

Kandidatuppsats i offentlig förvaltning HT13
Förvaltningshögskolan, Göteborgs universitet
Alexandra Aho
Emma Borgström
Handledare: Lars Karlsson
Examinator: Gregg Bucken-Knapp



Does the understanding between the parties in the implementation chain affect the policy outcome?

- A study about why Sida's anti-corruption policy has not been implemented in the aid-projects in Mae Sot according to the decision maker's intentions.

Abstract

Policy implementation is complex and it is not seldom that the outcome of a policy differs from the decision makers' intentions. This study aims to investigate the implementation problems of Sida's anti-corruption policy. The case examined is the highly corrupt Thai city Mae Sot, where Sida is financing many aid-projects. The analysis is taking its theoretical ground in Lundqvist's theory; Will, Can and Understand. Through the understand condition the study examines whether different perceptions of corruption affects the understanding between Sida and the regional perception in Mae Sot. Furthermore, the study investigates the unambiguity of Sida's anti-corruption policy. The empirical data was collected through interviews with respondents in Mae Sot and a text-analysis of Sida's anticorruption policy. The results were analysed through four dimensions of corruption and it revealed that the parties do not fully understand each other. Concerning the unambiguity of the anti-corruption policy, the results show that the policy was unambiguous. It is thereby possible to draw the conclusions that the different perception of corruption affects the understanding between Sida and the regional perceptions in Mae Sot.

Keywords

Implementation, understand, perception, corruption, Mae Sot, Sida's anticorruption regulations

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1. Introduction

Aid is a requisite for the development of a globally equal society. It should strengthen poorer countries when striving for democracy. The goal for Swedish aid is to create opportunities for poor people to improve their living conditions. The focus areas in Swedish aid are democracy and human rights, environment and climate and, finally, equality with a focus on women's roles in the development process.¹ Even though the purpose of the aid-projects is clear it does not always result in a success. There are many examples of failed aid-projects, one of these is the paper factory in Mufindi, Tanzania. When Tanzania got independent, they wanted to be self-sufficient in paper producing to enable Tanzanian children to receive textbooks. The World Bank and Swedish International Development Cooperation (Sida) supported the project. The factory was built to a total amount of SEK 1,5 billion, were Sida contributed with SEK 700 million but problems appeared from the start. First, it was discovered that the contractor could not provide the factory with the needed supply of coal. This was compounded by the fact that there were no paved road leading from the factory and finally the costs of exporting the surplus paper turned out to be too expensive. The last stroke was when the boiler could not get installed since the water reserve was empty because of the dry. In the end, the factory closed and was sold for USD 1 with the condition to resume the production of paper.²

As the example describes, there are many reasons for an aid-project to fail. One reason that is often overlooked is corruption. Sida acknowledge the fight against corruption as one of their priorities. According to Sida this is important since corruption is wide spread in many of the countries where Sweden is providing aid.³ Thailand is one of these countries. According to Transparency International's annual corruption ranking for 2013, Thailand was ranked as number 102, where number 1 is the least corrupt country.⁴ Mae Sot is a town located in the north-west of Thailand on the border of Burma. Approximately 140 000 Burmese refugees are living there and, as a result of this, many aid-projects find their home in the city, mainly to support the Burmese refugees.⁵ At the same time, as in the rest of Thailand, there is a high degree of corruption in Mae Sot that affects the entire city, not to mention the

¹ <http://www.sida.se/Svenska/Bistand--utveckling/Detta-ar-svenskt-bistand/> (read:131014)

² <http://www.sida.se/OmVarlden/Varlden/Analys/Det-nya-bistandet/De-basta-och-samsta-bistandsprojekten/> (Read: 131014)

³ <http://www.sida.se/Svenska/Om-oss/Sa-arbetar-vi/Vart-arbete-mot-korruption/> (read: 131014)

⁴ <http://www.transparency.org/country#THA> (Read 131214)

⁵ Brees, Inge. 2008:388

aidprojects that are carried out there. Since corruption weakens trust in a society, and thereby risks undermining democracy,⁵ it is necessary to explore the corruption issue further. This study will focus on the city Mae Sot.

1.1 Problem

Sida distributes half of the Swedish aid budget and the organisation is co-sponsor to many of the aid-projects in Mae Sot.⁶ Many of these aid-projects are schools for illegal Burmese refugees. Since the schools are run illegally they are forced to bribe the police on a regular basis in order to enable the students to stay in Thailand, thus the aid-projects are involved in corruption.⁷ Thereby corruption is a part of the everyday life within the aid-projects in Mae Sot. Because of that it is possible to assume that the frequent occurrence of corruption affects the perception of corruption within the aid-projects. Sida has an anti-corruption policy consisting of a collection of documents. One of them is the manual “Sida’s anti-corruption regulations” from 2004. The goals for the manual are to prevent corruption within the projects financed by Sida and it has a strict requirements for application in all of Sida’s aid-projects.⁸ Since the schools are forced to be involved in corruption the anti-corruption policy cannot be implemented in the aid-projects in Mae Sot according to the decision makers’ intentions. This external effect can have an influence on the regional perception of corruption in Mae Sot and in turn this might affect how the regional perception in Mae Sot perceives Sida’s anti-corruption policy. If so, there is a possibility that the perception of corruption differ between the parties, which implies that the parties do not understand each other, and it might complicate the implementation of the anti-corruption policy further.

1.2 Overall Purpose

The overall purpose of this study is to find out whether different understandings between Sida and the regional perception in Mae Sot complicate the implementation of the anti-corruption policy. If the perceptions of corruption differ between the parties, which imply that the parties do not understand each other, it might be an internal factor that complicates the implementation of Sida’s anti-corruption policy further.

⁵ <http://www.sida.se/Svenska/Om-oss/Sa-arbetar-vi/Vart-arbete-mot-korruption/> (Read: 131014)

⁶ <http://www.sida.se/Svenska/Om-oss/vart-uppdrag/> (Read 131006)

⁷ Brees, Inge. 2008:389

⁸ Sida's Anticorruption Regulation 2004

1.3 Overall question posture

How does the understanding between Sida and the regional perception in Mae Sot affect the implementation of the anti-corruption policy?

2. Theoretical framework

How can this study theoretically understand and explain why the understanding between Sida and the regional perception in Mae Sot might affect the implementation of the anti-corruption policy? It is common in research to try to explain these questions by using implementation theory. Implementation theory aims to explain how politics is implemented and why it sometimes does not lead to the desired result.⁹ Below a discussion about overall implementation theory will be held and it will lead to a presentation of Lundquist's theory; *will, can* and *understand* that will lay the foundation to this study's theoretical framework. Since this study examine Sida's anti-corruptions policy it is necessary to include a discussion about corruption to be able to define the concept theoretically. One part of the theory concerns implementation and the other one corruption, these two will then be used in the tool for analysing which will be presented in the end of this chapter.

2.1 Implementation theory

In implementation research the discussion usually concerns the two main divisions; top-down and bottom-up.¹⁰ A clear hierarchy reflects the implementation chain in the top-down approach where the decisions are made in the top to the bottom with a clear steering chain.¹³ The policy's goals can only be reached through legitimate and conscientious decisions, the policy formulation is hereby the key to a successful implementation. If the results are different from what was intended, something went wrong during the implementation phase.¹⁴ One of the main arguments against the top-down approach is that most policies are more complex to implement than they seem to be on paper.¹⁵ The bottom-up perspective emerged from a critic against the top-down approach.¹¹ According to the critics, vital actors are excluded when analysing the implementation chain through the top-down approach. The

⁹ Hupe, Peter L. 2010:63

¹⁰ Perrow, Charles. 1972:161 ¹³

Sannerstedt, Anders. 1997:22ff

¹⁴ Hill, Michael. 1997:67. ¹⁵

Ibid:133

¹¹ Sabatier, Paul. 1986:25

actors are even described as obstacles rather than assets.¹² The bottom-up approach focuses on the intended policy area rather than the implementation chain. The focus is thereby on the street-level bureaucrats and their networks. Furthermore, it is of interest to study how streetlevel bureaucrats enforce a policy in a certain political area. The implementation of a policy is seen from the street-level bureaucrats' perceptions and how they interpreted the policy, though this interpretation is not necessarily consistent with the decision makers' intentions for the policy.¹³ The top-down and the bottom-up approaches are the two main distinctions within implementation theory. This study will not focus on where and who in the implementation chain that formulate the policy. Instead, this study will examine how the parties in the implementation process understand each other. This will be done without any prejudice of who is formulating the policy. To enable an investigation of this a theory that is empirically useful is needed. Lennart Lundquist has operationalized three conditions that must be taken into account for a successful implementation. The enforcer has to *understand*, *can* and *want* to implement the policy.¹⁴ The first condition, *will*, is vital for a successful implementation. If it is not in the interest of the enforcer to carry through with the policy, it is not likely that the implementation will succeed. There are three main reasons why the enforcer will not carry through with the policy. It could be that the enforcer does not like the content of the policy, it can also be that the enforcer does not like the decision makers or that the enforcers mistrust the system.¹⁵ Condition number two, *can*, involve a number of things that is needed to be able to implement the policy, such as access to enough resources for instance including money, staff, equipment or knowledge. The decision makers should inventory available resources in the planning phase of the policy. For example, if the intended enforcer is unqualified, it is necessary to offer education. The third condition, *understand* means that information from the decision makers to the enforcer must be unambiguous, so there will not be no misunderstandings. It is of importance for the decision makers to note that the enforcer understands the directive that comes with the policy so that the intended results are achieved. A frequent problem related to this condition is that the decision makers are being ambiguous with their directives. Even though the decision seems clear from the decision makers' point of view, the enforcer might interpret the policy differently. The

¹² Ibid:30ff

¹³ Premfors, Rune.1989:124

¹⁴ Rothstein, Bo. (Ed). 2008:28f

¹⁵ Lundquist, Lennart. 1987:78

decision makers have to be aware of that the risk for misunderstandings increases when the enforcer and the decision makers do not speak the same language.¹⁶

We consider Lundquist's theory as a useful tool for studying implementation difficulties. However, there are some complications in his argumentation. The implementation chain is portrayed as a relation between decision makers and an enforcer. The reality is more complex since there are many parties engaged in the implementation process. Through the steps of the implementation chain the risks increase for that the policy could be interpreted differently than the decision maker's intentions. Therefore, it is sometimes beyond the decision maker's control to make sure that the enforcer understands the policy. Although the theory can be criticised, it also contains important information. The theory illustrates the differences between central and local context that is empirically useful. Lundquist's theory is a useful tool to study why a policy implementation is unsuccessful. An analysis of the *will* condition can reveal if the enforcer does not like the decision makers or mistrust the system.¹⁷ When investigating the *can* condition, physical things like if the project has enough resources are investigated. An analysis through the *understand* condition reveals if the information given to the enforcer is unambiguous or not. This study aims to examine if the understanding between the parties in the implementation process affects the policy outcome. To understand the policy outcome in practice one must first see how the people involved understand the policy.¹⁸ There are several aspects of the understand condition, one aspect is whether the perception of concepts is consistent between the decision makers and the enforcer. To enable an understanding of how a policy is perceived by the enforcer one must pay attention to different interpretations.¹⁹ If the perceptions of concepts differ, it might lead to an implementation problem. This raises the question whether different perceptions of concepts can be one reason for why Sida's anti-corruption policy has not been implemented in the aid-projects in Mae Sot. Since the focus of the study is the anti-corruption policy, it is interesting to study the parties' perception of the corruption concept. Another aspect of the understand condition is the unambiguity of a policy. When a policy is to be implemented, it is exposed to different thoughts and behaviour patterns. The enforcers are not neutral but carriers of norms

¹⁶ Ibid:77

¹⁷ Lundquist, Lennart. 1987:78

¹⁸ Yanow, Dvora, 2003:235

¹⁹ Ibid:235

and believe about what the policy intends and how it should be practised. The policy process can thereby be seen as a setting where different interpretation struggles to takeover.²⁰ This can result in that the policy implementation does not turn out according to the decision makers' intentions. As Lundquist emphasizes, it is important that the policy is unambiguous to reduce the enforcers' scope of interpretation. This makes it interesting to study the unambiguity of Sida's anti-corruption policy.

Based on this, Lundquist's condition *understand* is chosen as a theoretical base for this study. This will enable an investigation to find out whether the perception of concepts can be a reason to why Sida and the regional perception in Mae Sot do not understand each other. Since the anti-corruption policy is in focus, it becomes essential to concentrate on the concept of corruption. The *understand* criteria will also enable an investigation about the unambiguity of Sida's anti-corruption policy.

2.2 Corruption research

The quality of government institute claims that there are as many definitions of corruption as there are studies on the subject. This since there is no universal definition that is true for everyone and the definition changes according to time and context. Though the institution agrees on that a generally accepted explanation of corruption is the Swedish dictionary's, Nationalencyklopedin, definition;²¹ "...missbruk av förtroendeställning till egen vinning, främst genom tagande av mutor." which can be translated into; abusing a position of trust to serve self-interests, primarily through bribery.²² Transparency International is the leading international anti-corruption organisation.²³ The organisation defines corruption as when "private rather than public interests dictate policy."²⁴ Rothstein consider Kurers similar definition as a standard: "the abuse of public power for private gain".²⁵ Rothstein claims that this standard definition is problematic because it is too vague since "abuse" can be interpreted in many ways. Rothstein discusses the concept of corruption further when arguing that there are many things, which usually do not get attention when discussing corruption, that can be included. Rothstein includes "clientelism, lack of respect for the rule of law and property

²⁰ Fischer, Frank, 2003:217f

²¹ Berg, Ulrika. 2005:5

²² <http://www.ne.se/korruption> (Read 140106)

²³ Rothstein, Bo. 2011:2

²⁴ http://www.transparency.org/topic/detail/politics_and_government (Read 130916)

²⁵ Rothstein, Bo. 2012:10

rights, nepotism, cronyism, patronage, systemic discrimination and cases where administrative agencies are “captured” by the interest groups that they are set out to regulate and control”.²⁶ We agree with Rothstein’s critic against the definition of corruption. We believe that Rothstein's addition to the debate of how corruption could be defined is relevant as it provides a broader picture of what the concepts actually means. This because it involves acts that at first glance are not always connected to the corruption concept but which after consideration is coherent with the concept. To fulfil the purpose of this study a distinct definition with several dimension of corruption is needed, to enable a comparison and analyse of the empirical data. Nationalencyklopedins universal definition of corruption will be used in order to create different dimensions, this since it is a definition that many people can agree on. Since the definition is narrow, it is necessary to include Rothstein's additional definition. It is relevant since that definition broader the view of the corruption concept which enable a deeper comparison of the empirical data.

In Nationalencyklopedins definition of corruption two dimensions can be discerned. “Abusing a position of trust to serve self-interests” is interpreted as that a decision maker or a politician is taking benefits from its position. One example of this can be to let one’s Company or organization pay for bills on restaurants or clubs. To use one’s power in order to serve self-interests and in that way abuse the trust of the citizens is seen as one side of corruption. This behaviour will compose one dimension of corruption – the self-interest dimension. Furthermore, the definition states that abuse of power is expressed “primarily through bribery”. When a public official or a politician makes a decision to be able to receive money, goods or services it is corruption. Thus, when making a decision against the formal rules to get an exchange or transaction with citizens. Bribery is one part of corruption and the behaviour will compose another dimension of corruption – the bribery dimension. Rothstein’s wider the definition and include actions “such as clientelism, lack of respect for the rule of law and property rights, nepotism, cronyism, patronage, systemic discrimination and cases where administrative agencies are “captured” by the interest groups that they are set out to regulate and control”.²⁷ This definition can be discerned in several dimensions. Clientelism means when politicians are taking advantage of a relationship with clients.²⁸ Patronage has a similar definition since it includes when a public official or politician is breaking the rules and

²⁶ Ibid:11

²⁷ Rothstein, Bo. 2012:11

²⁸ <http://www.ne.se/sok?q=klientelism> (Read 140106)

laws with the purpose of political gain. For instance when making a certain decision in order to receive more votes.²⁹ When “administrative agencies are “captured” by interest groups that they are set out to regulate and control” it is corruption. Administrative agencies can be interpreted as decision makers and it can refer to public officials or politicians. In this situation certain groups in the society has a great influence on decision maker’s actions. This implies that the decisions is not made on objective grounds since the interest groups desires will influence the decisions, thus, it is not according to the democratic order. Clientelism, patronage and “administrative agencies are “captured” by the interest groups that they are set out to regulate or control” share similarities since they all concern politicians or public officials that are abusing their power by taking advantage of their position. It is therefore possible to combine these three corrupt behaviours to form one dimension – the patronage dimension. Cronyism is when one is favouring close friends and appointing them to political positions or other positions.³⁰ Nepotism is similar but it includes family.³¹ Systematic discrimination, is when certain groups in the society are being discriminated because of their group affiliation. When someone receives opportunities based on friendship or family relationships, it implies that individuals without these connections do not have the same opportunity. This can be seen as one part of discrimination. Based on this it is possible to combine the three behaviours into one dimension – the nepotism dimension. Rothstein also claims that “lack of respect for the rule of law and property rights” is corruption. This could be included in all of the four dimensions and it will therefore not be put in a certain dimension but it will pervade all of them. Starting from Rothstein’s and Nationalencyklopedin’s definitions four dimensions of corruption has been created. Since this study is examines weather perceptions differ from one another these four dimensions will not only help the comparison of the perceptions but also to construct a tool for analysing. The dimensions are defined as follows:

²⁹ Rothstein, Bo. (Ed). 2008:236f

³⁰ <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/cronyism> (Read: 140106)

³¹ <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/nepotism?s=t> (Read: 140106)

Bribery - When a public official or a politician makes a decision to be able to receive money, goods or services it is corruption. For instance, when making a decision against the formal rules to get an exchange or transaction with citizens.

Patronage - When a public official or politician breaks the rules and laws with the purpose of political gain. For instance when making a certain decision in order to receive more votes.

Nepotism - When exchange occur to benefit the public officials family or friends. For instance, when one is receiving a position based on friendship or family relationships. This implies that individuals without these connections do not have the same opportunity.

Self-interest - When a public official or politician is breaking the law to serve their selfinterest. One example of this can be to let one's company or organization pay for bills on restaurants or clubs.

2.3 Tool for analysing

The purpose of this study is to examine how Sida and the regional perception in Mae Sot perceives the four dimensions and investigate the unambiguity of Sida's anti-corruption policy. To be able to analyse the empirical data a tool for analysing was constructed where the regional perception of corruption in Mae Sot, Sida's perception of corruption and the unambiguity of Sida's anti-corruptions policy each represent one category with its own column. Mae Sot and Sida represent one category each since they are the parties examined in this study. The unambiguity of the anti-corruption policy will compose the third column. One alternative would be to analyse the unambiguity separately, thus not include it in the tool for analysing. This could be done by giving the unambiguity of the anti-corruption policy its own part in the result. In this study, the unambiguity of the anti-corruption policy will be included in the tool for analysing. This is done so that the result is assessable for the reader through a transparent comparison between the unambiguity of Sida's anti-corruption policy and the four dimensions. Each category will be put in to relation with the four dimensions to enable a transparent comparison through the *understand* condition. The tool for analysing will look as follows:

	The regional perception of corruption in Mae Sot	Sida's perception of corruption	The unambiguity of Sida's anti-corruption policy
Bribery			
Patronage			
Nepotism			
Selfinterest			

Figure 1. The three categories that will be analysed are put in relation to the four dimensions of corruption.

There are several ways of analysing a result, below it will be presented how the empirical data will be interpreted and analysed. The respondent's answers will be analysed as follows: If the majority of the respondents in Mae Sot consider bribery to be, for instance, receiving money it will be interpreted as coherent with the bribery dimension. If the answers differ between the respondents, the conclusion will be based on the majority's opinion. In the example above it is easy to compare the respondents answer with the definition of the dimension since they are using the same expression. In some of the other dimensions, the answer from the respondents might be vaguer. If the respondents consider the description of one dimension as unacceptable but they do not express it as illegal or corruption, it cannot be interpreted as the respondents consider this dimension as corruption. If they do describe it as illegal and an action that should be punished it might be possible to draw the conclusion that they consider the dimension as corruption. If this is the case, there will be a transparent analysis of the interpretations and the conclusions in the result.

During the text-analysis, the focus will be on how Sida perceives corruption according to the dimensions and on the other hand, the analysis will examine the policy's unambiguity. When examine Sida's perception of corruption the focus will be to compare the dimensions with expressions and sentences. For instance, Sida states that kickbacks, bribery, embezzlement, racketeering and extortion is corruption. This will be interpreted, as that Sida's definition is coherent with the bribery dimension. When comparing other dimensions the policy might not be as easy interpreted. If the policy do not express one specific situation as corruption, it is still possible to interpret this as corruption if there are similarities to the

dimensions. When analysing the unambiguity of the anti-corruption policy the focus will be on how accessible the content of the dimensions are. Words will not be counted but an overall impression of the unambiguity and the four dimensions will be captured. For instance, in Sida's official definition of corruption it states that kickbacks, bribery, embezzlement, racketeering and extortion are corruption. The expressions are there after used several times in the policy. This will be interpreted as that the policy is unambiguous of how Sida consider the bribery dimension as corruption. The tool for analysing will be filled in with the results and it is thereby the base for the conclusions. This is an example of how the tool for analysing will be filled in:

	The regional perception of corruption in Mae Sot	Sida's perception of corruption	The unambiguity of Sida's anti-corruption policy
Bribery	To receive money in order to execute a service is unacceptable and it is corruption.	To be involved in kickbacks, bribery, embezzlement, racketeering and extortion is corruption.	In the anti-corruption policy, Sida describes the bribery several times in a distinct way. They are clear in how they perceive bribery.

Figure 2. An example of how the tool for analysing will be used. The three categories are put in to relation with the bribery dimension.

The empirical data will be analysed through the theoretical framework, thus the *understand* condition. It is therefore necessary to clarify how understand will be analysed in this study. When analysing whether and how the parties understand each other, their perception of corruption will be in focus. If their perception is similar, it will be interpreted as that the parties understand each other. For instance in the bribery dimension the parties both used an example of receiving money to define the dimension, this will be interpreted as both parties considered the dimension to be corruption. Since they described it in the same way it can also be interpreted as that the parties understand each other. When analysing how the unambiguity in Sida's anti-corruption policy affects the understanding between the two parties, conclusions will be drawn according to how accessible words and expressions are. For instance, the content of the bribery dimension is outspoken when described through bribery, kickbacks, extortion and racketeering. According to this study, Sida's statement makes the information assessable for the reader so therefore the conclusion would be that the policy is unambiguous on this dimension.

2.4 Specified Purpose

In the beginning of the study a problem was brought up; corruption exist in Mae Sot and Sida's anticorruption policy cannot be implemented. It is therefore possible that this affects the understanding of corruption in Mae Sot. The overall purpose was to investigate how the understanding between Sida and the aid-projects in Mae Sot affects the implementation of Sida's anti-corruption policy. Through the theoretical framework, it is now possible to formulate the specified purpose of this study: To examine the regional perception of corruption in Mae Sot and compare it with Sida's perception of corruption. Furthermore, the purpose is to investigate how unambiguous Sida's anti-corruption policy is.

2.5 Specified Question postures

- How does Sida's perception of corruption differ from the regional perception in Mae Sot?
- How unambiguous is Sida's anti-corruption policy?

3. Data collection method

This study will attempt to determine if the understanding between Sida and the regional perception in Mae Sot affects the policy implementation by examining the different ways in how corruption is perceived.

- What helps to explain - *Lundquist's theory: Understand, Will and Can*
- What enables the comparison – *The four dimensions of corruption*
- What is intended to understand - *The different perception of corruption and the unambiguity of Sida's anti-corruption policy*

To be able to fulfil the purpose, a case study design was made with semi-structured interviews and text-analysis. The case study design should analyse the specific nature and complexity that a case exhibits.³² A problem concerning case studies is that they are not representative, but what is important to remember is that the purpose of case studies is not always necessarily to generalize or create a blueprint for other locations. The specific location is carefully chosen

³² Bryman, Alan. 2012:66

³⁸ Ibid:70.

to capture a specific phenomenon in one certain context.³⁸ This study is restricted to investigating the regional perception of corruption in Mae Sot. Mae Sot has a large population of refugees who have a great need for support. Therefore, there are many aid-projects established in the city. This, in combination with the fact that Thailand is a highly corrupt country, makes this location interesting to study.³³

3.1 Semi structured interviews

Semi structured interviews gives the researcher the ability to conduct the interviews with an interview guide, but the questions can be dynamically asked depending on the course of the interview. This allows the researcher to expand the interview through additional questions that are related to the respondents' answers.³⁴ This is useful for this study to capture the respondents' perception of corruption. The interview guide will contain hypothetical situations that cover the four dimensions of corruption. (See annex 1). By using hypothetical situations, the expectations are to overcome language barriers and create realistic scenarios. The interview guide was thoughtfully constructed to begin with questions that do not reveal that corruption is in focus. This since corruption sometimes has a negative connotation, which could affect the respondents' answers. The risk would then be that this would set the respondents in a narrow thought pattern and thereby fail to capture their perception of corruption. Therefore, the direct questions of corruption were put in the end of the interview guide. In Mae Sot, the respondents include people that are related to the aid-projects where Sida is involved. All respondents will be anonymous in this study since the respondents may face legal issues if their identity is revealed. The selection of respondents is management personnel since they are directly working with the anti-corruption policy. The respondents are ultimately responsible for the aid-projects and they are the ones that are responsible for the budget and the activity plans. Seven interviews will be performed. This is a representative sample even though it is not statistically significant. Rather than doing many interviews the focus will be on a few to enable a deeper conversation. The respondents in this study are the enforcers of Sida's anti-corruption policy and their perception of corruption has a great impact on the final stages in the implementation chain. The interviews will be recorded so that nothing of interest will be missed. Since the study will be performed in Mae Sot, the

³³ Brees, Inge. 2008:389

³⁴ Bryman, Alan. 2012:470

interviews will be conducted in English. The respondents have a good grasp of English so that should not be an issue. The study will not discuss gender issues but an equal gender balance will be endeavoured when choosing respondents.

3.2 Text-analysis

This study is restricted to examine Sida, since they are the organisation that distributes the majority of the Swedish government aid. Another reason for choosing Sida is the fact that the organisation is financing many of the aid-projects in Mae Sot. Sida have an anti-corruption policy that consists of a collection of documents. The focus in this study is “Sida’s anticorruption regulations” which were formed in 2004 and thereafter have been applied in Mae Sot. The approach when performing the text-analysis on Sida’s anti-corruption policy will be to gain the decision makers’ perceptions. First, by quickly peruse the text and attempt to obtain the overall impression.³⁵ This to capture the context in which the policy is written. The next step consists of investigating how corruption is defined. Then the policy will be read slowly while looking for emotive words. When an idea of how Sida perceives corruption is obtained the four dimensions of corruption will be distinguish and filled in to the tool for analysis. To be able to answer the second question posture the policy will be read slowly to examine how unambiguous the policy describes the content of the dimensions. The focus will be on how accessible the expressions are. Words will not be counted but an overall impression of the unambiguity and the four dimensions will be captured. This is a way to capture the unambiguity of the anti-corruption policy.

3.3 Alternative Design

There are several ways to build a research study. An alternative design for this study could be a cross-sectional design that includes structured observations on more than one case at one specific point in time. One argument to use a cross-sectional design could be with the purpose to capture different individuals’ definition of corruption at one specific point in time where each individual represent one case.³⁶ This study compares the differences in perception of corruption between Sida and the regional perception in Mae Sot. Therefore, a collected image of how people in Mae Sot perceive corruption is more suitable for the purpose. An alternative

³⁵ Esaiasson, P. Gilljan, M. Oscarsson, H. Wängnerud, L. 2010:237

³⁶ Bryman, Alan. 2012:62

to semi-structured interviews is unstructured interviews. An advantage with using unstructured interviews is that the questions are constructed in the context of the answers given. This allows the researcher to delve into the meaning behind each answer. A disadvantage when using unstructured interviews is that the researcher receives a lot of data and there is also a risk that the data amongst the respondents is incongruent and will therefore difficult to compare. The interview guide that is used in semi-structured interviews overcomes this issue, it helps to control the amount of data and ease a comparison. Semi-structured interviews are ideal because more than one person can carry out the fieldwork whilst ensuring that the important questions will be asked.³⁷ It would also be possible to construct a survey to collect the data. However, when using a survey the information received would not be as profound as when using semi-structured interviews. Given these reasons, this study uses semi structured interview. An alternative to text-analysis is to interview the authors of the policy to create an understanding for what the authors had in mind when constructing the policy. The disadvantage would be that the results would only contain the author's perspective. Not how Sida as an organisation perceives corruption. The text-analyse also enable the study to grasp the unambiguity of the policy which interviews would not. This study are interested in examine how unambiguous the policy is to the enforcers and since they only read the policy it make sense to study the policy instead of interviewing the authors. Thereby, this study will proceed with text-analysis.

3.4 The case

Mae Sot is unique in the sense that the city has a majority of residents that are refugees.³⁸ However, from a global perspective, the city is not matchless since there are many places with similar circumstances. This does not mean that the results of this study will be universal for all cities with similar demography, but the results can show trends in how people under similar circumstances perceives corruption. One part of the purpose of this study is to investigate whether the perception of corruption has an impact on the implementation process. What might affect the results is that the majority of the population is refugees, in the sense that they might have a negative experience and therefore perceives corruption excessively negative.⁴⁵ Thus, it may lead to a one sided results. What might also have an impact on the

³⁷ Ibid:472

³⁸ <http://sverigesradio.se/sida/artikel.aspx?programid=95&artikel=4167684> (Read 131215) ⁴⁵ Brees, Inge. 2008:389

results is the high degree of corruption in Mae Sot. That might increase the acceptability and thus the acceptations of corruption may be higher than in less corrupt cities. It can be expressed through that the population perceives corruption in a certain way in the Mae Sot context, since corruption has become a part of their everyday life. The respondents might have a different perception if they lived somewhere else. Even if the results of this study are not universal, it may act as an indication that can be useful at similar locations in the world.

4. Results

The purpose of this study is to find out if the understanding between Sida and the regional perception in Mae Sot affects the policy implementation. Furthermore, the study will investigate the unambiguity of Sida's anti-corruption policy. In this chapter the empirical results will be presented, this will be done through the tool for analysing. Each dimension will be presented separately, and each and every one of them will contain a review of the parties' perception of corruption. In this part, the respondent's answer will be presented separately. Furthermore, every dimension will contain an analysis of the unambiguity in Sida's anti-corruption policy. At the end of every dimension the data will be analysed through the *understand* condition. Here the respondent's answer will be put together and be mentioned as "the regional perception in Mae Sot". The chapter will end with a final analysis where the specified question postures will be answered.

4.1 Bribery

The bribery dimension is when a public official or a politician is making a decision to be able to receive money, goods or services. All respondents considered this an unacceptable behaviour. Three of them even connected the example of bribery directly to the word corruption, before the expression was mentioned. All of the respondents had their own experience of bribery and one of them described it like this:

"But the police, Thai police, how to say, they arrest me they say get one, give me one ah 100 bath, like that and then I can go around Mae Sot"

All the respondents shared similar examples and their experiences are consistent with the way this study perceives corruption through the bribery dimension. Sida's official definition of corruption is as follows:

“Corruption in this context means institutions, organisations, companies or individuals obtaining improper gains by their position in an operation and thereby causing damage or loss. It includes kickbacks and bribery, extortion, favouritism and nepotism, and also embezzlement, racketeering, conflicts of interest and illegal financing of political parties.”³⁹

Sida’s definition of corruption is well consistent with how this study defines the bribery dimension. Kickbacks and embezzlement is directly connected to illegal money transfers. Bribery, extortion and racketeering could concern money but can also include illegal exchange of goods or services. Furthermore, the criteria for the bribery dimension can be interpreted as abuse of power since it is a decision maker using one’s power to gain money or material things. If this is put in relation to the respondent’s answers, one of them used this description:

“Like some of the authorities you abuse, they abuse their power. And some of the government mismanage, like the resources like a, like the natural resources they sell to other countries and they keep, they keep the money in their pocket like mismanagement for their own purpose. [...] They abuse their power and oppress the people. That is not ok.”

All respondents strongly disagreed with what they perceived as a corrupt behaviour. This became clear through the examples they shared and one of them did not even wanted to leave the school, where he was working, because of fear to be stopped by the police. Based on this a conclusion can be drawn that the respondents agree with the bribery dimension and perceives it as corruption.

The results show that both Sida and the respondents in Mae Sot consider this dimension to be corruption. The greatest similarity between the parties’ is the fact that both highlighted bribery as a corrupt behaviour. Bribery was seen as an unacceptable behaviour that is harmful for the organization and the society as a whole. Sida’s anti-corruption policy includes more variables from the bribery dimension than the respondents did. Since they also explicitly include kickbacks, embezzlement, extortion and racketeering which none of the respondents mentioned. This does not necessarily mean that the respondents do not agree with Sidas wider definition. One of the reasons to why the respondents did not express this opinion

³⁹ Sida's Anticorruption Regulation 2004:2

can be that it is easier to clarify the whole picture in a text than it is when answering a question during an interview. Despite this difference the answers from both parties is consistent with how this study defines the bribery dimension. This makes it possible to draw the conclusion that both Sida and the regional perception in Mae Sot interpreted bribery in the same way and that, according with the bribery dimension. In the anti-corruption policy, Sida describes the behaviour several times in a distinct way. They use words and expressions to describe their perception of the bribery dimension in an unambiguous way. Since both of the parties have the same perception of bribery and the anti-corruption policy is clear in how Sida define it, there should be no obstacles to why the parties would misunderstand each other in this dimension.

4.2 Patronage

Concerning the patronage dimension, thus, whether it is okay or not for a public official or a politician to break the law in order to gain political benefits, the results differed between the respondents. Four of the respondents disagreed with this behaviour, one of them mentioned the importance of that the politician and army must obey the law:

“We have to be very strict in the law and also in the constitution. They are obligated to law and rule of law so they should not break, they must be obeyed.”

Two of the respondents thought it was ok for a politician to break the law. One of them related to the situation in Burma where the constitution, according to her, does not protect the citizens:

“Because sometime you have to do something that’s against the law. Because law is not really perfect then always not protect the people.”

The seventh respondent was also discussing the fact that the law is not perfect and that there are some situations when it is okay to break the law, if it is for the sake of the people. No conclusions could be drawn whether she thought it was ok for a politician to break the law in general terms. The result only answers what the respondents thought about a politician that where breaking the law to gain political benefits but it does not show whether or not they thought this was corruption. Thus, what becomes clear is that the majority of the respondents highlighted the importance of that politicians and army strictly must obey the law. Another thing that became visible is that the example was interpreted differently depending on the respondent’s view of the constitution in their country. Sida states in their policy that

corruption can be more than what was mentioned in their definition of corruption. It can also refer to other situations like obtaining gain for your political party⁴⁰. Sida means that corruption directly lead to demoralization of the political system and democracy as a whole.⁴¹

“Corruption in this context means institutions, organisations, companies or individuals obtaining improper gains by their position in an operation and thereby causing damage or loss. It includes [...] illegal financing of political parties.”⁴²

Furthermore, in the introduction of the anti-corruption policy it is written that:

“Corruption - demoralizes political systems and democracy.”⁴³

Sida mention that gain for one’s political party is a part of corruption. This sentence is up for interpretation and it is not necessarily consistent with the patronage dimension. When supporting one’s political party by not obeying the law, the person probably will receive increased popularity within the party and thereby get rewarded somehow, for example by getting a higher position. In this case, it is well consistent with the patronage dimension. Using one’s power to gain political benefits undermines the foundation of democracy and this kind of actions will in the long-term lead to a demoralization of the political system. When looking at Sida’s description from this perspective it is well consistent with the dimension used in this study. Not obeying the law can also be connected with the respondent’s answers. It is, as discussed above, not a direct connection to the patronage dimension. The respondents did not explain further, what they meant with not obeying the law. As a conclusion, however, the citizens elect politicians and they have thereby a responsibility to act in the interest of the people. This responsibility also gives the politicians the possibility to obtain power. To use this power in order to gain political benefits is in that sense an abuse of power, since they think it is of high importance that the politicians and army follows the law. A conclusion can thereby be drawn that the majority of the respondents consider patronage to be corruption. To sum up the discussion above both parties consider patronage to be corruption. Nevertheless, their point of departure differs, Sida emphasize that obtaining improper gains to one’s

⁴⁰ Sida's Anticorruption Regulation 2004:7

⁴¹ Ibid:II

⁴² Ibid:2

⁴³ Sida's Anticorruption Regulation 2004:II

political party is corruption while the respondents emanate from a perspective where they consider not obeying the law to gain political benefits to be corruption. Even though the parties emanates from different starting points they both consider the dimension to be corruption. This makes it possible to draw the conclusion that the parties would understand each other. In the anti-corruption policy, Sida clearly states that they are against this behaviour, they do not use the expression patronage but they are clear that they dislike the behaviour. Sida are distinct about their opinion and they even use it in their official definition of corruption. It is therefore possible to draw the conclusion that Sida are unambiguous in their perception of this dimension. Even though Sida and the regional perceptions in Mae Sot at some parts have a different description of patronage they both come to the same conclusion that patronage is abuse of power and therefore corruption. In that sense, it is possible to draw the conclusion that the parties would understand each other.

4.3 Nepotism

The nepotism dimension includes when exchange occur to benefit a public official, their family or relatives. In the interview guide a teacher was used as an example. All of the respondents highlighted the importance of that a teacher must treat all her students equally. They described the example as unfair and one of them expressed it like this:

“It think it should be not, should not happened. Because, you know, even ah, because you are the teacher you have the responsibility to teach and to treat the students equally.”

Three respondents explicitly considered nepotism to be corruption. Two of them had other examples of nepotism that they connected to corruption, one of those was:

“But this 1 % was doing corruption, but it is eh no place to put the money, that people and who are powerful and relative to the general, so that is just 1 %. So, but their wealthiness more than 99% haha, terrible but that is what I mean.”

The ways this three respondents interpreted nepotism is clearly coherent with this study. Concerning the answers of the other four, it is not possible to interpret them to be consistent with the nepotism dimension since they were not explicitly saying that it is corruption. What makes the analyse more complex is that two of the respondents did not consider the behaviour to be a bad thing. They thought it was a solidary act to help their family members to get a job:

“For example this teachers family member needs some job for money or something like that, we how do you say, we need to understand: Oh he need a job. And they need some money for family or something.”

Still they thought giving more helping to a related student in class was unfair. The fact that they thought it was okay to benefit a family member in their professional life makes it possible to draw the conclusion that they do not consider nepotism as corruption. To summarize the respondent’s answer; the results are widespread. Three of the respondents consider nepotism to be corruption, two of the other respondents did not and the last two did not agree with the example but still there were no connection between their answers and the nepotism dimension.

Sida on the other hand consider nepotism to be corruption. Their official definition of corruption even contains the expression nepotism:

“Corruption is...favouritism and nepotism...”⁴⁴

Sida interpreted nepotism in the same way as this study and agree that nepotism is corruption. Furthermore, Sida states that:

“The gain can also be indirect and refer to people close to me...”⁵²

It is possible to interpret “people close to me” as for instance friends. There is no doubt about the fact that Sida consider nepotism to be corruption. The answers from the respondents on the other hand are not as easily interpreted. Even though some respondents clearly expressed that this behaviour is corrupt they do not represent a majority. Thereby it is impossible to draw the conclusion that the respondents consider nepotism to be corruption, thus the nepotism dimension is, according to the respondents, not corruption. The conclusion is therefore that Sida and the regional perception in Mae Sot have different opinions whether nepotism is corruption or not. Sida consider it to be corruption while the regional perception in Mae Sot does not. In the anti-corruption policy, Sida is firm about the fact that nepotism is corruption. They even use the expression in their official definition of corruption. Since the parties’ do not perceive nepotism in the same way, the conclusion is that Sida and the regional

⁴⁴ Sida's Anticorruption Regulation 2004:2 ⁵²
Ibid:7

perception in Mae Sot do not understand each other. The misunderstanding does not depend on Sida being ambiguous in their anti-corruption policy but the parties have different ideas of helping ones family.

4.4 Self-interest

The self-interest dimension is when a public official or politician is breaking the law to serve their self-interest. All the respondents considered this an unacceptable behaviour. Two of them even called it corruption and one of them expressed it like this:

“In, according for financial rule you can say it kind of corruption. I don’t know, but in my view I think it is kind of corruption because he use this money for himself.”

The other respondents expressed their antipathy against a decision maker that is using the organizations money to pay for her own expenses. One of them thought that it was undemocratic:

“I mean that if the people do this the organization is not really democratic and the people who involved in the organization not really care about the organization and their reputation I think.”

One of the other respondents thought that this kind of behaviour must be punished. The other three respondents also thought that this was an unacceptable behaviour. All respondent reacted strongly against the behaviour and used harsh words to express their dislike.

The fact that the majority of the respondents consider self-interest to be either corrupt, a crime or something that should be punished makes it possible to draw the conclusion that they consider this to be corruption. It can thereby be said that the respondents agree with the selfinterest dimension and that they consider it to be corruption. In their anti-corruption policy, Sida states that their definition of corruption is consistent with Transparency Internationals definition:

“Abuse of entrusted power for personal gain”⁴⁵

This is fully in line with how this study considers the self-interest dimension. The fact that they consider a decision maker that breaks the law, in order to serve her self-interest, as corrupt makes their interpretation coherent with this study. Both the regional perception in

⁴⁵ Sida's Anticorruption Regulation 2004:7

Mae Sot and Sida consider a public official or a politician that is breaking the law, in order to gain personal benefits, as corrupt. In sum, the parties share the same opinion. The anticorruption policy is unambiguous about the fact that self-interest is seen as corruption, it even highlights one of Transparency international's definitions of corruption. Since the parties perceive self-interest in the same way, it implies that they do understand each other. Below the tool for analysis will be presented. The first two columns include how Sida and the regional perception in Mae Sot perceive corruption. The third one contains the unambiguity of Sida's anti-corruption policy:

	The regional perception of corruption in Mae Sot	Sida's perception of corruption	The unambiguity of Sida's anti-corruption policy
Bribery	To take a bribe is unacceptable and a corrupt behaviour.	To be involved in kickbacks, bribery, embezzlement, racketeering and extortion is corruption.	The policy is unambiguous when even using bribery in the official definition of corruption.
Patronage	To use one's power in order to gain political benefits is a corrupt behaviour.	Gaining one's political party in order to get political benefits is a corrupt behaviour.	The policy is unambiguous when describing the dislike against patronage behaviour.
Nepotism	To favour a student is an unacceptable behaviour. However, it is not corruption.	To favour people close to you like family and friends is corruption.	The policy is unambiguous when even using nepotism in the official definition of corruption.
Selfinterest	A decision maker that breaks the law to serve her self-interest commits a crime and should be punished. This is a corrupt behaviour.	A decision maker that breaks the law to serve her self-interest is corrupt.	The policy is unambiguous when quoting Transparency international's "abuse of entrusted power for personal gain" as an example of corruption.

Figure 3. The figure shows the three categories and their relation to the four dimensions of corruption.

4.5 Final analysis

The results show that the parties' opinions differ on one of four dimensions. They have a consistent perception of the bribery-, patronage- and self-interest dimension. Since they share the same words and they have a similar discussion about the content of the dimensions. Whereas to the nepotism dimension it is clear that Sida and the regional perception in Mae Sot do not understand each other since their perception differs. They have a different view on supporting one's family through one's position. The regional perception in Mae Sot considers helping one's family to be a solidary act, and an action that in first hand is something good. While Sida does not agree with the behaviour and clearly perceives nepotism as corruption. So it does not matter how clear Sida is on the fact that they think that this behaviour is unacceptable, this still would not change the regional perception of nepotism in Mae Sot. The different perceptions of the nepotism dimension could be one reason that complicates the implementation of the anti-corruption policy. It could lead to communication and cooperation difficulties since the parties do not understand each other. Concerning the unambiguity of the anti-corruption policy the results shows that Sida is unambiguous in their policy. They are clearly stating that bribery, patronage, nepotism and self-interest are corruption. The policy is out spoken in the expressions and the perception is assessable to the reader. Bribery and nepotism are used as expressions whereas the meaning of patronage and self-interest is clearly visible in the policy. All four dimensions are also expressed as corruption in Sida's official definition of corruption. Concerning the nepotism dimension Sida and the regional perception in Mae Sot differs despite the unambiguity of the policy. The parties have a very different view of nepotism. Therefore, even though Sida is unambiguous, this still would not change the regional perception of nepotism. In sum, there seems like there is no correlation between the unambiguity of the policy and the misunderstanding concerning the nepotism dimension.

5. Conclusions

Initially in this study, a problem was brought up; Sida distributes half of the Swedish aid budget and the organisation is co-sponsors to many of the aid-projects in Mae Sot.⁴⁶ At the same time, there is a high degree of corruption in Mae Sot that affects the entire city, not to mention the aid-projects that are carried out there.⁵⁵ Since the aid-projects are forced to be involved in corruption the anti-corruption policy cannot be implemented in the aid-projects in

⁴⁶ <http://www.sida.se/Svenska/Om-oss/> (Read 131006)

⁵⁵ Brees, Inge. 2008:389

Mae Sot according to the decision makers' intentions. This external effect can have an influence on the regional perception of corruption in Mae Sot and in turn this might affect the understanding between Sida and the aid-projects in Mae Sot. If so, there is a possibility that the misunderstanding between the parties might complicate the implementation of the anti-corruption policy further. To investigate this further we executed several interviews, we also conducted a text-analysis of Sida's anticorruption policy. The result has been presented and analysed and possible answers to the question postures have been discussed. It is now time to draw the conclusions of this study and discuss what knowledge it brought to the research field. To begin with, a discussion about what insights this study provided about the above-mentioned problem will be held to answer the specified question postures:

- How does Sida's perception of corruption differ from the regional perception in Mae Sot?
- How unambiguous is Sida's anti-corruption policy?

The perception of corruption differed between Sida and the regional perception in Mae Sot in one of the dimensions. Both parties agreed on that the bribery, patronage and self-interest dimension is corruption. Where as to nepotism the perceptions differed, Sida clearly stated that nepotism is corruption while the regional perception in Mae Sot considered it to be a solidary act towards one's family. Concerning the unambiguity in Sida's anti-corruption policy the results reveals that Sida is clear when describing the four dimensions as corruption. The content of the dimensions are assessable to the reader and it is used in Sida's official definition of corruption. The specified purpose was to examine whether different perceptions of corruption and the unambiguity in the anti-corruption policy is a reason to the implementation difficulties of Sida's policy. Now the specified question postures will be used to answer the overall question posture:

- How does the understanding between Sida and the regional perception in Mae Sot affect the implementation of the anti-corruption policy?

First, this study revealed that the perception of corruption differed in one dimension between Sida and the regional perception in Mae Sot. This implies that they do not always understand each other. Furthermore, the study revealed that Sida's anti-corruption policy is assessable to

reader and unambiguous. According to this study, with the method and theory that has been selected the results points in the direction that the understanding between the parties in the implementation process may affect the policy outcome. This since the parties has different perceptions of the nepotism dimension. Thus, the results indicate that this could be a reason next to the external effect that affects the implementation of the anti-corruption policy. Furthermore, the result indicates that the ambiguity of the policy is not a reason to why the policy outcome has not achieved the desired result. This implies that the unambiguity of the policy is not a reason for misunderstandings between the parties in the implementation chain. With this said it is now possible to draw some conclusions from the question postures:

- Sida and the regional perception in Mae Sot perceive corruption different in one of the dimension.
- Sida and the regional perception in Mae Sot do not understand each other fully.
- Sida's anti-corruption policy is unambiguous.

The theory highlights the importance of decision makers being clear and unambiguous in the policy process. To understand the outcome of a policy one must look at how the policy is understood by the people involved. This study examined the *understand* condition by investigating if different perceptions of corruption, and the unambiguity of a policy, affects the understanding between two parties in the policy process. The advantage with using the theory in this way was that it revealed different understandings of concepts, which in that sense made it clear that the parties did not fully understand each other. The theory has a great impact on the results. This study's choice of theory lead to that a comparison was made between two parties. The empirical analyse focused on searching for expressions and words, which then was compared between the two parties to examine whether or not they shared the same perception. The theory is not very descriptive in how to interpret a decision maker's unambiguity. This leaves rooms for interpretation that required us to set up our own frames of reference for how this study used unambiguity. This study focused on how accessible the content of the dimensions where in the anti-corruption policy. Sida's anti-corruption policy was read open minded, with the purpose to capture the underlying meaning. It might have affected the results in the way that there was a higher acceptance for what Sida perceives as corruption. In the sense that it was searched for descriptions of the dimensions and that might not be the way that the enforcer would read the policy. If the study would have interpreted

unambiguity differently, the results might differ. One example of this would be to look for certain words from the dimensions and then count how frequently they were used. In that case it would be possible to think that the results would present Sida's anti-corruption policy as more ambiguous. This since the definitions of corruption used in this study is not that frequently used in the anti-corruption policy. Concerning the reliability of the results, the answer from the respondents in Mae Sot was sincere and honest and it gave a comprehensive description of their perception of corruption, according to us. Even though the answers were reliable the study is not statistically reliable since only seven interviews were conducted. Still the study provides an image and it may act as a pilot study and give an indication of the regional perception of corruption in Mae Sot. The text-analysis is considered as reliable since it is Sida's official anti-corruption policy, which implies that it contains their perception of corruption.

The choice of data collection method always has an impact on the result and thereby the conclusions. The four dimensions of corruption that were used to construct the tool for analysing may have the effect that the researcher gave too much attention to the dimensions and thereby missed other perspectives of corruption. We are overall satisfied with the analysing tool but for future use, it would be simpler for the researcher to define the dimensions clearer for herself before gathering the empirical data. The empirical data in this study was collected through semi structured interviews and a text-analysis. The interview guide could have served to contain additional and more open questions, which should not be so strictly connected to the dimensions. This would enable the researchers to get a better understanding of the respondents' perception of corruption. Since the respondents then would be able to talk more freely about their opinions and experiences. The questions that were asked were strongly connected to the dimensions which could have led to that the results only exposed a narrow part of the respondents' perception of corruption. Concerning the textanalysis the anti-corruption policy could have been read through the enforcer's eyes, thus not search for the underlying meaning. Since the enforcer probably does not read the policy meticulously and thereby, only capture the straight out message. By reading the policy through the eyes of the enforcer, the results might give a more truthful image of the understanding between the two parties. This would probably affect the result in the way that the parties' perception would differ in a higher degree. To sum up this study it is now possible to state that the conclusions are coherent with the theoretical framework. Furthermore, in the theoretical chapter it is discussed that corruption can be interpreted in many different ways.

This is also confirmed through the results since it shows that the both parties in the study do not have a consistent perception of corruption. The results confirm the theory and it also brings new knowledge to the research field. We now know that Sida and the regional perception in Mae Sot perceives corruption differed at one point. The results also show that the two parties do not understand each other fully and it that this does not depend on that the anti-corruption policy is ambiguous. The part of the results that was considered as the most interesting was the fact that Sida and the regional perception in Mae Sot considered nepotism differently. It would be of interest for future researchers to investigate further how the perceptions differed. To find out wheatear or not and to what extent the different perceptions of nepotism affects the implementation process. During the research, it was a regular feature that the respondent´s political environment tainted their answers. Many of the respondents related corruption to the situation in Burma where it, according to them, is an undemocratic constitution. It made us consider that one´s perception can depend on the context in which one live, so ideas that are obvious for someone can be unclear for someone else who lives in a different context. It would be interesting for future researchers to examine whether the contextual differences has an impact on the perception of corruption. This is importance to investigate further since if this is the case the research can be a great help for future decision makers´ when formulation a policy.

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Annex 1: Interview guide

- How old are you?
- What ethical group do you belong to?
- How long have you been living in Mae Sot?
- What position do you have in your organisation?
- What education do you have?

- Natee is a politician and one day she gets an opportunity that would give her a rise in her political carrier. The opportunity also means that Natee has to break the law. What do you think Natee could do?

- What´s your opinion about a teacher having a family member´s child as a student in his class and gives the student more help than the other students?

- In Sweden it often happens that decision makers, like the police or other people working for authorities, uses money, from the organization that they are working for, to pay for their own expenses, what do you think about that?

- What´s your opinion about decision makers that asks for money or other material things, that they will keep for themselves, in order to execute a service?

- What is corruption to you?

- How would you define corruption?

- Could you please give an example on a corrupt situation?