



UNIVERSITY OF GOTHENBURG  
SCHOOL OF GLOBAL STUDIES

Master Program in Global Studies

Master Thesis: 30 Credits

Re-submitted on January 23, 2014

**The US-Taiwan Security Relationship: In The Light of A  
Perceived Chinese Threat Since 1971 To Today**

**Author: Mohammad Morad Hossain Khan**

**Supervisors: Svante Karlsson & Thord Janson**

*For my parents*

## **ABSTRACT**

*The aim of this research is to examine how a small country like Taiwan maintains a relationship with the sole superpower 'the United States of America' in terms of sovereignty and security against perceived Chinese political and military threats. It is interesting to note how the US sustains security relations with Taiwan without having formal relations with her. At the same time China's response to the US-Taiwan security relationship will also be observed since 1971 to till today. On the hand, Taiwan, which was divided by the civil war from China in 1949, is a democratic and capitalist state now. Taiwan has diplomatic relations with some states. On the other hand, China, which is still politically a communist country, is growing as a major economic power as well as military power in the contemporary world.*

*From the Cold War perspective, the US normalized relations with China in 1971 and recognized that Taiwan was the part of China. And in 1979 the US and China established formal diplomatic relations with each other, while in the same year, the US Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA.). The TRA provides all sorts of military as well as political security to Taiwan. Strategically, the US had to discard the formal diplomatic relationship with Taiwan for the sake of China since 1979. But the US stands by Taiwan with all military assistance, whenever necessary against any possible China's threats. But how? This study will endeavour to scrutinize the TRA from the political and military perspectives, in details, since the TRA provides holistic security to Taiwan from any possible Chinese invasion.*

*Interestingly, the US looks for a mutual peaceful solution of the Taiwan case, while China often threatens with the forceful reunification of Taiwan. The US is playing a role like a balancer between China and Taiwan. But the Taiwanese, especially new and current generation, prefer complete independence from China or at least the current status quo which has been going on for a long time. The current status quo of the Taiwan case serves the best possible purposes to the US, China and Taiwan since this status quo keeps peace in the region of Asia-Pacific. But how long the issue of Taiwan will go on like this, is a deep matter of question from the global security point of view.*

### **Key words:**

Arms, China, foreign policy, peaceful solution, security, sovereignty, Taiwan, the US.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Firstly, I am very grateful to the Swedish people as well as the Government of Sweden since they have given me admission to the University of Gothenburg without any tuition fees. It would be impossible for me to have higher education here in Sweden without such generosity and policy towards education, even for foreign students.

Secondly, I would like to express my cordial gratitude to my supervisors: Svante Karlsson and Thord Janson, for their wise guidance and invaluable attention towards me. Without their kind cooperation this research would not have been possible.

Thirdly, I must pay my hearty gratefulness to Sylva Frisk, Director of the School of Global Studies. She, being very patient, has made everything easy for me from the very beginning of my studies. She has also welcomed me regarding any academic affairs I looked for.

Fourthly, I express my humble gratefulness to Jörgen Hellman, Thesis Coordinator of Master Program in the School of Global Studies for his sincere cooperation to me.

Fifthly, I like to thank Northern University Bangladesh that has provided me ‘study leave’ for this higher education. I must be thankful to my senior colleague Md. Shayeekh-Us-Saleheen, Assistant Professor of English for his kind proofreading of my thesis.

Sixthly, I would like to give many thanks to my friends, both native and global, like Abdul Alim (bhai), Andreas, Freedom, Haisam, Jenny, Maria, Rosa, Aditya, Antonia, Daniel, Carin, Hanna of SDR & two Mariams for their cordial cooperation and inspiration towards me.

Seventhly, I also appreciate the encouragement and overall supports of all my family members including my newly wife Nazmun Nahar, relatives like Mou, Maisa, Tayassuk, Raisa, Inan, Nafisa, Sumaiya, Shoccho, Shoumik, Sinthiya, Sakib, boyhood friends like Mizanur Rahman, Abdul Alim, Harun and Jewel (Ctg.) and well-wishers like Rafiqul Islam, SM Maruf, Khademul Karim Iqbal bhai, Tareque bhai & Setu in my country.

Last, but not the least, I must express my gratitude to some of my teachers of the Department of History of the University of Dhaka for their continuous overall academic support and encouragement towards me in this regard.

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>Abstract</b> .....	3
<b>Acknowledgement</b> .....	4
<b>Table of contents</b> .....	6
<b>Abbreviations</b> .....	8
<b>Chapter one: Introduction</b> .....	9
1.1. Background .....	9
1.2. Problem Description .....	10
1.3. Aim and Research Questions .....	16
1.4. Limitations of the study .....	17
1.5. The structure of the study .....	19
<b>Chapter two: Theoretical Framework</b> .....	20
2.1. Political Realism .....	20
2.2. Hegemonic Stability Theory .....	24
<b>Chapter three: Research Methods</b> .....	27
3.1. Content Analysis Method .....	27
3.1.1. Research Materials .....	28
3.1.2. Advantages of Content Analysis Method .....	30
3.1.3. Disadvantages of Content Analysis Method .....	32
3.1.4. Validity & Reliability of Content Analysis Method .....	33
3.1.5. Role of the Researcher in Content Analysis Method .....	34
<b>Chapter four: Sovereignty of Taiwan</b> .....	35
4.1. Political Freedom .....	41
4.2. Territorial Integrity .....	46
4.3. Bilateral Agreements .....	49

<b>Chapter five: US Arms Sales To Taiwan and Joint Military Cooperation</b> .....	51
5.1. Conventional Weapons.....	54
5.2. Nuclear Weapons.....	56
5.3. Joint Military Exercises and Cooperation.....	61
<b>Chapter six: Analysis</b> .....	64
<b>Conclusions</b> .....	74
<b>A list of References</b> .....	76
Documents and Government Reports.....	76
Books.....	77
Journals, Electronic Journals and other Links.....	81
Newspapers and Magazines and other media.....	84
<b>Figure 1</b> .....	47
<b>Figure 2</b> .....	62

## ABBREVIATIONS

AIT	American Institute in Taiwan
ARATS	Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait
ASBM	Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
DPP	Democratic Progressive Party
DPT	Democratic Peace Theory
HST	Hegemonic Stability Theory
INER	Institute of Nuclear Energy Research (Taiwan)
IR	International Relations
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
PR	Political Realism
PRC	People's Republic of China
ROC	Republic of China (Taiwan)
SEF	Straits Exchanges Foundation
TRA	Taiwan Relations Act
TRR	Taiwan Research Reactor
UN	United Nations (Organization)
US	United States (of America)
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics



# Chapter One

## Introduction

### 1.1. Background:

The foreign relation between the United States of America (USA is usually known as the US) and the Republic of China (ROC), now popularly known as ‘Taiwan’ is very significant in the 20<sup>th</sup> and 21<sup>st</sup> centuries. The People’s Republic of China (PRC), currently better known as ‘China’ under the communist regime, considers Taiwan, capitalist and democratic state, as her integral part since 1949. Since then the case of Taiwan has become one of the most complex and difficult military security issues in the Asia-Pacific region as well as the global politics (Huang 2003: 25; Chiu 1973: 112). The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) led by Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-Tung) came to power in the mainland of China on October 01 in 1949 (BBC 2013; Hays 2008). Then the Chinese Nationalists led by then Chinese President Chiang Kai-shek shifted his government and followers to the islands of Taiwan, which was formerly known as Formosa and earlier it was a province of China. This means that the Chinese long civil war from roughly 1937 to 1949 divided China into two parts, ultimately two states: China and Taiwan (Dittmer 1996: 38). Demographically, China is the largest country in the world, i.e. its population about 1.35 billion, whereas Taiwan has only 23 million populace (Lawrence and MacDonald 2012: 2).

From the Cold War perspective, the US became actively involved in the case of Taiwan directly. During the Korean War from 1950 to 1953, the US sent its Seventh Fleet into the Taiwan Strait and thus Taiwan became a US protectorate (Dumbaugh 2006: 2; Kornberg and Faust 2005: 131-132; Chiu 1973: 116-117; Clough 1996: 104; Dittmer 1996: 29). Actually, Chinese entry into the Korean War emboldened the US-Taiwan security relationship named ‘the Mutual Defense Treaty or Assistance Agreement’ which was a US guarantee for Taiwan’s sovereignty from China (Drury 2003: 56).

According to the US, the reunification or any settlement between China and Taiwan has to be peaceful. According to the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, “any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means is a threat to the peace and stability of the Western Pacific area and is of grave concern to the United States” (Huang 2003: 36; Nathan 1997: 252; Taiwan Relations Act 2007).

China, more or less, adopts friendly foreign policy towards the external world, but coercive policy towards Taiwan as well as Tibet. But the political separation of Taiwan from the mainland is still a highly challenging issue for China. China often threatens to integrate Taiwan by force, but the US stands by Taiwan with military forces. Chinese military threat to Taiwan about reunification is a very significant and conflicting matter now in the Asia-Pacific region. It is a matter of deep question, ‘how long will the current status quo in the Taiwan Strait go on from the global and regional security point of view’?

## **1.2. Problem Description:**

The US-Taiwan security relationship, in the light of a perceived Chinese threat will be an explorative study. The US formally maintained state to state relationship with Taiwan known as the Republic of China from 1949 to 1978. Taiwan in the name of the Republic of China (ROC) represented China in the United Nations from 1949 to 1971. But the relationship between Taiwan and the US became complicated and interesting in the same year, when the US recognized the Communist regime in China and declared the disconnection of the official relationship with Taiwan conditionally. China became the member of the UN, and because of Chinese, Taiwan lost her membership on October 25 in 1971, when the UN General Assembly recognized China and initiated to expel Taiwan from the UN (Hanhimäki 2004: 174; Chung 2008: 254; Chiu 1973: 344). “Since Beijing took over Taipei’s UN seat in 1971, Taiwan has suffered one blow after another” (Dittmer 1996: 44).

But from 1971 the US-Taiwan relationship started becoming very different when the US declared “One China Policy” (Roy 2003: 139). The US came forward to reconciling disputes with China through Pakistan during the Bangladesh Liberation War in 1971 against the former Indo-Soviet Union allied from the Cold War perspective. China felt vital military security threat from the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) at that time. The two communist giants had huge differences over communist leadership and many other external affairs across the globe. That is why they were also involved in power struggle like some other powers. (Hanhimäki 2004: 56). However, China became ‘a semi ally’ of the US against the former Soviet Union (Yang 2009: 19). The US National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger, secretly visited China and paved the way to China visit by the then US President Richard Nixon in 1972 (Hanhimäki 2004: 154-184).

In 1979, the US and China established formal diplomatic relations (Huang 2003: 28) and the issue of Taiwan remains very important to the US through the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 at the same time. The US maintains good relations with both: Taiwan and China for her overall national interests so far. Both China and Taiwan agreed on ‘One China’ principle in the 1990s. But the interpretation of ‘One China’ was different from each side. For example, Taiwan explained that ‘One China’ meant the Republic of China which was established in 1912, but China elucidated the People’s Republic which was set up in 1949 (Chen 2008: 194). So, the gap or difference is not minimized between them at all. Both of them have been sticking to their own position firmly. But the Chinese role against this US-Taiwan relationship often seems to be dangerous from the security point of view since China threatens to use military forces against the will of Taiwan.

China is an emerging power (Goh 2009: 64) which might be a great challenge to Taiwan in terms of sovereignty and overall security of Taiwan. Chinese threat to Taiwan has made a complicated US-Taiwan security relationship in the world. To understand the problem like the case of Taiwan, two important theories—Political Realism and Hegemonic Stability theories are chosen. In addition, Content Analysis Method will be followed in this study. Government documents of the US, Taiwan and China will be analyzed in this study.

Some literature reviews are important to find the gap in the current research field. Some literature reviews are given below:

“U.S.-China Relations: Policy Issues” written by Lawrence and MacDonald is an important literature. Lawrence and MacDonald scrutinized the US-China relations from various perspectives like global and local politics, economy and so on. They mainly emphasized on the US policy towards China based on the Barack Obama Administration, a review of recent development in the US-China relationship, where Taiwan was also focused. In the paper, it is tried to show how the US and China can work together in the cases of North Korea, Iran, Taiwan, the South China Sea, the East China Sea, the Climate Change issues and so on (Lawrence and MacDonald 2012: 1-3). This paper has been written, especially focusing on the the issue of the rise of China in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The Obama Administration welcomes a strong, prosperous and a successful China that will play a greater role in the world affairs beside the US and other powers (Lawrence and MacDonald 2012: 3). They discussed the issues of Taiwan very briefly. Relevantly, they also mentioned the Three Communiques, the Taiwan Relations Act, and the Six Assurances in the cross-strait relations in short. About in a page, they tried to give some information about the US arms sales to Taiwan (Lawrence and MacDonald 2012: 23). But this is really very insufficient for understanding the whole tripartite and complex relations among the US, China and Taiwan.

Zhongqi wrote an article named “US Taiwan Policy of Strategic Ambiguity: a dilemma of deterrence”, where he tried to reveal the US ambiguous policy towards China and Taiwan indeed (Zhongqi 2003: 387). The author clearly advocated the unification of Taiwan with China in the paper. He also tried to establish that the best US interest in this Asia-Pacific region was the reunion of China and Taiwan (Zhongqi 2003: 388). From the realistic point of view, anyone can understand the very weakness of the above view. Does any superpower like to help growing another competitor in the realistic world? Though the author mentioned the three Joint Communiques and the Taiwan Relations Act, he did not clearly go through the documents at all. For an example, quoting the 1995-1996 Chinese missile crisis, the author termed the US policy as ambiguous and bankrupt. But

the US, according to the Taiwan Relations Act, sent two aircraft carriers to the Taiwan Strait, which in reality was distinctly in favour of Taiwan. And the author said that the US arms sales to Taiwan was the ‘most misleading and controversial’ (Zhongqi 2003: 389). But selling weapons to Taiwan is a very significant and realistic issue from the US and Taiwanese point of views. I would say that the US does the political realistic thing, what she has made the commitment herself and this policy will embolden the confidence within her alliances across the world.

Lee examined the recent developments of the the US, China and Taiwan in the paper named “The Defining Divide: Cross-Strait Relations and US, Taiwan, China Strategic Dynamics” very realistically. Lee mainly focused on the Ma Ying-jeou’s policy towards the mainland China and the security guarantor, the US, simultaneously. Lee gave some details about the recent economic rapprochement between China and Taiwan and, at the same time, Lee showed the differences between them, especially in terms of Taiwanese identity (Lee 2011: 83-84). She has stressed the increasing military cooperation between Taiwan and the US in the perspective of the the rise of China in the 21<sup>st</sup> century so that the US can continue her influence in East Asia like today (Lee 2011: 88-89). Anyway, any political or military holistic scenario has not been focused through this study.

Kan and Morrison have recently written comparatively a good report named “U.S.-Taiwan Relationship: Overview of Policy Issues”. The authors aim to give a clear overview of the major issues in the US policy on Taiwan through such Congressional Research Report in 2013. This papers, more or less, provides the political as well as military background of the relationship between the US and Taiwan. In addition to that, this paper focuses on the current economic prespevtive in the Asia Pacific region (Kan and Morrison 2013: 1). They termed the Taiwan Relations Act as one of the most important acts of legislative leadership and foreign policy in the history of the US (Kan and Morrison 2013: 2). Further, they gave a very brief description about the US arms sales to Taiwan (Kan and Morrison 2013: 24-25). But unfortunately, they did not look into the Mutual Defence Treaty, the TRA and other three US-PRC Joint Communiques thoroughly.

Papp et al. in the book “American Foreign Policy: History, Politics, and Policy” has emphasized very briefly how the US established good relations with the People’s Republic of China without abandoning Taiwan through the Shanghai Communiqué in 1972 (Papp et al 2005: 171). The writers did not elaborate the issues distinctly.

“China’s Taiwan Policy: Past and Present” written by Jing Huang is very central and it is an important book. Huang claims to write the article from a historical perspective. In the 1950s, China was taking preparation to capture Taiwan but Joseph Stalin, then Chinese Soviet ally, was not very willing to provide necessary military assistance to China against Taiwan since the US was determined to defend Taiwan at all costs. Stalin did not take that risk of war with the US at that time. The Korean War from 1950 to 1953 made the issue of Taiwan more complicated later on (Huang 2003: 26). From the Taiwanese side, it is manifested by President Chen Shui-bian in the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century that Taiwan will not seek independence or separation until China attacks (Huang 2003: 32-33). The vulnerable political and military condition of Taiwan after the declaration of the US diplomatic relations with China has not been reiterated in this book.

“US Taiwan Policy: Constructing the Triangle” written by Oystein Tunsjo is also a good book in this field. The author as well as the researcher has focused that the relationship between US and China is one of the most important issues that will shape international politics in this century (Tunsjo 2008: 1). According to the writer, “...this study’s main claim to originality is to offer the first rigorous and detailed critical constructivist analysis based on original and detailed archival research of the construction of the Taiwan issue in US China policy” (Tunsjo 2008: 1). He has also given a short background about the Sino-US relationship in the 1970s and at the same time, he also mentioned the Taiwan Relations Act and the American Institute in Taiwan. But he did not elaborate or clarify the act in the perspective of the Taiwanese sovereignty and security (Tunsjo 2008: 79). Rather, this book is a nice collection of a discursive analysis and international relations theory in general.

Tan, Alexander C. et al, in an article “Taiwan’s Evolving National Security Policy” in the book named “Conflict In Asia: Korea, China-Taiwan, and India-Pakistan” has given some exciting views about Taiwan. Though Taiwan was the Chinese representative in the UN till 1971, Taiwan has diplomatic relations with less than 30 countries now (Tan et al 2003: 41). By 2007 Taiwan had full diplomatic relations with 25 countries, mostly poor and small countries in Latin America, Africa and the Pacific islands (Roy 2009: 122). The writers (Tan et al. 2003) also mentioned the role of the US in the Sino-Taiwan relations very briefly. Taiwan’s ‘Go South’ policy in the 1990s did not bring any diplomatic recognition at all. The US helped China’s entry into the World Trade Organization in 2001. The engagement of China with the international community in terms of business and economic investments would make China rational and liable for global peace. And consequently, China would be less aggressive for its national interests (Tan et al 2003: 51).

Drury, A. Cooper, in an article of a book “Conflict In Asia: Korea, China-Taiwan, and India-Pakistan” claims that the US Presidents have changed their policies towards China and Taiwan from time to time. One thing is clear from him that the US maintains diplomatic relations with China, while preserving Taiwanese sovereignty till now at the same time. Especially, the US Congress shows much more interests about the defense of Taiwan against China so far (Drury 2003: 61). But Drury discussed the issues in short.

In this research, particularly issues like sovereignty of Taiwan and the US arms sale to Taiwan and Joint Military Cooperation will be focused based on the US-Taiwan security relationship in the light of a perceived Chinese threat from 1971 to today. None of the writers focused on the issue of Taiwan clearly, especially based on the security relationship between the US and Taiwan. In this study, political security like the sovereignty of Taiwan and military security like an arms treaty or cooperation between the US and Taiwan will be analyzed. The main link or difference between my study and previous studies is that I will focus on both political security and military security between the US and Taiwan in the case of a possible Chinese threat. Other authors focused on either one of them. This dissertation will introduce the complex political and

military relationship among the US, Taiwan and China from 1971 to today. From 1971, the case of Taiwan became very vulnerable since the US declared to establish diplomatic relations with China by announcing the fact that Taiwan was the part of China. Subsequently, the US declared to disconnect its formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan in 1979.

How the US still provides all kinds of political and military securities to Taiwan would be analyzed in this dissertation. Strategically, no authors have assessed the the most important security tool for the comprehensive security of Taiwan such as the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, in details, made by the US Congress. Interestingly, the Taiwan Relations Act ensures the all-inclusive security of Taiwan. Most importantly and relevantly, this endeavour would be a holistic approach in the political security and military security among the US, Taiwan and China from 1971 to today, especially based on the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979.

This attempt would be a new kind of study in the field of external or global political affairs since this study will focus on the relationship between the US and Taiwan whereas they do not maintain any formal or diplomatic relations at all.

### **1.3. Aim and Research Questions:**

The US-Taiwan security relationship in the light of a perceived Chinese threat from 1971 to today will be analyzed on the sovereignty of Taiwan and the US arms sale to Taiwan and joint military cooperation, especially based on the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979.

In order to fulfill the above aim of the explorative study, the following questions are to be answered:

- Why and how has the US been maintaining a security relationship with Taiwan, especially based on the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979?
- What is the driving force behind China's attempt to prevent the long-term security relationship between the US and Taiwan?



#### **1.4. Limitations of the Study:**

My focus will be on political and military security aspects between the US and Taiwan based on Chinese behaviour. Security of state is very important in the modern world. How the US protects Taiwanese sovereignty will mainly be discussed in relation to Chinese response in this regards.

Security scholars like Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, Alan Collins divide security into two approaches: new and old or traditional and non-traditional. Views of old or traditional security approach mean military and state-centered security in terms of the sovereignty of states. New views of security or non-traditional security views include economic, environmental and societal sectors as well (Buzan et al 1998: 1-2). Traditionally, the state is the central or the referent object of security and it seeks security through military might (Collins 2007: 2).

Economic and cultural aspects of the US-Taiwan relationship will not be discussed upon though they are very important and related to any foreign relationship across the globe. In the extended definition of security, economy is another important sector. It is even true that the economy is known as the driving force of relations in the international affairs. Recent Chinese annual economic growth is very high like 9.7 percent in the 1978-1999 period (Woo 2003: 13). In the future, China may try to manipulate the Taiwan issue in her own way but this economic issue will also be excluded from this study.

Security of state and thus human beings are more important and very special because military security can ensure the existence of states and human beings in terms of freedom of speech, economy, culture and actually every way. Security is a huge term in the contemporary world. In fact, the issue of security is being broadened day by day like human security, food security etc. But in this study, only political security and military security of states will be focused.

By the third decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, China will likely be a potential leading power in terms of economy. And then the ideological and geopolitical issues like Taiwan and the Korean Questions may lead to armed conflicts in the region (Kupchan 2003: 158). Here, the Taiwanese basic security threat is from China which will be focused in terms of US-Taiwan security relationship.

## **1.5. The Structure of the Study:**

The study comprises Six Chapters. The introduction is written in Chapter One. Background, Problem Description, Aim and Research Questions, Limitations of the Study and Structure of the Study are included in the Introduction.

Theoretical Framework is as Chapter Two in which two different theories like Political Realism and Hegemonic Stability Theory (HST) are discussed.

Chapter Three: Research Methodology of the study is an important part. Here Content Analysis Method has been used.

Security perspective based on the US and Taiwan relationship: in the light of a perceived Chinese threat from 1971 to the contemporary period can be divided into the following empirical chapters: ‘Sovereignty of Taiwan’ and ‘US Arms Sales To Taiwan’.

Chapter Four: “Sovereignty of Taiwan” has been focused very much as an empirical part of the study. Again, “Sovereignty of Taiwan” has been divided into three parts like Political Freedom, Territorial Integrity and Bilateral Agreements between the US and Taiwan with the Chinese response.

Chapter Five: “US Arms Sales To Taiwan” is also another empirical part of the study. Again, US Arms Sales To Taiwan has also been divided into three sections like Conventional Weapons, Nuclear Weapons and Joint Military Exercises and Cooperation.

Chapter Six: “Analysis” is obviously done based on the empirical findings of the study and different theories in the research.

Lastly, “Conclusions” in which research questions are answered in brief.

## **Chapter Two**

### **Theoretical Framework**

Political Realism (PR) and Hegemonic Stability Theory (HST) will be used in the research. The reasons behind the theories are numerous. In the international affairs, these theories are very relevant and important to understand any political problems, like the Taiwan case, among states across the globe. Among the theories, political realism is the most important theory to understand and solve the problem like the Taiwanese sovereignty and security relationship with the US.

#### **2.1. Political Realism:**

The theory of 'Realism' is still one of the most important dominating theories in the arena of international affairs, even from ancient periods to today (Chan 1997: 60). Especially, political realism is very significant theory in the field of international relations. One reason is that political realism emphasizes on the striving for the maximization of power in terms of sovereignty, national interests, national glory and upholding national identity against any outside security threat. According to Hans Morgenthau, the main objective of the foreign policy of any states "...must be defined in terms of the national interest" (Rosenau 1971: 241). National interest can be defined as what any particular nation will or decides for the betterment of its overall benefits (Rosenau 1971: 242). National interest is the central theme of political realism in international relations as well as national affairs in the world. "Political realism is a theory of political philosophy that attempts to explain, model, and prescribe political relations" (Moseley 2005). It especially indicates political power both domestic and international arena. In the domestic level, usually politicians try to exercise power, while states are the main actors in the international stage (Moseley 2005). Again, "Realists consider the principal actors in the international arena to be states, which are concerned

with their own security, act in pursuit of their own national interests, and struggle for power” (Korab-Karpowicz 2010). Realism or political realism and security of any state are very related affairs in this world because the security of states in terms of political and military perspectives is really momentous. To me, political security and military security of any state is the ultimate goal in the history of modern state system. The existence of any state sometimes depends on international actors like other states. Simply every state wants to survive in the international arena by any means.

According to classical realism up to 1948, the desire for power more and more is the vital cause which is the flawed nature of humanity and states are continuously engaged in a struggle to increase their own capabilities in terms of political, military, economic and cultural affairs (Elman 2007: 12). It is a very strong notion in determining relations with other states though other theories like liberalism or Marxism are also important factors in the globe. Realism or political realism is termed as the intellectual password in the arena of power politics in the international affairs (Fierke 2007: 17). “According to realists, national security- and especially territorial security – is the first order of business for any state; therefore, a state’s military and economic power matter most” (Papp et al. 2005: 17). I completely agree with them. The reason is apparent that without such political and military security and recognition from other states, small and weak nations or ethnic groups will be suppressed more by big and strong nations across the world.

Taiwan is trying to enhance its national power with the security cooperation of the US. Taiwan seeks to maintain its own identity in the international community. On the other hand, China is continuously trying to persuade Taiwan for peaceful reunification with China. If China cannot unify with Taiwan, other provinces like Tibet might be highly influenced in the near future. China usually never expects such political vulnerable situation in her state any more like Taiwan.

Morgenthau argues, “The insatiable human lust for power, timeless and universal, which he identifies with *animus dominandi*, the desire to dominate, is for him the main cause of conflict” (Korab-Karpowicz 2010).

In the contemporary world, one cannot imagine a modern state without sovereignty. The modern state system originated from the Peace Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 in Europe at first (Philpott 2010). Since then this system, recognizing each other over territorial sovereignty and state security, spread all over the world in the last few centuries gradually but effectively since while the nation states were only 50 in 1900, the number increased to about 200 by 2008 (Campbell et al 2010: 33-34). Sovereignty of any state is a very important component. Usually sovereignty means “supreme authority within a territory” (Philpott 2010). “The modern state is defined by the idea of sovereignty-the claim of exclusive right to self-government over a specified territory and its population” (Buzan et al 1998: 49). Here, the US and Taiwan maintain a security relationship with each other in a way that Taiwan is a sovereign state or at least Taiwan can show its capability over its territory completely from any Chinese intimidation. For the security measure given by the US, China cannot effectively force Taiwan in terms of unification with China.

From the realistic point of view, state security in terms of sovereignty is the most important for foreign policy still now. In the international affairs, states play the central role and thus the security of states is the most important factor from the traditional security point of view (Morgan 2007: 14). State security is complex and security threats are both external actors and internal affairs (Morgan 2007: 14). Components of state security are territorial safety, autonomy, development and rule in the current world (Morgan 2007: 14). Here Taiwan just wants to ensure its own security and development from any Chinese threat with the help of the US. And China simply wants to ensure its sovereignty over Taiwan.

The field of foreign relationship is very extensive in terms of security relationship. It covers a vast range of phenomena like politics, military, economy, cultural or any human activities at the same time (Rosenau 1971: 82). National identity certainly dominates most in foreign policy since national identity is constituted in relations to differences in various referent objects (Campbell 1998: 9). In the formulation of foreign relationship, national interest as well as national identity is a very important factor across the globe.

Here, the Taiwanese foreign policy aims to protect her own identity in terms of national security and thus sovereignty based on security relationship with the US against the Chinese military menace. On the other hand, China continuously tries to keep Taiwan away from the international community as much as possible (Kan 2011: 47).

The US is the only superpower in the contemporary world, while China might be another emerging power at the same time. From the Chinese point of view, the rise of China is one of the most important events in the post Cold War era of the world (Yang 2009: 13; Goh 2009: 64).

“The military sector is the one in which the process of securitization is most likely to be highly institutionalized” (Buzan et al 1998: 49). In terms of modern statehood, Taiwan fulfills all requirements. Taiwan has specified territory as well as full domination over its territory. Its population has their own identity named ‘Taiwanese’ which developed after the disintegration of China in 1949. Taiwan has international recognition, more or less. But from the Chinese point of view, China has a legitimate right to Taiwan, and the US involvement in the Taiwan case has been a great barricade to the unification of Taiwan with China. The long term separation and strong determination of Taiwan in terms of self-reliance and distinct identity has made the issue very complicated.

## **2.2. Hegemonic Stability Theory:**

The Hegemonic Stability Theory (HST) is also important to understand the real situation of the status of the US in the field of economic domination and political influence in the globe. Hegemony means global leadership (Brilmayer 1994: 14). Robert Keohane termed the Hegemon the “single dominant world power” (Brilmayer 1994: 14). Hegemony is mainly of two aspects: political and economic (Brilmayer 1994: 14). Cultural hegemony is also crucial. Cultural hegemony initially comes from the Italian Communist scholar Antonio Gramsci (1891-1937). According to Gramsci “...dominant groups maintain power and protect common class interests, namely, wealth and ownership, through the use of cultural institutions and alliances with other members of the elite, and not by coercion” (Dai-Rong 2006: 4). Antonio Gramsci, political theorist, focused on “the concept of cultural hegemony, which he used to address the relation between culture and power under capitalism” (Lears 1985: 568). Lears thought that Gramsci’s ideas about cultural hegemony were “...starting points for rethinking some fundamental issues in recent interpretations of American history” (Lears 1985: 568). Immediately after the Second World War in 1945, the US openly or secretly started establishing its political, economic and cultural hegemony across the world.

Since the Industrial Revolution, the United Kingdom and the United States respectively played important roles in the global political, territorial and especially economic relations in terms of their respective national security and economic interests over other states (Brilmayer 1994: 17). According to the hegemonic stability theory, “...order in world politics is typically created by a single dominant power, whose continued existence is necessary for continuation of world order” (Brilmayer 1994: 18). In this system, the hegemon is the main beneficiary and also the main provider of externalities to other states in the globe (Brilmayer 1994: 18). But from this system, how long the US will remain as the main beneficiary is a matter of question.

By the end of the Second World War, especially from the first Bretton Woods phase in 1944 (Agnew 2005: 158), the US exercised its hegemony, i.e. political and military



power based on its hegemonic economic capability across the globe (Brilmayer 1994: 15) though politically the US faced challenges from another superpower like the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) from 1945 to 1990s. In the post-Cold War era, the US hegemony especially its economy is in more or less decline (Bromley 1991: 1). Bromley argues, "...since military power ultimately rested on domestic economic vitality, so the world influence of the United States would in time be similarly eroded" (Bromley 1991: 1). Beside the US, the European Union, China, India, and Brazil are also emerging as decisive factors in the global economy, especially in the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

Among them, the economic growth of China is very significant. Chinese annual economic growth has been estimated at 9.7 percent in the 1978-1999 periods (Woo 2003: 13). China formally initiated its strategy of drastic economic reforms and opening up to the external world markets in 1978-1979 period in the modernization process of China (Yao and Liu 2003: 1). That means China economically has changed its policy but politically remains communist till today. However, by August 2010, China became the second largest economy after the US in the world, overtaking the position of Japan (Prosser 2010). It is predicted, if China can continue its current economic growth, China will surpass the world largest economy, the US, by 2030 (AGA 2010). Continuous Chinese economic growth in the late 20<sup>th</sup> century and in the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century made the US rethink about their overall relationship. At least Taiwan's recent economic setback and Chinese economic rise would in the long run affect the US role as a balancer in the region (Chen 2008: 210). So Chen argues:

"Therefore, Taiwan should do something on its own, or it will lose the leverage several years on. If that is the case, even the United States would not be able to deter China's threat against Taiwan" (Chen 2008: 210).

From the Political Realistic and Hegemonic Stability Points of view, the US is never ready to reduce its overall influence in the Asia-Pacific region at all. The US has deployed thousands of soldiers in the countries like Taiwan, South Korea, Japan since the

Second World War. It is obviously clear that the US is the only world hegemon with her alliance around the world, while China is a growing power and competitor (Goh 2009: 73). The Chinese called today's status quo with US intervention as the manifestation of the US hegemonism in the region of Asia-Pacific (Garver 1997: 6). The US is also trying to enhance its influence among her alliances in the region of Asia-Pacific against China.

To me, the Hegemonic Stability Theory is influenced by the theory of political realism since economic factor is one of the important driving forces of everything like a sovereign power and national glory. A strong economy is considered as the soft power which ultimately helps the increment of hard power, i.e. military power (Gray 2011: 28-29). Upholding economic power is also a matter of political realism in the world. Without economic power, no country can effectively compete with others for a long time. Nye opines that the definition of power is losing its emphasis on military force in the recent era and the factors like technology and economic growth are becoming more important in international power (Nye 1990: 154; Gray 2011: 6).

In that sense and in terms of GDP, the US economy is still peerless or the biggest one in the world. The US continuously tries to enhance its national power and influence all over the world due to its hegemonic economic condition. Thus it (HST) can be called as the extension of the Political Realism theory indeed since the US is playing its role in the case of Taiwan from the very realistic point of view. The US is being benefited from Taiwan in different ways. And the US is demonstrating its focus on political as well as military influence not only in Taiwan but also in other parts of the world. From the hegemonic stability point of view, no superpower wants to lose its economic influence over the globe. Here the US also does not want to lose its influence across the globe and simply tries to maintain the current status quo across the world.

## Chapter Three

### Research Methodology

#### 3.1. Content Analysis Method:

Qualitative Method, particularly Content Analysis Method, will be used in the research. That means different texts of different documents, i.e. agreements, treaties and acts will be analyzed. Secondary sources like books, journals including electronic journals, newspapers, magazines etc. will also be used in the research. Different data are mainly collected from official websites of different countries like the US, Taiwan and China.

Content analysis method is the re-analysis of existing data mostly collected by others in one's research (Allum and Arber 2008: 374; Hakim 1987: 24). "Content analysis is any technique for making inferences by objectively and systematically identified characteristics of messages" (Holsti 1969: 14 in Bryman 2008: 274). Content analysis is not a completely new approach in history. Durkheim was one of the first users of such analysis in the 19<sup>th</sup> century (Radey 2010: 163). From Durkheim's research, it is exemplified and manifested "...analysis can answer research questions not suitable for primary data analysis" (Radey 2010: 163).

In the primary analysis, collecting new data is known as one of the best ways to contribute knowledge to a particular field. In the same way, in the content analysis, using available data seems to be the best mechanism to provide knowledge in the field. Interestingly, both types are important methods in research (Radey 2010: 168).

Crowley and Delfico give a formal definition of content analysis like: "...it is a systematic, research method for analyzing textual information in a standardized way that allows evaluators to make inferences about that information" (Weber 1990 and Krippendorff 1980, in Crowley and Delfico 1996: 6). Content analysis not only helps in

the summarization of any written material but also describes the attitudes or perceptions of the author about the matter in a nice format (Crowley and Delfico 1996: 6).

“Content analysis is used to develop objective inferences about a subject of interest in any type of communication” (Kondracki 2002: 224). The process in this method consists of coding raw messages like textual material, visual images, illustrations according to a classification scheme (Kondracki 2002: 224).

“The coding process is essentially one of organizing communication content in a manner that allows for easy identification, indexing, or retrieval of content relevant to research questions. Content components may be words, phrases, theories, topics, concepts, or other characteristics” (Kondracki 2002: 224).

Content analysis method can be defined more “as a systematic, replicable technique for compressing many words of text into fewer content categories based on explicit rules of coding” (Stemler 2001). “Content analysis enables researchers to sift through large volumes of data with relative ease in a systematic fashion” (GAO 1996 in Stemler 2001). Thus it is a useful technique to discover and describe the focus of individuals, group, institutional, or social attention in one’s research (Weber 1990 in Stemler 2001).

### **3.1.1. Research Materials:**

Government documents like acts, bilateral treaties, communiqués, and official declarations of the US, China and Taiwan and would be analyzed to support a theoretical discussion in this study. Some important documents have been chosen for this research. The Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 which was enacted by the US Congress (the Senate and the House of Representatives) is the most important document in the US-Taiwan security relationship. This Act is also known as Public Law 96-8. Whenever the US Government came to establish diplomatic relations with China, the question of Taiwan became very critical. The main purpose of this Act of the US was to protect Taiwan from

China. Maintaining peace, security and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, the US ensured its continuous economic, cultural and other relations with Taiwan. For maintaining all kinds of communication, the US set up the American Institute in Taiwan in the same year. It will be obvious in this research that the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of 1979 is the most important security guarantee to the Taiwanese sovereignty against any outside military threat (Chung 2008: 254).

The 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty between the US and the Republic China (Taiwan) was signed to cooperate with each other against communist China. This treaty was a bilateral security agreement which successfully continued up to 1978. From the Cold War perspective the US and Taiwan enhanced bilateral security cooperation to contain China as well as to reduce Soviet influence in the Asia-Pacific region.

Joint Communique of the United States of America and the People's Republic of China also better known as Shanghai Communiqué 1972 was signed with a view to reconciling disputes between them. When the Liberation War of Bangladesh in 1971 started against Pakistan, Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty was signed on August 9, 1971. Since there was rivalry between the Soviet Union and China, the US came forward to making friendship with China through Pakistan. The fact is that Pakistan was trying to suppress Bangladesh Independence Movement at all cost with the help of the US. The US diplomatically and secretly negotiated with communist China for their mutual understanding through Pakistan. And the US National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger secretly visited China from Pakistan in July, 1971. After a long discussion the Shanghai Communiqué was signed between the US and mainland China in 1972. But the question of Taiwan remained a big issue of dispute between the US and China.

The Shanghai Communiqué in 1972 was the beginning of the normalization of relations between the US and China. But the Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China happened on 1 January 1979. This communiqué orchestrated the formal relationship between them. And they finally recognized and established diplomatic

relations with each other on January 1, 1979. In this relation the US had to discard formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan instantly. But the fact is that the US administration sets an important condition before China that the case of Taiwan would be handled peacefully. Apart from that the US Congress enacted the Taiwan Relations Act in 1979 which consequently and effectively protects Taiwan from any outside threat.

The Joint Communiqué on Arms Sales to Taiwan between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China was signed on August 17, 1982. The main motive was to reduce arms sales to Taiwan from the US. The US did this agreement with China. Here the US assured China that the US would gradually end arms sale to Taiwan.

The "Six Assurances" to Taiwan in July 1982 was made by US Ambassador John Holdridge. The United States agreed to these points, and the US Government informed the Congress of the agreement formally. Through this assurance the US reconfirmed that the US would not alter any provision of the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979.

The 8-Point Proposition made by the Chinese President Jiang Zemin on January 30 in 1995 is an important initiative to reconcile the disputes between China and Taiwan from the Chinese side. But the fact is that the Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui responded to Jiang Zemin through Taiwan Communiqué No. 66, June 1995 very negatively. Both stuck to their own position like before.

### **3.1.2. Advantages of Content Analysis Method:**

Firstly, in the contemporary world content analysis is easier than before because of computer and internet facilities (Allum and Arber 2008: 375). It seems to me that methods like collecting primary data, or interviewing foreign security experts or peoples from the US, Taiwan and China are not very necessary and practical for me. The reasons are various like traveling time, the huge cost and visa complications as well. The major advantage of Content Analysis Method is that one can get a lot of data and facts about the topic comparatively easy ways. Content analysis can certainly save resources like money,

time and personnel (Hyman 1972 in Radey 2010: 174). On the basis of those data, analysis can be done in a scientific way.

Secondly, Bryman argues, “Content analysis is a very transparent research method” (Bryman 2008: 288). Bryman termed content analysis method “an objective method of analysis” (Bryman 2008: 288). Radey argues that data with high reliability and validity in the area of interest makes sense in terms of content analysis (Radey 2010: 174). In such research, researchers can conduct their research on representative samples beyond their individual field (Sales et al in Radey 2010: 174). In such analysis, researchers can focus on other aspects of the research procedures instead of the instrument and sample recruitment as well (Moriarty et al in Radey 2010: 174). In such analysis, certain data can serve different purposes at different times (Hakim 1982 in Radey 2010: 174). Any objectivity or transparency of any data can be verified easy way because anyone can find the sources or documents from internet anytime.

Thirdly, available electronic data which have been collected for this study may help any researcher to identify the potential to answer research questions in the area of research interest (Radey 2010: 174). Content Analysis can demonstrate strengths and weakness of data which are not originally conceived by the primary data collectors in any particular research (Riedel 2000 in Radey 2010: 175).

Fourthly, some scholars view that collected data minimize unnecessary intrusions on peoples’ lives about any particular affairs (Hyman 1972; Krysik 2001 in Radey 2010: 175). In the era of internet and computer, participation in research has reduced dramatically. So, Radey suggests that any researchers should collect any data when it is very necessary.

Fifthly, another important point about the advantages of content analysis is that this type analysis brings data on new topics, policies, or issues for further study and thus “...it serves as a basis for gaps and identifies current needs of primary collection” (Hakim 1982; Sales et al 2006 in Radey 2010: 177). The content analysis method is also a very

flexible method used in the research (Bryman 2008: 289). This method is one of the easiest approaches to the examination of texts that have already been developed (Bryman 2008: 275). That means in this study some important contents of different treaties, acts, declarations made by the US, China and Taiwan will be analyzed.

### **3.1.3. Disadvantages of Content Analysis:**

Firstly, government documents is prepared by some high officials. Opinions of the common people do not often take into count, at least directly. Their opinions are not focused on this type of research.

Secondly, the problem of this type method is that some of the data like treaty, books or journals may be politically motivated or at least partially factual or true. That is why one needs to be very careful in analyzing any fact based on the content analysis method.

Thirdly, the important limitation about this kind of analysis is that purposes of data collection may certainly vary from one another which may carry deliberate or unintentional biases in the research (Stewart & Kamins 1993 in Radey 2010: 175). In the content analysis, researchers must examine their collected data in its entirety and must consider the realistic variable definitions of the data (Riedel 2000 in Radey 2010: 178). In this type of analysis, any gap may exist between the concept and the measured variable of the research (Hymam 1972 in Radey 2010: 175). “Several authors note that available data may limit theory testing” (Oris et al 1999; Sales et al 2006; Shepard et al 1999 in Radey 2010: 178). But the collected content might not be suitable for certain theories indeed.

Fourthly, content analysis method sometimes is accused of being atheoretical, but this type of method is not necessarily atheoretical at all (Bryman 2008: 291). The reason is that theory depends on the researcher, not on the method. It is researcher who decides to choose suitable methods and relevant theories in the particular research. An analysis is



made to make the research fruitful and meaningful based on theories. In this research, two important theories like political realism and hegemonic stability theory will be used (it is already mentioned in the previous chapter). That is why it can be clearly argued that the content analysis method is not atheoretical at all.

Last, but not the least, such content analysis research may often lack knowledge of the intricacies of the data collection, which might be a problem in any research (Radey 2010: 179). “Errors may be minor for purposes of initial data collection but could significantly alter a particular analysis” (Hyman 1972 in Radey 2010: 179). Researchers may not know the actual motive of the data. That is why it may be tough to judge errors in the data for a particular research topic. But government documents may certainly provide proper or factual data fit in the research. Again, researchers should know how to do documentation properly (Radey 2010: 179). “Researchers should consider the rules of data collection and how rules were applied in the field” (Riedel 2000 in Radey 2010: 179).

#### **3.1.4. Validity & Reliability of Content Analysis:**

Radey argues, “When determining the reliability and validity of secondary data, researchers should consider key components of the data collection and coding process” (Radey 2010: 171). About data reliability and validity and according to Riedel (2000), three step process is mentioned in evaluating secondary data. Firstly, researcher or analysts should know the data documentation like codebooks. Secondly, they should examine the documentation for limitations. And thirdly, they should ask for technical support for overseeing data collection (Radey 2010: 171-172). Radey argues:

“...analysis, or reanalysis of quantitative data with a purpose other than was originally intended, is an excellent mechanism to advance social work research” (Radey 2010: 180).

Validity and reliability of content analysis can be easily verified because anyone can check any documents by using computer and internet anytime.

### **3.1.5. Role of the Researcher in Content Analysis:**

It is obviously clear to me that measurement error is almost unavoidable in any research whether the primary or secondary analysis is made. Researchers or analysts must try to be objective and employ precautions to minimize error as much as possible (Radey 2010: 170). As a researcher, one must be cautious to avoid error as much as possible. Analysts can choose data from different sources which minimize error particular to the specific field and researchers can reduce error by combining them all together (Radey 2010: 171). For the knowledge base, researchers should pay careful attention to consistency among theory, operationalized variables, and available data (Shepard et al 1999 in Radey 2010: 178). As a young researcher, I will try my best to follow the above.

## **Chapter Four**

### **Sovereignty of Taiwan**

Sovereignty of Taiwan is a very complicated issue based on the US-Taiwan security relationship in the light of a perceived Chinese threat in terms of forceful unification of Taiwan. Sovereignty of any state is the supreme power and authority of its own in the state and sovereignty is very important component of a state in the world. Taiwanese sovereignty is basically dependent on the US-Taiwan security relationship so far since China remains as a great military threat towards Taiwanese sovereignty since 1949. Roy comments, “Beijing’s interests are a direct threat to the survival of the Republic of China (ROC) as a state” (Roy 2009: 121).

The US provides all sorts of security to Taiwan through the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of 1979. “This Act shall be effective as of January 1, 1979. Approved April 10, 1979” (Section 18 of the Taiwan Relations Act 2007). Before the TRA, the Mutual Defense Treaty between the US and Taiwan was going on up to 1978 since 1954. According to the Articles 1, 2 & 3 of the Mutual Defense Treaty, both the US and Taiwan made an agreement that they would work together to maintain peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region and they would cooperate with each other in terms of security, economy and social development as well (Mutual Defense Treaty 1958). Article 5 of the treaty clearly stated:

“Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the West Pacific Area directed against the territories of either of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes” (Mutual Defense Treaty 1958).

The treaty was signed for an indefinite period of time (Article 10 of Mutual Defense Treaty 1958). Even though the Carter Administration dropped the Mutual Defense Treaty in December 1978, China found in fact that the TRA was a more comprehensive security

guarantee to Taiwan than the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty between the US and Taiwan (Dittmer 1996: 33). Thus the US President Carter strengthened relations with China. The terminated Mutual Defense Treaty between the US and the ROC (Taiwan) which was signed on December 2 in 1954 at Washington effective from March 3 in 1955 was less effective than the TRA. But the difference is that the former treaty was the bilateral agreement between two states like the US and Taiwan (ROC). And the Taiwan Relations Act is the law adopted by the US Congress unilaterally for the defense of Taiwan. That means the US is committed herself to protect Taiwanese sovereignty and national security from any outside world, particularly from China.

Even though in the 1970s, the US suggested two seats for two Chinas, that proposal, however, was rejected in the UN (Dittmer 1996: 31). Almost since then, disconnection of diplomatic relations with Taiwan is a precondition for the formal relations with the People's Republic of China (Dittmer 1996: 31). Through the Shanghai Communiqué in 1972 the US has formally recognized 'One China' and declared that Taiwan is a part of China (Huang 2003: 28; Hanhimäki 2004: 197; Roy 2003: 139; Shanghai Communiqué 1972). But the US policy revealed in April of 1971 was that the question of the sovereignty of Taiwan was an unsettled matter to future international resolve (Chiu 1973: 340). "...the status of Taiwan remains to be determined" (Shanghai Communiqué 1972). The US gave condition to China that Taiwan case must be handled and thus solved peacefully (Shanghai Communiqué 1972; Taiwan Relations Act 2007).

The US maintains unofficial but effective relationships with Taiwan through the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, which set up the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), instead of an embassy, to handle the overall relationship between the two states (Dumbaugh 2006: 3; Kan 2010: 1). "AIT implements policy as directed by the Departments of Defense and State, and the National Security Council (NSC) of the White House" (Kan 2010: 1). The sections 6, 7, 8 & 9 of the Taiwan Relations Act describe about the overall activities and responsibilities of the AIT well (Taiwan Relations Act 2007). Again, according to the section 12 (a) of the Taiwan Relations Act, "The Secretary of State shall transmit to the

Congress the text of any agreement to which the Institute is a party” (Taiwan Relations Act 2007).

The US Congress has made it clear that the case of Taiwan has to be settled peacefully as well as mutually, not by force against the will of the people of Taiwan and the US took the decision:

“...to establish diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means ...” (Section 2 of Taiwan Relations Act 2007).

The US President Richard Nixon and Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai made this agreement which is known as Shanghai Communiqué. The Shanghai Communiqué contains the following about Taiwan:

“The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. With this prospect in mind, it affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installations from Taiwan. In the meantime, it will progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes” (Shanghai Communiqué 1972).

The Joint Communiqué of the United States of America and the People's Republic of China in January of 1979 also stated that the US would maintain unofficial relations with Taiwan and both the countries, the US and China, reaffirmed the principles agreed on the Shanghai Communiqué in 1972 (Joint Communiqué 1979).

Any of the US Presidents usually more or less showed the importance of China than Taiwan in any meeting with Chinese leaders during the Cold War and post-Cold War era against the former Soviet Union and so on. But the US Congress often and sympathetically sided with the Taiwanese sovereignty (Huang 2003: 30) and pressured

the US Government to strengthen the overall security measures in favor of Taiwan against any Chinese military threat.

According to section 14 of the Taiwan Relations Act, the Committee of Foreign affairs of the House of Representative, the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, and some other necessary committees of the Congress monitor the overall implementation of the provisions of the Act and overall situation of Taiwan (Taiwan Relations Act 2007). The most important change is found in the term 'Taiwan'. Here the Act clearly states that Taiwan means the island of Taiwan and the Pescadores, which the US recognized as the Republic of China prior to January 1 of 1979 (Section 15 of the Taiwan Relations Act 2007).

On the other hand, in 1994 Taiwan introduced 'White Paper' regarding cross strait relations. White Paper claimed of the sovereign independence of Taiwan (Garver 1997: 29). That is an incontrovertible historical fact that Taiwan is always "an independent sovereign state" in the world (Garver 1997: 29). The White Paper continues:

"The reality was that China was divided "for the time being" into "two political entities" with jurisdiction over separate territories. Those entities would interact on the basis of equality and mutual respect" (Garver 1997: 29).

In July 1999 Lee Teng-Hui, the Taiwanese President, termed the relationship across the Taiwan Strait as a special relationship between sovereign states or a state to state relationship, which brought a severe Chinese reaction like military exercises and missile threats throughout July, August and September of 1999 (Chung 2008: 249). In the second direct presidential election of Taiwan in 2000, Chen Shui-bian from the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) was elected as the President of Taiwan (Roy 2003: 227). Chen was very outspoken pro-independence leader ever before because his party DPP adopted a charter which advocated formal independence from China (Chung 2008: 251).

Before that, the Taiwanese democratization process: new identity politically and culturally started growing across the globe. And the "consensus that the Republic of

China is a sovereign nation” (Day and Yao 2004; Lin 2003; Wachman in Chung 2008: 251). “...Taipei considers the sovereignty exercised by the government of Taiwan over Taiwan as equal to the sovereignty of Beijing over the greater part of China based on China as a divided country” (Chung 2008: 251). According to China, Lee Teng-Hui of Taiwan started his ‘disguised independence scheme’ with the encouragement of the US patronization (Garver 1997: 35). Graver goes on:

“Hegemonists in Washington, D.C., were supporting Lee’s “splittism” as part of their strategy of weakening and containing China, many influential people in Beijing believed, and Lee was their puppet” (Garver 1997: 35).

But the general direct presidential election in 2008 and 2012 in Taiwan made it clear that the majority of the Taiwanese consistently preferred the status quo, neither reunification nor independently in the Taiwan Strait (Kan 2008: 5). The presidential candidate from the DDP was Frank Hsieh who got 41.5 percent votes, while Ma Ying-jeou of the KMT got 58.5 percent of the votes in the fourth presidential election in 2008 since 1996 in Taiwan (Kan 2008: 2). Ma Ying-jeou has been re-elected in 2012 too. He got 51.6 percent vote in the election, while DPP candidate Ms. Tsai drew 45.6 percent (Jacobs 2012: A6).

In that election of 2008, referendum towards Taiwanese membership to the UN was termed as a provocative measure in the Taiwan Strait by the Bush Administration (Kan 2008: 2-3). The people of Taiwan under the leadership of the KMT declined the referendum by guessing that any proposal regarding the re-entry of Taiwan into the UN would be vetoed by the PRC. And ultimately the relations among the PRC, Taiwan and the US would be damaged (Kan 2008: 2). Immediately after the result of the presidential election in Taiwan, the then US President W. Bush congratulated Ma Ying-jeou and termed Taiwan as the ‘beacon of democracy’ (Kan 2008: 2).

The presidential election in Taiwan in 2008 was observed by 28 representatives from different countries (Kan 2008: 2). The result in the general presidential election in 2008 in Taiwan once again proves that democracy does not, or at least very rarely, expect to clash with others, even if the other is not any democratic state. At least, this is very

evident that democracy tries to understand the peace with other states (Bohman 2006: 129). Accordingly, Taiwan became democratic to gain global support for her cause against China.

The victory of the KMT and the transfer of power from the DPP to the KMT consolidated the strength of Taiwan in terms of their self-reliance: national security and sovereignty. Through democratic practice, Taiwan becomes much more mature. “In any case, checks and balances plus the politics of moderation have been institutionalized in Taiwan, favoring U.S. interests in stability and security” (Kan 2008: 5).

The US somehow indirectly but effectively supports Taiwan to continue its own existence in terms of sovereignty in particular in the globe.



## **4.1. Political Freedom:**

The status of Taiwanese sovereignty, especially in terms of political freedom of Taiwan, is the most important conflicting issue, which can lead to an armed conflict between the sole superpower 'the US' and the rising power 'China' (Kastner 2009: 30; Tucker and Glaser 2011: 23). No-one can ignore this view. During the transitional period from 1971 to 1979 of the US-China relationships, the case of Taiwan was a very hot issue in the US internal politics. In 1976 Gerald Ford, Republican US President, accepted the de facto two-Chinas policy which later on reflected formally in the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 (Hanhimäki 2004: 448). The US adopted this legal process for the huge public support for the Taiwanese freedom from China. The Republican Party manifested before the general election in 1976:

“The United States government, while engaged in a normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China, will continue to support the freedom and independence of our friend and ally, the Republic of China, and its 16 million people. The United States will fulfill and keep its commitments, such as the mutual defense treaty, with the Republic of China” (Republican Platform 1976; Hanhimäki 2004: 448).

The above manifesto conveys the strong determination of the desire of the people of the US regarding Taiwan's sovereignty and security in the world. It may be noted that the US foreign policy was to 'maintain Taiwan's sovereignty' and to contain China (Drury 2003: 55). The Republican manifesto was nothing but the US promise or support towards the commitment of the Taiwanese own identity and existence.

But when the negotiations between the US and China were going on, the issue of Taiwan was one of the most complicated issues, no doubt. The comments of the US then Secretary of State as well as the National Security Advisor may be very diplomatic. For an example, Taiwan would be a part of the People's Republic of China as a result of a historical process, Henry Kissinger commented while meeting with Chinese Prime Minister, Zhou Enlai in 1971 (Hanhimäki 2004: 137). Kissinger made such comments for strategic reasons, especially to make China calm regarding Taiwan.

But the fact is that “the Taiwanese felt betrayed” immediately after the loss of UN membership and the US recognition of the mainland China in 1971. Kissinger had a little interest about Taiwanese membership in the UN (Hanhimäki 2004: 145). Kissinger just valued the Chinese demands about the Chinese representation in the UN from the political strategic point of view of the US.

When the US President Richard M. Nixon had a meeting with Chinese Prime Minister ‘Zhou Enlai’ in 1972, Nixon made it clear that his policy was based on five principles: none of them supported the Taiwanese independence. But Nixon stressed the peaceful solution of the Taiwanese case (Hanhimäki 2004: 193-194). In the Shanghai Communiqué, Taiwan section was adopted very carefully according to the interests of the US internal political needs (Hanhimäki 2004: 197). Many Taiwanese supporters in the US administration termed the Shanghai Communiqué as the “betrayal of Taiwan” (Hanhimäki 2004: 198) as the US compromised with China and established bilateral diplomatic relations with China by keeping Taiwan in a vulnerable position.

President Jimmy Carter issued the communiqué which made the formal relationship with China on December 15 in 1978, and at the same time this terminated the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954 with Taiwan (Clough 1996: 104; Drury 2003: 55; Roy 2003: 139). Immediately, a group of pro-Taiwanese politicians led by Senator Barry Goldwater sued President Carter and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance in federal court for failing to consult with the US Congress before terminating the Mutual Defense Treaty between Taiwan and the US though the Supreme Court dismissed the case (Roy 2003: 140). Taiwanese citizens sent about 200,000 letters to the US President requesting not to abandon Taiwan (Roy 2003: 138). The US Congress moved quickly and passed the Taiwan Relations Act on April 10 in 1979, which paved the way to US arms sale to Taiwan (Drury 2003: 61). The US Congress has managed to protect Taiwan so far till today since Taiwan was the fifth largest trading partner of the US and Taiwan was the fifteenth largest trading nation in the globe by this time (Clough 1996: 104-105). But this was a very important initiative to protect Taiwanese political freedom from any Chinese military action.

China often offers, e.g. ‘nine point Taiwan policy’ or ‘sunshine policy’ introduced by Chinese President Marshall Ye Jianying in 1979 that Taiwan would be given full autonomy so that Taiwan could continue its own internal political culture like administration, legal system, and even its armed forces (Huang 2003: 29). Deng Xiaoping termed this as “one country, two systems” (Huang 2003: 29). But Taiwan did not accept such proposal at all.

China argued that ‘one country, two systems’ proposed by Deng Xiaoping in 1984 was a good initiative for the two sides to institutionalize their growing economic cooperation (Garver 1997: 15). Indirect trade between China and Taiwan via Hong Kong increased dramatically from \$ 955 million in 1986 to \$ 8.7 billion in 1993 (Garver 1997: 15). China thought that Taiwanese investment in China would create friendlier environment for dialogue for reunification between them. But rather, Taiwan went on its continuous efforts through its ‘pragmatic diplomacy’ towards a new identity. Taiwan’s South East policy and trying to re-entry into the UN made China impatient. When Taiwanese President Lee Teng-Hui managed to get visas to visit the Cornell University in the US in 1995, China termed Lee’s visit as a clear major violation of the three communiqués between the US and China (Garver 1997: 13).

Then China started to show its coercive policy towards Taiwan by military means. Regarding Chinese rigid policy, even many Chinese who visited Taiwan started thinking that “all Chinese should not necessarily be under the sway of a single highly centralized and authoritarian political system” (Garver 1997: 17). This indicates that there is no reason for the Taiwanese to be unified with China.

In January 1995 Chinese President Jiang Zemin introduced Eight Points to reconcile with Taiwan about peaceful reunification with China (Garver 1997: 41-44; Huang 2003: 33; Zemin 2003; Roy 2003: 195). Jiang Zemin continues:

“Under the principle of one China and in accordance with the charters of the relevant international organizations, Taiwan has become a member of the Asian Development Bank, the

Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum and other international economic organizations in the name of "Chinese Taipei". However, we oppose Taiwan's activities in "expanding its living space internationally" which are aimed at creating "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan" (Point 2 of Zemin 2003).

Zemin's policy was termed as 'stick and carrots' policy (Huang 2003: 32) from the US and Taiwanese point of views. The Taiwanese President Lee Teng-Hui for the first time responded to any Chinese proposals in April, 1995 by his 'Six Points or Principles' (Roy 2003: 196; Teng-Hui 1995) proposal to the National Unification Council (Garver 1997: 41-44). Lee strongly mentioned in his speech:

"China and Taiwan should "normalize relations" on the basis of "the reality that the two sides are governed respectively by two governments. Moreover, "the two political entities" that ruled over the mainland and Taiwan were "in no way subordinate to each other" and had "separate governmental jurisdictions" (Garver 1997: 45).

Lee continued that both China and Taiwan should join international organizations on an equal basis (Garver 1997: 45; Teng-Hui 1995). That means Taiwan simply wants to exist in the international arena as a sovereign state like today or as usual like other states and the US just provides its strategic support to Taiwan from the political realistic point of view.

The Taiwanese pro-independence leader 'Chen Shui-bian' was elected as President of Taiwan in 2000 and Chen in August 2002 emphasized that "Taiwan is a sovereign, independent country and each side of the Taiwan Strait constitutes a separate country" (Bush 2005: 69; Su 2003: 242 in Kastner 2009: 35). Again, when Chen Shui-bian was asked whether he was moving towards the declaration of Taiwanese independence, he answered without delay: "...Taiwan is an independent sovereign country" (Chen 2008: 204). The Democratic Progressive Party formally introduced 'One China, One Taiwan' policy in 1991 (Nathan 1997: 121). Chen often said, democracy is the best defense of Taiwan (Roy 2009: 128). That means Taiwan is politically enjoying a free and

democratic life based on the US-Taiwan security relationship in the light of a perceived Chinese threat.

Taiwan does not want to reunify with China unless China becomes democratic (Kornberg and Faust 2005: 39). The reality is that most of the Taiwanese, especially second generation leaders don't want to be part of China any more and rather they want to continue their own identity 'Taiwanese', not Chinese (Huang 2003: 31). At least, most of the conservative Taiwanese support the current status of peaceful coexistence with China rather than rapid unification (Clough 1996: 112). Again, in the post-Chiang Kai-shek era, most of the Taiwanese view very differently that Taiwan should be an independent and democratic country which will be the member of the UN in the future (Kornberg and Faust 2005: 39-40).

## **4.2. Territorial Integrity:**

Specific territory is one of the important components of any state in the current international system. Some total area of Taiwan including the islands of the Pescadores, Matsu, and Quemoy is about 35, 980 sq km (Central Intelligence Agency 2010: 1). Taiwan is 240 miles long and 85 miles wide (Roy 2003: 2). Since the Communist Revolution in the mainland China in 1949, Taiwan has maintained its territorial integrity over the above area of land and also nearby sea. In the last few decades the Taiwanese Government demonstrated its continuous supremacy and rule with the help of the US and the international community. But Taiwanese territorial integrity has been under threat or pressure from China from 1979, when the US established formal diplomatic relationship with China and cut formal relationship with Taiwan (Drury 2003: 60; Roy 2003; 138-139).

Once the US showed its strong voice against Chinese military action towards Taiwan in September 1954, when China started shelling Quemoy and Matsu, the offshore islands of Taiwan, by threatening to use nuclear weapons against China, if necessary (Drury 2003: 59). Here it is very much clear that the US has been very much committed to protect Taiwan from the Chinese military threat.

According Barry Buzan et al, geography shapes the perception and operation of military threats and vulnerabilities (Buzan et al 1998: 59). They continue: “It is hard to imagine that Taiwan would exist as a separate state were it not for the protection offered by the Taiwan Strait” (Buzan et al 1998: 59). Technology and firm determination for self-governance based on nationalism and liberal democracy and strong support from the international community like the US may be enough for Taiwan to survive against hostile China.

**Figure 1: China, the Taiwan Strait and Taiwan**



Source: [https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/maps/maptemplate\\_tw.html](https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/maps/maptemplate_tw.html)

In June of 1994 Taiwanese leader Lee Teng-Hui gave an interview to Japanese writer Ryotaro Shiba. That interview was as like as ‘a political atomic bomb’ almost everywhere (Garver 1997: 23-24). Lee strongly went on, “...Taiwan must belong to the people of Taiwan” (Garver 1997: 24). In the same interview, Lee compared Taiwan with Egypt in the Old Testament and the people of Taiwan endured a lot of sufferings (Garver 1997: 24). In terms of national integration, Lee emphasized that Taiwanese children should learn Taiwanese national history and geography instead of learning the names of Chinese emperors and Chinese history at the elementary level (Garver 1997: 24).

According to Lee, China could no longer hope to reach a settlement with Taiwan ignoring the wishes of the people of Taiwan since democratization in Taiwan has made a strong barricade and the difference between China and Taiwan (Garver 1997: 24). Those views of Lee and the views of the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) are more or less same (Garver 1997: 24). But the importance of those views is that the US respects the wishes of the people of Taiwan as well as the people of the US based on democratic values (Garver 1997: 24-25).

China certainly did not like the views of Lee after a peaceful bilateral dialogue in Singapore between China and Taiwan initiated by the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS of China) and the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF of Taiwan) in 1993 (Garver 1997: 28-29). The bilateral dialogue did not go ahead from the Taiwanese side as the Taiwanese as well as the US were not interested in dialogue with China. Actually, the difference between China and Taiwan is very much political issue which is not a matter of compromise from the both sides.

In 2005 President George W Bush told a reporter, “If China were to invade unilaterally, we would rise up in the spirit of the Taiwan Relations Act” (Kastner 2008: 240). The territorial integrity of Taiwan is an important security issue of the US-Taiwan relationship.

Taiwan has been maintaining its own territory against continuous Chinese political and military threats. The US stands by Taiwan with her military capability when the sovereignty of Taiwan is really threatened by the Chinese military threats like 1995-1996 and also earlier times in the 1950s.



### **4.3. Bilateral Agreements:**

In the world of competition in terms of economy and technology, military and culture, bilateral relations among any states is very important. The bilateral security relation between the US and Taiwan is important for both sides. The reason is that both countries are benefited from their bilateral relations against China. Taiwan has been surviving as a sovereign state. And the US is fulfilling its multi-purposes, i.e. helping democratic values in Taiwan for its survival, at least now, and selling huge arms to Taiwan and also limited arms to China at the same time. But Taiwan is more benefited from such relationship with the US for her existence in the world.

The US and Taiwan maintain all sorts of bilateral relations through the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) from 1979, when the US disconnected formal official relation with Taiwan. According to the Taiwan Relations Act, the American Institute in Taiwan was established in Washington, headquarters in Arlington, and Taipei and this institute actively deals overall relations including economic, cultural and other relations between the US and Taiwan since 1979 (American Institute in Taiwan 1979). The AIT is nothing but a formal institution between the US and Taiwan like any foreign embassy.

The Carter Administration unilaterally dropped the Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan in 1979 from the realistic point of view without consulting the Senate (Papp et al 2005: 294). Later on Ronald Reagan, who was pro-Taiwanese before election, changed his foreign policy towards China for the Cold War perspective against the former Soviet Union in the 1980s (Papp et al 2005: 179).

The Reagan administration of the United States gave 'six assurances' to Taiwan in 1982. One of them was that the US would not mediate between China and Taiwan or the US would not pressure Taiwan to enter into negotiation with China (Dumbaugh 2007: 24). The Chinese response regarding this is always not so violent or aggressive as China is taking time to prosper herself in terms of economy and military power slowly but effectively. China knows it very well that she cannot cope with the US in terms of

military rivalry right now. China knows, “The ability to dominate rivals militarily is one of the pillars of hegemony” (Schroeter et al 2010: 41). China, from the experience of the Korean War in the 1950s and the US nuclear threat in the 1954-55, decided to make competent nuclear weapons and finally succeeded in 1964 (Schroeter et al 2010: 48).

The Taiwanese leaders, especially the KMT once hoped to recapture China from the communist leadership by force with the help of the democratic states like the US, but in the 1980s they gave up that hope (Kastner 2008: 234). But actually, the US did not move much in this regard. Gradually, the migrated Chinese people in Taiwan most likely tended to a new identity ‘Taiwanese’. The mainland migrated Chinese led by KMT took the lead in Taiwan and dominated local Taiwanese for decades. Anyway, Taiwan in 1993 actively tried to be the member of the UN as a sovereign state (Kastner 2008: 235). But Chinese firm opposition foiled the re-entry of Taiwan in the UN body. Chen Shui-bian again tried to re-enter of Taiwan in the UN during his second term from 2004 to 2008 and in this regard his government backed a new referendum (Kastner 2008: 235). But he did not get full support from the Taiwanese in the light of the Chinese threat. At least, the US did not encourage Chen Shui-bian openly.

In the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the US is continuously trying to reinforce its overall military strength with its long-standing alliances like Europe, Taiwan, South Korea, Japan to cope with China, an emerging competitor (Kupchan 2003: 233). The US simply wants to contain China into its boundary not allowing any military action into Taiwan from the US and Taiwanese point of views. The former Bush Administration identified East Asia as an area of enduring national interests to the US. China was indirectly indicated as a threat to the US in that case (Goh 2009: 72). That is why the US intends to enhance its overall cooperation with Taiwan.

## Chapter Five

### US Arms Sales To Taiwan and Joint Military Cooperation

The US arms sales to Taiwan will also be focused on the empirical chapters. Because continuous US arms sales to Taiwan certainly strengthen Taiwan's military power in the light of a perceived of a Chinese military threat. As a state Taiwan has been successful to show its ability in terms of sovereignty and national security based on the security relationship with the US since states are the most important factor in the military security sector (Buzan et al 1998: 49).

The Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 (TRA) is the strongest foundation of security measure for Taiwan. The reason is that through the Taiwan Relations Act, the US maintains and takes all sorts of security initiatives including arms sales to Taiwan against any Chinese military threat (Kan 2010: 1). According to the Section 2 (5) of the Act, the US is "to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character" (Taiwan Relations Act 2007). The next section 3 (a) made it more clear that

"...the United States will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capacity" (Taiwan Relations Act 2007).

By this law, the US President and the Congress will take decisions about the arms nature and quantity necessary for the defense of Taiwan in time (Taiwan Relations Act 2007). But earlier, the Mutual Defense Treaty between the US and the ROC (Taiwan) acted well so far against any outside threat. According to the Article 7 of the Mutual Defense Treaty, the ROC (Taiwan) allowed its land, air and sea for the military purpose of the US determined by the agreement (Mutual Defense Treaty 1958).

Immediately after the Taiwan Relations Act in 1979, Chinese reaction was very critical. According to the law, the US Government would sell arms as much as Taiwan needs for

her national security and self-defense (Dumbaugh 2008: 20). Actually, the security situation of Taiwan remained same to the US. The US sold Taiwan some \$ 800 million worth of arms immediately after the TRA in the beginning of 1980 (Dittmer 1996: 33). Chinese Government reacted against the Dutch Government on arms sale to Taiwan in 1981 and also criticized France on the same issue; but China could do almost nothing against the superpower, the US arms sales like advanced fighters in 1992 and later on (Dittmer 1996: 40-41). Since the US gives priority to Taiwan, Taiwan basically depends on arms sales from the US against China's huge numerical advantages in manpower and weapons systems (Roy 2009: 128).

According to the Joint Communiqué of the United States of America and the People's Republic of China in August in 1982, the US agreed the following:

“...the United States Government states that it does not seek to carry out a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan, that its arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed, either in qualitative or in quantitative terms, the level of those supplied in recent years since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and China, and that it intends gradually to reduce its sale of arms to Taiwan, leading, over a period of time, to a final resolution” (Joint Communiqué 1982).

But in July 1982 US former Ambassador John Holdridge during the Reagan administration made six guarantees to Taiwan. First two guarantees are: the US has not set a specific date for ending arms sales to Taiwan, and the US has not agreed to consult with China in advance of arms sales to Taiwan (Six Assurances 1982; Chen 2008: 197). Here in the same six guarantees, it was also assured that the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, the US pillar of political and security commitments to Taiwan, would not be revised and the sovereignty of Taiwan would remain same (Chen 2008: 197). Thus the US-Taiwan security cooperation goes on.

Even though Taiwan started building its own defense industry gradually and effectively and in the 1980s, Taiwan used to spend more than 30 per cent of the national budget in

defense purpose, “despite a cutback in the number of members of the armed forces from 600,000 in the early 1950s to 400,000 by 1989” (Dittmer 1996: 41).

The Chinese missile tests and nuclear threat during the 1995 and 1996 proved that the US was committed to perform according to the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 since the US stood by Taiwan with all sorts of necessary means including adequate military deployment in the Taiwan Strait. After the 1995-96 crisis, the US increased the arms sale to Taiwan and enhanced military ties with Taiwan in every way “in order to maintain a military balance of power between the two sides” of the Taiwan Strait (Changhe 2008: 223). But Chinese officials calculated that the US would not intervene in the Taiwan Strait confrontation from the US experience in Somalia, Bosnia and Haiti (Garver 1997: 114).

But when the US deployed two aircraft carriers in the Taiwan Strait, China was shocked because the US deployed naval forces which had the capability to destroy virtually the entire naval forces of China swiftly and with virtual impunity. China knew that very well. So, China did not dare to go to occupy Taiwan at all (Garver 1997: 117). China is also taking time to be well-prepared to cope with the US and Taiwan at the same time in terms of military power, capability and so on. By January 2007, China succeeded in testing its anti-satellite weapons by destroying old Chinese weather satellite in the space (Goh 2009: 82). This incident indicates that China is going on its modernization of its military capability, which was alarming to the US and its alliances (Goh 2009: 82).

China is the third country after the US and the former Soviet Union (now Russia) to have that capability in the world (Cooney 2009. 43-44). China is preparing herself in a long way so that China could challenge the US over 100 years at best (Cooney 2009: 45). In this perspective, the US-Taiwan security relationship in terms of arms cooperation will be enhanced too.

## **5.1. Conventional Weapons:**

In 1992 the Bush administration agreed to sell sophisticated aircrafts like 150 F-16 fighters and 4 E-2T AWAC to Taiwan (Chen 2008: 200; Changhe 2008: 225; Graver 1997: 35). Taiwan coproduced F5-E fighter aircraft for its air defense (Clough 1996: 105).

In the modern warfare, air power including missile is a very important decisive factor to all powers. The case of Taiwanese security is of no exception. With the help of the US air power over years, Taiwan has built a strong air power capability in the line of international standard (Edmonds 2004: 25). Consequently, Taiwan is very aware of the importance of the advanced military power in every way.

Chinese missile threats to Taiwan in 1995 and 1996 made Taiwan more tensed about her overall security. As a result, Taiwan would increase its defense budgets (Garver 1997: 154). During this missile tests crisis, the US declared to have approved the sale of Stringent anti-aircraft missiles to Taiwan from China (Garver 1997: 155). Immediately later on the US also announced to sell US Patriot anti-missiles to Taiwan for the better security of Taiwan from possible Chinese missile attacks (Garver 1997: 155).

A Chinese spokesman for the Taiwan Affairs Office of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee made a comment on the Xinhua News Agency three months after the Chinese missile tests crisis that China demonstrated her full determination and capability to safeguard Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity through the missile tests (Garver 1997: 155). But the reality is that Taiwan and the US became more aware of the Chinese strength. And thus, Taiwan is building its own military with the purchase of more sophisticated weapons and technology from the US.

“From worldwide sources, including the United States, Taiwan received arms deliveries valued at \$7.7 billion in the eight-year period from 2001 to 2008. Taiwan ranked 7<sup>th</sup> among leading arms recipients that are developing countries” (Kan 2010: 2). On the other

hand, the same source claimed at the same period and same cause that China spent \$ 16.2 billion, ranking 2<sup>nd</sup> in the world.

After the Chinese missile threats, the US increased overall military communication and assistance towards Taiwan unprecedentedly since 1979 every way like strategy, training, logistics, control and command (Kan 2010: 2). “After U.S. approval in 1992, Taiwan in 1997 acquired three Patriot missile defense fire units with PAC-2 Guidance Enhanced Missiles” (Kan 2010: 14). Taiwan bought four Kidd-class destroyers, costing \$ 875 million, which are the largest warships in Taiwan’s navy and which are equipped with SM-2 air-defense missiles and a joint combat management system in 2005 and 2006 (Kan 2010: 2).

Taiwan purchased 60 Black Hawk helicopters from the US after a long discussion and negotiations. In January 2010, the US President Barack Obama notified the US Congress of ‘a sale of the helicopters for \$3.1 billion’ (Kan 2010: 9). In October 2011, the Obama Administration also notified the Congress of a \$ 5.85 billion arms sale including 145 F-16A/B fighter jets, continuing pilot training program and also spare parts of for the three types of aircraft (Lawrence and MacDonald 2012: 23). The Obama administration was also considering more advanced weapons, such as F-16C/D to Taiwan, which China seriously opposed (Lawrence and MacDonald 2012: 23-24). Thus, Taiwan and the US are going on their security measures against any perceived Chinese threat towards Taiwan.

## **5.2. Nuclear Weapons:**

Chinese military exercises and missile tests close to Taiwan (in 1995 and 1996) and the US military mobilization towards the Taiwan Strait in favor of Taiwan made the world very tensed. This was a real security test between the US and Taiwan in terms of military security and sovereignty. According to Hong Kong Press, Chinese missile tests were part of the war preparation for using nuclear weapons against Chinese enemy's fleets in the region (Garver 1997: 128). "If Beijing were subject to nuclear attack, China would retaliate against New York," (Garver 1997: 129), Chinese Politburo Standing Committee member Qiao Shi told American visiting Professor in January 1996. During the Chinese missile tests China also tested two nuclear weapons in underground on May 15 and August 17 in 1995 (Garver 1997: 129-130).

China did so only to notice how Taiwan and the US alliance worked. The reason is that Chinese officials reiterated that China would not use nuclear weapons first against any non nuclear country (Garver 1997: 130). At the same time, regarding Chinese missile and nuclear threats against the US intervention in the Taiwan case, the US Assistant Secretary of State Winston Lord commented that some lower level Chinese officials might spread such propaganda and Lord termed it as "a little disinformation", "some psychological warfare" and "not official" (Garver 1997: 131). Regarding the Chinese missile threats against Taiwan during 1995 and 1996 Graver argues:

"China's nuclear signaling during 1995-1996 was designed to tell Washington and the American populace that China was determined to proceed with its coercion of Taiwan and the U.S. intervention would result in a Sino-U.S. war that would be open-ended, very costly, and difficult to conclude" (Garver 1997: 133).

According to Garver Chinese response to the Taiwan case is extremely dangerous affairs. In December 1995 the US sent aircraft carrier USS Nimitz, one of the largest warships in the world, to the Taiwan Strait in favor of Taiwan. In March 1996 the US President Bill Clinton also declared that he ordered another US aircraft carrier 'USS Independence' to



the region. Sending in those fleets to the region of the Taiwan Strait, the US demonstrated that she was prepared and able to intervene swiftly, forcefully, and decisively to save Taiwan according to the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 (Garver 1997: 150). The US deployed those naval forces just to deter Chinese military action towards Taiwan (Chung 2008: 249; Roy 2009: 123).

Chinese officials raised the question of the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons against the US intervention in Taiwan (Garver 1997: 97; Cooney 2009: 44). Garver also continues quoting the Xinhua of China, "...If outside powers intervened, The Chinese Government will not sit by watching with folded arms" (Garver 1997: 101).

According to the Taiwanese pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) supporters, this bogus Chinese nuclear and missile threat was used by the KMT to scare voters in the presidential election of 1996 which played an important role to keep the KMT in power and the DPP out of power (Garver 1997: 149). One can agree with the views partially because the Chinese intimidation towards Taiwan did not bring any good result in the general election of Taiwan in 2000. The DPP candidate 'Chen Shui-bian' won the election. From the Chinese point of view, China was successful in a stage through the 1995-96 third Taiwan Strait crisis as the US since 1971 refused to make it clear how the US would react in case of possible Chinese attack on Taiwan (Garver 1997: 149). But China clearly came to realize that the US would not follow 'the One China Policy' and ultimately Taiwan would not accept one China, two system policy at all (Garver 1997: 148).

Most importantly, those Chinese missile threats also made Taiwan rethink about their nuclear weapons capability and 'Sky Horse' missile program seriously (Pape 2004: 101). It is used to say that Taiwan started a nuclear weapons program immediately after the first Chinese nuclear bomb test in October 1964 (Aftergood 2000: 1; Roy 2003: 143). The source claimed that the late President Chiang Kai-shek of Taiwan ordered the nuclear fuel-reprocessing program after Mao Zedong succeeded in detonating first

nuclear weapons in 1964 (Hung 2004: 1). “In 1967, the ROC Ministry of Defense proposed a \$140 million program for developing nuclear weapons” (Roy 2003: 143).

In Taiwan, the National Tsinghua University was established in 1956. The National Tsinghua University immediately made the nation's first research nuclear reactor and started training atomic energy specialists (Aftergood 2000: 1). In Taiwan, the Institute of Nuclear Energy Research (INER) established in 1965 was the nation's sole institution dedicated to nuclear program research (Aftergood 2000: 1). With the help of the western countries like Canada, Taiwan initiated "Taiwan Research Reactor" (TRR) at INER in September 1969, and the reactor began operating in April 1973 (Aftergood 2000: 1). “The TRR continued in operation until 1988” (Aftergood 2000: 1). Aftergood continues:

“Developed atomic power engineering has been created in the country with the technical assistance of American and Western European states. By the mid-1980's, there were already six nuclear power units with a total capacity of 4,900 megawatts operating in Taiwan” (Aftergood 2000: 1).

The fact is that Taiwan does not have much natural reserves of nuclear raw materials. So Taiwan made agreements with others like any American firm and South Africa and so on (Aftergood 2000: 1). Sources claimed that the US secretly confronted Taiwan over the nuclear program during 1976, 1977 and 1978 (Burr 2007: 1). In that circumstance, “The late President Chiang Ching-kuo issued a statement in 1977 Taiwan has the capability of producing nuclear weapons but has no intention of making them” (Hung 2004: 1). Chiang also mentioned that China, not any other countries in the world, was the greatest threat to Taiwan (Hung 2004: 1).

“Taiwan needs nuclear bombs as a deterrent – to warn Beijing it would retaliate with weapons of mass destruction, if it were invaded” (Hung 2004: 1). From the Taiwanese realistic point of view, this might be okay. But the US strongly opposed the nuclear weapons program of Taiwan from her strategic and realistic point of view (Roy 2003: 143-144; Roy 2009: 129) since the US was going to normalize relations with China

during that time. China severely opposed the nuclear weapons program by Taiwan at that time. As the US gave all sorts of military support and security to Taiwan, the US did not want to allow Taiwan any nuclear weapons from a realistic point of view. From the Taiwanese realistic point of view, nuclear weapons would be one of the best security measures against any Chinese threat to Taiwan in the future. Still the issue of nuclear weapons of Taiwan is a matter of dispute and mystery in Taiwan internally and externally as well. Though Taiwan is a signatory of the Nonproliferation Treaty of 1968, Taiwan is believed to withdraw from the treaty in the future from a realistic point of view (Hung 2004: 1).

On the other hand, China has had a long history of proliferation, and has given weaponry and technology like nuclear and ballistic missile technology to many hostile states including Libya, Algeria, Pakistan, Iran, and North Korea that pose a significant threat to the United States and her allies (Fogg 2006: 17-18). Here, Pakistan is an ally of the US but not much reliable. But it is a matter of fact that China signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1996, while China joined the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1984 and China also signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1997 (Fogg 2006: 26). Thus China has tried to make it clear that China is also responsible like other democratic countries about nuclear weapons and technology.

But before such commitments to the international community, China has signalled the US and her allies that China can do more harm to the democratic world by providing nuclear technology and so on to undemocratic and hostile countries to the US. That means China has already consolidated its position in the world in terms of diplomacy, economy and military. For examples, North Korean nuclear weapons are a threat to the allies of the US like Japan and South Korea in the Asia Pacific region. At the same time, current Iranian possible nuclear weapons are a great threat to Israel, a very important ally of the US in the Middle East or West Asia. The US is going on its 'war on terror' across the globe after the 9/11 Incident. The War in Afghanistan and Iraq has caused the US billions of dollars of costs. The transnational terrorist group like the Al-Qaeda is still a major

security threat to the US and her allies across the globe. If such terrorist group can acquire nuclear weapons, the consequences will be very devastating indeed.

Against this backdrop, if the US supplies or allows nuclear weapons to Taiwan or Japan in the Asia-Pacific region, an inevitable arms race may start between China and her allies like North Korea and the US and her allies, which may lead a devastating conflict between two blocks almost just like the World War I.

The North Korean nuclear program is a very debating issues in the world. North Korea is an ally of the former Soviet Union and China. Since the Korean War in 1950s North Korea has been a significant threat to the US alliances like South Korea and Japan in particular since North Korea has been trying to develop weapons of mass destruction. In the 21<sup>st</sup> century North Korea is one of the longest political, ideological and military adversary states in the US (Kim 2007: 56). Nonetheless international huge opposition and criticism, North Korea tested its first nuclear weapons in October, 2006. The US policy 'muscle-bound and brain-dead' has not apparently worked well in terms of North Korea (Sigal 1998: 25). China often plays a role like a balancer between North Korea and the US in the post-Cold War period.

But both the US and China are aware of the fact that the case of Taiwan may drag them into a Sino-American war (Roy 2003: 1-2). According to Romberg, the case of Taiwan is the only issue in the world which can lead a devastating war between the major powers like the US and China (Kastner 2008: 232).

### **5.3. Joint Military Exercises and Cooperation:**


“The issue that causes the greatest tension between China and the United States is Taiwan” (Fogg 2006: 11). So, Taiwan always tries to maintain good relations with the US in terms of military training and joint military exercises for the development of the Taiwanese soldiers. Taiwan mainly depends on the US for upgrading the capability of her armed forces.

Since the disconnection of formal relations with Taiwan the US categorically reduced joint military exercise and training to her soldiers, many Taiwanese officials like Ministers and military personnel including Chief of General Staff visited the US for different military purposes like conferences and military talks on arms purchases and strategy and so on after the 1995-1996 Chinese missile threat towards Taiwan. That means Chinese threats again helped increase the communication and all sorts of military cooperation between the US and Taiwan. Even the US took part in a military exercise named the Hankuang-19 with Taiwanese military forces in 2001. About 20 US military personnel led by retired Admiral Dennis Blair joined that exercise (Kan 2010: 5-6).

Kan continues:

“The Hankuang-20 exercise reportedly included a U.S.-provided computer simulation in August 2004 that resulted in the PLA invading and capturing the capital, Taipei, within six days” (Kan 2010: 6).

Figure 2



“Red squares represent PRC airbases, blue squares represent US/Taiwan airbases. Missiles represent launch sites. Other orange and black squares represent anti-air defenses” (Fogg 2006: 13).

Image source: <http://home.nycap.rr.com/mismedia/PRCROCmissile/index.htm>

“The U.S. and Taiwan militaries set up a hotline in 2002 to deal with possible crises” (Kan 2010: 4). “...the Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Michael Wynne, submitted a letter to Congress on August 29, 2003, that designated Taiwan as a “major non-NATO ally” (Kan 2010: 5). Taiwan, being the non-NATO ally, felt much more secured since the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is the strongest transnational military organization in the world.

In 2007, Taiwanese Defense Minister Lee Jye confirmed that Taiwan was developing missiles with a range up to 1000 km that could attack Chinese missile bases in China (Roy 2009: 129). Stephen Young, director of the American Institute in Taiwan, explained quickly by saying that the focus would be defensive, not offensive in nature (Roy 2009: 129). That means there might be close cooperation between the US and Taiwan about the missile building in Taiwan.

China always criticizes the US-Taiwan military cooperation. China is aware of the fact that any military cooperation between Taiwan and the US complicates the issue of Taiwan since she has been getting confident of its military capabilities with the help of the US. That is why China simply and continuously tries to keep the US far from Taiwan (Schroeter et al 2010: 45). Since 1990s China has been modernizing its military forces and thus China is increasing its military capacity to defend the US aircraft carriers at a long distance using anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBM) (Schroeter et al 2010: 46). China deployed anti-cruise missile on its ship with the help of Russia and thus China has also developed “modern Russian fighter-bombers equipped with anti-ship missiles” (Schroeter et al 2010: 46). Against this backdrop, the western countries like the US try to establish “China threat theory” to the world (Yang 2009: 13).

By this time, China has developed the largest military numbering 2,225,000 active-duty personnel with about 800,000 in reserve (IISS 2005 in Kay 2008: 78). In this perspective, the US sells arms to Taiwan so that Taiwan and China remain separated like this for an indefinite period of time (Yang 2009: 21). According to China, these anti-Chinese forces, i.e. the US, continuously try to divide and contain China in different ways (Yang 2009: 21).

## **Chapter Six**

### **Analysis**

In the world of realism all states try to behave with each other pragmatically and want to be benefited directly or indirectly. In this explorative study, the US-Taiwan security relationship with China's response is of no exception than that kind of example.

From the realistic point of view, the US formally signed the Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan in 1954 but the US Congress enacted the Taiwan Relations Act in 1979, a holistic security tool. On the one hand, the former treaty was a bilateral agreement between the US and Taiwan Governments. But on the other hand, the TRA is an an internal law of the US Congress. In the former treaty, the US did not clearly state how much military cooperation would be between the US and Taiwana and the relationship between the US and Taiwan (the Republic of China) was 'state to state'. But the TRA clearly states that the US will provide arms and defense services as much as Taiwan needs. That means the US has obviously sided with Taiwan strongly in terms of its overall security cooperation which Taiwan needs.

Strategically, the termination of the Mutual Defense Treaty between the US and Taiwan was a great blow to Taiwan. The US dropped this treaty from the Cold War perspective to reconcile with China against former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). The Cold War recommenced from the US perspective in December, 1979, when the former Soviet Union made a military intervention in Afghanistan after a mutual friendship treaty between the former USSR and Afghanistan. As Afghanistan is a neighbouring country of China and Pakistan, this Soviet intervention emboldened the US-China diplomatic relationship (Hunt 1987: 186). At that time the US formed a strong alliance with China against the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Since the Soviet Union and China did not have good bilateral relations by this time, the US diplomatically as well as militarily defeated the Soviet Union in Afghanistan in a long term war with the help of her alliances



like Pakistan and China. And subsequently, in the 1990s, the US won the Cold War and became the sole superpower in the world. But the US managed Taiwan to continue its own existence almost like before through the TRA of 1979.

But why does the US support Taiwan till today? There are some obvious reasons for what the US supports Taiwan against China.

Firstly, the American people believe in democracy and freedom of choice which their government or political parties cannot ignore at all. The US has been involved in the Taiwan case to check communism in China. Later on, the US has played a pivotal role in building Taiwan's democratic system which is often called as a model for Asia (Tucker and Glaser 2011: 34). But politically, China still remains a communist. If the US decides to reduce arms cooperation with Taiwan, US friends and rivals globally and regionally will opine that the US is no more to be trusted one (Tucker and Glaser 2011: 33). Some East Asian allies like Japan, South Korea, Singapore and the Philippines are very dependent on the US for overall security for a long time. Particularly, Japan which is a very significant strategic US global partner will be shocked and thus, Japan may doubt the US reliability. Other countries may also follow Japan in this regard (Tucker and Glaser 2011: 32-33). Thus, the political image of the US would be endangered globally and regionally. Realistically, the US cannot do that. "...30 senators reminded Obama that "Taiwan is one of our strongest allies in Asia"" (Tucker and Glaser 2011: 29).

Secondly, the US defense industry earns a huge amount of money every year from Taiwan by selling arms and defense services (Tucker and Glaser 2011: 26). For example, in 2011, a bipartisan group of 45 US Senators advocated arms sales to Taiwan since Lockheed Martin's f-16 production would shut down without an order from Taiwan. And this shutdown would cause the loss of 11,000 jobs in 43 states in the US (Tucker and Glaser 2011: 26). "Taiwan is the ninth largest trading partner of the United States, and the United States is Taiwan's third largest, with two-way trade rising 32 percent in 2010. The United States is the largest foreign investor in Taiwan" (Tucker and Glaser 2011: 31-32). That is why the Obama administration in its first two years (2009-2010) sold almost

\$13 billion weapons to Taiwan accordingly (Tucker and Glaser 2011: 34). The US under the Obama administration also provided 60 UH-60M Blackhawk helicopters to Taiwan, and in 2011 sold it to the Patriot (PAC-3) air defense system for \$2 billion (Grimmett and Kerr 2012: 15).

In 2011, the Congressional Research Service Report clearly revealed that Taiwan was the leading US arms purchaser during the period of 2007 to 2010. During this period, Taiwan bought the US defense article and services which cost \$6.6 billion. Even in 2010 among the worldwide purchasers of US defense articles and services, Taiwan was also at the top, costing \$ 2.7 billion (Grimmett 2011: 2-3).

From the US point of view, any arms sales to Taiwan are for two prime objectives: one for containing China and another for militarily powerful Taiwan in the sense that the US does not need to send huge armed forces to ward off China (Black 2007: 3). But how does the US maintains communication with Taiwan since 1979 as there is no diplomatic relations with Taiwan?

The US maintains good relations with Taiwan through the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) which is clearly defined in the Taiwan Relations Act. According to the TRA, the US assists Taiwan in terms of political and military security since 1979 to date. The AIT like embassy provides almost everything Taiwan needs. To some extent, the AIT is stronger than any embassy. The reason is clear according to the Taiwan Relations Act:

“The absence of diplomatic relations or recognition shall not affect the application of the laws of the United States with respect to Taiwan, and the laws of the United States shall apply with respect to Taiwan in the manner that the laws of the United States applied with respect to Taiwan prior to January 1, 1979” (section 4 of Taiwan Relations Act 2007).

Therefore, the US is ready to stand by Taiwan by giving arms and sending military forces without any further statements from the Congress and the White House according to the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 (Kupchan 2003: 276). The Secretary of State of the US is

responsible to convey any agreement made by the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT). That means the AIT is a strongly effective body to represent the US in Taiwan.

So, it doesn't matter much whether there is any formal diplomatic relations between the US and Taiwan or not. The relationship between the US and Taiwan exists de facto through the TRA. The US declared disconnection of diplomatic relations with Taiwan in order to calm China since the US emphasized on the diplomatic relation with China by this time. From political realistic point of views, the US-Taiwan security relationship is very successful. The reason is that the US sets 'peaceful solution of Taiwan' very tactfully and diplomatically before China. China has been in a political trap like 'peaceful means or solution' about the Taiwan case since China has agreed in 1972 and 1979 communiqués with the US. So, against the will of Taiwan, China cannot force Taiwan to reunification.

From the Chinese point of view, any arms sales to Taiwan are nothing but interference in the internal affairs of China. China still believes:

“With the return of Hong Kong in 1997 and of Macau in 1999, Chinese leaders see Taiwan as the last remaining obstacle to completion of the communist revolution and restoration of the Chinese nation after a century and a half of foreign intervention and civil strife” (Frison and Scobell 2004: 3).

That means without the assimilation of Taiwan, the Chinese Communist Revolution of 1949 would be incomplete from the Chinese point of view.

In terms of military strength, the largest number of the army of China is tricky in quality because the ability of the Chinese army is still highly limited (Kay 2008: 79). But the fact is that the US is still the only superpower in the world. None can militarily challenge the US across the globe. Kay continues that the United States is without peer in defense spending and it is particularly capable because of its excellent technological superiority across the globe (Kay 2008: 79). The US military expenditure was 46.5 % of the total

military expenditure in the world, while China spent only 6.6% in 2009 (Shah 2010). That is why China has been very diplomatic as well patient with the US about Taiwan.

“Beijing does not want an outside state actor to mediate in the cross-strait dialogue and negotiations, but will accept a more motivational role from the United States in cross-strait communication” (Changhe 2008: 226). The reason is clear that is the security relationship between the US and Taiwan can effectively alter the balance between the two rival states. But according to the Six Assurances to Taiwan, the US is committed not to mediate between China and Taiwan. That decision goes to Taiwan’s favor since Taiwan wants to continue its existence like today without any pressure from the US.

In terms of economic policy, China started capitalizing extensively after the establishment of diplomatic relations with the US in the 1980s. China became the second largest economic power by 2010 and onwards (Lawrence and MacDonald 2012: 1). According to Chen, the US does not welcome the current tremendous economic growth of China at all since the US hegemony in the economy might be over after about twenty years. The economic progress of China might challenge the hegemonic power of the US in near future politically and militarily as well. That is why the US is continuously trying to enhance its alliance across the globe, particularly in Asia. From the strategic and hegemonic stability point of views, the US does not seem to be willing to see the solution or unification of the both sides of the Taiwan Strait at all (Chen 2008: 210).

On the hand, it is widely believed that China is developing her economy and military in a way so that China can compete with the US, at least regionally so that the US cannot defend Taiwan. On the other hand, the US continuously expects “...to keep China engaged economically to the point that the latter is economically too dependent on the Western markets to risk economic sanctions and the resulting collapse of its economy by invading Taiwan...” (Cooney 2009: 41). Thus, Taiwan will be secured in the world.

By the end of the Cold War, Taiwan started democratization process and also started normalization and its relations, like trade and travel by private citizens, with China. Thus,

the position of Taiwan has been consolidated in the world from the realistic point of view. The Tiananmen Square Incident in 1989 in China frightened the whole world including Taiwan.

The 9/11 Incident made China a very important partner of the US in the 'war on terrorism' across the globe. So, the US did not support any provocative activities of Taiwan which would jeopardize the status quo in the region of the Taiwan Strait (Chen 2008: 205-206).

Rather, from January 2001, Taiwan and China formally started the "three mini-links" like direct trade, travel, and postal links and in February 2002 they permitted direct cross-Strait trade. Since then cross-Strait trade grew rapidly over the past 10 years (American Institute in Taiwan 2010). "China is Taiwan's largest trading partner (Roy 2009: 134), and Taiwan is China's fifth-largest" (American Institute in Taiwan 2010). So, economic cooperation in the political separation across the Taiwan Strait serves both China and Taiwan as well. China hopes that Taiwan will be influenced politically too.

From the Chinese point of view, growing economic cooperation and thus economic integration with Taiwan will be more acceptable and very effective strategy to solve the problem (Yang 2009: 18). Roy sees, "...cross Strait trade as a means of eroding Taiwan's resistance to unification" with China (Roy 2009: 122). But Taiwan simply wants to be benefited and expects to continue relations like this to a maximum period of time. And the US just pursues its current realistic relations with China and Taiwan in the same way.

From the political realistic point of view, the US pursues the policy for its national interest basis. That is also absolutely true in the Sino-Taiwan relationship as well since the US reconciled and established diplomatic relations with China while preserving the sovereignty of Taiwan in practice. But Taiwan expects full diplomatic support to her case from the big powers like the US, the UN, the EU, and Russia. At the same time, China is never satisfied with the US about Taiwan at all.

That is why both China and Taiwan observed that relationship with the US was neither so good nor so bad (Chen 2008: 196). Chen goes on:

“The United States is so skilled in playing dual and even multi-dimensional roles that it benefits most from its interactions with sides of the Taiwan Strait” (Chen 2008: 196).

The US did not support Taiwan about nuclear weapons from the hegemonic stability and political realistic point of views. The reasons are clear that the US did not take any risk about the newly established diplomatic relations with China since China was very tensed and worried about this issue. And again the US wanted to continue its influence over Taiwan militarily. Nuclear powered Taiwan might be dangerous to the US from the strategic point of view too. It seems that the US needs dependent Taiwan for her national interests.

Interestingly, in the Post Cold War era, the US termed Taiwan as an important non-NATO ally. Through this message, the US clearly compared Taiwan to other NATO member states. The recognition like a key non-NATO ally is also a significant achievement about the Taiwanese sovereignty, security and national glory. But this new recognition more or less made Taiwan more dependent on the US. This might divert Taiwan from trying to acquire nuclear weapons in the long run since the the US as well as NATO, the strongest military alliance in the world, will stand by Taiwan when necessary from the US point of view.

In April 2004, the US officials during the Bush regime recognized that the military rise of China might already have favored the Chinese position over Taiwan in the Taiwan Strait. Such comments are sometimes made by the powerful states like the US since the US can sell expensive weapons to her allies like Taiwan. The long term separation of Taiwan from China has already made the Taiwanese very determined about their own identity. None can ignore that reality in the course of time. Possibly democratic China will certainly understand that hard reality. Yang quoted from Xia Liping, “As for the development of democracy and rule of law, ultimately, China will become a democratic

country ruled by law with Chinese characteristics” (Liping 2001: 17-25 quoted in Yang 2009: 25).

The then US Secretary of the Defense Department, William Perry, while visiting both Beijing and Taipei, emphasized on the restart of dialogue between them “as quickly as possible to achieve a possible peaceful coexistence model” (Changhe 2008: 222). But the US fundamental policy on the Taiwan Strait was based on three ‘noes’: ‘no independence’, ‘no unification’ and ‘no war’ (Changhe 2008: 226) introduced by the US President Bill Clinton in Shanghai on June 30 1998 (Chen 2008: 201). This policy was consistent with the other commitments with Taiwan made by the US. Because from the very political realistic point of view, the best option of the US between both sides of the Taiwan Strait is to play a role as an observer and a balancer at a maximum period of time (Changhe 2008: 230). At the same time from the political realistic point of view, Chinese efforts to unify Taiwan with her is very important because of her national glory and integration of all the Chinese people.

Despite the political pressure from China, the US Congressional support for Taiwan is still very firm. Recently, the Congressional Taiwan Caucus has 149 members which is the second largest caucus in the House of Representatives (Black 2007: 1). In May 2011, Senate Taiwan Caucus sent a letter to President Obama urging the approval of modern weaponries including F-16c and D Fighters to Taiwan. “The letter was signed by a total of 45 senators” (US-Taiwan Business Council 2012: 98).

Cabestan also mentioned that since 2008 the Obama administration committed more arms sales to Taiwan than the Bush administration in the seven previous years (\$18.3 billion and \$ 12.25 billion respectively) (Cabestan 2012: 5).

Since the Shangri La Strategic Dialogue in Singapore in June 2012, the US has started refocusing on Asia-Pacific. In her ‘rebalancing project’ presented by the US Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, the US would deploy more warships and armed forces to the Asia-Pacific region. The Defense Minister of Taiwan publicly instantly welcomed the US

decision (Cabestan 2012: 14). That means the US not only continues selling weapons to Taiwan but also will deploy more soldiers to the Asia-Pacific region in the upcoming years. That will certainly help Taiwan in her position.

Two distinct political entities: communist and democratic might continue to exist by the names of China and Taiwan for an indefinite period of time with the US intervention since major differences apparently remain unresolved and critical between them. Especially sovereignty and national security over new identity like the Taiwanese versus the Chinese is very differing. Without such security relationship with the US, it would be certainly very difficult for Taiwan to continue to exist as an independent state in the globe. Taiwan has already lost most of its diplomatic recognition with other states in the international and regional forums. But still Taiwan exists like many other nations with the US efforts.

Again from the above study, it is also apparent that China continuously tries to oppose any security relationship between the US and Taiwan since China cannot cope with the US-Taiwan alliance in terms of military power. On the other hand, China cannot recognize the fact that Taiwan is a sovereign state since other parts like Tibet will certainly be influenced in the near future.

From the Taiwanese point of view, sovereignty as well as its own identity is a matter of uncrompromise and unexchangeable issue since Taiwan considers herself as 'an independent sovereign state'. In the post Cold War era, few Taiwanese presidents like Lee Teng-Hui and Chen Shui-bian stated such statements several times. Realistically, Taiwan has never been ready to sacrifice its sovereign statehood. That is why Taiwan has to maintain good and realistic relations with the US.

It is finally explored that the peaceful solution of this problem is undoubtedly desirable. But so far it is interestingly found that peaceful co-existence of China and Taiwan like today serves the best interest of the US, China and Taiwan since any use of military force may bring very destructive consequences to the world. Therefore, from the realistic point



of view of all the above countries, it is clearly manifested that they all are behaving and continuing peaceful co-existence in the Asia-Pacific region.

## Conclusions

Firstly, it is explored through this study that the US has been maintaining a security relationship with Taiwan very diplomatically since 1971 to today in order to sustain Taiwan as an Independent State. From the Cold War perspective, the US had to reconcile its relations with China by keeping Taiwan in a vulnerable condition in 1971. The US declaration to establish diplomatic relations with China was a great diplomatic and political shock to Taiwan. Since 1971 to 1979, Taiwan had to struggle convincing the US administration about its sovereignty against China. Taiwan was successful to get support from the US people and the US Government since the US Congress enacted the Taiwan Relations Act in 1979. The Act has been protecting Taiwan politically and militarily from any hostile attitude of China since the US sells a lot of weapons to Taiwan.

Diplomatically, the US set a political trap before China in the Shanghai Communique in 1972 that the case of Taiwan would be handled mutually and peacefully. China agreed that condition. Is the sovereignty of Taiwan a matter of mutual and peaceful issue? Strategically, the period from 1971 to 1978 was a transitional period for Taiwan since it was not clear how the US would extend its support towards Taiwan after the establishment of diplomatic relations with China. From the realistic point of view, the US Government has enacted the Taiwan Relations Act which has been managing all types of security measures for Taiwan since 1979 to till today. The Taiwan Relations Act is a comprehensive security guarantee to Taiwan. The main purpose of this Act is to continue its good relations with Taiwan, while at the same time, the US has also been maintaining its relations with China formally since the beginning of 1979.

Realistically, the US extends its overall political and military supports to Taiwan from the very beginning of the Taiwan case in order to suppress the communists in China. Interestingly, in reality, the US needed to change its policy towards communist China in 1971 against the former Soviet Union. But the US did not quit Taiwan permanently. The US managed to continue relations with China and Taiwan at the same time but in

different ways. The purpose of the US to support Taiwan is to contain emerging China. And significantly, the US needs to continue her political image among her allies, such as Japan, Singapore, the Philippines, South Korea and so on in the Asia-Pacific region as well as the world.

Secondly, China is worried about the long-term security relationship between the US and Taiwan because such cooperation keeps China divided from the Chinese point of view. The Chinese Communist Revolution of 1949 is still incomplete without mainland China's rule over Taiwan. The US-Taiwan security cooperation seems to have separated Taiwan from China forever. China does not want to see that for good. A sovereign Taiwan has never been accepted to China from its realistic point of view. That is why China has been continuously striving to oppose any security cooperation between the US and Taiwan for a long time. Especially, China often stands against the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979.

Finally, it can be summarized that the US intends to be benefited from its allies like Taiwan by selling arms and services to her. In reality, the US sustains its hegemonic, political and economic condition by supporting Taiwan for a long time. But how long such security and political relationship will go on is a matter of question. If China can be a potential superpower by 2050, will the US be able to secure Taiwan like today?

## A list of References

### Documents and Government Reports

Dumbaugh, Kerry, 2006, Taiwan's Political Status: Historical Background and Ongoing Implications, *Congressional Research Service*, CRS Report for Congress.  
(<http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/4334.pdf>)

Dumbaugh, Kerry, 2007, Underlying Strains in Taiwan-U. S. Political Relations, *Congressional Research Service*, CRS Report for Congress.  
(<http://italy.usembassy.gov/pdf/other/RL33684.pdf>)

Dumbaugh, Kerry, 2008, Taiwan-U.S. Relations: Recent Developments and Their Policy Implications, *Congressional Research Service*, CRS Report for Congress.  
(<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/112057.pdf>)

Grimmett, Richard F., 2011 (December 16), U.S. Arms Sales: Agreements with and Deliveries to Major Clients, 2003-2010, *Congressional Research Service*.  
(<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/179578.pdf>)

Grimmett, Richard F. & Kerr, Paul K., 2012 (August), Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2004-2011, *Congressional Research Service*.  
(<http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/R42678.pdf>)

Joint Communique, 1979, Joint Communique of the United States of America and the People's Republic of China, *United States Information Service*, January 1.  
(<http://www.taiwandocuments.org/communique02.htm>)

Joint Communique, 1982, Joint Communiqué on Arms Sales to Taiwan between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China, *United States Information Service*, August 17.  
(<http://www.taiwandocuments.org/communique03.htm>)

Kan, Shirley, 2008, Security Implications of Taiwan's Presidential Election of March 2008, *Congressional Research Service*, CRS Report for Congress.  
(<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/104279.pdf>)

Kan, Shirley A., 2010, Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990, *Congressional Research Service*, CRS Report for Congress.  
(<http://fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL30957.pdf>)

Kan, Shirley A., 2011, China/Taiwan: Evolution of the “One China” Policy—Key Statements from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei, *Congressional Research Service*, CRS Report for Congress.

(<http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL30341.pdf>)

Kan, Shirley A., and Morrison, Wayne M., 2013, U.S.-Taiwan Relationship: Overview of Policy Issues, *Congressional Research Service*, CRS Report for Congress, November 18.

(<http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41952.pdf>)

Lawrence, Susane and MacDonald, David, 2012, U.S.-China Relations: Policy Issues, *Congressional Research Service*, CRS Report for Congress, August 02.

(<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/196934.pdf>)

Mutual Defense Treaty, 1958, Between the United States of America and the Republic of China, United Nations Treaty Series (Reg. no. 3496), pp. 214-216.

(<http://www.taiwandocuments.org/mutual01.htm>)

Shanghai Communiqué, 1972, Joint Communiqué of the United States of America and the People's Republic of China, *United States Information Service*.

(<http://www.taiwandocuments.org/communique01.htm>)

Six Assurances, 1982, The "Six Assurances" to Taiwan, July.

(<http://www.taiwandocuments.org/assurances.htm>)

Taiwan Relations Act, 2007, University of Southern California, *US-China Institute*.

(<http://china.usc.edu/ShowArticle.aspx?articleID=393&AspxAutoDetectCookieSupport=1>)

Teng-hui, Lee, 1995, Lee Teng-hui Responds to Jiang Jemin, *Taiwan Communiqué*.

(<http://www.taiwandc.org/twcom/66-no4.htm>)

Zemin, Jiang, 2003, The 8-Point Proposition on China's reunification, Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the United States.

(<http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zt/twwt/t36736.htm>)

## **Books**

Agnew, John, 2005, *Hegemony: The New Shape of Global Power*, Temple University Press.

Allum, Nick and Arber, Sara, 2008, Secondary Analysis of Survey Data in Nigel Gilbert (Ed.), *Researching Social Life*, 3<sup>rd</sup> edition, Sage Publications.

Bellamy, Ian, 1981 in Collins, Alan (Ed.), 2007, *Contemporary Security Studies*, Oxford University Press.

Brilmayer, Lea, 1994, *American Hegemony: Political Mortality In A One-Superpower World*, Yale University Press.

Bromley, Simon, 1991, *American Hegemony and World Oil: The Industry, the State System and the World Economy*, Polity Press.

Bryman, Alan, 2008, *Social Research Methods*, 3<sup>rd</sup> edition, Oxford University Press.

Buzan, Barry et al, 1998, *Security: A New Framework For Analysis*, Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Campbell, David, 1998, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*, the University of Minnesota Press.

Campbell, Patricia J. et al, 2010, *An Introduction To Global Studies*, Wiley-Blackwell.

Changhe, Su, 2008, The role of the United States in cross-strait negotiations: a mainland Chinese perspective in Bercovitch, Jacob et al (Eds.), *Conflict Management, Security and Intervention in East Asia*, Routledge.

Chen, Edward I-hsin, 2008, The Role of the United States in cross-strait negotiations: A Taiwanese perspective in Bercovitch, Jacob et al (Eds.), *Conflict Management, Security and Intervention in East Asia*, Routledge.

Chiu, Hungdah, 1973, China, the United States, and the Question of Taiwan in, Hungdah Chiu (Ed.), *China and the Question of Taiwan: Documents and Analysis*, Praeger Publishers.

Chung, Tsungting, 2008, Regional organizations, individuals, and the mediation in Beijing-Taipei disputes after the cold war in Bercovitch, Jacob et al (Eds.), *Conflict Management, Security and Intervention in East Asia*, Routledge.

Clough, Ralph N., 1996, U.S. Policy Toward Evolving Taiwan-Mainland China Relations in J.W. Wheeler (Ed.), *China Divide: Evolving Relations Between Taiwan and Mainland China*, Hudson Institute.

Collins, Alan, 2007, Introduction: What Is Security Studies? In Collins, Alan (Ed.), *Contemporary Security Studies*, Oxford University Press.

Cooney, Kevin J, 2009, Chinese-American hegemonic competition in East Asia: a new cold war or into the arms of America in Kevin J. Cooney and Yoichiro Sato (Eds.), *The Rise of China and International Security: America and Asia Respond*, Routledge.

Crowley, Brian P. and Delfico, Joseph F, 1996, *Content Analysis. A Methodology For Structuring And Analyzing Written Material*, General Accounting Office.

Dittmer, Lowell, 1996, The Evolution of China's Policy Towards Taiwan in J.W. Wheeler (Ed.), *China Divide: Evolving Relations Between Taiwan and Mainland China*, Hudson Institute.

Drury, A. Cooper, 2003, Ambiguity and US Foreign Policy on China-Taiwan Relations in Uk Heo and Shale A. Horowitz (Eds.), *Conflict In Asia: Korea, China-Taiwan, and India-Pakistan*, Praeger Publishers.

Edmonds, Martin, 2004, Air Power and Taiwan's Security in Martin Edmonds and Michael M. Tsai (Eds.), *Taiwan's Security And Air Power: Taiwan's Defense Against The Air Threat From Mainland China*, RoutledgeCurzon.

Elman, Colin, 2007, Realism in Martin Griffiths (Ed.), *International Relations Theory for the Twenty-First Century: An Introduction*, Routledge.

Fierke, K.M., 2007, *Critical Approaches To International Security*, Polity Press.

Garver, John W., 1997, *Face Off: China, the United States, and Taiwan's Democratization*, University of Washington Press.

Goh, Evelyn, 2009, US strategic relations with a rising China: Trajectories and impacts on Asia-Pacific security in Kevin J. Cooney and Yoichiro Sato (Eds.), *The Rise of China and International Security: America and Asia Respond*, Routledge.

Hakim, Catherine, 1987, *Research Design: Successful Design for Social and Economic Research*, Routledge.

Hanhimäki, Jussi, 2004, *The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy*, Oxford University Press.

Huang, Jing, 2003, China's Taiwan Policy: Past and Present in Uk Heo and Shale A. Horowitz (Eds.), *Conflict In Asia: Korea, China-Taiwan, and India-Pakistan*, Praeger Publishers.

Hunt, Michael H., 1987, *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy*, Yale University Press.

Kay, Sean, 2008, Global Security in Michael T Snarr & D. Neil Snarr (Eds.), *Introducing Global issues*, 4<sup>th</sup> edition, Lynne Reiner Publishers.

Kastner, Scott L, 2008, Managing America's Taiwan Dilemma: U.S. policy toward the Taiwan Strait and its implications for cross-strait stability in Bercovitch, Jacob et al (Eds.), *Conflict Management, Security and Intervention in East Asia*, Routledge.

Kastner, Scott L., 2009, *Political Conflict and Economic Interdependence Across the Taiwan Strait and Beyond*, Stanford University Press.

Kornberg, Judith F. and Faust, John R., 2005, *China In World Politics: Policies, Processes, Prospects*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, Lynne Reinner Publishers.

Kim, Samuel S., 2007, *North Korean Foreign Relations In The Post-Cold War World*, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College.

Kupchan, Charles A., 2003, *The End of the American Era: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Geopolitics of the Twenty-first Century*, Alfred A. Knope.

Morgan, Patrick, 2007, Security in International Politics: Traditional Approaches in Collins, Alan (Ed.), *Contemporary Security Studies*, Oxford University Press.

Nathan, Andrew J., 1997, *China's Transition*, Columbia University Press.

Pape, Robert A., 2004, Why a Chinese preemptive strike against Taiwan would fail in Martin Edmonds and Michael M. Tsai (Eds.), *Taiwan's Security And Air Power: Taiwan's Defense Against The Air Threat From Mainland China*, RoutledgeCurzon.

Papp, Daniel S., et al., 2005, *American Foreign Policy: History, Politics, and Policy*, Pearson Longman.

Radey, Melissa, 2010, Secondary Data Analysis Studies in Bruce Thyer (Ed.), *The Handbook of Social Work Research Methods*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, Sage Publications.

Rosenau, James N., 1971, *The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy*, The Free Press (Macmillan Company).

Roy, Denny, 2003, *Taiwan: A Political History*, Cornell University Press.

Roy, Denny, 2009, Taiwan's Response to the Rise of China in Kevin J. Cooney and Yoichiro Sato (Eds.), *The Rise of China and International Security*, Routledge.

Sigal, Leon V., 1998, *Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Dilomacy With North Korea*, Princeton University Press.

Tan, Alexander C. et al, 2003, Taiwan's Evolving National Security Policy in Uk Heo and Shale A. Horowitz (Eds.), *Conflict In Asia: Korea, China-Taiwan, and India-Pakistan*, Praeger Publishers.

Tunsjo, Oystein, 2008, *US Taiwan Policy: Constructing the Triangle*, Routledge.



Wolfers, Arnold, 1962 in Collins, Alan (Ed.), 2007, *Contemporary Security Studies*, Oxford University Press.

Woo, Wing Thye, 2003, China: Confronting restructuring and stability in Shujie Yao and Xiaming Liu (Eds.), *Sustaining China's Economic Growth in the Twenty-First Century*, RoutledgeCurzon.

Yang, Jian, 2009, The Rise of China: Chinese Perspectives in Kevin J. Cooney and Yoichiro Sato (Eds.), *The Rise of China and International Security: America and Asia Respond*, Routledge.

Yao, Shujie and Liu, Xiaming, 2003, Introduction in Shujie Yao and Xiaming Liu (Eds.), *Sustaining China's Economic Growth in the Twenty-First Century*, RoutledgeCurzon.

## **Journals, Electronic Journals and other Links**

Aftergood, Steven, 2000, Nuclear Weapons, *FAS*.  
(<http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/taiwan/nuke/index.html>)

American Institute in Taiwan, 1979, *AIT Introduction*.  
(<http://www.ait.org.tw/en/ait-introduction.html>)

AGA, Clifford, China Surpass Japan To Become Second Largest Economy, *Buzzle.com* August 16.  
(<http://www.buzzle.com/articles/china-surpasses-japan-to-become-second-largest-economy.html>)

American Institute in Taiwan 2010, Taiwan Economic and Political Background Note.  
(<http://www.ait.org.tw/en/tw-economic-political-background-note.html>)

Black, Sam, 2007, Arms Sales to Taiwan: A Means to What End?, *Center For Defense Information*,  
(<http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?lng=en&id=53572>)

Burr, William (ed.), 2007, U.S. Opposed Taiwanese Bomb during 1970s, The Nuclear Vault, *The National Security Archive*, The George Washington University  
(<http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb221/index.htm>)

BBC, 2013, China Profile, BBC News Asia Pacific.  
(<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-13017882>)

Bohman, James, 2006, Beyond the Democratic Peace: An Instrumental Justification of Transnational Democracy, *Journal of Social Philosophy*, 37: 1, 127-138.  
(<http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/118595529/PDFSTART>)

Cabestan, Jean-Pierre, 2012, Taiwan's Changing Security Environment, *Berlin: German Institute for International and Security Affairs*.  
([http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/projekt\\_papiere/Jean-PierreCabestan\\_Shanghai2012\\_web.pdf](http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/projekt_papiere/Jean-PierreCabestan_Shanghai2012_web.pdf))

Central Intelligence Agency, 2010, The World Factbook: Taiwan, *CIA publications* (the USA).  
(<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tw.html>)

Chan, Steve, 1997, In Search of Democratic Peace: Problems and Promise, *Mershon International Studies Review*, Vol. 41, No. 1 (May, 1997), pp. 59-91.  
(<http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/222803.pdf>)

Farber, Henry S. and Gowa, Joanne, 1995, "Politics and Peace", *International Security* 20: 2, 123-146.  
(<http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2539231.pdf>)

Fogg, Erik, 2006, The Chinese Nuclear Weapons Program and its Threat to the United States and Her Allies.  
(<http://web.mit.edu/efogg/Public/chinanuclear.pdf>)

Frison, Douglas and Scobell, Andrew, 2004, China's Military Threat to Taiwan In the Era of Hu Jintao, *Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College*.  
(<http://people.duke.edu/~niou/teaching/FrisonScobell.pdf>)

Gray, Colin S., 2011, Hard Power And Soft Power: The Utility Of Military Force As An Instrument Of Policy In The 21<sup>ST</sup> Century, *Strategic Studies Institute*,  
(<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1059.pdf>)

Hays, Jeffrey, 2008, COMMUNISTS TAKE OVER CHINA.  
(<http://factsanddetails.com/china.php?itemid=74&catid=2>)

Hung, Joe, 2004, Do we need nuclear weapons? NPF Commentary, *National Policy Foundation*.  
(<http://old.npf.org.tw/PUBLICATION/NS/093/NS-C-093-169.htm>)

Kondracki, Nancy L., et al, 2002, Content Analysis: Review of Methods and Their Applications in Nutrition Education, *Journal of Nutrition Education and Behavior*, Volume 34 Number 4.

[http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?\\_ob=MIimg&\\_imagekey=B82X5-4K60MC3-8-1&\\_cdi=33021&\\_user=646099&\\_pii=S1499404606600973&\\_orig=search&\\_coverDate=08%2F31%2F2002&\\_sk=999659995&\\_view=c&\\_wchp=dGLbVIW-zSkWb&\\_md5=0495d86ccf723b0956af10b63e38f833&\\_ie=/sdarticle.pdf](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=MIimg&_imagekey=B82X5-4K60MC3-8-1&_cdi=33021&_user=646099&_pii=S1499404606600973&_orig=search&_coverDate=08%2F31%2F2002&_sk=999659995&_view=c&_wchp=dGLbVIW-zSkWb&_md5=0495d86ccf723b0956af10b63e38f833&_ie=/sdarticle.pdf)

Korab-Karpowicz, W. Julian, 2010, Political Realism in International Relations, *Stanford encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/realism-intl-relations/>

Lears, T.J. Jackson, 1985, The Concept of Cultural Hegemony: Problems and Possibilities, *The American Historical Review*, Volume 90, Issue 3 (June), 567-593.

<http://xroads.virginia.edu/~DRBR2/lears.pdf>

Lee, Sheryn, 2011, The Defining Divide: Cross-Strait Relations and US, Taiwan, China Strategic Dynamics, *Security Challenges*, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Autumn ), pp. 79-89.

<http://www.securitychallenges.org.au/ArticlePDFs/vol7no1Lee.pdf>

Maoz, Zeev, 1997, The Controversy over the Democratic Peace: Rearguard Action or Cracks in the Wall?, *International Security*, Vol. 22, No. 1 (Summer, 1997), pp. 162-198.

<http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2539333.pdf>

Moseley, Alexander, 2005, Political Realism, *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

<http://www.iep.utm.edu/polreal/>

Nye, Joseph, S. Jr., 1990, Soft Power, *Foreign Policy*, No. 80, Twentieth Anniversary (Autumn), 153-171.

<http://faculty.maxwell.syr.edu/rdenever/PPA-730-27/Nye%201990.pdf>

Pascual, Federico D., 2004, Simple Equation: Foreign Policy Just An Extension of Domestic Policy, *(Star) Postscript*.

<http://www.newsflash.org/2004/02/ht/ht004533.htm>

Philpott, Daniel, 2010, Sovereignty, *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sovereignty/>

Republican Platform, 1976, *United States -- Chinese Relations*

<http://www.ford.utexas.edu/library/document/platform/china.htm>

Russett, Bruce et al, 1995, The Democratic Peace, *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Spring, 1995), pp. 164-184

<http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2539124.pdf>

Schroeter, Thilo et al, 2010, Challenging US Command of the Commons: Evolving Chinese defense technologies as a threat to American hegemony? *Bologna Center Journal of International Affairs*.

([http://bcjournal.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/05/schroeter-sollenberger-verink-from-bcjia-mag\\_final-3.pdf](http://bcjournal.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/05/schroeter-sollenberger-verink-from-bcjia-mag_final-3.pdf))

Shah, Anup, 2010, World Military Spending, *Global Issues*.

(<http://www.globalissues.org/article/75/world-military-spending#USMilitarySpending>)

Stemler, Steve, 2001, An Overview of Content Analysis, *Practical Assessment, Research & Evaluation*, A peer-reviewed electronic journal. ISSN 1531-7714.

(<http://pareonline.net/getvn.asp?v=7&n=17>)

Tucker, Nancy Bernkopf and Glaser, Bonnie, 2011 (Fall), Should the United States Abandon Taiwan? *The Washington Quarterly*.

(<http://csis.org/files/publication/twq11autumntuckerglaser.pdf>)

US-Taiwan Business Council, 2012 (March), Chinese Reactions to Taiwan Arms Sales, *Project 2049 Institute*.

([http://www.us-taiwan.org/reports/2012\\_chinese\\_reactions\\_to\\_taiwan\\_arms\\_sales.pdf](http://www.us-taiwan.org/reports/2012_chinese_reactions_to_taiwan_arms_sales.pdf))

Zhongqi, Pan, 2003, US Taiwan Policy of Strategic Ambiguity: a dilemma of deterrence, *Carfax Publishing: Journal of Contemporary China*, 12: 35, 387 — 407.

## **Newspapers, Magazines and other media**

Dai-Rong, WU, 2006, Cultural hegemony in the museum world, *INTERCOM*, Conference Paper.

(<http://www.intercom.museum/documents/2-5wu.pdf>)

Jacobs, Andrew, 2012, President of Taiwan Is Re-elected, a Result That Is Likely to Please China, *The New York Times*, January 14.

(<http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/15/world/asia/taiwan-presidential-election.html>)

Prosser, David (ed.), 2010, China Overtakes Japan As World's Second Largest Economic Power, *The Independent*, August 17.

(<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/china-overtakes-japan-as-worlds-secondlargest-economic-power-2054412.html>)