UNIVERSITY OF GOTHENBURG

Cultural Values and Social Unrest: Possible Connections

An investigation into the effects of cultural values as drivers of social unrest

Siobhán Garside
Pichika Somchai

Master of Communication Thesis
Report No. 2014:028
ISSN: 1651-4769

University of Gothenburg
Department of Applied Information Technology
Gothenburg, Sweden, June 2014

Abstract

The aim of this thesis is to identify cultural variables which may drive social unrest and the role these variables play in the communication of dissatisfaction. Data for this study was obtained by consolidating two different data sets. One set of data came from 'The GLOBE Study' which analyses responses from middle-management about cultural values in 62 societies. The second data set is from the 'The Economist Intelligence Unit' (EIU) which analyses political and economical variables in over 150 countries, with the aim to assess the risk of social unrest for each of those countries.

In the first part of the study, we conduct a literature review which examines social unrest at a micro level, paying particular attention to the communication and social movements theories. In the second part of the study we perform a data analysis, which will investigate trends and patterns which appear from the amalgamation of the GLOBE study and the EIU political instability index. In the results and discussion, we analyse those patterns which indicate what cultural values play a role in the communication of dissatisfaction and contribute to the risk of social unrest. These values are related to the dimensions of: *Uncertainty Avoidance, Institutional Collectivism, Performance Orientation* and *Future Orientation.*

Acknowledgements

We would like to extend a massive thank you to Björn Johansson who helped us crunch the numbers. The numbers could have been very overwhelming otherwise.

A big thank you to Göran Karlsson, our supervisor, who guided us through the process by specifying what needed clarification in the copious amount of information.

Finally, a big thank you to our proofreaders, Maureen Povey and Cyril Henriquet, who pointed out those small mistakes which our busy eyes skimmed over.

Contents

Introduction

Social unrest has many synonyms - uprising, revolt, rebellion, revolution and insurgence; these are just a few alternatives which describe the range of activity involved. In general, social unrest, like other forms of social movements, is a term which describes a group of people gathering together to challenge the status quo. Many people involved in the movement are tired of current conditions and hope to produce an outcome which will positively affect their quality of life. However, this unrest may cause a disruption to the very fabric of society.

As key terms, social unrest and its synonyms are being used more and more in current affair articles. In 'Protest in a connected society', Peter Spinks (2013) wrote; "From New York to Istanbul, and Rio to Tunis, waves of social unrest have been sweeping across the world". Though the magnitude of warfare has fallen to its lowest levels since 1961, "[s]ocietal warfare has been the predominant mode of warfare since the mid-1950s; increasing steeply and steadily through the Cold War period. (Center for Systematic Peace, 2011, p.4)". Nafeez Ahmed commented on this increase in unrest, on March 1, 2014. He wrote; "2013 and early 2014, has seen a persistence and proliferation of civil unrest on a scale that has never been seen before in human history. This month alone has seen riots kick-off in Venezuela, Bosnia, Ukraine, Iceland, and Thailand" (Ahmed, 2014).

The apparent causes, or drivers, for these outbreaks of unrest differ. Kekic (2013) states; "The reasons for the protests vary. Some are direct responses to economic distress (in Greece and Spain, for example). Others are revolts against dictatorship (especially in the Middle East). A number also express the aspirations of new middle classes in fast-growing emerging markets (whether in Turkey or Brazil)" (see appendix A).

However, it is also evident that 'Globalism' has had an impact in this recent wave. Westaway (2012, p.132) believes "that globalization has a clear and significant social dimension which encompasses security, cultural identity, social welfare, individual identity, and social cohesiveness." Westaway (2012) continues with a discussion on how the liberalisation of financial and trade markets have caused political and economical changes which institutions have been inadequately prepared for. "This undermining of authority in turn increases violence, corruption and increasing political dissatisfaction and unrest" (UN, 2011, as cited by Westaway, 2012, p.133-134). Natarajan (2011, p.89) adds to this observation by commenting "[r]ising aspirations release social energy and dynamism for new initiatives and more rapid progress. At the same time, if the rising aspirations and actual results do not match and the gap between expectations and reality becomes too wide, expectation turns into disappointment, discontent and in some cases violence.".

What is evident from figure 1, is that social unrest can be the cause of, or a consequence of, different factors. Jovanović et al (2012, p.13) expand on this by stating "[s]ocial unrest can be grouped into this framework of systemic risks. It can be a cause of risk to others, it can be a consequence of experiencing risk (for example a terrorist threat) or the manifestation of such a risk (the actual terrorist attack) or it can be a promoter of a risk chain".



Figure 1 - diagram from the OECD report on social unrest (Jovanović et al, 2012, p.12)

Whilst these causes and/or consequences appear to affect the macro level of society, Natarajan (2011, p.89) addresses drivers at a micro level by writing, "[d]iscontent is an indication that people are no longer resigned or satisfied with mere survival. It replaces a feeling of resignation with an active aspiration for more". Jovanović et al (2012, p.43) add to this concept by writing "[d]issatisfaction can arise out of physical, social or psychological reasons. Even if people are dissatisfied nothing will happen unless that dissatisfaction is displayed in some kind of public arena". This display of dissatisfaction is a process which involves communication with others and is the first step of action in the stages of social unrest. The degrees of escalation is further explained in figure 2.



Figure 2 - diagram from the OECD report on social unrest (Jovanović et al, 2012, p.44)

Communication is in fact a key component for each stage of social unrest. It is the means through which individuals affiliate themselves with networks that allow them “to make their voice heard in society” (Jovanović et al, 2012, p.51). Della Porta & Diani (2006, p. 126) add to this by stating that “activists create new channels of communication among them and increase the scope for promoting common campaigns”. Klandermans (1992) distinguished three processes of “meaning construction in the movement context: public discourse, persuasive communication, and consciousness raising during episodes of collective action” (as cited in Johnston & Klandermans, 1995, p.10).

Communication lays at the core of social unrest and the movements which ensue. It impacts “[s]ymbols, values, meaning, icons, and beliefs [which] are adapted and moulded to suit the movement's aims and frequently are injected into the broader culture via institutionalization and routinization” (Johnston & Klandermans, 1995, p.9). Johnston & Klandermans (1995, p.9) believe that “[a] performative view of culture stresses that social movements are not just shaped by culture; they also shape and reshape it.” In the more recent years, Johnston (2009, p.4) has added to this understanding by stating that “[n]arratives, text, discourse, metaphor, actors, and performances” need to be investigated further “to explain how social movements come into being and develop”.

The creation of a communication culture within social movements means that there are not just face-to-face interactions with other movement participants but interactions with other forms of communication such as “mainstream media” and “the activists' own media” (Cammaerts, Mattoni & McCurdy (2013, p.80 - 81) .

Communication cultures in both social movements and social unrest are complex entities. The values and beliefs which these communication cultures draw upon are often based within the very society they exist. However, the beliefs and the values of the individuals may be “distinct from the broader culture” meaning that “shifts in beliefs [can] cause social change” (Johnston, 2009, p.4). These shifts in values and beliefs which result in a change to practices in the broader culture is what this study is primarily concerned with and will be further investigated.

Aim of the Study

Problem scope

Studies on social unrest generally focus on the political, economical or environmental factors that can lead to, or be the consequence of, such uprisings. Little is written about the effect of culture in these situations. As Hawkes (2001, p.3) states, "culture is both the medium and the message – the inherent values *and* the means and the results of social expression. Culture enfolds every aspect of human intercourse: the family, the education, legal, political and transport systems". This statement encompasses the importance of culture and centres it at the core of society. Hawkes (2001, p.3) adds "culture is not the decoration added after a society has dealt with its basic needs. Culture *is* the basic need – it is the bedrock of society". As it may be implied, societies are fundamentally comprised of people, and the values these people hold. In times of hardship, these cultural values will impact how people within a culture react to external stimuli. Indeed in their report on 'Social Unrest' for the OECD Reviews of Risk Management Policies, Jovanović et al. (2012) acknowledge culture as a factor in driving social instability. On page 11 they state, "Social unrest is hence cause and effect in a complex risk web that links technological, natural, social and cultural drivers" (Jovanović et al, 2012). For these reasons, we believe it is necessary to investigate the role of culture in the risk of social unrest.

Significance

Barinaga (1996, p.1) confirms this expanding significance of culture in many cross-disciplines by stating; "[w]hat initially was restricted to anthropology, has been growing, now being the object of study in many other disciplines. Economics, management, politics and psychology are only some examples of it." However, research which focuses explicitly on culture as a driving force in social unrest appears to be scant. Guiso, Sapienza, & Zingales (2006) believe this is because it is difficult to quantify culture. On page 23 they state, "[u]ntil recently, economists have been reluctant to rely on culture as a possible determinant of economic phenomena. Much of this reluctance stems from the very notion of culture: it is so broad and the channels through which it can enter economic discourse so ubiquitous (and vague) that it is difficult to design testable, refutable hypotheses" (Guiso et al, 2006). Understandably, it is difficult to separate economics and politics from culture since there is a dual relationship and interdependence. However as Hawkes (2001, p.1) states "[t]here is a growing recognition among those who influence the way our society manages itself that economic benchmarks alone are an insufficient framework upon which to evaluate progress or to plan for the future". Since there appears to be a call to investigate the role of culture in social unrest, this study will attempt to develop a method in order to achieve this.

Originality of the research

There are a number of studies which assess the risk of social unrest. Many of them are based in analysing variables which are quantifiable, such as government type, GDP and social provisions. Whilst these studies use verified methods of predicting the chances of uprisings, they lack a certain 'human' quality about how the population feel about these events and about what drives people to participate in social unrest. It is at this level - the micro level - we believe that cultural values are the most important. This study will use data from the GLOBE study as a way of 'measuring' cultural values and practices, and amalgamate these variables with their respective countries in the 5 different risk of social unrest categories, as established by the the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU). This provides us with a way of 'quantifying' culture and investigating the impact values may have on the drivers of social unrest.

Hypothesis

We believe that social unrest in any given country is driven by many aspects. These include politics and economics. However, we also believe that there is a degree of influence from the gap between cultural values - what people define as important in their culture, and cultural practices - the way people normally behave during their everyday communication. Using theories developed in the social sciences, we will explain how gaps between these two cultural variables can lead to the communication of dissatisfaction. This in turn will help explain why some countries remain relatively stable and others eventually break into social unrest.

Purpose

The purpose of this report is to examine the differences between cultural values and practices in different countries. Through this analysis, the report will highlight, which cultural dimensions are relevant in causing the violation of peoples' cultural expectations. We will also examine the direction in which these violations happen (e.g. positive or negative gap direction) and examine whether this direction plays a part in the risk of social unrest.

Research Questions

- Are there cultural dimensions that can be seen to drive the communication of dissatisfaction and the eventual risk of social unrest in a given society?
- If yes, then:
    - which dimensions influence the risk of social unrest, and to which degree?
    - does the direction of movement in the gap between values and practice relate to the communication of dissatisfaction?

Overview of the study

The study will commence with a literature review of three social movements theories and three interpersonal communication theories. After this, our methodology will define our relevant theory, in which we explain the two key data sets we are using for this study. These are the GLOBE study of 62 societies and the EIU Political Instability Index. Moving on from this, we will explain how these two reports can be immersed into one for the purpose of this study. Our data analysis will investigate correlations between cultural dimensions in the 5 different risk categories. In the results we will establish what trends, if any, can be found. This will be further evaluated in our discussion, before concluding the study.

Scope of research

It is clear from much of the available literature on social unrest, that many researchers are focusing on 'Wellbeing' and 'Globalisation' as factors which impact the risk of social unrest. For socially focused research, The International Labour Organization (ILO), has used data from the Gallup World Poll. This data uses 5 variables in the construction of their Social Unrest Index. These are: *Confidence in Government, Living Standard, Local Job Market, Freedom in your Life* and *Access to Internet*. Whilst this is a valuable index which focuses on social conditions, we are attempting to concentrate solely on cultural values at the micro level and establish how the communication of dissatisfaction can eventually lead to social unrest. One limitation of our study is that we are using the GLOBE cultural taxonomy. This study was conducted among middle management which may not be fully representative of all people and their values within a given society. It was also conducted with the intent to focus on cultural differences between leaders within organisations. On the other hand, the strength of the GLOBE study is that it provides us with two sets of figures for each country and each dimension - one set on cultural values and one set on cultural practices.

These two sets of data are invaluable for our study, since it allows us to calculate the difference between values and practices and analyse whether this gap has an impact on the risk of social unrest.

Theoretical Framework

In order to investigate how culture may be a driver in the communication of dissatisfaction, it is necessary to develop an approach which allows us to construct a method in which we can assess the variables of culture and the impact these variables have on the risk of social unrest. This involves combining two different research studies. However, before we explain the variables of culture and social unrest, we will provide an explicit statement of our theoretical assumptions. After this we will provide details of our framework in which we provide an overview of what culture is and how it can be measured for the purpose of our study. Finally, we will explain social unrest and how it can also be measured for the purpose of this investigation. An explanation of how we merge the two data sets together will be given later in the Methodology.

Assumptions

The fundamental concept of our analysis is the assumption that the gap between what people have and what people want can lead to disappointment and a violation of expectations. Political scientist James C. Davies discusses this in his model the 'Davies J-Curve'. This model proposes that when the gap between expectations and reality remains stable then it is an ‘acceptable gap’, however, if there is a sudden increase in the gap size, this then becomes an ‘unacceptable gap’.



Figure 3 - The Davies J-curve (sourced from: globalpost.com)

This idea of an 'unacceptable' gap will be revisited later in our ‘discussion’ where we will further explore how unexpected violations lead to discontent which can cause the communication of dissatisfaction among people within a culture.

What is Culture?

To assess the impact of culture on social unrest, it is necessary to establish a clear definition of culture. According to Lustig & Koester (2010) culture can be described as a learned set of shared interpretations about:

- beliefs – what people assume to be true about the world; e.g. what is logical and illogical
- values – the characteristics which people desire; e.g what is good and bad
- norms – the expectations of appropriate behaviour

- social practices – predictable behaviour patterns that people within a culture typically follow.

Beliefs, values, norms and social practices vary from culture to culture, an example of this is offered by Allwood (1985) who states "[t]hat the members of a group have two legs is thus not a cultural characteristic but a natural one, while a special but common way of walking would probably be cultural."

Cultural Patterns

Understandably, there have been numerous studies to understand how culture impacts how people act and react in various situations. Once these reactions become more predictable, behaviours become programmed and cultural patterns will develop. As Lustig & Koester (2010, p.84) state, "[c]ultural patterns are the basis for interpreting the symbols used in communication". They also "form the basis for what is considered to communicatively appropriate and effective" (Lustig & Koester, 2010, p.105).

Taxonomies

Researchers, Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck, wanted to make sense of cultural patterns by exploring the "problems or orientations that each culture must address" (Lustig & Koester, 2010, p.90). They established that these 'problems' were addressed by five different value orientations. The patterns they defined are orientations to: *activity; relationships, human nature, people-nature*, and *time*. Whilst these issues looked at similarities across cultures, Geert Hofstede offered another approach to understanding cultures by focusing on what makes each culture unique and different to the others. In this study more than 100 000 IBM employees were surveyed. Hofstede believed that culture was a form of mental programming and that these programs "lie within the social environments in which one grew up and collected one's life experiences" (Hofstede, Hofstede & Minkov, 2010, p. 5). Hofstede et al. (2010, p.5) also stressed that even though the "software of the mind … only indicates what reactions are likely and understandable", people can deviate from what is expected and "react in ways that are new, creative, destructive, or unexpected." This research identified seven dominant patterns, or dimensions, along which culture can be assessed. These are: *power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism versus collectivism, masculinity versus femininity, long-term versus short-term orientation to time, indulgence versus restraint*, and *momentialism versus self-effacement* (Lustig & Koester, 2010, p.113). The study of cultural patterns, also known as cultural taxonomies, assess different cultural dimensions thereby making it easier to compare one culture to the next.

The GLOBE Study

One such cultural taxonomy is called the GLOBE study, which is the foundation of this thesis. GLOBE is an acronym for 'Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior Effectiveness'. The study builds on the work of Hofstede, and Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck, and identifies nine dimensions along which culture can be ordered. These nine dimensions differentiate between cultural practices (what people do) and cultural values (what people should do). The dimensions are separated as follows:

Power Distance is the degree to which people in a culture believe there should be unequal power distribution, of which, it should be mostly concentrated at higher levels of organisations and/or governments. "Within the high power distance cultures of the East, the stable distribution of power is expected to bring order to society and to allow unambiguous allocation of roles and rigid structure of relationship" (Carl, Gupta & Javidan, 2004, p.559). With this in mind, then high power

distance societies (Carl et al, 2004, p.536) tend to have:

- "limited upward mobility"
- "civil liberties" which "are weak and public corruption" which is "high"
- "high growth rates of consumption" and a "high need for resource coordination"

Carl et al (2004, p.518) state that "[w]ithin low power distance cultures, the distaste for large power differentials is often based on the beliefs that power corrupts". Low power distance countries (Carl et al, 2004, p.536) tend to have:

- "civil liberties" which "are strong" and "public corruption" which is "low"
- "high upward society mobility"
- "mature growth rates of consumption and high per capita purchasing power".

Uncertainty Avoidance is the degree to which people avoid ambiguity by relying on social norms and bureaucratic practices. In communication, Berger & Bradac (1982) and Berger & Calabrese (1975) have developed the 'Uncertainty Reduction Theory', which attempts to explain "how we communicate when we are unsure about our surroundings" (Knobloch, 2008, p. 133). In order to counter these uncertainties, societies which score higher in this dimension (Sully De Luque & Javidan, 2004, p.618), tend to:

- "take more moderate calculated risks"
- "show stronger resistance to change"
- "show less tolerance to breaking rules"

Those societies which scored lower in the Uncertainty Avoidance dimension (Sully De Luque & Javidan, 2004, p.618), tend to:

- "be less calculating when taking risks"
- "show less resistance to change"
- "show less desire to establish rules to dictate behaviour"

Individualism and Collectivism is the degree to which people in a culture think and act individually, or collectively as a group. This value is separated into two dimensions, which are:

- *In-Group Collectivism* - the degree to which people express loyalty to their families
- *Institutional Collectivism* - the degree to which a culture encourages collective actions and sharing of resources

Both forms of collectivism share similar features. Those societies which score higher in collectivism (Gelfand, Bhawak, Nishii. & Bechtold, 2004, p.454) tend to have:

- "group goals [which] take precedence over individual goals"
- "a slower pace of life"
- "lower subjective well-being"

On the contrary to these features, those societies which score lower in collectivism (Gelfand et al, 2004, p.454), tend to have:

- "individual goals [which] take precedence over group goals"
- "a faster pace of life"
- "higher subjective well-being"

Gender Egalitarianism is the degree to which people in a culture minimize gender role differences. This dimension encompasses two aspects of societal culture. The first part reflects the extent to

which society rewards 'masculine' values such as competition and success, versus 'feminine' values such as solidarity and nurturance. The second part of the Gender Egalitarianism dimension reflects what a society believes is appropriate behaviour for males versus females. According to Emrich, Denmark & Den Hartog (2004, p.359), societies which score higher in this dimension tend to:

- "have more women in positions of authority"
- "accord women a higher status in society"
- "have higher female literacy rates"

Contrary to this, societies that score lower tend to (Emrich et al, 2004, p.359):

- "have fewer women in positions of authority"
- "accord women a lower status in society"
- "have lower female literacy rates"

In addition, "[m]embers of societies that embraced more gender-egalitarianism values expressed a desire for less government" (Emrich et al, 2004, p.387).

Assertiveness is the degree to which people are confrontational and whether it is encouraged to be aggressive in their social relationships. Doney, Cannon, and Mullen (1998) "confirm a cultural pattern of assertiveness and aggressiveness that is consistent with a tendency towards opportunism" (as cited in Den Hartog, 2004, p.404). Societies which score higher in this dimension (Den Hartog, 2004, p.405) tend to:

- "value competition"
- "believe that anyone can succeed if he or she tries hard enough"
- "believe that individuals are in control"

Conversely, societies which score lower in assertiveness (Den Hartog, 2004, p.405) tend to:

- "value cooperation"
- "associate competition with defeat and punishment"
- "think of others as inherently worthy of trust"

Performance Orientation is the degree to which people encourage others in the culture to excel in their tasks. Cultures which score high in this dimension "tend to focus on the future" and "achievement", while "low-scoring cultures tend to focus on tradition" and "family" (Mansour, 2004, p.241). The GLOBE study found some key differences between societies which score higher in practices and those that score higher in values. According to Mansour (2004, p.258), societies which score higher in Performance Orientation practices:

- "are economically more successful and globally more competitive"
- "enjoy a more positive attitude towards life and live in a more civil society"
- "prefer individual accountability for their own well-being"

Similarly, those that score lower in Performance Orientation (Mansour, 2004, p.259):

- "are less competitive"
- "have lower life expectancy"
- "experience weak economic prosperity"

Future Orientation is the degree to which people engage in future oriented behaviours and delay gratifications. "[F]uture-orientated individuals and cultures have a capacity to enrich their lives and maintain self-control, whereas present-oriented individuals and cultures strive to simplify their lives and rely more on others" (Ashkanasy, Gupta, Mayfield, & Trevor-Roberts, 2004, p.285). In the

GLOBE study Ashkanasy et al (2004, p.302) state that societies which score higher on Future Orientation, generally:

- "achieve economic success"
- "have a propensity to save for the future"
- "have individuals who are psychologically healthy and socially well adjusted"

Societies which score lower in this dimension (Ashkanasy et al, 2004, p.302) tend to:

- "have lower levels of economic success"
- "have a propensity to spend now, rather than to save for the future"
- "have individuals who are psychologically unhealthy and socially maladjusted"

Humane Orientation is the degree to which people encourage others to be fair, friendly and generous. According to Wolf (1966) "societies that lack formal welfare institutions, where resources are very unevenly distributed and where political power is often unstable, a system of patronage - a form of benevolence - "based on relationships of family and friends emerges to fulfil some needs of individuals" (as cited in Kabasakal & Bodur, 2004, p.566). Higher Humane Orientation societies (Kabasakal & Bodur, 2004, p.570) tend to believe that:

- "others are important"
- "children of less-developed societies are expected to give material support to their parents"
- "parents should closely control their children"

In societies which score low in this dimension, they tend to believe that (Kabasakal & Bodur, 2004, p.570):

- "self-interest is important"
- "children of more-developed countries are not expected to give material support to their parents"
- "family members are independent".

In order to process responses from participants, the GLOBE study developed response alternatives on a seven point likert scale, where 1 equals this "behaviour or characteristic *greatly inhibits* a person from being an outstanding leader"; and 7 equals this "behaviour or characteristic *greatly contributes* to a person being an outstanding leader" (Hanges & Dickson, 2004, p.127). The five response alternatives in-between grade progressively between the two extremes. This scale, thus, gives researchers a quantifiable method to measure cultural values and practices. It provides "lenses through which cultures can be understood and appreciated" (Lustig & Koester, 2010, p.140). However, to fully comprehend the context of the results, Lustig & Koester (2010, p.108) state there are three points which must be remembered about all cultural taxonomies and these are:

1. "there is nothing sacred about these approaches and the internal categories they employ"
2. "[c]ultural patterns are understandable not in isolation but as a unique whole"
3. "members of a culture may vary greatly from the pattern that is typical of that culture"

Even though the GLOBE study focuses primarily on 'Leadership' and 'Organisational Behaviour', the main purpose of the GLOBE is to "increase available knowledge that is relevant to cross-cultural interactions" (House, 2004, p.3). For this reason it is possible to apply the study to the wider society since "[m]anagers and leaders, as well as the people they work with, are part of national societies. If we want to understand their behavior, we have to understand their societies" (Hofstede et al, 2010, p.25). This implies that the results provided by the GLOBE study would offer a wider representation of the national culture, which makes it possible to use this data set for our study.

What is social unrest?

Social unrest can be difficult to define, as it is a term which must often be taken in context to the situation it is being applied. As Jovanović et al (2012, p.42) state, "[w]hat appears to be a common form of political expression in one country is seen as major deviant behavior in another country". They also state that "social unrest is not necessarily dysfunctional but its manifestations appear as unexpected, unplanned, often spontaneous as well as unconstrained or uncontrollable within the functional system in which they occur" (Jovanović et al, 2012, p.40).

The Center for Systematic Peace uses an ecosystem analogy by Scheffer et (2001), to explain such unexpected events. On page 1, it states "that strategies for sustainable management of such ecosystems should focus on [building and] maintaining resilience….Stability domains typically depend on slowly changing variables…These factors may be predicted, monitored, and modified. In contrast, stochastic events that trigger state shifts are usually difficult to predict or control" (Center for Systematic Peace, 2011, p.1).

In such situations, the length and severity of unrest varies. Keidal (2005) states, "[t]he intensity of social unrest can be measured by the number of demonstrations, riots, armed infringements and strikes within a year (as cited in Jovanović, Renn & Schröter, 2012, p.39). So whilst there is some chance that these uprisings "may trigger positive changes in society, it is associated with the risk of experiencing damage to human lives and property" (Jovanović, Renn & Schröter, 2012, p.11).

The Political Instability Index

In order to measure the risk of social unrest, many institutions have developed their own specific indexes for state fragility - the degree to which a state is vulnerable to unexpected events. These include the 'Global Peace Index' - by the Institute for Economics and Peace; and the 'Failed State Index' - by the Fund for Peace. For the purpose of this study, we chose the 'Political Instability Index', which divides given countries into 5 different risk categories. This index was developed by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) and looks at the risk of social unrest and the threat this poses to 150 national governments. Their research is based on the 'Political Instability Task Force' (PITF), a model developed by George Mason University. This model "distinguishes countries that experienced instability from those that remained stable with a two-year lead time" and had "over 80% accuracy. Intriguingly, the model uses few variables and a simple specification" (Goldstone et al, 2010, p.190). Examining outbreaks of unrest, the PITF "identified 141 separate instability episodes" between the years of 1955 and 2003; of which most were "complex episodes involving a combination of different types of instability that overlapped or followed upon each other in close sequence" (Goldstone et al., 2010, p.192).

Using the PITF model, the EIU Political Instability Index, analyses 15 different indicators of unrest; 12 of which are underlying vulnerabilities such as state history and corruption, and 3 of which are representative of economic distress, such as unemployment and growth in incomes. Each indicator is ranked from 0 to 10, where 0 equals no vulnerability and 10 equals highest vulnerability. The risk level for each country is thus an amalgamation of these 12 indicator scores.

In 2007, 2010 and 2013, these predictions for the risk of social unrest have been published online - the latest set re-released in an online article by Laza Kekic named, 'Ripe for Rebellion? Where protest if likeliest to break out'.

Since we are not analysing the EIU report but using it as a frame to place the dimensions for each

country, we do not believe it necessary to develop any further on the EIU methodology, however more information may be found in appendices A, B, C & D.

Literature Review

In researching the available literature for this study, there appears to be some discussion about the culture *of* social unrest. Indeed, Friedman & McAdam (1992) confirm that "social movements are the sites where new cultural resources, such as identities and ideologies, are most frequently formulated" (as cited in Swindler, 1995, p.30). However, this study is focusing on culture as a driver of the communication of dissatisfaction, which can eventually escalate into social unrest. There appears to be little study on uprisings as a result of cultural values. For this reason, this section will review literature in the social movements theories and how individual values impact these movements. While there are some differences, in the later stages between social movements and social unrest, our study is focusing on the micro level; on the individual drivers that create the communication of dissatisfaction (see figure 2) - which is a similar process in both social movements and social unrest. After presenting these social movements theories we will also give an overview of interpersonal communication theories, which in line with the social movements theories can impact individual perceptions of cultural values.

Social Movements Theories

According to Flynn (2011, p.27), social movements are "in many instances, created through the use and manipulation of frames, resources, and information". The interdisciplinary study of social movements include many different areas of research which generally focus on the group motivation and goals. These theories include the 'Structural-strain theory' which refers to the idea that social structures put pressure on individuals to engage in deviant and criminal behavior" (Flynn, 2011, p.122). They also include the 'Resource Mobilization' theory which uses "the rational action paradigm to explain the procedure of selecting the most appropriate means for reaching pre-defined goals" (Klandermans, 1984; McCarthy and Zald, 2001; as cited in Jovanović et al, 2012, p.49). This part of the review, however, will focus on social movements literature which addresses the individual and the primary drivers of social unrest at a micro level.

The *Rational Actor Theory* looks at the "individual motivation and incentives for expressing dissatisfaction" while providing a "general frame in which individuals balance the pros and cons for taking stances in society" (Jovanović et al, 2012, p.47). According to the OECD Reviews of Risk Management Policies (Jovanović et al, 2012, p.46), "[t]he theory of rational action provides a concept of how people make decisions in the face of uncertainty". However, it does not address the reasons for why people initially become dissatisfied with their circumstances. As the OECD report continues, dissatisfaction is often "linked to the gap between personal expectation and perceived reality" in which "one can assume that the expression of dissatisfaction is a function of experience of unfair treatment by others" (Jovanović et al, 2012, p.46). Whilst this dissatisfaction may be openly expressed, "[i]n terms of the rational actor paradigm individuals calculate the costs of involvement and protest against the product of probability and expected revenues of being successful" (Jovanović, Renn & Schröter, 2012, p.57). As Jaeger et al (2001) state "[s]uch calculations will not be performed in any conscious act of deliberation but more or less as an internalized process of weighing the pros and cons" (as cited in Jovanović et al, 2012, p.57).

The *Framing Theory* is adapted from Goffman's theory of frame alignment and adds a "constructivist social psychological and ideological dimension to resource mobilization" (Snow et al, 1986, as cited in Langman & Morris, n.d). While resource mobilization theorists hold "that a social movement arises from long-term changes in a group's organization, available resources, and opportunities for group action (Flynn, 2011, p.112); framing theorists attempt "to understand the

way in which social movements and social movement actors create and use meaning, or how events and ideas are framed" (Christiansen, 2011, p.147). Even though this theory is invariably used at the macro scale for collective action, the theory stems from the work of Erving Goffman (1974) which focuses on the micro level. Goffman believed that "people frame experiences in order to organize and understand the world around them. Much like a picture frame excludes things while focusing attention on others, so does framing" (Christiansen, 2011, p.147). In addition Christiansen (2011, p.147) adds "[f]raming helps people interpret the world based on their social position and their previous experiences. Every social interaction that occurs is understood through a frame of reference within which people react based on their perception of the situation and the way they perceive the people with whom they are interacting".

The *Relative Deprivation Theory* "refers to the idea that feelings of deprivation and discontent are related to a desired point of reference" (Flynn, 2011, p.100). Morris & Herring (1984, p.25) discuss this theory through the approach that "focuses on the relationship between social conditions, perceptions of those conditions, and behaviors resulting from those perceptions". This theory argues that "when people perceive great discrepancies between the power and privileges they possess and the amount they ought to possess, they become frustrated, angered, and subsequently participate in movements and protest to offset feelings of deprivation" (Morris & Herring, 1984, p.26). As Flynn (2011, p.110) states "[r]elative deprivation is generally considered to be the central variable in the explanation of social movements and is used to explain the quest for social change that inspires social movement".

Communication Theories

It would be very difficult to discuss cultural values and the role these values play in social movements at the micro level, without discussing the role of communication. In this part of the literature review, we will discuss communication theories which are similar to, and support, the social movements theories we have thus far presented.

However, before presenting these theories, we will present an understanding of the term 'communication'. There are numerous and different definitions of this term, yet, John Stewart (1999) stressed that "[c]ommunication is the way humans build our reality. Human worlds are not made up of objects but of peoples' responses to objects, or their meanings. And these meanings are negotiated in communication" (as cited in Baxter & Braithwaite, 2008, p.4). Julia Wood (2002, p.89) builds on this concept by talking about perception as "an active process of creating meaning by selecting, organizing, and interpreting people, objects, events, situations, and activities." Therefore the following theories will address these notions with a focus on the theories relevant to this study.

The *Social Exchange Theory* in communication studies bears similarities with the 'rational actor' theory in social movements studies as it has roots in economics and behaviourist psychology. Laura Stafford (2008, p.378) states that "[s]ocial behaviour is a series of exchanges. Individuals attempt to maximize their rewards and minimize their costs". Embedded in this assumption are two concepts about self-interest and interdependence. Stafford (2008, p.380) writes that "[i]ndividuals are motivated to interact with others in ways that serve self-interest", and, "[i]nterdependence means that each person's outcomes or rewards are influenced by the other's efforts". Lawyer (2001, p.323) builds on this notion by stating "interdependencies among actors produce joint activities that, in turn, generate positive or negative emotions; these emotions are attributed to social units (relationships, networks, groups) under certain conditions, thereby producing stronger or weaker individual-to-collective ties". As a result of these interdependencies, rules of exchange are adopted.

Gouldner (1960) believes that as a 'folk belief', reciprocity "involves the cultural expectation that people get what they deserve" (as cited in Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005, p.876). Therefore, with these expectations of exchange as a balance maximising benefits versus costs, it can be anticipated that these expectations plays a role in the risk of social unrest at a micro level.

The *Attribution Theory* within communication studies, draws similarities with the 'framing theory' of social movements. Manusov & Spitzberg (2008, p.38) refer to work of Fritz Heider who believed that "people are active interpreters of the events that occur in their lives, and they use consistent and logical modes of sense-making in their interpretations. They do so, in large part, to both understand and control the world around them". Joy Hart (2005, p.47) adds to this by claiming three basic assumptions about the attribution theory, which are: "(1) individuals assign causes to behavior they observe, (2) individuals use systematic processes in explaining behavior, and (3) once attributions are made, they influence feelings and subsequent behavior". This theory, therefore, may play a part in the meaning people assign at the micro level, which can escalate into group involvement and eventual participation in social unrest.

The *Expectancy Violations Theory (EVT)* **"**seeks to explain and predict how communicators assess behaviour that deviates from expectation and how they respond communicatively to such violations" (White, 2008, p.189). Similar to the relative deprivation theory, EVT looks at the gap between expectations and outcomes. Burgoon (1993) noted that "expectancies can refer to what we anticipate will occur (predictive expectancies) or to what is desired or preferred (prescriptive expectancies)" (as cited in White, 2008, p.191). The violations of expectations, means that people must make sense of situations and assign value to the violation. If the violation results in a positive experience, then it is assigned a positive valence. If it results in a negative experience, then the violation has a negative valence. Subsequently, this theory may aid in the understanding of cultural expectations and the result violations play in the risk of social unrest.

Methodology

With the foundation of the EIU and GLOBE studies established, we will now clarify how we merge these studies together, in order to analyse how cultural values can lead to the violation of peoples' expectations, which in turn can cause the communication of dissatisfaction and eventual social unrest.

Approach

This is a quantitative study which looks at the influences of cultural expectations on the risk of social unrest. In order to assess the impact of these variables we need a method to measure the gap between cultural practices and values, which we will use to assess the impact this has on the communication of dissatisfaction. The GLOBE study which builds on the work of 'Hofstede' and 'Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck' provides such a breakdown with cultural values and practices being divided into nine different cultural dimensions. We will cross-reference the gap (between values and practices) with the EIU's Political Instability Index, which looks at the risk of social unrest in the given countries. These countries have been split into five different risk categories - very low risk, low risk, medium risk, high risk and very high risk.

Modification

To start with, we must establish which countries appear in both studies. Since the EIU report contains over 150 different countries whereas the GLOBE study only contains 62 countries, our combined dataset will only use those countries which appear in both datasets. This yields 60 cultures. However, some discrepancies exist in how the countries are presented. This means that we must therefore adjust the data for the following three countries:

- Germany is represented as east Germany and west Germany in the GLOBE study: The EIU has published its risk category as one country. Since the two GLOBE figures for Germany are not contradictory to each other, we find it reasonable to average the scores of east Germany and west Germany from GLOBE into one combined score in our dataset.
- Like Germany, Switzerland is presented as a French and a German speaking nation in the GLOBE study, whilst the EIU has it as one country in one risk category. For a modern, well-integrated nation like Switzerland, we found it reasonable to average the scores of French speaking Switzerland and German speaking Switzerland from the GLOBE study into one combined score in our dataset.
- Similarly, South Africa in the GLOBE study is represented in two different data groups, one Sub-Saharan (black) and one Anglo (white). However, in the EIU report, South Africa is reported as one country, in one risk category. We found no way of reconciling the differences between the two opposing figure sets and South Africa was therefore excluded from our study.

Merging

The merging of the two studies means that the resulting countries we are to analyse result in the following table.

Very low risk	Low risk	Medium risk	High risk	Very high risk
Austria	Australia	England	Albania	Argentina
Denmark	Canada	Colombia	Brazil	Bolivia
Japan	Costa Rica	Equador	China	Egypt
Switzerland	Finland	El Salvador	Guatemala	Greece
	Germany	France	Iran	Nigeria
	Hong Kong	Georgia	Kazakhstan	Venezuela
	Malaysia	Hungary	Mexico	Zimbabwe
	Namibia	India	Morocco	
	New Zealand	Indonesia	Philippines	
	Poland	Ireland	Portugal	
	Singapore	Israel	Spain	
	Sweden	Italy	Turkey	
	Taiwan	Kuwait		
	USA	Netherlands		
		Qatar		
		Russia		
		Slovenia		
		South Korea		
		Thailand		
		Zambia		

Table 1 - The distribution of the 57 GLOBE countries into the five EIU risk categories

Figures

The figures produced in the GLOBE study to which we will be referring is sourced from Lustig & Koester (2004). In their presentation of the 9 dimensions for each country, they use '0' as the midpoint - where a positive score means that the cultural practice or value is high in this dimension and a negative score means that the cultural value or practice is low in this dimension. The exception to this is Gender Egalitarianism - where a positive score means that the culture has a greater inclination towards feminine qualities and a negative score means the culture is inclined towards masculine qualities (see appendix E).

The next step in our study is to incorporate the values for each of the nine cultural dimensions into the risk category framework. We multiply all values in the dataset by 100, in order to rid the data of decimal points and simplify the presentation. This does not affect the analysis. For each country there is a left column and a right column of numbers where:

- The left column contains the cultural practice score (as per GLOBE study)
- The right column contains the cultural values score (as per GLOBE study)

very low risk	Austria		Denmark		Japan		Switzerland	
Power Distance	-93	-86	-302	7	-16	36	-70	-33
Uncertainty Avoidance	166	-159	176	-133	-15	-50	168	-185
In-group Collectivism	-41	-112	-220	-48	-71	-115	-169	-56
Institutional Collectivism	12	-2	132	-110	226	-150	-26	38
Gender Egalitarianism	-245	175	-19	228	-218	70	-216	170
Assertiveness	129	-153	-30	-66	-154	302	-44	-50
Performance Orientation	132	-95	128	-285	95	61	141	-171
Future Orientation	86	44	30	-104	30	-237	125	8
Humane Orientation	-78	-147	73	10	43	-7	-68	45

Table 2 - Showing the raw data from the GLOBE study for the countries belonging to the EIU very low risk group

low risk	Australia		Canada		Costa Rica		Finland		Germany		Hongkong		Malaysia	
Power Distance	-102	13	-84	-10	-102	-45	-67	-80	51	-35	-51	147	-2	68
Uncertainty Avoidance	38	-107	69	-144	-57	-9	143	-128	171	-163	26	-1	103	40
In-group Collectivism	-133	21	-121	81	23	112	-147	-70	-120	-131	23	-156	49	48
Institutional Collectivism	10	-68	32	-114	-76	88	92	-26	-137	2	-28	-62	87	26
Gender Egalitarianism	-161	216	-81	235	-118	135	-175	99	-247	189	-143	74	-132	-46
Assertiveness	35	-3	-28	48	-110	33	-28	12	135	-100	143	147	-77	147
Performance Orientation	52	-85	126	36	-54	-73	85	-105	56	-112	39	0	158	95
Future Orientation	65	-20	98	59	5	-17	-73	47	17	29	176	-95	60	26
Humane Orientation	39	68	83	94	62	-192	-28	169	-168	10	-40	-47	163	37

low risk	Namibia		New Zealand		Poland		Singapore		Sweden		Taiwan		USA	
Power Distance	26	-42	-67	231	-18	112	-44	89	-77	-10	1	10	-70	33
Uncertainty Avoidance	6	80	98	-87	-90	12	191	-68	192	-168	-20	110	-2	-103
In-group Collectivism	-86	109	-201	239	50	18	67	-48	-203	101	60	-62	-122	26
Institutional Collectivism	-28	-72	135	-108	68	-104	156	-38	233	-160	12	82	-12	-114
Gender Egalitarianism	-32	53	-210	49	5	110	-81	108	-43	243	-291	13	-178	224
Assertiveness	-66	12	-201	-44	-25	11	5	87	-112	-33	-63	-138	110	74
Performance Orientation	-78	151	-82	98	-160	-73	264	2	117	-148	-43	-73	65	-46
Future Orientation	-108	134	156	86	-53	50	201	-71	-96	-47	43	-65	89	56
Humane Orientation	-28	-12	48	-254	-101	-56	-126	160	2	99	-57	-73	16	46

Table 3 - Showing the raw data from the GLOBE study for the countries belonging to the EIU low risk group

medium risk	England		Colombia		Ecuador		El Salvador		France		Georgia		Hungary	
Power Distance	-5	19	90	-202	26	-127	118	-16	118	7	10	30	90	-71
Uncertainty Avoidance	81	-86	-98	56	-80	85	-90	111	44	2	-110	98	-173	4
In-group Collectivism	-145	-35	79	159	90	37	27	233	-67	57	142	-4	14	-37
Institutional Collectivism	5	-86	-105	128	-84	134	-129	182	-12	106	-52	-182	-172	-78
Gender Egalitarianism	-89	247	-89	211	-250	125	226	139	-97	150	121	-57	22	133
Assertiveness	0	-19	13	-60	-17	-27	129	-32	79	-68	8	78	175	-72
Performance Orientation	93	-107	-126	44	-24	29	-11	117	-24	-36	-95	12	-139	49
Future Orientation	-5	-17	-40	140	25	-1	-96	189	83	44	-55	-80	-169	2
Humane Orientation	-78	2	-78	81	117	-23	-80	15	-145	213	18	76	-155	24

medium risk	India		Indonesia		Ireland		Israel		Italy		Kuw ait		Netherlands	
Power Distance	69	-28	1	-103	-5	-7	-105	-5	59	-77	-13	126	-250	-83
Uncertainty Avoidance	-2	15	-40	97	23	-100	-25	-42	-62	-27	8	22	89	-227
In-group Collectivism	105	-98	72	-1	-1	18	-61	21	-28	12	89	-68	-197	-139
Institutional Collectivism	32	-6	5	88	92	-30	51	-94	-136	78	58	82	51	-38
Gender Egalitarianism	-296	108	-199	-23	-213	241	-218	150	-204	186	-382	-116	-135	209
Assertiveness	-116	140	-80	134	-63	24	22	-10	-22	-1	-143	-10	46	-122
Performance Orientation	74	24	2	49	28	-68	0	-61	-130	100	-128	58	165	-105
Future Orientation	38	29	10	-68	65	8	-5	-62	-131	35	-38	23	55	-140
Humane Orientation	100	-65	125	-117	181	19	2	85	-97	68	89	-161	-49	-100

medium risk	Qatar		Russia		Slovenia		South Korea		Thailand		Zambia	
Power Distance	-30	144	80	-34	36	-48	101	-54	106	36	31	-89
Uncertainty Avoidance	16	30	-213	71	-64	58	-102	6	-39	158	-10	6
In-group Collectivism	-11	-21	65	32	38	10	53	-73	75	23	94	26
Institutional Collectivism	128	78	60	-170	-28	-72	228	168	-52	72	87	0
Gender Egalitarianism	-38	-31	19	38	-11	175	-404	46	-175	34	-307	66
Assertiveness	66	-4	-129	-150	-41	114	68	112	-140	-53	-22	83
Performance Orientation	50	102	-210	-5	-56	-19	26	46	91	170	-50	97
Future Orientation	-86	2	-179	-125	-111	137	113	-212	-43	-65	15	86
Humane Orientation	146	-56	-32	72	-63	-78	-59	76	150	183	238	46

Table 4 - Showing the raw data from the GLOBE study for the countries belonging to the EIU medium risk group

high risk	Albania		Brazil		China		Guatemala		Iran		Kazakhstan	
Power Distance	-131	228	136	-112	-32	106	99	-112	59	19	31	120
Uncertainty Avoidance	68	119	-93	58	129	105	-43	40	-82	118	-84	-35
In-group Collectivism	80	-126	4	-145	89	-162	65	128	120	51	15	-65
Institutional Collectivism	70	-60	-100	176	125	-36	-132	98	-88	160	10	-140
Gender Egalitarianism	-78	40	-186	209	-256	-68	-264	112	-272	-53	-43	158
Assertiveness	203	87	13	-138	-107	242	-72	-29	-30	175	85	2
Performance Orientation	2	-19	-9	46	-22	-187	-132	100	-32	83	-61	-109
Future Orientation	179	-98	-15	53	88	-86	-73	56	121	38	-133	-64
Humane Orientation	114	-38	-91	112	56	-47	-42	-73	29	1	-21	85

high risk	Mexico		Morocco		Philippines		Portugal		Spain		Turkey	
Power Distance	10	33	225	109	61	-5	61	-103	80	-138	92	-95
Uncertainty Avoidance	3	102	-35	184	-45	82	-42	-33	-32	20	-88	6
In-group Collectivism	76	76	166	98	165	139	49	-73	41	32	99	26
Institutional Collectivism	-45	36	-16	120	29	8	-79	112	-96	92	-52	104
Gender Egalitarianism	-97	154	-248	15	-97	123	-91	239	-266	173	-299	106
Assertiveness	82	-6	101	-22	-39	197	-137	-38	74	22	104	-176
Performance Orientation	4	88	-128	202	65	105	-30	-117	-74	32	-24	80
Future Orientation	0	62	53	50	28	107	-126	134	-23	-47	-68	-170
Humane Orientation	-24	144	89	37	215	-29	-38	-51	-162	116	-32	41

Table 5 - Showing the raw data from the GLOBE study, of the countries belonging to the EIU high risk group

very high risk	Argentina		Bolivia		Egypt		Greece		Nigeria		Venezuela		Zimbabwe	
Power Distance	108	-118	-156	196	-60	147	52	-101	146	-13	52	-130	115	-19
Uncertainty Avoidance	-85	4	-135	10	-17	118	-128	74	21	157	-120	102	-2	15
In-group Collectivism	49	131	44	90	67	-32	16	-59	55	-54	52	137	57	48
Institutional Collectivism	-141	116	-50	72	60	22	-240	132	-26	58	-69	130	-31	26
Gender Egalitarianism	-137	207	-121	158	-320	-73	-140	188	-66	51	-102	173	-258	97
Assertiveness	19	-87	-99	-15	-66	-83	118	-131	104	-90	49	-75	-25	116
Performance Orientation	-167	68	-52	32	2	73	-97	-75	52	131	-108	71	-17	139
Future Orientation	-113	119	-123	29	43	-17	-227	-44	-45	95	-196	119	35	149
Humane Orientation	-21	68	-9	-157	133	-113	-157	-87	2	125	33	-51	75	-104

Table 6 - Showing the raw data from the GLOBE study, of the countries belonging to the EIU very high risk group

Calculations

After calculating the difference between the cultural values and practices for each dimension, we are left with just one score which equals the gap between reality and expectations. In the following tables, these results are colour coded for a quicker overview of the general trends. Therefore the colours for the gap differences are as follows:

- yellow equals the gap score is no more than a 100 points difference (in either direction) between values and practices
- red equals a negative gap score – when the people want/value the dimension less than their current practice
- green equals a positive gap score – when the people want/value the dimension more than their current practice

In addition, on the right hand side of each table there are two white scores. The left of these equals the mean score for that specific dimension in the table. The right score contains the computed standard deviation of the DCD index for all the countries in the table which is a measure of the spread of the values from the average. The results in each dimension for each country are as follows:

very low risk	Austria	Denmark	Japan	Switzerland		
Power Distance	7	309	52	37	101	140
Uncertainty Avoidance	-325	-309	-35	-353	-256	148
In-group Collectivism	-71	172	-44	113	43	118
Institutional Collectivism	-14	-242	-376	64	-142	203
Gender Egalitarianism	420	247	288	386	335	81
Assertiveness	-282	-36	456	-6	33	308
Performance Orientation	-227	-413	-34	-312	-247	161
Future Orientation	-42	-134	-267	-117	-140	94
Humane Orientation	-69	-63	-50	113	-17	87

Table 7 - Shows the gap scores, as well as the mean and standard deviations for the very low risk group. Calculated from the data in Table 2

low risk	Australia	Canada	Costa Rica	Finland	Germany	Hongkong	Malaysia		
Power Distance	115	74	57	-13	-86	198	70	78	101
Uncertainty Avoidance	-145	-213	48	-271	-334	-27	-63	-115	164
In-group Collectivism	154	202	89	77	-11	-179	-1	82	173
Institutional Collectivism	-78	-146	164	-118	139	-34	-61	-87	148
Gender Egalitarianism	377	316	253	274	436	217	86	256	112
Assertiveness	-38	76	143	40	-235	4	224	38	113
Performance Orientation	-137	-90	-19	-190	-168	-39	-63	-63	148
Future Orientation	-85	-39	-22	120	12	-271	-34	-29	139
Humane Orientation	29	11	-254	197	178	-7	-126	13	161

low risk	Namibia	New Zealand	Poland	Singapore	Sweden	Taiwan	USA
Power Distance	-68	298	130	133	67	9	103
Uncertainty Avoidance	74	-185	102	-259	-360	130	-101
In-group Collectivism	195	440	-32	-115	304	-122	148
Institutional Collectivism	-44	-243	-172	-194	-393	70	-102
Gender Egalitarianism	85	259	105	189	286	304	402
Assertiveness	78	157	36	82	79	-75	-36
Performance Orientation	229	180	87	-262	-265	-30	-111
Future Orientation	242	-70	103	-272	49	-108	-33
Humane Orientation	16	-302	45	286	97	-16	30

Table 8 - Shows the gap scores, as well as the mean and standard deviations for the low risk group. Calculated from the data in Table 3.

medium risk	England	Colombia	Ecuador	El Salvador	France	Georgia	Hungary		
Power Distance	24	-292	-153	-134	-111	20	-161	-55	124
Uncertainty Avoidance	-167	154	165	201	-42	208	177	59	146
In-group Collectivism	110	80	-53	206	124	-146	-51	-14	105
Institutional Collectivism	-91	233	218	311	118	-130	94	17	149
Gender Egalitarianism	336	300	375	-87	247	-178	111	238	181
Assertiveness	-19	-73	-10	-161	-147	70	-247	11	132
Performance Orientation	-200	170	53	128	-12	107	188	48	134
Future Orientation	-12	180	-26	285	-39	-25	171	24	145
Humane Orientation	80	159	-140	95	358	58	179	2	169

medium risk	India	Indonesia	Ireland	Israel	Italy	Kuw ait	Netherlands
Power Distance	-97	-104	-2	100	-136	139	167
Uncertainty Avoidance	17	137	-123	-17	35	14	-316
In-group Collectivism	-203	-73	19	82	40	-157	58
Institutional Collectivism	-38	83	-122	-145	214	24	-89
Gender Egalitarianism	404	176	454	368	390	266	344
Assertiveness	256	214	87	-32	21	133	-168
Performance Orientation	-50	47	-96	-61	230	186	-270
Future Orientation	-9	-78	-57	-57	166	61	-195
Humane Orientation	-165	-242	-162	83	165	-250	-51

medium risk	Qatar	Russia	Slovenia	South Korea	Thailand	Zambia
Power Distance	174	-114	-84	-155	-70	-120
Uncertainty Avoidance	14	284	122	108	197	16
In-group Collectivism	-10	-33	-28	-126	-52	-68
Institutional Collectivism	-50	-230	-44	-60	124	-87
Gender Egalitarianism	7	19	186	450	209	373
Assertiveness	-70	-21	155	44	87	105
Performance Orientation	52	205	37	20	79	147
Future Orientation	88	54	248	-325	-22	71
Humane Orientation	-202	104	-15	135	33	-192

Table 9 - Shows the gap scores, as well as the mean and standard deviations for medium group. Calculated from the data in Table 4.

high risk	Albania	Brazil	China	Guatemala	Iran	Kazakhstan		
Power Distance	359	-248	138	-211	-40	89	-53	180
Uncertainty Avoidance	51	151	-24	83	200	49	93	73
In-group Collectivism	-206	-149	-251	63	-69	-80	-83	89
Institutional Collectivism	-130	276	-161	230	248	-150	87	161
Gender Egalitarianism	118	395	188	376	219	201	284	102
Assertiveness	-116	-151	349	43	205	-83	3	185
Performance Orientation	-21	55	-165	232	115	-48	62	135
Future Orientation	-277	68	-174	129	-83	69	0	144
Humane Orientation	-152	203	-103	-31	-28	106	17	153

high risk	Mexico	Morocco	Philippines	Portugal	Spain	Turkey
Power Distance	23	-116	-66	-164	-218	-187
Uncertainty Avoidance	99	219	127	9	52	94
In-group Collectivism	0	-68	-26	-122	-9	-73
Institutional Collectivism	81	136	-21	191	188	156
Gender Egalitarianism	251	263	220	330	439	405
Assertiveness	-88	-123	236	99	-52	-280
Performance Orientation	84	330	40	-87	106	104
Future Orientation	62	-3	79	260	-24	-102
Humane Orientation	168	-52	-244	-13	278	73

Table 10 - Shows the gap scores, as well as the mean and standard deviations for the high risk group . Calculated from the data in Table 5.

very high risk	Argentina	Bolivia	Egypt	Greece	Nigeria	Venezuela	Zimbabwe		
Power Distance	-226	352	207	-153	-159	-182	-134	-42	226
Uncertainty Avoidance	89	145	135	202	136	222	17	135	69
In-group Collectivism	82	46	-99	-75	-109	85	-9	-11	84
Institutional Collectivism	257	122	-38	372	84	199	57	150	137
Gender Egalitarianism	344	279	247	328	117	275	355	278	81
Assertiveness	-106	84	-17	-249	-194	-124	141	-66	143
Performance Orientation	235	84	71	22	79	179	156	118	74
Future Orientation	232	152	-60	183	140	315	114	154	116
Humane Orientation	89	-148	-246	70	123	-84	-179	-54	147

Table 11 - Shows the gap scores, as well as the mean and standard deviations for very high risk group. Calculated from the data in Table 6

Data Analysis

With these combined datasets (from the EIU risk analysis and GLOBE study), we test our hypothesis on whether the gap between cultural values and practices for a given dimension has a bearing on the eventual risk of social unrest. In order to do this, we define our study parameter within each dimension as the Degree of Cultural Dissatisfaction, or DCD, in relation to the risk of social unrest. DCD is defined below as:

DCD = the gap between *Ideal value score of* 'X' and *Actual practice score of* 'X'

Our central study parameter in the combined dataset, where 'X' denotes any one out of the nine possible cultural dimensions listed in the GLOBE study.

- A positive DCD score represents a desire among people within a culture to have more of that dimension than is current practice.
- A negative DCD score represents a desire among people within a culture to have less of that dimension than is current practice.

After obtaining the DCD scores for all nine cultural dimensions, in all the countries in our study, we then look for patterns between each of the dimensions and their respective risk category. Searching for patterns, we then evaluate whether they are relevant as contributors to the risk of social unrest. The cultural dimensions which show relevant patterns will be further analysed in the discussion.

DCD values and the cultural dimensions graphs

In order to analyse the DCD scores, we will present the results in nine graphs representing each of the nine dimensions. Each graph shows the individual countries DCD scores for all five risk groups. In these graphs, each country has their own individual data point and each EIU risk group has been assigned its own specific icon. Positive scores indicate a positive DCD score - in which people want more than they currently have and a negative score indicates a negative DCD score – in which people want less than they currently have. In order to make the information more explicit, all the graphs will have the same format. Before each graph, we will provide a short explanation of the dimension we are analysing before clarifying what, if any trends, were found between the DCD scores and the risk of social unrest.

Power Distance refers to “the degree to which people believe that power should be stratified, unequally shared, and concentrated at higher levels of organization or government” (Lustig & Koester, 2010, p. 125). Among high power distance cultures, such as France and Argentina, disparity between social classes is considered very important. When authorities in higher levels of society make decisions or orders, those decisions and orders should be accepted and followed without resistance by those who belong to lower hierarchy. On the contrary, in low power-distance cultures such as Australia and Denmark, people value human equality and believe that the difference between social classes should be eliminated. People also believe that observing and questioning decisions of authorities is an individual's duty and responsibility. (Lustig & Koester, 2010).



Graph 1 - Showing the Power Distance DCD scores for all countries in Tables 7 through to 11

The table below summarises the overall trends found in tables 7 – 11 for each culture in each risk category, plus the average DCD scores for Power Distance.

Risk Category	**Positive DCD**	**No trend**	**Negative DCD**	**Overall DCD trend**	**Average DCD Score**
Very Low Risk	1	3	0	None	101
Low Risk	6	8	0	Some Positive	78
Medium Risk	3	7	10	Mixed, Mostly Negative	-55
High Risk	2	4	6	Mixed, Mostly Negative	-53
Very High Risk	2	0	5	Mixed, Mostly Negative	-42

Data interpretation: The majority of countries in the EIU 'very low risk' and 'low risk' groups show positive DCD scores indicating that people desire an increase in this dimension in comparison to its current practice. The countries in the EIU 'medium risk', 'high risk' and 'very high risk' groups show mostly negative DCD scores, indicating that people desire a decrease in this dimension in comparison to its current practice. However, there exists little difference between the countries in the EIU 'medium risk', 'high risk' and 'very high risk' groups. The appearance of a trend going from the 'very low risk' group to the 'medium risk' group is contradicted by the widening spread and rising average of the 'high risk' and 'very high risk' groups. Even though a trend could be constructed moving from the 'very low risk' DCD scores to 'very high risk' DCD scores, the outliers in the two higher risk groups detract from a solid pattern in this trend. This makes a correlation between this dimension and the risk of social unrest weak.

- Evaluation of data: Power Distance shows questionable a DCD pattern which will be further explained in the 'discussion'.

Uncertainty Avoidance refers to "the extent to which people strive to avoid uncertainty by relying on social norms, rules, rituals, and bureaucratic practices to alleviate the unpredictability of future events" (Lustig & Koester, 2010, p. 125). In high uncertainty avoidance cultures, such as Sweden and Switzerland, people expect stability in societal goals. Deviation in their social practices is not preferable and can be interpreted as insecurity. Consequently, society encourages uncertainty avoidance through the form of formal and informal regulations. These formalities regulate how an individual is supposed to behave in order to decrease uncertainty in society. On the other hand, in low uncertainty avoidance cultures such as Russia and South Korea, people have higher resistance to uncertainty and are more adaptable to uncertain ways of life. Therefore, people perceive deviance and ambiguity as outstanding rather than as threatening. Social rules and regulations are mild and limited among low uncertainty avoidance culture. (Lustig & Koester, 2010).



Graph 2 - Showing the Uncertainty Avoidance DCD scores for all countries found in Tables 7 through 11.

The table below summarises the overall trends found in tables 7 – 11 for each culture in each risk category, plus the average DCD scores for Uncertainty Avoidance.

Risk Category	**Positive DCD**	**No trend**	**Negative DCD**	**Overall DCD trend**	**Average DCD Score**
Very Low Risk	0	1	3	All Negative	-256
Low Risk	2	4	8	Mixed, Mostly Negative	-115
Medium Risk	10	7	3	Mixed, Mostly Positive	59
High Risk	4	8	0	Mixed, Some Positive	93
Very High Risk	5	2	0	Mostly Positive	135

Data interpretation: All five EIU social unrest risk groups show an increasing average and a relatively clustered spread of scores, especially in the 'high risk' and 'very high risk' of social unrest

groups. There is a clear pattern between these DCD scores and the risk of social unrest. The pattern starts with large negative DCD scores in the EIU 'very low risk' group and increase to positive DCD scores in the EIU 'very high risk' group. This indicates that as we move from lower to higher risk countries, people desire this dimension more and therefore, a clear positive trend between this dimension and the risk of social unrest can be indicated from these scores.

- Evaluation of data: Uncertainty Avoidance shows a relevant trend of increasing DCD scores from the EIU 'very low risk' group to the EIU 'very high risk' group.

In-group Collectivism refers to "the degree to which people express pride, loyalty, and cohesiveness in their family" (Lustig & Koester, 2010, p. 125). People in cultures with high in-group collectivism such as Georgia and the Philippines are tightly committed to their family and social groups. In contrast to this, people in cultures with low in-group collectivism such as New Zealand and Finland, find that group membership is not necessarily strong, even within the family unit. People depend more on themselves and prefer more privacy and freedom. (Lustig & Koester, 2010).



Graph 3 - Showing the In-group Collectivism DCD scores of all countries found in Tables 7 through 11.

The table below summarises the overall trends found in tables 7 – 11 for each culture in each risk category, plus the average DCD scores for In-Group Collectivism.

Risk Category	**Positive DCD**	**No trend**	**Negative DCD**	**Overall DCD trend**	**Average DCD Score**
Very Low Risk	2	2	0	Mixed	43
Low Risk	6	5	3	Mixed	82
Medium Risk	3	13	3	Mixed, Mostly no Trend	-14

High Risk	0	8	4	Mixed, Some Negative	-83
Very High Risk	0	6	1	Mostly no Trend	-11

Data interpretation: All five EIU risk of social unrest groups show mixed positive and negative DCD scores. It is difficult to see how any trend can found amongst these varying scores, as the average in each EIU group doesn't move far from zero.

- Evaluation of data: In-group Collectivism shows a non-relevant DCD pattern.

Institutional Collectivism refers to "the degree to which a culture's institutional practices encourage collective actions and the collective distribution of resources" (Lustig & Koester, 2010, p. 125). In cultures such as Qatar and Japan, which have high institutional collectivism, people prioritize benefits of the group before benefits for themselves as individuals. In contrast, low institutional collectivism cultures such as Italy and Greece, usually prioritize the individual benefits before benefits of the group. (Lustig & Koester, 2010).



Graph 4 - Showing the Institutional Collectivism DCD scores of all countries found in Tables 7 through 11

The table below summarises the overall trends found in tables 7 – 11 for each culture in each risk category, plus the average DCD scores for Institutional Collectivism.

Risk Category	**Positive DCD**	**No trend**	**Negative DCD**	**Overall DCD trend**	**Average DCD Score**
Very Low Risk	0	2	2	Mixed, some Negative	-142
Low Risk	6	5	7	Mixed	-87
Medium Risk	6	10	4	Mixed	17

High Risk	7	2	3	Mixed, mostly Positive	87
Very High Risk	4	3	0	Mostly Positive	150

Data interpretation: The five EIU risk of social unrest groups show an increasing average of DCD scores - starting with negative scores in the low risk groups, moving to positive scores in the high risk groups. The spread of scores remain similar in all the groups, and it is easy to spot a steadily increasing trend. This indicates a desire among people in the higher risk groups to have more of this dimension, whereas the people in the lower risk groups want less of this dimension.

- Evaluation of data: Institutional Collectivism shows a relevant trend in the risk of social unrest with increasing DCD scores moving from the EIU 'very low risk' group to the EIU 'very high risk' group.

Gender Egalitarianism refers to "the extent to which people minimize gender role difference and gender discrimination while promoting gender equality" (Lustig & Koester, 2010, p 125). In high gender egalitarianism cultures such as Hungary and Poland, people value equality between the genders and believe that people should be equally treated regardless of their gender. Conversely, people in low gender egalitarianism cultures such as Austria and Egypt, view the divergence in gender roles, expectations and treatment, as natural and appropriate. (Lustig & Koester, 2010).



Graph 5 - Showing the Gender Egalitarianism DCD scores of all countries found in Tables 7 through 11

The table below summarises the overall trends found in tables 7 – 11 for each culture in each risk category, plus the average DCD scores for Gender Egalitarianism.

Risk Category	Positive DCD	No trend	Negative DCD	Overall DCD trend	Average DCD Score
Very Low Risk	4	0	0	All positive	335
Low Risk	12	2	0	Mostly positive	256
Medium Risk	16	1	1	Mostly positive	238
High Risk	12	0	0	All positive	284
Very High Risk	7	0	0	All positive	278

Data interpretation: All five EIU risk of social unrest groups show consistently large positive DCD scores. This consistency disqualifies gender egalitarianism as an indicator of the risk of social unrest. No trend can be fitted to these scores.

- Evaluation of data: Gender Egalitarianism shows a non-relevant DCD pattern in conjunction with the risk of social unrest.

Assertiveness refers to "the degree to which people are assertive, confrontational, and aggressive in social relationships" (Lustig & Koester, 2010, p. 125). Among cultures which are high on assertiveness such as Germany and Hong Kong, people are competitive and value success. People generally believe it is appropriate that rewards and benefits should be passed to those with the highest competence. On the other hand, people in low assertiveness cultures such as Kuwait and Thailand value modesty and peaceful relationships between each other. These cultures view a win-lose orientation as the creation of disassociation within society. (Lustig & Koester, 2010).



Graph 6 - Showing the Assertiveness DCD scores of all countries found in Tables 7 through 11.

The table below summarises the overall trends found in tables 7 – 11 for each culture in each risk

category, plus the average DCD scores for Assertiveness.

Risk Category	Positive DCD	No trend	Negative DCD	Overall DCD trend	Average DCD Score
Very Low Risk	1	2	1	Mixed	33
Low Risk	3	10	1	Mixed, mostly no trend	38
Medium Risk	5	11	4	Mixed, mostly no trend	11
High Risk	3	5	4	Mixed	3
Very High Risk	1	2	4	Mixed, mostly Negative	-66

Data interpretation: There are mixed positive DCD scores and negative DCD scores across the five EIU social unrest risk groups. The average of the DCD scores within all the groups revolve around zero. There are also several large positive DCD scores and several large negative DCD scores but they average each other out in their respective risk cateogry. No trend can be fitted to these scores.

- Evaluation of data: Assertiveness does not show a DCD pattern which indicates the risk of social unrest.

Performance Orientation refers to "the extent to which people encourage others to improve their task-oriented performance and excel" (Lustig & Koester, 2010, p. 125). In high performance orientation cultures such as those in Canada and Singapore, competence and performance are very important for an individual's accomplishment - which also determines one's social status. Conversely, in low performance orientation cultures, such as Guatemala, social status of an individual does not necessarily depend on knowledge or ability but rather depends on social connections, power and tradition. Another aspect that shows differences between high and low performance orientation cultures, is communicational context. In high performance orientation cultures, people use low context communication and are direct to make sure there is effective communication. In contrast, people with low performance orientation, use high context communication in order to maintain harmony in their relationships. (Lustig & Koester, 2010).



Graph 7 - Showing the Performance Orientation DCD scores of all countries found in Tables 7 through 11

The table below summarises the overall trends found in tables 7 – 11 for each culture in each risk category, plus the average DCD scores for Performance Orientation.

Risk Category	Positive DCD	No trend	Negative DCD	Overall DCD trend	Average DCD Score
Very Low Risk	0	1	3	Mostly Negative	-247
Low Risk	2	6	6	Mixed, mostly Negative	-63
Medium Risk	8	10	2	Mixed	48
High Risk	5	6	1	Mixed	62
Very High Risk	3	4	0	All positive	118

Data interpretation: The five EIU risk of social unrest groups show a gradual change from all negative DCD scores in the EIU 'very low risk' group to all positive DCD scores in the EIU 'very high risk' group. An increasing trend can be found within these scores indicating a desire for more of this dimension amongst cultures in high risk groups as opposed to cultures in low risk groups who want less of this dimension.

- Evaluation of data: Performance Orientation shows a relevant trend of increasing DCD scores from the EIU 'very low risk' group to the EIU 'very high risk' group.

Future Orientation refers to "the degree to which people engage in future-oriented behaviours such as planning, investigating in the future, and delaying gratification" (Lustig & Koester, 2010, p. 125). In high future orientation cultures such as Hong Kong and Iran, people prefer to make plans and maintain control for their future security rather than having instantaneous pleasure. In low future

orientation cultures such as Portugal and Venezuela, people value having present satisfaction rather than concerning themselves about their past or future (Lustig & Koester, 2010).



Graph 8 - Showing the Future Orientation DCD scores of all countries found in Tables 7 through 11

The table below summarises the overall trends found in tables 7 – 11 for each culture in each risk category, plus the average DCD scores for Future Orientation.

Risk Category	Positive DCD	No trend	Negative DCD	Overall DCD trend	Average DCD Score
Very Low Risk	0	1	3	Mostly Negative	-140
Low Risk	3	8	3	Mixed	-29
Medium Risk	5	13	2	Mixed	24
High Risk	2	7	3	Mixed	0
Very High Risk	6	1	0	Mostly Positive	154

Data interpretation: Although the DCD scores in the 'medium risk' group and 'high risk' groups do not exhibit any clear change between values and practices; when looking at the whole picture there exists an identifiable trend going from the 'very low risk' group to the 'very high risk' group. Given this spread of scores within all the groups, it is possible to observe a pattern between this dimension and the risk of social unrest.

- Evaluation of data: Future Orientation shows a relevant trend of increasing DCD scores from the EIU 'very low risk group' to the EIU very high risk group'.

Humane Orientation refers to "the degree to which people encourage others to be fair, altruistic, friendly, generous, caring and kind" (Lustig & Koester, 2010, p. 125). Among high humane orientation cultures such as Zambia and Indonesia, people value and encourage actions of kindness

and sympathy between people. For low humane orientation cultures such as Spain, people prefer having personal convenience and satisfaction, or even solving their personal problems without others sympathy and help. (Lustig & Koester, 2010).



Graph 9 - Showing the Humane Orientation DCD scores of all countries found in Tables 7 through 11.

The table below summarises the overall trends found in tables 7 – 11 for each culture in each risk category, plus the average DCD scores for Humane Orientation.

Risk Category	**Positive DCD**	**No trend**	**Negative DCD**	**Overall DCD trend**	**Average DCD Score**
Very Low Risk	1	3	0	Mixed	-17
Low Risk	3	8	3	Mixed, mostly no trend	13
Medium Risk	6	7	7	Mixed	2
High Risk	4	5	3	Mixed	17
Very High Risk	1	3	3	Mixed	-54

Data interpretation: There exists mixed positive DCD scores and mixed negative DCD scores across the five EIU risk of social unrest groups. The average DCD scores in each risk category revolves fairly tightly around zero indicating that many cultures do not desire a change from their current practice. In addition, there are several large positive DCD scores and several large negative DCD scores but they appear to average each other out in their risk categories. No clear trend can be found among these scores.

- Evaluation of data: Humane Orientation shows a non-relevant DCD pattern.

Results

We set out to explore the relationship between cultural values and the communication of dissatisfaction among people within a given culture. We wanted to investigate the nature of those relationships, which we achieved by placing the GLOBE dimensions into the EIU political instability index. For each country we calculated nine DCD scores which indicated potential correlations between the dimensions and the country's risk of social unrest. We found the following trends:

- For four dimensions, we found that there is a clear correlation between our DCD score and the assessed risk of social unrest. These four were: *Uncertainty Avoidance, Institutional Collectivism, Performance Orientation* and *Future Orientation*. Among these four, the same pattern could be identified - countries in low risk groups were striving towards a lesser score of the dimensions, whereas countries in high risk groups were striving towards a higher score. In the diagrams, this is seen as a positive, rising trend going from left to right. Refer to Figure 3 for an illustration of this.
- For another four dimensions, we found no correlation between our DCD score and the assessed risk of social unrest. These four are: I*n-group Collectivism, Gender Egalitarianism, Assertiveness* and *Humane Orientation*. No discernible pattern could be identified with these dimensions, and so they were ruled out as possible candidates for influencing social unrest.
- For the remaining dimension, *Power Distance*, the results were inconclusive. A pattern could be seen in the graph, but it is not as clear as the other dimensions. The pattern is the inverse of the other four - countries in low risk groups were striving towards a higher score, and vice versa. In graph 1 this could be seen as a negative, falling trend going from left to right. However, as stated, due to the many outliers, this dimension was deemed as not showing a clear pattern between the DCD index and the risk of social unrest and so it was excluded.



Figure 4 - Illustrative rising DCD trend lines inserted into the four identified dimensions. Same data content as Graphs 2, 4, 7 & 8

In summary, for four out of the nine dimensions, there were clear indications of a relationship

between the magnitude of the DCD index and the assessed risk of social unrest in a given country. These dimensions will be further evaluated in the discussion.

Discussion

The purpose of this research was to investigate the role cultural expectations play in the risk of social unrest. This was done by using figures from the GLOBE report where we calculated the difference (gap) between cultural values and practices. If the gap score was positive, this meant that people valued that dimension more than the current practice. If the gap score was negative, this meant that people valued the dimension less than the current practice. After calculating these figures, we placed all 9 DCD (degree of cultural dissatisfaction) scores into the EIU risk of social unrest frame for each country. This meant we could analyse the DCD scores according to the risk category and analyse what trends could be found.

In this section we will deepen the discussion about our findings. We will begin with a discussion about the dimensions which displayed a DCD trend between the gap in expectations and the risk category.

Performance Orientation reflects the extent to which a community encourages each other to excel in their daily tasks. Our analysis of this dimension revealed a pattern in which very low and low risk countries mostly expressed a desire for less of this dimension in their day-to-day lives. Medium, high and very high risk countries mostly expressed a desire for more of this dimension than they currently have as a daily practice. According to Javidan (2004, p.245), what this equates to is that low risk countries (since they want less of that dimension) value:

- less feedback and appraisal as it is seen as being judgemental and discomforting
- more sympathy and tradition.

Conversely, high risk countries value:

- assertiveness, competitiveness and materialism
- education and learning

With these values explicitly defined, it goes without doubt that *performance orientation* could play a part in the expression of dissatisfaction. When discussing this dimension and political ideology, Javidan (2004, p.257) states that “those societies with higher Performance Orientation practices tend to show a more positive view toward democracy and prefer a less active role for the government”. In addition, these societies “prefer a stronger role for the private ownership of business and a greater reliance on individual rather than government responsibility” (Javidan, 2004, p.257). It would then be possible to deduce that countries which are in high risk of social unrest categories, have cultural values which desire increased autonomy from the government and economic success for the individual. However, as Javidan (2004, p.277) adds about societies which value this dimension, they “do not necessarily enjoy a greater economic prosperity, or a public attitude or government sector that encourages more competitiveness”. This statement about the gap between value and practices and the result in dissatisfaction which may be incurred, is conducive with the findings of our study.

Future Orientation looks at the degree to which people engage in planning and investing for the future rather than indulging in the present. Our data analysis highlighted that countries in high risk categories valued this dimension more than the current practice which is the norm. Ashkanasy et al (2004, p.302) explain that countries which want more of this dimension (eg. high risk countries) typically value:

- flexibility and adaptability
- delaying instant gratification by placing a higher priority on future plans

Countries in low risk categories valued this dimension less than their current practice in their

culture. In these countries, they tend to value:

- individuals who are inherently less motivated
- instant gratification and rewards

The countries in the middle risk categories showed mixed results. With these results it would be possible to state that *Future Orientation* cultural values impact low risk countries generally in a way which encourages spontaneity whereas high risk countries are impacted by values focusing on security in the future. Interestingly, Jaeger & Kanungo (1990) believe that "predictable environments in industrialized markets support planning" which means that "[p]eople in these environments give less regard to social and organizational traditions and make decisions based on the merits for the future" (as cited in Ashkanasy et al, 2004, p.295). Taking heed to this statement, then it could be possible to draw a conclusion which confirms that low risk countries have security in their institutions, which allows people to act more freely and indulge in instant gratifications. Conversely, this dimension may also indicate that the opposite is true. In high risk countries, it is possible there is little trust in institutions and because of the lack of provisions in social welfare, people value security. This desire to guarantee future well-being, may well be reflected in our results on what cultural values can contribute to the risk of social unrest. In addition, Ashkanasy et al (2004, p.318) state, "societies with stronger future-orientated practices are less likely to be passive and to reject democracy, and are more likely to express their voice". According to our results, this need to express individuals opinions appears to be desired more in high risk countries than low risk countries. Therefore, *Future Orientation* is justifiably a dimension which can contribute to the communication of dissatisfaction.

Institutional Collectivism relates to the degree in which a society's practices encourages collective actions. The data analysis results showed that most low and very low risk countries expressed a value for less of this dimension whereas most middle, high and very high risk countries expressed a desire for an increase in this dimension from their current daily practice. Therefore according to Gelfand et al (2004, p.454), middle and high risk countries desire more collectivist actions and believe that:

- duties and obligations are determinants of behaviour
- individuals should engage in group activities

Low risk countries, desire more individualism and believe believe that:

- attitudes and personal needs are determinants of social behaviour
- individuals should engage in activities by themselves

Interestingly, research has shown varying results between this dimension and societal well-being. Hofstede (1980) found a positive correlation between individualism and wealth, however, Bhawuk, Bechtol & Manusami (2003) found that "collectivism, not individualism, is more predictive of wealth" (as cited in Gelfand et al, 2004, p.451). Diener, Diener & Diener (1995) found a positive correlation between individualism and health, whereas, Sinha & Verma (1994) found "a positive association between allocentrism and psychological well-being" (as cited in Gelfand et al, 2004, p.451). With this in mind, then it is possible to say that whilst this dimension may be a driver in the communication of dissatisfaction, it must be taken in context with the situation. We explore this further in the 'mean of findings' below.

Uncertainty Avoidance is extent to which people feel threatened by ambiguity and will avoid it by establishing and following societal rules. Our data showed that very low risk countries all wanted less of this dimension. Low risk countries were mixed but the majority want less uncertainty avoidance. Middle risk countries were mixed with the majority wanting more of this dimension.

High risk and very high risk countries showed a positive gap movement between values and practices, showing that they also want more of this dimension. Put simply, this indicated that people in high risk countries wanted less uncertainty whereas people in low risk countries tolerated this ambiguity and if anything desired more of it by desiring a life which is less predictable. According to Sully De Luquq & Javidan (2004, p.618) cultures which desire more of this dimension, thus value:

- formalised rules and procedures
- stricter adherence to procedures and less tolerance to people breaking them

Those cultures which value this dimension less than their current practice, indicate that they want:

- to be less concerned about orderliness
- to be more informal with the people they interact with

This result was probably the most expected because as Hofstede (2001) confirms "[p]eople in societies create coping mechanisms to handle anxiety produced by excessive uncertainty" (as cited in Sully De Luquq & Javidan, 2004, p.607). It is understandable that cultures without a stable government and/or a formalised welfare system would crave the need to establish predictability in their lives. Hofstede (2001) continues by discussing three primary mechanisms which help societies cope with ambiguity, on page 146 he states "[t]echology has helped us to defend ourselves against uncertainties caused by nature; law, to defend against uncertainties in the behaviour of others; religion, to accept the uncertainties we cannot defend ourselves against" (as cited in Sully De Luquq & Javidan, 2004, p.607). In this case, our results would indicate that people in low risk countries already have established mechanisms to tolerate ambiguity and therefore want more individual freedom to be spontaneous, whereas people in high risk countries want security for their future and don't want to be vulnerable when the unexpected arises. Research by Arindell et al (1997) support this where they found that "measures of uncertainty avoidance showed a significant relationship with subjective well-being, with low uncertainty avoidance related to high levels of subjective well-being" (as cited in Sully De Luquq & Javidan, 2004, p.604). The trend we found between this dimension and the risk of social unrest is therefore fully supported by other research.

Having elaborated on the discussion for the four 'trended' dimensions, we will now discuss the dimensions which did not present a DCD trend between the gap in expectations and the risk of social category.

Power Distance is the degree to which people accept their leader's decisions without question. We found that whilst very low and low risk countries did show a desire for an increase in this dimension, the other three risk categories did not show any discernible pattern. We concluded that the low risk categories were not relevant because no overall trend could be found in this dimension for contributing to the risk of social unrest. This was a particularly surprising result since it would be expected that people in high risk countries would want to decrease the distance between themselves and the authorities ruling them. A lesser distance would give people the opportunity to play a part in the decisions which affect them. As Carl et al. (2004, p.515) state "the most foundational treatment of the concept of power emerged from Maslow's hierarchy of needs". This pyramid structure presents five categories of needs starting with physiological at the foundation, followed by safety, social, esteem and self-actualisation at the top. According to Maslow, these categories can be viewed from the perspective of either gaining or yielding power, in which, "this yearning was not simply a desire, but rather a fundamental need of mankind" (Carl et al, 2004, p.515). Once again, it appears that this dimension must be taken in relative context and cannot be used to analyse the violations of expectations. Carl et al (2004, p.518) confirms this sentiment that, whilst many cultures bear concerns that "excessive power results in the abuse" of it; in some high power distance countries, "power distance implies a reciprocal arrangement that has traditionally

protected the less powerful in a relationship".
Assertiveness is the degree to which people are encouraged to be confrontational and decisive. The results for all 5 risk categories were a mix between desired increases and desired decreases in this dimension. This dimension clearly shows that the desired value is relative to the society in which it is being measured. Countries which score low in *assertiveness* value modesty and tenderness and those which score high in this dimension value strength and success. The GLOBE study found that whilst there is a "positive relationship between Assertiveness practices and economic health"; it also found that "[s]ocieties that score higher on Assertiveness tend to exhibit lower levels of human health" (Den Hartog, 2004, p.416). The relationships, between this dimension, economic and human health, are somewhat contradictory to each other. For this reason, the inconclusive results within our data analysis between assertiveness and the risk of social unrest appear to be complemented by the puzzling "patterns of relationships unearthed" in the GLOBE study (Den Hartog, 2004, p.433).

Humane Orientation is the degree to which people are tolerant of each other and are encouraged to be friendly and generous. Our data analysis did not find any correlations between this dimension and the violation of expectations which can lead to the communication of dissatisfaction. This was probably the most unexpected of our results as one would expect people in high risk countries to want an increase in this dimension. Contrary to this expectation is that, as Wolf (1996) discusses, in some societies "a system of patronage based on relationships of family and friends emerges to fulfil some needs of individuals" (as cited in Kabasakal & Bodur, 2004, p.566). Whilst it is the norm in these cultures to rely on the family unit, it means that that the state does not need to ensure well being. As Kabasakal & Bodur (2004, p.568) comment, in many developed nations "the state takes the role of at least a minimum standard of guaranteeing well-being of members of society". This perplexing balance between state and family in guaranteeing well-being, may mean that some cultures are content with the family unit providing for them and in others, people are content with the state looking after them. Therefore, there is no visible trend in our results because the dimension must be taken within the context of the culture. Kabasakal & Bodur (2004) confirm this by listing two generalizations about this dimension. On page 597, they state "at a societal level" humane orientation "seems to increase under more difficult economic, physical, and climatic conditions" and "in less humane-orientated societies, the state more often and more strongly intervenes to protect and give social support" (Kabasakal & Bodur, 2004). These statements are somewhat complimentary of our expectations but unexpectedly do not appear to be supported by our results.

In-Group Collectivism assesses the degree to which people express loyalty with the family unit or 'in-group'. Our analysis did not show any correlation between the violation of expectations in this dimension and the risk of social unrest. This was to be expected since some cultures value independence and individuality and others value group membership and collectivism. Regardless of the culture, the family unit is a fundamental part of society. It is through this unit we develop a concept of who we are. According to Wood (2002) our identity is built through a combination of direct definitions such as "You're such a strong boy"; identity scripts (which function as rules) such as "We are accountable for our actions", and attachment styles (for how to approach relationships) such as "People are in general trustworthy". Of course, like all of these dimensions, there can be a great variation between individuals within each culture. It would therefore appear that if people are dissatisfied with their family and disagree with their values, it is not likely this would develop into a mass movement driven by people who are not involved nor impacted by this small units decisions. In contrast to many of the other dimensions which are related to how people view themselves in relation to institutions and the wider society, this dimension is much more 'private'. Even if peoples' expectations are being violated within this dimension then the violator is a friend or family member and not part of the bigger establishment. This may explain why the dimension does not appear to be a driver for social unrest.

Gender Egalitarianism looks at how a society minimises gender role differences and promotes equality between the sexes. This is an interesting dimension since it showed that the overwhelming majority of countries regardless of risk category desire a movement towards feminine values. Emrich et al (2004, p.362) state that "no society in GLOBE is perceived to be female dominated to the point of, for example, encouraging girls, more so than boys, to attain a higher education or for having more women than men in positions of high office". It would be possible to assume that countries in low risk categories would desire more gender egalitarianism whereas countries in high risk categories would desire less; however, this is not the case. In fact, Moore & Shackman (1996) present a perspective which "argues that gender inequality persists or even increases with growth in industrialization because it stimulates competition between women who are relatively powerless and men who wish to retain their power" (as cited in Emrich et al, 2004, p.355). In addition, monotheism - the belief in one (male) God - has no doubt impacted women's status in various cultures. This male figure has afforded men a higher status in society. However, as Elmrich et al (2004, p.386) argue, "beliefs about appropriate roles for women and men might cause religious attitudes rather than the reverse". Findings in the GLOBE study showed that "[m]embers of societies that embraced more gender-egalitarianism values expressed a desire for less government" Elmrich et al (2004, p.387). It should then be possible to conclude that, for varying reasons, this dimension does not appear to play a role in the risk of social unrest since most societies express a desire towards increased feminine values.

Meaning of the Findings

We discovered that four cultural dimensions appear to play a part in the risk of social unrest, whereas the other five did not show any apparent patterns. From these results we can thus make the following claims.

- In *Performance Orientation*, low risk countries express the desire to be less confrontational. High risk countries wanted to be more competitive.
- In *Future Orientation*, people in low risk countries generally value immediate gratification whereas people in high risk countries want a more predictable future and are willing to be vocal about this need.
- In *Institutional Collectivism,* people in low risk countries wanted more individuality and people in high risk countries wanted more collectivism.
- In *Uncertainty Avoidance*, low risk countries wanted to be more spontaneous and high risk countries wanted more security in their well-being.

Therefore, the results of our DCD analysis indicate that low risk countries want to be more individualistic and spontaneous by indulging in immediate gratifications. On the other hand, the DCD analysis indicated that high risk countries want to be more collectivistic by focusing on their future security and well-being. Understandably, when it comes to the two methods of expressing themselves, *performance orientation* indicates that low risk countries express a value in being less direct and confrontational whereas *future orientation* indicates that high risk countries are more willing to engage in methods to express their voice. These values alone are conducive with the idea that people in high risk countries are more likely to engage in the communication of dissatisfaction about the DCD gap than people in low risk countries.

As mentioned in the results, some of the trends were expected and others were not. This study primarily focuses on the individual dimensions and not the relationships that the trended and non-trended dimensions have with each other. However, there is one relationship worth discussing and this is the relationship between Institutional Collectivism and In-Group Collectivism. It was

expected that the two 'collectivisms' would have the same trend, either with or without an obvious DCD pattern. One would think that dependency on the 'in-group' unit would be valued more in high risk countries since there is less social welfare in many of these societies. However, this was not the case. On the contrary, it is clear that people in high risk countries want more institutional collectivism eg. for the state to look after them. What is interesting is that this is in fact a pattern generally found in Nordic nations. Gelfand et al (2004, p.502) state "Scandinavian nations can score high on Institutional Collectivism, yet score very low on other forms of In-Group Collectivism". It is an interesting juxtaposition of the dimensions and is clearly representative of the values people hold in many low risk countries (particularly those within Scandinavia). This balance should be a model for how high risk countries can maintain 'in-group collectivism' and 'institutional collectivism' as a way of reducing the communication of dissatisfaction. Barinaga (1996) expands on this concept of how communication reflects the values of culture in her paper "Swedishness through *lagom*: Can words tell us anything about a culture?". According to Barinaga (1996, p.4) there is a subtle equilibrium which "pervades the Swedish character in the way of behaving, the view held of society and of one's role in it. There is a balance between individualism and social concern." Herlitz (1991) states that the Swedish saying *Att få vara i fred* (To be let in peace), refers "to the beauty of finding time for oneself" but is "also attentive of others' need of peace in solitude" (as cited in Barinaga, 1996, p.5). Other Swedish terms include, *Jämlikhet* (equality) which encourages informality and flat hierarchy in the workplace and *Enighet* (consensus) which encourages respect between people and their opinions. These statements, which are key Swedish terms, reflect the balance between individualism and social responsibility. This balance has also encouraged a social welfare system few others have been able to achieve (Barinaga, 1996, p.10). Even the language use within Sweden indicates that it is a model for the equilibrium between *Institutional Collectivism* and *In-Group Collectivism.* The Swedish cultural values are also representative of low risk countries. Our research indicates that low risk countries are concerned about the general well-being of people by offering a welfare system that removes burden from the family unit. This promotes a certain amount of individualism. Our research also indicates that people in high risk countries value and desire a balance between independence and collectivism, which is something Sweden values not only in practical application, but also through the application of its language.

Relation to Social Science Theories

There has been little research on the effects of culture at the micro level as a driver of social unrest. For this reason, we will compare our results to the three communication theories and three social movements theories presented in the literature review. What we have thus far established is the cultural drivers - the cultural incentives at an individual level - for the communication of dissatisfaction. However, we have not yet discussed why a positive DCD gap may lead to social unrest when a negative DCD gap does not. This, we believe, is a combination and application of the six theories previously presented in the literature review.

The primary assumption in our investigation proposed that when there is the gap between values (expectations) and practice (reality), there can be cause for the communication of dissatisfaction. This is supported by the Expectancy Violation Theory in which people anticipate what will occur in the future. In both high and low risk countries, there appears to be gap in most dimensions. At this point however, the Expectancy Violation theory can not be further applied since the theory generally proposes that people assign a valance to the experience. For example, those acts which are unexpected will be viewed as favourable and better received than those acts which are also favourable but expected. The opposite is also true according to EVT. However, we have not yet discussed why a positive DCD gap may lead to social unrest when a negative DCD gap does not. We must then turn to the other communication and social movements theories to further explain

why the direction of the gap can lead to some countries being in higher risk of social unrest categories than others.

To address this, we must look at the framing theory within social movements and the attribution theory within communication. These theories looks at how people 'frame' or assign value to situations. Our results show that the dimensions with a positive gap score increase the chances of social unrest and the dimensions with a negative gap score decrease the chances of social unrest. Therefore, as the theories propose, how people perceive the gap is vital. What we propose is that when people want more of something, in this case, a cultural value, then they are more likely to communicate this dissatisfaction and engage in the later stages of social mobilization than people who want less of something.

Regardless of the direction, as the rational actor theory and social exchange theory propose, people are invariably going to weigh up the costs and the benefits of engaging in a movement. As the results in our data show, this may imply that people in low risk countries could potentially lose more than they would gain by participating in social unrest; whereas people in high risk countries who already feel frustrated and feel they are entitled to more, may feel like the benefits outweigh the costs. Therefore there is less incentive for people in low risk countries to communicate their dissatisfaction and therefore engage in social unrest, in contrast to people in high risk countries.

Deduction

Our research has investigated all nine dimensions in the GLOBE study and established a pattern between four of the dimensions and the risk of social unrest. This was achieved by calculating the DCD (degree of cultural dissatisfaction) scores for each country and each dimension. These DCD scores were then categorised according to the risk category which allowed us to analyse any apparent patterns. We have investigated the cultural desires which cause the communication of dissatisfaction and increase the risk of social unrest. This form of communication is, according to Jovanović et al (2012, p.44), the first stage in the risk of social unrest. However our findings on the incentives at a micro level, must not be taken out of context and separated from the macro environment; such as the political and economical situation within which the communication of dissatisfaction is occurring. We chose to ignore these two variables and ignore how culture can also have an impact on them. Yet, we must stress that both economy and politics are undoubtedly drivers in the risk of social unrest. Discussing them was not an objective and for this reason we have largely dismissed them in our study. As previously stated we wanted to investigate the role of culture in affecting values which would thus lead to the communication of dissatisfaction. What has become clear from this research is that perception and how people 'frame' the situation they are in has a clear impact on the communication of dissatisfaction. These frames are "both social and individual" (Johnston, 2009, p.25). As the Davies J-Curve (figure 3) suggests, a small gap between expectations and reality is acceptable but when the gap size increases, the difference between values and practices becomes unacceptable. What we purpose is that when the political and economical situation within a society becomes unstable, the four dimensions we found trends in, will contribute to the communication of dissatisfaction at a micro level, before it incites people to join movements and communicate their dissatisfaction at a macro level.

What is most important about our research is that it has identified four cultural dimensions which appear to play a part in the risk of social unrest and these are the values connected to: *Performance Orientation*, *Future Orientation*, *Institutional Collectivism* and *Uncertainty Avoidance*. According to our findings when the gap becomes unacceptable the values connected to these dimensions may well be a factor in driving the risk of social unrest. What is clear from this, is that subjective well-being - the experience people connect with their quality of life - is related to the value people place

in the 4 dimensions we found trends in.

Suggestions for Further Research

The premise of our study examined the gap between values and practices in nine different cultural dimensions and looked at whether this had an impact on the communication of dissatisfaction. Our research looked at the gap movement but gave little regard to the starting point of each country. A more thorough and in-depth analysis, may take the starting point of cultural practices into consideration.

This study focused primarily on each dimension individually as a driver of social unrest but we have written little about the dimensions in relation to each other. We did touch on this by discussing the two forms of collectivism, yet it is without doubt possible to delve deeper into this and research how the different dimensions impact each other.

It would also be interesting to see what results would be found in applying the same methodology to other indexes of unrest. At this point of our investigation our biggest unanswered question is; if we were to use another index of social unrest, would the results be the same? To be precise, it would be very interesting to see if the same four dimensions showed trends with the risk of social unrest as defined by groups other than the EIU.

In addition, as mentioned in the ‘aim’ of this research, the GLOBE study is a tool primarily used for measuring cultural differences between leaders and organisations in different societies. Nevertheless, we chose this study because the GLOBE investigations present two scores, one for cultural values and one for practices. Many other cultural taxonomies only provide one score for each dimension and since our study relied heavily on investigating the gap between values and practices, we decided the GLOBE study was the most suitable data source for our research. We would suggest that additional research into this gap should use data which was more representative of the general population and not just middle management.

Conclusion

The communication of dissatisfaction among people who share similar experiences and expectations is one very important fundamental element of social unrest; and it is a phenomenon that can potentially manifest in any country throughout the world. While the stability of a society in the short term can be easily predicted; medium and long term predictions can be harder to assess. Much of the research available on this topic, focuses on the more obvious parameters of economy, political governance and general welfare. We believe that these are important factors, yet culture, as both an individual and national phenomena, is often overlooked. Moreover, we purpose that people's cultural expectations can impact the communication of dissatisfaction and eventual risk of social unrest. Our contention is that for the given set of circumstances according to these mentioned parameters, cultural values and the perceived distance to those values, affect how people in a society communicate and react to the pressures of economy, politics and other hardships.

Throughout our study, we have shown that there is an apparent connection between some cultural values and communication of dissatisfaction, which can increase the risk of social unrest. However, it was challenging to research this since there was little available data on the subject. We hope that an increase of interest in this field will give rise to the availability of data upon which we can strengthen our understanding of this subject. We hope the dimensions we discovered can be further investigated and monitored in order to better understand the nature and magnitude of their contribution and covariance with other parameters. A better understanding would lead to new ideas and actions that could, in the long run, affect the quality of life for many people.

Reference List

Ahmed, N. (2014, March 1). New age of global unrest in full swing as industrial civilization transitions to post-carbon reality. *Guardian News and Media 2014*. Retreived from: http://www.rawstory.com/rs/2014/03/01/new-age-of-global-unrest-in-full-swing-as-industrial-civilization-transitions-to-post-carbon-reality/

Allwood, J. (1985). Tvärkulturell kommunikation [Intercultural Communication]. *Papers in Anthropological Linguistics, 12,* University of Göteborg, Sweden, Dept of Linguistics. Retreived from: http://immi.se/eiw/texts/Intercultural_Communication_-_Jens_Allwood.pdf

Ashkanasy, N., Gupta, V., Mayfield, M. S., & Trevor-Roberts, E. (2004). Future Orientation. In House, R. J., Hanges, P. J., Javidan, M., Dorfman, P. W., & Gupta, V. (Eds.) *Culture, Leadership, and Organizations : The GLOBE Study of 62 Societies*. (pp.282 - 342). Thousand Oaks, Calif: Sage Publications.

Barinaga, E. (1999). Swedishness through *lagom*. Can words tell us anything about a culture? *Centre for Advanced Studies in Leadership.* Retreived from http://www.academia.edu/1272414/Swedishness_through_Lagom._Can_Words_Tell_us_Anything_about_a_Culture

Baxter, L. & Braithwaite, D. (2008). Introduction. In Baxter, L. & Braithwaite, D. (Eds.), *Engaging Theories in Interpersonal Communication : Multiple Perspectives*. (pp.1 - 18). Thousand Oaks, Calif: Sage Publications.

Cammaerts, B., Mattoni, A. & McCurdy, P. (2013). *Mediation and Protest Movements*. Bristol, UK Chicago, USA: Intellect.

Carl, D., Gupta, V., & Javidan, M. (2004). Power Distance. In House, R. J., Hanges, P. J., Javidan, M., Dorfman, P. W., & Gupta, V. (Eds.) *Culture, Leadership, and Organizations : The GLOBE Study of 62 Societies*. (pp.513 - 563). Thousand Oaks, Calif: Sage Publications.

Center for Systematic Peace. (2011, December). *Conflict, Governance, and State Fragility.* Vienna, USA: Cole, B. J., & Marshall, M. G.

Christiansen, J. (2011). Framing Theory. *Sociology Reference Guide*. (pp.145 - 155). Pasadena, Calif: Salem Press

Cropanzano, R. & Mitchell, S. M. (2005). Social Exchange Theory: An Interdisciplinary Review. *Journal of Management 31(6),* 874 – 900. doi: 10.1177/0149206305279602

Della Porta, D. & Diani, M. (2006). *Social movements : An introduction*. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing

Den Hartog, D. N. (2004). Assertiveness. In House, R. J., Hanges, P. J., Javidan, M., Dorfman, P.

W., & Gupta, V. (Eds.) *Culture, Leadership, and Organizations : The GLOBE Study of 62 Societies*. (pp.395 - 436). Thousand Oaks, Calif: Sage Publications.

Emrich, C. G., Denmark, F. L., & Den Hartog, D. N. (2004). Cross-Cultural Differences in Gender Egalitarianism. In House, R. J., Hanges, P. J., Javidan, M., Dorfman, P. W., & Gupta, V. (Eds.) *Culture, Leadership, and Organizations : The GLOBE Study of 62 Societies*. (pp.343 - 394). Thousand Oaks, Calif: Sage Publications.

Flynn, S. I. (2011). Types of Social Movements. *Sociology Reference Guide*. (pp.26 - 36). Pasadena, Calif: Salem Press.

Flynn, S. I. (2011). Relative Deprivation Theory. *Sociology Reference Guide*. (pp.100 - 110). Pasadena, Calif: Salem Press.

Flynn, S. I. (2011). Resource Mobilization Theory. *Sociology Reference Guide*. (pp.111 - 121). Pasadena, Calif: Salem Press.

Flynn, S. I. (2011). Structural-Strain Theory. *Sociology Reference Guide*. (pp.122 - 133). Pasadena, Calif: Salem Press.

Gelfand, M. J., Bhawak, D. P. S., Nishii. L. H., & Bechtold, D. J. (2004). Individualism And Collectivism. In House, R. J., Hanges, P. J., Javidan, M., Dorfman, P. W., & Gupta, V. (Eds.) *Culture, Leadership, and Organizations : The GLOBE Study of 62 Societies*. (pp.437 - 512). Thousand Oaks, Calif: Sage Publications.

Goldstone, J. A., Bates, R. H., Epstein, D. L., Gurr, T. R., Lustik, M. B., Marshall, M. G., Ulfelder, J. & Woodward, M. (January, 2010) A Global Model for Forecasting Political Instability. *American Journal of Political Science 54*(1), 190–208.

Guiso, L., Sapienza, P., & Zingales, L. (2006). Does Culture Affect Economic Outcomes? *Journal of Economic Perspectives, 20*(2), 23 – 48 (ISBN: 1863350500)

Gupta, V., Sully De Luque, M. & House, J. (2004). Multisource Constructs Validity of Globe Scales. In House, R. J., Hanges, P. J., Javidan, M., Dorfman, P. W., & Gupta, V. (Eds.) *Culture, Leadership, and Organizations : The GLOBE Study of 62 Societies*. (pp.152 - 177). Thousand Oaks, Calif: Sage Publications.

Hanges, P. & Dickson, M. (2004). The Development and Validation of the GLOBE Culture and Leadership Scales. In House, R. J., Hanges, P. J., Javidan, M., Dorfman, P. W., & Gupta, V. (Eds.) *Culture, Leadership, and Organizations : The GLOBE Study of 62 Societies*. (pp.122 - 151). Thousand Oaks, Calif: Sage Publications.

Hart, J. (2005). Attribution Theory. In Heath, R. (Ed.), *Encyclopedia of Public Relations*. (pp.47-49). Thousand Oaks, Calif: Sage Publications.

Hart, S. (1996). The Cultural Dimension of Social Movements: A Theoretical Reassessment and Literature Review. *Sociology of Religions, 57*(1), 87 – 100.

Hawkes, J. (2001). *The Fourth Pillar of Sustainability : Culture's Essential Role in Public Planning*. Melbourne, Vic: Cultural Development Network & Common Ground.

Hofstede, G., Hofstede, G. & Minkov, M. (2010). *Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind* (3rd ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill.

House (2004). Illustrative Examples of GLOBE Findings. In House, R. J., Hanges, P. J., Javidan, M., Dorfman, P. W., & Gupta, V. (Eds.) *Culture, Leadership, and Organizations : The GLOBE Study of 62 Societies*. (pp.3 - 8). Thousand Oaks, Calif: Sage Publications.

Johnston, H. & Klandermans, B. (1995). The Cultural Analysis of Social Movements. In Johnston, H. (Eds.) *Social Movements and Culture*. (pp. 3 – 24). London: UCL Press.

Johnston, H. (2009). *Culture, Social movements, and Protest*. Farnham, England Burlington, VT: Ashgate.

Jovanović, A., O. Renn and R. Schröter (2012), *Social Unrest*, OECD Reviews of Risk Management Policies, OECD Publishing. *http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264173460-en*

Kabasakal, H. & Bodur, M. (2004). Humane Orientation In Societies, Organizations, And Leader Attributes. In House, R. J., Hanges, P. J., Javidan, M., Dorfman, P. W., & Gupta, V. (Eds.) *Culture, Leadership, and Organizations : The GLOBE Study of 62 Societies*. (pp. 564 - 601). Thousand Oaks, Calif: Sage Publications.

Kekic, L. (2013, November). Ripe for Rebellion? Where protest is likeliest to break out. *The Economist.* Retreived from: http://www.economist.com/news/21589143-where-protest-likeliest-break-out-ripe-rebellion

Knobloch, L. K. (2008). Uncertainty Reduction Theory. In Baxter, L. & Braithwaite, D. (Eds.), *Engaging Theories in Interpersonal Communication : Multiple Perspectives*. (pp.133 - 148). Thousand Oaks, Calif: Sage Publications.

Langman, L., & Morris. D. (n.d) *Internet Mediation: A Theory of Alternative Globalization Movements*. Department of Sociology: Loyola University of Chicago. Retreived from: http://www.csudh.edu/dearhabermas/langmanbk01.htm

Lawler, E. J. (Sept, 2001). An Affect Theory of Social Exchange. *The American Journal of Sociology, 107*(2), 321-352

Lustig, M. & Koester, J. (2010). *Intercultural Competence : Interpersonal Communication across Cultures*. Boston: Allyn & Bacon.

Mansour, J. (2004). Performance Orientation. In House, R. J., Hanges, P. J., Javidan, M., Dorfman, P. W., & Gupta, V. (Eds.) *Culture, Leadership, and Organizations : The GLOBE Study of 62 Societies*. (pp.239 - 281). Thousand Oaks, Calif: Sage Publications.

Manusov, V. & Spitzberg, B. (2008). Attribution Theory. In Baxter, L. & Braithwaite, D. (Eds.), *Engaging Theories in Interpersonal Communication : Multiple Perspectives*. (pp.37 - 49).

Thousand Oaks, Calif: Sage Publications.

Mucha, T. (2009, February 6). Peasant revolution 2.0 Analysis: Political science says more unrest is coming. So how bad will it get? *Global Post. America's world news site.* Retreived from: http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/commerce/090206/peasant-revolution-20

Morris, A. & Herring, C. (1984). *Theory and Research in Social Movements: A Critical Review.* Retrieved from http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/51075/307.pdf?sequence=1

Natarajan, A. (2011, October). Rising Expectations, Social Unrest & Development. *The CADMUS Journal, 1*(3), 88 – 99. Retreived from: http://cadmusjournal.org/files/journalpdf/vol1issue3october11.pdf

Spinks, P. (2013, July 30). Protest in the connected society. *The Sunday Morning Herald: Digital Life.* Retreived from: http://www.smh.com.au/digital-life/digital-life-news/protest-in-the-connected-society-20130726-2qoy.html#ixzz2yri0ZVGC

Stafford, L. (2008). In Baxter, L. & Braithwaite, D. (Eds.), *Engaging Theories in Interpersonal Communication : Multiple Perspectives*. (pp.377 - 389). Thousand Oaks, Calif: Sage Publications.

Sully De Luque, M. & Javidan M. (2004). Uncertainty Avoidance. In House, R. J., Hanges, P. J., Javidan, M., Dorfman, P. W., & Gupta, V. (Eds.) *Culture, Leadership, and Organizations : The GLOBE Study of 62 Societies*. (pp. 602 - 653). Thousand Oaks, Calif: Sage Publications.

Swindler, A. (1995). Cultural Power and Social Movements. In Johnston, H. & Klandermans, B. (Eds.), *Social Movements and Culture*. (pp.25 - 40). London: UCL Press

White, C. (2008). Expectancy Violations Theory and Interaction Adaptation Theory. In Baxter, L. & Braithwaite, D. (Eds.), *Engaging Theories in Interpersonal Communication : Multiple Perspectives*. (pp.189 - 202). Thousand Oaks, Calif: Sage Publications.

Westaway, J. (2012, June). Globalization, Sovereignty and Social Unrest. *Journal of Politics and Law 5(2)*, 132-139. Retreived from http://dx.doi.org/10.5539/jpl.v5n2p132

Wood, J. (2002). *Interpersonal Communication : Everyday Encounters*. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth/Thomson Learning.

Appendices

Appendix A - http://www.economist.com/news/21589143-where-protest-likeliest-break-out-ripe-rebellion

International

Ripe for rebellion?

Where protest is likeliest to break out

Nov 18th 2013 | From The World In 2014 print edition



From anti-austerity movements to middle-class revolts, in rich countries and in poor, social unrest has been on the rise around the world. The reasons for the protests vary. Some are direct responses to economic distress (in Greece and Spain, for example). Others are revolts against dictatorship (especially in the Middle East). A number also express the aspirations of new middle classes in fast-growing emerging markets (whether in Turkey or Brazil). But they share some underlying features.

The common backdrop is the 2008-09 financial crisis and its aftermath. Economic distress is almost a necessary condition for serious social or political instability, but it is not a sufficient one. Declines in income and high unemployment are not always followed by unrest. Only when economic trouble is accompanied by other elements of vulnerability is there a high risk of instability. Such factors include wide income-inequality, poor government, low levels of social provision, ethnic tensions and a history of unrest. Of particular importance in sparking unrest in recent times appears to have been an erosion of trust in governments and institutions: a crisis of democracy.

Trust has been in secular decline throughout the rich world since the 1970s. This trend accelerated and spread after the collapse of communism in 1989. And as opinion polls have documented, it has sped up again since the 2008–09 financial crisis.

65 countries will be at a high or very high risk

The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), a sister company of *The Economist*, measures the risk of social unrest in 150 countries around the world. It places a heavy emphasis on institutional and political weaknesses. And recent developments have indeed revealed a deep sense of popular dissatisfaction with political elites and institutions in many emerging markets.

The protesters in Turkey in 2013, for example, were dissatisfied with some abrupt decisions by Recep Tayyip Erdogan's government. In Bulgaria, what started off as protests against higher electricity bills turned into generalised anti-government demonstrations complaining of corruption —and led to the fall of the government. Protests have continued.

What to expect in 2014? The recession is now over or has eased in much of the world. Yet political reactions to economic distress have historically come with a lag. Austerity is still on the agenda in 2014 in many countries and this will fuel social unrest.

Restlessness on the rise

According to the EIU's ratings, 65 countries (43% of the 150) will be at a high or very high risk of social unrest in 2014. For 54 countries the risk of instability is medium and for the remaining 31 countries it is low or very low. Compared with five years ago, 19 more countries are now in the high-risk categories.

The Middle East and North Africa (MENA), southern Europe, the Balkans and the former Soviet countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) are well represented in the high-risk categories: 12 out of 18 MENA states, six of the seven Balkan countries, eight out of the 12 CIS states, five out of six southern European ones. More than 40% of the countries in eastern Europe are in the high-risk categories. This region was hit hard by the financial crisis and also has many of the underlying characteristics associated with unrest. Unsurprisingly, many high-risk countries are in sub-Saharan Africa. But there are also some in Latin America and Asia—including the world's largest and most successful emerging market, China, where the authorities are perennially nervous about the risk of mass protests.

Laza Kekic: director, country forecasting services, Economist Intelligence Unit

From The World In 2014 print edition

Appendix B - http://viewswire.eiu.com/site_info.asp?info_name=instability_map&page=noads

Manning the barricades

The Political Instability Index shows the level of threat posed to governments by social protest. Of 165 countries covered, nearly half are judged either high or very high risk. The index covers the period 2009/10.

'Roll over' the country outlines to see the country name, the index score and the associated risk level.

- See data in a table
- Full methodology



Appendix C - http://viewswire.eiu.com/index.asp?layout=VWArticleVW3&article_id=874361472
Political Instability Index: Vulnerability to social and political unrest
March 19th 2009
Our index draws on recent insights of the political science literature that seeks to identify and quantify the main social, economic and political factors and traits that are causally associated with, or that can predict, political instability. In particular, it draws on the work of the so-called Political Instability Task Force (PITF) based at George Mason University in the US. The PITF has created a simple model that has a rate of success of over 80% in identifying, ex post, outbreaks of serious instability for a data set that stretches back to 1955.

These attempts to predict the occurrence of unrest on the basis of quantitative models was borne of a dissatisfaction with the experience of traditional, qualitative analysis and assessments, which have had a poor record in predicting outbreaks of social and political turmoil. Some recent analyses have pointed to the need to combine quantitative models with traditional qualitative assessment by country experts. Although quantitative models have greater predictive success, they can miss out possibly pertinent specific features in countries that are not captured by the general model and the data that the model uses may also contain errors or may not always be up to date.

The final PITF model that had the greatest predictive power is a simple model that is based on only four factors: the level of development as measured by the infant mortality rate; extreme cases of economic or political discrimination against minorities (according to assessments and codings by the Minorities at Risk Project); "a bad neighbourhood" (if a country has at least four neighbours that suffered violent conflicts); and regime type (intermediate regimes that are neither consolidated democracies nor autocratic regimes combined with the existence in these regimes of intense factionalism in domestic politics, as coded by the Polity Project on democracy). Although over 80% of outbreaks of instability could be predicted (a very high "hit rate"), the model cannot predict the intensity or duration of the instability, or its exact timing.

We also look and measure other factors associated with instability that have been identified in the literature, such as inequality, a prior history of instability, ethnic fragmentation, poor governance, a proclivity to labour unrest, the level of provision of public services and state strength.

Economic distress and dislocation tend to be associated causally with instability, that is they precede, not only accompany, instability. Indeed, of the 50 cases of instability (instances of "adverse regime change") identified since 1980 by the PITF (about one-half of these were in Africa), in the vast majority of cases (46) the country that had an outbreak of instability had suffered a decline in GDP per head in at least one of the two years prior to the occurrence of instability.

Economic distress appears to be almost a necessary condition for serious instability, but it is not a sufficient one. There are many instances of declines in GDP per head that have not been followed by political instability. It is only when economic distress is accompanied by other, underlying or structural features of vulnerability that there is a high vulnerability to or risk of serious outbreaks of political and social unrest.

Defining political unrest

We define social and political unrest or upheaval as those events or developments that pose a serious extra-parliamentary or extra-institutional threat to governments or the existing political order. The events will almost invariably be accompanied by some violence as well as public disorder. These need not necessarily be successful in the sense that they end up toppling a government or regime. Even unsuccessful episodes result in turmoil and serious disruption. The assessment of what constitutes a "serious threat" still requires judgment and can be arbitrary, but this is a step forward from having no definition at all.

Political Instability Index

The overall index on a scale of 0 (no vulnerability) to 10 (highest vulnerability) has two component indexes—an index of underlying vulnerability and an economic distress index. The overall index is a simple average of the two component indexes. There are 15 indicators in all—12 for the underlying and 3 for the economic distress index.

I. Underlying vulnerability

1. Inequality

   Measured by Gini coefficient

   0 if lower than 40

   1 if 40-50

   2 if higher than 50

   Sources: World Bank, *World Development Indicators 2008*; Economist Intelligence Unit estimates.

2. State history

   Measured according to date of independence

   0 if before 1900

   1 if between 1900 and 1950

   2 if after 1950

Source: CIA, *Factbook*.

3. Corruption

   Economist Intelligence Unit ratings

   0 for low

   1 for moderate

   2 for high

   Source: Economist Intelligence Unit.

4. Ethnic fragmentation

   Ethnic fractionalisation index (0 to 100 scale)

   0 if lower than 30

   1 if 30 to 50

   2 if higher than 50

   Source: Alesina Alberto et al, "Fractionalization", *NBER Working Paper 9411*, 2003.

5. Trust in institutions

   Percentage of population that trusts/has confidence in parliament

   0 if more than 50%

   1 30-50%

   2 if less than 30%

   Sources: The Euro, Latino, Africa and Asia Barometer polls; World Values Survey.

6. Status of minorities

   High rates of economic or political discrimination against minorities. Based on latest available assessment and scoring on 0 (no discrimination) to 4 (extreme discrimination) scale by Minorities at Risk Project (MRP). The MRP defines extreme discrimination (score of 4) if any minority group is subject to public policies that constitute formal exclusion and/or recurring repression, and that substantially restrict the groups' economic opportunities or political participation. There is significant discrimination (score of 3) if minority group suffers from significant poverty and under-representation owing to prevailing social practices by dominant group.

   0 if low or no discrimination (MRP scores lower than 3)

   1 if significant discrimination (if score of 3 by for any minority by MRP)

   2 if extreme discrimination (if score of 4 for any minority by MRP)

7. History of political instability

   Significant episodes or events of political instability (regime change) as recorded by Political Instability Task Force (PITF)

   0 if no recorded episode

   1 if one major episode

   2 if two or more episodes

   Source: PITF database.

8. Proclivity to labour unrest

   Risk of labour unrest

   0 if low

   1 if moderate

   2 if high

   Source: Economist Intelligence Unit, Risk Briefing.

9. Level of social provision

   Measured on the basis of the "expected" infant mortality rate; based on residuals from a regression of the natural logarithm of the infant mortality rate on the logarithm of GPP per head US$ at purchasing power parity (PPP) for 2006.

   0 if the actual infant mortality rate is lower than predicted, or if the actual rate does not exceed the predicted rate by a significant margin

   1 if ratio between actual and predicted infant mortality rate is greater than 1.1 but less than 1.5

   2 if ratio between actual and predicted infant mortality rate is greater than 1.5

   Sources: Economist Intelligence Unit; World Bank, *World Development Indicators 2008*.

10. A country's neighbourhood

   Based on the average vulnerability index (calculated on the basis of all indicators except the neighbourhood indicator) for all of the country's geographic neighbours.

   0 if index is less than 5.8

   1 if index is 5.8 to 6.3

   2 if index is higher than 6.3

   Source: Economist Intelligence Unit.

11. Regime type

   Based on classification of political regimes, according to the Economist Intelligence Unit's Index of Democracy

   0 if either a full democracy or authoritarian regime

   2 if either a non-consolidated, "flawed" democracy or a hybrid regime (neither a democracy nor an autocracy)

   Source: Economist Intelligence Unit.

12. Regime type and factionalism

   The interaction of regime type with the existence of political factionalism (according to Polity IV database). According to Polity, factionalism is defined as polities with parochial (possibly, but not necessarily, ethnic-based) political factions that regularly compete for political influence to promote particularist agendas and favour heavily group members to the detriment of a common agenda.

   4 if a country is both an intermediate regime and suffers from factionalism

   0 if not

II. Economic distress

1. Growth in incomes

   Growth in real GDP per head in 2009

   0 if forecast growth in real GDP per head is positive, with minimal risks that it could be negative

   1 if a fall in GDP per head is forecast or there is a significant risk of that occurring, but the decline is less than by 4%

   2 if a forecast decline in GDP per head is greater than by 4% or there is a significant risk that this could occur

   Source: Economist Intelligence Unit.

2. Unemployment

   Unemployment rate, %.

   0 if forecast unemployment rate is less than 6% and there are only minimal risks that it could be higher than 6%

   1 if a forecast unemployment rate is higher than 6% or there is a significant risk of that occurring, but the rate does not surpass 10%

   2 if a forecast unemployment rate is higher than 10% or there is a significant risk that this could occur

   Sources: Economist Intelligence Unit; International Labour Organisation.

3. Level of income per head

   Measured by GDP per head at PPP, US$ in 2007, on the assumption that richer countries can more easily withstand economic distress

   0 if more than US$12,000

   1 if between US$3,000 and US$12,000

   2 if less than US$3,000

Notes: In the compilation of the economic distress sub-index, growth in GDP per head and unemployment have weights of 40% each, and GDP per head has a weight of 20%.

Appendix D - http://viewswire.eiu.com/site_info.asp?info_name=social_unrest_table&page=noads
Social unrest

The Political Instability Index shows the level of threat posed to governments by social protest. The index scores are derived by combining measures of economic distress and underlying vulnerability to unrest. The index covers the period 2009/10, and scores are compared with results for 2007.

Key: ▲ Risk has increased since 2007 ▼ Risk has decreased since 2007 ▶ Risk is unchanged since 2007
Very high risk High risk Moderate risk Low risk

Rank	Country	Underlying vulnerability	Economic distress	Index score	2007 score
1	Zimbabwe	7.5	10.0	▶	8.8

2	Chad	7.1	10.0	▲ 7.5
3	Congo (Democratic Republic)	8.3	8.0	▲ 7.2
4	Cambodia	7.9	8.0	▲ 6.0
4	Sudan	7.9	8.0	▲ 7.0
6	Iraq	8.8	7.0	▶ 7.9
7	Cote d'Ivoire	7.5	8.0	▶ 7.8
7	Haiti	7.5	8.0	▲ 6.8
7	Pakistan	7.5	8.0	▲ 5.8
7	Zambia	7.5	8.0	▲ 6.8
7	Afghanistan	7.5	8.0	▲ 6.8
7	Central African Republic	7.5	8.0	▲ 5.8
13	North Korea	5.4	10.0	▲ 3.7
14	Bolivia	8.3	7.0	▲ 5.7
14	Ecuador	8.3	7.0	▲ 6.7
16	Angola	6.3	9.0	▲ 5.6
16	Dominican Republic	6.3	9.0	▲ 5.6
16	Ukraine	6.3	9.0	▲ 4.6
19	Bangladesh	7.1	8.0	▲ 4.5
19	Guinea	7.1	8.0	▲ 6.5
19	Kenya	7.1	8.0	▲ 6.5
19	Moldova	7.1	8.0	▲ 4.5
19	Senegal	7.1	8.0	▲ 6.5
19	Guinea Bissau	7.1	8.0	▲ 6.5
19	Nepal	7.1	8.0	▲ 6.5
19	Niger	7.1	8.0	▲ 5.5
27	Bosnia and Hercegovina	7.9	7.0	▲ 6.5
28	Liberia	8.8	6.0	▲ 5.4
29	Venezuela	6.7	8.0	▲ 4.3
29	Timor Leste	6.7	8.0	▲ 4.3
31	Sri Lanka	7.5	7.0	▲ 4.3
32	Sierra Leone	8.3	6.0	▲ 5.2
33	Argentina	6.3	8.0	▲ 4.1
33	Kyrgyz Republic	6.3	8.0	▲ 5.1
33	Madagascar	6.3	8.0	▲ 6.1
33	Myanmar	6.3	8.0	▲ 4.1
33	Panama	6.3	8.0	▲ 5.1
33	Tajikistan	6.3	8.0	▲ 6.0
39	Colombia	7.1	7.0	▲ 6.0
39	Lebanon	7.1	7.0	▲ 5.0

39	Peru	7.1	7.0	▲ 6.0
39	South Africa	7.1	7.0	▲ 4.0
39	Thailand	7.1	7.0	▲ 6.0
44	Lesotho	7.9	6.0	▲ 6.0
44	Nigeria	7.9	6.0	▶ 7.0
44	Mali	7.9	6.0	▲ 5.9
47	Burkina Faso	5.8	8.0	▶ 6.9
47	Burundi	5.8	8.0	▲ 5.9
47	Cameroon	5.8	8.0	▲ 4.9
47	Papua New Guinea	5.8	8.0	▲ 5.9
47	Mauritania	5.8	8.0	▲ 3.8
52	Honduras	6.7	7.0	▲ 4.8
52	Indonesia	6.7	7.0	▲ 3.8
54	Philippines	4.6	9.0	▲ 4.8
55	Turkey	7.5	6.0	▲ 5.7
56	Eritrea	5.4	8.0	▲ 2.7
56	Estonia	5.4	8.0	▲ 5.7
56	Gambia	5.4	8.0	▲ 2.7
56	Latvia	5.4	8.0	▲ 5.7
60	Guyana	8.3	5.0	▲ 5.6
61	Algeria	6.3	7.0	▲ 4.6
61	Guatemala	6.3	7.0	▲ 5.6
61	Macedonia	6.3	7.0	▲ 3.5
64	Malaysia	7.1	6.0	▶ 6.5
64	Uganda	7.1	6.0	▲ 3.5
66	Russia	5.0	8.0	▲ 3.4
67	Paraguay	5.8	7.0	▲ 3.4
67	Romania	5.8	7.0	▲ 5.4
67	Serbia	5.8	7.0	▲ 5.4
67	Montenegro	5.8	7.0	▲ 3.3
71	Greece	4.6	8.0	▲ 3.3
71	Uzbekistan	4.6	8.0	▼ 8.3
73	Congo (Brazzaville)	7.5	5.0	▶ 6.3
73	Georgia	7.5	5.0	▲ 5.2
75	Albania	5.4	7.0	▲ 4.2
75	Belize	5.4	7.0	▲ 5.2
75	Iran	5.4	7.0	▲ 3.2
75	Turkmenistan	5.4	7.0	▲ 5.1
79	Croatia	6.3	6.0	▲ 4.1
79	Equatorial Guinea	6.3	6.0	▲ 3.1
79	Mexico	6.3	6.0	▲ 5.1
79	Yemen	6.3	6.0	▲ 3.1

83	Hungary	4.2	8.0	▲ 2.1
83	Lithuania	4.2	8.0	▲ 4.1
83	Saudi Arabia	4.2	8.0	▲ 3.1
83	Mongolia	4.2	8.0	▲ 4.0
87	Bulgaria	5.0	7.0	▲ 4.0
87	Jamaica	5.0	7.0	▲ 3.9
89	Benin	5.8	6.0	▲ 4.9
89	Ghana	5.8	6.0	▲ 3.9
89	Nicaragua	5.8	6.0	▶ 5.9
89	Tanzania	5.8	6.0	▲ 4.8
93	Namibia	6.7	5.0	▲ 4.8
94	Armenia	4.6	7.0	▲ 3.8
94	Syria	4.6	7.0	▲ 4.7
96	Malawi	5.4	6.0	▲ 4.7
96	Mozambique	5.4	6.0	▲ 5.6
98	Morocco	6.3	5.0	▲ 4.5
99	Bahrain	5.0	6.0	▲ 4.5
99	Cape Verde	5.0	6.0	▲ 2.5
99	Israel	5.0	6.0	▲ 3.5
99	Kuwait	5.0	6.0	▲ 3.5
99	Slovakia	5.0	6.0	▲ 2.5
104	Spain	2.9	8.0	▲ 4.4
105	Brazil	5.8	5.0	▲ 4.4
106	Egypt	3.8	7.0	▲ 4.4
106	Jordan	3.8	7.0	▲ 5.3
108	Togo	4.6	6.0	▲ 3.3
108	Bhutan	4.6	6.0	▲ 2.3
110	France	2.5	8.0	▲ 1.3
110	Iceland	2.5	8.0	▲ 1.3
110	United States of America	2.5	8.0	▲ 3.2
113	Azerbaijan	5.4	5.0	▲ 4.2
113	El Salvador	5.4	5.0	▲ 3.2
115	Uruguay	3.3	7.0	▲ 4.1
116	Gabon	6.3	4.0	▲ 3.1
117	Chile	4.2	6.0	▲ 4.1
117	Ethiopia	4.2	6.0	▲ 4.1
117	Laos	4.2	6.0	▲ 2.1
117	South Korea	4.2	6.0	▲ 2.0
121	Italy	2.1	8.0	▲ 4.9
122	Rwanda	5.8	4.0	▲ 3.9
123	Portugal	1.7	8.0	▲ 1.8

124	Belarus	4.6	5.0		▲ 2.8
124	China	4.6	5.0		▲ 3.8
124	Kazakhstan	4.6	5.0		▲ 3.8
127	Botswana	5.4	4.0		▲ 2.7
127	Swaziland	5.4	4.0		▲ 4.2
127	Trinidad and Tobago	5.4	4.0		▲ 2.7
130	Malta	3.3	6.0		▲ 2.7
130	Singapore	3.3	6.0		▲ 1.7
132	Ireland	1.3	8.0		▲ 0.6
132	United Kingdom	1.3	8.0		▲ 0.6
134	Tunisia	4.2	5.0		▶ 4.6
135	India	5.0	4.0		▶ 4.5
136	Poland	2.9	6.0		▲ 3.5
137	Libya	4.6	4.0		▲ 2.3
137	Sao Tome & Principe	4.6	4.0		▶ 4.3
139	Taiwan	2.5	6.0		▲ 1.3
139	Vietnam	2.5	6.0		▲ 2.3
141	Cuba	3.3	5.0		▲ 2.2
142	Cyprus	4.2	4.0		▲ 2.1
142	Qatar	4.2	4.0		▶ 4.1
142	Seychelles	4.2	4.0		▼ 5.1
142	United Arab Emirates	4.2	4.0		▲ 2.1
146	Belgium	2.1	6.0		▲ 2.0
146	Hong Kong	2.1	6.0		▲ 1.0
146	Netherlands	2.1	6.0		▲ 1.0
149	Oman	3.8	4.0	3.9	▲ 2.9
150	Germany	1.7	6.0	3.8	▲ 1.8
150	Japan	1.7	6.0	3.8	▲ 0.8
150	Slovenia	1.7	6.0	3.8	▲ 1.8
153	Czech Republic	3.3	4.0	3.7	▲ 2.7
154	Australia	1.3	6.0	3.6	▲ 0.6
154	Austria	1.3	6.0	3.6	▲ 0.6
154	Luxembourg	1.3	6.0	3.6	▲ 0.6
154	New Zealand	1.3	6.0	3.6	▲ 0.6
158	Costa Rica	2.1	5.0	3.5	▲ 1.5
158	Mauritius	2.1	5.0	3.5	▲ 2.5
160	Switzerland	0.8	6.0	3.4	▲ 0.4
161	Finland	0.4	6.0	3.2	▲ 1.2
161	Sweden	0.4	6.0	3.2	▲ 1.2
163	Canada	1.7	4.0	2.8	▲ 1.8
164	Denmark	0.4	4.0	2.2	▲ 0.2
165	Norway	0.4	2.0	1.2	▲ 0.2

Appendix E – Lustig & Kloester (2010, p.132 - 137)

132

TABLE 5.4 Groupings on the GLOBE Dimensions: Actual Practices

Culture	Power Distance	Uncertainty Avoidance	In-Group Collectivism	Institutional Collectivism	Gender Egalitarianism	Assertiveness	Performance Orientation	Future Orientation	Humane Orientation
Anglo									
Australia	-1.02	0.38	-1.33	0.10	-1.61	0.35	0.52	0.65	0.39
Canada (English)	-0.84	0.69	-1.21	0.32	-0.81	-0.28	1.28	0.98	0.83
England	-0.06	0.81	-1.45	0.05	-0.89	0.00	0.93	-0.05	-0.78
Ireland	-0.06	0.23	-0.01	0.92	-2.13	-0.63	0.28	0.65	1.81
New Zealand	-0.67	0.98	-2.01	1.35	-2.10	-2.01	-0.82	1.56	0.48
South Africa (white)	-0.04	-0.12	-0.88	0.89	-1.96	1.23	0.61	0.03	-1.36
USA (white)	-0.70	-0.02	-1.22	-0.12	-1.78	1.10	0.65	0.98	0.16
Latin Europe									
France	1.18	0.44	-0.67	-0.12	-0.97	0.79	-0.24	0.83	-1.45
Israel	-1.05	-0.35	-0.61	0.51	-2.18	0.22	0.00	-0.05	0.02
Italy	0.59	-0.62	-0.28	-1.36	-2.04	-0.22	-1.30	-1.31	-0.97
Portugal	0.61	-0.42	0.49	-0.79	-0.91	-1.37	-0.30	-1.26	-0.38
Spain	0.80	-0.32	0.41	-0.96	-2.66	0.74	-0.74	-0.23	-1.62
Switzerland (French)	-0.74	1.36	-1.77	-0.07	-1.56	-1.87	0.91	0.38	-0.34
Nordic Europe									
Denmark	-1.02	1.76	-2.20	1.32	-0.19	-0.30	1.28	0.30	0.73
Finland	-0.67	1.43	-1.47	0.92	-1.75	-0.28	0.85	-0.73	-0.28
Sweden	-0.77	1.92	-2.03	2.33	-0.43	-2.12	1.17	-0.96	0.02
Germanic Europe									
Austria	-0.53	1.66	-0.41	0.12	-2.45	1.29	1.32	0.86	-0.78
Germany (prev. East)	0.85	1.66	-0.86	-1.65	-2.53	1.59	0.22	-0.03	-1.45
Germany (prev. West)	0.17	1.76	-1.54	-1.10	-2.42	1.10	0.91	0.38	-1.91
Netherlands	-2.50	0.89	-1.97	0.51	-1.35	0.46	1.65	0.55	-0.49
Switzerland	-0.65	2.01	-1.60	-0.45	-2.77	0.99	1.91	2.12	-1.03

Culture	Power Distance	Uncertainty Avoidance	In-Group Collectivism	Institutional Collectivism	Gender Egalitarianism	Assertiveness	Performance Orientation	Future Orientation	Humane Orientation
Eastern Europe									
Albania	-1.31	0.68	0.80	0.70	-0.78	2.03	0.02	1.79	1.14
Georgia	0.10	-1.10	1.42	-0.52	-1.21	0.08	-0.95	-0.55	0.18
Greece	0.52	-1.28	0.16	-2.40	-1.40	1.18	-0.97	-2.27	-1.57
Hungary	0.90	-1.73	0.14	-1.72	0.22	1.75	-1.39	-1.69	-1.55
Kazakhstan	0.31	-0.84	0.15	0.10	-0.43	0.85	-0.61	-1.33	-0.21
Poland	-0.18	-0.90	0.50	0.68	0.05	-0.25	-1.60	-0.53	-1.01
Russia	0.80	-2.13	0.65	0.60	0.19	-1.29	-2.10	-1.79	-0.32
Slovenia	0.36	-0.64	0.38	-0.28	-0.11	-0.41	-0.56	-1.11	-0.63
Latin America									
Argentina	1.08	-0.85	0.49	-1.41	-1.37	0.19	-1.67	-1.13	-0.21
Bolivia	-1.56	-1.35	0.44	-0.50	-1.21	-0.99	-0.52	-1.23	-0.09
Brazil	0.36	-0.93	0.04	-1.00	-1.86	0.13	-0.09	-0.15	-0.91
Colombia	0.90	-0.98	0.79	-1.05	-0.89	0.13	-1.26	-0.40	-0.78
Costa Rica	-1.02	-0.57	0.23	-0.76	-1.18	-1.10	-0.54	0.05	0.62
Ecuador	0.26	-0.80	0.90	-0.84	-2.50	-0.17	-0.24	0.25	1.17
El Salvador	1.18	-0.90	0.27	-1.29	-2.26	1.29	-0.11	-0.96	-0.80
Guatemala	0.99	-1.43	0.65	-1.32	-2.64	-0.72	-1.32	-0.73	-0.42
Mexico	0.10	0.03	0.76	-0.45	-0.97	0.82	0.04	0.00	-0.24
Venezuela	0.52	-1.20	0.52	-0.69	-1.02	0.49	-1.08	-1.96	0.33
Sub-Saharan Africa									
Namibia	0.26	0.06	-0.86	-0.28	-0.32	-0.66	-0.78	-1.08	-0.28
Nigeria	1.46	0.21	0.35	-0.26	-2.66	1.04	0.52	-0.45	0.02
South Africa (black)	-3.02	0.71	-0.08	0.34	-0.91	0.57	1.71	1.41	0.52
Zambia	0.31	-0.10	0.94	0.87	-3.07	-0.22	-0.50	0.15	2.38
Zimbabwe	1.15	-0.02	0.57	-0.31	-2.58	-0.25	-0.17	0.35	0.75

(Continued)

133

134

TABLE 5.4 (Continued)

Culture	Power Distance	Uncertainty Avoidance	In-Group Collectivism	Institutional Collectivism	Gender Egalitarianism	Assertiveness	Performance Orientation	Future Orientation	Humane Orientation
Middle East									
Egypt	-0.60	-0.17	0.67	0.60	-3.20	-0.66	0.02	0.43	1.33
Kuwait	-0.13	0.08	0.89	0.58	-3.82	-1.43	-1.28	-0.38	0.89
Morocco	2.25	-0.35	1.66	-0.16	-2.48	1.01	-1.28	0.53	0.89
Qatar	-0.30	0.16	-0.11	1.28	-0.38	0.66	0.50	-0.86	1.46
Turkey	0.92	-0.88	0.99	-0.52	-2.99	1.04	-0.24	-0.68	-0.32
Southern Asia									
India	0.69	-0.02	1.05	0.32	-2.96	-1.16	0.74	0.38	1.00
Indonesia	0.01	-0.40	0.72	0.05	-1.99	-0.80	0.02	0.10	1.25
Iran	0.59	-0.82	1.20	-0.88	-2.72	-0.30	-0.32	1.21	0.29
Malaysia	-0.02	1.03	0.49	0.87	-1.32	-0.77	1.58	0.60	1.63
Philippines	0.61	-0.43	1.65	0.29	-0.97	-0.39	0.65	0.28	2.15
Thailand	1.06	-0.39	0.75	-0.52	-1.75	-1.40	-0.91	-0.43	1.59
Confucian Asia									
China	-0.32	1.29	0.89	1.25	-2.56	-1.07	-0.22	0.88	0.56
Hong Kong	-0.51	0.26	0.23	-0.28	-1.43	1.43	0.39	1.76	-0.40
Japan	-0.16	-0.15	-0.71	2.26	-2.18	-1.54	0.95	0.30	0.43
Singapore	-0.44	1.91	0.67	1.56	-0.81	0.05	2.64	2.01	-1.26
South Korea	1.01	-1.02	0.53	2.28	-4.04	0.68	0.26	1.13	-0.59
Taiwan	0.01	-0.20	0.60	0.12	-2.91	-0.63	-0.43	0.43	-0.57

A large positive score means that the culture is high on that practices dimension. A large negative score means that the culture is low on that practices dimension. The average score is zero. Ratings are standardized scores, with the decimal point omitted. For the Gender Egalitarianism dimension, a large positive score means that the cultural practices are feminine. A large negative score means that the cultural practices are masculine. A score of zero indicates egalitarianism.

Source: Based on data reported in Robert J. House, Paul J. Hanges, Mansour Javidan, Peter W. Dorfman, and Vipin Gupta (eds.), *Culture, Leadership, and Organizations: The Globe Study of 62 Societies* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2004).

TABLE 5.5 Groupings on the GLOBE Dimensions: Ideal Values

Culture	Power Distance	Uncertainty Avoidance	In-Group Collectivism	Institutional Collectivism	Gender Egalitarianism	Assertiveness	Performance Orientation	Future Orientation	Humane Orientation
Anglo									
Australia	0.13	-1.07	0.21	-0.68	2.16	-0.03	-0.85	-0.20	0.68
Canada (English)	-0.10	-1.44	0.81	-1.14	2.35	0.48	-0.36	0.59	0.94
England	0.19	-0.86	-0.35	-0.86	2.47	-0.19	-1.07	-0.17	0.02
Ireland	-0.07	-1.00	0.18	-0.30	2.41	0.24	-0.68	0.08	0.19
New Zealand	2.31	-0.87	2.39	-1.08	0.49	-0.44	0.97	0.86	-2.54
South Africa (white)	-0.28	0.06	0.65	-0.72	1.27	-0.21	0.39	0.83	0.99
USA (white)	0.33	-1.03	0.26	-1.14	2.24	0.74	-0.46	0.56	0.46
Latin Europe									
France	0.07	0.02	0.57	1.06	1.50	-0.68	-0.36	0.44	2.13
Israel	-0.05	-0.42	0.21	-0.94	1.50	-0.10	-0.61	-0.62	0.85
Italy	-0.77	-0.27	0.12	0.78	1.86	-0.01	1.00	0.35	0.68
Portugal	-1.03	-0.33	0.73	1.12	2.39	-0.38	-0.17	1.34	-0.51
Spain	-1.38	0.20	0.32	0.92	1.73	0.26	0.32	-0.47	1.16
Switzerland (French)	0.19	-1.31	-0.90	-0.86	1.46	-0.07	-1.70	0.08	0.85
Nordic Europe									
Denmark	0.07	-1.33	-0.48	-1.10	2.28	-0.66	-2.85	-1.04	0.10
Finland	-0.80	-1.28	-0.70	-1.26	0.99	0.12	-1.05	0.47	1.69
Sweden	-0.10	-1.68	1.01	-1.60	2.45	-0.33	-1.48	-0.47	0.99
Germanic Europe									
Austria	-0.86	-1.59	-1.12	-0.02	1.75	-1.53	-0.95	0.44	1.47
Germany (prev. East)	-0.13	-1.13	-1.26	-0.12	1.90	-0.90	-0.66	0.41	0.09
Germany (prev. West)	-0.57	-2.14	-1.37	0.16	1.88	-1.11	-1.58	0.17	0.15
Netherlands	-0.83	-2.27	-1.39	-0.38	2.09	-1.22	-1.05	-1.40	-1.09
Switzerland	-0.86	-2.40	-2.03	-0.10	1.94	-0.93	-1.73	0.08	0.50

135

(Continued)

TABLE 5.5 (Continued)

Culture	Power Distance	Uncertainty Avoidance	In-Group Collectivism	Institutional Collectivism	Gender Egalitarianism	Assertiveness	Performance Orientation	Future Orientation	Humane Orientation
Eastern Europe									
Albania	2.28	1.19	-1.26	-0.60	0.40	0.87	-0.19	-0.98	-0.38
Georgia	0.30	0.98	-0.04	-1.82	-0.57	0.78	0.12	-0.80	0.76
Greece	-1.01	0.74	-0.59	1.32	1.88	-1.31	-0.75	-0.44	-0.87
Hungary	-0.71	0.04	-0.37	-0.48	1.33	-0.72	0.49	0.02	0.24
Kazakhstan	1.20	-0.35	-0.65	-1.40	1.58	0.02	-1.09	-1.64	0.85
Poland	1.12	0.12	0.18	-1.04	1.10	0.11	-0.73	0.50	-0.56
Russia	-0.34	0.71	0.32	-1.70	0.38	-1.50	-0.05	-1.25	0.72
Slovenia	-0.48	0.58	0.10	-0.72	1.75	1.14	-0.19	1.37	-0.78
Latin America									
Argentina	-1.18	0.04	1.31	1.16	2.07	-0.87	0.68	1.19	0.68
Bolivia	1.96	0.10	0.90	0.72	1.58	-0.15	0.32	0.29	-1.57
Brazil	-1.12	0.58	-1.45	1.76	2.09	-1.38	0.46	0.53	1.12
Colombia	-2.02	0.56	1.59	1.28	2.11	-0.60	0.44	1.40	0.81
Costa Rica	-0.45	-0.09	1.12	0.88	1.35	0.33	-0.73	-0.17	-1.92
Ecuador	-1.27	0.85	0.37	1.34	1.25	-0.27	0.29	-0.01	-0.73
El Salvador	-0.16	1.11	2.33	1.82	1.39	-0.32	1.17	1.89	0.15
Guatemala	-1.12	0.40	1.28	0.98	1.12	-0.29	1.00	0.56	-0.73
Mexico	0.33	1.02	0.76	0.36	1.54	-0.06	0.88	0.62	-1.44
Venezuela	-1.30	1.02	1.37	1.30	1.73	-0.75	0.71	1.19	-0.51
Sub-Saharan Africa									
Namibia	-0.42	0.80	1.09	-0.72	0.53	0.12	1.51	1.34	-0.12
Nigeria	-0.13	1.57	-0.54	0.58	0.51	-0.90	1.31	0.95	1.25
South Africa (black)	2.66	0.25	-1.89	-0.88	0.55	-0.01	-0.73	-3.12	-1.57
Zambia	-0.89	0.06	0.26	0.00	0.66	0.83	0.97	0.86	0.46
Zimbabwe	-0.19	0.15	0.48	0.26	0.97	1.16	1.39	1.49	-1.04

Culture	Power Distance	Uncertainty Avoidance	In-Group Collectivism	Institutional Collectivism	Gender Egalitarianism	Assertiveness	Performance Orientation	Future Orientation	Humane Orientation
Middle East									
Egypt	1.47	1.18	-0.32	0.22	-1.73	-0.83	0.73	-0.17	-1.13
Kuwait	1.26	0.22	-0.68	0.82	-1.16	-0.10	0.58	0.23	-1.61
Morocco	1.09	1.84	0.98	1.20	0.15	-0.22	2.02	0.50	0.37
Qatar	1.44	0.30	-0.21	0.78	-1.31	-0.04	1.02	0.02	-0.56
Turkey	-0.95	0.06	0.26	1.04	1.06	-1.76	0.80	-1.70	0.41
Southern Asia									
India	-0.28	0.15	-0.98	-0.06	1.08	1.40	0.24	0.29	-0.65
Indonesia	-1.03	0.97	-0.01	0.88	-0.23	1.34	0.49	-0.68	-1.17
Iran	0.19	1.18	0.51	1.60	-0.53	1.75	0.83	0.38	0.81
Malaysia	0.68	0.40	0.48	0.26	-0.46	1.47	0.95	0.26	0.37
Philippines	-0.05	0.82	1.39	0.08	1.23	1.97	1.05	1.07	-0.29
Thailand	0.36	1.58	0.23	0.72	0.34	-0.53	1.70	-0.65	-1.83
Confucian Asia									
China	1.06	1.05	-1.62	-0.36	-0.68	2.42	-1.87	-0.86	-0.47
Hong Kong	1.47	-0.01	-1.56	-0.62	0.74	1.47	0.00	-0.95	-0.47
Japan	0.36	-0.50	-1.15	-1.50	0.70	3.02	-0.61	-2.37	-0.07
Singapore	0.89	-0.68	-0.48	-0.38	1.08	0.87	0.02	-0.71	1.60
South Korea	-0.54	0.06	-0.73	-1.68	0.46	-0.12	0.46	-2.12	0.76
Taiwan	0.10	1.10	-0.62	0.82	0.13	-1.38	-0.73	-0.65	-0.73

A large positive score means that the culture is high on that values dimension. A large negative score means that the culture is low on that values dimension. The average score is zero. Ratings are standardized scores, with the decimal point omitted. For the Gender Egalitarianism dimension, a large positive score means that the cultural ideal is feminine. A large negative score means that the cultural ideal is masculine. A score of zero indicates the cultural ideal is egalitarian.

Source: Based on data reported in Robert J. House, Paul J. Hanges, Mansour Javidan, Peter W. Dorfman, and Vipin Gupta (eds.), *Culture, Leadership, and Organizations: The Globe Study of 62 Societies* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2004).