MASTER'S THESIS
INTERNATIONAL ADMINISTRATION
AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

Self-Interest and Altruism as motivations of regional action?

A study of African Regional Organisations and the interventions in Mali and the DRC

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February 04, 2015

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Abstract

This thesis examines the military interventions of ECOWAS and SADC in Mali and the Democratic Republic of Congo. These interventions took place within the frame of the high expectations of international and regional peace after the collapse of the Cold War. However, conflicts have continued to flourish, with the African continent being the forefront for numerous. At the same time, regionalisation of security and humanitarian action is shifting the grounds for how such conflicts are addressed and regional organisations (ROs) are emerging at the centre of this development. Even so, there is still a considerable lack of knowledge in the literature on what such role entails and how these new actors actually behave and why.

Realism has been shown to explain state decisions, but realism has not been applied to the decisions of ROs. In this thesis, I explore the applicability of realism to the decisions of ROs. Specifically, I ask: Can realism explain the RO decision to intervene in a humanitarian conflict? Or is the decision to intervene alternatively motivated by altruistic concerns that cosmopolitanism can explain? Through an in-depth qualitative analysis of the two cases, I show that the answer is that while realism seems the most applicable it does not entirely explain RO decisions to intervene in a humanitarian conflict, I also demonstrate the presence of non-realistic, altruistic motivations as well. I explore the implications of this finding and avenues for future research in the discussion section. This work represents a significant step in the scholarly understanding of ROs as the unit of analysis. From a policy perspective, as we strive to understand the increasing role that ROs play in mitigating humanitarian crises, it is valuable to document the full spectrum of incentives influencing RO choices.

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List of Abbreviations

ADFL	Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo Zaire
AFISMA	African-led International Support Mission to Mali
AQIM	Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
CCAPRRI	Coordinating Committee on Assistance and Protection to Refugees, Returnees and Internally Displaced Persons in Africa
DDR	Disaster Risk Reduction
DRC	The Democratic Republic of Congo
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ECOMOG	The Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
HFA	Hyogo Framework for Action
IO	International Organisation
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MINUSMA	Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali of the UN
MNLA	Movement for the Liberation of Azawad
ODI	Overseas Development Institute
OPDS	SADC Organ for Politics, Defence and Security
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
RO	Regional Organisation
RPTC	SADC Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre
PADEP	ECOWAS for the Peace and Development Project
SACU	South African Customs Union
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SWAPO	South West Africa People's Organization
UNHCR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
ZANU-PF	The Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front

Chapter 1

Introduction

Anyone following international relations is likely to be struck by regionalism as one important contemporary trend. It is part of the momentous changes the world has witnessed since the dawn of the 1990s. In the words of Louise Fawcett "the regional momentum has proved unstoppable, constantly extending into new and diverse domains" (2004:431).

One of those domains are the humanitarian sphere. The African continent have seen a significant increase and change in humanitarian interventions. What makes these interventions special is that they are in growing numbers, gradually but consistently, carried out by African actors, namely regional organisations (ROs). While many point to this development and say that yes, ROs are indeed getting more and more active, in fact they may well be key to the future of humanitarian action, their role, the scope of their work and the actual activities as well as what drives them to act, still remain a fairly new and unexplored topic.

But ROs are increasingly becoming important players and the need to understand them and their action comes with such development. Their willingness to take action marks a departure from past military interventions, which most often where conducted by foreign powers with ties to the African state in question. This marks the development of an emerging new geography of political organisation and political power, transcending traditional territories and borders.

Studies on humanitarian efforts have within the research of ROs, who in themselves for long have been a topic of study, been outpaced by a focus on economic cooperation and trade agreements (Zyck, 2013:5). While there are an increasing body of literature on the institutional and organizational structure and appearance of ROs, there is far less known about the issue of their actual activities in crisis-affected contexts and the dynamic of such activities (Ibid). Adding to this, the existing studies that actually do address the humanitarian role seem to currently stop at concluding that there is a variable involvement of ROs and that such variation probably stems from a wide range of both political and capacity factors yet to be determined and studied.

One the one hand this study draws on two recent larger studies (Zyck, 2013; Ferris & Pets, 2013) that point towards this gap in the available literature and begun to map the current active

ROs worldwide with some basic indicators of their humanitarian involvement, but lack the in depth focus of specific ROs action. On the other hand this study borrows inspiration from how international relations theory have explained the behaviour of states as driven by national/self-interests. By taking flight from the assumption that ROs are indeed actors of increased scope and agency, this thesis assesses the theoretical realist self-interest notion that have been shown to explain state decisions on RO action to explore its applicability to ROs decisions to intervene in conflicts.

At the same time, the spirit and creation of ROs spur from being at least partly a project of peace and an idea of cooperation across traditional boarders. I argue that we cannot simply assume that ROs act in the same way as states but we need to look them as a new type of actor on the international arena in need of further exploration. Considering ROs nature and the growing international discussion and presence in both academia and policy formation of a norm of humanitarianism or altruism, realism might not fully be able to explain RO decision to intervene in conflicts. As a contrasting perspective, this thesis hence puts the normative theoretical idea of cosmopolitanism as an alternative possible explanation of action that centres on altruistic concerns being motivations for action. Even though cosmopolitanism in its essence is a normative theory, while realism is not traditionally so, both have values of what action should be about protecting; the state and interest of the self or a more other oriented humanitarian value. I believe hence, that even realism ultimately can be considered normative. This thesis is though about explaining actual action, rather than paint a picture of how ROs should act. Even so, I put forward the argument that they both serve as theoretical perspectives that can be contrasted and drawing on the contemporary debates are a suitable entry point for contrasting and categorising motives behind humanitarian interventions led by ROs.

To further explain, the need to contrast realism's idea of self-interests with altruistic concerns comes from the fact that even though the contemporary international society recognises the realist notion of states in pursuit of power and self-interest, it also further increasingly raises a right two intervene from another perspective of more normative nature that is based on moral, but not necessary legal, right of unauthorised intervention in cases of humanitarian suffering. The occurrence of military interventions for humanitarian purposes can as mentioned be understood as having marking the introduction to a new era of international relations, where traditional concepts of sovereignty and the nation state have been gradually replaced by more cosmopolitan notions and a poly-centric rather than purely state centric system (Krieg 2013:3).

This study takes on the approach of doing an in depth qualitative analysis of two cases of interventions taken on by two of the most prominent African regional actors; the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). The African regional context is one where the humanitarian momentum remains of the highest importance as long as conflict and humanitarian need continues to flourish. ROs in Africa are very active, they interact and are a big part of the current debate on development, even though regionalism in itself remain a contested issue.

Notably, the focus of this study is not to evaluate whether the organisations themselves are "good", "bad" or efficient. Rather the aim is upon the more tangible yet poorly studied topic of their actual behaviour and more specifically what motivations drives the decision to intervene in a crisis. Looking at not only what they put out on paper in terms of policies but on what they have practically done and how they behave are seen as important in order to contribute to better understanding their current and future role in African development and as humanitarian actors. To do this and attempt to acquire more in-depth knowledge than previous studies the subject of the study are the case of SADC intervening in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 1998 and ECOWAS intervention in Mali in 2012. Through such cases, the study attempts to provide answers to what different factors motivated the ROs in the past and to what extent these factors expresses degrees of self-interests and altruism involved the choice to intervene.

The study is done through structured reviews of the organisations' publicly available materials and the existing literature of the interventions and activities trying to trace the behaviour of the ROs. In other words, it is a desk study of qualitative sort.

1.1 Research aim and question

This thesis is motivated by the desire to in a large sense better understand the new role of ROs as humanitarian actors. It aims explore this by taking on an approach that seem to be lacking in the current literature, one that focuses not only on the institutional development of policies but on actual behaviour by looking at what motivations seems to drive the decision to act. Looking at the motivations that affects the decision to act is understood as a key element in organisational behaviour and the mapping of motivations as such as valuable in documenting the full spectrum of incentives influencing RO choices.

Taking on two cases of interventions is an attempt to draw on earlier research but at the same time narrowing the scope and going deeper into the actions of the specific actors than former

research have done, while at the same time applying a comparative-, rather than single-actor, focus.

The study will pursue the following question:

What motivations drove SADC and ECOWAS to decide to intervene in the DRC and Mali and to what degree can realism and potentially cosmopolitanism explain the RO choices?

Answering this question is relevant both in regards to the debate in academia as well as for policymaking. The research and analysis of past humanitarian intervention cases can contribute to the debate about realism and the centrality of self-interests in the advancement of regionalism as well as to which possible extent altruism may be considered a variable in regional action and decision making. Furthermore, the results of this research can grant policy makers insights to some of the motivations behind the cases of interventions in the past. As we enter further into the twenty-first century, one may confront the possibility that people worldwide will increasingly be subjects to threats of regional character in absence of sufficient national protection. Consequently, the international community will be ever so faced with challenges and moral obligations to manage humanitarian crises. As such, knowing what triggers intervention will help in the strive for outlining necessary policy changes to ensure sound future responses.

1.1 Previous research and further contribution of this study

Several previous studies have come to the conclusion that there to date is a lack of credible sources regarding the intentions, activities and impacts of ROs despite a growing body of literature that looks at their institutional structures, frameworks and conventions (Fawcett, 2004; Bailes and Cottey, 2005; GPDRR, 2011; Goertz and Powers, 2011; IFRC, 2011; Zyck, 2013). This claim is in large rooted in the fact that much of the current available information comes from the institutions themselves and are hence facing the problematic aspect of being biased when it comes to the balance between analyses and aligning with self-interests.

Yet there is an emerging body of literature from relatively independent sources in recent years that comes from think thanks and international organisations, such as the Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction (2009, 2011), the Brookings-LSE Project (Ferris and Pertz, 2013) and Overseas Development Institute (ODI) project (Zyck, 2013). What this literature has in common is that it focuses on the role of ROs when it comes to humanitarian action through what these have done in terms of work on strategic frameworks and memoranda's of

understanding. In other words they tend to take the starting point in what has been put down on paper rather than in what they have actually done. This has also been pointed out by Wilson Center (2008) as a big gap in the available literature; understanding what actions they actually undertake and why. One further aspect of this same body of literature is that it can be understood in some instances to be aspirational, considering and suggesting an ambitious future for ROs but not necessarily engaging in a deeper discussion with the factors do motivate and affect their actions.

Recognising the already available research on regional organisations institutional structures and descriptive studies of their policies (GPDRR, 2011; Haver and Foley, 2011; IFRC, 2011), this study aims to begin to explore their action by diving in to some of their interventions and what drove them to intervene. Understanding the driving factors behind the behaviour of ROs can begin guiding the surrounding humanitarian sphere as well as academics in their assumed increased contact and interaction as these organisations increase their scope and presence in the humanitarian field.

A recent report from a study from the ODI (Zyck, 2013) shows that the involvement of ROs are in fact increasingly engaged in humanitarian action but that it is a mistake to only look at them as one emerging key unit of actors. The study argues that the truth in fact is much more nuanced than that, with very wide variations among ROs and their humanitarian activities. While their commitments on paper within policies may to some degrees be similar, their actual contributions seem to be uneven (Ibid:1). What this variation stems from is yet to be explored and this is where a comparative case study could help start such exploration. ROs are importantly all formal interstates bodies who generally represent some contiguous territories, though having unique features in regards to history, values, culture and mandates. In other words, to contrast and compare regional organisations can help shed light into these bodies' individual and specific characteristics. This can be seen as important for other actors within the humanitarian sphere as they today must increasingly determine how to best engage with these so-called "emerging" actors in their field.

If turning to the research on humanitarian intervention and action, the literature has not yet pointed much attention to ROs. While this may be because of their relatively new and still developing engagement, it is still firstly states, NGOs and international organisations such as the UN and NATO that are the main focus of research. Maybe because we have better

theoretical tools to assess such actor's behaviour while how to address ROs are still rather unclear.

The controversy surrounding humanitarian intervention is not uniquely contemporary to today (Bass, 2008). While terms, actors and context may change, the core question remains more or less the same; Should external actors intervene on behalf of suffering people and if so, when and how? Research on humanitarian interventions shows that this in turn cannot be separated from the very idea of sovereignty that implies inviolability and the primacy of the principle of non-intervention (Hehir, 2013:2). Humanitarian intervention challenges the statist bias in international relations and are often viewed as a tension between the rights of states and the rights of individuals (Hehir, 2013:2).

Moreover, any actor that intervenes under the declaration of its actions to be humanitarian, can be understood to do so explicitly trying to legitimise the actions as non-partisan and moral, in other words as justified rather than selfish and strategic, and hence so as necessarily contentious (Ibid:16). Therefore, as Hehir argues, in a way quite similar to how an act of violence have been able to be labelled as "terrorism", the use of humanitarian action comes with essential normative assumptions. In so it elevates the importance of legitimacy of the actions, making it both subjective and contentious (Ibid:f).

So, to clarify what this study can contribute with, it can first of all be seen as a continuation of the relatively new and scarcely studied aspect of the work of ROs on humanitarian issues. As mentioned, the academic focus on ROs has not been upon humanitarian action but in regards to economic cooperation and trade agreements. This while at the same time there is a widespread acknowledged understanding that ROs are increasingly becoming more involved in humanitarian action. This merits the need for studying this topic. The motivations for the increasing humanitarian scope can be one way of widening the insights of the politics of regional relations. Also, a focus on ROs contributes as a new type of actor focus to the field of humanitarian action as since it has been mainly focused on states, NGOs and international organisations such as the NATO and the UN rather than regional bodies.

Speculative research on humanitarian action has mentioned the development of regionalism as potentially pointing towards new and more mature regional humanitarian architecture more "owned" by the region itself (Zyck, 2013A:2) . From this one can assume an understanding that the emergence of ROs can mean more "customised" and locally adapted solutions that may be less inspired by UN processes. In relation to this however, is the fact that even though financial

data is rarely available, many ROs continue to be finance heavily by foreign donors rather than by countries within the represented region (Ibid).

A study of the drivers of ROs to take action in a crisis can hence explore if and how possible motivations such as an altruistic, apolitical concern for human welfare, a self-interest guided and often strategic agenda and relations to external actors such as donors and the UN, are influential in the process of their behaviour.

In both the academic areas of humanitarian action and ROs the concepts of sovereignty and supranationalism are seen as central. There is a general assumption that multilateral bodies are in fact a case of supranationalism. In other words that they cede state sovereignty to a higher level (Zyck, 2013:10).

Members of the organisations have according to studies tended to accept the supranatural role of the organisations when it builds on their national interests and desires for sovereignty, as an e.g., when the organisations provide a platform for advocating their sovereignty when faced with external threats (Zyck 2013:11). While some organisations have grown has grown more interventionist with time, the issue of sovereignty continues to be central (Ibid.)

While highlighting the gaps in the literature that this thesis wants in part to fill, this thesis can only begin to address them. An important limitation to clarify is that a study like this depends on the availability of data. Fact is that the raw information about ROs field level activities are by large yet to be collected (Zyck, 2013). This as such is both a motivation for trying to map their behaviour, as well as a limitation to actually do so. Recognising the wealth of research on ROs policies and institutions, this study instead takes on contributing to a fuller discussion on their contributions to humanitarian action, through their involvement in conflict management and peacekeeping.

The label of humanitarian intervention have long in the African context been a pretext for what really have turned out to be political, economic and strategic self-interest (Francis 2006:110). Human intervention in Africa is in fact opening up a debate about on the retreat of sovereignty in situations of human rights abuses, but also in cases of political crisis and state collapse. Military interventions of one kind or another have dominated the post-colonial Africa. Most of whom have been conducted by post colonial powers or a dominant power in pursuit of power. Intra-African interventions have not however, received similar international and academic attention (Ibid:107).

The former studies have helped to serve as a basis for identifying the chosen regional organisations and the current gaps of 'what' and 'how' in regards to ROs. Approaching this gap this thesis is motivated by the desire to understand the role of regional organisations as humanitarian actors while at the same time taking on a more narrow and comparative approach than such studies. The study of the activities of ROs is in a wider perspective also interesting and valuable in order to highlight areas of similarities and contrast to so-called traditional aid actors in the UN and beyond. Indeed the study of ROs can not only be useful in order to better analyse their own performance, but are also about learning where they have developed new modes of work and strategies which other actors may wish to adopt or build upon.

Even though the specific area of conflict management and peacekeeping is in focus, it should be kept in mind that these forms of regional cooperation that the chosen actors represent also can have further implications. Possibly, the ROs may through their engagement in humanitarian assistance find ground for other and new areas for cooperation. The point of this is that this study then on a higher level of abstraction, hopefully can have relevance not only for the field of humanitarian intervention and humanitarian action, but also in a larger perspective of regional cooperation as an instance of global governance as well as a force of peace, security and development.

1.2 Key concepts

There are several key concepts that create the basis for this thesis that need early on clarification and definition. This section also intends to justify the use of such concepts and bring transparency as to why they were chosen.

1.3.1 What are regional organisations?

The term RO is most certainly a key concept. It is within literature commonly used but rarely without sufficient clarity. For instance, as a broad notion of ROs the literature at times approaches trade pacts (e.g. the North American Free Trade Agreement) in the same category as very broad bodies such as the Organisation of American states and the AU. In other instances RO is used in relation to issue- or resource-specific bodies (e.g the Nile River Initiative) alongside with organisations rooted in issues such as identity (e.g the Legue of Arab States) or religion (e.g. the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation) without discussion a clear rational for doing so. The research of Zyck (2013) and Ferris and Pets (2013) shed light on this in their

mapping of ROs worldwide and underline the importance to determine the key elements which define ROs, and further also what hence differentiate them from other intrastate bodies.

This thesis aligns with the definition of Zyck (2013) and considers a RO to be an institution meeting to the following criteria: (i) consisting of a substantial geographic proximity or contiguity; (ii) having an official intergovernmental status formulated in a treaty or other comparable legal instrument; (iii) having a cooperative or collaborative mandate rather than just a prime defensive mission; and (iv) having a multi sectoral focus (that is to say does not focus on a single issue such as free trade or fisheries).

As a consequence of this definition, non-regional bodies and issue-specific ones was from the beginning excluded and never up for selection. The definition also excludes organisations such as NATO, which at least in a traditional sense is not regional and is arguably focused almost exclusively on collective defence.

The definition also further means overlooking a distinction sometimes made within the literature on regionalism: the distinction between regional- and subregional organisations. This is though not a clear-cut distinction in many regions globally and given the lack of credible reasons for differentiating between the two, it can be a benefit to treat them as a single type of entity (Ferris and Petz, 2013). This study will as such not make such a distinction but rather for the sake of simplicity refer to all organisations (that do meet the above criteria) as ROs.

1.3.2 The scope of humanitarian intervention

This thesis applies to the scope of interventions that include the use of military forces but are framed as being humanitarian in nature. The occurrence of military interventions for humanitarian purposes can be understood as having marked the introduction to a new era of international relations, where traditional concepts of sovereignty and the nation state have been gradually replaced by more cosmopolitan notions and a poly-centric rather than purely state centric system (Krieg 2013:3). Both the disintegration of the cold war politics and globalization have laid the ground for new forms of conflict resolution and new actors to enter the stage. The idea that there is a limited but normatively legitimate right of intervention in supreme humanitarian emergencies is today well established in the international community and widely recognised among scholars (Bellamy, 2007 ;Finnemaore 2003; Lepard 2002; Wheeler 2001). Humanitarian intervention should though be understood as a concept that have been controversially debated by the international law community as well as among other dealing with ethics and morality in international relations.

Another scope of importance that alternatively could have been the focus is humanitarian action as a wider concept. Humanitarian action is for the purpose of this thesis understood in accordance with the conceptualization 'Principles and Good Practices of Humanitarian Donorship' as activities intended "to save lives, alleviate suffering and maintaining human dignity during and in the aftermath of man made crises and natural disasters, as well as to prevent and strengthen preparedness for the occurrence of such situations" (Good Humanitarian Donarship, 2003:1). While humanitarian action in general would have been interesting to also look at, I am convinced that humanitarian intervention with its inherent controversy says more about ROs and their behaviour since it through the use of military forces that ROs have shown willingness and capacity to act. Military interventions are also arguably through current action larger in scope and easier to define and look to as the availability of data is larger. But ultimately, to be able to say something about actual activities of ROs, one have to choose a scope of action where they have indeed acted. I believe humanitarian intervention is the most prominent such area.

Broadly speaking, humanitarian intervention is understood as the application of force in order to respond to a crisis of humanitarian atrocities (Francis, 2006:108). Oliver Ramsbotham explains that

> "whereas in classic terminology, 'humanitarian intervention' means 'forcible self-help by states across international boarders to protect indigenous human rights', under the re-conceptualisation, 'humanitarian intervention means cross border action by the international community in response to suffering, an expanded version of the classic concept to include collective action as well as self-help and no longer confined to human rights abuses by governments" (Ramsbotham 1997:456f).

This understanding suits the African context where humanitarian intervention is often widely used even in situations of political crisis and what analysis have described as cases of "regime support" (Francis, 2006:107f). The interventions in this study will not assumed to be humanitarian in nature but will throughout the analysis be under the scrutiny of their humanitarian aspects, as will be outlined in the theoretical framework.

1.3.3 Focusing on the decision to intervene

As outlined, this thesis looks at what motivations influences the ROs decision to intervene in a conflict. The decision to intervene as hence in other words be understood as the central dependent variable in this thesis. This entail the all the acts of taking action in response to the specific case in question, within the frame of what constitutes the scope of an humanitarian interventions. One important aspect of choosing this as the variable in question is that it allows

for the specific focus on the initiation of action, not as on e.g. RO processes after interventions. Take for example the case of spill over effects, the focusing on the decision to intervene means focusing on if there were potential spill over effects that were considered by the RO – not whether the intervention actually later spilled over to other places or not. The perceived threat is hence key rather than only the outcome. This centres on what prompts them to act, what conditions or factors that function as incentives for ROs within their process of deciding that they have a legit right to intervene. As the dependent variable, the initiation of action as a response to conflict is the effect or consequence through which the motivations ultimately take visible form that we can observe and analyse.

1.3.4 Motivations versus intentions

Motivations in this thesis is a central concept as it constitutes the independent variable and hence is understood as the presumed cause of the decision to act by ROs. The importance of motivations have been spurred within just war theory by the emerging norm behind humanitarian intervention. Pacifism apart, all other models just war theory accept that in certain scenarios the use of force and violence may within carful limitation be justifiable. Turning to just war theory as a field and the criteria that have been put forward to define just use of force, the key factor in determining such justness seems to be the "right intention". Humanitarian intervention as tolerated action of foreign forces into domestic affairs requires such criterion to be satisfied.

As both intention and motivation are used commonly in literature as interchangeably, it is of importance to discuss the meaning of the two terms that point in the same direction but may also describe two different conceptual ideas. Also as this thesis specifically uses motivations rather than intentions. Nardin (2006) explains that the intention is the ''[…] state of affairs it seeks to bring about. A motive, in contrast, is the frame of mind in which agents act—the desires and other passions that propel him". In other words intentions describes what an actor wants to achieve and is to some degree disregarding of why the actor wants to achieve it. Motivations on the other hand, entails the driving force behind the action, a further goal the actor seeks to accomplish with the act and is therefore key to a fuller explanation of any action (Krieg, 2013; Tenson, 2005). Saving a drowning puppy expecting a reward from the owner makes my intention right (actually rescuing the puppy) while my motivation is at the same time self-interested as I expect a reward. The motivation of the action hence become of interest if one wants to understand the full spectrum of incentives that influences the choice to act. While it from a methodological standpoint it is hard to measure motivations, arguably close to

impossible since we can never be fully sure about an actor's state of mind, intentions may be more obvious. Having said that, in order to assess the driving forces for actors to intervene in a certain crisis it is still necessary to try to shed light on both aspects of the decision making and taking on the task of trying to understand motivations. The choice of looking at motivations I argue is hence justified by the fact that even though this thesis might just being to explore a hard topic, it can still point to indicators of motivating factors that can help us create a fuller understanding of the choices the ROs make. Methodologically this thesis have also been carful as to be transparent throughout the presentation of the analysis and results structuring it according to a clear model with outlined indicators as to create structure and clarity to an area that is tangible and rests on interpretation rather than hard facts.

1.4 Structure of the thesis

Following this introductory chapter, the thesis will proceed as follows. Firstly, a theoretical framework is drawn out based on the interplay between realism and cosmopolitanism. Such theories and the understanding of motives as being of either self-interested or altruistic nature are presented in a six-parameter model that will be used as the basis for analysing the cases. Before such analysis though, chapter three is dedicated to the methodological considerations of the study. Moving on to the actual empirical results, chapter four presents an overview and assessment of the role of ROs in humanitarian action with the specific focus of conflict management to serve as a basis for a contextual understanding in with the case studies that follows take place. Chapter five outlines the two case studies of this thesis and is for the sake of clarity and structure presented with the help of the theoretical six-parameter model. The thesis lastly concludes by turning back to its research questions, discussing its results and looks to potential future research.

Chapter 2

Theoretical framework

The following framework can be considered to consist of three parts. The first part presents a case for how to understand ROs as not only a sum of actors and their interests but as actors who sometimes have grown into something more and can theoretically be treated and analysed as such. A second part draws out the theories of realism and cosmopolitanism and the third part is an operationalization of these theories related to ROs that consists of a model of six parameters, three for self-interest and three for altruism.

2.1 Regional organisations as actors with their own agency

Both the study of international relations and international governance have long primarily focused on state action and given short shrift to international organisations (IOs) as independent actors. Treated as part of regimes, IOs – including ROs- have been understood almost exclusively as arenas through which states act. Hence, ROs have been considered "byproducts of state action". In other words, not as actors in their own right and with no independent ontological status (Barnett & Finnemore, 2004: ix). This even though as the introduction outlined, ROs are indeed understood as actors of growing role and scope in international relations.

Even theories of organisations can mainly explain how ROs are created and formed, but don't focus on what happens after their creation. To explain the behaviour of IOs Barnett and Finnemore turn to sociology for tools on organisations and bureaucracies. Sociology, they argue, provides when applied on international relations "a basis for treating international organizations as ontologically independent actors and for theorizing about their nature and behavioural proclivities" (Ibid:viii). They found that the so-called "logic of bureaucracy" offers specific in regards to IO autonomy, the nature and effect of their power and the ways they evolve and expand. By thinking of IOs as social creatures, one can better understand their authority, their power, goals and behaviour (Ibid).

There is a normative bias in favour of ROs. They facilitate cooperation's among states. They help people overcome oppressive governments. They spread good norms and they articulate a

spirit of progress and enlightenment. This represents not only a selection bias but a theoretical disposition found microeconomics and liberal inspired theories (Barnett & Finnemore, 2004: ix). If we however, start from the premise that IOs are bureaucracies and behave accordingly, we generate different expectations. We paint a picture where IOs can act as good servants but can also produce undesirable and self-defeating outcomes (Ibid:ix).

While Barnett and Finnemore are not the first to theoretically argue this, they are not in a crowded field. As they point out, remarkably little empirical research gets inside IOs and ROs to understand how they work, nevertheless an increased attention to their existence (Ibid). Scholars of IR have given little systematic consideration to how IOs actually behave. Most of the theories are of states and state behaviour. IOs are treated as structures of rules, principles, norms and decision making processes through which others, mostly states, act. With this view from most available theories, IOs have no agency of their own. To the extent that IOs do "behave" at all, they are assumed to do so in accordance with what states want (Ibid:2).

Barnett and Finnemore is relevant to this study as the present the case that the subject of this study can actually be the ROs themselves. If not acknowledging ROs as at least somewhat independent actors, it would be more reasonable to only focus on the member states of the ROs and explore their action and motivations. I believe that in the contemporary international arena, it is highly motivated to go beyond such an approach.

As should be clear, this starting point does not deny the role of states. On the contrary, states are perceived as central to the life of ROs. But, states are considered not to be only component of RO behaviour. ROs are not simply passive servants to states.

2.2 Realism and cosmopolitanism

Ultimately employing use of force for humanitarian purposes has been and are still mostly assessed against the background of just war theory and the question of constitutes a righteous intervention. In the following subchapter I will discuss realist and cosmopolitan theories approach the motivation for humanitarian intervention. The first part will clarify why and how realism assigns importance to self-interests in the decision to intervene. The second part will make the argument for the prevalence of altruism as potential alternative motivation from a moralist point of view. Realism and cosmopolitanism can be identified as two common theoretical entry points to address the area humanitarian action. While cosmopolitanists regard people and their rights as the core of international relations, realists rather put forward the state and its rights as the most prominent value to be protected (Krieg, 2013:x). Following this

cosmopolitanism perceive interventions as legitimate and just when based upon the sole or primary purpose of saving or protecting individuals from suffering. Realists, on the contrary, distance themselves from the idea of solidarism in denouncing any action as unrighteous if not somehow serving or protecting the own state or nation.

Hence, at the very core of this theoretical debate lies the question of whether actors should act to protect the interests of states or the interests of individuals. Following this logic, we come to the question if humanitarian action should be, and are, based on apolitical motivations of human welfare or state interest-related considerations. Many authors acknowledge that motivations most certainly at least to some degree are mixed. While hence a simplification, the following perspectives can still serve as a point for categorisation and contrasting of motives to better understand actors. To further assess these theories to ROs rather than state action brings a new perspective that is one way to grasp and mirror the changing dynamics and actors on the international stage.

2.3 Self-interests

In itself, the term "humanitarian" grants a rather strong association to an act as being charitable, philanthropic or even altruistic. However so, this stands in quite strong contrast to the rather widely accepted assumption deriving from realist theory that actors in the international arena should and do base their acts on self-interest (Richardson, 1997:1). Self-interest, or national interest in a broader and more traditional sense can be understood to be under constant redefinition by policymakers and " the meaning of national interests can vary widely, from increasing a state's power to a survival of a state to upholding international legitimacy" (Arharya, 2003:2). Most commonly, the definition of self-interest seem to, based on a realist notion, be summed up as the material and security interest of a nation.

Regarding that the concept of humanitarian action has evolved from an ethical debate about making resources available for helping others, it would appear as self-interest have no place as a motivation for humanitarian intervention (Kreig, 2013:38). Mistakenly or not, the understanding of self-interest as intertwined with selfishness causes it to be sometimes understood as self-absorption, egoism and a perspective that disregards the rights and well-being of others (Maitland, 2002:4). This negative understanding connects to both definitions in economics and in political science. The notion of *homo economicus*, following the philosophy of Adam Smith, can however also be understood as positive as " (…) the human face of self-interest is understood as advancing the interest of all by pursuing one's own self-

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interest" (Krieg, 2013:38). This idea hold if one step away from the understanding of self-interest as selfishness. More precisely, the pursuance of self-interest can be considered unjust only if it disregards the interests of others. This understanding echoes among scholars of the realist school such as Morgenthau, who brought this notion to international relations theory (Ibid). As Morgenthau argued for national interest in terms of power he put forward the state as the sovereign as a servant to its society is trusted with the role of protecting and improving the state's power *vis a vi* other states (Ibid).

Apart from this understanding, in a more contemporary setting, self-interests can also be defined "in a broader sense as advancing more universal interests concerned with the wellbeing of mankind" (Ibid:39). Realists though often find a dichotomy between self-interest and values, sometimes disregarding that the desire to assist others in need is an enduring feature and underlying value of international affairs. Based on a claim of that it is in every state and regions self-interest to preserve global stability and care for a global humanity, actors may very well define their self-interest in terms of values such as democracy, liberalism and human rights (Walzer 1995:54). In other words, even though serving an ethical purpose, the promotion of such values beyond national borders can nonetheless serve the self-interest of nations or other actors. Even so, taking into account that there are moral value-related aspects of self-interests, spreading such values can also be seen as remaining a self-interested undertaking. This as there is an often-assumed notion that states or regions sharing the same values are more likely to be lucrative trading partners or political allies (Krieg 2013:40). While acknowledging that self-interest might indeed still serve humanitarian purposes, the operationalization of such an understanding risk the sphere of self-interest to expand to the point of meaning everything. To avoid this, and to make self-interests observable as well as distinct from altruism the basic understanding in this thesis is that self-interests primarily refers to benefitting the self rather than the "other".

2.3.1 Social Contractarianism

Among the realist school there is furthermore a strong conceptual idea of a social contract existing between the state and the people within its borders. A strong argument for national interests as motivations for state and other actors' behaviour comes from this contractarianism. As Allen Buchanan has argued, internal legitimacy can be contrasted to external legitimacy with the argument that the former takes precedence over the latter. This as authorities first and

foremost have to justify their actions internally to its own citizens as an efficient action in terms of a cost-benefit analyses (Krieg, 2013:40).

This idea of a social contract is that the construct by a certain group of people with the primary purpose of protecting that people within its reach. This mean that people submit to an authority, may it be a state or a regional body, in order to receive a return of protection and security (Dobos, 2009:3). So, in the realist schools eyes actors such as states and in this thesis case ROs, do not in themselves have an inherent legitimacy. Rather they are direct sole agents of the discretionary association they represent. Following this, purely humanitarian interventions as cosmopolitan envisage them can be rejected for the simple reason the intervening actor invest both funds and lives from their own people to help people who are not part of the social contract formed between an state or regional body and its people. As others become beneficiaries of resources that people of a state envisaged to be used for their own benefit, external interventions who does not primarily benefit the own people cannot be seen as justifiable or legitimate.

Critique of the realist social contract theory argue that the idea of a social contract can be extended beyond a state's own citizens. This as states and other actors today also have contracts through globalisation, international law and in broad terms with the international community (Krieg 2013:43). International law binds actors to international norms, which often dictate a defence of human rights worldwide, as such blurring some of the realists clear cut borderlines of responsibility. However, it is hard to assess such responsibility as international law still does not impose a clearly defined duty of when to intervene for humanitarian purposes. Even though concepts such as the responsibility to protect (R2P) does exist, it remain a contested and not at all consequent frame for action. In other words, to extend the boundaries of these social contracts does indeed muddle the idea of the contract itself somewhat. Therefore, while an acknowledging that such thoughts do exist, these contracts are understood mainly as evident and functional between states and their citizens.

2.3.2 The role of Self-Interest in Humanitarian Intervention

Realists argue that self-interest and that the struggle for power have primacy over all other interests. In assessing behaviour, actors are hence not guided by moral concerns and the pursuit of international justice but rather by maximising their territorial interests and protecting their security (Hehir, 2013:71). While the most conservative realist would rule out any action on humanitarian grounds as not to confuse international affairs with philanthropy, others might accept interventions as long as it does not challenge the own security or comes with costs in

terms of financial resources or loss of lives (Krieg, 2013:43). The intervening actor will consequently strive for both internal and external legitimacy has to invest effort in framing the costs, and benefits as well as the probability for success in order to generate support for its action. This as the citizenry presumably is composed by mostly by realists, otherwise such a strive would not be preserved as necessary.

2.4 Altruism

Altruism is in its essence the idea of a selfless and other-oriented behaviour. It has a difficult standing in international relations as well as in social sciences generally. In this thesis, altruism is understood as detached from the realist rationale presented above. While it has often been regarded an unrealistic and idealistic concept, altruism has nevertheless still found its way into the research of international relations. This especially in relation to humanitarian action and intervention. The Oxford Dictionary presents the definition as an "unselfish concern for others" (Soanes & Stevenson, 2005), showing an understanding of both the intention and the motivation as other-oriented. Bar Tal described altruism from five criteria:

> "(..) altruistic behaviour (a) must benefit another person, (b) must be performed voluntarily, (c) must be performed intentionally, (d) the benefit must be the goal by itself, and (e) must be performed without expecting any external reward". (Bar Tal, 1986:5)

From the perspective of Bar Tal, one can hence understand altruism from a motivation's angle, having in itself a value rooted in a clear other-oriented, self-less motivation. The stance of altruism being unrealistic and non-existing in pure form prevailed for a long time in economics, social science and even biology. The base for such an understanding was that any action, by an individual or a state/organisation, was assumed to without exception being connected to self-interest (Krieg, 2013:49). Though there are exceptions, even some of the most prominent advocators of rationality and self-interest, Adam Smith, stated in the 18th century that

> "How selfish soever man be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it, except the pleasure of seeing it" (Smith, 1969:47).

It is in recent years that scholars have begun to argue that altruism is an inherent part of human self-preservation, as humans do contribute to public goods with little or no benefit for themselves (Krieg, 2013:49). It is argued that this comes from the obtainment of a pro-social behaviour through socialization and the development of norms who facilitate social cohabitation (Ibid).

In this thesis altruism describes an other-oriented action of an actor not motivated by self-interest but motivated by empathy or norms of morality with the purpose of assisting people in need.

2.4.1 The role of Altruism in Humanitarian Intervention

This view that humanitarian action has to be accompanied by an empathetic and benevolent motivation derives from the cosmopolitan idea of moral universalism (Krieg, 2013:50ff). Cosmopolitans regard individuals and their rights rather than the state as the core of international relations (Ibid:41). Consequently interventions to save or protect individuals from suffering as righteous due what are called a "common humanity" that crosses national borders. Thus, as the cosmopolitan theory views a unitary world of equal individuals creating a community of humanity, the connection of individuals is through universal norms, shared values, rights and duties (Ibid:51). The deprivation of human rights in other words constitutes not a geographically limited problem, but are of concern to individuals and actors worldwide. Hence, the notion of strictly domestic affairs does not exist and for that reason, the duty to help goes out to everyone (Ibid.).

As a particular cosmopolitan ideology, solidarism can be described as a notion of an international system consisting of states that are part of a common world society built upon the rights of individuals (Kreig 2013:51). Unlike realists and pluralism that regard the world as a system consisting of the accumulation of independent states, and underlines co-existence, solidarism views the international system rather as a cooperative concert of states (Ibid). The international community is perceived as a collective of shared values and norms, making actors that work towards this community supposed to be committed to such values. Considering the manifestation of the UN's standing as part of this international community, and considering the role of human rights within the UN, the international community should invest in the enforcement of these human rights of individuals (Ibid:51). From a solidarist viewpoint, since the individual rights take precedence over the rights of states, interventions must firstly spur from solidarity – assisting people in need. Embedded in this, is hence an understanding of a duty of actors to intervene on the behalf of individuals. The legitimacy of interventions then, spurs from "that as mankind belongs to one, indivisible society the life of a stranger becomes of equal concern for every government" (Ibid:52).

Also within just war theory, there is a common understanding of humanitarian intervention as something disinterested, rather altruistic. Considering that the international community is

viewed as a statist system where international law gives centrality to the sovereignty principle, then; humanitarian intervention must be seen and understood as an exceptional permission of action. Acting for the sake of saving individuals from suffering must be detached from ulterior interests from the intervener as not to confuse such action with conventional into domestic affairs (Krieg, 2013:54). Arguing this, actors hence must show their humanitarian intention as to justify the act as legit. Michael Walzer argued already on the 1970s this idea of humanitarian intervention as legittimate exertion to the rule of non-interference and wrote that

> "We praise or don't condemn these violations of formal rules of sovereignty, because they uphold the values of individual life and communal liberty of which sovereignty itself is merely an expression […]" (Walzer 1977:108).

The legitimacy therefore comes from interventions altruistic nature, namely the concern for human rights. Following this, in both a legal and humanitarian perspective, political interests should not be a driving force for actor behaviour. The Former UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Sadako Ogata once stated that

> "The fundamental objective of humanitarian action is to alleviate suffering and save lives. Humanitarian action focuses on people and is rights based. Political action on states and is guided by national interests and respect for sovereignty" (Ogata, 1998).

It follows from this remark that humanitarian intervention is considered humanitarian action and is hence understood as separated from politics. Realistically however, it is hard to not see humanitarian intervention as a state and therefore remaining a political decision. On some level, one can argue that a merger of politics and humanitarianism will almost always be inevitable. Most commonly, altruism in humanitarian intervention is not as narrowly but rather, as Miller has argued, as a philanthropic effort that might not fully be separated from self-interest, but that, however, has to have altruism as the foremost driving force (Miller, 2008:57).

2.3 Theoretical operationalization: a six parameter model

As shown, the theoretical concepts of self-interest and altruism presents a way of approaching and contrasting the incentives to intervene by a certain actor or actors. In order to put such theoretical understanding to use in this specific thesis a set of six parameters will be applied to each case. The parameters consist of three altruistic and three self-interested parameters and is the way this thesis tries to attempt to depict the degree of altruism or self-interest that lies in the decision to act in response to a humanitarian crisis.

The parameters are the following:

Altruism	• Presence of an acute humanitarian crisis
	• Public awareness
	• Communication of a moral obligation to intervene by the decision-maker
Self-Interest	• Economic interest
	• Geo-strategic interest
	• Political interest of the decision maker

Presence of an acute humanitarian crisis

A basic factor affecting the degree of altruism in any decision to intervene is if there actually exists an acute crises where people are in great need. While one can assume that all interventions of humanitarian nature to some degree have to present the argument of an existing humanitarian emergency, the supremacy of the crisis in question is still important. The argument here that I want to put forward is that the rationale by the actor itself must be based on an actual humanitarian crisis that are understood to be severe. Walzer (1977) uses two indicators, the immediacy of danger and nature of the emergency, as the definition of a supreme crisis. The occurrence is when the danger is immediate and the nature of the emergency of unusual and horrifying kind (Walzer 1977:255).

Hence, the more acute a crisis is that is used as the justification for the intervention, the more likely is the intervener to be driven by altruistic motives. Same goes the other way around, the less acute the crisis is, the less likely is the actual crisis to be the motivation for action. Although one may argue that a less acute crisis actually can be more altruistic in nature as an intervention than could be less morally obligatory, I argue that interventions in such cases are more likely to be triggered by other motives. This as in such cases, the degree of altruism can be presumed not to be sufficiently compelling in itself as to trigger the intervention. In addition to the presence of an actual supreme humanitarian crisis, another important indicator can be the framing and characterization assessed to the situation by the intervening actor. Presumably, the degree of altruism is higher if the intervener makes strong public references to the crisis and addresses the severity of the situation. If the actor condemns the situation publicly and seems to be addressing the whole extent of the crisis, it is seen as an indicator that the actual crisis is of real concern and hence more likely to be altruistic. This as a contrast to if the reference to

the humanitarian situation only happens in the margins. In sum, an actual supreme situation together with a crises-oriented rhetoric will be interpreted as indicators of altruistic motives. The following will be used as criteria:

- Severity of the humanitarian situation
- Number of deaths and refugees
- How the RO refers to the crisis
- To what extent the whole extent of the crisis is addressed
- Public statements that assisting the endangered people is the prime reason for intervention.

Public Awareness

Media can be understood as critical in policy formation and have globally a steadily growing effect on decisions of policy makers and on public opinion (Krieg, 2013:64). Together, one can understand media and public opinion as a strong external actor of political weight. Sometimes this has been described at the "CNN-Effect" and according to such, interveners action may be triggered by empathic feelings of the media, redirecting them towards altruistic motives rather than self-interest considerations (Feist, 2001:713). Public awareness often stems from extensive media coverage that spill over to the public and can create a public call for empathy and action by the decision makers. One could argue that intervening as a result of public pressure could serve an actor's self-interest driven by the desire to pleasure its electorate (Krieg, 2013:65). But rather, due to the fact that this parameter is about bringing a humanitarian urgency into attention, actors are more likely to act out of altruistic motives as to save people in need. It is though understood that the parameter of public awareness may also trigger the parameter of political interest of the decision maker on the side of self-interest. The following will be used as criteria:

- Extent and focus of media coverage
- Whether media coverage depicts the events in humanitarian terms
- International attitude towards the situation

Communication of a moral obligation to intervene by the decision-maker

The last parameter that is understood to be a driving force of the decision maker to act out of altruistic reasons is the "personal affiliation" of the actor with the people on the ground and their fate. Aware that this is an inner motivation, this is the focus of the decision makers at the

highest level. Though difficult to assess, statements from the immediate vicinity can hint if a decision maker was empathetically engaged with the crisis (Krieg, 2013:65). Expressions of personal feelings of empathy and sympathy can function as an incentive and/or a facilitator for high decision makers to initiative altruistic decisions. Notably is that, the credibility of such statements will to be understood as weakened if indicators such as economic, political and strategic interests are strong as the presence of strong interest-based indicators may function underlying motives for expressing morality as a reason to intervene. In addition, a lack of vested interest is seen as an indication that the reason for acting being altruistic being more probable.

The following will be used as criteria:

- Statements from the decision makers that shows feelings of empathy with the people in crisis
- Credibility of the expressed statement

Economic interest

The presence of economic interests is assumed as one of the prime indicators of a perspective driven by self-interest. That is to say that in cases where crises affects natural resources or vital trade partners the actor may be driven not only by helping the people in need but also to secure the protection of such economic interests. Natural resources such as oil, often comes with suspicion of ulterior motives due to its important for most countries today. The following will be used as criteria:

- Existence of vital natural resources
- Strategic importance of the affected region for global trade

Geo-strategic interest

This parameter is understood as security related interests. The term in itself reflects the connection between power, security and geographical space in the international arena (Krieg, 2013:66). Power in the sense of control over territory or resources, while security means the protection of such territory or resources from foreign or other perceived hostile influences. For regional organisations, this can be the interests that come from within, but the connection to other IOs and countries may also contribute to spurring these kind of interests. The connection to the EU, USA and as an example the war on terror is hard to fully defer from on the global arena. But the core of this indicator is the understanding that when conflicts or a crisis threaten vital national or regional interests, or threaten to spill over to vital regions, then it is in the actors

geo-strategic interest to act towards ending such crisis. In particular, crises that erode the authority structure and the administrative infrastructure of a state, pose a threat as the potential failing of a state is most certainly problematic and a rupture in general global stability. The following will be used as criteria:

- Presence of security interests
- Potential spill over of conflict and threat to the integrity and regional stability
- Consolidation of influence in strategically important region

Political interest of the decision maker

This last parameter also serves as an indicator of self-interests as driving factors of action. Political interest of the decision maker should be understood as the potential gain and or losses that the actors themselves stand to acquire by intervening, in relation to the surrounding political realm. As the role of ROs are still in the making and that they are dependent of creating legitimacy for their action both internally and externally, political repercussions of any decision maker is a decisive factor in the decision making process. While if analysing a state this would arguably be a lot about the dependence of domestic support of the electorate, the in the case of a RO this is both in regards to the statesmen of the represented states in the organisation, but also towards actors such as the European Union and other large supporters of funding. When intervention have potential to contribute to a positive image of the actor, the political interest is likely to trigger action towards intervention. The contrary is at the same time true, it is likely that if the intervention is not conducive with public opinion, it is less likely to occur. There is also an aspect of military intervention as rather sensitive and hence intervention of such sorts can be used by an actor to divert attention from other issues that are perceived as problematic or creating a negative image of the decision maker (Krieg, 2013:68). The following will be used as criteria:

- Potential for decision makers to better their own position both internally and externally
- Potential of diverting public attention away from other issues

Chapter 3

Methodological and analytical considerations

Methodology is an inescapable component of any analysis and can as defined by Della Porta and Keating (2008:25) be understood as "the instruments and techniques we use to acquire knowledge". As imperative they are, methods have different goals, are used across fields and can be applied in a vast range of ways, independently or combined.

3.1 A qualitative case study design

This thesis takes the form of a qualitative study, characterized by the analysis of words and texts rather than numbers and statistics (Hesse-Bibier &Leavy, 2011). The strength of utilizing a qualitative analysis is that it will allow the study the in-depth focus that it strives to have in regards to the motivations of interventions by ROs. The case study design can also be seen as a choice to reach for depth rather than a wider scope. Case studies in general can contribute with fuller, more complex explanations than other designs (De Vaus, 2001:221). A case study can be understood as being a deeper exploration from multiple perspectives into the complexity and uniqueness a particular actor, project, institution or system in order to generate knowledge and/or inform policy and decision makers.

The cases can be defined as the specific interventions of ECOWAS in the case of Mali and SADC n the case of DRC with the wider phenomenon in focus being humanitarian response in conflict contexts. The units of analysis is furthermore then the ECOWAS and SADC, as a whole and as constituted by its member states. The case conception can be understood as specific, the cases were "found" and the understanding of the cases are hence as empirical units rather than a theoretical constructions. The case study design also seem appropriate in accordance with Yin (2009) criteria's that the extent of control over the events are non-existent and that it has a high degree of focus on contemporary events.

3.2 Motivation of case selection

The choice to focus on ECOWAS and SADC came from former studies pointing at them as the most active and prominent ROs within the African context, with the exception of AU. The choice to though focus on ECOWAS and SADC was made with the consideration that they

both constitute organisations with clear regional boundaries, they have both intervened at multiple occasions and they both strive to continue to do so. The focus on military interventions was as these have are well documented and most importantly represent the most strong and showcasing examples of the action of these ROs.

The Mali case is a very recent case of ECOWAS involvement in West Africa and do represent the latest case of intervention but is still a case in line with the trend of ECOWAS interventions being a response to civil rebellions and intrastate conflicts in the region. At the same time the Mali case stands out in relation to earlier conflicts as it to a further extent than before entail dimensions of cross border effects and was arguably regional in scope through its external terrorist network connections and other spill over threats. This makes Mali a case both in line with past interventions but still different. The difference though being of outmost importance as the regionalisation and interdependence that sets the scene for future conflicts is likely to increasingly incorporate regional and cross border dimensions.

DRC, as the case of SADC represents one of the few interventions it has initiated in but have been overshadowed by the intervention in Lesotho happening around the same time. The DRC case is arguably understudied as a consequence of this. The DRC intervention have been described as complex and as a clash of a variety of factors and actors that set the example for the future action in the entire region. Is as the case of Mali is an example of what begun as intrastate conflict and internal civil rebellion against the central power in the country. But the DRC case, maybe even to a further extent than the Mali case, unfolded into a regional conflict with dimension far beyond the borders of DRC.

The "regionality" of the scope of these both interventions I argue to be important as they may reflect the complexity and further interdependence of the regions. In other words mirroring a larger aspects of regionalisation and what might be trendsetting for how conflicts may extend beyond their borders and must be understood through such dimensions. Regional effects of conflicts increases the probability of the importance of regional response and how ROs act in such situations is as such important as they are likely to become more and more involved. Both cases are also understood as important as they constitute examples of the largest deployments of forces on behalf of the active ROs and trendsetting through the fact that they were both initiated without the international support of the UN and therefore being examples of the increasing confidence and agency the ROs are showcasing.

While an analysis compromising more than two cases would have been interesting, the choice was to rather strive for in-depth knowledge of the chosen ones.

3.3 Analytical approach

The study employs a deductive analytical approach of qualitative research, which embodies a theory-guided framework to be used throughout the thesis. Central to this is that a theory-guided builds on previous knowledge and theory that are tested against the empirical data. As the theoretical framework have already been presented, it should be clear that this thesis analyses the data through utilising realism and cosmopolitanism theories. As these theories, represent different driving forces and worldviews, they allow the analysis to ascertain which theory is most applicable to the actual behaviour in the cases studied. Arguably, as ROs and regionalism in a wider sense subscribes to a very wide range of activities and research areas, a purely inductive study could be limited by the difficulty to asses which aspects are relevant. At least, theory-guided case studies gives explicitly more structure by the use of a well-developed conceptual framework that assess a specific theoretical focus of some aspects of reality and neglects other (Levy, 2008).

3.3.1 Document analysis

The primary method used to generate empirical material has been by conducting document analysis. A content analysis of documents is "any qualitative data reduction and sense-making effort that takes a volume of qualitative material, and attempts to identify core consistencies and meanings" (Patton, 2002:453).

The method has as such been to systematically chose, review, re-read and evaluate the content of different documents with the aim of uncovering and register information that could be relevant and fruitful for what we had set out to research. When working with qualitative document analysis it is essential to do a thorough reading of the documents that constitute the material. This in order to determine what is important in the material, taking in account the texts as a whole, their various parts as well as the context in which they are submerged (Esaiasson et al., 2007:237).

This approach is understood to be beneficial to this study because it is most suited to the analysis of texts, quite naturally, without putting the main emphasis on why specific language is used for communication but placing its attention on what the language employed is communicating. This is furthermore beneficial as "a research method for the subjective interpretation of the content of text data through the systematic classification process of coding and identifying

themes or patterns" (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005: 1278). Part of the collection process entailed the act of categorizing the material according to the different parameters of the theoretical model. The outlining of what was found to be protruding and relevant in the material allowed me to put the material into these predetermined categories of the parameters and their indicators.

3.4 Data and material

The empirical material used in this thesis builds on secondary data, that is to say data that is already produced. It can further be divided into two main categories. The first category is the material from the ROs themselves that have been used to map and capture a picture of their activities. Thus, this category being official available reports, documents and statements by sources representing the ECOWAS and SADC and their different internal institutions.

The second category of sources are articles, documents and publications from scholars, researchers and institutions that all treat ROs in different ways. It is a collection of sources that treat the debate of ROs in general and regionalism as well as sources concentrating on the humanitarian role and documenting the activities during the last decades. As described before, and as noted as part of the motivation for this thesis, the latter sources are available to a much more limited amount than the former. Generally, I have found the latter sources to be rather scattered, in the sense that many do scratch the surface of what this thesis is trying to grasp but that few contribute with more in-depth knowledge. As this was discovered to be the case, the thesis can be understood to rely on a number of authors and sources that all contribute with the understandings of specific matters, rather than with overall lines of reasoning. In sum, though, this is seen as strengthening the findings since it have contributed to a wide range of sources to be included in the study.

3.5 Aspects of generalizability, validity, reliability and ethics

When it comes to the generalizability of the study one can firstly relate it to the choice of a case study design who sometimes are claimed to in comparison to other studies lack the ability generalize. But this is as Flyvbjerg writs one of the misunderstanding of qualitative research and that the force of example and transferability of such should not be underestimated (2011:305). The generalizability of case studies can furthermore be connected to the choice of case (Ibid:306). A strategically chosen case raises the transferability of the study. As part of the choice to focus on the decision-making process of the cases, the internal validity is the primary aim rather than the external one. While the findings of this research may not be directly

generalizable to other ROs without further comparisons and data, it still may provide important finings that can be generalizable to the regional contexts of the specific ROs and to the larger African context since it addresses two very prominent actors of the region. As regionalisation is a momentum still developing, SADC and ECOWAS might as influential and developed ROs be figures of lookout in the eyes of other ROs who might go in the same direction as to become more and more active in conflict resolution and peacekeeping. The chance is hence, that their action can be important as other might look to them for future action.

In the case of this thesis, the generalizability of the specific cases of Mali and DRC are understood present through the fact that these cases both represent situations of civil rebellion and intrastate conflict, which is evidently examples of types of conflict that are becoming more and more frequent as the main conflicts unfolding in present day Africa. Such characteristics of the conflicts makes the generalisations of the action of ECOWAS and SADC important for how the may act and what might motivate them to take the decision to act in other future conflicts. At the same time, both cases also had the character of being regional in scope. As an example Mali as it had high degrees of spill over effects through illegal networks and DRC as it was a conflict that unlike any other previous conflict engaged so many countries and created tensions far beyond the national borders of DRC. This regionalisation of conflicts is as have been mentioned also a contemporary trend that shows no sign of being less so in the future, rather the contrary is likely. Having said that. Both cases of Mali and DRC can contribute with important knowledge that can be generalized to other cases in the future when it come to their regional and cross border affects.

When it comes to ethics, one aspect that immediately helps reduce the problems is that this study is not based upon interviews who as a material most strongly brings up ethical questions and dimensions Marshall (2011:154). Still ethics should be considered in all research and one aspect relevant here is the attempt to keep a transparent and as objective distance to the material as possible. Even though total objectivity may never be considered achievable by some, one can still have objectivity in mind and throughout the process be aware of who wrote the used material, the context of it and for what purposes it was written. In this study, I see this as very important since it used material produced by organisations themselves and media. Media always choose to address some things, and leave out others. The same goes for the ROs themselves. Hence, the use of secondary sources, while quite natural in this type of study, is still also has limitations that one should be aware of.

In relation to credibility and validity, the question of the chosen cases as representative for the field of research that the study aims to contribute to is important. As the chosen cases are rooted in former research findings and the choice of the cases have been explained, the ambition has been to address such a problem. Findings in one case may not be true for another, but the opposite may as well also other times be true. Carful use and coding of the material can help prevent that something is missed out and a transparent process that facilitates reproduction can strengthen the findings.

Chapter 4

Assessing the contribution of African ROs to humanitarian action

4.1 From concepts to institutions

ROs worldwide, as a continuation on initiatives considered promising from preceding decades, begun in the 1990s and 2000s to initiate and develop humanitarian institutions. Such a development of an increasing number of ROs rather quickly taking on a humanitarian agenda can be related to some processes and factors.

One such process can be argued to be that this development happened at the same time as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were focused upon at the international stage of development action and brought increased attention to humanitarian and development conditions. At the same time, the MDGs further specified a role for regional monitoring processes that brought about an idea of a joint responsibility among national and regional actors (Zyck, 2013:13). Another such international happening setting the international arena is the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) on Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) developed in 2005 and valid until 2015. The HFA impels regional bodies to take increased action through that the framework specifically specifies that ROs have a role to play in DRR (UNISDR, 2005). Also sometimes pointed out as important is the willingness among ROs to demonstrate their capacity and relevance on the international arena (Zyck, 2013:13).

One can furthermore not disregard from some important events that have contributed to the process of development and to the "regionalisation of humanitarian action". The Rwandan genocide is one very important such. Its aftermath has meant a big discussion and attention to the transnational effects of conflict and even more so in terms of how to prevent future suffering of such kind. By the UN, such concerns were especially underlined by the International Commission on Intervention on State Sovereignty report published 2001 on Responsibility to Protect (R2P). Within the AU, the question was pushed by the development of early-warning systems for conflict. Such systems were put in place and developed quite rapidly in just a few years across Africa and spread to become part of the continents economic communities. The development and implementation of such systems were also connected to emerging research within the field of econometrics at the same time pointing towards and suggesting that it

eventually may be possible to gather enough data to be able to predict conflicts and therefore act in accordance with such predictions (Zyck, 2013:14). The 2004 tsunami also generated a further discussion pointing out the need of regional response to humanitarian problems.

Within this process and development, some trends as ROs emerged and developed their agenda can be pointed out. In the late 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s attention seem to have been focused on issues of peace, conflict and security cooperation. Later, towards the end of the 2000s the focus seem to somewhat have shifted with more of an underling of questions such as DRR and disaster management.

Most recently the this regionalisation of humanitarian issues can be understood as going towards a more open approach where rather than only being in regards to conflict or natural disasters, the focus are humanitarian needs in general (Zyck, 2013; Ferris & Pets, 2013). In other words the most recent development is towards a multi-sectoral focus indicating a deeper and more prominent engagement towards humanitarian issues. This is though very much on a ambitional level and part of the policy-development of the active ROs. It remains open if this is evident in the actual activities and interventions of these actors.

4.2 Introducing ECOWAS and SADC

Regional integration is nothing new to the African processes of development. As far back as the 1910 creation of the South African Customs Union (SACU), the continent have been seen like somewhat of a forerunner of economic integration. SACU often counts as one of the oldest customs union in the world. While one can point towards global trends of ROs becoming involved in humanitarian action, there is still a strong case for Africa standing out. Both the Overseas development Institutes report on ROs worldwide (Zyck, 2013) and the Brookings Institutions' project on ROs in DRM lead by Ferris and Pets (2013), points out only African ROs have had a significant and direct involvement in areas such as conflict management.

4.2.1 ECOWAS

In 1975, ECOWAS was founded by treaty. At the time, its primary aim was to spur economic integration and growth in west Africa. Even though regional security should not be discarded importance, it was not a vital concern (Levitt, 2005). In 1978 ECOWAS adopted a protocol on Non-Agression and in 1981 a protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance on Defence was agreed upon. Neither the treaty of the protocols empowered ECOWAS to initiate peace-keeping missions (Ibid). The real point of change came with the eruption of the Liberian civil war (1989-

97), in which, owing to international inaction, ECOWAS decided to take action and launched an intervention unilaterally, that is to say without Security Council authorisation.

4.2.2 SADC

As a regional organisation focused on security mechanisms SADC was formed in January 1992 as the successor to the Sothern African Development Co-ordination Conference, which was initiated by states in the region trying to reduce dependence on apartheid regime in South Africa. The succession appears to have been partly inspired by the changing political landscape in South Africa with Nelson Mandela's release from prison and the following efforts to dismantle the apartheid system (Levitt, 2005). SADC's new treaty entered into force in 1993 with the outlined primary aim to "promote and defend peace and security" in southern Africa.

SADC rather quickly developed a mandate for being a peacekeeping force. In 1996, it adopted the Organ for Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS). The key aims of the OPDS are to protect the people and the development of the region against violent conflict and breakdown of law and order (Lewitt, 2005). The OPDS gives a mandate to the organisation to protect regional security, supporting regional cooperation and conflict management, co-ordination and the participation of troops in international and regional peacekeeping as mechanisms through which the organisation may act. It more specifically also states that if diplomatic efforts fail, OPDS is responsible for recommending punitive measures that SADC may act upon (Ibid).

4.2.3 Comparing ECOWAS and SADC

An important distinction between ECOWAS and SADC is that the latter seem somewhat more conservative in that it seemingly requires that a country consent to an intervention, while ECOWAS clearly does not assess the need of such consent (Ibid). In addition, article 11(3)(d) of SADC protocol explicitly requires the interventions should be initiated only as a last resort and only with green light from the Security Council. ECOWAS protocol does not specify such authorisation. Notably it though that SADC in the case of its operation in Lesotho did not seek such endorsement prior to taking action (Levitt, 2005). That said, largely the criteria for intervention of both ECOWAS and SADC are similar and both provide a right to intervene.

4.2 Conflict management

The area of conflict management is the main area of humanitarian action were ROs seem keen to act and can be said to have actually contributed. Looking at such an engagement, it shows that the concept of subsidiarity are of high importance and have for long been applied in this

sphere of handling conflict and ascribing a role for ROs. Both researchers and policymakers seem to point towards the ROs potential to act in ways not necessarily possible for the UN or specific countries, given their better understanding of the conflict dynamics and local cultures (Pugh & Sidhu, 2003; Boutros-Ghali, 1992; Brahimi, 2000). This idea of subsidiarity being the leading way off approaching the role of ROs seem to go well with the activities of the African context looked upon in this thesis, where the ROs as a whole seem less wed to national sovereignty concerns and conflicts have a long history of spilling over to more than one country and hence concerning large areas.

There is a long record of activities that are significant to conflict management across the African actors in relation to both research, training and most clearly to diplomatic and military interventions. The AU have, to start with, engaged in a number of peacekeeping missions in Burundi in 2003, Sudan/Darfur in 2004, in Somalia in 2007 and together with ECOWAS in Mali 2013. Notably is that many of these missions where later taken on by the UN or from the beginning done in cooperation. In other words, the AU have also acted without the direct approval of the UN. In doing so they cited the responsibility to protect (R2P) in motivating the deployment of peacekeepers authorised by the AU Peace and Security Council and only later on seeking the approval of the UN (Paiwal, 2010). This has been the case with ECOWAS as well. There is in line with this a case for these ROs taking on a own authority, calling upon supremacy, and making their activities without UN mandate legitimate. It seems that there have been several interventions where the UN in this situation later have felt compelled to step in and back the African missions, partner with it or even take over it under a UN mandate (Zyck, 2013:24).

This sort of scenario have played out in West Africa several times. ECOWAS have become closely involved in conflict management in several ways. ECOMOGs' intervention with forces in Libya in 1990 seem to have set the bar for a developed reputation of ECOWAS being "the interventionist RO" (Ibid). Another example of activity is the deployment of forces in the case of Côted' Ivoire in late 2002. This time also without UN backing but alongside French troops. Since such activity ended on a positive note and possibilities for a peace treaty was created, ECOWAS have created some sort of legitimacy and respect for their treats of use of force. This can be supported by a case in 2009, when ECOWAS made the Guinean government come to the negotiating table only be making preparations of the use of force witch created a government confrontation with protesters (Stares & Zenkho, 2011). Another similar situation though ended not so much as on a positive note but are considered a failed activity in Côte d'Ivoire in 2010

(Yabi, 2012). ECOWAS activities have also faced several challenges. One of such challenges is the very high dependence upon Nigeria, who finances up to 70% of the organisation and contributes with the main troops. This giving Nigeria a veto-power like position hard to disregard from (Pitts, 1999).

The case of Mali that will be more closely studied in this thesis provides a further example of conducted activities that have meet many challenges in terms of capacity. Like had happened before, the national existing forces had been spearheaded for a specific UN mission; the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). MINUSMA in turn ended up absorbing the AU-backed ECOWAS mission in July 2013 (Zyck & Muggah, 2013).

SADC has established several institutions who are related to conflict management but is as an organisation on a much earlier stage in comparison to ECOWAS and the AU. Many of its institutions remain small (Essuman-Johnson, 2009) and furthermore very dependent on South Africa (Møller, 2005). Demonstrative of that these institutions are small in comparison is that SADC's regional Peacekeeping Training Centre actually only consists of seven staff members (SADC, 2012). SADC have intervened in a few conflicts. Firstly, SADC intervened in the case of DRC, as is the case in focus in this study. Secondly, they intervened in a quite controversial case in Lesotho in 1998. The legality have been called into question when it comes to if SADC hade the mandate to deploy peacekeepers and there have furthermore been accusations towards South Africa for having insufficient justification and an underlying agenda of securing continued access to water supplies via the Katse Dam (Cawthra, 2010; Zyck, 2013). Thirdly, SADC took action was in Madagascar, this time in a partnership together with the AU. They then advocated for and mediated a political solution in the aftermath of the coup that overthrew the elected president and replaced him with a rival. Notably is though that the mediated agreement was quite quickly violated (Baker & Maeresera, 2009).

Chapter 5

Case Analysis

In the following chapter the two cases of intervention will be presented and analysed on the basis of the six different parameters and indicators presented in the theoretical framework.

5.1 ECOWAS and Mali

Following the start of a rebellion in northern Mali in January 2012 and a coup d'état in the southern capital of the country in March, ECOWAS pursued a policy of intervention in what is one of its most troubled member states. Since late 2012, ECOWAS was part of a military intervention aimed primarily towards the secessionist conflict of the north where the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) and other actors was fighting for the control of the region. In addition, ECOWAS also supported a post-coup political transition in the south at the same time. For this thesis, the analysis is mainly concerned with the period from January 2012 to august 2013. This period covers the unfolding of the crisis, the intervention of ECOWAS and eventually an AU-led push for UN support resulting in the handover of the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) to the UN.

The origin of the Mali crisis steamed from former recurrent episodes of conflict in the northern parts since the Tuareg rebellion in 1963-64, and later periods of revolt from 1990-1996 and 2006-2009. The 2012 crisis had its roots in many interlinking processes, including the long-term problems of Mali's government institutions, a long history of grievances in the north, fractions between the political communities in the north and the centralized government in the south, and the failure of the government to handle cross-border criminal and extremist networks (Haysom, 2014:1). The key issues at stake in 2012 hence included the neglect of the north by the Bamako government, what role Islam were to play in politics and society, and the failure to make good on promises of decentralisation of political influence and funding for development (Thurston, 2013).

5.1.1 Presence of an acute humanitarian crisis

Throughout 2012, Mali was no doubt in a state of deepening crisis. Its political institutions were in disarray and the people, most prominently in the north, were facing displacement and violence. The political crisis unfolded against a backdrop of socio-economic conditions of

widespread, chronic food insecurity and acute hunger affecting millions of households across the entire country (Haysom, 2014:1f). The year 2012 came with a combination of crop failure, insect plague, high food process, conflict and drought, making the situation severe from a humanitarian standpoint in a country already suffering from among the highest rates of poverty in the world. Most of the estimated 4.7 million acutely food insecure people at the height of the crisis were in the south, but still over one million people were in the north at the outbreak of the conflict (Ibid:2). The violence further exacerbated the existing humanitarian crisis (for instance by affecting agricultural and pastoral possibilities) and created new needs. It lead to a displacement crisis and gradually caused a collapse of private enterprises and public services, creating even lesser access to water, food and health care (Ibid:3). In august, more than 600,000 Malians had fled their homes (OCHA, 2013). The crisis hence created a substantial wave of refugees, most of whom settled in neighbouring countries in improvised shelters near the borders, amongst hosting communities who themselves also were struggling from the region wide food crisis (Oxfam, 2013).

When it come to the extent of violence and deaths, the conflict was accompanied by reports of murders of civilians, executions of captured soldiers and rape by the MNLA (Haysom 2014:3). Kidnappings of both locals, soldiers and aid workers also emerged as a lucrative enterprise, inducing fear and reduced the access to aid in the area. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), active in the north, in particular used kidnappings as part of strategically expanding their activities through the huge ransoms paid by European governments for the release of their kidnapped nationals (Lacher, 2013).

In general, those who stayed in the northern Mali faced a stringent form of Islamic governance that violently punished religious infractions, while at the same time a degree of social order was arguably created (Nossiter, 2012: Tinti, 2012). The imposition of Sharia law though led to suppression of basic human rights and a greater seclusion, especially of women (Lecocq et al., 2013). More specifically, as examples, Tuareg rebels' targeted state structures and the MNLA closed down schools, prisons, hospitals and banks and left a big administrative void in which violence spurred (Haysom, 2014:3). Human Rights Watch warned that under this new order "stonings, amputations and floggings have become the order of the day in an apparent attempt to force the local population to accept their worldview" (Human Rights Watch, 2012). The many different population groups - mainly Fulbe, Dogon,Songhay, and Tuareg – all took up arms against each other as official structure and mediation was absent. Armed groups was also

reportedly requited children and youth for fighting around Timbuktu, Tessalit and Gao (Haysom 2014:3).

So, from a range of sources the situation in Mali can be understood as an actual severe humanitarian crisis with both reports of much violence, internal displacement and a wave of refugees. Making it then possible from the theoretical model and parameter one for altruistic motivations to be present. Nevertheless, when turning to ECOWAS themselves there is difficult to find evidence of that the endangered people as the *prime* reason for deciding to intervene. ECOWAS seem to rather have focused on the threat to West African stability and security with the potential spillover effects, especially into Niger, and the potential of Islamist groups developing stronger relations to groups in other countries. ECOWAS seem to most often have framed the situation as a political and, or, security crises and have declared in various statements their commitment to preserve Mali's "territorial integrity and combat terrorism" (See as examples the following official statements: ECOWAS 2013 a; ECOWAS 2013 b; ECOWAS 2012 a; ECOWAS 2012 d).

Not to say that the acting in response to the humanitarian need were not present. In a statement from November 2012 the president of ECOWAS commission, Kadre Desire Ouedraogo, urges for immediate international action from the point of view that "Urgent action is indispensable in order to avoid further deterioration of the situation following the unacceptable destruction of the country's cultural heritage, the violation of human rights and the humanitarian consequences of the crisis" (ECOWAS 2012 f). As the intervention was launched, the need for action was as expressed by General Soumaila Bakayoko, chair of the Committee of Chiefs of Defence Staff (CCDS) of ECOWAS, mostly important in the "spirit of regional solidarity and because we have become the same family now"(ECOWAS 2013 c) – showcasing a perspective of the need of individuals in focus. While these examples show an existence of altruism in the way that they refer to the needs of actual people rather than the need or threat towards states, it would be premature to interpret them as the prime motivations in the decision to intervene. Thus, the ECOWAS administration can be understood to have responded by assessing the need of acting in witnessing an actual humanitarian crisis. The official reference to the humanitarian emergency by ECOWAS, however, can still be considered rather weak it mainly fails address the crisis in a altruistic terminology. For most part, ECOWAS statements referred to the situation as primarily a security or political crisis and mention later on or in the margin the human rights abuses.

5.1.2 Public awareness

It is quite easy to observe the media coverage as part of the international discourse on the "war on terror". The motivational framing in terms of terrorists who pose a security thereat seems to be the common thread when describing the development in Mali. The AU further played a part in this as it took on a role in securing a broader political support for the mission, and ultimately a UN mandate, by framing it in a more global perspective in terms of the need for preventing jihadists from further establishment as a launching pad for attacks outside the region (Haysom 2014:8; Théroux-Bénoni, 2013).

A UN report underlined the threat of growing relations between Islamist groups in Mali and Nigeria as a security threat. According to the report, Boko Haram fighters from Nigeria received training at camps in Mali in 2011, and Boko Haram was further believed to have supported extremist groups in Mali (UN Security Council, 2011; De Castelli, 2013; Loeuillet, 2013). In understanding this one might also note the fact the ECOWAS leading up to the intervention established a working group with the aim "to ensure that AFISMA does not only succeed, but also enjoys the full support of Malians and the international community" (ECOWAS 2013 d). This arguably underlines quite clearly that the framing of an action and the public awareness they want to raise is most certainly a conscious act of strategy. Ultimately, ECOWAS was able to align its own security interests with the concerns of powerful western states, and as the conflict developed, they were clear with demonstrating a willingness to work with UN mechanisms – acquiring international legitimacy for their decision to intervene.

Dominant media accounts about the crisis have been argued to have focused mainly on ethnic or religious factors at play, especially in regards to the north, and not given the crisis of the state and governance enough attention. Hence contribution to an ignorance about the central grievances of Malians countrywide (Bergamaschi 2013) Key states outside ECOWAS such as Mauritania and Algeria for long blocked the efforts for political negotiations and military intervention. The UN was also reluctant for long to provide funding and logistical support. These reservations were mainly centred on the weakness and illegitimacy of the of the Bamako government that it would be supporting (Haysom, 2014:7). In the end, it was the southward advance of Islamist groups that broke such an impasse (Ibid:8)

Within Mali, there have arguably existed a resistance against ECOWAS and its right to decide to intervene. Shortly after the coup, for example, a regional delegation was barred from landing at the capital's airport because of a large political demonstration against ECOWAS interference,

including at the time a small peacekeeping force and economic and monetary sanctions (Sandor 2013). According to Sandor, these tensions where present and for long remained within local civil society organisations, media outlets and political observers who questioned the ECOWAS support for peace and security in Mali. In relation to this public opinion, one might understand the prudent strategy of intervention that ECOWAS put forward that hinges on a formal request from the Malian government of national unity.

At the same time newspapers, especially towards the end of 2012 and the beginning of 2013, reported about the growing frustration among the people in Mali and the blame put on the government for its inaction and lack of practical effort (IRIN, 2013). While hard to ascribe precise meaning, such reports may at least have had some contribution to an increased pressure to intervene. Clear though is that the focus of such media reports are not upon the gains or potential losses for the Mali and other states in the case of intervention but rather on the people's suffering and the violation of their rights.

Turning Mali into a new front in the "war on terror" in the global public opinion has in some analysis eyes had the consequence of overshadowing the long standing demands on political change by the north and made rule of most possibilities of a future peaceful coexistence among the many groups in the region (International Crisis Group, 2012:i). In other words the labelling of this as part of the "war on terror" might have resulted in increased international attention and has been a way of acquiring support and legitimacy internationally, but have locally increased the polarisation and already existing fractions among people.

5.1.3 Communication of a moral obligation to intervene by the decision-maker

As mentioned under parameter one there is some evidence of statements from high-level decision makers within ECOWAS expressing solidarity with the people suffering from the crisis. President Goodluck Jonathan of Nigeria, who served as a mediator at several occasions remarked as a further example in an official statement from a ECOWAS meeting to draw out a roadmap said that

> "what has been happening in Guinea-Bissau and Mali these past several months go against our collective vision of a peaceful, stable and economically prosperous region. The long-suffering people of Guinea-Bissau and Mali will be looking up to us to end their nightmares and open the door of security and prosperity to them. We must not fail them." (ECOWAS, 2012 c).

This statement demonstrates that President Goodluck to some extent was emotionally moved by the situation and communicated a degree of obligation to act in response. President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf of Liberia stated a similar standpoint in a special summit of West African leaders held in Dakar, Senega in May 2012 saying that "We have the moral obligations to stand by peace and democracy and the moral responsibility to give Malians and Bissau Guineas the right to live in peace"(Tamba, 2012). Leading up to the deployment of the intervention, the Malian President Dioucounda Traore met his Nigerien counterpart Mahamadou Issoufou. In a statement they showed their frustration with the UN's lack of acting responsibly towards the people in Mali saying that: "while the people of northern Mali suffer abuses committed on a daily basis by these four groups which are active, the international community, through the UN, has opted to backtrack" (Bakari Gueye, 2012). Inclining the need to act out of the mercy for the suffering people. These statements from influential ECOWAS decision-makers make it credible to assume that the leaders to some degree were driven by a sense of moral obligation to help the Malians and decided to intervene with altruistic concerns as motivating such decision.

Although part of the stated purpose of the ECOWAS intervention was indeed to protect the population in Mali, there seems that little was been done to support protection activities and supervising the threats (Haysom, 2014:11). There have though been pointed out that there is a need of addressing the abuses that have been committed to the conflict, and to that end ECOWAS has responded. It did so by announcing in April 2013 the deployment of human rights observers from the Network of National Human Rights Institutions in West Africa to monitor, report and document human rights violations (Associated Press Africa, 2013). In doing so, ECOWAS has indeed acknowledged the importance of the human rights abuses at least to some degree.

5.1.4 Economic interest

While Mali in itself does not possess a large degree of natural resources, there is some economic aspects that should are of importance. Firstly and seemingly the most evident area is that power relations in Mali are built out of structures of opportunity in regards to smuggling and trafficking of drugs, human beings and weapons through the porous borders of the north. This smuggling by criminal networks is a key feature of the north fuelling the black economy across Sahel, the Sahara and beyond and furthermore providing revenue to militant groups (Lebovich 2013; Sandor 2013:3; Haysom 2014;1). Considering this the negative potential economic aspects and the global scope of such networks makes the conflict in Mali of strategic importance

as it affects regional and global trade of drugs, weapons and human beings. This is closely linked to Mali being considered a security thereat continues risks of spilling over to other states, which is further developed as a geo-strategic interest.

Regarding natural resources do exist in the Sahel region and the especially relevant is that the Tuareg people's historical range of land have substantial deposits of gold, copper, uranium and phosphates. This is one of the long-standing factors that have caused grievances among the Tuareg and for that matter also most people in in especially Mali and Niger, since they haven't seen much benefit from such resources (Norwood & Null 2013).

Uranium can be understood as a particular source of interest. Niger is in fact the fourth-largest uranium producer in the world and have plans on duelling their output. Adding to this is that even though not fully explored, uranium outputs have been discovered in Mali (Ibid). It is hard to disregard that the conflict in Mali did pose a threat to interests of securing the uranium resources as is of economic importance not only for the region and ECOWAS countries, but maybe even more so for foreign countries as well. France is the most prominent example, who with the past as a regional colonial power has ties that goes deep both economically and culturally (Ibid). France who launched their intervention in Mali in January 2013 after the calls from ECOWAS for support, relay's on uranium exports from Niger for their energy security (and is furthermore also an important exporter of electricity to other EU countries). While not officially stated as the motivation for deciding to intervene, analysts seem to agree that the economic interest in Niger was certainly a key motivation in the decision to act (Francis, 2013:7). As an example of this being interconnected, several employees of the French nuclear company Areva operating in Niger and French engineers was kidnapped and smuggled across the border to Mali for ransoms. Something that was widespread in European media and seen as an indication of the threat that Mali was developing to be against French interests (Ibid).

As a sum, it is at least reasonable to conjecture that the intervention in Mali is in effect an economic policy strategy to protect and secure economic interests to both ECOWAS and France as a foreign example. Notable is also that the region is one of the poorest regions in the world with four of the bottom seven countries in the Human Development Index. In 2012, Mali placed 182nd out of 186 countries, while Niger ranked dead last (Norwood & Null, 2013). Logically, on the borderline of conflict in such an area, potential weakening of the already extremely fragile economies could be understood as a catastrophe in terms of the toll it would take on both

the local economy and the ECOWAS potential of achieving economic development within its region.

5.1.5   Geo-strategic interest

As the crisis unfolded during 2012 the situation was no doubt most often motivated in terms of stability, conceived at national, regional and global level from both ECOWAS and other international actors. Security was prompted as the key issue at stake and the use of the term terrorism is in almost every statement and reports found during the research of this thesis. At the emergency summit Abuja in November 2012 where the blueprint for an intervention where drawn the final communique clearly stated that the due to the security crisis an intervention was "indispensable in order to dismantle terrorist and transnational criminal networks that pose a threat to international peace and security" (ECOWAS 2012 e). "As developments unfold in Mali, the risks for infiltration and destabilization are real in some of the countries bordering Mali, as illustrated by the efforts of neighbouring countries to tighten security along the borders," the Secretary-General's Special Representative for West Africa, Mr Djinnit, said and further explained that the crisis had "heightened the overall terrorism threat in the subregion, adding that the international community must remain mindful of the limitations faced by Mali's neighbours" (UN, 2013a). The US was also quick at framing the crisis as part of the war on terror, unsurprisingly enough. As a response the coup and subsequent loss of the northern part Johnnie Carson, from the Bureau of African Affairs stated before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs that the coup "demonstrates all too clearly how quickly terrorists prey upon fragile states"…"(the) presence of extremists in northern Mali poses a threat to the entire Sahel region – and beyond"..." terrorism is a threat that knows no boundaries" (US Department of State, 2013). This echoes also in the EUs response. In fact, in the official European strategy on Sahel the only geographical map included is one large one of Al Qaeda activities in the area. Quite a visible statement of how terrorism was understood as the prime concern and motivating factor for deciding to act.

Romano Prodi, Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Sahel of the UN, said in an in-depth interview with the UN News Centre that "The refugees are everywhere, the fear is everywhere and the movement of terrorists are everywhere, so we better understand that this is not just Mali, this effects the wider area." (UN, 2013).

For ECOWAS the crisis was furthermore seen as a "catalyst for further instability in the region", and posed a "serious danger for the stability of Africa as a whole" and the whole Sahelian strip "has emerged over the past decade as a major hotspot for all those asymmetric threats which have characterized the global security agenda since the end of the Cold War " (Cristiani & Fabiani, 2013).

This makes it clear that in addition to the international community understanding the Mali crisis as a security and terrorism crisis, it had high potential spill over into a regional and global stability threat. It also indicates the opinion of the region as fragile. Hence, demonstrating that there was a strong intent to act in the self-interest of the region and the world in general.

Analysis have also described that neighbouring states have understood the crisis as one of statehood and national unity. The post- independence national borders drawn from colonial heritage have failed to produce a sense of national unity and the Mali crisis can be seen as a peak of such incapacity (Ibid). Making it representative of a peril and potential fundamental threat for the national integrity of many African countries. If this indeed was a present opinion and believed to be a credible threat among the decision makers of ECOWAS, then an intervention was likely to be seen as strategically important to achieve consolidation of influence.

5.1.6 Political interest of the decision maker

It is likely that the decision to intervene in Mali had a positive impact on ECOWAS political fortunes and the image of it being a strong resourceful actor who won't bow down under the pressure of threats and lack of international support. As has been clearly stated from the beginning of this thesis ECOWAS represents a type of organisation that do want to increase their scope, range and become strong international players. With this in mind, the persistent action in the Mali crisis can be assumed to have a possible boost of such ambition. As one example of how the crisis indeed can be understood to have had aspects of political interests is how president Deby of Chad himself enhanced his position through sending troops with the ECOWAS intervention as it made it more difficult for Western donors to criticise his bad track on governance and human rights (Bøås & Utas, 2013).

Nigeria, as the regional hegemon, and the economical backbone of the region with its rather large oil exportation, also further had an interest in continuing their central role within ECOWAS. While having domestic threats at the time of the intervention, with Boko Haram

gaining influence in the country, the participation and leading of the ECOWAS intervention was a way to show their regional strength and capacity (Shorey, 2012).

The presence of political interest by the decision makers involved in the intervention can also be exemplified from the perspective of how it have has a positive impact on the former president Hollande of France. He had before the intervention long received critique for being too soft, overly consensual and not capable of decisive actions (Shorey, 2012). As one analyst did put it, the president suddenly became "a new kind of leader" with domestic political ratings going up as a continuation (Schofield, 2013).

5.2 SADC and the intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo

The outbreak of a civil war in the DRC followed with devastating consequences in terms of peace and security in Great Lakes region, and the East and Southern Africa and at the time provided the first opportunity for SADC regional peacekeeping and conflict management. Zaire (as it was then called) had a long history of political instability and civil war. In 1996, a rebellion led by Laurent Kabila of the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (ADFL) challenged the sitting President Mobutu. Kaliba's ADFL was backed by both Rwanda and Uganda and by 1997 the more than 30 year dictatorship of the corrupt and authoritarian regime of Mobutu was overthrown by Kaliba who announced himself as the new president of the renamed country of the Democratic Republic of Congo (Francis 2006:196). The alliance between Kaliba and Rwanda and Uganda soon broke and the former allies turned on Kaliba and backed a new attempt to overthrow the sitting power just the following year by backing two rebel factions in DRC. The Kaliba regime hence tried to kick out its former allies from the country and interpreted the attack on the regime as territorial aggression and breach of the DRC political independence. Therefore, Kaliba called upon SADC to intervene with military forces in what had unfolded to a civil war. Under the auspices of SADC an intervention was launched led by Zimbabwe together with Namibia and Angola. Initially expected to be a "quick military victory" the situation unrolled as much more complex, leading to an extensive military deployment and clash of an estimated 66'000 soldiers in total (Francis, 2006:200).

This analysis focuses on the SADC and the intervention between 1998 and 2001. That said, the conflict did not end there but has been an ongoing conflict with devastating consequences and did over time become without a doubt a humanitarian crisis of extreme sorts with an estimated

5.4 million deaths up until 2008 according to a survey by the International Rescue Committee (IRC).

5.2.1 Presence of an acute humanitarian crisis

At the time of the SADC intervention the whole extent of the crisis was in large ignored by the interveners and by Kaliba himself. A report form Amnesty International in the aftermath of Kaliba's march towards the power in Kinshasa in 1997 stated that "In the wake of the military victory of Laurent Kabila and his forces, there has been an eagerness to welcome the new government and to downplay widespread human rights violations," and "Gross human rights violations by Mobutu's forces cannot serve as an excuse for the AFDL and its allies to massacre thousands of unarmed refugees and ex-Zairian civilians with impunity. A population which has suffered human rights abuses for decades deserves and must expect better." (Amnesty International, 1997). Kabila and the AFDL leadership did persistently deny reports of massacres, yet they refused to let independent and impartial investigations (Ibid). The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights reported that rebels and AFDL were responsible for "serious violations of the right to life" and called for this to be brought to attention. However, this side of the crisis seem to have been largely ignored by SADC decision makers.

The SADC and its member countries did rather than describe the situation in altruistic terms reference the justification for intervening as a "collective self-defence effort" for the sake of the political regime of Kabila. President Nujoma of Namibia stated clearly that the SADC intervention "was strictly geared towards defending the DRC's political sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the Kabila's regime in Kinshasa" (Francis, 2006:149). SADC as a whole echoed this stance, further expressing the justification as the situation was seen as a violation of the SADC Treaty, article 4 that states the right of humanitarian intervention by military force as a collective defence against external aggression (Ibid:198).

In sum, the element of morality was not present as a driving factor that prompted states and SADC to take action, even so rhetorically. Thus, a solidarist altruistic concern drawn from the concerns of the suffering individuals does not present a strong indication of the SADC decision to intervene in DRC in regards to this parameter.

5.2.2 Public awareness

The media coverage in the case of the DRC conflict during the decision-making process can be understood to mainly have focused on the power struggle between the high-end leaders within

SADC (Ngoma: 2004:5). Part of this was the tensions between Mugabe and Mandela, fuelling the suspicion of internal incoherence within the organisation. To understand this perception it is also important that when Kaliba called for an intervention of the SADC, Mugabe, in his capacity as Chair of the SADC organ, convened an extra-ordinary Summit at Victoria Falls to discuss the request among member states. However, South Africa was left out of this process and meeting due to the tensions between Mugabe and Mandela (Francis 2006:196). South Africa never took part in the intervention and was officially critical to the intervention having a SADC mandate. However, at a Non-Aligned Summit in South Africa, and in an attempt of easing the tensions and to "present a show of unity in SADC", Mandela claimed that SADC supported the intervention in DRC (Ibid:197).

Another important factor is that the west took the standpoint of Uganda and Rwanda rather than the one of SADC and through this further fuelled the international public opinion as negative towards the intervention. Pressure mounted on the SADC allies, particularly in regards to Zimbabwe who were the focus of international critique as some western states decided two withdraw their aid to Zimbabwe as they were not happy about the big spending that the operation in DRC required (Ngoma, 2004:6). The media coverage was widespread and often hostile. Both media and academic commentators at the time portrayed the SADC initiative and its leaders as, at worst, "greedy and proud" and, at best, as participants of a major "political miscalculation" (Ibid:5). Public opinion among Zimbabweans was also questioning the rational for the intervention diverting millions of dollars from national development (Francis, 2006:205). As such, the intervention became a domestic political issue were the population of Zimbabwe questioned the intervention from the standpoint of the government not upholding the theoretical idea of a social contract of its responsibilities being primarily towards its own people.

Despite international interests in Congo, the international media coverage largely ignored the conflict. The regional media was as mentioned focused upon the power struggles and the conflict can hence be understood not to have been extensively covered as the media was rather one sided and had a limited focus. Braekman explains this saying that

> "regional dominant media, based in South Africa, mounted an unrelenting campaign, portraying the involvement as illegitimate, ill-advised and based on personal quest for enrichment from the gold and diamonds in the DRC" (Braekman 1999:100).

With this in mind, the media and public opinion might have been a factor for increasing the pressure on SADC, but in terms of legitimizing their action and assuring success, rather than being motivation indicating altruistic concerns at the centre of the decision to intervene. This mainly because the humanitarian suffering seems to be lacking within the international media and public awareness as well, or at least such aspects seem overlooked.

5.2.3 Communication of a moral obligation to intervene by the decision-maker

A moral obligation to the people of DRC does not seem to have been of central concern. Solidarity of political sort does though seem to have been a central motivation for Namibia in taking part of the intervention. This in terms that the DRC intervention can be seen as a way to "reciprocate past favours" as it received support back in 1966 and forward when the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) began its armed struggle to liberate Namibia, in part from bases abroad (Tavaris 2011:164). Both Namibia and Angola furthermore underlined their desire to uphold international law and norms as motivations for intervening (Francis 2006:199).

5.2.4 Economic interest

The DRC is a very resource rich country, especially of mining resources such as; diamonds, the world largest reserves of coltan, and vital amounts of gold and copper. Most of the literature regarding the war in DRC understand economic interest as one of the prime motivations for actors involved at both sides of the conflict. The existing resources makes the potential commercial opportunities a most likely probable consideration and is hence not surprising as an indicator for self-interests being present. The almost "take-what-you-want" exploitation of the war economy of DRC did de facto accrue considerable economic benefits to especially Zimbabwean authorities and military elites (Francis, 2006:199; Tavares, 2011:162). In regards to strategy, Thomas Turner stated that the intervention from the view of Angola was to stop "supply routes, protect government oil installations crucial to the economy and war, and maintain a compliant regime in the DRC amenable to the interests of Angola" (Turner, 2003:75). Strongly indicating that economic interests was at the core of the motivations for the decision to intervene. In the case of Namibia the government had plans to divert water from Congo across Angola to northern Namibia. Thus, by the intervention of SADC president Nujoma had the opportunity to secure that such plans were not stopped.

In the extensive fieldwork of Rodrigo Tavares, several informants in regards to Zimbabwe said that at a time the country was facing the first repercussions of economic crisis, and consequently

the intervention was regarded as an effective way to ensure a steady flux of economic revenue (Tavares, 2011:162). There is a very comprehensive publication of economic exploitation of the war produced by panel experts established by the U.N. Security Council in 2000 (UNSC, 2001). The report confirms the economic gains of Zimbabwe by describing their involvement in at least three ways. First, Zimbabwe adopted a policy of indirect financing of the war through direct payments of Congolese companies with whom several contracts were signed. As an example, it signed a contract with Gécamines, a state-owned mining company, of which 37.5 percent of the company's profits were earmarked to finance the Zimbabwe's army (Prunier 2006:110). Second, Zimbabwe had lucrative contracts who had been signed before the intervention that they wanted to protect and finally, Zimbabweans were given financial incentives in the form of opportunities of acquiring mining concessions (UNSC 2001).

 In economic terms, while Angola had some interest in securing contracts through Sonangol, an Angolian state owned oil company, the country looking back did not profit particularly from the intervention. The panel of experts from the UN Security Council even noted this as "according to very reliable sources, joint ventures proposed to these two countries [Angola and Namibia] were a sign of gratitude rather than an incentive for their support and they never pressed for it." (Ibid). Both Rwanda and Uganda were also accused at the time of the intervention to be fighting a war for profit hence not being keen on finding political solutions. Some even go as far as describing the exploitation of Congo's mineral wealth as "official state policy" on the part of Rwanda and Uganda and put forward a case of western donors intentionally ignoring this (Willum, 2001).

Evidence suggests that all the intervening states in the conflict have benefited from the exploitation of the war and it is therefore plausible to understand the war as a commercial and economic enterprise to quite a high degree. Timothy Longman presents a figure of an estimated US dollar 20 million worth of coltan per month during the intervention. Additionally, Rwanda's exportation of diamonds increased from 166 carats in 1998 to 30.500 carats in 2000 (Longman, 2003:136). The UN panel of experts further mentioned top government military officers and commercial entrepreneurs actively involved in the exploitation of the war, fuelling its economic dimensions and complexity.

On Zimbabwes motivation, Rupiya argues that the economic aspect was not initially a reason for action and that "whatever economic interests Zimbabwe subsequently acquired in Congo were not art of its initial calculus of intervention" (Rupiya, 2003:97). This though seem to be a

rather plausible explanation common to all intervening forces involved in resource-rich countries when it comes to the opportunity of exploiting a war economy. Zimbabwe was in fact in the situation were the intervention came with high costs on its domestic political stability and economic well-being. This problem is mirrored in most of the involved countries in the CRD conflict, while maybe most prominent in the case of Zimbabwe (Francis, 2006:203). However, most empiric evidence indicates that there were a clear understanding that the costs of the war would be shared from the exploitation of Congo's mineral resources (Braekman, 1999). This "self-financing" strategy means that there was a de fact or informal agreement between the power in Kinshasa and its intervening allies to allow them to "help themselves" to the existing resources in the country to pay for their war efforts and provision of support (Francis 2006:203).

5.2.5 Geo-strategic interest

As outlined above a big part of the intervention in DRC seem to be connected to economic considerations. Even so, the motivations can also be understood to be of geo-strategic nature. Apart from the intervening Uganda and Rwanda who both framed their interventions in security terms, the SADC allies also viewed the situation as a security threat.

Namibia viewed the situation as a security concern as it affected its Caprivi region. Particularly as the Angolan civil war had the effect of strengthening tensions in the area, affecting Caprivi separatists (Francis, 2006). The geo-strategic location of especially Angola to the DRC is also important. The two countries share a common border where both have a major oil deposit. Strategic mineral resources can no doubt be said to be of very high importance in the war for both Angola and the DRC: For Angola, there was also a fear of a spill over effect by the fact that the deployment of troops by both Rwanda and Uganda was in the Bas-Congo region, basically Angola's own backyard (Ibid:199). Since Zimbabwe and Uganda had no permission at all to do so, this may likely only have reinforced the view in Angola that the use of force was necessary. The presence of security interest as central to the Angolan governments hierarchy of motivations also can be demonstrated by that it for instance "feared that Savimbi would once again use the Congo as a rear base for his rebellion, as he did during the Mobutu regime" (Ibid) and hence once again threaten the political stability in the country. As such, one can in the case of Angola understand the intervention at least partially as a second front in the war against UNITA, who have been fighting the government for years and is by SADC labelled a terrorist group.

Within the critique mentioned from the SADC allies towards Uganda and Rwanda as greedy and opportunistic there were also an understanding of such countries as deteriorating the political stability of the entire southern Africa. The SADC have been understood to have had a strategy of criminalising tits opponents and making them out to be the bad guys. Within these allegations the Zimbabwean Foreign Minister, Stan Mudenge reassured the SADC countries that they were in fact not aggressors by their actions and said that

> "we have no plans to invade Uganda and Rwanda. We are not interested in declaring war on the two countries. SADC allied forces are in the DRC to support a legitimate government and to resist aggression, and all we want is peace" (Francis 2006:201).

5.2.6 Political interest of the decision maker

The DRC intervention shows clearly how national, regional and personal interests become intertwined. There seem to be a widespread opinion that the decision to intervene in DRC was de facto designed to personally benefit some of these actors. The fact that only some SADC countries took part of the intervention and some even claim that it was never a legit coherent SADC act as an example South Africa and Mandela initially strongly opposed the initiative reinforces the indication of the centrality of national and personal interests and ties between the involved countries. The controversy that this seem to have sparked also most probably reflects the intense internal rivalry that existed within SADC, further underscoring the importance of personal interests. Many seem to regard the intervention on behalf of Zimbabwe as a way for Mugabe to outmanoeuvre Mandela as a political leader of Southern Africa and to challenge South Africa as the regional leading power and economy (Tavares, 2011:163).

The western support for the opposition forces and Uganda and Rwanda became an important concern for President Mugabe personally. These developments where by Mugabe not only understood as imperialist and territorial aggression, but as a sign of disrespect of his personal standing as the leading player in the regional politics of Southern Africa (Francis 2006:198: Rupiya 2003:96). In the case of Zimbabwe it has also been argued that the intervention was a way for Mugabe to "get rid of" a large number of unpaid and un-employed soldiers that were beginning to pose a threat to the authority control of ZANU-PF. In other words, the intervention is by several analysis understood as a ploy to appease the army (Tavares 2011:163; Maclean 2002; Francis 2006). Mugabe during the intervention continuously conveyed the message that that sovereignty was a prime principle of international relations and consequently any attempt to meddle with the domestic issues of a country (such as Rwanda and Uganda in the DRC) were

to be strongly opposed (Tavares 2011:164). Mugabe seem to have been fully aware that the argument of sovereignty was indeed a necessary defence in order to "bulletproof" his own very authoritarian regime who were subject to international criticism at the time. As mentioned above there was internal critique and and public opinion among Zimbabweans that the intervention was a waste of money in very difficult economic times domestically. The fact that Zimbabwe had internal problems and that Mugabe was under international scrutiny can also be understood as indicating that the intervention at least partially had the potential of diverting the attention away from the domestic economic situation. This through that it demonstrated showcase of strength in times when Mugabe was subject for critique of failing his own people. He once made the statement that *"I think our decision was a gallant one and our response so far has been just as gallant."* Showing off his decision as rather heroic and unquestionable (Ngoma 2004:5). Highlighting the "honourable" and self-interest motivation of the intervention, the commander in chief for the Zimbabwe military said that

> "I took the necessary action to come to the aid of an aggressed neighbour and fellow member of SADC…Ours was a response to an urgent appeal by the Congo to the SADC organ on Politics, Defence and Security… I did so conscious of the inherent dangers and problems including the death of our troops. It is an honourable act of enlightened self-interests" (Nagoma 2004:5).

The attempt to try to show off a string front and be seen as a regional power has been argued to be the case not only for Zimbabwe but for Angola as well. Analysis perceived the ambition of Angola to become a regional power as it has been keen to intervene in Congo as well as to install regime of Denis Sassou-Nguesso in Brazzaville (Francis 2006:199).

5.3 Summary of findings

5.3.1 Mali

Category	Parameter	+	-
Altruism	Presence of an acute humanitarian crisis	• Severe humanitarian crisis with large numbers of internal displacement, refugees and high food insecurity • Reports on kidnappings, executions and rape were extensive • The people endangered by the conflict were often mentioned in public statements by ECOWAS • Extremely poor and fragile area	• The humanitarian situation is by ECOWAS almost always mentioned in addition to the security- or political threat, not as the prime reason
	Public awareness	• Extensive coverage • Domestic discontent with international inaction to help the people	• International focus on the war on terror, farming the crisis as a security threat • Media focus on ethnic and religious factors rather than humanitarian suffering • UN reluctance to provide funding and logistical support
	Communication of a moral obligation to intervene by the decision-maker	• Several statements from decision makers of feelings of a moral obligation and expressed solidarity with the people of Mali • Expressed frustration over UN inaction • ECOWAS assigned deployment of human rights observers to document abuses	
Self-Interest	Economic interest	• Some presence of economic interest, especially in neighbouring countries • Strategic important region for trade of Uranium • France interest to secure its energy security	• Mali alone is not a very resource rich country
	Geo-strategic interest	• The international interest in stopping terrorism and extremist networks • Very high potential spill over effects for several countries through terrorist network and smuggling activities • Regional instability	
	Political interest of the decision maker	• Willingness to showcase agency and muscle by ECOWAS • Chad enhanced its humanitarian profile making as to overshadow domestic critique from the international community • Nigeria showed its regional strength and capacity even though domestic problems with Boko Haram • President Hollande of France diverged away from his earlier image of "being too soft"	• ECOWAS showcased a united front without focus on internal rivalry

5.3.2 DRC

Category	Parameter	+	-
Altruism	Presence of an acute humanitarian crisis	• Severe humanitarian crisis • Extensive presence of violence and internal displacement	• The humanitarian situation was referred to by the RO • The whole extent of the crisis was not addressed • Public statements never mention assisting the endangered people as the prime reason for deciding to intervene
	Public awareness		• Local focus on the power struggle of leaders • The western community and media negative towards the intervention • Sanctions and withdrawn aid to Zimbabwe by international donors • South Africa's reluctance to act
	Communication of a moral obligation to intervene by the decision-maker	• Namibia stated an obligation to "reciprocate past favours"	• The strong presence of self-interests such as economic interest strongly reduces the probability of moral obligations as central motivations
Self-Interest	Economic interest	• DRC is a very resource rich country with resources such as diamonds, coltan, gold and copper • Very important region of international trade for above mentioned minerals • Oil resources on the border to Angola • Large commercial opportunities for intervening countries • High documented exploration of the war economy	
	Geo-strategic interest	• Frequent mentioning of the crisis as a security threat • Very high potential spill over effects for several countries • International "mineral security" at stake	
	Political interest of the decision maker	• The intervention did personally benefit high leaders such as Mugabe and functioned as a diversion of Zimbabwe's domestic problems • Some SADC member countries strongly opposed action, especially South Africa • Intense rivalry within SADC leadership • Angola's ambition to become a regional power	

Chapter 6

Discussion and Conclusions

The analysis of this thesis shows that assessing the role of ROs is not an easy task as the motivations for action spur from a multitude of processes and considerations. This in line with the understandings of previous research. One might though clearly conclude that the studied cases demonstrate that self-interests trump altruistic concerns even though the interventions in one way or the other have been put forward as humanitarian action. Returning to the research questions some aspects are worth reiterating.

Firstly, the evidence found confirms a realist postulate that both ECOWAS and SADC's decisions to intervene were sparked primarily by motives characteristic of realism . Especially in the case of SADC and the DRC, national interests of the participating countries are found to be the most central motivating parameters. The evidence of economic and geo-strategic indicators prove strong and there is also strong support that political leaders and countries were interested in displaying and enhancing their power and status as meaningful players in the broader community as well as internationally. The potential spill over effects due to the interconnected ethnic relations, porous borders and economic interdependency seems to have been motivations in both DRC and Mali.

In addition, the decisions of African leaders seem to be motivated by personal considerations of politics and relationships between heads of states- based on empathy or animosity. It would be difficult to explain the DRC intervention without taking in to consideration the relationship between Mugabe and Mandela. Notably is though that personal considerations seems to develop with the increased fragmentation of SADC, and be, at least rhetorically, less evident within ECOWAS.

In both cases the likelihood of intervention was increased by the presence of international interests and pressure. In the case of SADC and DRC international pressure, seem to have sparked a will to demonstrate force and agency among the SADC allies and in the case of Mali the international support and acknowledgement seem to have been of crucial importance for the intervention happening at all. In both cases it is evident that ECOWAS and SDAC as representatives of most ROs are dependent on foreign funding, directly or indirectly (for

example by being aid dependently as in the case of Zimbabwe and the other DRC intervening countries). It is also evident, in the light of the Mali case, that the motivation of the conflict may be affected by the seeking of international approval and support. The quest for help of ECOWAS in Mali, when the UN and others were reluctant to action, might have been a push for the extensive use of the terminology surrounding terrorism as this was what most certainly spurred international attention (and in other words funding of action). Both cases though show that media and public opinion (mostly international pressure is a influencing factor in the decision to act and maybe even more so important for how we perceive the nature of the conflict in itself.

Mali, much more than DRC seem to be a case of regional consensus and of how a RO can indeed be considered an independent actor, acting out of at least partially its own agency. Not just as a coalition of stats acting out their own interests. The DRC intervention highlighted that there seem to have been considerable confusion about what may, or may not, be legitimately accomplished within the area of conflict management under the auspices of SADC. And, an ever greater confusion of how to interpret when SADC members are acting in concert and when one or a couple members act unilaterally and claim to be acting under SADC authorisation.

To understand the nature and dynamics of the implications of the DRC intervention and its regional dimensions, it became central to look at the motivation of intervening states. Even though presented as a SADC mandate, the decisions-making process in the case of the DRC made it hard to look at the motivations of SADC as one coherent body. The split between states, the strong involvement of personal interests and the lack of public statements from SADC made it rather hard to look at SADC as a coherent whole. The analysis was as such due to the empirical evidence centred upon the interests of states. As such, the empirical evidence signals SADC as a body through which individual states act out their individual motivations. This was not as strongly the case in regards to the intervention in Mali. The case contrastingly have much more evidence of ECOWAS acting as one actor, subscribing it more agency, internal coherence and regional legitimacy. In the case of ECOWAS it was instead hard to find the motivations of individual states as public statements and information was extensive but given from ECOWAS as one unit. The case of Mali hence to a larger extent builds on data published, by ECOWAS themselves, which may have contributed to masking internal differences. In regards to the theory of how to look at ROs the two cases seem to support different views. While the case of Mali supports the theory of ROs as examples of IOs that in fact can be treated as more than the sum of their member states, having a proper agency and hence potentially own motivations for

action, the DRC intervention seem to badly fit this theory. The most prominent thing the DRC case instead seems to showcase is that the motivations of states and individuals within the decision-making processes should never be disregarded. The difference between ECOWAS and SADC is a result in itself and is an indication that ROs should be regarded from a pluralist perspective - not assumed to act the same.

The case of Mali suggested some more evidence of altruistic motives being present than the DRC case. In Mali there were, at least on a rhetorical level, several statements that focused on the rights of individuals and actual people rather than the rights or interests of states, indicating a difference in motivations. This may be case specific. It may be due to the difference in time between the conflicts. But, it may also be due to that arguably the norm of altruistic motivations have become more central to the discourse humanitarian action in this period and is seen as an argument that cannot be disregarded (as in the case of DRC) without the loss of legitimacy as a cost of such disregard. Even so, the Mali case does indicate the existence of an other-oriented behaviour and at least, one cannot as pure realist would, disregard from altruistic concerns being a motivating factor for intervention. Nonetheless, pure altruism was not present in the studied cases and it therefore appear to remain rather idealistic.

Furthermore, it is a fact that most of the political leaders in SADC have appalling human rights records and not very high credentials in the promotion of democratic governance and the rule of law. It is likely to assume that this affect the rhetoric and actions of SADC leaders. Publically criticising Kabila, or Mugabe for that sake, for human rights abuses and violations of the rule of law would certainly, in their view, set a dangerous example, from which they then themselves would no longer be immune. This logic might explain the lack of focus on the humanitarian aspects of the crisis in the DRC conflict and the muted criticism from SADC in regards to Kabila and his regime. In ECOWAS and West Africa, while not at all free from human rights abuses, the situation does still not as strongly mirror southern Africa on this point. Reasoning like this, the incentives of wanting to avoid receiving critique in return might not have been as strong.

Significant from these cases is on the other hand is the lack of reference to international law and the lack of international support in the case of DRC and also so in the beginning of the Mali decision making process. The fact of the matter is that these organisations/countries took upon themselves to act without UN approval. This, at the least indicate some level of confidence of their own capacity and right to intervene as legitimate actors in the case of a crisis. Right or

wrong, that alone is a reason for recognising that ROs are of importance within international relations and should be further explored in future research.

The results of the empirical analysis come down to not fully satisfying neither the arguments raised by realism nor those by cosmopolitanism. The analysis have demonstrated that the interventions are motivated by a set of mixed motives, compromising both altruistic and self-interest parameters. Ultimately, however, this thesis concludes that self-interests are critical dynamics in international relations, also in the decisions to take action in order to help people in need. Notably is though that drawing on the two cases, unlike altruism, self-interests can exist on their own as the sole motivations for action as in the case of DRC, where according to the findings the level of altruism is not even noteworthy. According to the results, I even question if the DRC intervention should be labelled a humanitarian intervention at all. That it does so rather than saying something about the intervention, says that there is still a lot of tangibility to the term itself and not enough coherence to its use.

6.1 Avenues for future research

The results show that the motivations as a whole stem from both the agency of individual nations and from increasing the capacity and perception of the ROs as agents with proper agency and capacity to act. This means that ROs should be accounted for and taken into consideration in future research of international relations and the existing geographic of international power. As we enter further into the twenty-first century, one may confront the possibility that people worldwide will increasingly be subjects to threats of regional character in absence of sufficient national protection. Consequently, the international community will be ever so faced with challenges and moral obligations to manage humanitarian crises

This thesis indicates that in future research realism cannot alone account for explaining all the action but that altruism and cosmopolitanism should be considered when observing empirical action, not only in normative discussion of ideal types of action.

Areas that especially lingers and would contribute to adding on this thesis findings is how the motivations of the decision to act is influenced by the international agendas set by western powers such as the war on terror that have been shown in this thesis to be a constant point of reference. How dependent are these ROs to foreign donors and what would an increased independence mean for the choice of action? How would the motives portray themselves in a study that had the opportunity to use primary data from in depth interviews and more field research? And theoretically further research could explore the connection between realism and

cosmopolitanism not as a dichotomy but as coexisting and what this means for the use of such theories. If one were to dig deeper into the normative debate about what should motivate humanitarian action, would there be a discrepancy in comparison to the results found in this thesis?

Furthermore to be able to generalize to a larger scale of ROs more studies need to be conducted and maybe so also be compared to how these results of mixed motives relates to how other international organisations or for example NGOs choose to act. There is a further need to understand what the involvement of ROs means for other actors of the humanitarian sphere and what the potential interplay between ROs and others implies for the future of such field. While beginning to involve themselves in humanitarian action, ROs still seem too biased by their own interests to take on to much humanitarian work too quickly. While turning to their motivations in this thesis has begun to scratch the surface of their action, certainly though the string presence of motivations to act and willingness to grow make them actors who are here to stay and a future force to be recon with in international relations.

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