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Global Climate Governance: Participation and Resistance - the Case of REDD+ and Swedish Environmental Organizations

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Abstract. *This study analyses contemporary global climate governance represented by the case of REDD+, and how Swedish environmental movement organizations (EMOs) participate and/or resist this governance. The aim of the study is to provide a detailed account of contemporary global climate governance and EMOs participation and/or resistance using the theoretical perspective of governmentality, which gives the possibility to distinguish the rationalities and technologies used in climate governance, and to identify different levels of participation and resistance by the EMOs. The major rationality identified in global climate governance is marketization that permeates programme proposals. Marketization is understood as an expression of advanced liberal governing, transforming political responsibilities into market principles and emphasizing active, responsible and accountable actors in the pursuit of personal fulfilment. Other important rationalities are scientization and managerialization and all three rationalities are reciprocally connected. The resistance of the EMOs is mostly directed against the marketization of global climate governance, which is seen as a threat to political and democratic influence. However, some of the EMOs resistance can simultaneously be interpret as participation. By taking part in technocratic argumentations, EMOs legitimatize and underpin the importance of certain forms of knowledge and perspectives in global climate governance.*

Keywords: climate change, global governance, REDD+, governance, environmental organization, environmental movement, governmentality, power, resistance, participation, advanced liberal governing, neo-liberalism, management, science, technology,

Introduction

Climate change emerged into the broader public sphere during the late 1980s when issues such as the ozone layer and biodiversity environmental issues became more global. At this time, climate change was considered as only one of many environmental concerns, even after the 1997 Kyoto protocol which specifically dealt with global carbon emissions (Anshelm, 2012, p. 11; Jamison, 2001, p. 93). Research into the Swedish environmental movement (EM) in the 1990s shows that the climate issue still had not yet become *the* overriding issue (Boström, 2001). Despite warnings from the Intergovernmental Panel for Climate Change (IPCC) and environmental movement organizations (EMOs), it was not until the mid 2000s that the Swedish climate debate heated up and even reached apocalyptic dimensions. Several things contributed such as the Stern Report that dealt with the costs of climate change, Al Gores film *An Inconvenient Truth* and the IPCCs 4th report that expressed great concerns about the climate change. The climate change issue caused conflicts to resurface surrounding fundamental values about economic growth, the relation between politics and markets, lifestyles and consumption, global justice and the role of technology and science (Anshelm, 2012, pp. 12–17).

During this period, from the 1980s and onwards, the EM also faced political changes. In the 1980s, neo-liberal ideology spread and influenced environmental politics by translating political responsibilities into market solutions. The EMOs were directed more towards professional environmentalism

with an advisory role to business and governments and the establishment of green parties institutionalized environmental issues (Jamison, 2001, pp. 91, 92, 2003, p. 708). These processes continued during the 1990s and discourses such as ecological modernization that wanted to combine economic growth with ecological concerns and technological improvements for the environment became influential. This lead to a certain degree of de-radicalization and differentiation of the EM (Boström, 2001, pp. 289, 297; Jamison, 2001, p. 96).

There has been little research conducted about Swedish EMOs during the 2000s regarding their relation to climate change and global climate governance. In order to understand Swedish EMOs and their relation to global climate governance this study will use the case of REDD+ (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation) that was initiated in 2005 at the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) COP11 meeting in Montreal. It was presented as a way for developing countries outside the Kyoto protocol to take part in carbon emission mitigations. In 2007 at the COP13 meeting in Bali it was formally introduced into the Bali Action Plan where it got its official definition of purpose:

> (...) *reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries; and the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries* (...) (UN-REDD, 2013a, p. 6).

REDD+ is not yet fully finalised but the main idea is a performance-based compensation payment system for actions taken to avoid deforestation and forest degradation. It has become an anticipated component in the post-Kyoto climate policy field and has received broad support, not only from UNFCCC but also from non-state actors (Stephan, 2012, p. 621). REDD+ is interesting since it highlights many of those questions that the climate change debate in the mid 2000s brought forward.

The aim of this study is to analyse global climate governance from a governmentality perspective. More specifically the purpose of the study is to distinguish and analyse the rationalities and technologies in the context of REDD+, and to identify Swedish EMOs relationship to these rationalities and technologies. The research questions are:

What rationalities and technologies can be discerned within REDD+ proposals? In what ways do Swedish EMOs participate and/or resist to rationalities and technologies connected to REDD+?

Previous research

Previous research can be divided into two areas. The first is concerned with how climate change governance is made possible; how certain aspects are made thinkable and governable through different forms of knowledge and expertise. The second area deals with the development of the environmental

movement on a global and Swedish national level. Both areas are important for the purpose of this study, as articulated in the research questions.

Climate change governance

Bäckstrand and Lövbrand (2006) identify three overarching discourses (each with slightly different shades) in global climate governance and examine how they are expressed in treaty texts, NGO and business policies and scientific reports connected to tree planting projects (CDM projects) aiming to increase carbon sequestration in tropical forests. Two of the three discourses are considered dominant in global climate governance: *Ecological Modernization* (EMod) emphasizes a liberal market order with innovative technology investments as a method to achieve both economic growth and sustainable development. According to Bäckstrand and Lövbrand, EMod has been widely embraced by organizations like UNEP, FAO and the World Bank as a rationale for future actions. *Green Environmentalism* (GE) is resting upon science, where knowledge and expertise are intrinsically linked to the scientific management of life, including the natural environment (Bäckstrand & Lövbrand, 2006, pp. 3, 5). Experts have provided scientific and administrative rationales for measuring and certifying carbon and this has become a prerequisite in climate governance. Although sometimes in conflict, EMod and GE are mutually reinforcing each other and their dominant role in framing global climate policies (Bäckstrand & Lövbrand, 2006, pp. 67–69). The third discourse is *Civic Environmentalism* (CE) which has two alignments divided by their view on the role of the state and capitalistic economy. The reformative wing talk about the importance of civil society participation as a complement to state practices and promotes public-private partnerships between NGOs, business and governments in reaching result-based problem-solving. The radical part is very sceptical to the promises of stakeholder participation. Instead, they propose a fundamental transformation of consumption patterns and existing institutions towards a just world order. Bäckstrand and Lövbrand write that CE represents a critical counter-discourse that challenges the supposed benefits of sustainable development found in EMod and the managerial ambitions in GE (Bäckstrand & Lövbrand, 2006, pp. 56, 69).

Other research on climate governance looks more specifically at the commodification processes in climate governance. Stephan (2012) applies economic sociology and discourse analysis to show how carbon, or avoided deforestation is made into a commodity in REDD+. Stephan analyses how uncertainties concerning measurements for managing a carbon market are made invisible and instead constructed as unambiguous facts so that forests may function on a market as a commodity (see also Paterson & Stripple, 2012), and how agents like UNFCCC and IPCC are key actors in processes of pacifying contestations about measurement approaches. Stephan argues that although there is no formal decision on REDD+, there are tendencies of discourse closure on controversial issues which may lead to REDD+ becoming integrated in a carbon market. Stephan also looks at how the *carbonification* of forests alter and limit other perspectives and values connected to forests and that this may contradict claims about multiple benefits of REDD+, such as biodiversity. Lövbrand and Stripple (2012) have looked at similar processes where carbon markets are made into thinkable and governable domains,

and also how these processes reflect a changing rationality of government; where the civil society goes from being a passive receiver for interventions to an entity that is both an object and a subject for governance.

Environmental movements: responsibilization, institutionalization and counter actions

Boström's thorough study of six Swedish EMOs during the 1990s tries to understand the Swedish EM and its diversity, their political actions, the effect of their organizational structure and their cognitive actions. The part that is interesting for this study connects with governmentality and self-regulation. Boström wonders if one can talk about a paradigm shift in environmental governance that aims to support self-regulation among agents; a shift of responsibility from the political field to the civil society and the EMOs. In his interviews, some EM representatives say there is a tendency for politicians to "leave the playground" and hope for voluntary forces in public society. The EMOs are attributed the role of putting pressure on corporations or creating public pressure for firmer laws. This leads to less binding decisions being made and more voluntary procedural management in environmental issues. An EM representative speculates on why and one reason could be the relative success of bringing environmental issues into everyday practices such as consumer power, or that the operating freedom for environmental politics is limited in a globalized world, e.g. global economic competition may put pressure on environmental taxes. Another reason could be an ideological critique of the welfare state. The limits of traditional politics infer a turn to subpolitics for the EM, i.e. actions aimed directly towards market actors with recommendations, collaborations and proposals of voluntary actions, and where ecological concerns have to be translated into economical terms (Boström, 2001, pp. 200–204, 237, 245).

Jamison (Jamison, 2001, 2003) describes a shift in discussing environmental problems, from protection and particular improvements to the integration of environmental issues to all areas of society, an intellectual and cognitive greening of society where dominant agents emphasizing economic efficiency and rationality, have tried to incorporate environmental concerns into its own established modes of operation. As a result, the EM has become more differentiated and more professionalized according to Jamison. Some EMOs have become mainstream organizations and incorporated into political cultures. They have become more like institutions than movements and are mainly concerned with influencing policies, laws and agreements (Jamison, 2001, p. 158). Other EMOs have chosen a more radical approach and are more concerned with cultural change. Morality, ethics, ideological and utopian content is important in articulating resistance. The common denominator among this group is a resistance against global capitalism (Jamison, 2001, p. 181). Jamison is more critical to the differentiation of the EM than Boström. Activism according to Jamison has become increasingly like any other business. The professional environmentalists have pursued their own organizational goals without any broader political and social strategy. The radicals on the other hand have become defenders of the past and particular values and disregard the need for compromises. Jamison wishes that the EM could articulate a more coherent political program.

Thörn et al (Thörn, Cassegård, Soneryd, Wettergren, forthcoming) are, as Jamison, interested in processes of incorporation and resistance but they call it institutionalization and anti-institutionalization of the EM. They look at EMOs' strategies in the global context and the meaning of Climate Justice in the environmental movement. They agree that there are global institutionalization processes going on in the environmental movement but at the same time counter actions. After the disappointment of COP15 there is a growing anti-institutionalization movement with the emergence of new networks, like the Climate Justice Network, which brings more systemic critique to the environmental movement. There is also criticism aimed at parts of the EM for letting themselves being incorporated into pragmatically led official processes that depoliticize the climate issue. This criticism is often linked with issues like climate change and social inequality, often with a north-south perspective on the world. *Climate Justice* becomes a discursive nodal point that unifies several EMOs and the expansion of global networks between EMOs from both the north and the south makes exchanges of ideas almost inevitable. However, occurring simultaneously with globalisation is a refocus on national governments; the reason being the disappointment of international negotiation at COP.

The research above concentrates on either governmentality processes or social movement development and by combining these two perspectives this study can contribute by giving a more detailed picture of the relationship between global environmental governance and EMOs regarding resistance and participation, which has been lacking in governmentality studies (see Theory and Method below).

Theory and Method

Governmentality and power

Miller and Rose write that government is a problematizing activity:

> *By 'problematization' we mean the way in which experience comes to be organized so as to render something as a 'problem' to be addressed and rectified: interpretive schemes for codifying experience, ways of evaluating it in relation to particular norms, and ways of linking it up to wider social and economic concerns and objectives* (Miller & Rose, 2008, p. 175).

It is in relation to these *problems* that programmes are created in order to adjust the depicted failings in society. They may take the form of government reports or proposals by other agents that seek to specify how domains might be configured and managed in desirable ways. Problematizations connect to particular norms and ways of thinking, or *rationalities*. Rationalities can be seen as idealised systems of thoughts or discourses that works as representations of reality and that provide reasons to act in specific ways. Rose and Miller say that rationalities "*are morally coloured, grounded upon*

knowledge, and made thinkable through language" (Rose & Miller, 2010, p. 277). Rationalities are often guided by ideals like justice, equity, and efficiency. They also contain conceptions of the objects to be governed which could be the environment, the economy, the nation, or a community (Rose & Miller, 2010, pp. 276, 277). The tools used to realize rationalities are diverse *technologies* based on different forms of knowledge and expertise that provide authoritative criteria for decision and actions. These can be audits and evaluations, scientific calculations and measurements, standardized systems and best practices, and the use of expert vocabularies. Knowledge and experts are key aspects in making government possible and by transforming phenomena into information, reality is made stable, comparable and rendered in a form that can be diagnosed. Information is not a collection of objective facts but a device in itself to act upon the real in such a way as to make it amenable to calculation and evaluation in accordance with what is considered normal, healthy, desirable, efficient, moral etc. (Rose & Miller, 2010, pp. 273, 283). This way, subjects are encouraged to reflect on both their current position and the desirable position and are then provided guidance on how to adjust themselves according to the latter. Together with the legitimacy of experts it is possible to foster "*self-organizing capacities of the civil society*" (Rose & Miller, 2010, p. 277). This is the conduct of conduct (Foucault, 2008, p. 186).

Governmentality theory shows that contemporary governance cannot be understood as a single sovereign power exercising its will on the subjects. States do not possess the resources or knowledge to govern complex societies or international processes. Power is better understood as assemblages of knowledge and expertise that have coinciding and shared interests, where the state is only one of several agents. These assemblages can then become stabilized through the development of common modes of perceptions and the materialization of common ways to document, calculate, measure and evaluate (Rose & Miller, 2010, pp. 277,281, 282). These assemblages define contemporary *governance* that differs from previous forms of centralized government (Larsson, Letell, & Thörn, 2012, p. 16). Global environmental governance is a good example of dispersion of power, which makes *governmentality* a useful theoretical tool for analysing more specifically the processes in contemporary global climate governance.

Governmentalities - thinking and doing governance

The processes for conducting others can be described as governmentalities, i.e. different ways of thinking and doing governance. Rose and Miller have identified different forms of governmentalities in different periods, each being a response to earlier forms. They write that from the mid-seventies and onwards neo-liberal thinkers started criticizing the welfare state for government overload, inefficiency and for creating dependency among citizens with welfare programs. Neo-liberalism "*reactivates*", as Rose and Miller say, liberal principles with its doubts about state interferences for governing efficiently. Aspects that formerly were understood as political responsibilities are to be transformed into commodified forms and regulated through markets (Rose & Miller, 2010, p. 296). Instead of a welfare provision of collective security and social solidarity neo-liberalism emphasizes an active self-

governing agent in the pursuit of personal fulfilment through the discipline of competition in markets. The actors are conceived as subjects of responsibility, autonomy and choice and the way to govern them is by shaping and utilizing their freedom. This is what Rose and Miller term *advanced liberal governing* (ALG) (Miller & Rose, 2008, pp. 212–215). This is governmentality analysis applied to contemporary governance, a contextualization that is useful for the analysis in this study.

Governmentality - resistance and participation

The analytical focus in governmental studies often seems to be on alliances with authorities and other actors and thereby underestimates resistance and power struggles. This is why scholars have pointed out the need for an increased focus on resistance in governmental studies (Larsson et al., 2012, p. 11; Oels, 2005, p. 193; Death, 2010, p. 239). Power is never absolute and one can always find ways to destabilize power. Counter-conduct is a struggle against processes applied for conducting others and a symptom of a crisis of governmentality which helps to make visible both social conflicts and the rationalities and technologies surrounding them (Foucault, 2007, pp. 268, 504; Dean, 2010, p. 49).

EMOs might resist in their own self-assumed role as representatives or defenders of agents and things that are themselves objects of governance, such as the environment and indigenous people with no say in the environmental debate (Jamison, 2001, p. 161). In addition, the global scale of environmental problems can be seen as circumstances affecting all of us. EMOs' resistance could be the experience of a necessary self defence, the need of resisting dominant ideas and practices in which we all take part and instead creating spaces for other ways of thinking (Lilja & Vinthagen, 2014, p. 120). It is also possible that EMOs resist on different levels. It could be criticism on a systemic level where dominant structures are questioned (Lilja & Vinthagen, 2014, p. 120) or they might criticise specific technologies. This would say something about their degree of institutionalization.

There are no such things as pure antagonistic organizations (Melucci, 1996, p. 36) and EMOs do not only resist but also participate in governance. EMOs take part in of networks, or assemblages of knowledge and contribute as knowledge providers to governments (Boström, 2001, pp. 206, 216; Thörn, Cassegård, Soneryd, Wettergren, forthcoming). Resistance can simultaneously be viewed as participation. By engaging in technocratic or economic argumentations, the EMOs legitimate and reinforce certain forms of knowledge and perspectives in climate governance:

> *Secondly, protests, just as much as regimes of government, presume or reify certain regimes of knowledge* (Death, 2010, p. 241)

Governmentality and Method

Governmentality has a discursive character. All forms of government are using language for making representations that claims to describe the nature of a reality. By defining reality, through discursive mechanisms, it is made thinkable and thereby amenable to deliberations and actions. The way objects

of government are articulated and the way they are construed are linguistic elements that make up the rationalities of government. In this way language can be seen as an intellectual technology (Miller & Rose, 2008, pp. 29–31). The discursive perspective means that this analysis is not concerned with the *truth* - who is right or who is wrong in relation to *facts* - but rather to describe global climate governance as a field of contestation and how knowledge, ideals, moral and language are used in the processes of creating *reality* and *meaning* in relation to climate governance.

On a concrete level the analysis starts by identifying themes in order to understand on a large scale which domains and areas in the REDD+ debate are emphasized, both by advocators and sceptics. The analytical concepts derived from the empirical material are then analysed with theoretical concepts that further develop new analytical concepts derived from the empirical material. There is a constant movement back and forth between analytical concepts derived from the empirical material and theory. In identifying rationalities and technologies one look for regularities (Rose & Miller, 2010, p. 276) in problem definitions, descriptions of means and ends, what knowledge they rest on, conceptions of the objects governed, how language is used in connecting concepts and ideals and how all this creates meaning and legitimacy. Equally important is to identify what discursive statements hide. These regularities are understood as reflecting a specific governmentality. The same method is used in identifying resistance. It is important not to simplify by suggesting two competing discourses. Although being an area of contestation, the positions taken by agents towards global climate governance is more complicated than that and different discursive elements are at play at different levels (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2008, p. 381).

Selection of case and empirical material

REDD+ as a case is interesting for two reasons. First, it has become a central element in global climate change governance (Stephan, 2012) and secondly, it is interesting because of its unsettled form. There is no final decision yet about the layout of REDD+, which makes it a very dynamic field for investigating discourse development in global environmental governance.

There are several agents engaged in the development of REDD+ so further selection is needed. The UN-REDD programme[1] is a good candidate since it is one of the major actors in REDD+ development. It is part of the UN and works to implement decisions made within UNFCCC at COP16 and it has a close partnership with other important actors in international development and climate management like the World Bank (UN-REDD, 2011b, p. 1). The UN-REDD programme is also interesting since it focuses on many areas discussed by the environmental movement: the connection between global and local, developmental issues, equity, rights of indigenous people, and the commodification of nature.

[1] UN-REDD was created in 2008 to assist developing countries in building capacity to participate in future REDD+ mechanisms. It consists of three UN agencies; the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) (UN-REDD, 2011b, p. 1).

The selection of Swedish EMOs is made because of a lack of research on their relation to contemporary global climate governance policies. The EMOs are The Swedish Society for Nature Conservation (SSNC) and Friends of the Earth Sweden (FoE) and they are chosen because of their differences. SSNC are to a high degree professionalized and institutionalized. They have extensive employment of staff and experts, and regular consultations with political officials. They are also described as being more pragmatically oriented (Boström, 2001, p. 72; Thörn, Cassegård, Soneryd, Wettergren, forthcoming). FoE on the other hand is a smaller organisation, less professionalized and is sometimes described as being more confrontational and more ideologically minded than SSNC (Boström, 2001, p. 72). Unfortunately, Greenpeace Sweden (Scandinavia) did not have enough empirical material related to REDD+.

The empirical material for UN-REDD consists of policy documents concerning REDD+ and were mainly found on the UN-REDD website. Search words were "REDD" and "REDD+". The empirical material for the EMOs is made up of policy documents and articles found in member magazines and on their websites[2] mentioning "REDD" or "REDD+" and policies on climate change. The empirical material is both in Swedish and in English and quotations originally in Swedish is translated by myself, to the best of my ability and with great concern about the meaning of the text.

Results

Three dominant rationalities have been identified in the UN-REDD proposals for REDD+: *marketization, managerialization* and *scientization*. The concepts are borrowed from research that, interestingly, identifies similar processes in global AIDS aid governance, as found here in global climate governance (Follér, Haug, Knutsson, & Thörn, 2013). The technologies connected to marketization are *commodification; translation devices; entrepreneurial training* and *economic incentives*. Scientization is realised by technologies such as *measurements, quantifications* and *monitoring; reporting standards* and *methodological guidance;* and *methodological and technological training.* Finally, managerialization is connected to technologies like *guidelines* and *assessments;* and *capacity building.* Under each rationality, follows a presentation about resistance and participation by the EMOs.

The rationality of marketization

To understand the development of REDD+ and its rationalities and technologies it has to be contextualized in relation to societal processes and the discourses that drive them. Rose and Miller write that from the mid-seventies and onwards neo-liberal analyses have received more support. The view is that political regulations and political responsibilities are better handled by market principles, which reflects a neo-liberal scepticism against the capacities of political authorities to govern. Transforming political responsibilities into markets and letting active agents maximising their own interests makes it

[2] Some documents from FoE were linked from the Swedish website to FoE international website.

more efficient according to this view (Rose & Miller, 2010, pp. 296, 298). This neo-liberal governmentality or ALG is apparent in UN-REDD articulations.

By looking at UN-REDDs *problematization*, which is a key activity in governmentality (Dean, 2010, p. 38; Miller & Rose, 2008, pp. 29, 61), we can understand their reasoning and justification of a *marketization* of forests. The problem with current environmental governing according to UN-REDD is an inaccurate understanding about the "*true economic value of forests*" (UNEP, 2011a, p. 15):

> *Forests suffer from multiple market failures in that neither the benefits that they produce nor the costs of their destruction are visible in economic terms* (UNEP, 2011a, p. 8).

Apart from timber, forests also produce public goods such as carbon sequestration, water regulation, water purification, soil stability and biodiversity, all referred to as eco-system services. They also produce non-timber products as medicine plants, food and energy for over 1 billion people, mostly in poor developing countries according to UN-REDD (UNEP, 2011b, p. 156). Since traditional markets do not capture many of these eco-system services and products, they are not considered in forest management. Landholders and businesses receive no reward for providing these services and consequently, according to UN-REDD, they opt for maximum return with short-term benefits, e.g. by harvesting forests (UNEP, 2011a, p. 8, 2011b, pp. 156, 185). Although described as market failures the remedy that UN-REDD proposes is not less markets but more markets and markets that are more efficient. That in turn will create economic incentives to leave the forests standing. This is similar to other proponents of neo-liberal discourse saying that:

> (...) *capitalism has failed to deal adequately with environmental problems, because it has not been capitalist enough* (Jamison, 2001, p. 96).

This is the rationality of *marketization* in UN-REDD proposals and it permeates programme design proposals.

Commodification of forests and translation of objectives

Obviously, UN-REDD leans on economic knowledge and expertise in its proposals to a REDD+ programme but at the same time UN-REDD tries to expand its economic frame. Governmentalities consists of both practical and intellectual technologies and the role of an intellectual technology is to influence our mentalities and to make reality thinkable in a new way with new ideas and concepts (Miller & Rose, 2008, p. 36). The challenge for UN-REDD is to connect markets with forest goods and services not previously considered as commodities and making them perceivable as commercial products. UN-REDD looks on carbon and other forest benefits and tries to price them, which is a *commodification* of forests. By combining multiple

markets, the goal is that these services and products together can compete with unsustainable timber and palm oil (UN7, s. 41; UN2, s. 11). Another challenge is to connect this with ideals like sustainability, biodiversity and social equity. Language plays a decisive role in making the world amenable to actions (Rose & Miller, 2010, p. 275) and UN-REDD presents the concept of *green economy*. Green economy works as a *translation device* (Rose & Miller, 2010, p. 282) between the former opposing ideas and objectives of economic growth and environmental concerns (Duit, 2002, p. 105). It is articulated as a market innovation; something capable of revolutionizing sustainable forest management by promising both economic growth, economic efficiency *and* carbon mitigation, biodiversity, sustainability and social equity (UNEP, 2011a, pp. 3, 11). UN-REDDs intention is to transform national economies and, eventually, the global economy in a way that can generate growth by green economic actions, and to make the benefits of this green economy more equally distributed (UNEP, 2014, p. 13). UN-REDD says it will change the patterns of investments and generate benefits "*from basic livelihood to the arena of international finance*" (UNEP, 2011a, p. 15). This frame expansion is not really about incorporating other forms of knowledge but rather making environmental ideals and developmental issues fit into economic models and ways of thinking. The amount of actors that are incorporating a *green* vocabulary are increasing and everyone adopts it to fit their interests (Jamison, 2001, pp. 17, 94).

Entrepreneurial training and economic incentives

It is of course not enough to create new markets intellectually. They must also be materialized by active agents. UN-REDD estimates that US $30 billion per year is required to support performance based payments (UNEP, 2014, p. 44) and private capital sources are estimated to provide more than 80 per cent of the capital required for a transition to a low carbon economy (UNEP, 2011b, p. 595). UN-REDD says that:

> *It seems likely that REDD+ will be successful in the long term only if the private sector finds sustainable forest management to be an attractive investment* (UNEP, 2014, p. 30).

UN-REDD encourages both governments and local communities in developing countries to become active, responsible and accountable economic entrepreneurs and market actors in forest management. Governments still have the traditional role as the providers of solid governance: the rule of law, clear tenure and property rights. This will lower the risks for private sector investments (UNEP, 2011a, p. 14). The role as a decision maker is being replaced more by the role of a market actor. Governments are becoming buyers and sellers. As sellers, they need to make themselves attractive to private finance. UN-REDD says that governments should make a thorough analysis of possible barriers to doing business in sustainable forest management. Measures could involve the simplifying of tax systems, streamlining licensing procedures and removal of agriculture subsidies (UNEP, 2011a, pp. 8, 11, 14,

2014, p. 29). As buyers governments should look for the most competitive partners in forest management. UN-REDD writes that public funding:

> (...) *should provide incentives to private sector activities in a competitive manner that produces measurable results (...)*" (UNEP, 2014, p. 30).

In this way, governments reinforce entrepreneurial thinking in other agents as well. NGOs are attributed the role of helping companies incorporating sustainability and social responsibility into their "*global business goals, decisions and strategies"* (UNEP, 2011a, p. 13). All agents participate in the governance of each other towards a *green economy*.

To foster responsible and accountable economic actors it is vital to decide on who gets paid for what. Land tenure issues are therefore important and in UN-REDD they refer to local and indigenous communities (UN-REDD, 2011a, p. 3). UN-REDD says that land tenure clarifications:

> *(...) will determine accountability in the delivery of carbon stocks as well as the distribution of benefits from financial transfers from REDD+"* (UNEP, 2014, p. 42).

UN-REDD says that evidence from Indonesia indicate that land tenure security is decisive in motivating communities to contribute to REDD+ goals (UNEP, 2011a, p. 10). It is also important for private financial investments. UN-REDD says that:

> *lenders and investors will not (...) consider investing in REDD+ activities unless clear and undisputed ownership systems are in place*" (UN-REDD, 2011a, p. 3).

It is clear that governments are made responsible for attracting investors and also for governing other agents, through market discipline, so they will keep their competitive approach. The local communities are responsible and accountable for providing carbon stocks in such a way that they can function in a market and thereby attract investors.

Social coordination in forest management, according to UN-REDD, is to be governed through markets by market actors. This will most certainly depolitize forest management since market principles will limit what is politically possible. Political relationship is replaced by a market relationship and by using economic rationality as a coordinator for social actions, agents can be self-organized with no or little need of public and political debate on how to organize forest management. This is a transformation from the governmentality of welfare to the governmentality of ALG. "*Economic entrepreneurship is to replace regulation, as active agents seeking to maximise their own affairs (...)*" (Rose & Miller, 2010, p. 296)

EMOs and marketization

Initially it could be useful to mention something about the EMOs general view on REDD+. Neither SSNC nor FoE expresses a total rejection of REDD+ as a tool in global climate governance but they have reservations. SSNC says that REDD+ can be a complement to strong commitments in industrialized countries to decrease their carbon emissions and that REDD+ must be founded on peoples needs (SSNC, 2011a, pp. 1, 2). FoE are more sceptical and says "*there are many reasons to be extremely cautious about REDD*" and this because of ethical concerns, methodological constrains and how REDD+ is developing in reality (FoE, 2010, p. 5). Both SSNC and FoE resist or express critique against marketization both on a rationality and technology level and, as will be shown, this can be viewed as both resistance and participation.

Political responsibility versus economic interests

The EMOs describe a marketization of REDD+ as a shift of responsibility from developed countries to developing countries and from political influence to market influence. FoE says:

> *There are numerous interlinked reasons to oppose market-based REDD, which is a fundamentally flawed initiative geared primarily to shifting responsibility for the climate crisis from the rich to the poor* (FoE, 2011a, p. 6).

FoE says that the prevailing view in REDD+ negotiations has been to secure financing within a carbon market, which creates an opportunity for developed countries to make cheap compensations for their own emissions instead of making investments in renewable energy and sustainable transport systems at home[3] (FoE, 2011a, p. 6; Bernstad, 2009). Likewise, SSNC says that carbon markets is seen as a cheap way for industrialized countries to postpone the necessary adjustments of their own societies (SSNC, 2011a, p. 1). SSNC writes:

> *Two years before the wracked climate meeting in Copenhagen 2009, a new issue had climbed to the top of the agenda. The responsibility of industrialized countries for climate change got more and more in the dark while more attention was directed on greenhouse gas emissions from developing countries* (SSNC, 2011a, p. 1).

Solutions are usually aimed at where the problem is and the EMOs criticise the ideas in REDD+ that focus on constructing solutions for poor countries. This might suggest that the problem is about deforestation in developing countries. It is partly a discursive struggle about what is illuminated and what is obscured in REDD+ rationalities and technologies. By focusing on defor-

[3] Buying carbon credits will compensate for own emissions.

estation in developing countries, the life-style and consumption patterns in developed countries gets less attention.

This resistance connects to the role of politics and markets in global climate governance. The EMOs' resistance is interpreted as a reaction against the processes of transforming political relationships into market relationships (Rose & Miller, 2010, p. 296). Even though the EMOs have expressed great disappointment about political institutions, as in the Warsaw COP19 walkout where they actually left the meeting (Thörn, Cassegård, Soneryd, Wettergren, forthcoming), they still seem to have a belief in politics as such as a field for social coordination. SSNC articulates the REDD+ debate as a conflict between what they consider real integrated needs, which is the development of solid political structures for protecting biodiversity and local communities, and single-minded market interests that reduce forests to carbon (SSNC, 2011a, pp. 6, 26). SSNC clearly advocates political responsibility and wants to prioritize programmes and financing channels that are under the control and guidance of the UN system (SSNC, 2011a, p. 3). They want a publicly funded system[4] that is partly financed by money contributions from industrialized countries and partly by income from auctions of emission rights that have previously been awarded free to companies. Other possibilities are fees on international flights or a carbon tax (SSNC, 2011c, p. 25). This does not mean that SSNC rejects market rationalities per se. SSNC is known for its focus on consumer power and eco-labelling[5]. What we eat, how we transport ourselves etc. are a part of what can be referred to as *lifestyle politics*. SSNCs emphasis on political institutions *and* lifestyle politics are not to be interpreted as a contradiction. Lifestyle politics is rather an extension of the possibilities to articulate limits of our lifestyles and to show global solidarity by identifying one self with the *solidary consumer* (Thörn, 2000, pp. 217, 218). SSNC are even positive to the EU carbon market (SSNC, 2011b, p. 9) but, compared to the market solution proposed in REDD+, the EU carbon market is a semi-market controlled by the EU and the member states (European Commission, 2013) which is more in line with welfare governmentality and Keynesian thinking. These ideas were also found in the Swedish public debate on climate change (Anshelm, 2012, p. 90). FoE also defends the political stance against market forces. FoE has a decentralised or bottom-up view on politics and want to transfer power from the distant control by big corporates and banks to the local, and they want a strong movement composed by the environmental-, solidarity-, farmer-, worker-, indigenous- and feminist-movement, ready to take the battle for system change instead of climate change[6]. FoE is more politically outspoken and says that society should be:

> *founded on social, economic, gender and environmental justice and free from all forms of domination and exploitation, such as neoliberalism, corporate globalization, neo-colonialism and militarism* (FoE, 2010, p. 2).

[4] Whether REDD should be financed through markets or public funding is one of the major debates in REDD+ (SSNC, 2011a, p. 17).

[5] http://www.naturskyddsforeningen.se/vad-vi-gor/strategier#konsumentmakt

[6] http://www.jordensvanner.se/vart-fokus/klimat-och-energi/omstallning-for-klimatrattvisa

FoE focuses more on *life-form politics* that compared to lifestyle politics concentrate on building alternatives to established institutions from bottom up rather than taking over or reforming governmental political power (Thörn, 2000, pp. 218, 219). At the same time, they propose pragmatic and centralized solutions. FoE wants to finance global climate governance through public funding and fiscal means. The funding is expected to come from rich countries. It is articulated in a justice context, as a repayment for historical carbon debts created by developed countries (FoE, 2010, p. 25; Möllersten, 2009, p. 91). Another way to collect funding is taxes on financial transactions or fossil energy use (Bernstad & Swiergiel, 2009, p. 20). Both FoE and SSNC resist the rationality of marketization in its ALG shape. For SSNC it is not about market principles per se. The problem is the limited political influence that a marketization of REDD+ brings, which is in line with ALG and its view on the limited role of politics and the expanded use of markets. For FoE, it is more an ideologically driven by anti-capitalism and anti-neoliberalism, and more connected to issues of global justice and power relations between North and South.

Both SSNC and FoE express a concern about future possibilities for political influence in global climate governance. FoE says that even though there is no final decision on the layout of REDD+ in UNFCCC, there are several agents already active in pilot projects and preparations for REDD+. FoE describes it as a race for profitable opportunities including investors, banks (also the World Bank[7]), companies like General Motors, Shell, Chevron Texaco and BP and carbon traders (FoE, 2010, pp. 14, 25). According to FoE, there is a strong corporate lobby supporting the expansion of a global carbon market and their economic resources, expertise and influence combined with a side-stepping of the political process in UNFCCC may steer the development of REDD+ to their advantage, so that, when formal decisions are to be made, structures already exists that may affect the future shape of REDD+ (FoE, 2011b, p. 1, 2010, p. 14; Bernstad & Swiergiel, 2009, p. 26). This is what Rose and Miller call *materialization* of power (Rose & Miller, 2010, p. 281) SSNC express a similar concern:

> *Despite that REDD is a part of a UN process, the World Bank have already got a firm grip on the financial flows* (SSNC, 2011a, p. 9)

The EMOs articulate global climate governance as being highjacked by powerful agents striving towards a marketization of REDD+.

Participation in the economic discourse

When looking at the EMOs' view on marketization, it is hard to argue that they agree, support or participate in the economic development of REDD+, according to the dominant views in the REDD+ debate. However, this study

[7] The World Bank is one of UN-REDDs major partners in the development of the UN-REDD programme (UN-REDD, 2011b, pp. 1, 2)

wants to problematize counter-conduct and ask if resistance is always resistance. By identifying resistance on different levels, it is possible to make the seemingly obvious a bit more complicated.

On a *technology level*, the EMOs try to resist by leaning on the knowledge, concepts and reasoning used in the field of economics. Here the question of marketization is disconnected from its rationality and becomes a technical issue. By making the resistance technical and using economic concepts the EMOs *participate* in the economic discourse and reinforce the importance of applying economic knowledge, concepts and theories in the debate of global climate governance. SSNC discusses the appropriateness of using marginal costs as a tool for calculating the costs for REDD+. They also refer to reports from Rights and Resources Initiative and Swedish researchers showing that compensations for leaving forests standing can never compete with e.g. palm oil plantations (SSNC1, s. 10). Likewise, FoE argue that the price of carbon, as with any other commodity, is volatile and that forests would depend on the fluctuating prices of carbon, and that a carbon market could even create financial emission bubbles when trading with derivatives connected to a carbon market (Bernstad & Swiergiel, 2009, p. 19; Chan, 2009). The aim of the EMOs is probably to question the appropriateness of a carbon market but what they are questioning are different economic technologies, not the rationality.

This movement between levels can be understood in two ways. The first is that EMOs are strategic opportunists and will use any potential weak spot to argue against their opponents, regardless of what level they are focusing on. The most important factor argued by this study though is a strategic adaptation to surrounding contexts in order to gain influence in governance. Acting only as an antagonistic organization would lead to the risk of being dismissed as a marginal counter-culture without any possibility of exercising influence in dominant structures (Melucci, 1996, p. 36). Miller and Rose express a similar view:

> *For to presume to govern seemed to require one to propose techniques to intervene - or to be dismissed as a mere critic or philosopher. In short, to become governmental, thought had to become technical* (Miller & Rose, 2008, p. 15).

This is a constant dilemma for the EMOs. In order to gain influence more directly they have to attach to dominant structures and be able to translate their interest into language and forms of knowledge used in these dominant structures. Since the 1980s there has been a shift from a more radical and confronting approach from the EMOs, to presenting themselves as "*realistic, responsible and professional"* (Boström, 2001, p. 80). At the same time they risk becoming technocratic, institutionalized and loosing their fundamental organisational ideas.

The rationality of scientization

Scientization refers to the rationality of how science and experts are used in governance as providers of knowledge and technologies to make the world

manageable, and as providers of *truth* and *objectivity*. Science and experts are portrayed as carriers of neutrality beyond the subjectivity of politics and conflicts. Rational knowledge also brings promises of accuracy and effectivity. UN-REDD says that responses to address the challenges presented by climate change should be supported with "*sound scientific approaches"* (UN-REDD, 2013a, p. 1).

Measurements, quantifications and monitoring of forests

In order to create markets and commodities from forests services and goods not before included in traditional markets, then forests have to be measurable, quantifiable and monitored. UN-REDD says:

> *It is difficult, if not impossible, to manage what is not measured* (UNEP, 2011b, p. 23).

However, the information is not the result of objective observations. The information is in itself a device, a *technology*, to make something amenable to interventions (Rose & Miller, 2010, p. 283). REDD+ is *performance-based* which means that payments are delivered if one can prove that forest actions have increased carbon stocks or other forests benefits (UNEP, 2011b, p. 187, 2014, p. 35). To do this hypothetical future scenario calculations based on historical trends of forests usage provide a baseline from which conservation actions can be calculated and evaluated over time. This is difficult and UN-REDD is aware of the methodological problems:

> *Within current limitations, establishing a baseline and time period for measuring the benefits of adaptation over the costs of not acting remain a challenge that must be met if REDD+ is to meet its potential* (UNEP, 2014, p. 35)

Hypothetically calculated baseline scenarios show that scientific results are actively created and not just collected facts. The focus is on how to make REDD+ realisable. Another technology that is vital is monitoring forests for possible changes in land use or forest area in order to make evaluations of e.g. carbon stocks (UN-REDD, 2013a, p. 12). This is to be done by combining remote sensing technology with satellites and ground-based inventory, including participatory monitoring by local communities using GPS technologies (UN-REDD, 2013a, p. 18, 2013b, p. 7).

Reporting standards and methodological guidance

Reporting standards and methodological guidance are both management technologies supported by UN-REDD with the purpose of monitoring participating countries in their scientific approaches. UN-REDD says that it wants to promote good scientific practice to improve the precision and accuracy of estimates and to create comparable methodologies (UN-REDD, 2013a, pp. 12, 13).

Reporting standards and methodological guidelines limit what is possible to express and to do and so they therefore define the subject's attributed role, what information it is supposed to provide, how to act and also define what information and knowledge that counts. UN-REDD articulates the requirements:

> *To report these results, each country should collect information that allows a comprehensive assessment of the outcomes, including carbon stocks and other relevant information that a country may need to fulfil the information requirements under the UNFCCC* (UN-REDD, 2013a, p. 11)

UN-REDD often talks about the importance of respecting traditional knowledge of indigenous people (UNEP, 2011a, p. 14; UN-REDD, 2011a, p. 6, 2012c, p. 2) but in practice REDD+ is built almost entirely on western rationality and knowledge production. The compatibility between traditional knowledge and western rationality is not discussed and western rationality and scientific worldviews are transmitted and imposed through these reporting standards and guidelines. Other forms of knowledge become devalued (Follér et al., 2013, p. 46).

Methodological guidance can also be interpreted as a way to ensure a product that is trustworthy on a carbon market. Without this affirmation of good scientific practice the value of carbon credits could be challenged and then a market would collapse. This shows how the rationalities of scientization and marketization interconnect. UN-REDD writes:

> *How to reliably account for the amount of forest carbon, including changes over time is the core monitoring challenge in REDD+, well defined in greenhouse gas (GHG) reporting standards and IPCC guidelines* (UN-REDD, 2011b, p. 8)

According to UN-REDD NGOs could play a role here as verifiers of public information from forests protection projects, e.g. forest inventory data (UN-REDD, 2013a, p. 19). This would further reassure the solidity and trustworthiness of carbon estimates.

Reporting standards and methodological guidance includes both processes of responsibilization and de-responsibilization of subjects (Follér et al., 2013, pp. 48, 49). The subjects are responsible for implementing scientific designs practically, according to the guidelines, and for keeping track on their own scientific and methodological performance by sending reports higher up in the hierarchy. Simultaneously, they become less involved in the actual design of the programme since the very same reporting standards and methodological guides already set the frame. These are often developed by international agencies such as the IPCC (the IPCC's Good Practice Guidance or the Guidelines for National GHG Inventories) and the UNFCCC (UN-REDD, 2011b, pp. 8, 9, 11). As an example of both responsibilization and de-responsibilization UN-REDD says, on the same page:

> *Countries, based on their national circumstances and development priorities, need to exercise full control over the entire NFMS* (National Forest Monitoring System, authors note) *development process, assuming full responsibility for the implementation and effective operation of their NFMS from Phases 1 to 3 of REDD+.*
>
> *Countries need to fully integrate REDD+ activities and their NFMS in accordance with their UNFCCC commitments* (UN-REDD, 2013a, p. 15)

Methodological and technological training

Capacity building or training is vital to enable self-organizing subjects in forest monitoring and assessment. Again, this is a responsibilization of developing countries and local communities in the practical work of delivering and reassuring the "quality" of forest products and services in a REDD+ context. Also again, it contains a role attribution of their part in REDD+. It is more about implementing than creating. UN-REDD says:

> *Therefore, an important methodological exercise that countries should undertake in relation to monitoring for REDD+ is the harmonization of existing forest monitoring tools and their integration with new tools* (UN-REDD, 2013a, p. 11)
>
> *Technicians in MECNT were trained in 2011 on forest carbon measurements through a collaborative partnership between MECNT, the International Tropical Timber Organisation (ITTO), the Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS) and FAO* (UN-REDD, 2013a, p. 8) (UN9:8)

The citation above shows that civil society representatives, such as environmental NGOs, participate in capacity building. Training is also directed at indigenous and local communities. UN-REDD says:

> *They have also shown that they can collect reliable data on the carbon contained in their forests, with minimal training*" (UNEP, 2014, p. 42)

The articulation *minimal training* shows how capacity building links with role attribution and expectations from UN-REDD. The instrumental perspective is obvious.

EMOs and scientization

The EMOs show an ambivalent relationship towards science and expertise. They refer to scientific results in many cases when arguing for their cause, but sometimes science is articulated as being part of the problem.

Challenging scientific objectivity

The EMOs challenge knowledge claims produced by expertise and technologies and show that *objective* knowledge and technology can work as transmitters of other rationalities. The scientific representation of that to be governed is not a neutral reflection of reality but an inscription device to make a domain receptive to calculation and intervention (Rose & Miller, 2010, p. 283). Previous research shows how scientific uncertainties about climate governance are transformed in marketization processes (Stephan, 2012). Both FoE and SSNC say that there are great methodological problems in forest measurement. First, there is the difficulty of establishing a baseline from which deforestation mitigation can be measured and then there are problems making estimates using satellite surveillance since they cannot distinguish between natural forest and plantations, which has effects on both the amount of carbon that is stored and the biodiversity. Even if it were possible to monitor forests there is always the risk that deforestation relocates to other areas or countries, so called *leakage*. Because the driving forces of deforestation are not dealt with, technologies are, in a sense, only treating the symptoms[8] (Möllersten, 2009, p. 94; Bernstad & Swiergiel, 2009, p. 21; SSNC, 2011a, p. 12). The EMOs not only criticise science on a technology level but also the underlying rationality of marketization and how it affects science in its application in REDD+. The criticism implies that the role of science here is to make a carbon market possible by measurements and quantifications and to give it scientific credibility. SSNC says that the very rational behind these methods is to "*reassure buyers that they get what they pay for*" (SSNC, 2013, p. 7). SSNC continues and says that carbon credits is an imaginary commodity that:

> (...) *requires actual and hypothetical emissions reductions to be treated as equal and interchangeable entities*" (SSNC, 2013, p. 28)

FoE expresses similar thoughts:

> *Carbon trading involves the buying and selling of an artificial commodity, the right to emit greenhouse gases* (FoE, 2011b, p. 1)

Ambiguous participation

The EMOs quite often refer to scientific research and their involvement in scientific argumentation acknowledges the weight that scientific results carry in argumentations about environmental problems and thereby they participate in the scientization of climate governance. SSNC says:

> *If emissions continue to increase at a current rate, then science indicates a big scale, and in worst case, self-increasing climate change* (SSNC, 2011b, p. 4).

[8] http://www.naturskyddsforeningen.se/sveriges-natur/2010-5/dags-att-radda-regnskogen. http://www.naturskyddsforeningen.se/sveriges-natur/2010-5/dags-att-radda-regnskogen

At the same time SSNC reflects on what role science plays in environmental problems and solutions. They write that science, experts and developmental thinking in the modernisation process contributed, in a way, to the environmental problems we have today. Nevertheless, science has produced indicators, predictions and statistical material that could be utilized by the EM. The future, SSNC says, has become increasingly important for environmental protection. It is about protecting nature from the future scenarios that science presents[9]. FoE has a double relationship to science as well:

> *In an article in Science calculations are presented on how many years of warm-up from bio-fuels that is needed to compensate for altered land use* (Möllersten, 2009, p. 48)

Meanwhile FoE writes that:

> *We are facing a challenge that cannot be solved by experts but only by many people together. A transformation that must be built on insights about the needs of each and everyone and how local adaptation can be achieved. A transformation were democratic cooperation between people in general locally, nationally and internationally is important* (...)[10]

This could be interpreted as if expert guidance should give way to democratic reasoning about what people in society want in general. It is more of a systemic critique that seeks to challenge dominant structures set up by western rationality.

This ambivalence to science is yet another example of how the EMOs move between different levels of governmentality and how they try to balance pragmatic approaches with new perspectives that are not connected to dominant structures. SSNC emphasize the pragmatic side while FoE has more of a systemic critique, although the difference should not be exaggerated.

The rationality of managerialization

Managerialization is the rationality of how to direct subjects in desirable ways by making them aware of their behaviour in relation to certain norms, values and objectives, and to provide devices on how to get themselves from one state to the other (Rose & Miller, 2010, p. 285). This way it is possible to govern at a distance without encroachment on personal freedom. In UN-REDD proposals there is evidence of the extensive use of management technologies with the aim of assisting agents in identifying their weaknesses in relation to REDD+ preparations (UN-REDD, 2012a, p. 7, 2012b, p. 2).

[9] http://www.naturskyddsforeningen.se/sveriges-natur/2009-2/nar-naturen-blev-en-del-av-framtiden

[10] http://www.jordensvanner.se/klimat/krav-klimatrattvisa

Guidelines and assessments

Guidelines as a technology declare the objectives that are desired or expected and instructions on how subjects should act in order to become self-organizing in the implementation of these objectives. UN-REDD writes:

> *The Readiness Preparation Proposal (R-PP) template contains specific guidelines to assist a REDD+ Country to organize itself to become ready for REDD+"* (UN-REDD, 2012c, p. 4)

The citation above mentions templates which are a limited version of *reality*. The designers of the guidelines are in control of *what* reality should be represented, making other perspectives invisible. *Assessments* are similar to guidelines but use guidance that is more implicit. Assessments identify the breach between where subjects are and where they should be. This may induce agents to "calibrate" themselves and become self-regulating according to the implied norms that assessments carry. UN-REDD says:

> *A major country needs assessment carried out in 2012 jointly by the UNREDD Programme and the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) found that 'very urgent' support was needed in 52% of countries for the identification of major inconsistencies between the objectives of the REDD+ strategy and other sectors* (...) (UNEP, 2014, p. 25)

With guidelines and assessments, countries are made accountable and responsible for the implementation of the programme and for their own performance, made visible by the assessments, but they play a minor role in the construction of the management tools. Those creating the management tools and having the authority to apply them are less responsible and less accountable, even though they set the objectives. They often articulate themselves as *supporters*, providing intellectual and material devices helping developing countries adapt to REDD+, *not as governors*. UN-REDD says:

> *The Programme is responsive to country needs, and is prepared to support the transformation in the forest sector and other sectors that impact land use in developing country economies needed to achieve readiness for REDD+* (UN-REDD, 2011b, p. 1)

Capacity building

Capacity building or empowerment is often articulated with ideals such as freedom or liberation, but the governance perspective is less discussed. Capacity building is not the facilitation of capacities in general but rather certain capacities connected to specific rationalities and objectives. Empowered subjects are not liberated from power relations, but put in *particular kinds* of power relations, with specific forms of knowledge and expertise (Dean, 2010, pp. 83, 86; Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2008, p. 374). It is often the one who empowers that defines what sort of capacity building is needed and for what

reasons - based on their rationalities, forms of knowledge and conceptions about those whose well being they consider mandated to enhance. UN-REDD says about indigenous people:

> *Certain stakeholders may require capacity building or training in advance of a consultation to ensure that their understanding of the issues and ability to contribute are sufficient; this need should be identified in the terms of the consultation (step #4 above). The awareness and capacity of indigenous peoples and forest-dependent communities to engage with REDD+ discussions should be assessed with the use of questionnaires, surveys, focus group discussions, and/or workshops* (UN-REDD, 2012c, p. 10)

Here UN-REDD relies on several management technologies to assess whether stakeholders are able enough to participate and contribute sufficiently in REDD+. Miller and Rose write that power today is not so much a matter of constraining citizens but rather making them capable of bearing a regulated freedom (Miller & Rose, 2008, p. 53). It is constructed with incentives and enough freedom to engage subjects in self-governance and enough restrictions to guide them in the desired directions. It is apparent that capacity building has an instrumental dimension to it and governments and indigenous communities have to become capable in order to exercise their freedom and their responsibilities, in accordance with the objectives of the programme.

EMOs and managerialization

The EMOs do not oppose the rationality of managerialization in itself and their critique is aimed more at other levels. EMOs resistance focuses on management technologies such as safeguards, procedural guidelines and capacity building that are designed to ensure participation from local and indigenous communities and how consultations with these groups function in reality.

Insufficient tools and corrupted execution

Effective participation by indigenous people and other local communities are widely promoted by different REDD+ agents, including UN-REDD but the EMOs criticise how it works in practice. SSNC is concerned with specific management technologies and how they are designed. SSNC write that standards for Free Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC)[11] for local groups do not provide sufficient operational guidance for deciding what is an acceptable FPIC process, how rights holders must be allowed to define a process and that they lack definitions of concepts like *equity* or what constitutes a group. SSNC says that information and capacity building has been limited in some pilot projects due to a condescending view of indigenous people. On the reviewed projects that SSNC has looked at this has lead to the approval of projects at the expense of community interests according to SSNC (SSNC, 2013,

[11] According to UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, states should seek free prior and informed consent before decisions affecting indigenous people.http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/DRIPS_en.pdf

pp. 6, 7, 26, 27). FoE expresses comparable thoughts and say that the safeguards decided at COP16 in Cancun, referred to by UN-REDD, is a watered down text that is to weak to guarantee the rights of indigenous and local communities (FoE, 2011a, p. 8).

FoE adds implicit criticism on a rationality level saying that the rationality of marketization corrupts the execution of management technologies for securing stakeholder participation. FoE says that in practice governments only pay lip service to community rights (FoE, 2010, p. 21). They refer to studies showing that indigenous people are struggling to participate in consultations and other relevant processes. Information about meetings, background material, economic and administrative support has, in many cases, been inadequate. FoE describes it partly as an effect of investors wanting to hurry the deal making process and skip already agreed consultations and governments wanting to avoid critique against the implementation of REDD+ and carbon markets. FoE even accuses large environmental NGOs of participating in national dialogues that exclude communities and organizations critical to REDD+ (FoE, 2010, pp. 4, 15–18; Bernstad & Swiergiel, 2009, pp. 10, 25). FoE tries to illuminate how the rationality of marketization interferes and how other rationalities and technologies are used in the service of marketization or affected by marketization, as with the case of science above.

Participation in managerialization: capacity building

The EMOs express a will to empower both governments and local communities in developing countries but compared to UN-REDD they seem to focus on capacity building that provide tools for critically examining REDD+ proposals. SSNC write that it is fundamental to ensure that affected communities not only have sufficient access to information, but relevant capacity that allows them to properly assess proposals before negotiations (SSNC, 2013, p. 26). FoE says that they work to educate local communities in democracy, human rights and organization in order to influence decision makers[12]. This is perhaps more about liberating empowerment, but the EMOs also show instrumental intentions towards indigenous and local communities. SSNC says:

> *To acknowledge the local communities and indigenous peoples tenure rights, and give them support to manage forests, has shown to be the one of the most effective methods to protect and restore forests* (SSNC, 2011a, p. 19).

It is important to note that tenure rights and support to indigenous people is articulated as a *method* to protect forests and in a similar way FoE writes that studies have shown that tenure rights for indigenous people leads to preservation of the forests (Bernstad & Swiergiel, 2009, p. 9). Here, they share the same tactics as UN-REDD. Both these examples show empowerment from a governance perspective. The EMOs' thoughts about capacity building are partly about having people perform certain desirable actions to achieve specific goals according to ones rationalities. Both EMOs and local communities

[12] http://www.jordensvanner.se/vad-vi-gor/regnskog

have interests in preserving forests so the EMOs would probably describe it as a win-win situation.

Conclusion

So, what rationalities and technologies can be found in contemporary global climate governance? *Marketization* is the major rationality permeating UN-REDD proposals. It is about creating economic incentives by pricing forest services previously not included in traditional markets. This is very much in line with ALG and how to transform political responsibilities into market principles. The technology of commodification provides thinkable products needed for a marketization of forests and translation devices merge economic growth and environmental concerns into the concept of *green economy* that tries to disarm earlier oppositions between these objectives. Together with the creation of entrepreneurial actors you will have self-organizing actors with a minimum of public and political debate on forest management.

Scientization provides a rationality of legitimacy and objectivity that, as with marketization, de-politizes climate governance since scientific objectivity seems more legitimate than political subjectivity. It also provides technical devices and processes for creating a REDD+ programme in practice. Without technologies to create measurable units, there would be no carbon market. To ensure scientific procedures, participants have to be guided and trained in order to produce a credible market product such as carbon units. In this way, they also become responsible and accountable for implementation and deliverance. It is important to see how the different rationalities and technologies are interconnected. REDD+ is a knowledge intensive construction for climate governance and it highlights the prominence of assemblages in its development (Rose & Miller, 2010, p. 275). A complex creation such as REDD+ shows that ALG is not about de-regulation, often connected to neo-liberal thoughts, but rather a re-regulation according to other rationalities.

Managerialization is the rationality of how to govern by utilizing subjects' freedom and capacity to govern themselves by making them aware of their behaviour in relation to desirable objectives. Guidelines and assessments are technologies that will put focus on the gap between subjects' current state and the desirable state. With guidelines and assessments, subjects become responsible for implementation and control of their own performance but with little control over *what* to implement or assess. If necessary subjects are provided capacity building in order to perform their responsibilities that comes with their attributed roles in REDD+.

When comparing the result to previous research I find both similarities and differences. Also, some confirmations can be made. Bäckstrand and Lövbrand (2006) describe EMod and GE - that can be translated to marketization and scientization - as the dominant discourses in climate governance. UN-REDD seems to also incorporate what Bäckstrand and Lövbrand call reformative CE, described as a critical counter-discourse. UN-REDD talk about the importance of a public-private partnership between business, governments and NGOs in reaching result-based problem solving, and this is integrated into the rationality of marketization. Boström asks if one can talk about a paradigm shift in national level public environmental care towards supporting self-regulation (Boström, 2001, p. 316). This study cannot say

anything about the national level but in REDD+ the answer is definitely yes. The role attributed governments and politics in REDD+ is to be the *enabler* of a marketization, which means self-governing, responsible and accountable entrepreneurs disciplined by market principles.

The second research question was how the EMOs relate to REDD+ rationalities and technologies. The advantage of looking at resistance on different levels is that it provides a more detailed account of participation and resistance among EMOs. *Marketization* brings forward the biggest resistance among the EMOs and concerns the role of politics and markets in climate governance, and what should be the major coordinating factor. Both EMOs advocate political solutions and public funding but they differ on the political form. SSNC emphasizes centralized political institutions like the UN and aims more for a reformation of the system. It considers market solutions suitable as long as political forces can control them. FoE has an outspoken resistance against neo-liberalism and global corporations and expresses ideas about local democracy and building new political forms from below, connected with global movements. This seems to be more of a systemic critique. At the same time, they to talk about solutions that must be interpreted as centralized solutions e.g. taxes on financial transactions and public funding of climate governance. The EMOs' critique of economic methods is on a technology level which is a form of resistance. However, on a rationality level it simultaneously confirms the importance of economic knowledge in environmental debates. These are examples of institutionalization that previous research talked about (Jamison, 2001; Thörn, Cassegård, Soneryd, Wettergren, forthcoming).

There are also shifting perspectives with regard to *scientization*. Both EMOs refer to scientific results and therefore recognize scientific knowledge but they also show that science can work as a device for translating rationalities into *realities*. Claims of scientific objectivity and legitimacy can not be taken for granted and must always be understood in relation to context, which previous research also demonstrates (Stephan, 2012). This shows an ambiguity on a rationality level. Although sometimes critical to the scientization of society SSNC emphasize the importance of scientific scenarios in contemporary environmental protection. FoE is more sceptical and their articulations about expertise can be interpreted as a critique against the dominant role of experts and instead propose that democracy and people's needs should guide social development.

Regarding *managerialization* both EMOs criticise the design of the technologies used to ensure local community participation. They are not detailed enough to work as guidance for acceptable processes. FoE also talks about how the rationality of marketization corrupts the use of safeguards and how business, governments and even certain NGOs take part in this. SSNC and FoE express a will to empower. Their capacity building is partly aimed at local communities in order to provide tools for critically examining REDD+ proposals. They also show governing intentions with their capacity building. Clear tenure rights and support to manage forests is described as the best method to protect forests. Thus, capacity building is also about influencing behaviour through management.

This study comprises only two Swedish EMOs so one should be careful in making generalizations. However, being two important and diverse organiza-

tions, the result is most certainly a strong indicator about the opinion range in the Swedish EM.

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