

Master's thesis in Global Studies (15 ECTS)

# **THE EPITOME OF A LOST PEOPLE'S HOME**

*Sweden Democrats' Discourse of Ontological Security And National Identity  
Formation*

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# ABSTRACT

As globalization processes are continuously developing, and bringing the world in to every person's backyard, many problems may arise. Insecurity in one's self-identity, national belonging and cultural heritage may entail several shifts in the political discourse. The theoretical underpinning for this thesis, which is ontological security, addresses these issues and attempts to make sense of sociopolitical orders and events on several levels. As Sweden faces a new era in politics, one in which nationalist movements may play a greater role, they bring along issues of national identity and appeal to security aspects of identity. It may be possible that such parties are gaining strength from the central role of national identity in their party program, but then what does this mean in the formation of national identity? The importance of understanding their discursive practices in national identity formation, based on ontological security issues, may become key in understanding the consequences. Furthermore, this paper strives to gain a better understanding of what the possibilities are to mitigate ontological insecurity by a less securitized, and inclusive inference that responds to the current demographic. This paper recognizes the reflexive nature of both discourse and identity formation, hence the issue is not to step outside the discourse, but to demonstrate the discursive mechanisms and their possible implications in terms of their reflexivity. So forth, reflexivity will demonstrate the issues of discourses becoming entrenched, intertwined and possibly misguided in any attempt of mitigating of ontological security through securitizing and excluding. Awareness shall anyhow be directed toward the politolinguistic practices deployed by nationalist movements. Because, by understanding the discursive goals, we may also hypothesize on the implications. This paper will bring about central nominations, predications, argumentations, perspectivizations and intensifications/mitigations in the discursive practices of the Sweden Democrats and contextualize their rhetoric, in order to gain an understanding of their discursive means and aims. Several discursive components shall be elucidated, as well as the party's constructed discursive role. This shall bring about an understanding of the Sweden Democrats' constructed role in the discourse, but also by which means they approach such a depiction, and what that may ensue for defined out-group members.

**Keywords: Sweden Democrats, Discourse, Ontological Security, Identity Formation, National Identity**

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# INTRODUCTION

The field of how identity formation is related to the relationship of in-group affiliations and prejudice is a highly topical issue with long traditions within the social sciences. It goes back as far as Sumner's (1906) idea of 'ethnocentrism', and its inherent devaluation of out-groups. Albeit, other researchers have been arguing otherwise (Allport. 1954), it has been a dominant argument among researchers that the option to reject an out-group can serve as a strengthening of the in-group. This discussion about in- and out-group affiliations touches upon the socio-psychological issue of ontological security. That is, the security of one self as to who one is, and the need to experience one as a whole, continuous person through time, rather than always changing (Mitzen. 2006:342). Ontological security involves the need to feel secure in who one is, and to the identity that one chooses to subscribe. At times, insecurity to one's ontological identity can bring forward issues of prejudice, exclusion and the sustaining of destructive relationships. In order to operationalize a way forward in mitigating the feelings of insecurity, it is of importance to scrutinize the issue of identity formation to further understand the mechanisms at play in processes of group affiliations. A specific area in which identity formation historically has been debated in the European context is in relation to national identity. Although, acceptance towards a certain level of ontological insecurity within a population may be needed, leaving the discourse of ontological security in the context of national identity undebated may serve as an opening for populist mobilization. As globalization processes continues to develop, it has been postulated that certain identity markers such as religion and nationalism has become powerful responses to a crisis in ontological security (Kinnvall. 2004). This in turn may give rise to prejudice and exclusive politics. In my thesis I take my point of departure in the view of the social psychologist Henri Tajfel (1981:2), that prejudice denotes a serious social problem, which in essence means prejudice and as such ensues the de-individualization of members of an out-group, based on unfavorable stereotypes. Also, the consequences of a destructive form of ontological insecurity and prejudice correspond with what Gunnar Myrdal (1944:ch. 45) noted in *An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy*. He stated that any rise in the black population's status accompanied by a fall in the white population's prejudice would not only bring better conditions for the blacks, but would also consolidate inner unity for the whites. Thus, fracturing the fundamentals of identification between two groups, may stratify the population, and submerge it into a dilemma of identification not only in concern of national identity, but also self-identity. With this I want to demonstrate consequences and the linkage between prejudice, national identity and self-identity, which are key issues within ontological security. I

will come back to the notion of interconnectedness between national and self-identity later on in this thesis. The central interest in this thesis lies in what national identity discourse actually constitutes, its implications on out-groups and the possibilities of mitigating felt ontological insecurity through other means than exclusive policies. Moreover, it has been pointed out that many Western states are in a state of crisis when it comes to establishing a shared framework of national identity, this leaves a void in the process of constructing a shared sociopolitical purpose connecting the state with its citizens, a void which may be viable for parties to exploit for populist messages based on national stereotypes (Chandler. 2004). The core problematic that spurs this thesis may be formulated as: the lack of interest in national identity formation and mitigation strategies in felt ontological insecurity by the broader political spectra, may result in a unilateral national identity formation discourse by nationalists and populists, which then are given preferential right of interpretation.

In recent times, a rather rancorous debate has been conducted towards certain immigrant groups' lack of integration into the Swedish society. Certainly, international migration has in recent years been at unprecedented high levels and unlikely to decline. Furthermore, about 150 million people are estimated to be living outside their country of nationality (UNHCR. 2001:1). With recent migration trends all over the world, Sweden has not been left unaffected. For example, over the past 60 years the Muslim population has grown substantially in Sweden. From just a few individuals prior to 1950, to approximately 100,000 by the end of the 1980s. Furthermore, by 1996 the Muslim population had grown to 200,000 and by the year 2000 it reached approximately 350,000. Slightly over 85 percent of Sweden's Muslim population, or 300,000 of 350,000, have arrived in Sweden, or been born here, subsequent to 1985 (Otterbeck, Bevelander. 2006:8). Indeed, I do not wish to present a homogenous image of the Muslim community, it should rather be considered as an adaptation to the framing of the dichotomous debate. The entry of the party Sweden Democrats have further exacerbated the dichotomous debate of immigration, by issuing debate articles titled "Muslims are our biggest foreign threat" and stating that they will "do everything in their power to reverse the trend" (Åkesson. 2009). This party, having not been part of the parliament until 2006 - because of the 4 percent threshold - has in recent polls been measured as the third biggest party in Sweden, reaching as high as 14 percent in January 2013 (Svensk Opinion. 2013). The party's main ideological agenda is constructed around the notion of national identity, which distinctively separates them from the other political parties and can be considered a new element in Swedish politics. Thus, it is of importance to understand what it is that constitutes national identity in such a political party's views, and what entails if they are given preferential

rights of interpretation on the subject. Hence, turning a blind eye to the notion of national identity formation may ensue negative consequences to the other political parties' influence on that discourse. If the other political parties pursue a pragmatic political agenda in which they approach the mainstream of politics, fundamental and existential questions may end up uncontested in the Sweden Democrats' court. For instance, concerns has been raised if the Sweden Democrats are hijacking the debate on honor violence in order to facilitate their political agenda of limiting immigration (Schyman. 2012). So forth, the discourse of national identity may be subjected to a similar rhetorical approach.

This thesis will elucidate the boundaries of national identity established by the Sweden Democrats. Through a post-structuralist approach their political discourse will be deconstructed and its implications measured in terms of prejudice. The conclusions will elaborate on lessons that can be learned in how to mitigate ontological insecurity without construing images of in and out groups through stereotypical depictions.

## AIM

This study aims to deconstruct and map out the discursive content of the national identity propagated by the Sweden Democrats. This deconstruction will be a point of departure to further explore the prejudicial implications and possibilities of approaching mitigation of ontological anxiety through the theoretical field of ontological security. A transformative mixed methods approach of the concept ontological security will be utilized in order to move beyond a mere shallow understanding. That is, based on the discourse as well the theoretical approach, this study promotes a pragmatic viewpoint from which policy relevant discussion can be drawn. Moreover, the content to be analyzed will include both information on the Sweden Democrats' own identity philosophy as well as contextual elements.

## RESEARCH QUESTIONS

- (1) How do the Sweden Democrats discursively form their basis of national identification, and what possible implications does that ensue for defining out-group members?; and
- (2) Based on the theoretical understandings of identity formation and ontological security, how can possible insecurity be mitigated by a less securitized, and inclusive inference?

# THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This section presents the theoretical concepts that will be utilized, but should not be seen merely as an analytical framework. It will serve as a state of the arts in the field of identity formation as well as ontological security, and will be the theoretical groundwork for the analytical approach of this paper.

## IDENTITY FORMATION

As mentioned in the introduction, the field of identity formation in the social sciences has a history that stretches back over 100 years. Starting with Sumner's (1906) account of 'ethnocentrism', which states that one inevitably devalues out-groups as a causality to one's own group belonging. But, as Allport (1954) managed to demonstrate, there is no need for hate towards an out-group in identity formation, though he stresses that it helps. Furthermore, in more recent research, this idea of in-group affiliation and prejudice towards the out-group, is still strong. But, as has been highlighted by Billig (2002), social identity tradition has not been able to explain the phenomenon of 'bigotry'<sup>1</sup>. Billig calls for the utilization of a discursive analytical framework to understand what constructs prejudice in group affiliations. Reicher and Hopkins (2001) argues that national leaders need to be successful in asserting and portraying identity content in a manner that can be enabling to the nation in realizing what is constructed as its 'true' identity.

Recently, Pehrson, Brown and Zagefka (2009) has pointed at the causal relationship between essentialist in-groups' willingness to act against an immigrant group and asylum seekers. This, has been demonstrated as a direct causal linkage which highlights the consequences of group identification with a specific essentialist ideology. Furthermore, this comes to show that what defines the in-group as 'us', has a real causal role to play in defining personal identities. In a nationalistic in-group affiliation, this has been demonstrated to have the consequence of projecting determinations of autonomy, unity and identity (Pehrson, Brown & Zagefka. 2009:74).

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<sup>1</sup> intolerance towards those who hold different opinions from oneself. "bigotry". Oxford Dictionaries. April 2010. Oxford Dictionaries. April 2010. Oxford University Press. <http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/bigotry> (accessed May 12, 2013).

Furthermore, in terms of taxonomy, as illustrated by Hopkins & Kahani-Hopkins (2009), the utilization of an approach which predetermines certain notions of coining what is to be considered as an extreme or moderate viewpoint is in itself problematic. That is, terming a view to be characterized by extremist values, does in itself speak very little of the actual content of social actors' construction of reality. So forth, these assumptions help us very little in determining the essence of an ideology or identity. To exemplify, the values based in one's identity may well be extremist, such as Dr. Martin Luther King's notion of social justice which he held forward as extreme (Hopkins & Kahani-Hopkins. 2009:101). But, as demonstrated, the notion of extremism is composed of various negative connotations, which in turn do not provide any solid analytical foundation in this context. What is of importance in this case is to understand the implications and objectives of the aforementioned extreme viewpoint. Albeit, this is an aspect of consideration, based on this theoretical groundwork such normative taxonomies are for all intents and purposes to be avoided throughout this paper.

## ONTOLOGICAL (IN)SECURITY

Several authors have been influential in the exploration of the concept of ontological security, albeit applying it to different fields. The concept was initially developed through the works of Ronald David Laing (1960) in the field of psychology, later on, through the author Anthony Giddens (1991), the concept was brought in to sociology, and most recently it has been introduced to the field of International Relations by Jennifer Mitzen (2006). Through the work of Giddens two ingredients are presented as being crucial in the theory of human existence, which is 'ontological security' and 'existential anxiety'. In that sense, the very concept of ontological security can be seen as a base of protection and trust, which ensues an emotional inoculation against existential anxiety (Giddens. 1991:38-39). In other words, it is to be seen as a prerequisite for agency and self-identity. Moreover, this is not something that is given but is a narrative that needs to be routinely reconstructed and sustained by reflexive activities on the behalf of the individual. So forth, as the global political and economic climate is embarking on an ever-escalating globalization process, it has been postulated that certain type of 'identity-signifiers' - such as religion or nationalism - has become a powerful response to identity construction in a time of crisis in ontological security (Kinnvall. 2004). This reflexive characteristic of ontological security is reflected in the broader concept of modernity as well as the methodology of this paper in regards to the dialectical relationship between consumption and production of texts and social practices (Giddens. 1991:5, 14; Richardson. 2007:45). The



aforementioned authors apply this concept to analyze actors and agents which are relevant within their respective field, albeit the central components are the same and they will all be important in presenting a rich description of ontological security. Hence, the descriptive image will be allowed to vary as Mitzen's focus is mainly on state actors, Giddens' on people in social constructs and Laing's on people's psychological construct.

As mentioned, ontological security refers to the security of one self as to who one is, and the need to experience one as a whole, continuous person through time, rather than always changing. That involves the need to feel secure in who one is, and to the identity that one prescribes. It has been pointed out, that the ontological identity is formed and sustained through relationships. That is, by routinizing the relationship with significant others, which then forms social relationships (Mitzen. 2006:342). Furthermore, in security issues, the identity needs to demarcated and labeled in order for it to be 'securable' in relation to the dangerous 'others' (Stern. 2006:192). This constitutes a stratification between the people included in the identity and the people being excluded. The ramifications of this identity building can sometimes lead towards the construction of unsustainable relationships. That is, it might be of higher interest to sustain a bad relationship, because it certifies the one-ness of the identity, resulting an enduring rivalry, rather than heading for uncertainty. And, the subjects that do not measure up to the constituted demarcations, can only fail (*ibid*:199). This constitutes a very post-structuralist thought, as it asserts the relativity of (in)security in a given environment or group in relation to its demarcations and dissent. That is also how the concept is intended to be used in this study. Unsustainable relationships in this context may be seen as the blind commitment to routines in a sort of 'neurotic compulsion', where actors may get locked in to a security dilemma because of a basic lack of trust in each other (Browning & Joenniemi. 2010:6; Giddens. 1991:40). Rigid constructs of routines in themselves and a lack of adaptation to circumstances may indicate this kind of dilemma. Hence, ontological security should not be regarded as a matter of feeling safe through routines (essentially lack of routines may in itself be a routine), but to possess the tools to cope with changes in routines (Craib. 1998:72).

What has been postulated as a counter to violence in the context of manifestation of self-identity is the suspension of the demand of complete coherence in the identity, thus diminishing the demand for people to manifest that identity (Stern. 2006:199). Moreover, the routinizing of relationships and trust building through truth commissions, and other reconciliation processes has been suggested to be essential components of change in state relations (Mitzen. 2006:343). Trust is inherently a very important component of ontological security as it enables and allows for creative thought, adaptive behavior and is a prerequisite

for learning (Krolkowski. 2008:113). Ontological security has been mentioned as a basic need and cannot explain variation, in the sense that it is like the desire of physical security. And, it does constitute an indication of the stability of social relationships (*ibid*:342). Moreover, it has been said that the aporia of the broader term security, lies in that "the political structures of modernity, patriarchy and capitalism are the sources [rather than the vulnerable objects] of insecurity" (Burke. 2002:4). This, might in turn also be true for ontological security. This critique has postulated that security as a concept may no longer be viable; so forth, this paper do not wish to re-evaluate the usage of the concept ontological security, but rather to draw from its theoretical underpinnings in an abductive manner.

## METHODOLOGY & ANALYTICAL STRATEGY

In this coming section, I will elucidate the operationalization of the presented concepts. As will be clarified, the abductive approach taken by this paper will serve as a theoretical underpinning in the formulation of the given researchable issues and delimit data collection. The aim is to conduct a discourse and a content analysis based on the official party program of the Sweden Democrats, as well as their media coverage. The discourse analysis will represent the qualitative data and the content analysis will serve as a quantification and categorization. This method will be utilized to triangulate the qualitative information with the broader quantitative data. This way of conducting research has been described by Creswell (2009) as a transformative mixed method approach, defined as “procedures [...] in which the researcher uses a theoretical lens as an overarching perspective within a design that contains both quantitative and qualitative data. The lens provides a framework for topics of interest, methods for collecting data, and outcomes or changes anticipated by the study” (Creswell, 2009:25). Since there has been an alleged concern towards the lack of advocacy in terms of social justice promoted by mixed method inquiries, this transformative conduct will strive to circumvent that problematic (Sweetman, Badiee & Creswell, 2010). To emphasize the choice of a mixed method approach, it have been expressed as an inference that has the potential to reach greater strength than qualitative or quantitative solely (*ibid*:4).

Moving on to the methodological point of departure, the concept of critical discourse analysis will be explored in this section as well as the broader field of discourse analysis, coupled with the quantitative method of content analysis.

### DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

Through verbal communication, discourse analysis is concerned with investigating the relationship between form and function. Through key concepts which are defined as; (1) intertextual and inter-discursive relationships; (2) historicity; and (3) the contextual situation (Wodak & Krzyzanowski, 2008:2) this methodological framework will provide the basis for understanding the semiotics in the material. Here, intertextuality refers to the fact that all texts are linked together through time. Inter-discursivity refers to the inter-connectedness of discourses, such as the link between the discourse on (un)employment, often have an intrinsic link to other discourses, such as gender or racism. To put it simple, the usage of the concept discourse analysis, is sometimes vaguely defined, but is rudimentary the analysis of text in context. Thus, it contains no specific methodological system of analysis, but approaches the

semiotics of verbal communication through contextualization (*ibid*:5). Although some researchers have suggested that discourse is solely concerned with inter-relations of sentences; it has been pointed out that much of discourses are based in a wider inter-personal, institutional, socio-cultural and material contexts (Richardson. 2007:24). Other than that, this paper intends to take a specifically critical approach within the field of discourse analysis which will be further explained in the next section.

### *Critical Discourse Analysis*

The abductive mixed method approach conducted by this paper is constructed within a specific field of thought, which has been termed critical discourse analysis. The critical perspective is concerned with elucidating how ideologies and power structures are connected to the discourse, rather than just scraping at a broader semantic level. This is a type of discourse analysis that was developed by Norman Fairclough and includes prominent authors in the field, such as Ruth Wodak. This interest in power gives rise to a growing interest in textual powers, such as the media. Also, this raises interest in the 'learning' process and the transformation of subjectivity. Basic assumptions within critical discourse analysis, which separates it from other forms of linguistic analysis is that it postulates that; (1) language is a social phenomenon; (2) not only individuals, but institutions and social groupings have specific meaning and values, that are expressed in language in a systematic way; (3) texts are relevant units of language in communication; (4) readers are not passive recipients in their relationship to texts; and (5) there are similarities between the language of science and the language of institutions (Kress. 1989). As formulated by the aforementioned authors, a well-established definition is as follows:

CDA [Critical Discourse Analysis] sees discourse - language use in speech and writing - as a form of 'social practice'. Describing discourse as social practice implies a dialectical relationship between particular discursive event and the situation(s), institution(s) and social structure(s), which frame it. The discursive event is shaped by them, but it also shapes them. That is, discourse is socially constitutive as well as socially conditioned - it constitutes situations, objects of knowledge, and the social identities of and relationships between people and groups of people. It is constitutive both in the sense that it helps to sustain and reproduce the social status quo, and in the sense that it contributes to transforming it. Since discourse is so socially consequential, it gives rise to important issues of power. Discursive practice may have major ideological effects - that is, they can

help produce and reproduce unequal power relations between (for instance) social classes, women and men, and ethnic/cultural majorities and minorities through the ways in which they represent things and position people. (Fairclough & Wodak. 1997:258)

There has been an ongoing discussion between the idealistic and the materialistic viewpoints; in essence, if we create ideas of social reality which then are translated to the material reality, or if the material world shapes and create our social notions (Richardson. 2007:27-28). However, the view in this thesis here will adhere to a more dialectical viewpoint, which regards this as a two-way relationship. That is, discursive events are shaped by situations, institutions and social structures, but it also shapes them.

### *Politolinguistic Rhetoric*

As this study aims to investigate a specifically defined national identity, it is framed within a politolinguistic rhetoric which will serve as the basis of analysis. Wodak and Krzyzanowski (2008) provides a systematized form of approaching nationalist rhetoric; based on nomination, predication, argumentation, perspectivization and mitigation/intensification (Wodak & Krzyzanowski. 2008:99-100). These categories can thus serve as a point of departure in approaching certain politolinguistic analyzes. In such discourses, nomination refers to how social actors are being linguistically constructed; predication refers to what traits (positive or negative) that are attributed to the constructed actors; argumentation indicates how nominations and predications are justified; perspectivization aims to reveal the point of view from which these nominations, predications and argumentations are presented; and, mitigation/intensification refers to the articulation of presented utterances (nominations, predications, argumentations) and if they are being mitigated or intensified. These categories have been especially designed to investigate nationalist discourses. Hence, these categories serve as an approach to answering the formulated research questions.

## CONTENT ANALYSIS

Content analysis is the concept of analyzing texts, systematically coding them and quantify the data as far as possible (Bryman. 2008:275). For this study, the idea of quantifying is based on the media coverage, as the quantification of party program material is improbable as well as unwanted. There are no valuable data to be extrapolated in a quantitative measure of a political ideology. Moreover, categorization of certain researchable variables will be constructed and will

be described further in the section of coding. These variables will be constructed abductively, through the concept of ontological security as well as the broader field of identity formation. Furthermore, as coding can only account for what is actually being stated, in complement to this, it is also important to recognize what is not being said. That is, to dialectically approach what the underpinning message constitutes in its very absence. For this reason, the analytical work must also contain statistical data, policy information and a broader discursive analysis to reach a more comprehensive understanding.

Important critique that needs to be confronted in the usage of content analysis concerns are such issues as interpretative impact and its atheoretical approach (*ibid*:291). The latter is circumvented by the usage of the specific abductive approach applied by this paper. And the aforementioned is dealt with through triangulation. Albeit, the social sciences have to deal with issue of subjectivity, it is important to strive to minimize its influence. Furthermore, I would like to address and acknowledge three type of direct critique towards content analysis. That is, (1) the validity of the inference assumption between content and intent; (2) the assumption of universality in interpretation of intent; and (3) the meaningfulness of quantitative measures in content (Richardson. 2007:16-18). These are important points that need to be acknowledged in order to portray equitable research results. Albeit, these points have been taken in consideration for this paper and the only route to circumvent this is by coupling these results with 'thicker' qualitative measures. Thus, the content analysis should only be regarded as a quantitative and systematic manifest of communicated content, and not of intent.

## CODING

In a nutshell, coding is the inference of building a grounded theory based on a set of defined variables. For this study, it was essential to establish a coding manual, which then was consolidated to a coding schedule. For this purpose, the following variables of measurement are used; (1) national group identification; (2) depiction of out-group; (3) nature of exclusion; (4) identification significance of nation-building; (5) consolidating identity factors; and (6) immigration situation.

Within each of these measures, certain values can be asserted in accordance with the given research. These measures may be seen as few in number but are constructed to be exhaustive to all the data involved in the study. Certainly, these patterns speak little in and of themselves,

but will be contextualized by a thorough discourse analysis. To clarify what each variable intends to measure, I will briefly describe each measurement.

(1) National group identification is the measurement of which the in-group demonstrates their ontological security by essentialism or not. The (2) depiction of out-group intends to investigate what factors are brought forward as dissent factors between the groups. The (3) nature of exclusion measurement contains the notion of what is depicted as important differences between the in- and out-group. (4) Identification significance of nation-building will be the measure on how big the influx of these differences has on the identification and furthermore nation-building. The (5) consolidation identity factors will be the variable that seeks to measure the notion of ability of consolidating differences. And lastly, the (6) immigrant situation addresses the conception and depiction of the general immigration situation as part of the narrative.

These six variables will be divided by a finer gradation within each of them. Some of the variables have a large span of gradations, while some are more rudimental. But, what they do assert, are the issues of prejudice, national identity, unity and postulated measures of resolution. This will be further explored in the coming section.

## CODING MANUAL & SCHEMATIC

**Table 3.1** Coding manual

National group identification	Identification significance of nation-building
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Identification is only concerned with ethnic or cultural heritage</li> <li>2. Some traits of ethnic or cultural character are needed to identify with the group</li> <li>3. There are no traits on a cultural or ethnic basis that are inherent to group affiliation</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Similar identity is of very high importance</li> <li>2. Identity can be important but not crucial</li> <li>3. Unified identity is not part of nation-building</li> </ol>
Depiction of out-group	Consolidating identity factors
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Ethnic differentiation</li> <li>2. Cultural or Religious differentiation</li> <li>3. Both</li> <li>4. Other</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Expulsion</li> <li>2. Assimilation</li> <li>3. Integration</li> <li>4. None of the above</li> </ol>
Nature of exclusion	Immigration situation
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Social behavior</li> <li>2. Cultural values</li> <li>3. Language</li> <li>4. Religion</li> <li>5. Inability to acquire job</li> <li>6. Lack of spatial distribution</li> <li>7. Criminality</li> <li>8. Other felt injustice</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. The whole immigration situation is out of control</li> <li>2. The entering of certain groups of immigrants have been displayed problematic in society</li> <li>3. There are no immigration problems today but there will be in the future</li> <li>4. There are no immigration problematics and none in the foreseeable future</li> </ol>

**Table 3.2** Coding schematic

National group identification	Depiction of out-group	Nature of exclusion	Identification significance of nation-building	Consolidating identity factors	Immigration situation



## SAMPLING

Based in the traditions of discourse analysis, this paper will strive to sample as far to reaching saturation in the content. The content will be derived from media articles as well as blog posts by official Sweden Democrats representatives. Furthermore, the quantitative measure in this analysis, will enable a larger amount of data to be triangulated with the discourse analysis. For the discourse analysis one certain case will be further deconstructed and explored but also contextualized with the broader material.

## DELIMITATIONS

With regards to the given topic, the only articles of significance in the analysis, will be the ones that are concerning national identity formation. So forth, the broader political program of the Sweden Democrats will not be considered as a part of the discursive approach. As the central issue to this paper is identity formation and ontological security, the broader program concerning other issues is seen to have little significance.

## IN THE NEWS FEED

I will initiate this analytical section with the content analysis in order to discern patterns to be further explored. These patterns will be utilized to organize the content as I move further into the discourse analysis.

To begin with, consider this part a funneling of the data. The following the section will summarize the total cases used in this study, code the data and elucidate certain patterns in the content. All of these cases will not be used in the discursive decoding, but serves as a point of departure. The analysis consists of debate articles posted in news papers, blogs and on web platforms by official party members and the content of the party's program of principles. The aim is to quantify the cases in accordance to the coding manual in order to discern patterns, and to weed out material that do not address the issues of this paper. The following cases have been analyzed. For purposes of understanding, the titles have been crudely translated from Swedish to English.

Case 1. *An imam in the cathedral makes me upset*. [En imam i storkyrkan gör mig illa berörd] (2011)

Written by Jimmie Åkesson. Published on the Sweden Democrats' official web page.

Case 2. *Program of principles*. [Principprogram] (2012) Published on the Sweden Democrats' official web page.

Case 3. *The Muslims are our greatest foreign threat*. [Muslimerna är vårt största utländska hot] (2009) Written by Jimmie Åkesson. Published in Aftonbladet.

Case 4. *Reducing immigration is required to overcome culture of honor*. [Minskad invandring krävs för att få bukt med hederskultur] (2012) Written by Carina Herrstedt and Therese Borg. Published on Newsmill.

Case 5. *Why we say no to call to prayer from mosques*. [Därför säger vi nej till böneutrop från moskéer] (2012) Written by Robert Stenkvist. Published on Newsmill.

Case 6. *Conservatives defend Islamists in the corridors of power*. [Moderaterna försvarar Islamister i maktens korridorer] (2013) Written by Björn Söder. Published on the Sweden Democrats' official web page.

Case 7. *We have policies that violate exclusion*. [Vi har politiken som bryter utanförskap] (2012) Written by Jimmie Åkesson. Published in Dagens Nyheter.

Case 8. *Nationalism does not mean less cooperation*. [Nationalism betyder inte mindre samarbete] (2011) Written by Kent Ekeröth and Sven-Olof Sällström. Published in Svenska Dagbladet.

Case 9. *We welcome the Christian Democratic Youth League's initiative against multiculturalism.* [Vi välkomnar KDU:s initiativ mot mångkultur] (2011) Written by Gustav Kasselstrand. Published in Norrköpings Tidningar.

These cases have been analyzed and organized in the previously demonstrated schematic to create an overview of the content.

**Table 4.1** Coding schematic

Case	Day	Month	Year	National group identification	Depiction of out-group	Nature of exclusion	Identification significance of nation-building	Consolidating identity factors	Immigration situation
1	4	9	2011	1	2	2,4	1	-	-
2	17	2	2012	1	2	1,2,3,4	1	2	2
3	19	10	2009	1	2	1,2,4,7	-	-	2
4	9	10	2012	1	2	1,2,4,7	-	(1),2	2
5	7	10	2012	1	2	4	-	-	-
6	16	4	2013	1	2	1,2,4,7	-	-	-
7	5	11	2012	1	-	3,5,6	-	-	2
8	28	9	2011	1	2	2,5	1	-	1
9	21	6	2011	1	2	2,6	1	-	1

At this point a pattern of recurring content can be extracted from the schematic. In particular, it is noticeable that the textual content recurrently refers to religious and cultural values of the out-group. Furthermore, the central role of national group identification as well as religious and cultural differentiation in out-group depiction in the content is evident. Any conciliatory actions shine in its absence. The perception of the immigration status also tends to waver between complete dissatisfaction and dissatisfaction towards a specific immigrant group. As earlier mentioned, this content data speaks little in and of itself and is to be regarded as the point of departure for the coming section. These findings shall be further explored discursively, and may by that inference bring about a clearer demonstration of the semantics involved. But, as should be noted, any conciliatory plan of action - even in its simplest form - has seemingly not been provided in the content.

# THE POLITOLINGUISTIC DISCOURSE

As the groundwork for the data collection has been laid out, this section will be addressing the politolinguistic discourse that is underpinning the previously presented content. Here, a selection of cases will be revisited and presented by their strategy, argumentation and micro, meso and macrostructures in a visual overview and will further on be elaborated on. These categorizations are made to conduct a more structured and transparent analysis. One article (case 3 in the content analysis) will be thoroughly dissected and the others will act as supporting material by contextualizing the inter-textuality.

## STRATEGY

**Table 5.1** Discursive strategies

<i>Questions</i>	<i>Discursive Strategies</i>	<i>Purpose</i>
How are persons, objects, phenomena/ events, processes and actions related to ontological security and referred to linguistically?	<b>nomination strategies</b>	<p><b>discursive construction of social actors:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>diectics and phoric expressions:</i> I, one</li> <li>• <i>professional anthroponyms:</i> policymakers</li> <li>• <i>ideological anthroponyms:</i> (the) power elite, multicultural power elite</li> <li>• <i>collectives, including metonymic toponyms:</i> (the) Swedes, Muslims</li> <li>• <i>economic anthroponyms:</i> taxpayers</li> </ul> <p><b>discursive construction of objects/phenomena/events:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>concrete</i> Sweden, Europe, Western, Britain, France, Germany</li> <li>• <i>abstract</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>mental objects/feelings</i> blind</li> <li>• <i>political matters</i> mass immigration, immigration policies, lack of freedom,</li> <li>• <i>ideological matters</i> islamization, oikophobic, cultural denial</li> </ul> </li> </ul>

What characteristics, qualities and features are attributed to social actors, objects, phenomena/events and processes?

**predication strategies**

**discursive construction of processes and actions:**

- *material:*  
radicalization, Islamization, growing threat
- *mental:*  
domesticate, influence, reject

**discursive characterization/qualification of social actors, objects, phenomena, events, processes and actions:**

- *social actors:*  
the power elite: multiculturalists, post-modern, oikophobic, blind, naive  
muslims: anti-humanists, anti-enlightenment, criminal(rape rates), forceful, radicalized minority, in conflict with christians, rootless, conservative, segregated
- *processes*  
islamization: certain, dangerous, stratifying

Which arguments are employed in discourses about ontological security?

**argumentation strategies**

- *claims:*

multiculturalism is a mono-culture which is present in post-modern, oikophobic societies. persuasive definition argument.

multiculturalism leads to islamization, if not multiculturalism then no islamization: deductive fallacy, denying the antecedent. post hoc ergo propter hoc or circular argument.

argumentum ad baculum of Islamization

Overgeneralizations in nominations as well as equivocation.

argumentum ad ignorantiam of the Swedish muslim community.

argumentum ad populum based on the notion of 'most Swedes'.

self-contradiction by redefining multiculturalism as mono-cultural and further drawing on mono-culturalism as the solution.

From what perspective are these nominations, attributions and arguments expressed?

**perspectivization arguments**

**positioning the speaker's or writer's point of view and expressing involvement or distance:**

- *Ideological perspectives:*

Islam and Christianity versus multiculturalism and conservatives

Western versus Eastern

Are the respective utterances articulated overtly, are they intensified or mitigated?

**mitigation and intensification strategies**

**modifying the illocutionary force of utterances in respect of their epistemic or deontic status**

- epistemic
    - mitigationfallacy of data. 'to my knowledge there is no..'
  
  - intensification
fallacy of equating multiculturalism and Islamization  
  - deontic
    - mitigationtopos or fallacy of moral differentiation between religions
  
  - intensification
topos or fallacy of multiculturalism's history
- 

These presented strategies may seem overwhelming as they are presented, but is a way of demonstrating transparency in the process of analyzing the material. The table presented in this section should be seen as a broader holistic view of the general strategies deployed in the discourse, which will be seen in more detail in the coming sections. Also, the figure does contain many terminological difficulties for the reader that is unfamiliar with them, but as they will be revisited and described further on in the analysis, hopefully it shall not be discouraging to the reader in reaching an understanding. It will gradually become clearer how these strategies fits in with the macro- and mesostructures as well as how the argumentation, nomination and predication strategies that are formed within the discourse. So forth, regard this figure and its content as a way of being meticulous in demonstrating the development of the analysis. This illustration also shows the general features of the discourse, but does not offer any in-depth analysis. Although, the actors involved in the discourse, their predications, the argumentative strategies, intensifications/mitigations and the specific perspectivization provides an overview for what is going to be further investigated.

## MACRO- AND MESOSTRUCTURE

**Table 5.2** Macro- and mesostructures in Åkesson's article

<i>Case 3</i>	<i>Macro-, mesostructure and claims</i>
19/10/2009, Aftonbladet	Date of publication and news paper
Muslims are our biggest foreign threat	Title
Jimmie Åkesson	Author
<i>Paragraph 1</i>	
<p>One of multiculturalisms many inherent paradoxes is that, despite its universal claims, it is a mono-cultural phenomenon, only found in the fertile ground of the post-modern, oikophobic Western world and therefore also is based in western phenomenon and experiences in assessing and analyzing the world. The Western experience is seen as a higher stage of development as the rest of the world just have not had time yet to achieve.</p>	<p><i><u>Section 1: Problem formulation</u> - Multiculturalism is inherently detrimental to one's own cultural values. The post-modern western culture is promoting this.</i></p> <p><b>Claim 1:</b> <i>multiculturalism claims universality but is mono-cultural, post-modern and oikophobic which leads to Islamization.</i></p>
<i>Paragraph 2</i>	
<p>This is also the reason that today's multicultural Swedish power elite is so totally blind to the dangers of Islam and Islamization. It is assumed that Muslims do not want anything rather than adapt to a Western way of life and Western standards, and that Islam is basically the same thing as Christianity, with the only difference that Muslims have a different name for God.</p>	<p><i><u>Section 2: Exemplification of problem</u> - Muslims are not the same as Swedish and Christian by exemplification and do not wish to adapt. Which is contrasted to multiculturalisms philosophy.</i></p> <p><b>Claim 2:</b> <i>'the power elite' assesses Muslims to become assimilated and are failing.</i></p>
<i>Paragraph 3</i>	
<p>Thus, it is assumed that you will be able to domesticate Islam in the same way that secular forces for centuries domesticated European Christianity and relegated it to the private sphere. Islam differs from Christianity in many important aspects, such as the current distinction between spiritual and worldly power and views on the use of force. Islam has no equivalent to the New Testament, and no universal human love message. These differences have also been made to Islam and the Muslim world have actively rejected the Enlightenment and humanism. This, along with nearly 1,400 years of wars and conflicts between Islam and Christian Europe, today's policymakers believes to overcome in a jiffy.</p>	<p><i>Further exemplification by referencing to Christianity, emphasizing differences and that they are opposites. Emphasizing the assumed interconnection of Europe, the Western world, Sweden and Christianity.</i></p> <p><b>Claim 3:</b> <i>Islam differs from Christianity in terms of spiritual and worldly powers and the views on use of force.</i></p> <p><b>Claim 4:</b> <i>Islam has no universal message of human love.</i></p> <p><b>Claim 5:</b> <i>Muslims reject the enlightenment and humanism.</i></p>



#### *Paragraph 4*

So far, one is forced to conclude, however, that Islam has influenced Swedish society to a much greater extent than the Swedish society has influenced Islam. Mass immigration from Muslim countries, together with the relatively high birth rates in the Muslim community suggest that this trend will continue, unless a change in policy occurs. Of course, a significant proportion of Europe's Muslims are not literal believers, although most studies done in this area shows that the fundamentalists are a large and growing minority. Rootlessness, that the multicultural social order has fueled in many second and third generation immigrants, has led many to look to Islam as an identity-building and unifying force, and we are now experiencing a process of radicalization among Muslim youth in Europe.

#### *Paragraph 5*

In Sweden there is to my knowledge no known studies in the field, but in a British study from 2007 reported 37 percent of young British Muslims that they would prefer Sharia law in front of British law and a similar number believed that anyone who converts from Islam be executed. In other studies from France and Germany, the same pattern can be distinguished.

*Section 3: Outcome - multiculturalism leads to in-conciliatory identities which leads to radicalization.*

**Claim 6:** *Islam has influenced Swedish society more than vis-a-vis.*

**Claim 7:** *Growing radicalization amongst Muslims.*

**Claim 8:** *Muslims are rootless and turn to Islam for identification.*

*Further exemplification of the outcome by the referencing of adaptation of the Swedish society to the Muslims.*

**Claim 9:** *There is no studies on the Swedish Muslim strata, therefore the case of Britain is the example.*

20 years ago, I think that most Swedes would find it very difficult to imagine that Islam would become the second biggest religion, that Swedish artists who criticize or joke with Islam would live under the constant threat of death, that some ten Muslim terrorist organizations would establish themselves in Sweden, the leading Muslim representatives would make demands for the introduction of sharia law in Sweden, the Swedish county councils would use taxpayer money to cut the foreskin of perfectly healthy little boys, that Sweden would have the most rapes in Europe and that Muslim men would be highly overrepresented among the perpetrators, the Swedish bathhouse would introduce separate bathing times for men and women, the Swedish municipalities should consider the introduction of gender-segregated swimming classes in schools, the cabinets in our grocery stores would offer ritual slaughtered meat while Swedish preschools stop serving pork, to Swedish schools would introduce new holidays to celebrate the end of Ramadan, while church graduations banned in more and more schools and so on.

#### *Paragraph 6*

All this is now part of the Swedish reality. The question is how it looks like in another few decades, when the Muslim population - if the present rate continues - has multiplied in size and many of Europe's major cities, including Malmö, most likely has a Muslim majority.

The multicultural power elite may look at this future as a colorful and interesting change of Sweden and Europe as was all too often deny one's ever been "Swedish" or "European".

As a Sweden Democrat, I see this as our biggest foreign threat since World War II and I promise to do everything in my power to reverse the trend when we go to the polls next year.

**Claim 10:** *Most Swedes would not have imagined the growth of Islam.*

**Claim 11:** *Artists that criticize Islam are subjected to death threats.*

**Claim 12:** *Muslim terrorist organizations are established in Sweden.*

**Claim 13:** *Muslim representatives are claiming Sharia law in Sweden.*

**Claim 14:** *Taxpayers money are being used for circumcision.*

**Claim 15:** *Sweden has the highest rape rates in Europe and Muslim men are overrepresented.*

**Claim 16:** *Segregation and the imposition of Muslim traditions are stratifying and changing the Swedish way of life.*

Section 4: Conclusion - *Political advertising by propagating to reverse a trend (of salvation) to what threatens to consume the Swedish culture, tradition, way of life and ultimately security. No specification to what the solution is.*

**Claim 17:** *Malmö, and other major European cities, will soon have a Muslim majority.*

**Claim 18:** *The power elite denies their cultural identity.*

**Claim 19:** *Islamization is the biggest threat since World War II.*

## NOMINATIONS AND PREDICATIONS

**Table 5.3** Nominations and predications in Åkesson's article

<i>Sweden Democrats and like-minded</i>			
<i>I/we</i>		<i>You, Ours</i>	
<i>Nomination</i>	<i>Predication</i>	<i>Nomination</i>	<i>Predication</i>
<b>I/One</b>	<i>Defendant of the mono-cultural society and safeguards traditions</i>	<b>Swedes</b>	<i>Hoodwinked into a multicultural state</i>
	<i>Realist and a problem-solver</i>		<i>To be outnumbered in Sweden</i>
	<i>Understands the general populace's perception.</i>		<i>Lives under counter-traditional circumstances</i>
	<i>Opposes 'the power elite'</i>	<b>Sweden/ Swedish society</b>	<i>Being Islamized, segregated and traditionally stratified</i>
			<i>Has been heavily influenced by Islam but has not managed to influence Islam in return.</i>
			<i>Have the highest rape rate as a consequence of Muslim immigrants.</i>
			<i>Counter-traditional gender-segregated bath houses and swim classes in school have been the outcome of Muslim immigration</i>
			<i>Traditional customs such as church graduations are being replaced by Muslim holidays and customs</i>
		<b>Swedish artists</b>	<i>Live under constant threat of death in case they criticize or joke about Islamic objects.</i>

**Table 5.3** Nominations and predications in Åkesson’s article

<i>Groups of opponents</i>			
<i>The rulers and the establishment (the power)</i>		<i>The others</i>	
<i>Nomination</i>	<i>Predication</i>	<i>Nomination</i>	<i>Predication</i>
<b>The (multicultural) power elite</b>	<i>Blind to Islamization, lack of understanding the general populace, naïve and ignorant</i>	<b>Muslims</b>	<i>Do not wish to adapt to the Western way of life</i>
	<i>Welcomes Islamization and denies being ‘Swedish’ and ‘European’</i>		<i>Rejects the enlightenment and humanism</i>
<b>Multiculturalism</b>	<i>Post-modern and oikophobic</i>		<i>Mass immigrating to Sweden and high birth rates</i>
	<i>Fuels identity crises and Islamic radicalization</i>		<i>Makes demands of introducing Sharia law</i>
			<i>Highly overrepresented as rape perpetrators</i>
			<i>Are multiplying fast and will soon constitute a majority in many cities, eg. Malmö.</i>
			<i>Rootless and are being radicalized</i>
			<i>Majority not literal believers but a growing fundamentalist minority</i>
		<b>British Muslims</b>	<i>Would prefer Sharia law in front of British law and that anyone who converts from Islam shall be executed</i>
		<b>Islam</b>	<i>Differs from Christian values and contains no universal message of love</i>
			<i>Cannot be domesticated and secularized</i>
		<b>Muslim terrorists</b>	<i>Established in Sweden</i>
		<b>Muslim youth</b>	<i>Rootless and are being radicalized</i>

First of all, in assessing these nominations and predications, it is important to note that very little value is actually attributed to the Sweden Democrats themselves. Thus, the only way to reach an understanding of what they represent is to explore what they oppose.

From the asserted nominations and predications presented in table 5.3, patterns of polarization can clearly be discerned. For this specific article, the narrative is constructed to emphasize this polarization between what is being nominated as ‘Swedes’ and ‘Muslims’ fueled by ‘the [multicultural] power elite’. In essence, these nominations in and of themselves are grave overgeneralizations.

Furthermore, it is unclear what the nomination of Muslims as a coherent group is based upon. There is a continuous passage between the definition itself, moving across borders of countries as well as not clearly asserting how the definition is to be utilized. Moreover, several designations are being asserted, to this nomination of Muslims, which are very vaguely backed in the presented data. For example, one may ask to what extent British Muslims - which is yet another vague definition - are to be equated with the specific Muslim demographic in Sweden. This, is in itself a rhetorical equivocation, by sliding around a very vaguely defined term, one may utilize that advantage to facilitate a discourse and suggest similarities which in itself does not follow a logical inference. In addition, various other claims of truth are being asserted to the group by presenting undefined data as facts, thus overlooking alternatives and suggesting that other factors are irrelevant. For example, the portrayal of Muslims as the cause of high rape rates in Sweden in terms of being overrepresented in the statistics. How one could reach this conclusion is in itself a conundrum, as religious registration is prohibited by the Instrument of Government in the Swedish Constitution (Instrument of Government. 1974:ch. 2, § 3). Many values are being attributed to the Muslim demographic in this manner and gives little if any data that supports it. Furthermore, loaded language and emotive formulations are being used to fuel the feeling of the Muslims as an organism of collective thought. The term ‘mass immigration’ indicates that these are people acting collectively and are flooding Sweden to overwhelm its native population (this utilization is recurrent, in case 7 for example). The notion that the adjective ‘mass’ has negative connotation is well supported if one explores the general usage in British National Corpus. The term is often used to negatively exacerbate an event or noun. The usage of the terms is often in the following contexts: mass lay-offs, mass graves, mass opt-out plans, mass hysteria etc (BNC. 2007).

Moreover, in assessing the nomination of the ruling establishment, or what is termed ‘the [multicultural] power elite’, certain rhetorical devices are deployed. Here, a straw man

caricature is presented as a claim of truth. That is, that they (the power elite) belong to a mono-culture, based on post-modern oikophobic values and deny their cultural heritage. Thus, the discourse of what the Sweden Democrats represent - though implicitly stated - can easily be identified as the antipode to what the ruling power represent. More so, one could confirm that this constitutes a triangle in which the Sweden Democrats opposes both Islam and the power elite. Hence, the Sweden Democrats identifies with traditional (pre-modern) values, recognizes and cherishes their cultural heritage, and are thus the opposite to oikophobes. The importance of cultural and religious values are recurrent concepts of differentiation - as can be seen in table 4.1. Other than that, as an implicit notion, the Sweden Democrats are thus understanding the general populace in contrast to the power which is an 'elite'. Interestingly, the value of mono-culture is attributed to the multicultural agenda and its agents, while the counter argument itself is mono-cultural. Consequently, this rhetoric represents a type of persuasive definition, where the definition of multiculturalism becomes skewed from its original meaning which is an ideological standpoint that affirms the "containing [of] several cultural or ethnic groups within a society"<sup>2</sup>.

Albeit, presenting multiculturalism as a mono-culture may serve as an equator of ideologies in the discourse, and it provides the instruments of attributing several other values to the definition without having to risk accusations of overgeneralizing. Because, without asserting the mono-cultural position of multiculturalism, it is not possible to attribute oikophobic values to it. By poisoning the well, it is possible to preemptively make it difficult for the text consumer to associate with the group (Weston. 2009:78). What makes the definition unsustainable is the lack of information on how the author reaches that conclusion. As of the definition, the only explanation given is: that it is mono-cultural and oikophobic because it [multiculturalism] only exists in the West, and it only exist in the West because of that same reason. Hence, the power elite are oikophobic multiculturalists because the oikophobic multiculturalists are the power elite. This is stated in the first paragraph - quite clearly if one removes the adjectives - as: "multiculturalism [is] [...] only found in the fertile ground of the [...] Western world and therefore also is based in western phenomenon and experiences in assessing and analyzing the world". This circular argument is not only a fallacy of logic but also a false statement as there are many nation-states that contain several cultures, which are not part of the Western world. But, the emotive notion that the definition leaves us with is the

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<sup>2</sup> "multicultural". Oxford Dictionaries. April 2010. Oxford Dictionaries. April 2010. Oxford University Press. 02 May 2013. <http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/multicultural>

multicultural engineers, which strive to disassemble the traditional and cultural heritage of Sweden.

Another predication attributed to the concept of multiculturalism is the causality of Islamization. It is stated that multiculturalism leads to the influx of Islam which then leads to Islamization. Here, the logical inference does not necessarily follow a rational train of thought. It may as well be a deductive mistake of denying the antecedent. That is, if **p** then **q**, if not **p** then not **q**. In this situation that would render: if there is multiculturalism then follows Islamization; if no multiculturalism then no Islamization. This may seem logical in its presentation, but consider the following scenario and its logical reasoning: if there are icy roads, then the mail is late; if there are no icy roads, then mail will not be late (Weston. 2009:76). In this scenario we can discover many other factors, which can contribute to the mail being late, and there is no reason we should assume otherwise in the scenario of this text. So forth, it is necessary to keep in mind that Islamization is presented as a dependent variable to the independent variable of multiculturalism.

As of the nomination of the Islamic religion outside of its followers, certain moral and social predications are brought forward. Indeed, Islam in this text is contrasted to the Christian belief in order to heighten the impact of its differentiation and show how far apart it is to be regarded from the domestic Christian doctrine. Certainly, the attribution of growing radical elements within the belief may as well serve as an emotive antagonism, which says very little about the content. As described in the analytical framework, extremism and radicalism tells us little about the social reality, ideology and identity of the actors (Hopkins & Kahani-Hopkins. 2009:101). Furthermore, there are many claims about the content of the Islamic doctrine in the text, such as the lack of a universal message of human love. In this respect perspectivization is essential. If one wish to find messages of love, then one will find it and the other way around. For example, the following passage can be found in the Quran: "Those who spend (in Allah's Cause) in prosperity and adversity, who repress anger, and who pardon men; verily, Allah loves *Al-Muhsinin* (the good-doers)" (Taqi-ud-Din Al-Hilali & Muhsin Khan. 2007:3, 134). Furthermore, claims that Islam and the Muslim world inherently reject the Enlightenment and humanism is in itself a fallacy of history. Pakistan, which today may be seen as a conservative state, was the first independent Muslim state and was founded by Mohammed Ali Jinnah, a humanist and secularist (Ahmed & Sivan. 2001). Further back, we find Islamic philosophers such as Ibn Sinna and Averroes, who helped preserve the Aristotelean philosophy for the West (Epstein. 2009). From this perspective, humanism and the Enlightenment is not seen as a

straight path from ancient Greece to modern day Europe, but interwoven with another chapter of history. Once again, this is a clear example of the perspectivaztional strategy in the discourse, by adhering to a strictly western perspective, the eastern is kept unmentioned. Furthermore, the argument "[t]hese differences have also been made to Islam and the Muslim world have actively rejected the Enlightenment and humanism", which takes a generalizing view that becomes fallacious as soon as one Muslim is brought forward that does not abide to the claim.

## ARGUMENTATION

In observing the claims of the Sweden Democrats certain argumentative strategies are present, some of which have already been slightly addressed in the previous section. I would say that the following argumentative strategies are what constitute the backbone of the reasoning: *argumentum ad populum* (appealing to the people), *argumentum ad ignorantiam* (appealing to the ignorance), equivocation, *post hoc ergo propter hoc* (after this, therefore because of this; fallacy of causality) or circular argument, persuasive definitions, *argumentum ad baculum* (appeal to coercion), and self-contradictions. Firstly, as the Sweden Democrats presents the predication to multiculturalism as essentially being mono-cultural (and a threat to national identification), it is important to keep in mind the implicit meaning of this statement. That is, that cultural diversity is detrimental to national identity formation, although it is a mono-culture in their assessment of it, and they do promote a mono-culture national identity as the solution of that. It is quite a rhetorical entanglement, which in itself is self-contradictory. This strategy is also present as the Sweden Democrats' argue against the post-modernism that the power elite represents, which they later on promote when opposing the (anti-enlightenment) views of Islam. Moreover, when the author defines the conditions of multiculturalism he asserts that multiculturalism inevitably will lead to Islamization. Either this argument is a circular argument and a deductive fallacy or a *post hoc ergo propter* argument which is *non sequitur* (does not follow, illogical statement). It is unclear, because it is difficult to interpret if the author claims Islamization to be an actual event that already has been put in progress or if it is a future threat. Although, if we consult their election manifesto from 2012, the following formulation suggests that it is an ongoing process as they promise to: "[put] a stop to the Islamization of the Swedish society" (Sweden Democrats. 2010:3). This connects with the argument of the chosen title in this specific case, which clearly denotes an *argumentum ad baculum*. That is, the influx of Islam to the Swedish society is associated as a foreign threat,



and in the very last paragraph of the text is compared to a threat just as the second World War. Thus it enhances the impact of Islam in the society to some form of coercion over native elements and homogeneity. Hence, the ones that do not act against multiculturalism will suffer the consequences of Islamization.

Furthermore, the usage of *argumentum ad populum* is based on the nomination of 'most Swedes' as an argumentative support for the specific claim of Islam's growth in Sweden. Therefore, it relies on the opinion of 'most Swedes' for the argument to carry substance but may not contain any validity. So forth, the argument reinforces a state of emotive distraught that affirms the unlikelihood of current events, based on the general populace. Concerning the nominations of Muslims the recurrent theme of argumentation is the usage of equivocations and *argumentum ad ignorantiam*. First, the equivocation take place when the author continuously decides to shift the meaning of the nomination of Muslims, such as equalizing the Swedish Muslim demographic to the British. It is also backed up the *argumentum ad ignorantiam* which the appealing to ignorance on the subject. Yet again, the usage of the British example serves as a good enough case for the author to equate the Swedish Muslims, and thus arguing that the claim is true just because it has not proven to be false. Also, it is stated preemptively by the author, that to his knowledge there are no such studies made in Sweden, reinforcing the appeal to ignorance. Furthermore, the same argumentative strategy is used to demonstrate the societal impact of Islamization in Sweden. For instance, the author brings up the example of gender segregated bath houses to be an indicator of counter-traditional influx over Swedish customs. Although, such practices have been fairly common in many Swedish bath houses all through out the 20th century and quite recently been less frequent. To exemplify, the bath house in the small community in Mölle was the first one to introduce mixed bathing and was termed the 'sin in Mölle', which was in the beginning of the 20th century (Ekstrand, Jönsson & Zakariasson. 2005). So forth, many bath houses kept the gender segregated tradition well into the 20th century. Therefore, it is cumbersome to distinguish it as a typical non-Swedish custom.

Outside of these stated argumentative techniques, the author continuously utilizes loaded language in what is called 'poisoning the well'. That is, the author wish to make it difficult for the readers to associate themselves with the opposing view or to sympathize with the out-group, which in this case is demonstrates in various ways. The author uses loaded language in the following ways for example: by adding 'mass' to immigration; 'threat' speaks of an imminent risk; and by associating the Muslim nomination with rape, terrorism and backwards

forceful, gender segregated, misogynistic sharia laws. Furthermore, from what I have described as a politolinguistic triangle of argumentation, the same strategy is applied towards the ruling power elite. This positions the Sweden Democrats as a defender of culture, in the midst of a triad, where they are the spokesperson for the general populace by deploying these strategies. Moreover, recurrently, the importance of national identity, cultural unity and the value of traditions, are used as supporting factors of the author's argumentation. But, to clarify, in this case, religious views comprised within the notion of cultural values. Hence, this is another argumentative triad which demonstrates the content of what is at the center of the author's ideological compass.

## CONTEXT AND INTERTEXTUALITY

The contextual and intertextual components will in this section tie together the closely examined case with the broader textual, cultural and situational context in which the text is to be placed.

I would like to start this inquiry by addressing the backbone of the political framework, which the Sweden Democrats draws from, that is their program of principles (case 2 in the content analysis). This program is placed within a web platform and on this platform the importance of culture becomes clear by the rudimental web design choices. The party has chosen to designate a part of defining 'what Swedish culture is' as a separate sub-heading, in addition to the program of principles. This demonstrates the importance of defining the cultural core of the party's program of principles. I would like to bring a long this defining importance in the analysis, as they define it; the final paragraph reads: "We believe that Sweden and the Swedes will be uprooted and rootless in their identity if we do not have a clearly defined heritage and talk about culture as many different things, not just music and food, but the mentality and interpersonal conduct and behavior. We also believe that the values that exist in the traditional Sweden is sympathetic and worth preserving. We believe that some values that come into the country and gives a great flexibility in that we should be a multicultural society threatens to become a divisive effect on society" (Sweden Democrats. 2012:14).

Moreover, the threat to this is presented in the section of multiculturalism, which they define as "the political idea that it is good for a society within itself accommodate a variety of national cultures, lacking an overall majority culture and to actively work to immigrant groups to maintain their original culture and identity" (*ibid*:16). That it is an important aspect of their viewpoint becomes visible when discussing the outcome of multiculturalism, where they

indicate their indifference towards the intended outcomes. Whether or not the result is that cultures should be abandoned all together, admixed, or a multicultural state is the goal, is by their principles of no interest. Because, in their view, it will inevitably lead to the aforementioned rootlessness, segregation, insecurity, and reduced welfare. So forth, the only course of progression that is suggested is the course of assimilation into a majority culture which they define as "commonality creative assimilation policies that were prevailing until 1975" (*ibid*:16). They recurrently connect with this era in Swedish history by different means. For instance, they propagate for a Swedish society in which the ideology of *Folkhemmet* (the people's home) should be the keynote (*ibid*:26). This term is based in a Social Democratic political rhetoric which was born in the speech *Folkhemmet* in 1928 by the former Prime Minister Per Albin Hansson. Today it symbolizes the Nordic political model in Sweden, based on state guardianship; social reforms such as social security and equality. The people's home was used as a metaphor for Sweden to become a home for its people, and the state should be its guardian. As Per Albin Hansson himself stated; that it must be so, that the class society Sweden will be succeeded by the people's home Sweden (Hansson. 1928). These reforms would largely be based on what today has become known as Keynesian economics. So forth, this is utilized by the Sweden Democrats as the epitome of a lost paradise and alludes to the term's cultural heritage. They have used this in combination with slogans such as 'security and tradition', linking this epitome of a paradise as a solution in juxtaposition with the old farmers society, and the nuclear family (Ekman. 2009). This suggests that another principle - outside of culture and tradition, supported by the content in table 4.1 - becomes core to the ideological underpinnings to the Sweden Democrats, that is quite simply, security. But, it is also the same principles of national identity, culture and tradition, which constitutes that security and stability in their principles (Sweden Democrats. 2012:7).

So forth, the argumentative triad at center of the ideological principles presented in the argumentation section - which is national identity, cultural unity and value of traditions - can now be discerned as the discursive preconditions for security. This is further elaborated on in the program of principles as they define that: "people, as social and collective beings have an innate need to belong to a larger community, and that most people primarily identify with other individuals similar to one self and that most people find it easier to show solidarity and empathy with individuals that you experience as a part of the same community that they themselves belong" and that "a strong national identity and a minimum of linguistic, cultural and religious differences have a beneficial effect on cohesion, security and stability in a society" (*ibid*:7). In order to facilitate a discussion, let us call this concept the 'security triad'.

Furthermore, this is the same triad that define their terminological usage of the people's home, where cohesion is based on nationhood and not social class, and that national cohesion needs to be safeguarded, and presupposes a shared identity (*ibid*:26). The people's home is presented as the outcome of the security triad; hence the people's home in essence represents security. Yet the concept transcends mere security and stability, and advocates a sort of Swedish equivalent of the 'American dream' in its alluding to the cultural heritage, which in reality might be a pipe dream, and something unattainable. Albeit, interlacing this concept with one's political program certainly infers a powerful rhetorical apparatus.


By looking at the content of the structure in the program of principles, the importance of culture, national identity and immigration effects on these subjects is visible as 7 out of 21 topics in the program explicitly addresses issues concerning national identity, and 13 out of 21 bring it up in some way. Furthermore, as Muslims from different corners of the world have been a big immigrant group in recent times with visible cultural differences, they are the group that have exposed the most to the Sweden Democrats' differentiation strategies presented in this paper. There are no views on the subject of cultural differences in between these Muslim groups, they are all generally equated.

Culturally, Sweden has been pointed out to adhere to a sort of non-religious viewpoint while still valuing the cultural underpinnings of religion as part of traditions (Zuckerman. 2008). That is, religion plays a very little if any role in people's daily life, although it plays a cultural and traditional role in forming a wider community. Consequently, the rhetoric of reducing the Muslim population to its cultural denominators may serve as an equalizer to the Swedish viewpoint of religion and culture. It may be a way of approaching abstract cultural and religious notions, by creating a linkage to its practitioners. Furthermore, it becomes clear that the Sweden Democrats' discourse on national identity is strongly coupled with the discourse of limited immigration and assimilation. This inter-discursive pattern is recurrent and central to the substance of their discourse of national identity. Also, in addressing immigration issues, it is important to remember that the Sweden Democrats was founded as a successor to the Sweden Party, which in turn came out of the ruins of the racist organization 'Keep Sweden Swedish' [Bevara Sverige Svenskt]. Although the Sweden Democrats formally has cut its ties to these movements, it is important to keep in mind the historicity of the party. Also, the ties to the British National Front movement was prevalent until 2006 when the party changed their logo, from the Swedish version of the National Front torch, to the current blue anemone (Sweden Democrats. 2006). This change was attributed to the adaption of a logo that reflected the internal changes that had developed.

## DISCUSSION

Firstly, I would like to summarize the previous sections by a visual representation of the national identity formation discourse by the Sweden Democrats in terms of agents and fundamental principles. The triangle of agents that was first brought up in the nominations, and the triad of security that was introduced in the section on context, will now come together and form a broader picture of the applied politolinguistic discourse.

**Figure 6.1** Triangular national identity discourse representation



In the preceding chapters I have demonstrated how the Sweden Democrats is claiming to protect and nourish the epitome of a lost paradise and the dream of recapturing a bygone era. The Sweden Democrats' discourse is to a large extent based on a strong dislike towards anything that is regarded as discontinuous and disruptive of traditional and cultural patterns. The formation of ontological security through national identity is at times blatantly obvious in the Sweden Democrats' discourse. Securitization to achieve social cohesion lies at the very core of their discursive formation of national identity; this is not only implicit, but recurrently explicitly expressed. Thus, to conclude that the traditionalist ideas are used to promote an agenda to reach ontological security and to reduce existential anxiety is not far fetched. This corroborates with the initial theoretical framework, but also elucidate the characteristics of the Sweden Democrats' politolinguistic discourse's rhetoric. Although it is important to note, that the details of any plan of action to resolve this dilemma of crisis in ontological security - as it is presented by the Sweden Democrats - has been difficult to approach. This is mainly because, it is referred to in very broad terms of 'assimilation' or 'limited immigration', hence what any plan of action would constitute, remains recondite. As has been noted, this inter-discursive pattern between national identity and limited immigration is prevalent, and recurrent in regards to the notion of national identity. Albeit, it is quite possible that the discursive agenda of national identity may serve as a means to an end in an agenda of limiting immigration (prevalent in cases 2,3,4,7,8,9). That is, although national identity formation is essential to the party's principles, it is uncertain what underpins the driving urge for social cohesion. It could be based on a populist agenda that exploits the innate ontological insecurity of people, a purely xenophobic worldview, or a serious commitment of acknowledging the importance of social cohesion. Although the last one can quite early on be disregarded; because, if it was an honest commitment to establish social cohesion, out-groups as well as the excluding discursive rhetoric would not be as crucial. That leaves us with the two options of a populist or a xenophobic agenda. It seems like the discourse on limiting immigration is the main idea, which the discourse of national identity formation is designed to accommodate. I would argue that their discourse of topos or fallacy of homogeneity, argumentum ad baculum, topos or fallacy of differentiation towards other cultural groups, and the overemphasizing of the superiority of the native culture are classic elements of national populist discourses (Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl & Liebhard. 1999:222).

Moreover, the politolinguistic discourse of the Sweden Democrats does display the interconnectedness of ontological (in)security and the rejection of out-group members. In the specific in-depth analytical case, even more baroque insinuations were used as examples to

demarcate the dissent when nominations of Muslim men were predicated with overrepresentation in rape cases. In essence, the discourse of national identity forms around the notion that cultural differences equals ontological insecurity, although it is reinforced by examples that are used to demonstrate the moral deficiencies of the people of another culture, or religious practice. As it was demonstrated in the beginning of this paper: the identity needs to be demarcated and labeled in order for it to be 'securable' in relation to the dangerous 'others' (Stern. 2006:192). This has been demonstrated quite clearly in the definition of the collective Swedish identity based on traditional cultural values, which cherishes the people's home, but is under threat by foreign (out-group) forces. This intensification of insecurity might in itself antagonize the feeling of insecurity, and consequently foster an issue that was not there from the beginning. *Nota bene*, the reflexivity of a discourse and its consumers may further exacerbate the issues of national identification as it gets entrenched. However, it is difficult to assert if the discourse is responding to an existing insecurity or if it is constructing and antagonizing insecurity. Here, reflexivity is key. If we take the example by Gunnar Myrdal (presented in the introduction), and interlace it with the concept of ontological security, we discover the possibility of this constructing a destructive relationship, which may ensue corrosive implications on the otherwise mundane political subject of national identity formation.

## ONWARDS

Through the analysis it has also become evident that self-contradictory strategies of argumentation forms the backbone of the Sweden Democrats' ideological viewpoint in terms of national identity. The discursive mechanisms wind around themselves and bites its own tail. The entanglement it produces may in itself stratify the identity formation process, which was one of the key problem formulations going in to this study. Albeit, the key entry point of this study also stressed the importance of the broader political spectra to break the silence, but the question then becomes: how, and by which means? In summing up this research I would like to elaborate on these issues of mitigating insecurity by approaching them through the theoretical lens of ontological security.

As noted in the introduction, we may have to accept the presence of ontological insecurity and existential anxiety in a society, but we must at the same time pay attention and try to mitigate this felt anxiety so as to not allow destructive policies to stratify the core identity of a nation



and its population. In essence, the felt insecurity is to be regarded as the symptom of lacking basic trust. This is one of the most important insights of the theoretical framework of ontological security. That means, that policies are needed to mitigate societal structures that intensify the lack of basic trust. But, I would also like to stress the initiation of a process of constructing a leading national identity, one which can meet the needs of the current citizens. I argue that it is possible (although inconclusive by reflexivity) that this national identity construction meets a real need, and that the notion of national identity on a state level being a political non-issue, may have to be reevaluated. As both the concept of ontological security and the viewpoint of discourse analysis emphasizes the importance of reflexivity in late modernity, it is not for this for this paper to decide whether or not the issue is rooted in an existing anxiety, but to recognize the reflexive nature of discourse, security and its implications. Thus, paving the way for a one-sided discourse is not likely to bring about a sustainable identity and ontological security, and addressing it retroactively may entail loss of political credibility. Because, as has been demonstrated, many of the notions of which the Sweden Democrats form their identity are in themselves stratifying, incoherent and excluding for minorities in the current population. So forth, such a national identity formation will most likely not be able to sustain a satisfactory national identity for the broader population in the long-term. That is, core elements in the formation of national identity in the Sweden Democrats' discourse, such as: the people's home, the threat of Islamization and the threat of multiculturalism, are in themselves based on fallacies. That is for example, the exaltation and promise of a probable pipe dream (the people's home), deductive fallacies (the causality of Islamization from multiculturalism), and the appeal to ignorance (the equivocation of Muslim populations across nations, because there are no other data).

Furthermore, the inference of ontological security facilitates the utilization of life politics (that is policies that addresses issues of life, self, identity, reflexivity and life-style), and issues that have been brought up, such as spatial segregation and language barriers are hindrances to the building of basic trust. As such, they need to be addressed and should not be taken lightly in the discourse of national identity formation. Conclusively, such obstacles are instrumental to the very foundation of building basic trust and the routinization of relationships between citizens. Because, if the notion is to sustain a diverse population, and if we regard ontological security as a narrative that needs to be routinely constructed and sustained by reflexive activities on the behalf of the individual, the barriers in between need to be dismantled. But, it also reaffirms the need for policies that addresses issues of national identity formation and the reengagement in life politics. So forth, the Sweden Democrats may be correct in discussing the

flaws of multiculturalism, and that the lack of a majority culture threatens to be corrosive to ontological security. Though, this view of immigration conflicting with traditional and cultural roots, have been said to be rooted in the European cognitive image based on a culture of immobility (Rossi. 2003:123). Bluntly, even if this is case, it does not disable the formation of a national identity that supports inclusion and tackles issues of disenfranchising a certain minority group and/or culture. It only demonstrates the existing insecurity and cognitive dissonance that can be brought about by structural transformations through the reaffirming of existing routines and falling back on collective identities and stories (Browning & Joenniemi. 2010:8). In this context a process of re-narration would bring about a stronger security that would not only involve a specific in-group in the identity formation. Furthermore, just as the speech given by David Foster Wallace (2008), where he addresses the lack of reflection of everyday life occurrences by exemplifying how fishes do not reflect on their existence in water, I believe that sociopolitical issues may tend to not reflect on narratives that are foundational to nation states, which is the nation. As detailed plans of tackling unemployment and economic crisis in Europe become the core of political discourses, the very existential security may be overlooked and thereby be subjected to exploitation of peripheral parties' discourses, such as the limiting of immigration and the promotion of assimilation policies. So forth, the increase in voters support for the Sweden Democrats may not be an indicator of less tolerance in the Swedish society, but may as well point to other social instabilities, such as finding a formulation of national identification to mitigate existential anxiety in an increasingly globalized world.

## FUTURE RESEARCH

In the conclusion I have brought up and discussed the concept of 'core identity', which in itself may seem controversial if left unexplained, and it deserves to be clarified in the context of future research. In this thesis, what is meant by core identity does not necessarily insinuate that everybody adheres to the same worldview, or that a very homogenous identity formation is ideal. The notion is confined within larger researchable topic, which is open for further exploration. As modernity in itself fragments, it can also unite. However, forces of nationalism, xenophobia and traditionalism views will always be prone to regressionism, and will try to counter the advances of modernization and globalization. Albeit, as a thesis in the view of post-structuralism, notions of identity formation concurs with views of researchers such as Goffman. That is, that personal identities are multiple, being formed in the context of significant others, and that identity is reflexive to divergent interaction. This does not have to

mean that such practices only fragment but may as well serve to integrate and unite. For instance, a cosmopolitan person may draw strength from the specific notion of being secure in a variety of contexts. In the end, the standpoint of embracing multiple selves versus the traditionalist, may lead to extreme points in which both of them can result in pathologic insecurity patterns. Either, by denying any relativism in contexts and interpreting everything around fixed commitments (traditionalist), or almost dissolving as a chameleon into the relative cultural environment (constructivist). Both of these extreme points may entail an increase in ontological insecurity.

Furthermore, as changes in circumstances on local and global levels are becoming increasingly rapid, all the heavier burden is being placed on the narrative of self-identity to be responsive and able to cope with swift changes. Placing individuals within the global context, on a level that is comprehensive to the narrative of self-identity may be essential to the development and sustaining of ontological security. Getting these pieces to fit involves a variety of fields to reevaluate the responses to modernity and globalization. As questions of morals and social constructs keep returning to the central agenda of politics (Giddens. 1991:224), responsive policies that deal with short-comings of institutions constructed under modernity will have to be well-rooted in a wide scope of research. To hypothesize, one could elaborate on what kind of responses this would call for. For instance, as moral questions of self-identity involves issues of biography in terms of personhood, and moral questions of national identity involves nationhood, citizenship and civil life; may call for major shifts in how we view nations, individuals and construct narratives of these conflicting notions (individualism vs. collectivism and cosmopolitanism vs. statism). Although, the author Slavoj Žižek (1998:1008) has hypothesized that these are actually not dilemmas, but mere reflections of a post-political universe, I will leave such discussions for philosophers. In my idea and in relation to this thesis, referential systems such as self and body, national and global systems are essential parts of questions concerning ontological security, and one could see many fields of thought approach them from different angles. Certainly, research will in these field need to be interdisciplinary to reach conclusions of coordination and synergies, which transcends every issue on its own.

To further concretize my view on the subject, I will intend to exemplify how these questions can be approached. If modernity is prone to fragment fixed structures by its imposition of the reflexive project, while being subjected to contradictory internal referential systems (Giddens. 1991:231), how is it possible to formulate policies on social life without falling prey of prejudice and take the path of parties such as the Sweden Democrats? It has been suggested that

cognitive skills are key in developing skills to cope with this reflexivity (Esping-Andersen:109), which also is suggested to be developed very early in life. That is, in large part prior to school age (*ibid*:110). So forth, this opens up a large field of research within the pedagogical and psychological fields of research to explore to what extent cognitive skills developed early in life contributes to mitigate ontological insecurity throughout life. Such finding not only suggest that we can work proactively in mitigating ontological insecurity, but also raises the question if this partially can explain the prolonged influence - until recent times - of nationalist, traditionalist and populist movements in Sweden. It is quite clear that issues of ontological insecurity may spread and branch off into very diverse researchable topics, and that makes it a highly interesting research area. Hence, I would recommend research to focus on such areas that addresses ontological insecurity through the (1) early development of cognitive skills; and the (2) sociopolitical impact of policies on such developments. Cross-analyzing these aspects with growing nationalist, traditionalist and populist movement may yield interesting results in my view.

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