



GÖTEBORGS
UNIVERSITET

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

QUESTIONING THE POPULIST RADICAL RIGHT PARTY FAMILY

Exclusion based on culture – more than rhetoric?

Hanna Svensson

Master's Thesis:	30 higher education credits
Programme:	Master's Programme in Political Science
Date:	May 2015
Supervisor:	Jonas Hinnfors
Words:	19 846

ABSTRACT

The so called *party family* of populist radical right parties (PRRPs) have primarily been lumped together based on similarities in ideology (nativism) and immigration policy. While PRRPs' immigration policy has attracted considerable attention from scholars, the other main political instrument to reach nativist objectives – cultural policy - remains understudied. To make research on the PRRP family more comprehensive, this thesis compares ideas on cultural policy between three Western European PRRPs (Dansk Folkeparti, Front National and Sverigedemokraterna). It turns out that two subgroups are distinguishable within the PRRP family, whereof one underpins their nativist rhetoric with political substance while the other does not. However, besides ideology, PRRPs also differ when it comes to other commonly used criteria in party family research. As discovered that these parties also differ regarding cultural policy ideas, their nativist ideology as the foundation for being a party family is questioned.

Keywords:

Party families, the populist radical right, nativism, cultural policy, culture, Dansk Folkeparti, Front National, Sverigedemokraterna

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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. A forgotten policy area

As a response to the Greens, New left and regionalist parties, a third wave of right-wing extremism emerged in Europe in the early 1980s.¹ “Invented” by the French National Front (*Front National*, FN), these parties are primarily distinguished from previous waves by how they base their exclusionary politics on a cultural “mixophobia” instead of on biological racism.² The populist radical right parties (PRRPs) were initially treated as *pariah* by most other political actors.³ However, as their electoral achievements grew so did their political influence and right-wing extremism is currently experiencing its most successful period in post war Europe. Except being present in nearly all Western European countries, some parties, such as the Danish Peoples’ Party (*Dansk Folkeparti*, DF), have reached important government positions. Moreover, PRRPs advance both regarding ideological and electoral achievements. For example, the support for the Sweden Democrats (*Sverigedemokraterna*, SD) have more than doubled since 2010.⁴

Even if PRRPs have become a well-established feature in the political landscape, it has been proven problematic to assign them a common label, a theoretical definition and core characteristics. Several factors complicate this. For example, PRRPs originate from different historical, sociological and ideological roots.⁵ Laurenz Ennser notes that this could make us suspect them to be less uniform than other groups of parties.⁶ Still, they are treated as a *party family* by most scholars,⁷ which imply that family members are expected to share certain political viewpoints.⁸ PRRPs have principally been assembled on the *ideological level*, based on their current shared nativist ideology.⁹ In essence, nativism reflects the previously mentioned cultural mixophobia and concerns “the fight for the ‘survival of the nation’ as a culturally distinct entity and against

¹ Minkenberg (2000) p. 177; Mudde (2000) p. 6

² Bornschieer (2010) p. 25; Minkenberg 2000 p. 180

³ Even if these parties have been called by different names, the label PRRPs is used here. This label has been widely recognised in recent years (following Mudde: 2007) and well reflects current perceptions of the PRRP family. However, even if called PRRPs throughout the thesis, it should be clarified that some mentioned scholars use different labels. To avoid confusion, scholar’s use of other labels have been changed to “PRRPs” in cases when they 1) principally include the same set of parties as those here called PRRPs and/or 2) include a similar definition of the group even if labelling it differently. The reader should however be aware of that smaller differences between different scholars’ definitions can exist.

⁴ Minkenberg (2013) p. 9; Mudde (2000) p. 6; Mudde (2013) p. 9; Rydgren (2007) p. 242; Zaslove (2009) p. 309

⁵ De Lange (2007) p. 429; Ennser (2012) p. 151-152; Mudde (2007) p. 123

⁶ Ennser (2012) p. 151, 156


⁷ E.g. Betz (2003); Ennser (2012); Mudde (2007); Zaslove (2004)

⁸ Ennser (2012) p. 152

⁹ E. g. Betz (2003); Fetzer (2000); Mudde (2007)

multiculturalism”.¹⁰ In other words, nativism refers to culture (in a broad anthropological sense) and has the *protection of one’s own culture from* the culture of others as objective (see Figure 1:1). Still, both theoretical ideas and practical political actions express a party’s ideological position. On the *political level*, elements of nativism are found within many policy areas. However, I argue that *cultural policy*¹¹ (when applied in its broader anthropological manner)¹² is the principal instrument to reach nativism’s “protection of” objectives, while *immigration policy* is the principal instrument to reach its “protection from” objectives. If PRRPs’ exclusionary politics are based on nativism, this should thus be reflected both in their cultural and immigration policy. If not, even if other factors than ideology (such as national context, historical roots, age and parliamentary power) also influence the positioning of political parties,¹³ current PRRPs’ *exclusion based on cultural mixophobia* could be accused for rather being of a *discursive* character. That is, a currently more acceptable strategy to refuse immigrants compared to the *exclusion based on biological racism* used by previous waves of right-wing extremism.¹⁴

Figure 1:1 Nativist ideology and policy related to previous research on PRRPs



Previous research assumes and confirms that immigration policy is a core area for PRRPs and that they have similar objectives with it. On a political level, immigration policy is highlighted as the primary uniting feature for the party family and only PRRPs

¹⁰ Davies and Jackson (2008), p. 108

¹¹ Not to be confused with *cultural politics*. While cultural politics refers to all political actions relevant to culture, cultural policy only includes political action within the scope of a State’s cultural department (Harding 2007, p. 11)

¹² See chapter 4.1.

¹³ Mair & Mudde (1998) p. 211; Meret (2010) p. 316-317; Minkenberg (2013b) p. 5

¹⁴ Bornschieer (2010) p. 25; Minkenberg 2000 p. 180

that mobilize grievances over immigration gain electoral success.¹⁵ Thus, PRRPs meet the “protection from” part of nativism. Indeed, when going through research on PRRPs, immigration policy has undoubtedly gained the greatest share of attention.¹⁶ However, PRRPs are not single issue parties.¹⁷ As mentioned, scholars have also noted PRRPs’ cultural interest.¹⁸ However, their primary focus has been on how PRRPs base their exclusive politics on cultural arguments, rather than on investigating the substance behind those arguments.¹⁹ Apart from assumptions about shared cultural interest and objectives based on nativism, such substance is indicated by scholars such as Michael Minkenberg, who shows that cultural policies are where these parties are most influential when holding executive office.²⁰ However, research on PRRPs’ cultural policy, as on cultural policy in general, remains very sparse.²¹ A reason for this sparseness could be that cultural policy is not a central area for *general* political parties and rarely gets an eminent role in national election campaigns.²² To be able to confirm that PRRPs meet the “protection of” part of nativism on more than a rhetorical level, their cultural policy has to be further investigated.

What makes the absence of cultural policy research further problematic is that the PRRPs (beside shared immigration policy and current ideology) do not meet other normally used criteria to identify a party family such as shared historical, sociological and ideological roots. That is, if we discover that PRRPs do neither have similar ideas on cultural policy, it seems appropriate to question their (assumed) shared nativist ideology together with their so called party family.

1.2. Purpose and research question

Research on PRRPs’ cultural policy remains sparse. This is surprising considering that cultural policy combined with immigration policy should be the main political instruments for PRRPs to reach the family’s core ideological objective of nativism. The aim of this thesis is to make research on the PRRP family more comprehensive by critically examine those ideas that have been said to compose the basis of the PRRP family. More specifically, by exploring if PRRPs also resemble each other when it comes to the “protection of” part of nativism - cultural policy. To do so, the cultural policy of three Western European PRRPs (DF, FN and SD) is compared in terms of *importance*, *cultural range* and *objectives*. Depending on the parties’ resemblance, the appropriateness in calling the PRRPs a party family is discussed. Departing from this

¹⁵ Immerzeel et al. (2015) p. 1; Ivarsflaten (2008) p. 17

¹⁶ Immerzeel et al. (2015) p. 1

¹⁷ Mudde (2007) p. 19

¹⁸ I. e. Minkenberg (2000, 2001); Mudde (2007)

¹⁹ Bornschieer (2010) p. 25, 49; Minkenberg (2000, 2001)

²⁰ Minkenberg (2001) p. 1

²¹ Von Beyme (2014) p. 101

²² Frenander (2007) p. 403

purpose, the research question is formulated as follows:

How does the positioning of PRRPs regarding importance, understanding and objectives of cultural policy affect the appropriateness in calling them a party family?

2. POLITICAL PARTY FAMILIES

To facilitate the international comparison of national political parties, similar parties are commonly gathered in cross country subgroups. However, parties are often lumped together based on *a priori* assumptions rather than on systematic analytical examinations.²³ In political science, so-called *party families* provide *ideal types* for political parties. The identification of parties in families should thus be considered as a stereotypic reflection of reality based on a (non-existent) *ideal* party.²⁴ Even if this implies that no parties are identical, all family members will share core features.²⁵ The model provides both practical and theoretical advantages. Practically, it is a rather concrete and easily comprehensible tool. Theoretically, it facilitates the international comparison of national political parties by highlighting shared core objectives and identities. By doing so, it provides a cross country theoretical definition for national parties and thus communicates what parties *are* in an international context.²⁶ As explained by Peter Mair and Cas Mudde (1998), “it is only by identifying links and equivalences among parties in different polities that we can get a proper sense of what should and what should not be compared or of what is like and unlike”.²⁷

To decide whether parties with apparently similar core characteristics should be gathered in a family, they are compared according to relevant criteria such as *origins and sociology, transnational federations, policy and ideology* and *name* (see next chapter).²⁸ Those parties that meet the pre-established criteria are considered a family, as were parties in the widely recognized Liberal, Conservative, Socialist and Christian Democratic families.²⁹ But how to decide what the relevant criteria are or the core characteristics? And how much similarity between parties would be reasonable to expect? Beside such basic questions, scholars working with the concept have to deal with questions such as how many party families there should be (decisive for how broad and permissive each family are), how to distinguish clear borders between them and how to handle changing or unstable political parties. These questions remain unanswered, as the concept is still rather vague and undertheorised.³⁰

²³ Mair and Mudde (1998) p. 214; Mudde (2000), p. 2.

²⁴ Esaiasson et al. (2012) p. 139-140

²⁵ Mudde (2007) p. 13

²⁶ Mair and Mudde (1998) p. 215, 225; Mudde (2000), p. 1

²⁷ Mair and Mudde (1998) p. 212

²⁸ Mair & Mudde (1998) p. 211

²⁹ Mudde (2000), p. 2

³⁰ Mair and Mudde (1998) p. 211, 221-223, Mudde (2000), p. 2.

2.1. A problematic set of classification criteria

Different scholars have used different criteria to classify parties in families. Klaus von Beyme's (1985) classification of Western political parties in different *familles spirituelles* was for long precedential in the field. Here, conclusions about parties' ideological orientations were drawn on the basis of *party name* in combination with *voters' understanding* of parties' ideological position and program.³¹ The idea is that a party's name should reflect its ideological identity. However in practice, similar parties chose very different names. Moreover, both criteria share the problem of only being indirect classifications, as they are not based on systematic scientific analysis but on (possibly incorrect) assumptions.³²

More recent guiding classification criteria were listed by Michael Gallagher *et al.* (1995), who grouped parties based on *genetic origin*, *transnational federations* and *policies*.³³ Here, parties with origins in similar historical circumstances or social conflicts are said to share *genetic origins*.³⁴ However, to assemble current parties based on history is problematic as parties often change and depart from original values.³⁵ Further on, the criterion requires cross country comparable historical events, which make its use difficult outside of Western Europe.³⁶ *Transnational federations* assemble parties based on their associations in international political contexts such as the European parliament.³⁷ However, all parties do not take part in such, nor do they organize according to the party family-lines.³⁸ The last criterion, *policies*, assembles parties based on policy resemblance.³⁹ Policies do however not necessarily translate into the same thing across borders, which make also this criterion problematic.

In 1998, Mair and Mudde summarized the most relevant criteria found in previous research through the categories *origins and sociology*, *transnational federations*, *policy and ideology* and *name*. Here, *origins and sociology* corresponds to Gallagher *et al.*'s *genetic origin* and *policy and ideology* corresponds to Gallagher *et al.*'s *policies*.⁴⁰ These four criteria will henceforth be used in this thesis. Mair and Mudde primarily recommend the use of the criteria *origins and sociology* and *policy and ideology* when studying party families. These are considered as least problematic based on previous problems, and are suggested to best reveal relevant information about parties as they "tap into what parties are rather than what parties do and hence are more likely to uncover core identities and shared political goals".⁴¹

Moreover, the renaming *policies* into *policy and ideology* solves its main problem (i.e. difficulties to compare policies across countries). Instead of only focusing on policy,

³¹ Von Beyme (1985) p. 3.

³² Mair and Mudde (1998) p. 220-221; Mudde (2000) p. 3

³³ Gallagher *et al.* (1995) p. 181.

³⁴ Mudde (2000) p. 3

³⁵ Mair and Mudde (1998) p. 215; Mudde (2000) p. 3

³⁶ Mair and Mudde (1998) p. 215; Mudde (2000) p. 3

³⁷ Gallagher *et al.* (1995) p. 181

³⁸ Mair and Mudde (1998) p. 217; Mudde (2000) p. 4-5

³⁹ Gallagher *et al.* (1995) p. 181

⁴⁰ Mair & Mudde (1998) p. 211

⁴¹ Mair & Mudde (1998) p. 211

researchers should focus on the ideology on which policies are based. In doing so, scholars avoid being confused by difficultly comparable national policy boundaries. As explained by Mudde, “[i]deologies function as the normative bases of the pursued policies of political parties and have the advantage of being more generally formulated than the more nationally centred policies that are pursued”.⁴² Indeed, that ideology is still central to identify party families is confirmed by Ennsner (2012), who states that “[t]here is hardly a way around ideology (and party policy as its everyday manifestation) as a criterion for the classification of parties. All serious attempts at defining or classifying parties take into account the centrality of ideology”.⁴³

⁴² Mudde (2000) p. 5

⁴³ Ennsner (2012) p. 155

3. THE INCONGRUOUS FAMILY OF PRRPS

3.1. Difficulties in meeting party family criteria

Even if treated as a family by most scholars, the PRRPs have difficulties in meeting several of the previously mentioned party family criteria. This, Ennser notes, could make us expect the PRRPs to be less uniform than other party families.⁴⁴

The criterion *name* is not suitable for PRRPs, as Ennser notes that “for no party family is there (1) less (scholarly) consensus as to the exogenous labelling, and (2) greater discordance between exogenous and endogenous labels”.⁴⁵ Further on, the study of PRRPs *transnational federations* is of small use as no attempt to coordinate these parties’ interests has resulted in an institutionalized transnational organization.⁴⁶

Difficulties with above criteria is however less important as Mair and Mudde primarily recommend the use of *origins and sociology* and *policy and ideology* in the study of party families. It is therefore more problematic that also the criterion *origins and sociology* is of limited use when it comes to PRRPs.⁴⁷ First, the PRRPs originate from such diverse ideological roots as neo-liberalism, Nazism and fascism (and more). Moreover since their emergence many PRRPs have changed ideological core. Second, not only PRRPs emerged in the 1980s. Also the Greens emerged due to the same historical circumstances, and both mobilized the electorate along the GAL/TAN cleavage.⁴⁸ Third, even if sometimes argued that these parties represent the same social group,⁴⁹ most current scholars argue that this is not so.⁵⁰ Based on problems associated with the other categories, it seems most suitable to study current *policy and ideology* when doing cross country comparisons of PRRPs. Indeed, previous research indicates that these parties share a number of core policy and ideological characteristics. This is developed in next chapter.

⁴⁴ Ennser (2012) p. 151, 156

⁴⁵ Ennser (2012) p. 156-157

⁴⁶ Ennser (2012) p. 154-155; Mudde (2000) p. 4-5; Norris (2005) p. 43-44

⁴⁷ Mudde (2000) p. 3

⁴⁸ Ennser (2012) p. 152-154; Mair and Mudde (1998) p. 215; Mudde (2000) p. 3; Zaslove (2009) p. 309. GAL/TAN, or green/alternative/liberal versus traditional/authoritarian/nationalist

⁴⁹ See for example Kühnl et al. (1969) who argues that PRRPs represents middle-class extremism or Kreisi et al. (2006) who argues that PRRPs represents the “losers of globalisation”.

⁵⁰ E. g. Mudde (2000) p. 3, van der Brug & van Spanje (2009)

3.2. Towards a set of core characteristics

Scholars have not agreed upon a common name or theoretical definition regarding the (here labelled) PRRPs. In 1996, Mudde explained that “in 26 definitions of right-wing extremism that are used in the literature, no less than 58 different features are mentioned at least once”.⁵¹ That is, even if useful to compare PRRPs regarding current *policy and ideology* (as previously established), scholars do not agree upon which such characteristics should be. That makes research on the party family problematic. Based on different theoretical definitions, different scholars include different parties in the PRRP family. As expressed by Mudde, “While virtually everyone agrees on the inclusion of some parties in this family – most notably the prototypical *Front National* (FN) in France – there is considerable debate on various others”.⁵² Furthermore, based on different definitions, parties are compared based on different characteristics.⁵³ To take Ennser (2012) as an example, he compares PRRPs in the political areas *taxes vs. spending, social policy, EU authority, environment, decentralization and immigration* and concludes that PRRPs are a rather homogeneous party family.⁵⁴ However, if *immigration* is removed, their similarity drops.⁵⁵ Except underlining the importance of immigration policy for PRRPs, this demonstrates the importance of analysing party families based on carefully selected characteristics.

In summarizing the literature until 1996, Mudde explains that the five most mentioned political and ideological characteristics of PRRPs were nationalism, racism, xenophobia, anti-democracy and the strong state.⁵⁶ On the *political level*, PRRPs have mainly been lumped together based on their hostile policies towards immigration.⁵⁷ That these parties are sometimes simply labelled *anti-immigrant parties* reflects this.⁵⁸ For instance, Meindert Fennema defines as PRRPs those parties that have *immigration* as core political issue in electoral campaigns.⁵⁹

On the *ideological level*, nationalism was commonly (and is sometimes still) regarded as PRRPs core characteristic.⁶⁰ However, even if PRRPs tend to have nationalistic features, the concept is problematic as it concerns *the nation* and thus excludes regionalist parties. Furthermore, the concept is too broad to distinct PRRPs from parties with more moderate nationalist tendencies.⁶¹ Instead, many current scholars argue that

⁵¹ Mudde (1996) p. 229

⁵² Mudde (2013) p. 3

⁵³ Ennser (2012) p. 156

⁵⁴ Ennser (2012) p. 167

⁵⁵ Ennser (2012) p. 161, 167

⁵⁶ Mudde (1996) p. 228-229

⁵⁷ E.g. Immerzeel et al. (2015); Ivarsflaten (2008); Norris (2005); Zaslove (2004)

⁵⁸ E. g. Gibson (2002); Fennema (1997)

⁵⁹ As explained by van Spanje (2011) p. 306

⁶⁰ E. g. Blokker (2005), Eatwell (2000), Immerzeel et al. (2015); Rydgren (2004)

⁶¹ Ennser (2012) p. 156; Mudde (2007) p. 17

nativism is more appropriate (further defined in next chapter).⁶² Nativism is more specific than the broader *nationalism* in a manner that fits these parties. Even if nativism implies xenophobia and hostility towards immigration, it has the advantage of not *necessarily* involving racist arguments as it does not rank cultures (even if stating that cultures should not be mixed).⁶³

In sum, PRRPs are primarily lumped together based on immigration policy and nativism. However, research has not focused on cultural policy, which is surprising as cultural policy combined with immigration policy should be the main political instruments to reach nativist ideological objectives (see Figure 1:1). Before giving a more full description of the PRRPs, it should be mentioned that every scholar does not treat PRRPs as a family. Joost van Spanje argues that these parties should be regarded as two families, of which one is assembled based on anti-immigration policies and the other on right-wing ideology (both when it comes to the socio-economical and the GAL/TAN cleavage). That is, he objects to the literature where the terms are used interchangeably, by arguing that these parties cannot be assembled based on *both* ideology and policy.⁶⁴

3.3. The populist radical right: focus on nativism

Even if the definition of PRRPs is still debated, PRRPs have more in common than immigration policy and nativism. Providing what has been called “the most well-founded attempt at defining the radical right (populist) ideology to date”,⁶⁵ Mudde argues that PRRPs’ core ideological characteristic is *nativism*, combined with *authoritarianism* and *populism*.⁶⁶

In essence, nativism reflects PRRPs cultural mixophobia, refers to a broad anthropological understanding of culture, and has the *protection of* one’s own culture *from* the culture of others as objective. Mudde defines nativism as;

*an ideology, which holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group (‘the nation’) and that nonnative elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogenous nation-state. The basis for defining (non) ‘nativeness’ can be diverse, e.g. ethnic, racial or religious, but will always have a cultural component.*⁶⁷

⁶² E. g. Betz (2003); Fetzer (2000); Mudde (2007)

⁶³ Mudde (2007) p. 19

⁶⁴ Van Spanje (2011) p. 294, 297, 318

⁶⁵ Ennser (2012) p. 156

⁶⁶ Mudde (2007) p. 26.

⁶⁷ Mudde (2007) p. 19

An important part of nativism is that it concerns a version of pluralism which highly values cultural differentiation. PRRPs *ethnopluralist* view implies that cultures are seen as *equal but different*. Thus, hostile attitudes towards non-native elements are not based on that national culture is seen as superior, but on a perceived incompatibility of cultures. Preferences for national culture is simply based upon that *it is one's own*, and PRRPs commonly states that they defend *the human right of cultural identity*, or similar.⁶⁸ For instance, SD writes that “[t]he unique and diverse identities that humanity’s different peoples and ethnic groups exhibit are dictated by their respective cultures. The different cultures are the common heritage of humanity and should be recognized and protected for everyone’s benefit”.⁶⁹ SD calls their statement “a commitment to global cultural diversity”,⁷⁰ and nativism can thus appear permissive. However, as the preserving of national cultures’ entails a cultural mixophobia, the multicultural society is perceived as a threat. The culture perceived as most threatening to European culture and identity is Islam.⁷¹ As expressed by Michael Minkenberg, “its essence is a politically enforced segregation of cultures and ethnicities according to geographical criteria”.⁷² Similarly, Hans-Georg Betz states that nativism implies a very narrow approach to citizenship and entails a justification for exclusionary policies based on culture.⁷³

As previously explained, PRRPs are also said to share the characteristics authoritarianism and populism. With *authoritarianism*, Mudde means that these parties strive towards a society with a strict hierarchical order. In his own words, authoritarianism is “the belief in a strictly ordered society, in which infringements of authority are to be punished severely”.⁷⁴ *Populism* implicates a worldview of a divided society where PRRPs represent “the pure people” who are suppressed by a “corrupt elite”. Politics should instead of being designed by the elite, be designed according to the *general will* of the people.⁷⁵ It should also be mentioned that Mudde explains that PRRPs are radical but not extreme. While extremist parties are anti-constitutional, this is not the case for the radical PRRPs even if they deviate from liberal democracies by their cultural mixophobia.⁷⁶

⁶⁸ Betz (2003) p. 196; Mudde (2007) p. 18

⁶⁹ Sverigedemokraterna (2011) p. 19. All citations from political documents are translated from original language by the author.

⁷⁰ Sverigedemokraterna (2011) p. 20

⁷¹ Betz (2003) p. 204; Davies & Jackson (2008), p. 108

⁷² Minkenberg (2000) p. 180

⁷³ Betz (2003) p. 194-195

⁷⁴ Mudde (2007) p. 23

⁷⁵ Mudde (2007) p. 23

⁷⁶ Mudde (2007) p. 24; Zaslove (2009) p. 310

4. CULTURAL POLICY

Cultural policy concerns a state's institutionalized involvement in- and support to the area of culture. Cultural policy is thus not creative as such but bureaucratic and concerns actions such as distribution of funding and the development, implementation and evaluation of projects and regulations.⁷⁷ As pointed out by Anders Frenander (2014), cultural policy is expected to unite “such extreme contrasts as bureaucracy and art, the most conventional with the most radical”.⁷⁸

Further on, cultural policy design is closely connected to ideology and to ideas of what makes up an ideal society.⁷⁹ Even if modern democratic states' official general aim is to neither influence the content nor style of artists, it is questionable whether this is possible as governments decide which projects should be supported.⁸⁰ Toby Miller and George Yúdice (2002) even argue that “cultural policy always implies the management of populations through suggested behaviour”.⁸¹ Cultural policy is thus described as a project which educates citizens when it comes to behaviour and taste, and creates a common identity within a society. The importance of identity is underlined as *identification* creates collective loyalty.⁸²

4.1. Range of cultural policy

The range of cultural policy varies both between national contexts and political actors. According to range, cultural policy will embed different action possibilities and can therefore be used in a more or less creative way. First, actors' range can vary regarding *importance* accorded to cultural policy. In its most extreme, actors can minimize the state's cultural influence by exercising a passive cultural policy (i.e. minimum state intervention).⁸³ In contrast, actors can promote an extensive cultural policy – for example to be use cultural policy for ideological objectives such as nativism.

Other variations between actors' *range* are connected to the complex cultural concept. Indeed, it has been described as being one of the most complex concepts in the English language⁸⁴. In cultural policy, culture is primarily associated with an aesthetical meaning. However, the range of cultural policy can be wider and include an anthropological meaning of culture. Indeed, the employment of a wider understanding

⁷⁷ Miller and Yúdice (2002) p. 1

⁷⁸ Frenander (2014) p. 49

⁷⁹ Wolf-Csanády (1998) p, 398

⁸⁰ Frenander (2014) p. 51

⁸¹ Miller and Yúdice (2002) p. 14

⁸² Miller and Yúdice (2002) p. 7

⁸³ Blomgren (1998) p. 25-28

⁸⁴ Williams (1988) p. 87

of cultural policy has increased.⁸⁵ Figure 4.1:1 provides examples of cultural expressions associated with the aesthetic and anthropological understandings of culture. The narrower *aesthetical* understanding of culture is the more traditional of the two and concerns creative peoples’ artistic output and its study. Typically artistic expressions associated to the aesthetic cultural understanding are visual arts, theatre, music, dance, literature, and architecture. Compared to the more anthropological culture, aesthetic is associated with universal higher values and valuation of taste.⁸⁶ As explained by Miller and Yúdice, “in this world, culture is taken as a marker of differences and similarities in taste and status within social groups”.⁸⁷

Figure 4.1:1 Culture associated to different cultural understandings

Understanding of culture	Examples of cultural areas
<i>Aesthetical</i>	Visual arts Theatre Film Music Dance Literature Architecture Education in the arts
<i>Anthropological</i>	Art (all above areas) Language Religion Traditions Customs Education Sports Media

The broad anthropological understanding of culture implies a society’s whole way of life. Such culture is generated from cultural and natural conditions, and consists of all human behaviour not determined by nature. Except art, it includes all behaviours that actors acquire just from being part of a society such as habits, language, skills, customs, morals, knowledge and faith. The anthropological understanding do thus refer to a plurality of cultures (one for every society) and differences *in-between* societies, while the aesthetic have more of a universal meaning and refers to differences *within* societies.⁸⁸

4.2. Objectives of cultural policy

Based on actors’ different range of cultural policy, their objectives concerning *what kind of culture to support* will vary. In order to understand an actor’s objectives, it is useful to compare their cultural statements with pre-established typologies. However,

⁸⁵ Frenander (2014) p. 51; Harding (2010) p. 31

⁸⁶ Frenander (2014) p. 39; Harding (2007) p. 10; Miller and Yúdice (2002) p. 1; Åhlberg (1995) p. 169-70

⁸⁷ Miller and Yúdice (2002) p. 1

⁸⁸ Harding (2007) p. 10; Miller and Yúdice (2002) p. 1; Åhlberg (1995) p. 169-70

previous literature primarily use typologies with focus on the management of cultural policy, with categories such as *degree of state intervention*, *degree of central management*, *relations between cultural actors* or *models of distribution*.⁸⁹ A more suitable way to investigate aesthetical and anthropological objectives could possibly be based on cultural ideologies.⁹⁰ However, as political actors tend to have elements of many cultural ideologies, a strict classification based in ideology risks to be forced.⁹¹

Instead, Per Mangset argues that it is better to compare political actors when it comes to *cultural conflict lines*.⁹² Mangset argues that the ten most important conflict lines are *public direction/free market*, *public control/complete freedom of expression*, *social security (welfare)/cultural freedom of expression (creativity)*, *quality (professional)/similarity (amateur)*, *elite culture/popular culture*, *expert rule (profession)/rule of the people (democracy)*, *cultural creativity/bureaucratic organization*, *traditional/innovatory*, *national/international* and *central rule/local rule*.⁹³ However, all of these do not concern cultural aesthetical or anthropological objectives. A typology based on these conflict lines was therefore constructed including three relevant conflict lines: *elite culture/popular culture*, *national/international* and *traditional/innovatory*.⁹⁴ Mangset's conflict lines however concern the *aesthetical* understanding of culture (which makes sense based on general political actor's aesthetical focus).⁹⁵ As PRRPs cultural range is not yet explored, Mangset's aesthetical categories are supplemented with corresponding anthropological. The developed typology is displayed in figure 4.2:1 and will later be used in the analysis. To make the categories more comprehensive, they are sorted based on dimension (class-related, geographical or temporal). It should also be mentioned that the categories are theoretical *ideal types*. In practice, political actors' cultural objectives are generally a mix of these.

Figure 4.2:1. Main conflicting cultural objectives in cultural policy

Dimension (aesthetical or anthropological)	Conflict line (aesthetical or anthropological)
Class-related	High culture
	Popular culture
Geographical	International culture
	National culture
	Regional culture
Temporal	Traditional culture
	Innovatory culture

Note: Categorisation based on Mangset's (1992) cultural conflict lines, adapted to reflect aesthetical and anthropological cultural objectives

⁸⁹ Hylland (2011) p. 54; Mangset (1992) p. 23

⁹⁰ E. g. Hylland (2011) p. 63; Mangset (1992) p. 99-109

⁹¹ Mangset (1992) p. 110

⁹² Mangset (1992) p. 110

⁹³ Mangset (1994) p. 110-113

⁹⁴ These conflict lines reoccur in the literature even if not explicitly called "conflict lines". E.g. Bennett (1995); Blomgren (1998); Bennich-Björkman (1991)

⁹⁵ Frenander (2014) p. 51; Harding (2010) p. 31

Conflict lines on the class-related dimension: high/popular culture

The class-related dimension concerns *whose culture* the state should support with cultural policy. While the *high culture* is associated to culture of the upper social strata, *popular culture* is associated to culture of the lower social strata. According to Pierre Bourdieu, the upper social strata tries to culturally discern itself from lower strata by taking part in advanced and demanding aesthetical and anthropological (high) cultural activities inaccessible for others. Popular culture is more accessible and less demanding.⁹⁶ A paternalistic cultural policy is often involved in high culture, as argued to be good for citizens' wellbeing and moral and spiritual education.⁹⁷ An *aesthetical* understanding of the conflict line concern priorities between "serious artistic expressions of good taste" (high culture) and "accessible entertainment" (popular culture).⁹⁸ An *anthropological* understanding concerns priorities between *whose lifestyle* to support and thus reproduce.

Conflict lines on the geographical dimension: international/national/regional culture

The geographical dimension concerns the *scope* of cultural policy. Should the state primarily promote a homogeneous or multicultural national culture (where the latter can include the cultures of both national and foreign minorities)? The homogeneous alternative is closely connected to the fostering of a culturally distinctive national *identity*. Political actors do here use cultural policy to protect special national features, and to promote national prestige. Even if such policy can be perceived as propaganda, it is (in non-exaggerated proportions) a common feature in most nations.⁹⁹ An *aesthetical* understanding of the conflict concerns priorities between international, national and regional artistic expressions. An *anthropological* understanding concerns priorities between international, national and regional lifestyle(s).

Conflict lines on the temporal dimension: traditional/innovative culture

The temporal dimension concerns if cultural policy should support historically established culture or create opportunities for innovative cultural expressions. *Traditional cultural expressions* should however not be confused with *high culture*, even if often including high culture. The conflict line is connected to political actor's view on society, and if they focus on protecting *what is* or developing *what can be*.¹⁰⁰ An *aesthetical* understanding concerns priorities between support of historically established or innovative art and concerns both expressions and techniques. An *anthropological* understanding concerns if traditional or innovative lifestyles should be exposed and promoted.

⁹⁶ Burke (1983) p. 11; Engdahl and Larsson (2011) p. 252

⁹⁷ Blomgren (1998) p. 30

⁹⁸ Mangset (1994) p. 111

⁹⁹ Bennich-Björkman (1991) p. 60; Blomgren (1998) p. 31

¹⁰⁰ Mangset (1994) p. 112

5. WHAT ABOUT PRRPS AND THE “PROTECTION OF” PART OF NATIVISM?

- AN INCOMPLETE DISCUSSION

As described, scholars have recognized that PRRPs base their exclusive politics on cultural arguments.¹⁰¹ However, research on the substance behind those arguments remains sparse. As far as I am aware of, no research on the PRRP family gives special attention to cultural policy. When scholars focus on PRRP's *culture*, the culture considered is primarily PRRPs' culture of *authoritarianism*. Thus, when Simon Bornschieer (2010) finds considerable cultural similarities between PRRPs, he does not refer to the aesthetical/anthropological culture relevant for nativist objectives, but to cultural *authoritarianism* relevant for the GAL/TAN cleavage.¹⁰²

Some scholars do however shed light on certain aspects of the area. To begin with, research and theory confirms that PRRPs *should show* strong interest in cultural policy. Besides that PRRPs themselves emphasizes their cultural interest in terms of ethnopluralism,¹⁰³ cultural policy should be a core instrument for PRRPs to reach nativist objectives (see Figure 1:1). Moreover, PRRPs have reason to emphasize cultural objectives for electoral reasons, as far-right preferences are more common among those voters who perceive a cultural threat than those who perceive an economic threat from immigration.¹⁰⁴

Further on, research indicates that PRRPs *have* a genuine interest and influence in cultural policy. Mudde (2007) observes that PRRPs emphasize symbolic measures such as cultural politics when achieving power.¹⁰⁵ Importantly, he notes that this is a general theme in writing that “one of the few points standing out among virtually all cases of populist radical right rule at the local level is the emphasis on symbolic measures”.¹⁰⁶ Moreover, when Minkenberg (2001) investigates the political impact of PRRPs in four countries (France, Italy, Austria and Germany), he concludes that when they hold executive office, “a 'right turn' occurs primarily in cultural policies”.¹⁰⁷

The (sparse) literature thus indicates a genuine interest and influence of PRRPs in cultural policy. Questions concerning *how their influence is used and based on what objectives* are thus actualized. Mudde states that some of the most important practical consequences of PRRPs influence in the area are “the renaming of streets, the increase

¹⁰¹ I. e. Minkenberg (2000, 2001); Mudde (2007)

¹⁰² Bornschieer, Simon (2010)

¹⁰³ Betz (2003) p. 196; Mudde (2007) p. 18

¹⁰⁴ Lucassen and Lubbers (2012) p. 547

¹⁰⁵ Mudde (2007) p. 279

¹⁰⁶ Mudde (2007) p. 279

¹⁰⁷ Minkenberg (2001) p. 1

of national symbols in the cities, and the redistribution of local subsidies”.¹⁰⁸ Minkenberg provides examples from several countries of how PRRPs’ influence has been used. When FN held power in French municipalities, he explains that public libraries were cleansed. Moreover,

the cultural life in the cities governed by the FN underwent a severe transformation. Many cultural projects (theatre groups, music festivals, cinemas, clubs, coffee shops and so on) had to abandon their activities for lack of funding or withdrawal of their licence, bi-national marriages were blocked, and anti-FN activities were suppressed at the expense of civil liberties.¹⁰⁹

Minkenberg also accounts for cultural reforms that took place when the Freedom Party of Austria (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, FPÖ) and conservatives formed an Austrian coalition government.

FPÖ has insisted on including in the coalition agreement support for a new field of university research called *Volkskultur* and launched several attempts to push for the revitalisation of the concept of *Heimat*. This is part of a larger assault by Haider [Jörg Haider, former leader of FPÖ] on modern culture and his efforts to save Austria's 'real' art and culture from subversive counter-culture and 'leftwing cultural fascism' by eliminating cultural autonomy from the political realm.¹¹⁰

As Minkenberg’s focus is to describe the general political impact of PRRPs, little attention is paid to their cultural objectives. Minkenberg only touches upon this when he links the political behaviour of PRRPs to their general focus on the *nation* and *nationhood*.¹¹¹ However, the connection is only made briefly and inexhaustively. More importantly, it considers the politics of PRRPs in general and not cultural politics in particular. However when it comes to FPÖ, Minkenberg explains that their cultural policy “aims at 'liberating' Austria from the political left and from 'foreignisation' by reasserting the ethnocultural roots of the country”.¹¹² This is linked to an ethnocentric ideology, characterized by “its *völkisch* elements of a homogenous community of Austrians”.¹¹³

Similarly, Mudde explains the PRRPs’ actions in the cultural policy area with *nativist objectives*. According to Mudde, it is only when PRRPs discovers that power is particularly limited when it comes to “nativist policies at the core of their program”, that they refocus on cultural policy.¹¹⁴ Furthermore, their practical cultural influence is in all cases used “away from ‘alien’ and ‘antinational’ (e.g. leftwing and minority) individuals and organizations and towards ‘national’ or ‘patriotic’ actors”.¹¹⁵ However, Mudde only

¹⁰⁸ Mudde (2007) p. 279

¹⁰⁹ Minkenberg (2001) p. 8

¹¹⁰ Minkenberg (2001) p. 16

¹¹¹ Minkenberg (2001) p. 5

¹¹² Minkenberg (2001) p. 17

¹¹³ Minkenberg (2001) p. 17

¹¹⁴ Mudde (2007) p. 279

¹¹⁵ Mudde (2007) p. 279

briefly accounts for cultural policy and his arguments are not further developed. Indeed, the connection he makes between PRRPs' cultural politics and nativism do rather seem to be based on *what seems logic* considering PRRPs' nativist core, then on an actual analytic comparison between PRRPs' political positions.

Finally, in line with Mudde and Minkenberg, Rebecka Dittmer (2008) links FN's previously mentioned cleansing of public libraries to their aim to protect a French national identity. In a larger political context, Dittmer argues that this should be regarded as one part of a broader cultural strategy.¹¹⁶ As previous scholars, her analysis is however not enough developed to take the argumentation further.

To summarize the literature on PRRPs and cultural policy, it indicates that PRRPs have a genuine interest and are influential in the area. It also names examples of specific cultural areas where these parties have been active, which together indicates a focus on increasing national symbols, national cultural expressions and cultural heritage. Further on, their focus is explained by references to *the nation* and *nativism*. In the words used in this thesis, research thus indicates that PRRPs have a broader anthropological understanding of cultural policy. When it comes to cultural conflict lines (see Figure 4.2:1), it indicates that PRRPs have *national* cultural focus on *the geographical dimension*. Objectives on the *class-related-* and *temporal dimension* remains more unclear.

However, the literature is too sparse and vague to draw convincing conclusions. Research does not provide an extensive analyse concerning PRRPs' cultural interest, understanding and objectives. For example regarding cultural objectives, these are only vaguely formulated in terms of the nation and nativism and should rather be seen as general objectives for PRRPs than for PRRPs cultural policy in particular. As argued, statements about cultural objectives rather seem based on *what seems logic* considering PRRPs nativist ideological core, then on a deeper analysis. Moreover, previous research focuses on *outcomes* of PRRPs cultural policy. As argued in chapter 3.1., research on the PRRP family should focus on *policy and ideology*. To do so, a wider empirical material than the study of political outcomes is suitable. As no PRRP has (so far) possessed a majority of governmental seats, political outcomes will only demonstrate what reforms PRRPs was able to implement when negotiating with other parties. That is, it will not show what PRRPs *are* (which Mudde highlights as essential to uncover core identities and political goals),¹¹⁷ as would research on what PRRPs *would do* if they had the possibility. To confirm that PRRPs also meet the "protection of" part of nativism, research on their cultural policy must be more exhaustive and based on a wider empirical material than on political outcomes.

¹¹⁶ Dittmer (2008) p. ii, 23

¹¹⁷ Mair & Mudde (1998) p. 211

6. METHODS

6.1. Research design

Research on PRRPs cultural policy remains sparse. To further investigate the area, the approach of this study is *exploratory*.¹¹⁸ Mudde writes that, even if the most used method when comparing party families is *quantitative content analysis*, it is more suitable to use a *qualitative approach* when studying core features of party ideology.¹¹⁹ Quantitative content analysis “primarily code policy initiatives, which often translate only marginally to complex ideological features. Moreover, the strict coding scheme leads to conceptual rigidity”.¹²⁰ When it comes to complex phenomena like features of party ideology, a qualitative approach gives the researcher greater opportunity to properly understand them.¹²¹ For example, the researcher will have larger possibilities to distinguish primary from secondary ideological features and to be flexible when coding complex ideologies such as nativism.¹²²

Several qualitative methods can be used to analyse empirical material. However, both *argument analysis* and *discourse analysis* require that the researcher have further initial knowledge about the subject of analysis than is the case here.¹²³ As here, when the subject of analysis is relatively unexplored, a more elemental *qualitative idea- or ideology analysis* is appropriate. Even if this thesis’ overarching objective is to say something about PRRPs assumed nativist *ideology*, this is done by identifying *ideas* in cultural policy. That is, PRRP’s ideas concerning importance of cultural policy, cultural understanding and cultural policy objectives. Therefore, this thesis makes use of a *qualitative analysis of ideas*. It should however be emphasised that aggregated ideas do form the overarching ideology.¹²⁴ Furthermore, the analysis will be *comparative* as it is necessary to compare parties to discover if they share core characteristics – a fundamental feature in the study of party families.¹²⁵

Finally, the thesis is based on the approach of *social constructionism*. Culture and taste are thus not considered as given by nature, but dependant on social education.¹²⁶ Therefore, cultural policy can be used by actors to construct change.¹²⁷ This corresponds

¹¹⁸ Marshall and Rossman (2011) p. 69

¹¹⁹ Mudde (2007) p. 39

¹²⁰ Mudde (2007) p. 38

¹²¹ Marshall and Rossman (2011) p. 2; Mudde (2007) p. 39

¹²² Mudde (2007) p. 39

¹²³ Bergström & Boréus (2005) p. 18ff

¹²⁴ Bergström & Boréus (2005) p. 149f

¹²⁵ Mair & Mudde (1998) p. 211

¹²⁶ Miller and Yúdice (2002) p. 9

¹²⁷ Hacking (2000) p. 20

to the statement of Miller and Yúdice, who writes that “cultural policy [is] dedicated to producing subjects via the formation of repeatable styles of conduct”.¹²⁸

6.2. Case selection

To choose cases, relevant Western European PRRPs were first identified. Besides generally being considered to be PRRPs, relevant parties were assessed to be those with sufficiently electoral support to be present in national parliaments (and thus having certain political influence).¹²⁹ Based on the criteria set out by Mudde (2007, see chapter 3.3.), Figure 6.2:1 identifies the main current PRRPs in Western Europe.

Figure 6.2:1. Main current Western European PRRPs’ highest and latest electoral results from national general elections, 1980 - 2015

Country	Party	Highest result	Latest result
Austria	Alliance for the Future of Austria	10.7	3.53
	Austrian Freedom Party	26.9	20.5
Belgium	Flemish Interest	12.0	3.67
Denmark	Danish People’s Party	13.8	12.3
France	National Front	15.3	13.6
Germany	The Republicans	2.1	0.2
Greece	Popular Orthodox Rally	5.6	1.0
Italy	Northern League	10.1	4.1
Netherlands	Party for Freedom	15.5	10.1
Portugal	National Renovator Party	0.3	0.3
Sweden	Sweden Democrats	12.9	12.9
Switzerland	Swiss People’s Party	28.9	26.6
United Kingdom	United Kingdom Independence Party	12.6	12.6

Note: The figure is an updated version of Mudde’s (2013, p. 3). The parties’ latest electoral results are updated based on information from Álvarez-Rivera (2015).

The three cases that will be analyzed in this thesis are the Danish’ DF, the French’ FN and the Swedish’ SD. These parties are all among the Western European PRRPs with the highest electoral support. They should thus, based on previous research, share a nativist ideological core and focus on immigration policy (see Figure 1:1). That is, previous research shows that they meet the party family criteria *policy and ideology*.¹³⁰ In this thesis it is however argued that their shared nativism also should generate similarities in cultural policy. To test whether this is true and to allow for a result

¹²⁸ Miller and Yúdice (2002) p. 12

¹²⁹ Criteria primarily inspired by Ivarsflaten (2008) p. 9; Mudde (2012) p. 5 and Norris (2005)

¹³⁰ Mair & Mudde (1998) p. 211

somewhat generalizable for the party family, the cases were chosen based on their differences when it comes to other criteria used in party family research (i.e. *origins and sociology, transnational federations and name*).¹³¹ Concerning *origins and sociology*, especially parties' ideological roots are expected to leave traces because of *path dependency*, which implies that early standpoints in the party's history are hard to change.¹³² The parties' different national contexts should also be empathized, as it provides a framework of how parties value and think about cultural policy. Except criteria used in party family research, the category of *parliamentary power* is further added as expected to affect the parties' radicalism due to *taming effects*. When marginalized, a party's ideology tends to radicalize while embracing its anti-establishment position and while it do not have to consider inter-party negotiations and responsibilities.¹³³ Figure 4.2:1 accounts for these differences. If the analysis show that the three cases are similar also when it comes to cultural policy despite their differences, this indicates that they are a unified family based on something stronger – in this case their supposedly shared nativism.

Figure 6.2:2 Characteristics of FN, SD and DF

	FN	SD	DF
Country	France	Sweden	Denmark
Complete name	National Front	Sweden Democrats	Danish People's Party
Origins and sociology	Founded in 1972 Mixed right-wing	Founded in 1988 Nazism	Founded in 1995 Anti-tax, Neo-liberalism
Transnational federations	Non-attached Members (no group)	Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy	European Conservatives and Reformists
Parliamentary power	Weak	Moderate	Strong

Note: Considered transnational federation is here *group in the European Parliament*. Information about party group is collected from European Parliament (2015)

FN is said to have invented the *ethnopluralism* of PRRPs and is often described as a *prototype* for the party family.¹³⁴ When founded in 1972, it unified numerous right-wing sects and clubs such as *Action Française, Le mouvement Poujade* and *L'Organisation de l'Armée Secrète* around conservative and national-revolutionary ideas.¹³⁵ Except for being among the oldest PRRPs, FN was for long the most important and radical. However, they did not enter the French National Assembly until 1986.¹³⁶ Even if getting fairly high electoral support, they have so far never reached stronger parliamentary

¹³¹ Mair & Mudde (1998) p. 211

¹³² Mahoney (2000) p. 510-511; Pierson (2000) p. 252-253

¹³³ Meret (2010) p. 316-317; Minkenberg (2013b) p. 5

¹³⁴ Bornschier (2010) p. 25; Mudde (2013) p. 3

¹³⁵ DeClair (1999) p. 11-13; Kitschelt and McGann (1997) p. 94

¹³⁶ Betz (2003) p. 196; Kitschelt and McGann (1997) p. 94

power. Their current two of 577 seats in the National Assembly gives them small opportunities to get through with parliamentary motions. Still, they use their seats to make their message heard by involving in debates and asking questions.¹³⁷

When founded in 1988, SD both consisted of former members of *Keep Sweden Swedish* (Behåll Sverige Svenskt) with clear links to Nazism, and Nazi and fascist veterans.¹³⁸ Even if such Nazi roots remain unofficial, SD also had links “with a fairly extensive range of contemporary Nazi or white power groups”.¹³⁹ With time, SD got rid of most such influences and entered parliament in 2010. Even if treated like *pariah* by other political actors, they currently hold the balance of power in the Swedish government and are therefore assessed to have moderate parliamentary power.¹⁴⁰ In the European Parliament, they are part of the group Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy.

DF originated from the Danish Progress Party (Fremskridtspartiet) in 1995, which at the time was an anti-tax and neo-liberal party.¹⁴¹ After their entering in the Danish parliament in 1998, they have obtained a fairly strong parliamentary power. Except from being generally accepted by other political actors, they were the official support party of the former Liberal and Conservative government.¹⁴² In the European Parliament, they are part of the group Conservatives and Reformists.

6.3. Level of analysis

As explained, Mair and Mudde (1998) argue that the study of *policy and ideology* is suitable when examining party families.¹⁴³ By focusing on ideology when studying separate policy areas, core party identities will emerge as “[i]deologies function as the normative bases of the pursued policies”.¹⁴⁴ That party ideology is reflected in cultural policy is confirmed by Elisabeth Wolf-Csanády (1998). After having analysed political parties’ cultural values, she concludes that parties’ ideas on cultural policy are “rather strongly embedded in their general outlook or ideology [and] their vision of a ‘good society’”.¹⁴⁵

¹³⁷ Based on information from Assemblée Nationale (2015)

¹³⁸ Anders Widfeldt (2014) p. 181-182

¹³⁹ Anders Widfeldt (2014) p. 181-182

¹⁴⁰ Based on information from Sveriges Riksdag (2015)

¹⁴¹ Meret (2010) p. 22, 95, 101

¹⁴² Meret (2010) p. 317

¹⁴³ Mair & Mudde (1998) p. 211


¹⁴⁴ Mudde (2000) p. 5

¹⁴⁵ Wolf-Csanády (1998) p, 398

This thesis' level of analysis is thus in-between policy and ideology. As described, even though the overarching objective is to say something about PRRPs assumed nativist *ideology*, it is done by examining *ideas* in cultural policy. More specifically, this thesis' focus is on the *doctrine* of chosen PRRPs (see Figure 6.3:1).

Marie Demker (1993) uses the term doctrine in the sense of being a *link* between ideology and political actions.¹⁴⁶ She explains that ideology consists of *postulates* and *doctrine*, which both decide a party's more practical political positions. The *postulates* are the more abstract foundation of the ideology and consist of constitutive values, beliefs and perceptions of reality. As such, it set the framework for, guide and legitimate interpretations of the political reality - the doctrine. The *doctrine* is more flexible vis-a-vis the political reality, consists of time-bound and concrete desires and demands, and is reflected in verbal statements.¹⁴⁷ Indeed, in focusing on the doctrine of the chosen PRRPs, the previously explained danger in focusing on policy and ideology - that policy areas' content somewhat vary between countries - should be avoided.

Figure 6.3:1 Elements of a party's message



Note: The Figure is largely inspired by Demker (1993, p. 66)

6.4. Material

Based on the chosen cases and level for analysis, the empirical material should reflect the doctrine of DF, FN and SD. Even if interviews or statements by political commentators, party leaders, party members or voters are thinkable sources when studying parties, Mudde (2007) argues that this reduces a party's complexity. A doctrine is the product of several actors and processes, and can thus only be fully examined by material produced by (or representative for) the national party itself – that is, how it represents itself in official party literature. Except excluding organisations or actors closely associated to the party, this excludes material produced by local party organizations.¹⁴⁸ Studied documents are therefore DF's, FN's and SD's official party literature on cultural policy, as expressed through their own channels or in the national parliament.¹⁴⁹ Moreover, as the focus is on current doctrine, the empirical material should not be dated.

¹⁴⁶ Demker (1993) p. 67

¹⁴⁷ Demker (1993) p. 65-67

¹⁴⁸ Mudde (2007) p. 38

¹⁴⁹ Blomgren (1998) p. 21

Stances mediated through official party literature can however be accused for being “polished” to attract voters and thus potentially hide a more radical agenda. However, Mudde (2000) underlines that this is true for all parties, not only for PRRPs.¹⁵⁰ Furthermore, official literature should better reflect party doctrine than external actors’ assumptions about hidden agendas. Still, the reader should bear in mind that the “true” party doctrine could be more extremist than communicated officially. To prevent this, a mix of different party literature is used.

The analysed empirical material is therefore (for culture relevant) section(s) in the cases’ latest party program, section(s) in the cases’ latest budget proposal and, parliamentary motions (*beslutningsforslag/propositions de loi/motioner*) presented in *Kulturudvalget/La Commission des Affaires Culturelles et de l’Éducation/Kulturutskottet* by the cases during the last two years. The party programmes are expected to generate an overarching and general picture of ideas on cultural policy, and should thus (compared to other documents) be more representative for party ideology.¹⁵¹ A less abstract picture should be reflected in budget proposals and party motions, as these are connected to more practical policy outcomes. What sections that are “for culture relevant”, are moreover based upon what DF, FN and SD themselves include in the concept. Even if that imply that somewhat different political areas are included, this should not be a problem as the parties’ *ideas* (and not their policies *per se*) are in focus.¹⁵²

The quantity and quality of the described material vary between the parties. To prevent that from affecting the analysis credibility, complementing relevant material was used in cases when not judged as *thick* enough. This highlights the importance of design *flexibility*.¹⁵³ The material used in the analysis therefore varies to some extent between the parties. While SD’s material was judged as thick without complementation, DF’s were complemented with their principle program (*Principprogram*) and with a description of cultural policy on their homepage.¹⁵⁴ FN provided the sparsest material. As they did not present any parliamentary motions on cultural policy during the last years, such material were replaced with formally asked questions concerning cultural policy. Moreover, questions from FN’s deutes in the senate were also included. To confirm that the analysed material gave a correct reflection of the cases’ ideas, other material (such as older parliamentary questions, articles and blog posts by central actors) was gone through more superficially.

¹⁵⁰ Mudde (2000) p. 20

¹⁵¹ Rooduijn et al. (2012)

¹⁵² Mudde (2000) p. 5

¹⁵³ Marshall & Rossman (2011) p. 103, 251-257

¹⁵⁴ Dansk Folkeparti (a)

6.5. Processing empirical material

Marshall and Rossman (2011) state that “qualitative data analysis is a search for general statements about relationships and underlying themes”.¹⁵⁵ In this thesis, this implies a search for statements that illuminates PRRPs’ ideas when it comes to range and objectives of cultural policy. To recognize what parts of the empirical material that can be used as indicators for such ideas, the ideas should be transformed/operationalized into operational indicators.¹⁵⁶ Here, ideas on range and objectives of cultural policy are operationalized into two analytical instruments (see next two chapters for instruments and categories). While the first is used to identify range regarding *importance* and *understanding* of cultural policy, the second identify cultural policy *objectives*. As both instruments consist of a set of pre-established categories, the analytic process is *deductive*.

Units from the empirical material was coded and placed into the categories. Sections from longer texts,¹⁵⁷ budgetary areas, and parliamentary motions/questions were analysed as one unit each.¹⁵⁸ Units from party programs were valued as most important when placing the parties in the analytical instruments, as seen as the most central document for the party to communicate its message.¹⁵⁹ One unit could be coded into more than one category.

When coding, it is important to recognize that scholars are never free from own opinions.¹⁶⁰ Besides actively working with preventing potential biases, it is therefore important to choose a suiting method for coding. To code units according to the instruments’ categories, the *causal chain approach* was used. In each section of reasoning/unit in the studied empirical documents, cultural policy objectives were identified based on the argumentation or reasoning used to legitimize it. In other words, *symptoms* of the larger *objectives* (if not written out explicitly) were identified that could be traced back to their source.¹⁶¹ This can be illustrated with a unit from SD’s party program.

The cultural heritage has an intrinsic value, for instance by the aesthetic value that it represents. To safeguard the cultural heritage is also to show respect towards previous

¹⁵⁵ Marshall & Rossman (2011) p. 207

¹⁵⁶ Esaiasson et al (2012) p. 55; Marshall & Rossman (2011) p. 69

¹⁵⁷ Rooduijn et al. (2012, p. 566) argue that analysing sections in party programs makes most sense when studying ideology. Ideologies consist of certain claims, which are normally developed throughout several sentences in party programs. Therefore, sentences are too narrow to use as units. Sections of texts, on the other hand, have been proven useful as units as they are often divided by themes.

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¹⁵⁹ Rooduijn et al. (2012) p. 566

¹⁶⁰ Marshall & Rossman (2011) p. 251-257

¹⁶¹ Mudde (2000) p. 23-24

generations and to remember what they have accomplished. However, its most important aspect is that the cultural heritage creates unification. Every society needs shared norms and values, collective memories, common myths, common festivities and traditions, common manners and customs in order to keep together.¹⁶²

Here, the central objectivity of cultural policy is clearly to protect Swedish *cultural heritage* (coded in the instruments as anthropological – geographical/temporal dimension – national/traditional objectives). This is based on how SD legitimizes their focus on cultural heritage with argumentations about its *intrinsic* and *aesthetic value* and its ability to *create unification* and monitor *respect towards previous generations*.

The analysis came to an end when enough material had been analyzed for it to be reliable (i.e. to speak for itself).¹⁶³ If reflecting that the three cases are similar despite their internal differences, this indicates that DF, FN and SD are unified based on something stronger – in this case their supposedly shared nativism.

6.5.1. Range of cultural policy

The first instrument was developed to identify range when it comes to cultural policy *importance* and *understanding* (see Figure 6.5.1:1). Cultural policy *importance* was operationalized into the categories “higher” and “lower” importance. Besides using the *causal chain approach*, a party’s

Figure 6.5.1:1. Analytical instrument used to reflect political parties range of cultural policy

	Aesthetical	Anthropological
Higher importance		
Lower importance		

Note: Categories based on cultural theory. See chapter 4.1.

interest was assessed based on its parliamentary activity and budget proposal. If proposing an increase of the cultural policy budget compared to the national budget, this was taken as an indication of *higher importance*. *Understanding* of cultural policy was operationalized into the categories “aesthetical” and “anthropological” culture (indicators identified in chapter 4.1).

Based on theory, PRRPs are expected to be placed in the category “higher importance”, as cultural policy should be one of the main political instruments for PRRPs to reach nationalist ideological objectives (see Figure 1:1). Further on, they are expected to be placed in the category “anthropological” cultural understanding, as what should be

¹⁶² Sverigedemokraterna (2011) p. 19

¹⁶³ Marshall & Rossman (2011) p. 251-257

protected according to nativism is culture in its more anthropological sense. Furthermore, in contrast to aesthetical culture, anthropological culture refers to a plurality of cultures (one for every society) and thus also to cultural differences *between* rather than *within* societies.¹⁶⁴ Besides reflecting the nativist rhetoric of PRRPs explained in chapter 3.3., these expectations are further strengthened by previous research (see chapter 5).

6.5.2. Objective of cultural policy

The second analytical instrument was developed to identify *objectives* in cultural policy based on the typology of cultural conflict lines explained in chapter 4.2. According to the instrument, objectives in cultural policy were operationalized into 14 categories where a party can be placed in either the category “high culture” or “popular culture” on the class-related dimension, in “international culture”, “national culture” or “regional culture” on the geographical dimension, and in “traditional culture” or “innovative culture” on the temporal dimension. The categories are repeated to represent both an aesthetical and anthropological understanding of cultural policy (see Figure 6.5.2:1).

Figure 6.5.2:1. Analytical instrument used to reflect political parties objectives of cultural policy

Dimension	Conflict line	Aesthetical			Anthropological		
		DFP	FN	SD	DFP	FN	SD
Class-related	High culture						
	Popular culture						
Geographical	International culture						
	National culture						
	Regional culture						
Temporal	Traditional culture						
	Innovatory culture						

Note: Categories based on cultural conflict lines identified by Mangset (1992). See chapter 4.2.

By using the *causal chain approach*, the results of the coding are to be placed in the instrument. Here, one conflicting camp in each dimension is chosen for each party. For example, if the indication from the previous example (chapter 6.5.) is reflected in all documents, an “x” is placed in the second last box in the “SD-column”. This implies that SD prioritizes “traditional culture” over “innovatory culture” on the temporal dimension when it comes to anthropological cultural expressions. Further on, an “**X**” is used to signalize the category assessed as being the most important for each party.

¹⁶⁴ Harding (2007) p. 10; Miller and Yúdice (2002) p. 1; Åhlberg (1995) p. 169-70

As previously explained, the PRRPs are (based on theory) expected to prioritize anthropological cultural objectives. Further on, they are expected to prioritize national and traditional cultural objectives based on their nationally centered and conservative nativist core. The expectation about national cultural objectives is further strengthened by (sparse) previous research. However, previous research remains unclear regarding objectives on the temporal- and class-related dimension (see chapter 5). So is theory concerning the class-related dimension. However, based on nativism, parties could be expected to focus on cultural characteristic for their country. For example, FN could be expected to focus on high culture based on France's high cultural heritage. This dimension could however originate a conflict, as the populism of PRRPs states that politics should be designed according to the *general will* of the people (i.e. popular culture).¹⁶⁵

6.6. Delimitations

Before accounting for the analyzed material, the reader should be aware of the thesis' delimitations. First, in analyzing DF, FN and DF, only Western European PRRPs are included. That is, even if the results are expected to be somewhat generalizable for PRRPs, this is not necessarily true for Eastern European PRRPs or for PRRPs outside of Europe. Second, in analyzing official party material, parties are taken at their word. Even if, as discussed in chapter 6.4., this should be less of a problem than sometimes argued and measures are taken to prevent this, the reader should bear in mind that the "true" party doctrine could be more extremist than communicated officially. Moreover, in focusing on the core ideological characteristic of PRRPs – nativism – , the thesis disregards other characteristics that these parties are said to share (see chapter 3.3). Finally, it also disregards parts of cultural policy which are normally central in cultural policy research, such as organisation and state intervention. However, such issues are not relevant concerning what cultural expressions PRRP's want to *protect* with their cultural policy.

¹⁶⁵ Mudde (2007) p. 23

7. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

7.1. Range of cultural policy: cultural importance

As explained in chapter 1.1 and 4.5.1., DF, FN and SD are expected to attribute a higher importance to cultural policy, as it is considered to be a main instrument for PRRPs to reach nativist objectives.

In line with the expectations, central party documents reflect that DF assigns a *higher importance* to cultural policy. In their party manifesto and in their principle program, DF communicates that “Protection and development of this [Danish] culture is a prerequisite for the country's survival as a free and enlightened society”.¹⁶⁶ Further on, DF's interest in cultural policy is reflected in their proposal to increase its budget with 7%, compared to the government's (social democrats and leftists).¹⁶⁷ Such increase does however not seem to satisfy DF's interest, as they additionally want most possible cultural activities to be financed by advertisements and sponsorships.¹⁶⁸ DF's interest in cultural policy is further confirmed by their parliamentary activity. Between 2014 and 2015, DF presented 43.8 % (or seven motions) of all parties' parliamentary motions and legislative proposals in The Cultural Affairs Committee.¹⁶⁹

SD expresses that culture is central for society, national identity and the individual. Therefore, SD considers cultural policy to be an important area for the State.

Culture is not only a central building block in our society and national identity, it is also a valuable component of each individual's life. To create and take part in cultural experiences contribute to the personal development and enhance the quality of life [...] The Sweden Democrats' view is that the State has a heavy responsibility in terms of the creation of good prerequisites for a vibrant cultural life and to ensure a good infrastructure for cultural workers”.¹⁷⁰

Such interest is reflected in SD's proposition to increase the budget for *Culture, media, religious communities and leisure* with 3.06 % compared to government's budget (social democrats and greens).¹⁷¹ Their interest is also reflected in their high activity in the parliamentary Committee on Cultural Affairs, where SD has presented 21.3 % (or 27) of all parliamentary motions presented by Swedish parties between 2014 and

¹⁶⁶ Dansk Folkeparti (2009) p. 112, Dansk Folkeparti (2002) p. III.

¹⁶⁷ Dansk Folkeparti (2015); Finansministeriet (2015)

¹⁶⁸ Dansk Folkeparti (a)

¹⁶⁹ Information from Folketinget (2015). To also include initiatives put forward by governing parties, legislative proposals are included.

¹⁷⁰ 2014/15:2895 p. 4-5

¹⁷¹ 2014/15:SD100 p. 105

2015.¹⁷² When it comes to *importance* of cultural policy, SD (as DF) clearly follows the expectations in attaching a *higher importance* to the area.

FN's position is more contradictory. In their party program, FN follows the expectations of PRRPs by stating that culture is more important in France than elsewhere.

The art and language form an essential dimension of our identity. More than in other nations, Culture is inseparable from the history and radiance of France. France is an old human territory, heir to many of the greatest civilizations known to history [...] All authentic national politics should support this major asset, value it, keep an ambition that is at the height of this French exception.¹⁷³

The practical substance behind these phrases is however doubtful. Besides claiming that “[t]he Ministry of Cultural Affairs has been relatively pampered by the rightist and leftist governments”,¹⁷⁴ Marine Le Pen wants to reduce the cultural policy budget with 383 million EUR (2015).¹⁷⁵ Even if hardly noticeable compared to the generous national budget,¹⁷⁶ such reduction is an important statement. That FN is assessed to have a *lower* interest in cultural policy is further confirmed by their zero parliamentary motions presented in the National Assembly and Senate between 2014 and 2015. Other activity (i.e. asked questions) confirms the pattern as only nine questions can be linked to cultural policy.¹⁷⁷ In contrast to DF and SD, FN does thus not follow the expectations of PRRPs.

Taken together, SD and DF communicate a *stronger* interest in cultural policy, while the opposite is true for FN. Put differently, FN's interest is more similar to other political parties in general,¹⁷⁸ while SD's and DF's are in line with what could be expected from PRRP's based on their nativist ideological core.

7. 2. Range of cultural policy: understanding of culture

As explained in chapter 6.5.1., DF, FN and SD are expected have an anthropological understanding of culture while culture in its anthropological sense is what should be *protected* according to nativism.

Indeed, in line with the expectations, DF's *anthropological* cultural understanding is

¹⁷² Information from Riksdagen (2015)

¹⁷³ Front National (a), p. 24

¹⁷⁴ Front National (a), p. 24

¹⁷⁵ Front National (b) p. 1;

¹⁷⁶ In the French national budget for 2015, 2 567 282 855 EUR is dedicated to the program *Culture* and 717 824 967 EUR to *Médias, livre et industries culturelles* (Loi n° 2014-1654)

¹⁷⁷ Information from Assemblée Nationale (2015) and Sénat (2015)

¹⁷⁸ Frenander (2014) p. 51; Harding (2010) p. 31

clearly communicated in their statement that Danish culture “consists of the sum of the Danish people’s values, beliefs, religion, language, customs, attitudes and traditions”. Even if not mentioning *art*, DF’s central documents demonstrates that also aesthetical culture is important to DF (further developed in chapter 7.3;7.4 and 7.5., where it is also communicated that DF emphasises aesthetical objectives to a greater extent than SD).

The first phrases in SD’s party manifesto’s cultural section explicitly state that they follow the expectations of PRRPs by their broad *anthropological* understanding of culture. “Culture is an ambiguous concept, but is primarily used in the sense of mental cultivation or socially transmitted lifestyles. We claim that especially the latter of these meanings have a completely central political function”.¹⁷⁹ Their anthropological understanding is further demonstrated when SD accounts for how they define culture.

Culture may be defined as the lifestyle that unites a community or a certain group of people. As such, it includes languages, behavioural patterns, customs and festivities, institutions, art and music, dress codes, religion, rituals, games, values, norms concerning laws and moral systems, etc [...] In its broadest sense, the Swedish culture could be defined as the sum of everything that has ever been thought, written, said, created or made by persons belonging to the Swedish nation.¹⁸⁰

Indeed, in line with how anthropological culture is explained in chapter 4.1, SD’s definition includes the Swedish society’s whole *way of life*. This cultural understanding is reflected in all studied documents. While cultural expressions such as heritage, language, religion and sports recur, expressions attached to the more aesthetical understanding remains rare. For example, *theatre* (an usually important feature in cultural policy) is not mentioned except as an area of expenditure in SD’s budget.¹⁸¹

As the case regarding cultural importance, FN deviates from the pattern of DF and SD as well as from expectations of PRRPs. Even if *language* seems important for FN, they have a clear focus on aesthetical cultural expressions throughout the political documents. The opening phrase in FN’s party program’s cultural section reflects this in stating that “[t]he art and language form an essential dimension of our identity”.¹⁸² Even though language represents an anthropological understanding of culture, the totality of studied documents communicates a focus on aesthetical culture. Even if not presenting an explicit definition of culture as DF and SD, they are therefore assessed to have a more traditional and narrow *aesthetical* understanding of culture. That is, FN’s cultural understanding is rather in line with general parties’ cultural policy than what is expected from PRRP’s.¹⁸³

Taken together, DF and SD follow what is expected from PRRPs while FN deviates from the pattern. While DF and SD are assessed to have an anthropological

¹⁷⁹ Sverigedemokraterna (2011) p. 18

¹⁸⁰ Sverigedemokraterna (2011) p. 18-19

¹⁸¹ 2014/15:2895 p. 8

¹⁸² Front National (a), p. 24

¹⁸³ Frenander (2014) p. 51; Harding (2010) p. 31

understanding of culture and cultural policy, FN is assessed to have an aesthetic understanding of cultural policy.

7.3. Objectives of cultural policy: the geographical dimension

As explained in chapter 6.5.2., DF, FN and SD are expected to prioritize anthropological cultural objectives in all dimensions. On the geographical dimension, they are expected to prioritize national cultural objectives based on their nationally centered nativist core. Indeed, the empirical material clearly communicates that the *geographical dimension* is central for all parties. Again in line with the expectations, all parties focus on the protection of one's own *national culture* while being hostile towards foreign cultures.

DF demonstrates their national focus by stating that “[t]he Danish culture is under pressure from several perspectives. Therefore, the Danish People’s party asks for broad political initiatives to strengthen the Danishness [*danskheden*] in all our cultural institutions”.¹⁸⁴ The importance of national focus is underlined with the statement “[p]rotection and development of this [Danish] culture is a prerequisite for the country's survival as a free and enlightened society”.¹⁸⁵ That immigration of cultures and religions is threatening Danish culture is developed in the following section.

Danish People's Party favour cultural cooperation with other countries, but we are opposed to giving cultures, which are based on completely different values than ours, influence in Denmark. The way of life we have chosen in Denmark, is unique. It is conditioned by our culture, and can in a small country like ours not survive, if we allow mass immigration of foreign religions and cultures. A multicultural society is a society without internal coherence and unity, which is why the world's multicultural societies are characterized by a lack of solidarity and often also open conflict. There is no reason to assume that Denmark can avoid sharing the fate of other multicultural societies if we let foreign cultures get decisive influence.¹⁸⁶

Their hostility towards foreign cultures are also expressed in their principle program, where DF states that “Denmark is not, and has never been, a country of immigration. Therefore, we will not accept a multi-ethnic transformation of the country”.¹⁸⁷ Thus, following the expectations of PRRPs, DF clearly show that they want to protect Danish culture and the “Danishness” which they claim is threatened by the multicultural society. Especially, DF wants to protect such Danishness by focusing on anthropological cultural expressions like the Danish language and Danish cultural heritage such as

¹⁸⁴ Dansk Folkeparti (2009) p. 113

¹⁸⁵ Dansk Folkeparti (2009) p. 112. See also Dansk Folkeparti (2002) p. III section 6-7; Dansk Folkeparti (2009) p. 114 section 1.

¹⁸⁶ Dansk Folkeparti (2009) p. 112-113

¹⁸⁷ Dansk Folkeparti (2002) p. IV. For further examples, see Dansk Folkeparti (2009) p. 112 section 3 and 6; 113 section 2.

historical buildings and rune stones.¹⁸⁸ When it comes to aesthetical culture, DF's national focus is expressed by their support for Danish speaking pieces, Danish art work and Danish artists in general. For example, DF writes that "Danish film- and theatre productions should primarily get support when Danish is the dominating language in the production and when it uses a majority on Danish actors".¹⁸⁹

As DF and in line with the expectations, SD primarily focuses on preserving Swedish culture, said to consist of characteristics such as phenomena typical for Swedish society and history.

What we primarily focus on preserving is, however, things that we regard as the core of Swedish culture. To this core, we primarily consider those phenomena that have especially characterized the development of our society, are deeply rooted in Swedish history, are widespread among former and/or current Swedes, have a strong symbolic significance for Swedish identity or are unique to the Swedish nation or a certain part of the Swedish nation.¹⁹⁰

As previously recognized, this reflects an anthropological view on cultural policy. More specifically, SD emphasises the preservation of Swedish cultural heritage for which (among other things) Christianity is seen as especially important.

Sweden has been a Christian country for a thousand years. No other idea and institution has been as important for the formation of Swedish culture that has Christianity and the Swedish church. The preservation of the Christian heritage is therefore a concern of all Swedes, believers and non-believers. The ecclesiastical cultural heritage also represents the largest single part of the material Swedish cultural heritage.¹⁹¹

Other prioritized parts of Swedish heritage are the Swedish language, heritage sites, cultural landscapes, historical buildings and ships.¹⁹² Their national focus is also reflected in (their few) aesthetical initiatives, such as their proposal to introduce a Swedish cultural canon.¹⁹³ It should also be recognized that SD, in contrast to DF and FN, expresses some concerns regarding regional cultural objectives. Even if SD highlights their national focus in trying to prevent the disappearance of Swedish village-names (in favour for names in local languages),¹⁹⁴ they propose actions to preserve minority languages and heritage – especially concerning the Sami, Finnish-Swedes,

¹⁸⁸ For examples, see Dansk Folkeparti (2009) p. 113 section 4, 7; 2014/15:B4; 2013/14:B74; Dansk Folkeparti (a) section 4.

¹⁸⁹ Dansk Folkeparti (2009) p. 113. For further examples, see Dansk Folkeparti (2009) p. 114 (museums, theatres, orchestras and art schools) and 117 (radio).

¹⁹⁰ Sverigedemokraterna (2011) p. 19. For further examples, see Sverigedemokraterna (2011) p.19 section 4; 2014/15:2895 page 3 section 1, p. 4 section 2,

¹⁹¹ 2013/14: Kr12

¹⁹² 2014/15:SD100 p. 92 section 3; 2014/15:2899; 2014/15:247; 2014/15:2514; 2014/15:2895 p. 11 section 3. For further examples of Swedish cultural heritage in general, see 2014/15:SD100 p. 92 section 3; 2014/15:2898; 2014/15:2895 p. 5 section 7, p. 15 section 2

¹⁹³ 2014/15:2900. See also 2014/15:2895 p. 8 section 2

¹⁹⁴ 2014/15:2515.

Estonian-Swedes and the blind (i.e. Braille).¹⁹⁵

Also the “protection from” aspect of nativism is clearly reflected in SD’s cultural policy, as they state that “the Sweden Democrat’s view on culture and its importance for the survival for our society and nation evidently implicates that we are strong opponents of the political idea of multiculturalism”.¹⁹⁶ Instead of multiculturalism, SD advocates assimilation.

Our alternative to multiculturalism is a return to an assimilation policy that creates unity, similar to what existed in the country until 1975, where the objective is that immigrants should adapt to local customs and eventually abandon their original cultures and identities to, instead, become part of the Swedish nation. The core of assimilation is to establish that the Swedish State is not a cultural vacuum, and that the Swedish nation's culture by virtue of its history, with the sole exception of the national minorities, is superior to other nations' cultures within the Swedish State. As a logical consequence of this, all state and municipal support aiming to maintain and enforce immigrants’ original cultures and identities should be withdrawn. In parallel with this, support for the preservation and maintenance of the Swedish cultural heritage should increase.¹⁹⁷

Except withdrawing support to immigrants’ *original cultures and identities*, a further practical example is SD’s proposal to minimize international cultural exchange and cooperation.¹⁹⁸

DF’s and SD’s focus on the nation does not, however, prevent them from expressing that Swedish and Danish culture are parts of a larger *Nordic cultural community*, which is a part of the western world. DF states that,

Denmark's long cultural development has been greatly influenced by its connection with the world outside Denmark, mainly the Nordic countries, Germany, France, England and the United States. This cultural influence have not extinguished our genuine culture due to the fact that we, regardless of our country's small size, have had the ability and possibility to let the influence take place on our terms and to reshape the external influence according to our standards.¹⁹⁹

SD further explains how the familiarity between the Nordic countries and the Western world has originated.

The deepest root of the originality of Swedish culture lies in our history and in the nature and the climate in which it has emerged. Against this background it is not surprising that our culture is very similar to our Nordic neighbours’. Through the similarities in living

¹⁹⁵ 2014/15:2895 p. 6-7; 2014/15:2897. For further examples, see Sverigedemokraterna (2014) p. 18 section 8; 2014/15:2895 p. 8 section 4 and p. 11 section 4; 2014/15:2872

¹⁹⁶ Sverigedemokraterna (2011) p. 21

¹⁹⁷ Sverigedemokraterna (2011) p. 21

¹⁹⁸ 2014/15:SD100 p. 100. For further examples, see Sverigedemokraterna (2011) p. 19 section 1, p. 21 section 2; 2014/15:SD100 p. 93 section 4, p. 100 area 1:2, 2013/14:Kr10; 2014/15:2895 p. 12 section 2, p.13 section 1 ; 2014/15:2903 p. 2 section 3

¹⁹⁹ Dansk Folkeparti (2009) p. 112. See also Dansk Folkeparti (2009) p. 112, section 1.

conditions and millennia of close and natural relationships between peoples, a Scandinavian and Nordic cultural community has emerged. This Nordic cultural community is something that the Sweden Democrats want to embrace and develop. In a wider context, we also see Sweden as part of a North-European, European and Western cultural community.²⁰⁰

On a more specific political level, this is reflected in SD proposals to investment in a new *Nordic house* and in education to strengthen the comprehension of Nordic languages.²⁰¹ A culture underlined to be especially different and incompatible with the Swedish and Danish cultures are Islam.

Islam and in particular its strong political and fundamentalist branch is, according to the Sweden Democrats, that religious belief proved to have the largest difficulties to harmoniously coexist with the Swedish and Western culture. The influence of Islam on Swedish society should therefore in the largest possible extent be counteracted and immigration from Muslim countries with strong elements of fundamentalism should be strictly limited.²⁰²

Even if having more of an aesthetical cultural focus, FN's cultural policy resembles SD's and DF's and meets the expectations for PRRPs in its aim to protect what is French while considering outside cultural elements as a threat. As noted, FN writes in their manifesto that "[m]ore than in other nations, Culture is inseparable from the history and radiance of France. France is an old human territory, heir to many of the greatest civilizations known to history [...] All authentic national politics should support this major asset, value it, keep an ambition that is at the height of this French exception".²⁰³ Like DF, FN specifies the national aesthetical focus by expressing that French artists, art work/pieces and art industry should be prioritized. For example, FN writes that, "[d]evices promoting our cultural exception (quotas when broadcasting French works, special support to the French industry etc.) are part of a logic of national priority, where the cultural exception is nothing else but a national priority applied to culture".²⁰⁴

Concerning anthropological cultural expressions FN focus on language, both within and outside of French borders. In an international perspective, they want French to reclaim its position of a world language. For examples, the FN deputy Marion Maréchal-Le Pen states that,

While the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Culture whiteness, in the media, of their common will to develop a real cultural diplomacy, the French language must be one of its main instruments. Vector of a people, a culture and a way of thinking, this language was, until the Treaty of Versailles 1919, the language of international diplomacy.²⁰⁵

²⁰⁰ Sverigedemokraterna (2011) p. 18.

²⁰¹ 2014/15:2867; 2014/15:2932. See also 2014/15:2895 p. 11 section 3

²⁰² Sverigedemokraterna (2011) p. 27. See also Dansk Folkeparti (2009) p. 113 section 2

²⁰³ Front National (a) p. 24. For further examples, see Front National (a) p. 24 section 5;p. 25 section 1.

²⁰⁴ Front National (a) p. 25. For further examples, see Front National (a) p. 24 section 9 (literature industry), p. 25 section 3 (film) and 4 (artists),

²⁰⁵ (2013)N°:33520. For further examples, see Front National (a) p. 25 section 5; (2014)N°:58956; (2015)N°:72381

Indeed, FN notes that the French language is threatened by the increasing use of English globally and of anglicisms nationally. Another considered threat is the use of different teaching languages in school (such as Arabic and Romani).²⁰⁶ In general, FN writes that “The French cultural exception and our language are threatened by globalization. A true national policy must revive the excellence and originality of the French cultural creation and its worldwide diffusion in cooperation with the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Cooperation and Francophonie”.²⁰⁷

Taken together, the parties’ national focus follows what is expected from PRRPs, as characterized by their aim to protect national culture from the culture of others. However, while the main focus of FN is on national aesthetical culture, the focus of DF and SD is on national anthropological culture.

7.4. Objectives of cultural policy: the temporal dimension

As explained in chapter 6.5.2., DF, FN and SD are expected to prioritize anthropological cultural objectives in all dimensions. On the temporal dimension, they are expected to prioritize traditional cultural objectives based on their conservative nativist core. This expectation is reflected by all parties, and is particularly prominent regarding *cultural heritage*.

DF empathize traditional culture in highlighting that “a particularly important task is to preserve old historical buildings, art values and the like of the national heritage”.²⁰⁸ Indeed, a large focus of DF is on research and on the preservation of historical buildings and environments, such as the manor house museum *Gammel Esterup*.²⁰⁹ Other focuses is on the Danish language (said to have been “vulgarized”) and to preserve the constitutional monarchy.²¹⁰ When it comes to more aesthetical objectives, they focus on education in traditional Danish music and cultural history, the preservation of historical architecture and the presence of classical cultural expressions in the media.²¹¹ However, DF somewhat depart from the expected conservatism by also emphasizing more aesthetical innovative culture. For instance, DF states that “an important objective of cultural policy to give room and space to the creation of Danish art at a level which may

²⁰⁶ See for example Front National (a) p. 25 section 5; (2014)N°:58956; (2015)N°:72381; (2014)N°:73290

²⁰⁷ Front National (a) p. 24. For further examples, see (2014)N°:1828; (2014)N°:55665

²⁰⁸ Dansk Folkeparti (a)

²⁰⁹ 2013/14:B45. For further examples. See Dansk Folkeparti (2009) p. 114: section 3; 2014/15:B4; 2013/14:B46; 2013/14:B76

²¹⁰ Dansk Folkeparti (2009) p. 113 section 4, Dansk Folkeparti (2002) p. I. See also 2014/15:B124

²¹¹ Dansk Folkeparti (2009) p. 113 section 7-8, 117 section 2; 2013/14:B47

represent Danish culture and contribute to the discussion of central issues in our time”.²¹² For example, DF promotes modern architecture and literature.²¹³ Even if so, nearly all DF’s parliamentary motions concerns traditional culture. Therefore, DF’s temporal focus is assessed to be *traditional*.

Following the expectations, FN focuses on traditional culture in general and on cultural heritage in particular. FN’s criticism of the current government for neglecting historical monuments, literature, theatre and music reflect this.²¹⁴ In contrast to current French policy, FN states that “[o]nce again, defending the heritage will be given highest priority”.²¹⁵ Further on, besides focusing on the earlier mentioned aesthetical heritage of literature, theatre and music, they also emphasise the preservation of more anthropological historical monuments and venues.²¹⁶

Of the three parties, SD reflects the greatest empathy on traditional cultural objectives - especially concerning anthropological cultural expressions. Meanwhile, they express an almost hostile attitude towards innovative culture. In SD’s budget’s cultural section, the largest part is dedicated to the protection and vitalisation of Swedish cultural heritage.²¹⁷ SD explains the importance of cultural heritage in terms of its intrinsic value and unifying capacity.

The cultural heritage has an intrinsic value, for instance by the aesthetic value that it represents. To safeguard the cultural heritage is also to show respect towards previous generations and to remember what they have accomplished. However, its most important aspect is that the cultural heritage creates unification. Every society needs shared norms and values, collective memories, common myths, common festivities and traditions, common manners and customs in order to keep together.²¹⁸

More specifically, SD writes that “[w]e increase the founding to preserve, foster, animate and spread knowledge about ancient monuments, cultural landscapes and buildings”.²¹⁹ As mentioned, SD focuses on anthropological traditional cultural heritage such as Christianity, traditional folklore, historically important heritage sights, buildings and ships.²²⁰ Less focus is on traditional aesthetical cultural objectives. SD does however wish to develop a Swedish cultural canon and further support the production of

²¹² Dansk Folkeparti (2009) p. 113

²¹³ For examples, see Dansk Folkeparti (2009) p. 113 section 6, p. 114 section 6-7, p. 117 section 2

²¹⁴ Front National (a) p. 24

²¹⁵ Front National (a) p. 25. See also Front National (a) p. 24 section 1

²¹⁶ For examples, see (2014)N°:68952, (2014)N°:1828; (2013)N°:40956

²¹⁷ 2014/15:SD100 p. 92, 101

²¹⁸ Sverigedemokraterna (2011) p. 19. For further examples, see 2014/15:2895 p. 3 section 1, p. 5 section 7, p. 6 section 4; 2014/15:2898; 2014/15:2904; 2014/15:2850

²¹⁹ 2014/15:2895 p. 15. For further examples, see 2014/15:2895 p. 10 section 2, p. 11 section 2-3; p.12 section 1; 2014/15:3001; 2014/15:247

²²⁰ For examples, see 2013/14:Kr12; 2014/15:2514; 2014/15:2895 p. 9 section 3, p. 10 section 3; 2014/15:2902; 2014/15:2912

films monitoring Swedish history.²²¹ As mentioned, SD seems less eager to support contemporary and innovative culture. SD wants to “promote a high degree of independence within contemporary culture”.²²² Put differently, SD wants to heavily reduce funding for contemporary artists and for museums monitoring modern art.²²³

Summarized, the temporal dimension is assessed to be important for all cases. More specifically, in line with what could be expected from PRRPs, traditional culture is prioritized over innovative culture both regarding aesthetical and anthropological cultural understanding. However, while SDs focus on traditional culture is rather radical, DF and FN have more moderate positions. Further on, while DF’s and SD’s objectives are more anthropological, FN’s are more aesthetical.

7.5. Objectives of cultural policy: the class-related dimension

As explained in chapter 6.5.2., a potential conflict could be expected to occur regarding objectives on the class-related dimension. At the one hand, FN could be expected to prioritize high culture based on France’s high cultural heritage. As Denmark and Sweden are not characterized by their high cultural heritage, this must not be true for DF and SD. On the other hand, PRRPs are (in being *populist*) expected to prioritize popular cultural expressions as politics should be designed according to the *general will* of the people.²²⁴ As expected, the class-related dimension is where the parties display most differences.

Even if the two earlier dimensions are assessed to be of stronger interest for SD, they also empathises *anthropological popular culture*. Summarized together with their other objectives, SD wish to further support “the preservation of the cultural heritage and to animate the traditional, popular, Swedish culture”.²²⁵ SD’s focus on popular culture is further highlighted when explaining that one of the cores of Swedish culture is culture that is “widespread among former and/or current Swedes”.²²⁶

Connected to the popular aspect of culture, SD underlines the importance of accessibility in stating that “[c]ulture should be viable and for all. The guiding

²²¹ 2014/15:2895 p. 6 section 4, p. 3 section 3. For further examples, see 2014/15:2895 p. 8 section 2, p. 11 section 2

²²² 2014/15:2895 p. 6 section 3. For further examples, see 2014/15:2895 p. 9 section 2; 2014/15:SD100 p. 93 section 4

²²³ For examples, see 2014/15:2895 p. 10 section 1, p. 11 section 2

²²⁴ Mudde (2007) p. 23

²²⁵ 2014/15:SD100 p. 92

²²⁶ Sverigedemokraterna (2011) p. 19. See also Sverigedemokraterna (2011) p. 19 section 4.

principles for our policy in the area is accessibility and public health”.²²⁷ For instance, SD proposes large investments in education in the arts, that cultural institutions should be less focused on larger cities, and to strengthen the cultural accessibility for children, elderly and disabled.²²⁸ Further on, in line with populism, culture that gets public funding should (to a greater extent) be cultural expressions preferred by the people. For example,

One way to move the influence of contemporary culture closer to the citizens is to introduce a system where every resident is assigned a cultural allowance, a grant reserved for cultural consumption. In practical terms, this contribution could be designed like the grant for dental care, where museums, ateliers, concert halls and other venues that offer cultural consumption is connected to a system and that every citizen is annually awarded a pot that can be used when visiting the affiliated cultural arenas. In this way, support is given to cultural industries and contemporary culture without being controlled by forces other than the preferences of the people.²²⁹

To be more specific, SD’s main focus considering anthropological popular cultural expressions is on sports, language and on museums monitoring Sweden’s popular cultural heritage.²³⁰ SD’s large support of sports is legitimized with the (populist) argumentation: “[s]ports and outdoor recreation is a large movement in Sweden, often with great popular support while large parts are non-profit. The work and interest in sport and outdoor activities is also elemental for movement and public health, especially among children and young people”.²³¹ SD also proposes investments in more aesthetical popular culture such as traditional Swedish handcraft, folk art and folk music.²³² High cultural objectives only have a minor role in the studied SD documents, even if SD wish to develop a cultural cannon, provide qualitative education in the arts, promote the preservation and exhibition of historically important ships.²³³ Indeed, the objectives of high culture seem weak, as SD wish to reduce the budget both for current artists and literature.²³⁴ Moreover, the quite high culturally charged *theatre* is only mentioned when they propose increased founding to the more popular *Riksteatern*.²³⁵

In contrast, DF is assessed to focus on high cultural objectives. In their manifesto, DF writes that an important aim for cultural policy is to support culture at a level

²²⁷ 2014/15:2895 p. 4 section 1

²²⁸ For examples, see 2014/15:2895 p. 3 section 1, p. 4 section 3, p. 5 section 8, p. 6 section 1, p. 7 section 2-3, p. 8 section 1

²²⁹ 2014/15: 2849

²³⁰ For examples, see Sverigedemokraterna (2011) p. 27 section 3; 2014/15:SD100 p. 100 area 13:1; 2013/14:Kr12; 2014/15:2897; 2014/15:2895 p. 11 section 3, p. 12 section 1, p. 16 section 2

²³¹ 2014/15:SD100 p. 94

²³² For examples, see 2014/15:SD100 p. 100 area 4:3; 2014/15:2895 p. 8 section 2, p. 9 section 3. See also 2014/15:2895 p. 8 section 1

²³³ For examples, see 2014/15:2900; 2014/15:2895 p. 5 section 2, p. 11 section 4, p. 13 section 2; 2014/15:247; 2014/15:2537

²³⁴ For examples, see 2014/15:SD100 p. 100 section 3:1; 2014/15:2895 p. 5 section 3

²³⁵ 2014/15:2895 p. 8; 2014/15:SD100 p. 100

representative for Danish culture.²³⁶ To achieve this, they propose a council of art experts to be installed to support professional artists without large commercial income and to ensure the production of qualitative culture.

The Danish People's Party wants the economic and artistic responsibility for the support provided to the professional art, to be left to a council composed of persons with first-hand insight to art and culture. [...] The financial support is used primarily to ensure the production of artistic works of high quality to the Danish society. Danish People's Party emphasizes that support for individual artists should depend on their other income so that there is no support for artists with large commercial income.²³⁷

Further on, they want to support the production and meditation of high cultural expressions such as museums, theatres and orchestras, and to ensure the quality of cultural educations in areas such as architecture, film, fine arts and theatre.²³⁸ Even if emphasizing aesthetical high cultural expressions, DF also considers more anthropological culture such as the protection of castles, manors and the Danish monarchy.²³⁹ When it comes to more popular cultural objectives, DF (as SD) emphasizes cultural accessibility and that the Danish' people themselves should, to a greater extent, decide which cultural expressions that should be supported.²⁴⁰ More explicit policy examples are focused on the Danish language, general history and traditional music.²⁴¹

FN seems moderately interested of the class-related dimension and their objectives are complex. At first glance, FN seems highly culturally elitist with phrases such as “[m]ore than in other nations, Culture is inseparable from the history and radiance of France. France is an old human territory, heir to many of the greatest civilizations known to history” and that cultural policy should “keep an ambition that is at the height of this French exception”.²⁴² Such impression is further strengthened by their aesthetical focus on high cultural expressions such as historical monuments, architecture, literature, theatre and opera.²⁴³ However, popular objectives are reflected in their focus on accessibility and that cultural support should, to a greater extent, be attributed to culture chosen by the French people themselves. This is reflected in several places, such as in their claim that “our cultural life do too often suffer from opacity and clientelism, without sufficiently listen to the tastes and expectations of our people”²⁴⁴ and that “The budget of the Ministry of Culture focuses too much on Paris, and its sterile productions

²³⁶ Dansk Folkeparti (2009) p. 113

²³⁷ Dansk Folkeparti (2009) p. 114

²³⁸ Dansk Folkeparti (2009) p. 114. See also 2013/14:B47

²³⁹ Dansk Folkeparti (2009) p. 114, Dansk Folkeparti (2002) p. I. For further examples, see 2013/14:B45; 2013/14:B76; 2014/15:B124

²⁴⁰ Dansk Folkeparti (a) For further examples, see Dansk Folkeparti (2009) p. 113 section 6, p. 116 section 5

²⁴¹ For examples, see Dansk Folkeparti (2009) p. 113 section 4, 7-8, p. 117 section 1; 2013/14:B74

²⁴² Front National (a) p. 24. See also Front National (a) p. 25 section 2.

²⁴³ For examples, see Front National (a) p. 24 section 4-5, 9, p. 25 section 1, 4; (2015)N°:15459; (2013)N°:34967

²⁴⁴ Front National (a) p. 24

compared to the province; this condition must change. The practices of amateurs should be better cared of”.²⁴⁵ The theme of accessibility returns regarding more specific objectives of popular anthropological culture, such as increased access to historical venues and regional radio.²⁴⁶ FN also proposes investments in other popular anthropological cultural expressions such as the theme park *Parc Puy du Fou* – a popular tourist destination.²⁴⁷ However, FN’s focus regarding anthropological popular culture is on the French language, which is described as “structuring the collective culture” and for immigrants as “the ultimate substrate for assimilation into the national community” and for “learning of [French] citizenship”.²⁴⁸ Taken together, FN is assessed to emphasize high aesthetical culture but popular anthropological culture.

Summarized, the class-related dimension gets least attention from all cases compared to other dimensions. While SD shows clear preferences for popular culture, DF’s objectives are oriented towards high culture. FN objectives are divided, as they display high cultural aesthetical objectives in parallel with popular anthropological cultural objectives. Possibly, the differences between PRRPs could be seen as indication of the previously explained potential conflict between nativist and populist ideology. Especially regarding FN where nativism could be expected to generate high cultural objectives based on their high cultural heritage, while populism could be expected to generate popular cultural objectives to meet the *general will* of the people.²⁴⁹ However, this does not explain DFs high cultural objectives, as Denmark is not as France characterized by its high cultural heritage.

7.6. Range and objectives of cultural policy: summary and comparison

Figure 7.6:1 shows DF’s, FN’s and SD’s objectives (here as stances on the cultural conflict lines) in cultural policy.

²⁴⁵ Front National (a) p. 24. For further examples, see Front National (a) p. 24 section 4, 7.

²⁴⁶ For examples, see (2013)N°:44048; (2013)N°:40956. See also Front National (a) p. 25 section 7

²⁴⁷ (2014)N°:0276c. See also Front National (a) p. 25 section 1

²⁴⁸ (2014)N°:73290. See also (2015)N°:72381

²⁴⁹ Mudde (2007) p. 23

Figure 7.6:1 DF's, FN's and SD's objectives of cultural policy regarding aesthetical and anthropological understanding of culture

Dimension	Conflict line	Aesthetical			Anthropological		
		DF	FN	SD	DF	FN	SD
Class-related	High culture	x	x		x		
	Popular culture			x		x	x
Geographical	International culture						
	National culture	x	X	x	X	x	X
	Regional culture						
Temporal	Traditional culture	x	x	x	x	x	x
	Innovatory culture						

Note: "x" implicates the cultural objectives of parties regarding conflicting cultural camps. "X" signalizes the parties most important objective.

The figure displays that FN, SD and DF's objectives with cultural policy largely corresponds to the same pattern. The objectives are most extensive on the geographical dimension where all parties focus on national culture. As described in chapter 4.2, such national priority is closely connected to aims of a *homogeneous* national culture and a distinctive national identity.²⁵⁰ The parties' objectives are also important regarding traditional culture on the temporal dimension. Less importance is attributed to objectives on the class-related dimension, where DF focuses on high culture, SD on popular culture, and FN on both (aesthetical high culture and anthropological popular culture). In other words, the pattern largely corresponds to what is expected from parties with a nativist ideology which strengthen previous research' identification of nativism as core ideology for PRRPs. Even if interesting, DF's, FN's and SD's differences in the class-related dimension is less important for this conclusion, as this seems to be the least interesting area for the parties. Further on, nativism provides a possible explanation in the cases of FN and SD as their differences could originate from divergent national contexts.

However, DF's, FN's and SD's *range* of cultural policy is more complex. As communicated in figure 7.6:2, SD and DF are assessed to attach a *higher importance* and have an *anthropological understanding* of cultural policy. That position is in

Figure 7.6:2 DF's, FN's and SD's range of cultural policy regarding understanding and importance

	Aesthetical	Anthropological
Higher importance		SD DF
Lower importance	FN	

²⁵⁰ Bennich-Björkman (1991) p. 60; Blomgren (1998) p. 31

line with what is expected from PRRP's based on their nativist core ideology. However, the opposite is true for FN. FN is assessed to attach a *lower importance* and have an *aesthetical understanding* of cultural policy which does not reflect the expectations. Indeed, FN's range of cultural policy is more similar to political parties in general,²⁵¹ while SD's and DF's position is in line with what is expected from PRRP's.

Previous research confirms that DF, FN and SD meet the "protection from" part of nativism by their hostile immigration policy.²⁵² Taken together, DF's and SD's range and objective of cultural policy confirms that these parties also meet the "protection of" part of nativism. However, the same is not true for FN. Even if FN's objectives are in line with those of nativism, their lower interest and aesthetical understanding of the area communicates that they do not consider cultural policy to be a main political instrument to reach nativist objectives. Therefore, FN cannot be said to meet the "protection of" part of nativism on more than the (previously confirmed) rhetorical level.

²⁵¹ Frenander (2014) p. 51; Harding (2010) p. 31

²⁵² E.g. Immerzeel et al. (2015); Ivarsflaten (2008); Norris (2005); Zaslove (2004)

8. CONCLUDING DISCUSSION

Previous research claim that *nativism* is the core ideological characteristic for the so called PRRP family.²⁵³ Here, I have argued that two political instruments should be of particular interest for political actors to reach nativist objectives. While the literature confirms that *immigration policy* (i.e the “protection from” part of nativism) is a core political characteristic of PRRPs,²⁵⁴ the “protection of” part of nativism - *cultural policy* - remains understudied. To make research on the PRRP family more comprehensive, I have therefore questioned *what the positioning of PRRPs regarding importance, cultural range and objectives of cultural policy makes for the appropriateness in calling them a family.*

When comparing cultural policy *objectives* of DF, FN and SD, they all correspond to the expectations of PRRPs. That is, they empathise *national* cultural objectives over *regional*, while being hostile towards *international* culture on the *geographical dimension*. On the *temporal dimension*, they empathise *traditional* cultural objectives over *innovative*. As the expectations of PRRPs are less evident regarding the *class-related dimension*, the somewhat different objectives of DF, FN and SD are considered as less important.

The compared parties are less similar when it comes to *range* of cultural policy. DF and SD correspond to the expectations of PRRPs in attributing a *higher importance* and *anthropological understanding* to cultural policy. Taken together, their *objectives* and *range* of cultural policy therefore meet the “protection of” part of nativism. However, FN attributes a *lower importance* and *aesthetical understanding* to cultural policy, which communicates that they do not regard cultural policy as a main political instrument to reach nativist objectives. In other words, even if corresponding to the expectations of PRRPs regarding *objectives* of cultural policy, FN do not meet the “protection of” part of nativism on more than the rhetorical level.

That FN deviates from the expected pattern is serious for the so called party family of PRRPs. Besides considered to be the founder of PRRPs’ ethnopluralistic approach (i.e. exclusion based on culture), FN is often described as the prototype of PRRPs.²⁵⁵ Therefore, more PRRPs could be expected to have cultural policy ideas in line with those of FN. Especially as this study’s results should be somewhat generalizable for all Western European PRRPs based on the very different cases. Still, the results in this thesis do not change that PRRPs could be considered to be a (somewhat loosely connected) family based on their shared nativist *rhetoric*. However, the results communicate that the family should be divided in subgroups, whereof one branch underpins their nativist rhetoric with political substance (i.e. DF and SD) while the other

²⁵³ E. g. Betz (2003); Fetzer (2000); Mudde (2007)

²⁵⁴ E.g. Immerzeel et al. (2015); Ivarsflaten (2008); Norris (2005); Zaslove (2004)

²⁵⁵ Bornschier (2010) p. 25; Mudde (2013) p. 3

does not (i.e. FN).

The so called party family of PRRPs can however be further problematized. In previous literature, PRRPs are lumped together based on the party family criteria *policy and ideology* (i.e. nativism and immigration policy).²⁵⁶ However, PRRPs do not meet other criteria used in party family research such as *origins and sociology, transnational federations and name*.²⁵⁷ Indeed, if PRRPs (as communicated here) can only be lumped together based on similarities in *immigration policy* and their *nativist rhetoric*, it seems like a weak foundation for a family.

Even if so, it is difficult to definitively conclude that the PRRPs are *not* a family. Primarily as the concept of party families is both vague and undertheorised. Research has still not agreed on how many party families there should be, what relevant criteria or core characteristics parties should meet, and how permissive party families should be considering deviations.²⁵⁸ Indeed, this study highlights this problem. As long as research on party families is not developed, judgements about party familiarity will be rather subjective. Scholars will therefore continue to reach different conclusions concerning the PRRP family - not necessarily based on different research results, but based on the scholar's more or less permissive attitude towards anomalies.

Finally, when political actors try to limit the nativist influence of PRRPs, they generally focus on immigration policy.²⁵⁹ This thesis results indicate that they should also focus on cultural policy - at least regarding the branch of PRRPs that underpins their nativist ideology with political substance. Besides that cultural policy is considered as a core political instrument to reach nativist objectives, previous research shows that influential PRRPs have reached considerable influence in the area.²⁶⁰ That is, it seems probable that the considerable gap between these PRRPs' and general political parties' interest in- and understanding of cultural policy generates a wide scope of cultural policy action possibilities for PRRPs.

²⁵⁶ E. g. Betz (2003); Fetzer (2000); Immerzeel et al. (2015); Ivarsflaten (2008); Mair & Mudde (1998) p. 211; Mudde (2007); Norris (2005); Zaslove (2004)

²⁵⁷ Mair & Mudde (1998) p. 211

²⁵⁸ Mair and Mudde (1998) p. 211, 221-223, Mudde (2000), p. 2.

²⁵⁹ Mudde 2007, p. 279

²⁶⁰ Minkenberg (2001) p. 1; Mudde (2007) p. 279

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