

MASTER'S THESIS
INTERNATIONAL ADMINISTRATION
AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

Like a Bridge over Troubled Water: Gender Quotas and Women's Representation

A global, cross-country quantitative analysis of the impact of gender quotas on changed levels of women's representation in national parliaments 2001-2011

Author: Moa Larsson
Advisor: Marcia Grimes

25-05-2012

UNIVERSITY OF GOTHENBURG



ABSTRACT

The development of women's representation the last two decades has put pressure on research explaining the causes underlying high levels. Dahlerup and Freidenvall (2005) argue that high levels of women's representation have to be analysed from two ideal types, the *incremental* track and the *fast* track. Traditionally, women's representation is considered to be the outcome of overall societal development and a measure of the countries' gender-equality, advanced by the incremental track. The widespread adoption of gender quotas, however, has contributed to leaps in women's representation in a broad number of under-developed and gender-unequal countries, advanced by the fast track. This thesis analyses the impact of three gender quota types (reserved seats, legislated candidate quotas, and voluntary party quotas) on the changed levels of women's representation from 2001 to 2011. Particular attention is paid towards the countries' regime types. By using statistical design and a large-N sample, the results from the regression analysis (OLS) suggest that reserved seats have contributed to a large increase in women's representation. The most remarkable finding is that reserved seats and legislated candidate quotas have contributed to leaps in women's representation in non-democratic regimes. The conclusions from the findings are threefold: first, the results confirm the importance of Dahlerup and Freidenvall's two tracks to women's representation. Second, studies of gender quotas need to consider types of quota to be able to capture the impact of quotas. Third, the finding highlights the importance of including the perspective of non-democratic regimes in cross-country studies of women's representation and gender quotas.

Keywords: gender quotas, reserved seats, legislated candidate quotas, voluntary party quotas, women's representation, non-democratic regimes.

UNIVERSITY OF GOTHENBURG

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Figures and Tables

1. INTRODUCTION

In the beginning of the 1990s, the issue of women's under-representation in national parliaments was highlighted by women's movements, international organisations, and political leaders worldwide. At the United Nations' (UN) Conference in Beijing 1995, the participants agreed to encourage countries to adopt gender quotas on order to increase the levels of women's representation. A large number of countries accepted these recommendations and adopted quotas. In 2001, the global average was 12.2 percent women members of the parliament (MPs). Ten years later gender quotas seem to have had the intended impact: In December 2011, the global average of women's representation in national parliaments was 19.7 percent (IPU 2012).

The global average increase, of seven percentage points from 2001 to 2011, is interesting considering women's representation traditionally is claimed to be the outcome of overall societal development. Dahlerup and Freidenvall (2005) call the traditional way of increasing the proportion of women MPs the *incremental track* to women's representation. The incremental track is one of two ideal types that according to Dahlerup and Freidenvall explain cross-country differences in women's representation. According to the incremental track, women's representation is the outcome of a step-wise, time-consuming development where gender equality and the proportion of women MPs follow each other. The countries have in general reached certain level of democracy, and the Scandinavian countries are closest to the ideal type.

By contrast, according to the second ideal type, the *fast track*, women's representation is not an indication of gender equality or development, but rather the outcome of gender quotas. After the UN Conference in Beijing 1995, there have been a remarkable increased number of countries with gender quotas. The leaps of women's representation in non-democratic regimes like Rwanda and Afghanistan are to a large extent explained by gender quotas. Hence, Dahlerup and Freidenvall suggest as a consequence from the last two decades' increased number of countries having gender quotas, high levels of women's representation require an understanding of which the underlying causes are.

The proportion of women MPs at country-level reveals an even more interesting development. There number of countries with more than 30 percent[1] women MPs has increased remarkably the last decade:

Figure 1.1 Number of countries with more than 30 percent women MPs



Source: IPU 2012

As shown in Figure 1.1 the number of countries having more than 30 percent women MPs is more than three times as many 2011 compared to 2001. In 2001 only 8 countries had more than 30 percent women compared to 28 countries in 2011 (IPU 2012). Most of the countries have some type of gender quotas. Several are non-democratic regimes.[2]

The purpose of this thesis is to analyse the last decade's development of women's descriptive representation in national parliaments worldwide. The aim is to study the impact of three gender quota types on the changed country-levels of women MPs between 2001 and 2011. The thesis pays particular attention towards the countries' regime types, as little attention is paid to the development in non-democratic regimes in previous research. There is only limited previous research analysing the impact of gender quotas categorised by types of quota using global, cross-country perspective. By using large-N sample this thesis to study whether gender quotas can act as a *bridge over troubled water* and enable women to enter the national

[1] Some scholars argue 30 percent women MPs is considered to be the critical mass needed for women to be able to have substantial influence over the policy process (McAllister and Studlar 2002, Wängnerud 2009). More about the critical mass is described below.
[2] Pleas see Appendix Table 8.1 for an overview of which these countries are, and how common gender quotas are amongst them.

parliament despite institutional, structural, and cultural barriers that traditionally prevents women for entering the parliament.

2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 The incremental vs. the fast track to women's representation

For a long time the proportion of women in national parliament was considered to be an indicator of the status of countries' gender equality, and the outcome of society's overall development. This is most evident in the Scandinavian countries where women experienced a step-wise inclusion in society's economic and political activities (Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2005). Women's participation in workforce was enabled by welfare solutions, and increased inclusion in workforce led to increased political awareness and political interest among the Scandinavian women. The strengthened position in society experienced by the Scandinavian women was followed by a step-wise increase of the number of women in the national parliaments.

The Scandinavian example inspired Dahlerup and Freidenvall (2005) to construct the ideal type called the *incremental track* to women's representation. According to the incremental ideal type women's representation is explained by institutional factors, such as the electoral system and regime type, structural factors, such as women's workforce participation and economic development, and cultural factors, such as religion (Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2005:27, Wängnerud 2009). Depending on the characteristics of the institutional, structural, and cultural factors, women's political representation is enabled or prevented. High levels of women's representation is a time-consuming process in which the development of women's overall rights and status alongside with women's representation in the national parliament. Hence, according to the incremental ideal type women's representation is a measure of women's overall status and the country's gender equality status (Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2005:27).

During the last decade, however, the validity of the conventional wisdom of women's representation has been questioned. Critical voices argue that the conventional wisdom is based on the wisdom of women's representation in western democracies, thus irrelevant for explaining the proportion of women MPs in developing countries. Some of the countries with

the highest levels of women's representation today, are non-democratic regimes where women's status is low and gender-*in*equalities are more relevant label than equalities. Scholars argue that gender quotas help women overcome the traditional institutional, structural and cultural barriers to become elected, therefore women's representation is not a measure of gender equality or women's status nowadays (Francheschet et al 2012, Paxton et al 2010, Tripp and Kang 2008, Delvine and Elgie 2008, Dahlerup 2006, Jones 2004, Htun 2004, etc.).

Inspired by that last two decades' development, Dahlerup and Freidenvall (2005) constructed the second ideal type to women's representation, the *fast track*. According to the fast track, gender quotas can contribute to leaps in women's representation without being succeeded by societal inclusion of women. Closest to the fast track ideal type are the countries in Latin America. (Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2005:32).

Dahlerup and Freidenvall (2005) suggest the two ideal types explaining women's representation are useful tools for the understanding of women's representation today.

2.2 Why women in parliament?

Several arguments motivate women's presence in national parliaments. Except for the argument of justice; women constitutes half of the world's population and should therefore be present, the literature suggests a large number of other normative, theoretical and empirical arguments. The baseline argument is, however, that gender constructs a dividing line in political contexts.

2.2.1 Politics of presence and women's interests

When Anne Phillips launched her theory of "Politics of Presence" in 1995, a new chapter in the literature on women's representation was started. Until then, the representation on *ideas* had been in focus in the literature on political representation.

> "There are particular needs, interests, and concerns that arise from women's experiences, and these will be inadequately addressed in a politics that is dominated by men."
> Anne Phillips (1995:66)

Explaining the Politics of Presence, Phillips underlines that the political process can never fully be planned in advance, therefore the parliamentarians' personal experience will always

affect their political work to a smaller or larger degree. Hence, if a social category such as gender is under-represented, women's personal experience will be as well. Therefore, the legislative process will not include women's experiences. Women's representation is thence important for a gender-balanced representation of personal experiences. According to the feminist literature, women have certain interests based on their common experiences as women, formulated by the so called *women's interests*.

Phillips' theory is based on discourse of women's interests (Halsaa 1987, Hernes 1987, Jonasdottir 1985). These interests are not genetically associated to women, but rather the outcome of shared experiences of, for instances, care responsibilities, both in the public and the private sphere[3], and gender-related discrimination. Due to the fact that most women share the experiences contributing to the interests of women, the political work of most women MPs will be affected by women's interests[4]. Furthermore, it is believed to be in the interest of women MPs to contribute to the creation of policies which strengthen women's autonomy (Wängnerud 2000:70)[5]. Therefore Phillips' theory and women's interests are important for understanding why women and men MPs are considered to be different from each other.

2.2.3 Women's representation and democracy

Nowadays, women's representation is considered to be an integrated part of liberal democracy. In general the proportion of women MPs is considered an indicator of gender equality and an important factor in the democratization process. (Dahlerup 2006:306, Inglehart, Norris, and Welzel 2002:322). However, the debate surrounding women's representation and democracy reveals somewhat diverse arguments within the different regime types[6]. In semi- or non-democratic regimes is women's representation generally motivated by being a part of democratization process. Therefore, increased levels of women's representation are considered to strengthen democracy. The arguments are more in general terms than those found in the consolidated democracies (Tripp et al 2006:123).

[3] The private sphere is at home and at the public sphere includes the labour market.
[4] According to Wängnerud (2009:53) studies of women's descriptive representation, such as this one, do not need more far-reaching definitions on women's interests. Therefore I will not discuss the concept of women's representation further into detail. More precise definition of women's representation is more important for studies of women's substantive representation. The concepts of descriptive and substantive representation will be discussed below.
[5] One could also include the discourse of empowerment in this context. However, this thesis will not involve the empowerment discourse further into detail.
[6] This thesis includes three different regime types; democratic regimes, semi-democratic regimes and non-democratic regimes. The categorisation is based on Freedom House's Democracy Index. Further details could be found in the Data section.

In the democratic regimes, on the other hand, women's representation is perceived being an Achilles heel in the democratic systems. How could a country be labelled democratic, if women are heavily under-represented? The debate includes more specific arguments of justice and women's interests, rather than the general perception of women's representation as an indication of democratic status (Dahlerup 2006:207). However, women's representation in democratic regimes is still considered to strengthen democracy, even if the arguments are different form those found in other regime types.

2.3 Factors explaining women's representation

Three types of factors explaining cross-country differences in women's representation, is found in the literature: institutional, structural and cultural factors. This thesis primarily focus on the institutional factor gender quotas, however in order to control the strength of the impact of gender quotas, other institutional as well as structural and cultural factors are important to be aware of. Because of the only indirect importance for the purpose of this thesis, structural and cultural factors will be shortly introduced, before turning all of the attention towards the institutional factors.

Figure 2.2 Factors explaining cross-country differences in women's representation



2.3.1 The impact of structural factors on women's representation

During the 1960s and 1970s, economic development in general, and economic growth in particular, was considered to be the panacea to women's involvement in politics (Inglehart and Norris 2003:4). Economic growth would foster societal development which in turn would automatically contribute to the empowerment of women (Inglehart and Norris 2003).

Considering the Scandinavian countries were at top of the world ranking over women's representation, it is easy to understand why a country's economic development was believed to be the most important factor for the number of women MPs: In the Scandinavian countries women's inclusion in the national economy had been followed by a slow but steady increase of women in the national parliaments. However, as scholars continued to study women's representation, the importance of economic development appeared limited. (Ingehart and Norris 2003:5).

Today, the women's participation in the workforce and women's level of education are considered to be the most important structural factors having impact on women's representation (Stockmer and Byrne 2011).

2.3.2 The impact of cultural factors on women's representation

Several studies have found a correlation between culture and the number of women in national parliaments. The dominating culture is believed to have impact on the social norms and the population's attitudes towards women's role in society. In patriarchal societies, women usually face difficulties reaching the political sphere and become a part of the elected body. Religion is believed to be correlated to women's representation (Inglehart and Norris 2003:50). Inglehart and Norris' findings shows that Islam as is negatively correlated with gender equality (2003:68).

2.4 Women's political representation

Hanna Pitkin illuminates the importance of understanding four dimensions of political representation, in the book "The concept of Representation" (1967). Each of the dimensions contributes with a perspective explaining which ways women can be politically represented. Pitkin's four dimensions of representation include; formal, descriptive, substantive, and

symbolic representation. Women's political representation in this thesis involves the representation in national parliaments.

On next page, scholars' interpretation of Hanna Pitkin's four dimensions of representation will be presented. The aim is to provide the reader with information on *how*, and *why* the dimensions are useful tools for the understanding of women's representation in this thesis. Since the purpose of this thesis is to analyse the impact of gender quotas on women's descriptive representation, the primary focus involves the two dimensions of women's formal and descriptive representation. However, Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler (2005) it is useful to have knowledge about the all four dimensions of representation in analysis on women's representation, hence even substantive and symbolic representation will be introduced.

2.4.1 Formal representation – rules of the game

The formal dimension of representation, involves the institutional rules and procedures necessary to select the political representatives. These rules and procedures include for instance the electoral system and use of gender quotas. The formal representation contributes to an understanding of which the institutional barriers are preventing women from being elected. It also describes what mechanisms contribute to high levels of women's representation. (Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005:408).

2.4.2 Descriptive representation – does the parliament mirror the population?

Descriptive representation is defined as "extent the representatives 'stand for' the represented" (Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005:408). The idea behind descriptive representation is that the representatives should mirror the population in important aspects such as gender, age, social background, education, and occupation. Descriptive representation is also called *numerical* representation referring to the number of women MPs (Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005:409). In this thesis, the descriptive dimension of representation includes the proportion of women representatives in the national parliament's single or lower chamber[7].

[7] The descriptive representation could also refer to other factors such as the level of education among women MPs (see for instance Murray 2012). The norm in studies of women's descriptive representation similar to this one, is to measure the proportion of women in the single or lower chamber of the national parliament (IPU 2012, Wängnreud 2009).

2.4.3 Substantive and symbolic representation

As already mentioned, this thesis will not analyse the substantive and the symbolic dimensions of representation since these dimensions are not included by the purpose of this thesis. However, it might be relevant for the interpretation of the results to be familiar with the last two dimensions, thus they will be introduced.

Substantive representation could be understood as policy responsiveness: women MPs are expected to prioritize other policy areas, such as health and child care issues, and behave different compared to men MPs. This is explained by the so called *women's interests*, which were introduced above. Hence, the proportion of women in national parliament is expected to have an impact on the policy outcome. (Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005:409). Pitkin's definition of substantive representation states:

> "Representation here means acting in the interest of the represented, in a manner responsive to them"
> Hanna Pitkin (1967:209)

The symbolic representation includes how the voters perceive the representatives and the work the representatives perform. The symbolic dimension could be measures as the populations' perceptions on whether the parliament is considered legitimate or not. (Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005:409).

2.4 Linking the dimensions of women's representation

According to Pitkin the dimensions of representation are parts of a coherent whole, hence the dimensions need to be analysed in relation to each other (1967:10-11). These relations could be described as links. The purpose of this thesis is to explain what impact gender quotas have on the proportion of women MPs, thus the link between the formal and the descriptive dimensions of representation:

2.4.1 Linking formal and descriptive representation

2.4.1.1 Electoral System and women's descriptive representation

Women's formal representation, i.e. the institutional factors, is expected to have impact on women's descriptive representation, the proportion of MPs who are women.

The country's electoral system is a determinant of how the citizens' votes will transformed into seats in the parliament. Depending on the electoral system's type and characteristics, the parliament is less or more likely to have high levels of women's descriptive representation. In other words: the level of women's representation generally varies between the electoral systems (Paxton et al 2010, Wängnerud 2009). The electoral system is furthermore, considered one of the most powerful predictors of a country's proportion of women MPs (Paxton et al 2010:43, Matland and Taylor 1997:187).

But which types of electoral systems is interesting for the level of women MPs? According to the International IDEA Handbook on Electoral system design the electoral systems are generally categorized into three families; proportional representation systems (PR), plurality/majority systems, and mixed electoral systems[8] (Reynolds et al 2005:3).

PR-systems are in general favourable to women's descriptive representation compared to majority systems[9]. Due to the electoral districts' multi-member characteristics in PR-systems, the political parties are able to use the candidate lists as a measure to promote the election of women candidates. A gender-balanced candidate list give the voters the opportunity to base their choice on other policy concern than gender, but still be able to elect women MPs. (Reynolds et al 2005:61).

Furthermore, PR-systems translate the share of votes a party get into corresponding proportion of seats in parliament. Hence, if the political parties have gender-balanced candidate lists it is likely that the parliament will be gender-balanced as well (Reynolds et al 2005:57). In most PR systems the candidate lists are 'closed' meaning the voters cannot change the ranking of candidates. Thus, if women are placed at electable positions at the candidate lists by the political parties, it is favourable to women's descriptive representation (Reynolds et al 2005:61).

As a contrast to PR-systems, majority systems have single-member districts which encourage the political parties to favour candidates who appeal as many voters as possible. Women

[8] Categorization of electoral system: PR: List Proportional Representation (List PR) and the Single Transferable Vote (STV), Majority (including plurality): First Past The Post (FPTP), Block Vote (BV), Party Block Vote (PBV), Alternative Vote (AV), and the Two-Round System (TRS). Mixed: Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) and Parallel systems (Reynolds et al 2005:3).
[9] Mixed systems are expected to have an impact somewhere in between PR and majority systems.

candidates might therefore have difficulties to compete in the race of becoming the parties' candidate. Because the political parties in general chose candidates who beforehand is known to be accepted by the majority of voters, women's descriptive representation is affected negatively. Generally, the most accepted candidates are politicians with previous experience, hence, in systems where women are under-represented men have more experience and might therefore be preferred candidates. (Reynolds et al 2005:61).

According to research mixed electoral systems seem to be an alternative somewhere in between the PR and the majority systems, thereby the expected impact on women's representation is somewhere in between as well.
To sum up the section on electoral systems and women's descriptive representation, two things stand out: PR-systems contribute to the election of women meanwhile majority systems act as a barrier preventing women from being elected.

2.4.1.2 Regime type and women's descriptive representation

In studies of women's representation it is common to use regime type, i.e. the level of democracy, as a control variable (Dahlerup 2006, Tripp et al 2006, Ingelhart/Norris/Welzel 2003). According to Paxton (1997:445) democratic regimes are believed to improve women's representation through the open competition and free and fair elections.

It is argued, however, that women's representation is not favoured by democracy if cultural, economic and social inequalities are not removed (Yoon 2001:173). Furthermore, Howell (2006) argues that even non-democratic regimes may be able to have high levels of women's descriptive representation due to the lack of competition and absence of free and fair elections. The characteristics of the non-democratic regime type leave a room of manoeuvre for autocratic leaders to place women in the national parliament despite lack of support among the population. In non-democratic regimes it is possible for the political leaders to adopt legislations favouring women's representation and implement these legislations efficiently. (Howell 2006). Hence, it may not be the democratic regime type as such that contribute to high level of women MPs, something confirmed by empirical findings.

Empirical cross-sectional studies on women's representation and regime type show mixed findings. The level of democracy generally does not show any effect on women's representation (Kenworthy and Malami 1999:239, Paxton and Kunovich 2003:113, Reynolds

1999:569). Level of democracy has also shown negative effect in other studies (Paxton 1997, Yoon 2001). According to Paxton et al 2010 no larger cross-national studies has shown positive effect from democracy and women's descriptive representation (Paxton et al 2010:29). Paxton explains the lack of impact of democracy that the effect needs to be analysed over time (Paxton et al 2010:43). Paxton et al longitudinal analysis shows that women's representation takes longer time to accumulate in democratic regimes than in semi-democratic or non-democratic regimes where women's representation is hypothesised to change more easily (Paxton et al 2010:29).

The tendency in studies of the impact of regime type and women's descriptive representation is to focus on democratic regimes. Somewhat surprisingly considering the last two decades' development of women's representation in non-democratic regimes, there seem to be a relative lack of studies paying particular attention to women's representation in non-democratic regimes. (See Paxton et al 2010, Paxton and Kunovich 2003, Yoon 2001, Kenworthy and Malami 1999, Reynolds 1999).

2.4.1.3 Gender quotas and women's descriptive representation

The final important characteristic of the formal dimension of representation and the link to women's descriptive representation is also the characteristics of primary importance in this thesis; gender quotas. The introduction of gender quotas has gained salience within the research on women's representation during the last decades. Leaps in women's descriptive representation have occurred in many countries after the adoption of gender quotas. Since gender quotas constitute part of this thesis' purpose, gender quotas will be described further in detail below. Useful to know at this point is that gender quotas are institutional arrangements which help women to enter the national parliament.

2.4.2 Linking descriptive and substantive representation

As mentioned above, it might be useful for the interpretation of the results from the analysis, to have some understanding of links between dimensions other than the formal and descriptive. This section will introduce the reader to part of the research on the link between women's descriptive and substantive representation.

A growing field of research focuses on the link between descriptive representation and substantive representation, i.e. are women able to affect the policy outcome once elected?

This link is formulated by the *politics of presence*. As mentioned above, the politics of presence is based on the idea that men and women MPs are different form each other. Several empirical studies support the correlation between higher level of women's representation in parliament and changes in terms of policy outcome (Childs and Krook 2008, Wängnerud 2000 & 2005, Bratton 2005, Lovenduski and Norris 2004, Sung 2003, Studlar and McAllister 2002, Dollar et al 2001).

The link between women's descriptive and substantive representation is also studied by the research on women's representation and the Quality and Government[10] (henceforth QoG). Increased levels of women MPs are argued to lead to lower levels of corruption (Dollar et al 2001). Although Sung (2003:718), questions the results found by Dollar et al by arguing that the correlation between women's representation and low levels of corruption are both the outcome of liberal democracy. Charron and Lapuente[11] (2010) contrast Sung's statement by showing empirical findings for a correlation between certain types of non-democratic regimes and low levels of corruption. Relevant for the purpose of this thesis is the fact that even non-democratic regimes seem to be able to have features traditionally associated with democratic regimes.

The section on the link between descriptive and substantive representation ends by introducing the discourse about the *critical mass*. The critical mass theory argues that it is not until the number of women MPs has reached a certain *critical mass* of the total members of parliament, that women are believed to exert influence over the policy process. The critical mass is generally argued to be reach once the parliament has 30 percent women MPs. (Studlar and McAllister 2002:235, Wängnerud 2009:60)

2.4.3 An integrated model of representation

Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler (2005:410) suggest an integrated model of women's representation, by arguing that all four dimensions are likely to be correlated. On the next page, the authors of this thesis has applied gender quotas on the integrated model, by relating

[10] The Quality of Government is "research on the causes, consequences and nature of Good Governance and the Quality of Government (QoG) - that is, trustworthy, reliable, impartial, uncorrupted and competent government institutions." (QoG 2012)

[11] Charron and Lapuente use the definition "authoritarian regimes" in their paper. I chose to write non-democratic regimes in order not to confuse the reader since I will continue to use the definition non-democratic regimes in this thesis. Because both Charron/Lapuente and I refer to the same of countries, there should not be any problem with replacing their definition with non-democratic regimes.

Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler's arguments motivating the integrated model to the theory of gender quotas.

Figure 2.2 Gender quotas applied on Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler's integrated model



The adoption changes the character of the formal dimension. Gender quotas are believed to have impact on women's descriptive representation, i.e. the proportion of women MPs, according to previous research (Dahlerup 2006).

Quotas are also believed to impact the symbolic representation in the sense that adoption of quotas might awake feelings among the citizens and draw public attention towards the issue of gender equality. The adoption of quotas may have impact on the populations' perceptions on gender-related issues. (Bacci 2006).

Referring to the politics of presence, the increased level of women's descriptive representation is expected to have an impact on women's substantive representation. In other words: the increased numbers of women MPs will have an impact on the policy outcome, due to women's interests. (Bacci 2006, Wängnerud 2000 and 2005, Dollar et al 2001).

Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler's (2005) integrated model predicts the increased priority of women's interests the parliament to have an impact on the symbolic representation: By affecting the populations' perceptions of the policy outcome and the overall perceived legitimacy of the parliament's performance. According to Dollar et al (2001:424) women MPs are less likely to sacrifice the common good for personal gains; thereby the increased number of women will strengthen the legitimacy of the parliament.

Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler (2005) would then argue the strengthened legitimacy could contribute to the adoption of new for instance quota regulation, i.e. have an impact on women's formal representation. The conclusion to be drawn from the introduction of the integrated model is that, even if it is not directly relevant for the purpose of this thesis, the adoption of gender quotas could have more impact than controlled for in this thesis.

2.5 Gender Quotas

The centre of interest in this thesis is the impact of gender quotas on women's descriptive representation. Following section aims at introducing gender quotas and former research on the impact from quotas on women's descriptive representation.

2.5.1 Introducing gender quotas

As mentioned above, gender quotas are institutional mechanisms that countries can use to increase the number of women MPs. Gender quotas are not a one-single phenomenon, but rather there are a several types of quotas. In cross-country analysis on the impact of quotas it could be important to separate the different quota types due to research expect the types to have different impact on women's descriptive representation. This thesis will divide quotas into three types; reserved seats, legislated candidate quotas, and voluntary party quotas (Krook 2009, Quotaproject 2012).

The different quota types and the impact on women's representation are topics discussed further below. First the definition of gender quotas, used in this thesis will be presented:

> "Electoral gender quotas may be defined as legal or voluntary regulations that for public elections require a certain number or percent of women or of both sexes on one of the three levels" [12] Drude Dahlerup (2007:79)

Nowadays, gender quotas are considered to be the most powerful predictor of a country's level of women's representation, and a discourse that have gained increased interest within the literature on women's representation during the last 15 years (Tripp and Kang 2008:338,

[12] This thesis will not focus on all three levels but just two of the levels. According to Dahlerup (2006:19-21) gender quotas can target the aspirant level (the nomination process), the candidate level (the political parties' candidate lists), or the parliament (the distribution of seats in the parliament). This thesis will only pay attention to the candidate and the parliament level, since these are the two important in cross-country studies.

Krook 2009). Empirical analyses have shown that quotas have helped women overcome institutional, structural, and cultural barriers preventing women's political representation (Krook 2009, Jones 2004, Htun 2004).

Massive pressure from women's movements together with the attention towards women's under-representation from international organisations, have contributed to a globally spread of quota adoption. As a result, 106 countries have some type of gender quotas today. (Quotaproject 2012, Dahlerup 2007:73). Usually gender quotas are considered a temporarily measure to increase the number of women MPs (Bjarnegård and Zetterberg 2011:187).

Gender quotas are found in all types of countries considering regime type, electoral systems, level of human development, religions, etc. Hence, the internal variation is large within the group of countries having gender quotas (Dahlerup 2008:322).

2.5.2 Beijing 1995 and the changed international norm

At the UN's Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing 1995[13] the issue global under-representation of women in national parliament was discussed (UN 1995). Women's representation gained salience during the beginning of the 1990s, much due to women's movements which managed to bring the issue to the global political agenda (Dahlerup 2006:5). In Beijing 1995, the participants agreed to encourage the adoption of gender quotas in order to increase the number of women in national parliaments (Dahlerup 2006:4). Beijing 1995, marks a shift in the international norm about how gender quotas are framed: from being a highly controversial institutional mechanism before 1995, to have become an accepted tool to increase women's representation nowadays.

2.5.3 Critique on quotas

Even if gender quotas are widely accepted nowadays, there are still controversies related to the quotas. Depending the interpretation of the concept of equality, gender quotas could be described to either discriminate men, or help women by removing institutional, structural, and cultural barriers which prevents women from being elected (Bacci 2006:33, Dahlerup 2007:33-34). Equality can be understood as either equal *opportunities* or equal *results*. Before the Beijing Conference in 1995, equal opportunities was the most common interpretation.

[13] Henceforth referred to as "Beijing 1995". The participating countries, international organisations and NGOs agreements were summarized in the document "Platform for Action".

However, as a consequence from the global change in attitude towards gender quotas, today, equal results is the more common interpretation.

Table 2.1 Arguments for and against quotas

Quotas Proponents	Quota Opponents
➢ Equal Results	➢ Equal Opportunity
➢ Conventional merit underestimated women's experiences	➢ Conventional merits are the only true merits
➢ Gender is a merit	➢ Gender is **not** a merit
➢ Quotas compensate for institutional, structural, and cultural barriers	➢ Quotas discriminates men
➢ Goal: gender equality	➢ Goal: gender equality

Source: Murray 2012, Francheschet and Piscopo 2012, and O'Brien 2012, Bacci 2006, Htun and Jones 2002

The traditional way of understanding equality, which is generally found among quota opponents, is that everyone should have the same opportunity to be politically represented. Therefore, quota opponents argue, gender quotas discriminate men since not all people are treated the same (Bacci 2006:33). The goal for quota opponents is a gender blind polity where the most important factor in the political recruitment process is merits[14]. A competitive process where merits are in centre of attention should lead to recruitment of the best qualified political representatives. Quota opponents argue the recruitment of parliamentarians should deal with merits and not gender of the candidates, since the opponent do not consider gender a merit (Bacci 2006:34, Htun and Jones 2002:35). Quota opponents are not against gender equality, but against quotas since quotas discriminate men (Bacci 2006:34). Furthermore, gender quotas contribute to decreased competence among the parliamentarians, since quotas replace qualified men MPs with less qualified women MPs (Francheschet et al 2012).

The traditional interpretation of equality stands in contrast with the feminist perspective. According to feminist theory equality of results is considered most fair and gender quotas the tool to reach equal results. Quotas defenders argue there is no such thing as equal opportunity for men and women to become elected. Women's political representation is prevented by institutional, structural, and cultural barriers; hence only in a world where those barriers do not exist will men and women have the same opportunities. Quotas compensate women for

[14] The interpretation of merit is described on next page.

the barriers and enable equal results. Furthermore, quota proponents consider gender to be a relevant merit for political representation. Hence, the traditional way of defining merits are not sufficient enough to include women's merits. (Bacci 2006:34).

2.6 Types of gender quotas

The many definitions of quota types could be described as a quotas 'jungle' (Delvine and Elgie 2008, Dahlerup 2006, Htun 2004, Jones 2004). However, Drude Dahlerup suggests a categorisation of quotas that enable cross-country studies on the impact of quotas. Dahlerup's three types include: reserved seats, legislated candidate quotas, and voluntary party quotas:

Table 2.2 Gender Quota Types

Reserved seats	Reserves a certain number of seats in the parliament exclusively for women.
Legislated candidate quotas	The political parties are obliged by the law or constitution to have a certain minimum of women candidates at their party lists.
Voluntary party quotas	Rules or targets voluntarily set by political parties, that require a minimum number of women candidates at the party lists.

Source: Dahlerup 2006:21, Quotaproject 2012

2.6.1 Reserved seats

The reserved seats quota type is primarily found in Africa, Asia and the Middle East, generally in semi-democratic or non-democratic regimes (Krook 2009:6, Tripp and Kang 2008:358). Characteristic for countries that have adopted reserved seats is, furthermore, that the countries traditionally have very low levels of women's representation (Krook 2009:6).

There are different versions of this quota type; the quota provision could either guarantee a certain number of women in the national parliament by creating separate candidate districts for women, or create separate electoral rolls particularly for women. A third way is to distribute the parliamentary seats among women based the political parties' proportions of votes. (Krook 2009:6). The most important feature of reserved seats, and the common denominator for all versions, is that certain number of seats in the national parliament is reserved exclusively for women (Krook 2009:7). Therefore, this thesis will include all versions of reserved seats into one type.

What separates reserved seats from the two other quota types, is that it involve the parliamentary level of the electoral process. Reserves seats are the least common quota type among the countries; 18 countries[15] have it at the moment (Quotaproject 2012). The reserved seats quota gained popularity after Bejing 1995, and is generally considered to have most impact on women's descriptive representation contributing to leaps in women's representation in for instance Rwanda and Mozambique. (Krook 2009, Dahlerup 2006, Htun 2004).

2.6.2 Legislated candidate quotas

Legislated party quotas are national regulation demanding all political parties to ensure a certain number of women at the electoral candidate lists. The legislated candidate quotas could either establish a minimum proportion of women on the party lists, or both demand a minimum proportion of women candidates *and* mandate the placement of the women candidates (Jones 2004:1204). If the legislation require both a minimum of women, *and* mandates the placements the impact from legislated candidate quotas on women's descriptive representation is expected to be largest.

There are several cases where legislated candidate quotas have had significant effect on women's descriptive representation, for instance in Argentina (Francheschet and Piscopo 2012:45), in Costa Rica (Jones 2004:1203), and in France (Murray 2012:27). Today there are 40 countries[16] having legislated quotas

2.6.3 Voluntary party quotas

Voluntary party quotas are voluntary quotas adopted by one or several political parties in the country. The political parties that have adopted voluntary quotas have written into their internal regulation that they must take positive action in order to present gender-balanced candidate list. (Matland 2006:282, Dahlerup 2007:78 and 2006:20).

Voluntary party quota is the most common type of gender quota, at the moment found in 50 countries[17]. In some countries political parties have chosen to adopt voluntary quotas beyond the legislated candidate or reserved seats quotas. In those cases the political parties consider

[15] Today 18 countries have reserved seats, please see appendix for list of countries (Quotaproject 2012).
[16] At the moment 40 countries have legislated candidate quotas, please see appendix for list of countries (Quotaproject 2012).
[17] At the moment 50 countries have voluntary party quotas, please see appendix for list of countries (Quotaproject 2012).

the national quota to be set too low and therefore voluntarily adopt an additional quota. Hence, it is possible for countries to have both reserved seats/legislated candidate quotas *and* voluntary party quotas.[18]

The adoption of voluntary party quotas is generally considered to primarily have a symbolic value in terms of the political parties signals women's representation and gender equality are prioritizes issued within the party [19] (Matland 2006). The expected impact on women's descriptive representation is therefore limited.

2.7 Do quotas always work?

Since the mid-1990s when the number of countries adopting electoral gender quotas set off, the world has experienced some historical leaps in women's representation at country-level (Tripp et al 2006:112). Several studies find that the adoption of gender quotas has had impact on women's descriptive representation (Murray 2012, Francheschet and Piscopo 2012, O'Brien 2012, Araujo and Garcia 2006:100). However, there are also countries where gender quotas have not had the expected strong positive impact on women's descriptive representation (Krook 2009:6, Araujo and Garcia 2006:99-100, Nanivadekar, 2006:119, Freidenvall 2006:78, Jones 2004:1203). In other words: gender quotas do not automatically lead to dramatic increased number of women MPs (Dahlerup 2006:10, Matland 2006:278). One reason for lack of impact could the that gender quotas are believed to have a time-delayed impact on women's representation (Araujo and Garcia 2006:100).

2.8 Gender Quotas and Democracy

Gender quotas have been implemented by all types of regimes (Dahlerup 2007:77): consolidated democracies such as France, Norway, and Sweden, as well as non-democratic countries such as Rwanda, Djibouti, and China are all countries with gender quotas. According to Paxton et al (1997:445) gender quotas are believed to have impact in all regime types.

[18] However, according to the data used in this thesis it is only 15 out of 106 countries having both types therefore it should not have an impact on the results from the regression analysis.

[19] Some scholars divide voluntary party quotas into two types depending on which level in the nomination process the quota provision targets; *aspirant* and *candidate* level (Matland 2006:280-281). This thesis will not make such a separation but will include both types in the voluntary quotas category. Due to methodological reasons it would be complicated and time-consuming to collect such data, but first and foremost there are no strong theoretical arguments why the types would be of importance to the results in terms of quantitative analysis.

However, there are diverse opinion among scholars concerning whether or not regime type is a relevant factor to consider in comparative studies of the impact of gender quotas on women's descriptive representation. Jones (2004) for instance includes *only* democratic regimes in his study, assumable because he does not find it relevant to include other regime types. On the topic of whether or not include regime type as a control variable, Tripp and Kang (2008) make following conclusion from their analysis of the impact of gender quotas on women's descriptive representation year 2006 in 153 countries:

> "Our study suggests that there is no strong link between level of democracy and women's representation. We believe that the use of quotas increases rates of female representation in many non-democratic regimes, making regime type unimportant for explaining the numbers of women in parliament"
>
> Aili Maria Tripp and Alice Kang 2008:355

Considering causality, one might argue the opposite of Tripp and Kang's conclusion: since many non-democracies have adopted gender quotas, which have had impact on women's descriptive representation, regime type is an important variable to include when explaining the numbers of women in national parliaments.

Besides, Paxton et al (2010) analyse the impact of democracy, electoral system and gender quotas on women's representation in 110 countries from 1975 to 2000. Paxton et al's findings show that both gender quotas and democracy have significant effects on the level of women's representation over time (Paxton et al 2010:25). In their conclusions, Paxton et al (2010:43) suggest that democracy benefits women's descriptive representation in the long run.

Relevant in the discourse of gender quotas is which role democracy had in the countries' adoption processes. As revealed above, the quotas were motivated in democracies as a mechanism useful to strengthen the democratic legitimacy. In democracies the adoption of gender quotas has been promoted by arguments of justice and the representation on women's interests (Dahlerup 2006:306). The normative debate in democracies thus included women's under-representation in national parliaments as constrain for democratic legitimacy.

In semi- and non-democratic regimes however, the adoption of gender quotas are in general considered a tool contributing to the democratic process. Many countries adopt gender quotas in hopes to send signals to the international community that gender equality is a prioritized

issue in their country. As described above women's representation is traditionally correlated with a country's level of development explained by the incremental track to women's representation. (Tripp et al 2006:123, Dahlerup 2006, Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2005).

Furthermore, even if the national parliament do not have any substantial power, such as the case in non-democratic regimes, gender quotas could be important for women's representation: the increased number of women MPs in non-democracies may in fact prepare women for future political work. Hence, even if women do not have any substantial representation in non-democratic regimes women's presence might be important for the future to come. The effects of quotas might have an important symbolic value for gender equality in all regime types. The presence of women in the national parliament indicates women's political participation as legitimate and may send signals to the population that women have a legitimate role in all parts of society. (Nanivadekar, 2006:119).

Important to consider, not at least in the context of non-democratic regimes, is also that one of the argument to increase the number of women in the legislative body is to improve the quality of governance (Dahlerup 2006:306). As mentioned in the section on why women should be present in the national parliament, findings indicate a correlation between higher levels of women's representation and lower levels of corruption at country-level (Dollar et al 2001). Hence, the increased number of women in national parliament could be important for the quality of government in the long run.

As mentioned above, actors within international community[20] have encouraged countries with low levels of women's representation to adopt gender quotas. Developing countries might accept adoption of gender quotas as a response to the conditions correlated with adjustment programs[21] (Abou-Zeid 2006:173). Structural adjustment programs are considered to be one explanation why non-democracies adopt gender quotas. It is not clear however, whether quotas have the same impact in non-democratic regimes as in democratic regimes.

[20] These actors include for instance the UN, the ASEAN, the African Union, the European Union, etc (Tripp 2003:6)

[21] Structural adjustment programs are policies implemented in developing countries by International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Developing countries get loans on conditioned terms thus have to adopt a certain policy such as gender quotas.

Could the adoption of gender quotas be one small step towards democratization in non-democratic regimes? This is outside of the purpose of this thesis, but is interesting to consider for the interpretations of the results in the analysis. In other words, it remains to see which the impact of gender quotas might be if non-democratic countries with high levels of women's representation all of a sudden takes a turn towards democratization. This is not a completely unrealistic approach considering the heavy pressure for democratization from the international community in countries such as Afghanistan and Rwanda. (Matland 2006:278). However, before considering the potential outcome of women's representation in non-democratic parliaments, there is a need to analyse the impact of gender quotas.

2.9 What to expect.

The world of women's representation has changed after the global spread of gender quotas. The conventional wisdom of the level of women in national parliaments as an outcome from an incremental process is nowadays questioned. Instead scholars suggests a fast track to women's representation have developed where the use of gender quotas contribute to leaps in the number of women MPs, the world have never before seen. The last decade, there has been some remarkable increase in women's representation in non-democratic regimes after the introduction of quotas. At the same time, there is a relative lack of empirical studies using global, cross-country design and large-n sample. Little attention is directed towards the impact in non-democratic regimes. The purpose of this thesis is to analyse the last decade's development of women's descriptive representation in national parliaments worldwide. The aim is to study the impact of gender quotas on the changed levels of women MPs.

2.9 Research questions

1. Which types of countries have gender quotas?
2. Have gender quotas changed levels of women's representation descriptive representation from 2001 to 2011?
3. Does the impact of quota systems differ in countries depending on regime type?

3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY

What is needed in order to answer the research questions above? This section aims at describing the methodology used in the analysis, as well as various pros and cons with the approach used.

3.1 Data and operationalizations

The data used in this thesis is both of quantitative and qualitative (categorical) character, since both types of data are necessary to answer the research questions. In order to conduct regression analysis including variables at the ordinal level of scale some variables have been categorised into so called dummy variables (Sirkin 2006:35). Below the variables will be described into detail including discussion on operationalizations, validity[22], etc.

3.1.1 Data sources[23]

The primary source of data has been the QoG cross-section dataset. However, a number of variables included in this thesis have been collected from other databases in order to complement or update the QoG dataset. The data on gender quotas is collected from the Quotaproject database and data on women's representation from the Inter Parliamentary Union's database. The credibility of the data sources is believed to be high, but as always the trustworthy could and should be questioned. However, the databases used are commonly used and widely recognized in the literature hence considered to be trustworthy.

3.1.2 DEPENDENT VARIABLES

Women's representation 2011

Women's representation in this thesis refers to women's descriptive representation if nothing else is explicitly defined. The norm within research on women's descriptive representation is to operationalise the concept as the proportion of the total members of the national parliament's single or lower chamber who are women (IPU 2012). This thesis uses the established operationalization hence the validity is considered high. The QoG cross-section standard dataset includes measures of women's representation collected during the mid 2000s. The data measuring women's representation 2011 is therefore collected from IPU' database

[22] According to Sirkin (2006:66) operationalizations is "a definition of the way someone or something will be measured to determine the subject's score on a variable". Sirkin (2006:73) defines validity as "the extent to which the concept one wishes to measure is actually being measures by a particular scale or index". Validity is defined as "the likelihood that the scale is actually measuring what it is supposed to measure" (Sirkin 2006:75)

[23] The QoG, IPU, and the Quotaproject databases are described in appendix, for the interested reader.

(2012). The variable included in this thesis is the IPU's measures from the 31st of December 2011 which was the most recent data at the moment of my data collection.

Women's representation 2001

By controlling for level of representation years 2001 the predictions measure the estimated impact of the independent variables on women's representation during the last decade. The lagged dependent variable furthermore functions as an indirect control of independent variables effecting women's representation. Those independent variables affecting women's representation in 2001, and is assumed to have been constant during the following ten years, are controlled for by women's representation 2001. Hence, factors such as region, religion, a country's level of economic, social, and political development, social norms, women's participation in workforce, fertility rates, women's level of education, are all factors which are not assumed to have changed drastically during the last decade but are rather assumed to have been more or less constant at country-level.

In other words, by controlling for women's representation 2001 the lagged dependent variable controls for all mechanism held constant during 2001-2011 but had impact on women's representation 2001. Things which are assumed to have been constant during 2001-2011, but still believed to have had impact on women's representation 2011 are not controlled for. Level of democracy is one such thing that probably been constant, but as described above, it is believed that more non-democratic regimes have high levels of women MPs in 2011 than in 2001. Therefore regime type is not controlled for by women's representation 2001, even if the variable is assumed to have been constant during the last decade.

The choice of year for control is based on two important arguments: First, the conference in Beijing 1995 and the Platform for Action marks the starting-point of international encouragement of the adoption of gender quotas as a tool to increase the proportion of women in national parliaments. The following decade includes a remarkable increase in number of countries adopting gender quotas (Caul 2001, Dahlerup 2006, Tripp and Kang 2008, Schwindt-Bayer 2009). It is argued, however, that the effects of quotas on women's representation have a time-delayed effect. For instance Araujo and Garcia (2006:100) show in their study of the effects of gender quotas in Latin America that the effects of gender quotas were larger in countries experiencing two elections after the quota adoption, compared to the countries only experiencing one election after the quota adoption.

Second, most of the research studying the impacts of gender quotas do not control for the effects on the changes in women's descriptive representation. Paxton et al (2010) study the effects of gender quotas between 1975 to 2000, thus most probably do not capture the effects caused in countries adopting gender quotas after the Beijing Conference 1995. The validity of the variable is considered high, as a consequence of all above mentioned arguments.

The lagged dependent variable is collected from the IPU's measure of women's representation on the 5th of December 2011.

2.3.3 Reversed causality?

In the literature on factors contributing to the adoption of gender quotas, a country's level of women in the national parliament is sometimes mentioned as a factor. According to Caul (2001:1216), the number of women in politics in general and parliament in particular contributed to the adoption of gender quotas in. Thus, there is a risk of reversed causality of the focal relationship studied in this thesis. The risk should be kept in mind, but not overestimated since most studies argue that gender quotas contributes to increased levels of women MPs.

Gender Quotas

The variables measuring the different quota types are based on data from the Quotaproject database (2012). More specified details on the quota variables are described below[24]. The reliability of the quota variable is expected to be fairly high, since it is based on established research finings on gender quotas. What might decrease the reliability is that the categorisation is not yet an established measurement in quantitative research due to the newly established database found at Quotaproject.org.

Reserved seats

The variable measuring the gender quota type reserved seats includes all 196 countries in the QoG dataset. 18 countries have been coded 1, the remaining countries 0. 1 equals the country has reserved seats, 0 equals reserved seats do not exist.

[24] In case of interest, the codebook and dataset could be received from the author.

Legislated candidate quotas

The variable measuring legislated candidate quotas includes all 196 countries found in the QoG dataset. 40 countries have been coded 1 and the remaining countries 0. 1 equals legislated candidate quotas exist, 0 equals legislated candidate quotas do not exist.

Voluntary party quotas

The variable measuring voluntary party quotas includes all 196 countries found in the QoG dataset. 50 countries have been coded 1, the remaining countries 0. 1 equals voluntary party quotas exist, 0 voluntary party quotas do not exist.

Implications of the operationalization of gender quotas

There are several quantitative studies on the impact of gender quotas on women's descriptive representation (Francheschet et al 2012, Paxton et al 2010, Tripp and Kang 2008, Dahlerup 2006, Krook 2003, etc). However, it is a field of research currently under development. One of the implications is related to research methodology. One of the obstacles for this thesis was the absence of consensus on how to measure gender quotas in quantitative studies; some studies include only a dichotomous version of the quota variable. Other studies include only the legislated candidate quotas and pay attention to the implementation process instead. Yet other focus on which level of the political system the quotas target., just to mention some examples (see for instance Francheschet et al 2012, Paxton et al 2010, Tripp and Kang 2008, Dahlerup 2008).

A lot of time and effort was therefore devoted into finding theoretically proper operationalizations in terms of analysing the research questions. There are a wide number of contextual factors and institutional mechanism argued to affect the impact of gender quotas. In fact this theoretical quota "jungle" is so complex there is a need of simplifying the concept as much as possible meanwhile still capturing the most important characteristics.

After the literature study of gender quotas, the decision fell to use operationalizations capturing whether or not the quota is voluntary or legislated by law/constitution. The quota variable also needed to separate reserves seats which target the parliamentary level in the electoral process, from quotas which target the candidate level.[25] According to theory these

[25] Thus I exclude for instance to separate the *aspirant* level from the candidate level, which for instance Dahlerup (2006) encourages to.

are the most important mechanisms in terms of gender quotas' impact on women's representation in analysis of cross-country differences.

Regime type

As gender quota scholars elucidate, the adoption of gender quotas have occurred worldwide and in all types of regimes (Dahlerup 2007, Krook 2003). Hence, even if there is no consensus whether to include regime type in studies of women's representation, the fact that quotas have become a widespread phenomenon even in semi- and non-democratic regimes is reason enough to include regime type as an independent variable. To measure regime type, the Freedom House variable Polity/Democracy imputed version found in the QoG cross-section dataset from 2011, was used[26] (QoG 2012). The variable is an index of the countries' average values on Freedom House's variables measuring civil liberties and political rights. The index used to measure polity/democracy is transformed into a scale from 0 to 10 where 0 equals the least democratic and 10 the most democratic. In order to capture the effects of the regime type in reference to each other I have coded the index in three categories: democratic regime type, semi-democratic regime type, and non-democratic regime type. The democratic category includes countries scoring from 7-10 on the democracy index. The semi-democratic countries scores 3-6 on the democracy index. Non-democratic countries are those scoring 0-2 on the democracy index. This categorisation is similar to the one used by Tripp and Kang (2008:348).

It could be argue the categorization is too broad, and that there are more than three types of regimes. However, in regression analysis there is a risk of using too many independent. This thesis, however, is rather interested in analysing the general trends of the impact of regime types than the specific impact. Therefore the validity of the variable could be considered as high.

Electoral system

One of the most influential explanatory factors to the level of women's representation is the country's electoral system (see for instance Wängnerud 2009:54). This thesis includes three dummy variable measuring electoral systems; PR, mixed, and majority systems. The majority dummy also includes plurality electoral systems. There are several variables measuring

[26] The variable is coded as fh_ipolity2 in the QoG dataset.

electoral system in the QoG standard dataset (2011). The choice fell on the variable iaep_es from the Institutions and Elections Project at Binghamton University, because of its large sample of countries and because the variable was the one closest to the operationalization used in the thesis. The original variable contains four categories, separating majority and plurality systems. Majority and plurality are transformed into one variable.

The variable measuring electoral systems is broad. However, the purpose of this thesis is to analyse the general impact of the characteristics of electoral systems, and since the most important features of the electoral systems in analysis of women's representation to be included on my operationalization the validity is considered high.

Structural and cultural factors

According to theory, structural factors such as economics development, women's education, and the proportion of women included in the workforce, may have effect on women's descriptive representation. In order to capture the overall impact from structural factors, the human development index (HDI) was used. The UNDP's HDI, is a composite index which measures the countries' average development based of three dimension; long and healthy life, knowledge, and decent living standards. The variable includes life expectancy at birth, adult literacy rate, enrolments for primary, secondary, and tertiary schools, and GDP per capita in purchasing power parity (PPP) US dollars. In a sense the HDI is expected to be the outcome of social norms, hence it is also an indirect control of cultural factors with potential impact on women's representation.

The HDI is a very broad control variable, meaning it controls for overall development rather than specific factors such as women's participation in workforce. Using HDI could be criticized for being too broad, and therefore not being able to capture specific factors affecting women's representation. In cross-country studies with large-n sample, such as this one, the broad content of HDI could be considered a strength as it controls for a large amount of important indicators of a country's level of development. It would give regression models rather impossible to overview, if each and every variable that is included in the HDI were controlled for individually. Therefore the reliability of the HDI is considered to be high as a control variable for structural, and to some extent even cultural, factors theoretically argued to have impact on women's representation. HDI is coded as undp_hdi in the QoG standard

dataset (2011). The HDI was transformed into two dummy variables indicating whether the country falls below or above the mean.

Culture is more specifically operationalized as religion in this thesis, just as it is in Ingelhart and Norris (2003). According the Inglehart and Norris, Islam is negatively correlated to women's representation. The variables measuring religion are found in the QoG standard dataset (2011) and are an estimation of the proportion of countries in each country belonging to Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, and "other" religions. The variables are coded as lp_muslim80, lp_catho80, lp_protmg80, and lp_no_cpm80 in the QoG dataset.

It could be argued that religion is not at fully satisfying operationalization of the concept of culture. However, it is a commonly used definition therefore I consider the validity to be high.

3.2 Methodology

3.2.1 Research design

In order to answer the research questions which include a global, cross-country perspective, statistical design is probably the only realistic design to use. By using statistical methodology enables analysing large amounts of data, and to study the global impact of gender quotas under control for other relevant factors (institutional, structural, and cultural). Most previous research on women's representation and gender quotas are conducted with qualitative methods or quantitative methods with small-n sample (Krook 2009:5). It could therefore be argued that the field of research is more suitable for qualitative studies. However, the quantitative character of the research questions more or less demands statistical analysis. Furthermore, since a growing field of research on the link between women's descriptive and substantive representation using quantitative methods, the impact of gender quotas is necessary to include thus quantitative studies of the impact of gender quotas are crucial. This thesis contributes to the field of research showing that gender quotas could easily be a part of large-n statistical analysis.

3.2.2 Disposition of analysis

The analysis will be presented in two main sections. The first section could be described as an operationalization of the theory section. The first section provides the reader with descriptive statistics and bivariate analyses of the variables which are included in the thesis. The purpose

is to familiarize the reader with data and the variables included in the regression analysis in section two, and more specifically to answer research question number one. The tables and figures included in section one illustrate the distribution of countries along the established variables categorized in accordance with gender quota type, which assists our understanding in the interpretation of the results in section two. Section two includes regression analysis using the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) method. The purpose of section two is to answer research questions number two and three.

The results in section two will be the primary basis of which the conclusions of this thesis' contributions to the research and public debate will be drawn. The regression models presented in section two illustrates the impact of gender quotas under control for the factors which according to conventional wisdom explains cross-country variation in women's representation. The regression analyses the cross-section effects as well as the effects on changed levels of women's representation during the last decade by controlling for women's representation 2001.

3.2.3 Reliability

As always there is a risk of unsystematic mistakes during the working process. An additional risk in this thesis is the fact that the author have to a large extent collected, recoded and transformed the data used. A lot of work has been spent on the data processing. These procedures have been necessary in order to conduct the thesis, and to be able to answer the research questions. The author's awareness of the risk of mistakes is high, and has consequentially been as accurate as possible during the working process. The variable transformations have been double checked, some mistakes have been found and corrected, thus believe the risk of mistakes seriously affecting the statistical analysis to be small.

3.2.4 External validity

The results in this thesis have large potential to be generalized into broader terms. If countries that do not have gender quotas at the moment, decide to adopt quotas the impact would probably be similar to the results of this thesis, taking into consideration the country characteristics as well as quota type. Since this analysis uses large-n sample and gender quotas are expected to be adopted in all types of regimes, the external validity of this thesis is expected to be high.

3.2.5 Regression analysis

In the field of statistical analysis, there are several useful methodological tools for analysing large amount of data. Considering my aim to analyse the impact of gender quotas on women's representation over time (2001-2011), time-series regression might be the first hand choice to many. After considering the advantages and disadvantages to use time-series analysis compared to those of Ordinary Least Squares regression (OLS) with a lagged dependent variable and complementary descriptive/bivariate analysis, the choice fell on the later for two main reasons:

First, the time-perspective of interest in my thesis includes only ten years. Furthermore, since the research questions focus on the women's representation at one point of time; 2011, but instead aims at control the changes during the last decade, OLS seemed most usable. The development as such is not of interest in this thesis, but rather which factors are relevant in terms of the changed proportion of women MPs the last ten years.

Second, the theoretical framework surrounding gender quotas is complex. Therefore, it was important to simplify the analysis as much as possible without compromising with the quality of the analysis. OLS with a lagged dependent variable provides easily understandable statistical analysis. The descriptive and bivariate statistical analysis aims at simplifying the issue as well.

4. ANALYSIS

By using the theoretical framework provided in previous sections, and using the statistical methodology described above, this section aims at answer the research questions by presenting the results of the analysis.

Research Questions

1. Which types of countries have adopted gender quotas?
2. Have gender quotas changed levels of women's representation descriptive representation from 2001 to 2011?
3. Does the impact of quota systems differ in countries depending on regime type?

4.1 Section 1: Descriptive statistics and bivariate analysis

Section 1 provides bivariate analysis and descriptive statistics. The conclusions from the results will be described right after the results are presented since the conclusions from section 1 are needed to be aware of in section 2's regression analysis.

4.1.1 Dependent variable: Women's representation

Scholars agree that women's representation has experienced some interesting increase at country-level since the issue was highlighted in the beginning of the 1990s (see for instance Wängnerud 2009, Norris 2000, or Matland 1998). This thesis treat women's representation year 2011 as the dependent variable, hence the underlying purpose of all tables and figures is to, directly or indirectly, explain the proportion of women MPs in national parliaments in December 2011. So, if the countries are grouped together in accordance to quota type, which are the average levels of women's representation today? And equally interesting, which were the average levels in these countries a decade ago in 2001, before the effects from gender quotas in the developing countries is believed to have occurred? Figure X.1 below illustrates the proportion of women in the national parliament in 2011 (dark grey piles) and 2001 (light grey piles):

Figure 4.1 Women's representation 2011 and 2001



Comment: The proportion of women in the single or lower chamber 2011 and 2001 measured as percent of the total number of members of parliament. Based on IPU's measures. The countries are grouped in accordance with quota belonging. The quota types included in the table are reserved seats, legislated candidate and voluntary party quotas based on Dahlerup's categorization on quotaproject.org. *Sources:* Quota variables: Quotaproject.org 2012, please see codebook Larsson 2012 for detailed information about how the variables are coded. Source: IPU (2011) and QoG Standard dataset time-series (2001)

As we see in figure 4.1, women's representation has increased in all five categories of countries: in terms of average world level, countries with quotas, and in countries without quotas. The most remarkable increase has occurred in the countries having the reserved seats gender quota. Women's representation has more than doubled that past ten years in these countries: from an average of 9.3 percent women MPs in 2001, to an average of 23.5 percent in 2011. Furthermore, another interesting observation is that the countries having implemented reserved seats have the highest average of women's representation out of the five categories today, but had the lowest average of women MPs in 2001. It seems like women's representation and reserved seats are correlated, and if the regression analysis shows they are could the starting-point of women's representation in year 2001 be correlated to the effects of reserved seats in terms of increased levels of women's representation the following decade? The possibility of an interaction effect between women's representation in 2001 and gender quota type will be analysed in section two's regression analysis.

In the group of countries having legislated candidate quotas, women's representation has in average increased with 10.5 percentage points during the last decade. The countries having voluntary party quotas have in average experienced 7 percentage points increased levels during the same period, an increase slightly below the average global increase of 7.7

percentage points. However, yet another indication of the possible effect from gender quotas in terms of increased levels of women MPs the last ten years, is the average increase in countries without any type of quota: 3.8 percentage points.

Conclusions to be drawn from figure 4.1 would be as follow: During the last ten years, women's representation has experienced some remarkable increases. Especially interesting increases have occurred in countries having gender quotas, confirming the importance of analysis the effects from gender quotas in relation to the established explanatory variables to women's representation, in section two.

Before the focus turns towards the independent variables, the country-level variation in terms of changed levels of women's representation during the last decade will be looked upon. Table 4.1 analyses the variation at the dependent variable women's representation 2011 under control for the levels of women MPs 2001, when the countries are groups in accordance with gender quota types:

Table 4.1 Change in levels of women's representation 2001 - 2011 (percentage points)

	Average change	Min.	Max.
Reserved seats	13.4	-0.7	30.3
Leislated candidate quotas	10.8	-1.5	27.2
Voluntary party quotas	6.8	-9.10	30.2
World	6.9	-13.7	43.0
Without quotas	4.79	-13.7	43.0

Comment: The figure illustrates the differences in women's representation from year 2001 to year 2011 at country-level, grouped after quota type. The variable measures the differences in proportion of women in the single or lower chamber 2011 subtracted by the level for year 2001, thus the variable should be understood in percentage points. The countries are grouped in accordance with quota belonging. The quota types included in the table are reserved seats, legislated candidate and voluntary party quotas based on Dahlerup's categorization on quotaproject.org. *Sources:* Women's representation 2011 and 2001: IPU (2011) and QoG standard dataset time-series (2001), Quota variables: Quotaproject.org 2012, please see codebook Larsson 2012 for detailed information about how the variables are coded.

In table 4.1 the differences in proportion of women MPs at country-level during the period 2001 – 2011 is revealed. The table shows the range of the variable measuring the changed levels seen from the different quota types and the global average. The table's contribution to the thesis is first and foremost that it reveals even decreased levels of women in the national parliaments during the period –even in countries with gender quotas. Thus the dependent

variable women's representation year 2011 contains considerable internal variation under control for women's representation ten years earlier. The minimum values for changed levels in women's representation within the groups of countries having the reserved seats and legislated candidate quotas, indicate that the country with largest decrease in women's representation in each group has not decreased as much as the corresponding countries within the voluntary party quotas group of countries and the world. Could reserved seats and legislated candidate quotas possibly contribute to a moderating effect?

Furthermore, the average change in women's representation is higher among the countries having reserved seats and legislated candidate quotas than the average change in countries having voluntary party quotas or compared to the global average. Could this perhaps be an indication that reserved seats and legislated quotas contribute a leverage effect in terms of women's representation? The regression analysis in section two sheds light on this question. Furthermore, as understood from table x.1 gender quotas alone do not provide enough power as to explain all of the changes in women's representation. Therefore, it is essential to consider the effects from gender quotas from a larger perspective, meaning in comparison to the established variables explaining women's representation included in this thesis. Below, the independent variables will be described, seen from quota type point of view.

4.1.2 Independent variables

4.1.2.1 Gender Quotas

Since the Beijing Conference on women in 1995 concluded in agreement Platform for Action which encouraged countries to adopt gender quotas, there has been a remarkable increase in number of countries adopting gender quotas. However, as we remember from the theory section, gender quotas are not a uniform institutional arrangement. This thesis includes the categorization of three quota types; reserved seats, legislated candidate quotas, and voluntary party quotas. Each of which type is argued to have different effect on women's representation. Below we will look at the factors which according to the conventional wisdom effects women's representation, seen from a perspective where the countries are aggregated accordance with quota belonging. The purpose of grouping the countries in accordance with gender quota type is to answer the first research question:

1. Which types of countries have gender quotas?

Furthermore, the first research question serves the purpose to develop awareness about whether certain types of countries have the same type of quota, but also share the same attributes concerning the established factors explaining women's representation.

Figure 4.2 Number of countries categorised after gender quota type



Comment: The table illustrates the number of countries having the different quota types. 18 countries have reserved seats, 40 countries have legislated candidate quotas, 50 countries have voluntary party quotas. Because there are a number of countries having more than one type of, the total number of countries having quotas is lower than if you add the variable values of the three quota types together. 106 countries in the world have at least one type of gender quotas. The number of countries included in the study is the countries included in the QoG standard dataset (2011). *Source:* Quotaproject.org 2012, please see codebook Larsson 2012 for detailed information about how the variables are coded. QoG standard dataset 2011. [a]there are only 15 countries having two types of gender quotas, this should not effect the results in this thesis and is therefore not included

Figure 4.2 reveals first of all, slightly more than half of the countries in the world have adopted some type of gender quotas: 54 percent based on the countries included in this thesis (106 out of 196 countries). Secondly, the table shows that most common type of quota is the voluntary party quotas, which almost one-fourth of the countries have adopted (50 out of 106 countries). Legislated candidate quotas are the second most common, adopted in almost one-fifth of the countries worldwide (40 out of 106 countries). Reserved seats, which is considered to be the most powerful and most controversial type of quota, is adopted in nine percent of the countries (18 out of 106 countries).

4.1.2.2 Gender Quotas and the Regime Types

Included in this thesis are three regime types; democratic, semi-democratic, and non-democratic regimes. The categorization is based on Freedom House's democracy index which is a scale of the counties the civil liberties and political rights.[27] The field of research studying women's representation and gender quotas is not fully convinced that a country's democratic status have an effect on women's representation (see for instance Paxton et al 2010). However, the theory section outlined both theoretical and empirical arguments to include regime type as an independent variable in the regression model. The importance of considering the impact of regime type is furthermore highlighted in table 4.2:

Table 4.2 Quota Type and Regime Type (%)

Type of quota	Reserved seats	Legislated candidate quotas	Voluntary party quotas	World
Democratic	0 %	65 %	82 %	55 %
Semi-Democratic	40 %	16 %	9 %	21 %
Non-Democratic	60 %	19 %	9 %	24 %
Total	100 %	100 %	100 %	100 %

Comments: The table illustrates the distribution of the proportion of countries being democratic, semi-democratic, and non-democratic regimes, categorised by gender quota belonging. The variable values represent the percent of the total number of countries having the specific regime type, within the quota type sample. The sample of reserved seats is 15 countries, legislated candidate quotas' sample is 31 countries, and the country sample for voluntary candidate quotas is 45. Regime types included are democratic, semi-democratic, or non-democratic regimes. Regime type is based on Freedom House measure of democracy index where I have categorized the values 7-10 as democratic regimes, 3-6 as semi-democratic regimes, and 0-2 as non-democratic regimes. The countries are categorized in accordance with which quota type they have adopted. The quota types included in the table are reserved seats, legislated candidate and voluntary party quotas based on Dahlerup's categorization on quotaproject.org. *Sources:* Quota variables: Quotaproject.org 2012, please see codebook Larsson 2012 for detailed information about how the variables are coded. Regime type: QoG 2012 fh_ipolity2.

Table 4.2 illustrates that within the group of countries having reserved seats, 60 percent are non-democratic regimes, 40 percent are semi-democratic, but there are no democratic countries. The distribution of regime types within the group of countries having legislated candidate quotas differs remarkably from the countries with reserved seats. Out of the countries with legislated quotas, 65 percent are democratic regimes, 16 percent semi-democratic regimes, and 19 percent non-democratic regimes. Even more different form the

[27] The democratic category includes countries scoring from 7-10 on the Freedom House democracy index. The semi-democratic countries scores 3-6 on the democracy index. Non-democratic countries are those scoring 0-2 on the democracy index.

distribution of countries having reserved seats, is the regime type distribution within the group of countries having voluntary party quotas: 82 percent are democratic regimes meanwhile only nine percent have the semi-democratic and as many non-democratic regimes. The table also reveals the global distribution of countries along the regime type variable (World category).

So, which conclusions can be drawn from table 4.2? First, the table confirms the fact that gender quotas are adopted by all types of regimes. However, what is furthermore striking in this table is the fact that the different types of quotas seem to be adopted to a smaller or larger degree by different regime types. Reserves seats for instance, are primarily adopted by non-democratic countries. Consequently non-democratic regimes tend to adopt the type of gender quotas which according to theory are most efficient in increasing the level of women's descriptive representation. This somewhat surprising observation is interesting observation for a number of reasons. How is it even possible that autocratic leaders in non-democratic regimes agree to adopt the most efficient method in terms of gender quotas? If the only reason is to signal to the international community they have listened and responded to the international recommendation to adopt gender quotas, legislated candidate quotas would probably be preferable because it is a less powerful type of quota according to research. However, by adopting reserved seats, there most probably are other factors behind.

4.1.2.3 Gender Quota Types and Electoral Systems

Next table illustrate the distribution of countries along the dummy variables measuring electoral systems. The countries are groups in accordance with quota type, and the global average is included for the purpose of showing the average for the world. According to research the combination of PR electoral system and gender quotas should have most favourable for women's representation (see for instance Tripp and Kang 2008:338). Furthermore, generally the effect from PR is one of the strongest explanatory variables for explaining women's representation. Majority electoral systems (which also include plurality system in this thesis) are usually considered to be an institutional barrier preventing women from being elected to the parliament (Paxton et al 2010:43). The purpose of showing how the countries are distributed on the dummy variable electoral system is to see whether the variable contains internal variation as well as to see if there are some interesting patterns of country distribution in relation to the quota types.

Table 4.3 Quota type and electoral system (% countries)

	Reserved seats	Legislated candidate quotas	Voluntary party quotas	World
PR	20 %	51 %	43 %	33 %
Mixed	13 %	35 %	38 %	31 %
Majority	67 %	14 %	19 %	36 %
Total	100 %	100 %	100 %	100 %

Comment: The table illustrates the proportion of quota countries having PR, Mixed or Majority electoral systems, analysed in accordance with quota type. The dummy variable measuring majority electoral system also includes plurality systems. The reserved seats' percentage is based on a 15 country sample, the country sample for legislated candidate quotas is 37 countries, and voluntary party quotas percentage is based on 47 countries. The column percent illustrates the distribution of the different electoral systems based on the total proportion of quota countries, irrespective of type. The quota types included in the table are reserved seats, legislated candidate and voluntary party quotas based on Dahlerup's categorization on quotaproject.org. Sources: Quota variables: Electoral system: QoG Standard dataset, cross-section 2011 variable iaep_es. Quotaproject.org 2012, please see codebook Larsson 2012 for detailed information about how the variables are coded.

Table 4.3 shows that the world's countries are almost equally distributed along the electoral systems. In terms of gender quota types however, the pattern is somewhat different. As we see PR electoral system is the most common type of electoral system in both Legislated candidate quota countries and in countries with voluntary party quotas. As we know from previous research PR is the electoral system most favourable to gender quotas. Furthermore, the two quota types, especially the voluntary quota, are least efficient in order to increase the descriptive representation. Thus the combination of PR and quotas in the countries belonging to the two types might contribute to a combined effect on the number of women MPs. That is however an issue for the regression analysis in section 2 to deal with. The mixed electoral system type is not much to say about, the reader could on your own reflect upon the variable values if interested.

Rather more interesting is however to look at the majority electoral system type; we see that two-thirds of the countries with reserved seats have majority systems. This is somewhat interesting considering that the reserved seats is the most efficient quota type to increase the level of women MPs, meanwhile majority system is electoral system contributing to least women in the parliament according to (Matland and Studlar 1996:707). Furthermore, as we remember from the theory section earlier, Dahlerup and Freidenvall (2005:36) claimed that quota systems "undoubtedly" are more compatible with PR electoral systems than majority

systems[28]. Does this mean that the effect from reserved seats is pulled back by majority electoral system in the countries having it? Well, this is what I aim to find out in the regression analysis in section two.

4.1.2.4 Structural factors as independent variables

The economic and societal development is sometimes held forward as mechanism underlying women's representation. During the 1960s and 70s a country's economic development was perceived as the most powerful explanatory factor to women's descriptive representation. However, today it is more common to perceive for instance the degree of women's participation in the workforce as a stronger indicator of the number of women MPs (Storckmer and Byrne 2011). The importance of structural factors is however far from conventional wisdom in research on women's representation. Due to the characteristic of this thesis, where my primary aim is to analyse the effect from gender quotas on the changed levels of women's descriptive representation during the last decade using a global, cross-country design based on large-n sample of countries, structural factors are controlled by using a dichotomous version of the HDI. HDI is, as we remember from the data and methodology section, an overall measure of a country's human development operationalized from the three dimensions of *long and healthy life*, *knowledge* and *decent living standards* (UNDP 2012). The idea behind the structural factors is that of the empowerment of women; some scholars believe women's representation is the outcome of empowered women, which in turn is caused by overall societal –or human- development. The bar chart below illustrates the proportion of countries grouped by gender quota type, scoring higher than (lighter piles) or lower (darker piles) than the global average of HDI[29].

[28] It should be noted however, that after Dahlerup and Freidenvall's study (2005) there has been a significant number of countries that have adopted reserved seats thus we cannot be sure Dahlerup and Freidenvall's statement is still valid.
[29] The HDI is divided in two halves of each side of the global average HDI of 0.7.

Figure 4.3 Level of development within the Quota types (HDI)



Comment: Figure 4.3 illustrates the percent of countries' distributed on the dichotomous version of the UNDP's Human Development Index (HDI). The countries are grouped in accordance with gender quota type, the global average is also included as a reference category. The HDI dichotomous variable is the HDI divided in two halves of each side of the global average HDI of 0.7. The countries are categorised after gender quota type belonging. The quota types included in the table are reserved seats, legislated candidate and voluntary party quotas based on Dahlerup's categorization on quotaproject.org. The category World represents all of the world's countries that are included in this thesis. Sources: Quota variables: Quotaproject.org 2012, please see codebook Larsson 2012 for detailed information about how the variables are coded. HDI is based on undp_hdi found in the QoG standard dataset (2011).

Figure 4.3 reveals some interesting patterns in terms of the country distribution along the dichotomous HDI variable. Out of the countries with the reserves seats type of quota, the majority have an HDI below the global average. If Dahlerup and Freidenvall's two ideal types to women's representation (fast track and incremental track) are recalled, the low levels of HDI would place reserves seats countries close to the fast track ideal type if the regression analysis indicated effects from reserves seats on women's representation. The fast track implies that women's representation increase as a consequence of gender quotas rather than human development; whereas the incremental track to women's representation predict human development to precede women's representation (Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2005).

The countries with legislated candidate quotas indicate similar pattern however the proportion of countries below the global average at HDI is smaller than the proportion of countries having reserved seats. The stark contrast to the countries with reserved seats and legislated candidate quotas is the HDI among the countries having voluntary party quotas; more than

two-thirds of the countries with voluntary party quotas have HDI above the global average. Once again Dahlerup and Freidenvall's ideal types to women's representation are useful to consider. If the regression analyses do not indicate any effect from the voluntary candidate quotas I would suggest that most of these countries are closer to the ideal type incremental track to women's representation thus women's representation do not change as easy as it does in fast track countries.[30]

4.1.2.5 Cultural factors as independent variables

Inglehart and Norris (2003), argue culture and religion are important factors for women's representation. Table 4.4 below shows the average percentage of population within the countries grouped according to quota types belonging to Catholicism, Islam, "Other religion"[31], or Protestantism and in the world.

Table 4.4 Quota Type and Religion

Type of quota	Reserved seats	Legislated candidate quotas	Voluntary party quotas	World
Catholic	15 %	52 %	45 %	31 %
Islam	60 %	20 %	10 %	24 %
Other	22 %	23 %	30 %	32 %
Protestant	3 %	5 %	15 %	13 %
Total percent (%)	100 %	100 %	100 %	100 %

Comment: The table shows how many percent of the population in the countries belonging to relevant gender quota type who are Protestants, Catholics, Muslims, or other religious belonging. Sources: Quota variables: Quotaproject.org 2012, please see codebook Larsson 2012 for detailed information about how the variables are coded. The variables measuring religion are lp_protmg80, lp_catho80, lp_muslim80, and lp_no_cpm80 in the QoG standard dataset (2011). The quota types included in the table are reserved seats, legislated candidate and voluntary party quotas based on Dahlerup's categorization on quotaproject.org. The global average is based on the countries included in the QoG standard dataset (2011) lp_protmg80, lp_catho80, lp_muslim80, and lp_no_cpm80

[30] It might appear strange that the world do not have two equally high piles. However, this is because the HDI is split based on the global average and not the world median. Second, most countries in the world actually scores above the global average HDI. This means that the countries having reserved seats and legislated candidate quotas are not representative sample of the world. The fact that the countries with the most efficient types of gender quotas are not a representative sample of the world's countries highlights the importance of considering Dahlerup and Freidenvall's (2005) two tracks to women's representation, the fast and the incremental track.

[31] This thesis will not go further into detail on the categorisation of "other" religion due to its theoretically expected limited effect on women's representation. This variable is solely based on the categorisation found in the QoG standard dataset (2011). One could however, raise some criticism over label the largest category "other" instead of specifying more thoroughly. That is however the issue of a totally different context.

In countries with reserves seats Islam is the by far most common religion. Within legislated quotas most people seem to be Catholics, meanwhile the proportion of people is more evenly distributed in countries having voluntary party quotas.

4.2 Section 2: Regression analysis

The statistical analysis includes three regression models:

Model 1

The first regression model includes the established variables claimed to explain women's representation. These are: electoral systems, regime types, HDI, and religion. In addition to the established variables, the first model also includes gender quotas. The expected findings include e.g. positive effect from electoral system PR, negative impact from Islam. Whether gender quotas have effect

Model 2

Includes all the mentioned variables above, but also women's representation 2001 as an independent variable. By controlling for women's representation ten years ago, the aim is to analyse the impact of gender quotas during these years. Women's representation 2001 also is an indirect control for several other independent variables. More about this is described in next section:

Model 3

At a first glance at model 3 it could appear to be of limited importance due to the fact that it only includes gender quotas, electoral systems, regime types, and women's representation 2001 as control variables. However, the variable women's representation 2001 is an indirect control of country-specific mechanisms which do not easily change over time. These variables includes for instance social norms and religion (cultural factors), as well as women's participation in the workforce, women's level of education, HDI, (structural factors), etc. These are factors that have been more or less constant during the last ten years, thus it could be argued the variables do not need to be individually included in the regression model. Rather since these variables are held constant by nature from 2001 to 2011, it could be motivated the exclusion of these variables do not effect the predictions. Thus the independent variables contributing to the level of women's representation 2001 that have not changed the

last decade, would most probably have the same impact on women's representation 2011 and therefore do not demand further control.

One could argue however that electoral system and regime type also should have been constant during this period. However, according to theory both electoral system and regime type seem to be important for the impact of gender quotas thus contributes possible interaction effects[32]. Therefore, model 3 includes the variables and also control for potential interaction effects. Thus I would argue that model 3 is the most valid of the three models thus the most specified. Something the regression diagnostics also confirmed.

Necessary to write is the fact that regression analysis cannot control for causality, thus there is always a risk of reverse causality correlated with the choice of dependent variable. Instead I have to trust previous research in my choice of dependent variable. However, since model 2 and 3 control the change in women's representation between 2001 and 2011, the risk is even smaller in these models.

The results from the regression analysis will be presented on the next page.

[32] The interaction term reflects the extent to which the effect of two variables together differs from the effect of each one independently. The classic example to illustrate how an interaction effect works is 1+1=3. Variable 1 and variable 1 separate from each other would sum 2. But if the variable 1 and variable 1 interacts with each other, their value together equals 3.

Table 4.5 Regression analysis (OLS). Dependent variable: Women's representation in national parliament 2011 (% of total). (Standard errors)

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS			
Type of Quota: (ref. No quota)			
Reserved Seats	8.1^(4.81)	7.4* (3.21)	7.4* (2.98)
Legislated Candidate Quotas	2.8 (2.74)	3.1^ (1.83)	3.3* (1.58)
Voluntary Party Quotas	.5 (2.14)	-.3 (1.43)	-.1 (1.37)
Electoral System (ref. Majority)			
PR	7. 4 **(2.42)	2.8^ (1.67)	3.2^ (1.625)
Mixed	3.6 (2.48)	2.1 (1.66)	2.6 (.59)
Regime Type: (ref. Democracy)			
Non-Democracy	2.9 (3.51)	.1 (2.36)	-.3 (2-04)
Semi-Democracy	-4.1 (2.95)	-.7 (2.00)	-.1 (1.77)
Interaction effects			
Reserved Seats* Non-Democracy	7.9 (7.39)	10.9* (4.94)	11.3* (4.82)
Legislated Candidate Quotas* Non-Democracy	9.2 (6.69)	9.7* (4.47)	8.8 *(4.10)
STRUCTURAL FACTORS			
HDI	1.3 (6.15)	-3.9 (4.13)	
CULTURAL FACTOR (ref. Other religion)			
Islam	-.1 (.04)	.0 (.03)	
Catholicism	.0 (.04)	.0 (.02)	
Protestantism	.2*** (.05)	.0 (.04)	
CONTROL VARIABLE			
Women's representation 2001		1.0***(.09)	1.0***(.07)
Constant	12.0* (5.83)	7.3^(3.91)	3.8^(1.97)
N	102	102	104
Adjusted R^2	.312***	.693***	.697***

Comment: Levels of significance: ^p≤ 0,1, *p ≤ 0,05, **p ≤ 0,005, ***p ≤ 0,001. The table illustrates the results from regression analysis (OLS) treating women's representation 2011 as the dependent variable. Women's representation includes the proportion of women members of the parliament in the single or lower chamber measured in percent thus the effects from the independent variables should be interpreted as percentage points. Because the table also includes women's representation year 2001, the table results should be interpreted as the effect on country-level changes in women's representation during the last decade. The gender quota variable is a dummy variable coded in order to treat countries without gender quotas as the reference category therefore the effect from countries without quotas are found in the constant. Included quota dummies are reserved seats, legislated candidate quotas, and voluntary party quotas each of which includes the countries having the quotas type. The effects shown in the table should be interpreted in reference to countries without gender quotas. Electoral system is also a dummy variable, treating majority (including plurality) electoral system as the reference category thus its effect is included in the constant, PR and mixed electoral systems' effects are presented in the table and should be interpreted in reference to countries having majority electoral systems. In regime types democratic regimes is the reference category. The effects from the dummy variables non-democratic and semi-democratic regimes should be understood in reference to democratic regimes. The two interaction effect variables are computed variables. "Non-democratic*Reserved Seats" has multiplied the non-democratic regime variable with the variable reserved seats. The effect should be interpreted as "if a country combines a non-democratic regime type with reserved seats the effects is as follows". The interaction effect "Non-democratic*Legislated Candidate Quotas" has multiplied the variable non-democratic regime type with the variable measuring legislated candidate quotas and the effect should be understood as the former interaction effect except from replacing reserves seats with legislated gender quotas. Structural factors are measured by the human development index (HDI) scale 0-1. Cultural is measured by religion. The variables measure the estimated proportion of the population at country-level who belong to the certain religions. Sources: Women's representation 2011: IPU (December 31st 2011), Women's representation 2001: QoG standard dataset time-series (2001). Gender quotas: Quotaproject.org 2012, please see codebook Larsson 2012 for detailed information about how the variables are coded. Electoral system, Regime type, HDI and religion: QoG standard dataset cross-section(2011) iaep_es, fh_ipolity2 (7-10 as democratic regimes, 3-6 as semi-democratic regimes, and 0-2 as non-democratic regimes), undp_hdi, and lp_protmg80, lp_catho80, lp_muslim80, and lp_no_cpm80

4.2.1 The models' explanatory power

The explanatory power is measured by the adjusted R^2 and could be interpreted as how many percent of the variation in dependent variable women's representation 2011 that is explained by the variables included in the regression model. Table 4.5 shows that the variables included in model 1 explain approximately 31 percent (.312) of the variation in the dependent variable. The explanatory power in model 2 and 3 is as expected high, as the two models both explain almost 70 percent (.693 and .697) of the changes in women's representation between 2001 and 2011. However, both models pass the Durbin-Watson test thus the high levels are not problematic. All three models are statistically significant at the 99 percentage safety level, thus we can trust the predictions to a large extent.

4.2.2 Impact of gender quotas

Table 4.5 first of all reveals the importance of dividing the different types of quotas in statistical analysis. The impact of gender quotas on women's descriptive representation is different depending on which type of quota the countries have. The results will be discussed below in accordance with types of quota.

4.2.2.1 Reserved seats

As for the reserved seats quota type, model 1 does not indicate any significant impact on women's representation (b-coefficient 8.12 is significant only at the 90 percentage level). The conclusion to be drawn is that at the moment reserved seats do not explain women's representation in a broader context, i.e. cross-section analysis. However, the results in model 2 and 3 indicate the explanatory power from reserved seats quotas might gain importance in the future: when controlling for the changed levels of women's representation the last ten years, as is the case for model 2 and 3, the regression coefficients are statistically significant at the 95 percent level. Thus at the moment the impact of reserved seats has to be understood during a limited period of time. These results are in accordance with the theoretical expectations considering reserved seats increased popularity in the late 1990s-early 2000s and there are only a limited number of countries having reserved seats (Krook 2009).

During the last decade reserved seats have had significant impact on the changed levels of women's representation: the b-coefficients are 7.4 both in model 2 and model 3. Since the b-coefficients could be interpreted as percent, and considering the variable is a dichotomous, the

results predicts an increase of more than 7 percentage points in countries having reserved seats during the last ten years.

Even more interesting are the results from the variable measuring the impact of reserved seats in non-democratic regimes: during the last decade non-democratic regimes having reserved seats, have experienced an additional approximately 11 percentage points' increase in the proportion of women MPs (the interaction effect in model 2 is 10.9 and 11.3 in model 3). Consequentially, my models predict an increase of 7+11=18[33] percentage points' increased level of women's representation in non-democratic countries having reserved seats during the last ten years.

The remarkable result that non-democratic regimes having reserved seats in general have increased the proportion of women MP with 18 percentage points during the last ten years is even more interesting if we recall the field of research arguing women's representation is considered to be a step towards democratization in developing countries (Dahlerup 2006, Inglehart/Norris/Welzel 2002). Furthermore, these findings confirm Howell's argument (2006) stating that non-democratic regimes have the capability to change structures fast due to the lack of checks-and-balances provided in democratic regimes. The possible contributions of the results will be discussed more in the concluding section below.

4.2.2.2 Legislated candidate quotas

The effect from legislated candidate quotas is only significant in model 3, where I argue the independent variable measuring women's representation 2001 is an indirect control for structural and institutional factors. My interpretation of the result in model 1 is simply that legislated candidate quotas do not contribute to explain women's representation seen from a cross-section perspective. In model 2 the impact from legislated candidate quotas is significant at the 90 percent level, thus I would not draw any further conclusions from the results. In model 3 however, the impact is statistically significant at the 95 percent level therefore pass the criteria for statistical significance in social sciences. My interpretation of the lack of significance in model 2 is that model 2 is too unspecified due to it includes religion and HDI as independent variable, meanwhile I argue both variables are indirectly controlled for through women's representation 2001. According to the rules of regression diagnostics

[33] 7+11=18 percentage points (Effect from reserved seats + effect from the interaction of reserved seats and non-democratic regime = total effect from non-democratic regimes having reserved seats)

(Edling and Hedström 2003), regression models which are unspecified increases the risk of fallacious predictions. Of course one could argue model 3 breaks the regression diagnostic rule of all relevant variables should be included. However, since I argue all relevant variables are indirectly included in the variable measuring women's representation 2001, my conclusion is that the lack of significant effect in model 2 is due to unspecified model.

The impact of legislated candidate quotas on women's representation in model 3 is predicted to be 3 percentage points (b-coefficient 3.3). Thus under the control for the structural and cultural factors contributing to the level of women's representation year 2001, and under control for regime type, and electoral system the adoption of gender quota type legislated candidate has contributed to a three percentage points' increase of the proportion of women in the national parliament 2011.

In non-democratic regimes the impact of legislated candidate quotas is significant in both model 2 and 3. The adoption of legislated candidate quotas in non-democratic regimes has contributed to an additional approximately nine percentage points' increase in the proportion of women MPs during the last ten years (b-coefficient in model 2 is 9.7 and in model 3 is 8.8). In other words: if two non-democratic countries had the same level of women MPs in 2001, have the same electoral system, but one country has legislated candidate quotas and the other country do not, the quota country is predicted to have 12[34] percentage points more women in its national parliament today. The results contribute further to the confirmation of non-democratic regimes' possibility to change faster than the other regime types.

By contrasting the results from legislated candidate quotas with those from voluntary party quotas my results furthermore confirms the previous empirical finding that the institutional character of the quota seem to be important for the impact on women's representation (Dahlerup 2006, Htun and Jones 2003). Voluntary party quotas do not show any significant effects in any of the models'. Since voluntary party quotas and legislated candidate quotas are similar except for the legislative character, it seems to be important for the impact on women's descriptive representation that the quota has some type of legislative character.

[34] 3+9=12 percentage points (Effect from reserved seats + effect from the interaction of reserved seats and non-democratic regime = total effect from non-democratic regimes having reserved seats)

4.2.3 Impact of Electoral system

As expected PR electoral system has strong, significant impact on women's representation in model 1's cross-section analysis. Countries having PR electoral system is predicted to have approximately seven percentage points' higher representation of women than countries with majority systems (b-coefficient 7.4).

More surprisingly is however, that the impact of PR electoral system is not significant in model 2 and 3. My conclusion is that PR needs more time than ten years to have a significant impact on women's descriptive representation.

4.2.4 Lack of impact from structural and cultural factors

Except from Protestantism which has a small significant impact in model 1, there are no significant effects from structural or cultural factors from the regression analysis. This result highlights the importance of the institutional factors to explain women's representation.

5. DISCUSSION and CONCLUSIONS

Below the conclusions from the statistical analysis will be discussed in relation to the research questions. Dahlerup and Freidenvall's (2005) two ideal type tracks to women's representation will be mention below. It could therefore be useful to remind the reader about the *incremental* and the *fast* track to women's representation. The incremental track predicts women's representation to be the outcome of a step-wise, time-consuming process where gender equality and the proportion of women MPs follow each other.

The fast track to women's representation predicts leaps in the number of women MPs as an effect from gender quotas. Women's representation in national parliaments is according to the fast track ideal type, not an indication of gender equality or development, but rather the outcome of gender quotas.

5.1 Which types of countries have gender quotas?

The conclusions from the results confirm that all sorts of countries have gender quotas. The contribution of this thesis has been to present the country characteristics when the countries are grouped according to gender quota types. In the first section in the analysis, the results from the descriptive statistics indicates that it is important to separate the countries after gender quota type since the country characteristics to a large extent differs between the quota types. Since the findings shows that all types of countries have adopted gender quotas, it may be possible to generalize the results to countries adopting quotas in the future. Hence, the findings of this thesis are relevant for future research on the impact of gender quotas on women's representation.

5.2 Have gender quotas changed levels of women's representation descriptive representation from 2001 to 2011?

The results from the regression analysis illustrates it is important to consider which type of gender quota the country has. The voluntary party quotas do not contribute to the changed level of women's representation 2001-2011, meanwhile legislated candidate quotas and reserved seats contribute to changed levels. But is it likely that countries adopting quotas today will experience the same impact on women's representation the following decade? If nothing unexpected happens, then it is highly possible that the gender quota types will have the same effect in the future.

As for the lack of significant impact from voluntary party quotas on women's descriptive representation, this is not particularly surprising. According to Matland (2006) most political parties adopt voluntary party quotas to signal to other parties as well as to other actors that they prioritize women's representation and gender equality. Therefore, voluntary party quotas probably are more likely to have impact on women's substantive representation. Hence, in the long run, the voluntary party quotas might have most impact on women's representation. This is, however, an issue for future research to study.

As the results in section 1 show, the majority of the countries with voluntary party quotas are closer to Dahlerup and Freidenvall's incremental ideal type track to women's representation, than to the fast track. For instance 82 percent of the countries with voluntary party quotas are democratic regimes (please see table 4.2), most countries are above the world mean HDI (please see figure 4.3). Hence, the results confirm the importance of separating voluntary party quotas from the two other types of quotas. The results also highlight the importance of continue to explain women's representation in several countries in accordance with the conventional wisdom advanced by the incremental track.

Legislated candidate quotas and reserves seats quotas have had a large impact on changed levels of women's representation from 2001 to 2011. According to the predictions in table 4.5, reserved seats seem to be a more powerful tool to increase the proportion of women MPs than legislated candidate quotas even if both quota types have impact. Hence, the results from the regression analysis highlights the importance of separating gender quotas that target the parliamentary (reserved seats) level of the electoral process, from the quotas targeting the candidate level (legislated party quotas).

5.3 Does the impact of quota systems differ in countries depending on regime type?[35]

The results from the regression analysis revealed major impact of gender quotas on women's representation in non-democratic regimes (as the reader recalls there were significant interaction effects from both reserved seats and legislated candidate quotas in non-democratic regimes). Considering the possibility to generalize the results to non-democratic regimes adopting gender quotas in the future, it is likely quotas will have the same impact. In other

[35] As the reader will recognize, I have allowed myself to include my personal perspective in this section.

words, if it is of interest to increase women's descriptive representation reserved seats and legislated candidate quotas seem to be two appropriate alternatives. This thesis furthermore confirms the possibility to use reserved seats to increase women's representation in other regimes as well.

According to my opinion the results that the impact of gender quotas have been strongest in non-democratic regimes, is the most interesting observation made by this thesis. But what makes the finding so interesting? After all these women MPs probably lack substantial influence in these parliaments.

First of all, Schwind-Bayer and Mishler's (2005) integrated model argue the dimensions of representation should be understood in relation to each other. The authors suggest for instance that the formal representation have impact on the descriptive, the substantive *and* the symbolic representation (Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005:410). Even if Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler's results are based on democratic regimes, their model offers an interesting aspect of the potential effects from the increased descriptive representation. So even if this thesis only control for the impact of quotas on women's descriptive representation there is reason for future research to analyse the impact on the substantive and symbolic representation as well.

Second, despite parliaments in non-democratic regimes in general are regarded as powerless, the presence of women could be important. Nanivadekar (2006:119) argue women's representation could be important even in non-democratic regimes. For instance, women get experience from political work which could be useful if the country starts a democratization process: even if women MPs do not have any substantial power today, they are at least present in the parliament if the country takes a turn towards democratization.

Furthermore, women MPs in non-democratic countries could serve several symbolic values. The presence of women may in the long run contribute to increased acceptance for women's in politics. Thus increased number of women MPs may effect the perceptions of women's role in society, i.e. the social norms. Personally, I do not think we should underestimate the importance of symbolic representation in this context. I believe the presence of women in parliament, for instance, may encourage younger generations of women to demand education on the same terms as their male friends. Women MPs may even inspire young women to take

part of workforce as well as the political life. Increased level of education, participations in workforce and political activism among women in developing countries have important impact on the national economy, child health, etc.

The third reason why I find the results interesting is related to the political leaders in the non-democratic regimes. Which are the reasons political leaders in no-democratic regimes approve of gender quotas, and how is this interesting for the research question?

According to Tripp et al (2006) and Dahlerup (2006) increased proportion of women MPs are often perceived to be associated with democratization and a measure of development. These perceptions could be traced to the incremental track to women's representation (Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2005). Hence, one possible explanation why the political leaders in non-democratic regimes adopt gender quotas could be that non-democratic leaders associate increased levels of women MPs with democratization and choose the quotas as a tool to increase the democracy. There is also a chance that the political leaders actually want to involve more women in politics. If the political leaders adopt quotas to strengthen democracy or to involve more women in politics, then it is likely that changed levels in women's descriptive representation may have impact on women's substantive representation.

However, a more likely explanation would be that these leaders want to frame their countries as more gender equal and developed than they really are. If the reason why non-democratic political leaders adopt gender quotas, is to frame the country as more developed and gender-equal than the country really is, it is less likely that the changed levels of women's descriptive representation will have substantive impact.

Furthermore, the political leaders in non-democratic regimes may have accepted gender quotas as a condition set by international loan givers, such as structural adjustment programmes. Then the international actors may have an important role if the increased levels of women's descriptive representation will have effect on the substantive representation.

The fourth reason why I find the results showing leaps in women's descriptive representation in non-democratic parliaments as an outcome of gender quotas, is because the findings highlight the importance to consider the impact of quotas in studies of the link between women's descriptive representation and substantive representation.

One example is research on women's representation and level of corruption (Dollar et al 2001, Sung 2003, also relevant Charron and Lapuente 2010). If the impact of gender quotas is not controlled for in such studies, the analysis may give misleading predictions. Since many non-democratic regimes have adopted gender quotas and experiences leaps in women's descriptive representation, these countries have taken the so called fast track to high levels of women's representation. Consequently, the predicted outcome of women's descriptive representation needs to be analyzed separately from the predicted outcome in countries taken the incremental track to high levels of women MPs, since women's representation measures two different things. Women's descriptive representation should not be expected to have impact on the substantive representation in non-democratic regimes, as it is expected to have in democratic regimes (see for instance Wängnerud 2005).

The fifth reason why I find the results so interesting is I believe the increased levels of women's representation non-democratic regimes, is the importance of the international community to contribute to country-level changes. The widespread adoption of quotas occurred largely after Beijing 1995. Even if it is not directly controlled for in this thesis, it seems like the international agreement have had the intended impact.

It is important, however, that the international community, women's movements and the countries do not relax behind the veil of ignorance: women's representation can no longer be understood in the same way as it used to. Today women's representation needs to be understood from the *two* ideal type tracks developed by Dahlerup and Freidenvall (2005). In countries taking the fast track to women's representation the leaps in proportion of women is not an indication of strengthened rights of women or the outcome of societal development, nor an indication of improved gender-equality. Instead the presence of women in non-democratic parliaments is nothing but numbers until empirical finding proves differently. Even if these countries have reached levels of women's representation above the critical mass of 30 percent (Studlar and McAllister 2002, Wängnerud 2009), it would be highly unlikely that the women MPs would have as much influence over the policy process as the women in democratic countries taken the incremental track. The next task for the international community is to develop strategies how to conduct the presence of women in national parliaments in all regime types. To develop strategies encouraging countries to conduct the competence and experience these women have in non-democratic as well as democratic

regimes. To develop strategies supporting political leaders in non-democratic regimes to realise the values of taking the path leading towards democratization.

It is also important to be aware of the fact that incremental track to women's representation is still highly relevant. Hence, it is crucial to keep the conventional wisdom of women's representation in mind as well. In other words: women's representation today needs to be understood from the two ideal types advanced by Dahlerup and Freidenvall (2005)

The concluding remarks summarizing this thesis are: Based on the findings in this thesis, gender quotas seem to be the mechanism *bridging women over the troubled water* of institutional, structural, and cultural barriers otherwise preventing them from political participation. At least in non-democratic regimes.

Final words from the author

Thanks to my advisor Marcia Grimes for giving constructive criticism that has encouraged me to improve my work.

My gratitude to family and friends who have supported me when writing the thesis:
You have been *my* bridge over troubled water throughout this process -in more than one way!

A special thanks to Ms. Jansson and Ms. Söderqvist for valuable feedback and for inspiring me to work even harder: *Never. Say. Never.*

7. Literature list

Abou-Zeid, Ginan (2006) *The Arab region: Women's access to the decision-making process across the Arab nation* in 'Women, Quotas and Politics' edited by Dahlerup, Drude. pp. 168-193. Routledge.

Araujo, Clara and Garcia, Ana Isabel (2006) *Latin America: The experience and the impact of quotas in Latin America* in 'Women, Quotas and Politics' edited by Dahlerup, Drude. pp. 83-111. Routlegde Research in Comparative Politics.

Bacci, Carol (2006) *Arguing for and against quotas: theoretical issues* in 'Women, Quotas and Politics' pp. 32-52. Routlegde Research in Comparative Politics.

Bauer, Gretchen and Britton, Hanna 2006 *Women in African Parliaments* Boulder, Co: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006.

Bjarnegård, Elin & Zetterberg, Pär (2011) *Removing quotas, maintaining representation: Overcoming Gender Inequalitites in Political Party Recruitment* Representation vol 47, issue 2, pp. 187-199

Bratton, Kathleen A. (2005) *Critical Mass Theory Revisited: The Behaviour and Success of Token Women in State Legislature* Cambridge University Press

Carroll, Susan (2000) *Representing Women: Congresswomen's perceptions of their representational roles* Prepares presentation at "Women transforming congress: gender analysis of institutional life".

Caul, Miki *Political Parties and the Adoption of Candidate Gender Quotas: A Cross-National Analysis* The Journal of Politics vol 63, issue 4 pp. 1214-1229.

CEDAW http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/committee.htm 2012-05-23

Charron, Nicholas and Lapuente, Victor (2010) *Which Dictators Produce Quality of Government?* QoG Working Paper Series 2010:11 ISSN 1653-8919.

Childs, Sarah and Krook, Mona Lena (2008) *Critical Mass Theory and Women's Political Representation* Political Studies vol 56 pp. 725-736.

Dahlerup, Drude (2006) *Introduction* and *Conclusion* in 'Women, Quotas and Politics' pp. 3-31, 293-307. Routlegde Research in Comparative Politics.

Dahlerup, Drude (2007) *Electoral gender quotas: between equality of opportunity and equality of result* Representation, vol 43, issue 2, pp. 73-92.

Dahlerup, Drude (2008) *Gender Quotas – Controversial but Trendy* International Feminist Journal of Politics 10:3, 322-328

Dahlerup, Drude (2008) *Gender quotas – controversial but trendy* International Feminist Journal of Politics, vol 10, issue 3, pp. 322-328.

Dahlerup, Drude and Freidenvall, Lenita (2005) *Quotas as the 'fast track' to equal representation for women. Why Scandinavia is no longer the model* International Feminist Journal of Politics vol 7, issue 1, pp. 26-48.

Devlin, Claire and Elgie, Roberta (2008) *The effect of increased women's representation in parliament. The case of Rwanda.* Parlamentary Affairs vol 61, issue 2 pp. 237–254.

Dollar, David, Fisman, Raymond, and Gatti, Roberta (2001) *Are women really the "fairer" sex? Corruption and women in government* Journal of Economic Behaviour & Organization vol 46, pp. 423-429.

Edling, Christofer och Peter Hedström (2003) *Kvantitativa metoder. Grundläggande analysmetoder för samhälls- och beteendevetare*. Lund: Studentlitteratur

Franchschet, Susan and Piscopo, Jennifer (2012) *Gender and Political Backgrounds in Argentina* in 'The Impact of Gender Quotas' Edited by Francheschet, Susan, Krook, Mona Lena and Piscopo, Jennifer M. pp. 43-56. Oxford University Press.

Halsaa, Beatrice (1987) *Har kvinnor gemensamma intressen?* Kvinnovetenskaplig Tidskskrift vol 4, pp.42-56

Herner, Helga Maria (1987) *Welfare State and Women Power*. In "The Political Interest of Gender" edited by Jones, Kathleen B. and Jonasdottir, Anna G. SAGE Publications Ltd.

Howell, Jude 2006 *"Women's Political Participation in China: in whose interests elections?*" Journal of Contemporary China vol 15, issue 49, pp. 603–619.

Htun, Mala (2004) *Is gender like ethnicity? The political representation of identity groups* Perspective of Politics vol 2, issue 3, pp. 439-458.

Htun, Mala N, and Jones, Mark P. (2002) *Engendering the right to participate in decision-making: electoral quotas and women's leadership in Latin America* in Gender and the Politics of Rights and Democracy in Latin America edited by Craske, Nikki and Molyneux, Maxine. Palgrave.

Hughes, Melanie M, and Paxton, Pamela 2008 *Continuous change, episodes, and critical periods: a framework for understanding women's political representation over time* Politics & Gender vol 4 pp. 233-264

Inglehart, Ronald, Norris, Pippa, and Welzel, Christian (2002) *Gender Equality and Democracy* Comparative Sociology vol 1, issue 3-4, pp. 321-345.

IPU 2012 http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/classif.htm 2012-05-23

Jonasdottir, Anna G (1985) Kvinnors intressen och andra värden. Kvinnovetenskaplig tidsskrift vol 6, issue 2, pp. 17-33.

Jones, Mark P. (2004) *Quota legislation and the election of women: learning from the Costa Rican experience* The Journal of Politics, vol 66, issue 4, pp. 1203-1223.

Kenworthy, Lane and Malami, Melissa (1999) *Gender Inequality in Political Representation: A Worldwide Comparative Analysis* Social Forces vol. 78, issue 1, pp. 235-268.

Krook, Mona Lena (2009) *Quotas for Women in Politics. Gender and Candidate Selection Reform Worldwide.* Oxford University Press.

Krook, Mona Lena (2010) *Women's representation in parliament: A qualitative comparative analysis* Political Studies vol 58, pp. 886-908.

Lovenduski, Joni, and Norris, Pippa (2004) *Westminster Women: The Politics of Presence* Political Studies.

Larsson, Moa 2012 Codebook for Gender Quotas and Women's Representation

Matland, Richard (2006) *Electoral Quotas: frequency and effectiveness* in 'Women, Quotas and Politics' pp. 275-292. Routlegde Research in Comparative Politics.

Matland, Richard and Taylor, Michelle (1997) *Electoral system effects* Comparative Political Studies vol 30, issue 2, pp. 186-210.

Murray, Rainbow (2012) *Parity and Legislative Competence in France* in 'The Impact of Gender Quotas' Edited by Francheschet, Susan, Krook, Mona Lena and Piscopo, Jennifer M. pp. 27-42. Oxford University Press.

Nanivadekar, Medha (2006) *Critical perspective on gender and politics. Gender Quotas II* Politics & Gender vol 2, pp. 119-128 .

Norris, Pippa (2006) *The impact of electoral reform on women's representation* Acta Politica vol 41, issue 2, pp. 197-213.

O'Brien, Diane Z. (2012) *Quotas and Qualifications in Uganda* in 'The Impact of Gender Quotas' Edited by Francheschet, Susan, Krook, Mona Lena and Piscopo, Jennifer M. pp. 57-71 Oxford University Press..

Paxton, Pamela (1997) *Women in National Legislatures: A Cross-National Analysis* Social Science Research vol 26, pp. 442-464.

Paxton, Pamela, Hughes, Melanie M, and Painter, Matthew A. (2010) *Growth in women's political representation: A longitudinal exploration of democracy, electoral system and gender quotas* European Journal of Political Research vol 49, pp. 25-52.

Paxton, Pamela and Kunovich, Sheri (2003) *Women's Political Representation: The Importance of Ideology* Social Forces vol 82, Issue 1, pp. 87-113.

Phillips, Anne 1995 *The Politics of Presence* Oxford University Press. University Press.

Pippa, Norris (2000) *Women's Representation and Electoral Systems* For Richard Rose (ed) *Encyclopedia of Electoral Systems* Washington DC: CQ Press.

Pitkin, Hanna Fenichel (1967) “The Concept of Representation” University of California Press.

QoG (2012) http://www.qog.pol.gu.se/digitalAssets/1358/1358062_qog_codebook_v6apr11.pdf 2012-05-23

Quotaproject 2012 http://www.quotaproject.org/index.cfm 2012-05-10

Reynolds, Andrew (1999) *Women in the legislatures and executives of the world. Knocking at the highest glass ceiling.* World Politics vol 51, pp. 547-572.

Reynolds, Andrew Reilly, Ben and Ellis, Andrew (2008) *Electoral System Design: The New International IDEA Handbook* edited by Reynolds, Andrew Reilly, Ben and Ellis, Andrew

Sater, James M. (2012) *Reserved Seats, Patriarchy, and Patronage in Morocco* in ‘The Impact of Gender Quotas’ Edited by Francheschet, Susan, Krook, Mona Lena and Piscopo, Jennifer M. pp. 72-86. Oxford University Press. University Press.

Schwindt-Bayer, Leslie A. and Mishler, William (2005) *An integrated model of women’s representation* The Journal of Politics vol 67, no. 2, pp- 407-428.

Sirkin, Mark R. 2006 *Statistics for the Social Sciences* Sage Publications.

Stockmer, Daniel and Byrne, Maeve (2011) *Women’s Representation around the World: The importance of Women’s Participation in the Workforce* Parliamentary Affairs Advance Access published December 12 (2011) page 1-20.

Studlar, Donley T and McAllister, Ian (2002) *Does a critical mass exist? A comparative analysis of women’s legislative representation since 1950* European Journal of Political Research vol 41, pp. 233-253.

Sung, Hung-En (2003) *Fairer sex or fairer system? Gender and corruption revisit* Social Forces vol 82, issue 2, pp. 703-723.

Tripp, Aili Maria (2003) *The changing face of Africa’s legislatures: women and quotas* Paper presented at the International IDEA/EISA/SADC Parliamentary Forum Conference in Pretoria.

Tripp, Aili Maria and Kang, Alice (2008) *The global impact of quotas. On the fast track to increased female legislative representation* Comparative Political Studies vol 41, issue 3, pp. 338-361.

Tripp, Aili Maria, Konaté, Dior, and Lowe-Morna, Colleen (2006) *Sub-Saharan Africa: On the fast track to women's political representation* in ‘Women, Quotas and Politics’ edited by Dahlerup, Drude. pp. 112-137. Routledge.

UN 1995 http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/beijing/platform/ 2012-03-12

UNDP 2012 http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/hdi/ 2012-05-08

Wängnerud, Lena (2000) *Testing the Politics of Presence: Women's Representation in the Swedish Riksdag* Scandinavian Political Studies, vol 23, no. 1 p.67-91.

Wängnerud, Lena (2005) *Sweden: A step-wise Development* In Women in Parliament: Beyond Numbers, Case Study: Sweden. International IDEA Handbook edited by Julie Ballington and Azza Karam pp. 238-239.

Wängnerud, Lena (2009) *Women in parliament: descriptive and substantive representation* Annual Review of Political Science vol 12, issue 5, pp. 51-69.

Yoon, M.Y. (2001) *Democratization and Women's Legislative Representation in Sub-Saharan Africa* Democratization vol 8, issue 2, pp. 169-190.

8. Appendix

8.2 Women's representation

Table 8.1 Countries with more than 30 percent women MPs 2001 and 2011. *Quotas* means that the country has gender quotas

Rank			2011	(%)
	Country, 2001	**(%)**		
1	Sweden *qutas*	42.7	Rwanda *qutas*	56.3
2	Finland	36.5	Andorra	50.0
3	Netherlands *qutas*	36.0	Cuba	45.2
4	Norway *qutas*	35.8	Sweden *qutas*	44.7
5	Iceland *qutas*	34.9	Seychelles	43.8
6	Germany *qutas*	31.1	Finland	42.5
7	New Zealand	30.8	South Africa *qutas*	42.3
8	Mozambique *qutas*	30.0	Netherlands *qutas*	40.7
9			Nicaragua *qutas*	40.2
10			Iceland *qutas*	39.7
11			Norway *qutas*	39.6
12			Mozambique *qutas*	39.2
13			Denmark *qutas*	39.1
14			Costa Rica *qutas*	38.6
15			Angola *qutas*	38.2
16			Belgium *qutas*	38.0
17			Argentina *qutas*	37.4
18			Spain *qutas*	36.0
			Tanzania *qutas*	
19			Uganda *qutas*	35.0
20			Nepal *qutas*	33.2
21			Germany *qutas*	32.9
22			Ecuador *qutas*	32.3
			Timor-Leste/East Timor *qutas*	
24			New Zealand	32.2
			Slovenia *qutas*	32.2
25			Belarus	31.8
26			Guyana *qutas*	31.3
27			The F.Y.R. of Macedonia *qutas*	30.9
28			Burundi *qutas*	30.5

Source: IPU (2012) and Quotaproject (2012)

Table 8.2 Women's representation 2011 (% women MPs in lower or single chamber)

Country	(% W)
Rwanda	56.3
Andorra	50.0
Cuba	45.2
Sweden	44.7
Seychelles	43.8
Finland	42.5
South Africa 1	42.3
Netherlands	40.7
Nicaragua	40.2
Iceland	39.7
Norway	39.6
Mozambique	39.2
Denmark	39.1
Costa Rica	38.6
Angola	38.2
Belgium	38.0
Argentina	37.4
Spain	36.0
United Republic of Tanzania	36.0
Uganda	35.0
Nepal	33.2
Germany	32.9
Ecuador	32.3
Timor-Leste	32.3
New Zealand	32.2
Slovenia	32.2
Belarus	31.8
Guyana	31.3
The F.Y.R. of Macedonia	30.9
Burundi	30.5
Portugal	28.7
Trinidad and Tobago	28.6
Switzerland	28.5
Austria	27.9
Ethiopia	27.8
Afghanistan	27.7
Tunisia	26.7
South Sudan	26.5
Mexico	26.2
Bolivia	25.4
Iraq	25.2
Lao People's Democratic Republic	25.0
Luxembourg	25.0
Canada	24.8
Australia	24.7
Sudan	24.6
Namibia	24.4
Viet Nam	24.4
Lesotho	24.2
Liechtenstein	24.0
Croatia	23.8
Poland	23.7
Kyrgyzstan	23.3
Latvia	23.0
Philippines	22.9
Senegal	22.7
Pakistan	22.5
Malawi	22.3
United Kingdom	22.3
Singapore	22.2
Mauritania	22.1
Czech Republic	22.0
Eritrea	22.0
Serbia	22.0
Uzbekistan	22.0
Italy	21.6
Peru	21.5
Bosnia and Herzegovina	21.4
China	21.3
Bulgaria	20.8
Cape Verde	20.8
Dominican Republic	20.8
Cambodia	20.3
Israel	20.0
Estonia	19.8
Republic of Moldova	19.8
Bangladesh	19.7
Honduras	19.5
Lithuania	19.1
El Salvador	19.0
Monaco	19.0
Tajikistan	19.0
France	18.9
Mauritius	18.8
Greece	18.7
San Marino	18.3
Indonesia	18.2
Sao Tome and Principe	18.2
Kazakhstan	17.8
United Arab Emirates	17.5
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	17.4
Morocco	17.0
Venezuela	17.0
Turkmenistan	16.8
United States of America 2	16.8
Saint Lucia	16.7
Azerbaijan	16.0
Slovakia	16.0
Thailand	15.8
Albania	15.7
Democratic People's Republic of Korea	15.6
Burkina Faso	15.3
Ireland	15.1
Zimbabwe	15.0
Republic of Korea	14.7
Chile	14.2
Gabon	14.2
Turkey	14.2
Cameroon	13.9
Djibouti	13.8
Russian Federation	13.6
Swaziland	13.6
Grenada	13.3
Guatemala	13.3
Niger	13.3
Sierra Leone	12.9
Chad	12.8
Jamaica	12.7
Central African Republic	12.5
Dominica	12.5
Madagascar	12.5
Paraguay	12.5
Syrian Arab Republic	12.4
Montenegro	12.3
Bahamas	12.2
Colombia	12.1
Uruguay	12.1
Suriname	11.8
Zambia	11.5
Romania	11.2
Togo	11.1

Cote d'Ivoire	11.0
India	11.0
Japan	10.8
Jordan	10.8
Cyprus	10.7
Antigua and Barbuda	10.5
Malaysia	10.4
Mali	10.2
Bahrain	10.0
Barbados	10.0
Equatorial Guinea	10.0
Guinea-Bissau	10.0
Kenya	9.8
Liberia	9.6
Hungary	8.8
Kiribati	8.7
Malta	8.7
Brazil	8.6
Bhutan	8.5
Panama	8.5
Armenia	8.4
Benin	8.4
Ghana	8.3
Algeria	8.0
Ukraine	8.0
Botswana	7.9
Kuwait	7.7
Libya	7.7
Gambia	7.5
Congo	7.3
Nigeria	6.8
Somalia	6.8
Saint Kitts and Nevis	6.7
Tuvalu	6.7
Georgia	6.6
Maldives	6.5
Sri Lanka	5.8
Haiti	4.2
Samoa	4.1
Mongolia	3.9
Tonga	3.6
Myanmar	3.5
Lebanon	3.1
Comoros	3.0
Marshall Islands	3.0
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	2.8
Egypt 3	2.0
Vanuatu	1.9
Oman	1.2
Papua New Guinea	0.9
Yemen	0.3
Belize	0.0
Micronesia (Federated States of)	0.0
Nauru	0.0
Palau	0.0
Qatar	0.0
Saudi Arabia	0.0
Solomon Islands	0.0
Democratic Republic of the Congo	?

Table 8.3 Women's repersentation 2001 (% women MPs in lower or single chamber)

	Women in Parliament (%)
	2001
Sweden	43,00
Denmark	37,00
Finland	37,00
Netherlands	36,00
Norway	36,00
Iceland	35,00
Germany	31,00
New Zealand	31,00
Mozambique	30,00
South Africa	30,00
Cuba	28,00
Spain	28,00
Argentina	27,00
Austria	27,00
Grenada	27,00
Rwanda	26,00
Vietnam	26,00
Turkmenistan	26,00
Namibia	25,00
Seychelles	24,00
Australia	23,00
Belgium	23,00
Switzerland	23,00
China	22,00
Monaco	22,00
Canada	21,00
Croatia	21,00
Laos	21,00
Korea, North	20,00
Peru	20,00
Costa Rica	19,00
Guyana	19,00
Estonia	18,00
Uganda	18,00
United Kingdom	18,00
Botswana	17,00
Latvia	17,00
Luxembourg	17,00
Portugal	17,00
Angola	16,00
Dominican Republic	16,00
Mexico	16,00
Bahamas	15,00
Czech Republic	15,00
Ecuador	15,00
Eritrea	15,00
Tajikistan	15,00
Burundi	14,00
Slovakia	14,00
United States	14,00
Israel	13,00
Jamaica	13,00
Poland	13,00
St Kitts and Nevis	13,00
San Marino	13,00
Bolivia	12,00
Colombia	12,00
Congo	12,00
Ireland	12,00
Mali	12,00
Senegal	12,00
Slovenia	12,00
Tunisia	12,00
Uruguay	12,00
Barbados	11,00
Bulgaria	11,00
Cape Verde	11,00
Chile	11,00
France	11,00
Italy	11,00
Lithuania	11,00
Mongolia	11,00
Philippines	11,00
Romania	11,00
St Lucia	11,00
El Salvador	10,00
Kazakhstan	10,00
Malaysia	10,00
Nicaragua	10,00
Panama	10,00
Syria	10,00
Venezuela	10,00
Zambia	10,00
Bangladesh	9,00
Bhutan	9,00
Gabon	9,00
Greece	9,00
Guatemala	9,00
Guinea	9,00
Honduras	9,00
India	9,00
Malawi	9,00
Malta	9,00
Sao Tome and Principe	9,00
Sierra Leone	9,00
Zimbabwe	9,00
Ethiopia (1993-)	8,00
Hungary	8,00
Indonesia	8,00
Iraq	8,00
Liberia	8,00
Madagascar	8,00
Moldova	8,00
Guinea-Bissau	8,00
Russia	8,00
Ukraine	8,00
Burkina Faso	8,00
Samoa	8,00
Andorra	7,00
Belize	7,00
Cambodia	7,00
Central African Republic	7,00
Cyprus	7,00
Georgia	7,00
Japan	7,00
Singapore	7,00
Macedonia	7,00
Uzbekistan	7,00
Brazil	6,00
Cameroon	6,00
Benin	6,00
Korea, South	6,00
Maldives	6,00
Mauritius	6,00
Nepal	6,00
Albania	5,00
Antigua and Barbuda	5,00
Equatorial Guinea	5,00

Kiribati	5,00	Togo	5,00		
St Vincent and the Grenadines	5,00	Kenya	4,00		
Lesotho	4,00	Swaziland	3,00	Yemen	1,00
Liechtenstein	4,00	Solomon Islands	2,00	Djibouti	0,00
Mauritania	4,00	Chad	2,00	Jordan	0,00
Turkey	4,00	Gambia	2,00	Kuwait	0,00
Algeria	3,00	Kyrgyzstan	2,00	Vanuatu	0,00
Armenia	3,00	Lebanon	2,00	Micronesia	0,00
Iran	3,00	Papua New Guinea	2,00	Tonga	0,00
Nigeria	3,00	Morocco	1,00	United Arab Emirates	0,00
Marshall Islands	3,00	Niger	1,00		
Paraguay	3,00				

8.2 Gender Quotas

8.2.1 The history of gender quota types

The last decade's there has been increased attention towards gender quotas in the literature on women's representation. As already mentioned, there are 106 countries have gender quotas at the moment (Quotaproject 2012, Dahlerup 2007:73). Gender quotas are not such a new phenomenon.[36] The reserved seats quotas emerged as early as the 1930s, and were the most common type of gender quotas during the 1970s. However, reserved seats lost popularity after the 1970s, and did not regain its popularity until the beginning of the 2000s. It is primarily semi- and non-democratic regimes with traditionally low levels of women MPs that have adopted reserved seats (Krook 2009:7).

Replacing reserved seats as the most common type of gender quotas after the 1970s was the voluntary type. Voluntary party quotas emerged in the mid-1970s when the Norwegian Labour party adopted internal quota regulation with the ambition to increase the number of women in the parliament (Caul 2001:1214). The Norwegian example inspired other countries to consider gender quotas with the purpose of increasing women's representation (Tripp and Kang 2008:339).

Legislated candidate quotas is the newest type of quota, and was first introduced in Argentina in 1991, as a response to intense work by women in political parties and women's organisations in the civil society (Francheschet and Piscopo 2012:44). Legislated candidate quotas gained popularity in Latin America during the late 1990s, and has spread globally ever since.

36 During the period 1985-1995, 21 countries adopted some type of gender quotas. In the meantime, however, 25 former Soviet republics dropped their gender quotas. These 25 countries include: Belarus, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Republic of Moldova, Croatia, Latvia, Poland. The F.Y.R Macedonia, Estonia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Czech Republic, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slovakia, Turkmenistan, Slovenia, Kazakhstan, Russian Federation, Georgia, Hungary, Serbia and Montenegro, Albania, Armenia, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan (Tripp and Kang 2008:359). This thesis will not pay particular attention towards the fact that the former Soviet republics dropped their quotas.

8.2.2 25 former Soviet republics removed gender quotas:

Belarus, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Republic of Moldova, Croatia, Latvia, Poland. The F.Y.R Macedonia, Estonia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Czech Republic, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slovakia, Turkmenistan, Slovenia, Kazakhstan, Russian Federation, Georgia, Hungary, Serbia and Montenegro, Albania, Armenia, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan (Tripp and Kang 2008:359).

8.2.3 Countries having Reserved Seats Quota

Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Burundi, China, Djibouti, Eritrea, Jordan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Morocco, Niger, Pakistan, Rwanda, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda (Quotaproject 2012).

8.2.4 Countries having Legislated Candidate Quotas

Albania, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Belgium, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, East Timon, Ecuador, Egypt, France, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, South Korea, Macedonia, Mauritania, Mexico, Namibia, Nepal, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Senegal, Serbia, Slovenia, Spain, Tunisia, Uruguay, Uzbekistan (Quotaproject 2012).

8.2.5 Countries having Voluntary Party Quotas

Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bolivia, Botswana, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, El Salvador, France, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Kenya, Korea South, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mali, Malta, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Niger, Norway, Paraguay, Philippines, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, United Kingdom, Uruguay, Zimbabwe (Quotaproject 2012).

Table 8.4 Regime Type and Gender Quotas (number of countries)

Type of quota	Democratic	Semi-Democratic	Non-Democratic	Total number of countries
Reserved seats	0	6	9	15
Legislated candidate quotas	20	5	6	31
Voluntary party quotas	37	4	4	45

Comments: The table illustrates how many countries that have gender are considered to be democratic, semi-democratic, or non-democratic regimes. The countries are divided in accordance with which quota type they have adopted. The variable values equal the number of countries in that specific category having a certain regime type. The quota types included in the table are reserved seats, legislated candidate and voluntary party quotas are based on Dahleru's categorization on quotaproject.org. The total number of countries illustrates how many countries that have a value on the regime type variable. Regime type is based on Freedom House measure of democracy index where I have categorized the values 7-10 as democratic regimes, 3-6 as semi-democratic regimes, and 0-2 as non-democratic regimes. *Source:* Quota variables: Quotaproject.org 2012, please see codebook Larsson 2012 for detailed information about how the variables are coded. Regime type: QoG 2012 fh_ipolity2.

Table 8.5 Institutional factors: Distribution quota type and electoral system (number of countries)

Type of quota	PR	Majority	Mixed	N
Reserved seats	3	10	2	15
Legislated candidate quotas	19	5	13	37
Voluntary party quotas	20	9	18	47

Comment: The table shows how many countries have the different quota types. *Source:* Electoral system, QoG cross-section 2011 variable iaep_es. Plurality and majority electoral system are both coded as 'Majority'. Quotas: Quotaproject.org 2012, please see codebook Larsson 2012 for detailed information about how the variables are coded.

Table 8.6 Structural Factors: Quota type and Women's political and economic rights

Type of quota	No political rights	Full political rights	No economic rights	Full economic rights	Total number of countries
Reserved seats	1	0	2	0	15
Legislated candidate quotas	0	4	1	0	39
Voluntary party quotas	0	13	0	1	50
World	5	21	7	3	193

Comment: The ciri_wopol, and ciri_wecon in QoG standard dataset (2011)

Figure 8.1 Structural factors: Quota type women's education



Table 8.7 Average years of education and Quota Type

Type of quota	Average level of women's education
Reserved seats	2.9 years
Legislated candidate quotas	6.7 years
Voluntary party quotas	8.0 years
World	6.8 years

Comment: The table illustrates the average number of years women have studied in the countries.The countries are categorised after gender quota type belonging. The quota types included in the table are reserved seats, legislated candidate and voluntary party quotas based on Dahlerup's categorization on quotaproject.org. The world average is based on the countries included in the QoG standard dataset (2011). Sources: Quota variables: Quotaproject.org 2012, please see codebook Larsson 2012 for detailed information about how the variables are coded. Electoral system: QoG Standard dataset, cross-section 2011 variabel iaep_es. Women's education: QoG Standard dataset (2011) variable ihme_ayef.

Table 8.8 Distribution of countries, grouped after quota type, and HDI dichotomous variable

Type of quota	HDI above world average	HDI below world average	Total percent (%)
Reserved seats	20	80	100
Legislated party quotas	30	70	100
Voluntary party quotas	70	30	100
World	62	38	100

Comment: Table x.x illustrates the dichotomous version of the UNDP's Human Development Index (HDI). The HDI is divided in two halves of each side of the world average HDI of 0.7. The countries are categorised after gender quota type belonging. The quota types included in the table are reserved seats, legislated candidate and voluntary party quotas based on Dahlerup's categorization on quotaproject.org. The category World represents all of the world's countries that are included in this thesis. Sources: Quota variables: Quotaproject.org 2012, please see codebook Larsson 2012 for detailed information about how the variables are coded. HDI is based on undp_hdi found in the QoG standard dataset (2011).

8.3 Databases

The QoG database is created by the Quality of Government institute at the University of Gothenburg. All information about the QoG institute is taken from the QoG webpage:

"The QoG Institute was founded in 2004 by Professor Bo Rothstein and Professor Sören Holmberg. It is an independet research institute within the Department of Political Science at the University of Gothenburg. We conduct and promote research on the causes, consequences and nature of Good Governance and the Quality of Government (QoG) - that is, trustworthy, reliable, impartial, uncorrupted and competent government institutions. Our research addresses the questions of how to create and maintain high quality government institutions and how the quality of such institutions influences public policy and socio-economic conditions in a broader sense. While Quality of Government is our common intellectual focal point, we apply a variety of theoretical and methodological perspectives. Around twenty-five researchers are currently engaged in different projects organized or funded by the QoG Institute. A central part of establishing the QoG Institute has been the construction of a comparative data base and we believe that we now have the most complete data set pertaining to this type of research." (http://www.qog.pol.gu.se/aboutus/)

The Quotaproject database is the result from cooperation between the International IDEA, the IPU, and the Department of Political Science at Stockholm University. All information below is taken from the Quotaproject website (http://www.quotaproject.org/aboutProject.cfm)

International IDEA is an intergovernmental organization that supports sustainable democracy worldwide. IDEA undertakes its work through providing comparative knowledge resources and tools, influencing policy and politics, and support democratic reforms. This is done in electoral processes, constitution building processes,

political participation and representation, democracy and development, gender in democracy, democracy assessments and addressing crosscutting issues on conflict, security, diversity and gender.

The IPU is the international organization of Parliaments, established in 1889. The Union is the focal point for world-wide parliamentary dialogue and works for peace and co-operation among peoples and for the firm establishment of representative democracy. It seeks to foster contacts, co-ordination, and the exchange of experience among parliaments and parliamentarians of all countries.

At the Department of Political Science at Stockholm University, Drude Dahlerup is heading a research project entitled: *"Quotas - a Key to Equality? An International Comparison of the Use of Electoral Quotas to obtain Equal Political Citizenship for Women"*. The project is supported by the Swedish Research Council.