



UNIVERSITY OF GOTHENBURG

Department of political science

If Election were Held Today

The temporal proximity-effect and the polls

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Abstract

This thesis tests Franklin & Weber's finding that national elections have a temporal proximity-effect. They find that when a first-order election is closer in time, voters in second-order elections behave more similar to voters in a first-order election. By investigating respondent behaviour in polls - which, for voters, are similar to second-order elections - this thesis tests Franklin and Weber's novel findings. By using Swedish poll-results over a long time the thesis investigates whether a shorter temporal distance to a national election make respondents more likely to respond to the polls with instrumental rather than sincere concerns.

The thesis finds that vote sincerity (the tendency to vote for ones favourite party) is larger in the beginning and middle of an electoral cycle, and that that it drops closer to the next election. Contrary to Franklin & Weber's findings this temporal proximity-effect is only found in the time leading up to the election, but after the election it seems to disappear.

Besides testing Franklin & Weber's findings on voter behaviour, the thesis also shines some light on respondent behaviour in polls. It shows that temporal proximity is an important factor that determines how respondents answers in opinion-polls, implying that polls far from an election will be systematically worse at predicting election results.

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1.1. Franklin & Weber and the polls

Polls are problematic. Looking back at the Swedish electoral cycle 2006-2010 it was only during the four months around that the poll-of-polls managed to mirror the election-results fairly well.¹ This may seem a harmless case of respondents changing their opinions during the electoral cycle, but the thesis show that it is partly something much more problematic: the amount of time until the next election systematically changes some of the respondents priorities and considerations when answering in the poll.

Very recently Mark Franklin and Till Weber wrote a working paper (soon to be published) in which they discovered that national elections had a gravity-like effect (temporal proximity-effect) on European Parliament-elections (EP-elections). In EP-elections closer to a national election, voters give more weight to considerations similar to those in the national election. In EP-elections further from a national elections, voters are more likely to give weight to other concerns. For example people are more likely to vote according to party-preference, rather than instrumental concerns when the election is far away.²

First-order elections bring additional considerations to bear, considerations that are sufficient salient to voters as to override even rational considerations of lower salience³

Franklin & Weber's research relates to a lot of previous research on so-called "Second-order elections" (elections where national executive power is not at stake). EP-elections are often considered second-order elections and differ from national elections because voters think of them as less important. Voters use second-order election to send signals about their opinions in national elections. EP-elections and other second-order elections are also preceded by less campaigning than first-order elections (national elections).⁴ Much conceptualization about second-order elections, including Franklin & Weber's own research imply that in second-order elections voters are more willing to vote for their favourite parties or the parties they think are best at policy-making in the area. This is similar to the measurable concept of "Sincere voting" (to vote for the party that is ones favourite).

¹ Holmberg & Oscarsson 2013 p. 28

² Franklin & Weber (working paper 2013) p. 25


³ Op. Cit. p. 26

⁴ Op. Cit. p.2

This thesis tests Franklin & Weber's finding that national elections have a temporal proximity-effect by investigating a situation which should be sensitive to the instrumental concerns raised by a national election in the same way as second-order elections: polls. Using a comparison of vote intention and party preference on Swedish poll-results over a long time allows the thesis to investigate whether a shorter temporal distance to a national election make respondents more likely to respond to the polls with instrumental rather than sincere concerns.

The thesis finds that vote sincerity is larger in the beginning and middle of an electoral cycle, and that that it drops closer to the next election. Contrary to Franklin & Weber's findings this temporal distance-effect is only found in the time leading up to the election, but after the election it seems to disappear. In this testing the thesis manages to do three things: first it shows that the mechanisms that make second-order elections special are transferable to polls; second it questions some of Franklin & Weber's interpretations and thirdly it contributes to the understanding of why poll results far from elections tend to be poor reflections of the results in the actual election.⁵ This final contribution is actually very important: the cyclical temporal proximity-effect on polls which the thesis discovers help interpret what poll-results actually mean.

Figure 1. The research problem



⁵ Holmberg & Oscarsson (2013) p. 28; Martinsson (2009), p. 262

2.1. Franklin & Weber's temporal proximity-effect

A recent study delved into the problem of temporal proximity to first-order elections. Franklin & Weber investigated how first-order elections tend to have structuring effects on the second-order elections close to them, by studying European-Parliament elections within different temporal proximities to national elections.⁶ Their study is continues on previous research they reported in 2010 concerned with how party systems are consolidated, but their approach brings them close to the scope of this thesis.⁷ Closer to a national election, the considerations that voters make in a corresponding EP-election are more similar to those in the national election. And when further from a national election, voters are more likely to give weight to other concerns. For example when the election is far away people are more likely to vote according to issue opinion (and with their hearts), rather than instrumental concerns.⁸

Essentially the causal mechanisms Franklin & Weber point out are that second-order elections can "borrow" voting behaviour from first-order elections. The ideas, preconception and priorities which voters developed for the first-order election, including their tactical voting-strategies, party-leader preferences and opinions on government competence are allowed to colour their votes in the second-order election, if it is close in time to the first-order election. When the first-order election is further away many of these borrowed instrumental concerns fade in favour of, for example, voting for favourites or parties one considers most competent on issues relevant in the second-order election.

*The effects of this variable [...] indicate that respondents' preferences move towards a party they consider most competent on issues as the cycle moves towards midterm.*⁹

Franklin & Weber claims that this tendency can be interpreted as voters voting "with their hearts" (which is a popular theory about second-order elections), but that they think an alternative explanation is better. Their preferred explanation is that voters behave more like Downsian rational voters (voting for the party that they think is best in EU-issues) during midterm than when the first-order election is close. This is because first-order elections are salient enough to override the less salient concerns of the second-order election.¹⁰

⁶ Franklin & Weber (Working paper 2013) p. 2

⁷ Franklin & Weber (2010)

⁸ Franklin & Weber (Working paper 2013) p. 25

⁹ Op. Cit. p. 21f

¹⁰ Op. Cit p. 25f

According to Franklin & Weber proximity to a first-order election does have effect. Since polls share many features of second-order elections, this temporal proximity-effect should exist for polls as well. Thus polls can be used to test the temporal proximity-effect Franklin & Weber discovered. Generally, regular polls do not contain the huge amounts of data which Franklin & Weber use map out how first-order elections structure second-order elections. However there are regular polls in Sweden which makes it possible to test the proposition that there is a temporal proximity-effect for people "voting with their hearts" or with sincerity: are people more sincere in mid-term polls than in polls close to a national election?

It is important to notice that Franklin & Weber do not exclude the possibility that people do vote with their hearts, but rather interpret the data indicating such a voting-behaviour as a part of the Downsian rationality they use to explain the temporal proximity-effect.

2.2. Sincere voting

"Sincere voting" essentially is to vote for the party one likes the best, the favourite party.¹¹ Sincere voting is contrasted with insincere (Rosema uses the term non-sincere) voting, where people vote for other parties than their favourites, for example due to tactical reasons, performance evaluations, candidate evaluations, habit and to support the largest party in coalition with their favourite party.¹²

A number of items has been shown to impact whether people vote sincerely or insincerely. The voters preferred coalition after the election has a lot of impact - and made many voters vote for another party than their favourite.¹³ Furthermore, there are indications that some voters prefer to vote for the strongest party that is in a potential coalition with their favourite party.¹⁴

There is always a discrepancy between party-preference and voting intention, the size of this discrepancy depends on how many voters whom let insincere concerns crowd out the sincere concerns of party-preference.¹⁵

¹¹ Rosema (2004) p. 63

¹² Op. Cit. p. 137ff

¹³ Rosema (2006) p. 483f

¹⁴ Holmberg & Oscarsson (2013) p. 175

¹⁵ Rosema (2004) p. 65, Rosema (2006) p. 482f

Table 1. Vote insincerity in Swedish elections

Election	1988	1991	1994	1998	2002	2006	2010
Insincere	4.4	16.2	8.8	4.6	5.4	6	14.3

Source data in appendix D

As shown using data over Swedish elections, the degree of insincere voting has varied a lot over the last six Swedish elections. Sometimes its effect has been very substantial, sufficient to cause election results different from those that would have emerged, had everyone voted for their favourites.

This thesis expects that when there are less insincere concerns salient, more respondents will vote sincerely, when there are more insincere concerns salient, respondents more respondents will vote insincerely. For example: a poll farther away from an election should inherit less of the elections insincere concerns and thus display more vote sincerity. This mirrors the theories regarding second order election: when the government issue is removed more people are free to vote with their hearts, or their issue-opinions.

2.3. Second-order elections similarities to polls

Second-order elections are elections where national executive power is not at stake. In second-order elections it is not uncommon that voters use their votes to send signals to the politicians whom they may vote for in an upcoming first-order election.¹⁶ Second-order elections do share important features with polls. Voters rarely consider second-order elections as important as first-order elections, since they have less impact on the national politics of which many voters are most interested, Rief and Schmitt conceptualize this as the "Less-at-stake"-dimension.¹⁷ Polls go a bit further, since they elect no-one, not even to a second-order office. Furthermore, second-order elections are preceded by less campaigning than first-order elections.¹⁸ The same thing is very true for polls (unless they happen close to the election), people are asked to respond during a time when they have not been bombarded with political information. This should be seen in the light of John Zaller's theories of mass opinion: campaigns and intensive information-flows are important for a certain parts of the electorate when they develop their vote-intention. Campaigns have the potential to sway the opinions,

¹⁶ Franklin & Weber (working paper 2013) p.2

¹⁷ Norris (1997) p. 111; Rief & Schmitt p.9; Holmberg & Oscarsson (2010) p. 20

¹⁸ Hix & Marsh (2007) p.496

especially among those who have less political knowledge.¹⁹ The similarity between polls and second-order elections are such that the causal mechanisms behind the temporal proximity-effect should exist for polls as well. An approaching national election should make instrumental concerns, such as tactical voting, government competence etc. relevant for the respondents in a poll the same way they become relevant for a voter in a second-order election.

2.4. Findings on second-order elections

Compared to the literature on polls, the literature on second-order elections is extensive. In both American midterms and EP-elections (which are often considered second-order elections compared to the first-order national elections) the government tend to lose out to the opposition. In EP-elections this mainly benefits small parties in opposition.²⁰

There are four theories with extra prominence in the literature that explain these tendencies and the differences between first- and second-order elections. The first theory states that since voters do not think that second-order elections are as important as first-order elections, the voters do not feel the need to make as many tactical choices, and instead are free to vote more "with their hearts". Thus votes in second-order elections are supposed to reflect the voters sincere opinions better than their votes in first-order elections.²¹

A second theory states that voters are less concerned with the outcome of the election and thus use the election to signal satisfaction or (more likely) dissatisfaction with the current government.²² A third states that what actually happens is that first-order elections are so campaign-heavy that they manage to distort voters "normal" opinions. However, during second-order elections there is less electoral communication, and thus the voters change less and remain closer to said "normal" opinions.²³ This theory is similar to the idea of "Surge and decline", where the winner of a first-order election has mobilized more voters than what is normal (surge) and in the second-order election there is less mobilization (decline), so that the winner of the first-order election appears to be losing support.²⁴

¹⁹ Zaller (1992) p. 267

²⁰ Franklin & Weber (working paper 2013) p. 11ff; Tufte (1975) p. 812; Hix & Marsh (2007) p. 506

²¹ Franklin & Weber (working paper 2013) p. 14

²² Norris (1997) p. 112; Hix & Marsh (2007) p. 495

²³ Franklin & Weber (working paper 2013) p. 1

²⁴ Campbell (1987) p. 977

The fourth and final theory is quite obvious: the second-order election is not about the same thing as the first-order election. In a EP-election or an American midterm there are new candidates and different issues. In this theory, the second-order election is not really a second-order election, some voters do treat it like a *different* first order-election.

Franklin & Weber's findings seems to support either a theory close to our third, *surge-and-decline-like* theory or a theory like the first - where it is voters sincere opinions that matter. Franklin & Weber's interpretation are along the lines of the third theory: national elections mobilize a surge of special concerns, such as tactical and instrumental voting-concerns, and further from the election, these concerns decline in favour of issue-voting which they appear to think can be mistaken for "voting with ones heart", but believe signals a different behaviour. Second-order election theory still claims that "voting with ones heart" is a very important feature of the elections. This thesis does not consider the different explanations mutually exclusive, sincere voting (or voting "with ones heart) seems to be one of the things which are crowded out by the upcoming national election.

2.5 The problem with believing the polls

Studies on respondent behaviour in polls are rare, which causes a problematic knowledge-gap. In Sweden there are some publications looking into how reliable different polls are.²⁵ There is plenty of research on how polls impact the behaviours of other actors in society after they are published. Some researchers are worried that polls turn political debate away from issues and towards a "horse-race" where focus is on the parties relative size, rather than their opinions.²⁶ There are also debated instances of the so called "bandwagon effect" where the success of a party in polls inspire people to vote for it in election and the "underdog effect" where bad results for a party in polls make people tactically vote to save it.²⁷

There are also indications that politicians care a lot about the results in opinion polls, according to Strömbäck, they may even care more than the general citizen.²⁸ More than thirty years ago Holmberg & Petersson indicated a similar thing, most parties order polls and use them as part of their strategic work.²⁹ Added up, past research makes it clear that a lot of people: voters, politicians and researchers, rely on opinion polls. Disregarding any normative

²⁵ Holmberg & Petersson (1980), Petersson (2008)

²⁶ Moy & Rinke. (2012 - edt. Holtz-Bacha & Strömbäck) p. 226

²⁷ Op. Cit. p. 229

²⁸ Strömbäck (2012 - edt. Holtz-Bacha & Strömbäck) p. 261

²⁹ Holmberg & Petersson (1980) p.211ff

issues on whether polls should impact political behaviour from any group, it is a problem for all actors who base analysis or decisions on opinion polls if said polls turns out to be misguiding.

Some problems with polls are known, for example the margins of error, when too few respondents makes statistically significant conclusions on opinion-changes difficult. Another problem is the phrasing of questions to the respondents, which could impact how they answer and a third is the problem of non-randomness when selecting respondents.³⁰ However this thesis adds something important and new: it investigates whether respondents in polls think differently, when the polls happens further from a national election. This is important since it adds knowledge about cyclical and stable changes in the responses in opinion polls. The causal mechanisms from Franklin & Weber's research help interpreting results in polls which would otherwise be wrongfully attributed to party behaviour or current events.

2.6. How polls test Franklin & Weber

This thesis tests Franklin & Weber's finding that national elections have a temporal proximity-effect on a situation which should share the causal mechanisms which explain the temporal proximity-effect in second-order elections: polls. The thesis aims to provide additional understanding for two phenomena. First how proximity to a first-order election impacts respondents or voters behaviours, second how polls may systematically deviate from election results. These two phenomena can be investigated in concert, since temporal proximity to a first-order election seems to have properties which impact how and why people vote in polls. By looking at the effects of temporal distance to election on polls, it is possible to both continue on Franklin & Weber work as well as investigating why polls far from an election rarely mirror it very well.

Franklin & Weber attribute the effect they found to voter rationality, rather than to voting with ones heart or sincere voting. However, a lot of second-order election-theory do claim that sincere voting is an important feature of second order elections. Actually the two theories are not incompatible and the way Franklin & Weber presents their findings it seems that sincere voting (or "voting with ones heart") is a part of this rationality. People vote for the parties they think are best, which is compatible with sincere voting, however they do not vote "on a whim" or without thinking.

³⁰ Holmberg & Petersson (1980) p. 43; 65

2.7. Research questions and hypothesis

Two research questions and the hypotheses associated to them will guide the study in this thesis. The first question is: *Is vote sincerity in polls affected by temporal proximity to the national election?* Looking at vote sincerity related to the temporal proximity to election there are roughly four clear possible outcomes: a) Sincerity is systematically smaller close to elections than around mid-cycle periods; b) sincerity is systematically larger close to election; c) sincerity does not systematically shift; d) sincerity is systematically smaller or larger, but during other points of time not specifically related to the election. Based upon the second-order election theory used in this study, there are sound reasons to expect the sincerity to be smaller around elections. Thus the first hypothesis is: *a) sincerity is systematically smaller close to elections than around mid-cycle periods.* Any other of the predicted outcomes would result in a rejection of the hypothesis.

A question that will help understanding the effects of shifting levels of sincerity is about whom benefits. Studies on EP-elections show a number some beneficiaries: a) Small parties; b) Non-government parties;³¹ The benefits of opposition-parties and small parties could be due to the second-order features of the election, and thus they guide our second hypothesis: *The main beneficiaries in polls with more vote sincerity will be both: a) small parties; b) Opposition parties.*

Table 2. First and second hypothesis-matrix

Sincerity close to election x parties benefitting from sincere voting	Yes - Small parties and opposition parties benefits	No - Small parties and opposition parties do not benefit
Less sincerity close to the election	Hypotheses 1 and 2 confirmed	Hypothesis 1 confirmed, hypothesis 2 rejected
Even sincerity close to the election	Hypothesis 1 rejected, hypothesis 2 confirmed	Hypothesis 1 and 2 rejected
More sincerity close to the election	Hypothesis 1 rejected, hypothesis 2 confirmed	Hypothesis 1 and 2 rejected


³¹ Marsh & Hix (2007) p. 506

3.1. Method

3.2. Basic relationships

The basic relationship investigated in this thesis about the effect of temporal distance to election on vote sincerity, and vote sincerity on poll-results.

Figure 1. Basic relationship



"Sincerity or insincerity of vote" is a complicated way to say "Voting for ones favourite party". The relationship gets a bit messier when other competing intersecting effects are included. The shift from retrospective to prospective concerns as well as the shifting effects of party leaders and the influence of voters whom decide which party to vote for very close to the election are all important effects which needs to be included in a complete theory of temporal proximity-effects on vote sincerity.³² Unfortunately the available data will not allow controls for many of these effects.

3.3. Basic methodological choices

In order to investigate this relationship a choice had to be made (due to time-considerations) between quantitative data, or more detailed interviews with respondents. While an interview-approach would allow delving into the *thinking* of the respondents the problem with such an approach is threefold. First of all there is no such material readily available, while there are polls covering a long period of time. Second, there is the matter of number: in order to not only establish whether sincere voting changes during electoral cycles but also how it may impact the polls there needs to be a very large number of respondents (enough to get results to generalise, preferably for all parties). Third, interviews would capture what respondents *believe* they think is important, and their *interpretation* of their own behaviour, which does not always match the myriad of concerns which were important during the actual poll or vote. Instead of interviews this study utilizes data at the same macro-level as the phenomena investigated. When polling, focus tends to be on which parties will win, but a lot of polls have more to tell. Using the fact that several polls both measure vote-intention and party-preference makes it possible to measure systematic deviances of insincerity and sincerity in polls. This

³² Rosema (2006) p. 483f

choice of data has impact on the validity and reliability of the thesis, which is expanded upon in chapter 4.2.2.

The thesis uses Swedish data. Franklin & Weber have detected the temporal proximity-effect for the entire EU, but the Swedish case should be one of the most difficult countries to find the effect in. This is because Sweden has a very stable party-system with a clear left- and right class-cleavage around which parties take positions.³³ In a country where the party-system is more consolidated and voters are less mobile, changes in vote-intentions should be smaller and the temporal proximity-effect should be harder to detect. Sweden is such a country and puts the theory to a hard test, but if it is confirmed the temporal proximity-effect gains great support.

3.4. Design

In order to measure the sincerity in the poll, it is actually easiest to measure the *insincerity* in the poll. So the essential measure used in this thesis will be about the portion of people who vote for another party than their favourite. The most straightforward way of doing this is to ask respondents first which party is their favourite and second which party they would vote for. Fortunately, this is being done. From these two questions it is possible to calculate a insincerity-measure, where a greater discrepancy between the two items means that a larger portion of respondents are voting for another party than their favourite (more insincerity). This kind of insincerity-measure is important in Rosema's studies on Sincere votes and a similar measure is used by Holmberg & Oscarsson to measure "tactical voting" (Holmberg & Oscarsson seems to be using insincere voting as a proxy for tactical voting).³⁴ Since sincerity is defined as voting for one's favourite, respondents who are not captured the insincerity-measure are defined as the sincere ones. While the insincerity-measure is good for capturing sincere and insincere voting it has a problem: the measure cannot differentiate between different types of sincerity or different types of insincerity.

3.5. Details on the insincerity-measure

The insincerity-measure is calculated by subtracting the percentages intending to vote for a party from the percentage that has this party as its favourite. This results in a "Single Party Discrepancy". The "Single Party Discrepancies" are summarized into an over-all discrepancy

³³ Holmberg & Oscarsson (2013) p. 74

³⁴ Op. Cit. p. 175

for every single poll.

An alternative, similar approach, inspired by Holmberg & Oscarsson measure of tactical voting, was considered, but rejected from this thesis. The alternative was to measure how large a portion of the people intending to vote for a party would actually have preferred to vote for another. A drawback of this second approach was that it requires micro-data about each individual respondents voting-intention and party-preference. The first approach (which this study utilizes) allows comparisons between different data-sources and sources whom do not publish micro-data, and was therefore preferred in this thesis.

3.6. Who benefits?

As stated in section 2.7. a lot of literature on second-order elections indicates that certain types of parties tend to benefit in these elections compared to first-order elections. This thesis attempts to extend these parts of second-order-theories to polls as well, by examining which parties tend to benefit from sincere- and insincere voting. Provided that there is a systematically shifting lever of sincerity during the electoral cycles and provided that the tendency for small parties and opposition parties to benefit from second-order elections is due to the vote-sincerity aspect. How much said parties benefit should change in correlation with the insincerity-measure, so that when insincerity is low, small parties and opposition parties should benefit more.

4.1. Material

The ideal data for this study would ask and report separate "party-preference" and "vote-intention" questions. Furthermore, the more surveys per year the better. The closest to this ideal data in Sweden is the micro-data from the "Partisymptatiundersökningen" (PSU) (collected by the Swedish statistical central bureau, SCB). Unfortunately it is not available, and parts of the micro-data is not kept.

The second-best data that could be accessed and will be used here is the aggregated results from the PSU, over the time period 1973-2010 (excluding measurements from autumn 1979 until spring 1985). It covers 9 electoral cycles, with two surveys each year (during May and November) The respondents are divided in three groups, each group participating during three polls, during each new poll one group is phased out and a new, randomly selected group is included. The respondents are randomly selected using the population register, which ensures great random selection.³⁵

Additionally, data from two poll-institutes, SIFO and SKOP, will be used. They cover the time-period of 2002 to 2010.

4.1.2 Advantages with the PSU

The main advantage with the PSU-data is its size. With 9000 respondents the typical drawback of many polls (that the statistical significance of changes can not be confirmed) is avoided or greatly reduced. Another advantage is the that the survey asks both the question of party-preference and vote-intention to the same people at the same time. Most other polls are flawed in this regard, since they either ask about party-preference or vote-intention, not both. Since different polls are rarely conducted at exactly the same time it is hard to compare them: the differences between party-preference and vote-intentions are often rather small, normal fluctuations in the public opinion may be enough to drown out the effect studied. Finally, the PSU-surveys are very transparent, the math used to treat their micro-data as well as the exact phrasings of the different questions in the survey are recorded (something many other polls are rather secretive about), this also makes it possible to ensure that the PSU-data has been collected in roughly the same way during the entire period of time covered in this thesis. Added up, this makes the PSU-data ideal for this study.

³⁵ Eklund (2013)

4.1.3. Drawbacks with the PSU

Compared to the ideal data, the aggregated PSU-data still has some drawbacks which limit the scope of this thesis. The first major drawback with the PSU is that SCB only gives access to already treated data. The treatment of the data causes a few problems: a) while the party-preference item is un-weighted, the vote-intention data is not, it is both weighted for people unwilling to respond and "filled out" with the party-preference question (so there is a overlap between the two measures, that could make gap between party-preference and vote-intention smaller). This has two implications: first the absolute levels of discrepancy may not properly reflect the discrepancy between the respondents answers (this problem is easily dealt with since the same weighting is used for the entire time series, thus it is possible to trace changes in discrepancy-levels, but it makes it difficult to conclude exact effect sizes). The second implication is that *if* respondents become *more* sure about their vote-intention, then less "fill-out" from the party-preference is needed (which could cause a false increase in the discrepancy). This second implication could cause problems if respondents got more sure of whom to vote for closer to the election, Table 3 shows that this problem does not occur.

Table 3. Average portion of uncertain respondents in polls

	May 2002-2006	November 2002-2006
Average until election year	12.725	12.76364
Election year	15.65	11.7
	May 2006-2010	November 2006-2010
Average until election year	12.5	13.04118
Election year	14.1	9.25

Data collected by Novus³⁶

A number of different polls (Temo, Sifo, Skop, Demoskop, Novus and Synovate) during the electoral cycles 2002-2006 and 2006-2010 show that there is no decrease in uncertainty leading up to the election. In fact the uncertainty is somewhat higher in the May-survey before the election and during the November-survey the number of uncertain voters had dropped. If anything, this means that there is a risk for a slight underestimation of the temporal proximity-effect.

³⁶ Novus collected polls from different Swedish poll-institutes 2002-2014

Using aggregated data unfortunately makes it almost impossible to include any control-variables in the tests, as well as many conventional tests of standard-errors and credibility. However, this drawback exists for all aggregated data, no matter the source. Two variables remain available using the PSU-data, the first is point in time and the second is the number of parties represented in the polls. Though more control-variables would be desirable these will help understanding any systematic shifts in insincerity in the data.

The thesis puts the temporal proximity-effect to a hard test since the poll closest to the election is in May and some of the expected causal mechanisms have had very little time to kick-in. This combined with the risk of underestimating the effect means that the existence of any effects found gain extra support.

4.2 Additional data

There are some other polls out there that could be used to conduct this study, for example the SKOP-poll asks about party-preference rather than vote-intention. It should be possible to compare the results from that poll to some or several other polls for the corresponding time. There are however three problems: 1) most polls do not differentiate between vote-intention and party-preference, and the two questions are not reported separately; 2) mostly the different polls are conducted during very different times of the month, so the SKOP-poll for November may be conducted during the beginning of the month and the SIFO-poll during the end of the month; 3) most polls has about a thousand respondents and have problems giving statistically significant results for the support of small parties, thus there is a ever-present risk that measurement errors cause substantial distortions in the results.

These three problems makes the discrepancy measure derived from regular polls unreliable. However, data from the SKOP and SIFO-polls will still be used as a "worst case scenario", if there is a very clear trend in the data, it may show even in these less suitable polls.

4.3 How is a insincerity-measure constructed using the data?

Essentially, the PSU provided measures of the vote intention for each party, as well as the party preference for each party, during each poll. Using this data it is possible to create the insincerity-measure as detailed below:

For each PSU-survey a party-preference measure and a vote-intention measure is collected. Then, the party-preference result is subtracted from the vote-intention result.³⁷

SPD (Single Party Discrepancy) = VI (vote-intention) - PP (party-preference)

For each party we gain a "single party discrepancy"-value, it may be either positive (getting more vote-intention than party-preference, thus gaining insincere support) or negative (getting less vote-intention than party-preference, thus having sincere respondents who chose to support another party instead). These values are used to create the timelines in section 5.3 and determine which types of parties gain or lose from insincere voting during the electoral cycle. In order to get a useful insincerity-measure the single party discrepancy-values are then summarized in each poll, resulting in a over insincerity-measure (the values are treated as absolute values and thus added as if none of them were negative).

Insincerity = $\Sigma |SPD|$

From this insincerity-measure it is possible to create time-lines both for the entire time-period and for average electoral cycles. The shifts in insincerity during these cycles is the core of the data-analysis.

It may be discussed why the insincerity-measure is not divided by number of parties covered in the polls. There are three important reasons for this: a) the insincerity-measure captures a behaviour among respondents, as a group, if the measure was divided with the number of parties it would no longer reflect the actual amount of insincerity in the population; b) dividing by the number of parties would make it much more difficult to relate the insincerity-levels discovered to the data on which parties benefits or lose on the insincere voting; c) the number of parties is stable for each electoral cycle, so there is no reason to expect a changing number of parties to interfere with the analysis.

Since the measure is constructed similar to the one suggested in Rosemas research on vote sincerity and Holmberg & Oscarssons measures of insincere (tactical) voting, and since sincere voting is pretty much defined as voting for ones favourite party. The measure is expected to be very valid. The threats to its validity mostly comes in the form of overlap between party-preference and vote-intention in the PSU, but that problem has been sufficiently dealt with in section 4.1.3. and is not expected to cause any severe problems for

³⁷ Appendix A

the study, except limiting the conclusions that can be drawn about absolute discrepancy levels. Regarding reliability, not much need to be said, the discrepancy-measure in itself will give the same answer whenever applied to the same data, so any reliability problem would have to originate in the data collection for the PSU, and as stated in section 4.1.2 the data-collection is quite credible.³⁸

4.4. Which conclusions does the data allow

A limitation of the aggregated PSU-surveys is that they allow very little in terms of significance-testing. Of course that also limits the amount of generalization that can be done using this study. The margins of errors attached to the aggregated poll results sometimes result in an overlap between the lower bounds of party-preference and the upper bounds of vote-intention (or vice versa), since the study uses several electoral cycles, this should present no major problem, but can cause some limitations. However the data can be perceived in a different way: all polls tend to face this problem with overlap and tend to treat it in ways similar to the PSU (that is, to report the vote-intention or party-preference that is in the middle of their upper and lower bonds), therefore the method still says a lot about how respondents voting behaviour impact polls.

Another limitation in the thesis is that the aggregated PSU-data does not have many control-variables (except time and number of parties). As the study's aim is to discover *if* there is a temporal proximity effect on vote sincerity, this only limits deeper delving into causal mechanisms.

Though previous research indicate that the mechanisms of sincere voting and temporal proximity to election exist in most of Europe, and though Sweden is a suitable case (see section 3.3.) conclusions based upon only one country do have limits in how far they can be generalised. In future research the findings of this thesis should be replicated across a wider set of countries.


³⁸ Field (2013) p. 12

5.1. Results

5.2.1. There is a temporal proximity-effect

The main hypothesis was that closer to elections the discrepancy between party-preference and vote-intention would increase. The first result of the insincerity-measure can be illustrated in the graph below:

Graph 1. Vote insincerity 1973-2010 (excluding 1981-1983)



Summarized discrepancy values from vote-intention (weighted) minus party-preference (unweighted) for all parties, in each PSU-survey. For detailed numbers, see appendix A. Discoloured area marks the data-gap between 1981-1983.

Best Linear Unbiased Estimates(BLUE)-tests (since R^2 is calculated using linear regression): Normally distributed residuals, homoscedasticity, autocorrelation and error term causes no problems. No reason to expect multicollinearity with only one independent variable. Outliers causes no problematic distortions (Cook's distance and average leverage). Some problems with linearity (cubic model improves fit with 0.018 r^2). Altogether the linear model passes the BLUE-test.

This graph shows a number of things : first of all discrepancy (which indicates insincerity) shifts from a lowest value of 3.3 to a highest of 16.1 percent points with an average insincerity of 9.4 percent points. Since we are comparing a weighted to an unweighted table, the absolute level of insincerity is not as important or reliable as the relative level. The relative level of insincerity shifts a lot between polls. In six of the nine electoral cycles insincerity starts of at a level lower than the previous election, in seven of the nine cycles it rises a bit two polls into the cycle, and in eight it drops around mid-cycle just to increase closer to the election. In Graph 2, 3 and 4 average measures of insincerity are used to show the general electoral cycle, from which more reliable assessments can be made.

Two additional important things show up in Graph 1: first of all: actual discrepancy in elections differ a lot from polls, showing that even polls close to the election have problems capturing voters self reported vote-sincerity (the problem may however be that *reported* sincerity after having cast a ballot does not match the actual considerations made when casting the ballot), the data does not support the idea that voters are more sincere in polls in general than they are in elections. A second important thing is that the average insincerity drops over time, in the graph the drop has a R² value of .079 (correlation between dropping insincerity and time), the drop is about two percent points.

The low R² value of time as a variable indicates that there are other important aspects which explain the dropping insincerity. In the following regression analysis the only other control-variable available (number of parties) is used.

Table 4. Regression of vote insincerity

	Time model	N party model	Combined model
Year	-.064 (-.121; -.008)**		.047(-.068; .161)
Number of parties		-1.027(-1.684, -.369) **	-1.518 (-2.892; -.144)**
Intercept	137.535**	15.730***	-74.291
R2	.079	.14	.15

*** p<0.001, ** p< 0.05, * p<0.1. Year ranges from 1972-2010, n-parties ranges from 5-8
Best Linear Unbiased Estimates(BLUE)-tests: Normally distributed residuals, homoscedasticity, autocorrelation and error term causes no problems. Outliers causes no problematic distortions (Cook's distance and average leverage). Some problems with linearity (cubic model improves fit with 0.018 r² for the "Year" variable is improved by 0.04 R² using cubic model). Multicollinearity causes problems, "number of parties" and "year" correlates at .877 Pearson's correlation (VIF 4.345, tolerance 0.230 are both problematic). The regression model does not pass the BLUE-test. However modifying the independent variables will add no further explanatory power.

What the dropping level of insincerity shows is essentially that in general, respondents poll with a bit more sincerity now than during older electoral cycles and that the number of parties present in the polls is a probable part of any explanation of the dropping insincerity.

5.2.2. Average insincerity

In order to get average changes during election-cycles, data for each electoral cycle (in table 2 below) has been converted into two average electoral cycles. The first cycle covers the period


1973-1994, when the cycles were three years long and contained six PSU-polls. The second average cycle covers 1994-2010, when the cycles were four years long and thus contained eight PSU-polls.

Table 5. Insincerity during average electoral cycles (excluding 1979-1985)

1973-1994 (six surveys each cycle)	1/6	2/6	3/6	4/6	5/6	6/6		
Average discrepancy (insincerity)	8.64	9.66	10.22	9.92	9.74	12.22		
1994-2010 (eight surveys each cycle)	1/8	2/8	3/8	4/8	5/8	6/8	7/8	8/8
Average discrepancy (insincerity)	8.7	10.5	8.625	7.55	8.75	8.175	7.825	8.375


Average discrepancies (insincerity) for three-year and four-year electoral cycles, calculations based on PSU-data, for details see appendix A

Graph 2. Average insincerity in the electoral cycles between 1973-1994



Average insincerity (discrepancy) during the electoral cycles: 1973-1976, 1976-1979, 1985-1988, 1988-1991 and 1991-1994. Graph based on data from table 4. R^2 0.6505* (sig. .053). *Best Linear Unbiased Estimates (BLUE)-tests* (since R^2 is calculated using linear regression): Normally distributed residuals, homoscedasticity, autocorrelation and error term causes no problems. No reason to expect multicollinearity with only one independent variable. No outliers. No problems with linearity. Altogether the linear model passes the BLUE-test.


Graph 3. Average insincerity in the electoral cycles between 1994-2010



Average insincerity (discrepancy) during the electoral cycles: 1994-1998, 1998-2002, 2002-2006, 2006-2010. R^2 0.267 (not significant). *Best Linear Unbiased Estimates (BLUE)-tests (since R^2 is calculated using linear regression): Normally distributed residuals, homoscedasticity, autocorrelation and the error-term causes no problems. No reason to expect multicollinearity with only one independent variable. No outliers. No problems with linearity. Altogether the linear model passes the BLUE-test*

In the first graph, 1973-1994, insincerity clearly rises close to the election, and drops post-elections. In the second graph, 1994-2010, this relationship does not show, instead we get a rather flat line, with a bump in the second poll. This does not match what seems to happen in the over-all timeline, and it can be explained by looking at the cycle 1994-1998. During this cycle insincerity rose with about four percent-points between the election and the second poll, then over the cycle it dropped from 14.7 to 3.3 percent-points. A drop large enough to drown out the changes in the rest of the electoral cycles averaged. This electoral cycle was also somewhat special, a party that had previously dropped out (The Greens - Miljöpartiet) re-entered parliament while another party (New Democracy - Ny demokrati) dropped out. It could explain the very high insincerity-levels in the polls soon after the 1994 election. Unfortunately it does not explain why insincerity dropped to the lowest level recorded in the end of the 1994-1998 cycle. What is clear is that the cycle 1994-1998 was abnormal.

Graph 4 . Average insincerity in the electoral cycles between 1998-2010




Average insincerity (discrepancy) during the electoral cycles: 1998-2002, 2002-2006, 2006-2010. Excluding 1994-1998. R^2 0.5806** *Best Linear Unbiased Estimates(BLUE)-tests (since R^2 is calculated using linear regression): Acceptably normally distributed residuals, homoscedasticity , autocorrelation causes no problems, and the error-term is sufficient. No reason to expect multicollinearity with only one independent variable. No outliers. No problems with linearity. The linear model passes the BLUE-test*

When the period 1994-1998 is excluded, the data supports the same interpretation as the earlier cycles: leading up to the election insincerity increases, but after the election insincerity drops and voters are more sincere. For the cycles between 1973-1994 the average increase of insincerity during the cycle was about 3.6 percent points (from 8.64% to 12.22%). During 1998-2010 insincerity rose with about 2.3 percent points over the average electoral cycle (from 7.8% to 10.1%). Interestingly both the 1973-1994 average cycle and the 1998-2010 average cycle gets very high and significant R^2 -values in regression-analysis focusing on the relationship between time until election and level of insincerity, (0.6505* and 0.5806**, not to be mistaken for slope-coefficients). It implies strong correlations between point of time in the electoral cycle and level of insincerity. As the tables indicate a temporal proximity-effect is indeed there, and it has a substantial impact on the poll results.

This temporal proximity-effect is not exactly the same as expected in the first hypothesis. The first hypothesis is: *a) sincerity is systematically smaller around elections than around mid-cycle periods*, and predicts less sincerity both before and after the election. The temporal proximity-effect hypothesised would look something like a series of slow, gentle waves, with peaks during the elections. The temporal proximity-effect discovered looks more like a series

of slopes, leading up to steep drops: a "temporal proximity until next election"-effect as modelled in the graph below:


Graph 5. Models of temporal proximity-effects



5.2.3. Additional data

When making an electoral cycle average for the SKOP and SIFO-data, things become a lot less clear, first of all the cycle display each month, unfortunately for some months there are no polls. Even so, the SIFO/SKOP-data does not display any clear electoral cycle trend at all.

Graph 6. Average insincerity in the cycles between and 2002-2010, using SKOP and SIFO-data




SIFO and SKOP-data collected and published by Novus³⁹

³⁹ Novus collected polls from different Swedish poll-institutes 2002-2014

5.3 Who benefits?


The second hypothesis was that small parties and opposition parties were going to benefit the most in polls. What is shown here is how much different types of parties benefit or lose from insincere voting. Combined with the temporal proximity-effect the thesis expect that small parties and opposition-parties will benefit more further from elections. In the following graphs parties benefits or losses from the insincere portion of the votes is broken down into average electoral cycles.

Graph 7. winning or losing from insincere voting 1973-1994



Detailed data in appendix B and C. Parties with more than 20% electoral support in the last election are classified as "large parties". Support parties are not given separate category.

Graph 8. winning or losing from insincere voting 1994-2010



Detailed data in appendix B and C. Parties with more than 20% electoral support in the last election are classified as "large parties". Support parties are not given separate category.

It is a bit problematic to use Sweden to investigate this aspect of polls, since the Social democrats have been a hugely dominating party for a long time, which is reflected in how they have been losing support due to insincere voting in every poll until the 21:th century (but their losses have been smaller when in opposition). As a result a lot of the losses of government and large parties are losses of the Social democrats, and mandates some carefulness when making any kind of generalisation.

In general graph 7 and 8 show that opposition-parties, small parties and especially small opposition-parties tend to benefit from insincere voting in polls. However moving closer to the election does not seem to make any substantial difference. This lack of temporal proximity-effect means that the results do not support the second hypothesis. Even though these parties seem to benefit a bit from insincerity, they do not benefit or lose more when insincerity increases.

6.1. Discussion

6.2. Why is there no temporal proximity-effect post-election?

The first hypothesis gained mixed support, it predicted rising insincerity (less sincerity) in polls closer to the election. For the time leading up to the election, this turned out to be the case. However this temporal proximity-effect disappeared after the election, making the model incorrect. This corresponds with other findings on Swedish polls: the months closest after an election, voters are more likely to change which party they support than during any other period except the months just before the election, meaning that at least some kind of important change (maybe a "winner of election-effect") in respondent behaviour happens during these first months of a new electoral cycle.⁴⁰

A possible explanation for this can be derived from the field of psychology and the theory of cognitive dissonance: people tend to change their attitudes and opinions in order to fit their behaviour - it is possible that voting for a party increases the chances of making the party a favourite.⁴¹ Another possible explanation is that many of the rational concerns that makes people vote insincerely disappear the moment the election is over. If the salience of the upcoming election raises insincere concerns in the polls (as predicted in the first hypothesis), then getting done with the election may also result in getting done with the insincere

⁴⁰ Oscarsson (edt. Strömbäck & Nord 2013) p.286

⁴¹ Passer, Smith, Holt, Bremmer, Sutherland and Vliek (2009) p. 611f

concerns. It would imply that voters are more rational and aware in their temporal proximity-behaviour than Franklin & Weber's findings indicate.

What this thesis find can be called a "temporal proximity until next election"-effect. Whether it can be best explained using cognitive dissonance, rational concerns or some other explanation remains for future research to determine and requires deeper delving into the actual reasoning of respondents.

6.3. Implications for Franklin & Weber's theory

Despite being different from Franklin and Weber's research, this study did share the feature of looking on how temporal proximity to election structure respondents voting behaviour.

Franklin & Weber looked at how voting in EP-elections was structured, while this study focuses on the responses in polls. Despite sharing several second-order-election features, polls do differ from EP-elections in a very significant way: polls are still about national politics, while EP-elections may also be about European union-politics. This difference may be important to explain why they found a temporal proximity-effect, while this study discovered a "temporal proximity until next election"-effect. In Franklin & Weber's case a whole lot of national concerns sort of crowd out EP-concerns and even after the national election, some national concerns may remain. In this thesis it is the insincere national concerns that crowd out other national concerns, and after the election they may all become irrelevant.

In general this thesis confirms Franklin & Weber's findings, but there is a small conceptual difference. Franklin & Weber prefer to not explain their results as people "voting with their hearts". An important reasons is that "voting with ones heart" can imply voting on a whim or without thinking, which they do not find in their results. However this thesis cannot establish how much thinking has gone into the responses to opinion polls. Therefore the simplest explanation for the temporal proximity-effect on vote sincerity found in this thesis may be that respondents "poll with their hearts". It is important to understand that Franklin & Weber's explanation does not reject sincere voting, just ill-considered voting. In this thesis sincere voting is found to be part of the rational concerns which are overridden by the concerns of the national election. Unfortunately the thesis is unable to determine how rational respondents sincerity is.

Finally, this study highlights an area that requires future research: If proximity to elections do structure responses in polls and elections with second-order-features, then *how* does this

structuring work? Is it simply a matter of salience and temporal proximity (as indicated by Franklin & Weber) or is the explanation more messy (as indicated in this thesis)?

6.4. Implications for polls

Are there special features of polls which make them different from national elections?

According to this thesis there are. Much like second-order election polls display a temporal proximity-effect. Respondents are more likely to vote sincerely (vote for their favourite parties) in polls further from the next election. In the PSU-polls in Sweden (where the absolute numbers are a bit unreliable) the insincerity increased with 3.6 (1973-1994) and 2.3 (1998-2010) percent points from the beginning to the end of the average cycles. This at least indicate that the results in polls far from the election will be less reliable when it comes to predicting election results, because the election encourages different concerns among respondents.

Another problem in polls was discovered almost incidentally: there is a large difference between vote-intention and party-preference (the insincerity measure). On average in the PSU this difference was 9.4 percent points. Despite this, several polls still use the party-preference-question as a proxy to fill out where people are unable to answer the vote-intention question. Party-preference and vote-intention is not the same thing, and this difference naturally has to show up in the results. Fortunately the results in this thesis show that shifting levels of sincerity does not benefit specific party-types, so even if polls do not predict election results as well further from the next election, there is no evidence that they predict wrong in systematic favour of any specific parties.

7. Conclusions

This thesis has provided mixed support for the hypothesis that *"Sincerity is systematically smaller close to elections than around mid-cycle periods"*. Discrepancy between party-preference and voting-intention (and thus insincere voting) increases in the period leading up to the election, but then drops greatly. Thus a simple temporal proximity-effect is unfit to explain the data, while a "temporal proximity until next election"-effect fits better. A theory incorporating rational choice or one using cognitive dissonance may explain this effect.

Many of the rational concerns that makes people vote insincerely disappear the moment the election is over. If the salience of the upcoming election raises insincere concerns in the polls, then getting done with the election may also result in getting done with the insincere

concerns. The theory of cognitive dissonance, on the other hand, states that people tend to change their attitudes and opinions in order to fit their behaviour. It is possible that voting for a party increases the chances of making the party a favourite.

Finally: who benefits? According to the second hypothesis: *The main beneficiaries in polls with more vote sincerity will be both: a) small parties; b) Opposition parties.* However there was no clear tendency for a specific party-type to benefit or lose when vote sincerity decreased closer to the election. The second hypothesis was thus rejected. For the people making polls this is good news: if there are problems with the measurement in polls, they are at least not systematic.

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9. Appendix

Appendix A

Discrepancy-levels for each electoral cycle (excluding cycles between 1979-1985). Based on appendix B and C.

1973-1994	1973-1976	1976-1979	1985-1988	1988-1991	1991-1994	Average
1/6	7.7	8	10.5	10.3	6.7	8.64
2/6	9.6	7.9	10.6	13.3	6.9	9.66
3/6	11.4	5	12.8	13.1	8.8	10.22
4/6	11.3	8.5	12.4	10	7.4	9.92
5/6	12.7	9.5	10.4	9.3	6.8	9.74
6/6	16.1	10.7	14.1	10.9	9.3	12.22
1994-2010	1994-1998	1998-2002	2002-2006	2006-2010		Average
1/8	11.4	6.5	9.2	7.7		8.7
2/8	14.7	8.5	11.8	7		10.5
3/8	9.9	6.7	9.6	8.3		8.625
4/8	6.3	8	9.4	6.5		7.55
5/8	8.9	9.2	10.8	6.1		8.75
6/8	5.5	10.3	10.1	6.8		8.175
7/8	3.7	8.4	10.7	8.5		7.825
8/8	3.3	11.2	10.4	8.6		8.375

Appendix B: Vote-intention for each party 1972-2012

Vote-intention	1972M11	1973M02	1973M05	1973M11	1974M05	1974M11	1975M05	1975M11
M	10.9	11.4	12.8	14	14.1	14.3	15.1	15.3
C	26.7	26.3	25.6	26.6	25.9	25.1	24.7	23.9
FP	13.4	13	12.5	8.7	8.2	8.5	7.6	8.9
KD
NYD
MP
S	40.6	41.3	41.3	43.9	44.7	44.6	45.1	44.3
V	5.7	5.2	5.2	4.8	5	5.1	5.2	5
SD
others	2.6	2.6	2.6	2	2.2	2.4	2.4	2.6

1976M02	1976M05	1976M11	1977M05	1977M11	1978M05	1978M11	1979M02	1979M05
15.3	16.9	15	14.5	14.5	15.5	15.6	15.5	16
23.5	22.8	23.5	22.8	21.8	20.3	20.6	19.9	21.1
10.1	10.8	11	9.3	9.6	10.1	12.1	13.7	13.6
..
..
..
44	42.3	43.8	47.6	48.1	47.7	45.2	44.2	42
4.8	4.8	4.6	4.1	4.1	4.4	4.6	4.7	4.9
..
2.3	2.3	2.1	1.7	1.9	1.9	1.9	2	2.4

1979M11	1980M05	1980M11	1981M05	1984M05	1984M11	1985M05	1985M11	1986M05
21	21	20.8	22.6	25.9	27.8	27.6	20.4	18.8
18	16.5	15.6	12.8	14.7	14.4	12.6	9.7	10.3
10	8.7	7.2	6.4	6.2	6.6	6.5	17.9	16.7
..
..
..
43.8	46.5	48.9	50.6	44.4	41.7	43.7	43.6	46.4
5.7	5.6	5.4	5.4	4.5	4.8	5	5.1	4.3
..
1.5	1.8	2.1	2.2	4.2	4.7	4.6	3.3	3.5

1986M11	1987M05	1987M11	1988M02	1988M05	1988M11	1989M05	1989M11	1990M05
20.4	18.8	19.9	18.9	20.6	17.8	20.4	24.2	26.2
10.4	9.9	9.4	9.8	9.3	11.8	12.2	11	11.6
16	16	16	16.6	15.2	11.9	12.1	12.4	12.5
..
..

..	5.7	6.2	5.7	4.7
44.9	42.8	42	43.2	42.6	43.8	39.3	36.2	32.8
4.5	4.1	4.2	4.4	4.7	5.5	6.2	7	7.8
..
3.8	8.4	8.4	7.1	7.6	3.5	3.5	3.5	4.4

1990M11	1991M05	1991M11	1992M05	1992M11	1993M05	1993M11	1994M05	1994M11
29.1	23.4	22.5	20	21.4	19.6	19.6	21.8	22.9
10.7	9.8	8.1	6.5	6.5	6.2	6.6	7.9	7.6
11.9	10	8.8	6.7	6.8	7.2	6.8	6.7	6.6
..	7.1	6.8	5	4.4	4.5	4.3	4.4	4.2
..	8.7	6.8	9.6	8.3	5.8	5.3	2.3	..
4	2.6	3.1	2.5	2.6	2.9	2.5	2.6	6.7
31.2	32.1	39.1	46	45.8	49.8	50.8	50.1	44.9
6.4	5.4	4.1	3.1	3.4	3.4	3.5	3.9	6.7
..
6.8	0.8	0.6	0.5	0.8	0.6	0.6	0.4	0.5

1995M05	1995M11	1996M05	1996M11	1997M05	1997M11	1998M05	1998M11	1999M05
25.1	25.7	25.7	25.8	30.4	29.2	27.2	24.6	26.4
8.3	6.8	6.8	6.9	6.8	6.1	5.9	5	4.7
7.1	5.2	5.9	6.5	5.9	6.5	6.8	4.9	4.2
4	3.8	3.7	4.7	4.6	4.6	4.7	11.1	11.9
..
6	12.1	8.7	7.4	6.4	4.9	5.7	4.3	4.1
36	34.2	36.9	34.7	34.9	39.2	40.1	36.3	34.1
12.9	11.7	11.6	12	10.4	8.4	8.5	12	13.2
..
0.7	0.6	0.7	2.1	0.7	1.1	1.1	1.8	1.4

1999M11	2000M05	2000M11	2001M05	2001M11	2002M05	2002M11	2003M05	2003M11
25.2	24.6	23.9	23.6	23.8	21.9	15.3	16.8	20
4.5	4.6	4.6	7.2	5.8	5.4	5.8	6.5	6.6
5.3	5.2	4.6	4.9	4.9	5.1	13.7	14.5	13.6
11.1	10.9	12.5	10.1	9.6	9.2	8.5	8.2	7
..
4.5	4.6	3.7	3.4	3.3	3.2	3.9	4.6	4.5
36.1	35.4	35.3	36.7	39.9	43.1	41.3	38.3	36.9
12.2	13.3	14	12.6	11.4	10.4	9.1	9.1	9.3
..
1.2	1.4	1.4	1.6	1.3	1.7	2.5	2.1	2.2

2004M05	2004M11	2005M05	2005M11	2006M05	2006M11	2007M05	2007M11	2008M05
21.6	23.4	27.7	25.9	25.9	24.9	23.9	22.6	22.4
6.6	6.7	6.5	5.9	6.2	7.1	6.5	6.2	6.2

11.7	12	11.7	11.1	10.9	6.8	5.9	6.5	6.8
6.2	5.5	4.4	4.8	5.8	5.7	4.4	4.6	4.6
..
4.6	4.7	4.4	4.1	4.7	5.5	5.5	5.2	5.9
37.7	37.9	34.7	37.1	37.5	40.4	45	45.9	44.7
9.5	7.6	7	5.7	5.8	5.4	5	5.1	5.1
..
2.2	2.2	3.5	5.5	3.3	4.2	4	3.9	4.2

2008M11	2009M05	2009M11	2010M05	2010M11	2011M05	2011M11	2012M05	2012M11
24.8	29.9	26.2	29.2	32.4	31.1	33.4	28.6	28.1
5.9	5.5	5	4.6	5.8	4.5	5.5	4.7	4.4
6	5.5	6.5	5.8	6.8	6	5.6	5.5	5.5
4.5	4.3	4.8	4.5	4.3	3.8	3.8	3.7	3.8
..
6.1	6	8.4	10.7	8.8	8.9	11.7	8.1	8.6
42.3	36.6	36.5	33.8	29	34	27.7	37.3	34.8
5.7	5.7	5.1	5.6	4.7	4.5	5.2	5.9	5.8
..	6.7	5.7	5.7	5.4	7.9
4.7	6.4	7.5	5.7	1.5	1.5	1.4	0.8	1.2

Appendix C: Party-preference 1972-2010

Party-preference	1972M11	1973M02	1973M05	1973M11	1974M05	1974M11	1975M05	1975M11
M	10.6	10.8	12.8	13	13.2	13.3	13.6	13.9
C	25.4	27.3	26.6	26.3	24.8	23.6	23.7	22
FP	10.9	10.3	9.3	7.7	6.7	7	6.2	8.2
KD
NYD
MP
S	47.2	45.4	45.8	47.8	49.4	50.3	50.7	50.7
V	3.9	4	3.6	3.5	3.9	3.7	3.8	3.5
SD
others	2	2.2	1.9	1.8	1.9	2.1	2	1.8

1976M02	1976M05	1976M11	1977M05	1977M11	1978M05	1978M11	1979M02	1979M05
13.5	15.3	13.2	14.3	13.7	14.1	14.3	14.2	15.2
20.9	18.8	23	21	21.8	19.5	20	18.7	19.3
9.4	10.6	11	8.5	9.1	9.6	10.8	13	13.1
..
..
..
51.2	50.4	47.8	51.5	50.6	52	50	49.2	47.3
3.2	3.2	3.1	3	3.1	3.2	3.4	3.3	3.4
..
1.6	1.7	1.9	1.8	1.7	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6

1979M11	1980M05	1980M11	1981M05	1984M05	1984M11	1985M05	1985M11	1986M05
19	20.3	19.6	21.8	24.1	26.1	25.9	18.9	16.6
17.1	16.4	15.1	13	13.7	13.2	11.8	9.5	9.8
10.3	7.3	6.1	5	6.3	6.4	6.4	15.8	15.1
..
..
..	1.8	1.4
47.4	49.7	52.4	53.7	48.8	46.7	48.3	47.9	51.7
4.6	5.1	5.2	5.1	3.3	3.6	3.6	3.8	3.5
..
1.6	1.3	1.6	1.4	3.8	4.1	3.9	2.2	1.9

1986M11	1987M05	1987M11	1988M02	1988M05	1988M11	1989M05	1989M11	1990M05
17	16.4	18.3	17.4	18.1	16.4	18.4	22.1	25.7
9.7	9.5	8.7	9	9	10.9	11.6	10.4	10.9
14.9	14.5	14.6	14.5	12.8	11.1	10.7	11.7	11.1
..	1.1	2.4	2.1	2.1	2.9
..
2	5.8	6.6	5.8	5.9	5.7	6	5.3	4.8
51.3	49	47.2	48.7	49.1	48.9	46	42.7	37.7
3.5	3.4	3.1	3.4	3.6	4.3	4.8	5.3	6.3

..
1.6	1.4	1.4	1.3	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.6
1990M11	1991M05	1991M11	1992M05	1992M11	1993M05	1993M11	1994M05	1994M11
28.4	23.8	24.5	21.5	23.8	21.4	20.2	20.7	22.3
10.1	8.5	8.6	6.3	6.4	6.4	6.7	7.6	7.7
10.7	8.7	9	7	6.8	7.1	6.8	6.7	6.6
5.3	7.3	6.6	4.7	3.5	3.4	2.9	2.8	2.6
..	6.9	4.7	7.2	6.1	4.1	3.7	1.6	..
3.7	2.2	2.4	2.3	2.3	2.5	2.2	2.3	4.4
35.7	37	39.8	47.7	47.8	51.5	53.5	54.7	50.3
5.3	4.8	4.1	3.1	3	3.1	3.5	3.3	5.5
..
0.6	0.8	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.5	0.5	0.3	0.7
1995M05	1995M11	1996M05	1996M11	1997M05	1997M11	1998M05	1998M11	1999M05
23.5	24.5	25.4	25.8	31.6	29.3	28.4	24.9	26.3
8.1	6.8	6.6	6.6	6	5.6	5.6	5.1	4.7
6.9	5.4	5.4	5.7	5.5	6.4	6.5	5.8	5.1
2.5	2.7	2.7	3.6	3.4	3.8	4.3	8.6	9.5
..
4.9	10.6	8.7	8.3	6.5	5.2	5.6	4.9	4.9
43.1	38.9	40.1	38.2	36.3	40.6	40.6	38.9	36.6
10	10.5	10.5	10.6	10.1	8.5	8.3	10.6	12.2
..
0.8	0.6	0.7	1.2	0.8	0.7	0.8	1.2	0.6
1999M11	2000M05	2000M11	2001M05	2001M11	2002M05	2002M11	2003M05	2003M11
25.6	24.9	23.9	22.2	22.6	20.6	15.8	17.3	19.6
4.9	5.3	4.4	6.8	5.9	5.7	6	5.9	6.3
5.7	5.6	4.7	5.2	5	5.1	12.2	12.3	12.4
9.2	8.3	9.3	7.6	7.6	6.3	6.7	6.4	5.8
..
4.9	5.1	4.4	4	3.3	3.2	4.2	4.5	4.9
37.8	37.5	39	40.4	43.9	48.4	44.7	43.7	41.3
11.4	12.5	13.5	13.1	11.1	9.7	9.3	9.1	8.9
..
0.5	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.6	1	1.2	0.9	0.9

2004M05	2004M11	2005M05	2005M11	2006M05	2006M11	2007M05	2007M11	2008M05
21.9	23.2	28.8	27.9	27.8	27.2	25.8	25.3	24.1
5.5	6.3	6.1	6.3	6	7.4	6	5.6	5.6
10.6	9.5	9.2	8.9	8.9	7.3	6.5	6.9	7
5.2	4.4	4	3.6	4	5	3.9	3.4	3.5
..
4.5	5.5	4.6	4.5	4.9	5.9	6.1	5.7	6.4
42	41.9	37.7	39.3	40.4	38.6	44	45.2	45.3
9.3	8.1	7.8	6	6	5.7	5.3	5.7	5.4
..
0.9	0.9	1.8	3.5	2.1	2.8	2.4	2.3	2.7
2008M11	2009M05	2009M11	2010M05	2010M11				
27.2	31.2	29.8	32.1	34.9				
5.4	4.9	4.5	3.9	4.8				
6.2	6	7.1	6.8	7				
3.4	3.4	3.9	3.6	3.7				
..				
6.1	6.4	8.2	10.6	9.9				
42.5	37.8	36.4	32.6	30.5				
5.9	5.7	4.9	6.1	5.1				
..	2.9	3.1				
3.2	4.5	5.1	1.5	0.9				

Appendix D: Discrepancy from SOM-data (<http://www.som.gu.se/>)

1985	Vote- intention	Party- preference		1988	Vote- intention	Party- preference	Discrepancy
V	4.7			V	5.5	4.6	0.9
S	47.9			S	44.3	43.4	0.9
C	9.4			C	11.3	10.3	1
FP	14.1			FP	13	12.3	0.7
M	20.2			M	16	15.7	0.3
KD	1.3			KD	2.7	3.4	-0.7
MP	2.2			MP	6.9	8.2	-1.3
Others	0.2			Others	0.2	2.1	-1.9
				Total			4.4

1991	Vote- intention	Party- preference	Discrepancy	1994	Vote- intention	Party- preference	Discrepancy
V	5.1	4.6	0.5	V	6	6.9	-0.9
S	37.3	31.9	5.4	S	44.8	43	1.8
C	9	7.3	1.7	C	7.8	7.3	0.5
FP	9.3	9.1	0.2	FP	8.2	8.2	0
M	20.5	21.7	-1.2	M	23.2	21.8	1.4
KD	7.5	8.4	-0.9	KD	4.1	3.4	0.7
MP	3.8	3.6	0.2	MP	4.4	5.4	-1
NYD	6.5	7.3	-0.8	NYD	0.8	1.4	-0.6
Others	0.9	6.2	-5.3	Others	0.7	2.6	-1.9
Total			16.2	Total			8.8

1998	Vote- intention	Party- preference	Discrepancy	2002	Vote- intention	Party- preference	Discrepancy
V	12.1	12.7	-0.6	V	7.9	8.6	-0.7
S	37.4	35.8	1.6	S	42	41.5	0.5
C	5.1	4.5	0.6	C	6.3	6.5	-0.2
FP	5.1	5.1	0	FP	15.8	16.6	-0.8
M	22.2	22.1	0.1	M	13.4	11.6	1.8
KD	11.5	11.6	-0.1	KD	7.8	7.8	0
MP	4.8	5.8	-1	MP	4.6	4.2	0.4
Others	1.8	2.4	-0.6	Others	2.1	3.1	-1
Total			4.6	SD		0.8	5.4
				Total			

2006	Vote- intention	Party- preference	Discrepancy	2010	Vote- intention	Party- preference	Discrepancy
V	5.8	5.9	-0.1	V	5.4	4.4	1
S	34.1	32.8	1.3	S	28.9	26.8	2.1
C	7.5	7.7	-0.2	C	6.6	4.9	1.7
FP	7.8	7.2	0.6	FP	8	7.9	0.1
M	28.2	27.1	1.1				

KD	6.6	6.8	-0.2	M	31.5	33.3	-1.8
MP	5.6	7.8	-2.2	KD	6.3	4.1	2.2
Others	4.5	4.8	-0.3	MP	8.2	11.1	-2.9
SD		2.2		SD	3.9	4.2	-0.3
FI		0.6		FI	0.3	0.7	-0.4
PP		0.5		PP	0.5	1	-0.5
Total			6	Others	0.3	1.6	-1.3
				Total			14.3