held in Kinshasa, DRC, at the end of 2009 (SADC 2012b). RCSOs have also been critically involved in the development of the SADC Common Poverty Matrix, with common poverty indicators, which has resulted in several regional civil society meetings (SADC-CNGO 2011a). Furthermore, a Southern Africa Civil Society Reference Group on the RPO was formed to coordinate civil society participation in the planning process and to make concerted input to the new framework. Members of the reference group, i.e. representatives of women's organizations, social movements, church organizations, trade unions and NGOs, have met regularly to deliberate on the content and operation of the RPO

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[37] Pressand, interview, 27 November 2008

[38] Vilakazi, interview, 15 December 2009

(ibid). EJN, SATUCC and SADC-CNGO, as well as their partners and members, are key players in these processes.

To conclude this section, facilitating regional CSO co-operation, both indirectly and directly, the SADC acts as an important regional focal point. Indirectly, the SADC facilitates regional CSO coalition-building and the Civil Society Forum and Peoples' Summit are cases in point. These regional platforms heavily centre on the SADC, building up regional lobbying and advocacy capacity to influence SADC-led regional governance. These two regional forums, triggered by an urge to influence SADC policy-making, are the most important concrete regional platforms for RCSOs such as SAPSN, EJN and SADC-CNGO to consolidate regionally and therefore play a vital role for civil society regionalization. In terms of direct facilitation, the RPO and related institutions and regional meetings are important instruments for CSO regional consolidation. In the various RPO-related gatherings, the members and partners of regional CSOs such as SADC-CNGO, EJN and SATUCC meet regularly, which strengthens regional networking both between and within these CSOs. In the end this enhances civil society regionalization.

4.2.3 CSO Inclusion and Exclusion in the SADC

This section is divided into two parts. The first accounts for those RCSOs that are included in SADC-led regional governance and the (positive) effect this has on civil society regionalization. The second part problematizes civil society involvement in SADC institutions and argues that important RCSOs are marginalized due to their critical agendas. This can negatively affect regional consolidation.

CSO Inclusion

Regardless of the statist character of the SADC discussed in the last chapter, generally excluding civil society in regional integration, some CSOs in the trade sector have nevertheless been able to participate in various SADC institutions. These CSOs more or less buy in to the SADC's neo-liberal trade agenda and provide policy advice and other services in issue areas where such assistance is wanted by the SADC. Highlighting their proximity to the SADC, both geographically and ideologically, ASCCI and SEG, together with SADC-CNGO and to some extent SATUCC, are often referred to as SADC subsidiary organizations (Ncube 2009). This implies that (most of) these organizations are located in Gaborone, that they share, more or less, the SADC's regional agenda, and that they have formal relations with the Secretariat.

Regional business organizations generally enjoy a fair amount of attention from the SADC and are regularly involved in policy discussions in various SADC institutions. SEG, for example, is involved in various SADC Technical Committees and working groups, such as the SADC Employment and Labour Task Force, which is comprised of government, labour and employer representatives and discusses regional labour and employment issues. SEG has regular contact with the SADC Secretariat, for example through TIFI, and is regularly invited to various regional meetings arranged by the SADC, such as the SADC Customs Private Sector

Partnership Forum. SEG has also managed to directly address both the SADC Summit (2008) and SADC COM meetings (2010) with their issues (SEG 2010).

Furthermore, ASCCI has entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU)[39] with the SADC on partnership in terms of promotion of business in the region, a core aspect of the SADC's neo-liberal trade agenda. ASCCI regularly arranges regional conferences for SADC officials and government and business representatives to discuss the trade agenda and speed-up regional integration. For example, in 2012 they held a workshop in Gaborone in order to improve the involvement of private sector interests in the SADC's regional integration, which included participants from the SADC Secretariat and the SADC private sector, as well as the EU and the ILO (ASCCI 2012a). ASCCI, through various sub-committees, also prepares position papers and reports on trade-related issues which are presented at COM meetings of trade ministers and SADC Summits, with the aim of influencing policy and legislation in the region. Lastly, ASCCI conducts the Regional Business Climate Survey to assess how conducive the environment for trade is in various SADC countries. The Survey results are used to lobby the SADC Secretariat and governments to further facilitate regional trade integration (B2B Renewable Energies 2012). According to ASCCI themselves, there is a general willingness from the SADC Secretariat to engage with them and their interaction with the TIFI and IS Directorates is successful (ASCCI 2012b: 10, 14). This is partly due to the fact that the Deputy Executive Secretary for Regional Integration 'is a strong champion for private sector involvement within the SADC Secretariat' (ibid: 19), unsurprising considering the SADC's neo-liberal, market-oriented agenda. In fact, in most regards, the SADC and the private sector agree on the present neo-liberal type of regional governance and share the conviction that trade liberalization will create the foundation for economic development and prosperity in the region. In a statement by the SADC private sector at the SADC Summit in 2008, SADC promotion of intra-regional trade and investment through deepening regional economic integration was strongly endorsed (Nkosi 2008).

Furthermore, regional resource and research centres such as SARDC, Trades Centre and SEATINI also participate regularly in SADC-led regional governance and view themselves as partners in a common quest for regional trade integration and development. SARDC works closely with the SADC Secretariat and has signed a MoU which formalizes the relationship. SARDC plays the role of pushing the SADC and governments to assist in pin-pointing potential bottlenecks in the implementation of various policy documents, such as RISDP, through providing policy-relevant information.[40] SARDC also researches and disseminates information on the impact of key economic development processes on regional integration in Southern Africa, in close collaboration with the SADC Secretariat and other partners, for example through the SADC Today newsletter and a series of policy review briefs covering a wide range of issues such as trade, transport and

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[39] A memorandum of understanding (MoU) is a document describing a bilateral or multilateral agreement between two or more parties. It expresses a convergence of will between the parties, indicating an intended common line of action. It is often used in cases where parties do not imply a legal commitment.

[40] Valy, interview, 21 November 2008

agriculture. Currently, SARDC is also implementing a regional project called 'Communicating Energy in Southern Africa' together with the Southern African Power Pool (SAPP), a SADC project aiming at connecting the power grids of all member states, and with the SADC Secretariat. The aim is to promote the development of national and regional policies that allow for private sector investment in the power sector (SARDC 2011). In general, according to the representative of SARDC, the SADC and governments take SARDC seriously and in many final declarations it is clear that SARDC's advice is incorporated.[41]

Trades Centre specializes in demand-driven research and training on trade and development issues, and their target groups are national and regional policy-makers, as well as business and civil society in the Eastern-Southern Africa (ESA) region. According to the director of Trades, 'SADC takes us as a think-tank. When they have issues that they need special analysis and assessment […] they engage us'.[42] Central for Trades are providing the SADC and other partners with technical support and strengthening their position in regional and multilateral trade negotiations (Trades Centre 2011), assisting the SADC in improving and harmonising regional trade policies, and participating in the design and implementation of multilateral trading regimes such as EPAs (Trades Centre 2010). For example, their research output has been used by government and the business community to enhance benefit from trade liberalization, has helped members of the COMESA to take firm positions in the EPA negotiations, and has made recommendations on how the FTA can contribute to poverty eradication and development (ibid). All in all, '[t]he research papers from the Centre are highly sought by government, business sector, civil society, parliamentarians, to name a few' (ibid: 5) and 'because of the high quality […] a lot of interest [is] generated by […] regional trade organizations such as SADC, COMESA and EAC' (Trades Centre 2011: 5).

SEATINI has organized and participated in a number of national and regional workshops and lobby meetings in Eastern and Southern Africa with members of parliament, CSOs, government officials and representatives of the SADC and EAC Secretariats, in order to influence bilateral and regional trade negotiations, for example EPAs, and to promote sustainable development. SEATINI has also produced a number of research publications and information material about trade and development issues, including EPA, which have been distributed to various policy-makers on national and regional levels, for example the SADC (SEATINI 2010). Most importantly, SEATINI regularly participates in various government trade delegations at regional and global level (SEATINI 2009), for example the ESA group in the EPA negotiations.[43] In fact, 'SEATINI has [...] been recognized by governments as one of the leading NGOs involved in trade issues' (SEATINI 2009: 6).

Since 2004 SADC-CNGO has tried to interact with SADC institutions. In the previous year, 2003, SADC-CNGO and the SADC Secretariat entered into a formal partnership through a MoU. The MoU aims to provide a framework for cooperation

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[41] Valy, interview, 21 November 2008

[42] Chigwada, interview, 3 December 2009

[43] Machemedze, interview, 4 December 2009

between the two parties and promote collaboration in the implementation of SADC-CNGO programs on poverty eradication and sustainable development (SADC-CNGO 2003). There are on-going discussions with the Secretariat, including the Executive Secretary, to operationalize the MoU, and a more concrete framework of collaboration has been proposed (SADC-CNGO 2010d: 3). In relation to trade, so far SADC-CNGO has participated in the formation of the SADC RPO and has made input to the RPRF. According to the SADC-CNGO representative 'we do feel we have been able to contribute not only to the process but even to the substantive issues […] So if you read [the RPRF] many issues reflect our opinions and views'.[44] Within the Campaign for Free Movement of Persons in the SADC, SADC-CNGO also conducted a study to assess the state of free movement which has been communicated with policy-makers at the national and regional levels, including the SADC Secretariat (SADC-CNGO 2010d: 5).

SADC-CNGO and its partners have scored some success in terms of engaging SADC Summits and other high level meetings. At the 4th Forum in South Africa in 2008, civil society through SADC-CNGO was allowed to address the Summit (EJN 2010a), albeit not directly. A SADC-representative participated in the Forum to clarify the SADC's position and debate with civil society on various issues.[45] The greatest success came later the same year at the Mauritius conference on poverty and development. The director of SADC-CNGO was allowed to attend the meeting and directly address the heads of governments and states (Osei-Hwedie 2009: 10). All in all, according to Forum Nacional das Organizações Não Governamentais em Moçambique (TEIA), a national NGO forum in Mozambique and one of the founding members of SADC-CNGO, the doors to the official SADC meetings are now opening up[46]; in the same vein, SADC-CNGO claims that 'we do see ourselves making several inroads'.[47]

The choice of SADC-CNGO as a regional civil society partner to the SADC, representing development-oriented NGOs in the region, stems from the fact that SADC-CNGO shares much of the SADC's neo-liberal view on regional integration. For example, this is manifested by the Forum Statement at the 5th SADC Civil Society Forum held in Kinshasa, DRC, in 2009, and issued by SADC-CNGO and its partners. In this statement, it is claimed that civil society in the region reaffirms commitment to the aims and ideals of regional cooperation and development as spelt out in the SADC Treaty. The Forum also noted the progress that the SADC is making in a number of areas, for example in terms of trade, but was concerned about a number of impediments for regional economic integration and called upon member states to accelerate regional infrastructure development projects (SADC-CNGO 2009b). This problem-solving approach was further consolidated at the SADC Civil Society Forums in South Africa 2011. The forum urged member states to:

> address key challenges to intra-regional trade and regional economic integration, particular-
> ly simplification of rules of origin; macro-economic convergence; harmonization of trade,

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[44] Muchabaiwa, interview, 7 December 2009
[45] Simane, interview, 5 December 2008
[46] Uthui, interview, 24 November 2008
[47] Muchabaiwa, interview, 7 December 2009

industry and finance policies; tariff and non-tariff barriers; customs administration and mit-
igating the effects of regional economic integration such as loss of customs of revenue
(SADC-CNGO 2011b).

More specifically, the Forum pushed governments to implement the Trade Protocol
(Pressend 2010). In other words, the Forum called on the SADC to accelerate
implementation of already established protocols, plans and programs. A further
indication of the tendency to buy in to the SADC´s market-oriented agenda is the
Southern Africa Civil Society Poverty and Development Charter, written by SADC-
CNGO after consultation with a number of CSOs in the region. In the 'common
vision' of the Charter, high and sustainable economic growth is called for; in the
'pillars of poverty eradication', private sector development is highlighted as a cross-
cutting issue; and in terms of 'financing of poverty eradication programmes', public-
private partnerships are sought. It is also claimed that the full implementation of
various SADC protocols, including the Trade Protocol, would go a long way
towards eradicating poverty in the region (SADC-CNGO 2010b).

SATUCC also seeks close collaboration with SADC institutions and wants to
have influence on regional policy-making. SATUCC is the only trade union
confederation with a formal status in the SADC (SATUCC 2011) and their
relationship is more formalized when compared with SADC-CNGO. First of all,
SATUCC is a member of the SADC Tripartite Meeting in the Employment and
Labour Sector, held once a year and often referred to as the ELS Meeting. The ELS
Meeting brings together the SADC Ministers responsible for Employment and
Labour and social partners in the Employment and Labour areas, i.e. SEG
representing employers and SATUCC representing workers, to discuss related
policy issues (Osei-Hwedie 2009). Within the ELS Meeting, SATUCC has been part
of designing various policy documents, such as various codes, labour standards and
declarations and charters, including the Code of Conduct on HIV/AIDS and
Employment; the SADC Declaration on Productivity and Social Security; the
Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons; and most recently the SADC Protocol
on Gender and Development (discussed further in section 5.2.1). Most importantly,
SATUCC was instrumental in developing the SADC Charter of Fundamental Social
Rights, as indicated above, which is seen by SATUCC as a major achievement.[48]
Furthermore, SATUCC also takes part in the ICM sub-committee linked to the
Directorate of Social and Human Development, representing labour in the region
(SATUCC nd) and sits on a number of technical committees at the Secretariat.
Currently, through the ELS, SATUCC is in involved in the development of a SADC
Employment and Labour Protocol and implementation of the SADC Decent Work
Programme (SATUCC 2012). The Protocol is intended to facilitate the
harmonization of labour and employment policies/legislation in the region, to
facilitate the promotion of productive employment creation, and to ensure minimum
labour standards, social protection and social dialogue. In essence, the new Protocol
seeks to add to the employment and labour agenda as articulated in the RISDP and

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[48] Katchima, interview, 8 December 2008

Social Charter (SADC 2011b). All in all, according to the Secretary General of SATUCC, over the years it has built up a cordial relationship with the SADC.[49]

Even though SATUCC supports the SADC-led regional integration agenda, and wants to improve the interaction with various SADC institutions, also makes some critiques. In some respects, SATUCC is quite critical of the SADC agenda and sometimes openly contests SADC policies, which, as will be shown below, has made it difficult for some of its policy proposals to be taken seriously. In more detail, SATUCC is critical of the *laissez-faire* aspect of the current trade liberalization framework, and it argues that the SADC must include market regulation schemes to protect the most vulnerable people.[50] SATUCC, together with national trade union partners, has also developed concrete policy alternatives to the present SADC-led regionalism within the ANSA-project (Alternatives to Neo-liberalism in Southern Africa). Seeking fundamental policy reform of the current regional scheme, ANSA puts forward alternative policy proposals for a range of areas. In terms of trade, an alternative trade policy 'aims to involve the region's citizens in the ownership, production and trade structures of the economy in a much more meaningful and sustainable way' (Kanyenze et al 2006: 271).

CSO Exclusion

In the context of the overall statist and capitalist regional order, SADC-civil society interaction must be problematized. The SADC controls which CSOs to include in regional governance related to trade, at the expense of others. There are regulatory obstacles that make it difficult for anyone who wants to engage with the SADC on a more formal level to do so. Formal engagements with the SADC are regulated by MoUs, which are limited to a few CSOs that are considered key representatives of civil society and business in the region and/or as possessing valuable policy-related knowledge, such as ASCCI, SARDC, SATUCC and to a certain extent SADC-CNGO. With the Secretariat's limited capacity, coupled with a reluctance to talk to those CSOs that challenge the SADC's neo-liberal agenda, it is efficient and convenient for the SADC to single out a limited number of civil society partners. The SADC representative confesses that this system bars many important CSOs from accessing the SADC. For example, 'since it is SADC-CNGO and no-one else that SADC has a MoU with, it is impossible for other actors to come in, regardless of how important they are. This is one negative effect of a bureaucratic institution such as SADC: the only interaction is with those on the list'.[51] According to one prominent researcher with great insight into SADC affairs: '[i]f this is the [SADC] attitude and they told us this themselves […] to get an institutionalized relationship is extremely difficult'.[52]

Due to the capitalist regional order that supports those actors who somehow enhance capital accumulation, some CSOs are more involved in regional trade governance at the expense of others. Those CSOs, mostly business and research NGOs, that offer technical expertise in various trade-related areas where the SADC

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[49] Katchima, interview, 8 December 2008
[50] Katchima, interview, 8 December 2008
[51] Ncube, interview, 8 December 2008
[52] le Pere, interview, 27 November 2008

lacks competence and which share the same market-oriented development agenda, for example related to business development and capacity building of trade negotiators, are generally much more included in various SADC institutions than advocacy-oriented RCSOs which demand people-centred regional economic integration and policy reform of SADC policy documents to include ICBT or the like. Therefore, even some RCSOs with an institutionalized relationship with the SADC have struggled to have real influence on trade-related policy-making when occasionally raising a more critical voice. Critical proposals by SATUCC, for example, pushing for critical policy reform of the neo-liberal agenda within the ANSA framework are taken lightly by the SADC, not to mention SAPSNs resistance agenda (see below). CSOs with a different take on regional integration, for example relating trade to labour rights, ICBT and poverty, which are not priority areas for the SADC, as discussed in section 4.2.1, are to a varying degree marginalized in SADC-led regional trade governance.

For SADC-CNGO, the space for real policy influence is narrow. According to one scholar, the partnership between SADC-CNGO and the SADC as envisaged in the MoU 'exists in the world of theory. It has not yet been translated into practical reality' (Matlosa and Lotshwao 2010: 41). There is no formal consultative process between SADC and SADC-CNGO around various components of regional integration. Therefore, SADC-CNGO struggles to efficiently engage the SADC, especially on trade-related matters. According to the representative, the relationship is strong with some directorates and very weak with others such as TIFI: 'By and large civil society engagement with SADC has been uneven. In some pockets very well, such as in the HIV/AIDS-groups, in some cases [such as trade and security] very bad'.[53] Furthermore, SADC-CNGO does not have an effective and regular space to critically influence the SADC Summit.[54] The director of SADC-CNGO has noted that, despite a breakthrough for SADC-CNGO in 2008, during past Forums it has been difficult to get officials from the SADC Secretariat into the meeting (EJN 2010a). This culminated in 2011, when the leaders of EJN, SADC-CNGO and SATUCC were denied entrance to Angola, where the SADC Summit was held, despite having valid visas. This was considered 'a blatant attempt to deny leaders of civil society to interact with and add voice to SADC structures' (EJN 2011). Also, in terms of the policy influence of the Forum, it is claimed that civil society mobilization around the Summit, led by SADC-CNGO, has had very little effect on the COM and Summit outcomes: 'Declarations and communiqués […] have […] had very minimal impact on SADC Policy decisions' (SADC-CNGO 2010c: 11).

The marginalization of SADC-CNGO partly has to be viewed in relation to the network's increasingly critical approach. In recent years, SADC-CNGO has broadened its concept of trade integration. For example, in the Forum Declaration in South Africa in 2011, taking a more critical stance, it was noted that the current model of regional economic integration, premised on the liberalization of trade and investments, has not translated into improved standards of living for the people of the region. Bringing ICBT into their agenda, the Forum also notes the further

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[53] Muchabaiwa, interview, December 2009

[54] Muchabaiwa, interview, December 2009

marginalization of the rights of informal traders in the region and urges the SADC to develop a supportive policy and operational framework for cross-border traders (SADC-CNGO 2011b). This critical stance is further accentuated in the civil society charter, where it is claimed that poverty is being fuelled by neo-liberal economic reforms and trade integration should therefore be coupled with provision by the SADC states of services and public healthcare, as well as an effective social protection system, in order to achieve social justice in the region (SADC-CNGO 2010b). Besides the fact that the SADC is allergic to more critical voices, SADC-CNGO itself is also to be blamed for its increased marginalization due to a weak knowledge foundation for its policy claims, discussed in section 4.5.2.

All in all, SADC interest in collaborating with CSOs such as SADC-CNGO is shallow and exists provided that they do not mount too much critique and, as one commentator puts it, 'rock the boat', but instead align themselves with the interests of the SADC.[55] Hence, even though the SADC allows SADC-CNGO to come to some of its meetings, it is expected to be compliant with the SADC agenda. In fact, 'SADC-CNGO is almost like a bureaucratic appendix of […] the Secretariat and there is now a growing critique of that'.[56] In terms of the latter, according to a recent study on public participation and democratization in the SADC, SADC-CNGO was seen by most respondents to be a formal part of the SADC system, which is problematic (Nzewi and Zakwe 2009: 26). One CSO representative goes even further and claims that SADC-CNGO is 'a classic case of institutionalized co-option, [SADC] trying to legitimize certain processes regionally through consultations with civil society'.[57] These critical comments raise serious concerns about the autonomy of SADC-CNGO and the risk of being co-opted and neutralized by regional policy-makers such as the SADC. This is a complex process. On the one hand, as shown above, by getting too close to those in the SADC it wants to influence, SADC-CNGO risks being drawn into the neo-liberal SADC agenda and playing a legitimizing role. One sign of this is the quite diverse and even paradoxical approach to SADC-led regional integration. For example, as shown above, in the Civil Society Charter SADC-CNGO strives for social and economic justice and people-driven regional integration, while at the same time calling for the facilitation of regional trade and economic growth. The Forum has also criticized trade liberalization for not bringing widespread development but at the same time recognizes the importance of the neo-liberal Trade Protocol. These two standpoints might not be mutually exclusive but they are certainly not natural companions. The other side of the neutralization coin is sheer exclusion. As we saw above, the more critical SADC-CNGO gets, the more marginalized it is in the SADC structure.

Furthermore, SATUCC, even though it is active in the ELS Meeting, claims to struggle to find new entry-points to SADC (SATUCC nd). In fact, according to the former director, the formal space granted to SATUCC in policy-making processes has never been an automatic route to policy influence. In his words, 'to have that

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[55] le Pere, interview, 27 November 2008

[56] le Pere, interview, 27 November 2008

[57] McKinley, interview, 1 December 2008

space is one thing, to get involved is another thing'.[58] SATUCC constantly has to claim its space,[59] which has proven more difficult in recent years. Another SATUCC official is more critical of the SADC and claims that it is generally reluctant to work with SATUCC, a major stumbling block for their regional consolidation (Osei-Hwedie 2009: 15). Besides having influence on the SADC-led employment and labour agenda in terms of participation in the design of various SADC policy instruments, there is also no evidence that points to SATUCC's alternative policy proposals being taken into consideration by the SADC (ibid: 14), for example in terms of the critical ANSA policy framework. All in all, 'the space for trade union participation [in SADC] has narrowed down' (SATUCC nd*)*, to the benefit of SADC business, which is gaining momentum, as shown by the examples above.

In terms of specific trade issue areas, due to the weak emphasis put on social aspects of trade such as ICBT issues as discussed in section 4.2.1, in line with neo-liberal regional governance the SADC considers interaction with CSOs dealing with these issues unimportant, which results in exclusion. For example, CSOs doing advocacy around informal trade, social rights and trade justice are generally largely excluded and ignored by the SADC. One example is EJN, which has a specific regional programme on SADC Advocacy, of which one aspect is ICBT. The most important output so far is research on ICBT in Southern Africa, which generated evidence of the (weak) status of informal traders in the region. The results have been used to strengthen ICBT associations to advocate for fair trade policies at the SADC and elsewhere (EJN 2009). EJN has shared its results with SADC officials in order to influence national and regional policy-making (EJN 2012b), and demands that SADC member states recognize ICBT in regional trade-related policy-making and create the necessary conditions for it to flourish (Damon and Jeuring 2010). According to the director of EJN, 'if one talk of regional integration you will have to talk about informal cross-border traders because informal trade is a big part of trade integration [...] We have done research on the issues and we are pushing SADC for informal trade as part of regional integration'.[60] Nevertheless, despite being knowledgeable on the matter, EJN is still denied access to the SADC in terms of policy influence in the trade arena.

Another important regional player in the ICBT field is CBTA. CBTA is accredited to COMESA and the SADC (SARDC 2008: 64) and lobbies various SADC institutions to support and facilitate cross-border informal trade and to enable free movement of informal traders between SADC countries through press statements and written submissions. Yet, CBTA has not managed to form a strong relationship with the SADC or COMESA (Nchito and Tranberg Hansen 2010: 181). The same applies to cross-border traders associations operating in the MDC. In terms of the most important institution governing the MDC, MCLI, it is claimed that it is 'founded on the principle of making the Maputo Corridor the first choice for *all stakeholders*' (MCLI 2012, original emphasis). However, studying their homepage it is clear that MCLI is heavily dominated by big business and that no organizations

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[58] Katchima, interview, 8 December 2008

[59] Katchima, interview, 8 December 2008

[60] Damon, interview, 15 December 2009

dealing with ICBT are involved (ibid). In general, the proponents of MDC, including MCLI, are bad at recognizing informal traders (Söderbaum and Taylor 2008: 48). According to the director of Street Net, 'if governments continue to do their planning without any consultation with the organizations of informal traders, it will be a matter of pot luck whether they happen to benefit the vendors or not' (Pat Horn quoted in Söderbaum and Taylor 2008: 48). The hope for greater policy influence on the SADC in the future is brought by the newly-established SACBTA. SACBTA seeks to lobby the SADC for recognition of the needs of informal cross-border traders in important regional policy instruments such as the Trade Protocol and the Protocol on the Movements of Persons, and organizes regular meetings with SADC officials, for example at TIFI (SACBTA 2012: 12).

In fact, the TIFI Directorate would be a natural partner for civil society engagement with the SADC on ICBT issues, as it is responsible for trade issues at the SADC Secretariat. However, according to the TIFI representative, engagement with informal trader interest groups is not prioritized as TIFI, focusing on the facilitation of formal trade, only works with business organizations such as ASCCI and SEG that are dealing with the movement of goods, productivity and investment. In his own words: 'yes, I could say that in a nutshell we have a particular constituency of civil society we deal with, mainly the people that do the import and export of goods are our focus. We don't deal much from a trade perspective with the pressure groups'.[61]

Apart from ICBT, EPA is another trade-related area where critical advocacy CSOs are in general excluded in policy discussions. Within the EPA Watch Programme, EJN tries to critically monitor EPA negotiations in the SADC EPA group (EJN 2012c). EJN has produced a number of research papers that analyse the impact of EPA on regional integration, which have been used to try to engage and lobby government trade negotiators and SADC officials (EJN 2009: 33). Based on their own research, EJN claims that EPAs are free trade agreements with no development dimensions, resulting in regional disintegration and fragmentation (ibid). However, the demands of EJN and other advocates of critical reform of the EPA agenda mostly fall on deaf ears. At a pan-African civil society EPAs review meeting in Cape Town in 2008, hosted by EJN, it was also claimed that there is generally little interaction between governments and CSOs to forge national and regional positions on EPAs (EJN 2008). Furthermore, the representative of SADC-CNGO claims that it has never been engaged in the EPA negotiations or been called to meetings in the EPA-SADC group.[62] Similar conclusions were made by the trade union movement in Southern Africa at a regional meeting in Botswana in 2006, led by SATUCC. In the final statement, the trade unions were '[c]oncerned about the lack of trade union and other stakeholders' participation in the EPA-negotiations' (SATUCC 2006). SATUCC is highly critical of EPA, claiming it will obstruct intra-SADC trade since local products would compete with subsidized EU products on the SADC market. The EPA negotiations have also split the SADC, leading to regional disintegration (Kanyenze et al 2006: 277). Lastly, SEATINI was earlier invited by

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[61] Kuzvinzwa, interview, 11 December 2009

[62] Muchabaiwa, interview, 7 December 2009

COMESA to take part in the EPA negotiations. However, developing a more critical attitude towards EPAs at a later stage and problematizing the benefit for regional development, it was cut off from further negotiations.[63]

The conclusion from these examples is that, regardless of how much knowledge organizations such as EJN and SEATINI have, for example through their extensive and evidence-based research on the (negative) effects of current EPAs on development in the region, challenging the SADC's and COMESA's positive view of EPAs as trade and development generating frameworks, they are barred from policy discussions and denied the possibility to influence these.

Other regional civil society actors are even more critical towards EPAs and consequently more excluded. Their radical agenda makes them 'mortal enemies to SADC'.[64] SAPSN is the best example here. SAPSN is deeply committed to structural change of the present regional and global order and criticizes SADC-led trade integration in Southern Africa for being intimately connected with the current global neo-liberal trade regime. SAPSN demands trade justice that puts the needs of the Southern African people before profits for big corporations (SAPSN ndb). Trade, in SAPSN's view, is interpreted quite differently when compared with business CSOs such as SEG and ASCCI, as well as regional research centres, and is related to a wide range of issues such as social and economic rights, poverty eradication, debt and privatization. Regarding trade and EPA, in the Peoples' Declaration from the Peoples' Summit in Windhoek 2010, all free trade arrangements, especially the EU-imposed EPAs which are dividing and threatening the very survival and future of the SADC, are rejected (SAPSN 2010). A similar critique was delivered during the 2009 Peoples' Summit in Kinshasa, where it was noted that the privatization of basic public services, promoted by the SADC's market-oriented trade integration agenda, violates the right to life as it goes against the common rights to education, health care, water etc. and thereby worsens poverty in the SADC (SAPSN 2009).

The radical standpoint of SAPSN makes the SADC unwilling to even listen to its critique. According to one SAPSN activist, Peoples' Declarations such as the above are not yet even officially recognized in SADC meetings.[65] SADC leaders are often invited to attend the Peoples' Summit. However, the only time SADC leaders accepted the invitation, in Zambia 2007, they backed out at the last minute for various reasons, which included perceived hostility from activists at the Summit (EJN 2010a). Furthermore, due to their critical agenda, as a representative of social movements in the region SAPSN has not been invited to be a member of the RPO Steering Committee.[66] SAPSN's critical stance towards the SADC puts it on the side-lines of the SADC. Contesting the very neo-liberal foundation upon which the present SADC-led regional integration project is built, SAPSN will never get a chance to present its views directly to the Council of Ministers, nor to have influence

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[63] Machemedze, interview, 4 December 2009
[64] le Pere, interview, 27 November 2008
[65] Kasiamhuru, interview, 2 December 2009
[66] Damon, e-mail communication, 20 August 2012

on the content of SADC Protocols and Communiqués.[67] This is also related to its contentious methods, discussed in section 4.5.2.

To conclude this section, inclusion/exclusion in the SADC seriously affects civil society regionalization. Decisions by the SADC to include or exclude CSOs in policy-making in various institutions greatly affect the latter's organizational strength and regional profile. It is without doubt that most CSOs in this study are eager to somehow interact with the SADC and to participate in various forums, and when they succeed this strengthens their regional action and consolidation. The examples of SEG, ASCCI, SARDC, Trades Centre and SEATINI are telling. For these CSOs, interaction with the SADC is an important part of their activity portfolio, and being granted space in various meetings enhances their status, which strengthens their regional work. In fact, the very interaction with the SADC is in itself an important force behind regional consolidation. However, for CSOs such as SADC-CNGO and SATUCC, a lot is at stake in terms of interacting with the SADC, since policy dialogue with it is one of the most important reasons for their existence. Not being granted space in key policy areas such as trade risks weakening them and SADC-CNGO especially is in a very vulnerable position in this regard. However, for critical actors such as SAPSN, resisting the SADC agenda, being excluded from the SADC adds to their image as 'outsiders', which can actually boost regional consolidation and strengthen the network. This will be further discussed in section 4.6.2.

4.3 Inter-Organizational Relations between Donors and CSOs

This section will discuss how the statist-capitalist informed social relations between various donors and RCSOs influence civil society regionalization in the trade sector in two different ways. First, the role of donor funds in facilitating civil society regionalization and the problematic dependency this creates on behalf of CSOs will be analysed and, secondly, the ways in which donor agendas shape the nature of regionalization. However, the section starts by discussing how, in more general ways, the capitalist social structure has affected donors' relations with CSOs, as well as listing the most important donors involved in the trade sector.

4.3.1 The Funding Rationale for Donors

To a large extent donors are part of reproducing a capitalist regional order. Generally, donors mainly support CSOs that are engaged in service provision, solving problems related to the process of neo-liberalization in the region. Claiming that government service delivery is insufficient, donors think that CSOs should be supported to fill these gaps, acting as a voice for the poor and ensuring basic service delivery for the marginalized (Southern Africa Trust 2010b). In line with the economistic rationale of neo-liberal thinking, another incentive to support service

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[67] Osei-Hwedie, interview, 5 December 2008

provision is the fact that funders want concrete and tangible results. The results of such funding are easier to measure. In terms of advocacy-based organizations that try to change the foundations for service provision and make states take more responsibility, it is harder to see tangible results. The difficulty of measuring certain types of activities also applies to the general reluctance to fund networking, co-ordination and coalition-building, which do not lend themselves to the same kind of quantification as the provision of certain tangible services. This trend has been further enhanced by implementation of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness from 2005, [68] which has changed the aid architecture within the last 10 years towards more efficient funding, pooling of resources, and joint donor programmes. Due to the Paris Agenda, more conditionality is tied to aid, and requirements for accountability and attention to measurable outcomes and results are further strengthened (Southern Africa Trust 2010b; Trust Africa 2008).

However, despite the overall trend of funding measurable service-providing activities, some donors support the advocacy activities of critical CSOs. These donors believe that civil society organizations should ultimately not be responsible for service delivery, as it is primarily government's role and government must be held accountable if it does not fulfil this function. These donors dislike when CSOs take over the role of governments, filling gaps in service delivery, claiming that responsibility for service provision resides with the government. Therefore, they mostly fund those CSOs that advocate for improved service delivery by the state, for economic justice, and for pro-poor development (Southern Africa Trust 2010b). Applied to the trade sector, these more general points will discussed further in section 4.3.3 and 4.3.4, as well as in corresponding sections in chapter 5 with regards to the HIV/AIDS sector.

4.3.2 Key Donors

Southern Africa Trust is a regional non-profit organization based in Johannesburg, South Africa. Its prime objective is to 'contribute towards supporting deeper and wider civil society engagement in regional policy dialogue to overcome poverty in Southern Africa' (Southern Africa Trust 2011). The Trust therefore supports diverse CSOs from Southern Africa that are dealing with, for example, finance, trade, investment and pro-poor growth, and that want to influence national and regional policy-making to become more pro-poor and developmental. The main strategies are capacity-building; strengthening policy dialogue between CSOs, state actors and the private sector; evidence-based advocacy; and grant making (Southern Africa Trust 2010a).

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[68] The Paris Declaration was the outcome of a High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Paris 2005 where ministers of developed and developing countries responsible for promoting development and heads of multilateral and bilateral development institutions met to discuss how to make development co-operation more efficient. The declaration strives to strengthen partner countries' national development strategies and operational frameworks; increase alignment of aid with partner countries' priorities, systems and procedures; enhance donors' and partner countries' accountability to their citizens and parliaments; eliminate duplication of efforts and rationalize donor activities; reform and simplify donor policies and procedures; and define measures and standards of performance and accountability of partner country systems (OECD 2005).

The Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa (OSISA) is a Johannesburg-based private foundation working in 10 Southern Africa countries. OSISA supports local, national and regional civil society activities, mainly on a project level. One thematic area is economic justice, and here OSISA supports NGO initiatives that, for example, support government trade negotiations, CSO advocacy, civil society initiatives that promote regional labour rights, and research and advocacy on regional integration, trade and development. OSISA also promotes regional civil society networking (OSISA 2008).

Diakonia is an INGO from Sweden, with a regional office in Kenya that is involved in supporting regional CSOs in Eastern and Southern Africa. Diakonia has a regional programme on Social and Economic Justice (SEJ) that focuses on overcoming the structural causes of poverty in Africa. Therefore, Diakonia supports regional CSOs that work with debt cancellation, trade, aid effectiveness, gender equality in economic issues, and sustainable private sector investments. More specifically, Diakonia wants to strengthen these organizations' abilities to do research, networking, mobilization and advocacy work in order to influence the policies and practices of national governments and regional institutions such as the SADC (Diakonia 2011).

Action Aid International (AA) is another INGO, based in South Africa and with an African regional office in Nairobi, Kenya. AA supports a range of regional civil society initiatives in not only Southern Africa but the whole African continent. Even though AA's primary focus in Africa is at the local level, it also engages with CSOs working at African regional levels, supporting the development of popular alliances to influence regional policy and empower citizens to demand protection of socio-economic rights. For example, AA strengthens the regional leadership, engagement and coalition-building of organizations and movements of poor people demanding the right to food and just trade, and facilitates regional civil society meetings (Action Aid International 2005).

Norwegian Church Aid (NCA), an INGO based in Norway and with a regional office in Pretoria, South Africa, is deeply committed to supporting regional civil society engagement. NCA has developed a specific regional programme for Southern Africa on economic justice, for example dealing with resources and finance, and livelihood and trade. In particular, NCA aims to strengthen CSOs to take part in regional policy formulation and advocacy, foremost within the SADC and AU frameworks. NCA facilitates efficient linkages between the two. In essence, NCA enhances the capacity of CSOs in the regional work they do, facilitates information sharing between partners, and creates regional platforms (NCA 2010).

The German Agency for International Cooperation (GIZ), which includes the former German Technical Cooperation (GTZ), is an international enterprise owned by the German government. GIZ assists the government to provide international cooperation services for sustainable development on a global scale (GIZ 2012). In Southern Africa, GIZ has a regional programme in support of the SADC. The programme focuses on strengthening regional economic integration, consolidating cooperation on trans-boundary water resource management, and promoting the conservation and sustainable use of natural resources. Besides enhancing the

capacity of the Secretariat, the programme also promotes civil society and private sector participation in the integration process, supporting some SADC-affiliated RCSOs (GIZ 2011).

Lastly, the European Commission (EC) aims to support the acceleration of economic growth and development in the SADC region through deeper levels of regional economic integration and political cooperation. This is mainly, but not only, done by providing broad-based support to deepen SADC economic integration and trade policies, including investment promotion, regional infrastructure and food security. One (small) component of EC support to regional integration in the SADC is direct support to private and civil society organizations for involvement in SADC policy-making and service provision. The SADC Secretariat is responsible for channelling funds to CSOs as part of the overall budget support (EC 2008).

4.3.3 Dependency on Donor Funds

In general, the regional level is becoming more and more important for various types of donors. According to the director of EJN, for CSOs 'there is definitely more money for regional work today'.[69] This perception is backed up by a major study carried out by the Southern Africa Trust about donor and civil society relations in Southern Africa. According to the study, there seems to be an increase in donor funding to civil society organizations that work towards advancing the regional agenda. These include CSOs and networks that act regionally, or which have programmes focusing on regional issues (Southern Africa Trust 2010b: 12). This is particularly the case in the trade field, where donors increasingly emphasize support to regional civil society activities. However, according to this research project it seems like the granting of funds for regional activities is greatly skewed towards private funders such as foundations, trusts and INGOs, at the expense of bilateral and multilateral funders, who tend to focus more on other sectors, foremost HIV/AIDS. Few bilateral/multilateral donors are engaged in supporting the regionalization of civil society in the trade sector. As discussed in the last chapter, bilateral donors' motives for developing regional programs are often administrational in terms of promoting aid effectiveness and harmonization of country programs, and do not reflect a deep commitment to regionalization. This plays against a genuine interest in supporting the involvement of CSOs in regional integration, which will be discussed further in section 5.3.2.

RCSOs in the trade sector are highly dependent on the availability of donor funds, which stems from the general tendency of RCSOs to be 'dependent on donor decisions, financial resources available and the overall change in aid architecture' (Southern Africa Trust 2010b: 39) for their operation. One well-known scholar emphasizes this dependency even more, claiming that many national and regional networks and NGOs are generally kept alive by donor money,[70] including trade-related ones. In the same vein, the director of the Southern Africa Trust, with major insight in the regional civil society arena, argues that some RCSOs that they support

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[69] Damon, interview, 15 December 2009

[70] Vale, interview, 2 March 2005

in the trade sector tend to 'go regional' mainly for the money and not because of a fundamental interest in dealing with regional issues. RCSOs, including those in this study, are partly driven by economic interests, which are intimately related to the current availability of donor money.[71] Therefore, according to another donor representative, CSOs 'sometimes […] work in the region not necessarily because they believe in it but because this is where the funding is […] So for organizations, such as any other business […] you have to be realistic and go where the money is'.[72] Therefore, '[y]ou end up having people following resources rather than resources following ideas'.[73]

RCSOs are generally greatly dependent on the decision of donors to fund them or not. At the moment, the financial situation for the RCSOs in this study is quite good, due to the great interest by trusts, foundations and INGOs in supporting regional civil society work around trade and development issues. However, for some RCSOs this has not always been the case, proving the vulnerable situation they are in. SADC-CNGO, for example, has long struggled to sustain its activities and build up organizational capacity and the network has 'emerged and then died out three times'[74] due to shifting donor commitments. In fact, it has not been until recently that SADC-CNGO established a fully-fledged secretariat, thanks to donor support.[75] SATUCC also struggled for funds for many years (ibid). During periods with weak donor funding, the regional presence of these networks has been considerably lower due to fewer regional activities. SAPSN has faced similar challenges and is widely criticized for being inactive between regional events such as the Peoples' Summit. This is partly related to the occasional lack of donor interest. Up until recently, donors mostly funded particular SAPSN-led events and temporal campaigns, such as the Peoples' Summit, and not wider programs and the capacity-building of the secretariat. According to the SAPSN representative, 'most donors only give support for specific projects and activities, which is very unfortunate'[76] The SAPSN case is related to the wider donor propensity to fund specific projects, foremost those (service-delivery) ones whose results can be easily measured, as discussed in chapter 4.3.1.

To sum up, even though donors on the whole are influenced by a state-centric, national framework, and prioritize the national over the regional level (discussed further in section 5.3.2), they are still active regionally and provide (some) funds for regional civil society work in the trade sector. This specifically applies to non-state donors such as private foundations, trusts and INGOs. On the whole, these donor funds are essential for the regionalization of civil society. Without donor support to CSOs, the regional dimension of civil society work would be very weak. However, there are signs of CSOs being partly driven by economic interests when applying for regional funds and not always by a genuine affinity with the region. This is even

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[71] Gabriel, interview, 2 December 2008

[72] Ally, interview, 26 November 2009

[73] Muchena, interview, 1 December 2008

[74] le Pere, interview, 27 November 2008

[75] Chiriga, interview, 2 December 2009

[76] Kasiamhuru, interview, 2 December 2009

more pronounced for actors in the HIV/AIDS sector, such as Southern African Network of AIDS Service Organizations (SANASO), which will be addressed in section 5.3.2. The instrumentality of regional engagement will also be discussed further in chapter 6.

4.3.4 Donor Influence on the CSO Agenda

In general, donors tend to influence CSO's agendas according to what they believe the regional development priorities should be. In connection with the argument above, regional civil society organizations often find themselves in a situation where they need to navigate between shifting loyalties between financial support and defending their constituencies (Southern Africa Trust 2010b: 38).

Bilateral and multilateral donors have a great influence on their CSO partners, who are often steered in a particular ideological direction. One arena for donors to influence their partners' agendas is participation in the development of CSO policy documents. One example is the process of designing the 2010-2014 Strategic Framework of SADC-CNGO, in which the donors were greatly involved (SADC-CNGO 2009a: 24). Bilateral and multilateral funders primarily support problem-solving agendas in support of the present neo-liberal order. In essence, they want to strengthen the current type of SADC-led, market-oriented regional integration and, for example, facilitate trade and economic growth in the region. GIZ and the EC, for example, enhance the capacity of the SADC Secretariat to improve implementation of trade liberalization schemes. For GIZ and the EC, CSOs are also somewhat important to support in this endeavour, since they provide various services and policy advice that strengthens regional trade integration. Some examples are: private sector development (in terms of ASCCI); monitoring implementation of the SADC agenda (SADC-CNGO); capacity-building of trade negotiators and provision of policy-related research (Trades Centre); and dissemination of SADC-related information and news (SARDC). However, it should be noted that bilateral and multilateral support to regional civil society is much more common in the HIV/AIDS sector, where various types of service-providing activities dominate. This will be discussed further in the next chapter.

Those donors that are willing to fund more critical regional civil society agendas are themselves often critical of the current market-oriented regional governance in Southern Africa. The critical agendas of these donors greatly influence the work of their regional recipients. These donors are mostly private foundations such as OSISA and INGOs such as NCA, AA and Diakonia, which share the worldview and critical approach of their Southern African partners. For example, NCA has a clear preference for supporting critical advocacy in relation to service-provision, in line with the RBA. It is claimed that, 'as the political space for civil society is shrinking in the region […] NCA [needs to] strengthen our partners to take active part in the on-going political processes' (NCA 2010: 19) and to foster values-based co-operation between NCA and partners based on a common struggle for social and economic justice.[77] Similarly according to the representative of AA, 'we believe it is

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[77] Chidaushe, interview, 29 November 2009

possible to transform the current structures to be able to accommodate the interests of the poor'[78] and here partners in Africa are important instruments. Lastly, OSISA strives to change the neo-liberal paradigm and start discussing alternative models, such as ANSA. One central role for OSISA, therefore, is to harness alternatives to the prevailing paradigm that reside in civil society, which informs its support to the Peoples' Summit, EJN and other critical voices.[79] Hence, EJN, OSISA and other donors 'are more like partners in a common struggle'.[80]

INGOs, and to a certain extent private foundations and trusts, relate differently to the capitalist, neo-liberal global order than their bilateral and multilateral counterparts discussed above. Foundations, trusts and INGOs are private and not public, which gives them a degree of independence and autonomy. As funders they are then more willing and able to support more critical civil society strategies and agendas. From the above it is also clear that, in a way, civil society is viewed as an instrument for donors to achieve the overall goals of trade justice, pro-poor development and critical reform of the current regional governance architecture. In this process, CSOs are stimulated to foster a critical agenda and develop a contentious attitude towards various policy-makers.

On the other hand, aid flows from bilateral and multilateral donors are dependent on foreign policy in their home countries (Southern Africa Trust 2010b). Therefore, according to one commentator, 'they are more reluctant to fund things that might embarrass their counterparts and can harm trade relations and political ties […and] tend to be more conservative and cautious.'[81] One civil society representative goes as far as saying that bilateral donors are in fact mere extensions of their foreign affairs departments, carrying out state policies through aid.[82] It is no wonder, therefore, that bilateral donors find it difficult to fund rights-based organizations such as EJN, SAPSN and, to a certain extent, SEATINI, that challenge government agendas, want to reform current regional trade schemes and argue for trade justice. In contrast to SARDC and Trades Centre, who cooperate with bilateral funders, because of their more critical agenda SEATINI are foremost funded by private foundations such as Rosa Luxemburg Foundation and INGOs such as AA and Oxfam.

To conclude, donors are decisive in shaping the regionalization process in terms of the agendas of RCSOs, the issues they deal with, their overall strategies, and concrete regional activities. This relates to bilateral and multilateral donors that tend to export a problem-solving development agenda to partners such as SADC-CNGO and ASCCI, as well more radical donors such as Diakonia and OSISA, which steer their CSO partners in another, more contentious direction. In the end, donors have great influence on creating a heterogeneous civil society regionalization where

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[78] Sucá, interview, 24 November 2008

[79] Muchena, interview, 1 December 2008

[80] Damon, interview, 15 December 2009

[81] Ally, interview, 26 November 2009

[82] Gentle, interview, 17 December 2009

different CSOs drive different agendas, resulting in tense intra-civil society relations on the regional level, which will be discussed next.

4.4 Inter-Organizational Relations between CSOs

This section will focus on the third inter-organizational structural level and analyse the social relations between CSOs on a regional level. Two dimensions of civil society regionalization will be highlighted here: CSO ideological rivalry, discussed in the next section, and CSO competition for donor funds, analysed in section 4.4.2.

4.4.1 CSO Ideological Rivalry

It is widely acknowledged by donors, researchers and also CSOs themselves that the main watershed within regional civil society is related to ideology and strategy. Different types of CSOs often have fundamentally different views on Southern African regionalism *per se*, using different strategies to reproduce, reform or even transform it. This implies that CSOs ideologically relate differently to the current regional capitalist order and its various manifestations, such as SADC-led neo-liberal regional governance. On a broad level, it is possible to distinguish between 'insider' and 'outsider' CSOs (e.g. van Rooy 2004). On the one hand, 'insider CSOs' are those formal NGOs and research centres that acknowledge the present regional governance framework and want to engage governments and regional institutions to modify policies and accelerate implementation. On the other hand, social movements and certain more critically-inclined NGOs, i.e. 'outsider CSOs', contest the current neo-liberal agenda and emphasize popular mobilization, protest and also disengagement from state actors. In this regard, one CSO succinctly states that '[w]e the social movements do the mass mobilization around the issues, they do the research and the formal proposals'.[83] The outsider CSOs are best exemplified by SAPSN and member organizations such as Alternative Information and Development Centre (AIDC) in South Africa and Zimbabwe Coalition on Debt and Development (ZIMCODD) in Zimbabwe. These and other critical actors, loosely connected to SAPSN, such as International Labour Resource and Information Group (ILRIG) in South Africa and the former Anti-Privatization Forum (APF), believe that the best way people can influence regional processes is not from inside these structures but from the outside. To a varying degree, they opt for disengaging from formal, institutionalized processes and refuse to join the 'NGO crowd'[84] for example related to the SADC, since they believe this would justify an unjust regional order: 'The insider lobbying, trying to change the policies of regional integration, leads nowhere'.[85] On the other hand, insider NGOs such as Trades Centre, SARDC and SEATINI believe the best option for having influence on regional governance is to

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[83] Matanga, interview, December 2009

[84] McKinley, interview, 1 December 2008

[85] Gentle, interview, 17 December 2009

act from within. According to one commentator, 'sometimes it is better to be on the inside and not always on the outside […] There are some benefits you can get from being on the inside'.[86] In the same vein, the SARDC representative claims that '[w]e don't see […the SADC] as our enemy […] we want to complement the government's work […] If we are going to criticize, we are trying to do that as constructively as possible. We have realized that if you are too negative you are not likely to be heard'.[87]

Many CSOs involved in the study testify about problems in interacting with each other, especially across the 'insider/outsider' divide. For example, according to the Trades representative, 'engaging with other CSOs is not without conflicts; conflicts are inevitable especially if you use different strategies'.[88] The negative effect this has on the ability of CSOs to reach overall regional development objectives worries many organizations involved in this study. For example, according to SADC-CNGO, '[c]ivil society has suffered from unnecessary and sometimes counterproductive divisions on ideological, methodological and sometimes personality grounds to the detriment of the common good' (2010c: 11). Furthermore, ZIMCODD emphasizes the challenge of collaboration even further. Addressing both insider and outsider CSOs, the director highlights the need to 'stop wasting time dividing ourselves between the NGOs and the social movement […] It is much easier to get consensus amongst the leaders of the region than amongst civil society'.[89]

One contentious issue-area in which these tensions are pronounced is EPA. Different and sometimes incompatible views on EPA and conflicting strategies for engagement (and non-engagement) with state actors have plagued civil society for a long time and prohibited a united regional front. On the one side, as already indicated above, CSOs such as SAPSN have argue for 'no to EPAs' and frantically tried to influence SADC leaders to refuse to negotiate with the EU. On the other side, Trades Centre has a more pragmatic view on EPA and engaged SADC leaders and trade negotiators with 'facts about EPA' in order to discuss how the region can best benefit from this process. Trades Centre has therefore been criticized by SAPSN and others for being a sell-out.[90] Similarly, SEATINI has been questioned by certain trade unions for having dialogue with governments on EPA and other trade-related issues, even if it has a somewhat critical attitude, and instead have urged it to march with the unions on the streets.[91] Lastly, in terms of the Civil Society Forum, some participants seem to be in favour of EPAs and also engaging with neo-liberal institutions such as the WTO (Pressend 2010). The cleavages regarding EPAs worry CSOs from both camps, who argue that without collaboration between CSOs with different qualities, regional civil society will be weakened and risk having little influence on the overall outcome of the process. According to one actor, '[n]ow Economic Partnership Agreements are coming and some countries [in

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[86] Machemedze, interview, 4 December 2009

[87] Valy, interview, 21 November 2008

[88] Chigwada, interview, 3 December 2009

[89] Matanga, interview, 4 December 2009

[90] Chigwada, interview, 3 December

[91] Machemedze, interview, 4 December 2009

the region] are excited to sign agreements and so forth. They are making deals but we are hitting each other'.[92]

The most profound manifestation of intra-civil society rivalry is the very existence of two different civil society meetings parallel to the SADC Summit. The Forum is more institutionalized, involving formal NGOs and is more restrictive in terms of participation. It pursues more formal engagement with governments at the SADC Summit. On the other hand, the Peoples' Summit is less formal, is organized more as a social forum, and is more open to various sorts of non-institutionalized local groups that believe in contentious engagement and even disengagement with the SADC and emphasize mass protest.[93] In essence, the two meetings play different roles, wherein the Forum is intimately linked to the SADC agenda and the Peoples' Summit engages with issues related to social and economic justice more broadly.[94] Both meetings claim to represent civil society in the region, albeit in different ways. On the one hand, the Forum claims to speak for NGOs in the region, and on the other hand the Summit claims to be the voice of popular, grassroots-led organizations.[95] The two forums also issue separate declarations with, as shown above, very different approaches to the SADC. One commentator concludes that '[i]n terms of political and ideological inclinations they are very different'.[96]

It is widely acknowledged among both CSO representatives and donors that due to their different ideological inclinations, choice of strategy and types of participants, relations between the SADC Civil Society Forum and the Peoples' Summit are contentious.[97] According to one donor representative 'there is a lot of animosity between the social movements in the Peoples Summit and the NGOs in the Civil Society Forum. There is no room for coming together'.[98] The refusal of social movements to interact with the SADC makes them very hesitant to co-operate with the SADC-friendly Forum.[99] SADC-CNGO, the main organizer, is accused of not putting forward an autonomous agenda and merely being a civil society face of the SADC.[100] NGOs are also invited to join the marches of the Peoples' Summit, but few have shown up so far[101] because NGO leaders generally don't want to be associated with contentious strategies such as demonstrations, which might play against them in engagement with SADC leaders. This in turn relates to the fact that SADC-CNGO and other NGO groups question what change popular mobilization activities really make.[102] NGOs in the Forum also question the sometimes aggressive approach towards the SADC and other target groups. One prominent commentator with great insight into both processes concludes that 'civil society groups are largely

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[92] Matanga, interview, 4 December

[93] Barnard, interview, 26 November 2008; Mati, interview, 27 November 2009

[94] Pressand, interview, 27 November 2008

[95] Osei-Hwedie, interview, 5 December, 2008

[96] le Pere, interview, 27 November 2008

[97] E.g. Muchabaiwa, interview, 7 December 2009; Kasiamhuru, interview, 2 December 2009; Chidaushe, interview, 29 November 2009

[98] Mhlongo and Chiriga, interview, 2 December 2008

[99] Mhlongo and Chiriga, interview, 2 December 2008

[100] le Pere, interview, 27 November 2008

[101] Kasiamhuru, interview, 2 December 2009

[102] Muchabaiwa, interview, 7 December 2009

split […C]onflicting declarations […] and a divided understanding of the implications of 'free trade' […] undermine collective goals towards social justice and building regional solidarity' (Pressend 2010). All in all, until recently there have been no meaningful structural relations between the two.[103]

Furthermore, the exclusion of social movement such as SAPSN from the Forum is more or less institutionalized. SADC-CNGO, EJN and SATUCC have formed a MoU on general co-operation, which is referred to as the 'Pact of Regional Apex Organizations'. In the document, the particular view on civil society and who belongs to it is clearly stated: '[c]ivil society in this context refers to churches, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and trade unions' (2010b: 1). Hence, social movements, CBOs or other types of popular, non-formal organizations are left out. At the same time, SAPSN has been invited to a number of planning meetings in connection with the Summit, but it has not been until recently that it has shown an interest in participating. According to one commentator, social movements are hesitant to participate because they don't want to be co-opted: 'If you co-opt them, how do they march outside the SADC Summit? It will give SADC the power to say why do you march now when you are also sitting inside?'[104]

However, the icy relations between the Forum and Summit are beginning to melt. In the past few years, SAPSN has accepted joining a few planning meetings, for example a 2010 Apex-meeting. At that, SAPSN agreed it was important to better link up with NGOs in the Forum to ensure collaboration across the ideological divide (EJN 2010a). The same year, SAPSN also invited SADC-CNGO to a workshop to build their capacity around effective engagement with the SADC (SADC-CNGO 2010d). At a SAPSN coordination committee meeting in 2009 it was also agreed that the two meetings should remain separate but that competition should be minimized.[105] It remains to be seen what this will lead to in terms of broader co-operation between forums.

4.4.2 Civil Society Competition for Donor Funds

Another dimension of intra-civil society tension on a regional level is the competition for donor funds. It is widely claimed in the donor community that the limited availability of donor resources results in a tendency for CSOs to compete for the same funds.[106] According to one donor, referring to CSOs such as SADC-CNGO, SAPSN and EJN, 'these organizations compete for money between themselves'.[107] This implies that CSOs always try to prove to the donors that they perform better than their rivals.[108] SADC-CNGO has greatly felt this competition, which adds to the ideological rivalry between it and, for example, SAPSN.[109]

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[103] Gabriel, interview, 2 December 2008

[104] Chiriga, interview, December 2009

[105] Kasiamhuru, interview, 2 December 2009

[106] Muchena, interview, 1 December 2008; Chidaushe, interview, 29 November 2009; Yates, interview, 14 December 2009; Mhlongo and Chiriga, interview, 2 December 2008

[107] Yates, interview, 14 December

[108] Chidaushe, interview, 29 November 2009

[109] Muchabaiwa, interview, 7 December

To conclude the previous two sections, there are many tensions between CSOs of insider and outsider characters in the trade sector, most fundamentally manifested in the existence of two rival civil society meetings running parallel to the SADC Summit. In the words of one commentator, 'ideologically, there is no homogeneity within civil society in the region'.[110] The rivalry and competition can play against the regionalization of civil society on an overall level, for example in terms of fragmented civil society engagement with the SADC, even though the conflictual relations are beginning to ease. However, these tensions might have different effects on different CSOs. In case of SAPSN, for example, its regional collaboration can in fact be strengthened by the above ideological conflicts, boosting an 'outsider' identity, as will be discussed in the next two sections. On the whole, as we have seen so far, there are many signs which indicate that civil society regionalization is a very diverse process, like all other social processes determined by the capitalist and neo-liberal global order. The nature of interaction between CSOs and the SADC varies greatly with regards to different CSOs, and some are more included than others in regional governance institutions. Different funders with different inclinations and motivations for supporting RCSOs also steer the latter in different directions. Donor funds also tend to create CSOs which are partly driven by a search for economic resources to fulfil material needs, and not always by altruistic and developmental visions. The overall consequence of the ideological cleavages and competition for donor funds is the evolution of heterogeneous civil society regionalization in the trade sector based on internal rivalry and tension. This might hamper the overall regionalization process.

4.5 Intra-Organizational Relations: CSOs and Issue-Framing

In this and the next section, focus will be put on the agency of RCSOs, albeit within the context of the three higher structural levels discussed above, in terms of the ways they frame issues and construct identities for regional consolidation. Hence, as will be clear in the coming two sections, while being partly an autonomous process, the internal motivations of RCSOs to 'go regional' are influenced by external actors such as the SADC and donors. Inter-organizational relations between the SADC and CSOs particularly affect how regional NGOs and networks frame issues and construct identities. The section will start by discussing two dimensions of civil society regionalization related to issue-framing: regional issue-framing and construction of regional target groups. In section 4.6, the role of positive and exclusive regional identity-making for civil society regionalization is discussed.

4.5.1 Regional Issue-Framing

Regional issue-framing plays an important role in understanding the regionalization of civil society. According to one commentator, 'the issues are a major unifying

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[110] Mati, interview, 27 November 2009

factor, for example debt and trade'.[111] Networks such as SADC-CNGO, SATUCC, EJN and SAPSN are regionally consolidated partly because of a shared regional perception of the issues they work with.

For SADC-CNGO, in its Southern Africa Civil Society Poverty and Development Charter for example, the SADC region is seen as having many development challenges in common. These include weak and non-dynamic economies, high income inequalities, high unemployment, high economic informalization, recurrent food insecurity, inadequate social protection, inadequate infrastructure, and weak regional integration (SADC-CNGO 2010b). These problems are inherently cross-border and regional in character. In the latest strategic plan of SADC-CNGO, the regional commonality of development issues is further emphasized. Here, issues such as hunger, malnutrition, landlessness and food insecurity are viewed as regional issues, which characterize the SADC region as a whole, affecting citizens regardless of where they live. Therefore, these problems need to be tackled collectively (SADC-CNGO 2009a: 34-36).

SATUCC reaches similar conclusions. According to the representative, 'when it comes to regional issues we are not divided. We see things from a common perspective'.[112] SATUCC has worked hard to educate member organizations on regional socio-economic issues such as EPAs, and these issues are then debated in order to reach a consensus within the coalition on how to argue their case at regional and national levels. Hence, when the former SATUCC director went to various SADC meetings on behalf of SATUCC, he claimed to present one common SATUCC standpoint.[113] One important regional policy issue for SATUCC is employment, and it is claimed that unemployment and a growing informal economy are not local or national problems but affect people equally all around the region (Makanza nd). This common understanding within the network seems to be essential for regional consolidation.

Furthermore, for EJN one rationale for bringing together church organizations regionally to advocate for economic justice is the perception of regional development commonalities. According to one EJN representative, 'the poverty issues are common in the region and unite civil society'.[114] EJN claims that the regionalization of poverty and development issues ultimately stems from the overall regional neo-liberal, market-oriented trend in Southern Africa, partly manifested by the current EPA negotiations. In terms of the latter, 'international trade agreements [such as EPA…] have direct impact on SADC livelihoods' (EJN 2008: 19). EPA is framed by EJN as a regional issue since it is greatly affecting regional integration in Southern Africa for the worse. In fact, EPA negotiations between the EU and countries in Southern Africa are perceived as fragmenting regional initiatives like the SADC, since their members are divided into two different negotiating groups, i.e. the SADC group and the ESA group (EJN 2009).

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[111] Chiriga, interview, 2 December 2009

[112] Katchima, interview, 8 December 2008

[113] Katchima, interview, 8 December 2008

[114] Vilakazi, interview, 15 December 2009

Regional civil society meetings are important platforms for the regional construction of trade and development issues and the further consolidation of regional networks. The SADC Civil Society Forum is important in this regard. The Civil Society statements, released at the end of every Forum, embody the debates taking place. For example, the statements in connection to the SADC Summits in 2010 and 2011 set the agenda for a regionally-active civil society. In the preambles it is stated that participants commit themselves to 'collectively engage SADC and Member States on issues of common interest such as poverty eradication, promotion of democracy and good governance and justice' (SADC-CNGO 2010a: 1, 2011b: 1). This indicates a perception that trade and development issues concern the whole region and therefore presupposes collective regional action.

Regional research NGOs such as SARDC and Trades Centre strongly emphasize the connection between 'local', 'national' and 'regional' development processes. For them, the regional and global perception of the issues they deal with is a strong incitement for regional engagement. SARDC argues that informal trade is inherently cross-border in nature and intimately linked to regional development and integration. It is claimed that in order to understand and also support informal traders, its activities must by linked to the overall regional trade and poverty structures (SARDC 2008). SARDC is therefore dedicated to informing and influencing citizens and policy-makers in the region about ICBT issues and how they affect national and regional processes. In the same vein, Trades Centre argues that, since the poverty dynamics in Southern Africa are regional, there is a great need to develop existing regional strategies, such as the SADC RISDP 'to guide the region out of poverty' (Trades Centre 2010: 2). This motivates the Centre's strong emphasis on assisting regional policy-makers, such as the SADC Secretariat, to develop and implement regional policy instruments. Lastly, business CSOs also make, more or less, a regional analysis of private sector-related trade issues. For example, the mission of ASCCI is to 'promote an enabling environment for business development in the SADC region' (2012b: 8), which means pushing SADC institutions and members to harmonize standards to facilitate market penetration of innovative goods and reducing production costs (ibid: 21).

To conclude, regional framing of trade-related issues plays a very important role for the regional consolidation of most RCSOs in this study. Issues such as EPA, poverty and ICBT are conceptualized as common to Southern Africa as a region, having similar expression in various countries and affecting people in the same ways. Most importantly, regional issue-framing triggers an urge to take regional action, since an understanding of regional commonalities presupposes joint activities, for example networking and collective advocacy, in order to solve common problems.

4.5.2 Construction of Regional Target Groups

It is clear from the above that RCSOs often frame their issues around regional policy-making actors such as the SADC. As will be shown below, the SADC is framed as an important target for regional lobbying, advocacy and social mobilization, as responsible for lack of implementation of various projects, for lack

of development-orientation and even for causing poverty and injustices in the region. In different ways, the SADC is in itself an important incentive for regionalization of civil society. According to one interviewee, 'what makes […] a regional formation powerful is that they have clear targets and enemies in what they are doing, for example the SADC Secretariat'.[115] In the trade arena it is particularly easy to see where important political decisions are taken and it is clearer who the 'bad guys' are.[116]

In the case of SADC-CNGO, to a large extent the member councils are bound together by issues related to the SADC.[117] In the words of the SADC-CNGO representative, 'we are telling SADC indeed we are a diverse group but we are bound by a common vision, which is to see a prosperous and democratic SADC'.[118] In fact, studying the strategic plan for 2010-2014 it is clear that the rationale for SADC-CNGOs work is spelt s, a, d and c. The Coalition's perception of regional integration, development and trade revolves around the SADC and most activities have some link to the SADC agenda (SADC-CNGO 2009a).

However, regardless of effort to align its goals with the SADC agenda, as discussed above, in practice SADC-CNGO is somehow excluded in various policy-making forums in the SADC, particularly in the trade sector. This is partly related to the fact that SADC-CNGO is considered by some people to have weak knowledge about trade and development issues. In other words, SADC-CNGO is not that knowledgeable about the issues it frames as regional. As discussed in section 2.8.1, the framing of issues in particular ways needs to be backed up by serious claims to knowledge in order to be taken seriously by target groups such as the SADC and to gain influence. This is not the case for some CSOs in this study. Hence, according to one prominent commentator, when SADC-CNGO is invited to SADC meetings it does not really use that opportunity to influence:

> They merely sit there, and are happy with that, but don't contribute with substance. And, SADC knows that these RCSOs will not make a difference in policy-making, nor partici-pate significantly in implementation of programs. In essence, in the eyes of government they lack credibility.[119]

SADC-CNGO also struggles to document evidence from local realities in its advocacy work.[120] The people participating at the SADC civil society forums are normally not the ones working directly with the various issues discussed, and have grassroots experience but are uninformed representatives of national networks. When called on by the SADC to discuss trade issues such as EPAs, it also does not send experts from the various member NGOs and more knowledgeable regional partners such the EJN, but staff from the Secretariat who know very little of the issues.[121] According to one of the SADC representatives:

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[115] Vilakazi, interview, 15 December 2009

[116] Law, interview, 15 December 2009

[117] Simane, interview, 5 December 2008

[118] Muchabaiwa, interview, 7 December

[119] Gabriel, interview, 2 December 2008

[120] Mati, interview, 27 November 2009

[121] Pressand, interview, 27 November 2008

> if they would have been more organized, they could have come here and literary pushed [for change…] They just want to come and speak to Summit meetings […and] do not demand space in a strategic way in policy-making processes, sending proposals pertaining issues they are interested in.[122]

SADC-CNGO partly agrees with the criticism that its advocacy is rather weak and not that evidence-based, even though this is improving.[123] For regional civil society at large, '[s]ome of the […] policy demands tend to be overly general and predictable and of little practical value for regional policy formulation' (SADC-CNGO 2010c: 11).

SAPSN also struggles to be taken seriously by the SADC due to lack of issue substance. SAPSN struggles to provide viable alternatives to the current regional agenda, based on evidence-based facts, alongside delivering criticism.[124] This is related to a general lack of knowledge of current development processes in the region. Therefore, comments on a new regionalist agenda presented in various SAPSN statements, such as Peoples' Declarations, are rather sweeping and no concrete programs for this people-driven regionalism are presented.[125] SAPSN itself agrees that 'making noise' at Peoples' Summits in terms of demonstrations and marching must be matched with serious proposals for change, worked out between meetings, which is currently lacking.[126]

The weak knowledge foundations of SADC-CNGO and SAPSN stand in sharp contrast to research NGOs such as Trades Centre and SEATIN. Those possess well-researched information, often evidence-based, that is sought after by the SADC. This is vital for their involvement in regional governance, which in the end strengthens their regional profiles. Of course, it must be noted again that the kind of knowledge they offer is in line with the SADC's problem-solving agenda, which is another important reason for their inclusion.

Other CSOs involved in this study share the tendency to focus their activities and agendas around the SADC. SATUCC, for example, is driven by an urge to report on economic, political and labour conditions in the quest to influence SADC policies and the 'regional SADC agenda' more generally (SATUCC nd). Furthermore, for ASCCI, one of the core interventions is to 'influence the trade agenda of SADC' (2012: 21), and SEG aims to present joint positions on labour and employment issues at SADC meetings and liaise with SADC institutions (2003: 1). Similarly, the central objectives of Trades Centre are to assist the SADC and COMESA to harmonize and deepen regional trade policies and to participate in the design and implementation of fair multi-lateral trading regimes (2010: 4).

A common strategy to influence the SADC agenda is to monitor regional policy-makers' implementation of certain agreed-upon policies. SADC-CNGO and their colleagues in the Apex pact try to push the SADC to practice what it preaches. In the latest SADC-CNGO Strategic Plan it is stated that 'one of the key roles of civil

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[122] Ncube, interview, 8 December 2008

[123] Muchabaiwa, interview, 7 December

[124] Ncube, interview, 8 December 2008

[125] Bond, interview, 14 December 2008

[126] Matanga, interview, 4 December 2009

society organizations is to monitor the performance of SADC Secretariat […] towards achieving […] regional development commitments including basic human rights' (SADC-CNGO 2009a: 16). For example, SADC-CNGO is concerned about the fact that many SADC members still have protectionist trade policies. Therefore SADC-CNGO takes on lobbying the SADC to collectively address issues that go against deeper regional economic integration in order to live up to the Trade Protocol and RISDP (ibid: 37-38).

This is further emphasized in the 2010 Forum Statement where participants recognize that 'intra-regional trade is progressing at a very slow pace due to a variety of fundamental challenges […] such as tariff and non-tariff barriers'. The Forum therefore calls upon member states to 'address key challenges to intra-regional trade and regional economic integration […and] to speak with one voice and enhance cooperation and coordination when engaging trading partners' (SADC-CNGO 2010a). Furthermore, the Forum is concerned about the difficulties faced by SADC citizens in moving around in the region due to restrictive and disparate labour migration policies. The Forum also pushes for harmonization of human rights policies in the region in order to make sure all citizens within the SADC enjoy the same rights, and specifically urges SADC member states to ratify the SADC Charter of Fundamental Social Rights from 2003, as well as the Protocol on the Facilitation of the Movements of Persons (ibid). It is obvious that SADC-CNGO and partners are careful not to harm their precious relationship with the SADC by exposing particular member states or using strong language.

Lastly, it should be underlined that the SADC Civil Society Forum does not play a big role in terms of spurring on more concrete regional action connected to the meeting. The Forum can be criticized for merely being a forum for debates, habitually releasing Civil Society Statements, indeed creating a sense of regionalization of development issues, but without resulting in more immediate regional advocacy action. The opposite is true of SAPSN. In this case, the construction of the SADC as a target for civil society advocacy is taking more radical forms and shaming the SADC is done on more moral grounds. The SADC is viewed as an enemy which should be resisted, both because of its fundamental democratic deficit and its anti-development agenda. The SADC is portrayed as only engaging in rhetorical declarations about development cooperation and integration, without any serious action, and in fact blamed for causing poverty and unemployment in the region when advancing a neo-liberal market-driven agenda (SAPSN 2008). Various SAPSN statements also charge that 'SADC leaders are using the SADC as a self-serving 'old boys' club' for mutual support whenever the interests and power of the ruling elites come into conflict with the human rights, and the democratic and development aspirations of their own populations' (Godsäter and Söderbaum 2011: 13).

The above perceptions of the SADC plant an urge among Forum participants to take action. In this way, the Peoples' Summit becomes an important venue for putting strong words and feelings into practice. According to the SAPSN coordinator, 'the Peoples summits are easy to mobilize people because there is a

clear target in SADC, which calls for direct action'.[127] Hence, resistance of the SADC is translated into direct action using various contentious strategies such as popular marches, where the SAPSN activists shout various slogans demanding trade justice, no to EPAs, and radical change of the SADC structure. In the words of one commentator, 'instead of engaging with SADC they will have a banner saying do away with SADC and they are very confrontational with the government'.[128]

The construction of the SADC as an enemy has indeed consolidated the SAPSN movement and created a regional advocacy momentum, but it should be noted that the demands often fall on deaf ears. This partly has to do with the anti-capitalist message, but also the choice of methods for delivering it. In fact, it can be argued that SAPSN's version of shaming has been taken too far and become counter-productive. It is a thin line between making political leaders accountable and take responsibility for development in the region on moral grounds, appealing to universal values of justice, gender equality and human rights, and alienating the same leaders by using provocative language. This applies to SAPSN. The radical slogans used during SAPSN marches connected to the Peoples' Summit and the ridiculing of political leaders in seminars scare off SADC officials. Regardless of what they have to say, SAPSN is easily brushed away because, according to one SADC representative, 'they are insulting […] If you come to insult the Heads of State in the meeting, do you think they are going to listen? [...] Ultimately there is an individual who wants respect sitting at the table [...] They need to refine their tactics'.[129] However, SAPSN itself does not relate exclusion from the SADC to their mode of communication being too radical, arguing that it is the democratic right of people to deliver their opinions in the ways they see fit.[130]

To conclude, the framing of the SADC as responsible for (lack of) regional trade, development and socio-economic justice spurs regional civil society action. Whether deemed a partner in solving trade-related problems, as in the case of Trades Centre and SADC-CNGO, or dismissed and constructed as an enemy which should be resisted, as regards SAPSN, the SADC is given a great deal of attention by most CSOs. On the whole, inter-organizational social relations between the SADC and CSOs greatly affect internal CSO motivations for 'going regional', in this case in terms of issue-framing. Identity-making will be discussed next.

4.6 Intra-Organizational Relations: CSOs and Identity-Making

4.6.1 Positive Regional Identity-Making

On the whole, regional identity-making is not an important dimension of the regionalization of civil society dealing with trade-related issues, but for some

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[127] Kasiamhuru, interview, 2 December 2009
[128] Chiriga, interview, 2 December 2008
[129] Ncube, interview, 8 December 2008
[130] Kasiamhuru, interview, 2 December 2009

regional networks the conscious construction of a clear 'we', i.e. a positive identity, plays a role in 'going regional'. This applies to EJN, SAPSN and SATUCC, which will be discussed later in this section. As was argued in section 2.10.1, the creation of structural relationships between the members of a certain network in order to speak with one 'voice' greatly determines the strength of the network. Such unified 'voice' is in turn dependent on the extent to which members represent a specific constituency based on a common social trait or adherence to some specific values or principles. Regional research NGOs and business associations, on the other hand, do not appear to foster clear regional identities in either of these ways.

For networks other than the above, it is questionable if regional identity-making plays a role for regional consolidation. For example, SADC-CNGO and member NGO coalitions do not seem to represent a particular social constituency. In its strategic plan for 2010-2014, it is vaguely stated that SADC-CNGO '[r]epresents NGO interests and perspectives on SADC institutions' (2009a: 13) but what kind of interests or perspectives and which constituencies are represented by these NGOs is not further explained. According to one prominent scholar, referring to the SADC-CNGO leadership, 'as far as I am concerned they only represent themselves'.[131] In fact, this criticism is not denied by SADC-CNGO itself. For example, the director of Botswana Council of Non-Governmental Organisations (BOCONGO), a member of SADC-CNGO, claims that the Civil Society Forums 'are not representative enough of people's views in their respective countries, it has always been delegations of the councils coming to the summits, only representing their councils'.[132] The SADC-CNGO Secretariat is also worried about exclusive tendencies and agrees that representation has not been as effective as it has wanted.[133] Furthermore, the principles and values guiding the activities of SADC-CNGO are also rather vague. Highly general formulations of 'equality and equity', 'respect for human rights and dignity' and 'people centred sustainable development approaches' (SADC-CNGO 2009a: 15) are not further clarified. One negative consequence of such lack of network identity, as will be discussed in section 6.3, is that the Secretariat struggles to hold the network together. In the absence of a unifying social trait or clearly stated shared values and principles, members tend to be preoccupied with particular, national interests.

Equally, regional research NGOs and business associations are not so explicitly value-driven and generally have a weak identity. For example, ASCCI claims to represent chambers of commerce and industry, trade associations, and employer organizations and is '[m]andated to be the voice of the private sector' (2012: 8), without going into depth about which particular constituencies and interests are represented. Indeed, the 'private sector' in the broad sense of the word is very diverse, incorporating a range of different actors, including medium-sized business, transnational corporations and informal traders. It is also not clear what the underlying values that guide ASCCI are, except for sweeping comments about 'business development' and creating 'a unified private sector' (ibid). One slight

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[131] le Pere, interview, 27 November 2008
[132] Simane, interview, 5 December 2008
[133] Muchabaiwa, interview, 7 December 2009

exception to this is SEATINI. Claiming to be a 'people-centred non-profit seeking organization' (2010: 2), it is unclear who are the 'people' it represents. However, lacking a clear constituency, it nevertheless seems to be more values-driven in terms of commitment to a rights-based approach to development, a search for alternatives to the contemporary neo-liberal model of globalization and regionalization, and regional and continental unity, which are elaborated upon at length in various documents (e.g. 2010: 2-3).

In contrast, some RCSOs have constructed a clear regional positive identity based on certain values, experiences and/or social traits, even if they are in a minority. SAPSN is very active in manufacturing a regional SAPSN-identity based on shared values, world-views and life styles, even though it does not have a clear constituency, unlike for example SATUCC and SACBTA. The SAPSN Secretariat urges its members to have a SAPSN banner visible during local and national meetings in their home countries, to mention SAPSN and what it stands for in all publications by members, and to speak on behalf of SAPSN at press conferences. According to the coordinator, these things bring a sense of belonging to a 'SAPSN-family'.[134] One important dimension of the SAPSN identity is a shared feeling of belonging to a common Southern African colonial past, transformed into a neo-colonial situation. This implies a link between the past colonialism and freedom struggle in Southern Africa and present day popular mobilization and resistance to neo-liberal oppression by Western powers. In the words of the director of ZIMCODD, 'the contemporary common struggles in the region go back to the common struggles for liberation in the past. Guerrilla fighters were trained in various countries in the region, governments supporting each other and colonized people elsewhere in the region'.[135] Arguing along the same lines, according to the SAPSN coordinator it is not enough to have formal political independence from former colonizers. People still need to be involved in regional struggles, this time in terms of influencing processes where neo-liberal policies manufactured in the West are today affecting the region: '[S]uffering from certain policies from the IMF, the WB, WTO […] we are now fighting another war together'.[136] In this war, SAPSN is to a large extent value-driven[137], manifested by sentiments related to social and economic justice, rejection of privatization, anti-neo-liberalism, an alternative approach towards development, and 'regional solidarity'. On the whole, this brings the members together.[138]

Constructing a sense of regional solidarity is specifically important for popular mobilization within SAPSN and intimately linked to its identity. According to one interviewee, the act of showing solidarity is in fact the most important factor that binds the social movements and trade unions within SAPSN together.[139] According to the director of ZIMCODD:

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[134] Kasiamhuru, interview, 2 December 2009
[135] Matanga, interview, 4 December 2009
[136] Kasiamhuru, interview, 2 December 2009
[137] Chiriga, interview, 2 December 2009
[138] Pressand, interview, 27 November 2008
[139] Chiriga, interview, 2 December 2009

[n]ow when the colonization is gone, we should continue with the solidarity at the level of the people since the problems have not ended […] The problems in South Africa are also problems for me in Zimbabwe and the social and economic and political problems are also problems for the region. Therefore, we want to give our solidarity to comrades in the region and also receive that solidarity. So we also go and assist other people in their struggle.[140]

Regional meetings, where NGO members and social movements' activists physically meet, play a major role in the construction of regional solidarity and identity-making, which in the end spurs regionalization of the more critical parts of civil society. SAPSN Peoples' Summits and Southern African Social Forums (SASF)[141] are good examples of this. At the beginning of every Peoples' Summit SAPSN reminds attendees about their historical regional connections and how they used to support each other's liberation struggles, and urges the participants to continue such support today and revive past solidarity: 'People then often start telling stories on how they collected cloth and money to send to liberation movements in other countries'.[142] Together such stories about common struggles for freedom from colonial oppression in the past form an important part of the construction of contemporary struggles and regional solidarity. This implies evoking strong feelings of regional togetherness and the importance of helping people in need throughout the region. At the Peoples' Summit in Namibia in 2010, for example, the meeting was characterized by 'lively cultural presentations and energized by the participants singing and chanting, receiving solidarity greetings from all fellow citizens of SADC and brief reports on their respective areas of work and the key concerns in their national terrains' (SAPSN 2010). Furthermore, the coming together of activists from all around the region at SASF, sharing experiences of local and national struggles, creates a sense of regional comradeship which spurs regional action. For example, the SASF in Zimbabwe in 2005 was seen as an important manifestation of regional solidarity with the democratic forces in Zimbabwe, and the SASF in Swaziland in 2008 was an example of showing solidarity with the suppressed people of Swaziland, contesting the initial banning of the forum by the king.[143] At these SASF events people from all around the region are brought together, issues and community struggles are presented, and linkages are forged. All in all, 'people celebrate what they are doing. They see other community people celebrating the same thing and they celebrate together. Then they go back home and say that we are more than this community'.[144] Thus, the forum acts as a

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[140] Matanga, interview, 4 December 2009

[141] SASF is a continuation of the Africa Social Forum (ASF) that has taken place annually since Bamako in 2002 as a prelude to the World Social Forum (WSF) that was initiated in Porto Alegre (Brazil) in 2001. The latter is an annual event that is deliberately organized to coincide with the World Economic Forum in Davos. The social forum process is generally constituted by members of the so-called alter-globalization or global justice movement who come together to coordinate campaigns, share and refine organizing strategies and to debate and inform each other about various issues related to the fight against neo-liberalism (SASF 2013). In terms of SASF, the chief aim is to create regional solidarity against neo-liberal policies and to facilitate regional networking to strengthen solidarity among the peoples of southern Africa (PAAR 2011).

[142] Kasiamhuru, interview, 2 December 2009

[143] Gentle-ILRIG, interview, 17 December 2009

[144] Peek, interview, 12 December 2008

springboard for the formation of a regional consciousness linked to solidarity among SAPSN activists and their perceived comrades throughout the region.

One concrete example of regional solidarity in action is the various regional activities connected to regional campaigns with oppressed people in Zimbabwe and Swaziland. In 2008, for example, AIDC played a big role in building up regional solidarity for Zimbabwe when arranging a pre-meeting to the later Peoples' Summit in Johannesburg. The rally in Cape Town, which attracted around 2000 people, was an important part of the overall planning for resistance towards the Zimbabwean leadership at the Peoples' Summit the same year.[145] At the end of the latter, SAPSN organized a big march to the SADC Summit together with the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), a member of SATUCC, and in connection with the 'Mugabe must go' campaign, showing solidarity with people in Zimbabwe and Swaziland, demanding political, social and economic rights and the resignation of President Mugabe and the Swazi king.[146]

Another activity within the loosely organized regional campaign for Zimbabwe was regional resistance towards the Chinese export of weapons to Zimbabwe, where COSATU and the South African Transport and Allied Workers Union (SATAWU), supported by trade unions from Namibia, Mozambique and Angola, refused to handle the weapons destined for Zimbabwe that were on board a Chinese vessel. The regional trade union coordination managed to prevent the arms ship from offloading in port after port in Southern Africa. According to SAPSN this was a small but significant act of regional support with workers in Zimbabwe against the repressive Mugabe regime, which 'was intended to send a clear message to people that we are with them in their struggle for democracy and economic development' (SAPSN 2008).

To move on, the construction of a transnational/regional identity on non-territorial terms, based on a perception of shared social traits, has a profound impact on the regionalization of some other CSOs. The regional consolidation of EJN is linked to a Christian church identity, which constitutes a strong theological base for its various regional activities.[147] According to the director of one EJN member in Mozambique, Conselho Cristão de Moçambique (CCM), the strong church foundation is a powerful uniting force for the network. He underlines that the churches, which make up the member council of churches, are very organized and manage to represent a Christian constituency in the region. The Christian identity is in turn based on Christian values, i.e. humanism, morality, dignity, respect, honesty, participation, justice and equality, which are shared by all EJN members in the region. This creates a powerful common platform that consolidates EJN.[148] In the words of one of EJN's funders, NCA, because of the common church identity, 'that oneness is there […despite] language barriers'.[149]

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[145] Ashley, interview, 17 December 2009

[146] Kasiamhuru, interview, 2 December 2009

[147] Damon, interview, 15 December 2009; Chidaushe, interview, 29 November 2009

[148] Moiana, interview, 17 November 2008

[149] Chidaushe, interview, 29 November 2009

Regional conferences and workshops are important venues for consolidating a regional church-based identity. Here, EJN-staff actively try to make theological connections to the often technically-inclined issues such as EPA and ICBT, and present a Christian biblical rationale for engagement in these.[150] This has a unifying effect on the members of EJN, constructing a sense of regional belonging based on Christian values and identities. One concrete example is the Summit of Religious Leaders in Southern Africa in 2009, where religious leaders, representing NGOs and church communities throughout Southern Africa, including several members of EJN, met to discuss what role faith communities can play in seeking a sustainable future in terms of creating socio-economic justice, environmental sustainability, food security and poverty alleviation. The meeting was hosted by South African Faith Communities' Environment Institute (SAFCEI), an organization loosely linked to EJN. In the declaration from the Summit, it is stated that '[w]e, the members of faith communities from across Southern Africa [….] acknowledge that while we are of diverse faith traditions with varying beliefs and practices, we are united through our common commitment to a just care of the earth and all of God's creation' (SAFCEI 2009).

SATUCC is a good example of the cultivation of a borderless, non-territorial working-class identity. SATUCC seems to have a clear constituency in terms of trade unions, which in turn represent workers in the region. According to the former Secretary General, the trade union members have got a clear understanding of their identity, rooted in the working class. In his words:

> [i]f you come from that [working class] background, you carry that with you throughout your lifetime […] It is there, it is in us, we are working-class. So whatever we say, we have that background, that push […] This gives us the identity and strength to articulate what we want to articulate because we know what we are.[151]

In other words, one important force that holds SATUCC together seems to be the identity of being a worker. In various SATUCC regional meetings and conferences, such as the annual SATUCC Congress, representatives of SATUCC members meet and share similar experiences of being 'workers' and of being denied social and economic rights, which adds to the consolidation of this identity (SATUCC 2001).

4.6.2 Exclusive Regional Identity-Making

The only example of the construction of an exclusive regional identity based on resistance is SAPSN. As was discussed above, in many regards SAPSN activists position themselves against the SADC, which is seen as the regional culprit. This fosters a sort of anti-SADC identity. One important aspect of this resistance identity is the creation of an image of being the voice of the 'grassroots' against the NGO and the SADC 'establishment'. SAPSN claims to represent the marginalized and poor people in the region that suffer from neo-liberal policy-making by the SADC and member states. In various statements SAPSN claims to support and build-up people-driven, grassroots alternatives to the SADC's top-down and oppressive

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[150] Damon, interview, 15 December 2009

[151] Katchima, interview, 8 December 2008

regional integration agenda in Southern Africa, and the Peoples' Summits are important regional arenas for this (SAPSN 2008, 2010). Most participants in these forums seem to be ordinary people representing community-based organizations (CBOs).[152] According to one scholar with great insight in the Peoples' Summit process, elite activists and technocrats from the more professional NGOs are in a minority.[153] In order to have as many people participating as possible they use buses as the prime medium of transport and not airplanes, which are much more expensive.[154] Despite not representing a clear constituency, as SATUCC and EJN do, the resistance identity is important for regional consolidation of the SAPSN network and further exclusion by the SADC can actually strengthen this process. However, the SAPSN claim to represent the 'grassroots' will be challenged in section 6.3 when the legitimacy of RCSOs is problematized.

To conclude, identity-making plays an important role for the regional consolidation of a few RCSOs in this study, i.e. SAPSN, SATUCC and EJN. The identity of these CSOs is either based on some shared strong values and principles and a perception of common historical experiences, as in the case of SAPSN, and/or some common social traits as in the cases of EJN and SATUCC. Regional meetings and campaigns are important instruments for forging regional identities, especially when formed around notions of regional solidarity. However, for most other RCSOs identity-making plays a weak role, since these organizations neither represent a particular social group nor are values-driven. In terms of the latter, the motivation for 'going regional' is not linked to adherence to some clear values and principles. If identity-making is positioned against regional target groups such as the SADC, it is further strengthened. The case in point here is SAPSN, which has cultivated a sort of outsider, resistance identity against the SADC, embracing everything that the SADC is not; i.e. grassroots-centred, pro-poor and working towards trade justice. Hence, the identity-making process can be informed by exclusion in the SADC and actually strengthen regional mobilization. This also shows the influence of SADC-CSO inter-organizational relations on identity-making, ultimately emanating from the deeper statist-capitalist social structure.

4.7 Conclusions

This chapter has analysed civil society regionalization in the trade sector, based on the 11 dimensions of civil society regionalization presented in chapter 2. The chapter has shown that most of these dimensions play an important role for understanding how and why the activities of CSOs take regional proportions. The inter-organizational relations between the SADC and CSOs, and between donors and CSOs, manifesting the statist-capitalist social structures in Southern Africa, create the overarching framework within which many regional civil society activities take

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[152] CBOs are smaller CSOs that operate within a single local community. They are sometimes a subset of wider civil society groups. CBOs are often run on a voluntary basis and are self-funded.

[153] Pressand, interview, 27 November 2008

[154] Kasiamhuru, interview, 2 December 2009

place. In different ways, the SADC and donors both facilitate and obstruct civil society regionalization. The issue preferences of the SADC, highlighting business development and facilitation of formal trade over ICBT and other social dimensions of trade, inform which CSOs are included and excluded in regional trade governance. It is quite clear that being welcomed in the corridors of the SADC Secretariat strengthens the regional profile of CSOs and their work. On the other hand, those CSOs that try hard to get the SADC's attention but fail are weakened. Yet for others, being side-lined by the SADC can in fact spur feelings of resistance, which cultivates a quite strong outsider identity, in the end also spurring regionalization. Donors are equally important for setting the boundaries for civil society regionalization, providing and withdrawing the necessary funds for regional activities and also influencing the problem-solving or critical agendas of CSOs. In the end this fosters a quite heterogeneous regional civil society.

Furthermore, internal forces related to ideas and identities are also important motivations to 'go regional'. However, due to the effect of the statist-capitalist social structures, CSOs are only partly autonomous in their endeavour to 'go regional'. Regional issue-framing, and, to a lesser extent, identity-making play important roles, creating a sense of regional awareness transgressing the local and national spaces. The construction of regional 'Southern African' issues related to, for example, ICBT and EPA, and of regional identities based on class, colonial and neo-colonial oppression and Christianity are often somehow linked to SADC-led neo-liberal regional governance, showing the importance of statist-capitalist social structures for CSO agency. However, as will be discussed further in section 6.3, where civil society regionalization is problematized, the regional identity-making process is in fact rather weak, considering the influence of a state-centric organization such as the SADC and the widespread national sentiments among people in Southern Africa mentioned in section 3.1.1. In many regards civil society regionalization is a SADC and donor-driven process, which makes it quite superficial and vulnerable.

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Civil Society Regionalization in the HIV/AIDS Sector in Southern Africa

In line with the previous chapter, which focused on the trade sector, this chapter will be devoted to discussing civil society regionalization in the HIV/AIDS sector. This involves analysing how the deeper social structures marking the highest structural level, i.e. world order, inform civil society regionalization on the third and fourth structural levels in the Prendergast and Knottnerus model discussed in section 2.4. After a general description of key RCSOs in the sector, section 5.2 discusses inter-organizational relations between the SADC and CSOs, followed by a discussion of inter-organizational relations between donors and CSOs, and inter-organizational relations between CSOs, in sections 5.3 and 5.4 respectively. Section 5.5 highlights intra-organizational relations within CSOs in terms of issue-framing and section 5.6 analyses the same type of relations but with a focus on identity-making. A concluding section rounds up the chapter.

5.1 Key RCSOs

The five regional NGOs and networks related to HIV/AIDS that are the focus in this chapter will now be shortly described. As for the CSOs discussed in the last chapter, the members and partners of these NGOs and networks are listed in tables 13-17 in the Appendix. Also, in section 5.3.1, the donors relevant for this study will be presented.

The Southern African Aids Trust (SAT) is based in Johannesburg, South Africa with six country offices in Malawi, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Zambia and Botswana. SAT is an independent regional NGO that supports community responses to HIV and AIDS through the capacity-strengthening of partners in prevention, care, treatment and support, impact mitigation, advocacy, information exchange and networking, including provision of micro grants. SAT is currently working in partnership with 130 community-based organizations and national advocacy and networking partners in six SADC countries. At the regional level, SAT hosts the

Regional African AIDS NGOs (RAANGO), an informal network for regional HIV/AIDS service organizations in Southern Africa (SAT 2012). In terms of the analytical distinction between different types of NGOs discussed in section 1.3.5, SAT is a good example of a service providing NGO.

The Southern Africa HIV and AIDS Information Dissemination Service (SAfAIDS) is a regional NGO based in Harare, Zimbabwe with four country offices in South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia and Mozambique. Its mission is to promote effective and ethical development responses to the AIDS epidemic and its impact. This is done through the capacity-development of 150 local partner CSOs in nine countries; information production; collection and dissemination; networking; and building partnerships and leadership in promoting dialogue on issues related to HIV and AIDS. SAfAIDS currently implements its programmes in ten countries in Southern Africa (SAfAIDS 2011). SAfAIDS is another example of a service providing NGO.

The AIDS and Rights Alliance for Southern Africa (ARASA) is a regional partnership of 53 NGOs from all 15 SADC member states working together to promote a human rights approach to HIV/AIDS and TB. With a head office in Windhoek, Namibia, ARASA supports partners to monitor the efforts of national governments to protect, respect and uphold human rights in the context of national responses to AIDS and TB, as well as build the capacity of partners to promote a human rights-based response to TB, HIV and AIDS. ARASA directly lobbies the SADC on HIV/AIDS and rights issues (ARASA 2010). ARASA is a combination of an advocacy and service-providing network.

The Network of African People Living with HIV for Southern African region (NAPSAR) is a regional network of national CSOs for people living with HIV and AIDS (PLWHA) in ten countries in Southern Africa. The regional secretariat is situated in Johannesburg, South Africa. NAPSAR seeks to improve the quality of life of people living with or affected by HIV/AIDS and to make sure they have equal access to social services related to prevention, treatment and care. It also wants to ensure that the voices of PLWHA are heard in policy-making related to HIV/AIDS on all levels. This is done through lobbying policy makers, including the SADC, providing technical support and training to strengthen partner organizations, and facilitating regional networking (NAPSAR 2012a). In terms of the analytical distinction between different types of network, discussed in section 1.3.5, NAPSAR is a good example of a combination of a facilitating and advocacy network.

The Regional Aids Training Network (RATN) is a network of 29 NGOs, management institutions and university departments involved in HIV/AIDS work in Eastern and Southern Africa, based in Nairobi, Kenya. RATN strengthens the management and technical capacities of members, facilitates the exchange of ideas and experiences between members, and lobbies RIGOs such as EAC, COMESA and the SADC to support its capacity development agenda. More specifically, RATN training revolves around HIV prevention, treatment and care, impact mitigation, and institutional strengthening (RATN 2011). RATN is primarily a facilitating network, but with an element of advocacy.

5.2 Inter-Organizational Relations between the SADC and CSOs

This will discuss how the statist-capitalist informed social relations between the SADC institutions and various RCSOs influence civil society regionalization in the HIV/AIDS sector in three different ways. First, the overall low priority of HIV/AIDS compared with, for example, trade; which HIV/AIDS-related issues are prioritized in the SADC agenda; and how this affects the regional work of CSOs will be discussed. Secondly, the focus is put on the direct and indirect creation of regional platforms for CSO collaboration. Thirdly, and intimately related to the SADC's issue preferences, the inclusion of certain CSOs and exclusion of others in various SADC institutions will be analysed in terms of how this affects civil society regionalization.

5.2.1 SADC Issue Preferences

Formally, the SADC does put some emphasis on HIV/AIDS in regional integration. For example, combating HIV/AIDS in the region is one of the main objectives in the amended SADC Treaty, alongside promoting sustainable and equitable economic growth and development, and regional consolidation of democracy (SADC 2001). Equally, in RISDP one priority intervention area is HIV/AIDS, and it is claimed that '[t]he HIV/AIDS pandemic, and other communicable diseases, undermine our development efforts by robbing us of the most productive citizens of our regional community' (SADC 2003a). The Declaration on HIV/AIDS from 2003 outlines a number of priority areas for dealing with the pandemic, i.e. prevention, improved care and treatment, accelerating mitigation, intensifying resource mobilization and strengthening institutional mechanisms, and it urges member states to develop strategies and promote programmes (SADC 2003c). In the declaration it is obvious that the SADC views HIV/AIDS as a great threat to regional stability and development. It is also stated that non-state actors are needed to stem the pandemic and SADC-civil society collaboration is called for (ibid). Therefore, realizing that HIV/AIDS has become a real threat to widespread development, it should be addressed in all SADC activities. The Declaration links HIV/AIDS to human rights, recognising that:

> the upholding of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all […] is a necessary element in our regional response to the HIV and AIDS pandemic, […] which would encompass access…to education, inheritance, employment, health care, social and health services, prevention, support, treatment, legal protection (ibid).

However, regardless of the above policy instruments, the HIV/AIDS area is nevertheless inferior compared to the great emphasis the SADC puts on facilitating trade integration. A good way of showing this would be to compare the money the SADC spends on various sectors. However, the SADC budget is secret, as indicated in the last chapter, which makes this an impossible task. Nevertheless, since the SADC is heavily donor dependent (Tjönneland 2006), studying the allocation of donor funds to various issue areas would be a second best option. In an overview of

on-going and intended activities for donor support to the SADC done by the EC in 2008, donor funds totalling 101 million Euros were directed to TIFI but only 59 million Euros to the SHDSP, including HIV/AIDS work. It should be noted that 231 million Euros were channelled to the IS sector, improving the regional infrastructure in terms of, for example, transportation, electricity supply and water management, which are intimately related to, and in fact considered a prerequisite for, enhanced trade integration. Furthermore, if one excludes two major temporal projects financed by the African Development Bank, which made up the bulk of the SHDSP-related activities, only 18 million Euros were left for social issues. This is less than one fifth of the financial resources channelled to trade and other regional economic integration-related areas. Out of this, only 4.5 million Euros specifically targeted HIV/AIDS (EC 2008).

Furthermore, some of the largest SADC donors such as the EC and GIZ strongly prioritize efforts to strengthen regional economic integration in Southern Africa over HIV/AIDS and other social development areas. In terms of the EC, by far the greatest SADC donor, support to SADC-led regional integration within the Regional Indicative Programme 2008-2013 is greatly geared towards economic integration. Out of the total budget of 116 million Euros, 80% of all dispersed funds go to activities related to regional economic integration, in particular trade facilitation, capacity building of the SADC Secretariat, and infrastructural development; 15% is geared towards regional political co-operation; and only 5% to 'other programmes'. The latter involves support to HIV/AIDS and other social areas (ibid: 46-50). Similarly, even if no numbers can be provided, it is clearly stated on the GIZ webpage that support to the SADC (for 2011) focuses on strengthening regional economic co-operation, consolidating co-operation on trans-boundary water resource management, and promoting the sustainable use of natural resources (GIZ 2011).

These numbers clearly indicate the trade bias of the SADC *vis-à-vis* social issue-areas such as HIV/AIDS.[155] The SADC is much more poorly equipped with resources to implement various regional policy frameworks dealing with HIV/AIDS than trade. It seems as if the SADC, in practice, does not see the urgency of HIV/AIDS-issues.[156] In the words of one commentator, 'if it is a trade issue or a customs issue they move quicker […] at the expense of other issues that affect people on the ground, HIV/AIDS being one of them'.[157]

Furthermore, some aspects of the HIV/AIDS agenda are considered more important than others, which affects interaction with CSOs, as discussed in section 5.2.3. Service-delivery issues are higher on the SADC agenda than rights issues.[158] In terms of the former, mitigation, prevention, treatment and care are emphasized, but instead of pushing member states to deliver various AIDS services, the SADC

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[155] Nevertheless, the SADC has set a rather ambitious budget to implement the SADC HIV Business Plan 2010-2015. However, of the total budget of 40.6 million dollars, member states only contributed 14.2 million. Hence, the SADC has asked donors to cover the funding gap of 26.3 million dollars (Caholo 2010). It is uncertain to what extent member states have actually contributed to the budget and if the SADC has managed to attract the additional funds.

[156] Msosa, interview, 23 April 2012

[157] Msosa, interview, 23 April 2012

[158] Clayton, interview, 16 February 2012

drives an agenda in which such services are outsourced to CSOs, in line with the general neo-liberal trend discussed in chapter 3. Hence, as will be discussed in section 5.2.3, collaboration with service-providing CSOs who can assist the SADC in programme implementation is prioritized by the SADC.

Formally, besides the Declaration mentioned above, there are a couple of other regional policy documents that address human rights issues in particular HIV-related areas. For example, the SADC Code on HIV/AIDS and Employment from 1997 urges member states to develop and harmonize standards for dealing with HIV/AIDS in workplaces (SADC 1997). One CSO claims that the Code has been one of the most influential documents on HIV/AIDS and human rights in the region (ARASA 2009). Another human rights-related document is the SADC Policy Framework on Population Mobility and Communicable Diseases from 2009, which provides guidance on protecting the health of cross-border mobile populations with regard to communicable diseases such as HIV/AIDS (IOMb 2010: 34). Furthermore, the Protocol on Gender and Development from 2008 should also be mentioned. The Protocol aims to provide for the empowerment of women, eliminate discrimination and achieve gender equality in the region through gender responsive legislation and programmes (SADC 2008). One section specifically deals with gender and HIV/AIDS, and commits states to expand access to prevention, treatment and support for women who are infected and affected by HIV (ARASA 2009: 16). Lastly, the Model Law on HIV in Southern Africa, initiated by the SADC but formally linked to the SADC Parliamentary Forum (SADC-PF),[159] is a rather progressive regional document 'which say all the right things'.[160] The aims of the Model Law are to provide a legal framework for the review and reform of national legislation related to HIV/AIDS, to promote the implementation of effective social services, to ensure that the human rights of people affected by HIV/AIDS are protected, and to stimulate specific measures to address the needs of social groups that are marginalized (SADC PF 2008).

However, in practice human rights is generally not high up the agenda of most member states,[161] since realization of political and socio-economic rights threatens the powerbase of the ruling elite and, in the end, the regional state-centric, capitalist order. Human rights issues in terms of safeguarding the rights of people infected and affected by HIV to various AIDS services, as well as the particular rights of vulnerable social groups such as sexual minorities, are marginalized in the SADC agenda. In this vein, one interviewee draws attention to the fact that there is no specific official and legally binding regional policy on HIV/AIDS and human rights. The quite progressive Model Law has not yet been adopted as an official SADC document and nor has it been implemented by any member state.[162]

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[159] SADC PF is a forum for regional political party co-operation in Southern Africa, based in Windhoek, but it does not officially belong to the SADC. It aims to strengthen the SADC's implementation capacity by involving parliamentarians, their parties and also NGOs in SADC activities and to promote the principles of human rights and democracy. Among its activities, SADC PF makes recommendations to the SADC on how to improve its operations, gives policy advice, and scrutinizes the SADC budget (Oosthuizen 2006).

[160] Clayton, interview, 16 February 2012

[161] Clayton, interview, 16 February 2012

[162] Clayton, interview, 16 February 2012

Therefore, in the SADC's practical work, human rights issues are downplayed in terms of action plans and implementation instruments. For example, the most important action plan for the SADC's work on HIV/AIDS, the SADC HIV and AIDS Strategic Framework 2010-2015, is weak on human rights. The main objectives include that member states should deliver universal access to prevention and treatment, that the impact of HIV and AIDS on the socio-economic development of the region should be reduced, that sufficient resources should be mobilized, and that institutional capacity should be enhanced. However, there are no clear obligations put on member states in terms of actual service delivery, and monitoring mechanisms are conspicuous by their absence. Human rights are also only mentioned as a cross-cutting issue and not as a priority area in and of themselves. Member states are recommended to deal with the promotion, protection and respect for human rights of people who are infected and affected by HIV/AIDS, but this is not concretized and no further guidance is delivered. For example, there are no specific objectives in the framework related to protection of the human rights of vulnerable social groups (SADC 2009). It is uncertain what weight the corresponding HIV Business Plan 2010-2015, in which the Strategic Framework is operationalized, gives to human rights issues, since this document has not been able to be obtained. Furthermore, even if the latest SADC HIV and AIDS Work Plan for 2012-13, drawn from the Strategic Framework, is more concrete in terms of social service provision targets in the areas of prevention, care and treatment, it puts no real obligations on member states to actually deliver. It is also weak on human rights issues, for example in terms of the protection of vulnerable social groups such as sexual minorities (SADC 2011c). Hence, the inclusion of human rights-related HIV/AIDS issues in policy documents is rather rhetorical.

One concrete implementation instrument for the realization of the Strategic Framework is the SADC HIV/AIDS Special Fund. The Fund is to be used for small projects and activities that enhance the impact of existing HIV and AIDS programmes in member states, and CSOs are encouraged to apply. However, in the priority areas for funding, no reference is made to advocacy activities related to, for example, protection of human rights or to monitoring member states' provision of AIDS services. Instead, only projects dealing with direct service-delivery activities related to, for example, prevention, organizational development, research, and production of medicines are eligible for funds (SADC 2012c). In practice, therefore, most funds go to service-providing activities which yield faster and more visible results, in line with the demands of the market-oriented regional order. This is a further indication of the fact that the SADC is not as interested in AIDS rights work as it is in issues related to service delivery. Furthermore, on the whole the Fund has been poorly implemented. Applying for and dispersal of funds have been very slow processes.[163]

Lastly, with or without progressive regional policy documents on HIV and human rights, due to the state-centric and neo-liberal nature of the SADC most important state decisions affecting the overall HIV/AIDS situation in the region are taken by member states on a national level. Therefore, the realization of an effective

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[163] Msosa, interview, 23 April 2012

regional framework for protection of the rights of AIDS sufferers relies on the willingness of member states to implement various regional policy instruments and to allocate resources for project implementation. It is argued here that the lack of effective regional policy instruments and programmes dealing with HIV/AIDS and human rights boils down to the fact that SADC leaders and officials hide behind 'sovereignty principles', as discussed in 4.2.3, when progressive human rights resolutions are to be developed and implemented and when member states who fail to deliver are being pushed to do so. Lacking supra-national powers, the SADC is not an important actor in terms of promoting HIV/AIDS rights in the region. For example, the SADC has no power to enforce harmonization of human rights laws in the region and can only adopt Protocols that *recommend* that member states align their laws and policies in the human rights field. The director of ARASA concludes that:

> [t]here are many countries that say all the right things in terms of we acknowledge that HR is essential to an effective response to HIV but when it comes to translating that into practice it does not work [….] SADC countries do not walk the talk […] HR is not an issue that they readily jump to.[164]

Therefore, emphasizing human rights issues risks putting the SADC Secretariat on a collision course with member states.[165] Supporting the rights of sexual minorities, for example in terms of access to AIDS services, is particularly sensitive to the SADC and there are very few interventions in this field.[166]

To conclude this section, the SADC HIV/AIDS agenda is highly problem-solving, in line with the overall neo-liberal regional governance in Southern Africa. It is clear that the SADC in practice focuses on service-delivery issues, often in collaboration with CSOs, as will be shown below. Hence, the SADC supports the outsourcing of provision of services related to care for sick people, prevention, and HIV capacity-building to civil society. Very little practical work is done to push member states to protect the rights of people infected and affected by HIV, or to take responsibility for service delivery, for example in terms of creating and regionally harmonizing human rights-related policy documents, and there are no enforcing or monitoring mechanisms. On paper, there are some progressive regional policy frameworks that deal with HIV/AIDS and human rights, even though a particular document on human rights is missing, but these are poorly implemented. State intervention in terms of guaranteeing rights to AIDS services and giving certain social groups, such as sexual minorities, specific legal protection is not compliant with the free market logic inherent in the capitalist regional order. On the whole, the SADC's emphasis on particular HIV/AIDS issues related to service delivery, at the expense of human rights issues, affects which CSOs are involved in regional governance, which in turn influences their regional profile. This will be further discussed in section 5.2.3.

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[164] Clayton, interview, 16 February 2012

[165] Msosa, interview, April 2012; Clayton, interview, 16 February 2012

[166] Mxotshwa, interview, 27 March 2012; Msosa, interview, 23 April 2012

5.2.2 SADC Focal Point Creation

Like for the trade sector, the SADC facilitates CSO regional co-operation, both directly and indirectly. This implies that it is creating regional platforms and acting as a regional focal point for regional civil society campaigns to evolve, which will be discussed in this section.

In the SADC HIV and AIDS Strategic Framework it is clearly stated that meaningful citizen participation, via civil society, 'is imperative in policy development and programme delivery' (SADC 2009: 33). Therefore, one important task for the SADC is to '[i]dentify and mobilize technical resources at regional and MS [member state] level, in order to strengthen and leverage expertise and knowledge within the region' (ibid: 39). The SADC Secretariat has taken this task seriously and tries to coordinate regional activities on HIV/AIDS and set up various consultative and decision-making mechanisms for this. Most importantly, a HIV and AIDS Technical Advisory Committee (TAC), Working Groups, and a SADC Partnership Forum (PF) have been established for enhanced participation of CSOs and the private sector in SADC policy-making, project implementation and delivery of technical expertise (ibid: 20-21).

It is clear that the SADC Secretariat wants to stimulate regional civil society collaboration on HIV/AIDS issues and enhance involvement in the SADC's work. According to interviewees, the creation of regional platforms for engaging with civil society is viewed very positively and seen as important for regional coordination of HIV/AIDS CSOs.[167] The PF brings together all major players in the HIV/AIDS sector, including CSOs, and convenes twice a year. The PF is an important opportunity for regional civil society networking. During the meetings, CSOs, donors and the SADC discuss the strategic planning of the Secretariat, and CSOs give more concrete technical support to the Unit.[168] The latter is done collectively through RAANGO. In fact, giving such responsibly to RAANGO and not to individual CSOs is in itself a way of facilitating and enhancing broader civil society collaboration in the HIV/AIDS sector, since the RAANGO members have to agree on common standpoints *vis-à-vis* the SADC. All in all, in this way the SADC acts as a facilitator of the consolidation of regional civil society co-operation and adds to the regionalization of that part of civil society dealing with HIV/AIDS.

Bilateral donors have also played a big role in pushing the SADC Secretariat to open the door to CSOs in the HIV/AIDS sector. Partly thanks to donors' efforts, CSOs such as SAT and NAPSAR have gained an entry-point to the HIV/AIDS Unit and are part of regional project implementation and policy-making, boosting regionalization. Several donors are part of this process. Of most importance is the joint support provided to the SADC HIV/AIDS Unit by RNE, Irish Aid and SIDA, discussed further in section 5.3.1, in terms of capacity building and financing the operationalization of the Unit. In this support, one important element has been to sensitize and push the SADC to open up for engagement with civil society and to actively link CSOs up with the SADC Secretariat in areas where the two have things

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[167] Page, interview, 24 November 2009; Mxotshwa, interview, 27 March 2012

[168] Sandström, interview, 27 November 2009

in common.[169] UNAIDS' Regional Support Team in Johannesburg has also pushed for improved partnership between the SADC and civil society and has actively facilitated this process.[170] One concrete example is the PF, discussed above, which the above donors have been instrumental in creating and maintaining. Because of donor financial support and engagement with the SADC HIV/AIDS Unit, according to SIDA, the Unit now increasingly interacts with CSOs (SIDA 2009).

Furthermore, regional advocacy campaigns revolving around the SADC can be powerful instruments for regional consolidation. Perhaps the best example is the process leading up to the ratification of the SADC Gender Protocol in 2008. The Gender Protocol Alliance was formed in 2005 by 26 CSOs dealing with gender and HIV/AIDS issues in the region, and launched a regional campaign for the SADC to adopt such a Protocol. Every thematic area in the proposed new Protocol had a lead organization, which was in charge of formulating that part. SAfAIDS led the sexual and reproductive health cluster. Overall coordination was done by Gender Links, a regional NGO based in Johannesburg, South Africa, that deals with gender and development issues, and SAfAIDS. These two CSOs worked closely together with the Gender Unit in the drafting of the Protocol (Gender Links 2009).

To conclude this section, the SADC acts as an important facilitator and focal point for regional civil society collaboration. The PF, organized by the HIV/AIDS Unit at the SADC Secretariat, is a case in point. Here, HIV/AIDS CSOs from all around the region gather, share experiences and network, which enhances regional consolidation both within and between organizations. Donors play an important role in supporting the Secretariat to engage with CSOs on a regional level, for example through financing the PF. The SADC also more indirectly facilitates civil society regionalization through being a regional focal point around which regional advocacy campaigns such as the Gender Protocol Campaign evolve.

5.2.3 CSO Inclusion and Exclusion in the SADC

The statist and capitalist social structure greatly affects civil society regionalization in the HIV/AIDS sector, both in terms of facilitating and obstructing regional networking. Focal point creation was touched on above and discussion now turns to inclusion and exclusion in regional governance. Compared to the trade sector, where many CSOs have a hard time engaging the SADC, in the HIV/AIDS sector the SADC is more open to interaction with civil society and has engaged with a broad range of CSOs, at least on a Secretariat level. Ultimately this strengthens regional CSOs. Most interviewed RCSOs feel welcomed at the SADC Secretariat, which has a positive effect on their work. Yet, as will be discussed further below, CSO participation in other SADC institutions, such as the Summit and COM, is much weaker.

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[169] Anamela, interview, 26 November 2009; van Tol, interview, 30 November 2009

[170] Sandström, interview, 27 November 2009

CSO Inclusion

The relationship between civil society and the SADC Secretariat in relation to HIV/AIDS has improved in recent years and many interviewees claim that the SADC and CSOs work well together.[171] As already indicated, the HIV/AIDS Unit is the main SADC contact point for civil society in the HIV/AIDS sector. According to the Unit representative, it has taken time to develop a relationship with civil society that is considered today to be 'very good'. In general there are no tensions or conflicts of interest between the Unit and CSOs, regardless of the latter's approach to HIV/AIDS work. In contrast to her colleague in TIFI, the representative claims that the Unit is open to collaboration with different types of CSOs. To her mind, technical NGOs are experts in their respective fields and provide policy advice to the SADC; membership-based NGOs bring the voices of their grassroots constituencies to the SADC; and the more activist-oriented social movements are important to scaling up HIV/AIDS work and pushing for more radical policy change.[172] One of the key civil society players in the PF, SAfAIDS, agrees with the Unit representative's positive picture of SADC-civil society collaboration. According to its director, the HIV/AIDS Unit 'accommodates the diversity of civil society'.[173] Even if more critical actors such as ARASA have to be persistent and 'pushy' to get the Secretariat's attention, they do not feel excluded because of the fact that they advance a human rights agenda.[174] The same applies to NAPSAR, which claims that '[w]e work together with SADC and we are a key partner'.[175]

Furthermore, the Unit representative claims that CSOs generally have great influence in regional policy-making and project implementation in the HIV/AIDS area. According to her, CSOs 'are very much involved and they do influence a lot of decisions and a lot of things that we implement as a region. […They] should feel that their contributions are taken on board and valued'.[176] For example, after pressure from CSOs at the PF in 2008, the Unit revised its strategic plan to include engagement with the media and private sector in the SADC's HIV/AIDS activities.[177] The DFID representative agrees with this picture. According to her, the official consultation mechanisms with civil society in the HIV/AIDS field work quite well: 'The HIV/AIDS Unit has come quite far in understanding its relationship with civil society and structures this relationship in a constructive way'.[178]

Many CSOs in this study are formally recognized by the SADC Secretariat and are invited to various regional meetings arranged by the SADC, such as the PF, as well as granted a seat in various policy-making forums, such as the TAC. The TAC is considered quite influential, since all plans, agendas and documents have to be scrutinized and evaluated by this committee before being sent to the COM for

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[171] van Tol, interview, 30 November 2009; Yates, interview, 14 December 2009; Page, interview, 24 November 2009; Sandström, interview, 27 November 2009
[172] Sanje, interview, 11 December 2009
[173] Page, interview, 24 November 2009
[174] Clayton, interview, 16 February 2012
[175] Mxotshwa, interview, 27 March 2012
[176] Sanje, interview, 11 December 2009
[177] Sanje, interview, 11 December 2009
[178] Yates, interview, 14 December 2009

decision-making. The main institutionalized collaboration between the SADC and civil society occurs through RAANGO and the principal venue is the PF. RAANGO is given two hours in every meeting to voice the concerns of its members and address pertinent issues in the region.[179] RAANGO members are also given a chance to make inputs to various policy documents such as strategic plans. In 2008, for example, RAANGO was extensively consulted on the new Strategic Framework for HIV/AIDS 2010-2015, addressed above, and was used as the main civil society referral body in the process.[180] In this vein, CSOs have taken on the role of monitoring the SADC and making it accountable for its HIV/AIDS-related activities. Hence, at the PF the Unit accounts for its activities in terms of progress and failures during the past year and the extent to which it has dealt with issues brought up at the last meeting.[181] The formal recognition of CSOs has strengthened ties between the SADC and RCSOs, and expanded the space for CSOs to influence SADC policy-making (which will be discussed below), which in the end enhances regional work.

In terms of specific RCSOs, SAT has increasingly strengthened its link to the Unit over the years, for example through active involvement in the PF and close cooperation in specific areas (SAT 2008: 18). Presenting its research in various meetings, SAT claims to give voice to the concerns of the local communities it supports in order to influence SADC policy-making (ibid: 16). For example, in the PF in Namibia 2010, SAT presented findings from a major study about youth capacity building in HIV/AIDS work (SAT 2011: 32). Furthermore, SAT is a member of the SADC working group on HIV Prevention. The previous director of SAT, as the convener of RCSOs in RAANGO, also used to be regularly invited to various SADC meetings to give her opinion on HIV/AIDS issues, for example on how the economic crisis of 2008 affected HIV/AIDS organizations in the region. All in all, the SAT representative believes that SAT is taken seriously by the SADC and claims that the relationship between SAT and the Unit is close.[182]

RATN continuously lobbies RIGOs such as EAC, COMESA and the SADC to support its HIV capacity-development agenda and to give high priority to training in regional policy-making and project implementation (RATN 2009, 2011a). In addition, RATN also involves representatives from RIGOs in its various training courses, including the SADC (RATN 2009). RATN has a formal partnership with the SADC Secretariat, which has resulted in participation in various working groups and technical committees. For example, RATN was part of the steering committee for the development of the SADC HIV Capacity Building Framework, which aims to give technical HIV/AIDS support to member states, and RATN also provides the SADC with further technical support in the implementation of the framework (RATN 2011a: 9). Lastly, RATN has co-hosted various regional HIV/AIDS conferences with the SADC, the latest being the HIV Capacity Building Partners Summit in Eastern and Southern Africa held in Nairobi, Kenya in 2011; a joint

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[179] Sandström, interview, 27 November 2009

[180] Page, interview, 24 November; Sandström, interview, 27 November 2009

[181] Page, interview, 24 November; Sandström, interview, 27 November 2009

[182] Sandström, interview, 27 November 2009

arrangement between RCSOs such as RATN, SAT, NAPSAR and SAfAIDS as well as the SADC. The Summit brought together CSOs dealing with capacity-building linked to HIV/AIDS-related work, as well as governments, RIGOs and donors, to assess progress, to share achievements and best practices, and to identify gaps in capacity building in Eastern and Southern Africa (RATN 2011b).

ARASA is a formal member of the TAC and its director serves as an expert on HIV and human rights. ARASA has also provided technical inputs to various HIV/AIDS treatment and prevention policy documents (ARASA 2010: 25-26). For example, ARASA was consulted by the SADC Secretariat in the creation of a Model Law, addressed in section 5.2.1, together with SADC-PF.[183] According to the director of ARASA, it has a substantial say in the design of various policy documents.[184] Furthermore, ARASA has also been engaged in various regional advocacy campaigns which target the SADC and its member states. For example, in 2010 ARASA teamed up with trade unions, researchers and ex-mineworker organizations in Swaziland and Lesotho to urge the SADC Secretariat and the South African government to improve the local and cross-border management of HIV-infected mineworkers in the region (ARASA: 16). In fact, according to an external evaluation of ARASAs work, it is deemed important by policy-makers, including the SADC, and by civil society in making sure that the voice of human rights-related CSOs is heard at the regional level. On the whole, ARASA is considered a key link between civil society and the SADC (Singizi Consulting 2012: 46, 57).

NAPSAR claims to work closely with the Unit. According to the director of NAPSAR, the SADC quickly recognized the network as the main body for representing PLWHA in the region. The partnership between NAPSAR and the SADC is formalized within the SADC PLWHA Framework from 2008. In its capacity of representing PLWHA in the region, NAPSAR is also a member of the HIV/AIDS TAC.[185] Furthermore, the collaboration with the SADC has resulted in its participation in the design and review of a number of SADC policy documents. For example, NAPSAR was influential in the development of the Population Mobility Framework as well as the Model Law, and made inputs to the latest SADC Business Plan. NAPSAR has also provided the SADC with policy-relevant research on issues related to HIV and human rights. For example, together with SAT it conducted a study on the needs of young people who live with HIV/AIDS, which also highlighted gaps in the current provision of health services to young people in the region. The project was financed by the SADC through the Special Fund, discussed above. NAPSAR is currently pushing the SADC to adopt a Regional Treatment Protocol (NAPSAR 2011: 5, 7, 11, 19).

In terms of influencing SADC policy-making, SAfAIDS mainly acts through RAANGO.[186] It is uncertain to what extent SAfAIDS sits on the TAC and participates in the various working groups. SAfAIDS's main contribution to policy influence is more indirect, disseminating information which is used by various CSOs

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[183] Page, interview, 24 November 2009
[184] Clayton, interview, 16 February 2012
[185] Mxotshwa, interview, 27 March 2012
[186] Page, interview, 24 November 2009

in their advocacy work at national and regional levels.[187] For example, it distributes various information materials related to treatment and supports partners to develop and implement effective HIV interventions at workplaces (SAfAIDS 2006). As one of the leading CSOs in the Gender Protocol Alliance, SAfAIDS also provided alliance members with information and research around gender, HIV/AIDS and health which was used in advocating for and designing the Gender Protocol. In the process, SAfAIDS was selected to represent regional CSOs in the SADC Task Force, put together by the Gender Unit, and was responsible for providing guidance on the Protocol sections dealing with HIV/AIDS (SAfAIDS 2006: 12). Acknowledging the policy influence of SAfAIDS and Gender Links, according to one SADC representative the Gender Protocol was as much the product of the Alliance as the SADC.[188] Furthermore, SAfAIDS provides training services to SADC officials and governmental institutions dealing with HIV/AIDS. For example, it arranged a training course in 2008 about documentation and the sharing of Best Practices in HIV and AIDS programming in the Southern African region (SAfAIDS 2012).

The fact that SADC-civil society collaboration is endorsed by both parties and generally considered to be well-functioning, as argued above, is intimately linked to a shared (problem-solving) approach to HIV/AIDS work. As already indicated, many of the CSOs involved in SADC-led HIV/AIDS regional governance, such as SAT, RATN and SAfAIDS, in many respects want to contribute to the SADC's HIV/AIDS agenda, as outlined for example in the Declaration and Strategic Framework 2010-2015. These actors view governments and RIGOs as partners in a common endeavour to provide AIDS-related services to various target groups. This is manifested, for example, in the Summit Communique from the HIV Capacity Building Partners Summit in Nairobi mentioned above. The Communique calls upon 'civil society organisations, regional economic communities, private sectors and institutions […] to commit themselves […] and play their role as *partners* in the implementation of effective HIV capacity building initiatives towards achieving universal access' (RATN 2011b, my emphasis).

This partnership approach is clearly displayed by SAT, which is:

> further committed to contributing to universal access to prevention, treatment, care and support for people of the SADC region, and to mitigation of the impact of AIDS communities and its members, through and expanded, comprehensive and sustained response, in line with SADC's HIV and Aids Business Plan (SAT 2008: 4-5).

More particularly, SAT wants to contribute to the area of capacity development of community responses to HIV/AIDS in the plan (ibid: 4), which is in fact one of the SADC's core areas in its HIV/AIDS work. SAT therefore supports local and national partners in a range of activities such as HIV prevention, care and support, impact mitigation and ART literacy (SAT 2011: 6). Similarly, RATN wants to contribute to the SADC's goal of enhanced institutional HIV/AIDS capacity in the region through delivering capacity building and training to various institutions, state

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[187] Page, interview, 24 November 2009
[188] Ncube, interview, 8 December 2008

as well as non-state, that are involved in prevention, care, support and mitigation (RATN 2009: 16). Lastly, SAfAIDS's production and dissemination of information to and facilitation of collaboration between various stakeholders in the region resonates well with the SADC's aim to identify and mobilize technical resources and share expertise and best practices in the region. All in all, the above examples imply that CSOs in this study take an active role in delivering AIDS-related services and thereby participate in the reproduction of the capitalist social order in which responsibility for social service provision is increasingly outsourced to non-state actors in line with the neo-liberal demand.

CSO Exclusion

As in the case of the CSO involvement in regional governance in the trade sector, the equivalent role played by CSOs related to HIV/AIDS has to be problematized. It is true that CSOs are involved in service delivery and some policy-making, but this involvement is generally conditional and takes place on the SADC's terms. To start with, it is argued that CSOs are primarily called upon when the SADC needs them on various matters related to HIV/AIDS, and not due to some overall commitment to facilitate civil society participation in regional integration. One major reason for the participation of CSOs in SADC-led regional HIV/AIDS governance is the fact that the SADC lacks sufficient knowledge and expertise in many HIV/AIDS areas to implement the Strategic Plan. Therefore, the SADC is in great need of NGO's competence. In many regards, CSOs are seen as important partners because of their expertise and ability to provide services. According to the director of SAfAIDS, even though the SADC's capacity to do HIV/AIDS work has been strengthened because the Unit's organizational capacity has been improved, the Unit is still rather weak and relies quite a lot on civil society. For example, the SADC needs the technical expertise of CSOs to design regional policy documents.[189]

Another important reason for the SADC's positive attitude towards civil society is its willingness to outsource service delivery activities related to prevention, mitigation, care and treatment to civil society actors such as RATN, SAfAIDS and SAT, in line with the overall neo-liberal regional governance agenda. One instrument for this is the Special Fund which, as discussed above, mainly supports activities related to service provision. According to the representative of the Unit, '[i]n the HIV/AIDS-sector CSOs are key actors and SADC cannot have a meaningful response without them'.[190] The PF is particularly important for the SADC to involve CSOs in the implementation of the HIV/AIDS agenda. If the Secretariat is tasked to work on a particular issue as set out in the Strategic Framework, for example in terms of providing certain services, but lacks resources or knowledge, the Unit tries to find a partner in the forum who is willing to assist and take responsibility for that task.[191]

In the HIV/AIDS sector more broadly, service-providing NGOs are generally in a great majority, at the expense of more critically-inclined human rights advocacy organizations which question the structural causes behind, for example, lack of

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[189] Page, interview, 24 November 2009
[190] Sanje, interview, 11 December 2009
[191] Sanje, interview, 11 December 2009

AIDS treatment (SIDA 2009). Taking a historical perspective, the initial HIV/AIDS CSOs that came about were service organizations focusing on mitigating the immediate effects of the pandemic through counselling, home-based care and other services. In fact, 'there have always been few organizations that focus on HR and a right based response to HIV…and this has perpetuated through time'.[192] Therefore, there are also few human rights CSOs working on a regional level (Singizi Consulting 2012). As shown in section 5.2.1, AIDS and human rights is a contested area for many CSOs, governments and donors, and it is only during the last 5 years that human rights have started to be acknowledged in the HIV/AIDS sector (ibid).

Advancing a human rights agenda, critical CSOs such as NAPSAR and ARASA have a different, more advocacy-oriented approach to SADC-led regional HIV/AIDS governance when compared with more service-oriented CSOs. In their view, the SADC and member states have the prime responsibility to deliver AIDS services, not civil society, and need to be pushed to live up to their commitments. Therefore, the main roles of NAPSAR, ARASA and their partners and members are to monitor states' provision of services to people infected and affected by HIV/AIDS, particularly vulnerable social groups such as sexual minorities and women, who are often denied support, and to advocate for legally binding national and regional HIV/AIDS-related policy frameworks. According to NAPSAR, denying PLWHA access to services in relation to treatment, care and prevention is considered a human rights abuse. Therefore, NAPSAR advocates the SADC and member states to scale up AIDS treatment. According to the director of NAPSAR, 'our logic behind treatment and prevention is more controversial than distributing condoms'.[193] However, contesting national and regional politics around HIV/AIDS makes these CSOs quite controversial in the eyes of most governments. Therefore, NAPSAR members that work on LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual and transsexual) rights and HIV/AIDS are excluded in many ways in their respective states.[194] ARASA takes this critical approach one step further and calls for deeper law reform. Hence, even if one important task is still to monitor the implementation of various existing legal and policy frameworks connected to treatment and prevention, in line with the work of NAPSAR, another important challenge is to 'move beyond a narrow focus on protecting the rights of PLWHA to a broader equality agenda' (ARASA 2009: 96). This entails not only strengthening existing rights but also fundamental reform of discriminatory laws, policies, practises and beliefs against marginalized groups in society in conservative judicial areas, such as criminalization of same-sex relations and transmission of HIV (ibid: 94, 96).

Even if they are involved in policy dialogues with the SADC Secretariat, for example through the TAC, and are deemed important partners by the Unit, on a deeper decision-making level critical CSOs such as NAPSAR and ARASA are generally not interesting to the SADC and its member states, since they challenge the dominant problem-solving HIV/AIDS approach in the region that is related to the neo-liberal discourse. In that way, these CSOs go against the workings of the

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[192] Clayton, interview, 16 February 2012
[193] Clayton, interview, 16 February 2012
[194] Mxotshwa, interview, 27 March 2012

capitalist system. In fact, despite the quite impressive SADC-CSO interaction accounted for above, according to one commentator, 'if [the Secretariat] is the high point of civil society interaction [with] SADC it is very sad'.[195] Because of the entrenched statism in the SADC, member states want to retain decision-making power in all issue areas, including HIV/AIDS. The SADC decides what levels in the SADC hierarchy CSOs are allowed to have influence at. Therefore, the bulk of SADC cooperation with CSOs in the HIV/AIDS sector in terms of policy-making takes place at lower levels at the Secretariat, for example through the Unit, TAC, PF and various working groups. The most important policy decisions, governing the overall HIV/AIDS agenda, are taken by member states in COM and Summit meetings. CSOs are excluded in these forums. In addition, without any monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, these decisions are then left to be implemented through the members' good will.[196] SADC member states shy away from advancing a human rights agenda and the Summit and COM devote little attention to human rights and AIDS issues. Hence, since much important decision-making is taking place elsewhere, CSOs such as ARASA which seek to reform the overall HIV/AIDS agenda in the region are very reluctant to strengthen interaction with the Secretariat. In the words of the director of ARASA, 'we rarely go [to the PF] because it is just a room full of a huge amount of different people listening to an update from SADC which is not all that interesting'.[197] In terms of the Unit, which is supposed to lead the region in terms of HIV/AIDS intervention, it is not performing in the way that some CSOs expect. The Unit is considered very constrained in terms of what it can do, lacking power and resources and not being important in terms of policy development.[198] This is related to the prevailing sovereignty-boosting and neo-liberal regional governance in which member states refuse to transfer supranational power to the Secretariat and prioritize trade over social issues. In line with the overall tendency to put most resources into trade, unsurprisingly the Trade Directorate is stronger and more resourced and the people working there are more effective in putting their issues on the SADC agenda.[199]

To conclude, the SADC tends to control and dominate the relationship with CSOs. Interaction between the SADC and CSOs to a large extent takes place on the terms of the former. CSOs are involved in regional governance related to HIV/AIDS because the SADC needs technical expertise and assistance in implementing various projects. However, the inclusion/exclusion dynamic caused by the SADC is less pronounced in the HIV/AIDS sector when compared with trade. For example, all HIV/AIDS RCSOs involved in this study are involved in policy-making at the Secretariat and get invitations to the Partnership Forum. However, due to the statist and capitalist regional order, a supra-national institution such as the Secretariat is rather powerless. The member states in the Summit and COM have control of most

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[195] Clayton, interview, 16 February 2012

[196] Gender Links 2009; Clayton, interview, 16 February 2012

[197] Clayton, interview, 16 February 2012

[198] Msosa, interview, 23 April 2012; Clayton, interview, 16 February 2012

[199] Msosa, interview, 23 April 2012

decision-making in regional HIV/AIDS governance and they do not prioritize controversial human rights issues related to protection of vulnerable social groups such as sexual minorities and the safeguarding of citizens' rights to AIDS services. Hence, critical CSOs dealing with human rights issues, such as ARASA and NAPSAR, have big problems getting attention for their issues on a deeper decision-making level. In general, CSOs are barred from decision-making forums such as the COM and Summit. Therefore, for CSOs such as ARASA that find the space for real policy influence in the SADC diminishing and see no point in engaging with those policy forums that are actually open to civil society, such as the PF, there are decreased incentives for engagement with the SADC. In this way, in excluding CSOs from those SADC institutions where they really would like to have a say, the SADC decreases their regional profile, which can be an obstacle for regional consolidation. At the same time, as will be discussed in the section on issue-framing below, being barred from high-level decision-making forums by member states can spur regional advocacy by ARASA and NAPSAR. Furthermore, for those CSOs like SAT and RATN which are involved in service provision, want to contribute to the SADC's HIV/AIDS Strategic Framework, are content with having minor policy influence in terms of making technical inputs to various strategic documents, and indeed value involvement in lower-rank policy-making forums, collaboration with the SADC indeed strengthens regional work.

5.3 Inter-Organizational Relations between Donors and CSOs

This section will discuss how the statist-capitalist informed social relations between donors and RCSOs influence civil society regionalization in the HIV/AIDS sector in two different ways. First, the role of donor funds in facilitating civil society regionalization and the dependency this creates on behalf of CSOs will be analysed and, secondly, the ways in which donor agendas shape the nature of this process. However, the first task is to list the most important donors involved in this sector.

5.3.1 Key Donors

Irish Aid has a Regional Programme on HIV/AIDS for Southern and Eastern Africa, with the purpose being to promote and strengthen the regional response to prevent the spread of HIV/AIDS and reduce its impact in Eastern and Southern Africa (Irish Aid 2008). This is coordinated by a Regional Advisor and based at the Pretoria office in South Africa. In essence, the regional programme complements the national level by addressing the cross-border dimensions of HIV/AIDS issues, for example in terms of the linkage between migration and the spread of HIV, and through strengthening the exchange of information between national actors. In the regional programme, Irish Aid supports a range of organizations, including intergovernmental organizations and regional NGOs (ibid).

The Swedish International Development Co-operation Agency's (SIDA) funds to regional HIV/AIDS activities are channelled through the Swedish-Norwegian

Regional HIV/AIDS Team for Africa (referred to as the Team). The Team is a joint programme of the governments of Sweden and Norway which was started in 2000, covers Sub-Saharan Africa, and is based at the Swedish embassy in Lusaka, Zambia. The Team's main functions are to provide financial support and dialogue with regional partners for a strengthened regional response to the HIV/AIDS pandemic and to give technical assistance to the Swedish and Norwegian Embassies in the region in their national HIV/AIDS work (SIDA 2011). The Team provides regional platforms for networking, interaction and exchange of information between various state and non-state organizations involved in HIV/AIDS work, and to build the capacity of both RIGOs and regional NGOs and networks. Moreover, the Team finances key regional forums such as the PF and RAANGO (SIDA 2009).

The UK Department for International Development (DFID) also has a specific regional programme in Southern Africa, alongside the national activities in various countries. The regional programme is administered from the regional DFID office in South Africa. In comparison with SIDA and Irish Aid, DFID's regional programme is broader than HIV/AIDS and includes other areas of engagement. Within the HIV/AIDS theme, DFID has partners both from civil society and the state. In terms of the latter, DFID supports the implementation of the SADC HIV/AIDS Business Plan, and technical and financial support has also been given to RCSOs within RAANGO (DFID 2006).

The Royal Netherland Embassy (RNE) has a regional programme which solely deals with HIV/AIDS issues, which is managed by their office in South Africa. The overall objective of the programme is to 'accelerate the response to the AIDS pandemic, through regional cross-border approaches, which complement/strengthen country-level efforts, leading to more efficient/effective country-level prevention and mitigation efforts' (RNE 2009: 2). Apart from support to the SADC HIV/AIDS Unit, RNE gives financial and technical support to several regional NGOs and networks (ibid). One core aspect of the regional programme is to facilitate linkages between state and non-state actors on a regional level, for example through the PF.[200]

Besides bilateral development co-operation with a number of countries in Africa, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) also has a Regional Programme for Southern and Eastern Africa that has two components: Economic Growth and Children and Youth. The latter focuses on reducing the spread of HIV/AIDS in the region. The overall goal of the programme is to build the capacity of regional institutions, organizations and networks, including regional HIV/AIDS CSOs, to more effectively stimulate sustainable economic growth and secure a future for children and youth (CIDA 2012).

Besides these bilateral donors, a few private foundations, trusts and INGOs are involved in supporting the regionalization of civil society in the HIV/AIDS sector. The most important one is the Dutch-based Humanist Institute for Development Cooperation (HIVOS), which has an HIV/AIDS Sector within its Civil Choices Programme, administrated by its regional office for Southern Africa based in Harare. The HIV/AIDS Sector involves providing support to national and regional CSOs in

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[200] van Tol, interview, 30 November 2009

terms of project financing, organizational development and networking, strengthening of advocacy, and promoting participation of CSOs in international forums. HIVOS recognizes the overriding importance of the participation of and co-operation among CSOs of PLWHA and women in advocacy and campaigns (HIVOS 2009: 16-17).

5.3.2 Dependency on Donor Funds

The constellation of donors involved in the regionalization of civil society in the HIV/AIDS sector is a bit different when compared with the trade sector. Private foundations, trusts and INGOs are more involved in trade-related support than HIV/AIDS, and the opposite is true for bilateral donors. In the HIV/AIDS sector, bilateral donors run the show, and as we have seen the most prominent ones are RNE, Irish Aid, SIDA, CIDA and DFID. These donors have embarked on regional programmes supporting RCSOs doing regional work, for example SAfAIDS, SAT and RATN, and RIGOs such as the SADC. However, the regional work of these donors is far from being as important as the national. In fact, regional support is more or less questioned by most donors in terms of the added value, which makes funding for regional civil society very uncertain in the long run.

For most bilateral donors, it seems that supporting the regionalization of civil society is not an obvious thing to do and is a source of great debate. According to the RNE representative:

> here is this catch-22 situation whereas if you purely work on the regional level, what are the outcomes; […] meetings, papers, networks and when there is such an urgency in fighting the epidemic people are saying, you know, this is useless […] we have enough of that, we need implementation on the ground. So it is a constant endeavour to justify that you are actually adding something that will make country processes work better.[201]

Every year, then, RNE asks itself if it should spend its money on bilateral programmes instead because it sees better results on the national than the regional level.[202] Even if RNE has a regional programme within the HIV/AIDS sector, it has encountered many challenges in implementing it due to the widespread national bias in Dutch development co-operation. Regardless of the regional programme, in practice the attention of Dutch staff in Southern Africa is primarily on the national level: 'Regional initiatives are at best a lower order priority and at worse a distraction. There is very few staff in the region or in the Hague whose work has an explicit regional focus' (NRE 2009: 20). It is claimed that regional programming is an unusual aid modality and that most staff engaging with the regional programme have little understanding of the regional level (ibid).

In terms of DFID, similarly the country-based approach takes primacy in enhancing development in Southern Africa. Regional and continental initiatives are only undertaken where they can add value to the country-based approach (DFID 2006). Even the regional activities of the Team are much less in volume than

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[201] van Tol, interview, 30 November 2009

[202] van Tol, interview, 30 November 2009

bilateral Swedish and Norwegian support to individual countries.[203] Furthermore, according to Irish Aid, its regional programme on HIV/AIDS in principle functions as a complement to the national level. In fact, one important element of the regional work is to support Irish authorities in various countries to exchange information in order to develop the national response in various countries (Irish Aid 2008). It should also be noted that what often is called a 'regional' programme by bilateral donors is in fact a multi-country approach where the same thing is done in many countries, without coordination of these activities or targeting of regional actors such as the SADC.[204]

The RCSOs in this study are concerned about the overall national priorities of bilateral donors and claim that few of these appreciate and understand what regional CSOs really do. According to the director of ARASA, it has taken some effort to persuade donors, particularly the bilateral ones, that regional work is important. ARASA is still sometimes approached by donors such as Irish Aid and SIDA, who want to discuss what the value added of the regional level really is.[205] In the same vein, the director of SAfAIDS claims that donors want projects that are easily monitored and regional activities do not always lend themselves to that.[206]

It is obvious that donors play an important role for civil society regionalization, making financial resources available for regional HIV/AIDS activities. However, this has to be problematized. First of all, even if there are indeed bilateral donor funds available for regional civil society work in the HIV/AIDS sector, as shown above, due to their national inclinations, donors constantly question this type of support. This creates a rather vulnerable financial situation for most RCSOs, at least in a long-term perspective. The availability of donor funds can also create regional 'briefcase' CSOs in which financial resources are used by staff members for personal enrichment rather than broader development objectives. In fact, there is a lot of self-interest and territory-marking in the HIV/AIDS sector, including at the regional level. According to one CSO leader:

> I have been astonished many times by the attitudes of civil society organizations which sometimes have stopped representing the interests of their own constituencies and started represented their own interests […] civil society is not a saint. I have been disappointed many times.[207]

According to another commentator:

> why people move from government to NGOs is because […] they have realized that you can get a lot of money […] It is more of an income generating activity. This is almost like charity work, that is why they call it non-profit, but it pays more than any other work really […] It is really, really, really good business. You have nice offices, you have nice cars, you have high salaries […] Everyone wants to get as much money as possible as organizations

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[203] Sandström and Thiis, interview, 7 March 2005
[204] Schoeman, interview, 19 November 2009
[205] Clayton, interview, 16 February 2012
[206] Page, interview, 24 November 2009
[207] Kujinga, interview, 1 December 2012

and you want to be seen as doing the work that is expected. If you look at which people have the best houses in town, they work at NGOs such as SAT and SANASO.[208]

However, such rent-seeking is a risky business and jeopardizes the existence of CSOs, since financial mismanagement, of course, is generally not tolerated in the donor community. As in the trade sector as exemplified by SADC-CNGO and SAPSN above, donor dependency makes RCSOs very vulnerable, and changing donor preferences can terminate their activities, for example in cases of economic fraud.

One telling example of the latter is the former SANASO, which was one of the most important regional players in the HIV/AIDS field for many years. SANASO was a regional network of 10 national CSOs involved in HIV/AIDS work in Southern Africa, facilitating contact among members around the region, and promoting cooperation between civil society for mutual learning and to better utilize each other's resources to create a common position on issues in the HIV/AIDS response in the region. SANASO engaged the SADC extensively and was highly involved in various policy forums at the Secretariat (SANASO 2011). However, in 2008 and 2009 donors on several occasions complained that funds intended for certain HIV/AIDS activities were instead allocated to the operation of the office. For example, funds were used to buy a second office car without the consent of the donors, which was used for the director's private business. The director also increased her salary by 50%, which was not endorsed by the donors, and even used some funds for various personal expenses.[209] In an audit of SANASO commissioned by the lead donor, SIDA, in 2008, it was concluded that 'the outcome […] has been dismal […There is] suspect misappropriation of project funds' (Ramstedt 2008). In effect, SIDA and other donors later decided to withdraw their funds and SANASO ceased to exist in 2009.[210] This is a very good example of how doing regional HIV/AIDS work for personal enrichment jeopardizes an organization's existence.

To conclude, donor funding plays a major role in civil society regionalization. All RCSOs in this study are highly dependent on the continued influx of donor funds for their operations and regional work. This puts them in a very vulnerable position. If donors change their funding preferences, choose other partners, issue areas and/or decide to focus on the national instead of the regional level, this can obstruct and even terminate CSOs and their regional work, which negatively affects civil society regionalization in a more long-term perspective. In fact, regional support already hangs by a thread, being questioned by many donors. The availability of donor funds can also create highly vulnerable CSOs that are more interested in making profit for personal enrichment than doing genuine development work, as the example of SANASO demonstrated. This can create a distorted kind of market-oriented civil society regionalization which is totally at odds with the vast needs for care, prevention and mitigation related to HIV/AIDS in the region.

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[208] Msosa, interview, 23 April 2012

[209] Msosa, interview, 23 April 2012

[210] Msosa, interview, 23 April 2012

5.3.3 Donor Influence on the CSO Agenda

Discussing the role of donors more broadly, the availability of regional funds seems to be greater for service-delivery activities when compared with rights-based work. One CSO is concerned with the '[u]nwillingness or reticence of some funders to support advocacy and training work on human rights' (ARASA 2007: 15). According to the Trust study, mentioned in section 4.3.1, this has partly to do with the fact that many donors consider CSOs responsible for basic service delivery to marginalized people in light of the reduction of the welfare state. In addition, service delivery gives donors 'good press at home', as Western tax-payers would 'rather support poor street children than advocacy groups' (Southern Africa Trust 2010b: 16). This should not be underestimated in a time of economic recession and given the overall trend towards a results-based approach and demands for efficiency within the donor community.[211] Bilateral donor aversion to supporting advocacy-based human rights work also has another, more political dimension. Just as SADC member states refrain from collaboration with human rights-related CSOs, many donors, especially bilateral ones, also find supporting human rights work controversial.[212] One concrete reason is that this can harm foreign relations between the donor agency and recipient country. One example is the previous Dutch support to Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) in South Africa, which put pressure on the South African government to scale up the delivery of AIDS medicines. However, collaboration with TAC, which was criticizing the government, was tricky because it could harm foreign relations between Holland and South Africa, and was eventually terminated.[213]

As discussed in the last section, operating in a capitalist structural framework where development activities are increasingly carried out according to the market logics of supply and demand and accumulation of capital, CSOs in the HIV/AIDS sector are increasingly run like businesses. Therefore, when looking for potential funders they tend to go where the money is. As indicated above, many donors increasingly prefer to fund HIV/AIDS projects that are easily measured. The consequence of this is that many NGOs in the sector, on local, national as well as regional levels, seem to go for service-provision because the results there are more tangible and measurable.[214] This stands in sharp contrast to rights-based work, where it is difficult to see immediate results because the impact of advocacy for AIDS rights, for example in terms of networking, research and monitoring, is hard to measure:[215] 'Log frames don't really work with HR […] but you can count how many people you have put on treatment. It is easier to show results, whereas with HR it is difficult'.[216] As it is a rather non-profitable development activity, many CSOs refrain from doing advocacy work related to human rights. According to one commentator: 'NGO-staff do not want to lose their jobs and therefore they play safe

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[211] van Tol, interview, 30 November 2009

[212] Msosa, interview, 23 April 2012

[213] van Tol, interview, 30 November 2009

[214] Msosa, interview, 23 April 2012; Clayton, interview, 16 February 2012

[215] van Tol-RNE, interview, 30 November 2009

[216] Clayton, interview, 16 February 2012

and apply for money related to service provision, and not for example pushing governments to find better treatment'.[217] In general, then, it is easier to get donor money for service delivery than human rights work, which also applies at the regional level. This has made a fundamental imprint on civil society regionalization in the HIV/AIDS sector, which is highly problem-solving in character.

Donors involved in supporting the regionalization of civil society in the HIV/AIDS sector generally have great influence over the type of work carried out by their recipients. This relates to donors supporting service-provision as well as advocacy related to human rights. In the words of the representative of RNE:

> there are those NGOs who do advocacy and act as watch dogs vis-à-vis governmental actors, and those who collaborate hand in hand with government in delivering services […] If you as a donor are aware of who is doing what you can influence the level playing field.[218]

Since service-providing activities are privileged, this is what most CSOs such as SAT, RATN and SAfAIDS put their focus on. Consequently, few bilateral donors work with regional advocacy organizations. The latter get the bulk of their funds from private funders and trusts. For example, NAPSAR is funded by Trust Africa, an African foundation based in Senegal and the UK National Lottery, as well as SIDA (NAPSAR 2012b). In the same vein, the main donors of ARASA are SIDA, OSISA and the Ford Foundation[219]. Hence, the exception to the rule among bilateral donors is SIDA, which in fact questions the general focus on service-delivery. It explains its support to advocacy and human rights in the following way: '[I]n an era when many of the NGOs are mainly acting primarily as service providers, an organization such as ARASA is supported to lift other organizations to the level of providing more critical engagement' (SIDA 2009: 64). This quote shows that more critically inclined donors have a vested interest in steering their recipients in a certain strategy and issue direction. Hence, ARASA is used by SIDA to infuse a more advocacy-oriented agenda in the HIV/AIDS sector, in line with the agenda of some critical private funders in the trade sector, as shown in section 4.3.4.

Donor influence is often manifested in more direct interventions in the work of their recipients. The representative of Irish Aid, for example, claims that her agency has a great influence on the work of its civil society partners, being involved throughout the process of project management in terms of giving technical input to strategic planning, for example. According to her, this is normal in the donor community, since donors always have their own agendas: 'We can´t help, you know, that we tell partners once in a while that it would be good if you could include this […] For example Irish Aid is always happy when issues of children are included'.[220] The director of SAT agrees that donor dependency affects its strategic planning. Donors often want to discuss what issues and projects should be prioritized.[221]

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[217] Msosa, interview, 23 April 2012

[218] van Tol, interview, 30 November 2009

[219] Clayton, e-mail communication, 3 August 2012

[220] Anamela, interview, 26 November 2009

[221] Sandström, interview, 27 November 2009

To conclude this section, donors greatly affect the HIV/AIDS agenda of RCSOs. Donors have a vested interest in influencing the issues dealt with and the strategies used by CSOs according to their own agendas and interests, something which applies to all types of donors. In terms of the bilateral donors, in contrast to more controversial human rights advocacy, a problem-solving agenda does not risk compromising foreign relations. Influenced by the overall capitalist social structure, bilateral donors are also much more inclined to support CSOs that are engaged in service-providing activities since, when compared with advocacy work related to human rights, these are easier to measure, in line with the neo-liberal, market-oriented discourse. CSOs are equally influenced by this thinking; motivated by their material interests in securing financial resources, they resemble private businesses. Since most resources are found in the service-providing field, this is where they put their attention. This of course affects the composition of regional civil society in the HIV/AIDS sector to the benefit of CSOs that pursue a problem-solving agenda. Hence, human rights organizations are in a minority on the regional level.

5.4 Inter-Organizational Relations between CSOs

This section will focus on the third inter-organizational structural level and analyse social relations between CSOs on a regional level. Two dimensions of civil society regionalization will be highlighted: CSO ideological rivalry, discussed in the next section, and CSO competition for donor funds, analysed in section 5.4.2.

5.4.1 CSO Ideological Rivalry

The relationships between CSOs in the HIV/AIDS sector on a regional level seem to be rather harmonious, unlike the trade sector. Due to the dominance of the service-providing agenda, reproduced by SADC influence and donor funding, most HIV/AIDS CSOs share the same problem-solving approach and perform similar activities, even though different emphasis is put on prevention, treatment, care or mitigation. According to one commentator, CSOs in the HIV/AIDS sector more broadly agree on the content of the issues, for example in terms of the nature of the HIV/AIDS problems and the strategies needed for dealing with them, when compared with CSOs in other sectors.[222] This implies that relations between mainstream service-providing CSOs and the minority of CSOs doing human rights are rather smooth. This is exemplified by CSO co-operation within RAANGO. According to the SAT representative, she has not experienced any tensions between the members of the network,[223] and the director of ARASA claims that: '[w]e have a very good working relationship with other regional organizations, mainly through the forum of RAANGO […] even though we focus on different things'.[224] Compared with the trade sector, where ideological rivalry risks fragmenting civil

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[222] Barnard, interview, 26 November 2008

[223] Sandström, interview, 27 November 2009

[224] Clayton, interview, 16 February 2012

society on the regional level, the harmonious relations between HIV/AIDS CSOs could strengthen civil society regionalization in the long-term, benefitting coordination between CSOs in different fields and broad coalition-building.

5.4.2 CSO Competition for Donor Funds

However, notwithstanding the, more or less, problem-solving consensus among CSOs in the HIV/AIDS sector, regional co-operation between CSOs in the HIV/AIDS sector is still not without challenges. The business-like drive for CSOs to secure their economic base and striving for personal enrichment by NGO staff due to the overall capitalist social structure creates another type of tension based on competition for donor funds. This negatively impacts on relations between CSOs, which becomes clear when further analysing the intra-civil society dynamics. It is widely recognized within civil society that, due to the financial crises and shifting donor preferences, the financial resources available for HIV/AIDS work are shrinking. Since RCSOs compete for the same, reduced, funding pool, this by necessity creates increased competition and also tension.[225] One concrete example is the various DFID funds, for example the Transparency and Governance Fund, from which Gender Links and SAfAIDS have obtained support. According to the representative of DFID, the Fund is competitive, meaning that CSOs have to compete for contributions. Sometimes NGOs even compete with their donors, for example OSISA, for the same money.[226] It is clear that the nature of the funding arrangements, based on the market logic, spurs competition and tension.

One important manifestation of the financial competition is the contest for 'entitlement', i.e. which organization is best suited to lead the work in various issue areas. This includes having the mandate to represent civil society in Southern Africa in various international forums.[227] Gaining such entitlement is also an important ticket to attracting further donor funds. One example is the tension between SANASO and other RCSOs within RAANGO related to SANASO's previous claim to be the most representative RCSO in the HIV/AIDS area.[228] This tension increased during the time of SANASOs financial mismanagement and it was gradually isolated in the regional CSO community. According to one commentator, '[i]t was no other organization in solidarity with SANASO saying that this is an important organization […] Even the organizations that were its peers did not defend it enough'.[229] It is tempting to conclude that other RCSOs saw the possibility to get rid of a fund-raising competitor. Moreover, RAANGO has often been a forum for arguments related to entitlement. According to the SAT director, a particular member sometimes considers itself to be the most knowledgeable CSO in a certain issue area and asks to be mandated to lead in that area, but is then challenged by

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[225] SAT 2011: 13; Page, interview, 24 November 2009; Msosa, interview, 23 April 2012; Mxotshwa, interview, 27 March 2012

[226] Yates, interview, 14 December 2009

[227] Yates, interview, 14 December 2009

[228] Anamela, interview, 26 November 2009

[229] Msosa, interview, 23 April 2012

others who contest for the same position.[230] One concrete example is the previous fight between ARASA and NAPSAR about at which level (regional or local) to do advocacy work related to decriminalization of transmission of HIV. Both organizations also claimed to have the best legal expertise in the area.[231]

To conclude the two previous sections, civil society regionalization in the HIV/AIDS sector, when compared with trade sector, is rather homogenous. Ideological tensions between CSOs seem to be low, since most do a similar kind of work, related to service-delivery and capacity-building, and using similar strategies. Critical human rights-oriented CSOs such as ARASA are in a minority and do not challenge those CSOs advancing a more problem-solving agenda. However, driven by an urge to secure funding, financial competition and contest for entitlement to act as lead-CSOs in various areas can jeopardize this seemingly stable situation, which might weaken long-term civil society regionalization.

5.5 Intra-Organizational Relations: CSOs and Issue-Framing

In this and the next section, the focus will be on the agency of RCSOs in the HIV/AIDS sector, albeit within the context of the higher structural levels discussed in section 2.4, in terms of the ways in which they frame issues and construct identities for regional consolidation. Hence, as will be clear in the coming two sections, while partly an autonomous process, the internal motivations of RCSOs to 'go regional' are influenced by external actors such as the SADC and donors. Inter-organizational relations between the SADC and CSOs in particular affect how regional NGOs and networks frame issues and construct identities. The section will start by discussing two dimensions of civil society regionalization related to issue-framing: regional issue-framing and construction of regional target groups. In section 5.6, then, the role of positive and exclusive regional identity-making for civil society regionalization will be investigated.

5.5.1 Regional Issue-Framing

Regional issue-framing plays an important role for regional consolidation of RCSOs in the HIV/AIDS sector. The perception of HIV/AIDS issues as having a regional 'Southern African' character is widespread among regional organizations in this study.[232] For example, according to the director of SAfAIDS:

> HIV/AIDS crosses borders, it is an issue that affects the whole region and not just national-ly. There are many examples of HIV/AIDS issues in terms of prevention, treatment etc. that have a regional scope, for example an infected person living in Zimbabwe who needs ac-cess to treatment in South Africa. Such situations and more generally flows of people […]

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[230] Sandström, interview, 27 November 2009
[231] Page, interview, 24 November 2009
[232] Sandström, interview, 27 November 200;, Clayton, interview, 16 February 2012; Mxotshwa, interview, 27 March 2012; Page, interview, 24 November 2009

> need to be addressed on a regional level, you can´t have one country with certain protocols and another country with nothing.[233]

Such regional understanding of HIV/AIDS has spurred SAfAIDS' involvement in the Gender Protocol Alliance, discussed above, in regional information dissemination and in other regional activities.[234] In the same vein, SAT argues that the key drivers of the pandemic are similar within the region, including concurrent partnership by men and women with low consistent use of protection, which affects local communities throughout the region in a similar fashion. Another general feature of the pandemic throughout the region is also the fact that women and children are hardest hit (SAT 2008: 4-5). Due to these regional similarities, SAT believes it can use similar empowering techniques to develop the capacity of communities in various countries in the region to deal with the pandemic (SAT 2011: 14).

The director of NAPSAR suggests that HIV/AIDS issues related to human rights are regional. There are a number of similarities between rights-related issues in the countries in the region, for example the marginalization of certain social groups such as sexual minorities. Therefore, NAPSAR pushes the SADC and member states to standardize and harmonize policies and laws related to human rights and AIDS between countries in the region.[235] ARASA also believes that rights-related issues are very similar in the region, for example criminalization of same sex relations and poor access to AIDS treatment in prisons. Therefore, '[i]t makes sense to work on a regional level'[236] in terms of networking and sharing of information and best practices between ARASA partners in order to enhance national advocacy as well as work regionally to push the SADC to adopt regional resolutions.[237]

Furthermore, when national CSOs physically meet in regional conferences, forums and advocacy campaigns, this has a heavy impact on the regional constitution of the networks and NGOs they are linked to. Regional issue-framing plays an important role here. SAT, for example, regularly arranges regional meetings for its partners to discuss various HIV/AIDS issues, and some kind of regional consensus is often reached on how to best deal with these. According to the director of SAT, in these meetings 'we share knowledge in order to create one voice from Southern Africa based on what is happening in several countries'.[238] She specifically mentions one regional seminar in 2009 where 60-70 partners in the region participated. Through intense discussions, the participants agreed on the best methods for working with HIV/AIDS problems in Southern Africa, resulting in a publication that claims to deliver the voice of civil society in HIV/AIDS prevention in the region.[239] Such regional issue-framing helps in uniting the different partners of SAT and thereby strengthens the regional consolidation of the organization.

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[233] Page, interview, 24 November 2009
[234] Page, interview, 24 November 2009
[235] Mxotshwa, interview, 27 March 2012
[236] Clayton, interview, 16 February 2012
[237] Clayton, interview, 16 February 2012
[238] Sandström, interview, 27 November 2009
[239] Sandström, interview, 27 November 2009

According to the SAT director, because of the many regional meetings they arrange, a feeling of regional connectedness among the partners is created, based on similar perceptions of the work they do. In these meetings, partners often state that they 'are part of the SAT-family',[240] which, it should be underlined, is not based on shared social traits or values and therefore not linked to a deeper sense of belonging and identity.

Another good example of regional issue-framing at regional meetings is a pan African civil society meeting in 2009 organized by the African Council of Aids Service Organizations (AFRICASO) to discuss a certain UN report. Several RCSOs from Southern Africa participated, for example SAfAIDS. Among the Southern African CSOs an understanding of the specificity of the issues in this part of Africa developed during the meeting. For example, when relating to other African civil society groups, the Southern African CSOs identified particular key drivers for the spread of HIV in Southern Africa as a region. Hence, the regional issue-framing within the Southern Africa group depended on the 'othering' of other African regions such as East Africa, which was perceived as constituting a different social context, harbouring other types of factors for the spread of HIV. In fact, certain HIV issues 'might have different names in different countries and played out differently but in essence is the same thing'.[241]

Furthermore, in the Communiqué developed at the end of the HIV Capacity Building Partners Summit in 2011 discussed above, participants reached consensus about key challenges and proposed actions for future HIV/AIDS work in the ESA region. In the Communiqué it is stated that, since there are many common challenges in the region, such as the capacity-building needs of women, children and other key populations at risk, methodologies and practices should be replicated and harmonized across the region (RATN 2011b: 56-57). As one of the organizers, RATN provided leadership in the discussions during the Summit and was highly involved in building such consensus. This, it is claimed, strengthened RATN's profile in the region (RATN 2011a: 9). Hence, regional meetings such as the Summit, which provide platforms for CSOs and other stakeholders to reach agreement on common problems and ways of dealing with them, are a powerful example of regional issue-framing, which ultimately strengthens the regionalization of CSOs.

For ARASA, regional meetings are also important to stimulate partners to reach consensus about key regional concerns.[242] The annual Partnership Forum is the biggest platform for ARASA partners to share their accomplishments and identify advocacy priorities (ARASA 2012). At the Forum in 2011, the partners agreed on four themes to prioritize in their national and regional advocacy during 2012, including expanded access to prevention services and preventing criminalization of HIV transmission and exposure.[243] According to its director, 'ARASA has managed

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[240] Sandström, interview, 27 November 2009

[241] Page, interview, 24 November 2009

[242] Clayton, interview, 16 February 2012

[243] Clayton, interview, 16 February 2012

through the partnership forum to raise awareness of issues that are more regional '.[244] This has strengthened the ARASA regional partnership.

To conclude, regional framing of various aspects of the AIDS pandemic creates a feeling of regional unity among CSOs, both within regional networks and NGOs and more broadly in the HIV/AIDS sector. Most CSOs involved in the study conceptualize HIV/AIDS issues as having a regional character and such regional perception of issues seems to spur regional activities. Having a view that HIV/AIDS issues affect people throughout the region in similar ways warrants 'going regional' in various ways. Hence, regional issue-framing is a major dimension of civil society regionalization.

5.5.2 Construction of Regional Target Groups

As in the case of the trade sector, for many RCSOs involved in HIV/AIDS work regional issue-framing is strongly linked to the SADC. The SADC is an important international target for CSOs in the HIV/AIDS field, such as SAfAIDS, which actively supports the SADC agenda.[245] Furthermore, SAT clearly states that the geographical location of its programmes is the 'SADC region', and the SADC is framed as an important regional actor in terms of overall regional coordination of the HIV/AIDS sector and setting necessary priorities (SAT 2008: 4, 22). Therefore, as already indicated, one important driving force behind SAT's regional work is contributing to the SADC's Business Plan for HIV/AIDS. Similarly, a lot of NAPSAR's regional work centres on the SADC, which is deemed an important actor for the harmonization of human rights laws and policies in the region and for pushing member states to improve AIDS services for PLWHA. Therefore, NAPSAR is currently pushing the SADC to adopt a Regional Treatment Protocol (NAPSAR 2011: 19). According to the director of NAPSAR, the actual establishment of the network also depended a lot on the SADC's formal recognition.[246] In the same vein, according to ARASA the SADC is perceived as an important regional actor in ensuring that human rights remain a central concern of the national response to HIV/AIDS by member states. Since legal and policy frameworks for protecting the rights of PLWHA against unfair discrimination are partly in place, one focus for ARASA and its partners is to monitor the SADC and member states to increase implementation, which to a large extent lags behind. ARASA tries to expose those member states that fail to materialize the adopted laws and policies (ARASA 2009: 97).

In terms of regional campaigns such as the Gender Protocol Campaign, the centre of gravity is often the SADC. The Protocol Campaign is a good example of a successful SADC advocacy campaign based on evidence-based knowledge and which used shaming as an important instrument to achieve its objectives, as discussed in section 2.9.2. Gender Links and SAfAIDS were instrumental in building up knowledge in various areas within the Protocol Campaign, a key factor

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[244] Clayton, interview, 16 February 2012

[245] Page, interview, 24 November 2009

[246] Mxotshwa, interview, 27 March 2012

behind pushing the SADC member states to sign the Gender Protocol. The Alliance managed to create a knowledge bank of gender and HIV/AIDS issues in the region, built on member's experiences of working with those issues in different countries, as well as processing and compiling this information for the SADC and the media. This included technical expertise in various areas, such as statistics on the situation of women in the region and knowledge about various regional policy frameworks, policies and programmes on gender equality and human rights in Southern Africa and globally. Furthermore, the advocacy pursued by the Alliance was evidence-based in the sense that the policy claims were rooted in the voices and perspectives of grassroots women in the region, obtained by various studies conducted by members of the Alliance. For example, the Regional Audit of Sexual and Reproductive Rights carried out by SAfAIDS measured the performance of SADC countries against the poor commitment to various international policy frameworks such as the African Charter on Human Rights, for example in terms of the linkage between HIV/AIDS and gender inequalities (SAfAIDS 2006: 10-11)

Most importantly, one essential factor behind the Alliance's ability to convince the SADC leaders of the importance of a regional Gender Protocol was also the use of this knowledge in a strategic way, shaming the SADC for not practicing what it preaches. For example, the Alliance showed the difference between member states' existing gender policies and their bad record of working towards gender equality in reality: 'It was known that most governments in the region paid lip service to women's issues while the practices were different' (Gender Links 2009: 42). The Protocol was seen as an important regional legal instrument to push governments to deliver according to their promises in terms of advancing gender equality. According to the Gender Links representative, 'we say […] this is something our governments are committed to do, as civil society we take on to hold that government accountable [....] Civil society organizations exist to be watch dogs'.[247] In the advocacy campaign, the Alliance therefore invoked various initiatives that the SADC had previously taken towards the realization of the Protocol but which had so far failed to materialize. For example, a COM meeting in 1997 urged the SADC to establish a policy framework for mainstreaming gender in all its activities, the SADC Treaty called for a protocol on Gender and Development in 1992, and RISDP identified gender as one of the most important crosscutting issues. Therefore, 'the Alliance's knowledge […] provided the moral and political tools needed to push through a half-open door' (Gender Links 2009: 34).

One difference between SAPSN's contentious advocacy style, discussed in the last chapter, and the Alliance's more pragmatic approach is the different use of language. Instead of mocking SADC leaders for not delivering on gender issues, in line with the SAPSN style, the Alliance learned how to talk to senior policy-makers in COM and other SADC decision-making bodies during the drafting process in ways that made them listen and take many of the policy demands on board. For example, the Alliance was careful not to use language that was too prescriptive and managed to frame gender and HIV/AIDS issues in a way that was accepted by government representatives. This of course required compromises, since demanding

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[247] Tolmay, interview, 27 November 2009

a comprehensive, detailed document on all gender equality and women's rights would scare off government officials. However, the inclusion of a number of clear targets in the Protocol was a huge gain for the members of the Alliance, who then had a platform for measuring governments' performance.

Regional issue-framing linked to regional advocacy campaigns is a powerful tool for regional consolidation. The Protocol Campaign is a good example of this, successfully using the shaming strategy to influence a regional target, which spurred regional CSO coalition-building and raised the regional profile of CSOs such as SAfAIDS and Gender Links, among others. As shown in section 5.2.3, the campaign had a positive effect on CSOs' influence on the SADC, which in turn further strengthened the Alliance members. According to one commentator, belonging to the same campaign (such as the Protocol Campaign) generally creates and at the same time builds on a sense of regional belonging among CSOs,[248] which leads to the question of identity-making, discussed in the next section.

To conclude, when CSOs' understanding of HIV/AIDS issues is tuned in with the SADC HIV/AIDS agenda, as in the case of SAT, RATN, SAfAIDS, NAPSAR and, to a certain extent, ARASA, this spurs regional activities, often linked to the SADC. For example, when issue-framing is linked to a clear regional advocacy target such as the SADC and based on great knowledge, it strengthens regional networking and improves the regional profile of CSOs. The regional Gender Protocol Campaign is a good example of this. Hence, the inter-organizational relations between the SADC and CSOs inform how the latter conceptualize HIV/AIDS issues as linked to the SADC agenda. This provides evidence of regional issue-framing being greatly influenced by the statist and capitalist social structures. On the whole, regional issue-framing and the construction of the SADC as a regional target is an important force behind civil society regionalization.

5.6. Intra-Organizational Relations: CSOs and Identity-Making

5.6.1 Positive Regional Identity-Making

Identity-making is generally a weak dimension of civil society regionalization in the HIV/AIDS sector. Not representing a particular constituency, CSOs such as SAT, SAfAIDS, RATN and, to a certain extent, ARASA, display a weak sense of a regional ´we´. As we saw in section 4.6.1, shared values, principles, past experiences or sharing a common social trait can create a deeper sense of regional belonging, but more often this is not the case. This also applies to the above-mentioned HIV/AIDS organizations.

SAT is very clear about not being membership-based[249] and its work is not geared towards a common social constituency. Instead, it views its local partners in

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[248] Kujinga, interview, 1 December 2012

[249] Sandström, interview, 27 November 2009

the region more as clients, supporting their capacity to deal with the pandemic. Even though SAT's work is underpinned by some universal values, such as the protection and promotion of human rights, gender equality and public health principles, the overriding belief is that communities 'are best placed to define their own needs' in a spirit of diversity and respect for ethnic, religious, political and other types of social differences between communities (SAT 2008: 12-13). Hence, unlike ARASA and NAPSAR, SAT does not actively foster regional consolidation of local communities, laying the foundation for a regional identity within the organization. Not being membership-based nor guided by universal values such as participation, human rights and transparency, which play against regionalization of identity, also apply to SAfAIDS (SAfAIDS 2006: 2). Contrary to the above CSOs, RATN is a membership organization, but the member institutions are highly diverse, with no common denominators other than delivering AIDS capacity-building services. The members are everything from medical foundations, management institutes, local government institutions and university departments to religious organizations and NGOs. Studying the latest RATN Strategic Plan and Annual Report it is also not clear what the underlying values or principles are, other than sweeping comments about RBA and gender equality (RATN 2009, 2011a). All in all, studying the above CSOs, there are no signs of fostering a regional sense of identity and belonging among partners and members.

On the other hand, NAPSAR has a clear constituency, i.e. HIV-positive people. Through their organizations, regardless of ethnic, religious, class and national differences, the people involved in NAPSAR share the same experience of living with HIV/AIDS. This common social trait transcends national borders and creates a regional sense of community. In fact, according to the director of NAPSAR, the HIV/AIDS-identity is what ultimately builds up the organizational character and is also the greatest strength of the network. For the members, this identity is the reason why they are actually part of the network[250]:

> We as people living with HIV/AIDS are different compared with organizations that are rep-resenting people living with HIV/AIDS [such as SAT, SAfAIDS and RATN…] NAPSAR's identity, NAPSAR's uniqueness and NAPSAR's competitive advantage […] is that HIV/AIDS is about ourselves, about our lives.[251]

In fact, PLWHA make up the bulk of NAPSAR's organizational structure, from local and provincial members of the country organizations to the regional board. The latter is made up of the chairpersons of the member organizations, who are all HIV-positive. The common HIV-positive identity lays the foundation for a strong sense of regional solidarity between member organizations, which results in an urge to support each other's national struggles in a common effort to improve the protection of human rights of people infected and affected by HIV/AIDS in the region. Regional meetings are important for the regional community-building within NAPSAR. Interacting with each other during these regional meetings, and reaching consensus on which specific issues to focus on, the members of NAPSAR reproduce

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[250] Mxotshwa, interview, 27 March 2012

[251] Mxotshwa, interview, 27 March 2012

and strengthen a common identity of being HIV-positive,[252] which further consolidates the NAPSAR network.

Even if not as strong as in the case of NAPSAR, regional solidarity also plays a certain role in the regional consolidation of ARASA. The ARASA partners do not have a similar distinct common identity of being HIV-positive, even if some are, but do share similar experiences of fighting injustices related to discrimination against people affected by HIV/AIDS. Being largely value-driven, the partners share a common cause of improving the human rights for PLWHA through the region, which creates a sense of 'we', even if it is not as pronounced as for NAPSAR. According to the director of ARASA:

> [i]ncreasingly there is a feeling among ARASA partners that they are part of this big fami-
> ly. If one is wronged, then others will stand up […] It did not used to be as cohesive as it is
> now […] ARASA is today an increasing critical mass of indigenous NGOs who are stand-
> ing up for issues in the region.[253]

One important manifestation of, and instrument for, regional community-building within ARASA is its Declaration of Principles, in which the partners formally commit themselves to certain values and principles. For ARASA, '[t]he basis of the partnership is solidarity and shared responsibility in the struggle to advance social justice in the region […] supporting each other in addressing human rights violations in our respective countries' (ARASA nd: 1). The Declaration is in itself an important vehicle for fostering a sense of togetherness within ARASA and is in fact unique for CSOs in this study. Hence, it is clear that the construction of feelings of togetherness, for example through the Declaration and discussions at the Forum, play an important role in regional consolidation of ARASA. This can be contrasted with SAT, which rather than strengthening ties between local partners, for example through building consensus on key challenges and facilitating a formal adherence to common values, seems to cultivate a spirit of social, ethnic and religious difference between and uniqueness of communities.

5.6.2 Exclusive Regional Identity-Making

Exclusive identity-making of a resistance character does not apply to any of the RCSOs involved in this study. There are no examples of cultivation of anti-SADC 'outside' identities as in the case of SAPSN. All the HIV/AIDS CSOs studied more or less buy in to SADC-led regional HIV/AIDS governance. Even if ARASA calls for comprehensive law reforms in the region, it cooperates with the SADC in different ways and participates in regional governance.

To conclude the two last sections, regional identity-making plays a role in regional consolidation for only some CSOs in this study, i.e. NAPSAR and, to a lesser extent, ARASA. Representing a clear constituency in terms of HIV-infected people, specifically in the case of NAPSAR, is an important foundation for regional community-building, which spurs regional action of various sorts. As in the case of

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[252] Mxotshwa, interview, 27 March 2012

[253] Clayton, interview, 16 February 2012

SAPSN, this often takes the form of regional solidarity between members who support each other in a common fight for improvement of human rights in their respective countries. The members or partners of most other RCSOs, however, do not share such common social traits, since they do not represent specific constituencies and are not so value-driven. In terms of the latter, common values or ideologies do not seem to be significant for holding these organizations together. On the whole, regional identity-making is not a strong force behind civil society regionalization in the HIV/AIDS sector.

5.7 Conclusions

In terms of civil society regionalization, the HIV/AIDS sector shows many similarities with the trade sector. The inter-organizational structural level plays a big role in shaping the process. Like for trade, SADC-CSO and donor-CSO relations inform much of regional civil society activity. The issue preferences of the SADC to a large extent set the HIV/AIDS agendas for individual CSOs. Donors play a similar role, affecting the types of issues and activities their recipients engage in. Issues and activities related to CSO service-delivery are prioritized before advocacy work related to human rights, which is deemed both controversial and hard to measure by SADC member states and donors. This is in line with the statist-capitalist social structures, manifested by the SADC's market-oriented agenda to outsource service delivery to private actors, in which CSOs play a big role for the HIV/AIDS sector. However, the availability of regional donor funds, evoking material interests among the recipients and fostering a market-orientation in terms of development interventions, tends to create incitements for CSOs to focus on personal enrichment. This can obstruct and even terminate organizations, of which SANASO is an example, thus playing against regionalization.

Yet, in terms of intra-organizational relations between CSOs, civil society regionalization in the HIV/AIDS sector seems to be rather harmonious, unlike the trade sector. Due to the dominance of the service-providing agenda, reproduced by SADC influence and donor funding, most HIV/AIDS CSOs share the same problem-solving approach. Compared with the fragmenting ideological rivalry in the trade sector, the harmonious relations between HIV/AIDS CSOs could strengthen civil society regionalization in the long-term.

Moreover, on a SADC Secretariat level, it is telling that all RCSOs are invited for policy dialogue and to deliver technical inputs in various forums, including the more critical human rights organizations. However, since most decisions that have the biggest influence on shaping the regional HIV/AIDS agenda are taken in Summit or COM meetings, which are no-go areas for CSOs, the latter have no possibility to really push member states to take human rights issues seriously. This makes actors such as ARASA rather uninterested in strengthening collaboration with the powerless Secretariat. However, exclusion from regional decision-making will not necessarily weaken their regional profile, which instead depends on other things, such as knowledge possession, issue-framing and, to a certain degree, identity-making. On the other hand, service-providing CSOs such as SAT and RATN, seek

participation in low-level SADC policy forums at the Secretariat which strengthens their regional consolidation.

Regional issue-framing is an important dimension of the regionalization of civil society in the HIV/AIDS sector, and once again the SADC is important in this process, which further emphasizes the link between the inter-organizational and intra-organizational structural levels. HIV/AIDS issues are generally constructed as crossing borders, affecting people throughout the region in similar ways, which warrants regional activities. Many CSOs also conceptualize HIV/AIDS issues within a problem-solving SADC framework and their regional activities, often related to service-provision, are frequently informed by various SADC policy documents. Hence, the deeper capitalist social structures play a big role in shaping how CSOs understand HIV/AIDS issues and the strategies used for dealing with them. Identity-making plays less of a role, since many HIV/AIDS CSOs lack a clear social constituency. NAPSAR is an exception whose HIV-positive identity greatly consolidates the network, stimulating regional solidarity between members and spurring various cross-border activities.

6
Civil Society Regionalization in a Comparative Perspective

Having analysed the two sub-cases of trade and HIV/AIDS separately, in this chapter they will be compared in order to discern trends in the overarching case of civil society regionalization in Southern Africa. However, to recall the discussion in section 1.4.2, this does not imply a structured and focused comparison of the two sub-cases in order to find causal relations and explain similarities and variations. Instead, in a more unsystematic and loose way, the chapter will make an unstructured comparison of the trade and HIV/AIDS cases based on the empirical analysis of the 16 CSOs in chapters 4-5 in order to discover broader patterns of how civil society regionalization can be understood. Some dimensions of civil society regionalization are more important than others and this will be evident in the coming analysis. However, it is not the intention to rank these dimensions, for example in terms of how much they can 'explain' regionalization according to some predetermined criteria. Occasionally, potential differences between inter-organizational and intra-organizational relations in the two cases will also be discussed. All in all, comparison is here used for taking the understanding of civil society regionalization in Southern Africa one step further.

The chapter will start by comparing the dynamics of civil society regionalization in the trade and HIV/AIDS cases in line with the analytical framework presented in section 2.4. This means comparing the inter-organizational relations between the SADC and CSOs, between donor and CSOs, and between CSOs themselves, as well as intra-organizational relations in terms of CSO issue-framing and identity-making in the two sectors. This discussion, taking place in section 6.1, will make up the bulk of the chapter. Having discussed the civil society dynamics on the regional level, the second section, 6.2, will say some words about how 'regional' the CSOs involved in this study are. Here it will firstly be argued that in terms of the sample of CSOs in this study and the specific five ways in which CSOs can be considered 'regional' highlighted in section 1.3.5, civil society regionalization is quite a strong process. This section will also, secondly, move beyond the sample of CSOs in this thesis and briefly discuss the tendency towards 'going regional' more broadly. Section 6.3 will discuss the many problems related to 'going regional', i.e. lack of policy influence, a

weak sense of regional identity, weak legitimacy, donor dependency and intra-civil society fragmentation. The fourth section, 6.4, rounds up the chapter.

6.1 Dynamics of Civil Society Regionalization

This section will compare the dynamics of civil society regionalization in the trade and HIV/AIDS cases. When comparing the two cases it is evident that statist and capitalist social structures fundamentally shape civil society regionalization. This is particularly, but not only, manifested in the inter-organizational relations between RIGOs and CSOs, between donor and CSOs and between different CSOs. Even though the motivations of CSOs affect the urge to 'go regional', in comparing the two cases it is clear that the two types of intra-organizational relations must be understood in relation to the deeper social structures marking social order in the region. One section will be devoted to each of the above five types of relation.

6.1.1 Inter-Organizational Relations between RIGOs and CSOs

Analysing RIGO-CSO relations is very important for understanding the regionalization of civil society in Southern Africa. In the thesis, focus has been put on CSOs' interaction with the SADC as the most important RIGO in Southern Africa, and also the most important target for CSO engagement with regional governance, although COMESA has also occasionally been discussed in this vein.

One major conclusion of this thesis is that CSOs, across and beyond the trade and HIV/AIDS sectors, generally struggle to participate in formal, SADC-led, regionalism, due to the deeply rooted statism in Southern Africa. States want to be in sole control of regional integration, regardless of lofty statements in various declarations about the importance of civil society in this process, and as a consequence the SADC and its various institutions are rather closed to the involvement of CSOs. Olivet and Brennan reach a similar conclusion when comparing the involvement of civil society in regional processes in Latin America, Southeast Asia and Southern Africa. They argue that civil society has generally met with institutional barriers and has largely been marginalized in MERCOSUR, ASEAN and SADC respectively (2010). However, contrary to the conclusions of much previous research on civil society regionalization in Southern Africa (e.g. Landsberg 2011; Peters-Berries 2010; Matlosa and Lotshwao 2010; Pressend 2010), all CSOs are not equally marginalized in the SADC, and civil society cannot be generalised as playing an insignificant role on the regional level. SADC-CSO relations in Southern Africa are much more complex than that and some CSOs, from both cases, are indeed increasingly involved in regional governance, which will be shown later in this section as well as section 6.2. Igarashi notes the same positive trend in Southeast Asia, where the prominence of (some) transnational CSOs in relation to ASEAN has been growing (2011). In the case of HIV/AIDS, CSOs are generally more included in the SADC, since this area is not seen as important compared to trade and less is at stake for the member states in terms of policy-making. The SADC can therefore afford to open more doors to civil society inclusion in policy-making. Additionally, as already indicated, in providing AIDS

services to vulnerable social groups at the margins of the market-oriented regional order, CSOs are needed to make the regional neo-liberal project work. In the trade sector, on the other hand, member states carefully guard their (national) interests and are more reluctant to include CSOs, especially the more critical ones, in line with the entrenched statism in the region. Nevertheless, some CSOs are indeed involved in trade-related regional governance.

Another important conclusion is that where CSOs have, in one way or another, managed to engage the SADC, that organization has greatly shaped civil society regionalization. In these cases, a lot of regional CSO activities revolve around the SADC, sometimes in tandem with, and in other cases in reaction against, the SADC agenda. Firstly, the SADC sets and dominates the regional trade and HIV agendas, which in turn sets the stage for which CSOs are included and excluded in SADC-led regional governance. In the present neo-liberal, market-oriented regional order, trade is considered the most important aspect of regional integration, at the expense of social issue-areas such as HIV/AIDS, which receive less attention. Therefore the regional FTA is considered the flagship of the SADC. A lot is at stake for SADC members in terms of implementation of the trade integration scheme, seeking to control policy-making in the field, which makes them highly dominant in the interaction with civil society. The SADC emphasizes certain types of trade issues in line with neo-liberal regional governance (i.e. trade liberalization, facilitation of the movement of goods, private sector support and the EPA) at the expense of others (i.e. ICBT, labour rights and the movement of workers).

HIV/AIDS is generally not given as much attention as trade in policy-making and project implementation in the SADC, which is evident from the heavy financial emphasis put on the latter. Additionally, when HIV/AIDS is targeted in regional governance, this is strongly geared towards problem-solving activities in terms of service delivery related to care, prevention, mitigation and capacity-building. The link between trade integration, development and HIV/AIDS is made explicit in many SADC policy documents in terms of the latter being an obstacle for regional trade and development and the operation of a regional market. In line with the neo-liberal trend of outsourcing provision of social services to private actors, a lot of responsibility for delivery of AIDS services is put on CSOs, on a national and regional level, in place of the member states. This implies that, despite (rhetorical) statements in various policy documents, the human rights component of the SADC HIV/AIDS agenda, in terms of safeguarding the right to AIDS services and the political rights of people infected and affected by HIV, especially vulnerable groups such as sexual minorities, is weakly implemented. Efforts to harmonize laws in relation to AIDS and human rights and to push member states to provide AIDS-related services shine by their absence, partly because such political interventions go against the free market logic.

The SADC has great influence on civil society regionalization by setting the overall regional agenda within which CSOs perform regional governance functions, for example in terms of providing research and capacity building; monitoring implementation; assisting in policy development; and provoking critical advocacy for policy reform. The same applies to donors, who push CSOs in certain directions,

as discussed below. This not only affects the type of work CSOs do but also, indirectly, determines which CSOs can be eligible as partners to the SADC and which are marginalized. CSOs such as regional business, research and HIV/AIDS NGOs working within the parameters of the current neo-liberal regional order, possessing knowledge and expertise that the SADC is missing and providing services and policy advice, are involved in various regional institutions. In fact, these CSOs are needed for the SADC to implement the various regional governance schemes. On the other hand, other CSOs are excluded from SADC when they contest the current neo-liberal regional integration: for example by questioning EPA as a vehicle for regional development; by demanding that ICBT should be incorporated in the SADC agenda; and by pushing for regional harmonization of human rights laws connected to HIV/AIDS. This resembles the processes in which CSOs engage with regional environmental governance in East Africa, where the EAC and its various regional institutions have shown collaboration interest only in those sections within civil society that are compliant with and uncritical of their business and deliver various services related to, for example, resources management (Godsäter 2013a).

The inclusion/exclusion dynamics is particularly evident in the trade arena, for example in relation to trade negotiations within the SADC, including EPA. Due to the prevalent statism in the region, such negotiations tend to be constructed in such a way that CSOs are excluded and therefore have a hard time gaining influence. The same trend can be discerned in Latin America, where CSO access to and influence on trade-based negotiations related to the FTAA and MERCOSUR are extremely limited (Grugel 2006). Such exclusion can also spur a radicalisation of civil society engaged with trade issues in Southern Africa, with the critical trade agenda of EJN and SAPSN a good example of this. Yet, in line with the above, CSOs such as SEG, SEATINI and Trades Center that provide the SADC and COMESA with technical expertise and policy advice, albeit within the prevalent neo-liberal trade agenda, are engaged in policy discussions and even included in formal trade negotiations. This is reminiscent of CSO involvement in ASEAN in Southeast Asia where those actors driving a market-oriented agenda are favoured at the expense of more critical voices trying to advance alternative regionalism (Igarashi 2011).

Through its inclusion and exclusion of different CSOs in regional governance, the SADC plays a big role in fostering, or hindering, civil society regionalization. By creating space for participation in trade and HIV/AIDS-related regional governance, and by giving CSOs an active role in the implementation of the SADC agenda through participation in various technical committees, Partnership Forums, and trade negotiations, the SADC spurs and strengthens the regional operation of included CSOs. In fact, many CSOs such as SADC-CNGO, SATUCC, NAPSAR and SAT are so tied to the SADC agenda that interaction with the Secretariat in particular, but also other regional institutions, is an important reason for their existence. However, at the same time, especially in the trade sector, many of those CSOs that work hard to be included in regional policy-making struggle in vain and are somehow excluded, due to their more critical agenda. Being rather dependent on the acceptance by the SADC, exclusion negatively affects their regional status,

which works against regionalization. However for a few CSOs, such as SAPSN, exclusion can in fact make them stronger. In fact, as will be discussed below, SAPSN partly thrives on its outside identity. Exclusion from the SADC can spur the regionalization of civil society for those CSOs with a critical and anti-SADC agenda in the sense that they consolidate regionally around a common enemy.

Lastly, civil society regionalization in Southern Africa is also more directly influenced by the SADC in that the RIGO facilitates regional networking and coalition-building, creating concrete platforms for state-civil society interaction. The best examples are the HIV/AIDS PF and the RPO framework. Donors also play an important role in this process, financially supporting regional forums as well as pushing the SADC to create space for interaction with civil society. On a more indirect level, as with the rise of regional summitry in East Asia, with several regional networks emerging as a result of response to international summits (Gilson 2011), the SADC has spurred regional coalition-building in terms of acting as a focal point around which CSOs consolidate regionally. The Civil Society Forum and Peoples' Summit are a case in point, as well as the campaign for a regional Gender Protocol. In this way the SADC plays a major role for civil society regionalization.

6.1.2 Inter-Organizational Relations between Donors and CSOs

Without donor funds, there would probably be scant regionalization of civil society. This is one of the most important conclusions that emerges from comparing the trade and HIV/AIDS cases. The availability of donor funds for regional activities is a major force behind CSOs 'going regional'. CSOs are generally greatly dependent on donor funds for regionalization, lacking other means of resource mobilization. It should be noted, though, that some regional research NGOs, such as Trades Centre and SEATINI, have managed to generate some alternative income based on consultancy work, which has eased the level of dependency somewhat. In fact, donor dependency has created many challenges for CSOs active on the regional level.

First of all, donor dependency has put CSOs in a very vulnerable financial situation, especially in the HIV/AIDS sector, where many of the donors (mostly bilateral) tend to regularly change their funding preferences. At the moment they question the value-added of the regional level and might withdraw from supporting regional work. But in the trade sector also, regional networks such as SADC-CNGO, ASCCI, SATUCC and SAPSN have suffered from inactivity due to periods of shallow donor interest. This partly has to do with the fact that donors, especially the bilateral ones, influenced by the statist social structure, tend to prioritise support to RIGOs such as the SADC and its work in the trade arena, at the cost of financing CSOs. Few regional activities would take place without regional donor funds and, coupled with the donor influence on CSOs' regional agendas discussed below, civil society regionalization is not only donor-dependent but also donor-driven. Latin American CSOs working on the regional level face similar challenges. Being heavily dependent on a limited number of financial sources, funding difficulties constrain their capacity to participate consistently in regional policy-shaping processes (Korzeniewicz and Smith 2005). One scholar concludes that 'the

momentum for transnational campaigning is difficult to sustain over time, with the result that activism ebbs and flows, picking up in moments when opportunities open up and scaling back at other times' (Grugel 2006: 214). Furthermore, the vulnerability inherent in regional work is related to the strong nationalist undercurrent in civil society regionalization. Regional issue-framing and to a lesser extent regional identity are indeed important forces for civil society regionalization, but on the whole regional consciousness is still in a rather embryonic form and would not in itself be enough of an incentive for CSOs to regionalize. This will be discussed further in section 6.3.

Secondly, marked by the capitalist world order, donor-CSO relations tend to foster rent-seeking and profit-making tendencies within civil society, also on a regional level. This has also been observed in East Asia, where the realm of transnational civil society is penetrated by the dominant neo-liberal discourse (Igarashi 2011: 24). In fact, donor money can corrupt CSOs in both the trade and HIV/AIDS sectors in the sense that regional activities are somehow motivated by an urge to fulfil (sometimes personal) material needs and not by the desire to benefit needy people. One tragic example is SANASO, which developed into a regional briefcase NGO when it became a private project for the director to enrich herself, resulting in the eventual termination of the organization due to mismanagement of donor funds. However, this should not be seen as an isolated example but rather as an important negative aspect of donor dependency. Due to the capitalist social structure, donor funding fosters a market orientation within civil society which encourages CSOs such as SANASO, which are increasingly driven by a quest to make money. There could well be more SANASOs out there on the regional level. In the end, donor dependency creates a very vulnerable civil society regionalization which can easily lose pace if donor funds are suddenly withdrawn or if the CSOs implode due to economic greed.

Thirdly, donors have great influence over the regional agendas of CSOs, which in the end affects the ways that CSOs regionalize. Hence, influenced by the overarching capitalist world order, donors indirectly use their CSO partners in Southern Africa to either reproduce or contest the prevailing order. The study shows how most donors, mainly bilateral, foster a problem-solving way of thinking within regional civil society, especially in the HIV/AIDS sector, where CSOs are supported to deliver services to mitigate the negative effects of the neo-liberal project for poor people. Those few CSOs in the HIV/AIDS case which pursue a human rights agenda, such as ASRASA and NAPSAR, mainly attract private donors. In these two cases, as for many of the CSOs in the trade sector, donors such as OSISA, NCA and Diakonia view their recipients as partners in a common quest for structural transformation of the neo-liberal world order. All this ultimately affects what issues are dealt with and what types of strategies are used by CSOs in their regional work. The point here is that donors play an important role not only in terms of financial facilitation but also by shaping the nature of civil society regionalization which, together with the inclusion of certain CSOs and the exclusion of others in SADC-led regional governance, creates a quite heterogeneous regional civil society (especially in the trade sector).

6.1.3 Inter-Organizational Relations between CSOs

The statist-capitalist regional order ultimately creates a heterogeneous civil society regionalization, even though this is more pronounced in the trade than the HIV/AIDS sector. In fact, one major contribution of this thesis is to show that the regionalization of civil society in Southern Africa is a highly diverse process, contrary to what other studies have noted (e.g. Olivet and Brennan 2010; Saguier 2007; Igarashi 2011). As noted in chapter 1, one important exception is Korzeniewicz and Smith, who note that '[p]olarization in terms of strategies and collective action repertoires, rather than convergence and collaboration, appears to be the more likely scenario for the future practice of regional civil society actors on issues related to hemispheric integration' (2005: 146) in Latin America. This view is in line with the overall critical understanding of civil society in Africa as complex and even contradictory, as discussed in section 2.2.3. Hence, in the same vein, RCSOs in this study interpret and relate differently to the overall statist-capitalist world order, are funded by different donors supporting different agendas, and engage the SADC in dissimilar ways. One way of portraying the heterogeneity of regional civil society is to categorize the CSOs involved in this study,[254] based on the types of strategies used, the issue focus and the relationship to regional governance institutions. Four categories of CSO - commercial CSOs, partner CSOs, critical reformist CSOs and resistance CSOs - are discussed below and summarized in table 2.[255]

Commercial CSOs are only found in the trade sector. They support the SADC's neo-liberal trade agenda, which implies that their focus lies on trade liberalization, facilitation of regional trade, and the movement of goods, as well as private sector development in the region. Many regional activities centre on the SADC, such as providing research on the above issues, lobbying for a better business climate in the region, and arranging regional conferences for business and policy-makers in the trade arena. The SADC is recognized for its emphasis on business and trade and is perceived as a partner in advancing regional trade integration. Therefore, in most cases commercial CSOs are included in SADC-led regional trade governance. In fact, the SADC considers commercial CSOs to be key partners in advancing regional trade integration. Examples of this category are SEG and ASCCI.

Partner CSOs share the neo-liberal and market-oriented world-view of commercial CSOs and the SADC, but want to strengthen the development, social, HIV/AIDS and poverty-alleviation dimensions of the SADC regional agenda. This approach implies supporting those social groups that are marginalized and negatively affected by the neo-liberal project. Besides focusing on regional trade

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[254] Categorization of different organizations is common in the social sciences, including IR and political science, for example in terms of CSOs involved in global governance (Armstrong et al 2004; Costoya 2007) and types of international organizations (Jacobson 1984; Archer 2001).

[255] Note that this categorization is not mutually exclusive. The four 'categories' are not clear-cut and should be understood more as CSO positions in various areas. Considering their often complex and sometimes contradictory positions, it is possible for CSOs in this study to 'belong' to more than one of the categories below. Also, since the outlook of CSOs is not static, their positions change over time and so does their placement in a certain category. The below categorization is foremost an attempt to conceptualize the heterogeneity of civil society on the regional level and will naturally change in line with the evolution of civil society regionalization.

facilitation and EPA, therefore, important regional issues are the RPO, HIV capacity-building, and the dissemination of HIV-related information. For partner CSOs, regional policy frameworks related to trade liberalization, poverty alleviation and HIV/AIDS are in place, but the SADC and member states need to be monitored in order to accelerate implementation. Partner CSOs provide various services, technical expertise and policy assistance to regional policy-makers in the SADC and also COMESA, related to the above issues, as well as supporting local and national state, business and civil society actors in various ways. Partner CSOs are included in SADC-led regional governance, or at least strive to be, since the SADC is considered an important partner in a common quest for regional development. Examples of partner CSOs are SADC-CNGO, SAfAIDS, SAT, RATN, Trades Centre, SEATINI and SARDC.

Critical reformist CSOs also emphasize the development, social and poverty dimensions of regional integration but are more critical towards the current neo-liberal trend in the region and therefore focus on different sets of issues compared with the partner CSOs. In essence, these CSOs have a more rights-based approach, dealing with ICBT, labour and AIDS rights, and propose alternative regional policy frameworks. Contrary to commercial and partner CSOs, critical reformist CSOs are not, as the name indicates, content with current regional governance and want fundamental reform of the present policy frameworks related to trade and HIV/AIDS. This includes giving voice to marginalized social groups in society, such as informal traders and HIV-positive people. The critical reformist CSOs believe in engagement with regional policymakers, and the SADC is considered important for regional integration, but these associations consider regional policy frameworks to be in great need of reform. These groups engage with SADC in a more critical way and advocate for policy reform to benefit various marginalized groups. Critical reformist CSOs are largely excluded from formal regional governance structures due to their critical agendas. Examples of this category are ARASA, NAPSAR, EJN, SATUCC and CBTA/SACBTA.

Resistance CSOs emphasize structural transformation of the current neo-liberal regional order and strongly oppose SADC-led regional governance. These groups put forward still stronger and more radical demands for trade justice, people-driven regional integration and EPA resistance. They also tend to use more contentious methods such as demonstrations and civil disobedience. In essence, this category of CSO believes that service provision merely reproduces a highly unjust society and the prevailing capitalist order. Instead, the patterns of unsustainable development must be identified and transformed, and this can only be done through popular mobilization. Interaction with state actors is therefore contentious. The SADC is considered to be a regional enemy, causing regional disintegration and poverty due to its neo-liberal agenda, and should therefore be resisted. However, since many regional activities centre around the SADC, resistance CSOs still 'engage' the SADC, if only indirectly. Due to their critical agendas and contentious methods, they are highly excluded from the SADC. The only example of a resistance CSO covered in this research is SAPSN.

Table 2: Categorization of 16 regional CSOs in the trade and HIV/AIDS sectors in Southern Africa

	Regional activities	Issue focus	Inclusion/ exclusion in the SADC	Examples
Commercial CSOs	Lobbying, policy advice, research	Trade facilitation, trade liberalization, private sector development	Inclusion	SEG, ASCCI
Partner CSOs	Research, policy advice, monitoring, lobbying, information dissemination, capacity building	RPO, regional trade integration, EPA, HIV-info dissemination, HIV-capacity building	Inclusion/ partly exclusion	Trades Centre, SARDC, SEATINI, SAT, RATN, SAfAIDS, SADC-CNGO
Critical reformist CSOs	Advocacy, research	ICBT, EPA-critique, AIDS-rights, ANSA	Partly inclusion/ exclusion	ARASA, NAPSAR, EJN, SATUCC, CBTA/ SACBTA
Resistance CSOs	Advocacy, popular mobilization	Trade justice, EPA-resistance, people-driven regionalism	Exclusion	SAPSN

The civil society regionalization process shows somewhat different patterns in the two cases and the heterogeneity is not equally pronounced in both of them. For example, ideological rivalry is clearer in the trade than the HIV/AIDS sector. The trade sector is marked by ideological tensions among CSOs, manifested in diverging ideas about EPA, in different emphasis put on trade issues, and in dissimilar perceptions of regional integration, as well as different choices of work strategies, i.e. social mobilization and advocacy from the 'outside', or service provision, policy assistance and lobbying from the 'inside'. The existence of two, mutually exclusive civil society platforms for SADC engagement – namely the Peoples' Summit, driven by SAPSN and social movements, and which resists the SADC agenda; and the Civil Society Forum, driven by SADC-CNGO and NGO partners, which wants to engage and support it – is an important illustration. In the HIV/AIDS sector, these ideological differences are less pronounced, which stems from the fact that most CSOs support the SADC agenda, including CSOs that are to some extent also more critical and human rights-oriented, such as NAPSAR and ARASA, and want to be included in policy discussions at the SADC Secretariat and contribute towards the implementation of SADC-led HIV/AIDS programs through delivering various services. Moreover, the HIV/AIDS sector is generally dominated by bilateral donors, which are on the whole inclined towards problem-solving agendas, in contrast to the trade sector where private donors are in a majority, pursuing a more critical agenda. Hence, most CSOs in the HIV/AIDS-sector are engaged in measurable and less politically sensitive service-delivery activities such as HIV capacity building, information dissemination, community support and distribution of AIDS drugs. However, resource-based competition seems to be strong in both cases. Geared

towards a market-orientation and enticed by donor money, CSOs have become competitors in the donor market. This also creates quarrels about who should be entitled to 'lead' in specific issue areas. All in all, the ideological and resource-based tensions in the trade sector, and to a lesser extent in the HIV/AIDS sector, can possibly hamper overall regionalization in terms of making it difficult for broader regional civil society co-operation to occur across ideological divides.

A similar feature of regional intra-civil society relations in the trade and HIV/AIDS sectors is the general domination of South African CSOs over those from other countries, which tends to fragment civil society regionalization. This tendency is in line with the overall capitalist power dynamics in the region, in which South Africa and its businesses dominate regional processes, as discussed in section 3.2.1. Half of the 16 CSOs investigated in this study have, in different ways, a heavy South African influence. Six CSOs, i.e. SEG, SAT, SAfAIDS, ARASA, NAPSAR and EJN, are based in South Africa. SATUCC is in practice led by COSATU from South Africa, notwithstanding that the regional secretariat is in Gaborone.[256] SAPSN was founded in South Africa and was coordinated by AIDC for the first five years (SAPSN nd), which made a big imprint on the further development of the network. South African CSOs are often more resourced, better staffed and more successful in lobbying, service provision and popular mobilization. South African dominance is felt by CSOs from across the region, and is often manifested in various regional forums. According to one commentator, 'everything in the region goes through South Africa and the most logical city to have a meeting is Johannesburg'.[257] For non-South African CSOs, often lacking sufficient resources, it is expensive to travel outside the country in order to attend regional meetings, which are mostly in South Africa. According to the Mozambican Debt Group (MDG), a SAPSN member, 'in some meetings there can be 50 people from South Africa and one from Mozambique and one from Angola'.[258] Additionally, being in such a great minority, one negative result of this is the fact that many of the Portuguese-speaking participants from Mozambique and Angola have a hard time communicating their ideas, according to another CSO from Mozambique, CCM.[259]

Furthermore, since the 'node of resistance is South Africa',[260] the South African domination and marginalization of CSOs from other countries in the region is particularly strong in the critical section of regional civil society. The great majority of the critical reformist and resistance CSOs in this study from both sectors are from South Africa. In regional forums such as the SASF and the Peoples' Summit, South African CSOs often take the lead and tend to dominate participants from other countries.[261] As indicated in section 3.2.2, the strong and rather autonomous civil society in South Africa has allowed the cultivation of an arena for more radical groups. This spills over to the regional level and, hence, South African CSOs are

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[256] Ngwane, interview, 3 December 2008
[257] Gentle, interview, 18 December 2009
[258] Nemete and Guileugue, interview, 20 November 2008
[259] Moiana, interview, 17 November 2008
[260] Bond, interview, 14 December 2008
[261] Ngwane, interview, 3 December 2008

often the most vocal and militant ones at regional forums.[262] Compared with the more critical stance of South African CSOs, the general approach towards government actors including the SADC in, for example, Mozambique is more diplomatic and pragmatic.[263] Due to their dominating and radical attitude, one scholar concludes that 'it is hard to interact with the South African CSOs'.[264] The power dynamics between CSOs from South Africa and other parts of the region tend to further increase   regional intra-civil society tensions. According to one commentator, this can hamper the overall fight for social justice and development in the region.[265]

6.1.4 Intra-Organizational relations: CSOs and Issue-Framing

The internal motivations of CSOs to 'go regional' play less of a role for civil society regionalization than forces related to SADC-CSO and donor-CSO relations, especially identity-making. Nevertheless, issue-framing is an important dimension of civil society regionalization, and worthy of more discussion. Even though regional issue-framing is partly an autonomous processes stemming from within CSOs, and facilitating the development of a regional consciousness, this process must also be understood in connection with the overall statist–capitalist regional order. In essence, the ways trade and HIV/AIDS issues are framed regionally are intimately related to SADC-CSO and donor-CSO relations.

All CSOs in the study, across both cases, show a rather strong propensity to frame their issues as 'regional', which greatly affects their potential and willingness to 'go regional'. Most networks, but also NGOs, have an fostered an idea of 'Southern Africa' as an unified region among their members and partners, where trade and HIV/AIDS-related issues are seen as common, affecting and concerning people throughout the region in similar ways. Hence, deficient access to AIDS services occurs in most countries in the region; the way HIV is transmitted is specific to Southern Africa compared with other African sub-regions; the situation of poor people, including informal traders, is similar throughout the region; and EPA affects regional integration in Southern Africa. In addition, regional issue-framing is coupled with a widespread view within most RCSOs that their members and partners have a shared responsibility for improving the HIV/AIDS, development and trade situations, which necessitates regional collaboration, spurring regionalization. Such unified perceptions of trade and HIV/AIDS-issues are rather absent among regional networks in the Baltic region, according to one of few studies that analyse the role of ideas and identity-making in civil society regionalization. There, the lack of commonly perceived causes to rally around has made it difficult for network members to create a solid ground for co-operation (Reuter 2007: 257).

That said, CSOs in Southern Africa do not put equal emphasis on the regional level in their perception of trade and HIV/AIDS. Of the studied CSOs, regional NGOs, particularly research NGOs such as SEATINI, Trades and SARDC, make the

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[262] Ngwane, interview, 3 December 2008

[263] Nemete and Guileugue, interview 20 November 2008

[264] Castel-Branco, interview 24 November 2008

[265] Gentle, interview 18 December 2009

strongest claims about issue-regionalization and most forcefully stress the inter-linkage between the local, national and regional arenas. A considerably portion of their research output and information dissemination concerns regional issues, and their policy proposals are often directed towards regional policy-makers such as the SADC and COMESA. On the other hand, even though regional issue-framing does play a big role for many of the regional networks, their regional work is generally not grounded among their members, whose main concerns often lie on the national level. Hence, regional networks such as SADC-CNGO, RATN and SATUCC are quite contradictory since the regional secretariats, regional boards and various policy documents emphasize regional commonalities and regional action at the same time as members, to varying degrees, focus on national and local work. In fact, one important mandate of these and other networks is to support the work of national members, whereby these networks occasionally become drawn into national issues and agendas. In the end, this risks taking focus away from the regional arena and diluting the regional aspect of their work. In essence, this has to do with a weak regional identity, discussed in the next section. Most importantly, to a certain extent engaging with 'regional' issues is partly instrumental for these organizations in order to obtain regional donor funds.

Furthermore, as indicated above, regional issue-framing among the CSOs in this study is generally linked to the SADC agenda, as well as affected by donor dependency. Hence, this aspect of being motivated to 'go regional' has to be understood in relation to the statist-capitalist regional order. For those CSOs which relate to and even align their regional work with various SADC documents, the SADC plays a big role in their (regional) understanding of trade and HIV/AIDS issues. Additionally, being part of formal neo-liberal regional governance, CSOs such as SADC-CNGO, SEG and SAT are influenced to view trade and HIV/AIDS issues from a problem-solving standpoint, which has great influence over their inclination to deliver services and assist in policy development. Hence, a regional understanding of trade and HIV/AIDS issues is coupled with a SADC-induced problem-solving approach, which has been exemplified throughout this chapter.

On the other hand, as mentioned above, some CSOs relate differently to the statist-capitalist world order, are more critical of neo-liberal regional governance, and hence tend to be marginalized in the SADC institutional framework. These CSOs frame trade and HIV/AIDS issues differently, albeit still in relation to the SADC agenda. Critical reform of and even resistance to the SADC agenda is advocated. For example, viewed as a regional issue concerning informal traders from different countries in similar ways, these associations have pushed for inclusion of the 'informal' aspect of trade integration on the SADC agenda. Similarly, the SADC is pushed to enforce harmonization of AIDS rights policies in the region in order to give people affected and infected by HIV equal treatment wherever they live. Lastly, these groups blame the SADC for causing regional disintegration and advancing a regional agenda that causes regional trade injustice and social marginalization.

In all of the above cases, the SADC is constructed as a regional target for engagement, either in terms of collaboration or contestation, which stimulates regional action of various sorts.

6.1.5 Intra-Organizational Relations: CSOs and Identity-Making

Comparing the trade and HIV/AIDS cases in terms of regional identity-making it can be concluded that this dimensions of civil society regionalization is the weakest. For most regional NGOs and networks, in both cases, lacking a clear social constituency and strong values, principles and common experiences of, for example, oppression and poverty, identity-making plays a minor role for regional consolidation. Reuter makes a similar observation in the Baltic region, claiming that ideas about regional identity, constructed by the region-building discourse, are far from realization among NGO networks (2007: 256). In terms of Southern Africa, the general lack of identity-making is despite the fact that issues are often framed regionally, which shows that identity-making and issue-framing are not necessarily connected, even if there are contact points. Hence, issues can be framed regionally and linked to the SADC agenda without cultivating regional community-building.

Combining evidence from the two cases, it is argued that even if the staff and board members of regional NGOs and networks advance a regional agenda, at the same time they often identify themselves with the national level and do not link up with a broader regional community of, for example, activists, workers, informal traders, Christians or HIV-positive people. Hence, as indicated above, for regional NGOs in particular, regional issue-framing and regional work have a dose of instrumentality in the sense of being used as a way of getting an entry-point to the SADC or attracting regional donor funds. On the other hand, for CSOs that represent a specific social group, transnational social markers such as working class identity, as in the case of SATUCC, and being HIV-positive, as in the case of NAPSAR, inform the construction of regional identity and a sense of belonging to a common community that transcends national borders. In these cases, regional identity-making is an important force behind 'going regional', forming regional coalitions of people with similar challenges due to their common social background. Regional solidarity campaigns such as the regional trade union support to oppressed workers and other people in Zimbabwe and the mutual support of NGOs working with human rights abuses of sexual minorities are good examples.

Regional meeting places such as the ARASA and NAPSAR annual partnership forums, the SATUCC Congress and the SAPSN Peoples' Summit are particularly important for the construction of regional identities, as well as for regional issue-framing. In these meeting places people with similar social backgrounds and experiences, or sharing certain values and principles, physically coalesce. At these meetings, regional consolidation is often actively supported by the staff and board members of the arranging organization, which facilitates the construction of common identities, cross-country solidarity and a regional understanding of trade and HIV/AIDS issues. Hence, a 'NAPSAR-identity' based on common experiences of being HIV-positive and being denied access to AIDS services; a 'workers-identity' within SATUCC based on common working-class experiences of social

marginalization; and a 'Christian' identity within EJN, based on Christian ethics and values; and a 'SAPSN-identity' based on feelings of regional solidarity with oppressed people in the region and perceptions of shared experiences of colonialism and neo-colonialism, are essential for holding together and strengthening these networks. In terms of the latter, other scholars have also come to the conclusion that a common commitment to regional solidarity is important for drawing the members of (critical) regional networks, such as SAPSN, together (Olivet and Brennan 2010: 121). The above regional network identities are further consolidated through public communication, often in relation to regional conferences, in which organizational banners are presented, press releases are given and common statements are delivered.

A few more words should be said about the regional identity of resisting CSOs such as SAPSN, which should partly also be seen in terms of opposition to the current neo-liberal regionalism. This identity thrives on a social construction of an 'evil other', considered responsible for various forms of oppression and injustice. If this 'other' is a regional target, often the SADC, it spurs advocacy and popular mobilization on the regional level. Hence, the SAPSN-identity not only comes from within the network, based on internal mechanisms, but also centres on external actors such as SADC, and is a good example of an exclusive identity, or 'outside' identity. Ignoring the demands made by SAPSN-activists, the SADC further fuels this identity-making process. In this case, strengthening the SAPSN-identity in terms of being an outsider, the marginalization of SAPSN in SADC-led regional governance strengthens the regional status of the network. Moreover, the existence of two parallel civil society forums around the SADC adds to this process, since activists at the Peoples' Summit often construct their colleagues in the Civil Society Forum as 'others' who are being co-opted by the SADC.

To conclude the previous two sections, even though there are signs of a growing regional awareness among CSOs in Southern Africa, for some CSOs more than others, on the whole the regional conceptualization of trade and HIV/AIDS issues and regional identity-making among civil society is a slow process. This will be further discussed in section 6.3.

6.2 How 'Regional' is Civil Society in Southern Africa?

Having discussed the dynamics of civil society regionalization in terms of the forces behind this process in the last section, this section will look into how much CSOs in the trade and HIV-sectors have 'gone regional'; in other words how strong their regional engagement is. This implies discussing how 'regional' they are in terms of the five criteria for what makes CSOs regional discussed in section 1.3.5. In other words, this section will say some words about how strong the regional presence of these CSOs is, also going beyond the sample of this thesis.

As indicated throughout this thesis, academic researchers often consider civil society on the regional level in Southern Africa to be weak and even insignificant.[266] Such statements are highly problematic, since civil society regionalization is a very complex and even paradoxical process in which, as we have seen, a number of CSOs in Southern Africa do engage regionally in a variety of ways and are quite successful in what they are doing. In essence, as will be shown below, civil society on the regional level cannot be ruled out as either weak or insignificant, even though it is true that CSOs are confronted with many challenges in their regional work. However, while being heavily influenced by external actors such as the SADC and foreign donors, regional CSOs are not necessarily passive and powerless. The dismissal of regional civil society in Southern Africa, almost becoming a truism, will be challenged in this section.

In order to discuss the regional presence of CSOs, and perhaps come to the conclusion that civil society regionalization is an insignificant process (as most scholars do), we first have to define 'what' it is that is considered weak or strong and why. This involves being clear about, firstly, which part of civil society is being considered, given that civil society is very diverse and is engaged in a number of different issue areas, as well as, secondly, the particular aspect of civil society regionalization that is being examined, for example regional identity-making or engagement with the SADC. Without defining what part or dimension of civil society regionalization is being assessed, scholars such as Landsberg (2012); Peters-Berries (2010); Matlosa and Lotshwao (2010); and Pressend (2010) come to the premature and generalized conclusion that civil society in Southern Africa is weak on the regional level.

In terms of this thesis, firstly, the part of civil society regionalization under scrutiny has been clearly defined, i.e. regionally-active CSOs in the trade and HIV/AIDS sectors, and more particularly the sample of 16 regional NGOs and networks. Secondly, the thesis has earlier (section 1.3.5) highlighted five ways of what makes CSOs 'regional': namely, creating regional organizational forms, framing issues regionally, engaging with formal regional governance, using regional donor funds and constructing regional identities. If these points are used as criteria against which the regional presence of CSOs is measured, the 16 CSOs in this study are not necessarily weak in terms of the first four. In fact, quite the contrary is true.

To start with, CSOs in this study have a developed regional organizational infrastructure in Southern Africa, which gives them a strong regional presence. Regional NGOs reside in one particular country where the head office is located, but activities are undertaken in several countries in the region, often via a great number of partner organizations coordinated by field offices. Regional networks either have a separate regional secretariat, or are hosted by one of the members. Often the national members of the network span the whole region. In both cases, the staffs of the secretariat and board members are recruited regionally and represent several

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[266] The 'weakness' of regional civil society in this literature is both referred to how much (or rather how little) CSOs have 'gone regional', in other words their regional presence, as well as their power to influence regional policy-making and possession of material resources. This section will foremost discuss the former even though policy influence and resource possession will also be briefly discussed.

countries. Regional meetings, such as annual partnership forums, bring the various stakeholders together on a regular basis. Furthermore, the headquarters of several of the regional NGOs and networks, such as SEATINI, Trades Centre, SAT and RATN, have developed great capacity on trade and HIV/AIDS-related issues, which often surpasses that of the SADC Secretariat. Therefore, their expertise is strongly requested by the SADC, which in turn gives them an opportunity to influence regional policy-making.

Secondly, as shown in the previous section, CSOs in this study show a strong regional engagement in terms of issue-framing. It should be noted that issue-framing can be seen as both a dimension of civil society regionalization, in terms of an intra-organizational mechanism behind 'going regional', and as a measure of CSOs' regional engagement. CSOs in this study generally put strong emphasis on the regional level in their perception of trade and HIV/AIDS issues, which spurs regional coalition-building, advocacy of regional target groups such as the SADC, research on regional issues, provision of services to regional actors, and information dissemination in the region. Furthermore, the SADC informs the ways that trade and HIV/AIDS issues are regionally interpreted and therefore indirectly plays an important role for civil society regionalization, discussed further at the end of this chapter. CSOs' strong focus on the SADC in their understanding of trade and HIV/AIDS helps them to develop a regional consciousness, which further strengthens the regional appearance.

Thirdly, all CSOs in this study somehow, though in different ways, engage with regional governance frameworks, and many of them are quite successful in terms of providing various services to the SADC and COMESA and in assisting in policy development, even if this mostly applies to those actors who buy into the SADC's neo-liberal agenda. Some CSOs – for example regional research NGOs such as Trades Centre and SEATINI – are important partners to the SADC, and also COMESA, giving policy advice in trade negotiations and providing policy-makers with policy-relevant research on various trade-related issues. Such partnership is also seen in the HIV/AIDS field, where the interaction between CSOs and the SADC Secretariat, particularly the HIV/AIDS Unit, is strong. CSOs such as SAT, RATN and NAPSAR are very active in various SADC technical committees, the PF and other policy forums, and have made important contributions to various regional policy frameworks. Furthermore, some CSOs such as SAfAIDS have conducted successful advocacy campaigns. Through the Gender Protocol Alliance, SAfAIDS has managed to push the SADC to adopt a Protocol on Gender and Development. Additionally, the SADC has recently started to show a growing interest in the ICBT sector and has adopted some new policy instruments, partly thanks to growing pressure from CSOs such as SATUCC.

Fourthly, CSOs in this study are 'regional' in terms of attracting regional donor funds, which is essential for their regional operation. As was discussed in the previous section, donor funds for regional activities are increasingly available to CSOs in the trade and HV/AIDS sectors, even though they are not very sustainable, and CSOs to a varying degree manage to make use of these funds. CSOs are also good at using donor funds in a range of different ways to suit their particular needs.

Some examples are organizational and administrative support in terms of capacity building of regional secretariats; more general financial support and grant-making; more specific regional projects, such as EJN's EPA Watch programme, and regional campaigns, such as the Gender Protocol Campaign; and regional networking and coalition building, including arranging and participating in regional forums. However, the flip side of using regional funds is donor dependency, which can jeopardise civil society regionalization in the long run, as discussed in section 6.3.

Fifthly, as in the case of issue-framing, regional identity-making can be seen as both a force behind civil society regionalization as well as a sign of how regional CSOs are. In terms of the latter, discussed here, regional identity-making is generally not very pronounced among CSOs in this study compared with the other ways of being regional. However, a few of the studied CSOs have managed to construct a strong sense of regional belonging among their partners and members, which has improved their status in the region. For example, the shared perception by SAPSN members of a common historical colonial experience, transformed into present-day struggle against global and regional neo-liberal powers, has informed the construction of a regional SAPSN-identity. Additionally, belonging to a specific social group, sharing common social traits such as being a 'worker', 'Christian' or 'HIV/AIDS-positive', constitutes the foundation of a quite strong non-territorial, Southern African for SATUCC, EJN and NAPSAR respectively. Regional identity-making also has to be problematized, which will be done in section 6.3.

Furthermore, it is often commonly perceived that the SADC has a tendency to dominate and to exclude parts of regional civil society in regional governance, which is also emphasized in this thesis. This is related to a more general criticism within academia that the SADC, in most facets, is 'weak'. For example, scholars have highlighted the organizational weakness of various SADC institutions, especially the Secretariat, in terms of their limited resources and low capacity (le Pere and Tjönneland 2005), and the reluctance of member states to transfer power to the supra-national level, making the SADC rather toothless (Afadameh-Adeyemi and Kalula 2011; Matlosa and Lotshwao 2010). This, in the end, plays against the inclusion of civil society in the SADC. Additionally, the SADC's commitment to strengthening political integration and establishing common political and democratic values is questioned (Mulaudzi 2006; Peters 2011), as well as the emphasis it puts on development in regional integration (Ajulu 2007; Blaauw 2007) and its willingness to support regional identity-making and citizenship (Williams 2006). Lastly, even the very heart of the SADC's regional governance agenda – trade liberalization and integration – is accused of being too slow (Peters 2011; TRALAC 2012). However, this thesis has shown that, regardless of the above weaknesses, the SADC is in different (sometimes more indirect) ways very important for civil society regionalization to occur. In fact, one central conclusion of this thesis is the great importance of the SADC as a driving-force and incentive for CSOs to 'go regional'. Hence, in terms of fostering bottom-up regional co-operation, the role SADC play in regional integration is not necessarily 'weak', at least not in terms of the parts of civil society studied in this project.

If one broadens the horizon and moves outside the trade and HIV/AIDS sectors, are there any general trends of civil society regionalization in Southern Africa? The end of this section will briefly discuss how much CSOs have 'gone regional' beyond the sample of CSOs in this thesis. However, the discussion will not be based on the five criteria of what makes CSOs regional *per se*, but will be more generally structured and raise some more general points.

There are indeed some empirical indications of more general regional tendencies among CSOs in the region. In a SADC-wide survey conducted by the Namibian Economy Policy Research Unit (NEPRU) on the perceptions of non-state actors from various countries in the region about regional integration, 69% of all responding CSOs claim that they have internal discussions about regional integration within their organizations and 48% say that they have attended workshops and conferences on regional integration (Deen-Swarray and Schade 2006: 4-5). Additionally, recalling the thesis' introductory chapter, the database survey conducted for this project on the regional interest of CSOs in South Africa, Zimbabwe and Tanzania points in a similar direction, concluding that between 15% and 34% of South African and Zimbabwean CSOs from various development sectors somehow engage regionally. One form of regional engagement, discussed at length in previous chapters, is interaction with the SADC. In a major study by the Southern African Trust, assessing the state of CSOs from various countries doing regional policy work, about 90% of the involved research organizations, 70% of the Faith-Based Organizations (FBOs)[267] and almost 60% of the NGOs across issue-areas reported linkages with various SADC institutions (Southern Africa Trust 2009: 14).

Several interviewees in this project agree with the above picture, acknowledging a general increase in regional engagement among CSOs during the past 10 years or so. According to Adam Habib, a prominent political science scholar, 'civil society on a regional level is in a much better position than five years ago. The regional connections that exist today did not exist before'.[268] Talking from a South African perspective, the director of the Ford Foundation in South Africa, Russell Ally, agrees. He argues that many South African NGOs started off as pure national organizations but have during the past decade to an increasing extent reached out to the surrounding region.[269] In the same vein, the director of one of the major regional networks in this study, EJN, claims that compared with the beginning of the last decade there is today more focus on the region within civil society in Southern Africa, for example in terms of a stronger regional policy awareness, and that there are more non-state actors active on the regional level. This also applies to EJN itself, which has gradually developed a strong SADC-focus in its work and has increasingly realized the importance of trying to influence regional policy-making.[270] In terms of SAPSN, similarly, the network is considered much stronger

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[267] FBOs are development-oriented organizations that are based on religious believes.

[268] Habib, interview 25 November 2009

[269] Ally, interview 26 November 2009

[270] Damon, interview, 15 December 2009

in the regional arena today than in the end of the 90s.[271] Lastly, according to União Nacional de Camponeses (UNAC) in Mozambique, loosely connected to SAPSN, its regional co-operation has also improved a lot since the end of the last millennium. Today it knows much more about the regional scene and can make more informed decisions about who to interact with in the region.[272]

However, there are also indications that the seeming increase of regional civil society activities is geographically asymmetrical, which is linked to the general dominance of CSOs from South Africa. ´The countries in the region are far from being equally represented in civil society regionalization. As will be further discussed in section 7.3, Mozambican CSOs feel largely left out and marginalized in regional civil society co-operation. Similarly, CSOs from Tanzania mostly seem to be bystanders in regional processes, poorly involved in regional work. According to this project's database survey, in the HIV/AIDS and Environment sectors, only 0.6% and 1%, respectively show some sort of regional engagement. As might be recalled, the corresponding numbers for South Africa are 15% for of HIV/AIDS and 25% for Environment.

Regardless of the geographical asymmetries associated with the regionalization process, whether the empirical observations above are signs of a more overall, bottom-up regionalization in Southern Africa or merely illustrate a temporal tendency of a small elite section of civil society, made up of well-resourced NGOs, to 'go regional' is a matter of speculation. Unfortunately, civil society regionalization, at least in the trade and HIV/AIDS sectors, can be accused of being elitist and indeed suffers from severe legitimacy problems. This and other weaknesses of civil society regionalization will be discussed next.

6.3 Problematizing Civil Society Regionalization

Despite the generally strong regional appearance among CSOs in this study, 'going regional' still has to be problematized on a number of points. In other words, the high extent to which CSOs at a first glance can be considered 'regional' has to be challenged. In fact, there are a number of problems with civil society regionalization in Southern Africa.

Firstly, picking up the thread from the end of the last section, one of these relates to the weak bottom-up nature of civil society regionalization. As indicated in chapter 3, state-led regionalism in Africa and elsewhere tends to have 'largely developed without the citizens' (Fioramonti 2012: 159), excluding the diversity of voices and roles in broader society, serving the specific interests of the ruling elite, and reflecting the neo-liberal agendas of the industrial and financial powers (ibid). A similar critique can also be delivered about civil society regionalization, including the majority of the CSOs in my sample, since many CSOs active regionally are rather elitist and lack legitimacy[273] among ordinary citizens.

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[271] Muchena, interview, 1 December 2008

[272] Nhampossa, interview, 18 November 2008

[273] Legitimacy can be understood in two different ways: in terms of representation and accountability (van Rooy 2004). In the first case, being membership-based and representative of other people than the immediate staff and board-

Many regionally active CSOs, including the trade and HIV/AIDS sectors, show a weakness in the ways they are linked with and accountable to the groups whose voices they want to represent on the regional level, and poorly reflect the interests of poor people and marginalized social groups (Southern Africa Trust 2009). This is linked to the fact that, due to donor dependency, many regionally engaged CSOs in the Southern and other parts of Africa tend to focus on upward accountability, whereby they spend significant energy to satisfy the requirements and needs of boards, councils of management and donors, at the expense of downward accountability in terms of responsibility to the constituencies they claim to work for (Africa Trust 2008). RCSOs are not only criticized for failing to maintain their relationship with the people they claim to represent, but can also be accused of not even having a constituency, as in the example of SADC-CNGO, discussed in section 6.1.5.

For regional networks such as SATUCC, SADC-CNGO, ARASA and RATN, it is more complicated to maintain legitimacy on a regional than national level, since it is unclear what the actual constituency is. For example, is it the national member organizations or their respective target groups? According to one scholar, it is hard to say how close the aforementioned regional networks are to ordinary people because they primarily represent national NGOs *per se*. Therefore, in order to evaluate the legitimacy of these networks, one has to find out how much their national members actually reach out to the grassroots level,[275] which is beyond the scope of this study. Hence, the legitimacy of regional networks cannot be determined through an aggregation of the legitimacy of their members. However, as indicated earlier, there are reasons to believe that many national NGOs and networks are driven by pecuniary considerations and not a genuine development interest, and serve the interests of a limited number of people at the expense of broader grassroots communities. This of course complicates the legitimacy of regional networks and the NGOs to which they are related.

Some regional networks such as EJN, NAPSAR and SATUCC have a vast membership in Southern Africa in terms of churches, HIV/AIDS organizations and labour organizations in almost all of the SADC countries, representing Christians, HIV-positive people and workers on a broad scale. It might be the case that these regional networks, as membership-based organizations, gain what van Rooy calls 'automatic credibility' (2004: 64) because of the sheer number of affiliates. For example, according to the EJN director:

members is a powerful source of legitimacy, especially if such membership is large. In fact 'the volume of membership is its own criteria for legitimacy' since it creates 'a sort of automatic credibility' (ibid: 64). Even though the sheer numbers are very important for gaining legitimacy based on representation, what is also important is the breadth of that representation (ibid 64-65). For example, are different public opinions and social groups represented in the membership? Second, another important aspect of legitimacy is accountability, in the broadest way referred to the responsibility of CSOs to answer for particular performance expectations to specific stakeholders (Brown 2007). Accountability can be understood in two ways. Upward accountability means accountability to donors who provide resources, in terms of conditionality and reporting requirements attached to funding (Ebrahim 2003: 814). Downward accountability means the immediate accountability of the leadership back to its members and/or those it claims to represent (van Rooy 2004: 72). The latter is intimately related to how much the constituencies or members that an organization claims to represent and/or work for actually 'own' the activities carried out by the organization (Ebrahim 2003; Brown 2007).

[275] Osei-Hwedie, interview, 5 December 2008

> we are not a grassroots organization but we represent organizations that work on a grass-
> roots level […] Our legitimacy comes from the fact that we are not a briefcase NGO, but
> have strong members in the countries who are committed to the grassroots.[276]

Yet, if legitimacy is seen in terms of the quality of the linkage to the constituencies of these CSOs – for example regarding how much the CSOs are actually accountable to the people they claim to represent, and how much their constituencies are involved in decision-making and project planning and implementation – then legitimacy has to be questioned. This can make the regionalization of civil society weak in terms of it not being grounded on a more grassroots level.

To link this argument to the question of issue-framing and identity-making, it is questionable if SATUCC, EJN, SADC-CNGO, RATN, ARASA and NAPSAR really represent a widespread sense of regional understanding and identity among their member organizations' constituencies, such as workers, HIV-positive people and church communities. It must be questioned if SATUCC's members, i.e. national coalitions of trade unions, and in turn their member organizations, cultivate the same feelings for a borderless, transnational/regional community of workers as the Secretariat and the regional board. Hence, to what extent is the transnational/regional working-class mentality relevant for and rooted among grassroots workers on the ground? All in all, the regional presence of regional networks and NGOs can be a rather elite-driven process not rooted among local and national members. This will be further discussed below when 'regional' identity-making is scrutinized.

Furthermore, in terms of SAPSN, resisting regional governance and striving towards people-driven 'transformation' does not automatically make it a positive force in society or for democracy. Agents of civil society resisting regional governance have clearly managed to fill a vacuum created by the absence of real alternative state-led regionalisms. But in filling this gap, these agents are not necessarily 'people-driven', and their frequently proclaimed links to the grassroots and to 'peoples' need to be scrutinized and debated. Despite the participation of CBOs, which are locally based, in Peoples' Summits, on a more general level the resistance sections within SAPSN are an elite-led process, dominated by a relatively small number of NGO representatives and activists. For example, contrary to SATUCC, most CSOs participating in SAPSN are not membership-based. The number of participants and stakeholders involved is steadily increasing, but the agenda and output are dominated by a limited number of vocal activists. Their ability to deliver their message (their 'voice') and to finance their activities is also heavily dependent on how successful they are in attracting donor funding from INGOs, private trusts and foundations. These critical factors raise questions about legitimacy, accountability and representation. According to one commentator:

> SAPSN is more of a shadow membership-based network and should not be regarded as a
> representative network in the region […] SAPSN is not a result of local grassroots mobili-

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[276] Damon, interview, 15 December 2009

zation that leads to some kind of regional network [and therefore] does not constitute any kind of genuine civil society collaboration in the region.[277]

Secondly, nationalism is still a strong undercurrent for many members of and partners to regional networks and NGOs, which are often nationally-oriented and preoccupied with national issues. This is a well-established fact within the academic community and civil society in the region.[278] In the words of one commentator, 'among regional civil society structures, the inclination towards nationalism […] has undermined […] solidarity' (Pressend 2010). This is linked to the general nationalist tendencies among people in the region, in turn enforced by the deeper statist social structure in Southern Africa. The nationalist inclination is an inbuilt problem of networks such as SAPSN, RATN, SADC-CNGO and ASCCI, which partly exist to support the national work of their members. Hence, many regional networks suffer from their members' general inability and unwillingness to connect local and national issues with broader regional processes. According to a prominent Mozambican scholar, if CSOs do not make a regional political-economic analysis of development issues in Southern Africa, there are no incentives to engage regionally:

> The political economy of Mozambique is connected to and affected by the regional processes. The levels are integrated. The situation in Zimbabwe affects the whole region; you cannot run away from that. If you don't see these regional commonalities you don't see the point of engaging regionally[279]

This is the case for many CSOs on a national level, including members of regional networks in this study.

It can be argued that the ultimate strength of regional networks is related to the ability of their national members to take regional issues forward to the national and local levels and to make the network active between regional meetings and campaigns, which is often not the case. Since national agendas and interests make big imprints on the activities of members, regional momentum tends to die out between regional events and the regional work of the network then loses pace. Hence, partly because of members' preoccupation with 'national' issues, SAPSN has a very low profile between regional events such as the Peoples' Summit. SAPSN is very diverse, with CBOs, women's groups, social movements, NGOs and other types of organizations focusing on their own particular local and national struggles, often without relating to the broader regional struggle.[280] This undermines the regional consolidation of the network. For example, one SAPSN member, MDG, claims that the debt issues they deal with are mainly seen in light of the national Mozambican agenda. MDG has therefore not taken the regional context seriously enough and struggles to relate national issues to regional processes, which results in a weak regional engagement within SAPSN and elsewhere.[281] The fact that the

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[277] Gentle, interview, 18 December 2009

[278] Muchabaiwa, interview, December 2009; le Pere, interview, 27 November 2008; Mati, interview, 27 November 2009; Vale, interview, 2 March 2005

[279] Castel-Branco, interview, 24 November 2008

[280] Gentle, interview, 18 December 2009; Bond, interview, 14 December 2008

[281] Nemete and Guileugue, interview, 20 November 2008

construction of regional identities depends a lot on regional gatherings, as discussed in section 6.1.5, which are limited in time and scope, as well as the (weak) regional commitment of their members, make the regional SAPSN-identity superficial and vulnerable. The SAPSN representative confesses that not much happens in between summits and blames the members for not taking the regional and global issues discussed at the Summit further in their respective countries.[282] There is a risk, then, that the regional solidarity and community-building created during regional events is not sustained in a long-term perspective.

SADC-CNGO faces similar challenges, claiming that 'members are not moving at the same pace as the Secretariat' (SADC-CNGO 2010d: 7). The fact that some members fail to take regional issues seriously can partly be attributed to the organizational structure of SADC-CNGO, which is constituted by national NGO coalitions, formed around national interests, and which possess the prime decision-making power at the expense of the quite weak secretariat. Therefore, some scholars argue that SADC-CNGO, similarly to SADC, 'may have fallen into the same trap of perceiving regional integration through statist […] lenses' (Matlosa and Lotshwao 2010: 40). In terms of SATUCC, similarly, the regional presence and agendas are not evident to national members and it is not clear to them why they should actually be part of SATUCC.[283] This is partly related to the fact that SATUCC is dominated by COSATU, which tends to prioritize support for national economic processes in South Africa.[284] Finally, ARASA blames its members for being too caught up with their national activities to maintain on-going engagement with the regional secretariat (ARASA 2007: 10). All in all, due to the nationalist preoccupation of many CSOs, deeply influenced by the statist social structure, for civil society 'Southern Africa as a region is under construction'.[285]

The above raises serious questions about how rooted the regional issue-framing and regional identities of the regional NGOs and networks in this study are among the national and local partners and members, discussed in sections 6.1.4 and 6.1.5. This resonates with the wider problem of the cementation of national sentiments among people in the region, as shown in section 3.1.1, which spills over to CSOs. In the end, nationalistic tendencies can obstruct civil society regionalization. Another contributing factor, linked to the above, is the organizational structure of many regional networks and NGOs. Primarily being of a facilitating, service providing nature, especially in the case of HIV/AIDS, the focus lies on facilitating the work of national members and partners. Additionally, the aim of some of these CSOs, at least on paper, is also to influence regional policymaking, in line with the advocacy type NGO and network, which can foster a regional consciousness and spur regionalization. Yet, as shown in the empirical chapters, influencing regional policy-making is a difficult endeavour and many networks, such as SADC-CNGO, tend to resort to providing services to the national members. Regional CSOs face similar problems in Latin America, the Baltic region and East Asia. In terms of Latin

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[282] Kasiamhuru, interview, 2 December 2009

[283] Gabriel, interview, 2 December 2008

[284] Ngwane, interview, 3 December 2008

[285] Gabriel, interview, 2 December 2008

America, most regional groups which engage regionally remain rooted in their national contexts and interpret regional integration with their particular national experiences (Grugel 2006: 225). Similar tendencies can be discerned in the Baltic region where few regional networks have managed to organize around principles other than nationality (Reuter 2007: 256). In East Asia, in fact, regional networking and information sharing can be seen merely as another means of trying to influence national politics. In the end, this implies that 'transnational networks implicitly affirm the legitimacy of state authority within regional governance' (Gilson 2011: 144).

Furthermore, if civil society regionalization is not based on a widespread sense of belonging to a regional community among the actors involved, regional work can be quite vulnerable to external pressures, such as declining donor funds, which in the end can play against regionalization. At the same time, as shown in the end of the last section, there is evidence of a general increase in interest in regional issues and regional engagement among CSOs. These seemingly contradictory processes might be explained by the fact that, as already indicated, civil society regionalization can be rather short-term, superficial and brittle, partly driven by material interests, and not reflecting more genuine, deeply rooted sentiments of regional community-building. When 'going regional', CSOs do this partly because of an urge to be associated with regional policy-makers, gaining (sometimes personal) power, and because there is money available for regional work. Hence, in many respects, civil society regionalization tends to be driven by SADC and donor.

Thirdly, despite the success of CSOs in this study in attracting regional donor funds, these funds can also weaken them. In fact, civil society regionalization can be considered weak in the sense of RCSOs being dependent on donor funding for their existence. For many CSOs involved in this study, such dependency creates a very vulnerable financial situation where regional work can lose pace and even terminate if donor funds dry out. SANASO is a clear-cut example. Hence, if regionally active donors decide to concentrate on new issue areas and/or to focus more on other levels of engagement, i.e. local and national, this can severely harm civil society regionalization. The HIV/AIDS sector is particularly at risk here because of the high involvement of bilateral donors, which generally tend to question the value-added of the regional level. In the trade sector, dominated by private donors, CSOs might be less at risk, since these donors have a more genuine commitment to the regional level.

Fourthly, the fact is that civil society regionalization is a very heterogeneous process, and this heterogeneity can in itself play against further strengthening of regionalization. The ideological and resource-based competition between CSOs, stemming from the statist and capitalist regional order, creates a rather diverse and divided civil society regionalization, especially in the trade sector, which might be weakened if this competition increases. Additionally, and linked to this, civil society regionalization has its winners and losers, which implies that some pockets of regional civil society, i.e. regional NGOs and some networks with close links to SADC-led regional governance and donors, are quite strong. In contrast other, more critical sections of regional civil society, which challenge the mainstream neo-liberal

discourse in the region, are generally more marginalized among RIGOs and (especially bilateral) donors and, hence, make less of an impact on the character of civil society regionalization. It must be concluded that critical reformist and resistance CSOs are less powerful on the regional scene than their commercial and partner colleagues.

Fifthly, because of the strong statist undercurrent in Southern Africa, manifested in a general SADC domination over civil society discussed in section 3.1.3, even though some of the CSOs involved in this study are formally involved in policy discussions at the SADC Secretariat, for example in relation to the HIV/AIDS PF, the TAC, TIFI meetings and the RPO, this does not make them influential on a deeper level. This especially relates to the more critically inclined CSOs. Hence, considering the fact that these meetings occur within the powerless and quite insignificant SADC Secretariat, the real policy influence of civil society on the SADC is kept to a minimum. CSOs are only allowed to influence regional agenda-setting and implementation on low policy levels. As also indicated in section 3.1.3, member states are reluctant to circumvent national sovereignty or transmit any decision-making powers to supra-national regional institutions such as the Secretariat and Tribunal. The decision-making of more political weight takes place elsewhere, in Summits and COM meetings, where member states are in control and CSOs are not welcome, except for some occasional posts in the policy debate by business NGOs. In these forums, dominated by the neo-liberal market-oriented trade agenda, human rights, improved service delivery, ICBT, regional citizenship and other issues pertinent to many critical CSOs are low on the agenda. Hence, on the whole, due to the inherent statism in the region, civil society is rather powerless in relation to the SADC and its member states. As already indicated, SADC-CSO relations greatly take place on the former's terms.

6.4 Conclusions

This chapter has compared the two cases of civil society regionalization in the trade and HIV/AIDS sectors respectively in order to investigate overall trends and discern (some) dissimilarities. First, the dynamics of civil society regionalization were discussed. It was concluded that the SADC, across sectors, plays a very important role for civil society regionalization in a number of ways and has a great influence on the process. Fundamentally informed by the workings of the capitalist social structure, the SADC sets the (problem-solving) regional trade and HIV/AIDS agendas and thereby affects which CSOs are included and excluded in regional governance. Since participation in regional governance is of great importance to many CSOs in this study, being included or excluded in the SADC has a deep influence on the regional profile of CSOs and consequently regionalization. The SADC also, indirectly and directly, facilitates regionalization, acting as a focal point around which regional activities take place as well as creating regional forums for regional interaction. Furthermore, the SADC is a centre of gravity for regional issue-framing among CSOs, which spurs their regional work. In fact, constructing trade and HIV/AIDS issues as 'regional' is an important dimension of civil society

regionalization for most CSOs in this study, at least with regards to the top layer of these organizations.

CSO-donor relations also fundamentally affect civil society regionalization. Most CSOs in this study are heavily dependent on donor funds for 'going regional', which puts them in a very vulnerable situation due to the changing funding patterns of donors. In the end this fundamentally affects their opportunities to work regionally. Donors also greatly affect the agendas of their recipients, for example in terms of advancing a problem-solving or a critical agenda, indirectly using CSOs as instruments to reproduce or contest the prevailing capitalist order. In turn, the influence of the SADC and donors creates intra-civil society conflict on the regional level, resulting in a quite heterogeneous regional civil society, even if this is less pronounced in the HIV/AIDS sector where the problem-solving agenda and bilateral donors dominate.

Identity-making is the weakest dimension of civil society regionalization. Across cases, identity-making based on common values and experiences of oppression and common social traits informed regionalization for only a few CSOs in this study. Regional forums play a major role in this process, constructing ideas of regional belonging and community-building, which also enforces regional issues-framing.

Furthermore, some brief comments about how much CSOs have gone regional in the two cases were made. Discussing how strong CSOs are in terms of the five criteria of what makes a CSO 'regional', it was concluded that, in terms of building a regional organizational infrastructure, framing issues regionally, engaging with regional governance and using regional funds, CSOs have a rather pronounced regional profile. Furthermore, going beyond the scope of the 16 CSOs studied in this project, and also outside the trade and HIV/AIDS sectors, there are indications of a wider process of civil society regionalization.

Lastly it was showed that civil society regionalization suffers from a number of problems: lack of legitimacy, weak regional identity-making due to the nationalistic tendencies of member and partners, dependency on donor funds, and ideological and resource-based conflict between CSOs. The latter can play against wider regional CSO co-ordination and weaken influence on SADC-led policy-making.

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7
Conclusions

This thesis has dealt with civil society regionalization in Southern Africa. To recapitulate, the overall aim has been to analyse the dynamics of civil society regionalization in Southern Africa in terms of the interconnection between CSO agency and social structures in this process, both empirically and from a theoretical perspective. This has been done by building on existing research on civil society regionalization in Africa and elsewhere and collection of new empirical data. The thesis investigated two case studies: civil society regionalization in the trade and the HIV/AIDS sectors.

The backdrop to this thesis, discussed in chapter 1, is the lack of empirical studies of civil society regionalization globally, and particularly in Africa. The bulk of regionalism studies concern inter-governmental regional integration and are inherently state-centric and weak in accounting for agency in region-building. This relates to the mainstream rationalist regionalism schools in particular, such as neo-realism, neo-liberal institutionalism and neo-liberal economic integration, but also to the reflectivist, critical school of the NRA. Even though it challenges the mainstream argument in regionalism studies that states are the main actors and deploys a more multi-dimensional approach, the NRA still favours structural perspectives on regionalization and remains weak on serious study of the role of civil society in this process, including CSO's motivations to regionalize and how they are affected by social structures. Some recent studies have challenged the general state-centric view on regionalism and attempt to bring in the role of CSOs in regional processes, which should be celebrated. However, there are still serious gaps in the understanding of civil society regionalization, including: fixation with states-led regional governance (even if this of course plays a big role in CSOs' regional work), also without relating it to the overall statist and capitalist social structures; generalization of civil society on the regional level without accounting for the diversity inherent in this process; and, not least, unwillingness to study CSOs as conscious actors in regionalization processes using various means, such as issue-framing and identity-making, to construct regional co-operation.

In chapter 2, the theoretical setting of this thesis was outlined. Starting with an account of the meta-theoretical foundations in terms of the relations between theory and practice, agency and structure, and material and ideational, which are largely informed by a social constructivist understanding, a historical *exposé* of the theoretical development of the concept of civil society was then undertaken. Here,

views of civil society as part of society, as a form of society and as public sphere were highlighted. This lead on to the contemporary civil society debate, including the understanding of the transnationalization of civil society within three major contemporary theoretical strands: the third sector, global civil society and global public sphere. The debate on civil society in Africa was then discussed in light of these three strands. It was concluded that one common weakness of all conceptualizations of civil society in Africa and elsewhere is the lack of focus on the members of civil society themselves, i.e. the agency of CSOs. This corresponds to a lack of conceptual instruments for understanding how and why CSOs act the way they do, including 'going regional'.

Since this issue is a major line of inquiry in this thesis, the chapter turned to a discussion of social constructivist studies on transnational advocacy networks and new social movements which focus on the social construction of CSOs. In particular, the ideational aspect of civil society behaviour, in terms of issue-framing and identity-making, was highlighted. At the same time, it was argued that the role of social structures is vital for understanding civil society regionalization, which directed the thesis to critical theoretical thinking, arguing that CSO agency must be viewed in relation to the social structures marking the overall statist and capitalist world order. In essence, the relationship between agency and structure is understood in terms of conceptualising social structure as a phenomenon of levels, invoking a model by Prendergast and Knottnerus (1994). In this model, structural influence of agency operates down six levels of social structure which, from highest to lowest, are the world system, societal stratification, inter-organizational relations, intra-organizational relations, social networks and social relationships.

The third and fourth structural levels were of most importance to this thesis and five types of relationships related to civil society regionalization were presented: inter-organizational relations between RIGOs and CSOs, between donors and CSOs, and between CSOs, as well as intra-organizational relations within CSOs in terms of issue-framing and identity-making. These are ultimately influenced by the world order and its manifestation on the regional level. The bulk of chapter 2 was devoted to the construction of 11 dimensions of civil society regionalization, related to the above five types of relations, i.e. RIGO issue preferences; RIGO focal-point creation for CSOs; CSO inclusion and exclusion in RIGOs; CSO dependency on regional donor funds; donor influence on CSO regional agendas; CSO ideological rivalry; CSO competition for donor funds; CSO regional issue-framing; CSO construction of regional target groups; CSO positive regional identity-making; and CSO exclusive regional identity-making. These informed the empirical analysis of civil society regionalization in Southern Africa in chapters 4-5.

Chapter 3 provided the structural backdrop to civil society regionalization in Southern Africa and described the current regional order in which this process takes place. It argued that statist and capitalist social structures, manifested by authoritarian and neo-liberal regimes, a civil society that is state-dominated and problem-solving, and sovereignty-boosting and neo-liberal regional governance fundamentally influence civil society regionalization. Hence, statism and capitalism greatly affect the relationship between the SADC and CSOs, between donors and

CSOs and between CSOs, as well as within CSOs in terms of issue-framing and identity-making.

Chapters 4 and 5 were devoted to the cases of civil society regionalization in the trade and HIV/AIDS sectors respectively, based on the 11 dimensions outlined in chapter 2. The main findings of these empirical discussions, and also the major contributions of the thesis, will be accounted for in the next section when the main research questions are answered.

Chapter 6 broadened this empirical discussion, comparing the two cases and teasing out general trends as well as major differences in terms of how civil society dynamics on the regional level are played out. The chapter also discussed the extent to which regionally active CSOs can be called ´regional´. Linking back to the five criteria of what makes CSOs 'regional´, it was argued that the 16 CSOs in this thesis are quite strong in most of these five ways. Additionally, moving outside the sample and beyond the trade and HIV/AIDS sectors, it was argued that there are some empirical signs of an intensification of this civil society regionalization process during the last 5-10 years on a more overall level. At the same time, civil society regionalization suffers from a number of problems, such as lack of legitimacy, weak regional identity-making, dependency on donor funds, weak policy influence on a higher level and intra-civil society tensions, which might hamper wider regional co-operation.

The first section in the reminder of this chapter goes back to the research questions and discusses in what ways the thesis has answered them. In the second section, the main empirical and theoretical contributions to the study of civil society regionalization will be discussed and the chapter rounds up with a section on remaining research issues.

7.1 Dynamics of Civil Society Regionalization in Southern Africa

Having briefly recapitulated the main findings of this thesis, this section will go into more depth on the core questions. This implies discussing how the thesis has answered the three research questions outlined in the introductory chapter. One section will be devoted to each research question.

7.1.1 How is Civil society Regionalization Influenced by RIGOs and Donors?

The SADC's and donors' interaction with CSOs have greatly influenced and shaped civil society regionalization in Southern Africa, in line with previous research which has focused on the dominating role of external actors in this process. This thesis has increased knowledge about the external context in which civil society regionalization takes place through relating RIGO-CSO and donor-CSO relations to the underlying statist and capitalist world order.

Deeply influenced by statism, it has been showed how SADC member states are reluctant to transmit any decision-making powers to supra-national institutions such

as the Secretariat and Tribunal. In addition, striving to monopolize regional policy-making, member states generally exclude CSOs and other private actors from regional institutions such as the Summit and COM where the most important regional decisions are taken. Consequently, on a general level, CSOs are denied influence over regional decision-making and are only granted access in lower policy-making organs, such as the SADC Secretariat. The statist social structure affects civil society regionalization in terms of the difficulties CSOs encounter in participating in regional governance. Since the regional profile of many CSOs in this study depends on open doors to the SADC, being denied access negatively affects their presence on the regional level.

In more detail, the thesis shows how the SADC dominates the regional trade and HIV/AIDS agendas and decides what issues are emphasized and marginalized in regional governance. Deeply entrenched in the neo-liberal and market-oriented discourse, the SADC give precedence to economic integration at the expense of social issues such as HIV/AIDS, and trade is considered the most important aspect of regional integration. Additionally, the SADC emphasizes certain types of trade and HIV/AIDS issues, in line with the neo-liberal logic, such as trade liberalization, EPA, information dissemination and HIV capacity-building, at the expense of others, for example ICBT and AIDS rights. Most importantly, civil society and other 'private' actors are given increasing responsibility for delivery of AIDS-related services, also on a regional level. The SADC is reluctant to push member states to take greater responsibility for providing services more generally and pinpointing vulnerable social groups such as sexual minorities, for example through harmonization of human rights policies related to HIV/AIDS.

The issue-preferences in the SADC agenda fundamentally decide who is included and excluded in the SADC and, hence, influence CSO performance in regional governance. Those CSOs working in line with the neo-liberal agenda, for example by assisting in regional trade-related policy-making and providing AIDS-related services, are somehow involved, at least on a Secretariat level. Those contesting the neo-liberal agenda, seeking critical reform and advocating for the SADC to facilitate informal trade and safeguard the rights of HIV-infected and affected people, are marginalized, even though this foremost relates to a deeper decision-making level. These inclusion and exclusion dynamics greatly affect civil society regionalization. For those CSOs included in regional governance, regional consolidation and presence is strengthened, whereas those CSOs which seek to be involved but are denied access are weakened. In fact, many CSOs in this study are dependent on being involved in SADC-led regional governance for their very existence, which makes them very vulnerable to closed SADC doors. The SADC also plays a more direct role for civil society regionalization in terms of creating regional forums for regional engagement as well as, more indirectly, being a regional focal point around which regional civil society meetings evolve. The SADC Civil Society Forum and the Peoples' Summit are cases in point.

In terms of CSO-donor relations, the thesis has shown that donor funds are a major force behind civil society regionalization. In fact, CSOs are highly dependent on regional donor funds for their regional operation. Such dependency affects civil

society regionalization in three important ways. Firstly, donor dependency has put CSOs in a very vulnerable financial situation in both the trade and HIV/AIDS sectors, since donors tend to be unreliable and can suddenly change their funding preferences. This has put many CSOs in a difficult financial situation from time to time and has weakened their regional work. In other words, the strength of their regional presence fluctuates in relation to the availability of funds. Secondly, marked by the capitalist world order, donor-CSO relations tend to foster rent-seeking and profit-making NGOs and networks, on a national as well as regional level. The neo-liberal modes of funding tend to foster market and profit-oriented CSOs driven by economic interests, sometimes on a personal level, rather than by devotion to social development. This can create regional briefcase NGOs such as SANASO. Being dependent on donor funds and driven by money considerations, CSOs are fragile and can implode, which jeopardizes civil society regionalization. In addition, their interest in regional issues can be quite superficial and linked to the funds available for that. Lastly, donors have great influence over the regional agendas of CSOs, which ultimately affects the character of civil society regionalization in terms of the issue focus, strategies used and role undertaken in regional governance. In fact, it has been argued that, influenced by the overall capitalist world order, donors use their partners to either reproduce the current order through fostering service delivery, or to contest the very same order through striving for social transformation.

7.2.2 What is the Composition of Civil Society on the Regional Level and how do CSOs Relate to Each Other in the Process of Regionalization?

Many previous studies on civil society regionalization neglect the heterogeneity of this process, for example focusing on one part of civil society (e.g. 'counter-hegemonic forces') at the expense of others, or describing a few specifically-targeted CSOs. Most importantly, they fail to account for the interaction between different types of CSOs pursuing different agendas, using different strategies and playing different roles in regional governance. Contrary to previous studies, this thesis has deepened understanding of the heterogeneity of civil society regionalization. In fact, one central finding of this thesis is that civil society regionalization in Southern Africa is highly diverse and conflictual, especially in the trade sector.

Influenced by the deeper statist and capitalist social structures, by deciding which CSOs are included and excluded in regional governance and by funding development activities that either reproduce or contest the prevailing neo-liberal discourse, the SADC and donors ultimately divide civil society on the regional level. One way of portraying this heterogeneity is to categorize the involved CSOs in this study in terms of the issues emphasized, the work strategies adopted and the relation to SADC-led regional governance. Four categories have been crystallized: commercial CSOs, partner CSOs, critical reformist CSOs, and resistance CSOs. Commercial CSOs are primarily interested in facilitating private sector development and trade liberalization and support the SADC's neo-liberal and market-oriented regional agenda through policy assistance and capacity-building. Considered a

partner in a common quest for regional trade integration, commercial CSOs are generally included in SADC-led regional governance. Partner CSOs in principle share the neo-liberal regional agenda of the SADC but want to improve social development aspects such as poverty alleviation and HIV/AIDS. Therefore, these CSOs collaborate with the SADC, assist in policy development, and take part in and monitor implementation of various programmes. Critical reformist CSOs also emphasize the development and poverty dimensions of the trade agenda, but are more critical towards the SADC, striving for reform. A different set of issues are put forward, for example ICBT and AIDS rights, through various advocacy campaigns. Critical reformist CSOs are largely excluded in the SADC. Lastly, resistance CSOs fight for structural transformation of the current neo-liberal regional order and contest SADC-led market-oriented regional integration. Sharing many of the principles of critical reformist CSOs, such as social justice and human rights, the resistors use more radical strategies related to social mobilization and refuse to be co-opted into the SADC agenda. Hence, direct engagement with the SADC is avoided.

The relations between the above categories of CSOs, particularly between commercial/partner and critical reformist/resistance CSOs, are generally marked by tensions and rivalry, both in terms of ideological cleavages and resource-based competition, even if this is more pronounced in the trade than HIV/AIDS sector. One important example of this regional intra-civil society rivalry is the existence of two separate regional civil society forums parallel to the SADC Summit and the frosty relations between them. The members of these forums relate differently to the SADC agenda and pursue different strategies, which boil down to fundamentally different views on the neo-liberal regional project altogether. Another dimension of intra-civil society rivalry is related to competition for a limited pool of regional funds, which causes conflicts related to CSO entitlement to 'own' various issues.

Another fragmenting force is the dominance of well-resourced South African CSOs in civil society regionalization, in line with the overall capitalist power dynamics in the region in which South African interests control regional affairs. The power asymmetries between CSOs from South Africa and other parts of the region are most pronounced in relation to the more critical part of regional civil society. Critical CSOs predominately reside in South Africa, which historically has harboured a more autonomous and vocal civil society when compared with, for example, Mozambique. These power relations are manifested in regional conferences in which non-South African CSOs, particularly from Portuguese-speaking countries, are often marginalized.

The heterogeneous nature of regional civil society can possibly hamper civil society regionalization in the long run, negatively affecting stronger, broader and better-coordinated regional civil society co-operation across ideological cleavages in the future.

7.1.3 What are the Motivations for Regionalization among CSOs?

Studying CSOs as conscious actors in regionalization, albeit influenced by statist and capitalist social structures, and accounting for the motivations for 'going regional' is perhaps the most under-researched area so far. This thesis has taken this challenge seriously and devoted considerable space to the agency of CSOs on the regional level. It has been shown that CSOs are quite active in region-building, taking an active part in constructing regionalization, albeit under the auspices of the underlying statist-capitalist regional order.

One central finding is that regional issue-framing is an important motivation for CSOs to 'go regional'. Regional NGOs and networks in the trade and HIV/AIDS sectors tend to perceive the issues they deal with in a regional perspective, which in turn has great influence on the urge to work regionally. Framing trade and HIV/AIDS issues in a 'Southern African' setting, ascribing to them certain commonalities across borders, and claiming that CSOs have a shared responsibility to solve common development problems spurs civil society regionalization. Importantly, regional issue-framing is often intimately linked to the SADC and its regional agendas and policy frameworks. On the one hand, being included in SADC-led regional governance and participating in the implementation of the SADC agenda, often involving aligning activity plans and other policy documents to the SADC's regional policy frameworks, supports the propensity to 'think regionally'. Affected by the SADC's neo-liberal understanding of regional integration and development, issues are framed in terms of problem-solving; i.e. the solution to the common regional development problems foremost lies in enhanced service delivery, extensively outsourced to private actors such as CSOs. On the other hand, CSOs which are more critical of SADC-led regional governance in the trade and HIV/AIDS sectors frame the SADC as a target which should be contested not supported. Even though these CSOs emphasize other types of issues, they still somehow relate to the SADC agenda, which should be reformed. This spurs regional advocacy directed towards the SADC.

Identity-making is another important motivation for regionalization among some CSOs in this study, i.e. certain regional networks. It should be underlined, though, that identity-making is not as strong a dimension of civil society regionalization as originally proposed. Most CSOs in this study lack a clear social constituency, are not value-driven and do not relate their regional engagement to common experiences of some sort, for example related to oppression, which is important for regional identity-making to occur. For a few regional networks in the study, identity-making does indeed play a role in 'going regional'. These networks claim to represent a specific social group which their members belong to, such as HIV-positive people, informal traders, workers or Christians; and/or to share similar historical experiences of colonialism and neo-colonialism; and/or are informed by strong values often related to solidarity with oppressed people. This informs the construction of a common regional identity and in the end triggers regional activities. Regional meetings such as annual partnership forums and the Peoples' Summits are particularly important for fostering such identities, creating a sense of regional

togetherness. If the construction of trans-border, regional identities is coupled with a sense of marginalization and alienation, often in relation to a certain regional enemy such as the SADC, this can strengthen the process of identity formation even further and foster a kind of resistance identity. SAPSN is a case in point here.

As seen above, CSOs are not by any means autonomous actors in the regionalization process, being influenced by external actors such as the SADC and donors. Issue-framing and identify-making, albeit being constructed within CSOs themselves, must be understood in relation to the underlying statist and capitalist social structures. Hence, the construction of identities as 'regional' is generally hindered by nationalist forces. The thesis has shown that the members of and partners to regional networks and NGOs are greatly influenced by national interests and agendas due to the cemented statism in the region. Hence, the regional agendas and identities constructed by head offices and secretariats are often not rooted among the local and national building blocks of the organizations. For some regional networks such as SADC-CNGO, the network rather exists despite, and not because of, the intentions of members to work regionally. Many networks in fact exist to a large extent to support the local and national work of their members. Hence, regional identity-making can be seen as a rather elite-driven process, driven by some segments of the networks, i.e. elite activists, regional board-members and regional staff, as well as the top executive layer of (some) national partner and member NGOs, which are the ones most frequently participating in regional forums.

In fact, one central conclusion of the thesis is that civil society regionalization can be rather short-term and superficial, not reflecting deeply-rooted and widespread sentiments of regional community. Often, CSOs 'go regional' because there are donor funds available for that and/or they want to raise their (often personal) profile by involving themselves in policy circles within the SADC. Hence, in some regards, civil society regionalization tends to be donor and SADC-driven.

7.2 Contributions to the Study of Civil Society Regionalization

In this section the major empirical but also theoretical contributions of this thesis to the study of civil society regionalization in Southern Africa, and potentially elsewhere, will be discussed. In particular, this discussion will centre around four major contributions. Firstly, the thesis contributes to the deepened understanding of civil society agency and demonstrates that CSOs can be quite active on the regional level in terms of engaging regional governance as well as regional issue-framing and identity-making. Secondly, the thesis finds that civil society regionalization is a very heterogeneous process and adds knowledge about this heterogeneity. Thirdly, the thesis provides input into understanding the influence of statist and capitalist social structures, manifested by RIGOs and donors, on regional CSO agency. Lastly, the thesis demonstrates the importance of conceptualizing the interplay between structure and agency in the process of civil society regionalization. These four contributions will now be discussed in more detail, ending with a few words about

the potential application of this thesis' theoretical framework to other regional contexts.

Firstly, this study shows that CSOs are more active agents in the process of regionalization than previous research claims to be the case, portraying CSOs as rather insignificant on the regional level, for example in terms of being passive *vis-à-vis* regional policy-makers. In this vein, the thesis has shown the importance of treating CSOs as actors in their own right, driven by their own motivations to 'go regional'. This thesis shares with much earlier research the insights that regionalism in Southern Africa is largely state-centric and that civil society tends to be marginalized in the SADC, something which the cases of trade and HIV/AIDS demonstrate. However, the thesis simultaneously points to the need for this general perception of the marginalization of civil society to be nuanced and for the often-generalized SADC-CSO relations to be empirically unpacked in order to see variation. Through such an unpacking, the thesis shows that some CSOs, buying into the current neo-liberal agenda, actually play quite an active role in regional governance, contributing to regional policy-making and service provision. In fact, in both the trade and HIV/AIDS cases, CSOs provide RIGOs with technical expertise and policy advice, albeit within the prevalent neo-liberal trade agenda. They are also engaged in policy discussions and help implementing various SADC projects. Some CSOs even actively participate in formal trade negotiations between states, which is quite remarkable considering the deep statism in the region. Additionally, even though not directly involved in the SADC, advocating for policy reform and alternative regionalism, the more critically inclined CSOs still play a role in regional governance processes in terms of challenging the taken-for-granted neo-liberal agenda. There are also some examples of recent successes, for example making SADC more attentive to social aspects of trade in policy-making.

Additionally, a major contribution of this study to the understanding of civil society regionalization, and a move away from current state-centric regionalism research, is to provide important insight into intra-organizational processes related to issue-framing and identity-making and how these spur regionalization. In particular the regional construction of issues related to trade and HIV/AIDS is a significant force for 'going regional', even if building identities based on particular social attributes that transcend national borders, such as workers, informal traders, HIV-positive and Christian is important for the regional engagement of some CSOs. The thesis also shows the importance of regional civil society forums and events for these processes. In fact, there are indications that CSOs play a more important role in 'constructing regions' and creating a regional consciousness than states. This is another way in which the presumed 'weakness' of regional civil society should be questioned.

To move on, linked to the discussion about agency, this thesis suggests that there is a strong relation between material and ideational forces at play in civil society regionalization processes, which future studies need to take into consideration. One important example is the interconnection between CSO construction of ideas related to a particular region, for example in terms of framing issues regionally and perceiving identity in regional ways, and the attraction of donor funds for material

gains. As seen in this study, in particular by the examples of regional networks that work regionally without a strong foundation for doing this among their national members, issue-framing and regional identity-making partly occur instrumentally in order to portray the organization as 'regionally conscious' and hence eligible for regional donor funds. In the case of one of the networks in this study, the above was put to the test, since the constructed regional outlook of the organization helped the director to fundraise for personal needs. Furthermore, CSO interpretation of formal regionalism, for example in terms of contestation and resistance that portrays regional governance frameworks as unjust and anti-poor, or in terms of support where the same regional project is framed as development-oriented and growth-enhancing, is shaped by material forces. Losing out from neo-liberal regional governance, for example through informal traders not materially benefiting from market-oriented trade integration from above, CSOs defending the rights of this and other marginalized social groups will contest RIGOs that advance this agenda. On the other side, the business associations and employers' groups represented by commercial regional CSOs are in a much more privileged position in the capitalist social order and will materially benefit from free trade and market integration. Therefore, such CSOs create a positive image of neo-liberal regional governance. These are only a few examples of the importance of taking the interaction between ideational and material forces seriously when conceptualizing civil society regionalization. This is an important theoretical contribution of this thesis, not only to the study of regionalization but to international relations more generally.

Secondly, it was argued above that civil society engagement with regional governance is more multi-dimensional and diverse than commonly believed. 'Insider' and 'outsider' strategies are only two of several possible ways of approaching RIGOs. One important contribution of the thesis, then, is to conceptualize civil society on the regional level in somewhat new ways. In this vein, this study developed a four-fold categorization of CSOs in terms of the issues emphasized, the work strategies adopted, and the relation to regional institutions: commercial CSOs; partner CSOs; critical reformist CSOs; and resisting CSOs. The thesis also contributes to an often overlooked aspect of civil society regionalization: the relation between CSOs involved in this process, which can be understood as conflictual and based on ideological rivalry and resource-based competition. The heterogeneity of civil society regionalization is, in turn, intimately related to the relations between CSOs and RIGOs, and between CSOs and donors, discussed below. All in all, the thesis has made a significant contribution to a heterogeneous understanding of civil society regionalization. It argues that regionalism studies must better acknowledge this heterogeneity and not be blinded by the normative preference for a certain set of actors, for example the counter-hegemonic ones inherent in some studies related to the NRA.

Thirdly, taking the structural context in which CSOs operate seriously, another important contribution of this thesis is to show how CSO participation in regional governance; raising of regional donor funds; framing of issues regionally; and construction of regional identities are all influenced by the statist-capitalist social structures, which mark the regional order in Southern Africa and other regions. The

inclusion or exclusion of CSOs in certain regional institutions is not only determined by statism, which results in regional decision-making forums being run by states and generally closed to CSOs, with only lower levels of policy-making on a Secretariat level being (somewhat) open to CSO participation, but is also deeply affected by the capitalist social structure. Those CSOs working within the neo-liberal parameters of the regional order, providing various types of services and technical expertise and promoting business interests, are more involved than those actors challenging the current regional governance schemes. Hence, one major contribution of this thesis is to show that RIGOs and their member states are something more than mere 'external' actors, blocking or facilitating access to regional policy-making forums, as they have often been portrayed by previous studies. Instead, they are understood more as organizational manifestations of the statist and capitalist workings of the regional order. This implies the need to study not only the more direct effects of the domination of CSOs by RIGOs, in which vein this thesis has contributed to enhanced understanding of the power dynamics inherent in CSO participation in regional governance, but also the need to study how such domination more indirectly affects the regional agency of CSOs. One important example of such indirect effect is the ways in which CSOs frame issues and construct identities, discussed below.

In terms of donors, in a short-term perspective they do facilitate civil society regionalization, providing important funds for regional activities. In fact, the availability of regional funds and the capability of CSOs to attract those funds is another sign of the 'strength' of CSO engagement on the regional level. However, an important contribution of this thesis is the developed understanding of the long-term effects of donor funding. Being deeply influenced by the neo-liberal discourse, donors generally tend to foster a market-oriented, problem-solving development agenda by regional CSOs, giving rise to activities that are easily measurable and often related to business promotion and service provision. Donors also support the establishment of regional 'briefcase' NGOs driven by material, sometimes personal, incentives. Additionally, the changing funding preferences of donors in terms of selection of recipients as well as shifting of focus between the national and regional levels, create a very vulnerable financial foundation for CSOs. This can jeopardize civil society regionalization in the long run. However, the thesis also highlights the complexity of donor funding, showing that some donors with a more critical approach to the neo-liberal world order shape parts of regional civil society in that direction. In the end, this supports the diversification of civil society regionalization.

Furthermore, the thesis provides important inputs into the understanding of the ways in which statist and capitalist social structures, manifested by RIGOs such as the SADC, more indirectly foster civil society regionalization by acting as a focal point around which regional civil society co-operation takes place, including the more critical elements, as well as by informing regional issue-framing and identity-making. In terms of the latter, the thesis shows how CSOs, under the influence of RIGOs, actively use ideas about the latter to construct regionalization. For example, the regional perception of issues related to trade and HIV/AIDS is often centred on regional policy-makers and directly linked to their agendas, which in the end

supports CSOs in building regional coalitions and raising their regional profile. Partly through their mere existence, RIGOs, then, foster civil society regionalization. This also questions the perception, common among scholars, that RIGOs such as the SADC are generally 'weak' and 'inefficient' in terms of supporting regional integration, highlighting their (indirect) importance for civil society regionalization in the above ways. In that sense, RIGOs are not 'failures'. However, at the same time CSO reliance on RIGOs for constructing regionalization also goes against this process. Influenced by RIGOs and the deeper statist-capitalist social structures they are a manifestation of, CSOs can also adopt nationalist and statist mind-sets, which take many expressions. For example, regional CSOs, particularly regional networks, often organize in a rather statist way that is influenced by inter-state co-operation, in which the national agendas of the member organizations risk diluting the building of a regional awareness. This creates a very weak foundation for regional identity-making within civil society, which can make civil society regionalization a rather superficial venture, vulnerable to external pressures such as the donor dependency discussed above. Additionally, the inability and unwillingness of state-centric RIGOs such as the SADC to actively foster regional community-building among people in the region adds to this. Hence, to a certain extent, the results of this thesis question the importance of 'regional identity' in building regions that is claimed by constructivist-oriented regionalism scholars, at least in terms of regionalization from below.

Fourthly, taking all three previous points into consideration, the thesis has improved the understanding of the interplay between structure and agency in civil society regionalization. One theoretical contribution of this thesis for the study of civil society regionalization is the importance of conceptualizing how statist and capitalist social structures, via RIGOs and donors, simultaneously work against and foster regional engagement of CSOs, including the construction of a deeper regional consciousness. This implies improved knowledge about how CSOs active on the regional level are deeply influenced by, but also actively navigate within, the statist and capitalist regional order. The analysis of the dual effect of social structures on civil society regionalization, where statist and capitalist social structures can both hinder and obstruct CSO regional engagement, is also a contribution to the wider theoretical debate about the relation between structure and agency in international relations.

Lastly, it should be noted that the analytical framework developed for this study is in itself a contribution to the development of a theoretical understanding of civil society regionalization within regionalism studies more generally and the NRA in particular. The 11 dimensions of civil society regionalization building up the framework are important analytical tools for conceptualizing how and why CSOs 'go regional', particularly in terms of how structure and actor-oriented forces interact in the process of civil society regionalization. However, it remains to be seen how valid these dimensions of civil society regionalization are to similar processes in other parts of the world. Research has to be extended to other world regions to test if the analytical tools of this project are applicable more generally. As

already discussed, civil society has similar attributes in Latin America, Asia and Africa, being influenced by the same, overarching statist and capitalist world order. Consequently, the understanding of civil society regionalization in Southern Africa can possibly be translated to other regions in the South. In any case, comparing with and applying my results to other regions in the South is necessary for further theoretical and empirical development of the understanding of civil society regionalization and to contribute to the NRA and regionalism studies more generally. There are already a wide range of theories for understanding and explaining regional integration between states and the need for improved theoretical instruments to comprehend regionalization from below is vast. This study is one step ahead in this quest.

7.3 Future Research Areas

As discussed in the previous section, this study is an important contribution to the understanding of civil society regionalization, not only in Southern Africa but also in other world regions. The thesis has analysed the dynamics of this process from a number of different angles and presented a theoretical framework. Nevertheless, there are still many gaps in the study of civil society regionalization and what forces drive this process that call for further research in the field. This section will reflect on what can be developed from the previous understanding as well as some potential new areas of research. More specifically, in order of appearance in the section, the need to study: a broader sample of study objects including local, national and global CSOs, also from other sectors, involved in civil society regionalization; the motivations of CSOs to 'go regional', including further analysis of regional issue-framing and identity-making; new potential dimensions of civil society regionalization in terms of mass media, ICT and language; the legitimacy of CSOs active on a regional level; and policy implications of an improved understanding of civil society regionalization for RIGOs and donors will be discussed.

Firstly, one gap in the present study, as well as other studies related to civil society regionalization, is the exclusive targeting of 'regional' NGOs and networks, leaving out those local and national CSOs which also engage regionally. Even if their engagement is generally more occasional, these actors nevertheless play a role in civil society regionalization, in terms for example of engaging RIGOs, doing research on regional issues and building up regional networks and NGOs as members and partners. In addition, as we have seen, some of them play a big (negative) role in regional identity-making and community-building, diluting the regional consciousness of the networks they are part of by invigorating national interests and agendas, which needs to be further interrogated. Future research, then, has to involve a broader sample of CSOs involved in regional work, not only including local and national but also international/global NGOs and networks in order to present a more comprehensive picture of civil society regionalization. The linkage between regional and global processes is important. How does global civil society, for example through global forums such as World Social Forums, INGOs and TANs impact on civil society regionalization in various world regions?

Furthermore, even though this thesis has not moved beyond the trade and HIV/AIDS sectors in the analysis of civil society regionalization, some preliminary findings discussed in section 6.2 indicate that are there are strong reasons to believe that similar processes take place in other sectors. For example, according to the quantitative study in this project, the Environment and Human Rights sectors seem to host many regionally active CSOs. Future research will benefit from a more comprehensive quantitative survey in order to better capture the scope of civil society regionalization in the trade and HIV/AIDS, as well as other sectors. How big is this phenomenon generally in Southern Africa and elsewhere? Is it mainly driven by a handful of regional NGOs and networks, or, as there is some indication of, is it more widespread within and between countries as well as sector-wise? Hence, the 'what' of civil society regionalization has to be further clarified, which also involves further investigations of what make CSOs 'regional'. This project highlighted five ways of 'going regional' but there are of course many others.

Secondly, there is a great need to dig deeper into the agency of CSOs on the regional level in terms of the motivations to 'go regional'. As indicated in the first chapter, this is a serious gap in contemporary research on civil society regionalization. This study has indeed filled a part of this gap and contributed a great deal to the understanding of regional agency, particularly in terms of the 16 investigated CSOs in the trade and HIV/AIDS sectors. However, more is yet to be said in order to paint a broader and more detailed picture of civil society regionalization. There is a need to treat CSOs even more as actors in their own right, as consciously constructing regionalization and building regions, in future studies. This includes a need to study the extent and ways in which CSOs can circumvent the pressure of social structures and contribute towards structural change. This study has moved in this direction but still privileged structure over agency and has not focused enough on how CSOs participate in social transformation. Also, further elaboration is needed in terms of the intra-organizational processes related to regionalization themselves. Identity-making, for example, is a very complicated and subtle process which is difficult to grasp and, so to speak, 'pin down'. To further understand this process, how it is played out and how it spurs regionalization is an important future research task. This requires targeting other CSOs from other sectors than those investigated in this study. It also requires new research techniques, for example participant observation. Since regional civil society forums such as the SADC Civil Society Forum, the Peoples' Summit and various annual partnership forums of regional NGOs and networks are important venues for identity-making, and also issue-framing, participating in them is crucial to further grasp the mechanisms related to these processes.

Thirdly, related to the need to further study CSO agency in regional processes is the importance of incorporating new dimensions. In particular, investigating mass media, ICT and language, and the ways in which CSOs relate to them in the process of 'going regional', can greatly benefit understanding of civil society regionalization in Southern Africa and also other regions. In terms of mass media, the diffusion of ideas about the region, for example in terms of trade, HIV/AIDS and other types of development-related issues, through transnational communication and media

circulation is important for regional integration to evolve (Blaauw 2007: 58), including the regionalization of civil society. Mass media is a helpful source of information on regional issues for CSOs and an important vehicle to spread their agendas to the wider public in the region. Two examples from Southern Africa are the South African newspaper Mail & Guardian, with its coverage of regional development issues, and SADC Today, a regional bulletin about SADC regional processes published by the regional information centre SARDC. Being featured in these and other types of media, as well as becoming more knowledgeable about regional processes, can strengthen the regional profile of CSOs (Southern Africa Trust 2010a). Hence, media can possibly raise the regional awareness of CSOs and strengthen regional issue-framing and identity-making, which fuels civil society regionalization. These processes are important to study in future projects.

Furthermore, linked to the above and indicated in section 1.5, the use of ICT can be important for civil society regionalization and another aspect of 'going regional'. For Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole, there has been a remarkable growth in ICT services in the past decade (MISA 2007). The SADC region in particular is quite well interconnected in terms of communication facilities. For example, all countries have established mobile telephone networks and the number of internet users is steadily rising (Peters-Berries 2010: 116). ICT can be a powerful force for regional integration, facilitating cross-border co-operation and transnational communication. In terms of civil society, ICT can strengthen co-operation between CSOs. In Zimbabwe, for example, through the Kubatana project[286] disparate CSOs have been able to work together and pool their resources in order to voice their concerns about human rights abuses in the country. This has involved the use of various communication technologies such as the internet and e-mail. This is one example of the positive effect of the increased presence of ICT for coalition-building among CSOs in Southern Africa, which can also be used to break down geographical boundaries and spur trans-border coalition-building (Michelson 2006). It is without doubt that ICT plays an important role for CSOs on a regional level. Strategically using various communication channels for regional work can indeed strengthen regionalization. Hence, studying the use of media and ICT in regional collaboration would enhance understanding of the motivations for 'going regional'. This is an important task for future investigations.

To move on, there are indications that the language question affects civil society regionalization. Too many spoken languages in a region can obstruct regional integration in the sense that cross-national communication is hampered. In the case of Southern Africa, English is indeed the dominant but not the only business language. Besides English, the SADC has two more official languages: Portuguese and French. In fact, it has proved to be costly and cumbersome to have three working languages, as additional translation services are needed at regional conferences and for all official documents. According to Peters-Berries, 'this slows down the speed of communication and sometimes decision-making' (2010: 124), in

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[286] The Kubatana Project, led by the Kubatana Trust of Zimbabwe, aims to strengthen the use of e-mail and internet strategies for Zimbabwean NGOs and makes human rights and civic education information accessible to Zimbabwean civil society (Kubatana Trust 2013).

the end negatively affecting regional integration. The same problem can be discerned in the civil society regionalization process. Since English is the regional *lingua franca*, but is not sufficiently mastered by many Portuguese and French-speaking CSOs from Angola, Mozambique, Mauritius, the DRC and Madagascar, there is a risk that some CSOs are marginalized in regional processes. One the other hand, English-speaking CSOs benefit from their privileged language position and can possibly dominate regional collaboration. There are already indications of this. Not having mastered English, CSOs from Mozambique claim that the language issue is a challenge for their ability to interact regionally. According to one commentator, 'English is the dominating language in many regional civil society meetings and often there are no translation facilities'.[287] Similarly, for MDG the domination of the English language prevents them and other CSOs from Mozambique from interacting regionally. Therefore, according to the MDG representatives, few people from Mozambique and Angola generally participate in regional forums.[288] The domination of CSOs from English-speaking countries, particularly South Africa, and the marginalization of non-English speaking CSOs can possibly hamper the overall regionalization process. These power dynamics are related to the general South African domination discussed in section 6.1.3. Most importantly, studying these dynamics would increase understanding of the heterogeneity of civil society regionalization in terms of the inherent power relations between CSOs from different countries, which warrants further research.

Fourthly, as indicated in section 6.3, there is a big debate around the legitimacy of CSOs. However, this debate primarily relates to so-called 'global civil society' and NGOs operating on a local-national level, not least in an African context. The legitimacy of CSOs operating regionally, in Africa and elsewhere, is largely under-researched and not particularly mentioned in the debate. While not explicitly focusing on this dimension of civil society regionalization, this research has shown that there are worrying signs of a general lack of legitimacy on behalf of regional NGOs and networks, which tend to be rather elitist. However, this question needs a lot more attention in future studies. This implies, for example, digging deeper into the extent to which CSOs on a regional level are representative of and accountable to various social groups in society and how much the grassroots people that CSOs often claim to safeguard and even represent, are involved in decision-making, project planning and implementation. In other words, how grounded is civil society regionalization on a more grassroots level? This touches upon important overarching questions related to how 'democratic' regional CSOs are and what 'democracy' means on a regional civil society level. Democracy is a hot topic in the discussion of regional governance in terms of how democratic RIGOs are, not least in Southern Africa, where the democratic state of the SADC is called into question (e.g. Godsäter 2014). It is equally important to scrutinize how 'bottom-up' the so-called 'bottom-up' aspect of regionalization really is and put the democratic state of RCSOs in the spotlight.

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[287] Moiana, interview, 17 November 2008

[288] Nemete and Guileugue, interview, 20 November 2008

Lastly, another important future research area is the policy implications of the study of civil society regionalization for donors and RIGOs. In terms of the former, supporting regional integration in general and civil society regionalization in particular is a new thing, and the present funding mechanisms for dealing with regional integration issues are far from perfect, as many of the interviewees in this study have underlined. Shedding light on the process of civil society regionalization will certainly assist donors in the improvement of regional funding for CSOs. How can donors better facilitate the regional engagement of CSOs and foster a more sustainable, but also bottom-up, type of regional integration in Africa and elsewhere? This involves developing the, quite weak, funding modalities for supporting CSOs working on the regional level. The same challenge relates to the SADC and other RIGOs in their quest (at least on paper) for improved interaction with CSOs in order to enhance development in the region. How can studies on civil society regionalization support and push RIGOs to take engagement with civil society more seriously and to better involve CSOs in regional integration? What new avenues of interaction with CSOs can be created? These are pertinent questions which warrant more policy-oriented studies of civil society regionalization. Last but not least, research on civil society regionalization can further support CSOs in their regional work, for example in terms of improved regional coalition-building and participation in regional governance, and in becoming more powerful in regional policy-making. This goes hand in hand with the normative driving force behind writing this thesis. Improved scholarly understanding of civil society regionalization can support CSOs as drivers of change in the quest for social- and economic justice and development in Southern Africa and elsewhere.

Svensk Sammanfattning
(Swedish Summary)

Sedan mitten av 80-talet har regionaliseringsprocesser intensifierats runt om i världen. Man pratar ofta om en ny våg av regionalism, kallad 'nya regionalismen' för att särskilja från den 'gamla regionalismen' som ägde rum på 50- och 60-talen. Många delar av världen är idag involverade i regionalt samarbete där stater, men även icke-statliga aktörer, sträcker sig utanför de nationella gränserna för att lösa gemensamma, regionala, problem relaterade till handel, säkerhet, miljö och utveckling. I detta avseende talar man ofta om 'regional styrning' (regional governance) inom ramen för regionala mellanstatliga organisationer (så kallade RIGOs) såsom European Union (EU), Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) och Southern African Development Community (SADC). Afrika är inget undantag i denna utveckling. I linje med den 'nya regionalismen' är även afrikanska länder angelägna att skapa formella, institutionaliserade regionala samarbeten för att uppnå ökad regional integration och utveckling. Den 'nya regionalismen' i Afrika involverar en rad olika typer av aktörer jämfört med den stats-centrerade första vågen. Vid sidan av stater spelar marknadsaktörer och civilsamhällesorganisationer (CSOs) en viktig roll i regional integration. I södra Afrika är denna trend särskilt tydlig.

Forskarvärlden är inte okunnig om de regionala processerna runt om i världen, inklusive Afrika, och den så kallade regionalismforskningen har blivit något av en akademisk tillväxtindustri i många samhällsorienterade discipliner, särskilt Internationella Relationer. Även om denna forskning tvekläst bidrar till förståelsen av regionala processer återstår viktiga luckor. Till exempel är betoningen på civilsamhället knapphändig. När CSOs tas upp i studier om regionala processer är det framförallt i relation till det regionala interstatliga samarbetet och inte i egenskap av självständiga aktörer. Detta är beklagligt då civilsamhället i praktiken kan vara en dynamisk kraft i regionala processer och förtjänar specifikt fokus. I södra Afrika är bristen på studier av civilsamhällesregionalisering särskilt stor och behovet av att analysera vilka faktorer och omständigheter som driver CSOs att arbeta regionalt är överhängande. I själva verket avfärdas ofta CSOs som obetydliga på den regionala arenan, trots många empiriska tecken på motsatsen.

Det övergripande syftet med denna avhandling är att analysera dynamiken bakom regionaliseringen av civilsamhälle i södra Afrika, både empiriskt och från ett teoretiskt perspektiv. Detta görs genom att bygga vidare på existerande forskning om detta fenomen i Afrika och på andra platser och samla in ny data. Fokus ligger på att förstå hur CSOs agerar i regionala processer och hur detta påverkas av externa aktörer såsom SADC och biståndsgivare. Det teoretiska perspektiv som anläggs i

studien är en kombination av Kritisk Teori och Socialkonstruktivism. Avhandlingen ställer tre forskningsfrågor:

- Hur påverkas civilsamhällesregionaliseringen av RIGOs och biståndsgivare?
- Hur är civilsamhället uppbyggt på den regionala nivån och hur relaterar CSOs till varandra i regionaliseringsprocessen?
- Vad är den interna motivationen hos CSOs till att arbeta regionalt?

Förutom dessa primära empiriska mål vill även avhandlingen bidra till den bredare teoretiska debatten om regionalism och internationella relationer, i synnerhet med avseende på civilsamhällets roll i regionala processer. Även om studien i första hand är avsedd för att öka kunskapen om och konceptualiseringen av civilsamhällesregionalisering i södra Afrika kan förhoppningsvis studiens resultat bidra till den empiriska och teoretiska förståelsen om denna process i andra världsregioner.

Den övergripande forskningsmetoden i denna avhandling är den kvalitativa fallstudien; en metod som används för att generera en djup förståelse för komplexiteten i specifika social fenomen, som i det här fallet utgörs av civilsamhällesregionalisering i södra Afrika. Inom detta övergripande fall görs två separata studier på två enskilda fall, nämligen regionalisering inom handels- respektive HIV/AIDS-sektorerna. Fokus ligger på 16 regionala NGOs (non-governmental organization) och nätverk, t.ex. SADC-Council of NGOs, Southern Africa Peoples' Solidarity Network, Southern Africa Aids Trust och Aids Rights Alliance of Southern Africa. Fallen jämförs sedan för att urskilja gemensamma mönster. Insamlingen av empiriskt material gjordes under två fältstudier i regionen 2008 och 2009, i första hand genom semi-strukturerade intervjuer med företrädare för CSOs, givare och SADC, men även genom insamling av diverse rapporter, utvärderingar och årsplaner relaterade till de undersökta organisationerna.

Forskningsresultaten i avseende på den första forskningsfrågan pekar på att SADCs och givares interaktion med CSOs har starkt påverkat och format civilsamhällesregionaliseringen i de båda sektorerna. Avhandlingen har ökat förståelsen för den externa kontext inom vilken CSOs' regionala samarbete äger rum, vilken utgörs av den underliggande statscentrerade och kapitalistiska regionala sociala ordningen i södra Afrika, inom ramen för den globaliserade världsordningen. SADC's och givares påverkan på CSOs bör förstås i ljuset av denna övergripande ordning. Detta manifesteras av att CSOs generellt förnekas inflytande över regionalt policy-skapande inom SADC, åtminstone på en högre beslutsnivå, då man endast får tillträde till policyproceser på lägre nivåer inom SADC sekretariatet. Vidare påvisar resultaten hur SADC dominerar de regionala handels- och HIV/AIDS agendorna och bestämmer vilka specifika frågor som betonas respektive marginaliseras i den regionala styrningen av handel och HIV/AIDS. SADC är djupt rotad i en nyliberal- och marknadsorienterad diskurs, som i sin tur kommer av den kapitaliska regionala ordningen i södra Afrika. Detta vilket tar sig uttryck i satsningar på handelsliberalisering och främjande av företagande, på bekostnad av sociala frågor som t.ex. informell handel och HIV/AIDS. Vissa HIV-AIDS-relaterade frågor som ligger i linje med den nyliberala, problem-lösande, diskursen, t.ex. produktion och

spridning av AIDS-mediciner och HIV-information (ofta outsourcade till icke-statliga aktörer) får uppmärksamhet i det SADC-ledda regionala samarbetet medan rättighetsfrågor som handlar om rätten till AIDS-vård och sexuella minoriteters rättigheter är marginaliserade.

Den regionala agendans utformning påverkar i sin tur vilka CSOs som är inkluderade respektive exkluderade i SADC. De CSOs som arbetar i linje med den nyliberala agendan och t.ex. erbjuder handelsrelaterad expertis samt levererar AIDS-relaterad service är mer involverade i SADC, åtminstone på sekretariatsnivå, än de CSOs som påverkar SADC att ge bättre stöd till informella handelsidkare och främja sexuella minoriteters rättigheter. Mest åsidosatta är de aktörer, ofta sociala rörelser, som genom social mobilisering vid SADC-toppmöten ifrågasätter själva det marknadsorienterade regionala projektet. Denna inkluderings-exkluderingsdynamik påverkar civilsamhällesregionaliseringen starkt då de CSOs som välkomnas i SADC stärks i sitt regionala arbete och de som stängs ute försvagas.

Gällande CSO-givarrelationer påvisar denna forskning att biståndspengar är ett stort incitament till regionalisering av civilsamhället. Tillgången till extern finansiering av regionalt arbete är relativt god, även om den fluktuerar starkt. Liksom SADC är givarna influerade av den nyliberala diskursen och bedriver ett bistånd som är marknadsorienterat och mätbart där rättighetsfrågor och påverkansarbete är underprioriterat. I själva verket är många CSOs starkt beroende av givarstöd för att kunna verka regionalt. Detta beroende påverkar dock regionaliseringen negativt i tre avseenden. För det första skapar biståndsberoendet en väldigt sårbar situation för CSOs då många givare är opålitliga i det att de regelbundet skiftar sitt stöd. T.ex. finns det tendenser på att givare ifrågasätter stöd till regionala civilsamhällesaktiviteter i förhållande till lokalt och nationellt utvecklingsarbete. För det andra tenderar biståndspengarna att skapa NGOs och nätverk som är mer intresserade av ekonomiska intressen och ökad (ibland personlig) materiell standard än socialt utvecklingsarbete. För det tredje har givare stort inflytande över CSOs agendor vilket i slutändan påverkar civilsamhälles-regionaliseringens karaktär i termer av vilka frågor som drivs och strategier som används regionalt samt relationen till SADC.

För att gå till den andra forskningsfrågan är en central slutsats i denna avhandling att civilsamhällesregionaliseringen är mångfaldig och konfliktfylld, framförallt i handelssektorn. Genom att bestämma vilka CSOs som är inkluderade och exkluderade i den regionala styrningen och stödja regionalt civilsamhällesarbete som antingen stödjer eller utmanar den nuvarande kapitalistiska ordningen i södra Afrika delar SADC respektive biståndsgivare upp det regionala civilsamhället. Avhandlingen konceptualiserar denna heterogena process genom att konstruera fyra kategorier av CSOs på den regionala nivån: kommersiella CSOs; partner CSOs; kritiska reformistiska CSOs; samt mostånds-CSOs, med olika agendor, strategier för det regionala arbetet och relationer till SADC. Relationen mellan dessa aktörer kännetecknas av spänningar och rivalitet som bygger på ideologiska motsättningar och konkurrens om ekonomiska resurser. En viktig illustration av dessa konflikter är existensen av två olika och konkurrerande regionala civilsamhällesforum som äger rum i samband med SADC's årliga toppmöten och den frostiga relationen dem

emellan. Den heterogena karaktären av det regionala civilsamhället kan hindra en fortsatt regionalisering och negativt påverka ett bredare regionalt samarbete.

I termer av den tredje forskningsfrågan påvisar denna avhandling att CSOs är förhållandevis aktiva i regionsbyggande i södra Afrika och tar en mer aktiv del av den regionala styrningen än vad tidigare forskning gett vid handen. Detta trots att, som vi sett ovan, CSOs påverkas starkt av den statscentrerade och kapitalistiska regionala ordningen. Ett centralt resultat är betydelsen av regional 'issue-framing' (inramning av frågor) som en viktig drivkraft för CSOs att arbeta på den regionala nivån. Regionala NGOs och nätverk, och dess nationella partners och medlemmar, tenderar att konstruera handels- och HIV/AIDS relaterade frågor som 'regionala'. Detta betyder att dessa frågor förstås i ett regionalt sammanhang; de anses angå hela regionen och kräver därför regionala lösningar. Regional 'issue-framing' är ofta kopplad till SADC som 'regional' organisation, med dess regionala agendor och policy ramverk, vilket är ett ytterligare incitament till att verka på den regionala arenan. Vidare är regionalt identitets-skapande den svagaste kraften bakom civilsamhällesregionaliseringen. De flesta CSOs i denna studie saknar en tydlig målgrupp, representerar inte specifika sociala grupper och drivs inte av tydliga värderingar vilket är centralt för att skapa starka kollektiva identiteter enligt gängse civilsamhällesforskning. För ett fåtal nätverk betyder dock identitetsskapande en hel del för viljan att verka regionalt. Dessa nätverk samt medlemsorganisationer skapar en bild av att de representerar specifika sociala grupper som t.ex. 'HIV-positiva', 'informella näringsidkare', 'arbetare' eller 'kristna' och/eller delar vissa starka värderingar och erfarenheter. Dessa sociala tillhörigheter, värderingar och erfarenheter konstrueras som 'transnationella/regionala' och inte kopplade till en viss stat, vilket möjliggör skapandet av identiteter som skär över nationsgränserna och i slutändan utlöser en vilja att samarbeta regionalt. Regionala möten är viktiga instrument för att reproducera regionala identiteter samt 'issue-framing.

Avhandlingen påvisar också att befästandet av ett regionalt medvetande hos CSOs, t.ex. i termer av identitetsskapande över nationsgränserna, negativt påverkas av nationalistiska krafter som närs av den stats-centrerade regionala ordningen. Flertalet medlemmar och partners till regionala nätverk och NGOs är starkt influerade av nationella intressen och identiteter och det regionala medvetande som växer fram är därmed inte lokalt förankrat. En central slutsats är att civilsamhällesregionalieringen är kortsiktig och ytlig då den inte reflekterar djupt rotade och utbredda känslor av regional gemenskap. CSOs går ibland 'den regionala vägen' för att det finns biståndspengar tillgängliga för regionalt arbete och för att höja organisationens profil genom att synas i SADCs korridorer. Det regionala arbetet tenderar därmed att vara styrt av SADC och givare.

Även om avhandlingens resultat i första hand gäller regionen södra Afrika finns det anledning att tro att regionaliseringsdynamiken där kan appliceras på andra världsregioner i det globala Syd. Det finns nämligen många likheter mellan civilsamhällena i Afrika, Latinamerika och Asien; t.ex. med avseende på relationen till staten, givarberoendet och den heterogena karaktären. Andra studier får dock påvisa i vilken grad och på vilka sätt denna avhandlings resultat ramverk kan användas för att förstå regionala civilsamhällesprocesser i andra delar av världen.

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Appendix

Table 3. Members of the Association of SADC Chambers of Commerce and Industry (ASCCI)

Member	Country
Angola Chamber of Commerce and Industry (CCIA)	Angola
Associacao Industrial de Mozambique (AIMO)	Mozambique
Botswana Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Manpower (BOCCIM)	Botswana
Confederation of Tanzania Industries (CTI)	Tanzania
Lesotho Chambers of Commerce and Industry (LCCI)	Lesotho
Malawi Confederation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry (MCCCI)	Malawi
Mauritius Chambers of Commerce and Industry (MCCI)	Mauritius
Namibia Chamber of Commerce and Industry (NCCI)	Namibia
Chambers of Commerce and Industry South Africa (SACCI)	South Africa
Seychelles Chambers of Commerce and Industry (SCCI)	Seychelles
Federation of Swaziland Employers and Chamber of Commerce (FSE&CC)	Swaziland
Zambia Association of Chambers of Commerce and Industry (ZACCI)	Zambia
Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries (CZI)	Zimbabwe
Zimbabwe National Chambers of Commerce (ZNCC)	Zimbabwe

Source: ASCCI (2013)

Table 4. Members of the SADC Employers Group (SEG)

Member	Country
Association of Lesotho Employers (ALE)	Lesotho
Association of Tanzania Employers (ATE)	Tanzania
Botswana Confederation of Commerce Industry and Manpower (BOCCIM)	Botswana
Business Unity South Africa (BUSA)	South Africa
Confederation of Business Associations of Mozambique (CTA)	Mozambique
Employers Confederation of Zimbabwe (EMCOZ)	Zimbabwe
Employers Consultative Association of Malawi (ECAM)	Malawi
Federation of Swaziland Employers and Chamber of Commerce (FSE&CC)	Swaziland
Mauritius Employers' Federation (MEF)	Mauritius
Namibian Employers' Federation (NEF)	Namibia
Zambia Federation of Employers (ZEF)	Zambia

Source: SEG (2010)

Table 5. Members of the SADC Council of Non-Governmental Organizations (SADC-CNGO)

Member	Country
Forum of Angolan Non-Governmental Organizations (FONGA)	Angola
Botswana Council of Non-Governmental Organizations (BOCONGO)	Botswana
Conseil National des ONGD	DRC
Lesotho Council of Non-Governmental Organizations (LCN)	Lesotho
Consortium de Solidarité avec Madagascar (CdSM)	Madagascar
Council for Non-Governmental Organizations in Malawi (CONGOMA)	Malawi
Mauritius Council of Social Service (MACOSS)	Mauritius
Forum Nacional das Organizações Não Governamentais em Moçambique (TEIA)	Mozambique
Namibia NGO Forum (NANGOF)	Namibia
Liaison-Unit of Non-Governmental Organisations of Seychelles (LUNGOS)	Seychelles
South African NGO Coalition (SANGOCO)	South Africa
Coordinating Assembly for Non-Governmental Organizations (CANGO)	Swaziland
Tanzania Association of NGOs (TANGO)	Tanzania
Zambia Council for Social Development (ZCSD)	Zambia
National Association of Non-Governmental Organizations (NANGO)	Zimbabwe

Table 6. Partners of the Southern African Research and Development Centre (SARDC) (selected)

Partner	Country
Women and Law Development in Africa (WLDAF)	Africa
Action for Rural Development and Environment (ADRA)	Angola
Rede Mulher and Development Workshop	Angola
Women's NGO Coalition	Botswana
Eastern and Southern African Management Institute (ESAMI)	Eastern and Southern Africa
Mauritius Alliance of Women	Mauritius
Forum Mulher	Mozambique
Centre for African Studies at University of Eduardo Mondlane	Mozambique
University of Namibia (UNAM)	Namibia
Seychelles Women's Commission	Seychelles
South Africa University of the Western Cape, Gender Equity Unit	South Africa
Centre for Development Research and Information in Southern Africa (CEDRISA)	Southern Africa
Southern African Development Community (SADC) Secretariat	Southern Africa
Southern African Power Pool (SAPP)	Southern Africa
Trade and Development Studies Centre (Trades Centre)	Southern Africa
Women and Law in Southern African (WLSA)	Southern Africa
Zambezi Watercourse Commission (ZAMCOM Secretariat)	Southern Africa
Zambezi River Authority	Southern Africa
Tanzania Gender Networking Programme (TGNP)	Tanzania
National Management Agency of Uganda	Uganda
Zambia Association for Research and Development (ZARD)	Zambia
Zambia Environmental Management Agency	Zambia
Media Monitoring Project Zimbabwe (MMPZ)	Zimbabwe
University of Zimbabwe	Zimbabwe
Zimbabwe Women's Resource Centre and Network (ZWRCN)	Zimbabwe

Source: SARDC (2013)

Table 7. Partners of the Southern and Eastern African Trade Information and Negotiations Institute (SEATINI) (selected)

Partner	Country
Africa Trade Network	Africa
African Women's Economic Policy Network (AWEPON)	Africa
Tax Justice Network-Africa	Africa
Third World Network-Africa	Africa
Action Développement et Intégration Régionale (ADIR)	Burundi
Collectif des association Paysannes pour l'auto development (CAPAD)	Burundi
L'expérience de l'Organisation d'appui à l'autopromotion (OAP)	Burundi
East African Civil Society Organizations' Forum (EACSOF)	East Africa
East African Community (EAC)	East Africa
Eastern African Sub Regional Support Initiative (EASSI)	East Africa
East African Trade Union Confederation	East Africa
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)	Eastern and Southern Africa
Eastern and Southern African Small Scale Farmers (ESSAF)	Eastern and Southern Africa
Association for Cooperative Operations Research and Development (ACORD)	Rwanda
Centre for Trade and Development Rwanda	Rwanda
Consultative Council of Organizations Supporting Grass-roots Initiatives (CCOAIB)	Rwanda
Southern African Development Community (SADC)	Southern Africa
Southern African Peoples' Solidarity Network (SAPSN)	Southern Africa
Arusha NGO Network (ANGONET)	Tanzania
Tanzania Civil Society Trade Coalition (TCSTC)	Tanzania
African Centre for Trade and Development (ACTADE)	Uganda
Ministry of East African Community Affairs (MEACA)	Uganda
Ministry of Tourism, Trade and Industry (MTTI)	Uganda
Uganda National Chamber of Commerce and Industry (UNCCI)	Uganda
Uganda Network of Businesses (UNB)	Uganda
Uganda NGO forum	Uganda
Community Technology Development Trust (CTDO)	Zimbabwe
Training and Research Support Centre (TARSC)	Zimbabwe
Zimbabwe Coalition on Debt and Development (ZIMCODD)	Zimbabwe

Source: SEATINI (2013a; 2013b)

Table 8. Partners of the Trade and Development Studies Centre (Trades Centre) (selected)

Partner	Country
African Forum and Network on Debt and Development (AFRODAD)	Africa
AIPAD	Africa
East African Community (EAC)	East Africa
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)	Eastern and Southern Africa
Southern and Eastern African Trade Information and Negotiations Institute (SEATINI)	Eastern and Southern Africa
Southern African Development Community (SADC)	Southern Africa
Southern African Research and Development Centre (SARDC)	Southern Africa
Government of Zambia	Zambia
Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries (CZI)	Zimbabwe
Ministry of Industry and Commerce	Zimbabwe
Ministry of Regional Integration and International Cooperation	Zimbabwe
Trade Capacity Building Project (TCBP)	Zimbabwe
University of Zimbabwe – Department of Economics	Zimbabwe
Zimbabwe Coalition on Debt and Development (ZIMCODD)	Zimbabwe
Zimbabwe Cross-Border Traders Association (ZCBTA)	Zimbabwe
Zimbabwe Economics Society	Zimbabwe
Zimbabwe Revenue Authority (ZIMRA)	Zimbabwe
Zim Trade	Zimbabwe
Women in Business	Zimbabwe
Women in Tourism	Zimbabwe

Source: Trades Centre (2010, 2011)

Table 9. Members of the Southern African Trade Union Coordination Council (SATUCC)

Member	Country
União Nacional dos Trabalhadores de Angola (UNTA-CS)	Angola
Central Geral De Sindicatos Independentes E Livres De Angola (CGSILA)	Angola
Botswana Federation of Trade Unions (BFTU)	Botswana
Confederation Syndicale du Congo (CSC)	DRC
Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU)	South Africa
Federation of Unions of South Africa (FEDUSA)	South Africa
National Council of Trade Unions (NACTU)	South Africa
Lesotho Congress of Trade Unions (LTUC)	Lesotho
Malawi Congress of Trade Unions (MCTU)	Malawi
Mauritius Trade Union Congress (MTUC)	Mauritius
Confederacao Nacional Dos Sindicatos independentes Liveres De Mozambique (CONSILMO)	Mozambique
Organizaçâo dos Trabalhadores de Moçambique (OTM-CS)	Mozambique
National Union of Namibian Workers (NUNW)	Namibia
Trade Union Congress of Namibia from Namibia (TUCNA)	Namibia
Trade Union Congress of Swaziland (TUCOSWA)	Swaziland
Trade Unions' Congress of Tanzania (TUCTA)	Tanzania
Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU)	Zambia
Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU)	Zimbabwe

Source: SATUCC (2013)

Table 10. Members of the Southern African Peoples' Solidarity Network (SAPSN)

Member	Country
Africa Trade Network (ATN)	Africa
The Gender & Trade Network in Africa (GENTA)	Africa
Associacao para Desenvolvimento Rural de Angola (ADRA)	Angola
Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP)	Malawi
Lalit	Mauritius
All Workers Conference (AWC)	Mauritius
Mozambiquen Debt Group (MDG)	Mozambique
Labour Resource and Research Institute (LARRI)	Namibia
Namibian Economic Policy Research Institute (NEPRU)	Namibia
Institute for Participatory Development (IPD)	South Africa
Ecumenical Service for Socioeconomic Transformation (ESSET),	South Africa
South African National NGO Coalition (SANGOCO)	South Africa
Alternative Information and Development Center (AIDC)	South Africa
Jubilee 2000	South Africa
National Education Health and Allied Workers Union (NEHAWU)	South Africa
Food and Allied Workers Union (FAWU)	South Africa
Southern Africa Clothing and Textile Workers Union (SACTWU)	South Africa
Reflection and Development Centre for NGOs in Eastern and Southern Africa (MWENGO)	Southern Africa
Southern African Council of Churches (SACC)	Southern Africa
Southern and Eastern African Trade Information Negotiations Institute (SEATINI)	Southern Africa
University of Swaziland, Political Science Department	Swaziland
Swaziland Solidarity Network (SSN)	Swaziland
Uganda Debt Network (UDN)	Uganda
Debt Project/Jubilee 2000 Zambia	Zambia
Zimbabwe Coalition on Debt and Development (ZIMCODD)	Zimbabwe
Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU)	Zimbabwe

Source: Söderbaum (2007)

Table 11. Members of the Economic Justice Network of FOCCISA (EJN)

Member	Country
Conselho de Igrejas Cristãs em Angola (CICA)	Angola
Botswana Council of Churches (BCC)	Botswana
Christian Council of Lesotho (CCL)	Lesotho
Malawi Council of Churches (MCC)	Malawi
Conselho Cristão de Moçambique (CCM)	Mozambique
Council of Churches in Namibia (CCN)	Namibia
South Africa Council of Churches (SACC)	South Africa
Council of Swaziland Churches (CSC)	Swaziland
Christian Council of Tanzania (CCT)	Tanzania
Council of Churches in Zambia (CCZ)	Zambia
Zimbabwe Council of Churches (ZCC)	Zimbabwe

Source: EJN (2013)

Table 12. Members of the Southern African Cross Border Traders Association (SACBTA)

Member	Country
Cross Border Traders Association of Malawi	Malawi
Association of Informal Sector Traders and Importers (MUKHERO)	Mozambique
Cross Border Traders Association in Zambia (CBTA)	Zambia
Zimbabwe Cross Border Traders Association (ZCBTA)	Zimbabwe
Cross Border Traders Association in Swaziland	Swaziland

Source: SACBTA (2012)

Table 13. Partners of the Southern African Aids Trust (SAT) (selected)

Partner	Country
African Network of Higher Education and Research in Theology HIV&AIDS	Africa
Soul City Institute	Africa
Botswana Christian AIDS and Intervention Programme: Selibe Phikwe Centre	Botswana
Botswana Council of NGO's (BOCONGO)	Botswana
Botswana Network of People Living With HIV Aids (BONEPWA)	Botswana
Botswana Network on Ethics Law & HIV/AIDS (BONELA)	Botswana
Pinagare Support Group	Botswana
Seetebosigo Theatre Group	Botswana
Women Against Rape	Botswana
Eastern African Network of AIDS Service Organizations (EANNASO)	East Africa
Human Rights Development Initiative (HRDI)	Eastern and Southern Africa
Regional AIDS Training Network (RATN)	Eastern and Southern Africa
Regional Psychosocial Support Initiative (REPPSI)	Eastern and Southern Africa
Friends of AIDS Support Trust	Malawi
Malawi Interfaith AIDS Association (MIAA)	Malawi
Malawi Network for AIDS Service Organizations	Malawi
Malawi Network of religious leaders living with or Personally Affected by HIV and AIDS (MANERELA+)	Malawi
Mtisunge PLWHA Support Organization	Malawi
Nkhotakota AIDS Support Organisation	Malawi
Salima AIDS Support Organisation	Malawi
IHLULILE PLWHA Support Group	Mozambique
Kuyakana PLWHA Women Support Group	Mozambique
Mozambique Treatment Access Movement (MATRAM)	Mozambique
Mozambican Network of AIDS Services Organizations (MONASO)	Mozambique
Network of religious leaders living with HIV and AIDS and personally affected (MONERELA+AD, NETIs)	Mozambique
Rede Nacional de SIDA (RENSIDA)	Mozambique
Tchavelela PLWHA Support Group	Mozambique
Health Economics and AIDS Research Division – University of KwaZulu Natal (HEARD)	South Africa
Aids and Rights Alliance Southern Africa (ARASA)	Southern Africa
Disability HIV and AIDS trust ([DHAT)	Southern Africa
Network of African People Living with HIV for Southern African Region (NAPSAR)	Southern Africa
Southern Africa AIDS Information and Dissemination Services (SAfAIDS)	Southern Africa
Advocacy Network for HIV and AIDS in Tanzania (ANAT)	Tanzania
Faraja AIDS Orphans and Training Centre	Tanzania
National Network of Organizations working with Children (NNOC)	Tanzania
Tanzania Network of Religious Leaders Living with or Personally Affected by HIV (TANERELA)	Tanzania
Tanzania Network of the Organizations for PLWHA (TANOPHA)	Tanzania
Women Skills Initiative Centre (WOSIC)	Tanzania
Youth/Parent Crisis Counseling Centre (YOPAC)	Tanzania
Copperbelt Health Education Project-Luanshya	Zambia
Family Health Trust	Zambia
HIV/AIDS Prevention Project (HAPN)	Zambia
Kabompo AIDS Programme (KAP)	Zambia
Traditional Health Practitioners of Zambia (THPAZ)	Zambia
Twafane Christian Community Care Centre	Zambia
Zambia Network of Religious Leaders Living with or personally affected by HIV and AIDS (ZANERELA+)	Zambia
Zambia AIDS Law Research & Advocacy Network (ZARAN)	Zambia
Family AIDS Caring Trust - Rusape	Zimbabwe
Gays and Lesbians of Zimbabwe	Zimbabwe
Insiza Godlwayo AIDS Council	Zimbabwe
Mutange Adventist AIDS Programme	Zimbabwe
Sesithule Vamanani Caring Association (SEVACA)	Zimbabwe
Umzingwane AIDS Network (UAN)	Zimbabwe
Zimbabwe National Network for Religious Leaders infected and affected by HIV and AIDS (ZINERELA)	Zimbabwe

Source: SAT (2013a, 2013b)

Table 14. Partners of the Southern Africa HIV and AIDS Information Dissemination Service (SAfAIDS) (selected)

Partner	Country
African Network for the Prevention and Protection against Child Abuse and Neglect (ANPPCAN)	Africa
African Network of Higher Education and Research in Theology HIV&AIDS	Africa
Soul City Institute	Africa
Eastern African Network of AIDS Service Organizations (EANNASO)	East Africa
Human Rights Development Initiative (HRDI)	Eastern and Southern Africa
Regional Psychosocial Support Initiative (REPPSI)	Eastern and Southern Africa
Lesotho Catholic Bishops Conference	Lesotho
Lesotho Network of People Living with HIV and AIDS (LENEPHWA)	Lesotho
Phelisanang Bophelong	Lesotho
Society of Women Against AIDS in Lesotho (SWAALES)	Lesotho
Chitani Organization	Malawi
Gender Support program	Malawi
Malawi Network of Religious Leaders Living/Affected by AIDS (MANELERA)	Malawi
Malawi Network of People Living with HIV/AIDS (MANET)	Malawi
Aro Juvenil	Mozambique
ECoSIDA-Associacao de Empresarios contra o Sida	Mozambique
FOCADE-Forum de ONG,s de Cabo Delgado	Mozambique
Mocambicana de Lideres Relegiosos vivendo com HIV	Mozambique
Mozambican Network of AIDS Services (MONASO)	Mozambique
Rede Nacional de Associacoes de Pessoas Vivendo Com HIV/SIDA (RENSIDA)	Mozambique
AIDS Care Trust (ACT)	Namibia
Namibia NGO Forum (NANGOF)	Namibia
Namibia Women's Health Network (NWHN)	Namibia
AIDS Response Trust	South Africa
Grandmothers Against Poverty and AIDS (GAPA)	South Africa
Health and other Services Trade Union of South Africa	South Africa
Health Economics and AIDS Research Division – University of KwaZulu Natal (HEARD)	South Africa
National Union of Public Services and Allied Workers	South Africa
Positive Women's Network	South Africa
Aids and Rights Alliance Southern Africa (ARASA)	Southern Africa
Disability HIV and AIDS trust ([DHAT)	Southern Africa
Network of African People Living with HIV and AIDS (NAPSAR)	Southern Africa
Panos Southern Africa	Southern Africa
Southern Africa AIDS Trust (SAT)	Southern Africa
Women and Law in Southern Africa (WLSA)	Southern Africa
Regional AIDS Training Network (RATN)	Southern and Eastern Africa
Church Forum	Swaziland
Khulisa Umntfwana	Swaziland
Positive Women Together	Swaziland
Shiselweni Reformed Church	Swaziland
Swaziland Business Coalition on HIV and AIDS (SWABCHA)	Swaziland
Swaziland Network of People Living with HIV/AIDS (SWANNEPHA)	Swaziland
Swaziland Positive Living (SWAPOL)	Swaziland
Family Health Trust (FHT)	Zambia
Network of Zambian People living with HIV (NZP+)	Zambia
Planned Parenthood Association of Zambia (PPAZ)	Zambia
Society for Women and AIDS in Zambia (SWAAZ)	Zambia
Treatment Advocacy and Literacy Campaign (TALC)	Zambia
Young Women in Action (YWA)	Zambia
Zambia National Farmers Union	Zambia
Contact – Family counseling Centre	Zimbabwe
Insiza Godlwayo Aids Council	Zimbabwe
Lupane Women's Centre	Zimbabwe
Uzumba Orphan care (UOC)	Zimbabwe
Zimbabwe lawyers for human rights	Zimbabwe
Zimbabwe Nurses Association	Zimbabwe
Zimbabwe Women Lawyers Association	Zimbabwe

Source: SAfAIDS (2013a; 2013b; 2013c; 2013d); SAT 2013b

Table 15. Partners of the AIDS and Rights Alliance for Southern Africa (ARASA)

Partner	Country
Associacao de Reintegracao dos Jovens/Criancas na Vida Social (SCARJOV)	Angola
The Botswana Network on Ethics, Law and HIV/AIDS (BONELA)	Botswana
Rainbow Identity Association,	Botswana
Action SIDA Comores	Comoros
Protection Enfants Sida (PES)	DRC
Rigiac Sida Sannam	DRC
Adventist Development & Relief Agency (ADRA)	Lesotho
Development for Peace Education (DPE)	Lesotho
Lesotho Network of PLWA (LENEPWHA)	Lesotho
Phelisanang Bophelong (PB)	Lesotho
Sambatra Izay Salama (SISAL)	Madagascar
Centre for the Development of People (CEDEP)	Malawi
Centre for Human Rights and Rehabilitation (CHRR)	Malawi
Coalition of Women Living with HIV/AIDS in Malawi (COLWHA)	Malawi
Grassroots Movement for Health and Development (GMHD)	Malawi
National Women's Lobby and Rights Group (NAWOLG)	Malawi
REACH Trust	Malawi
Idrice Goomany Centre for Prevention and Treatment of Alcoholism and Drug Addiction	Mauritius
Prévention Information et Lutte contre le Sida (PILS)	Mauritius
Associação Kindlimuka	Mozambique
Associacao Mulher Lei e Desenvovimento (MULEIDE)	Mozambique
Association for Help and Development (PFUNANI)	Mozambique
Mozambican Treatment Access Movement (MATRAM)	Mozambique
AIDS Law Unit, Legal Assistance Centre of Namibia (LAC)	Namibia
Rights Not Rescue Trust (RNRT)	Namibia
Tonata PLWHA Network	Namibia
HIV/AIDS Support Organization of Seychelles (HASO)	Seychelles
African AIDS Vaccine Programme's Co-ordinating and Resource Facility on Ethics, Law and Human Rights (AAVP ELH)	South Africa
AIDS and Human Rights Research Unit, University of Pretoria (AHRRU)	South Africa
AIDS Legal Network (ALN)	South Africa
Community Health Media Trust/Beat It	South Africa
Section 27, incorporating the AIDS Law Project (ALP)	South Africa
The Unit for Social Behavior Studies in HIV/AIDS and Health (USBAH)	South Africa
Treatment Action Campaign (TAC)	South Africa
Disability HIV and AIDS trust ([DHAT)	Southern Africa
Human Rights Development Initiative (HRDI)	Southern Africa
Network of African People Living Positively, African Region (NAPSAR)	Southern Africa
Regional AIDS Training Network (RATN)	Southern Africa
Southern Africa AIDS Trust (SAT)	Southern Africa
Southern Africa HIV and AIDS Information Dissemination Service (SAfAIDS)	Southern Africa
SADC Parliamentary Forum (SADC PF)	Southern Africa
The Southern African Treatment Access Movement (SATAMO)	Southern Africa
Population Services International (PSI), Swaziland	Swaziland
Swaziland Positive Living (SWAPOL)	Swaziland
Women and Law in Southern Africa Research Trust (WLSA)	Swaziland
Children's Dignity Forum (CDF)	Tanzania
Children Education Society (CHESSO)	Tanzania
Southern African Human Rights Network, Tanzania Chapter (SAHRiNGON)	Tanzania
Copperbelt Health Education Programme (CHEP)	Zambia
Friends of RAINKA	Zambia
Prisons Care and Counseling Association (PRISCCA)	Zambia
Treatment Advocacy and Literacy Campaign (TALC)	Zambia
Youth Vision	Zambia
Zambia AIDS Law Research and Advocacy Network (ZARAN)	Zambia
Zambia Network of Religious Leaders Living With or Personally Affected by HIV and AIDS (ZANRELA+)	Zambia
Gays and Lesbians of Zimbabwe (GALZ)	Zimbabwe
Network of Zimbabwean Positive Women (NZPW+)	Zimbabwe
Women and Law in Southern Africa Research Trust Zimbabwe (WLSA Zimbabwe)	Zimbabwe
Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights (ZLHR)	Zimbabwe
Zimbabwe National Network of People Living with HIV (ZNNP+)	Zimbabwe

Source: ARASA (2013); SAT (2013b)

Table 16. Members of the Network of African People Living with HIV and AIDS for Southern Africa Region (NAPSAR)

Member	Country
Rede de Mulheres Vivendo Com VIH/SIDA (Rede MWENHO)	Angola
Botswana Network of People Living with HIV and AIDS (BONEPWA)	Botswana
Lesotho Network of People Living with HIV and AIDS (LENEPWHA)	Lesotho
Malawi Network of People Living with HIV and AIDS (MANET)	Malawi
Rede Nacional de Associacoes de Pessoas Vivendo Com HIV/SIDA (RENSIDA)	Mozambique
Lironga Eparu	Namibia
National Association of People Living with HIV and AIDS South Africa (NAPWA SA)	South Africa
Swaziland Network of People Living with HIV and AIDS (SWANNEPWHA)	Swaziland
Zambia Network of People Living with HIV and AIDS (NZP)	Zambia
Zimbabwe National Network of People Living with HIV and AIDS (ZNNP)	Zimbabwe

Source: NAPSAR (2013)

Table 17. Members of the Regional Aids Training Network (RATN)

Member	Country
Institute of Development Management (IDM)	Botswana
African Medical & Research Foundation (AMREF)	Kenya
Centre for African Family Studies (CAFS)	Kenya
Kenya AIDS Vaccine Initiative (KAVI)	Kenya
Gertrude's Peadiatric Training Centre	Kenya
Liverpool VCT Care and Treatment (LVCT)	Kenya
Kenya Association of Professional Counsellors (KAPC)	Kenya
Network for Researchers in Eastern and Southern Africa (NARESA)	Kenya
University of Nairobi, Clinical Epidemiology Unit (CEU)	Kenya
Institute of Development Management (IDM)	Lesotho
Malawi College of Health Sciences (MCHS)	Malawi
Malawi Institute of Management (MIM)	Malawi
Kigali Health Institute (KHI)	Rwanda
Pro Femme Twese Hamwe	Rwanda
Health Economic and HIV/AIDS Research Division (HEARD)	South Africa
Southern Africa AIDS Dissemination Service (SAfAIDS)	Southern Africa
Southern African AIDS Trust (SAT)	Southern Africa
Eastern and Southern African Management Institute (ESAMI)	Eastern and Southern Africa
Regional Psycho-Social Support Initiative (REPSSI)	Eastern and Southern Africa
Mananga Centre for Regional Integration and Management Development	Swaziland
Tanzania Gender Networking Programme (TGNP)	Tanzania
AIDS Information Centre (AIC)	Uganda
Infectious Diseases Institute (IDI)	Uganda
Mildmay Uganda (MU)	Uganda
The AIDS Support Organization (TASO)	Uganda
Traditional and Modern Health Practitioners Together Against AIDS (THETA)	Uganda
Uganda National Consumers Organization (UNHCO)	Uganda
Churches Health Association of Zambia (CHAZ)	Zambia
In-Service Training Trust (ISTT)	Zambia
Kara Counseling and Training Trust Ltd (KCCT)	Zambia
The Salvation Army, Chikankata Mission Hospital	Zambia
CONNECT - Zimbabwe Institute of Systemic Therapy	Zimbabwe
Family AIDS Caring Trust (FACT)	Zimbabwe
Genito-Urinary Centre (GUC)	Zimbabwe
Zimbabwe Open University (ZOU)	Zimbabwe

Source: RATN (2013)