Outlook-based Semantics

A semantic theory for predicates of personal taste

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1. Introduction

(1) John: The chili is tasty.

I believe most people would intuitively say that a sentence like (1) states that the speaker finds the chili in question tasty according to themselves only. If the speaker would be contradicted however, as in (2), the problem with this view becomes evident:

(2) John: The chili is tasty.
Mary: No, the chili is not tasty.

(Lasersohn 2005:649)

John and Mary clearly seem to be contradicting each other. But if, in (1), John is speaking only for himself when talking about how the chili tastes, Mary should also be speaking about her own tastes in (2). Then there would be no contradiction (Lasersohn 2005:649). If we assume that the response does not work the in the same way as the first sentence, so that Mary is not talking about herself, who is she talking about? If Mary would talk about John's personal taste the issue of contradiction would be solved, but then Mary would try to show that she knows more about John's tastes than he does himself, and this does not seem probable (Lasersohn2005:651). One possible conclusion from this is that we do not only speak about our own personal tastes when we utter a sentence like (1). For a disagreement to be possible, one solution is to assume that we are speaking about the tastes of a group of people that includes at least the speaker and the listener. That notion also renders a separate judge parameter like the one Lasersohn (2005) introduces unnecessary, since it would be included in the context. This is the foundation for the theory I'm going to form in this paper. If we assume that John's utterance should be understood as a proposition to add *this chili is tasty* as a subjective truth to a common outlook of a group, then we can understand Mary's utterance as a rejection of this proposal. If Mary had agreed with John in (1), it would result in the common ground being updated with this proposal. If, as in (2), she does not accept the proposition, it has failed. This may have different results – if no one in the group presses their opinion against the others, the situation may end in there being no predicate assigned to *this chili* in the group's common outlook. Another possible

consequence is that one participant may try to convince the others that their view is the right one, thus enforcing their own opinion to the common outlook. If someone cannot agree with this, a subgroup will be created, consisting only of the people who agree on the matter in question, and the proposition will be added to the common ground of the subgroup, but not to that of the original group.

1.1. Purpose & Aims

The purpose of this paper is to investigate different theories about predicates of personal taste (PPTs). There are different theories concerning this today, but none yet seems to solve the problem in a wholly satisfactory way. So a new theory that can answer previously unanswered problems is needed. The theory I will propose is one among the theories that claim that PPTs should be seen as making a proposal for a whole group. I will examine the arguments for and against this assumption, but this type of theory comes with new questions. For example, how does the uptake to a common outlook look and what happens if not all members of the group can come to a common decision? I will examine how questions like these can be answered, and what advantages a new group-based theory can have against previous theories and problems.

1.2. Method

First off, pros and cons with previous theories for PPTs will be examined and discussed, and some of the critique against a group-perspective will be answered. The focus will lie on theories that embrace the relativist approach, since they are the most similar to outlook-based semantics. These theories also share some basic theoretical assumptions, which will be explained. Stephenson (2007) will be studied especially closely, since her theory is very close to Outlook-based semantics (OBS), but with some important differences. Lasersohn's (2005) critique of many of the earlier perspectives is useful, and some of it will be used in this critique as well. He also argues against a group-based analysis like OBS, and these arguments will be met. The new theory will be drawn up and its predictions will be illustrated with examples from genuine speech. Basic terminology, as well as semantic and philosophical theories needed to understand how OBS works, will also be studied.

1.3. Material

Examples will be gathered from the GSM-materials (gymnasisters språk och musikvärldar/the language and music worlds of high-school students), which was recorded in 1997 by Gothenburg university, executed and used by Wirdenäs (2002), among others.[1] It was part of a project by the department of Swedish and the department of music and film (today the department of Cultural Sciences). The material consists of Swedish high-school students who are instructed to talk about their taste in music. The conversations take place in groups of 3 to 5 students. Participation was voluntary and the participants in each group are part of the same social group. Their task was to answer five different questions about different songs played. There were nine different songs, each from a different music genre. The question asked that will be most interesting for this essay is "what do you think about the music and why?", since this is when most discussions about personal taste will occur. An interviewer was present throughout all the conversations (in some cases the interviewer was able to leave the room for a short time with hopes of making the conversation more natural, but this was not the case in any example used here). This was either a teacher or a researcher from the university. His/her task was to make sure that the questions were answered for each music example, but was not to interfere too much with the flow of the conversation, since the goal was to get as spontaneous conversations as possible (Wirdenäs 2002:42-49). I have used the already transcribed material for this essay, not the recordings. In the examples provided in this study *F* will be used when the interviewer is speaking, just as in the original transcriptions. The school- and gender-coding used for the students in the original transcription will here be changed to A, B, C etc. For the purposes of this study, and its clarity, the language examples will be simplified and translated to English. The contents and, as far as possible, shape of the utterance will be kept, but typically spoken-language phenomena will be excluded, as well as shorter shifts of subject in between two relevant passages. I will translate freely from Swedish to English, and only include the English versions in the text. Simple glosses from Swedish to English will be provided in an appendix. Here the original excerpts as well as simplified versions in Swedish will be provided as well.

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[1] Thanks to Anna Gunnarsdotter Grönberg at the Department of Swedish at Gothenburg University for providing the materials.

I have chosen to use this material since it contains lots of utterances and disagreements about taste. The conversations take place in a clearly distinguishable group, which should also be the group referenced to when making propositions about taste. The age of the material should not be a problem, since there is nothing that suggests that what happens subconsciously when uttering PPTs should be changing over time. What could be problematic is the presence of the interviewer. Although the researchers were concerned with getting spontaneous conversations and the students mostly seemed to feel comfortable in the situation (Wirdenäs 2002), there are situations where the moderator interferes with the conversation. There are, however, many other cases where it is evident that the informants discuss their disagreements exhaustively, so even if problems like this arise, there is still enough material here for our purposes.

1.4. Disposition

In the background (section 2) I will explain some terminology and basic theories about language that will be useful in explaining the problems of designing a theory for PPTs. I will also present some previous theories on the subject, along with critique presented against them. Here I will also give a short overview of possible ways to solve some of the problems with previous theories, and a group-based perspective. In the proposition-chapter (section 3), I will draw up my new theory, Outlook-based Semantics, as well as examine the predictions this makes and see how these fit with examples of disagreement found in the material. In the conclusion (section 4), the gains of a theory like OBS is repeated, along with suggestions on how to continue the research within the field of PPTs.

2. Background

2.1. Faultless disagreement

One of the major arguments for the relativist view (see section 2.4) that will be adopted here is the notion of faultless disagreement. This is when two speakers disagree about something which does not have any objective truth value – hence neither of them is wrong. This would show that something can hold true to one individual, but not necessarily to another.

> What is crucial about faultless disagreement is that both agents seem to be right in their claims or beliefs [...] the intuition is that both the statement and its negation are in some sense true, though as uttered by different judges.
>
> (Moltmann 2009:189)

This is the case in the disagreements that will be interesting to look at for the purpose of this study. Faultless disagreement (or any disagreement at all, for that matter) does not arise with sentences that express different propositions when uttered by different speakers – and thus it does not arise when the 'judge' is made explicit, as in (3):

> (3) A: Frog legs taste good to me.
> B: Frog legs do not taste good to me.
>
> (Moltmann 2009:190)

2.2. Miscellaneous theories[2]

2.2.1. Barker

Barker (2013) suggests that disagreements are not really about the state of the world, but rather about the discourse. He talks about vague predicates, which are words with an unclear extension (Sorensen 2013). A standard example of this is a gradable adjective, such as *tall* or *fun* (Barker "Vagueness":2-3). Barker's idea is that "[...] disagreeing about taste may be a special case of disagreeing about the applicability of a vague predicate" (2013:241). So a disagreement about taste would be "a failure to negotiate vague standards" (Barker 2013:241). Contents should be evaluated at pairs of a world and a discourse *<w, d>*. He suggests that different people have different standards for e.g. *tall* – so when people disagree on whether someone is tall, it is a disagreement about the cutoff between tall and non-tall. He does not explicitly deal with PPTs, but states:

> [...] as long as we can assume that whenever two people disagree about such functions they have materially different assumptions about the discourse situation, then the account of here of faultless disagreement generalizes smoothly to such cases.
>
> (Barker 2013:251)

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[2] This is just a very short overview of possible solutions to the problem with PPTs and critique of these. Further discussion and counterarguments towards Lasersohn's (2005) critique can for example be found in Sundell (2010).

He also believes that there is always a fact of the matter, even if it is impossible to find out what it is (one would assume that this should apply to PPTs as well) (Barker 2013:255).

Lasersohn (2005) addresses this type of theory. One person might have an interpretation of the word *fun* that applies to a specific roller coaster, another person may not (Lasersohn 2005:659). This would mean that when someone utters a sentence that that ascribes a PPT to something, e.g. *fun*, that could be seen as an attempt to define where the boundary between *fun* and *not-fun* lies. Then this disagreement would provide conflicting information about the pragmatic context, and not about how the world is (Lasersohn 2005:660). Lasersohn argues against this view, if it is assumed within a Kaplanian framework. We can indeed retell a disagreement like that about *fun* embedded within a clause containing a verb of propositional attitude, like this (Lasersohn's example (37)):

(4)John thinks that roller coasters are fun, but Mary thinks that roller coasters are not fun

If someone utters this sentence, they would claim that John and Mary have contradictory beliefs. In a Kaplanian framework though, "verbs of propositional attitude relate individuals to the *contents* of their complement clauses" (Lasersohn 2005:661). This would mean that (4) expresses a disagreement about content (see sect. 2.3.1), and not about the meaning of the word *fun* or the context (Lasersohn 2005:661). So, in a Kaplan-style system, this approach would not work.

2.2.2. First person-based genericity

Moltmann (2009) proposes a theory based on first-person genericity. She compares this to the use of generic *one*. She claims that generic *one*-sentences have much in common with PPTs, e.g. that *one* can give rise to faultless disagreement (2009:203). She claims that this would have an advantage over standard relativist theories:

> […] on the present account it is not the propositional content whose truth is relative to an agent, but rather the cognitive access to the propositional content, which requires an agent to grasp the content in a first-personal way, whatever his evaluative or epistemic

background may be.

(Moltmann 2009:200)

So, her claim is that truth need not be relativized in the standard relativist way, but that truth conditions are agent-independent:

> […] it is not the truth value of the propositional content that must be relativized to an agent, but rather it is the propositional content that must be grasped in a first-personal way to be evaluable as true or false.

(Moltmann 2009:218)

Generic quantification is also supported by Pearson (2013), who briefly explains the view like this:

> When I say *This cake is tasty*, I say roughly that for all worlds *w* and all individuals *x* such that *x* is relevant in *w* and I identify with *x*, the cake is tasty to *x* in *w*

(Pearson 2013:103)

Lasersohn (2005) offers a critique against theories that generically quantifies some hidden argument of PPTs. Lasersohn claims that "you can sincerely describe something as fun as long as it's fun for *you*, even if you know that most people would not enjoy it" (Lasersohn 2005:654). He says that to follow this theory, one would have to say *this is not fun at all, although I'm having fun doing it* in this case, since *this is fun* could not be true since most people doesn't judge it as fun. He thinks that it is ridiculous to talk like this – there is really nothing wrong with the simpler version of the sentence. Lasersohn also states that according to these theories, it would be contradictory to say "This is fun, but most people would hate it!". This sentence is, in reality, perfectly fine. (Lasersohn 2005:654)

2.3. Indexicality theory

2.3.1. Content and character

According to Kaplan (1978) there are two different kinds of meaning: content and character. He writes that "the content of an expression is always taken *with respect* to a given context of use" and illustrates this with the example *I was insulted yesterday* (1978:83). In the context of Kaplan's paper, it would explicitly mean *David Kaplan was insulted on April 20 1973*. If anyone but David Kaplan utters it, or if Kaplan utters it at some other time, it would

mean something else, e.g. if I say it the day that I write this sentence, it would mean *Frida Blomqvist was insulted on April 27 2014*. This would be a change in the content, but not in the character of "I was insulted yesterday" (Kaplan 1978:83-84). So the character of a sentence is basically what it shares when uttered in different contexts (roughly "the speaker was insulted the day before the speaking of the sentence"). Its content is its meaning when all the referents of indexical expressions have been resolved. The relation can be seen like this:

Character → Resolve indexicality → **Content** → Evaluate truth value

(Lasersohn 2005:646)

According to Lasersohn, a contradiction can only be said to exist when two conflicting contents are expressed (2005:647). This will be explained further in the next section, 2.3.2.

2.3.2. Hidden indexical argument

The first theory Lasersohn examines in his 2005 paper is a theory that ascribes a hidden indexical argument (or some other unarticulated constituent) for PPTs, that is always set to the speaker of the sentence. So the content of a sentence is different in every context, due to the speaker being a different person. This kind of outlook would produce the following:

(5) John: The chili is tasty
Tasty(the-chili, John)
Mary: No, the chili is not tasty
¬tasty(the-chili, Mary)

(Lasersohn 2005:649)

This type of theory runs in to a problem with contradiction. Lasersohn (2005) claims that contradiction only arises with propositions of conflicting contents (2005:647). Two sentences of conflicting character is by no means a contradiction, since they do not talk about the same thing in the real world. Using Lasersohn's examples (8) and (9)(2005:647):

(6) John: I'm a doctor.
Mary: No, I'm not a doctor!

This is not a contradiction. The characters of the two sentences may be in conflict, but not the content. The two sentences speak about two different individuals – John may well be a doctor even if Mary is not. A contradiction would take place in this situation:

> (7) John: I'm a doctor.
> Mary: No, you're not a doctor!

Here the characters are not in any conflict with each other, but the contents are – both John and Mary are talking about whether or not John is a doctor.

So, according to any analysis that includes some kind of hidden or unarticulated constituent that's fixed to the speaker, there would not be any contradiction in dialogue (5).

> […] if we analyze them in this way, it appears to force us into claiming that they express different contents for different speakers, and then we no longer seem to be able to explain accurately which utterances contradict each other and which don't.
> (Lasersohn 2005:649-650)

In addition to this, the hidden argument theory seems to predict that there is no difference between sentences of the type *I think that x* and simply *x* (e.g. *I think that this chili is tasty* and *this chili is tasty*, respectively). I will argue that there is a difference (this will be examined more deeply in section 3.2.1.). This is an example that shows that some difference between the two types of sentences exists:

> (8) A: The soup is disgusting.
> B: I don't know, I think it's (/it tastes) good.
> B: I don't know, it tastes good to me.
> B: #I don't know, it's (/it tastes) good.[3]

I don't know can only be used together with some explicit judge, not with a simple *type-x* sentence. This suggests that they have different contents, which a theory with a hidden indexical argument cannot explain.

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[3] Thanks to Elizabeth Coppock for this observation

2.4. Relativism[4]

For my own theory I will advocate the perspective that truth values shift depending on who/what group the predicate is used for. This is the basic assumption of the relativistic approach – that the truth values of sentences can be relativized, "so that they might be true relative to one individual but false relative to another" (Lasersohn 2005:644).

2.4.1. Lasersohn's judge parameters

In Lasersohn's (2005) own theory, he claims that truth values should be evaluated to a judge-parameter. Barker explains this notion like this:

> Lasersohn argues that faultless disagreement requires truth to be relativized to a judge (an assessor) [in Lasersohn 'Context Dependence]. Then 'This chili is tasty' may be true relative to me, but false relative to you. Given any fixed choice of judge, the claims are contradictory, but when judges differ, the claims are perfectly compatible.
>
> (Barker 2013:242)

So this is not a fixed judge that is always assigned to the speaker. One judge is required for every context, and it is the person that evaluates the truth values for the sentence in this context. "For any context c, there must be a unique individual J(c), the judge of c" (Lasersohn 2005:669). So when I say *this chili is tasty*, I mean that a certain chili is tasty according to a judge J in context c.

Stojanovic (2007) criticizes this theory, and claims that it runs into the same problems that Lasersohn claims that contextualist theories do. Her critique is somewhat based on the assumption of semantic competence (SC) which is endorsed by most theorists:

> Speakers of English are semantically competent with predicates of taste: they master their meaning and truth conditions.
>
> (Stojanovic 2007:696)

We can apply her reasoning to example (5) above. She says that given SC, both John and Mary knows that the truth values of their sentences depend on which judge they are evaluated with respect to. If both intend the content of their uttered sentences to be evaluated respect to different judges, their disagreement will not be genuine.

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[4] It should be noted that this essay only deals with relativism concerning matters of taste. The broader relativistic philosophical outlook that considers everything, even matters of fact, to be relative is not dealt with, nor embraced by the author here.

Both of them, given SC, know that one and the same content may take different truth values when evaluated at different judges. They also know that the one's assertion and the other's denial of the same content are inconsistent only when evaluated with respect to the same judge. Hence if each party intends the asserted content to be evaluated at himself or herself, and if this is mutually clear between them, then they will realize that there is no clash in truth value between their claims (when evaluated as they intend them to be), and that their 'disagreement' is thus nothing more than a divergence in preferences.

(Stojanovic 2007:696-697)

2.4.2. Group-based vs. not group-based theories

Lasersohn describes a simple group-based theory, and calls it an indexical analysis without first person restriction:

Analyze sentences containing *fun, tasty,* etc., as making indexical reference to some relevant individual or group, not necessarily the speaker.

(Lasersohn 2005:650)

This idea avoids the problem of contradiction that the indexicality theory as described above runs into, as long as every participant makes their reference to the same group. This can also explain the motivations for a negative response to someone else's claim, repeating example (5):

(5) John: The chili is tasty
    Mary: No, the chili is not tasty

Mary can claim that John's utterance is false for any group of which she is a member (if we assume that everyone in a group has to agree on something for it to count as true). She knows that she is a part of the group, and that she doesn't like the chili, so she can reject John's utterance that the chili is tasty for the group (Lasersohn 2005:651).

But, according to Lasersohn, there's a problem with the group-analysis when the disagreement goes "backwards" like this (Lasersohn's example (17)):

(9) Mary: This is not fun.
    John: Oh, yes it is!

It would then be irrational to say something that you know the group will not easily accept into the common ground, since you know that not all members of the group find it fun.

> […] Mary knows the roller coaster is not fun for her, it follows that it is not fun for the group, and John is in no position to deny this. By contradicting her, John must be acting irrationally, or ignoring what Mary said, or claiming to know her own mind better than she does herself […] Intuitively, we may interpret John and Mary in (17) as each asserting his or her own perspective over and against that of the other, and Option 2 [Lasersohn's group perspective] does not seem to accommodate this intuition.
>
> (Lasersohn 2005:651-652)

Stojanovic (2007) offers a critique on this problem. She writes that John might not succeed in convincing Mary that the roller coaster is fun for *her*, but if she behaves rationally, he should be able to convince her that it is judged as fun by a majority. She claims that a disambiguation is needed for the phrase *to convince someone that something is fun* (Stojanovic 2007:696).

But according to Lasersohn (2005), the only way to make sense of the problems described above is by assuming some kind of context-shift, so that Mary and John would be talking about different groups or persons, or that we assume that not all the members of the group have to find something fun for it to be fun for the group. The first option would however be incompatible with the fact that there is a contradiction, since it would mean that the two utterances do not have the same content. He thinks the second option sounds unreasonable, since Mary will not be persuaded to think the roller coaster is fun in (9) just because everyone else in some group thinks so (Lasersohn 2005:652)

Stephenson (2007) builds upon Lasersohn's theory of a judge, and claims that this should be understood as a group rather than an individual. She proposes to:

> […] treat the context set as a set of world-time-judge triples instead of worlds or world-time pairs. In particular, I propose that for all the triples in the context set for a conversation, the judge element represents the plurality of the group of participants in the conversation.
>
> (Stephenson 2007:509)

Her judge differs from Lasersohn's in that it consists of a group. So *this chili is tasty* is true only if the chili tastes good to *j* (which is a group) in *w* at *t* (Stephenson2007:503). However, the group is less important for the norm of assertion than the speaking individual is:

> In order for A to assert that S, A only needs to believe that S is true as judged by A, but if A's assertion is accepted by the other speakers and added to the common ground, it has the same effect as adding the proposition that S is true as judged by the group of conversational participants. This shows that the relevant judge for the purposes of the norm of assertion is just the speaker, and not the entire group of conversational participants.
>
> (Stephenson 2007:509)

Stephenson (2007) claims that there is no difference between the propositional content in a PPT-sentence of type *x* (e.g. *this chili is tasty*) and *I think that x* (*I think that this chili is tasty)*. A sentence where *x* is in the embedded clause says something about the beliefs of the speaker in relation to the proposition *x,* but it does not change proposition *x* compared to if it had not been embedded. When someone uses their own beliefs as evidence for *x,* then "[…] the utterance acts as if it is asserting both the main clause and the embedded clause" (Stephenson 2007: 513). So her view on differences between the two types of sentences is relatively weak.

Stephenson (2007) bases her theory on the assumption that "[…] what a group does in a conversation is analogous to what an individual does in developing and revising a set of beliefs" (2007:510). As well as an individual is trying to find out where in the space of possible individuals he/she is, a group is trying to find out where in the space of possible groups they find themselves.

> In other words, they are trying to align their world views, not only with regard to factual beliefs […], but also with regard to subjective matters such as what is tasty and which epistemic options are still open.
>
> (Stephenson 2007:510)

This search would be the motivation for trying out new proposals with the group, and also to object to or accept these. This idea is also very close to the theory of OBS.

2.5. Common ground

The notion of common ground is very similar to what I will call the common outlook. Therefore an explanation of the idea is required.

Stalnaker (2002) describes the common ground as "the mutually recognized shared information in a situation in which an act of trying to communicate takes place" (2002:704). This information is constantly updated and changed as the conversation goes along (Stalnaker 2002). This shared information is not as simple as just the common belief of the group though. For something to be in the common ground it needs to be *accepted* by all members of the group as such. "To accept a proposition is to treat it as true for some reason. One ignores, at least temporarily, and perhaps in a limited context, the possibility that it is false" (Stalnaker 2002:716). The simplest motivation to accept something is to believe it – but there are cases where a proposition may be accepted to the common ground even if one (or more) participants do not believe it. This might be when a conversational participant refrains from correcting the speaker for the sake of conversation. An example: Bob is holding his baby daughter, and Alice asks him "how old is he?". Bob understands that Alice mistakenly presupposes that the baby is a boy, and he may choose to correct her by overtly saying that it's a girl. This would add the fact that the baby is a girl to the common ground, and the common ground would match Bob's and Alice's common beliefs. But this may not necessarily be the case (e.g. if Bob answers "two years old"):

> […] if the presupposition is irrelevant to the purposes of the conversation […], Bob might decide to ignore the matter, tacitly *accepting* what Alice is manifestly presupposing for the purpose of facilitating communication without disrupting the conversation with a distracting correction. That is, Bob accommodates, not by coming to *believe* the false proposition that Alice is presupposing, but by accepting it as part of the common ground
> (Stalnaker 2002:717-718)

In this scenario, the conversation is allowed to go on without interruptions, but since Bob has chosen to accept a proposition that he does not believe to be true into the common ground, there will be a divergence between the participant's common ground and their common belief (Stalnaker 2002). This results in a notion of common ground defined like this:

It is common ground that ɸ in a group if all members *accept* (for the purpose of the conversation) that ɸ, and all *believe* that all accept that ɸ, and all *believe* that all *believe* that all accept that ɸ, etc.

(Stalnaker 2002:716)

The basis for these assumptions is that the participants are being cooperative. There needs to be a common aim to enhance the common ground, and this is assumed to hold for most ordinary conversations (Balogh 2009:28). The conversational participants do however constantly negotiate which propositions that gets to go into the common ground, this is not accomplished simply by one speaker asserting it. A proposition gets added to the common ground only if it is accepted by the listener(s): "[…] the update effects of an utterance are first provisional, they get definitive if the responder accepts them, or they get cancelled if the responder rejects them" (Balogh 2009:34).

2.5.1. Possible worlds

Stalnaker (1978) writes that propositions should be seen as functions from possible worlds to truth values (1978:79). A possible world is one way that the actual world might be, or might have been. The actual world is one of the possibilities in the space of possible worlds (Menzel 2014). Stalnaker also introduces the context set, which is "the set of possible worlds recognized by the speaker to be the 'live options' relevant to the conversation" (1978:85).

To make an assertion is to reduce the context set in a particular way, provided that there are no objections from the other participants in the conversation. The particular way in which the context set is reduced is that all of the possible situations incompatible with what is said are eliminated. […] This effect is avoided only if the assertion is rejected.

(Stalnaker 1978:86)

So the space of possible worlds constantly gets narrowed in a conversation, when new assertions get made and accepted to the common ground. This is also the desired effect – the participants have a common interest of reducing the context set, but they may not always agree on how (or with what propositions) this should be accomplished (Stalnaker 1978). So when disagreements about what should go into the common ground arise, they are actually debates about which possible worlds that should be kept among the 'live-options' for the actual world.

For each possible world there is a definition of the state of affairs in this world. This is the model, M, and it also defines the denotations of words in that particular model. This varies across different models, just as with possible worlds – Bart may snore in M_1, but not in M_2 (Coppock 2014:50). The model consists if a domain D and an interpretation function I ($M=\langle D, I \rangle$). The domain specifies which individuals that exist in the given model, and the interpretation function tells us which predicates that apply to which individuals. It shows the result of taking a predicate and applying it to an individual from the domain – this result can be 1 (true) or 0 (false) (Coppock 2014). To illustrate, we'll draw up the domain and the results of applying some predicates to some of these individuals (example adapted from Coppock 2014):

Domain of M_1: D_1= {Maggie, Bart, Homer}
I_1(BORED) = {Bart – 1, Homer – 0, Maggie – 0}
I_1(HAPPY) = {Bart – 0, Homer – 0, Maggie – 1}

When we have this, we can apply this to natural predicates and terms. Let's assume that we want to calculate *Maggie is happy* in M_1:

$$[\![HAPPY(Maggie)]\!]^{M_1}=\text{I(HAPPY(Maggie))} =1$$

This shows that Maggie is happy in M_1.[5]

2.5.2. Maintain the common ground – quality maxim

Grice (1989) introduces four different maxims for conversation. We will have reason to get into one of these – the maxim of quality. It suggests us to "Try to make your contribution one that is true" along with the sub-maxims: "Do not say what you believe to be false" and "Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence" (Grice 1989:27). In conversation, participants assume that this maxim is followed. Balogh's (2009) version of this Gricean maxim is "*Maintain the common ground!*" (2009:28). This calls for the conversational participants to not add propositions that they do not believe themselves to the common ground:

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[5] This is a serious simplification of first-order logic, but it's enough for the purposes here.

> [...] the speaker should not utter anything that is not supported by her own information state (*Be truthful!*) and the hearer should not update her state with φ if it would lead to inconsistency, and she has to announce this rejection explicitly.
>
> (Balogh 2009:28)[6]

If the speaker does not announce that an asserted proposition is in conflict with his or her own beliefs, his/her belief state would not be a subset of the common ground. Then the common ground cannot be maintained. From the discussion above it also follows that an utterance should not produce any update for the speaker's own information state (Balogh 2009:28). In negotiating where among the possible worlds the actual world might lie, breaking this condition would mean eliminating what might be a live option in your private context set from the context set in the common ground. The rest of the participants would believe that you agree with something that you in fact don't agree with. This would be a defective context set (Stalnaker 1978:85).[7] Stalnaker (1978) also describes a context which is "close enough" to being nondefective. This is when the presuppositions are not shared throughout the group, but this is not a problem for the discourse – the conflict does not arise in the conversation (1978:85). This can also be the case with the acceptance of something that one does not believe, as described above. So the notion of acceptance can be maintained even in a theory that presumes that one needs to obey the maxim of quality, if one sees the "close enough"-case as acceptable.

2.6. What will a new theory have to explain?

Moltmann (2009) criticizes many points of the relativist approach to PPTs. I will examine some of her arguments here to see what a new theory needs to avoid.

Moltmann (2009) argues, like Stojanovic (2007) (see sect. 2.4.1. above) that relativist theories like Lasersohn's cannot explain contradiction or faultless disagreement in a satisfying way.

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[6] Also cf. Groenendijk and Roelofsen 2009.

[7] Stalnaker bases his description of non-defective context on a scenario where all the participants have the same presuppositions, and a defective content as the opposite. This is can however be translated to the situation we are discussing here. The conversational participants presuppose that the common ground is in line with everyone's beliefs, or at least acceptances – if this is not the case, the one who disagrees will know this, and will not share this presupposition. Then this scenario matches Stalnaker's description for a defective context.

> […] why on the relativist account can there be disagreement among two speakers when the speakers know that the content of their utterances can be both true, though relative to different contexts?

<div align="right">(Moltmann 2009:194)</div>

A group-based theory can avoid this problem. If we see utterances about taste as propositions to add to the outlook of the group, a disagreement is about what the current group can accept into their common ground. And in the same common ground, two conflicting utterances cannot be accepted, as long as the common ground should be maintained. So if a disagreement is about whether a proposal can be accepted in the current group or not, this problem is avoided.

Moltmann also claims that some versions of relativist theory (Lasersohn (2005) is among these) cannot explain the difference between what I call *type x*-sentences and *I think that x*-sentences. Moltmann's examples are *frog legs taste good* and *frog legs taste good to me*, respectively (Moltmann 2009:194-195). We have already seen in section 2.1 that there is a difference between these two. So to avoid this critique, we need to make sure that there is a clear difference between these two sentences in our new theory.

Lasersohn's critique against a group-based theory explained above (sect. 2.4.2) is based on there being a problem with what I call "backwards disagreement". I repeat example (9) from above:

(9) Mary: This is not fun.
John: Oh, yes it is!

I believe that Lasersohn's problem can be solved if we treat the negation of a proposal in the same way as we treat the positive version. If a theory can assign ¬*fun* to an object in the same way as *fun,* (9) works in the exact same way as any disagreement. Moreover, that one member of the group has already made their opinion clear should not mean that no one else can utter the negation of this sentence without behaving irrationally. A good group-theory should be able to explain John's rejection of Mary's proposal - in fact it should be necessary for him to do this if he is not willing to accept Mary's proposal. Otherwise the common ground would not be maintained, and the context set be a defective one, since

disagreements have to be announced. Offering a counter-proposal to this is no more irrational than in any other case – it simply results in taking the proposals up for debate. So there should be ways for a group-based theory to handle this problem, and a new theory needs to be able to do that.

3. Proposal – outlook-based semantics

3.1. Basics

The previous theory that stands strongest given the discussions above seems to be a group-based theory that manages to avoid the problems stated in section 2.6. Stephenson's (2007) theory is a good contestant, but it does need some modifications. I will build on some of Stephenson's (2007) basic theoretical assumptions to make up a new theory – Outlook-based Semantics (OBS).

I will start off by arguing that a separate judge parameter is unnecessary, given the other points of evaluation that we already have. If we assume that utterances with PPTs are always propositions to add the content of the utterance to the group's subjective common ground (their common outlook, we'll get to this in sect. 3.1.1.), then this would mean that the group-judge is included in the context itself. When a sentence is evaluated with respect to a context *c,* the judge-dependency is automatically included. This is especially true if we limit the group to only the people engaged in the conversation. The context tells us who the speaker and the addressee(s) are. The group consisting of speakers and addressees is the only possible judge for each discourse, so we do not need to include them in the equation once more - they are already included by the context. So, this means that the judge in every discourse would be fixed to the participants of the conversation in question, which is one of the basic assumptions in OBS.

3.1.1. Common outlooks

Common outlooks are (as you would understand from the name) the central issue in OBS. The assumption is that just as any group shares a common ground it also shares a common outlook. The common outlook is a belief or an opinion that everyone in the group shares, or at least accepts, that everyone believes that everyone shares etc. So when someone utters

this chili is tasty, that should be seen as a proposal to add the predicate *tasty* to the object *this-chili* in the common outlook. *Tasty* is one example of a predicate that can be applied to an object, as is *disgusting*. I also propose that ¬*tasty* is a possible predicate, and that it should be analyzed in the same way as *tasty* or *disgusting*. I will repeat example (5) again here:

(5) John: The chili is tasty
Mary: No, the chili is not tasty

When Mary rejects John's proposal by stating the negative version of the utterance, she is proposing that ¬tasty(this-chili) be added to the common outlook. So, she rejects John's proposal with a proposal of her own, just as if she had said *No, the chili is disgusting*.[8] Regarding ¬tasty as a possible predicate also solves the problem with "backwards disagreement" presented in section 2.4.2 above.

An outlook works pretty much like a possible world, except that the outlook determines the extensions of subjective predicates, like *tasty*, rather than factual ones. So when a group accepts a proposition to their common outlook, this works in the same way as when someone utters a matter of fact that narrows down the space of possible worlds in which the real world is. So when a group accepts a proposition, this limits the space of possible outlooks in which this particular group's own outlook lies. So what you want to do with a subjective proposition is to expand the reach of a specific predicate in your outlook-model, to include the object that you are talking about. E.g. the model for one group's outlook may look like this:

$M_2 = \langle D_2 I_2 \rangle$
$I_2(FUN) = \{$roller-coaster - 1, driving − 0$\}$
$I_2(TASTY) = \{$cake - 1, apples − 1$\}$

When you utter *this chili is tasty*, the proposal you make is to get the result 1 in applying the predicate (tasty) to *this-chili* in I_1 for your group's common outlook o_1. The result would be that in the updated model M_2' the interpretation function of *tasty* would look like this:

---

[8] This may not be the case if the speaker puts heavy emphasis on the word *tasty*, as in *well, it's not TASTY (but it's not disgusting either)*. The analysis above concerns the use without a marked emphasis like this.

$I_2'(TASTY)=\{cake - 1, apples - 1, this\text{-}chili - 1\}$

I also propose that there is a stronger difference between the proposition *x* and *I think that x* than Stephenson (2007) seems to believe. The latter sentence has an explicit judge that is the speaker of the sentence – this is not a proposal to the group, but is evaluated to the speaker alone. If Mary in (5) had said *I do not think that the chili is tasty* this would not have served as a counter-proposal to John's claim, it would only have been a rejection of it, from Mary's own point of view. As evidence that *I think x* and *x* are not equivalent, I repeat example (8) from above:

(8) A: The soup is disgusting.
B: I don't know, I think it's (/tastes) good.
B: I don't know, it tastes good to me.
B: #I don't know, it's (tastes) good.

3.1.2. Pragmatics

Every proposition made for the common outlook should first off be judged as true by the individual who utters it. I find Stephenson's explanation of this (sect. 2.4.2.) a bit redundant since this conclusion follows purely from the Gricean maxim of quality. And if John in (5) did not believe his own proposal about the chili being tasty, why would he wish to add it to the common outlook? It is not consistent with his own perspective, so that would lead to him excluding his own context set from that of the group, and thus failing in maintaining the common ground.[9] For the common ground to be kept a new proposition must be consistent with what's already been accepted to the common outlook. It also has to be publicly accepted by all members of the group. If then one group member utters φ and another utters $\neg\varphi$, an argument to persuade the other is expected to ensue, to make sure that the common outlook is supported by one's own information state. If no acceptance among all the members can be reached, then neither φ or $\neg\varphi$ can be added to the common ground of the whole group, or the common ground would not be maintained. What might happen is that a subgroup can be created, where there is no problem in maintaining the common

---

[9] The notion of acceptance wouldn't help him here. You can accept someone else's proposal to the common outlook just for the sake of conversation, but it still wouldn't make any sense to propose something yourself which you do not believe "for the sake of conversation".

ground, since the disagreeing group member(s) would be excluded from this new subgroup. They would still, however, be part of the bigger, original group that everyone will fall back into once the subject is changed. There would be no truth-value assigned to φ in the original group, but in the subgroup φ would be true (if that's what they agreed upon). There will be more on this in section 3.2.2.

3.2. Predictions

3.2.1. Differences between *type-x* and *I think that x*

As we concluded above, a sentence of *type x* is stronger than its contrast *I think that x*-sentences and makes a proposition for the common outlook. It would most often be used when the speaker feels very strongly about something, or when he/she believes that the proposition will be accepted by the group. *I think that x*-sentences would more likely be used when the speaker feels that the group might find the subject controversial, or when the speaker doesn't know the rest of the group very well. For example, a discussion may start with the subject being eased into with *I think that x*, and if most of the group seems to be agreeing, then the *type x*-sentence would probably be used. The latter can be seen in the following example:

> (10)F: We take the next one
> A: Yes, this is not so good either
> B: Here we have a good example of bad music then
> A: But this is really bad music
> B: Yes this is bad music
>
> (GSM)

Here everyone uses the *type-x* sentence, since it's been made clear that this particular music is disliked in the group. But someone who knows that they are disagreeing with what the others have already said is more likely to use the weaker *I think that x*. This is confirmed by example (11):

> (11)F: Is this something you like?
> A: It's bloody good music actually
> B: [LAUGHS] I don't think it's that good. I don't think that there's any melody really, to dig to.
>
> (GSM)

I'd like to suggest that you use the agent-less, *type-x* sentence when you know that your opinion will not raise too much of a controversy, when you suspect that at least one of the others agrees with you – that is, when you suspect that your proposal will be accepted to the common outlook of the group.

> (12) A: I listen to Magnus Johansson, he writes such wonderful…
> B. I mostly listen to the radio. I've heard your record with him, it was really good.
> C: Yes, that one's good. I have two [records] with him.
> A: Yes, that's right.
>
> (GSM)

Here everyone seems to know in beforehand that this type of music is well-liked by the others, and all the utterances are of *type x*. There is no explicit judge, and according to outlook-based semantics, B's first sentence should be interpreted as a proposition to add *good*(*Magnus-Johansson-record)=1* to the common ground of the group. This seems to succeed, and it's picked up by at least one other participant, and A has made it clear from the start that she appreciates this musician. There are other participants in the group, but they remain silent, and one is left to assume that they accept the proposition as well, since they do not publicly announce their rejection, which is required by the aim to maintain the common ground. If a proposition does not succeed and is not picked up by the rest of the group, it might look something like this:

> (13) A: But jazz is good
> B: [Nja][10], I don't like jazz that much
> A: Well I like jazz
> B: [Nja], I think jazz is crazy music […]
>
> (GSM)

Here A starts out by making a proposition which is not accepted by B, and A then somewhat retracts his statement, now stating that only A himself likes jazz. B still uses himself as explicit judge in his response. Since B uses the weak *I think that x*-sentence, and thus has not made a proposition to the common ground, and A retracted his proposition to hold only for himself, 'jazz' would remain undefined in the common ground – the proposition has failed,

---

[10] Nja is a Swedish expression that's basically a mixture between *yes* and *no*.

and no counterproposal has been made. The case might have been another had they continued discussing the same subject.

So the stronger proposition, *type x,* should lead to more arguments and conflicts than the weaker sentence. When someone uses a *type x* sentence they are expected to be ready to defend their propositions against the critics – otherwise they would have used the weaker type. In a situation where both φ and ¬φ are put forth as *type-x* sentences, they are both proposals for the common ground. This predicts a debate about which proposal should go in the common ground.

> (14)A: She's good
> B: She's lousy
> A: No I think she's nice
> B: No, because she always has to talk while I'm sunbathing
> C: But it's good when they play music non-stop […]
>
> (GSM)

Here both A and B are confident to start off with, but at least A realizes that the B does not agree, and switches to the weaker *I think that x*-type. B is bold in this case, and keeps on pressing her opinion throughout. This might be why C interrupts as well – she senses that there might be a fight about this and switches the subject before it ensues.

3.2.2. Subgroups created by disagreement

What can be seen in the material is that sometimes it seems like a new sub-group is created, consisting only of the members of the group that agrees with each other about whatever it may be. When moving on to a new subject, the disagreeing member is back in the conversation. So it would seem like a temporary, smaller group is created for discussing the consequences of some common taste. Any participant from the bigger group that does not have the same taste about the object being discussed is simply left out of this subgroup, while still being a part of the big one. So some kind of exclusion seems to be evident, which can also be shown by the agreeing parties calling the non-agreeing one out:

> (15)A: What do you listen to then?
> B: HQ
> A: You see, you're weird.

B: It's, like, techno
A: You're weird Nordstrom
C: Yes, you are a bit weird.

<div align="right">(GSM)</div>

Here B is called out as weird for liking a music genre that the others do not like. Even if this may not clearly be a case of creating a subgroup from which B is excluded, it is a case of some division between B and the group of A and C, where B is suffering negative social consequences. Had the conversation about techno music continued, one can imagine that A and C would talk about what they dislike with the genre, and since they've made it very clear that they cannot be persuaded to like it, B would probably not have much to add to the conversation. Then a new subgroup would be evident.

If one accepts this theory, one would assume that dialogue participants make moves to make sure that they do not need to suffer social consequences, such as being excluded or called-out. This might be seen in the following example, where other participants have already made known that they think hip-hop is good:

(16)F: But you don't like this?
A: No
F: What is it that you don't like then?
A: I don't think it's any... they just stand and talk […]
B: I admire the lyric-writers of hip-hop songs, because the lyrics are so awfully long in hip-hop songs [continues to explain why he admires writers of hip-hop lyrics][…]
A: The hip-hop that I do like in that case, if one can call it hip-hop, would be Just D. I think they're good […]

<div align="right">(GSM)</div>

Here A can be seen as somewhat reluctantly accepting that (at least some) hip-hop might be good in order to avoid exclusion from the newly-created, hip-hop-liking subgroup. Especially the use of *in that case* gives us a hint that A does not completely agree with the premise that hip-hop is good. But here he seems to accept it for the purpose of conversation and to make sure he does not suffer the consequences from disagreeing with the group.

One must not confuse the two states of uptake – one where the proposals are being negotiated, and one where the matter has been decided, but when the conversation is still about the same subject, maybe to discuss positive memories associated with a certain song

or something like that. OBS predicts that a disagreeing group member is a part of the discussion in the first stage, when the proposals are being discussed. The creation of a subgroup happens when some participants choose to ignore the disagreeing member's perspective, and add the proposition anyway – it then gets added to the common ground of the subgroup, otherwise the big group's common ground would not have been maintained, due to the disagreeing member. This is when the exclusion happens, not before.

4. Conclusion

In this paper, a new solution to the mystery of PPTs has been offered in the shape of Outlook-based semantics. This manages to avoid a number of problems that other relativist theories have been criticized for, as well as explaining some new data. All the problems from section 2.6 have been avoided, due to taking a new stance on the group-based theory. We've established that a group strives to narrow-down their set of possible common outlooks, and they accomplish this through adding propositions into their outlook model. We have explained what happens with groups that cannot come to an agreement with the creation of subgroups within this group. This way they may update their common outlook without worrying about the disagreeing member. We have also managed to produce a slightly simpler theory than Stephenson's (2007), since we can render the separate judge-parameter unnecessary, while being able to keep all the advantages of a group-theory like Stephenson's, like solving the issue of contradiction.

The version of OBS accounted for here is just a brief start, and I'm sure that the theory can be expanded in many ways. More predictions need to be tested, and a proper formalization needs to be made. It would also be interesting to see if the theory translates beyond predicates of taste; morality discussions for example. There is much yet to be done in the semantics of PPTs, and hopefully OBS will be a part of the future of the field.

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Outlook-based semantics – Appendix – GSM materials

Example (10)

F	ha tar vi nästa<
HM5	ja (.) de e ju inte heller så bra<
HM3	här har vi då eh praktexemplet i usel musik då nä men (.) nä<
HM5	men de men de e verkligen dålig musik (.) musiken är rent (.) dålig<
HM3	ja de här e dålig musik<

F: tar vi nästa
   take we next

A: Ja, det är ju inte heller så bra
   Yes it is   neg. either so good

B: Här har vi praktexemplet i dålig musik då
   Here have we good example in bad music then

A: Men det är verkligen dålig musik
    But it is really   bad music

B: Ja det här är dålig musik
   Yes it here is bad   music

F: We take the next one
A: Yes, this is not so good either
B: Here we have a good example of bad music then
A: But this is really bad music
B: Yes this is bad music

Example (11)

F	ä de nånting ni tycker om de här?<
HM1	jaah (.) X X X de e jädrigt bra musik faktiskt (.) <
[…]	
HK1	eh SKRATTAR jag tycker inte de e så bra <
HK2	näe jag e inte heller<
HK1	jag e- tycker inte man hittar nån (.) melodi direkt å digga till som såhär- <
HM1	de e liksom (.) sånt• jag lyssnar på (.) om man säger så e de- (.) jag sympatiserar med

de helt å hållet (.) hardcore<

F: Är det någonting   ni   tycker om det här?

   Is   it   something youPL like   this here?

A: Det är jädrigt   bra musik faktiskt […]

    It   is bloody good music actually

B: SKRATTAR Jag tycker inte   att det är så bra.

    LAUGHS   I   think   neg. that it   is so good.

Jag tycker inte man hittar någon melodi direkt att digga till

 I   think neg. one finds any   melodi really to dig   to

F: Is this something you like?

A: It's bloody good music actually

B: [LAUGHS] I don't think it's that good. I don't think that there's any melody really, to dig to.

Example (12)

MK3   jag lyssnar på Magnus Johansson då han e ju eh så skriver så underbara<

MK4   jag lyssnar mest på radio<

MK4   jag har hört din skiva me honom å den va ju skitbra<

MK1   ja den e ju bra (.) (jag har två me honom)<

MK3   ja just de<

A: Jag lyssnar på Magnus Johansson, han skriver   så underbara…

   I   listen   to Magnus Johansson, he   writes so wonderful…

B: Jag lyssnar mest på radio. Jag har   hört din   skiva med honom, den var   skitbra.

   I   listen   most to radio. I   have heard your record with him,   it   was really good

C: Ja den är bra.   Jag har   två [skivor] med honom

  Yes it   is good. I   have two [records] with him

A: Ja   just det.

  Yes   just that.

A: I listen to Magnus Johansson, he writes such wonderful…

B. I mostly listen to the radio. I've heard your record with him, it was really good.

C: Yes, that one's good. I have two [records] with him.

A: Yes, that's right.

Example (13)

HM5	men jazz e bra så<
HM3	nja jazz jag tycker inte om jazz så mycke<
HM5	jo jag tycker om jazz<
HM3	nja jazz jag tycker de e vrickad musik rent X nä men<

A: men jazz är   bra så
   but   jazz is good so
B: nja jazz jag tycker inte om   jazz så mycket
     jazz I   like   neg.   jazz so much
A: jo jag tycker om jazz<
  yes I   like   jazz
B: nja jazz jag tycker de e vrickad musik   rent
    jazz I   think it is loony   music purely

A: But jazz is good
B: [Nja], I don't like jazz that much
A: Well I like jazz
B: [Nja], I think jazz is crazy music […]

Example (14)

HK4   mm (.) å City 107 ska bara tjata hela tiden dom har f- (.) hon som- hon som- hon som e de där allstå de e en tjej (.) Madeleine *Kryger* SKRATTAR<

HK5	ja dom tjatar (ganska) bra så där<
HK5	ja men hon e bra<
HK4	hon e urkass<
HK5	nä jag tycker hon e trevlig<
HK4	nä för hon ska jämnt prata när jag ligger å solar SKRATTAR<

HK3   men de e bra- de e bra iallefall när de kommer liksom typ (.) music non–stop å sånt när dom kör bara musik<

A: Hon är bra
  She   is good
B: Hon är urkass
  She is lousy

A: Nej jag tycker hon är trevlig

   No I   think she is nice

B: Nej   för   hon ska   jämt prata när   jag ligger och solar

   No because she shall always talk when I   lying and sun-bathing

C: Men det är bra   när det kommer musik non-stop…

   But it   is good when it comes   music non-stop…

A: She's good

B: She's lousy

A: No I think she's nice

B: No, because she always has to talk while I'm sunbathing

C: But it's good when they play music non-stop […]

Example (15)

HM3   *måndagar* (va lyssnar du på då)<

HM6   HQ<

HM3   *du ser (.) du e ju konstig*<

HM6   de e alltså techno typ<

HM3   *du e konstig du Nordström*<

HM5   *ja du e lite konstig*<

A: Vad   lyssnar du   på då?

   What listen   you to then?

B: HQ

   HQ

A: Du ser, du   är ju konstig

   You see, you are   weird

B: Det är alltså techno typ

   It   is like techno like

A: Du är konstig du   Nordström

  You are weird   you Nordstrom

C: Ja   du   är   lite konstig

  Yes you are little weird

A: What do you listen to then?

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B: HQ

A: You see, you're weird.

B: It's, like, techno

A: You're weird Nordstrom

C: Yes, you are a bit weird.

Example (16)

HK2   vilken va de?ah hip-hop ah men den tycker jag e bra<

HK1   No limit <

F   näe de va de inte X<

HM1   nääe de va väl hip-hop?<

HK1   va de inte?<

HK1   aah den (.) ah just de<

HM1   skitbra<

HM1   skitbra också<

[…]

HM1   å man påverkas ju av de man blir ju verkligen särskilt jag man blir liksom man kan inte sitta still när man lyssnar på hip-hop (.) de e jädrigt bra<

HK2   men eh jag tycker sån hip-hop som e på MTV å så (.) den tycker jag e verkligen skit<

HM1   ah men de e ju hip-hop de beror ju på de e ju bara kända hip-hoplåtarna som e (.) spelas på MTV (.) eller ah inte på X X X (.) eh men de (.) beror ju på   <

HK2   j- ja<

F   men du gillar inte dehär? <

HK1   näe   <

F   va e- va e de du inte gillar då? <

HK1   jag tycker inte de e nå (.) dom bara står å pratar å (.) står å käckar sej å typ liksom   <

F   mm (.) <

F   b-<

HK2   jag tycker in-<

HM1   jag be- beundrar text- (.) författaren till hip-hoplåtar (.) för att de e X så fruktansvärt långa texter i en hip-hoplåt (.) de liksom man tänker ju inte på ja j- s- typ i i- i fodralet eller i häftet i sånna här till hip-hop öh- (.) öh såhär ahm när texten väl står (.) så e de ju otrolig (.) text asså de e hur mycke som helst (.) så de e nånting som e (.) väldigt långa texter å (.) ah (.) de e ju ofta- de e ju rim (.) de e mer rim (.) i hip-hoplåtar egentligen än va de e i (.) andra texter (.) så de e ju också en grej som e- <

F   mm<

F   mha   <

HK1   den hip-hop som jag vill- gillar i så fall (.) om man ska kalla de för hip-hop de e (.) Just D
(.)   de tycker jag e bra (.) (liksom do-)   <

HK2   aah<

HM1   ah de e he-<

F: Men du   gillar inte   det här?

   But you like   neg. this here?

A: Nej.

   No.

F: Vad   är det du   inte gillar då?

   What is it you neg. like then?

A: Jag tycker inte det är något… de   bara står   och pratar […]

    I   think neg. it is any … they only stand and talk

B: Jag beundrar textförfattaren   till hip-hoplåtar   för   att det är så fruktansvärt långa

    I   admire   lyric-writerDET to hip-hopsongs because that it is so   awfully   long

texter   i en hip-hoplåt[fortsätter förklara varför han beundrar författare till hip-hoptexter] […]

 lyrics in a hip-hopsong [continues to explain why he admires the writers of hip-hop lyrics]

A: Den hip-hop jag gillar i   så fall, om man ska kalla det för hip-hop, det är Just D. De

   The hip-hop I   like in so case, if one will call   it   for hip-hop, it   is Just D. They

tycker jag är   bra […]

 think   I   are good

F: But you don't like this?

A: No.

F: What is it that you don't like then?

A: I don't think it's any… They just stand and talk […]

B: I admire the lyric-writers of hip-hop songs, because the lyrics are so awfully long in hip-hop songs

[continues to explain why he admires the writers of hip-hop lyrics] […]

A: The hip-hop that I do like in that case, if one can call it hip-hop, would be Just D. I think they're

good […]