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THE QOG EXPERT SURVEY II REPORT

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THE QUALITY OF GOVERNMENT EXPERT SURVEY II IN BRIEF

- The Quality of Government Expert Survey II (QoG Expert Survey II) focuses on the organizational design of public bureaucracies and bureaucratic behavior on countries around the world
- It is based on the subjective assessments of carefully selected country experts
- Expert participation is pro bono
- In total, 7096 questionnaires were sent
- 1294 questionnaires were completed
- The questionnaire included 71 substantive questions
- Geographical coverage: 159 countries
- 122 countries have three or more experts
- The QoG Expert Survey II includes the following new topics: women in public administration, corruption and embezzlement and transparency
- It has also improved measures for personnel management systems and administrative wages
- There are one individual-level and one country-level datasets.
- The QoG Expert Survey II has, in total, 59 country-level indicators

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Introduction[1]

The idea that a high quality of government is of the utmost importance for sustained positive social outcomes is widely accepted by both the academic community and practitioners (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012, North, Wallis and Weingast 2009; World Bank 1997; United Nations 2000). However, the big question as to what constitutes a government that enhances welfare for all members of society remains largely open. In this debate the greatest attention has been paid to the impact of political regimes and, more specifically, the strength of political constraints on valued social outcomes such as economic growth and the provision of public goods. Scholars have successfully created comparative datasets on what we call the input of political institutions, for instance, electoral systems, number of veto players, party system, institutionalization and others (see Teorell et al. 2015 for a comprehensive dataset). The impact of public bureaucracy on social outcomes has so far attracted much less attention, notwithstanding some important theoretical (Miller 2000; Rothstein and Teorell 2008) and empirical (Evans and Rauch 1999) contributions. A major stumbling block on the way to understanding the role of bureaucracy in human development is the lack of comparative observational data on the organizational design of public bureaucracies and bureaucratic behavior. The problem seems to persist over time. Thus, in 1996, Bekke, Perry and Toonen stated that our basic knowledge of bureaucratic structures is "woefully inadequate" (vii) and, in 2012, Francis Fukuyama expressed a seemingly similar sentiment in a piece titled "The strange absence of the state in political science". Notwithstanding a seminal effort by Peter Evans and James Rauch in mapping the bureaucratic structure in 35 less developed countries for the 1970-1990 period (Evans and Rauch, 1999; Rauch and Evans, 2000), the lack of empirical data pertaining to bureaucratic organization and practices is a well-known problem (Lewis 2007, Miller and Whitford 2010, Rubin and Whitford 2008).

It is with the aim of addressing this acute issue that in 2008 the Quality of Government Institute launched the QoG Expert Survey – a longitudinal project to collect data on the organizational design of public bureaucracies and bureaucratic behavior in the countries of the world. The QoG Expert Survey I took place in 2008-2012 in three waves, involving more than 1000 public admin-

[1] First of all we would like to thank all the experts who took part in this survey. Without your help this would not have been possible. We would also like to thank Monika Bauhr, Selome Balcha, Andreas Bågenholm, Agnes Cornell, Maria Gustavson, Marcia Grimes, Sören Holmberg, Victor Lapuente, B. Guy Peters, Jon Pierre, Bo Rothstein, Helena Stensöta, Anders Sundell, Richard Svensson, Lena Wängnerud, and everyone at the Quality of Government Institute for invaluable inspiration, support and work in helping us put together this survey.

istration experts world-wide. The outcome of the first survey is a rich dataset, covering such topics as meritocratic recruitment, internal promotion and career stability, salaries, impartiality, NPM reforms, effectiveness/efficiency and the bureaucratic representation of ethnic groups and gender in 135 countries. The new dataset has been welcomed by the academic community as evidenced in the discussion "What is governance?", sparked by Fukuyama (2013), and has also been utilized in several publications in highly ranked journals (Chong et al. 2014; Cornell and Grimes 2015; Dahlberg and Holmberg 2014; Dahlström, Lapuente and Teorell 2011b; Sundell 2014) and books (Norris 2015).

A new wave of the expert survey—the Quality of Government Institute Expert Survey II (the QoG Expert Survey II for short)—was carried out in 2014. The QoG Expert Survey II has preserved the theoretical and methodological approaches of the first survey but, in comparison with the previous effort, has extended the number of dimensions of bureaucratic structure and bureaucratic behavior and also improved measures on a range of topics.

The QoG Expert Survey II Report provides information on the questionnaire design and data collection, summary of the data, including some basic facts about the respondents, evaluations of potential respondent perception bias, and the results of the data validation through the data from the QoG expert Survey I and external data.

Questionnaire design

The purpose of both the QoG Expert Surveys I and II is to provide quantitative assessment of the organizational design of public bureaucracies and bureaucratic behavior across countries. Conceptually, both surveys are primarily based on Evans and Rauch's pioneering research on Weberian bureaucracies (1999, 2000), although other theoretical perspectives, namely New Public Management (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004) and administrative impartiality (Rothstein and Teorell 2008) have also informed the questionnaire design.

Similar to the QoG Expert Survey I, the QoG Expert Survey II's questions are designed to capture the theoretical concepts through expert perceptions of the state of affairs in a country's bureaucracy. The majority of the substantive questions are formulated as statements, and experts are invited to indicate the extent to which the statements correspond to reality in the country of their expertise

on pre-defined scales of answers (1- Hardly ever (Not at all), 7 – Almost always (To a very large extent).[2] The seven-point scale with pre-defined endpoints is utilized for all but three items (replacement of public sector employees, women in public administration and corruption and embezzlement).

This survey protocol is a divergence from Evans and Rauch's approach, which relies more on unprompted responses to questions asked, and is more in line with the general surge in expert polls on quality of government across the globe, such as those provided by the World Bank and Transparency International. The difference between the QoG Expert Survey II and Evans and Rauche's approaches should be acknowledged, but not exaggerated, because the aim of the QoG Expert Survey II is not perceptions per se, but the reality that underlies these perceptions. As indicated by the extensive test of respondent perception bias reported below, there are few instances where personal characteristics of the respondents systematically predict their assessments. In other words, the survey design seems not to be a serious threat to the validity of the resultant indicators.
The structure of the questionnaire in the QoG Expert Survey II is improved from the previous survey, and the individual questions are grouped together to form items (see Appendix E). There are nine substantive items:

- recruitment and careers of public employees (10 questions)
- replacement of public sector employees (1 question)
- preconditions and tasks (7 questions)
- policy-making and implementation (15 questions)
- women in public sector (5 questions)
- impartiality (1 question)
- corruption and embezzlement 1 (7 questions)
- corruption and embezzlement 2 (5 questions)
- transparency and control (8 questions).

There are also two additional items: 1) selection of the country of expertise (1 question) and 2) background information of the respondents (7 questions).

[2] The exceptions are items 3, 6 and 9 of the questionnaire (Appendix E), which require unprompted responses.

The experts themselves selected the country of their expertise; therefore, unlike the other dataset produced by the Quality of Government Institute, no special decision was required on the criterion of country coverage. A list of countries that were selected by at least one expert can be found in section 9 of the report.

The QoG Expert Survey II has 59 substantive questions, which is twice as many compared to the QoG Expert Survey I. The expansion is due to the inclusion of new topics and a more refined measurement of the previously existing ones. These include:

1. New indictors of the hiring and firing procedures. The QoG Expert Survey II asks, for example, how often "the practice of hiring, firing, promoting and paying public sector employees follows the provisions of the laws and other legal documents regulating these processes," and if "vacant positions in the public sector are advertised in newspapers and the websites of relevant organizations." There is also a new question asking "with a new central government in place (for example, after a national election), approximately how many public sector employees are exchanged?"
2. New indicators of the career perspective, such as whether "entry to the public sector is open only at the lowest level of the hierarchy"
3. Several new questions on salaries and pensions, tapping into the extent to which it is possible for public employees to sustain themselves on their salaries and pensions, and if there is a spread absenteeism among public sector employees
4. Several new aspects of the policy process are captured through such questions as the extent and circumstances when politicians and public sector employees are directly involved in policy-making and policy implementation processes and the extent to which some issues lack clear solutions.
5. There is a new battery of questions on the percentage of women in the public sector generally, on the senior level and in specific sectors such as in the police, the health and the educational sectors.
6. There is a new battery of questions on corruption and embezzlement and those tapping into the difference between petty and grand corruption.
7. Three new questions concerning the existence, independence and efficiency of a national audit office have also been added.

The data collection

Recruitment

Recruitment commenced in the beginning of February 2014 with the unification of the expert database from three waves of the QoG Expert Survey I, yielding about 3000 names. Since the coverage of western Europe and North and South America was sufficiently high in QoG Expert Survey I, the Middle East, Africa, eastern Europe and Asia were identified the priorities for the new expert recruitment for QoG Expert Survey II.

The recruitment was carried out in four steps. A number of public administration organizations were first contacted through an email with information about the survey and a request for contact information of potential country experts.[3] The homepages of these networks of scholars also provided a number of names of public administration scholars and practitioners. Second, because only 350 experts answered the survey as of May 2014, a new effort to recruit experts was launched in July, yielding about 800 new experts by the end of September. This wave of experts was identified primarily through the professional networks of the scholars at the Department of Political Science at the University of Gothenburg and Internet searches. Third, in order to increase coverage of countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Middle East, another effort to collect experts was launched in October of 2014. This wave included experts identified through searches in peer-reviewed journals and on university websites, which helped to include scholars who had recently published on public administration in countries and regions with low coverage. We also contacted research institutes with a regional focus on Sub-Saharan Africa and the MENA region.[4] Fourth, the last effort to recruit new experts was undertaken in the beginning of 2015 and focused exclusively on those countries that already had one or two experts.

[3] Most public administration organizations were found through the United Nations Public Administration Network (http://www.unpan.org). For the list of other organization please contact the corresponding author of the report.
[4] Such as the African Association for Public Administration and Management (AAPAM), the African Training and Research Centre in Administration for Development, and the Centre for Public Service Innovation (CPSI).

FIGURE 1, TOTAL NUMBER OF QUESTIONNAIRES SENT, STARTED AND COMPLETED: APRIL 2014 - APRIL 2015



In total, the QoG Expert Survey II database consists of 8102 names of experts, each of whom received a personalized email with a description of the research and an emphasis on the fundamental role that their expertise played in the success of the project. 1006 emails returned as undelivered, and the subsequent email with the link to the questionnaire was therefore sent to **7096** addresses. **2583** of these were part of the QoG Expert Survey II pool of experts, and **4513** were new recruits. **1784** experts started the survey and **1294** finished it (see Figure 1).

The experts participated in the survey on a voluntary basis, i.e. pro bono. They were able to select the country of their expertise on their own from a list of 196 states.

Procedure

The QoG Expert Survey II's questionnaire was translated into French, Spanish and, for the first time, into Russian. Similar to the protocol of the QoG Expert Survey I, in order to encourage participation, each expert that was identified received a personalized email with information about the survey a couple of weeks before receiving the actual questionnaire. The survey was first distributed to a random sample of **100** experts from the QoG Expert Survey I pool at the start of the project in order to pre-test the questionnaire. The questionnaire was deemed satisfactory on the basis of the results of the pre-test.

The data

Data from the pooled QoG Expert Survey II include information for 158 countries and one semi-sovereign territory (Hong Kong). It is based on expert assessments of **1294** respondents, including those who only partially answered the questionnaire. Responses range from around ten minutes to several days, but after removing responses taking longer than ten hours, the mean response time was 36 minutes.

Although 150 experts quit the survey at an early stage, the majority of those who did not complete the questionnaire in full answered the majority of the questions (see Figure 3). All eligible information provided by the experts entered the dataset, irrespective whether they answered all questions. Questions answered by fewer than three experts per country were set to missing in the aggregate data.

The mean number of respondents per country in the dataset is **8.1**, but the variation is high. 122 countries have more than three experts and 37 countries have less than three experts (see Table 1). The QoG Expert Survey II data have broad geographical coverage and include countries from all regions around the world. Figure 3 visualizes the geographical coverage and the density of expert evaluations per country, where darker colors indicate more experts per country.

FIGURE 2, NUMBER OF QUESTIONS ANSWERED PER RESPONDENT (N=1294)



Note: The figure is based only on the questions with the pre-defined answer scale (items 2, 4, 5, 7, and, 11). The questions that require experts unprompted responses are excluded (items 3,6 and 9).

TABLE 1, NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS PER COUNTRY

Number of Respondents	Countries
1-2	37
3-6	54
7 - 11	35
12 - 28	28
more 28	5
Total	159

FIGURE 3, GEOGRAPHICAL COVERAGE OF THE QOG EXPERT SURVEY II DATA



Note: Darker colors indicate a higher number of expert assessments per country.

Assessing Respondent Perception Bias

The average respondent in the pooled QoG Expert Survey II is a man (73 %) with a PhD degree (74%) born in 1966. On average, respondents are born (81 %) and live in (76 %) the country for which she/he assesses. The most common employer is a public university (56 %), followed by a private university (12 %), governments (10 %) and NGOs (9 %).

Do respondent characteristics affect the perceptions of bureaucratic structures and bureaucratic behavior? The issue of perception bias is a non-trivial problem in expert surveys, because, if expert assessments vary systematically on the observable characteristics of experts, then the validity of the data could be in doubt.

Extensive perception bias checks were carried out to make sure that estimates for a particular country are not determined by the make-up of the group of experts who provided assessments but in fact reflect the country's bureaucratic structure and practices. In practice, all items in the questionnaire were regressed on six available characteristics of the respondents, controlling for countries' fixed effects.

The results of the regression analyses suggest that, by and large, experts' characteristics do not affect their perceptions in a systematic way. Of **324** tests conducted on the individual level, only 41 (13 %) are significant at the 95 % level or higher. This is certainly larger than the 5 % that one could observe due to chance but still sufficiently low to rule out systematic perception bias. More importantly, when they appear, the differences are not very large in absolute terms (see Appendix D for numerical evidence).

TABLE 2, RESPONDENT PERCEPTION BIAS: *PROFESSIONALISM*, *CLOSEDNESS* AND *IMPARTIALITY*

	(1)	(2)	(3)
VARIABLES	**aproff**	**aclosed**	**impari2**
Gender	-0.0684	0.0717	-0.118**
	(0.0706)	(0.106)	(0.0485)
PhD	-0.0860	0.0212	0.0186
	(0.0800)	(0.127)	(0.0549)
Birth year	-0.00180	0.00300	-0.00325*
	(0.00285)	(0.00415)	(0.00197)
Not born	-0.0631	-0.205	-0.110*
	(0.0880)	(0.144)	(0.0608)
Not live	-0.126	-0.111	-0.136**
	(0.0847)	(0.158)	(0.0582)
Govemp	0.169	0.278	0.216***
	(0.109)	(0.171)	(0.0750)
Constant	7.847	-1.217	6.602*
	(5.601)	(8.151)	(3.867)
Observations	1,001	523	997
R-squared	0.013	0.015	0.036
Number of countries	116	47	113

Standard errors in parentheses
**** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1*

To illustrate the perception bias that was identified, there is, for example, a tendency among government employees to assess their bureaucratic structures differently than non-government employees. Respondents assessing countries in which they currently live also assess their bureaucracies differently as compared to experts not living in their chosen country of expertise. Although the perception bias is normally small in absolute terms, two questionnaire items – corruption and embezzlement 2 (item 8 of the questionnaire) and policy-making and implementation (item 5) – are more sensitive to the personal characteristics of the respondents than the rest of the questions (see

Appendix D). Yet again, it is not surprising that government employees judge the degree of corruption in their own organization differently than people not employed by the government. Neither is it surprising that they tend to evaluate their own work more positively than others' work.

Although these systematic differences exist in the data, the country-level averages normally balance them out since they are never based on the evaluations of only one type of expert. The country-level estimates are also exceptionally robust to the controls for expert characteristics.[5]

Furthermore, the aggregate indices constructed from the data – *professionalism, closedness* and *impartiality*[6] – also show no or little evidence of perception bias (Table 2). *Professionalism* picks up the personnel management dimension of bureaucratic structures, including the extent of meritocracy in recruitment, *closedness* measures the extent to which the public sector labor market is a special case of the country's general labor market conditions, and *impartiality* taps into the impartiality of bureaucratic decision-making. While the results of the tests suggest that perception bias is not an issue at all for *professionalism* and *closedness*, *impartiality* is slightly contaminated by the tendency of government employees to view governments' actions as more impartial and of the respondents who are non-residents of their chosen countries of expertise to evaluate government as more partial. One could expect such a predisposition, however, considering that the questions on impartiality touch upon a very sensitive and controversial topic.

Cross-Source Validation

This section reports the results of the cross-source measurement validity tests. First, several important measures in the QoG Expert Survey II are compared with the indicators from *external* data sources that measure the same theoretical concepts. Second, indicators from QoG Surveys I and II are compared. Since "Measurement validity is specifically concerned with whether operationalization and the scoring of cases adequately reflect the concept the researcher seeks to measure" (Adock and Collier 2001: 529), it is expected that the QoG Expert Survey II indicators will be suf-

[5] Average country scores with and without controls for expert characteristics correlate at the 99% level of confidence.
[6] The indices are constructed in accordance with the methodology of the QoG Expert Survey I (Dahlberg et al. 2013), Dahlström, Lapuente and Teorell (2012) and Rothstein and Teorell (2012). *Professionalism* is captured by questions q2_a, q2_b, q2_g and q2_h; *Closedness* by q2_d, q2_j and q4_f, and *Impartiality* is captured by and q8_g, q5_f, q5_g, q7 and q9_a. The indices are constructed by adding each measure weighted by the factor loading obtained from a factor analysis.

ficiently highly correlated with alternative measures for similar theoretical concepts and highly correlated with comparable indicators from QoG Expert Survey I.

External Cross-Source Validation

Professionalism, Closedness and Impartiality

The validity tests for *professionalism*, *closedness* and *impartiality* are first done using four external indicators. One is the number of politically appointed officials in the central governments of 18 countries from Dahlström (2011). Similar to the QoG Expert Survey II methodology, this indicator is based on the assessments of a pool of experts, whose composition (but not the number of respondents per country) is similar to that of the QoG Expert Survey II. The key difference is that, unlike predefined answer scales of the QoG Expert surveys, Dahlström's survey protocol relied on unprompted, and allegedly more objective, statements by experts. It is expected that more professionalized systems should have fewer political appointees and therefore QoG Survey II's *professionalism* and Dahlström's indicator should be sufficiently highly negatively correlated. At the same time, *closendness* and *impartiality* are expected not to be correlated with the number of politically appointed officials.

The second measure is the "bureaucracy quality" indicator for 143 countries from the Political Risk Services (PRS et al. 2001) group's International Country Risk Guide (ICRG).[7] The ICRG data, which are based on the assessments of a variety of locally produced information, are both a highly valued market service and an established indicator for the quality of government in economics and political science (see for example Knack and Keefer 1995). It is expected that "bureaucracy quality", *professionalism* and *impartiality* are sufficiently highly positively correlated.

The third external measure relates to the closedness dimension of bureaucratic structures. The data come from the OECD (2009) research on recruitment systems in 27 countries, conducted in a survey of senior officials from ministries and agencies responsible for public employment or the civil service management. The underlying data are thus subjective perceptions, but in this case from the viewpoint of civil servants themselves rather than outside experts. The data employed in the validity

[7] Data are taken from the year 2012, and range from 1 (low) to 4 (high) bureaucracy quality.

test are the "Index of Recruitment System", varying from 0 ("career-based system", that is, "closed") to 1 ("position-based system", that is, "open").[8]

"Favoritism in decisions of government officials" from the Global Competitiveness Report (WEF 2012) was utilized to test the external validity of *impartiality*.[9] Since *impartiality* is a measure of neutral service delivery, which may manifest itself in more or less favouritism by government officials, a strong positive correlation is expected between these two indicators and by extension with a high quality bureaucracy (sufficiently high positive correlation with ICRG's "bureaucracy quality").

TABLE 6, CORRELATES OF *PROFESSIONALISM*, *CLOSEDNESS* AND *IMPARTIALITY*

	(1)	(2)	(3)
VARIABLES	**Professionalism**	**Closedness**	**Impartiality**
Log No. political appointees (Dahlström)	-0.684**	**0.607***	-0.457
	(16)	(15)	(16)
Bureaucracy quality (ICRG)	**0.642*****	-0.0430	**0.737*****
	(98)	(40)	(98)
Index of recruitment system (OECD)	0.0451	**-0.709*****	0.229
	(25)	(21)	(25)
Favouritism in decisions of government officials (WEF)	**0.707*****	0.225	**0.727*****
	(107)	(47)	(106)

**** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05*
Number of observations in parentheses

Table 6 reports the results of the correlational tests, suggesting that, by and large, the expectations are well borne out. The number of politically appointed officials in national governments is moderately negatively correlated with *professionalism* at the 99% of the confidence level, whereas its association with *closedness* is weaker in strength and at the lower level of confidence. Furthermore, the ICRG's "bureaucracy quality" is highly positively and at the 99.9% of the confidence interval asso-

[8] The index captures the possibilities that individuals have to become part of the civil service throughout their careers at all seniority levels. It includes four indicators with weights: 1) policies for becoming a civil servant in general (e.g. competitive examination or not); 2) policies for recruiting senior civil servants; 3) systems for appointing entry-level positions and 4) and for allocating posts across departments (OECD 2009). These features closely correspond to the theoretical distinction between open and closed bureaucracies (Dahlström, Lapuente and Teorell 2012).
[9] "What extent do government officials in your country show favoritism to well-connected firms and individuals when deciding upon policies and contracts?" [1 = always show favoritism; 7 = never show favoritism]. The measure is taken from the QoG Standard Dataset, wef_fgo, (Teorell et al. 2015, 702).

ciated with *professionalism*, but unrelated to *closedness*. By contrast, the association between the OECD indicator for position vs. career-based recruitment and *closedness* is in the expected direction, moderate in strength and significant at the 99.9% of the confidence level. No association is found between the OECD measure, *professionalism* or *impartiality*. As expected, a high positive association is found between *impartiality* and the measure of favouritism of government officials, and also between *impartiality* and the ICRG's "bureaucracy quality".

National Audit Office

Among the new indicators of the QoG Expert Survey II are those related to the national audit office. Namely, the survey asked whether a) the National Audit Office was independent from the government (q11_e); b) auditors at the National Audit Office had the appropriate education and qualifications (q11_f) and c) the National Audit Office regularly communicates their results to the general public, including results that may be inconvenient for the government (q11_g). The QoG Expert Survey II audit measures range from 1 (Not at all) to 7 (To a very large extent). The data for the validity test are an indicator that captures the strength of audit and reporting standard for business entities, measured on the same scale as the audit questions, taken from the World Economic Forum's Global Competitiveness Report (WEF, 2013).[10] The underlying assumption for the selection of this indicator is that the likelihood that a country has sound audit and reporting standards in business and government at the same time is higher than the likelihood of having a desynchronized reporting and audit culture (i.e. high audit culture in business, but low in government and vice versa). The data are subjective evaluations of the world's business elite. It is expected that all three audit indicators are highly positively correlated with the WEF's audit measure.
Table 7 reports the results of the correlational analysis that suggest that, by and large, these expectations are borne out: WEF's audit is positively, moderately and at the 99.9% of the confidence level correlated with the QoG Expert Survey II audit indicators.

[10] "In your country, how would you assess financial auditing and reporting standards regarding company financial performance?" [1 = extremely weak; 7 = extremely strong]. The measure is taken from the QoG Standard Dataset, wef_audit (Teorell et al. 2015, 698) for the year 2012.

TABLE 7, CORRELATION MATRIX (NATIONAL AUDIT OFFICE), WEF & THE QOG EXPERT SURVEY II

	(1) wef_audit
q11_e	0.648***
q11_f	0.684***
q11_g	0.687***
N	150

$^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{***}p < 0.001$

Women in Public Administration

QoG Survey II asked experts to assess the percentage of women at different levels and in different sectors of public administration. Specifically, the questions were on the percentage of women a) in the public sector generally, b) in senior positions in central government, c) within the police force, d) within the public health care system and e) within public education. Question 6_a was selected for the external validity checks, employing the officially released data on the number of women in general government in OCED countries (2009).[11] Table 8 reports a positive, strong and significant at the 99.9% of the confidence level association between the OECD and the QoG Expert Survey II measures in questions.

[11] The OECD documents the source of the data as: International Labour Organisation (ILO), LABORSTA (database).

TABLE 8, CORRELATION MATRIX (WOMEN IN GENERAL GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT), OECD & THE QOG EXPERT SURVEY II INDICATORS

	(1) Women in general government employment (OECD)
q6_a	0.896***
N	117

*$p < 0.05$, **$p < 0.01$, ***$p < 0.001$

Transparency

Among the new indicators are those pertaining to transparency in public administration, including those based on the following questions: a) whether public sector employees risk severe negative consequences if they pass on information about abuses of public power to the media (q1_a), whether government documents and records are open to public access (q11_b), whether abuses of power within the public sector are likely to be exposed in the media (q11_c) and whether citizens and media actors can track the flow of government revenues and expenditures (q11_d).[12] The data for the external validity test of the transparency battery come from the HRV Index of Transparency (Hollyer et al. 2014) and indicators for press freedom from Reporters without Borders and Global Integrity. The HRV index measures a specific aspect of government transparency – reporting national data to international organizations – which is expected to be sufficiently highly correlated with q11_b. It is expected that the association of the HRV Index with other transparency indicators would be weak in strength but statistically significant, except for q11_a, which relates to a separate aspect of transparency (whistle-blower protection).

[12] The answer to all questions is on a scale from 1 (Not at all) to 7 (To a very large extent).

TABLE 9, CORRELATION MATRIX: (TRANSPARENCY), HRV INDEX & THE QOG EXPERT SURVEY II INDICATORS

	(1) hrv_index
q11_a	-0.176
q11_b	0.490***
q11_c	0.295**
q11_d	0.420***
N	153

*$p < 0.05$, **$p < 0.01$, ***$p < 0.001$

Table 9 reports the results of the correlational tests. The HRV Index is moderately significantly associated with q11_b and q11_d indicators of transparency from the QoG Expert Survey II, and weakly significantly with q11_c. No association is established between the HRV index and q11_a.

The Press Freedom Index by the Reporters without Borders measures the amount of freedom journalists and the media have in each country and the efforts made by governments to see that press freedom is respected.[13] A similar indicator from the Global Integrity Report evaluates civil society organizations working on anti-corruption issues, the media's effectiveness in reporting on corruption (including licensing requirements) and public access to information.[14] It is expected that both press freedom measures are sufficiently highly correlated with q11_c.

Table 10 reports the results of the correlational analysis, showing moderate associations between q11_c and two external measures of media freedom. These associations are in the expected direction and at the 99.9% of the confidence level. Overall, the validity tests suggest that, by and large, the QoG Expert Survey II's transparency indicators are in line with those produced by reputable organisations and researchers outside the QoG Institute.

[13] The measure is taken from the QoG Standard Dataset 2015, rsf_pfi (Teorell et al. 2015, 400). The data are taken for the years 2010-2013.
[14] The data were taken from the QoG Standard Dataset 2015,gir_csmai (Teorell et al. 2015, 262).

TABLE 10, CORRELATION MATRIX (TRANSPARENCY): REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS AND GLOBAL INTEGRITY & THE QOG EXPERT SURVEY II INDICATORS

	(1) q11_c
Reporters	-0.595***
Global Intergrity	0.437***
N	177

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Corruption

A new battery of questions in the QoG Expert Survey II is concerned with corruption in different branches of government. Specifically, the corruption questions asked whether members of the executive (q8_a), public sector employees (q8_c), members of the legislature (q8_e) or members of the judiciary (q8_f) *grant favours in exchange for bribes, kickbacks or other material inducements***,** further, whether members of the executive (q8_b) or public sector employees (q8_d) *steal, embezzle or misappropriate public funds or other state resources for personal or family use***.** Lastly, the experts were asked whether firms that provide the most favourable kickbacks to senior officials are awarded public procurement contracts at the expense of firms making the lowest bid (q8_g).

The expectation with regard to these questions is that their resulting data should be correlated with other generic measures of corruption in a society such as the Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI)[15] or the World Bank's Control of Corruption (CoC).[16] For both, sufficiently high negative correlations with the QoG Expert Survey II corruption indicators are expected.

In addition, the validity test employed three external indicators from the Global Corruption Barometer, capturing corruption perception in different branches of government: 1) in the judiciary

[15] The CPI Score relates to perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen by business people, risk analysts and the general public and ranges between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt).
[16] The governance estimates are normally distributed with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one each year of measurement. This implies that virtually all scores lie between -2.5 and 2.5, with higher scores corresponding to better outcomes.

(gcb_pj), which is expected to be sufficiently highly correlated with q8_f; 2) in parliament (gcb_pparl), which is expected to be sufficiently highly correlated with q8_e; 3) in the public administration/civil service (gcb_poff), which is expected to be sufficiently highly correlated with q8_d.[17] Furthermore, the external validity for q8_g, which captures the extent of corruption in relation to private companies, is checked by the correlational analysis with the World Economic Forum's indicator on irregular payments and bribes payed by companies (wef_ipb).[18]

Table 11 reports the results of the correlational analysis, showing that the expectations find sound support in the data. The two generic measures of corruption correlate with all measures from the QoG Survey II at 0.82 or higher with significance at the 99.9% level of confidence. The external measures capturing corruption in specific branches of power have lower correlation coefficients but are all significant at the 99.9% level of confidence.

[17] Question from Transparency International: To what extent do you perceive the following categories in this country to be affected by corruption? Judiciary/Legal system. 1 (Not at all corrupt) - 5 (Extremely corrupt).
[18] Irregular Payments and Bribes: Average score across the components of the following Executive Opinion Survey question: In your country, how common is it for firms to make undocumented extra payments or bribes connected with (a) imports and exports; (b) public utilities; (c) annual tax payments; (d) awarding of public contracts and licenses; (e) obtaining favourable judicial decisions. In each case, the answer ranges from 1 (very common) to 7 (never occurs).

TABLE 11, CORRELATION MATRIX (CORRUPTION): TI CPI, WB CONTROL OF CORRUPTION, TI GLOBAL CORRUPTION BAROMETER, WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM & THE QOG EXPERT SURVEY II INDICATORS

	(1) q8_a	(2) q8_b	(3) q8_c	4 q8_d	5 q8_e	6 q8_f	7 q8_g
ti_cpi	-0.826***	0.833***	-0.894***	-0.885***	-0.827***	-0.857***	-0.850***
wbgi_cce	-0.824***	0.834***	-0.895***	-0.886***	-0.833***	-0.859***	-0.854***
gcb_pj	0.512***	0.502***	0.587***	0.587***	0.601***	0.666***	0.616***
gcb_pparl	0.236*	0.201*	0.270**	0.265**	0.357***	0.217*	0.338***
gcb_poff	0.428***	0.407***	0.470***	0.481***	0.524***	0.486***	0.515***
wef_ipb	-0.834***	0.823***	-0.899***	-0.893***	-0.847***	-0.853***	-0.860***
N	193	193	193	193	193	193	193

$p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Internal Validation: Professionalism, Closedness and Impartiality

The composite measures of bureaucratic structure (*professionalism* and *closedness*) and the one on bureaucratic behavior (*impartiality*) were subjected to the internal validity test by comparing the covariance structure of the measures on the same theoretical concept from the 2012 and 2015 QoG expert surveys. Naturally, one would expect a high positive correlation between the relevant measures from different surveys, as they capture the same phenomena that are also known for their low rates of change over time. A very strong correlation is not expected, given the differences in the pool of experts and also a small temporal effect. Table 12 reports the results of the correlational analysis,

showing that the relevant measures from the QoG Surveys I and II are strongly significantly correlated.

TABLE 12, CORRELATION MATRIX – PCI (QOG EXPERT SURVEY I) VS PCI (QOG EXPERT SURVEY II)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
VARIABLES	**Professionalism QoG Expert Survey II**	**Closedness QoG Expert Survey II**	**Impartiality QoG Expert Survey II**
Professionalism QoG Expert Survey I	**0.838*** **	-0.0759	0.651***
Closedness QoG Expert Survey I	-0.0587	**0.792*** **	-0.00621
Impartiality QoG Expert Survey I	0.753***	-0.0553	**0.869*** **

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05*

The Dataset

The QoG Expert Survey II data are available on both *individual* and *aggregate* levels. The unit of analysis in the individual version of the dataset is expert. The unit of analysis in the aggregated version of the dataset is countries. The aggregated data only include those countries for which at least three experts answered the survey. When there are not at least three answers *for a particular question*, it is set to missing. The data and corresponding documentation can be downloaded at http://qog.pol.gu.se/data.

Suggested data citation: Dahlström, Carl, Jan Teorell, Stefan Dahlberg, Felix Hartmann, Annika Lindberg and Marina Nistotskaya. 2015. *The QoG Expert Survey Dataset II*. University of Gothenburg: The Quality of Government Institute.

Suggested report citation: Dahlström, Carl, Jan Teorell, Stefan Dahlberg, Felix Hartmann, Annika Lindberg and Marina Nistotskaya. 2015. *The QoG Expert Survey II Report*. Gothenburg: The QoG Working Paper Series 2015:9

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APPENDICES

Appendix A: Three indices

FIGURE 8, PROFESSIONALISM INDEX



FIGURE 9, PROFESSIONALISM INDEX II



FIGURE 10, CLOSEDNESS INDEX



FIGURE 11: IMPARTIALITY INDEX I



FIGURE 12, IMPARTIALITY INDEX II



APPENDIX B: LIST OF COUNTRIES AND NUMBER OF EXPERTS

TABLE 13, SUMMARY STATISTICS.

Country	Number of Experts
Afghanistan	5
Albania	7
Algeria	5
Angola	2
Argentina	13
Armenia	7
Australia	24
Austria	7
Azerbaijan	7
Bahamas	2
Bahrain	1
Bangladesh	16
Barbados	3
Belarus	2
Belgium	7
Benin	6
Bolivia	7
Bosnia and Herzegovina	6
Botswana	5
Brazil	16
Brunei	1
Bulgaria	13
Burkina Faso	3
Burundi	2
Cambodia	5
Cameroon	7
Canada	18
Chile	11
China	11
Colombia	8
Congo, Democratic Republic	2
Costa Rica	9
Cote d'Ivoire	6
Croatia	10
Cuba	3
Cyprus (1975-)	5
Czech Republic	10
Denmark	22
Dominican Republic	6

Ecuador	4
Egypt	5
ElSalvador	6
Equatorial Guinea	2
Eritrea	3
Estonia	10
Ethiopia (1993-)	15
Fiji	6
Finland	6
France (1963-)	11
Gambia	1
Georgia	7
Germany	35
Ghana	21
Greece	15
Grenada	1
Guatemala	4
Guinea	4
Guinea-Bissau	2
Guyana	3
Haiti	1
Honduras	1
Hong Kong	6
Hungary	15
Iceland	6
India	32
Indonesia	18
Iran	1
Iraq	4
Ireland	11
Israel	14
Italy	21
Jamaica	5
Japan	8
Jordan	4
Kazakhstan	8
Kenya	11
Korea, South	21
Kuwait	1
Kyrgyzstan	9
Laos	1
Latvia	5
Lebanon	5
Lithuania	17
Luxembourg	2
Macedonia	11
Madagascar	5
Malawi	8

Malaysia (1966-)	3
Maldives	1
Mali	2
Malta	4
Mauritania	1
Mauritius	4
Mexico	20
Moldova	8
Mongolia	2
Montenegro	3
Morocco	7
Mozambique	4
Myanmar	2
Namibia	6
Nepal	4
Netherlands	26
New Zealand	14
Nicaragua	5
Niger	3
Nigeria	32
Norway	16
Pakistan (1971-)	8
Papua New Guinea	2
Paraguay	2
Peru	9
Philippines	12
Poland	11
Portugal	17
Romania	19
Russia	14
Rwanda	8
Samoa	1
Saudi Arabia	1
Senegal	5
Serbia	9
Sierra Leone	1
Singapore	3
Slovakia	9
Slovenia	8
Solomon Islands	1
Somalia	6
South Africa	24
South Sudan	4
Spain	23
Sri Lanka	5
St Lucia	1
Sudan (2012-)	2
Swaziland	2

Sweden	13
Switzerland	5
Syria	2
Taiwan	3
Tajikistan	3
Tanzania	10
Thailand	6
Togo	3
Tonga	1
Trinidad and Tobago	1
Tunisia	3
Turkey	14
Turkmenistan	1
Uganda	6
Ukraine	5
United Arab Emirates	3
United Kingdom	35
United States	61
Uruguay	7
Uzbekistan	2
Venezuela	11
Vietnam	6
Zambia	2
Zimbabwe	5

APPENDIX C

TABLE 14, SUMMARY STATISTICS

Variable	Number of Observations	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
q2_a	1238	4.357027	1.735593	1	7
q2_b	1240	4.067742	1.859537	1	7
q2_c	1236	4.06068	1.844227	1	7
q2_d	1210	4.409091	2.063608	1	7
q2_e	1235	5.144939	1.789365	1	7
q2_f	1230	5.150407	1.933638	1	7
q2_g	1213	4.877164	2.023928	1	7
q2_h	1216	4.830592	1.52863	1	7
q2_i	1184	3.756757	1.845684	1	7
q2_j	1222	4.738134	1.732335	1	7
q4_a	1201	3.298085	1.713983	1	7
q4_b	1214	4.497529	1.945569	1	7
q4_c	1190	3.051261	1.70387	1	7
q4_d	1186	3.980607	2.104557	1	7
q4_e	1143	3.216973	1.85182	1	7
q4_f	1165	5.534764	1.688307	1	7
q4_g	1122	3.462567	1.885417	1	7
q5_a	1178	4.812394	1.814119	1	7
q5_b	1175	4.620426	1.71741	1	7
q5_c	1096	4.74635	1.58402	1	7
q5_d	1114	4.658887	1.602552	1	7
q5_e	1093	4.615737	1.629796	1	7
q5_f	1149	3.789382	1.790176	1	7
q5_g	1139	4.045654	2.060087	1	7

q5_h	1149	3.791993	1.692185	1	7
q5_i	1127	3.096717	1.544042	1	7
q5_j	1131	3.536693	1.599012	1	7
q5_k	1186	3.902192	1.660322	1	7
q5_l	1190	4.062185	1.63112	1	7
q5_m	1188	4.644781	1.709801	1	7
q5_n	1164	4.082474	1.754513	1	7
q5_o	1178	5.141766	1.459544	1	7
q7	1159	4.462468	1.671181	1	7
q8_a	1148	3.836237	2.109722	1	7
q8_b	1153	3.662619	2.146492	1	7
q8_c	1164	3.791237	1.991441	1	7
q8_d	1162	3.63167	2.005237	1	7
q8_e	1132	3.836572	2.021714	1	7
q8_f	1134	3.328042	2.069824	1	7
q8_g	1137	4.21372	2.070727	1	7
q9_a	1069	53.97549	31.00308	.1	100
q9_b	1205	28.58772	70.97347	0	1000
q9_c	1205	34.75203	73.51532	0	550
q9_d	1205	24.36672	57.00249	0	500
q9_e	1205	22.22539	56.79285	0	600
q9_f	1203	9.423441	34.28511	0	550
q11_a	1148	4.683798	1.78393	1	7
q11_b	1163	4.038693	1.816273	1	7
q11_c	1157	4.597234	1.636074	1	7
q11_d	1159	4.108714	1.846039	1	7
q11_e	1118	4.594812	2.161652	1	7
q11_f	1071	5.22409	1.716391	1	7

q11_g	1112	4.752698	2.027043	1	7
q11_h	1141	4.344435	1.910184	1	7
gender	1160	1.268966	.4436133	1	2
education	1160	9.706034	.5485551	5	10
employer	1152	1.301215	.5406807	1	3
work	1139	5.583845	1.75642	1	9
contact	1146	1.071553	.4074981	1	4
aproff	1182	4.094191	1.30674	1	7
aclosed	613	4.810495	1.232585	1.333333	7
impar_old	924	-4.23e-10	1	-1.853327	2.039466
impar	911	7.85e-10	1	-2.046183	1.842796
impari2	1125	.0231022	.9940177	-2.046183	1.842796
impar	1125	4.195073	1.549163	1	7
bs1point1	1220	3.63809	1.00373	1.5	5.815476
bs1point2	1220	4.604934	.9282357	2.25	6.75
bs2point1	1210	-.3150261	.8201202	-1.850595	1.176021
bs2point2	1210	.3619195	.7370447	-1.367054	1.621036
bs3point1	628	4.327248	.8017342	2.380952	5.636364
bs3point2	628	5.301439	.7226143	3.547619	6.606061
eu28	1294	.2990726	.4580287	0	1
oecd	1294	.4219474	.4940612	0	1

APPENDIX D: QUESTIONS' PERCEPTION BIAS

Questions that have at least a significant difference at the .95 or .99 level with source of difference:

- q2 a [notlive, .99]
- q2 b [govemp, .99]
- q2 d [birthyear, .99 / notlive .95]
- q2 e [notborn, .99 / notlive .99 / govemp .95]
- q2 f [birthyear, .99 / notborn .99]
- q2 g [notlive, .95]
- q4 d [birthyear, .95]
- q4 f [phd, .95]
- q5 b [gender, .95]
- q5 f [birthyear, .95 / govemp .95]
- q5 g [notborn, .95 / govemp .99]
- q5 k [phd, .95 / govemp .95]
- q5 l [govemp, .99]
- q5 m [govemp, .99]
- q5 n [gender, .99]
- q8 a [notlive, .99]
- q8 b [notlive, .99]
- q8 c [notlive, .99]
- q8 d [notlive, .99 / govemp, .99]
- q8 e [notlive, .99]
- q8 g [notlive, .99 / govemp, .95]
- q9 a [gender, .99 / govemp, .99]
- q9 c [birthyear, .99]
- q9 f [notlive, .99]
- q11 b [govemp, .99]
- q11 d [notborn, .95 / govemp, .95]
- q11 g [gender, .95 / birthyear, .95]
- q11 g [gender, .95 / gender, .99]

It also becomes apparent that the concepts of professionalism and closedness are independent dimensions when looking at the relation plotted in Figure **Error! Reference source not found.** using data from the Qog Expert Survey

II. Unlike the usual uni-dimensional accounts of bureaucracies (that is, patronage versus merit based), we see how four different types of bureaucracies emerge.

FIGURE 13, SCATTER PLOT - PROFESSIONALISM (Y) VS. CLOSEDNESS (X)



APPENDIX E: PERCEPTION BIAS

TABLE 15, RESPONDENT PERCEPTION BIAS - QUESTIONS 2, 4, 5

VARIABLES	(1) q2_a	(2) q2_b	(3) q2_c	(4) q2_d	(5) q2_e	(6) q2_f	(7) q2_g	(8) q2_h	(9) q2_i	(10) q2_j
gender	-0.0314	0.200*	0.177	-0.0625	-0.138	-0.0687	0.0786	0.0690	0.0348	0.156
	(0.0950)	(0.107)	(0.111)	(0.131)	(0.103)	(0.116)	(0.138)	(0.105)	(0.135)	(0.112)
PhD	-0.0443	0.113	0.0263	0.0183	0.0460	-0.0730	0.162	-0.0259	-0.00630	-0.0371
	(0.107)	(0.121)	(0.126)	(0.148)	(0.117)	(0.130)	(0.156)	(0.119)	(0.152)	(0.127)
birthyear	0.00310	0.00388	0.00742*	0.0232***	0.00730*	0.0126***	0.00629	-0.00162	0.00498	-0.00691
	(0.00383)	(0.00433)	(0.00449)	(0.00533)	(0.00418)	(0.00466)	(0.00556)	(0.00425)	(0.00550)	(0.00456)
notborn	-0.189	0.167	0.240*	-0.254	-0.475***	-0.499***	-0.115	-0.00502	-0.211	0.00278
	(0.119)	(0.134)	(0.139)	(0.166)	(0.128)	(0.145)	(0.172)	(0.132)	(0.171)	(0.140)
notlive	-0.247**	0.0594	0.200	-0.380**	-0.340***	-0.220	0.329**	0.0858	-0.0298	0.0399
	(0.113)	(0.128)	(0.134)	(0.157)	(0.124)	(0.138)	(0.164)	(0.125)	(0.164)	(0.134)
govemp	0.0536	-0.453***	-0.255	0.177	0.337**	0.0358	-0.0237	0.127	-0.282	0.0276
	(0.147)	(0.166)	(0.172)	(0.201)	(0.159)	(0.177)	(0.213)	(0.162)	(0.209)	(0.173)
Constant	-1.496	-4.027	-10.92	-41.01***	-8.851	-19.29**	-7.810	7.920	-6.032	18.15**
	(7.527)	(8.498)	(8.825)	(10.47)	(8.208)	(9.162)	(10.92)	(8.344)	(10.81)	(8.956)
Obser-vations	1,004	1,005	1,002	983	1,004	1,000	989	993	963	999
R-squared	0.013	0.020	0.019	0.033	0.041	0.029	0.009	0.002	0.005	0.004
Number of countries	121	122	122	122	122	122	122	122	122	122

Standard errors in parentheses
**** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1*

VARIABLES	(1) q4_a	(2) q4_b	(3) q4_c	(4) q4_d	(5) q4_e	(6) q4_f	(7) q4_g
gender	-0.177	-0.179*	-0.189*	-0.160	-0.138	0.0339	0.00540
	(0.122)	(0.104)	(0.112)	(0.114)	(0.125)	(0.123)	(0.141)
PhD	-0.0172	0.112	0.205	0.0136	0.125	0.282**	-0.166
	(0.138)	(0.118)	(0.127)	(0.129)	(0.140)	(0.139)	(0.162)
birthyear	0.00134	-0.000777	-0.000641	0.00975**	-0.00270	0.00295	0.00482
	(0.00492)	(0.00421)	(0.00450)	(0.00464)	(0.00501)	(0.00497)	(0.00573)
notborn	-0.113	0.0357	-0.160	-0.00305	0.190	-0.177	-0.0614
	(0.152)	(0.130)	(0.138)	(0.143)	(0.156)	(0.156)	(0.175)

notlive	0.0394	0.0130	0.00238	-0.0198	0.000103	-0.0724	-0.0228
	(0.146)	(0.125)	(0.135)	(0.137)	(0.150)	(0.148)	(0.172)
govemp	0.166	-0.142	0.128	-0.127	-0.443**	0.325*	-0.0453
	(0.188)	(0.161)	(0.170)	(0.177)	(0.187)	(0.189)	(0.218)
Observations	1,001	1,009	991	988	953	973	928
R-squared	0.004	0.007	0.008	0.007	0.016	0.009	0.003
Number of country	122	122	122	122	122	122	120

Standard errors in parentheses
**** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1*

VARIABLES	(1) q5_a	(2) q5_b	(3) q5_c	(4) q5_d	(5) q5_e	(6) q5_f	(7) q5_g
gender	-0.0685	-0.326**	-0.0224	-0.0671	-0.0756	0.0899	0.104
	(0.122)	(0.130)	(0.126)	(0.126)	(0.131)	(0.120)	(0.122)
phd	0.200	0.0257	0.245*	0.160	0.261*	0.0763	0.0846
	(0.139)	(0.147)	(0.142)	(0.142)	(0.145)	(0.135)	(0.137)
birthyear	-0.00475	-0.00224	-0.00222	-0.000688	-0.00303	0.0122**	0.00268
	(0.00491)	(0.00520)	(0.00513)	(0.00505)	(0.00524)	(0.00483)	(0.00491)
notborn	0.124	-0.163	-0.0162	-0.0152	0.108	0.249*	0.319**
	(0.151)	(0.161)	(0.157)	(0.156)	(0.162)	(0.148)	(0.153)
notlive	0.120	0.237	0.0247	-0.128	-0.193	0.173	0.289**
	(0.147)	(0.155)	(0.155)	(0.153)	(0.157)	(0.143)	(0.145)
govemp	0.305	0.178	0.0376	-0.117	0.0730	-0.434**	-0.502***
	(0.188)	(0.199)	(0.192)	(0.192)	(0.198)	(0.185)	(0.191)
Constant	14.04	9.383	8.946	6.036	10.51	-20.47**	-1.587
	(9.652)	(10.22)	(10.07)	(9.926)	(10.29)	(9.500)	(9.646)
Observations	999	1,001	923	943	928	980	967
R-squared	0.008	0.012	0.005	0.004	0.008	0.026	0.028
Number of country	122	122	121	122	122	121	122

Standard errors in parentheses
**** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1*

VARIABLES	(8) q5_h	(9) q5_i	(10) q5_j	(11) q5_k	(12) q5_l	(13) q5_m	(14) q5_n	(15) q5_o
gender	0.0241	-0.198	-0.171	-0.0789	-0.0487	-0.0611	0.409***	0.0442
	(0.125)	(0.121)	(0.120)	(0.101)	(0.0971)	(0.100)	(0.121)	(0.106)
phd	-0.0544	0.0249	0.151	0.277**	0.0938	0.115	0.0924	0.0461
	(0.140)	(0.134)	(0.134)	(0.114)	(0.110)	(0.113)	(0.136)	(0.119)
birthyear	-0.000620	-0.00509	-0.00604	-0.00594	0.00128	0.00513	0.00170	0.000811
	(0.00501)	(0.00484)	(0.00483)	(0.00410)	(0.00395)	(0.00407)	(0.00490)	(0.00430)
notborn	0.181	0.134	0.0791	-0.00410	-0.0997	-0.172	0.0668	-0.0578
	(0.155)	(0.147)	(0.148)	(0.126)	(0.121)	(0.126)	(0.152)	(0.133)
notlive	-0.00531	-0.147	-0.0940	-0.164	-0.204*	-0.122	0.0923	0.112
	(0.147)	(0.144)	(0.144)	(0.121)	(0.117)	(0.120)	(0.145)	(0.126)
govemp	-0.195	-0.139	-0.268	0.384**	0.565***	0.425***	-0.183	0.185
	(0.193)	(0.185)	(0.184)	(0.156)	(0.150)	(0.155)	(0.187)	(0.163)
Constant	5.002	13.35	15.57	15.53*	1.597	-5.365	0.0880	3.410
	(9.842)	(9.508)	(9.495)	(8.063)	(7.757)	(7.991)	(9.628)	(8.441)
Observations	974	958	958	1,006	1,008	1,008	986	1,000
R-squared	0.003	0.008	0.013	0.018	0.024	0.015	0.017	0.003
Number of country	122	122	122	122	122	122	121	122

Standard errors in parentheses
**** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1*

TABLE 16, RESPONDENT PERCEPTION BIAS - QUESTIONS 7, 8

VARIABLES	(1) q7
gender	-0.188*
	(0.101)
PhD	-0.0447
	(0.115)
birthyear	-0.00165
	(0.00408)
notborn	-0.167
	(0.125)
notlive	-0.110
	(0.120)
govemp	-0.0140
	(0.156)
Constant	8.084
	(8.020)
Observations	991
R-squared	0.009
Number of country	122

Standard errors in parentheses
**** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1*

VARIABLES	(1) q8_a	(2) q8_b	(3) q8_c	(4) q8_d	(5) q8_e	(6) q8_f	(7) q8_g
gender	0.131	0.149	0.0574	0.0601	0.0215	0.0939	0.199*
	(0.109)	(0.105)	(0.0890)	(0.0953)	(0.108)	(0.0948)	(0.110)
phd	0.0879	0.135	-0.00206	-0.0243	0.0102	0.142	-0.0907
	(0.123)	(0.118)	(0.100)	(0.107)	(0.120)	(0.106)	(0.123)
birthyear	0.00590	0.00647	0.00122	0.000699	0.00592	0.00677*	0.00631
	(0.00442)	(0.00425)	(0.00357)	(0.00383)	(0.00430)	(0.00379)	(0.00442)
notborn	-0.0280	-0.117	-0.0399	-0.143	0.0305	-0.172	0.0835
	(0.135)	(0.130)	(0.110)	(0.118)	(0.134)	(0.118)	(0.136)
notlive	0.354***	0.327***	0.316***	0.391***	0.464***	0.181	0.383***
	(0.130)	(0.125)	(0.106)	(0.114)	(0.127)	(0.112)	(0.130)
govemp	-0.258	-0.281*	-0.546***	-0.609***	-0.135	-0.171	-0.393**
	(0.168)	(0.161)	(0.138)	(0.147)	(0.165)	(0.145)	(0.167)
Constant	-8.146	-9.468	1.223	2.125	-8.004	-10.30	-8.522
	(8.680)	(8.342)	(7.018)	(7.518)	(8.450)	(7.446)	(8.693)
Observations	992	995	1,005	1,004	979	979	979
R-squared	0.020	0.023	0.034	0.039	0.024	0.016	0.028
Number of country	121	121	121	121	120	121	120

Standard errors in parentheses
**** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1*

TABLE 17, RESPONDENT PERCEPTION BIAS - QUESTION 9, 11

VARIABLES	(1) q9_a	(2) q9_b	(3) q9_c	(4) q9_d	(5) q9_e	(6) q9_f
gender	-5.886***	-1.480	-6.006	-0.138	-3.862	-1.873
	(1.867)	(5.340)	(5.787)	(4.103)	(3.891)	(2.807)
phd	2.695	-0.868	2.583	-3.048	-8.312*	-1.489
	(2.096)	(6.060)	(6.567)	(4.656)	(4.415)	(3.192)
birthyear	0.00727	0.0716	0.962***	0.174	-0.130	-0.0369
	(0.0747)	(0.216)	(0.234)	(0.166)	(0.157)	(0.114)
notborn	-0.875	11.09*	9.661	-1.811	-2.474	-4.518
	(2.318)	(6.637)	(7.192)	(5.099)	(4.836)	(3.490)
notlive	-2.748	7.142	10.87	4.197	7.104	9.228***
	(2.238)	(6.386)	(6.920)	(4.906)	(4.653)	(3.355)
govemp	7.794***	-3.909	-3.352	0.939	-6.017	2.457
	(2.858)	(8.244)	(8.933)	(6.334)	(6.007)	(4.337)
Constant	46.43	-113.4	-1,853***	-316.7	287.2	85.00
	(146.8)	(424.0)	(459.5)	(325.8)	(308.9)	(223.3)
Observations	929	1,017	1,017	1,017	1,017	1,015
R-squared	0.024	0.007	0.028	0.003	0.008	0.010
Number of countries	122	122	122	122	122	122

Standard errors in parentheses
**** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1*

VARIABLES	(1) q11_a	(2) q11_b	(3) q11_c	(4) q11_d	(5) q11_e	(6) q11_f	(7) q11_g	(8) q11_h
gender	0.179	-0.00660	-0.0791	-0.100	-0.212*	-0.0805	-0.268**	-0.296**
	(0.127)	(0.111)	(0.110)	(0.113)	(0.115)	(0.111)	(0.114)	(0.118)
PhD	0.276*	0.0869	-0.0296	0.0473	-0.253*	-0.285**	-0.145	-0.000636
	(0.143)	(0.126)	(0.125)	(0.128)	(0.130)	(0.123)	(0.127)	(0.133)
birthyear	0.000518	0.00431	-0.000296	0.00586	-0.00747	-0.000387	-0.0110**	0.00160
	(0.00512)	(0.00448)	(0.00446)	(0.00456)	(0.00466)	(0.00449)	(0.00460)	(0.00475)
notborn	0.190	0.0403	-0.0683	-0.298**	0.000505	-0.0823	-0.0828	-0.163
	(0.158)	(0.138)	(0.137)	(0.141)	(0.145)	(0.138)	(0.144)	(0.146)
notlive	0.201	-0.101	-0.0582	-0.0439	-0.136	-0.149	-0.260*	-0.0452
	(0.152)	(0.133)	(0.132)	(0.135)	(0.138)	(0.132)	(0.136)	(0.140)
govemp	0.379*	0.522***	0.258	0.418**	0.288	0.171	0.323*	0.565***
	(0.197)	(0.172)	(0.171)	(0.175)	(0.178)	(0.170)	(0.174)	(0.182)
Constant	3.072	-4.431	5.340	-7.220	19.83**	6.392	27.01***	1.599
	(10.06)	(8.802)	(8.771)	(8.965)	(9.162)	(8.815)	(9.039)	(9.340)
Observations	997	1,010	1,005	1,008	970	932	967	990
R-squared	0.014	0.013	0.005	0.016	0.020	0.015	0.030	0.021
Number of countries	121	122	122	122	122	122	122	122

Standard errors in parentheses
**** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1*

APPENDIX F: QUESTIONNAIRE

The following section depicts the questionnaire implemented via Qualtrics Software.



Country for which you want to provide your answers

All questions in this questionnaire pertain to the public sector employees of a specific country of your choice. This could be your country of birth, your country of residence, or any other country for which you perceive yourself most knowledgeable to provide answers.

When asking about public sector employees in this survey, we would like you to think about a typical person employed by the public sector in the country of your choice, excluding military. If you think there are large discrepancies between branches of the public sector, between the national/federal and subnational/state level, or between the core bureaucracy and employees working with public service delivery, please try to average them out before starting your response.

Please, choose the country for which you want to provide your answers:

1. Your country of selection:

Comment: Each respondent may only answer to one country. We would like you to choose the country on which you are most knowledgeable.

<< >>



Recruitment and careers of public employees

2. Thinking about the country you have chosen, how often would you say the following occurs today?

	Hardly ever 1	2	3	4	5	6	Almost always 7	*No opinion*
a. When recruiting public sector employees, the skills and merits of the applicants decide who gets the job.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
b When recruiting public sector employees, the political connections of the applicants decide who gets the job.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
c. When recruiting public sector employees, the personal connections of the applicants (for example kinship or friendship) decide who gets the job.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
d. Public sector employees are hired via a formal examination system.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
e. The practice of hiring, firing, promoting and paying public sector employees follows the provisions of the laws and other legal documents regulating these processes.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Hardly ever 1	2	3	4	5	6	Almost always 7	*No opinion*
f. Vacant positions in the public sector are advertised in newspapers and websites of relevant organizations.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
g. The top political leadership hires and fires senior public officials.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
h. Senior public officials are recruited from within the ranks of the public sector.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
i. Entry to the public sector is open only at the lowest level of the hierarchy.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
j. Once one is recruited as a public sector employee, one remains a public sector employee for the rest of one's career.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

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Replacement of public sector employees

3. With a new central government in place (for example, after a national election), approximately how many public sector employees are exchanged?

Please, try to specify an approximate number, e.g. 152, 2 400 or 26 321

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Preconditions and tasks for public employees

4. Thinking about the country you have chosen, how often would you say the following occurs today?

	Hardly ever 1	2	3	4	5	6	Almost always 7	*No opinion*
a. Senior officials have salaries that are comparable with the salaries of private sector managers with roughly similar training and responsibilities.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
b. Public sector employees are paid salaries on which they can sustain themselves.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
c. The salaries of public sector employees are linked to appraisals of their performance.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
d. Retired public sector employees can sustain themselves on a public old-age pension.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
e. Public employees are absent from work without permission.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
f. The terms of employment for public sector employees are regulated by special laws that do not apply to private sector employees.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
g. Key ethnic and religious groups in society are proportionally represented among public sector employees.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

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Policy making and implementation

5. Thinking about the country you have chosen, how often would you say the following occurs today?

	Hardly ever 1	2	3	4	5	6	Almost always 7	*No opinion*
a. When preparing policy proposals, both public sector employees and politicians are involved.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
b. When implementing policies, both public sector employees and politicians are involved.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
c. Policy making in the economic policy sector is characterized by highly complex issues to which there are no apparent solutions.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
d. Policy making in the social policy sector is characterized by highly complex issues to which there are no apparent solutions.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
e. Policy making in the environmental policy sector is characterized by highly complex issues to which there are no apparent solutions.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Hardly ever 1	2	3	4	5	6	Almost always 7	*No opinion*
f. When deciding how to implement policies in individual cases, public sector employees treat some groups in society unfairly.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
g. When granting licenses to start up private firms, public sector employees favor applicants with whom they have strong personal contacts.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
h. The provision of public services is subject to competition from private sector companies, NGOs or other public agencies.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
i. The provision of public services is funded by user fees and/or private insurances rather than taxes.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
j. Public services are provided by quasi-autonomous agencies.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

	Hardly ever 1	2	3	4	5	6	Almost always 7	*No opinion*
k. Public sector employees strive to be efficient.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
l. Public sector employees strive to help citizens.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
m. Public sector employees strive to follow rules.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
n. Public sector employees strive to fulfill the ideology of the party/parties in government.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
o. Public sector employees strive to implement the policies decided upon by the top political leadership.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

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Women in public sector

6. Thinking about the country for which you have chosen to submit your answers, what is the proportion of women among public sector employees?

Fill in the percentages for each question in the right column.

In the public sector, generally	
Among senior positions in central government	
Within the police force	
Within the public health care system	
Within public education	

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Impartiality

By a common definition, impartiality implies that when implementing policies, public sector employees should not take anything about the citizen/case into consideration that is not stipulated in the policy.

7. Generally speaking, how often would you say that public sector employees today, in your chosen country, act *impartially* when deciding how to implement a policy in an individual case?

Hardly ever 1	2	3	4	5	6	Almost always 7	*No opinion*
○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

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Corruption and embezzlement

8. Thinking about the country you have chosen, how often would you say the following occurs today?

	Hardly ever 1	2	3	4	5	6	Almost always 7	*No opinion*
a. Members of the executive (the head of state, the head of government and cabinet ministers), or their agents, grant favors in exchange for bribes, kickbacks or other material inducements.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
b. Members of the executive (the head of state, the head of government and cabinet ministers), or their agents, steal, embezzle or misappropriate public funds or other state resources for personal or family use.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
c. Public sector employees grant favors in exchange for bribes, kickbacks or other material inducements.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
d. Public sector employees steal, embezzle or misappropriate public funds or other state resources for personal or family use.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Hardly ever 1	2	3	4	5	6	Almost always 7	*No opinion*
e. Members of the legislature grant favors in exchange for bribes, kickbacks, or other material inducements.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
f. Members of the judiciary grant favors in exchange for bribes, kickbacks or other material inducements.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
g. Firms that provide the most favorable kickbacks to senior officials are awarded public procurement contracts in favor of firms making the lowest bid.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

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Corruption and embezzlement

9. Hypothetically, let's say that a typical public sector employee was given the task to distribute an amount equivalent to 1000 USD per capita to the needy poor in your country. According to your judgement, please state the percentage that would reach:

The needy poor	0
People with kinship ties to the public employee	0
Middlemen/consultants	0
The public employee's own pocket	0
The superiors of the public employee	0
Others*	0
Total	0

Fill in the percentages for each question in the right column and make sure that all questions together add to 100 percent.

10. For the answer *others: please specify whom?**

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Transparency and control

11. To what extent would you say the following applies today to the country for which you have chosen to submit your answers?

	Not at all 1	2	3	4	5	6	To a very large extent 7	*No opinion*
a. Public sector employees risk severe negative consequences if they pass on information about abuses of public power to the media.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
b. Government documents and records are open to public access.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
c. Abuses of power within the public sector are likely to be exposed in the media.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
d. Citizens and media actors can track the flow of government revenues and expenditures.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
e. The National Audit Office is independent from the government.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
f. Auditors at the National Audit Office have the appropriate education and qualifications.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
g. The National Audit Office regularly communicates their results, including results that may be inconvenient for the government, to the general public.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
h. When found guilty of misconduct, public sector employees are reprimanded by proper bureaucratic mechanisms.	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

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Finally, we would like to ask some questions about yourself

12. Are you a man or woman?

○ man

○ woman

13. What is your level of education?

Mark the answer that You think most properly describes your education.

14. Which year were you born?

(year: 19xx)

15. In which country were you born?

16. In which country do you live today?

17. Is your current employer located in the country for which you have submitted your answers?

- Yes
- No
- Unemployed/Retired

18. Who do you work for?

Please choose the response category that best describes your current employer

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Considerations about this survey?

19. Please indicate who sent the link to this questionnaire to you:

- Directly from the QoG Institute (Bo Rothstein, Stefan Dahlberg)
- From an organization of scholars of which I am a member (e.g., CLAD, AMDIN, or other)
- From someone else whom I know personally
- From someone else whom I do not know

20. If you have any considerations about this survey, please write them down in the box below.

Do you know anyone from your country who you think could contribute to the Quality of Government Expert Survey?

Please, fill in the name and the position of the person(s) suggested.

Please, fill in the e-mail address of the suggested participant(s).

Thank you for your interest and your participation in our study.

All replies will be treated with strictest confidentiality, and personal information will in no way be publicly revealed.

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Thank You for your participation! We at the QoG Institute appreciate that you took the time and effort to respond to our web survey on the Quality of Government. Your answers are of great value to us. If you have further *questions*, would like to download the *data*, or review a detailed *report* of the survey, please visit our homepage:
http://www.qog.pol.gu.se/data/datadownloads/qogexpertsurveydata/

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