



UNIVERSITY OF GOTHENBURG

MASTER THESIS IN
EUROPEAN STUDIES

Competing or complementing?

An empirical pilot study of Swedish
MEPs' and MPs' perceptions of Nordic and
European security collaborations

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19th of May 2014

Abstract

Previous research has shown that a possible tension can be viewed to exist between the two parallel Nordic and European security structures which have come into place on the European arena since the end of the Cold War. On all political levels though, the notion of competing regional security structures is firmly opposed. A general agreement exists that Nordic security cooperation in all ways is a complement to European. However, as previous research has indicated, this notion needed to be problematized, and therefore this thesis aims to examine the possible tension using and comparing the perceptions of Swedish MEPs and MPs. This research can be viewed as an empirical pilot study using a comparative dimension to assess perceptions on Nordic and European security collaborations. Twenty Swedish parliamentarians from the European Parliament and the Nordic Council were interviewed for this research. The concept of actorness and its components: recognition, authority, autonomy and cohesion constituted the theoretical framework which was used to assess perceptions of the two regional security entities as actors. High perception of actorness for both would indicate that they are competing.

Main findings of this research are that the MPs perceive both Nordic and European security collaborations to possess relatively high levels of security actorness. The MPs' views therefore indicate a possible competition between the two parallel security structures. While the MEPs perceive European security cooperation to have high security actorness and Nordic security cooperation to have low security actorness. Implying that it is the MEPs' view that the two regional entities are not competing.

Key words: Regionalisation of security, Nordic security cooperation, European security cooperation, regional security entities, Nordic Council, European Union, parallel security structures, security actorness, interviews, parliamentarians' perceptions, comparative study.

Word count: 20588

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Abbreviations:

BeNeLux	Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
EC	European Communities
EDC	European Defence Community
EEAS	European External Action Service
EP	European Parliament
EPC	European Political Cooperation
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
EU	European Union
IR	International Relations
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NB8	Nordic-Baltic Eight
NC	Nordic Council
NCM	Nordic Council of Ministers
NORDEFKO	Nordic Defence Cooperation
NPE	Normative Power Europe
MEP	Member of European Parliament
MP	Member of Parliament
MS	Member State
UN	United Nations
US	United States of America

1. Introduction

Recent trends in Nordic and European security cooperation show that both security structures are on the rise. Different security solutions have come into place on the European arena, several security structures co-exist and parallel processes develop these further. Regional entities play a more significant role when it comes to security than ever before.

Historically, the end of the Cold War opened up new possibilities for both European and Nordic countries to participate in security cooperation. Within the Nordic context Finland and Sweden went from avoiding all forms of formal security cooperation with Western powers to actually, during the early 1990s, declaring an official interest in participating in the construction of a security cooperation within the EC/EU. Membership negotiations with the EU began, for both Finland and Sweden, in February 1993. Step by step the neutrality that characterized Sweden's foreign policy in the bipolar order of the Cold War era was downplayed.¹ To participate in the EU and to be included in European integration during the 1990s clearly became a central objective for the Swedish government, so much in fact that it overshadowed Nordic cooperation.² It has indeed taken time, as the literature review will show, but Nordic security cooperation has in the late 2000s re-emerged and is more vital than ever, with extensive and ambitious ideas and proposals. Due to this development a possible concern rises: *can* we develop ever closer security cooperation within the framework of *two* regional collaborations at the same time? Does a competitive situation exist? This thesis will take a closer look at the possible tension between Nordic and European security collaborations.

Today, the official material from the Nordic Council (NC) and the Nordic Council of Ministers (NCM) strongly opposes that the organisations *ever* could compete and *firmly* convey that the Nordic security cooperation is in all aspects a complement to European. Parallel processes on European and Nordic level drive regional security cooperation forward. On the European level the Lisbon Treaty brought forward developments such as a new and more central role for the High Representative on Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and the instatement of a common European External Action Service (EEAS).³ On the Nordic level closer cooperation has led to the development of the Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFECO), which is the umbrella organisation for several areas of security and defence cooperation such as common surveillance, common training exercises, procurement of defence equipment and much more.⁴ The Stoltenberg report is also a prominent example of development when it comes to Nordic security cooperation. The report recommended for instance – which has now come to pass – a Nordic solidarity declaration. A couple of years ago this

¹ Doeser, F. (2012), "Kalla krigets slut och utrikespolitisk förändring i Finland och Sverige", in *Norden mellan stormakter och fredsförbund*, Santérus Academic Press Sweden, p. 169-170

² Doeser (2012), p. 193-201

³ The Lisbon Treaty (2008), *konsoliderad version av EU:s fördrag*, SNS Förlag, p.19-20

⁴ NORDEFECO Annual Report 2012

was basically unthinkable due to the many differences in security solutions, some Nordic countries are EU members, some NATO-members, some both.⁵

In the scholarly debate there are proponents who say that European and Nordic security cooperation are in fact *competing*, while others find the Nordic level to be a *complement*. Petersson (2010) is very firm in his verdict: “Nordic co-operation of today stands out, unfortunately, as more of a competitor than a complement to NATO and the ESDP⁶.”⁷ Petersson (2010) argues that the two security structures are competing since the Nordic countries let other security structures i.e. NATO and EU take president, leaving Nordic security cooperation weak.⁸ While Forsberg (2013) argues that *not competing* is what is enabling Nordic security cooperation. He writes “[i]t can be argued, indeed, that Nordic defence cooperation has become possible precisely because it is not seen as a true alternative to cooperation within the EU or NATO.”⁹ Hofmann (2009) sees that it is, or can become, problematic being engaged in parallel security collaborations. She writes “[w]hile it is hard to characterize the NATO–ESDP relationship as either competitive or cooperative, overlap has clearly impeded the development of an efficient division of labour between institutions”¹⁰ Hofmann’s statement signals something that also can be true for the EU-Nordic relationship: The absence of cooperation between organisations and several organisations working with the same questions and issues can most likely be problematic. Petersson (2010) questions why the Nordic countries choose to build new, separate Nordic institutions instead of using already existing cooperation forms. He goes so far as to suggest that it might be time for Finland and Sweden to reconsider a NATO membership.¹¹

Researchers such as Petersson (2010) and Hofmann (2009) have shown that competition is something that is present between regional security entities. This tension will be a central point throughout this research. The different perspectives and perceptions of parliamentarians constitute a way to investigate and address this tension. For this thesis, ten Swedish Members of European Parliament (MEPs) and ten Swedish Members of Parliament (MPs) from the Swedish Delegation to the NC have been interviewed.

This thesis can be viewed as an empirical pilot study trying to shed light on a known area of tension by using a new perspective; the perceptions of Swedish parliamentarians from the two regional parliamentary assemblies, the Nordic Council (NC) and the European Parliament (EP). A tool in this

⁵ Britz, M. Interview 12th February 2014, at the Swedish Defence College

⁶ The European Security and Defence Policy

⁷ Petersson, M. (2010) ”Komplement eller konkurrent? Några reflexioner kring det nordiska militärpolitiska samarbetet”, Institut for forsvarsstudier, Årgang 6, p.256

⁸ Petersson (2010), p. 239-240

⁹ Forsberg, T. (2013), ”The rise of Nordic defence cooperation: a return to regionalism?”, International Affairs Volume 89, Issue 5, pp. 1176

¹⁰ Hofmann, S. C. (2009) ”Overlapping institutions in the Realm of International Security: The Case of NATO and ESDP”, Perspectives on Politics 7 (1): p.45-46

¹¹ Petersson (2010), p.256-257

investigation will be the concept of actorness, which will constitute the theoretical framework of the study. Analyzing the ‘actorhood’ of European and Nordic security structures will problematize the parliamentarians’ understanding of them as actors, and in turn help determine if the two security structures are perceived to compete or complement. For instance, strong perceptions of actorness for both the European and the Nordic level indicate and highlight a possible competitive climate. Jupille and Caporaso (1998) have formulated four components of actorness: *recognition, authority, autonomy* and *cohesion*.¹² These are prominent throughout the research: Firstly, since they were used to develop the interview guide and thereby to steer the investigation. Secondly, because they constitute the framework for analysing the MEPs and MPs views on the two security structures.

Comparing the European and the Nordic parliamentarians’ views have been key to see if their preferences differ, to find patterns and to find possible differences in opinions between the two regional levels. The 20 parliamentarians interviewed are in a unique position to shed light in several ways governing bodies could not, and to give a more diverse insight on whether European and Nordic security structures should be viewed as competing or not. As stressed by Hofmann (2013), “[o]ne can observe that many foreign and security policies are not backed by a national consensus but instead divide ‘the national’.”¹³ Since the parliamentarians are not viewed to be the primary actors, they could be more outspoken when discussing these issues and thereby contribute with truly diverse and sometimes unexpected views and perceptions of both Nordic and European security structures. Having the MEPs and MPs as the unit of analysis has given the opportunity to view the internal divide as well as the European-Nordic tension when it comes to regionalisation of security.

¹² Jupille, J., & Caporaso, J. A. (1998) “States, Agency, and Rules: The European Union in Global Environmental Politics.” In C. Rhodes, *The European Union in the World Community* (pp. 213-229). Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers, p.213-221

¹³ Hofmann (2013), *European Security in NATO’s shadow – Party Ideologies and Institution Building*, Cambridge University Press, p. 13

2. Aim and question

The overarching aim of this thesis is to contribute to the understanding of regionalisation of security and two possibly conflicting regional security entities, Nordic and European. This thesis will contribute to the understanding of the two regional security processes with a focus on the parliamentarians' perspective. An empirical pilot study on regional security cooperation, according to parliamentarians' from two regional parliamentary assemblies, the NC and the EP, will constitute the basis for this study. This research gives several opportunities to compare: Firstly, and most importantly, between the two regional levels. Secondly, to some extent, along the different party lines.

This research will use the concept of actorness as theoretical framework when comparing the views and arguments of the Swedish MEPs and MPs of the Swedish delegation to the NC on European and Nordic security cooperation. A central aspect of this study is to determine if these two security structures, according to the parliamentarians, can be viewed to be competing or complementing with regard to each other. The research questions have been formulated as follows:

How do Swedish MPs from the European Parliament and the Nordic Council perceive; on one hand European security cooperation and on the other Nordic security cooperation?

- *Do the MEPs' and MPs' perceptions indicate that the two regional security entities possess actorness?*
- *Do the MEPs' and MPs' views imply that European and Nordic security cooperation complement or compete with each other?*

2.1 Contribution to the field

A lot of research can be found on both the development of European and of Nordic security cooperation. In general, research on the European level tends not to give focus to the possible EU-Nordic tension concerning parallel security structures. Research on Nordic security collaboration cannot ignore the relation to the European level. This study will, as the research on Nordic security cooperation, give weight to the EU-Nordic relation, but it will differ extensively as it uses the parliamentarians as the unit of analysis. No other studies focusing on parliamentarians can be found within this field. Furthermore not much empirical material exists illustrating whether or not the European and Nordic security structures are in fact competing or complementing. This is an empirical pilot study, and could as such possibly pave way for future, truly comprehensive, studies of parliamentarians' views on regionalisation of security. This research will contribute by firstly presenting and comparing the perceptions of MEPs and MPs, secondly by contributing empirical material to further investigation of the possible tension between parallel European and Nordic security collaborations.

2.2 Outline of the thesis

After the introduction, aim and question a section on previous research will follow. This third chapter will be divided into three parts; one on Nordic, one on European and one on similarities and differences between the two. Thereafter, in chapter 4, the theoretical framework will be presented; the concept of actorness and the four derived components of recognition, authority, autonomy and cohesion. Chapter 5 include research design; an empirical pilot study with a comparative dimension. Chapter 6 deals with the methods, including sections on an empirical pilot study, why the parliamentarians were chosen as the unit of analysis, the use of interviews as a method, as well as a section on ethics, validity and generalizability. The results are presented in chapter 7, focusing on comparing the MEPs and MPs within the aforementioned components followed by a comparative summary of the results. Last but not least is chapter 8 with the conclusions of this thesis and suggestions for further research.

3. Previous research

This chapter will first include two sections; one on Nordic and one on European. Each section will describe the development up to the current security cooperation forms on the two regional levels, followed by an academic discussion on why this rise and development have occurred and what it entails.

Regarding the scholarly debate on European security cooperation one should keep in mind that it is not particularly focused on relationships or tensions between the EU and other regional organisations, but rather on what type of actor the EU is and can be in the international arena. Conversely, on the Nordic level, it is impossible not to give significance to its relation to the EU and NATO.

3.1 Nordic security cooperation

3.1.1 The development of Nordic security cooperation

The relations among the Nordic countries, Doeser et al (2012) point out, have since the end of the Napoleonic wars been characterized by a will of cooperation and peace, rather than war and conflict.¹⁴ In fact, the Nordic countries have shared 200 years of unbroken peace. Yet, development of Nordic security cooperation is a relatively recent venture. At the same time, the concept of Nordic security is in no way a new one. Nordic cooperation has a long history towards the current forms of cooperation. The NC was formed as early as 1952. The NCM was established in 1971.¹⁵

The formation of the NC gave Nordic cooperation both a political dimension and an institutional structure. When it comes to military alliances NATO and 'Norden' have only once stood openly opposed to each other as two alternative security structures. This was in the late 1940s with the proposed Scandinavian Defence Union; Denmark and Norway chose NATO, Sweden chose neutrality and Finland was already bound to the Soviet Union with the Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance, also known as the YYA Treaty.¹⁶ Cold War tensions between East and West, and the Nordic countries' differing relationships to the two superpowers prevented open defense and security cooperation.¹⁷ Rieker (2004) points out that the Nordic states' security policies within the Cold War context were referred to as the 'Nordic balance'¹⁸, which entail different alliances to the

¹⁴ Doeser, Petersson and Westberg (ed), (2012) *Norden mellan stormakter och fredsförbund*, Stockholm: Santéus Academic Press Sweden, p.19

¹⁵ <http://www.norden.org/en/about-nordic-co-operation/nordic-co-operation>

¹⁶ Petersson, (2010), p.242

¹⁷ Doeser, Petersson and Westberg (ed), (2012), p.20

¹⁸ Forsberg (2013:1166) describe that the 'Nordic balance' can be viewed as a 'kind of regional security system that sustained stability in northern Europe' and further describes that Nordic balance meant that Norway and Denmark applied restrictions in their relationship with NATO that could be removed were the Soviet Union to tighten its grip on Finland, and that Sweden could eventually also join NATO as a response to possible Soviet attempts to widen its sphere of influence in northern Europe. This system was not, however, based on any agreement, even an informal one.

superpowers creating a status quo aiming to limit any further Nordic aspirations from the Soviet Union.¹⁹ Later, it has become evident that even under the ‘Nordic balance’ period the Nordic states had quite extensive security cooperation, in particular concerning air surveillance as well as intelligence- and security services, but there was little or no transparency.²⁰

The end of the Cold War and changes in Eastern Europe brought about changes in the security landscape, enabling new possibilities for Nordic security and defense cooperation. As Forsberg (2013) put it: “Finland was no longer bound to a defence treaty with the Soviet Union. Both NATO and the EU started to foster regional cooperation and did not oppose cooperation with partner countries that were not members.”²¹ However, as Rieker points out, “[w]hile the end of the Cold War paved the way for a different and more complex security approach, it took some time before the Nordic states responded to this new security context.”²² Actual change and concrete initiatives have come about relatively recently. The Stoltenberg report (2009) and the development of Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFECO) (2009) are prominent features of this.²³ In effect, the end of the Cold War to some extent left the Nordic identity in crisis. Forsberg explains this situation eloquently:

[w]ith the end of the Cold War, the grounds for a superior Nordic identity and balance between East and West seemed to disappear. As a consequence of the pace of European integration, ‘Norden’ was no longer a promise; instead, a Nordic identity threatened to become marginalized in the new Europe.²⁴

Among some scholars ‘Norden’ was declared ‘dead’ (ex. Jukarainen 1999 and Karlsson 1994 – the latter an official publication of the NC). The debate on Nordic identity and the role of the Nordic countries in the international arena lasted almost two decades. It took a long time to consolidate new possibilities, brought about by the end of the Cold War, and Rieker for one underlines that all the Nordic states retained their “traditional Cold War-inspired understanding of security (with emphasis on territorial defence and/or military aspects of security in general), much longer than most of their European counterparts.”²⁵

The development after the end of the Cold War shows that Sweden went from firmly standing by its neutrality to being an involved security collaborator (Doeser et al 2012, Forsberg 2013, Petersson 2010 and Rieker 2004). The shift came about during the 1990s, especially when a right-wing government replaced the social democratic government in 1991 and the importance of Sweden’s neutrality began to be downplayed. Simultaneously the discussions about EC-membership were very

¹⁹ Rieker (2004) “Europeanization of Nordic Security: The European Union and the Changing Security Identities of the Nordic States”, *Cooperation and Conflict* 39, p. 369

²⁰ Petersson(2010), p. 243

²¹ Forsberg, (2013), p.1176

²² Rieker (2004), p. 369

²³ Doeser, Petersson and Westberg (ed), (2012), p.17

²⁴ Forsberg (2013), p.1164

²⁵ Rieker (2004), p.371

vivid in Sweden. The social democratic government (pre-1991) firmly argued that it is possible to combine membership with neutrality. Step by step the Swedish policy of neutrality was declared obsolete.²⁶ Doeser (2012) establish that the administration under Prime Minister Carl Bildt (1991-1994) wished to be open to possible security cooperation. According to Doeser (2012), factors behind the shift in attitude includes the changed security situation, domestic deliberations and economic motifs, but these factors were less important to the Bildt administration than the will to participate in European integration and security cooperation.²⁷ Of course this development occurred in parallel to other processes, but in contrast to the enthusiastic interest in joining the European integration, both the interest and the processes towards building Nordic security cooperation were slow.²⁸

Small steps followed in the 1990s and early 2000s. For instance the establishment of the Nordic Battle Group in 2004 and the participation in crisis management. Nordic countries participated together both in Afghanistan and in Chad during the 2000s.²⁹ Yet, the period from the late 2000s to present is perhaps the most significant for the current Nordic security cooperation, especially the development that has followed the Stoltenberg Report (2009), which was produced by the former Norwegian foreign minister Torwald Stoltenberg. In short it is a declaration that Nordic security cooperation is very much sought after today.³⁰ Several of the 13 proposals in the Stoltenberg report (2009) have already come into place, and the Nordic countries seem to strive to reach the aims of the Stoltenberg report.³¹ For instance, one of the prominent proposals – a Nordic Declaration of Solidarity – was adopted at the Ministerial Council in Helsinki in April 2011.³² By scholars, like Britz (2014), it has been seriously questioned what this Solidarity Declaration actually entails. She adds that it seems unlikely that a Nordic country would intervene on the behalf of another and that in the end it is NATO that sets the frame of action.³³ In addition NORDEFECO, which was established the 4 November 2009 and can be seen as a merger of three previously existing forms of military cooperation between the Nordic countries,³⁴ has been criticised of being problematic. This is because according to Petersson (2010) it duplicates security structures and creates inefficiencies.³⁵

²⁶ Doeser (2012), p.186-193

²⁷ Doeser (2012), p.195

²⁸ Doeser (2012), p.195-198

²⁹ Interview with Britz, M., 12th February 2014, Defence College, Stockholm.

<http://www.forsvarsmakten.se/sv/var-verksamhet/internationella-insatser/pagaende-internationella-insatser/afghanistan-isaf/>. <http://www.regeringen.se/sb/d/12119/a/113412>.

³⁰ Stoltenberg, T. (2009) NORDIC COOPERATION ON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY

³¹ Stoltenberg (2009), p.3

³² Swedish Committee on Foreign Affairs Report 2011/12:UU9, p.8

³³ Britz, M. Interview 12th February 2014, at the Swedish Defence College

³⁴ More can be read on NORDEFECO's website: <http://www.nordefco.org/The-basics-about-NORDEFECO>

³⁵ Petersson (2010), p.239-240

3.1.2 Why a rise of Nordic Security cooperation?

Quite a lot has been written about the rise of interest in Nordic security cooperation in the past years. This debate has been focused on how to explain the recent shift towards closer and deepened Nordic cooperation (Britz 2012, Forsberg 2013, Hofmann 2009, Petersson 2010). Britz (2013) describes that:

All of a sudden Nordic security co-operation has re-emerged on the political agenda in the Nordic states. [...] Researchers as late as 2007 posed the question of why the Nordic states would go back to speak about security when the political space successfully has been characterized by the absence of security. This has become an increasingly intriguing question given the fact that security co-operation since 2007 has become an explicit part of the Nordic political agenda.³⁶

The Nordic countries are perhaps externally perceived as a single unit, but Rieker (2004) stresses that one needs to keep in mind that “the region consists of states with differing relationships to the EU and differing security policy traditions.”³⁷ Forsberg (2013) looks for the “driving forces behind Nordic defence cooperation”³⁸, which he points out is a mixture of different aspects. The financial argument about cost efficiency has been a major factor in the debate. Forsberg (2013) underlines this with the statement “[s]mall countries, in particular, cannot afford not to cooperate.”³⁹ He also presents geography as well as Nordic identity, culture and values as possible driving forces.⁴⁰ Petersson (2010) finds the same arguments very prominent. According to him it is clear that the three arguments: economics, geography and organization are perceived to be at the heart of explaining the recent development.⁴¹ Forsberg (2013) concludes that geography, identity, culture and limited resources are factors that have been present for a long time, and can therefore not alone be what lies behind the rise of Nordic security cooperation in recent years.⁴² Yet, as Petersson (2010) pinpoints; those responsible for the development of the wider and deeper Nordic defence cooperation stress these factors as driving forces.⁴³

Rieker’s (2004) line of argument might instead explain the recent development. She states that “rather than adapting to the changing conditions created by the end of the Cold War, the Nordic states changed their security approaches in response to the European integration process.” – which chimes into the will among the Nordic countries to participate in the European integration process.⁴⁴ Since European integration was a priority, the now possible Nordic security cooperation was not considered until later. This is in line with Forsberg’s (2013) view that the rise of Nordic security cooperation is

³⁶ Britz, M. (2013), <http://www.fhs.se/en/contact/b/malena-britz/>

³⁷ Rieker (2004), p.371

³⁸ Forsberg, (2013), p.1174

³⁹ Forsberg, (2013), p.1174-1175

⁴⁰ Forsberg (2013), p.1175

⁴¹ Petersson, (2010), p.246-247

⁴² Forsberg, (2013), p. 1175

⁴³ Petersson (2010), p.246

⁴⁴ Rieker (2004), p.369

due to the fact that European security cooperation to some extent had stalled. Forsberg (2013) concludes that:

[t]he Nordic countries have recently taken steps towards enhanced defence cooperation. This can be seen both as a sign of a new evolving regionalization of European security structures under NATO and the EU and as a new stage in Nordic cooperation. It has already been regarded as a model to be followed by other regional groupings in Europe, or at least an important case to be studied. At the very moment when defence cooperation at the European level has stalled, it seems that there is much more new dynamism at the regional level.⁴⁵

Petersson (2010) claims that a ‘cautionary finger’ has to be raised; development of security cooperation on *both* European and Nordic levels is creating competition. To Petersson (2010) it is evident that the difficulties to reach common priorities and conclusions leads to Nordic security cooperation being a competitor rather than a complement to NATO and EU security structures.⁴⁶ What the Nordic countries seem to be able to agree upon, according to Petersson (2010), is uncontroversial, smaller areas of cooperation. But this development is not what the political proponents of Nordic cooperation bring up. Almost without exception, Petersson (2010) underlines, the proponents firmly convey that Nordic security cooperation does *not compete* with, but *complements* the existing collaborative structures within the UN, NATO and the EU.⁴⁷ In addition, Petersson (2010) questions why the Nordic countries chose to build new, separate Nordic institutions instead of using the already existing cooperation within NATO.⁴⁸ To him it is clear that involvement in parallel security structures introduces the risk of competition for resources and priorities as well as complicating coordination.⁴⁹

To Petersson (2010) it is clear that it also is reasonable to include other than before mentioned possible explanations to the recent rise in Nordic security cooperation. He applied three types in his study; *materialist*, *intentionalist* and *functionalist* explanations. According to Petersson (2010) the materialist reasoning would be rational, power focused and realist, and is therefore quite straightforward in explaining the rise in Nordic security cooperation. Rational states with a high degree of common interests, common geography and tight economic resources have a lot to gain by cooperating. Yet, Petersson (2010) states, why not then have the same direct and rational cooperation within the NATO framework? Petersson (2010) argues if those who are already NATO-members – Denmark, Norway and Iceland – ever come to a conflict over economic resources; would it not then be more rational for them to focus on NATO which actually guaranties the safety of one’s nation? The intentionalist approach, Petersson (2010) suggests, is closer to the liberal IR theory that the anarchy of the world order can be remedied with integration, negotiation and institutionalised cooperation. According to

⁴⁵ Forsberg, (2013), p.1161

⁴⁶ Petersson, (2010), p.256

⁴⁷ Petersson, (2010), p.246

⁴⁸ Petersson (2010), p. 239

⁴⁹ Petersson (2010), p. 239-240

this approach Nordic cooperation is therefore by definition ‘good’. Petersson (2010) points out, that the different Nordic countries’ institutional ties to different international bodies are complex and intricate, and this structure might create a situation with unnecessary duplication and perhaps also direct competition. In any case parallel structures infer an inefficient planning process. In addition, even if it seems unlikely at this point, actual conflicts might arise; involvement in security collaborations might at some point prove too expensive, both politically and economically. In that case, Petersson (2010) notes, it seems likely that the ties to the military alliance are the strongest. The functionalist approach focuses on the mechanisms in place to preserve a societal order or to preserve a certain system. Representatives from organisations and bureaucratic structures tend to view the organisations’ interests as equal to those of the nations, determines Petersson (2010). If that is the case, it is reasonable to interpret further development of the Nordic security cooperation as a survival strategy for one’s own organisation. The functionalist approach, according to Petersson (2010), also includes focusing on Nordic culture and identity. On a general level both politicians, the military and the public feel strongly positive about Nordic culture and identity, these feelings may lie behind the current development. However, Petersson (2010) point out that every time a threat has been real, or the Nordic states have been under attack the Nordic countries have kept to themselves.⁵⁰ All three approaches pinpoint several arguments indicating that European and Nordic structures are actually competitors. At the same time, as Forsberg (2013) argued, it might be precisely because the Nordic level is not seen as a possible threat to the European level that is has been so successful, and that all it ever can be is a complement.⁵¹

3.2 European security cooperation

3.2.1 European integration and the development of CFSP

European integration can be argued to constitute the core of the entire EU. At the expense of their own sovereignty states choose to take part in what has become a supranational project which for the member states (MS) in many ways entails binding regulations. Dellenbrandt and Olsson (1994) write “[i]t is no longer a question about whether or not we will have a stronger European integration. The issue today rather concerns the methods and ultimate goals of the integration process. The question is not *if* we are going towards an integrated Europe, but rather *how* and *where* exactly are we going.”⁵² European integration has also set the agenda when it comes to CFSP. However, Weiler (1999) when arguing the need for the EU to develop appropriate structures for CFSP, points out that “despite the

⁵⁰ Petersson (2010), p. 248-253

⁵¹ Forsberg (2013), p.1176

⁵² Dellenbrandt and Olsson (1994), “Regionalization and Security of the European North”, in *The Barents Region: Security and Economic Development in the European North*, eds. Dellenbrandt and Olsson. Umeå CERUM, p. 9

repeated calls since the early 1970s for a Europe that will ‘speak with one voice’, the Community has never successfully translated its internal economic might to commensurate outside influence”.⁵³

The steps towards a developed European CFSP have been many, but it is evident that the idea of security cooperation has always been present during the development and integration of the EU.⁵⁴ Even if it never came to pass a European Defence Community (EDC) was proposed already in 1950.⁵⁵ Because of concerns for national sovereignty the French National Assembly voted no to the proposed EDC and the question of common security structures were not revisited for several decades. In the 1990s security questions were as Hix and Høyland (2011) put it, “pushed to the top of the agenda”.⁵⁶ It is important to keep in mind the emerging wars at this time; the Gulf Crisis (1990) and the Yugoslavian civil war (1991). New steps towards common policy were taken on the European level with the Maastricht Treaty (1993), which “transformed the European Political Cooperation (EPC) into the Common Foreign and Security Policy: the so-called ‘second pillar’ of the EU. The second pillar set out five CFSP objectives [to strengthen security and preserve peace]. To achieve these goals the decision-making procedures and instruments of foreign policy cooperation were reshaped. Foreign policy issues became a routine part of Council business.”⁵⁷ The Amsterdam Treaty (1999) further developed the CFSP and brought significant changes: Common strategies, Common positions, Joint actions, Qualified Majority Voting (QMV), a High Representative for the CFSP, and the instatement of the ESDP. It is clear that the EU was very active within this policy field, but the EU still showed incapable to act jointly, especially in Yugoslavia and later in Kosovo (1998-1999). Hix and Høyland (2011) stress that “[t]he failings in the Balkans [...] prompted the EU to take some decisive steps towards developing a credible ESDP.”⁵⁸ In the early 2000s the focus turned to Battle Groups and as pointed out by Hix and Høyland (2011): “the EU battle groups became fully operational in 2007. By 2010, the EU had taken on six military missions. In addition to the missions on the Balkans, the EU also provided troops to missions in Congo, Somalia, Chad and the Central African Republic.”⁵⁹ In addition, Hix and Høyland (2011) emphasize that “so far, the perhaps greatest display of the EU as a serious diplomatic actor came in the autumn of 2008 [during] the war between Russia and Georgia in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.”⁶⁰ Hix and Høyland (2011) conclude that this “could be considered as the first significant display of the EU’s newfound capacity to act in the arena of international crisis management”.⁶¹

⁵³ Weiler (1999), *The Constitution of Europe – “Do the clothes have an emperor?” and other essays on European integration*, Cambridge University Press, p.95

⁵⁴ Hix, S.& Høyland, B. (2011) *The political system of the European Union*, 3rd ed. Palgrave Macmillan, p.318

⁵⁵ http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/institutional_affairs/treaties/amsterdam_treaty/a19000_en.htm

⁵⁶ Hix and Høyland (2011), p. 311

⁵⁷ Hix and Høyland (2011), p.311-312

⁵⁸ Hix and Høyland (2011), p.315

⁵⁹ Hix and Høyland (2011), p.315

⁶⁰ Hix and Høyland (2011), p.315 and 318

⁶¹ Hix and Høyland (2011), p.318

The development of the CFSP has followed several different paths, and tension can be found between those who want to deepen and further the integration and common security aspirations, and those who want to keep security issues separate, i.e. within other security forums and ultimately with the nation state. As put by Rieker (2004) “assuming both that the EU is an actor and that it has a distinct security approach is controversial. For a long time the main opposition stood between those who perceived European integration solely as an arena for intergovernmental bargaining, and those who saw it as a continuous process towards a supranational state.”⁶² Some would argue that this still is the case.

3.2.2 Normative Power Europe

Rieker (2004) argues that whether the EU has reached a ‘distinct security approach’ rests with how one perceives security itself. She reasons that there are two main ways of looking at this: Firstly, the more traditional – perhaps more *realist* way – which defines security as being based on military might, something the EU by itself lacks. Therefore Rieker (2004) points out that the traditionalist “may tend to ignore the EU as a security actor.”⁶³ Secondly, Rieker (2004) turns to what she calls a ‘broader’ – perhaps a more *liberal* – understanding of security. To the author it is clear that for the proponents of a broader definition of security “the Union’s potential to coordinate diverse tools of security policy — economic, political and military — makes it one of the most important security actors of the post-Cold War context”.⁶⁴ One of the clearest proponents of the latter understanding would be Ian Manners. Whether or not the EU is and/or should be a *normative power* on the international arena, an actor driven by values and norms, has in recent years taken centre stage in both the academic and the political debate. Manners’ article “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?” (2002) has been influential and in it Manners establishes that the EU *acts* as a normative power in the world and *is* thereby a normative power.⁶⁵ It is Manners’ (2002) view that one should look beyond whether the EU is a military or civilian power. He believes that one should look at how the EU’s identity, ideals and values are affecting its role in the international arena.⁶⁶ Manners (2002) argues that the EU is a normative power, because it changes the standards and norms in international relations and moves away from the traditional state centric patterns.⁶⁷ The Normative Power Europe (NPE) theory is in no way universally accepted as the way to view the EU’s foreign policy aspirations, and Manners has received critique for his reasoning. A good representative of this is Diez (2005), who writes the following “[...] I call for a greater degree of reflexivity, both in the academic discussion about normative power, and in the political representation of the EU as a normative power”⁶⁸ He also

⁶² Rieker (2004), p.370

⁶³ Rieker (2004), p.370

⁶⁴ Rieker (2004), p.370

⁶⁵ Manners, I. (2002), “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?”, JCMS, p.235

⁶⁶ Manners (2002), p.238

⁶⁷ Manners (2002), p.235, 238-239

⁶⁸ Diez, Thomas (2005) “Construction the Self and Changing Others: Reconsidering ‘Normative Power Europe’, Millennium – Journal of International Studies, vol.33, p.614-615

believes that more systematic discourse analysis of the concept of normative power is needed. Furthermore, Diez (2005) argues “that the concept of NPE must be ‘saved’ from those currently undermining it by ‘writing it in big letters on their banners’”.⁶⁹ Nevertheless the NPE discourse – i.e. the perception of the EU as a normative power – remains strong and it has in many ways influenced policy, most notably the Lisbon Treaty, which came into force the 1st of December 2009.⁷⁰ Hix and Høyland conclude that the development of a CFSP thus far, “has been a gradual establishment of foreign and defence policy competences at the European level and a progressive movement towards supranational decision-making, an increased role for supranational actors and institutions in Brussels, and instruments to ensure that the EU acts as a united force in world affairs”.⁷¹ At the same time it is important to note that even though it has been developed and strengthened, the CFSP is still a policy that is ultimately decided through intergovernmental cooperation, and within the EU it is under the Council’s domain.⁷²

3.3 Differences and similarities

Some of the basic similarities the European and Nordic security structures include the fact they were both established and deepened in the post the Cold War era. It is also true that neither the European nor the Nordic security cooperation have armies of their own. Military strength lies with the nation states, and to some extent with NATO. Furthermore, both are relatively new actors when it comes to security policy and what kind of actors they should be and what kind of roles they will have in the international arena is still very much open for debate. Notably, of course, the EU is a much bigger international organisation and the discussion about the EU as an actor – or a possible new superpower, is evidentially given more space on the international arena: the 28 EU MS represent 500 million people, the 5 MS involved in Nordic cooperation represent 25 million. Therefore the more prominent role of the EU is obvious. Yet, the Nordic countries’ norms and values seem to be important features of their foreign policy and their contribution to international relations as well, however, this is on a smaller scale than the EU norm promotion. In addition, it has been argued that the Nordic contribution to the UN for instance can be considered extensive in comparison to the size and capabilities of the respective countries.

The EU level is, in comparison to the Nordic level, much more institutionalized, and the NC and NCM are quite firmly intergovernmental collaborations. The European common institutions and framework are more extensive especially within the CFSP, aided by the EEAS and the High Representative. In the Nordic arena we have NORDEFECO and the ministers driving the organisational effort. Nordic security cooperation can be viewed as a rather loose form of cooperation without much insight.

⁶⁹ Diez (2005), p.615

⁷⁰ The Lisbon Treaty (2008), section on CFSP

⁷¹ Hix and Høyland (2011), p.319

⁷² The Lisbon Treaty (2008), p.37-48

One difference that stands out is that the EU has European integration as a driving force for further deepening of cooperation, even when it comes to CFSP. Additionally, research has shown that there exists a political will to follow a federalist path, along which this policy area would be fully integrated. Despite the fact that Wetterberg (2010) presented the NC with a vision of a Nordic Federal state, the recent rise in common security cooperation does not in any way indicate such an outcome. It is worth noting that proponents of Nordic security structures firmly agree that the role of the Nordic security cooperation is to be a complement to the European.

4. Theoretical Framework

4.1 The concept of *Actorness*

The concept of actorness is frequently used when analysing actors on the international arena. Hettne and Söderbaum (2005) go as far as to describe the concept of actorness as part of the European foreign policy discourse.⁷³ Pieper et al. (2011) writes that “[t]he concept of actorness, as developed by Jupille and Caporaso, lies at the core of numerous analyses of the EU’s role in the international arena”⁷⁴ It is important to keep in mind that while the actorness theory has been used frequently to study the EU, it is likely also well suited when analysing other regional entities, in this case Nordic security cooperation.

A theoretical framework built on the components of actorness will be used as an instrument when analyzing the two regional security collaborations in this study. Sjöstedt coined the concept of actorness in 1977, and he defined actorness as “the ability to function ‘actively and deliberately in relation to other actors in the international system’”⁷⁵ Different scholars have come up with new ways to further develop and conceptualise actorness. The approach by Jupille and Caporaso (1998) has perhaps over time received the most attention.⁷⁶ The core of the authors’ approach is that the degree of actorness is determined by four “components of actor capacity in global politics;”⁷⁷

- Recognition – acceptance of and interaction with the entity by others
- Authority – [...] competence to act
- Autonomy – independence from other actors
- Cohesion – degree of which an entity is able to formulate common policy preferences⁷⁸

⁷³ Hettne, B. & Söderbaum, F. (2005) “Civilian Power or Soft Imperialism? The EU as a Global Actor and the Role of Interregionalism,” *European Foreign Affairs Review* 10: 535–552, Kluwer Law International., p.537

⁷⁴ Pieper et al. (2011), “The European Union as an Actor in Arctic Governance”, *European Foreign Affairs Review* 16: 227–242, 2011. Kluwer Law International., p.229

⁷⁵ Niemann, A., & Bretherton, C. (2013). EU external policy at the crossroads: The challenge of actorness and effectiveness. *International Relations*, Vol. 27, No. 3, p. 265

⁷⁶ Niemann, A., & Bretherton, C. (2013), p.265-267

⁷⁷ Jupille and Caporaso, (1998), p.214

⁷⁸ Jupille and Caporaso, (1998), p.214

Jupille and Caporaso (1998) and their components have been criticized especially for excluding external factors such as ‘contextual opportunity’ and the ‘division of structural power’.⁷⁹ However, the focus on the *internal* characteristics of actors is highly relevant during this investigation, especially since the MEPs and MPs often share that perspective. Furthermore, the component recognition will help assess some aspects of how the regional security collaborations are perceived externally.

Groen and Niemann (2011) also take their point of departure in Jupille and Caporaso’s approach and they pinpoint and underline an important connection, namely that:

Increased actorness is often associated with increasing supranationalism in the policy process and less actorness with intergovernmentalism.⁸⁰

This statement also identifies why it is interesting to use the concept of actorness as an analytical framework; it will help give an indication on whether the parliamentarians perceive European and/or Nordic security cooperation to be supranational or intergovernmental, and what is desirable. These perceptions are in turn closely linked to observations on whether or not the two collaborations are viewed to compete or complement. The components of actorness have been further developed and adapted for this study, and these adaptations are found in the following sections.

4.1.1 Recognition

Jupille and Caporaso (1998) write that “[r]ecognition can be either de jure or de facto.”⁸¹ Signalling that regional organisations do not, in the same way as a nation state, get immediate recognition. In the case of EU, Jupille and Caporaso (1998) point out, that states “traditionally have been extremely reluctant to grant recognition in full”.⁸² The authors underline that the EU gained de facto recognition because it often is instrumental in global politics. Jupille and Caporaso (1998) conclude that if third parties choose to interact with the EU instead of going to (or in addition of going to) individual states, that would be a sign of recognition and an important indicator.⁸³ This can of course also apply when it comes to Nordic security cooperation. Recognition boils down to whether other actors recognize, accept and interact with the entity in question (in this case either the European or Nordic security cooperation). Recognition in this investigation could for instance be within a certain security policy issue, such as; foreign policy, conflict resolution or recognition as a ‘good example’ of regional security cooperation. For this study one adaptation of recognition have been to look for recognition of EU as a promoter of norms. Another adaptation have been to examine recognition of ‘Nordic model’.

⁷⁹ Bretherton, C., & Vogler, J. (2013). A global actor past its peak? *International Relations*, Vol. 27, No. 3, p.375–380.

⁸⁰ Groen and Niemann (2011), “EU actorness and effectiveness under political pressure at the Copenhagen climate change negotiations”, Paper prepared for the Twelfth European Union Studies Association Conference Boston, Massachusetts, March 3-5p.5-6

⁸¹ Jupille and Caporaso, (1998), p.215

⁸² Jupille and Caporaso, (1998), p.215

⁸³ Jupille and Caporaso, (1998), p.215-216

The *level* of recognition and within *which areas* of security the parliamentarians perceive the different entities to have recognition will be important in determining security actorness for each regional organisation.

4.1.2 Authority

When it comes to authority it is important to note that the focus for this research will be on competence to act (not legal competences). Jupille and Caporaso (1998) state that “authority ultimately derives from the states”.⁸⁴ Security issues are closely interlinked with national sovereignty, and both on the European and the Nordic level the formal competence ultimately lay with the national level. On EU level the Council have the formal authority and for foreign and security decisions consensus is needed. On the Nordic level no formal Nordic Ministerial Council on security exists and security cooperation is to some extent still intergovernmentally negotiated. However, the states are free to give mandate and delegate areas of their security competences. This research need to establish to *which* regional entity mandate has or should be given, and to establish *when* the respective organisations have mandate to act, and to establish *what* security issues the parliamentarians’ believe are, or believe should be delegated. Furthermore the perceptions of the two respective ‘toolboxes’ of Nordic and European security collaborations need to be examined.

4.1.3 Autonomy

For Jupille and Caporaso (1998) independence is central when it comes to the component of autonomy, distinctiveness and independence from state actors especially. Jupille and Caporaso (1998) writes that “what matters is that EU [or another regional organisation] is a “corporate” – rather than a “collective” – entity, which has, or at least can have, casual importance that is more than the sum of its constituent parts.”⁸⁵ Once again one needs to keep in mind that security issues ultimately are questions handled by the different governments. Another valuable perspective on interdependence is the parliamentarians’ views on possible independence from the nation states and from other regional entities i.e. whether parliamentarians perceive Nordic security cooperation independent from the EU. Military alliances also need to be taken into account; and to what extent regional entities can be independent from these. A starting point when investigating perceptions on interdependence was the within EU CFSP established concept of “speaking with one voice”. Since this can be argued to be a method to wield more importance than the individual states might have.

⁸⁴ Jupille and Caporaso, (1998), p.216

⁸⁵ Jupille and Caporaso, (1998), p.217

4.1.4 Cohesion

On the component of cohesion Jupille and Caporaso (1998) note that “[a] complex international organisation such as the EU can act with varying degrees of cohesion.”⁸⁶ The authors try to pin down the concept of cohesion even further by firstly putting focus on value cohesion, meaning compability of basic values and goals. Secondly by giving weight to possible tactical cohesion, which they describe as to use negotiations and to bargaining so that somewhat differing goals still can be made to fit. Thirdly Jupille and Caporaso (1998) put emphasis on procedural cohesion as “some consensus on the rules and procedures used to process issues where conflicts exists”. Lastly, the authors give importance to ‘output cohesion’ which can be said to combine the three above – value, tactical and procedural cohesion – and give indications on regional entities actual ability to devise collective positions and projects.⁸⁷ The two regional security collaborations have very dissimilar institutional frameworks, which obviously will influence perceptions on possible unity. All four dimensions mentioned are important to determine the parliamentarians’ perceptions of cohesion.

⁸⁶ Jupille and Caporaso, (1998), p.218-219

⁸⁷ Jupille and Caporaso, (1998), p.219-220

5. Research Design

This research is designed to conduct a qualitative, empirical pilot study with a comparative dimension. Comparisons will be made between the MEPs and MPs and the comparison will show if the parliamentarians from the two different parliamentary assemblies have different or similar opinions concerning European and Nordic security cooperation. In contrast to previous research, which to a great extent has focused on *why* the rise in European and Nordic security cooperation has occurred and what it entails, this thesis will present the views of parliamentarians and compare them. Assessment of the MEPs and MPs perceptions will give indication on whether the two regional security collaborations should be regarded as complementing or competing. Comparability is key; this research gives several possibilities to compare, shown in this figure:




Figure 1. The arrows represent the viewpoints of MEPs & MPs that are to be investigated and compared.

Central to the design and in assessing the regional security collaborations are the theoretical framework of actorness and the analytical components of *recognition*, *authority*, *autonomy* and *cohesion*. The components of actorness were operationalized into the interview guide, which steers the investigation, in addition the components of actorness constitute the comparative framework for the results.

6. Methods

6.1 An empirical pilot study

This empirical pilot study focuses on the views of Swedish democratic representatives on European and Nordic security cooperation. The analytical framework based on the concept of actorness have been developed to assess if the two security cooperation are competing or complementary. Esaiasson et al. (2007) describe an empirical pilot study as a form of concept developing study, not aimed at providing a full description or explanation to a phenomena, but rather to shed light on a phenomenon or to give a new angle that has not received much attention before. In this case the new angle would be the views of the Swedish parliamentarians on the issue of regionalisation of security. Esaiasson et al. (2007) state that according to their way of reasoning, concept developing studies are about providing order to an already existing discussion. Esaiasson et al. (2007) also describe the empirical pilot study as a ‘dress rehearsal’ for more comprehensive full scale studies that may follow.⁸⁸ This pilot study will not claim to be able to give comprehensive conclusions on how *all* parliamentarians’ perceive Nordic and European security collaborations, but this thesis will shed light on a new angle, by comparing and presenting the views and arguments of 20 Swedish MEPs and MPs.

6.2 Why parliamentarians?

The parliamentarians interviewed are in a unique position to shed light on the question in ways governing bodies could not and give more diverse perspectives on whether European and Nordic security structures are competing or not. In the international arena states are viewed to be the primary actors, and the governments play the role of primary representatives of the nation states and their interests. Yet, it is also true that “domestic actors disagree on foreign and security issues”, as pointed out by Hofmann (2013), within a state different actors make “different assessments of national interests and identity,” and have “different views about multilateral use of force, international institutions and European integration”.⁸⁹ Moravcsik (1998) states that it is abundantly clear that democratic states are internally divided. At the same time it is equally clear to Moravcsik (1998) that states have to become unitary on the outside. The state has to adopt one line externally.⁹⁰ Parliamentarians can present more diverse views. Nevertheless, in the international literature, the parties’ views and politics that are ongoing within each state are “deemed to be of little relevance”, concludes Hofmann (2013), and in relation to this she underlines that “[t]his neglect is surprising given the centrality of political parties in consolidated democracies”.⁹¹ Interviewing Swedish

⁸⁸ Esaiasson, Gilljam, Oscarsson, Wängnerud (2007) *Metodpraktikan: konsten att studera samhälle, individ och Marknad*, Nordsteds Juridik, Edition 3:2, p.36

⁸⁹ Hofmann, S. C. (2013), p. 14

⁹⁰ Moravcsik, A. (1998), *The Choice for Europe, Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht*, Cornell University Press, p.52,63

⁹¹ Hofmann (2013), p. 13

parliamentarians on European and national/Nordic level will give two added dimensions. Firstly, each state only has *one* government, but in the case of Sweden (Denmark and Finland as well), parliamentarians hold seats in *both* the EP and the NC. This approach gives the opportunity to compare whether their preferences differ. Secondly, having MEPs and MPs as the unit of analysis presents a chance to examine internal divide on regionalisation of security. Also, since the parliamentarians are not seen as the primary actors, they can discuss the issues more openly. In addition, MEPs and MPs represent different parties, different ideologies and different security policy choices, so one benefit of interviewing parliamentarians is that they represent a spectra of ideas and attitudes. Lastly, as far as is it possible to gather from the literature within this field, a study about parliamentarians' views on European and Nordic security cooperation has not yet been carried out. Choosing the parliamentarians as the unit of analysis appears to be unusual, and highlights a gap in the literature.

6.3 Interviews as a method

For this thesis 20 Swedish parliamentarians' were interviewed; nine in Brussels, nine in Stockholm and two via telephone. The focus of this thesis is not to show the current situation, but rather to show how parliamentarians perceive it to be. Therefore in-depth interviews seem to be a very well-suited method for this research, as the point of such interviews is precisely to find views and arguments of interviewees on a certain issue.

As described by Denscombe (2007) “[i]nterviews place emphasis on the interviewee’s thoughts. The researcher’s role is to be as un-intrusive as possible – to start the ball rolling by introducing a theme or topic and then letting the interviewee develop their ideas and pursue their train of thought.”⁹² Denscombe (2007) describes four advantages with in-depth interviews: Firstly that they are easy to arrange. Secondly that you get ideas directly from the source, who are able to speak very freely. Thirdly that this type of interview is quite easy for the researcher to control. Lastly that it will be easier to transcribe than if several persons were to be interviewed simultaneously.⁹³ A questionnaire, in comparison, would not be as thorough and it would not be able to follow up on interesting ideas that might surface during an interview. Research based on interviews gives a good opportunity to register unexpected answers,⁹⁴ which has proven important in this study. The type of interviews that have been conducted for this study are one-to-one interviews.

Esaiasson et al. (2007) describe several different areas of use for in-depth interviews, two of which were of particular interest during this study. The first one is when researching an unknown field, and

⁹² Denscombe, M. (2007),*The Good Research Guide for small-scale social research project* 3rd edition, Open University Press, p.176

⁹³ Denscombe, (2007), p.177

⁹⁴ Esaiasson et al. (2007) p 283-284

the second when wanting to know people's perceptions.⁹⁵ This field is of course not entirely unknown, but the focus on parliamentarians to some extent is. As the second 'area of use' suggests, this research definitely focuses on the parliamentarians perceptions and uses this pilot study on parliamentary perceptions to shed light on whether the two regional security collaborations can be viewed to compete with or to complement each other.

6.4 The unit of analysis and sampling

The focus on the views of the MEPs and MPs has led to a strategic sampling procedure; the interviewees for this research are chosen on the basis of being elected representatives in two specific regional assemblies, the EP and the NC. For the study all ordinary Swedish parliamentarians of the EP and NC have been contacted and asked to participate. Both delegations consist of 20 parliamentarians – all in all 40 possible participants.⁹⁶ In total 20 MEPs and MPs were interviewed, 10 from each delegation.

In Brussels a total of nine parliamentarians were interviewed; two representatives for the Social Democratic Party, two from the Liberal Party, two from the Pirate Party, two from the Green Party, one from the Christian Democrats and the representative from the Left Party participated in a phone interview. The Moderate Party and Centre Party, who holds four and one seat respectively in the EP, were unavailable to participate. The Social Democratic Party holds six seats in the EP and in total the Liberal Party holds three seats.

In Stockholm interviews were conducted with: three representatives each from the Social Democratic Party and the Moderate Party, one from the Green Party, the Left Party and the Sweden Democrats. In addition the representative from the Liberal Party participated in a phone interview. The representatives from the Christian Democrats and the Centre Party could not participate. The Delegation of 20 MPs consists of seven Social Democrats and seven Moderates. The other six parties only hold one seat each. Speaking to three from each of the two bigger parties was interesting, especially since Sweden hold the Presidency of the NC in 2014. Karin Åström (S) is the current President and Hans Wallmark (M) is the Vice President. This has given extra insight into the NC's international dealings.

Problems that might have been encountered where; firstly, gathering a sufficient number of participants, secondly, having a wide selection of parties represented and thirdly, having a comparable amount of representatives from the EP and NC. When it comes to gathering a sufficient number the

⁹⁵ Esaiasson et al. (2007), p.184-187

⁹⁶ Both groups of parliamentarians are on the last year of their mandate periods (elections to the EP were last held in 2009 and elections to the Swedish parliament were last held in 2010). Of the 349 MPs of the Swedish Parliament 20 are elected by the party groups according to which mandate each party holds, to represent Sweden/their party in the NC, which is the parliamentary body of Nordic cooperation. Representatives to the EP are elected directly.

goal has been to interview representatives from as many parties as possible – collecting a wide range of opinions. The added value from the input of another party can be argued to be greater than the added value from that of another participant from the same party. In this study most parties are represented, the spread has been good and the data extensive. Lastly, the number of interviews ended up being very comparable, precisely ten from each parliament.

6.5 Conducting the analysis and ensuring quality

The first step towards conducting the analysis was to first transcribe the interviews and then to code and compare the material. Essentially this was a comparative study, comparing the views of MEPs and MPs has been fundamental throughout the investigation. Analysing the material was a process that was made in several steps where the components of actorness: recognition, authority, autonomy, and cohesion were important tools. How the parliamentarians' answers compare within the components helped to further determine how much actorness they perceive from either organisation. If two regional security collaborations are perceived to possess great actorness this may indicate competition.

An important thing to keep in mind is that the interviews were conducted in Swedish, therefore it has been essential to translate to the best of my ability, to be true to the transcriptions and when in doubt to contact the interviewee once more. All the citations in this research are in English even though the original language is Swedish. The reason behind not also including the original citations is the fact that it would not have been possible within the given scope. Using illustrative citations have been a key component to show the parliamentarians' perceptions and these citations (in English) were therefore prioritized, in respect to having fewer citations but including the Swedish translation.

Quality is something all research should strive for and constantly one should try to exclude all systematic errors and be aware of possible mistakes.⁹⁷ The investigation has attempted to follow these principles; keeping to the interview guide as well as the theoretical framework. The interview guide helped to filter out the complexity of assessing these actors and it also helped to make the answers comparable and ensuring comparability between MEPs and MPs perceptions has been paramount.

6.6 Ethics, validity and generalizability

When conducting interviews it is always important to talk about ethics. Interviewees should never feel pressured to answer in a certain way, and there has to exist a mutual trust between the researcher and the interviewee.⁹⁸ Throughout this research this was strived for and each interview started off with an affirmation that it is of course possible to be anonymous in the thesis and that, whenever they wish, it

⁹⁷ Esaiasson et al. (2007), p.64

⁹⁸ Denscombe, (2007), p.183

is possible to excise anything said, even after the interview. All 20 participants chose to not be anonymous.

Eriksson and Wiedersheim-Paul (2011) define validity as a method to assess what should be measured in the research. If you set out to measure efficiency, the research should tell you how efficient something is.⁹⁹ This study focuses on the views of the MEPs and MPs on security cooperation, so for validity it is important that this also is what appears in the final product.

In all qualitative research generalizability can be difficult. This empirical pilot study sheds light on the possibly problematic relation between the European and Nordic security structures via the perspective of the parliamentarians' perceptions. The results of this study can be seen as very specific: They are the views of 20 representatives from two delegations of Swedish parliamentarians, one to a regional parliament and one to an inter-parliamentary assembly, on regionalisation of security. Yet, as Esaiasson et al. (2007) highlights, “[g]eneralization does not eliminate the importance of the particular. In fact, the very purpose of moving from particular to general is to improve our understanding of both.”¹⁰⁰ The answers of the parliamentarians are specific, but the questions are broad. Firstly, the results of this study could be argued to be generalizable for Swedish MEPs and MPs in the Swedish delegation to the NC in general, not just the participating interviewees. Secondly, the result can probably be generalized on party basis, but one need to keep in mind that the sample is small. It is probable that at least aspects of this research will have a wider applicability, as representative perceptions for the European and Nordic levels in general.

⁹⁹ Eriksson, L.T., Wiedersheim-Paul, F. (2011), *Att utreda forskna och rapportera*, 9th edition, Liber, p.60

¹⁰⁰ Esaiasson et al. (2007), p.26-27

7. Results

This section will focus on finding patterns within the two groups of parliamentarians and will do so by comparing the data collected during the 20 interviews with Swedish MEPs and MPs. The results chapter will demonstrate these patterns with descriptions, arguments and illustrative citations. The components of actorness; recognition, authority, autonomy and cohesion will constitute the basic layout for this section. Differences and similarities within each component will be an essential feature throughout this chapter. The sub-sections are determined partly by the questions derived from within each component, partly from categories that have stood out as common denominators for either the MEPs or the MPs. The final part of this chapter will be a comparative summary of the results.

7.1 Recognition

The component of recognition, as adapted for this research, focuses on how regional security entities are perceived. Particularly three dimensions of perceptions will be investigated: Firstly, how the parliamentarians view EU's perception of Nordic security cooperation (EU → 'Norden'). Secondly, how the parliamentarians believe the Nordic level to perceive the European security cooperation ('Norden' → EU). Thirdly, how the outside world is thought to view the two security structures.

7.1.1 EU → Norden

One pattern that stands out is that the MPs tend to view the EU's perceptions of the Nordic security cooperation in a more positive manner than the MEPs. In fact, several of the MPs state that Nordic security cooperation is seen as a 'good example' of regional security by the EU, one that can be followed and used by the EU. Such a perception was, in the adaptation of the specific component, highlighted a possible form of recognition. Two of the MEPs also explicitly discuss this perception of 'Norden' as a 'good example' however, in a more negative way than the MPs. Schmidt points out that Nordic strategic defence procurements and dealings cannot be viewed as 'good examples', since it is evident that almost all major defence deals have failed.¹⁰¹ M. Gustavsson argues that the reason why the EU cannot view the Nordic security structure as a 'good example' is the fact that by doing so the EU would implicitly criticise their own security cooperation. To M. Gustavsson it is clear that by admitting Nordic as good, the recognition and acknowledgement implies EU as bad or insufficient.¹⁰² Furthermore the material suggests that even if a majority of the MPs point out 'the Nordic' as representing a 'good example', the rest are slightly more sceptical in their verdict. Instead they believe that the EU does not view the Nordic security cooperation in any particular manner. In fact, they argue that the EU does not pay attention to Nordic security aspirations at all, and definitely do not perceive them as a threat. The two strongest proponents of this are from the Moderate Party and from the Social

¹⁰¹ Schmidt (Liberal Party)

¹⁰² M. Gustavsson (Left Party)

Democrats.¹⁰³ Interestingly the proponents of the contrary view (a good example) are even more diverse in their party affiliations, including members from the Social Democratic, Moderate, Left and Green Parties, as well as the representative from the Sweden Democrats, who also believes the EU view on Nordic security cooperation to be ‘positive’ and an example to be followed.

Almost all MPs gave weight to the role of NATO, some by declaring that it is in fact NATO who sets the framework and is the security actor that deserves recognition. Others by stating that NATO, in contrast to the EU, has a better perception and understanding of Nordic security cooperation, and is by extension, much more so than the EU, the actor who gives the Nordic level recognition.

The clearest trends of the MEPs views’ on EU perceptions of the Nordic security cooperation is that the EU does not give it much attention. Several of the MEPs gave very similar statements, almost using the same words; ‘let them play up there in the North if they want to’.¹⁰⁴ M. Gustavsson argues that the lack of interest from the EU can best be described as ‘well-meaning indifference’.¹⁰⁵ One appreciation, expressed by Nilsson, was that the EU sees the North as a calm corner of Europe where the EU need not fear conflict. It was clearly pointed out among the MEPs that Nordic security cooperation is not a prominent feature when discussing foreign policy in Brussels. Schlyter placed great emphasis on the statement that “the EU do not care [about Nordic security cooperation]”¹⁰⁶ and this statement does seem significant for the MEPs perceptions of EU’s views on Nordic security structures. Wikström states that the EU views the Nordic countries and their collaboration just as they view the cooperation of the BeNeLux-countries, namely as “small, tiny countries that may organize themselves as much as they like”.¹⁰⁷ Furthermore Wikström points out something that the MEPs in general agree upon: for them it is clear that the EU does not find the rise in Nordic security cooperation in any way provocative.

7.1.2 Norden → EU

It is the common view of both the MPs and MEPs that the EU is perceived by ‘Norden’ to be the more visible security actor in the international arena, getting more recognition internationally. Here party affiliation seems to be a better indicator when determining the attitudes – positive or negative – towards the EU ‘speaking with one voice’. Among the parliamentarians the Moderate and Liberal parties seems to be the loudest advocates of a strong and developed role for the High Representative on CFSP. Wallmark states that he was surprised by Ashton and declares that her achievements are far beyond what he expected. He describes Ashton’s work as diplomatically competent receiving a lot of recognition. Wikström agrees and speaks in an extremely positive manner about the importance of the

¹⁰³ Wallmark (Moderate Party) and B. Gustafsson (Social Democrats)

¹⁰⁴ Schmidt (Liberal Party), Wikström, (Liberal Party), Schlyter (Green Party), M. Gustavsson (Left Party)

¹⁰⁵ M. Gustavsson (Green Party)

¹⁰⁶ Schlyter (Green Party)

¹⁰⁷ Wikström (Liberal Party)

EU ‘speaking with one voice’, a feature that in the future she thinks should become even more prominent as a defender of democracy and Human Rights. For the proponents it is very clear that the EU is an actor that gets international recognition and that is the way it should be. The strongest opponents to the concept of ‘speaking with one voice’ are the Left and Green Parties as well as the Pirate Party and the Sweden Democrats, who see it as an expression of federalist aspirations. Schlyter describes ‘speaking with one voice’ as ridiculous and declares that it is part of a discourse created by ‘Eurocentric crusaders’. M. Gustavsson points out that he sees the logic behind one flag, one anthem, one ‘foreign minister’, and ‘speaking with one voice’, and so on, but he does not like it at all. Schlyter explains it like this; “if you behaved badly, what would affect you the most; one strong father figure reprimanding you, or 28 friends in different manners conveying that you done something really wrong?”¹⁰⁸ For Schlyter the answer is of course the last; 28 voices are perhaps not as strong, but they are 28 none the less. Nilsson stresses that the most fortunate aspect of the way the EU works now – with a High Representative, ‘speaking with one voice’ – is the success it has brought to the Balkans. Here Ashton has, according to Nilsson, received recognition and made an impact.

For Nordic cooperation especially, the MPs underline that the EU is something one, ‘Norden’, always must relate and adapt to.¹⁰⁹ As Åström puts it “the EU is something you can neither ignore, overlook nor disregard”.¹¹⁰ At the same time Bordén and B. Gustafsson point out that the situation of recognition in fact differs depending on which Nordic country you are from, and each country’s relation to NATO needs to be considered. Once again several MPs give much weight to NATO as a recognised international security actor, influencing possibilities for both European and Nordic recognition.

The Presidential Programme (2014) of the Swedish Delegation to the NC is called “‘Norden’ in Europe, Europe in ‘Norden’”.¹¹¹ This programme and the intentions that lay behind it are an important dimension that has been stressed by the majority of the MPs. They describe it as an indicator on how they see the EU-Nordic relationship. Especially Åström, who leads the NC this year (2014), emphasises that the NC and Nordic cooperation in general strive to become a more prominent actor in the eyes of the EU and the world. “We need to be on the agenda, we need to be seen and heard, because we have a significant role to play, in particular as a ‘bridge builder’, mediator and platform for dialogue.”¹¹² Some of the MEPs view this ambition from the Nordic cooperation to participate in and cooperate with the European level in a slightly more negative way. In their opinion this divide shows that “oh it seems really exciting to go and play with the ‘big boys’, lets join forces on Nordic level so

¹⁰⁸ Schlyter (Green Party)

¹⁰⁹ Engblom (Moderate Party), Åström (Social Democrats), Björnsdotter Rahm (Moderate Party), Wiechel (Sweden Democrats), Lindholm (Green Party), Johansson (Social Democrats)

¹¹⁰ Åström (Social Democrats)

¹¹¹ The Swedish Delegation to the Nordic Council (2014) *Norden i Europa, Europa i Norden*, Swedish Parliament Print

¹¹² Åström (Social Democrats)

we actually can be allowed to join the others”.¹¹³ Svensson also finds that there is a clear drive from Nordic collaboration to be included in the community because they recognise the EU to be an important security actor.

7.1.3 Views of the outside world

A clear pattern here was that all MPs, without exception, spoke about ‘the Nordic Model’ when asked about the views of the outside world. Some emphasised on a ‘Nordic brand’, most laid weight on the Nordic states as welfare states, and some discussed social and economic structures. What the outside notice, according to the MPs, is not the common security structures but rather ‘the Nordic Model’ and Nordic welfare societies. Wiechel adds that “it is more likely that the outside world sees ‘the Nordic’ rather than one single country”.¹¹⁴ Once more, some would say that the Nordic collaboration is seen by others as the ‘good example’. Engblom said “the outside world sees ‘Norden’ as a ‘good example’, for instance during the meetings of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, where I represent Sweden this is discussed from time to time”.¹¹⁵ In addition, several MPs stressed that recognition of the ‘Nordic Model’ is something that should be used as a way to market and promote Nordic values and the entire Nordic cooperation model.¹¹⁶ Concerning recognition of Nordic security, several MPs placed emphasis on prominent Nordic diplomats being visible and receiving international recognition for Nordic diplomacy and mediation. Furthermore the MPs have generally underlined the Nordic countries as prominent and visible actors within the UN.

The Nordic Model and ‘Nordicness’ was also highlighted by some of the MEPs but not as extensively as from the MPs. The level of international recognition and perceptions of a ‘Nordic Model’ were to some extent discussed among the MEPs, who viewed it to have significance for recognition, but at the same time not on its own decisive for perceptions of Nordic security cooperation.

According to Jupille and Caporaso (1998), if third parties interact with a regional entity instead of the nation states this is a sign of recognition. This research uncovered that such interaction is currently in progress in the wake of the Ukraine Crisis (2014). This was brought forward by Åström and Hallmark, President and Vice president of the NC. They pointed out that the NC have been contacted by representatives from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland and that this in itself is a sign of recognition for Nordic cooperation. Bordén argues that the wish from these countries to open a dialogue on these issues seems very natural, these countries collaborate in the NB8 format and have countless intersections and contact points. Furthermore Brodén believes that “they feel that their concerns will be heard by the Nordic countries, even if they perhaps know that opportunities to act are

¹¹³ Schlyter (Green Party)

¹¹⁴ Wiechel (Sweden Democrats)

¹¹⁵ Engblom (Moderate Party)

¹¹⁶ Wallmark (Moderate Party), Åström (Social Democrats), Johansson (Social Democrats)

limited, the dialogue is very positive.”¹¹⁷ Furthermore, when it comes to recognition from the world, Åström enclosed that Scotland applied for membership to the NC last year, thereby recognising the NC as an actor and an interesting arena to participate in. In addition, several MPs pointed out that Nordic cooperation receives recognition, both within and outside Europe, within the frameworks of the Arctic Council (AC), the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC) and the Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference (BSPC).

From the MEPs’ point of view Nilsson speaks for many when he says that “I do not think the outside world give the EU as much respect as the EU would want”.¹¹⁸ M. Gustavsson had a very – among the MEPs – significant comment showing the perceptions of Nordic contra European: “globally I believe that the world perceive that there is a block of the Nordic countries, but not that they are an organized entity. While the EU, definitely is an organized entity that is trying to conduct foreign and security policy jointly”.¹¹⁹ Another statement also representative for some of the MEPs is that “[b]oth Russia and the United States probably see EU as a rather ‘shaky actor’. An ‘insufficient creation’ that cannot fully be trusted. The US have to trust their NATO friends instead.”¹²⁰ Andersdotter agrees and underlines that she finds a lack of respect (and thereby also lack of recognition) for the EU, especially from the US.¹²¹ The division on perceived recognition among the MEPs is strongly dictated by party affiliation and lies close to the MEPs’ wishes for the role of CFSP in general and the role of ‘speaking with one voice’ in particular. Still most parliamentarians from the EP agree that the High Representative is visible and that she receives recognition from the outside world. Lövin says “I think Ashton have international media attention for instance when she travels, meets representatives and make statements”.¹²²

In sum, the general opinion of both parliamentary groups was that the regional entity which the outside world gives recognition is the EU. However, recognition here can be both ‘positive’ and ‘negative’. Furthermore the parliamentarians overall agree that the ‘Nordic Model’ is perceived to be internationally visible. A comparison of perceptions on recognition indicates that between the MPs and MEPs it is the MPs who to a greater extent perceive Nordic security cooperation to receive recognition and by extension at least some actorness due to this. While both the MPs and the MEPs find the EU to be a security actor that definitely receives recognition and thereby possess actorness within the component of recognition.

¹¹⁷ Brodén (Liberal Party)

¹¹⁸ Nilsson (Social Democrats)

¹¹⁹ M. Gustavsson (Left Party)

¹²⁰ Nilsson (Social Democrats)

¹²¹ Andersdotter (Pirate Party)

¹²² Lövin (Green Party)

7.2 Authority

When assessing the authority of the two regional entities, especially on the European level, the assessments seem to lie close to the parliamentarians' preferences on an intergovernmental – supranational scale. Sovereignty of states has consistently been underlined and most parliamentarians point out that ultimately, defence and security issues are to be decided on the national level. There are exceptions, however, where many of the parliamentarians' believe that the states should give mandate to either the EU or Nordic security cooperation, or both. Regarding authority the theoretical adaption puts focus on *when* the parliamentarians perceive the regional entities to have competence to act, but also when they *should* have. Perceptions on what is included in the two respective security collaborations' 'toolboxes' are key aspects when determining possible authority on security issues. This section will first review perceptions on Nordic competence to act and thereafter European competence to act.

7.2.1 Nordic competence to act

The Nordic parliamentarians have perhaps more insight to Nordic security cooperation and have hence included more areas where they believe the Nordic entity to have a mandate to act. A common opinion among the MPs is that Nordic security cooperation has, and should have, the competence to work with 'soft security', for instance natural disasters, environmental hazards and civil defence. The other commonly mentioned dimension among MPs is a more practical approach to security questions; logistics, administration, resource efficiencies, synergies when pooling resources and cost efficiency. The general view is that Nordic security collaboration should have the capacity to rationalise towards more cost effective – common – solutions. The MEPs, unlike the MPs, point out that giving mandate to for instance common procurement, and having this as a prerogative, has in the past been unreliable. In the words of MEP Ludvigsson: "attempting cooperation is good, but when you do try, with for instance joint procurement, then it is very important to succeed, which has not been the case on the Nordic level".¹²³ In fact several MEPs point to the fact that within areas where Nordic security cooperation has been given competence, very little has happened.¹²⁴

Engblom answers, representatively for the MPs, the following question; *could 'Norden' act jointly on security issues, in particular military issues?* "Yes, and we have, but NORDEFECO is in no way a platform for foreign or security policy decision making (in contrast to the Foreign Minister meetings on the EU-level)."¹²⁵ A majority of the MPs underline that UN mandates are of the utmost importance if Sweden or 'Norden' were to take action. Engblom describes that the way of the Swedish Parliament

¹²³ Ludvigsson (Social Democrats)

¹²⁴ Schmidt (Liberal Party), Ludvigsson (Social Democrats), Nilsson (Social Democrats), Schlyter (Green Party)

¹²⁵ Engblom (Moderate Party)

is to always ensure broad majorities before entering into any military promises – again highlighting that it is the MPs’ perception that the military authority belongs to the nation states.

The MEPs’ views of Nordic capacity to act is that it is very limited, they agree that most cooperation is ‘good’, but Nordic security cooperation does not “entail much that actually leads to concrete action”.¹²⁶ Ludvigsson has the impression that if the Nordic countries cooperate they can have greater influence within the European system. This view is shared by several MEPs and this could be the role of Nordic security cooperation – coordinating before discussing on EU-level and thereby gaining more influence. Schlyter presents a suggestion that stands out: the formerly neutral countries – Sweden, Finland, Austria and Ireland – should together move away from the pending militarisation of the EU and instead build a civil intervention force with mediators, engineers, nurses, accountants and administrators. “The smaller you are the more specific you have to be to make an impact, so if the Nordic countries have a Battle Group? *yawn*, but if they instead have 2500 ready engineers and nurses – that would truly be something to be proud of and something these countries could do with credibility”¹²⁷ says Schlyter. Schmidt and Wikström’s opinion is that NATO membership should be at the top of the agenda. Wikström states: “sure, rationalisation, coordination, cost efficiency and such are good, but as long as all Nordic countries are not NATO members then all this is chimeric.”¹²⁸ Ludvigsson on the other hand states that “it is important to operate on all levels – and we shall not let go of questions which are better solved back home, or on the Nordic level.”¹²⁹

7.2.2 European competence to act

The MPs views on European competence to act are divided along two lines; those who are generally positive and those who are generally negative to further integration on the European level. It is also clear that even if the MPs are positive – they do not compare to their counterparts on the European level who have an even more enthusiastic approach and view of EU authority. The more sceptic MPs hold views along these lines: “the basis for operative – especially military – action is that all MS agree, and the possibilities to reach consensus on operative action are quite limited”.¹³⁰ Berg goes as far as to state that the EU has played out its role as a champion of ‘soft power’ if the EU furthers its military aspirations. Wiechel also presents the negative view that “the EU trying to have a CFSP is not at all positive given that the EU has developed into a supranational creation – the power to decide upon foreign policy should solely lie with the nation state”.¹³¹ It is evident that the MPs first and foremost view the EU to have competence when it comes to shaping and conveying its foreign policy. Its prominent features are, according to the MPs, ‘soft power’, economic sanctions, trade agreements

¹²⁶ Nilsson (Social Democrats)

¹²⁷ Schlyter (Green Party)

¹²⁸ Wikström (Liberal Party)

¹²⁹ Ludvigsson (Social Democrats)

¹³⁰ B. Gustafsson (Social Democrats)

¹³¹ Wiechel (Sweden Democrats)

as well as dialogue, talks and statements. Communication rather than enforcement, say the MPs, is the hallmark of the EU. All MPs find that competence to act with military assets lies within the framework of UN and/or NATO.

The MEPs are also divided Left to Right. The strongest opponents of giving mandate to the EU level being the MEPs from the Left, Green and Pirate Party, who's basic views are that the EU should not have competence to act, the nation states should. Cooperation is good, agree the opponents, but not at the expense of sovereignty. Common attitudes to the EU's external policies, from this group of MEPs, are that 'many voices are better than one' and that there is 'a lot of talk with little impact'. The other MEPs, from the Social Democratic and Liberal Parties as well as the Christian Democrats, perceive the EU to have quite extensive competence to act with a varied toolbox of economic sanctions and trade agreements as prominent features. Nilsson, concerning actor capability and what the EU can do, stresses that "sanctions and economic levers are perhaps the two most important tools of the EU, along with trade agreements. The EU does not possess any military strength, NATO does".¹³² Wikström applies great significance to the EU's role as a 'normative power', promoting norms around the world. Norms such as democracy, freedom of speech/press and Human Rights, underlines Wikström, are included in statements and dialogue as well as in trade deals. An example of EU norm promotion, Nilsson points out, is that "the EU recently included clauses on Human Rights in a treaty on fisheries, that now binds 25-30 countries."¹³³ The basic view of the 'positive side' is that 'speaking with one voice' is a prominent feature of the CFSP. The EU has been given competence to 'speak with one voice' on behalf of its MS and the 'positive side' find this to be a way for the EU to take part in the international arena. Lövin questions this and perceives the CFSP to be a collection of 'declarations' which is perhaps not followed up with much substance. Engström states that the EU does not have any credible threats in its toolbox, since for instance the US still dares conduct surveillance within EU jurisdiction, particularly on the Internet. Schlyter concludes that EU authority concerning security issues is bad and possibly dangerous. It is his perception that:

England, France and Germany are today too weak on their own to invade and boss around, therefore, cynically analysed, they developed the EU and will militarise so that they can once again play the role of superpower. The moment the EU achieves military might, it will act like every other superpower before it. It is only the lack of military muscles that has forced the EU to use other tools from its toolbox.¹³⁴

Furthermore M. Gustavsson notes that, even if the EU does not on its own have a formal mandate, one can see that in reality many states seem to be forced into agreeing with the majority, led by the larger EU states. "The formal intergovernmental structure should satisfy the Left Party, but since we of

¹³² Nilsson (Social Democrats)

¹³³ Nilsson (Social Democrats)

¹³⁴ Schlyter (Green Party)

course see the underlying structures pushing countries to concede sovereignty to the EU, we cannot be satisfied with the development.”¹³⁵ On the other side Wikström stands out as the strongest promoter of giving the EU more authority, it is her view that:

The EU can and should go further. Personally, I dare say it, the F-word. Federalism. I believe in the vision of an EU where we have strengthened our cooperation on defence, security and foreign policy. More competences to the EU – that is the way of the future. It is an important path and there is a lot to gain for our continent but also to secure peace in the world. [...] I see a time when the citizens of Europe think it is uncontroversial and natural to have a common Defence Minister. It might lie far in the future now, but for me the vision entails a common EU defence.¹³⁶

It is clear that the perceptions of EU’s authority today are closely linked to the political inclinations of the different MEPs, i.e. ‘positive’ MEPs view the EU to have extensive capacity to act, whereas ‘sceptical’ MEPs point out CFSP as being inefficient and often lacking in results. All MEPs agree that the EU does not have military authority, except via MS. There is overall agreement on working under the UN-flag, but opinions differ on the matter of NATO membership.

To summarize the parliamentarians’ perceptions of the regional entities authority on security it can be said that that Nordic security cooperation is perceived to have competence to work with ‘soft security’ and with a ‘practical approach’, focusing on logistics and cost efficiency. Particularly the MPs place emphasis on the notion of this competence. Both groups of parliamentarians view the EU to have mandate to work with the CFSP, especially to ‘speak with one voice’, and that the EU is quite visible in doing so. However, on the opinions differ on whether this is ‘positive’ or ‘negative’. The MPs are more open to Nordic security collaboration being granted authority and are open to the Nordic level possessing actorness when it comes to security issues. Both MEPs and MPs acknowledge that within different question and domains, European security cooperation – especially after the Lisbon Treaty came into place – have authority and competence to act and thereby possess actorness.

7.3 Autonomy

The key question concerning autonomy seems to lie in the perceptions of independence. In the adaptation of the autonomy component significance is given to whether a regional entity is perceived as a ‘corporate’ more than a ‘collective’ organisation and whether the regional entity is perceived to have an importance that is ‘larger than the sum of its parts’. This section will be divided into three subsections which will take a closer look at the perceptions on European, Nordic and Swedish independence to act.

¹³⁵ M. Gustavsson (Left Party)

¹³⁶ Wikström (Liberal Party)

7.3.1 European independence?

One clear pattern among the MPs is that they firmly emphasize the MS sovereignty and independence. The nation states are, according to the MPs, the primary actors on security issues, and the EU and High Representative do what the states tell them to. The MEPs present a more nuanced view of this, giving the EU greater importance as an entity that influences both foreign and security policy.

In general, the MPs perceptions are that they internally wish the EU to be a ‘collective’, and externally a ‘corporate’, since it is extremely important for the MPs that the MS have the right to decide their own foreign policy, and thereby not grant the EU independence from the nation states. At the same time all MPs wish for Sweden to cooperate and for the EU to be a common actor ‘for good’ in the international arena. Within the EU it is the MPs’ view that intergovernmentalism must prevail on security issues. It is also the view of the MPs that the EU does not possess autonomy from the MS, as this is regulated in the Lisbon Treaty. A remark representative of the MPs stance on EU independence is:

It is reasonable that each MS ‘owns’ the question, and ultimately has the right to say yes or no – every MS is sovereign. At the same time it would be futile to leave the Union and be left out, we need to participate and cooperate.¹³⁷

Some MEPs argue that the EU as an entity has capacity to influence beyond the mandate given by the MS. In accordance with the adaptation of autonomy, they view the EU as a ‘corporate’ and ‘more than the sum of its parts’. The MEPs, in contrast to the MPs, give more importance to the EU level and its ability to reduce the MS’ independence. Half of the MEPs view the nation state to be the primary independent actors on security issues, as described by Nilsson: “no level is stronger than the nation states allow”.¹³⁸ Yet, the other half of the MEPs perceive that Sweden, even if so on paper, might not be completely independent after all. M. Gustavsson, for instance, fears that loyalty to the EU de facto entails supranationalism on security issues:

I, as a representative for the Left Party, should be happy; security issues are intergovernmentally handled by the Council. Yet, it is problematic, since some kind of loyalty to the EU exists, fed by the inaccurate notion that leaving security policy to the supranational level makes it ‘stronger’.¹³⁹

To Svensson it is equally clear that MS interdependence is limited, but he views this as positive;

It is my understanding that the nation states cannot have significant importance on their own – that is why it is so important to cooperate. Sweden depends on the EU to have influence on security policy in the world.¹⁴⁰

¹³⁷ B. Gustafsson (Social Democrats)

¹³⁸ Nilsson (Social Democrats)

¹³⁹ M. Gustavsson (Left Party)

¹⁴⁰ Svensson (Christian Democrats)

Most MPs agree that the EU should ‘speak with one voice’. “Yet, it is not Ashton who on her own decides what to say, no, her voice, the EU’s voice and message is decided by the sovereign MS” concludes Björnsdotter Rahm.¹⁴¹ MEPs, regardless of political colour, are more prone to seeing the EU as ‘more than the sum of its part’; that it has a greater impact than just 28 states would. For instance; the EU’s role in the UN, the EU ‘speaking with one voice’, the EU prerogative to be a normative power and the EU ‘soft power’ are by the ‘EU-positive’ MEPs viewed to be evidence of this impact.¹⁴²

7.3.2 Nordic independence?

In general, when it comes to independence, the MPs give the national level more weight in comparison to the Nordic level, while the MEPs give importance to both nation states as well as the EU. In the MEPs’ defence of sovereignty none seem willing to assess Nordic security cooperation as ‘more than the sum of its parts’. Furthermore, the MEPs seem to have less confidence than the MPs in the Nordic countries acting jointly. Nilsson represents several MEPs when expressing that “you cannot trust the Nordic countries to stand united on security issues – they have too different security solutions to do so, especially concerning NATO-membership”.¹⁴³ M. Gustavsson, together with MEPs from the Green and Pirate Parties, finds the limited ability to act jointly to be positive, since it indicates that Nordic collaboration is truly intergovernmental. “It is possible to cooperate within this and this, but not that, thereby enabling a lot more bilateral and trilateral cooperation”¹⁴⁴, which according to M. Gustavsson makes this type of security cooperation more dynamic and desirable (than EU cooperation). Schmidt agrees with Nilsson’s statement and further declares that in a conflict situation the Nordic security cooperation will not stand firm or even attempt to be independent. The Nordic NATO members will definitely act in accordance with the military alliance.”¹⁴⁵

A prominent aspect that speaks for Nordic security cooperation acting as an independent actor is, as reported by Åström, that NC delegations independently from nation states and from the EU, as a result of the Ukraine Crisis (2014), decided to visit Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland during the spring of 2014. Another feature of independence Åström points out is that “the NC will continuously keep condemning Russian escalation of violence, and in addition decided not participate in or send delegates to a meeting in Murmansk in March 2014.”¹⁴⁶ During the interview with Åström she was asked: *Do you consult the EU before the NC express their opinion on the crisis in Ukraine or decide not to participate in a meeting in Russia?* Åström answered: “No, why should we?” This indicates that there is a perception among MPs that the NC can independently express views without asking for permission from neither the EU nor the nation states. Perhaps these statements and the dialogue with

¹⁴¹ Björnsdotter Rahm (Moderate Party)

¹⁴² Schmidt (Liberal Party), Wikström (Liberal Party), Svensson (Christian Democrats)

¹⁴³ Nilsson (Social Democrats)

¹⁴⁴ M. Gustavsson (Left Party)

¹⁴⁵ Schmidt (Liberal Party)

¹⁴⁶ Åström (Social Democrats)

Eastern European states does not diverge from the EU line, but at the same time it does indicate that the MPs see NC aspiring to be an independent actor. However, Wallmark argues that:

As long as the European and Nordic security collaborations are coordinated they will amplify each other and this is a strength. The more active you are in this field, the more important it is that the head and the tail knows what the other is doing. From my point of view I cannot see that the European and the Nordic security decisions should differ in any fundamental way – therefore it is my firm belief that the two regional collaborations have an amplifying effect.¹⁴⁷

Wallmark's perception is that there is no conflict of interest concerning Nordic autonomy since it, according to him, is highly unlikely that Nordic and European security interests will differ. Interestingly enough, the MEP Wikström uses the same allegory in regard to Nordic independence; "it goes without saying that I would be deeply offended if the Nordic security cooperation perceived themselves to be the head and not the tail".¹⁴⁸ That said, Wikström together with most of the MEPs believes that the areas where Nordic cooperation can to some degree work independently are 'soft security', prevention of natural disasters, environmental hazards and also civil defence. MEPs find this natural to do within Nordic geographical context.

7.3.2. Swedish independence?

One overarching pattern is that every parliamentarian has a relation to and an opinion about Swedish independence. These seem to be driven by ideological convictions and to some extent correlate with which parliamentary assembly they belong to. The MP Björnsdotter Rahm firmly states that "I do not believe in supranationalism – and Sweden is a sovereign state, free to decide its foreign policy. That said, I think that cooperation is good, but the decision in the end always lies with the nation state".¹⁴⁹

The MPs, without exception, assert and insist upon Swedish independence. The liberal MP, Brodén, on the question of European federalism takes, in comparison to her fellow party members in the EP, a more cautious stand, giving her vision as: "In the future I see a number of European countries cooperating, but I also see independent countries, still with sovereign status, no federalist state".¹⁵⁰ The Sweden Democrats fear supranational development and Wiechel presents that his party wants to either re-negotiate the Swedish membership or leave the EU entirely to reaffirm Swedish independence. Wallmark is more representative of the MPs when he states that "the short answer on Swedish independence is that as long as we have not entered any binding assurances with any country we are by definition alone and independent, but it is our ambition to be an involved partner".¹⁵¹ The MEPs in general contradict this notion and from different points of view try to explain how Swedish

¹⁴⁷ Wallmark (Moderate Party)

¹⁴⁸ Wikström Liberal Party)

¹⁴⁹ Björnsdotter Rahm (Moderate Party)

¹⁵⁰ Brodén (Liberal Party)

¹⁵¹ Wallmark (Moderate Party)

independence is limited by the EU, whether this is necessary for greater EU common influence or simply negative for the MS. M. Gustavsson is representative for those who find this negative, according to him there is strong pressure on MS to accept demands promoted on EU level. Additionally, M. Gustavsson argues that:

The smaller countries – like Sweden – become very passive before the Council has decided its position. The smaller countries wait for the Council position and then defend this position. This results in many countries not determining their own foreign policy and becoming weak and passive.¹⁵²

For Sweden both the Lisbon Treaty and the Helsinki Declaration include clauses on solidarity. Engblom finds the European solidarity declaration to be the most important because it is statutory and in comparison she views the Nordic solidarity declaration more as a ‘hand shake’ and a lesser commitment. Yet Wallmark emphasises that neither the Lisbon Treaty nor the Nordic Solidarity Declaration should be viewed as formally binding. Not all MPs agree and instead, like most of the MEPs, Berg argues that:

If something were to happen somewhere in Europe, I believe that the EU would demand that Sweden participates. EU-membership and ultimately the Lisbon Treaty demands that Sweden acts in such a scenario – regardless of national will.¹⁵³

In sum, the MPs are more open to Nordic independence, as mentioned especially regarding NC actions taken due to the Ukraine Crisis. Therefore the MPs, in comparison to the MEPs, view Nordic security cooperation to possess at least some actorness within the component of autonomy. The key finding about independence may be that, in general, the MPs perceive that ‘the EU cannot be independent from the nations’. While at least half the MEPs perceive it to be the other way around; ‘the nation states cannot be independent from the EU’. At least half of the MEPs believe the EU to have autonomy – being a ‘corporate’ when conducting foreign policy, i.e. possessing actorness within this component. The MPs do not perceive the EU to be independent from the nation states in these matters, i.e. the EU, according to the MPs, possesses little actorness when it comes to autonomy.

7.4 Cohesion

This section will be divided into two subsections; one on cohesion within Nordic security cooperation and one on cohesion within European security cooperation. Within each section, in accordance to the adaptation of the component of cohesion, focus will be on cohesion of values, as well as tactical cohesion and procedural cohesion. Also perceptions on the regional security entities’ cohesion on ‘output’ will be assessed.

¹⁵² M. Gustavsson (Left Party)

¹⁵³ Berg (Left Party)

7.4.1 Nordic Cohesion

According to most MPs the value cohesion among the Nordic countries is very strong. All MPs gave weight to factors such as common history, common culture and common values. Some of the MPs acknowledge that the common values only go so far and that realist, power politics and military alliances, in particular NATO, will be the primary consideration. As many as half of the MEPs also problematized cohesion on values further, saying: Nordic common values are a prominent feature of Nordic cooperation, but when it comes to security it is evident that the Nordic countries have very different history and above all, the Nordic countries have different security solutions, where NATO membership clearly sets boundaries for possible cohesion. Ludvigsson exemplifies with common procurement plans that have failed, and uses the Swedish-Norwegian negotiations on Norway buying Swedish airplanes (the ARCHER-project) as an example. Norway instead ended up buying planes from their NATO ally, the US, showing the greater importance of military alliances.

The MP Åström points to areas where Nordic security cooperation has ‘tactical’ cohesion, stressing that “In fact, we can and do practise together and have common exercises”. MEP Nilsson stresses that even if it is difficult for the Nordic countries to have cohesion when it comes to ‘hard questions’ influenced by military alliances, it is clear that:

Common Nordic values do exist, Stoltenberg also concludes this in his report, but the common Nordic values, while easy to agree upon, are perhaps more on ‘soft security’. It is evident that a common ground of basic welfare, proactive views to work for the environment and will to spread norms like democracy and Human Rights exists.¹⁵⁴

When it comes to procedural cohesion M. Gustavsson finds it very positive that Nordic security cooperation does not support strong institutions that can override the MS and create a situation of ‘push’ on the MS to display loyalty and to ‘get in line’. NORDEFECO and Nordic security cooperation are seen as truly intergovernmental by the Left and Green Party representatives who view this as very positive. Other MEPs, without declaring a positive or negative stand, also find that when it comes to procedural cohesion the Nordic security cooperation is quite loosely formed. Cohesion on ‘output’ can be viewed as a mixture of the level of agreement on common values, goals and procedures as well as ‘degree to which it is possible to link issues tactically’. Here MPs perceive a greater Nordic capability to be cohesive and cooperative than the MEPs. Yet, both MPs and MEPs agree that NATO affiliation sets limits for possible cohesion between the Nordic countries.

7.4.2 European Cohesion

MPs are divided along EU-positive and EU-sceptical lines, but the trend among the MPs is that they acknowledge that common values on the European level have been given greater significance over

¹⁵⁴ Nilsson (Social Democrats)

time. The common goal of peace is also something that most parliamentarians point out as a key prerogative and common imperative.

The MEPs stress the fact that value cohesion on the European level can be found even in the Lisbon Treaty where norms of democracy, Human Rights, Freedom of Speech etc. are stipulated and legally binding. Proponents of European integration among the MEPs give great importance to the cohesion the EU has shown when trying to ‘speak with one voice’ and to promote norms in the international arena, i.e. be a Normative Power Europe. Yet, some MEPs point to the fact that internal cohesion might not be as extensive as some would wish, especially; “when it comes to Human Rights the status in some of the MS is not as good as one could wish.”¹⁵⁵ At the same time Nilsson stresses, this gives the opportunity to conduct ‘internal security and norm promotion’.

Internal norm promotion became evident in the case of Hungary recently. Hungary legislated laws that conflicted with the Lisbon Treaty; the new laws impeded the opposition and the media and they politicised the legal system. The EP found 10 violations and adopted a resolution in the EP demanding that the Commission take action, which it also did.¹⁵⁶

The MEPs find that tactical cohesion is very much present. It is Schlyter’s view that a lot of ‘horse-trading’ is going on between the MS seems to be representative for about half of the MEPs.¹⁵⁷ The other half recognise that some trade-offs takes place, and see this as ‘common politics’ but do perhaps not view tactical cohesion in quite such a negative manner. Among the MPs Wallmark represents most when he declares that “with 28 MS, with all the benefits we stand to gain from this, it is important that we respect the fact that it takes time to coordinate and negotiate”.¹⁵⁸ At the same time Wallmark declares that state interests are obviously present on the European arena. Viewing the Ukraine Crisis (2014) and assessing the EU’s actions Wallmark draws the following conclusions:

State interests [lack of cohesion] makes it more difficult to respond to Russian aggression. It would have been interesting to think about heavily decreasing import of Russian gas, but that will not go well with Germany. To do something about fiscal transactions in ‘Londongrad’ would have been an interesting sanction, but that will not go well with the United Kingdom. Finally it would have been very interesting to stop arms sales to Russia, but that will not go well with France.¹⁵⁹

Concerning procedural cohesion MPs and MEPs agree that there are several formal rules and procedures in place when deciding on security matters on the European level. When it comes to ‘output cohesion’ practically every parliamentarian has his or her own view of the EU cohesion on

¹⁵⁵ Nilsson (Social Democrats)

¹⁵⁶ Nilsson (Social Democrats)

¹⁵⁷ Schlyter (Green Party), M. Gustavsson (Left Party), Andersdotter (Pirate Party)

¹⁵⁸ Wallmark (Moderate Party)

¹⁵⁹ Wallmark (Moderate Party)

security matters. One pattern that can be found is that both MPs and MEPs acknowledge the EU to have a certain degree of output cohesion, but that it differs from case to case. Generally MEPs view output coming from the High Representative and the EEAS as cohesive.

When summarizing the parliamentarians' views on cohesion, it is clear that the MPs perceive Nordic security cooperation to possess at least some cohesion, in particular on practical coordination and cooperation. Whereas the MEPs in general point to the limitations the different Nordic security solutions – NATO – have put on possible cohesion, thereby finding Nordic security cooperation lacking in actorness when it comes to this component. The MEPs perceive European security cooperation to have cohesion, especially pointing out common values and institutions as evidence of this. At the same time the MEPs are internally divided on whether this is 'positive' or 'negative'. The MPs overall also find that the EU has cohesion when it comes to security cooperation, but they also point out that MS often have problems finding common solutions when negotiating. Therefore the MPs perceive the EU to have cohesion actorness, to some extent, but not fully.

7.5 Comparative summary

This section will further compare the results from the interviews with the two groups of parliamentarians. One of the clearest patterns throughout this research has been that the vast majority of the parliamentarians, when explicitly asked if European and Nordic security structures complement or compete, answer – almost without thinking about it – that the two security collaborations are without doubt complementary. For the parliamentarians it seems almost impossible to admit a potential competition between the two parallel security structures. Yet, the rise of parallel Nordic and European security collaboration, as previous research has shown, entails possible tension. The four components of actorness have helped map out the complexity of the parliamentarians' views and arguments.

Hereafter follow four models assessing and comparing actorness of both Nordic and European security cooperation. The models are all based on a scale comprising five possible levels; High, High/Moderate, Moderate, Moderate/Low and Low.

The first two models are on Nordic security actorness showing generalized assessments of MPs and MEPs views. The perceptions between the MPs and the MEPs differ on Nordic security actorness. The MPs, in comparison with the MEPs, perceive Nordic security cooperation to have a higher level of actorness. In fact, the MEP appreciation of the actorness of Nordic security cooperation is very low, indicating that they do not perceive the Nordic level to be an actor in this field.




Figure 2. The MPs generalized assessment of Nordic Security Cooperation




Figure 3. The MEPs generalized assessment of Nordic Security Cooperation

The MPs view the recognition of Nordic security cooperation to be *high/moderate*, especially focusing on the ‘Nordic Model’, Nordic diplomats, historic Nordic recognition within UN and perhaps most prominently the recognition from other neighboring countries in the wake of the Ukraine Crisis (2014). The MEPs acknowledge that the ‘Nordic Model’ is visible, but do not find the Nordic security cooperation to be recognized either on EU level or by the outside world resulting in the component of recognition being *moderate/low*. The MPs especially point to Nordic security cooperation having authority on more practical matters; logistics, exercises, resource and cost efficiency, and ‘soft security’. At the same time areas mentioned are a quite small part of security competences all together, making *moderate* the most suitable level. The MEPs perceive Nordic security cooperation to have low authority, since the capacity to act is deemed severely limited, few areas of competence, where competence has been given little has happened, and the different Nordic countries security solutions, in particular NATO-membership sets limits. On autonomy MPs on one hand stress the importance of nation states being the primary actors on the other find that the Nordic level can to a certain extent give statements independently; leaving their perceptions on autonomy *moderate*. The MEPs, on the other hand, view the Nordic security cooperation as truly intergovernmental, indicating *low* autonomy.

MPs perceive Nordic cohesion to be *moderate*, focusing on common values and tactical will to cooperate, as well as output such as common exercises indicating cohesion. In addition, MPs acknowledge that in particular different security solutions set boundaries for Nordic cohesion. MEPs view Nordic cohesion to be *moderate/low*, since they have pointed out that most defense deals have failed thereby signaling a lack of cohesion. Moreover the basic fact that Nordic security cooperation institutionally is loosely shaped, together with the fact that NATO membership, plays a large role in Nordic cohesion.

The third and fourth models show the parliamentarians’ perceptions of European security actorness. While both the MEPs and MPs in general tend to have quite high assessments of actorness here, the MEPs views indicate them perceiving both autonomy and cohesion being higher than the MPs.

MPs views on European Security Actorness			
Recognition: High	Authority: Moderate	Autonomy: Low	Cohesion: Moderate

Figure 4. The MPs generalized assessment of European Security Cooperation

MEPs views on European Security Actorness			
Recognition: High	Authority: Moderate	Autonomy: Moderate	Cohesion: High/Moderate

Figure 5. The MEPs generalized assessment of European Security Cooperation

Both groups of parliamentarians find the EU to have *high* recognition, both from the Nordic level and from the outside world. Also both the MPs and the MEPs can be said to view European security cooperation to possess *moderate* authority. It is especially the CFSP, the High Representative and her visible role and the norms of the Lisbon Treaty that speak to actorness. While it is the lack of military strength and lack of formal mandate to decide on security matters that speak against, leaving actorness at a *moderate* level for both groups. The MPs especially stressed that the autonomy of the EU on security matters is quite *low*, and that foreign and security policies are within the nation states’ domain. Several of the MEPs described this notion as false, pointing to the opposite: nation states that are members of the EU can in fact not be perceived to be truly independent from the European level. At the same time security policy is formally an intergovernmentally handled policy area, resulting in

the EU autonomy being assessed as *moderate* by the MEPs. The MPs perceive European cohesion to be *moderate*; with common values stipulated in the Lisbon Treaty, the institutional framework giving countless opportunities for discussion. However the MPs also see that national interests seem to keep the EU internally divided, lacking cohesion on ‘tough matters’ such as Russian gas, financial interests and arms deals. The MEPs find European cohesion to be *high/moderate*, since the MEPs place emphasis on common norms, ‘speaking with one voice’, and possibilities in the Lisbon Treaty to legally pressure MS to follow the Treaty. The MEPs acknowledge that even if the EU operate within an extensive framework of institutions it takes time to negotiate common positions and the common positions are not always as firm as a majority of the MS would want.

Something that stands out in this research is that the two regional security entities are perceived to mainly operate within different dimensions. The area where the European security cooperation is perceived to be most prominent is *foreign policy*: ‘Speaking with one voice’ and being a normative power in international politics. While the Nordic security cooperation are viewed to be most prominent within *practical and tactical security cooperation*; civil security and pooling resources. This indicates two different dimensions for these two parallel security structures to operate. Though the will from some of the MPs to have a more visible Nordic security cooperation with more competences may contradict such a notion.

This thesis has used the theoretical framework of actorness to assess the parliamentarians’ perceptions of both Nordic and European security cooperation. This research has shown that the MPs find quite high actorness for both security collaborations, thus suggesting and affirming that a possible situation of competition does in fact exist. When it comes to the MEPs perceptions of Nordic and European security actorness the situation is different; with low actorness for Nordic and quite high actorness for European security cooperation, the MEPs perceptions do not indicate competition between the two parallel security structures.

8. Conclusion

This section will evaluate the results of this investigation and draw conclusions as well as present the answers to the research questions. This thesis started out intrigued by the possible tension in developing parallel security structures both on Nordic and European level. As the previous research has shown, the rise especially on Nordic level came about relatively recently, and Nordic security cooperation has re-emerged as a contestant for both funds and political interest. Yet, representatives from all political levels seem resolute and determined to oppose any notion that that Nordic and European security structures ever could compete. The results of this investigation problematized this and uncovered inconsistencies by applying the concept of actorness on the collected data.

How do Swedish MPs from the European Parliament and the Nordic Council perceive; on one hand European security cooperation and on the other Nordic security cooperation?

This question has no short answer. Comparing perceptions of parliamentarians from both Nordic and European level has given insight into two different ways to view regionalization of security. One perhaps expected find is that the perceptions seem to have close ties to and to be affected by which regional entity the parliamentarian operates within. For instance the MPs were more positive in general to the Nordic level. Furthermore they took a firm stand emphasizing state sovereignty and intergovernmentalism, perhaps since any other stand would lessen their own significance. It was to some extent expected that the parliamentarians had more knowledge and understanding of the regional cooperation they themselves belong to. In addition this research has shown that occasionally the political affiliations of the parliamentarians were central, while other times members from different ideological backgrounds seemed to have very similar opinions.

Conducting this investigation at this very moment in time has indeed been exciting. In the spring of 2014 security issues have been pushed to the top of the agenda. The turn of events now unfolding in Eastern Europe accentuates that European status quo has proven to be much more fragile than most people and politicians imagined. Security issues have proven to be a very current topic highlighting the roles of different European security structures. In all 20 interviews the Ukraine Crisis was discussed and it became the most prominent example to relate to when giving their perceptions on Nordic and European security cooperation. One of the more unexpected discoveries of this research was the recognition the NC received in the wake of the Ukraine Crisis from several Eastern European countries.

To the field of European Studies this thesis contributes by presenting a broad spectra of parliamentary opinions on regionalization of security that has not been compared like this before. Another contribution is the use of this specific group as the unit of analysis, parliamentarians has not been subject to much or any previous research in these matters. This thesis gives a deeper understanding of

their perceptions on developing parallel security structures. The comparative structure, comparing the European and Nordic level, added an interesting dimension since it highlighted that different comprehensions of the two security collaborations seem to be based more on EU or Nordic affinity than political affiliation.

Do the MEPs' and MPs' perceptions indicate that the two regional security entities possess actorness?

The comparison made in this investigation between MEPs and MPs indicate that they in general find the different regional security entities to possess *varying* levels of actorness, as shown in the comparative summary. The MPs, in comparison to the MEPs, assess Nordic Security cooperation to possess higher levels of actorness. The areas where Nordic security cooperation by the parliamentarians in general have been perceived to have mandate and some level of independence is practical and tactical security cooperation focused on logistics, cost efficiency and pooling resources to achieve for instance common exercises. Whereas the area that European security cooperation in general has received most attention from the parliamentarians is on foreign policy, especially the role of the High Representative and the prerogative to 'speak with one voice'. Overall both MEPs' and MPs' perceptions indicate European security cooperation to possess actorness, especially in comparison to the Nordic level.

Do the MEPs' and MPs' views imply that European and Nordic security cooperation complement or compete with each other?

It is intriguing that the MPs, who most fiercely oppose the notion that the two security structures *ever* could compete, are the ones whose assessment of Nordic and European security actorness is the one that most indicates competition. One basic assumption of this research is that high levels of actorness for both regional security collaborations indicate possible competition. The results of this research therefore points to MPs' perceptions implying some level of competition. While the MEPs' views – high EU security actorness, low Nordic security actorness – imply that the two regional security structures are in fact complementing each other. In general the parliamentarians have difficulties seeing any situation where Nordic and European security cooperation would stand against each other. The for MEPs representative perception that the EU views Nordic security cooperation with 'well-meaning indifference' is in accordance with the reasoning of Forsberg (2013), who pointed out that it is because Nordic level cannot compete that it has been possible to develop. The assumption by Petersson (2010) that military alliances and 'hard security' will prevail if ever put to the test has in this thesis been highlighted by several of the parliamentarians. However, neither Nordic nor European security structures can be viewed as true military alliances, giving the impression that NATO membership appears to be the most influential in determining actorness as well as priorities for the

regional security collaborations. In addition the parliamentarians' perceptions imply extensive political ambitions to cooperate on security issues within regional frameworks. Participating on several levels – all levels – is a notion that seems especially common on the national level, while the EU level seem to have a widespread focus on European cooperation. The results of this study indicate that if the aspirations of the MPs and their way of perceiving regional security collaboration prevails it may indeed result in a situation of competition. This especially if both security structures keep developing or reach a point where interests or priorities explicitly collide. However, this is perhaps not something any political level dares put to the test. When interests collide states respond according to their priorities without ever discussing the situation as a possible conflict, retaining to the opinion that 'all cooperation is good'.

Recommendations for further research involve future truly comprehensive research on the views and perceptions of parliamentarians. Parliamentarians exist within all regional security collaboration and can therefore provide insight as well as a wide spread of opinions and in extension these views should to be more thoroughly researched. An empirical pilot study like this one, a 'dress rehearsal' as it has been called, could be a first step towards comprehensive studies of the parliamentarians' perceptions. An initial step could be to include parliamentarians (MEPs and MPs) from Denmark and Finland using the same theoretical framework and comparative dimension to assess perceptions on security actorness. This would present the chance to compare several added dimensions, but firstly it would give the opportunity to compare on a country basis to see if the same relation between MEP and MP perception exists. Secondly similar security collaborations, for instance among the BeNeLux countries, could be investigated and compared using this theoretical framework.

Another idea for future research would be to compare parliamentarians' perceptions over time. Firstly it would be extremely interesting to interview the Swedish parliamentarians once again after the EP elections in May 2014 and the national Swedish elections in September 2014. Could a change in perceptions then be found? Moreover it would be interesting to research parliamentary views on security issues in a longer perspective, repeating studies with regular intervals to try to detect changes in opinions, attitudes and aspirations.

Furthermore, regarding the issue of whether the two regional security entities are competing or complementary, the concept of actorness and its components could be applied in a truly comprehensive investigation examining *actual* actorness, not perceived actorness, of these two security collaborations. Lastly, the extensive data collected for this research could definitely be researched further, as some of the material was extremely interesting but it did not fit into this framework of analysis. This material could once more be asked questions about Nordic and European security collaboration.

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9.1 Interviews

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9.1.1 European Parliament

Andersdotter, Amelia (Pirate Party), 17th March 2014, Brussels

Engström, Christian (Pirate Party), 19th March 2014, Brussels

Gustavsson, Mikael (Left Party), 3rd March 2014, phone interview.

Ludvigsson, Olle (Social Democratic Party), 17th March 2014, Brussels

Lövin, Isabella (Green Party), 18th March 2014, Brussels

Nilsson, Jens (Social Democratic Party), 18th March 2014, Brussels

Schlyter, Carl (Green Party), 18th March 2014, Brussels

Schmidt, Olle (Liberal Party), 20th March 2014, Brussels

Svensson, Alf (Christian Democrats), 18th March 2014, Brussels

Wikström, Cecilia (Liberal Party), 19th March 2014, Brussels

9.1.2 Swedish Delegation to the NC

Berg, Marianne (Left Party), 25th March 2014, Stockholm

Björnsdotter Rahm, Elisabeth (Moderate Party), 25th March 2014, Stockholm

Brodén, Anita (Liberal Party), 12th April 2014, phone interview

Engblom, Annicka (Moderate Party), 25th March 2014, Stockholm

Gustafsson, Billy (Social Democratic Party), 5th March 2014, Stockholm

Johansson, Ann-Kristine (Social Democratic Party), 13th of March 2014, Stockholm

Lindholm, Jan (Green Party), 6th March 2014, Stockholm

Wallmark, Hans (Moderate Party), 13th March 2014, Stockholm

Wiechel, Markus (Sweden Democrats), 27th March 2014, Stockholm

Åström, Karin (Social Democratic Party), 13th of March 2014, Stockholm

Appendix I. Interview guide in Swedish and English

Intervjuguide Svenska:

Först några praktiska saker;

- Upplägg; några inledande frågor, därefter fyra mindre teman, och sedan några avslutande frågor.
- Spela in; Är det okej att jag spelar in vår intervju?
- Alla deltagare i undersökningen har rätt att vara anonyma om de vill.

Introduktion:

Bakgrund. Är det något du vill lägga till om din bakgrund?

Fokus för min uppsats ligger på å ena sidan europeisk säkerhetspolitik, å andra sidan nordisk. Båda har varit på framgång de senaste åren. Europeisk säkerhetspolitik genom förstärkningar i Lissabonfördraget, förstärkning rollen för Höga representanten för utrikes- och säkerhetspolitik, inrättandet av European External Action Service (EEAS), bland annat. Nordiskt säkerhetspolitiskt uppsving blir tydligt genom Stoltenbergreporten, solidaritetsförklaring, tätare samarbete, gemensamma inköp och övningar, utvecklandet av NORDEFSCO med mera. Helt enkelt har säkerhetspolitik hamnat på agendan för båda regionala organisationerna. Men mycket av den tidigare forskningen har fokuserat på kommissionen, eventuellt nordiska ministerrådet, eller nationalstaterna och regeringsnivå. Jag vill fokusera på parlamentarikerna och det är därför jag är här för att intervjua er.

Vilka anser du är säkerhetspolitikens främsta uppgifter?

Är regionalisering av säkerhetspolitik bra? Vilken nivå bör säkerhetspolitiken skötas på?

Vilka är de viktigaste skillnaderna, anser du, mellan det europeiska och det nordiska säkerhetspolitiska samarbetet?

Vilket är viktigast för Sverige, europeiskt eller nordiskt säkerhetspolitiskt samarbete?

Vilken är din syn på utvecklingen på EU nivå, till exempel den höga utrikes- och säkerhetspolitiska representantens förstärkta roll?

Vad anser du om att Nordiska rådet föreslog ett ministerråd inom säkerhetspolitik men ministrarna valde att inte inrätta ett?

Recognition – Hur regionala säkerhetspolitiska samarbeten uppfattas

Vilken är din bild av hur EU ser på Nordiskt säkerhetspolitiskt samarbete? (Ser EU nordiskt säkerhetspolitiskt samarbete som ett hot?)

Vilken är din bild av hur man på nordisk nivå ser på europeiskt säkerhetspolitiskt samarbete? (Ser man från nordisk nivå EU:s säkerhetspolitiska samarbete som ett hot?)

På vilket sätt skulle du säga att omvärlden ser på å ena sidan det europeiska å andra sidan det nordiska säkerhetspolitiska samarbetena?

Authority – auktoritet, kompetens, mandat, befogenhet, ”rätt” – att agera

Vilken kompetens, möjlighet att agera skulle du säga att EU har inom säkerhetspolitik?

Vilken kompetens, möjlighet att agera skulle du säga att nordiskt säkerhetspolitiskt samarbetet har?

Vilka områden av utrikes- och säkerhetspolitik borde man syssla med på europeisk respektive nordisk nivå? – Borde man syssla med olika områden av säkerhetspolitik på olika nivåer, och vilka är då bäst på europeisk respektive nordisk nivå?

Vilken typ av säkerhetspolitisk aktör skulle du säga att europeiskt säkerhetspolitiskt samarbete är?

Vilken typ av säkerhetspolitisk aktör skulle du säga att nordiskt säkerhetspolitiskt samarbetet är?

Autonomy – vilken autonomi regionala säkerhetspolitiska samarbeten har

I vilken utsträckning tror du att europeiskt respektive nordiskt säkerhetspolitiskt samarbete kan agera självständigt?

Vad tycker du att EU/Nordiskt samarbete har rätt att göra (när det gäller säkerhetspolitik)?

När tror du att det blir problematiskt att veta på vilken nivå man skall hantera en fråga?

Tror du att allianser spelar roll – vilka stater som är med i Nato till exempel?

Cohesion – Handlar om intern sammanhållning

Anser du att man inom de regionala samarbetena har eller inte har gemensamma värderingar när det gäller utrikes- och säkerhetspolitik?

Vilka tror du är de största fördelarna med att samarbeta? Vilka inre drivkrafter till samarbete kring utrikes- och säkerhetspolitik tror du finns?

Finns det procedurer inom de respektive organisationerna som bidrar till sammanhållning inom säkerhetspolitiskt samarbete?

Upplever du att det finns mycket motsättningar inom de respektive organisationerna på området säkerhetspolitik?

När vilka situationer – vilka frågor – tror du att sammanhållningen brister på respektive nivå?

Avslutning:

Vad tror du att gemene man tycker om europeiskt och nordiskt säkerhetspolitiskt samarbete?

Avslutningsvis, skulle du säga att europeiskt och nordiskt säkerhetspolitiskt samarbete konkurrerar med varandra eller kompletterar varandra?

Har du något mer du vill ta upp på området? Något mer att tillägga?

Interview guide English:

First some practical things;

- The outline.
- Is it okay to record the interview?
- All participants have the right to be anonymous.

Introduction:

Do you have anything to add about your background?

Focus in this thesis will be on one hand on European and on the other Nordic security cooperation. Both these regional security structures have the past years been on the rise. EU: the Lisbon Treaty. The High Rep. The European External Action Service (EEAS) among others. Nordic security cooperation: the Stoltenberg report. Solidarity Declaration, common exercises, common procurement, the development of NORDEFECO and so on. Safe to say, security are on the agenda for both regional entities. Previous research have focused on governing bodies. I want to focus on you, parliamentarians and that why I am here to interview you.

Which are the primary tasks and goals of security policy?

Is regionalization of security 'good'? On which level should security policy be determined?

Which are the greatest differences between Nordic and European security collaborations?

Which is most important for Sweden?

What is your take on development on EU-level, for instance the new role of the High Representative?

What is your take on the fact that the NC suggested an instatement of a NCM on security issues but the ministers decided not to?

Recognition

What is your view of how the EU perceive Nordic security cooperation? (A possible threat?)

What is your view of how the Nordic level perceive European security cooperation? (A possible threat?)

What are your perceptions on how the outside world views Nordic and European security collaborations?

Authority

What competence to act would you say that the EU has within the policy area of security?

What competence to act would you say that the Nordic security cooperation has within the policy area of security?

Which areas of security should be handled on the different levels? Can issues be handled on several levels at the same time, and if so what is best handled where?

What type of security actor would you perceive the EU to be (on security issues)?

What type of security actor would you perceive the Nordic security cooperation to be?

Autonomy

To what extent do you believe that Nordic and European security collaborations can act independently?

What do you think the EU/Nordic security cooperation have the mandate to do when it comes to security issues?

When is it problematic to know on which level to handle a question?

Do you believe that military alliances – such as NATO – is important for security choices?

Cohesion

Do you perceive the two regional security collaborations to have common values on security policy?

What are the greatest advantages of cooperation? What do you view as the driving forces behind the two security collaborations?

Do you believe that procedural cohesion on security issues exist within the two regional entities?

Do you find there to be a lot of conflict within the two regional security collaborations?

What situations reduce cohesion?

Concluding questions:

What do you believe is the public opinion on Nordic and European security collaborations?

Lastly, would you say that Nordic and European security collaborations compete or complement each other?

Anything you would like to add on the subject?