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Introduction

It has been argued that bureaucratic structures have important effects on political, economic, and social outcomes. Scholars in economics and sociology argue that a strong and well-organized bureaucracy contributed to the economic growth in the Asian miracle economies of the 1990s as well as to the economic growth more generally in semi-industrial countries (Amsden 1989; Evans and Rauch 1999; Wade 1990; World bank 1993). Other scholars claim that the way the state bureaucracy is organized also strengthens poverty reduction in developing countries (Henderson et al 2007). With reference to the rich western democracies, political scientists have long argued that the bureaucratic structure directly affects policymaking, both historically and today (Dahlström 2009; Heclo 1974; King and Rothstein 1993; Marier 2005; Weir and Skocpol 1985). Within the field of public administration, scholars have defended the bureaucratic organization, warned against the effects of New Public Management reforms and are now predicting the "rediscovery" of bureaucracy (Olsen 2006; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004; Suleiman 2003).

However, in spite of the attention paid to bureaucratic structures there are very few large cross-country comparisons where the organization of the state bureaucracy is actually incorporated. There are several reasons for this. First, the "sore point in the development of comparative public administration" is the lack of reliable data on bureaucratic structures (Brans 2003, 426; see also Lapuente 2007, 301). There are numerous cross-country indicators on the outcomes of bureaucracies, both from private organizations – such as the widely used *Political Risk Services'* International Country Risk Guide

indicator of "quality of bureaucracy" – and from public ones – such as the encompassing *World Bank*'s "governance indicators". Yet there is an almost no cross-country datasets on bureaucratic structure. The sole exception is Peter Evans and James Rauch's pioneering work. Their innovative study resulted in several influential articles and a dataset that has extensively been used in several cross-country comparisons (see for example Evans and Rauch 1999; Rauch and Evans 2000; Henderson et al 2007; Van Rijckeghem and Weder 2001). Evans and Rauch dataset has however some limits since it only covers 35 developing or "semi-industrialized" countries and focuses on the 1970-1990 period. While it provides pioneering insights into the bureaucratic structures of a particular group of countries which experienced unprecedented growth rates with the help of autonomous bureaucracies (such as Spain, South Korea and other Asian "Tigers"), it remains unclear if the same results holds for other parts of the World.

A second reason for why we do not see more cross-country comparisons of state bureaucratic structures is that it is not entirely clear what should be compared. Evans and Rauch address – and find support for – what they call the "Weberian state hypothesis". This hypothesis refers to the effect of several different Weberian organizational features (such as meritocratic recruitment to the state bureaucracy, predictable careers for bureaucrats, etc.) on economic growth and bureaucratic performance. However in a recent article, Johan P. Olsen points out that one of the main lessons from the "ups and downs of bureaucratic organization" is that the composite nature of bureaucratic organizations makes it probable that the different bureaucratic dimensions change in different ways and "is not always positively correlated" (Olsen 2008, 13, 25). Olsen's

note reminds us of that even if we limit the analysis to the Weberian features of the bureaucracy it might very well be multidimensional.

This chapter addresses these two obstacles for cross-country comparisons of the state bureaucratic structure. First, we present the Quality of Government Institute's "Quality of Government Survey", a dataset on the structure and behavior of public administration based on an expert poll in 97 countries. It uses the conceptual basis of Evans and Rauch's data on Weberian bureaucracies as a theoretical tool for guiding data collection, but other perspectives such as New Public Management and administrative "impartiality" has also informed the questionnaire design (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004; Rothstein and Teorell 2008). The goal is to identify important structural characteristics that differentiate public administrations. Second, the chapter suggests two dimensions of the bureaucratic structure, labeled bureaucratic "professionalism" and "closedness", which correspond with established classifications in the comparative administrative history (see for example Silberman 1993 or Lægreid and Recascino Wise 2007).[1] Interestingly, however, the "closedness" dimension only appears in parts of our sample, namely developed Western democracies and the post-communist countries, not in developing countries in Latin America, Asia or Africa. The "professionalism" dimension, by contrast, comes through as a more universal feature of bureaucracies.

In the remainder of the chapter we first provide the theoretical justification for focusing our analysis on the human relations features of public bureaucracies. Second, we describe the sampling frame, data collection and questionnaire design in some detail. Third, we

analyze the multidimensionality of the bureaucratic structure and propose the two

bureaucratic dimensions mentioned above as a way of classifying public administrations.

Finally, we validate the cross-country patterns against other available sources, including

broad cross-country datasets, few case comparisons and more in-depth case studies, and

assess the extent to which respondent characteristics predict placement of countries along

these dimensions. In the concluding section we discuss the implications of our study.

Key characteristics of bureaucratic structures

When it comes to measuring and classifying public bureaucracies, there are broadly

speaking two strands in the literature. On the one hand economists, who are mostly

focused on the "quality" of the outcomes produced by a given state apparatus (see for

example the World Bank's Governance Database). On the other hand comparative public

administration scholars have developed broad typologies based on theoretical concepts

such as administrative legacies or civil service traditions (Barzelay and Galleo 2010;

Painter and Peters 2010).

The subject for this chapter is however somewhat different, and the important question is

which the key characteristics of bureaucratic structures are. Following Evans and Rauch

(1999), our answer is that the employment system in the public sector offers a useful way

of classifying public bureaucracies in comparative public administration. There are

several reasons for this.

First, while employment relationships are at the theoretical core of the concept of Weberian bureaucracy, they have been empirically overlooked. In his pivotal essays published in the volume *Economy and Society* (1978), Max Weber gave an overwhelming importance to public staff policy. The interactions between rulers and their administrative were essential to understand a society (Keiser and Baer 2005). Weber saw an unavoidable organizational conflict within modern bureaucracies: "Historical reality involves a continuous, though for the most part latent, conflict between chiefs and their administrative staffs for appropriation and expropriation in relation to one another" (Weber 1978, 264). Personnel policy is the tool for managing that "latent" but key bureaucratic conflict and therefore we consider it to be a preferential object of study.

Second, scholars have pointed out important variations in how public employment is managed. In some public administrations, politicians are totally free to choose their public employees. In others, administrations have stringent civil service regulations or autonomous administrative *corps* that constrains the selection. These employment systems represent "the most striking" difference between public and private organizations (Frant 1993, 990; Lapuente 2007, 1).

These reasons are also the motivation behind Evans and Rauch's (1999) data collection effort. Following Weber's insight that the key for achieving good governance is replacing a patronage bureaucracy with a merit bureaucracy, Evans and Rauch (1999) develop the "Weberian state hypothesis". Their data collection is guided by the idea that there is an underlying continuum between, on one extreme, patrimonial bureaucracy and, on the

other, Weberian ideal-type bureaucracy. In line with this, they build an indicator – called "Weberianness Scale" – and show how developing countries scoring higher on it were growing faster in the 1970-1990 period. The "Weberianess Scale", which collapses information on ten items, captures the degree to which bureaucracies employ meritocratic recruitment and give predictable, stable and rewarding long-term careers to civil servants.

Despite the strength of their findings, we wish to highlight an intriguing puzzle that is not captured by Evans and Rauch (1999). As pointed out of by administrative scholars and historians bureaucracies are not one-dimensional. Based on studies of Civil service systems in Europe scholars have observed several dimensions that not necessarily is positively correlated.

If there was only one dimension capturing the Weberian ideal-type bureaucracy, one should expect bureaucracies more similar to the private sector (flexible and with few constrains to hire and fire) to be less meritocratic, and more patrimonial than bureaucracies where public employees enter the civil service via a formal examination system and enjoy special protections against arbitrary actions by their (political) superiors. However, in practice, the advancement of meritocracy does not necessarily go hand in hand with a higher protection of employment in the public sector (Olson 2008).

There are examples from Early Modern Europe suggesting that there are at least two dimensions capturing the how the bureaucracy works. Britain and France represent two opposite models on how to achieve a meritocratic public workforce. In its state-building

process, Britain did not develop an autonomous civil service. The non-formalized system of hiring and firing in the Early Modern Britain was more private-sector-like. As Fischer and Lundgreen (1975, 483) point out Britain lacked, comparatively speaking, legal regulations for public employment and "no merit system was formally established, but this does not mean that merit remained necessarily unrewarded". Britain created a system of "hunting" and protection of talent, which "remained in a much more fluid, adaptable state than on the Continent". On the contrary, in France, Prussia and Spain the transformation from a patrimonial to a meritocratic bureaucracy entailed the development of highly legalistic civil service systems. Public employees were covered by extensive special regulations and grouped into autonomous and self-regulated administrative bodies, generally known as *Corps*. These bodies established formalized merit-based examinations to recruit new members, which were hardly disrupted by governmental or royal arbitrary intervention, and they also monopolized the management of civil servants' incentives and disciplinary measures (see also Finer 1997). It thus seems like Britain was able to develop a professional bureaucracy, without also introducing a closed recruitment system. This indicates that the professionalism and the closedness of the bureaucracy should be measured separately.

The historical differences discussed above were still present at the moment of expansion of state activities in Western countries during the late 19th century. In an analysis of the evolution of bureaucratic structures at that time, Silberman (1993) finds that in countries like the US, the UK, Canada or Switzerland public bureaucracies developed a 'professional orientation', since public employees, like the private-sector employees,

were recruited to fill in a given job. In the section "Dimensions of bureaucracy in the real World" we will discuss our empirical indicators of this professionalism dimension.

A second dimension has been described by several authors. Building on experiences from civil service systems in Europe, they point out that there is a division between "open" (e.g. UK, Denmark, and Netherlands) and "closed" systems (e.g. France, German, Spain). In the closed system, public employees join the administration through formalized civil service entry examinations, enjoy life tenure and are frequently managed by self-regulated autonomous administrative corps. At the other end of the continuum we have the more "open" civil service systems, where most public employees are regulated by general labour laws like their private-sector counterparts and selected according to the rule of "best-suited candidate for each position", instead of generally joining an administrative body (Auer, Demmke and Poltet 1996; Bekke and van der Meer 2000; Heady 1996; OECD 2004). Also this dimension will be further discussed and evaluated in the empirical section.

In sum, scholarly studies point towards the existence and importance of the employment system as a key characteristic for defining public bureaucracies. We have also explained why we expect at least two dimensions – referred to as professionalism and closedness – to occur in the data. We should, however, already at this point note that these two dimensions are developed mainly based on a European experience, while we are testing them on a Global sample of countries. In the next section we will describe the data collection and then turn to the empirical analysis of these dimensions.

Questionnaire design

The general purpose of the "Quality of Government" survey is to measure the structure and behavior of public administration across countries. The exact wording of the items analyzed in this chapter is provided in Appendix A. For the full questionnaire and more details see Dahlberg et al. (2011), and the data generated by the survey is available at the Quality of Government Institute web page (www.qog.pol.gu.se).

Despite being condense, the questionnaire covers a variety of topics which are seen as relevant to the structure and functioning of the public administration according to the literature, but on which we lack quantitative indicators for a large number of countries, such as meritocratic recruitment, internal promotion and career stability, salaries, impartiality, NPM reforms, effectiveness/efficiency, and bureaucratic representation.

Two considerations motivating the questionnaire design deserve special mentioning. First, the questionnaire asks about *perceptions* rather than about statements of facts. In this regard, it differs from Evans and Rauch (1999; Rauch and Evans 2000) and is more in line with the general surge in expert polls on quality of government across the globe. Thus, for example, whereas Rauch and Evans (2000, 56) ask their respondents to state "approximately what proportion of the higher officials…enter the civil service via a formal examination system", with responses coded in percentages, we instead ask: "Thinking about the country you have chosen, how often would you say the following

occurs today: Public sector employees are hired via a formal examination system", with responses ranging from 1 ("hardly ever") to 7 ("almost always").

The downside of this strategy is that the subjectively defined endpoints might introduce bias in the country-level estimates, particularly if experts have varying standards of what should be considered "common" or "uncommon". The reason we still opted for this strategy is twofold.

First, this enables us to use the same response scale for a large number of "factual" questions, rather than having to tailor the response categories uniquely for each individual item in the questionnaire. The overarching rationale here is thus questionnaire efficiency: we save both space and response time by a more standardized question format.

Second, we believe that even the most knowledgeable country experts are rarely in a position to correctly answer more than a handful of these questions with any precision. In other words, even the factual question format used by Evans and Rauch (1999) evokes informed guesswork on behalf of the experts. The questionnaire makes this guesswork more explicit from the outset by asking about overall perceptions rather than "correct" answers.

The difference between these two question formats should not be exaggerated. At the end of the day, most of the questions have a factual basis in the sense that some answers for a

given country are more correct than others. We are not primarily interested in perceptions per se, but in the reality that underlies these perceptions. As indicated by the assessments of respondent perception bias reported below, there are few instances where personal characteristics of the experts systematically predict how they place their respective countries. In other words, subjectively defined endpoints do not appear to be a serious threat to the validity of these measures.

Moreover, by relying on more than one expert per country, the cross-country descriptive reported below rely on the convergence of different expert perceptions as our point estimate for the actual workings of a certain country. In practice, this means relying on the mean estimate per country. These cross-country means are overall well correlated with other data sources representing the most established – although small-N – proxies for types of bureaucratic structure up to date. As the section on cross-source validation indicates, there is no obvious support for the presence of systematic measurement error in our data. As a matter of fact, it is quite the opposite, the data presented here seems to generalize for a larger and more diverse group of countries some smaller-N studies and insights by administrative historians. At the same time, respondent disagreement within countries (i.e. the variation around the country mean) may be used as an indication of the uncertainty surrounding each country estimate, thus providing a gauge of the extent of random measurement error.

The second design issue concerns how to label and select the dramatis personae at center stage of the inquiry. More precisely, should one ask about the public administration in

general or about specific sectors or agencies? The survey could have been focused on a "core agency" in the public administration, as did Evans and Rauch (1999), but it is challenging to define what should be considered the "core" of a state. Recall that Evans and Rauch (1999) had a particular bureaucratic outcome in mind when designing their study: that of attaining economic development. Our approach is more general. Apart from studying outcomes such as growth or economic well-being, the survey is designed to explore consequences for public opinion such as generalized trust and subjective well-being. For these types of outcomes the characteristics of street-level bureaucrats could be as important as the those of senior officials, and what specific sector or agency within the public administration that should matter the most cannot be easily settled in advance (and might very well vary between countries). Thus, we opted for a holistic take on the public administration, trying to gauge perceptions of its working in general (with one major exception: we explicitly exclude the military).

After pre-testing it in a pilot, the term chosen to designate – at the most general level – those persons within the public administration we inquire into was *public sector employee*. This is of course a debatable solution. Most notably, there might be large variation across different types of public sector employees in a country, and the expert respondents might then run into difficulties when asked to provide one overall judgment. To off-set this problem somewhat, the survey contained the following clarification in the opening page of the questionnaire:

When asking about public sector employees in this survey, we would like you to think about a typical person employed by the public sector in your country, excluding the military. If you think there are

large discrepancies between branches of the public sector, between the national/federal and subnational/state level, or between the core bureaucracy and employees working with public service delivery, please try to average them out before stating your response.

This is of course more easily said than done, as is also indicated by the numerous comments on this particular issue provided by the respondents. By exploring the consistency and face validity of the data below, however, we may conclude that this strategy worked more often than not.

Sampling frame and data collection

After a pilot conducted in the winter of 2007-2008, the survey has been administrated in two waves, the first between September 2008 and May 2009, the second between March and November 2010 (for details, see Dahlberg et al. 2011). In order to obtain a sample of experts, we drew up a list of persons registered with international networks for public administration scholars (such as NISPACEE, EGPA, EIPA, SOG, CLAD, ICAP, ISEAS and CAPAM), complemented with searches on the internet, personal contacts, the list of experts recruited from a pilot survey, and a small snowballing component. All in all, this resulted in a sample of 1361 persons in the first wave, of which 528 or 39 percent responded, and 1414 in the second, of which 432 or 31 percent responded.[2] Adding to this 13 persons who responded to an open link distributed to one network of scholars (where we thus cannot track the number of potential respondents), this sums to 973 experts having provided responses for 126 countries (including 2 semi-sovereign territories: Hong Kong and Puerto Rico).

The distribution of experts across countries is provided in Table 1. While the number of respondents varies substantially, from only 1 for some countries to a maximum of 28 in the Czech Republic, on average 7.7 experts per country have taken the time to respond to our survey. The countries covered more or less span the globe, including Western Europe and North America, the post-communist countries in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, Latin America, Asia and even the Middle East. Two notable omissions in terms of geographical representation stand out: one concerns Sub-Saharan Africa, the other island states in the Pacific and Caribbean. Although some of the poorest countries of the world are thus not included, our sample thus still covers a substantial part of both the developed and developing world.

*** Table 1 about here ***

Dimensions of bureaucracy in the real World

We now turn to the key result of this web survey. To enhance data quality, this section's analysis exclusively relies on the 936 respondents covering 97 countries for which at least 3 expert responses have been obtained. Given the impossibility to account for all bureaucratic features in a comparative study, we concentrate on what could be referred to as the human resources dimension(s) of a Weberian bureaucracy, leaving other characteristics aside. With the human resources dimension(s) we basically mean the recruitment, the career, and the rewarding system for public employees. It is important to emphasize here that, as Olsen (2008) notes; there are several other characteristics of an ideal type Weberian bureaucracy such as the bureau organization, the hierarchical

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organization, and the rule-based authority. Nevertheless, following the theoretical reasons presented in previous sections and the empirical recommendation by Evans and Rauch, we consider staff policy or human resources to have an essential role for explaining bureaucratic capacity (Evans and Rauch 1999; Olsen 2008).

For the present purposes we have explored the eight items that, for the literature reviewed above, represent the main employment-related characteristics of a Weberian bureaucracy. According to the most prevailing view (confirmed in Evans and Rauch's 1999 dataset) one should expect these characteristics to go hand in hand. These items include the extent to which recruitment is based on merit (q2_a) and formal examinations (q2_c) rather than political criteria (q2_b, q2_d), as well as the extent to which promotion within the hierarchy is an internal affair (q2_e) and is based on lifelong career paths (q2_f). Competitive salaries (q2_k) and special protection from extraordinary labor laws (q8_1) are other components of this assemblage of features. (For an extract of the survey questionnaire including the items just discussed see Appendix A.)

These questions are capturing different bureaucratic characteristics, and could be seen as indicators of distinct bureaucratic dimensions. Table 2 reports the results from country-level principal components factor analyses of the above mentioned eight items. The goal is thus to ascertain whether a set of underlying dimensions structure the differences in mean responses across countries.

As reported in the first panel (A) of Table 2, based on all 97 countries, meritocratic recruitment and internal promotion appear to be strongly connected in a first dimension with a non-politicized bureaucracy. Since these characteristics represent the ideal of a "professional" (vis-à-vis "politicized") administration, and mentioned earlier in the chapter we call this dimension bureaucratic "professionalism".

Nevertheless, not all "Weberian" characteristics seem to go hand in hand. Specifically, some features form a second empirically significant cluster. In this second dimension, the use of formal examination systems is intimately connected to having lifelong careers and protection through special employment regulations. Since this dimension captures the distinction between open (i.e. more "private-like") and closed (i.e. more "public-like") civil service systems mentioned above, we call it bureaucratic "closedness".

Thus, contrary to the intuitive view that a more public-oriented or "closed" administration would prevent politicization and enhance meritocracy, the analysis in Table 2 shows that the countries with more closed bureaucracies *do not* significantly have more meritocratic recruitment or less politicization of the civil service. The final component, competitive salaries, does not conclusively belong to either of these dimensions and should therefore be treated separately.

*** Table 2 around here ***

However, upon closer scrutiny it turns out that this dimensional structure is not universally applicable. Based on more fine-grained dimensional analyses performed region-by-region,[3] the details of which we omit for space-preserving reasons, the global pattern seems to hold up fairly well in the 47 countries drawing from the "West" (meaning Western Europe, North America, Australia and New Zealand) and the "East" (meaning the post-communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union) (see upper part of panel B). In the remaining countries from the "South", however, stemming from Latin America, East, South-East and South Asia, the Middle East and scattered parts of Sub-Saharan Africa, there is a critical difference in the makeup of the two first dimensions (see upper part of panel C). More specifically, the use of formal exams as a mechanism for public sector recruitment is in these parts of the world a component of the "professionalism" dimension, leaving lifelong careers and special employment laws as the only indicators of closedness.

Here is not the place to determine exactly why this difference in public employment structures has emerged. We can only speculate in the possibility that, at the critical stage of state-building, competitive exams became the primary mechanism for implementing meritocratic recruitment in the developing world. In Europe, by contrast, these exams only became the tool for establishing meritocratic recruitment in closed bureaucracies formed in the "Napoleonic" tradition, such as France and Spain, whereas other mechanisms of meritocratization were implemented in, for example, Britain and Scandinavia (Peters and Painter 2010, 20-23). Whatever its origins, this dual nature of formal exams raises a problem of measurement equivalence for our efforts to compare

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bureaucratic structures systematically across the globe. Put simply, what the lower panels of Table 2 imply is that professionalism and closedness are not the same "species", as it were, in different parts of the world. This in turns means that we cannot form an equivalent measure of the two across all countries.

The lower parts of panels B and C of Table 2 however also suggest a partial solution to this measurement problem by indicating that the four core indicators of the professionalism dimension, if studied in isolation and most critically without the item on formal exams, hold up well across contexts. As a consequence, we may safely compare this dimension across countries, although the remaining three indicators of closedness (formal exams, lifelong careers and special employment laws) may only be combined into a meaningful measure of closedness in the "Western" and "Eastern" sample of countries.

Based on these results we thus construct two additive indices, *professionalism* and *closedness* which link back to the theoretical expectations described in previous sections, computed by averaging the respective items to which these dimensions are strongly connected, but for the closedness index based on a more limited sample (only "Western" and "Eastern" countries). Theoretically these indices may vary from 1 to 7, with 1 representing completely unprofessionalized or perfectly open systems, and 7 corresponding to a perfectly professionalized or closed system. The basic descriptive information on these two indices, together with the remaining competitive salaries indicator, is presented in Table 3. As can be seen, the average bureaucratic system

included in this sample is deemed to be slightly more professionalized and, even clearer so, more closed than the midpoint (4) of the 1-7 scale. Salaries are however to a lesser degree perceived to be competitive in these countries.

*** Table 3 about here ***

As Table 3 also indicates, however, there are large discrepancies around these means, both among experts assessing different countries and among those judging the same country. These variations are presented in Figure 1-2, which together with the country-specific means display 95 % confidence intervals that take the underlying within-country uncertainty into account.[4]

*** Figure 1-2 around here ***

In Figure 1 we find most countries belonging to the Anglo-Saxon tradition or strongly influenced by that tradition, such as Ireland, New Zealand, Hong Kong and the UK, or to the Scandinavian administrative tradition, such as Norway, Denmark and Sweden, at the top of the Professionalism continuum, which is not very surprising. However, here we also find countries belonging to the East Asian administrative tradition, like Japan and Korea, known for having a strong professional bureaucracy. In the middle of the scale we find European countries with known high levels of politicization of the civil service, such as Spain and Italy (Dahlström 2009; Matheson et al 2007), and close to the bottom, several Latin American countries, which according to Peters and Painter (2010, 24) are

belonging to an administrative tradition that is "patrimonial at its core". As the confidence intervals indicate, there is of course considerable uncertainty underlying these estimates. Of particular concern in this regard are Botswana, Mozambique, Nepal, Ecuador and Kyrgyzstan, where the expert respondents are in considerable disagreement over the extent to which the public administration in these countries is professionalized. The average 95 % confidence interval is however 1.01, almost exactly the magnitude of the cross-country standard deviation. The ratio of the between- over the within-country variation, moreover, is approximately 1.19 (see Table 3). Despite expert uncertainty, and in some cases small country samples, we would thus argue that these data give meaningful estimates of the level of professionalization across countries.

Figure 2 captures how "closed" civil service systems are in the limited sample (only "Western" and "Eastern" countries), and, again, the ranking seems to correspond with established observations in the small-N studies surveyed above. Near the top are Spain and France, countries that already in the historical analysis of public administrations in the 19th century have been pointed out as the clearest examples of bureaucracies with "organizational orientation", in opposition to the ones with "professional orientation" (Silberman 1993). Those countries (together with other such as Greece, Italy or Belgium) also rank at the top in more contemporary accounts of closed administrations, both by scholars (Peters and Painter 2010) and international organizations (OECD 2004). At the bottom of the ranking, we find the countries regarded in those accounts as more "open" (or more professional or private-sector oriented), such as New Zealand, Australia, Denmark or the Netherlands (OECD 2004). These countries lack the formal examinations

more "closed" bureaucracies have (e.g. French *concours* or Spanish *oposiciones*) as well as their guarantees of lifelong tenure and other civil service protections established in special employment laws (Bezes 2010; Lapuente 2007). At the bottom of the bureaucratic closedness scale we also see a very different group of countries – such as Belarus, Georgia or Russia – that were also at the bottom in terms of bureaucratic professionalism given their high levels of politicization and low levels or meritocracy. In other words, being at the bottom of this scale, because you have a more open or private-oriented approach to public employment, does not lead you to have a less (or more) meritocratic bureaucracy.

Again these point estimates are surrounded by perception uncertainty. The average 95 % confidence interval is here 1.10, and the between/within-country variation ratio only .84. Countries of considerable concern are Uzbekistan, where the uncertainty bounds are so wide as to render any meaningful inference almost impossible, but also Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzhtan, Azerbaijan and Austria. Although this warrants caution for potential data users, the cross-country patterns are nevertheless sensible enough to suggest that these data tap into another structural difference among bureaucratic systems.

The fact that professionalism and closedness are independent dimension is graphically summarized in Figure 3, which plots the 47 countries from which we have data on both their degree of "professionalism" and "closedness." Unlike the usual unidimensional accounts of bureaucracies (i.e. patronage-based vs. merit-based), we see here how four different types of bureaucracies emerge. Among the more "open" (or more "private"),

there are both patronage-based (e.g. Moldova, Georgia) as well as the top performers in merit (e.g. New Zealand, Denmark). And among the more "closed" or "public" there are some relatively meritocratic (e.g. Ireland, Belgium and France), but there are also some with relatively high levels of politicization and lack of merit (e.g. Greece, Italy). In other words, having a more "public" bureaucratic employment system does not mean having a more meritocratic bureaucracy (they correlate at –.05). These findings can have important normative implications for policymakers interested in developing more meritocratic bureaucracies.

*** Figure 3 around here ***

Cross-source validation

We now turn to a check of the robustness of the two dimensions just discussed, using four different alternative proxies of bureaucratic structure from various sources. These tests are reported in Table 4. The first source of validation is an expert survey on the number of politically appointed officials in the central government offices from 18 countries conducted by Dahlström (2011). Between two and four highly qualified country experts, all of whom were identified on the basis of their publication record in public administration, were asked to provide an estimate of this number. This survey is thus similar to ours in terms of the sample of experts (although the sample size per country is more narrow), but instead of using a subjectively defined response scale, exact, and thus more objective statements of facts, were solicited. We have taken the log of this figure to smooth out country outliers, the expectation of course being that more professionalized

systems should have fewer political appointees. The degree to which a bureaucratic system is open or closed, on the other hand, is not expected to be correlated with this number.

*** Table 4 about here ***

The second source reported in Table 4 is the scale of "Bureaucracy quality", ranging from 1 to 4, as reported by the Political Risk Services group's "International Credit Risk guide" in 2008, the latest year available. The ICRG staff produces a subjective assessment based on available political information from 143 countries in the world, 87 of which overlap with our country sample.[5] We expect also this assessment to be correlated with the professionalism index, but not with bureaucratic closedness.

The third and fourth sources have been selected to correspond to the closedness dimension. Data for both have been collected by the OECD through a survey filled in by senior officials from ministries/agencies for public employment/management of the civil service. The underlying data are thus again subjective perceptions, but now from the viewpoint of civil servants themselves rather than from outside experts. The first is the "Index of Recruitment Systems", which theoretically varies from 0 ("Career-based system", i.e., "closed") to 1 ("Position-based system", i.e., "open"). This index is constructed from four questions, two of which tap in to the use of competitive examinations vs. direct applications in the recruitment process, and one of which concerns the extent to which positions in the civil service are open to external recruitment

or not. These features closely correspond to our theoretical distinction between open and closed bureaucracies (OECD 2009).

The fourth (and second OECD) source is a measure of the "degree of individualization", which denotes "the degree to which the management rules and practices vary according to the individuals and less according to the group" (OECD 2004, 17). In those systems defined as closed, public, organizationally-oriented or career-based, candidates join the civil service in relatively large-scale job competitions, their salaries and employment conditions are collectively bargained and their promotions collectively regulated and granted. In simple words, civil servants are, first and foremost, treated as members of a collective. On the contrary, in those systems known as open, private, professionally-oriented or position-based, candidates (like their private sector counterparts) are recruited to fill a particular position, and their salaries and employment conditions are more likely to be set on an individual basis. Thus, this is a measure we expect to be associated with the closedness of a bureaucracy, not to its degree of professionalism.

As Table 4 makes clear, these expectations are well borne out. Among the 18 countries for which there are overlapping observations, the professionalism index is negatively correlated with the number of appointees (at –.67), whereas the association with the closedness index at .42 is only marginally significant. Moreover, ICRG:s "bureaucracy quality" is reasonably well correlated with professionalism (at .70), but completely unrelated to closedness. By contrast, the two OECD indices are most closely related to

closedness (with correlations at –.66 and –.55), but their relationships with professionalism are weak and not statistically significant.

Equally reassuring are the results from correlating selected indicators in our data with those obtained by Rauch & Evans (2000) for 27 overlapping countries. Their "merit" indicator, which is a composite but mostly should tap into the use of formal examination systems, correlates at .83 with our corresponding formal exams indicator (q2_c), and at .64 with our more general item on meritocratic recruitment (q2_a). Their gauge of "career stability", moreover, correlates at .74 with out measure of internal promotion (q2_e), and at .72 with that of lifelong careers (q2_f). Finally, our measure of competitive salaries correlates at .46 with Rauch & Evans (2000) corresponding indicator. (See Appendix A for our items.)

Assessing Respondent Perception Bias

The expert respondents taking part in our survey of course differ from each other. The average respondent in our more restricted sample of 97 countries with at least 3 respondents is a male (71 %), 48 years old PhD (72 %), an overwhelming majority of which were either born (89 %) or live (93 %) in the country for which they have provided their responses. From the second wave of data collection, when a question on employment was first introduced, we also know that 56 percent of the respondents are university academics, 14 percent work for an NGO or non-profit organization, and 15 percent are employed by the very government they are being asked to assess. Do these expert characteristics somehow affect perceptions of bureaucratic structures? If

perceptions vary systematically by observable expert characteristics, the extent to which they reflect a common underlying reality would be in doubt. That would for example imply that the estimate for a particular country is determined by the make-up of the sample of experts rather than by its bureaucratic structure or practices.

To assess the risk of such perception bias, we have in Table 5 regressed the two dimensions of bureaucracy on all six expert characteristics for which we have data. Table 5 contains three columns. The first column reports results from both waves for the professionalism dimension (97 countries), while the second reports the results for the professionalism dimension only using the second wave (53 countries). The reason for including the second column is that we can only analyze the effect of employment in the second wave. In the third column we report results for the closedness dimension, using information on "Western" and "Eastern" countries from both waves (47 countries).

In order to assess differences in perceptions across different types of experts while holding the object of evaluation (i.e. the bureaucracy of a specific country) constant, these estimates exclusively rely on the within-country variation among experts (in technical terms, we control for country-fixed effects). With this control in place, as can be seen, there are no gender or age differences in the estimates of professionalism or closedness, nor does country of birth matter. However, a systematic tendency that does appear is that respondents assessing countries *in which they do not live* perceive bureaucracies to be less professionalized and more open (as compared to experts living in the country they assess). Thus, once cross-country variation is being controlled for,

respondents not living in the country they assess rate the bureaucracies .362 points lower than resident respondents on the 1–7 professionalism scale, and .384 lower on the 1–7 closedness index. There is also a hardly surprising tendency of about the same magnitude that government employees assess their bureaucratic structures as more professionalized than non-government employees. Finally, respondents having achieved a higher level of education (in effect PhDs) perceive bureaucracies as somewhat less professionalized.

*** Table 5 about here ***

Although we must acknowledge that these systematic differences appear in the data, they are at the same time not very large in absolute terms. When it comes to relative differences in country scores, moreover, the results we obtain are extremely robust to these controls for expert characteristics (average country scores with and without controls correlate at .99). By and large then, whereas these sources of perception bias introduce some extra noise in our data, they are not serious enough to question the overall validity of the dimensions of bureaucracy.

Conclusions

The field of comparative public administration lacks broad comparative data on many of its key variables which, of course, hampers empirical analyses. This chapter has presented a unique attempt to provide such data on several relevant administrative features for a large number of countries. This data is publically available at Quality of Government Institute web page (www.qog.pol.gu.se) and will in the future hopefully help

to explain differences in bureaucratic performance, state capacity and social outcomes such as corruption and economic growth.

The chapter makes both a theoretical and an empirical contribution. Drawing on the work of administrative historians, we argue that already on theoretical grounds one should expect several dimensions in a Weberian bureaucracy. While acknowledging that there are several other characteristics of an ideal type Weberian bureaucracy not measured by our data (such as the bureau organization, the hierarchical organization, and the rule-based authority), we suggest two dimensions based on the recruitment and career systems in the bureaucracy. In this chapter we refer to the two dimensions as bureaucratic *professionalism* (i.e. up to which extent bureaucracies are "professional" vis-à-vis "politicized") and bureaucratic *closedness* (i.e. up to which extent bureaucracies are more "closed" or public-like vis-à-vis "open" or private-like).

The main contribution of the chapter is however empirical and we demonstrate that the recruitment and career features of the bureaucracy follow the two dimensions in Western democracies and post-communist countries. By contrast, in other parts of the World, such as Latin America, Asia and Africa, only the professionalism dimension is applicable. These findings are interesting for at least two reasons. First, it demonstrates that analytic dimensions based on the European experience of administrative history can not be assumed to work in developing countries without empirical scrutiny. Second, it also shows that while some bureaucratic features do not cluster together to meaningful dimensions for all parts of the World, others actually do. Maybe the most important

finding in the chapter is that the professionalism dimension actually allows meaningful comparison of public administrations across different contexts. Finally, by way of validating the two dimensions against other independent data sources and demonstrating that the results have not been produced by respondent perception bias the chapter secures data quality and points to the significance of the results.

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Table 1. Number of Valid Responses by Country

Country	n	Country	n	Country	n
Albania	11	Guatemala	18	*Panama*	2
Algeria	3	*Guinea*	1	Paraguay	6
Argentina	17	*Guyana*	1	Peru	9
Armenia	16	Honduras	3	Philippines	15
Australia	11	Hong Kong	12	Poland	11
Austria	5	Hungary	15	Portugal	9
Azerbaijan	6	Iceland	4	Puerto Rico	6
Bahamas	1	India	15	Romania	17
Bangladesh	6	Indonesia	19	Russia	6
Barbados	1	Ireland	16	*Rwanda*	1
Belarus	9	Israel	15	Saudi Arabia	4
Belgium	9	Italy	7	Serbia	3
Bolivia	9	Jamaica	9	*Seychelles*	1
Bosnia	7	Japan	9	*Sierra Leone*	1
Botswana	3	Jordan	4	*Singapore*	1
Brazil	8	Kazakhstan	7	Slovakia	7
Bulgaria	22	South Korea	15	Slovenia	11
Burkina Faso	1	*Kuwait*	2	South Africa	9
Cameroon	2	Kyrgyzstan	6	Spain	7
Canada	18	Latvia	7	Sri Lanka	8
Chile	17	Lebanon	3	*St Lucia*	1
China	4	*Lesotho*	1	*Sudan*	2
Colombia	15	Lithuania	11	Suriname	3
Costa Rica	14	*Luxembourg*	1	Sweden	10
Croatia	6	Macedonia	7	Switzerland	5
Cuba	1	Malawi	3	Taiwan	3
Cyprus	2	Malaysia	8	*Tanzania*	1
Czech Republic	28	Malta	4	Thailand	*10*
Denmark	13	Mauritania	3	*Timor-Leste*	1
Dominican Rep.	5	*Mauritius*	2	*Trinidad & Tob.*	1
Ecuador	5	Mexico	11	*Tunisia*	1
Egypt	3	Moldova	3	Turkey	20
El Salvador	11	*Mongolia*	2	*Uganda*	2
Estonia	10	Morocco	3	Ukraine	11
Ethiopia	1	Mozambique	3	United Arab Em.	4
Finland	11	Nepal	5	United Kingdom	12
France	6	Netherlands	14	United States	19
Gabon	1	New Zealand	12	Uruguay	10
Georgia	8	Nicaragua	17	Uzbekistan	3
Germany	12	Nigeria	5	Venezuela	22
Ghana	1	Norway	12	Vietnam	15
Greece	22	Pakistan	3	*Zimbabwe*	1
				TOTAL	973

Note: Countries in italics are not included in this chapter due to too low response rate.

Table 2. Dimensions of Bureaucracy.

	Professionalism	Closedness	Salaries
A. GLOBALLY (*n*=97)			
Meritocratic recruitment (q2_a)	**.91**	.08	.07
Political recruitment (q2_b)	**−.88**	−.03	−.15
Political elite recruits senior officials (q2_d)	**−.80**	−.08	.09
Senior officials internally recruited (q2_e)	**.70**	.43	−.10
Formal examination system (q2_c)	.34	**.74**	−.06
Lifelong careers (q2_f)	.28	**.78**	−.24
Special employment laws (q8_f)	−.24	**.78**	−.03
Competitive salaries (q2_k)	.07	−.09	**.97**
B. EAST & WEST (*n*=47)			
Multidimensional:			
Meritocratic recruitment (q2_a)	**.91**	−.15	−.01
Political recruitment (q2_b)	**−.93**	.14	−.09
Political elite recruits senior officials (q2_d)	**−.85**	−.13	−.09
Senior officials internally recruited (q2_e)	**.82**	.25	−.08
Formal examination system (q2_c)	−.08	**.86**	.08
Lifelong careers (q2_f)	.23	**.76**	−.30
Special employment laws (q8_f)	−.37	**.59**	−.20
Competitive salaries (q2_k)	.05	−.07	**.97**
Unidimensional:			
Meritocratic recruitment (q2_a)	**.93**	—	—
Political recruitment (q2_b)	**−.94**	—	—
Political elite recruits senior officials (q2_d)	**−.85**	—	—
Senior officials internally recruited (q2_e)	**.80**	—	—
C. SOUTH (*n*=50)			
Multidimensional:			
Meritocratic recruitment (q2_a)	**.89**	.22	.10
Political recruitment (q2_b)	**−.78**	−.20	−.30
Political elite recruits senior officials (q2_d)	**−.79**	.05	.15
Senior officials internally recruited (q2_e)	**.64**	.45	−.27
Formal examination system (q2_c)	**.81**	.36	−.17
Lifelong careers (q2_f)	.43	**.75**	−.25
Special employment laws (q8_f)	.08	**.87**	.11
Competitive salaries (q2_k)	.01	−.04	**.92**
Unidimensional:			
Meritocratic recruitment (q2_a)	**.92**	—	—
Political recruitment (q2_b)	**−.82**	—	—
Political elite recruits senior officials (q2_d)	**−.78**	—	—
Senior officials internally recruited (q2_e)	**.72**	—	—

Note: Entries are varimax rotated factor loadings retained from principal components factor analyses at the country level. Loadings >.5 or <−.5 are highlighted in bold, questionnaire items (see the Appendix) within parentheses.

Table 3. Descriptive Characteristics of Three Dimensions of Bureaucracy.

	Country–level mean	Cross–country standard deviation	Within–country standard deviation	Ratio cross–over within variation	N (n)
Professionalism	3.92	.99	.83	1.19	97 (936)
Closedness	4.92	.74	.87	.84	47 (486)
Salaries	3.21	1.02	1.42	.72	97 (910)

Note: Each dimension may theoretically vary from 1 to 7. The within–country standard deviation is based on *n* individual–level respondents, the country–level means and cross–country standard deviations are based on *N* countries.

Table 4. Tests of Cross–Source Validity.

	Professionalism	Closedness
Log of no. of political appointees	–.67***	.42*
	(18)	(18)
Bureaucracy quality (ICRG)	.70***	.03
	(87)	(41)
Index of recruitment system (OECD)	.08	–.66***
	(25)	(21)
Degree of individualization (OECD)	.31	–.55***
	(28)	(25)

* significant at the .10–level, ** significant at the .05–level, *** significant at the .01–level.

*Note:* Entries are correlation coefficients, with number of countries within parentheses.

Table 5. Respondent Perception Bias.

	Professionalism	*Professionalism*	*Closedness*
Female	–.033	–.019	–.137
	(.072)	(.118)	(.104)
PhD	–.164**	–.105	.018
	(.081)	(.120)	(.130)
Year of birth	–.000	.000	.005
	(.003)	(.004)	(.004)
Was not born in country	–.061	–.030	.115
	(.102)	(.153)	(.161)
Does not live in country	–.362***	–.283	–.384**
	(.123)	(.194)	(.191)
Government employee in country		.350**	
		(.159)	
Number of respondents (*n*)	874	370	457
Number of countries (*N*)	97	53	47

* significant at the .10–level, ** significant at the .05–level, *** significant at the .01–level.

Note: Entries are country–fixed effects regression coefficients with standard errors within parentheses.

Figure 1. Bureaucratic Professionalism (country means with 95 % confidence intervals)

Professionalization index (upper half)

Figure 2. Bureaucratic Closedness (country means with 95 % confidence intervals)

Figure 3. Bureaucratic professionalism and bureaucratic closedness.

Appendix A: Extract from the QoG-survey questionnaire

q2. *Thinking about the country you have chosen, how often would you say the following occurs today?* [Response scale from 1."Hardly ever" to 7."Almost always"]

a. When recruiting public sector employees, the skills and merits of the applicants decide who gets the job?

b. When recruiting public sector employees, the political connections of the applicants decide who gets the job?

c. Public sector employees are hired via a formal examination system?

d. The top political leadership hires and fires senior public officials?

e. Senior public officials are recruited from within the ranks of the public sector?

f. Once one is recruited as a public sector employee, one stays a public sector employee for the rest of one's career?

g. Firms that provide the most favorable kickbacks to senior officials are awarded public procurement contracts in favor of firms making the lowest bid?

h. When deciding how to implement policies in individual cases, public sector employees treat some groups in society unfairly?

j. When granting licenses to start up private firms, public sector employees favor applicants with which they have strong personal contacts?

k. Senior officials have salaries that are comparable with the salaries of private sector managers with roughly similar training and responsibilities?

l. The salaries of public sector employees are linked to appraisals of their performance?

m. When found guilty of misconduct, public sector employees are reprimanded by proper bureaucratic mechanisms?

q8. *To what extent would you say the following applies today to the country you have chosen to submit your answers for?* [Response scale from 1."Not at all" to 7."To a very large extent"]

a. Public sector employees strive to be efficient?

b. Public sector employees strive to implement the policies decided upon by the top political leadership?

c. Public sector employees strive to help clients?

d. Public sector employees strive to follow rules?

e. Public sector employees strive to fulfil the ideology of the party/parties in government?

f. The terms of employment for public sector employees are regulated by special laws that do not apply to private sector employees?

g. The provision of public services is subject to competition from private sector companies, NGOs or other public agencies?

h. The provision of public services is funded by user fees and/or private insurances rather than taxes?

i. Women are proportionally represented among public sector employees?

j. Key ethnic and religious groups in society are proportionally represented among public sector employees?*

k. Public sector employees risk severe negative consequences if they pass on information about abuses of public power to the media?*

l. Government documents and records are open to public access?*

m. Abuses of power within the public sector are likely to be exposed in the media?*

* Note: Questions q8_j, q8_k, q8_l, and q8_m were only included in the second wave (2010). Neither of these questions are however analysed in this chapter.

Notes

[1] It should, however, already at this point be noted that we do not claim that these two dimensions are the only important characteristics of a Weberian bureaucracy. We are aware of that we are leaving features such as the bureau organization, the hierarchical organization, and the rule–based authority, aside and concentrating our efforts on recruitment and career systems.

[2] The average response time was around 15 minutes when correcting for extreme outliers in the first wave, and 18 minutes in the second. We contacted these persons by email, including a clickable link inside the email leading to the web–based questionnaire. In the first wave, only an English–language questionnaire was provided, whereas respondents in the second were also offered the questionnaire in Spanish and French. The only incentives presented to participants were access to the data, a first–hand report, and the possibility of being invited to future conferences.

[3] Although these regional level analyses signify an important move down the ladder of generality, it would of course have been ideal to pin down the dimensional structure on a country–by–country basis. However, the very small sample sizes within countries do not allow that option.

[4] Since the average sample size per country is slightly less than 10 respondents, non–parametric bootstrapped confidence intervals are deemed more accurate than parametric ones based on the normality assumption. Bias–corrected 95 percent confidence intervals with 1000 replications on a country–by–country basis have been estimated in Stata 11.0

[5] ICRG, "Interbnational Country Risk Guide Methodology". The PRS Group. Available online at: http://www.prsgroup.com/ICRG_Methodology.aspx, p.7.