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CORRUPTION AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

A Multilevel Analysis

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ABSTRACT

Based on an understanding of political participation as key for a functioning democracy, the paper examines the relationship between corruption perceptions and political participation. Founded on previous literature on the negative effects of corruption on our attitudes towards democracy, legitimacy of political institutions, and political trust, the paper argues for corruption as also having a negative effect on our political behavior. A causal mechanism is specified, in which external political efficacy has a mediating effect on the posited relationship - corruption makes citizens feel as if they have no influence on politics, when decisions are made corruptly, which in turn lower our propensity to engage in political participation. Political participation is operationalized as three separate dependent variables: institutionalised participation; non institutionalised participation; and voter turnout. Data is collected from the ISSP survey, covering 29299 individuals in 33 countries. Due to the clustered data, multilevel analyses are performed on each dependent variable. The results indicate that corruption perceptions have a dampening effect on voter turnout. At country-level, the aggregated corruption measure displays a strong negative effect on non-institutionalised participation, whereas no significant effect of corruption is found for institutionalised participation. Path analyses also reveal external efficacy as a mediator. Further research would benefit from more developed survey items as well as more levels of analysis.

Keywords: corruption; political participation; voter turnout; multilevel analysis

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Introduction

As stated by Almond Verba & Sidney Nie (1967:1), *citizen participation lies at the heart of democracy*. It is when we vote, protest, sign petitions, or contact elected officials that our desires, needs, and wants are communicated. The significance of a politically engaged and active citizenry is the starting point for this paper. Furthermore, the aim is to explore the relationship between political participation and one of society's most detested phenomena - corruption. Over the last decades, the phenomenon has gained wide scholarly attention. Found almost everywhere, always present, even in the most industrialized and democratic countries, corruption generate damaging effects in the economic, social, and political realm (Rose-Ackerman 1999). Moreover, one could posit corruption as the very opposite to democratic values. By turning public goods into private gains, corrupt practices undermine democratic values and the democratic process. Rule by the people, even in its most minimal sense, is seriously impaired when political decisions are made corruptly. Basic mechanisms of representation and inclusive values of democracy, such as openness and responsiveness, is put out of work when politicians are guided by personal benefits at the expense of the desires, needs, and wants of the citizens. As argued by Mark Warren (2013), in opposition to the inclusive values of democracy, corruption represent exclusion by corroding the means through which inclusion is made.

Empirical research on the effects of corruption on citizen's attitudes towards the political system is widely developed. Thus, we know that corruption create distrusting citizens (Mishler and Rose 2001), who ascribe less legitimacy to the political system (Seligson 2002), and who display lower levels of satisfaction with democracy (Wagner et al. 2009) and less confidence towards the democratic process and political institutions (Anderson and Tverdova 2003; Uslaner 2001). However, research on how corruption perceptions shape our political behaviour is scarce, and poses a fundamental question in regard to democratic theory. If corruption perceptions affect our attitudes toward democracy, political institutions, and trust, one could argue that it should logically impact our political behaviour as well. This relationship is the central theme of this paper. The paper examines the linkage between corruption perceptions and various forms of political participation. The ambition is to combine two fields of research in order to answer a question central to democratic theory. By doing so, this paper adds to the limited research on corruption and political behaviour.

Emerging research on the relationship between corruption and political participation offer mixed results (Stockemer 2013; Stockemer et al. 2013; Kostadinova 2009). The body of research is marked by a focus on voter turnout, and a mix of data in terms of levels, countries, and regions. Another feature is the lack of causal mechanisms or arguments in relation to the findings. While existing empirical studies point towards corruption as having a negative effect on voter turnout, few arguments are put forward for why this is the case. Why does corruption seem to lower our motivation to participate? In order to further examine the relationship between corruption and political participation, the notion of efficacy as an important de-

terminant for political participation will be used. The notion of political efficacy focuses on what makes us motivated to participate, and refer to the sense of self-confidence and the ability to influence the political process (Milbrath 1965). The general idea is that corruption perceptions delineate individual's subjective perception of the possibility to influence the political process and decision-making. If one cannot influence the outcome – why bother to participate?

As well as contributing empirically and developing arguments about the relationship between corruption perceptions and political behaviour, this paper stresses the importance of examining various types of political participation. Attention is therefore also directed towards the between-elections and day-to-day type of political participation.

Based on an understanding of political participation as a key mechanism for a functioning democracy, the overall purpose of this paper is to examine how citizen's propensity to engage in political participation is affected by corruption perceptions, and to what extent this relationship is mediated by political efficacy. The overarching argument is that our political attitudes and psychological predispositions are affected by perceptions of corruption and have a dampening effect on our motivation to engage in political participation.

Political participation and democratic theory

The introduction of this paper started with a quote from two of the most influential writers on political participation, stating that political participation lies at the heart of democracy. It does seem clear that any paper or writing on political participation has to do with democracy. Still, the emphasis and value put on political participation is highly normative.

A given point of referral is the norms of participation within what often is referred to as classical democratic theory and participatory democracy[1]. The essential idea starts off with democracy as government or rule by the people. From this, the norm of political equality is derived, which signifies that every citizen, potentially affected by a decision, should have equal opportunities to affect it. The ideal is a system which maximizes rule by and for the people. In summary, the argument put forward is that democracy as the rule of the people is attained through the means of maximum participation of all people (Pateman 1970).

The participatory ideals presented by Joseph Schumpeter (1942) represent a stark contrast to the classical theorists. In the second half of the 1900's, democratic theorists raised concerns over what was seen as the weak empirical foundations of classical theory. Rather, participation became associated with the dangers of mass participation and its perceived association with totalitarianism. Schumpeter (1942) basically defined

1 Carole Pateman (1970) discusses the usage of 'classical democracy' as a caricatured notion. It does ignore the differences between the range of democratic labeled as classical democratic theorists. However, it does capture some of the basic ideas of participatory democracy.

political participation solely as the choices made by the decision makers, and his view on democracy is well captured in the following quote "the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote" (Schumpeter 1942:269). Such a minimalist view requires participation to be kept at a minimum in order to protect society from poorly informed citizens and bad political decisions.

Making participation a central subject of study can be seen as a normative standpoint on its own. Raising the question of how corruption affects political participation, inevitably suggest that levels of political participation plays an important role. From an elitist perspective, voter turnout is of central concern. Raised concerns about declining levels of participation[2], and voter turnout in particular, should from an elitist perspective be especially alarming since election serve as the prime mechanism of people exercising their power, and is the mechanism by which politicians are held accountable. As previously stated, this paper also emphasizes other types of political participation, often taking place between elections. Hence, a broad view on political participation, beyond voting, recognizes the importance of other types of political participation and, consequently, transgresses a minimalist notion of democracy.

Corruption: definition, democracy & consequences

There is no commonly agreed upon definition of corruption[3]. However, the most frequently used definitions derive from concepts related to the public office and the decisive role of the state[4]. Corruption practices are here seen as deviations from the norms surrounding public power, such as misuse of their position to receive private benefits. First, Rose Ackerman (1999:) offers a rather straightforward definition, where corruption is "the misuse of public power for private benefit". Similar definitions are also provided by established bodies such as the World Bank and Transparency International[5]. Taken as a whole, the various definitions most often derive from the role of the state. Consequently, corruption concerns a particular state society relationship (Amundsen 1999). The state is here represented by politicians, bureaucrats, or civil servants, and it is when such actors misuse their power for private benefits that one can talk about corruption practices – public goods are turned into private gain.

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2 For empirical research on decline of voter turnout, see Blais (2000) and Franklin (2004). For an overview of trends in participation, see Dalton & Klingemann (2009).

3 Corruption studies cuts across several borders of academic disciplines. The multi-faceted and complex nature of corruption is reflected within the body of research and the various definitions provided. For a comprehensive literature, see Amundsen & Fjeldstad (2000), or Jain (1998).

4 Heidenheimer, Johnston, Le Vine (1999:8-11) discusses three basic models or concepts of corruption. The first, *public-office-centered* definition has already mentioned is the most applied by social science writers. *Market-centered* definitions perceive corruption as a simple maximizing effort of the public officeholder and are often applied to non-Western societies who lack established norms of public office. Finally, *public-interest-centered* define corrupt practices as those who do damage to the "public interest".

5 The World Bank defines corruption as "the abuse of public office for private gain", whereas Transparency International defines corruption as "the abuse of entrusted power for private gain".

Political and bureaucratic corruption

Corruption can be understood as a wide array of practices[6]. In terms of who initiates, who profits, which methods are being used or the extent of practices, corruption is a diverse phenomena. A helpful distinction, often applied in literature on corruption, is between political and bureaucratic corruption. First, one has to note the existence of a somewhat confusing terminology. Political corruption is sometimes treated as equivalent to the term grand corruption. However, grand corruption can also be separated from political corruption, and is often described as corruption taking place at the highest possible level of political power, such as between governments and private actors. Henceforward, the two notions are described in a corresponding manner. Political corruption, then, involve actors who are involved in the political decision-making process. Acts of political corruption therefore occur when those who control the policy formulation and legislation are corrupt and use their political power as a mean for private gain or benefit (Andvig et al. 1999:11).

Bureaucratic corruption refers to corruption practices within the public administration and the actual implementation of a policy (Andvig et. al 1999:12). Corruption practices within public administration are often described as petty corruption, since it has to do with the day-to-day practices and is situated on a lower level than political corruption. In reality, the distinction between political and bureaucratic corruption is sometimes less clear. Andvig et al. (1999:12) note that both types of corruption are mutually reinforcing. Political corruption is held up by extensive bureaucratic corruption, whereas political corruption transmits to the civil servants who follow or even take instructions from the higher levels of politicians. Hence, political and administrative corruption tends to go hand in hand.

Corruption & democracy

From a normative perspective, one can argue that corruption practices undermine democratic values. Mark Warren (2013:1) states that corruption "corrodes the norms, processes and mechanisms of democracy itself". In a similar fashion, Dennis Thompson (1993) claims that the inherently bad nature of corruption is due to its sidestepping of representation, debate, and public choice. Corrupt practices, therefore, represent a serious deviation from democratic values.

Heywood (1997) stresses the damaging effects of corruption in democracies, since it undermines the basic principles, such as openness in decision making, accountability, and responsiveness. Therefore, he argues, corruption is even more damaging in established democracies, since it violates the very foundations. Warren (2013:1) follow the same line of thought, claiming that "what defines a practice, action, exchange or

6 Several taxations of corruptions practices can be made (see Blundo 2006). Some main forms are; bribery, embezzlement, fraud, extortion, nepotism, patronage and favoritism (Amundsen 2001:10-11).

institutions as 'corrupt' is a corrosion of some feature that enables 'democracy"'. Being so, Warren (2013) claims that the relationship can be described as *inclusion* versus *exclusion*. Democracy enables inclusion, by creating opportunities for those who potentially are affected by decisions to influence them. Corruption, then, represents exclusion, by corroding the means, through which inclusion is made. Warren (2013) describes several ways in which corruption works in exclusive ways. First, it undermines the very power of the people expressed through voting and participating. The impact of voting is diminished, since the principal-agent relation, which is the very basis of democratic representation, is undermined. Furthermore, it reduces responsiveness and processes of deliberation. As argued by Warren (2013:9), corruption in democracies signals "exclusions of those with claims to inclusion".

With this, it is safe to say that corruption signals a breach to democratic values. Rule by the people, even in its most minimal sense, is seriously impaired when political decisions are made corruptly. Informed by the exclusive effects of corruption, there are good reasons to assume that individual's perceptions of their ability to influence the political system, and in turn their very political behaviour, is influenced by corruption.

Since this paper goes beyond voting when looking at participation, a final note on responsiveness and its relation to corruption will be mentioned. The notion of responsiveness is closely related to that of political representation and embodies the relationship between representatives and constituents. The concept is often related to Hanna Pitkins definition of representation as "acting in the interest of the represented, in a manner responsive to them" (Pitkin 1967:209). Today, responsiveness is often conceived as the mechanism that regulates the relationship between representatives and the represented, in between elections (Esaiasson et al 2013). Responsive politicians convey citizen demands into the decision-making process. Therefore, corrupted representatives can be seen as the absolute opposite to responsive ones. Political corruption practices involve decision-making guided by personal gain, not the formulated wishes of the citizens. Corrupt practices is the antithesis to "..in a responsive manner". To conclude, the ideal of political representation cannot be fulfilled through the mechanism of responsiveness, if politicians are guided by personal benefits at the expense of the public voice.

In this paper, the idea of responsiveness will be present in the notion of political efficacy, which relate to how citizens perceive the responsiveness of politicians in terms of their ability to have an actual influence on the political system. Further, arguments are put forward for efficacy as being a key motivation behind political participation and a key component in corruption's de-mobilizing effects on political participation.

Consequences of corruption

Empirically, corruption is widely assumed to have the damaging effects on a country's social, economic, and political development[7]. Corruption debilitates economic growth, productivity, stability, and decreases investments (Mo 2001; Mauro 1995). In the political realm, several studies have shown how corruption undermines the legitimacy of and trust in the political process and its institutions. Political attitudes such as satisfaction with democracy (Wagner et al. 2009, Stockemer & Sundström 2013), trust in democratic institutions (Mishler & Rose 2001), confidence in government (Anderson & Tverdova 2003; Uslaner 2001; Tavits 2007), and legitimacy (Seligson 2002), are delineated by corruption. Due to the intrinsic secretive nature of corruption, most research focuses on individual perceptions of corruption. A general conclusion is that our very perceptions, independent of actual levels of corruption, has a strong effect on our attitudes.

When discussing the damaging effects of corruption, perhaps the most damaging effect is that on citizen's attitudes and belief in the democratic process and political system. Based on these central findings, the idea of these effects, as having an impact on citizen's willingness to participate, come close at hand.

Corruption & political participation

Considering previous research, demonstrating the damaging effect of corruption on citizen's attitudes towards the democratic and political process, the idea of corruption as having an impact on political behaviour in terms of participation is not far-fetched. Research on the effects of corruption on political participation is scarce and constitutes a relatively new line of inquiry. One can distinguish between two clear and contradictory directions, which can be described as the question of indignation or resignation (Bauhr & Grimes 2013), mobilization or apathy (Stockemer 2013), engagement or disengagement (Kostadinova 2009). Basically, there are two competing views on the expected relationship and findings.

The minority view is represented by scholars pursuing the argument of corruption as a mobilizing factor. The argument is straightforward; corruption is believed to create enraged citizens which in turns increase their willingness to punish corrupt politicians through participation. Representing this line of thought, Johnston (1983) reports a positive relationship between corruption and voter turnout in U.S presidential elections. Imman and Andrews (2010) offer some empirical evidence for this position in a Senegalese context. By conducting a natural experiment, they find that perceptions of corruption increase the likeliness of both protesting and voting. In a study of Portuguese municipalities, Stockemer and Calca (2013) find corruption to be a strong mobilizing factor, where high corruption areas display high voter turnout. Thus, the case has been made for the claim that corruption serves as a mobilizing factor.

7 For reviews, see Montinola and Jackman (2002) and Rose-Ackerman (1999).

The most adherent view held by scholars does, however, claim a negative relationship between corruption and political participation (Stockemer et al 2012; Stockemer 2013; Simpser 2005; Kostadinova 2009; Dominguez and McCann 1998). Here, corruption is believed to decrease citizen's willingness to engage in the political process and thus have a de-mobilizing effect. So far, three macro-level studies have been conducted. In a broad sample of democratic states, Stockemer, LaMontagne and Scruggs (2012) found a negative relationship between voter turnout and corruption in legislative elections. Daniel Stockemer (2013) also finds a negative relationship between political corruption and turnout in a macro-level study covering 70 presidential elections. Finally, Alberto Simpser (2004) concludes that the belief of an election being corrupt decreases the likelihood of voting. Notably, all three macro-level studies have only looked into voter turnout, and research allowing stronger generalizations are still missing, for other types of political participation.

Dahlberg and Solevid (2013) examined a large sample of countries, and found that voter turnout is lower when individuals perceive corruption as widespread. When controlling for system-level corruption, the effect, however, disappear in countries with high levels of system-level corruption. Rothstein and Solevid (2013) found a similar interaction effect on non-institutionalised participation, when examining perceptions of bureaucratic impartiality and system-level quality of government indicators. In a sample of Eastern European countries, Kostadinova (2009) finds a twofold pattern. First, corruption might mobilize citizens who vote in order to throw the rascals out. However, the long-term effect of corruption on attitudes such as distrust in the democratic process, and perceived ability to actually influence politics, leads to the reversed reaction where citizen abstain their vote. The mobilizing effect is therefore cancelled in the long run. Besides, corruption also affects individual's political efficacy, by weakening citizen's belief that their vote makes a difference. Kostadinova (2009:15) concludes that corruption both have a direct effect on turnout, but also an indirect effect by lowering individual's sense of efficacy. Bauhr and Grimes (2014) also describe how increased transparency and information of corruption practices fuels resignation rather than indignation. Resignation refers to the absence of three components: political interest; political involvement; and institutional trust. Bauhr and Grimes (2014) conclude that in countries with the highest levels of perceived corruption, political involvement as well as trust in political institutions is undermined.

In summary, previous research on the connection between corruption and political participation is emerging and offer mixed results. In terms of data, a selection of countries, regions, and levels and have been looked into. As for type of participation, voter turnout has been the primary object of interest, although some attention has been directed towards other types of participation. Notably, the literature suffers from a lack of explanatory focus, where few mechanisms behind the perceived relationship are put forward. One can therefore conclude the need of both specifying causal mechanisms and empirical accumulation.

Political participation – how & why

The venues open for participation are multifold, and, as argued by Huntington & Nelson (1976:14), "the concept of political participation is nothing but a umbrella concept which accommodates very different forms of action constituting differentiating phenomena, and for which is necessary to look for explanations of different nature".

Institutionalised & non-institutionalised participation

Although voter turnout remains the most studied act of participation, other acts such as protesting, party membership, contacting officials, boycotting, striking, and petition signing have received scholarly attention (Dalton 2008; Verba & Nie 1972; Verba et al 1995: Norris 2002). As the range of activities included in participation research grew, so did the number of typologies, modes, and clusters of activities[8]. Today, several authors adhere to the distinction between institutionalised participation and non-institutionalised participation (Christensen 2011).

The distinction was set out by Barnes and Kaase (1979) and relates to differences between acts, in relation to the formal political system. The crucial difference is who defines and organises the participation. Institutionalised participation, such as turnout, campaign work, and party membership is closely related to the institutional structures, and is initiated by the political elite. On the other hand, non-institutionalised participation, such as protesting and boycotting, are initiated by non-elite actors, and is situated outside the formal political institutions. Nevertheless, both institutionalised and non-institutionalised participation represent channels, through which citizens express their needs and demands.

Why we participate

One of the most influential models of political participation in participation literature is the civic voluntarism mode, CVM (Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995). Instead of asking the question of why we participate, Verba et al. asked *what make us not participate?* The answer to that question, as well as the basic idea of the CVM, is well captured in the following quote: "Because they can't; because they don't want to; or because nobody asked. In other words people may be inactive because they lack resources, because they lack psychological engagement with politics, or because they are outside of the recruitment networks that bring people into politics" (1995:26)

8 Categorizing political participation is a common exercise within the literature. Verba et al (1978) present a fourfould typology: voting, campaign activity, communal activity, particularized contacts. Dalton (1998), developed five modes of participation: voting, campaign activity, communal activity, contacting officials and protest. Most recently, Teorell et al. (2007) presents five dimensions based on 18 types of acts: voting, contacting, party activity, protest activity and consumer participation. In sum, several generic categories of political participation exist.

Resources are defined as time, money, and civic skills (Verba et al 1995:270). The central idea is that different resources are needed in order to bear the costs of participation, where resources can either constrain or abilitate people. The importance of social background is highlighted, where resources vary according to for instance income, education, and gender. Here, the importance of separating different acts of participation becomes clear. As argued, different types of participation require different amounts of time, money and civic skills (Verba et al. 1995:285).

The second dimension in the model refers to engagement. Defined as different psychological predispositions, such as political interest, civic values, group consciousness, and party identification, citizens with high levels of engagement display high levels of participation. Verba et al (1995:272) also include political efficacy as a key factor in terms of engagement, a notion which will be further developed in the next section. Another key feature of the civic voluntarism is the co-dependency between the dimensions. Without the actual resources to participate, the likeliness to do so is limited. However, an individual with a lack of engagement is less likely to do so even if he or she have the resources. Finally, recruitment refers to requests to participate which can motivate political participation. Although, this third dimension is rather downplayed in the model, the role of various institutions such as parties, organizations, church and workplace is proven to serve as a mobilizing force. If no one asks you to participate, you are less likely to do so even if you do have the resources and the engagement (Verba et al 1995).

Resources, engagement, and recruitment are the cornerstones in the civic voluntarism model. The importance of these factors has been confirmed in several studies, where resource-centred explanations have been in the centre of understanding individual political participation[9].

Voter turnout: beyond individual explanations

Voter turnout differs from other types of participation in many ways. It is by far the most common act of participation, and requires relatively low costs in terms of resources, time or skills (Verba et al. 1995). However, the commonly applied individual based explanations are not sufficient for voter turnout. As argued by Franklin (2004), institutional and contextual explanations strongly modifies the costs of voting, and in a cross-national perspective, the composition of the electoral system tends to differ more than the very electorates. In order to answer the question of why we vote, a brief account of institutional and contextual explanations for voter turnout will therefore be provided.

Institutional explanations refer to the setting of the electoral system. Here, compulsory voting laws has been one of the most enduring findings, and has shown to bolster turnout (Blais 2006). High turnout is

[9] For a review on contemporary participation research, see Lamprianou (2013).

also associated with proportional representation (Lijphart 1999; Blais 2006). A great number of parties are a characteristic associated with proportional system, where the advantages of proportionality can be counterbalanced by too many parties, which in turn confuse the electorate and depress turnout (Blais & Dobrzynska 1998). Other institutional factors are size of the electoral district, voting age, and voting rules[10]. Specific features of an election have also proven to impact the decision to vote. A clear conclusion is that elections that are close, competitive, and decisive, will display high levels of turnout (Franklin 2004).

Political efficacy

A broad body of research has been especially concerned with subjective attitudes as antecedents to political participation. The relationship between the political efficacy and political participation has been supported in numerous empirical studies (Milbrath 1965; Easton and Dennis 1967; Barnes and Kaase 1979; Verba and Nie 1972; Finkel 1985; Verba, Schlotzman and Brady 1995). As previously mentioned, political efficacy is also included in the engagement-dimension in the CVM (Verba, Schlotzman and Brady 1995).

Political efficacy was originally defined by Campbell et al. (1954:187) as "the feeling that individual political action does have, or can have, an impact upon the political process, that it is worthwhile to perform ones civic duties". Easton and Dennis (1967:26) eloquently describe an efficacious citizen as able "to construct a psychic map of the political world with strong lines of force running from himself to the places of officialdom". Political efficacy is therefore concerned with the relationship between oneself and those who govern. In terms of participation, studies have shown that citizens who feel that they have the ability to influence politics are more likely to become involved in politics. Empirically, political efficacy can be considered a relatively strong predictor of political participation (Verba, Schlotzman and Brady 1995: Sullivan and Riedel 2001). Hence, the subjective assessment of one's possibility to have an influence is vital for the decision to act politically.

The notion of political efficacy has subsequently been refined, a process which transformed the unidimensional concept into two dimensions, *internal* and *external* efficacy (Lane 1959). Sullivan and Riedel (2001) argue that both dimensions of political efficacy refer to beliefs and assessments of the relationship between oneself and the political system. However, they differ when accounting for the presence or absence of political efficacy. Internal efficacy reflects individual's beliefs in their own political capacity, skills, and the ability to influence the political process as a result thereof (Converse 1972; Balch 1974). Explanations to internal efficacy are often related to individual characteristics such as socioeconomic background and education (Sullivan and Riedel 2001:4354).

[10] For a review on research on how institutional and contextual factors foster voter turnout, see Blais (2006).

The notion of external efficacy refers to citizen's perceptions of the possibility to impact the political process, as a result of those in power adhering to citizen opinion. The pursued argument of corruption as having an indirect effect on political participation through political efficacy, therefore mainly concerns the external dimension of the notion. External efficacy is closely related to responsiveness. As described by Lane (1959), an underlying principle of the subjective feeling of external efficacy is that the government is responsive to its citizens. External efficacy has therefore often been translated as the *subjective perception of responsiveness*. Kölln, Esaiasson and Turper (2013) find that perceived responsiveness and external efficacy often has been described in terms of the other, despite differences in theoretical backgrounds. As argued, perceived responsiveness is related to specific beliefs about how representatives and institutions treat the demands and views of their citizens, whereas external efficacy reflects affective and generalized beliefs about the outcome of representative processes (Kölln, Esaiasson and Turper 2013:1).

Proposed mechanism & hypotheses

Considering the amount of research pointing towards the damaging effects of corruption, this paper proposes a negative relationship between corruption and participation. On a theoretical level, corruption is the fundamental opposite to democratic values. As argued, corruption signifies an exclusive process, where the inclusive mechanisms of democracy, such as openness, accountability and responsiveness are put out of work. Corruption also has a negative impact on how citizens perceive the functioning of democracy and the political institutions, political trust, and legitimacy. One could therefore expect these negative attitudes to affect citizen's willingness to act politically. Informed by previous research, most studies point toward corruption as having a dampening effect on political participation. Despite a lack of theoretical arguments put forward, the process can be described as that of resignation or cynicism, where corruption works in a de-mobilizing manner.

In order to capture this process and develop a causal mechanism, one has to consider explanations for political participation. As has been put forward, the most influential theory behind political participation is the civic voluntarism model. This paper will focus on the engagement-part in the model translated as political efficacy, in order to understand why corruption might influence citizen's decision to engage politically. Based on the negative impact corruption have on citizen's evaluation on the political system and the democratic process, I suggest an indirect mechanism of corruption on political participation. This indirect effect can be specified as corruption eroding the individual's sense of political efficacy. Corruption creates mistrusting citizens, who questions their own capacity and potential to act politically. Corruption therefore diminishes the motivation for citizens to participate politically by corroding the belief that one can influence unresponsive politicians acting from their own private gain. Corruption creates unresponsive politicians, which is seen through citizen's subjective perceptions. The general idea can be summarized as this: if one cannot influence the outcome – why bother to participate?

The proposed mechanism is illustrated in Figure 1. The figure illustrates the focal relationship between corruption and political participation, as well as the focal mediating variable of political efficacy. Hence, perceptions of corruption is an exogenous variable, whereas political efficacy, political participation, and other determinants of participation are endogenous variables (Aneshensel 2013: 247; 88).

FIGURE 1, ILLUSTRATION OF THE PROPOSED CAUSAL MECHANISM.



On the basis of previous studies on the relationship between corruption and political participation, as well as classical theories on why citizen's become politically engaged, the following hypotheses are stated:

H1: The higher degree of corruption perceptions, the lower the level of non-institutionalised participation.
H2: The higher degree of corruption perceptions, the lower the levels of institutionalised participation.
H3: The higher degree of corruption perceptions, the lower the levels of voter turnout.

Noticeably, three separate hypotheses are stipulated. The rationale behind this division is the large differences found between different acts of participation, and the strong conclusion that one simply cannot translate participation into one single dimension. However, there is no informed reason to motivate corruption as having separate effects on the three clusters of participation and hence corruption is believed to have a suppressing effect on non-institutionalised participation, institutionalised participation, and voter turnout.

Although the main purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between corruption and political participation, as expressed in the stipulated hypothesis above, the theoretical argument behind the causal mechanism (Figure 1) will be tested explicitly in order to illustrate the extent to which the relationship between corruption and political participation is mediated by external political efficacy. In order to specify the expected relationship expressed in previously stipulated hypotheses, the following hypothesis is stated:

H4: The relationship between corruption perceptions and political participation is mediated by external efficacy.

Data

The data used in the analysis is collected from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP)[11]. The ISSP is a cross-national collaboration on surveys covering various subjects. In this study, the ISSP module Citizenship (2004) is used, which focuses on issues such as political attitudes and behaviour. Data from 38 countries was collected between 2003 and 2006. In order to deal with missing values, list wise deletion of missing values was applied to the data. In total, the analysis is based on full data for 29299 respondents in 33 countries[12]. An advantage working with ISSP data is the diverse sample of countries, which offer interesting variation of individual level factors (Nevitte et al 2000). The somewhat aged data is unfortunate. However, data which contain measurements of various acts of political participation *and* corruption perceptions are hard to come by. Also, the ISSP offers various items on political efficacy. To conclude, the accessibility to well defined key variables became the decisive factor[13]. When discussing the age of the data, there is no theoretically informed reason to believe that the nature of the relationship under scrutiny, that is, corruption and political participation, would have changed considerably during the last years. Corruption is a stable phenomenon. Rothstein (2011:231) concludes previous research on corruption's persistence as "once the system gets there, it stays there".

Another issue with the ISSP data is the structure of the working methods. As mentioned, the ISSP is collaboration rather than a uniform cross-national survey. The method of collection differs between countries, as well as sampling procedures, although most countries deploy a stratified random selection. This is unfortunate in terms of reliability. However, the ISSP provide extensive related documentation on sampling procedures, data collection, and more, and deviations are thoroughly reported[14]. The ISSP does not provide any weights applicable to the data as a whole. Instead, each country survey has applied their own weighting system, most often based on skewness in region, education and age. Yet again, this reflects the collaborative nature of the ISSP.

[11] Data and related documentation can be retrieved from the GESIS Data Archive (http://www.gesis.org). Data for statistical analysis is made available by ZACAT (http://zacat.gesis.org).
[12] Countries included in this study are: Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Japan, Latvia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zeeland, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United States, Uruguay and Venezuela.
[13] When determining which data to use, two other large cross-national surveys were considered and access to key variables was compared. First, the European Social Survey is well-known for its reliability. The types of participation included are similar to those in the ISSP. However, there were no sufficient items on political efficacy and no explicit question on corruption perceptions. Also, the ESS only includes European countries. The second survey considered was the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES), which cover similar countries as the ISSP. However, CSES only include four participation items which would create an inferior operationalization of the dependent variable. The CSES survey was deployed under the same time as ISSP, and thus did not have the advantage of providing more recent data.
[14] Detailed information about sampling procedures and weights can be found in the study report (Sholz, Harknes & Faaß 2008).

Country level data is collected from the Quality of Government (QoG) Standard Dataset (Teorell et al. 2010). The QoG data consist of compiled cross-sectional data sources, and covers a wide area of social science indicators, focusing on quality of government aspects[15].

Dependent variables

In order to capture the relationship between corruption and political participation, this study will have three dependent variables: institutionalised participation, non-institutionalised participation and voter turnout. The main rationale behind the separation has previously been discussed in the theory section, and follows the framework set out by previous research. The distinction applied is also empirically validated as an assenting factor analysis displaying three distinct dimensions (see Appendix C).

Institutionalised and non-institutionalised participation

The ISSP questionnaire provides respondents with a list of different types of participation acts; sign a petition, boycott certain products, take part in demonstration, join an internet political forum, attend a political meeting or rally, or contacted a politician. For each activity, respondents were asked to indicate whether they (1) Have done it in the past year; (2) Have done it in the more distant past; (3) Have not done it but might do it; or (4) Have not done it and would never, under any circumstances, do it. Each item was dichotomized. Here, I opted for a generous interpretation, where respondents who had participated in the last year and in the more distant past were coded into the same category (1). The main reason behind this choice was to create more variation in the dependent variable, since several items are rarely performed. By doing so, the results capture a more long-term phenomena. In order to further check for robustness and validity, multilevel regressions with the narrower operationalization was deployed, only including respondents who had participated the last year[16] (see Appendix D).

The ISSP also include an item on belonging to a political party. The respondents were asked to indicate whether they *(1) belong and actively participate; (2) belong but don't actively participate; (3) used to belong but do not any more; (4) or have never belonged*. The variable was dichotomized, and respondents who belong and actively participate in a political party were coded one category (1). Since the ISSP questionnaire did not include items on party or campaign work, this item seemed highly suitable and thus relate to such activities[17].

[15] Data can be sought from http://www.qog.pol.gu.se.
[16] When using a narrower operationalization, the mean values of non-institutionalised and institutionalised participation dropped. Thus, this operationalization creates less variation. As for the results when the dependent variables are coded more narrowly, the multilevel model for non-institutionalised participation demonstrates a positive effect on corruption perceptions, although very weak. As for institutionalised participation, more variation is found in the country-level. For more detailed results, see Appendix D compared to forthcoming results (Chapter 8).
[17] Other participation studies using the ISSP have also chosen to include this item (Hooghes & Quintellier 2013). To actively participate in a political party also follow the definition offered by Brady (1999), and can thus considered as an act of political participation.

In order to measure institutionalised and non-institutionalised participation, two additive scales were constructed. First, institutionalised participation was constructed out of three participation items: *(1) contacted a politician, (2) attend political meeting or rally and (3) actively participate in political party*, generating a scale ranging from 0-3, where each value represents one performed activity. The non-institutionalised participation index consists of four participation items: *(1) signing a petition, (2) boycotting or deliberately buying products for political, ethical or environmental reasons, (3) joining an internet political forum or (4) taking part in a demonstration*. The scale ranges from 0-4, where each value represents one performed activity. For more detailed description on the coding of variables, see Appendix A.

Voter turnout

The dependent variable for turnout is measured as whether the respondent voted in the last election. Country specific question wordings were used[18]. In the subsequent analysis, respondents below voting age were excluded.

A well-known issue when measuring voter turnout is a strong tendency of over-reporting, where several validation studies have pointed towards substantial differences between reported and official turnout (Granberg & Holmdal 1991; Karp & Brockington 2002). Most of these inaccuracies are due to respondents who reportedly voted, when in fact they did not. Explanations for this behaviour are often ascribed to memory flaws or social desirability bias of the respondents (Blais 2000; Karp and Brockington 2005). The social desirability bias of respondents refer to a phenomena where respondents, due to social norms norms, feel obliged to provide the socially desirable answer, that is, that they have voted when they in fact did not (Karp and Brockington 2005).

Figure 2 displays a comparison between self-reported turnout by respondents in ISSP and official turnout figures from IDEA[19]. The correlation between all countries is .65. A clear pattern of substantial deviation between reported turnout and official data become visible. In all countries except from Uruguay, self-reported turnout is higher than official turnout. Canada, Chile, Mexico, New Zeeland, Poland, Slovakia, South Korea and Switzerland display large deviations (> 20 percentage points). This inevitably creates less variation in one of the dependent variables. In summary, the three dependent variables consist of information on eight different types of participation. Two additive indexes were created, measuring institutionalised and non-institutionalised participation, whereas voting constitutes a dependent variable on its own.

[18] The exact wording of the survey question differs between countries. In all cases included, a specific election is referred to. For instance, Swedish citizens were asked "Did you vote in the last parliamentary election", Japanese citizens "Did you vote in the Upper House election in July" and Venezuelan respondents "Did you vote at the last presidential election?".
[19] The data can be retrieved from IDEA: http://www.idea.int/vt/.

Corruption perceptions

The main independent variable of interest is corruption, where high levels of perceived corruption are believed to suppress political participation. The item measuring corruption in the ISSP relates to perceptions of corruption, not individual experiences. However, a measurement based on perceptions of corruption may not fully respond to actual levels of corruption, where perceptions of corruption not necessarily correspond to actual experiences (Abramo 2008). Perception-based measurements have shown to be sensitive to external factors, such as media coverage, and increased policy efforts (Galtung et al. 2006). Kauffman et al (2007:3), however, make a sound argument stating that "perceptions matter because agents base their actions on their perceptions, impressions and views". It is not the actual levels of corruption that matters, but rather, it is how individuals themselves perceive corruption that shapes our behaviour.

FIGURE 2, SELF-REPORTED TURNOUT (ISSP 2004) COMPARED WITH OFFICIAL TURNOUT (IDEA).



Source: ISSP Citizenship 2004 and IDEA. Official turnout figures display the percentage of the voting age population (VAP) who voted.

The ISSP survey provides one item related to corruption perceptions, namely the question: *"How widespread do you think corruption is in the public service in (COUNTRY)?"*. Response options are *(1) Hardly anyone involved; (2) A small number of people are involved; (3) A moderate number of people are involved; (4) A lot of people are involved; (5) Almost everyone is involved.* Notably, this question is limited to public officials, associated with bureaucratic corruption. As previously mentioned, studies have shown how bureaucratic and political corruption tend to go hand in hand (Andvig et al. 1999). One could therefore expect that perceived high levels of public corruption correlate with perceived high levels of political corruption.

In order to validate the measure of corruption, two comparisons were made. First, aggregated data from ISSP was correlated with data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES)[20], both measured within the same time period. In the CSES survey, the respondents were asked only about perceptions of *political* corruption. Both surveys include 26 matching countries. As expected, the two corruption perceptions measurements were highly correlated (.92). Second, the aggregated ISSP corruption perception item was compared with Transparency Internationals Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI)[21]. Again, a strong correlation between the two measurements was found (.85). The strong correlations thus limit possible validity concerns. For more detailed information on correlations between corruptions measurements, see Appendix E.

Political efficacy

Another variable of interest is political efficacy. As already argued, political efficacy is an important determinant of political participation. This study suggests an indirect effect of corruption, where perceived high levels of corruption lower individual's sense of external political efficacy. External efficacy relates to individual's feeling of responsiveness, or their possibility to influence political outcomes. Two items in the ISSP relate to external efficacy. The respondents are asked *"To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?"*. The first statement is *"People like me don't have any say about what the government does",* and the second is "*I don't think the government cares much what people like me think"*. Response options are *(1) Strongly agree; (2) Agree; (3) Neither agree nor disagree; (4)*

[20] The data can be sought from the CSES Secretariat: www.cses.org. The data can also be downloaded from www.umich.edu/-cses.
[21] Data from Transparency International, compiled by Teorell et al 2010.

Disagree; (5) Strongly disagree. The two items were combined, creating an external efficacy scale ranging between 0-8.

By employing the division between external and internal efficacy, this study stays in line with previous research. A confirmatory factor analysis also demonstrates the empirical validity of this division (see Appendix C). Internal efficacy relates to individual's perceptions of their own abilities. Two internal efficacy items were used, where the respondents were asked: *"To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?"*. Statement one is: *"I feel I have a pretty good understanding of the important political issues facing [COUNTRY]"*, and the second statement is: *"I think most people in (COUNTRY) are better informed about politics and government than I am"*. Response options are: *(1) Strongly agree; (2) Agree; (3) Neither agree nor disagree; (4) Disagree; (5); Strongly disagree.* A scale ranging from 0-8 was created by combining the two internal efficacy items. Although internal efficacy is not believed to be highly affected by higher levels of corruption perceptions, it is still just as an important determinant of political participation and hence serves as a control variable. For detailed information on coding of variables, see Appendix A.

Individual level control variables

In the analysis, various theoretically informed control variables are included. These variables represent commonly used explanations of why political participation varies among individuals[22]. Previous research has indicated that gender, age, education, political interest and party mobilization can be related to levels of participation. For detailed information on question wordings and coding procedures, see Appendix A.

Country level control variables

In order to account for differences between countries, country-level variables are included. As for institutionalised and non-institutionalised participation, few aspects on the country level are believed to influence levels of participation. In summary, previous research does not provide much general cross-national evidence about systematic effects caused by political or demographic differ-

[22] Here, two additional variables can be considered: generalized trust and government support. As for generalized trust, no such item was found in the ISSP. In order to control for government support, extensive separate coding procedures for each country would have been necessary. I would still argue that the final model exposes the posited relationship for very hard and thorough tests, both in terms of control variables and statistical method.

ences. Still, one factor that was found to influence levels of institutionalised and non-institutionalised participation is democratic status, where political participation tends to be lower in less established democracies (Kostadinova & Power 2007). However, when controlled for Freedom House Democracy Index, only one country in the analysis was considered merely *partly free*, whereas the rest was classified *free*[23]. Due to the close to zero variation in the data for democratic status, the variable was excluded.

Two variables for non-institutionalised and institutionalised participation was however included in the model. *GDP Growth* control for economic development, where previous research show how more affluent countries display higher levels of participation (Inglehart 1997; Teorell et al 2007). The data derives from the World Bank Indicators (WBI), compiled by Teorell et al (2010). *Transparency International's CPI Score* is also included in the analysis in order to control for aggregated perceptions of corruption as seen by business people, risk analysts and experts. The CPI measure both political and administrative corruption[24].

As previously discussed, institutional and contextual factors have a large impact on voter turnout. In order to thoroughly control for institutional and contextual factors affecting voter turnout, five variables are included in the analysis.

Compulsory voting, is a given control variable, since the presence of compulsory makes citizens forced by law to vote and thus should bolster turnout (Franklin 2004). The variable was coded as a dummy, where the reference category is the four countries in the material that enforce and establish sanctions against non-voters: Australia, Cyprus, Uruguay and Chile[25]. Data on compulsory voting laws was sought from IDEA.

Presidentialism is a dummy which distinguish between presidential and parliamentary systems. In presidential systems, legislative elections are believed to have lower turnout than parliamentary systems, since the stakes are lower when only the legislature and not the executive are voted for

[23] The Freedom House Democracy Index is an index where countries are rated "not free", "partly free" or "free". For more information and data download, http://www.freedomhouse.org/
[24] For more information on the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/cpi_2004.
[25] Two countries with compulsory voting laws were discarded. In Mexico, no sanctions are established against non-voters. In the Venezuelan case, the laws have not in effect been implemented and no sanctions are specified. Data retrieved from the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA): http://www.idea.int/vt/compulsory_voting.cfm.

(Stockemer & Calca 2013). The variable was coded in correspondence with which type of elections respondents in the ISSP survey was asked about and was also compared with data from IDEA.

Proportional system is coded as a dummy variable and differentiates between proportional and majoritarian/mixed electoral systems. Despite mixed findings (Blais 2000), a positive relationship between proportional representation and voter turnout is still assumed. Data on electoral representation was sought from IDEA.

Multipartyism measure the effective number of political parties. Multipartyism is predicted to depress voter turnout. Data on effective number of political parties is from the Database of Political Institutions (DPI), compiled by Teorell et al. (2010).

Majority status is the final control variable, which deals with the electoral context and relate to the competitiveness of elections. Majority status is measured as the number of government seats divided by the total seats in the legislature. A small share of government seats indicate a competitive election and are believed to increase turnout. Data is from DPI, compiled by Teorell et al. (2010).

Statistical methods

In order to evaluate the relationship between corruption and political participation, the data is analyzed by conducting a multilevel regression. Given the fact that data was collected from 33 countries, a reasonable expectation is that respondents in the same countries resemble one another. Hence, one can assume a nested structure of the data. By conducting a multilevel analysis, one can avoid biased standard errors and in turn spurious significance testing.

Political participation is operationalized as three dependent variables; non-institutionalised participation, institutionalised participation and voter turnout. Therefore, three separate multilevel regressions are conducted. Voter turnout comprises one of the dependent variables, and since this variable only includes two categories, the conventional statistical method is a logistic multilevel analysis. However, this study conduct a linear multilevel analysis due to practical reasons, where the used statistical software SPSS does not accommodate logistic multilevel analysis. Two standard objections against the usage of a linear regression equation are often put forward (Hellevik 2009). First, the linear analysis might create outcomes in terms of predictions that are illogical, with values out-

side of the 0-1 interval. Second, it violates the assumption of homoscedasticity in the standard errors, which in turn might create inappropriate significance tests.

However, one can argue that these two issues are exaggerated. Hellevik (2009:61) argue that impossible outcomes outside of the 0-1 interval are extremely rare, and derive from extreme combinations of values of the independent variables. Interaction effects in the data might also be a cause, and when including relevant interaction terms, the issues with non-logical results are overcome. Furthermore, Hellevik (2009) only finds minimal differences between linear and logistic significance testing, and concludes that, at its most, doubts about misleading results for significance testing only is warranted for when dealing with small samples. Overall, linear models with binary variables produces robust significance tests, even in more problematic samples with skewed distribution of the dependent variable (Hellevik 2007:64). Finally, one advantage with the usage of linear model is the comprehensible coefficients, which also make it possible to compare effects between models. In order to validate the results from the multilevel regression, a logistic regression table, including voting as dependent variable, and all independent variables on individual level is reported in Appendix F.

Since this thesis suggests that external efficacy has a mediating effect on the relationship between corruption and political participation, a path analysis is conducted. Most often, this method is used when comparing different hypothesized models. In this case, however, the path analysis is used merely to illustrate the proportions of direct and indirect effects. The path parameters are estimated by an OLS-regression, and the path coefficients represent the standardized beta-coefficients for the regression. As for turnout, a linear OLS-regression was performed, following the same line of argument as for the multilevel analysis. Unfortunately, multilevel analysis is not available in SPSS. In order to account for the nested structure of the data, each country was coded as a dummy variable an entered in the model.

Results

The main analysis of the empirical findings contains three separate multilevel regressions, all representing each of the three dependent variables: non-institutionalised participation; institutionalised participation: and voter turnout.

Non-institutionalised participation and corruption perceptions

The first multilevel analysis focuses on non-institutional participation and the effect of corruption. First, a brief note on distributions within this variable: Non-institutionalised participation is measured by an additive index, where each point represents one activity. Thus, respondents who indicated a (4), have performed all four acts. Overall, levels of non-institutionalised are low, and only a small percentage (1.8) of the respondents have reportedly participated in all four acts. On the other hand, over a third of the respondents have not engaged in any of the four acts (36.7 percent). For more descriptive statistics, see Appendix B.

Table 1. Non-institutionalised participation and corruption. Multilevel regression model, individual and country-level fixed effects, random slope intercept. Standardized errors in brackets.

	Model 0	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Individual level fixed effects						
Corruption perceptions (1= hardly anyone involved 5= almost everyone involved)	-	-0.037*** (0.006)	-0.007 (0.006)	0.009 (0.006)	-	0.010 (0.006)
External efficacy (higher values= more efficacy)	-	-	0.070*** (0.002)	0.027*** (0.002)	-	0.027*** (0.002)
Internal efficacy (higher values=more efficacy)	-	-	-	0.071*** (0.003)	-	0.071*** (0.003)
Gender (male)	-	-	-	-0.057*** (0.010)	-	-0.057*** (0.010)
Age	-	-	-	-0.003*** (0.000)	-	-0.003*** (0.000)
Age^2	-	-	-	-0.0002*** (1.829)	-	-0.0002*** (1.829)
Education (0=low, 5= high)	-	-	-	0.135*** (0.004)	-	0.135*** (0.004)
Political interest (1=not interested, 4=very interested)	-	-	-	0.195*** (0.007)	-	0.196*** (0.007)
Party mobilization (1=strongly disagree, 5=strongly agree)	-	-	-	-0.022*** (0.005)	-	-0.022*** (0.005)
Country level fixed effects						
Transparency CPI (higher values = more corruption)	-	-	-	-	-0.171*** (0.025)	-0.140*** (0.023)
GDP Growth	-	-	-	-	0.013 (0.015)	-0.016 (0.014)
Intercept	1.135*** (0.085)	1.250*** (0.085)	0.919*** (0.086)	-0.055 (0.081)	2.126*** (0.160)	-0.777*** (0.151)
Individual level variance	0.961*** (0.007)	0.960*** (0.007)	0.940*** (0.007)	0.820*** (0.006)	0.961*** (0.007)	0.820*** (0.006)
Country level variance	0.241*** (0.060)	0.224*** (0.056)	0.229*** (0.057)	0.180*** (0.045)	0.103*** (0.027)	0.088*** (0.023)
Intra-class correlation (%)	20.0	18.9	19.5	18.0	9.7	9.7
Number of countries	33	33	33	33	33	33
Number of individuals	29299	29299	29299	29299	29299	29299
-2 Log Likelihood	82194.96	82168.69	81584.17	77595.35	82178.00	77582.80

**** p<0.001, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: ISSP Citizenship 2004, Quality of Government Standard Cross-Section Dataset, May 2010. Comment: See Appendix A for coding of variables.*

Table 1 presents a multilevel regression model predicting non-institutional participation. The null model includes no variables and shows the amount of variation distributed between individual and country level. From this, the intra-class correlation is calculated, which shows that 20 percent of the variation in non-institutionalised participation can be situated at the country level. This indicates that countries differ quite strongly from one another.

Model 1 presents the bivariate relationship between corruption perceptions and non-institutionalised participation. A significant, although very weak, negative effect of corruption perceptions is found. Model 2 estimates the effect of corruption perceptions when controlled for external political efficacy, which is a key control variable in the proposed relationship. When controlling for external efficacy, the already weak effect of corruption perceptions is no longer significant.

In model 3, all individual level variables are controlled for. Corruption perceptions display a very weak positive effect, however not significant. The effect of external efficacy remains, although not that strong. The remaining individual level variables all have significant effects. The results confirm previous findings: well educated, politically interested and internally efficacious individuals are more likely to engage in political participation. Females and those who are younger are more prone to engage in non-institutionalised participation, compared to men and those who are older. However, perceptions of politicians encouraging citizens to become active in politics seem to have a weak negative effect. The strongest predictor of non-institutionalised participation in Model 3 is political interest.

Model 4 controls for the two country level variables included in the analysis. The result indicate that the global corruption perceptions index has a relatively strong and significant negative effect on non-institutionalised participation. Thus, individual's corruption perceptions have no significant impact, whereas the aggregated corruption measure point towards a strong negative effect. Corruption assessments do not matter, but a corrupt context seems to have an effect. Noticeably, differences between countries, expressed as ICC, drops with 10 percentages when global corruption perceptions are accounted for.

In Model 5, individual level variables and country level variables are estimated. Overall, the individual level effects found in Model 3 remain and very little happens. The effect of global corruption perceptions index is weakened. Still, the effect is relatively strong: for each step on the global cor-

ruption perceptions index, non-institutionalised participation decrease by 0.140. The maximal effect, moving from 0 to 10 on the global corruption index, predicts a decrease in non-institutional participation by 1.4 activities.

To summarize, corruption perceptions display a weak effect in the bivariate regression, but under control for other variables, individual's perceptions of corruption does not have an impact on our propensity to engage in non-institutionalised forms of participation. The aggregated measure of corruption did, however, have a strong and significant effect.

Institutionalised participation and corruption perceptions

The second multilevel model predicts the relationship between institutionalised participation and corruption perceptions (Table 2). The variable is constructed as an additive index, ranging

Table 2 Institutionalised participation and corruption. Multilevel regression model, individual and country-level fixed effects, random slope intercept. Standardized errors in brackets.

	Model 0	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Individual level fixed effects						
Corruption perceptions (1= hardly anyone involved 5= almost everyone involved)	-	-0.034*** (0.004)	-0.012* (0.005)	0.006 (0.004)	-	0.006 (0.004)
External efficacy (higher values = more efficacy)	-	-	0.051*** (0.002)	0.023*** (0.002)	-	0.023*** (0.002)
Internal efficacy (higher values=more efficacy)	-	-	-	0.048*** (0.002)	-	0.048*** (0.002)
Gender (male)	-	-	-	0.090*** (0.008)	-	0.090*** (0.008)
Age	-	-	-	0.006*** (0.000)	-	0.006*** (0.000)
Age^2	-	-	-	0.0001*** (1.410)	-	-0.0001*** (1.410)
Education (0=low, 5=high)	-	-	-	0.051*** (0.003)	-	0.051*** (0.003)
Political interest (1= not interested, 4= very interested)	-	-	-	0.225*** (0.005)	-	0.225*** (0.005)
Party mobilization (1= strongly disagree, 5=strongly agree)	-	-	-	0.036*** (0.004)	-	0.036*** (0.004)
Country level fixed effects						
Transparency CPI (higher values = more corruption)	-	-	-	-	-0.044** (0.013)	-0.013 (0.011)
GDP Growth	-	-	-	-	-0.014 (0.005)	-0.015* (0.007)
Intercept	0.555*** (0.034)	0.660** (0.036)	0.420*** (0.037)	-0.597*** (0.037)	0.831*** (0.094)	-0.495*** (0.077)
Individual level variance	0.580*** (0.004)	0.580*** (0.004)	0.569*** (0.004)	0.487*** (0.004)	0.580*** (0.004)	0.487*** (0.004)
Country level variance	0.038*** (0.009)	0.035*** (0.008)	0.033*** (0.008)	0.024*** (0.006)	0.028*** (0.007)	0.021*** (0.005)
Intra-class correlation (%)	6.2	5.7	5.5	4.7	4.6	4.2
Number of countries	33	33	33	33	33	33
Number of individuals	29299	29299	29299	29299	29299	29299
-2 Log Likelihood	67393.71	67355.60	66848.75	62300.69	67396.67	62310.26

**** p<0.001, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: ISSP Citizenship 2004, Quality of Government Standard Cross-Section Dataset, May 2010. Comment: See Appendix A for coding of variables.*

between 0-3 where each step represents one activity. By taking a quick look at descriptive activities (61.9 percent). Hence, institutionalised participation is less commonly performed than non-institutionalised participation. See Appendix B for descriptive statistics.

The null-model demonstrates that 6.2 percent of the variation is found between countries. Hence, countries differ less from one another with regard to institutionalised participation as compared to non-institutionalised participation. In Model 1, we can see the bivariate relationship between institutionalised participation and corruption perceptions. Perceiving high levels of corruption has a negative, although weak, effect on institutional participation. Each step on the corruption perceptions variable (from "hardly anyone involved to "almost everyone involved) predicts a decrease in institutionalised participation by 0.034 activities, with a maximal effect of 0.12 activities. Model 2 includes external efficacy, and similar to non-institutionalised participation, the effect of corruption perceptions is considerably weakened. Corruption perceptions do, however, remain significant.

Model 3 demonstrates the effects of the remaining individual level variables. By now, corruption perceptions do not reach statistical significance and display very weak effects. All other individual level variables have significant effects. One can conclude that those who have a sense of political efficacy, are older, more educated, and are politically interested, are more likely to engage in institutionalised participation than those who are have less political efficacy, are younger, less educated and are less interested in politics. In contrast to what was found when looking at non-institutionalised participation, men compared to females, and people who are older, are more likely to engage in institutionalised participation. In line with the traits of institutionalised participation, political mobilization has a significant effect.

Model 4 estimates the effects of the two country level variables included in the analysis. Noticeably, the global corruption perceptions index displays a weak significant effect. Finally, Model 5 shows both individual level and country level variables. As for the individual level variables, very little happens and the results are comparable to that of Model 3. The effect of global corruption perceptions is reduced and does not reach statistical significance. A growth in GDP predicts an increase in institutionalised participation.

To summarize, the negative effect of corruption perceptions found in the bivariate model is reduced and rendered non-significant when controlling for other determinants of political participation.

Voter turnout and corruption perceptions

The final type of participation being analysed in relation to corruption perceptions is voter turnout. In terms of frequencies, turnout definitely stands out. In total, 79.4 percent of the respondents reported to have voted in the last election. However, one should keep in mind the previously discussed tendency of over-reporting.

Proceeding with the analysis of the final multilevel regression model, one can note that the ICC is 8 percent. Hence, only a small amount of the variation is due to differences between countries. This is a rather surprising result, considering the well-known large effects of electoral system design and contextual factors. However, the amount of variation, to begin with, is limited due to the high number of self-reported turnout.

Model 1 displays the estimated effects on corruption perceptions on turnout. In line with Hypothesis 1, corruption perceptions have a weak negative effect on turnout. The maximal effect, moving from low corruption perceptions to high, predicts a decrease in turnout of 0.08.

Table 3. Voter turnout and corruption. Multilevel regression model, individual and country-level fixed effects, random slope intercept. Standardized error in brackets.

	Model 0	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Individual level fixed effects						
Corruption perceptions (1=hardly anyone involved 5=almost everyone involved)	-	-0.020*** (0.002)	-0.014*** (0.002)	-0.010*** (0.002)	-	-0.009*** (0.002)
External efficacy (higher values = more efficacy)	-	-	0.012*** (0.001)	0.008*** (0.001)	-	0.008*** (0.001)
Internal efficacy (higher values=more efficacy)	-	-	-	0.014*** (0.001)	-	0.014*** (0.001)
Gender (male)	-	-	-	-0.022*** (0.004)	-	-0.022*** (0.004)
Age	-	-	-	0.007*** (0.000)	-	0.007*** (0.000)
Age^2	-	-	-	0.0002*** (7.264)		0.0002*** (7.264)
Education (0=low, 5=high)	-	-	-	0.020*** (0.001)	-	0.019*** (0.001)
Political interest (1=not interested, 4=very interested)	-	-	-	0.045*** (0.002)	-	0.045*** (0.002)
Party mobilization (1= Strongly disagree, 5=agree)	-	-	-	0.006** (0.002)	-	0.006** (0.002)
Country level fixed effects						
Transparency CPI (higher values=more corruption)	-	-	-	-	-0.025* (0.009)	-0.009 (0.009)
GDP Growth	-	-	-	-	0.004 (0.005)	0.003 (0.005)
Proportional system	-	-	-	-	-0.036 (0.040)	-0.017 (0.039)
Compulsory voting	-	-	-	-	0.110 (0.065)	0.115 (0.063)
Presidentialism	-	-	-	-	-0.069 (0.052)	-0.056 (0.050)
No. of electoral parties	-	-	-	-	-0.005 (0.012)	-0.002 (0.012)
Majority status	-	-	-	-	-0.162 (0.181)	-0.153 (0.175)
Intercept	0.796*** (0.021)	0.858*** (0.021)	0.797*** (0.022)	0.608*** (0.022)	1.075**** (0.139)	0.767*** (0.135)
Individual level variance	0.147*** (0.001)	0.147*** (0.001)	0.146*** (0.001)	0.129*** (0.001)	0.147*** (0.001)	0.129*** (0.001)
Country level variance	0.014*** (0.003)	0.013*** (0.003)	0.013*** (0.003)	0.010*** (0.002)	0.010*** (0.003)	0.010*** (0.002)
Intra class correlation (%)	9,1	8,2	8,5	7,7	6,7	7,1
Number of countries	33	33	33	33	33	33
Number of individuals	29299	29299	29299	29299	29299	29299
-2 Log Likelihood	27263.18	27208.94	27090.91	23462.42	27283.40	23492.12

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: ISSP Citizenship 2004, Quality of Government Standard Cross-Section Dataset, May 2010. Comment: See Appendix A for coding of variables.

In Model 2, external political efficacy is included. The effect of corruption perceptions is weakened, yet significant. External efficacy displays a positive effect. Moving from not feeling like you can have an influence, to a strong feeling of having an influence (0-8) predicts an increase in turnout with 0.09.

Model 3 contains all individual level variables. Similar to previous results, all individual level control variables show significant effects and are in line with previous research. As before, those who have strong feelings of political efficacy, are older, are male, more educated, and more interested in politics, are more likely to vote. When controlling for individual level variables, the effect of corruption perceptions is reduced by half, but remain significant.

Model 4 shows the estimates of country-level variables. Similar to the findings for other types of participation, the global corruption perceptions index has a significant effect. Moving from clean (0) to corrupt (10) predicts a decrease in turnout with 0.025. Variables related to electoral design and context do not reach statistical significance.

Model 5 displays the results of when both individual and country level variables are included. Here, very little happens and the effects correspond to those in Model 3. Under control for determinants, known to affect turnout, each step on the corruption perceptions variable (from "hardly anyone involved to "almost everyone involved) predicts a decrease in institutionalised participation by 0.009 activities, with a maximal effect of 0.03. The effect of global perceptions corruption index is reduced and rendered non-significant when individual level variables are included in the model. In summary, perceptions of corruption as widespread have a weak negative effect on turnout under control for well-known determinants.

Assessment of causal mechanism

Finally, the results of a path analysis are presented. The path analysis illustrates the indirect and direct effects, and corresponds to the posited causal mechanism previously proposed (Figure 1). As previously mentioned, the coefficients obtained derive from an OLS-regression. Again, the path analysis shown below is merely an illustration of the proposed causal mechanism and the final predictions and conclusions thereof are tested more robustly in multilevel regressions.

Figure 3,4 and 5 demonstrate path analyses for institutionalised participation, non-institutionalised participation, and turnout. Figure 3 tells us that corruption perceptions (C) have a weak, non-significant, direct effect on non-institutional participation. The indirect effect of corruption perceptions is obtained by multiplying all coefficients from path C, via E to NP[26]. The estimated indirect effect of corruption perception through efficacy, although non-significant, is 0.029, or 83 in percentage. However, there is a strong association between perceived widespread corruption and individual's sense of political efficacy.

Figure 3. *Estimated path coefficients, non-institutionalised participation.*



*** p<0.001, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Figure 4. *Estimated path coefficients, institutionalised participation.*



*** p<0.001, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Figure 5. Estimated path coefficients, voter turnout.



*** p<0.001, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

[26] The direct effect of corruption on participation is demonstrated in the path moving from C → NP/IP/T. The indirect effect is obtained by multiplying the effect from path C to E, with the effect from E → NP/IP/T. In order to express the direct/indirect effect in percentage, the indirect/direct effect is divided with the total effect, which is the coefficient obtained in a bivariate analysis on NP/IP/T and corruption perceptions. The sum of direct and indirect effects is the same as the total effect. For example, as for the path analysis for turnout, the indirect effect is calculated as 0.205*0.071 = 0.0145. The direct effect is 0.037. The total effect is therefore 0.0145+0.037 = 0.051. To express the effect in percentages, the indirect effect is calculated by dividing the indirect effect with the total effect and multiply with 100: 0.0145/0.051=28.4*100=28.4.

Figure 4 demonstrates the path analysis for institutionalised participation. Here, the direct effect of corruptions is .015. Again, one can calculate on the effects. The direct effects represent 34 percentage of the total effect, whereas the indirect effect (0.029) makes 65 percentages. In sum, the path analysis on institutional participation does indicate that a majority of the effect is mediated by external efficacy.

Figure 5 shows the final path analysis on turnout. Compared with the path analysis for institutionalised participation, the pattern is reversed. The direct effect of corruption is 0.037, or 72 in percentage. The indirect effect via external efficacy is merely 0.014 or 28 in percentage.

To conclude, the three path analyses demonstrate different compositions of indirect and direct effects. Whereas corruption has no significant direct effect on non-institutionalised participation, a large part of the effect on institutionalised participation is mediated by external efficacy. As for turnout, the indirect effect is smaller with regards to institutionalised participation, although a considerable amount is still mediated by external efficacy.

Concluding discussion

This thesis started off by establishing that a well-functioning democracy depends on citizen's engagement – whether it is limited to voting at Election Day, or the daily between-election participation. Another central thought is that of corruption as the very opposite to the inclusive nature of democracy. Corruption signals exclusion, where key mechanisms of democracy, such as openness, accountability, and responsiveness, are damaged. Given the importance of participation, and the well-known negative effects of corruption, the aim was to investigate how perceptions of corruption influence our propensity to engage in political participation. A second ambition was to specify an underlying mechanism behind the apparent negative relationship found in previous studies. The research question was met by developing three fully elaborated multilevel models. All in all, 29303 respondents in 33 countries were included.

By acknowledging previously confirmed determinants of participation, the stipulated hypotheses (Chapter 6) underwent rigorous testing. Under control for well-known determinants of voter turnout, corruption perceptions were found to have a negative effect on self-reported turnout, thus confirming hypothesis 1. As for institutionalised participation, the multilevel model did not find

support for hypothesis 2. With regard to non-institutionalised participation, the picture is somewhat more complicated. Living in a corrupt context seems to have a negative impact on our willingness to engage in non-institutionalised participation, while the individual perceptions of corruption do not. Here, it seems clear that the multilevel approach reduced the risk of ecological inference fallacies. The findings are in line with previous research that found the effect on individual perceptions of corruption to be highly influenced by a corrupt context (Solevid & Rothstein 2013; Solevid & Dahlberg 2013). In sum, corruption perceptions mean different things depending on the corruption context. The results do not, however, find support for Hypothesis 3, stating that corruption perception affect our willingness engage in non-institutionalised participation.

Self-confidence about one's ability to influence or have a say in politics prove to have an effect on all forms of political participation. As for turnout, the analysis confirms that both corruption and external efficacy has a similar effect. This thesis also suggested a possible causal mechanism, where external efficacy has a mediating effect. The path analysis demonstrates how corruption perception has a strong effect on individual's sense of external political efficacy, and that efficacy in turn affects political participation. Hence, some sort of relation is found. Keeping in mind the statistical simplicity of the path analysis and its coefficients, Hypothesis 4 can be supported since the path analysis does demonstrate indirect effects of external efficacy. The direct effects were however weak, and for non-institutionalised participation non-significant.

Most general, this paper adds to the general participation literature by confirming effects on well-known determinants of participation. This study also contributes to the growing literature examining the influence of corruption on political participation. The most important finding is that corruption perceptions may discourage voter turnout. Considering competing claims about the relationship between corruption and turnout, the findings support the majority view of corruption as having a de-mobilizing effect on turnout (Stockemer 2013: Stockemer et al 2013: Solevid & Dahlberg 2013). The nil findings on institutionalised and non-institutionalised participation are difficult to situate since most previous research has focused on turnout. The importance of corruption context on non-institutionalised participation does indicate a need to further elaborate on differences between corruption perceptions and context.

As for the general corruption literature, the findings add to the already long list of the damaging effects of corruption. If perceptions of corruption as widespread does decrease turnout, it signals

that corruption affect not only how we think, but also our actual political behaviour. From a normative view, a potentially de-mobilizing effect on turnout should be regarded as serious. If elections are the prime mechanisms for a functioning democracy, a decreased turnout as a result of corruption signals a serious problem.

Future research

Research on corruption and political participation is still in its early stages and several venues are open for future research. Given the importance of an active citizenry and the persistence of corruption, such research is much warranted for.

Both this paper and previous studies call for a development of survey items. A battery of questions, or a set of indicators for corruption, would benefit the research program and generate more robust results. Also, one could elaborate with several corruption measures. This notion is also backed by previous research, which demonstrates dissimilar effects, when using different aggregated corruption measures (Stockemer 2013).

Another venue for future research is to engage even more levels of analyses. Previous studies, based on regional, sub-national levels, have reached different conclusions (Stockemer & Calca 2013; Stockemer & Sundström 2013). It does seem that differences within countries matter, an effect which should be further examined for all types of political participation. Existing surveys, such as the European Social Survey, provide data on both individual and regional level within countries. In addition, I suggest a more case-specific approach. For instance, one could examine how corruption scandals might mobilize or de-mobilize political participation. Perhaps, the more general perceptions are not as influential as a corruption scandal involving for instance an election.

Besides the given need to expand research both in space and time, another interesting venue would be to examine how politicians within countries, marked by widespread corruption act. Possibly, policies that actually hinder citizens to participate are put in place in order to guarantee their power position and enable further corrupt practices. If corruption signifies exclusion, perhaps this is also reflected in policy. Thus, such policies would in the long-term provide hindrance for citizens to participate and possibly exaggerate the negative impact of corruption on political participation.

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APPENDIX

Appendix A. Coding of variables

Dependent variables

Non-institutionalised participation:"Here are some different forms of political and social action that people can take.Please indicate, for each of one, whether: you have done any of these things in the past year; you have done it in the more distant past; you have not done it but might do it; or have not done it and would never, under any circumstances, do it". The variable was constructed as an additive index composed of four participation items: V17) Signed a petition, (V18) Boycott certain products, (V19) Take part in demonstration, (V24) Joined an internet political forum. Original ISSP coding: 1=Have done it in the past year; 2=Have done it in the distant past; 3=Have not done it but might do; 4=Have not done it and would never, under any circumstances do it. Each variable was coded (1/2=1) (3/4=0). A scale ranging from 0-4 was created by combining the five non-institutionalised participation items.

Institutionalised participation: "Here are some different forms of political and social action that people can take. Please indicate, for each of one, whether: you have done any of these things in the past year; you have done it in the more distant past; you have not done it but might do it; or have not done it and would never, under any circumstances, do it". The variable was constructed as an additive index composed of three participation items: (V20) Attended a political meeting or rally (V21) Contacted a politician , and (V25) Actively participate in political party. V21 original coding: 1=Have done it in the past year; 2=Have done it in the distant past; 3=Have not done it but might do; 4=Have not done it and would never, under any circumstances do it. Variables mentioned above was coded as (1/2=1) (3/4=0). V25 was also made into a 0-1 variable. Original ISSP coding: 1= Belong actively, participate; 2=Belong, don't participate; 3= Used to belong; 4=Never belonged. Coded as (1=1) (2/3/4=0). An additive scale ranging from 0-3 was created by combining the three institutionalised participation items.

Voting (V297): "In the last election, did you vote" (No=0) (Yes=1).

Independent individual level variables

Corruption perception (V59): "How widespread do you think corruption is in the public service in (COUNTRY)?": In order to facilitate the analysis, the original ISSP coding was turned. New coding: Almost everyone is involved=1; A lot of people are involved=2; A moderate number of people are involved=3; A small number of people are involved=4; Hardly anyone is involved=5.

External efficacy (V36+V37). The variable consist of two external efficacy items. V36) "To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?: People like me don't have any say about what the government does" (1=Strongly agree) (2=Agree) (3=Neither agree or disagree) (4=Disagree) (5=Strongly disagree). V37) "To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?: I don't think the government cares much what people like me think" (1=Strongly agree) (2=Agree) (3=Neither agree or disagree) (4=Disagree) (5=Strongly disagree). An additive index was created by combining V36 and V37, creating a scale ranging between 0-8.

Internal efficacy (V38+V39). The variable consist of two internal efficacy items. V38: "To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?: I feel I have a pretty good understanding of the important political issues facing (COUNTRY)". " (1=Strongly disagree) (2=Disagree) (3=Neither agree or disagree) (4=Agree) (5=disagree). V39 was turned in order to facilitate interpretation. V39: "I think most people in (COUNTRY) are better informed about politics and government than I am" (1=Strongly agree) (2=Agree) (3=Neither agree or disagree) (4=Disagree) (5=Strongly disagree). An additive index was created by combining V38 and V39, creating a scale ranging between 0-8.

Sex (V200). Coded as a dummy variable (1=male) (0=female, reference).

Age of respondent (V201). Respondents below voting age of 18 was filtered out. The variable was centered around its mean. A squared age term was also created (age*age).

Education (V205). Highest education level (degree). (0= No formal qualification) (1= Lowest formal qualification) (2=Above lowest qualification) (3=Higher secondary completed) (4=Above higher secondary level) (5=University degree completed).

Political interest (V42). "How interested would you say you personally are in politics?". (1=Not at all interested) (2=Not very interested) (3=Fairly interested) (4=Very interested). In order to facilitate analysis, the variable was turned.

Party mobilization (V59). "Thinking now about politics in (COUNTRY), to what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?: Political parties encourage people to become

active in politics". (1=Strongly disagree) (2=Disagree) (3=Neither agree or disagree) (4=Agree) (5=Strongly agree). The variable was turned in order to facilitate analysis.

Independent system level variables

Global corruption perception index (ti_cpi) is based on Transparency Internationals corruption perception index (CPI). The CPI focuses on corruption in the public sector, and does not distinguish between administrative and political corruption. Surveys focuses on acts in line with corruption defined as "the misuse of public power for private benefit", such as bribe-taking. The CPI Score relates to perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen by business people, risk analysts and the general public. In order to facilitate analysis, the original scale was reversed. The scale ranges between 0(=highly clean) and 10(=highly corrupt).

GDP Growth measure the annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local currency. Data from the World Bank national accounts and OECD National Accounts files, compiled by Teorell et al (2010).

Compulsory voting. Countries with compulsory voting laws (1=Compulsory voting) (0= No compulsory voting). Data from IDEA http://www.idea.int/.

Proportional system. Countries with proportional electoral systems. Coded as a dummy (1=Proportional 0=Majoritarian/mixed systems). Data from IDEA http://www.idea.int/.

Presidentialism (pt_pres). Dummy variable (1=Presidentialism) (0=Parliamentary). Measure forms of government. Only regimes where confidence in the assembly for the executive is not needed in order to stay in power is classified as a presidential regime. Retrieved from QoG Cross-Section dataset, May 2010. Compiled by Persson & Tabellini (2003).

Effective Number of Electoral Parties (gol_enep). Measured as the effective number of parliamentary parties calculated by the vote-shares using the index of Laakso and Taagepera (1979).

Majority status (dpi_maj). Number of government seats divided by the total seats in the legislature. Data from Database of Political Institutions (DPI).

Appendix B. Descriptive statistics

	Min	Max	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Dependent variables					
Non-institutional participation	0	4	1.14	1.09	29299
Institutional participation	0	3	0.55	0.78	29299
Voting	0	1	0.79	0.40	29299
Independent variables					
Corruption perception	1	5	2.93	1.05	29299
External efficacy	0	8	3.42	2.18	29299
Internal efficacy	0	8	4.62	1.65	29299
Gender (1=male)	1	0	0.49	1.65	29299
Age	18	94	45.42	16.45	29299
Political interest	1	4	2.53	0.86	29299
Party mobilization	1	5	2.98	1.06	29299
Country level control variables					
TI Corruption Perceptions Index	2.50	9.70	5.65	2.16	33
GDP Growth	-11.03	6.97	1.60	3.57	33
Majority status	0.33	0.89	0.53	0.10	33
Eff. number political parties	2.18	9.74	4.42	1.58	33
Proportional system (mixed/majoritarian ref.)	0	1	0.59	0.49	33
Presidentialism (parliamentary ref.)	0	1	0.30	0.46	33
Compulsory voting laws	0	1	0.13	0.33	33

Source: ISSP 2004 Citizenship. Quality of Government Standard Dataset, May 2010.

Appendix C. Principal Component Analysis of political participation and political efficacy items.

Principal component analysis of seven political participation items. Varimax rotation.

	1	2
	Institutionalised participation	**Non-institutionalised participation**
V17 Sign a petition		.762
V18 Boycott certain products		.803
V19 Joined a demonstration		.641
V20 Attend political meeting or rally	.670	
V21 Contact politician	.552	
V24 Join internet political forum		.490
V25 Belong and participate in political party	.863	
Eigenvalue	1.049	2.946

Source: ISSP Citizenship 2004.

Cronbachs Alpha non .642

Cronbachs Alpha inst .653

Principal component analysis of four political efficacy items. Varimax rotation.

	1	2
	External efficacy	**Internal efficacy**
V36 People like me don't have a say	.857	
V37 Government does not care what I think	.855	
V38 Good understanding of political issues		.838
V39 Most people are better informed than I am		.723
Eigenvalue	1.641	1.132

Source: ISSP Citizenship 2004.

Appendix D. Multilevel regressions with recoded dependent variables.

The displayed variables show the multilevel analysis when the dependent variables of non-institutionalised participation and institutionalised participation are coded more narrowly. Each participation item was dichotomized before combining items, creating two additive scales. Here, only the answer option of "Have done it in the last year" was coded as 1, whereas the rest of the answer options was coded as 0.

Institutionalised participation and corruption. Multilevel regression model, individual and country-level fixed effects.

	Model 0	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Individual level fixed effects						
Corruption perceptions	-	-0.012***	-0.004	0.002	-	0.001
		(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)		(0.002)
External efficacy	-	-	0.018***	0.008***	-	0.007***
			(0.001)	(0.001)		(0.001)
Internal efficacy	-	-	-	0.016***	-	0.016***
				(0.001)		(0.001)
Gender (male)	-	-	-	0.025***	-	0.025***
				(0.004)		(0.004)
Age	-	-	-	0.001***	-	0.001***
				(0.000)		(0.000)
Age^2	-	-	-	-6.255***		-6.266***
				(7.493)	-	(7.493)
Education	-	-	-	0.012***		0.012***
				(0.001)		(0.001)
Political interest	-	-	-	0.088***	-	0.088***
				(0.002)		(0.002)
Party mobilization	-	-	-	0.014***	-	0.014***
				(0.002)		(0.002)
Country level fixed effects						
Transparency CPI	-	-	-	-	0.010	0.000
					(0.005)	(0.005)
GDP Growth	-	-	-	-	-0.006	-0.006
					(0.003)	(0.003)
Intercept	0.132***	0.169**	0.083***	-0.275***	0.074	-0.269***
Individual level variance	0.148***	0.148***	0.147***	0.137***	0.148***	0.137***
Country level variance	0.005***	0.005***	0.004***	0.004***	0.004***	0.003***
Number of countries	33	33	33	33	33	33
Number of individuals	29299	29299	29299	29299	29299	29299
-2 Log Likelihood	-27467.00	-27453.63	-27207.72	-25254.11	-27478.80	-25268.92

**** p<0.001, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: ISSP Citizenship 2004, Quality of Government Standard Cross-Section Dataset, May 2010. Comment: See Appendix A for coding of variables.*

Non-institutionalised participation and corruption. Multilevel regression model, individual and country-level fixed effects.

	Model 0	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Individual level fixed effects						
Corruption perceptions	-	-0.001	0.021***	0.035***	-	0.035***
		(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)		(0.005)
External efficacy	-	-	0.053***	0.020***	-	0.020***
			(0.002)	(0.002)		(0.002)
Internal efficacy	-	-	-	0.056***	-	0.056***
				(0.003)		(0.003)
Gender (male)	-	-	-	-0.069***	-	-0.069***
				(0.010)		(0.010)
Age	-	-	-	0.005***	-	-0.005***
				(0.000)		(0.000)
Age^2	-	-	-	-8.330***	-	-8.315***
				(1.709)	-	(1.709)
Education	-	-	-	0.077***		0.077***
				(0.003)		(0.003)
Political interest	-	-	-	0.185***	-	0.185***
				(0.006)		(0.006)
Party mobilization	-	-	-	0.005	-	-0.004
				(0.004)		(0.004)
Country level fixed effects						
Transparency CPI	-	-	-	-	0.102***¨	0.088***
						(0.019)
GDP Growth	-	-	-	-	-0.020	-0.020
						(0.012)
Intercept	0.613***	0.616**	0.364***	-0.446***	-0.222	-0.085
Individual level variance	0.797***	0.797***	0.786***	0.715***	0.797***	0.715***
Country level variance	0.117***	0.117***	0.114***	0.096***	0.067***	0.059***
Number of countries	33	33	33	33	33	33
Number of individuals	29299	29299	29299	29299	29299	29299
-2 Log Likelihood	-76717.69	-76726.10	-76324.18	-73602.98	-76710.67	-73598.24

**** p<0.001, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: ISSP Citizenship 2004, Quality of Government Standard Cross-Section Dataset, May 2010. Comment: See Appendix A for coding of variables.*

Appendix E. Correlation between corruption measurements.

The figure below illustrates the correlation between aggregated country means of corruption perceptions (ISSP) and Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index.

$R^2 = 0.760$. N=26.



The figure below graph the correlation between aggregated country means of corruption perceptions from ISSP and the Comparative Electoral Systems Survey.

$R^2 = 0.861$. N= 26.



Appendix F. Binary logistic regression, voter turnout and corruption perceptions.

Binary logistic regression: corruption perceptions and voting.

	Model 1		**Model 2**		**Model 3**	
	OR	95 % CI	OR	95% CI	OR	95 % CI
Corruption perceptions	0.702***	0.702-0.741	0.733***	0.713-0.754	0.810***	0.786-0.834
External efficacy			1,052***	1,038-1,066	1.051***	1.036-1.066
Internal efficacy					1.162***	1.138-1.186
Sex (male)					0.901**	0.847-0.959
Age					1.046***	1.044-1.048
Education					1.176***	1,149-1,205
Political interest					1.344***	1.292-1.398
Party mobilization					1.009	0.981-1.039
Intercept	2..384***		2.165***		-1.841***	
Nagelkerke R^2	0.030		0.033		0.188	
-2 Log Likelihood	29265.52		29210.26		26052.94	
Total	29299		29299		29299	

*Source: International Social Survey Programme (2004). Comment: Values express the odds ratio (OR) and confidence interval (CI) of 95%. Significance levels: * p<0,05, ** p<0.01, ***p<0,001.*