

Göteborgs universitet

Statsvetenskapliga Institutionen

Der ewige Russische

The Swedish military and its schizophrenic struggle for an identity

Kandidatuppsats i

Statsvetenskap

VT 2013

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Abstract

This study is about how the Swedish military handles their identity in regards to a post-Cold War world both in the formal and informal sense. In the study we ask how the two identities of the Swedish military are constructed are and if they are compatible. We also discuss what consequences may come from the two identities. As analytical tool we used Critical Discourse Analysis combined with a framework by Lene Hansen combined with Cold War and post-Cold War security logics. We find that there is two incompatible identities struggling in the eye of the public and that there can be problematic consequences from this struggle between identities.

Keywords: Swedish military, Lene Hansen, Speech act, Post-Cold War Security logic, Cold War security logic, Critical Discourse Analysis, Securitization, Political Science

This thesis is dedicated in loving memory of

Hugo Chavez

That died during the writing of this thesis

Thanks to **Ulf Bjereld** for his supervising and good advise

Thanks to **Denny Pencheva** for her insightful comments while writing this thesis

Without you all, nothing of this could have been done, Thank you!

Comments, typos found, money, love notes, hate mail,
death threats, letter bombs, anthrax to:

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1. Swedish defense – a case of unresolved identities	5
2. Previous research with a focus on International Security Studies in relation to identity	6
3. Aim of the study and research question	7
4. Theoretical terms and definitions	8
a. Securitization and Speech act	8
b. Security logics	8
i. Cold War security	9
ii. Post-Cold War security	9
iii. Sweden during Cold War and Post-Cold War	10
c. Identity	11
i. Formal identity	11
ii. Informal identity	11
5. Analytical method	12
Critical Discourse Analysis in combination with Lene Hansen	12
6. Empirical material	14
a. The campaign “Vad håller du på med?” (What are you doing?)	15
b. The interview with Sverker Göranson in SvD	16
7. Analysis	17
a. Analysis of the PR-campaign	17
b. Analysis of the interview with Sverker Göranson in SvD	18
c. Summary	21
8. Conclusion and discussion	22
9. Bibliography	24
10. Appendix I	The PR-clips
	28
11. Appendix II	interview with Sverker Göranson in SvD
	30

1. Swedish defense – a case of unresolved identities

The overarching question for this study is how the Swedish Armed Forces (SAF) handles the issue of its own identity in the post-Cold War world considering the statement by commander in Chief (ciC) Sverker Göranson in Svenska Dagbladet (SvD). In this interview Sverker Göranson positions himself in a Cold War security logic, in contrast with the official post-Cold War security logic of the PR-campaigns of later years.

During the Cold War Sweden maintained a policy of neutrality in peace time to be able to stay neutral in case of hostility between the two military blocs North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact (WP). This led to a development of a stable identity for the SAF and a large army and with a large weapons industry that developed its own weapons system independent of the two military blocs, even though it was clear that, in case of war SAF would side with NATO and the “West”.¹ The identity and purpose was clear for the military, they were to fight against an expected mass invasion, so in other words Sweden had a non-flexible defense against an imagined mass invasion during the Cold War. When the end of the Cold War came and the Soviet Union disintegrated the traditionally imagined enemy had gone and the SAF stood without a clear enemy or identity. This was also true for most of Western Europe, which took part on the side of the U.S. in the Cold War. Their identity “crisis” was solved through NATO and an identity transformation from deterrence to defender of liberal values globally.²

This was the starting point for a long range of changes for the SAF. Since the end of the Cold War, the SAF have changed from being manned by a general conscription army to a voluntary army, dismantling parts of the army and a “strategic time-out”. These changes have had a strong influence on the SAF and have led to an uncertainty about the purpose and identity of the SAF, both for the general public and the organization itself. For the SAF this was manifested in their “strategic time out”³ that they took after the fall of the Soviet Union. The uncertainty in identity amongst the general public regarding about the SAF was illustrated in the guidelines for the PR-campaign of 2006 “Vägen framåt” (The road forward). The campaign had a section called Kunskapskampanjen (Knowledgecampaign) that was specifically aimed at the general public. This part of the campaign had the explicit purpose of getting a “ökad kunskap hos allmänheten om *insatsförsvaret*”(raised increased public awareness of the *rapid reaction force*) due to the fact that the general public had very low opinion about the SAF in general but also about their ability to live up to their assignment.⁴ The aim of the campaign was to anchor an identity for the SAF fit for the post-Cold War world and the “new”

¹ Ulf Bjereld in Brommesson & Ekengren (red), 2007 chapter. 3

² Hansen, 2006 p. 36

³ <http://blogg.forsvarsmakten.se/kommentar/2012/01/15/fof-rikskonf-%E2%80%93-ob-anforande/> accessed 2013-02-04 21:10

⁴ 4.23 Försvarsmakten 2006

security logic or as described by the SAF, “Försvarsmaktens roll i en förändrad värld” (The role of the SAF in a changed world).⁵

We will discuss the two security logics further under theoretical terms. The identity in the PR-campaign was projected on to a general public but also inwards into the organization in order to give the people in military a good understanding of the SAF:s assignment in the post-Cold War era.⁶ While the process to create a formal identity through continuous PR-campaigns the military command ended its strategic “time out” recently.⁷ We will see consequences from this in the empirical material when Sverker Göranson expresses his view on the state of the SAF. We will see these two as manifestations of informal and formal identity; we will discuss these categories of identity further when discussing theoretical terms.

2. Previous research with a focus on International Security Studies in relation to identity

This study has a focus on security studies through identity creation, this warrants a short re-cap of security studies from the Cold War era and the post-Cold War period.⁸ The study also has a primarily focus of the European theater of the Cold War and its aftermath, specifically Sweden. During the Cold War the world was stable or constantly unstable depending on your view. This international climate fostered a research discipline focused on realism and states as the primary actor.⁹ The scenario that held the most urgency for researchers within security was an possible “warm” conflict between the two blocs East-West, Communism-Capitalism which was combined with military alliance along the same division, NATO for the West, led by the United States (US) and the WP led by the Soviet Union (USSR). Excluding some research fields “coming up” during the 70’s and 80’s,¹⁰ it was the end of the Cold War that really opened up the research field. The old thinking and the role of the armies started to be questioned by new challenges.¹¹ Three, for this study, important and prominent researchers and a school are David Campbell, Lene Hansen and the Copenhagen school. Campbell focuses on the US and its identity in regards to threats to the national security.¹² Lene Hansen focuses on the creation of a *less than radical other* during the Balkan wars.¹³ The Copenhagen school (which Lene Hansen is a part of) has focused on deepening and widening the security “dilemma”. Specific for this study is

⁵ Uppslag 4.23 Försvarsmakten 2006

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ <http://blogg.forsvarsmakten.se/kommentar/2012/01/15/fof-rikskonf-%E2%80%93-ob-anforande/> accessed 2013-02-04 21:10

⁸ For a larger selection of previous research please see for example, amongst other; Collins (red.) 2010, Nye 2009 and Barash, & Webel 2009

⁹ Glaser in Collins (red.) 2010 chapter. 1

¹⁰ Buzan & Hansen 2009 p. 2

¹¹ Buzan & Hansen 2009 p. 2ff

¹² Campbell 1998

¹³ Hansen 2006



Copenhagen schools Securitization and De-Securitization and the “creation” of threats.¹⁴ In regards to Copenhagen school this study will not use Securitization *per se* because it is the identity of the SAF that is the focus. The threat comes to play only in a secondary role in this study. The creation of identity and the definition of the term will be discussed below under the section “Identity”. In regards to research about Sweden and its armed forces the research has focused mainly on how the transformation of the army is to be done and how well it has worked.¹⁵ Previous research concerning unresolved identities has mainly been done on “hot” cases such as Israel-Palestine conflict or less stable societies such as Northern Ireland.¹⁶ In comparison with previous research the case of the SAF and Sweden becomes an anomaly of sort considering the stability of the state and the lack of armed conflict in recent years. This study takes on a current discussion and for obvious reasons little research have been done on this issue because, to some extent, it is still ongoing. But there is still a general lack of research regarding how the formal and informal identities of the SAF are constructed and how compatible they are with each other and what the consequences may come from dual identities. This takes us to the next section, where we map out the aim of the study and the research questions.

3. Aim of the study and research question

There has been a lot of debate surrounding the Swedish armed forces touching on a variety of subjects such as new weapons systems¹⁷ and the budget for the armed forces¹⁸, the latest debate started after Sverker Göransons interview in SvD which will be used as empirical material and will be discussed below. But there have been little discussion concerning the identity of the SAF and also the problem that may arise when a subject (the SAF) struggles with two identities. The SAF are trying to find its place within the Swedish state and society in the post-Cold War period, and when doing so, is trying to create an identity and justification for its existence. At the present time this study assumes that they have failed in doing so, as in so far as, they have not created a unison identity; rather they have, as discussed in the introduction, created two, possibly incompatible, identities. The aims of the study is to map out the two different identities within the Swedish military, and if they are compatible or if they are contradictory to each other. We will also discuss possible implications if these two identities are contradictory. It will only be speculative reasoning because the consequences have yet to materialize.

- How is the two identities of the Swedish military constructed
 - o What are the different referent objects that are to be secured
 - o What are the different objects that threaten the referent object
- Are the two identities compatible and what consequences may we see from them

¹⁴ Collins 2010 p. 91 Copenhagen distinctions

¹⁵ See for example Bailes., Herolf & Sundelius (red) 2006, Berggren (red) 2007 and Haldén 2007

¹⁶ See for example Brian Graham 2004, Williams and Paul (red.) 2012 p. 65ff and 70

¹⁷ <http://www.dn.se/ekonomi/super-gripen-dyrare-an-beraknat> accessed 2013-02-13 22:32

¹⁸ <http://sverigesradio.se/sida/artikel.aspx?programid=83&artikel=5438880> accessed 2013-02-13 22:35



The answer to these questions will “trickle down” during the analytical section and then we will summarize and discuss them under the section End discussion and Conclusions. Already at this stage there is a point to be made that there is no clear distinction within the answer. Rather, when using Critical Discourse Analysis there is a interpretation of the material with a result that may be and should be contested by the reader and through a dialogue create a stronger research. We will get back to this issue under the presentation of the Critical Discourse Analysis.

4. Theoretical terms and definitions

All translations and emphasis was be done by the author unless noted.

a. Securitization and Speech act

The Copenhagen (CPH) School argues that security cannot be defined in objective terms; instead they argue that security is a *speech act*. This means that by saying “security” (not necessarily the word *security*) an authority actor within a specific field can claim a form of emergency for that sector.¹⁹ If the speech act is successful an issue can become *Securitized* and be presented in terms of security, as an existential threat.²⁰ CPH describes that “In principle, [any] securitizing actors can attempt to construct anything as a referent object.”²¹ Referent object is in this context something that “which you can point to and say: ‘it has to survive, therefore it is necessary to [. . .]’.”²² But CPH also point out that not every speech act is successful and that, in order to be successful, it must convince the relevant audiences, in this study the relevant audiences is the general public, we will elaborate on this later. They also give consideration to the history, geography and structural position of the state when considering the potential for a successful Securitization.²³ In the material for this study we identify the speech act(ing) when “casting of the issue as one of an “existensial threat,” which calls for extraordinary measures beyond the routines and norms of everyday politics.”²⁴ Although in this sense only the interview in SvD with Sverker Göranson can be consider “real” speech act. We still include the PR-campaign based on that it’s aim is to create something that is such a grave “threat” that it cannot be ignored and needs to be dealt with by the volunteer conscripts of the SAF. For our study we consider the two different identities as different forms of speech acts and that they both attempt to securitize two different issues based around two different security logics. We will not attempt to analyze the potential success of either Securitization attempts instead we will focus on the issue of promoting the two different identities that is the consequences of these two security logics.

¹⁹ Buzan & Hansen 2009 p. 33f

²⁰ Buzan & Hansen 2009 p. 214

²¹ Buzan and Wæver 2009 pp 253-276

²² Buzan and Wæver 2009 pp 253-276

²³ Buzan & Hansen 2009 p. 34

²⁴ Williams Dec., 2003 pp. 511-531 p. 514



b. Security logics

The two presentations of different security logics should be seen as ideal types in the Weber²⁵ sense of the word and that both identities contain both logics but one is far more prevalent than the other and will therefore shape the SAF from one of the security logic.

i. Cold War security

During the Cold War the security was formed around the military and anything incorporated into the security sector was incorporated because of its impact on a states possibility to use force i.e. within the sphere of the military sector. Economic, technology or material resources were not a security issue in their own right; rather they were a security issue due to their possible implications for the military sector.²⁶ There were two issues that primarily set the frame for security studies and the role for the military during the Cold War; Bipolarity (US vs. USSR, NATO vs. WP) and Nuclear weapons.²⁷ The organization of the “defense” during the Cold War evolved around nuclear weapons (for those who had them) and large standing armies or alliances (some choose to be neutral and instead focused on building armies, like Sweden which we will discuss below) all aimed at deterring an aggression from another state, alliance or bloc.²⁸ Most of the security strategies during this time period evolved around the logic of realism.²⁹

ii. Post-Cold War security

The collapse of the Soviet Union left a “hole”, so to say, for the western armies. They lost their traditional enemy and the centre for their defense structure as Russia (former USSR) and its military was in economical free fall.³⁰ This opened for other sectors than the military sector to become included in the concept of security in their own right. An example of this is NATO:s identity transformation, from being based on deterrence against a territorial threat from the USSR and the WP in Europe to becoming a defender for liberal values on a global scale.³¹ After the middle of the 80’s there have been numerous account of different concepts of security presented, many of these are presented in Alan Collins book *Contemporary security studies* for those who wish to have a broader overview. For this study we will only discuss the ones relevant for our analysis. First concept is Human security which is based on the United Nations *Human Development Report* 1994 where it is stated that; “The concept of

²⁵ With Weber means the ideal type presented by Max Weber to be used for analytical purposes. Lundquist 1993 p. 82f

²⁶ Buzan & Hansen 2009 p. 12

²⁷ Buzan & Hansen 2009 Chapter 4 and specifically p. 83

²⁸ Kaldor 2006 p. 32

²⁹ Baylis, & Smith (red.) 2005 p. 164

³⁰ Sverker Göranson refers to this as a reason for the strategic time out in the SAF in the interview

³¹ Hansen 2006 p. 36

security has for too long been interpreted narrowly...” “- fighting a cold war all over the world.” “For many of them[ordinary people], security symbolized protection from the threat of disease, hunger, unemployment, crime, social conflict, political repression and environmental hazards.”³² This moved the security concern from the State itself and instead focused on (ordinary) people. The move from state-centric security to other issues such as human security does not only stem from the end of the Cold War but also from the globalization process which gained even more momentum in the years after the end of the Cold War.³³ The logic is that the problems of the “South” affects the states of the “North” and therefore cannot be ignored.³⁴ Another issue related to human security is the *Responsibility to protect* (R2P) which contains the idea that sovereign states has the *responsibility* to the international community to prevent, react and rebuild in protection of populations (including populations of other states) when they are suffering serious harm. Such harm may be genocide or mass atrocities but it also, important for our study, includes a responsibility to rebuild polities and societies after a war or mass atrocities.³⁵

iii. Sweden during Cold War and Post-Cold War

During the Cold War Sweden adapted a strict neutral stance towards the two military and ideological blocs NATO and the WP.³⁶ Even though it was implicitly understood that NATO would come to the aid of Sweden in case of an assault by WP, which was the imagined enemy.³⁷ During the years of the Cold War Sweden maintained a, for its size, huge army that would deter any form of aggression from another state, a defense against a mass invasion.³⁸ For the purpose of having credibility in their policy of neutrality, Sweden also maintained a large military industry that was not compatible with any other states army (compare for example NATO and its ammunition that is compatible for every member states army)³⁹ and also the development of their own high tech weapon system such as the fighter jet Jakt Attack Spaning JAS (Hunt Attack Reconnaissance).⁴⁰ In other words, during the Cold War the SAF was an isolated island between two blocs of integrated armies with no official contact with either. After the end of the Cold War the SAF have done an enormous transformation of its size, its purpose and its international connections. Instead of “staying at home” as during the Cold War their “...internationella roll har ökat betydligt. Idag har försvaret ett större ansvar att upprätthålla den säkerhetspolitiska situationen i världen.” (international role have become significantly more important.

³² *Human development report. 1994*, <http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/1994/en/> p. 22 Accessed 2013-02-16 17:24

³³ Abrahamsson 2008 p. 1

³⁴ Abrahamsson 2008 p. 4 http://www.globalstudies.gu.se/digitalAssets/1274/1274383_abrahamsson_kina.pdf accessed 2013-02-16 16:42

³⁵ Collins 2010 p. 88 and p. 368ff

³⁶ Gustafsson 2007 p. 7

³⁷ Hugemark (red) 2006 p. 32

³⁸ Bailes, Herolf, & Sundelius 2006 p. 142

³⁹ Ibid. p. 142

⁴⁰ Haldén 2007 p. 58

The military today have a greater responsibility to maintain the political security of the world).⁴¹ In their own words they say that; “Vi [The SAF] ska klara kvalificerad väpnad strid i ett multinationellt sammanhang. På marken, till sjöss och i luften. Det är det vi tränar oss inför.” (We [the SAF] shall be able to handle qualified armed combat within a multi-national context. On the ground, at sea and in the air. This is what we train for).⁴² Further down in the text we can notice that the SAF also have other purposes, although secondary to the one first stated. “Försvarsmakten har *också* andra viktiga uppgifter.” (The SAF *also* have other important assignments) such as ”... bevakar Sveriges gränser...” (guarding Sweden's borders) and “[the SAF] stöder *också* samhället vid större kriser...”(also support the society when larger crises occur) ”... om en person försvunnit...” (if a person gone missing). SAF have gone from large to slim, national to international, from static invasion defense to a dynamic operational defense, in short, a total reconstruction.

c. Identity

In this study we focus on the *social identity*. With social identity we mean the different form of purposes attributed to individuals, organizations, *the self*, and specific for the study, the military in relation to an *other*.⁴³ Further we see identity, *the self*, as a part of the *being*, meaning part of everything and everyone and that it is created in relation to *difference*.⁴⁴ We also assume that identity is temporal and is always changing and is in need of this *difference* in order to create and establish and/or maintain the identity of the self.⁴⁵ This gives the consequences in our study that the SAF needs to identify itself with something *different* or something *radical other*, in order to be useful, to have a purpose or identity. Specifically for the military it needs to identify with an enemy to combat in one way or another to be able to create a purpose for itself, a *raison d'État*.⁴⁶

i. Formal identity

With formal we mean the public identity that is displayed to a broader public. The formal identity that the SAF creates is, for this study, taken from the recruitment commercials that SAF ordered from the PR-company DDB called “*Vad håller du på med?*” GMU 4/5 2013. It is taken as the way SAF wants to be identified as and is also the way it has been politically decided that the SAF should be identified,⁴⁷ this will be further discussed during the analysis of the material. The commercials are used for recruiting more people to the military and for this reason we see this as a formal way of presenting its identity. In this study this commercial campaign will be analyzed through a Critical

⁴¹ <http://www.sakerhetspolitik.se/Forsvar/Om-forsvaret/Forsvar-i-forandring/> accessed 2013-02-16 18:17

⁴² All quotes taken from: <http://www.forsvarsmakten.se/sv/om-forsvarsmakten/> accessed 2013-02-16 18:26

⁴³ Giddens & Birdsall 2003 p. 43f

⁴⁴ Campbell 1998 p. 9

⁴⁵ Hansen 2006 p. 43

⁴⁶ *raison d'État* means reason of state

⁴⁷ <http://www.government.se/content/1/c6/12/29/57/853ca644.pdf> accessed 2013-03-17



Discourses Analysis (CDA) with the additional inclusion of Lene Hansens framework to give a deeper understanding of how the identity is created and in regards to who or what is constituted as a threat. Through the analysis we will then establish what identity is created through the commercial campaign with the help of a post-Cold War security logic.

ii. Informal identity

For this study the word informal indicate that it's something without base in official documents and can sometimes be hard to identify. In this study the interview with Sverker Göranson, ciC of the SAF, in SvD 30 december 2012 will represent the informal identity.⁴⁸ That his opinions in the interview were the informal view was indicated when attorney general Tomas "Spy prosecutor" Lindstrand started a preliminary investigation for crimes against national security due to Sverker Göransons statement.⁴⁹ The investigation was dropped without any charges being filed against Sverker Göranson, but the reaction from the prosecution office and from other people gave a strong indication that it was not the formal views of the SAF.⁵⁰ Also the fact that Sverker Göranson uses a different form of security logic compared to the formal identity further indicates that this is a different identity than the formal one, which we will discuss further in the analysis.

5. Analytical method

Critical Discourse Analysis in combination with Lene Hansen

In this study we will use a version of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) as the main analytical method in combination with a modified version of Lene Hansens analytical framework presented in her book *Security as Practice*.⁵¹ The reason for choosing CDA over other analytical methods is because of the material in the study which warrants a method like CDA that enables the researcher to study wide variety of material such as moving clips and interview articles.⁵² How these analytical methods differ from the "textbook" version will be as far possible presented and discussed in the following. CDA is an interpretational form of analyze, this means that the interpretations are not beyond dispute. Rather this form of analyze is based on discussion and that the result can, and should be questioned, this leading to a better research results. To avoid unnecessary questioning of the result it is my role as analyzer to, as far as possible, be transparent with my interpretations of the material. The CDA will be combined with the framework for *radical other* and *less than radical other* created by Lene Hansen and Post-Cold War and Cold War security logic view of the material to be able to determine the security logic in the material. This form of analytical pattern takes the assumption that a text or a

⁴⁸ http://www.svd.se/nyheter/inrikes/forsvar-med-tidsgrans_7789308.svd accessed 2013-02-04 18:23

⁴⁹ http://www.svd.se/nyheter/inrikes/ingen-forundersokning-mot-ob_7880148.svd accessed 2013-02-04 18:28

⁵⁰ <http://www.dn.se/nyheter/sverige/forsvarsministern-en-veckas-forsvar-ar-tillrackligt> accessed 2013-02-04 18:28

⁵¹ Hansen 2006

⁵² Bergström & Boréus 2000, primarily chapter 6 which discusses Discourse Analysis

speech (interview) is more than just an informational transporter; rather it sees this as a form of social action that aims at influencing its intended audience. This study will deal with different material, an interview in a daily news paper and a PR-campaign on display in different media, although we will only analyze the material used on screen, which we will discuss under the section empirical material. CDA analysts usually see texts and other material they use as a discourses in them self,⁵³ in this study the material is given a “lesser” prominence i.e. the material is seen as trying to produce a certain *identity* in the surrounding discourse of society. The material is part of a discourse, not a discourse in itself, but we also see that the material represent two different security discourses within society. CDA takes the standpoint that all form of social relations and society is characterized by conflict and power relations. This means that communication through speech, written text, photography and such is more or less steeped in ideology, accepted truths by the ruling discourse. Society is seen as an ongoing process where this communication affects the society within which it is produced and consumed.⁵⁴

When it comes to the identity within the realm of security in the post-Cold War it has become more instable than during the Cold War. The end of the Cold War has led to “identities previously not articulated [may have] become important”.⁵⁵ This opens up the field for a form of struggle in the public sphere of what the security identity should engulf.

We will now go over to discuss Lene Hansen terminology and framework that warrants a short explanation of the terms and their meaning before we move forward. We will not use the full terminology or framework but in order to make coherent discussion of her research and our version of it, it is warranted to evolve it a little broader than we will use it:

- Self – the I, who we are, For our study this will be the SAF and how they perceive and wish to be perceived
- Radical otherness – Something to identify against and that needs to be dealt with (destroy or neutralized). In historic Sweden this has been Russia/USSR, unknown “evil” people “over there” creating a situation of emergency that requires response from the Self
- Less than radical otherness – Someone or something that is different from the Self but can be saved. Someone or something that is not fully like us, but have potential to be. Can be a civilian population in a conflict or an opposition “we” support.
- Spatial – The physical placing of the identity, can be that the identity is savage Russian or barbaric.
- Temporal – The timely placing of the identity, can the identity change, evolve or transform over time or not. The idea of development or democratization possibilities is example of this.

⁵³ Berglez 2000 Chapter 8; Kritisk diskursanalys, p. 195

⁵⁴ Berglez, Olausson in; Ekström 2008 p. 122f

⁵⁵ Hansen 2006 p. 40

- Ethical identities – The articulation of responsibility in an identity, that the Self have a responsibility toward the Other. An example of this is The white mans burden.⁵⁶

Our analytical framework will be much more limited than Lene Hansen, and this will only be a quick review of her research. If the reader would like a better examination and explanation of this theory Lene Hansens book *Security as practice* is highly recommended. For the following text chapter 3 of Lene Hansens mentioned book has been used, notes will only be used at direct quotes.

When presenting her framework Lene Hansen discusses the term *basic discourse* and that a basic discourse manifests the “main points of contestation within a debate”.⁵⁷ This term requires a larger body of empirical material than this study has at its disposal and the study is not wide enough to reach conclusions regarding other discourse present in society so the usage of this term is mute. Although we may argue that the formal and informal identity are the basic discourses of the debate. Due to the fact that the two different logics and by extension their identities have been the main structural position in the debate. This will be discussed during the analysis of the material and the following end discussion. In relation to this, Hansen argues for a large amount of empirical material (texts) for fully understanding and mapping out the identities. Since this study uses SAF:s formal material aimed at creating identity and gain voluntary conscripts and text material by the ciC of the SAF we consider that this limited study still have enough relevant empirical material to answer the questions for this study. Also we base this decision on the placing of the material in this study: The PR-campaign is advertised nationwide both in print and television⁵⁸ and the interview in SvD which is one of Sweden’s biggest newspapers. Hansen further discusses “key representation of identity”⁵⁹ which can be metaphors or geographical identities which signals a basic discourse. Considering our small amount of empirical material we will broaden our approach and instead use CDA to identify how the rhetoric congregates around certain security logic. Hansen also discusses conceptual histories of the representations, for our study we will use the two security logics as historical representations. Her fourth point discusses that the Other and Selves should differ in the three different constructions (spatial, temporal and ethical). We will limit the study to what construction that are articulated in the material which means that if a construction is absent it will not influence the analysis. Her fifth point states that the basic discourses should advocate different policies. As discussed above this will be discussed under the analysis and the discussion but we will refrain from the terminology of basic discourse due to the limitations of the study.

In summary: in this study we will use the concept of Identity to define the different aspects of the role of the SAF. We will consider the PR-campaign and the interview with Sverker Göransons as forms of

⁵⁶ This terminology is taken from Hansen 2006 Chapter 3 Beyond the other

⁵⁷ Hansen 2006 p. 46

⁵⁸ GMU 4/5 2013 Försvarsmakten

⁵⁹ Hansen 2006 p. 47

Speech act that try to Securitize different issues with different security logics and thereby secure their identity within the realm of society.

6. Empirical material

In the context of this study and its aims, the relevant material will be what that general public will take part of, in other words the PR material and the interview. For this study we have chosen to use the ongoing PR campaign for recruiting new soldiers called “Vad håller du på med?” and the statement by the ciC of the SAF made while the PR campaign was still ongoing. The choice to use this material is based on the fact that both of these “speech acts” were performed during the same time period and they appeal to the general public. The PR-campaign is obviously aimed at a broad audience. Sverker Göransson's interview also has the aim of influencing the wider public, as compared to, for example, his speech at Sälen some weeks later at the annual Folk och försvars rikskonferens in which he addressed a far smaller group and also chose a clearly different form of expression when articulating possible threats.⁶⁰ Also there's a timely reason, the Swedish parliament will decide on a new budget for the SAF during this year (2013) which, Sverker Göransson alludes to in the interview, which gives a greater tendency to create a sense of urgency in the threat in order to gain more allocation (for Sverker Göransson). In regards to the empirical material chosen, we limit ourselves from doing any generalization on the basis of this material other than the situation at present. But we can trace the formal identity of the SAF in regards to the PR aspect back to at least as early as 2006 when trying to establish an identity that is in line with the identity they are still trying to establish today.⁶¹ As for the informal identity we cannot make any generalization other than that Sverker Göransson's opinion are most likely fairly constant over time and that he has maintained these opinions from taking office up until now or when the assumptions he base his opinions on took place. For this study we are not concerned with actual measure of credibility of the different threats or any sort of analytical position in regards to the salience of the threats. In this study we are focused on the identity the SAF wants to create in the public sphere or discourse and their possible consequences. As discussed earlier during formal and informal identity, these two speech acts will represent each of the identities within SAF. We identify the two points as different attempts to securitize different issues through different security logics and by doing so performing a form of speech act towards a relevant audience, the general public. Since Sweden is a democratic state its population is an important audience in a strong position to influence the politicians and how the budget is spent and what political decisions are made.

⁶⁰ <http://blogg.forsvarsmakten.se/kommentar/2012/01/15/fof-rikskonf-%E2%80%93-ob-anforande/> accessed 2013-03-04 17:29

⁶¹ Uppslag 4.23 Försvarsmakten 2006

a. The campaign “Vad håller du på med?” (What are you doing?)⁶²

This campaign is in the same vein as the 2006 PR campaign “Vägen framåt” (The road forward).⁶³ The goal of that campaign was to give the wider public a (better) understanding of what the SAF does. The SAF describe that they focus on international assignment and peace assignments in the international arena, an identity based on a Post-Cold War logic.⁶⁴ We can see the current PR-campaign as a continuation of the same, meaning reach new recruits and inform the public of the still “new” tasks for the SAF. Although the earlier campaign in 2006 was more focused on incorporation of the wider public, the later one is to a higher degree aimed at new recruits.⁶⁵ As mentioned earlier, we see it as a speech act in so far as they present an issue of such an emergency that people voluntarily will enlist and risk their life for it.

The campaign consists of;

- 4 commercial clips, each approx 45 seconds long
- 3 letters directly sent to people
- 5 billboards with motives connected to the commercial clips
- 5 radio spots that are in the same “manner” as the commercial clips, although not the same “issues”
- 3 banners for homepages, with the same motives as the billboards.

For our analysis we will use the 4 commercial clips since the rest of the material in all intents and purpose display the same message and is centered on the same question “Vad håller du på med?” (What are you doing?) but the clips contain the most material for analysis.

The clips are without dialogue and consist of people doing a variation of questionable activities and ends with a phrase that look to encourage people to participate in different form of military activities. We will evolve on this during the analysis. Each clip will be shortly described in Appendix I with a direct link to each clip. In the analysis we will only present the “tag-line” of each clip and analyze what kind of identity and security logic is behind.

b. The interview with Sverker Göranson in SvD⁶⁶

The statement Sverker Göranson did in SvD was in an interview where he expressed his views on that state of the SAF. He expressed an alarming opinion that the SAF were in *such a bad shape* that they

⁶² The campaign can be found at: <http://www.forsvarsmakten.se/sv/Press/Kampanjer/> accessed 2013-02-16 19:21

⁶³ Opublicerat manuskript. Uppslag 4.23

⁶⁴ Opublicerat manuskript. Uppslag 4.23 p. 9 and Dandeker Dec., 1994 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/591887> Accessed 2013-02-18 17:52

⁶⁵ GMU 4 2013 and GMU 5 2013

⁶⁶ http://www.svd.se/nyheter/inrikes/forsvar-med-tidsgrans_7789308.svd accessed 2013-02-04 18:23

would only withstand an armed aggression for less than one week. We might debate if it is reasonable that the SAF should be able to withhold an attack longer than one week or not, but it was framed as an issue of great urgency. It was a speech act in so far as Sverker Göranson was trying to grant emergency status for the SAF and when doing so trying to alter the public's perception of the SAF. We will discuss this further in the analysis. In regards to the relation between what the journalist writes and what Sverker Göranson says we view it as that they both are making the speech act. Sverker Göranson is the authority to speak, the journalist works as a megaphone to deliver the message. Mikael Holmström, the journalistic author, have done interviews with many of the previous ciC over the years and have a record of writing articles that correlates with what the interviewed person wished to say. In a conversation with Mikael, he described that he has not had a case of misquoting anyone during his 30 year long career. Even though Sverker Göranson did not have a final say, in regards to the final version of the article, we still see it as, what the journalist writes is coherent with what Sverker Göranson said and that the message in the text is Sverker Göransons. We base this assumption both on the long record of Mikael's work but also that Sverker Göranson most likely hand-picked the journalist for the interview. We can see the interview as a conversation where the journalist and the ciC takes turn in confirming each other's statements, this will be clearer during the analysis.

The interview will be presented in its entirety in Appendix II with additional marking for each paragraph for easier read for the readers.

7. Analysis

a. Analysis of the PR-campaign

“Vad håller du på med?”

In the PR-campaign we don't see an archetypical securitization. But considering that the SAF asks people to risk their life and well being it is still a matter of securitizing an issue and a grave threat and danger to the *self* projected through the message in the campaign. Also, the PR-campaign has a lesser need to articulate a form of threat of urgency in a specific temporal or spatial form because the logic it is based in has been hegemonic for several years after the end of the Cold War and the structural reformation of the SAF from an invasion defense to a flexible defense. This can be seen if we compare the PR clips of the campaign of 2006 “Vägen framåt” (The road forward) to the clips used in this study. In the clips from 2006 a connection between Sweden's security and the insecurity of the world “out there” is explicitly expressed.⁶⁷ As discussed earlier, the clips do not contain any spoken dialogue; instead the focus is on portraying regular people doing “meaningless” actions. This is followed by the question “Vad håller du på med? (What are you doing?). This is played out as a

⁶⁷ The two clips in the campaign can be viewed at <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NcysQ6RWock> – Small world and <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IEkci-SDG50> – Africa – both clips accessed 2013-03-15. Both of these clips were analyzed by Ali, Daniel, Arvastson, Camilla et al. 2012



provocative question, implying that what you (the person in the clip and the audience) is doing is not as important as what the SAF is doing. In the following we will focus on what the SAF presents that they are doing. We will analyze these presentations from a post-Cold War logic.

Clip 1 – Post-it

At the end of the clip the campaign slogan is shown “Vad håller du på med?” (What are you doing? - This is repeated in each clip) and then comes the line “Vi håller på med att undsätta drabbade efter stormar” (We are rescuing victims after storms)

In this message there is no clear indication if this is a national or an international operation but we can assume they refer to a storm within the nation because, if it's an international operation it is usually described as victims of a catastrophe as we will see further down. But this statement put people in the centre of the operation, and also society at large by extension. The centering is around the security of people instead of a state, i.e. Human security, a post-Cold War logic.

Clip 2 – Inredning (Home decoration)

“Vi håller på med att säkra mattransporter vid humanitära katastrofer.” (We are securing food transportations during humanitarian disasters.)

In this message we see a clear international angle, the securing of food supply during humanitarian disasters. This could mean earthquakes, tsunamis and such which primarily happens in areas outside of Sweden and Europe (possibly with the exception for Turkey if we count it to Europe). The logic in this statement is that the consequences of a disaster may cause a large population to be vulnerable and in need of food, shelter and security in the risk of becoming radicalized. This population is temporally placed as being able to change, a less than radical other that we therefore need to help. The logic is that due to their grievances in their situation they may be victims of influence from radical others that either provide them with food, shelter and security and then count on them for support in a struggle for their own aim or influence them to direct their anger towards the West. So in order to avoid this radicalization to threaten the West or Sweden the SAF takes on the mission to radicalize these people for their own aim. The thought behind is that in the globalised world, what happens somewhere effects everyone everywhere, a post-Cold War logic.

Clip 3 – Frukost (Breakfast)

“Vi håller på med att försvara mänskliga rättigheter i krigshärjade länder” (We are defending human rights in war-torn countries)

This goes back to the previous clip, with a presentation of an international operation based on creating a better life for less than radical others. This form of justification for an international operation is in



line with the concept of R2P and clearly presents the assignment within a post-Cold War security logic. In this operation, instead of providing food transportation the SAF needs to go abroad to implement western humanitarian rights and create a less radical other that won't threaten the self (the West or Sweden) in the globalised world. The difference is that this would be in a post-war country compare to the previous which was situated in a country or place which was disaster torn. The difference would mean the soldier run a higher risk of danger in a war-torn country considering the possibility of post-conflict weapons in circulation.

Clip 4 – Ballong (Balloon)

“Vi håller på att säkra mattransporter vid humanitära katastrofer” (We are securing food transportations during humanitarian disasters.)

This is a repetition of the message in the second clip and the same logic applies.

b. Analysis of the interview with Sverker Göranson in SvD

The interview is first presented with a large picture of Sverker Göranson putting on (or taking off) his military coat. Compare this to military personal wearing a suit for example, which gives a more bureaucratic impression. This gives a signal off, amongst other things, that he is in touch with the military and he speaks with knowledge of the area. We will connect back to this in the textual part of the article.

In the headline we can read that there is a time limit on the Swedish defense “Försvar med tidsgräns” (Defense with a time limit), a reference to a state of emergency.

This is followed by a lead section that puts the situation in the present and the immediate urgency of the matter “*Om Sverige idag angrips militärt kan vi i bästa fall försvara oss i en vecka*” (*If Sweden today is military attacked we can at best defend ourselves for a week*). It is in the best possible way that Sweden may defend itself for a week, but it's likely less time than that. It indicates that it is more likely Sweden will fall sooner than a week. This puts further emphasizes on the urgency of a threat even though it's an indirect threat (*If*). After this we note that, this is how the situation *really* is, Sverker Göranson is speaking “*klarspråk*” (similar to speaking frankly or honestly in English) in the article according to the journalist.

Going down to the first paragraph Sverker Göranson moves the temporal placing of the threat to the future in “fem till tio år” (five to ten years) and references what his legacy may be. He also positions the reason why this threat has been able to occur: “[anslagen] *inte räcker* [...] till försvar som riksdagen beslutat om” ([the funding] is *not enough* [...] for the defense the parliament have decided). This shows both the perceived problem and the solution to the problem, the government need to allocate more money to the defense otherwise the SAF cannot live up to their obligations. The

wording indicates that this is the definitive problem and that the solution is the opposite i.e. more money.

In the second paragraph we are told that Sverker Göranson has been ciC since 2009. We also find out that he is travelling on the behalf of official mission, travelling to the north of Sweden (Kiruna) to thank the people that had taken part in a rescue mission for Norwegian pilots that were involved in a crash during a NATO exercise.

Going to the third paragraph the journalist situates the ciC in a position of knowledge and authority within the field he speaks about. The journalist does this by describing how Sverker Göranson takes of his “vapenrock” (weapons coat), indicating that he is official and in touch with his job (compare to the earlier discussion about military personnel in suits), the journalist also describes that Sverker Göransons weapons coat is decorated with “eklöv” (oak leafs) and “fyra stjärnor i guld” (four stars of gold) indicating that the ciC is a decorated and experienced leader within the military field and there for speaks with authority. Then the journalist once more remarks that the ciC is on a “tjänsteresa” (official mission), then he goes on to describe that the ciC is still “smärt” (athletic) making a nod that the ciC is “still with it” and hasn’t lost touch with the people on the “ground”. After this the journalist makes an analogy that the ciC may be in shape but the SAF is not, this also sets the tone for the interview as we will see further down.

In the fourth paragraph we get a short historical backdrop with references to the former chief of the military intelligence service Stefan Kristiansson and his warning about Russia re-arming. This “warning” from Stefan was apparently not heeded by the government and “[m]ånga befarar att detta är inledningen på ett nytt “stålbad”” (many fear this is prelude to a new “steel bath”, a reference to severe financial cuts). In this paragraph we find the first allusion to the Cold War enemy Russia and that the defense should be financed based on the threat that Russia poses against Sweden.

In the fifth paragraph the journalist asks the question “Kan vi försvara oss?” (Can we defend ourself?) with a reference to Krigsvetenskapsakademien (the War science academy) who asked this “kärnfråga” (essential question) the previous spring (2012). This reference is used to indicate that this is not a new question and aims at giving further urgency to the matter of the state of the SAF. This can be seen when the journalist phrases it as “*redan* i våras” (*already* last spring). Before the ciC replies the journalist puts emphasis that this answer is the *real truth* saying that the ciC’s answer is “klartext” (similar to speaking frankly or honestly in English). The ciC then replies “Vi kan försvara oss mot ett angrepp med ett begränsat mål. Vi talar om ungefär en vecka på egen hand.” (We can defend ourself against an attack with a limited target. We are talking about one week by ourself.) The only “enemy” mentioned in the article so far is Russia, so it can be assumed that this “threat” that Sweden only can defend against for a week is Russia.

Then in the seventh paragraph the journalist takes the scenario of an attack further and asks what happens if Sweden is attacked from two directions at the same time. The ciC answer “Nej, då klarar vi inte av det särskilt länge, *så är fakta*” (No, then we won't resist for long, *that is the fact*). Here is a further emphasis on the seriousness of the matter, that this is not a guess or an opinion, it is a fact.

In the ninth paragraph the journalist describes what the ciC say “...de militära hoten man ser mot Sverige är av ett annat slag än kalla krigets stora invasioner.” (...the military threat against Sweden is of a different kind than the large scale invasions of the Cold War) This indicating that the SAF has adapted a post-Cold War logic, but we will come back to this when the ciC discusses the situation in the surrounding geography today. After this remark it's described how the SAF exercise with a post-Cold War security logic in “hemliga [krigs] spel” (secret [war] games) “...utsätts Sverige för begränsade militära våldshandlingar.” (Sweden is subjected to limited violent military actions) “...angripares syfte [är att] ställa Sverige inför fullbordat faktum” (the attackers aim [is to] set Sweden to a fait accompli), “...genom att slå ut en storstad eller inte ett begränsat geografiskt område.” (by taking out a large city or a limited geographical area.) This is not the post-Cold War security logic adopted by the PR-campaigns but it is not the security logic of the Cold War, rather it can be seen as something in between the two. Although it is not clear if this military attack is going to be performed by an organized army (like the Russian) or a band of “unorganized” extremists using terror tactics. But the only articulated threat have been Russia and as we will see further in the article, it is the only one.

Then in the following paragraphs the question about Sweden's defense capabilities is asked again and with a similar response. Then the ciC goes on and discusses the possibilities of NATO helping Sweden. This gives a strong indication that the enemy is Russia considering the historical roots of NATO and the historical discussion in Sweden referencing to NATO as protection against WP and USSR. Also if the reasoning only concern state vs. state threat there is not many other options considering that NATO includes most countries in Europe.⁶⁸ The journalist and the ciC also discuss the other Nordic countries in non threatening wordings placing them outside the temporal placing of the threat. Then the ciC frames the threat in a definitive way: “*Västvärlden kommer sannolikt också att vara engagerad i vad som händer oss*” (*The western world will most likely also be engaged in what is happening to us*). It is clear that the threat do not come from the west, notice how this term to divide the world (Västvärlden/Western world) comes the Cold War logic. Then the ciC remarks that he cannot see a scenario where Sweden is attacked and nothing is going on in the “*omvärlden*” (*the wider world*) considering the change of wording this likely means that the attack would most likely be part of a larger conflict. With this imagined scenario by the ciC it is unlikely he believes that there will be a

⁶⁸ Member states of NATO are (as of 2013) Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom and the United States - http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-A72FAA78-8B4FF351/natolive/nato_countries.htm accessed 2013-03-15

limited attack by none-state actors or a limited attack by another state on Sweden, rather a full scale war between states. This further positions the ciC's strategic reasoning in Cold War security logic with large scale invasion wars.

Then we move to the next, the sixteenth, paragraph where the journalist further emphasizes that this is something "...som inte hörts på sjutton år." (that hasn't been heard in seventeen years) "[att en] ÖB har [...] talats klarspråk" ([that an] ciC has [...] spoken honestly).

In the next paragraph we get a short historical re-cap about the development of the SAF from 1996 until today. It is described how the SAF have been dismantled and the strategic planning for defending Sweden's territory ceased. This was because the "Sovjetimperiet" (The Soviet Empire) had disintegrated and that the Russian military was in "fritt fall" (free fall).

This is followed by, in the next paragraph, that the ciC describe that the "[o]säkerheten har ökat" (The insecurity has increased) in contrast to the earlier situation. Now we can clearly see that the threat is Russia, if we consider what has been said so far in the interview and what we will see in the next paragraph. We will also see clear reference to the Cold War enemy the Soviet Union.

In the nineteenth paragraph the temporal creation and spatial placing of the threat becomes concrete. The spatial placing of the insecurity is "när Ryssland-Georgien kriget bröt ut 2008" (when the Russia-Georgia war broke out in 2008). This gives us a time and an actor, but it is not the actor Russia that is the primary threat, instead it is the Russian leader Putin. "Ryssland under [...] Putin [har] antagit alltmer sovjetiska drag" (Russia under [...] Putin [has] taken on increasingly soviet traits) temporally placing Putin in the era of the Soviet Union. Now the spatial enemy from the Cold War is brought back and in the next sentence "...paras med en kraftfull rysk upprustning som svenska försvaret kan följa på nära håll" (...combined with a powerful rearmament that the Swedish armed forces can watch closely). This gives indications that the SAF and the ciC have good knowledge about the Russian forces and the leaders (Putin) intent which heightens the threat to security posed by Russia.

Then in the twentieth paragraph the ciC reaffirms this, describing that the "Normalbilden" (Normal picture: How things usually have been – Author's explanation) has changed compared to that of 10 years ago. "Det är allt större, allt mer komplexa övningar [som ryssarna utför]." (It is a lot bigger, a lot more complex exercises [that the Russians are doing].) These exercises are done in the waters close to Sweden, the Baltic sea and the Norwegian sea indicating the Russians are creeping closer.

In the next paragraph we learn that the SAF have *now* begun to plan for a defense of the Swedish territory. *But*, the new SAF is so slimmed that "...hälften av stridsflyget och många fartyg [...] [saknade] personal" (...half of the war planes and many ships [...] [were missing] personnel) so they were unable to be operational during 2012. So the SAF now sees a threat and tries to plan for it but are unable to fulfill their assigned duty due to a lack of monetary resources.

The two following paragraphs contain numbers to describe the information in the previous paragraph.

The next, twenty-fourth, paragraph the journalist illustrate this issue further when asking "...utan mer pengar måste man lägga ner en försvargren," (...without more money do you have to terminate a defense branch,) and the ciC replies with shortly with a "Ja" (Yes).

In the last two paragraphs of the interview the journalist presents a time limit on when a solution to the spatial framing of these threats have to be realized. On the first of March the ciC is due to deliver his own proposed efficiency proposals and proposed cut backs for the SAF. This also gives a time limit on the securitization, before this date the ciC must convince the general public (relevant audience) and them in turn must convince the politicians before this date so he may get the budget so that the SAF may be able to counter this threat before it is too late.

c. Summary

As we can see, the PR-campaign is firmly placed in the post-Cold War logic with a focus on securing humans that are threatened by a unknown object or by disorder in the society. While in the interview the threat is centered around Russia in a Cold War security logic with a state as a referent object and the only possible external help can only be obtained from NATO. Even though the "argumentation" in the PR-material is not as explicit or centered around an explicit grave threat it is still clear the security logic of the message is that of post-Cold War. Considering the hegemonic position of this security logic the SAF do not need to raise the same level of urgency as the challenging security logic. Compare this to the earlier PR-campaigns which had a more emphasis on creating a hegemonic position of the new logic i.e. persuading the general public of the SAF new role and the urgency of the threat. Compared with the interview we can see that Sverker Göranson uses a far more urgent way of describing the situation. Even though Sverker Göranson mentions that SAF:s strategy today is based on that there will be a limited attack, it does not appear that he believes it himself. At least we can see that he alludes to an all out war between states and that the state needs to be secured against territorial threats. The messages in the PR clips have a strong focus on a mobile military that will work all over the world, wherever there is a need for relief food or for upholding western version of human rights. This means that the defense needs to be small and flexible. Rather it's a matter of logistics (to transport the troops and food all over the world) and small units to perform these tasks (rescue a person in distress or securing a food transport). The end result is a small army with large resources for transportation that can be deployed rapidly. In Sverker Göransons security logic it is the opposite, the SAFs assignment is to protect the Swedish state from a possible aggressive Russia. We can understand from Sverker Göransons reasoning that the SAF should be built around the logic of the Cold War and that the defense of Sweden should be able to withstand an invasion, from Russia. This would mean a organization of the military like the one before the end of the Cold War, a large defense centered on mass mobilization and general conscription. Although this time around it seems like it is not based on

the principle of neutrality, rather it is explicitly discussed a scenario of holding out until NATO would come to Sweden's aid. This form of defense is static, large and prepared for a large scale invasion with a small focus on issues within a post-Cold War security logic. International operations are mentioned, but instead of securing human rights or securing food transports its focus are on getting better at defending against an attacker in co-operation with other (NATO) armies.

8. Conclusions and discussion

We can see that the SAF are trying to create an identity against two different types of threat a aggressive state or a somewhat abstract threat of disorder and human suffering based in two different security logics. This has, as we mentioned in the analysis far reaching consequences in how the SAF is organized. Eva Haldén describes the two different ways of organizing as direct opposites of each other.⁶⁹ Based on Haldén this leads to a conclusion that this split identity can have negative consequences for the SAF. One important issue to consider is, what the potential recruits believe they enlist for. As described in *Transformation of the Swedish Armed Forces*, “recruitment and selection are [...] fundamental to the ability of the [SAF] to successfully accomplish the tasks assigned to them.”⁷⁰ When two different identities are presented to the general public suitable recruits may be hard to find. In regards to the general public, when this identity “struggle” is done in the eye of the public it may hamper the trust the general public has for the SAF, as was indicate in a SIFO⁷¹ survey done by SVT.⁷² The survey gave a result that showed that 39 percent of the Swedish population feels unsafe with the SAFs ability to defend the Swedish territory.⁷³ There is no estimate on how much influence on public opinion Sverker Göransons interview had but since the debate is attributed to the interview we can assume it has had some effect on the general perception. The feeling of safety is an important factor in this regard, just like a bank people need to trust the institutions to function, so does the SAF. So when this identity “battle” is done with the general public as an audience and the issues is draped in such a daunting and intimidating manner it may have counterproductive effect, i.e. low level of trust. Another issue that has been contested due to this dual identity is how large the budget SAF needs and what it is supposed to be used for and the possibility for an alliance with the war-driven organization NATO.⁷⁴

There is a risk of a problem when the debate surrounding the SAF does not touch upon the issue of these two incompatible identities and their implications. The debate has mainly evolved around the

⁶⁹ Haldén 2007 p. 45

⁷⁰ Berggren (red) 2007 chapter. 1 Carlstedt, Berit and Carlstedt Leif, quote taken from p. 20

⁷¹ SIFO is a survey company in Sweden and stands for *Svenska institutet för opinionsundersökningar* (the Swedish Institute of Public Opinion Research)

⁷² SVT stands for Sveriges Television (Swedish Television) and is the biggest TV-channel in Sweden and is a public service channel owned by the Swedish state

⁷³ <http://www.svt.se/nyheter/sverige/bara-var-fjarde-svensk-trygg-med-forsvaret> accessed 2013-03-16 22:21

⁷⁴ <http://www.dn.se/nyheter/politik/reinfeldt-forsvaret-ar-ett-sarintresse> accessed 2013-03-06 22:33

budget, the reason (identity) for either budgetary proposal have been taken for a given. Either Russia is seen as a credible, future, threat or the state as a referent object or it is dismissed as a fictive rambling.⁷⁵ The dismissive side of the debate focuses on human security with civilians (less than radical others) being the referent object and vague radical others as a threat. Without a stable identity for the SAF there is a chance that the general public may be split in their perception of what the purpose of the SAF and this could lead to, as we have already seen, a lowering of the trust for the SAF and their ability to perform their assignment. The possible consequences of a low trust for the SAF can be that it becomes wrongfully funded when no one is sure of their assignment, a widely prevalent lack of trust for the SAF that by extension can affect the state and government in their ability to gain trust amongst the population in regards to safety.

Most important conclusion

We established that this is a case of a defense force that struggle with incompatible identities. This gives us helpful tools when assessing the reason and credibility for the alarming reports about the horrific state of the Swedish defense.

In regards to generalization of the result it is hard to make any as previous research regarding identity conflict mentioned earlier had shown not to be applicable in this case, we must considering the uniqueness of each case and study. Other states have experienced similar identity issues but none exactly as Sweden which makes a generalization of the material impossible. But the analytical framework, for this study, can be applied in a general manner. The framework can work on different case studies similar to this one, but it may need modification, to gain insight and understanding in the specifics of other states and their processes of their armed forces and identity creation.

⁷⁵ <http://www.fokus.se/2013/02/vaderkvarnar-i-forsvarsdebatten/> accessed 2013-03-06 22:33

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Appendix I

Clip 1 – Post-it

http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=TS5o0p-LdV8 accessed 2013-03-12

The clip starts with a view of an office-landscape with a young man strolling a cart. He reaches a desk and climbs upon it. Then he begins putting up post-it notes on a window above the desk while we hear birds singing in the background. Afterwards the viewer can see that the post-it notes forms a shape of computer-game figures. These figures are similar to those of the graffiti artist Banksy that became famous through the movie *Exit through the gift shop*. After this a woman enters the room and gives the young man a strange look while she is xeroxing, after which he sits down and gazes upon his work. Then the name of the campaign is shown “Vad håller du på med?” (What are you doing? - This is repeated in each clip) and then comes the line “Vi håller på med att undsätta drabbade efter stormar” (We are rescuing victims after storms) that describes what the SAF are doing.

Clip 2 – Inredning (Home decoration)

http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=Oj11RGlabo4 accessed 2013-03-12

A young man in an apartment stares at a coffee table and begins to sort a pile of newsmagazines after some considering. He then walks to a windows and begins to sort a pile of magazines on the window ledge. Meanwhile we can also see through the window and see that he is in a high-rise building. He continues to do this until the campaign slogan is shown, and then comes the line “Vi håller på med att säkra mattransporter vid humanitära katastrofer.” (We are securing food transportations during humanitarian disasters.)

Clip 3 – Frukost (Breakfast)

http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=Lkh_gKL4Vn0 accessed 2013-03-12

A young woman takes pictures with her mobile phone of her breakfast. She tries to fix the breakfast plate so that it will look good in the picture. While she is doing this, a man wakes up in the next room; he looks briefly at her and then walks away from the clip. The young woman then stands up on the table to take more pictures, assumingly to get a better angle. This being a reference to Facebook and instagram where it is popular to take pictures of what you eat in the morning, usually with some catchy line. After this comes the PR-slogan and then the line “Vi håller på med att försvara mänskliga rättigheter i krigshärjade länder” (We are defending human rights in war-torn countries)

Clip 4 – Ballong (Balloon)

http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=SD4sLilt_OM accessed 2013-03-12

The clip starts with a view of a common room in a student dorm, and then the camera moves into one of the student rooms. In the room we can see a young man sitting on a bed in front of his computer. He puts a gigantic balloon on his head and tries to pull it over himself. After he gives up trying he gives a


sign to the computer. This gives a indication that the web camera on the computer was filming him during his attempt with the ballon. This clip is a reference to the many viral videos on youtube where people do things out of the ordinary and, by broadcasting it on the internet, gain fame and sometimes become rich. Although in the clip it seems like the young man fails in his attempt. After this comes the PR-slogan and after that the message “Vi håller på att säkra mattransporter vid humanitära katastrofer” (We are securing food transportations during humanitarian disasters.) is shown.

Appendix II

http://www.svd.se/nyheter/inrikes/forsvar-med-tidsgrans_7789308.svd accessed 2013-02-04 18:23

Headline **Försvar med tidsgräns**

Lead Om Sverige i dag angrips militärt kan vi i bästa fall försvara oss i en vecka – därefter måste vi få hjälp från andra länder. Inför hotet om nya nedskärningar av försvaret i en allt mer osäker värld så talar överbefälhavare Sverker Göransson klarspråk.



ÖB Sverker Göransson.

Foto: yvonne åsell

30 december 2012 kl 21:58 , uppdaterad: 24 februari 2013 kl 18:33

Paragraph 1 ”Försvarsmakten och dess personal levererar kanonkvalitet varje dag, men jag har också ett ansvar för att våra efterträdare om fem eller tio år ges samma förutsättningar”, säger en bekymrad Sverker Göransson eftersom anslagen inte räcker till för det försvar som riksdagen beslutat om. Här under en tjänsteresa i försvarets TP 100 (Saab 340) Bromma–Kiruna nyligen.

Paragraph 2 Sverker Göransson har varit överbefälhavare sedan 2009. SvD följde honom på en tjänsteresa till Kiruna, dit han reste för att tacka alla dem som deltog i röjnings- och räddningsarbetet efter olyckan den 15 mars i år, då ett norskt Herculesplan som ingick i en Natoövning och skulle ha landat i Kiruna kraschade in i Kebnekaise. Alla fem norska officerare ombord omkom.

Paragraph 3 **General Göransson** tar av sig sin vapenrock med eklöv och fyra stjärnor i guld innan han sätter sig till rätta i flygplansstolen under en tjänsteresa. Trots tre år på ÖB-stolen är Sverker Göransson fortfarande smärt. Även om ÖB själv verkar vara i god form är det tveksamt om det också gäller Sveriges hårt bantade militära försvar.

Paragraph 4 I en SvD-intervju den 27 september varnade den avgående chefen för den militära underrättelsetjänsten, Stefan Kristiansson, för Rysslands upprustning. Han ansåg att den borde påverka nästa svenska försvarsbeslut 2015. En vecka senare gav regeringen den 4 oktober motsatt signal: Ekonomin för försvaret är given fram till 2019 och ÖB måste rätta sig efter det. Många befarar att detta är inledningen på ett nytt ”stålbåd” av nedläggningar i försvaret.

Paragraph 5 Redan i våras ställde Krigsvetenskapsakademien kärnfrågan: ”Kan vi försvara oss?”. Och nu svarar ÖB för första gången i klartext:

Paragraph 6 – Vi kan försvara oss mot ett angrepp med ett begränsat mål. Vi talar om ungefär en vecka på egen hand.

Paragraph 7 Om Sverige angrips från två håll, klarar vi det?

Paragraph 8 – Nej, då klarar vi inte av det speciellt länge, så är fakta, svarar Sverker Göranson.

Paragraph 9 ÖB förklarar att de militära hot man ser mot Sverige är av annat slag än kalla krigets stora invasioner. I dag gäller andra scenarier som Försvarsmakten prövat i hemliga spel. I dessa utsätts Sverige för begränsade militära våldshandlingar. En angripares syfte skulle då vara att under en internationell kris ställa Sverige inför fullbordat faktum. Detta genom att slå ut en storstad (exempelvis Stockholm) eller inta ett begränsat geografiskt område (en landsända eller Gotland).

Paragraph 10 Vi klarar alltså ett begränsat angrepp i en vecka?

Paragraph 11– Ja, sedan är våra resurser nedkörda på sådant sätt att motståndskraften inte är så stor längre, svarar Sverker Göranson.

Paragraph 12 En vecka in i striderna förväntar sig ÖB att Sverige får militär hjälp – men inte från EU där vi är medlemmar ”det är ingen militärallians”. I stället nämner han hur Sverige i en stabsövning ledd av Nato 2011 satte in större delen av sina Gripenplan för att undsätta Norge som angripits av övningsfienden. Han förväntar sig samma solidaritet om Sverige attackeras.

Paragraph 13– Jag ser det nordiska samarbetet i det perspektivet. Vi har inga avtal med dem på något sätt, vi är fortfarande militärt alliansfria.

Paragraph 14 I Norden är tre av fem länder med i Nato, är det alltså Nato vi räknar med eller hoppas på?

Paragraph 15– Jag varken räknar med eller hoppas. Jag konstaterar att världen ser ut på ett visst sätt. Västvärlden kommer sannolikt också att vara engagerad i vad som händer oss. Jag kan inte se ett scenario med ett begränsat angrepp mot Sverige och att ingenting händer i omvärlden.

Paragraph 16 Sverker Göransons besked innebär nya signaler som inte hörts på sjutton år. Inte sedan 1995 då Owe Wiktorin var ÖB har det talats klarspråk om att försvaret inte klarar sina uppgifter utan hjälp utifrån. Wiktorins varning kom inför försvarsbeslutet 1996 då invasionsförsvaret lades ned.

Paragraph 17 1996 var ju också det tidigare hotet, Sovjetimperiet, upplöst och ryska försvaret i fritt fall. I stället blev internationella insatser, som i Afghanistan, den nya huvuduppgiften för Försvarsmakten. Under näste ÖB, Johan Hederstedt, såg försvaret inga militära hot utan tog en ”strategisk timeout”. För tio år sedan tömdes alla mobiliseringsförråd, krigsbaser lades ner och all planering för försvar av Sveriges territorium upphörde.

Paragraph 18 I dag är läget ett annat. Enligt Sverker Göranson, som blev ÖB i mars 2009, är en sak säker: ”Osäkerheten har ökat”.

Paragraph 19 Pendeln började svänga tillbaka i augusti 2008 när Ryssland-Georgienkriget bröt ut. Det visade att gränser i Europa åter kan ändras med våld. Sedan dess har Ryssland under president Vladimir Putin antagit alltmer sovjetiska drag. Detta paras med en kraftfull rysk upprustning som svenska försvaret kan följa på nära håll.

Paragraph 20 – Normalbilden har förändrats jämfört med för tio år sedan. Det övas betydligt mer från rysk sida i Östersjön och Norska havet. Det är allt större, allt mer komplexa övningar. De är på väg uppåt i kvalitet i sin försvarsmakt.

Paragraph 21 Försvarsmakten har nu åter börjat planera för försvar av riket och 2013 återinförs fyra regionala staber. Men markförbanden som de ska kunna leda i Insatsorganisation 2014 är inte fullt bemannade och övade förrän 2019. Det nya yrkesförsvaret är så slimmat att Riksrevisionen konstaterat att hälften av stridsflyget och många fartyg inte kunde sättas in 2012 eftersom personal fattades.

Paragraph 22 I april gav ÖB regeringen besked om att försvarsbudgeten på i dag 41 miljarder per år inte räcker till från 2015. Dels kostar det ytterligare 1,5 miljarder kronor att anställa och öva hela Insatsorganisationen. Dels finns ett ”materielberg” med äldre utrustning för 25 miljarder kronor som måste ersättas.

Paragraph 23 Därefter har riksdagen beställt 40–60 nya Super-Jas vilket tränger undan planerad materiel för 5,5 miljarder kronor – vilket kan skapa nya luckor försvaret.

Paragraph 24 Du sade i somras att utan mer pengar måste man lägga ner en försvarsgren, gäller det fortfarande?

Paragraph 25 – Ja, svarar ÖB.

Paragraph 26 De anslagna pengarna räcker alltså inte till för att driva det försvar som politikerna bestämt att Sverige ska ha. Därför fick ÖB genom ”regeringsbeslut 7” den 4 oktober uppdraget att föreslå nya effektiviseringar och nedskärningar. Om sitt svar som Sverker Göranson ska lämna den 1 mars säger han endast:

Paragraph 27 – Det är en oerhört tuff uppgift.