# UNIVERSITY OF GOTHENBURG
## DEPT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

Have Refugees Become A Security Problem?
A Comparative Study Of Securitization In The
United Kingdom And Germany

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**ABSTRACT**

This study seeks to identify if and how transnational migration is linked to security issues when a discourse of a 'refugee crisis' is being established. The theoretical framework of 'securitization theory' developed by the Copenhagen School is applied and tested; namely the process of treating a political issue as an urgent threat to legitimize extraordinary measures. The British and German governments are compared through a discourse analysis according to a 'most similar design'. The findings show that a government-led securitization of migration has occurred in the UK during the initial phases of the 2015 'refugee crisis'. The government frame migration as a threat towards the British society and sovereignty. In Germany however, such a securitization process is absent. Instead, the German government express security concerns about *nationalism* and *xenophobia*, which are perceived as threats towards the EU cooperation and towards migrants. Security rhetoric can thus be used to justify a stricter migration policy, but also to legitimize extraordinary actions in favour of migrants and to protect the EU. These results display that a discursive approach to security is continually relevant to detect 'new' and untraditional security issues.

Key words: *securitization, refugee crisis, migration, discourse analysis, UK, Germany, Copenhagen School*.

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# 1. INTRODUCTION

*'The Prime Minister should remember that he is not talking about insects here, he is talking about people. And what he should be doing instead of whipping up hostility against migrants in Calais, he should be sorting the situation out.'* Harriet Harman, Labour MP (BBC 2015)

Almost 20 million people were recognised as international refugees in 2014. In April 2015, the refugee situation in Europe became urgent when several boats with refugees and irregular migrants shipwrecked in the Mediterranean, leading to death tolls of over a thousand people. It triggered emergency talks between governments in the European Union and the discourse of a *refugee crisis* was established (Park 2015).

In 2015 we have noticed that receiving states are dealing with migration in profoundly different ways. The European states have to varying degrees responded reluctantly, with stricter asylum policies or closed borders (Kneebone, Stevens & Baldassar 2014). Have refugees and irregular migration become a 'security problem' in Europe?

## 1.1 RESEARCH QUESTION AND AIM

Since the end of the Cold War and specifically after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001, many researchers agree that migration has been framed as a security issue in the occidental world. The 'securitization' of migration has been noticed in Europe and within the institutions of the European Union. This process of addressing an issue with an elevated degree of urgency to legitimize extraordinary action has been developed under the label 'securitization theory' (ST). As an example, governments and media are able to link migration to terrorism and so frame it as a national security threat, taking absolute priority that justifies controversial legislation (Huysmans 2000; Balzacq 2015). In the UK, this discursive relationship has established and legitimized stricter asylum policies in the following years after 9/11 (Hampshire 2009). However, some specific countries such as Germany have gained surprisingly little attention. Despite indications that a securitization of migration has occurred, the research displays ambiguous or contradictory results (Diez & Squire, 2008; Kaya 2009).

Throughout the initial phase of the refugee crisis situation in 2015, these two countries have responded very differently. Until September 2015, the German asylum grants were more than ten times higher than the British (174'000 against 12'000)[i]. The German government

however has responded with an open-door policy and are expecting an estimated one million refugees to arrive during 2015 (AFP 2015). In August, they side-lined the Dublin regulation in order to accept refugees that were otherwise supposed to register in the EU country where they first arrived. The United Kingdom have agreed on taking in 'up too 20'000 Syrian refugees' during a five years period, and 1'000 are expected to be resettled before Christmas. They do not accept refugees that have travelled through Europe but take them directly from refugee camps neighbouring Syria (Cameron 2015f). This proves an interesting case for examination in regards to their motivation leading up to the different policies. Consequently, this study seeks to answer the following question:

> *Has the 'refugee crisis' in 2015 been framed by the governments in Germany and the United Kingdom as a security issue, and if so, in what ways?*

The aim of the study is to investigate if and how migration is linked to security and how this securitization process operates when a discourse of a 'refugee crisis' is being established. The knowledge from this empirical case will contribute a deeper understanding of the political responses to a refugee 'crisis' such as the situation in Europe. It will also test the relevance of a discursive 'speech act' approach to security, with the aim at testing the theory.

## 1.2 LIMITATIONS AND DEFINITION OF TERMS

This dissertation will focus on the discursive dimensions of securitization theory, whereby the political rhetoric is seen as an important political action, called the *speech act*. The speech act approach provides the tools to analyse the current situation from a scientific distance, despite its status as an on-going process. Consequently, it is possible to conduct a research of more immediate relevance than if one would be interested in the effects or implementation of the current changes of asylum policies.

The time frame will be set between April and October 2015. The emphasis will be put on the comparison between the two countries, which makes the time frame rather limited. With a start in April however, when the 'crisis' discourse was first established, I will interrogate any discursive changes connecting to the escalation of the 'crisis' situation in the Autumn of 2015. The material will proceed until the end of October since I do not want any interference of the Paris attacks on 13 November, which could substantially alter the dynamic of this study.

This dissertation will be conducted through a discourse analysis. On the meaning of discourse, I will use the definition by Jorgensen & Phillips, namely *'a particular way of talking about and understanding the world (or an aspect of the world)'* (2002:1).

There is no consensus on what kind of crisis the refugee situation is. It could be framed as a national security crisis, a humanitarian crisis or an organisational crisis of the receiving states to mention some. A refugee crisis can thus display different dimensions and causes that would provoke diverse responses.

Generally, 'crisis' could be defined as following: 'a serious threat to the basic structures of the fundamental values and norms of a system which under time pressure and highly uncertain circumstances necessitates making vital decisions' (Boin et al. 2005), Here, there are three main components, namely threat, uncertainty and urgency.

Naturally, when referring to transnational movements by people, both groups of refugees and migrants might be present. *Refugees,* people who are forcibly fleeing persecution or war, stand under international protection (UNHCR 2015). Refugees have an internationally recognised right to seek asylum according to the UN charter of Human Rights, which all the European states have agreed on. *Migrants* are defined as those who choose to move 'not because of a direct threat of persecution or death, but mainly to improve their lives by finding work, or in some cases for education, family reunion, or other reasons.' (UNHCR 2015).

I expect there to be differences in how the term 'migrant' and 'refugee' are employed between the cases and between actors, since politics intervene in this issue. In order to isolate as much relevant material as possible, I will search for material addressing both terms. Subsequently, they will be used varyingly throughout the study.

When further referencing the 'refugee crisis' in this specific study, it refers to the refugee situation in Europe from April to October 2015. It is used with the awareness of its contested meanings and eventual political connotations from which I aim to distance myself.

## 1.3 DISPOSITION

The next chapter outlines the theoretical framework, followed by earlier research on empirical cases of securitization of migration. The subsequent chapter presents the method and analytical framework consisting of specified research questions as well as the discourse-

analytical approach. In chapter four, the results will be presented and analysed according to the methodology, before presenting the conclusions in the fifth and final chapter.

# 2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

## 2.1 SECURITIZATION THEORY

Traditionally, the notion of *security* has concentrated on the threat or actual use of force between political actors. The traditional perspective focused on military issues and the state was both the primary actor and object of reference. In the 1980's, a critique of this narrow definition of security was developed, which called for a widening of the security agenda. They wanted to claim security status on *new*, *different* or *untraditional* issues outside of the military sphere.

A problem that followed the 'wideners' approach was the risk of extending the notion into an incoherent issue, also changing security into something *good*. If all issues are named security, the notion is emptied of content. To handle this challenge, 'securitization theory' was developed during the 1990's. It aimed at a coherent framework for a widened security agenda after the end of the Cold War, and was finally put together in the work *Security studies - a new theoretical framework* by Buzan, Waever & de Wilde (1998). It was based on a social constructivist vision of international politics. The perceived reality and positions of political actors are seen as *intersubjective* since they are neither entirely objective, nor subjective. *Security* functions similarly as a social, intersubjective phenomenon  (Diez & Squire 2008; Buzan et al. 1998:35). The relations are constructed through negotiations between actors, and later they are taken for granted as uncontested units; that is why the political positions are regarded as 'objectively given'. They make sense and they affect us because we believe in them rather than because of their objective existence outside of social relations (Wendt 1992). This founding orientation of ST went under the label of Copenhagen school (CS).

### Copenhagen School

In securitization theory according to CS, a difference is made between *non-politicized, politicized* and *securitized issues*. A specific issue gets politicized when it enters in the public debate, such as the environmental question during the late parts of the 20th century. Thereafter when the process of securitization occurs, the topic is labelled 'security' by

regarding it as an urgent, existential threat. This in turn gives reason for controversial measures that go beyond normal political actions. The line between a politicized and securitized issue can sometimes be thin, therefore stressing the need for developing accurate criteria when securitization occur (Buzan et al. 1998; Balzacq 2015; Peoples & Vaughan-Williams 2015).

How important is the *speech act* for the construction of a security issue? According to CS, the distinguishing feature of securitization is the rhetorical structure. The theory thus focuses on public announcements and speeches of securitizing actors as one of the key actions to start a securitization. The speech act is creating urgency when signalising that *'if we don't act now it will be to late'* (Buzan et al. 1998:26). The political leaders specifically need to legitimate their political actions (especially in liberal democracies). The speech is an indication of the actions to come, and even if it is not successfully followed by a political action, the framing says something about the worldview of the actor.

Thus building on the speech act literature, words not only has a descriptive but *performative* character, with the possibility to transform social reality (Balzacq 2015). It is the utterance itself that is the action, regardless if the situation is real or not, so by saying 'I do' on a wedding or giving a promise, something is done (Buzan et al. 1998:23). Securitization can then be studied directly and does not need indicators, since it is shown in the rhetorical discourse. Therefore it makes sense to study (sections of) the world through a discourse analysis rather than to study what is traditionally seen as 'real threats', such as military actions or rearmament.

The core concepts developed by the CS are the *referent object*, the *referent subject*, the *securitizing actor,* and the *audience*. Firstly, the referent object is the entity which is threatened, and as CS adds, to its *existence*. This group, state, nation or principle must have a legitimate claim to its existence and survival as a group, sufficiently enough to be able to impose a security status on the object. Secondly, the referent subject is the entity that is threatening, imagined or real. It could be another state, an opposing culture or transnational migrants. Thirdly, the securitizing actor is the one (or those) who declares a referent object threatened. Traditionally it refers to a government representative, the 'voice of the state' that speaks on behalf of the citizens, seeking to securitize the state (in case of war or conflict) but it could also be the UN (securitizing the Human Rights principle), media or other actors from

the politico-economical elite. The condition is that the actor has the support to act on behalf of the threatened group (the referent object) (Buzan et al. 1998:35-37).

The securitization act is seen as completed if a relevant audience (public opinion, politicians, military officers) is convinced that the issue is a threat to the referent object to accept the proposed measures of action. Since securitization is an intersubjective process, security must be articulated and justified in the dialogue between actor and audience. In the case where an elected government 'speak security' on behalf of the nation, the theory assumes that the audience normally accepts the speech act of this actor without further notice (Balzacq 2015; Buzan et al. 1998). In the current case the audience acceptance is thus possibly not the most difficult step, since the political representatives are democratically elected and officially regarded as legitimate actors for speaking on behalf of the nation.

CS discusses *migration* as a potential referent subject (threat) in the 'societal' sector, where the referent object is *society* (compared to the *state* in the political sector). Here, the importance of identity is emphasized – the criterion of societal securitization is that the referent object is threatened *as to its identity (core values, culture, language)* (Buzan et al. 1998; Waver et al. 1993).

The aim of ST is to understand existing actors involvement in security policies, which contributes to the current structure and dynamics of international and national politics. Dependent on the empirical case in question, different securitizing actors are important. The state and its representatives maintain a very central position in articulating what is considered a threat and what is the threatened object. In the case of the securitization of migration, the state and governments have a central position. The head of state is also usually seen as the primary representative of the state (and in many case of the nation), therefore the one who *sends signals* to migrants and to the international community about the country's current opinion (Buzan et al. 1998).

Securitization theory has now been criticised, applied empirically and developed in more than 20 years and has at present two main lines of inquiry. The first could be called the 'logic of exception', emphasizing topics treated with a specific urgency, where CS has a prominent place (Bourbeau 2014). The second approach is the 'logic of routine'. It focuses on security practices and the institutionalisation of securitization. Thus, the first provides the best tools for explaining controversial actions and *changes* in security policy and discourse, while the

second rather deals with security dynamics in routines and *continuation* (Balzacq 2015). Given the character of this thesis I will argue that the 'logic of exception' provides with the most suiting tools for analysis. There are also great advantages of keeping the combined approach in mind, since both logics of continuity and change might be at play in the actual case.

## 2.2 LIMITATIONS AND STRENGTHS OF SECURITIZATION THEORY

The social constructivist character of ST makes it difficult to comment on how the socially constructed image is related to the more positivist 'actual situation'. Its framework does not provide tools to make specific comparisons to the ontological reality or the institutionalized practice. However, the aim of the theory is rather to describe and understand the political society and what is socially constructed as a truth. As an example, both human rights principles and national borders are in some way social constructions that structure ordinary people's' reality (Buzan et al. 1998).

One could ask why the securitization logic would occur in the domain of politics. This explicit question is rarely discussed in the literature, but the main implicit explanation is the interest in influence or 'power maximization' (Boswell 2007:592). In democratic systems, political actors and parties are in need of popular support to reach the position of government. The governments also need legitimacy for their decisions, making the claim by Boswell (2007) highly reasonable. There are also tactical gains in raising an issue to security status. It is then given highest priority, which governments (or other actors) can take advantage of to gain more control, acting *in the name of security* (Buzan et al. 1998:29).

This study can contribute through highlighting the question if refugees are *victims to insecurity* or *causes of insecurity*. As Buzan et al. (1998:29) says, national security has given power holders reasons to exploit 'threats' for domestic purposes, to handle something less democratically and more constrained. With a securitization of migration, the focus moves from the *need of protection against war, conflict and prosecution* to the need of *protection against the refugees*. In other words, it would legitimize a national security discourse at the expense of a humanitarian discourse.

## 2.3 EARLIER RESEARCH OF SECURITIZATION OF MIGRATION

### Impacts of 9/11 in Europe

One striking similarity between the different empirical studies on the securitization of migration in Europe is their common point of reference; the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001. It provided the European countries with an opportunity to securitize migration by discursively linking it to an increased threat of terrorist acts. This motivated the implementation of a toughened migration policy and control mechanisms within the EU and legitimized practices that were reserved for emergencies. Such practices were all part of controlling the immigrant. The discourse concentrated on the 'illegality' of the irregular migrants and other unwanted foreign nationals, which in turn legitimised stricter entry restrictions. Border control and deportation was argued for and implemented in many European countries (Diez & Squire 2008; Huysmans 2006; Kaya 2009).

In the United Kingdom, the direct governmental response after 9/11 was the rapid passing of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act (ATCSA) in 2001, including controversial proposal of faster deportation and rejection of foreign nationals involved in terrorism (Hampshire 2009). In the political discourse, the traditionally separated borders between terrorism, immigration and asylum seekers were obscured, which resulted in a security approach to deal with all these questions (Diez & Squire 2008; Balzacq, 2015). The security aspect of migration has been present after the 9/11 events and has legitimised a restriction of liberal ideas that normally constrain immigration policy (Hampshire 2009).

Securitization research that puts Germany in the spotlight is scarce and lacks coherence compared to the UK. For example, Diez & Squire (2008) compare citizen traditions in Germany and the UK, stating that both countries are securitizing migration through the terrorism linkage. Besides the countries are going towards a homogenisation of traditionally different citizenship traditions. Kaya (2009) in *'The age of securitisation'* states similarly that migration has been securitized in Germany. He is interrogating the regimes of citizenship, integration and migration in Germany, however basing the analysis on interviews with immigrants, thus giving a sociological focus on the issue. He claims that migration recently has *'been framed as a source of fear and instability for the nation-states in the West. Yet not so long ago it was rather the source of contentment and happiness'* (Kaya, 2009:

201). Furthermore, Boswell (2007) claims in contrast that very little evidence actually exists of the attempts to securitize migration after 9/11 through the possible linkage to the anti-terrorism agenda. In fact, migration control policies do *not* appear to have become securitized as expected. A main explanation is that the image of highly organized terrorist networks did not correspond at all with the earlier established image of desperate migrants arriving in an unstructured fashion to the southern borders of Europe (Boswell 2007: 598). Additionally, as Koser (2011) claims, the terrorist linkage is not evident after the economic crisis beginning in 2008, which instead shifted the focus to economic threats of increased migration.

Thus the absence of coherent securitization research makes Germany a curious case, also as one of the most popular European destination countries for refugees in 2015. The country is a major actor in the European Union, where the securitization of migration is more confirmed. In the actual context, if there is no government-led securitization of migration, we could ask if the security logic is entirely absent or directed in another way. A suggestion is that Germany instead needs to defend their open policy, which could lead to a framing of the liberal core values as threatened and in need of protection.

In sum, this literature overview shows an important research gap when trying to apply the earlier knowledge on the current migration situation. The linkage between migration and terrorism is not obvious in the 2015 'refugee crisis', which rather has a dimension of humanitarian urgency. A substantial part of the refugees are also themselves fleeing from terrorist organisations such as the 'Islamic state', making a 9/11 linkage between terrorism and migration rather paradoxical. A contribution of this research will be to interrogate this earlier established linkage. If it is not created, what are the main arguments for keeping a securitized view of migration? (Koser 2011)

# 3. METHOD

## 3.1 DESIGN

This study conducts a discourse analysis to investigate *if* migration has been perceived as a security issue in Germany and the United Kingdom in the initial stage of the 2015 'refugee crisis' in Europe and *how* this was done. Until now, no securitization research has been conducted in relation to this 'refugee crisis' and earlier research does not provide any clear indications. This motivates an open stance (asking *if* and how it occurs) and a testing of the theory. The challenge and eventual difficulties connected to the analysis lies in creating an analytical tool that can detect the security discourse on a reasonable scale; therefore it is important that it is neither to narrow (not detecting any security discourse) nor too big (naming everything security).

In the analytical framework, the general research problem will be divided into more specific questions regarding security articulations and identity constructions. The focus will be on the comparison between the two cases with the objective to highlight discursive differences concerning security. In addition to a deeper understanding of political responses to a 'refugee crisis', I aim to test the theory, although not in the strict sense by formulating hypotheses. I will investigate if the Copenhagen school 'speech act approach' to security and its emphasis on identity issues prove to be relevant to detect security logics. If the identity analysis provides insights on why the development looks so different in my two cases, the theory will be strengthened. This since the CS perspective on security is social constructivist, and it assumes that identity, self-image and social signals play an important role in international politics. In addition to that I will examine how the security discourse develops and changes over time.

### Strategic choice of analytical units

According to George and Bennett (2005: 83) 'the primary criterion for case selection should be relevance to the research objective of the study', in my case if and how the refugee crisis has been constructed as a security issue in European receiving states. Thus in order to avoid selection bias, the criterion of selection is not the outcome of the cases, but to find to interesting comparable units of analysis according to a most similar design. Put more concretely, I began with the decision to compare the securitization of migration in states affected by the recent increase of migration Europe. I did not choose cases dependent on if

and how securitization occurs in the two chosen countries (the outcome is unknown), they rather proved to be two interesting and appropriate cases for comparison on the different mechanisms of securitization, since they have reacted very differently on the 'crisis' despite many characterising similarities.

Subsequently, to reconnect to the aim of study, the question *if* securitization occurs is worth attention to be able to ask *how* it operates. Securitization, to frame something as a security issue, always needs justification. Since security and threat perceptions are not entirely static, stable and fixed (and when migration is changed or put in a new context) we cannot know in advance how the states are responding this time.

Germany and the United Kingdom will be chosen as a focal point because they show many similarities as countries. They have experienced a significant immigration the past decades and are affected by the recent refugee crisis (Diez & Squire 2008). Historically, they both enjoy a positive reputation for providing protection for refugees in times of crisis.[ii] Secondly, they are both EU members and economically developed liberal democracies of comparable size (the population in Germany is 80 millions and in the UK 64 millions, making them the first and third largest countries in Europe) (Eurostat, 2015). Thirdly, conservative parties govern both countries (The Conservative party in the UK and the Christian democrats CDU in Germany, in coalition with the Social Democratic Party SPD).

Finally, the two countries are interesting even as isolated cases. They are influential countries in the international arena and the countries might inspire and 'set the standard' for the migration- and asylum politics in Europe and the European Union. How they chose to frame the migration issue and their political actions send important signals to the international community which could impact the asylum policy of surrounding states and also the common EU policy.

## 3.2 ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

The analytical framework consists of specified research questions, which are combined with criteria for inference under each question. I will structure the results and ideas displayed in the material by answering these questions. The first question addresses the security and threat constructions. *1a)* seeks to establish *if* we can detect a securitization of migration and *how* it is politically motivated, while *1b)* interrogates the suggested political measures to deal with the situation; namely the securitizing move. *2)* deals with identity constructions. It has the

purpose to discuss how identity and rivalry is constructed and how national identity is related to other levels, specifically towards migrants and the EU.

These questions represent an operationalisation of the theory, directly inspired by the core concepts of the ST. It has the advantage to give the analytical framework a high validity. The disadvantage might be that some of the results are foreseeable, because of the need to develop the theoretical and methodological framework extensively (Bergström & Boréus 2012: 406).

*1a. Do the actors articulate a linkage between security and migration in the material? In what way is it constructed?*

Is there a security discourse in the material that stresses existential threat, survival or priority? Firstly, the question aims at detecting the first step of the securitization process, namely the 'threat construction' (Buzan et al. 1998). The analysis will begin with a search for key indicators of securitization framing such as 'threat', 'pressure' or 'security'. The threat is *existential* if migration or refugees is addressed as more important than other issues and therefore must take highest priority (Buzan et al. 1998: 24-25).

Secondly, *how* do the state representatives motivate their proposed actions or general policy? The second part of the question aims at investigating the migration discourse after different sectors. As an example, is it mainly through a logics found in the societal sector or the political sector (logics of identity vs. logics of sovereignty)? If there are references to the 'political sector', state survival, sovereignty or ideology should be mentioned. Here, the linkage to terrorism would be a key indicator. If there are references to the 'societal sector', the linkage to the national identity, religion or culture would be key indicators.

*1b. Which political measures do the actors suggest as a direct response to the refugee crisis? Which of those measures indicate securitization moves and which do not?*

This question is an operationalisation of the next step in the process, namely to detect the securitizing move. The move has the purpose of legitimizing extraordinary political responses for the reason of 'security', necessary for a complete - successful - securitization. If the actors speak of threats that need to be fought by implementing extraordinary actions, this move occurs. If threats are articulated without mentioning corresponding measures, it is considered only as a threat construction rather than a securitizing move. This distinction is important since it is the securitizing move we want to discover.

*2. In what way is identity constructed in the material?*

In the case of securitization of migration, identity constructions are central for understanding, and to some extent explaining, the development in play. I will firstly pay attention to the *national identity* construction, secondly how the national identity is related to *migrants and refugees*, and thirdly how it is related to the adjacent European community and the *EU*. With this structuring of the material, we can detect how the securitizing actors frame the identity of the referent object in relation to the referent subject. The discourse is judged as *exclusive* if the solidarity and 'we' only refers to the national identity, and *inclusive* if the 'we' is repeatedly including migrants, other Europeans or the humankind.

This question of identity is also important where securitization might be absent, as hypothesized in the German case. If this assumption proves to be correct, the question makes it possible to analyse the identity relations in the German case too.

*Table 1. Specified research questions*

| No. | Question |
| --- | --- |
| 1.a | Do the actors articulate a linkage between security and migration in the material? In what way is it constructed? |
| 1.b | Which political measures do the actors suggest as a direct response to the refugee crisis? Which of those measures indicate securitization moves? |
| 2 | In what way is identity constructed in the material? |

## 3.3 ANALYTICAL TOOLS FROM SECURITIZATION THEORY

This section aims at identifying referent objects and securitizing actors that will be used to detect and isolate relevant material before and during the analysis. The tools are specifically related to the securitization theory developed by the Copenhagen School and the framework they propose, providing closeness between empirical indicators and theoretical concepts (Esaiasson et al. 2012). These questions are an operationalisation of the theory and will be used as tools of analysis, combined with discourse analysis.

*Who are the securitizing actors?* Who initiate a move of securitization through the speech act? According to ST in the case of migration, this is expected to be a 'voice of the state', namely a head of state or another member of government responsible for the migration

policies, such as the immigration minister or the minister of home affairs. I have therefore detected three major securitizing actors in each country (presented below in the material chapter).

*Who or what is to be protected?* This question clarifies who or what is the *referent object* in need of security. If we have a case of securitization of migration, the object that is threatened refers to the nation, the 'people', the society, the state or the economy. The actors might also simply speak about 'us', the 'Germans' 'Germany' or the 'British people' or 'the UK'. That will also be regarded as a construction of the referent object if it is constructed in some kind of opposition to the migrating individuals. These notions are indicators of the nation or state.

*From what kinds of threat are the referent objects to be protected?* This question defines the referent subject. A condition is that it must be presented as an *existential* threat, linking the concept of security to some kind of survival. Thus, a criterion is that migration (e.g. refugees, irregular migrants, or failed integration) is articulated as the main threat of the referent object in need of protection.

*Table 2. Analytical tools from ST*

| Term | Definition |
|---|---|
| Referent object | The threatened entity |
| Securitizing actor | Person performing the security articulation |
| Referent subject | The entity that is threatening |
| Audience | The group from which consent is needed |

(Buzan et al. 1998)

## 3.5 ANALYTICAL TOOLS FROM DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

Discourse analysis (DA) as a method has the ability to highlight how dominant discourses serve to create structures of meaning and power, which is thus related to ST and its constructivist discursive approach to security. Here, DA can provide important perspectives and analytical tools for the analysis. Despite the diversity of DA, some common points exist:

1. Critical approach to taken-for-granted knowledge such as power relations and identity constructions. Reality, as we perceive it, is a product of our categorising of the world. Thus, representations of the world are products of discourse and not reflections of the world 'out there'.

2. Historical and cultural specifity - in a broad historical sense, our worldviews and our identities could be different and could change over time.

3. Link between knowledge and social processes. How we understand the world is created and reproduced by social processes.

4. Link between knowledge and social action. About the effects and implications of discourse: they lead to the perception that some actions are accepted and some perceived as unthinkable. Social constructions of knowledge and truth have social consequences since they lead to different social practices (Jorgensen & Phillips 2002:5).

The following section presents analytical tools, which will prove useful to describe how a certain framing causes a certain solution, such as the current case where the German and British government use different solutions to the same problems.

The research question should define the suiting methodology, therefore I have chosen to use tools from two different sources: Faircloughs' Critical Discourse Analysis and the poststructuralist tradition of Laclau & Mouffe. *Intertextuality,* as understood by Fairclough, concerns how texts relate and correspond with to each other. Through analysis of intertextuality one can examine the reproduction of discourses where no new elements are introduced, also in order to detect discursive change where new components are introduced (Jorgensen & Phillips 2002:73). If the speech of the British Prime Minister is in line with earlier announcements, the governmental discourse is marked by stability (rather than change), and a significant intertextuality.

Following tools are developed by Laclau and Mouffe. The central terms and *signs* in a specific discourse can be identified. In the discursive centre, we can detect a *nodal point* organising the discourse. This is a sign with a central position that creates *chains of equivalence* when related to other signs in the discourse. An element gains meaning in opposition against *or* in a positive relationship with other elements, such as 'the British people' in relation to 'the migrant'. Regarding the nodal point, in some cases the discourse would not even be possible without it, such as the 'Jew' in the Nazi discourse (Bergström & Boréus 2012:318). Furthermore, *antagonism* concerns the dissolution and instability of discourse. Antagonism is found where discourses collide, for example as in the case of a human rights principle colliding with the national sovereignty principle (Jorgensen & Phillips 2002). Regarding the second research question on identity constructions, the concepts of

*domain of objectivity* and *domain of the political* will be used. The first is identifying identities that are taken for granted, whilst the second describes issues that are discussed and fought over, that are less stable and thus it is easier to imagine how they could change (Jorgensen & Phillips 2002:57).

DA (and consequently of the widened security approach) is often criticised for relativizing all, so that knowledge and social identities end up being contingent, relative and flux. This is not the case however, because theorists agree that the social field still is rule-bound and regulative. Even though identities are socially created and intersubjective, they are relatively inflexible in specific situations. Specific contexts place restrictions on the identities, which can be assumed and analysed (Jorgensen & Phillips 2002:6). This relative stability of political and social relations is fundamental to understand the discourse analysis as a method of social science.

## 3.4 EMPIRICAL MATERIAL

The empirical material focuses on *British and German government speech acts.* It will consist of *primary sources* and the selection criterion is: speeches, parliamentary debates and ministerial announcements concerning migration related to the 'refugee' and 'migrant crisis' in 2015. The ambition is to analyse the official political perception of the refugee crisis, which motivates to find material from government representatives, as discussed in the theory chapter (p. 10). The speeches are supposed to be public and directed towards the national audience.  Since this is a qualitative comparative study it is important to use as similar material as possible between the units of analysis, so that we can draw comparable conclusions in the empirical analysis. The strict criterion of comparability also strengthens the objective of transparent and reliable results (Esaiasson et al 2012).  To detect the most relevant actors, it begins with a key word search on 'speech' 'immigration' 'refugees' 'migrant crisis' and 'refugee crisis'. The research then indicated that *the head of state*, *the interior minister* and *the minister responsible for migration* were the most suitable actors for comparison. They are chosen because of their position as 'voices of the state/people' from which they speak and exercise their influence.

Further, the data collection was performed identically to detect relevant material among the chosen actors. It resulted in parliamentary debates and announcements, press conferences and public speeches (of Merkel and Cameron). Two British speeches from the Conservative party

congress are included and judged as suitable since they are directed to a broad national public and since the actors are acting as state representatives. The list of primary sources for the analysis is presented on page 37.

Thus, the choice of actors is based on both the principle of comparability and the principle of relevance. Here follows a presentation of the government representatives that are judged to be the key actors in a position for securitizing migration. *Angela Merkel* is the federal president of Germany (Bundeskanzler) since 2005, the same year she became elected as leader of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU). *Thomas de Maizière* (CDU) is the Interior Minister since December 2013 and has served in the Merkel cabinet since 2005. *Aydan Özogus* is the Minister for Migration, Refugees and Integration since January 2014 and a representative of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) that forms a majority coalition government with the CDU. *David Cameron* serves as the British Prime minister (abbreviated PM) since 2010. Re-elected in May 2015, he now leads a majority government for the Conservative Party (Party leader since 2005). *Theresa May* is Interior Minister (Home Secretary) since 2010. Lastly, *James Brokenshire is* 'Minister of Security, Defence and Immigration' since 2010, a title which changed to Minister of Immigration after the 2015 re-election.

As to the implications of choice of actors, the biggest difficulty is that the responsibilities of the two migration ministers are slightly different. Özoguz portfolio is focusing more on integration issues than Brokenshire. (Interestingly, comparing the ministerial tasks of the migration ministers could say a lot about their worldviews. In the UK it is the former minister of defence that deals with immigration versus the minister of refugees, integration and immigration in Germany.[iii]) Özoguz is also member of the social democratic party, not the CDU. It might lead to a bias in the results where a security approach to deal with migration is more logical for Brokenshire than for Özoguz. To avoid bias, I will only choose some few speeches from the migration ministers and emphasize the announcements of the other actors more, where this problem does not occur.

*Table 3. Actors for the empirical analysis*

| Country | Head of State | Interior Minister | Migration Minister |
|---------|---------------|-------------------|--------------------|
| Germany | **Angela Merkel** (CDU) Bundeskanzlerin | **Thomas de Maizière** (CDU) Innenminister | **Aydan Özogus** (SPD) Ministerin für Migration, Flüchtlinge and Integration |
| UK | **David Cameron** Prime Minister | **Theresa May** Home Secretary | **James Brokenshire** Minister of Immigration |

# 4. ANALYSIS

## 4.1 UNITED KINGDOM

### Security constructions

During the given time period of the analysis, the government introduced a new Immigration Act, proposing tougher measures compared to the earlier immigration policy. Much of the analysed material addresses this piece of legislation - introduced in the House of Commons (HC) 17 September 2015. In additional speeches, the ministers are directly commenting on the Mediterranean refugee situation or generally on the 'refugee crisis':

> *'The NCA, the National Crime Agency, one of its core tasks is to challenge, break up and take to court organised gangs of criminals, whether they are trafficking children or trafficking migrants. This is very testing, I accept that. Because you got a swarm of people coming across the Mediterranean, seeking a better life, wanting to come to Britain. Because Britain has got jobs; it has got a growing economy; it is an incredible place to live. But we need to protect our borders by working hand in glove, with our neighbours the French, and that's exactly what we are doing.'* (Cameron 2015b, July 30)

The government frames a '*comprehensive approach to this unprecedented challenge*' (May 2015c), that centres around efforts of both humanitarian aid, and of *'stopping people making these dangerous journeys by breaking the link between illegal immigration and settlement in Europe;'* and *'disrupting the criminal gangs'* (May 2015c)[iv]. She adds that there is no national interest for migration to stay on the scale that we have experienced the last decade:

*'Even if we could manage, Britain does not need net migration in the hundred of thousands every year.'* (May 2015e).

> *'If we are genuinely to help refugees, this cannot simply be about helping the fittest, the fastest and those most able to get to western Europe. We must help those who are left behind in the camps, who are sometimes the most vulnerable.'* (May 2015c, September 8)

The British government resist the EU quota system for mandatory resettlement of refugees; instead they aim at take some hundred people directly from the Syrian refugee camps (May 2015c). Europe is thus not part of the British response to the crisis.

What do the findings from the British material show? There is a notable coherency and *intertextuality* between the statements over time, and between actors. The division between 'genuine' and 'false' migrants were repeated in every analysed statement. In the British governmental discourse, *'uncontrolled immigration'* is the *nodal point* around which the other signs are related. It creates a *chain of equivalence* equated with *'abuse of the system'*, *'the smuggling and criminal aspects of the crisis'*[v] and *'illegal migrants'* – signs of insecurity. The nodal point is then contrasted with *'national responsibility' 'border security'*, *'growing economy', 'Britains prosperity' and 'control'* - signs associated with security from threat (May 2015b, Cameron 2015f). Thus, in the British migration discourse there are constantly linkages to control, border control and immigration control, creating a causal linkage between migration and national security.

How is the 'refugee crisis' described? The situation is generally described as a 'crisis' and an *'unprecedented challenge'* (May 2015e). Cameron pictures the refugee situation as a *'crisis'* that *'confronts our world'* (2015e). Other central signs are his articulation of a *'swarm of people'* (2015b), and later saying that *'our country will be overwhelmed'* if more refugees were taken in (Cameron 2015f).

The British people and the British society are articulated as something to protect, thus representing *the referent object*. More specifically the national public services, labour market, infrastructure, national borders and the British lifestyle are all 'threatened' by migration (May 2015e). *The referent subject* is identified as the 'uncontrolled' and 'illegal' immigration that implies every refugee and migrant coming irregularly to the British borders.

**Security measures**

In a speech to the nation on May 21 (2015b), Cameron said that control measures will be *'pushed forward'* with *'a new Immigration Taskforce, (...) which will hold every part of government to account on our relentless drive to control immigration.'*

> *'As the Prime Minister and I have repeatedly made clear, the most important step to resolving the situation in the Mediterranean is breaking the link between migrants making this dangerous journey and achieving settlement in Europe'* (May 2015b, June 24, HC Deb).

With an almost literate repetition of this message in other announcements before and after, the intertextuality is notable (May 2015a, Cameron 2015e). In September, the government introduced a new Immigration Act, including controversial legislation such as *'electronically tagging illegal migrants'*. The main goal with the bill is to classify irregular migration as a criminal act to justify controversial harder measures on deportation and refusals[vi]. Similarly, Home secretary May emphasizes a tougher control of migrants *'abusing our asylum system for welfare gains'* (May 2015d). To criminalise all irregular migration is a vast step away from the EU migration policy.

To revoke the securitization criteria: firstly, the emotionally charged words around refugees and irregular migration are marking urgency and an exceptional situation outside of the normal political procedures. The material demonstrates a construction of a threatening situation, thus meeting the criteria of an *existential threat*. Secondly, the governmental measures responding to the 'refugee crisis' are referring to control and national security (against criminality and system abuse). The analysis shows an urgent, militarized approach to deal with the situation, which the *Immigration Taskforce* clearly indicates. This corresponds remarkably well with the securitization framework. Migration is framed as a menace to which they reinforce the countermeasures; border control, more efficient removals and 'breaking the link' between fleeing to Europe and being granted asylum. Though we cannot be entirely certain that the Immigration Act and Taskforce are direct responses to the 'crisis', the emphasis of the *tougher border control* is. These responses consequently meet the second criteria of *securitization moves*.

## Identity constructions

*'I love Britain. I love our history and what we've given to the world'* Cameron (2015d) said at the Tory conference in October. At the same conference, the Home secretary stated the following:

> *'It is often said, often by advocates of open door immigration, that Britain is by definition a country of immigrants. In fact compared to the countries of the new world, and compared by the countries of Europe with their shifting land borders, we have until recently always been a country of remarkable population stability*[vii] (May 2015e).

The national identity is established in an absolute uncontested way, placed in the domain of objectivity; it is the defining feature of identity and belonging. The national identity and interest are also the given reference point throughout the speeches. The relation between the securitizing actors (the government) and the referent object (the British people) is affectionate, speaking about the country in a patriotic tone. *'The British people'* is identified as the nodal point, since without this sign the whole discourse would fall. It has positive connotation with *'British tradition', national sovereignty', 'working people', 'remarkable population stability'*, and is juxtaposed against *'illegal migrants'* and *'clandestines'*. These opposing identities of *the other* are defining and motivating the British identity, by showing what it is *not*.

How is the national identity related to migrants and refugees? The government constructs two categories of migrants, namely *'economic migrants and genuine refugees'* (May 2015e). *'There are people who need our help and there are people who are abusing our good will'* (ibid). The *'economic migrants'* are *'falsely claiming asylum and exploiting the UK welfare system'* and in practice, it applies for all individuals who are coming to Europe on their own behalf (Cameron 2015d)[viii]. They are described as *'migration offenders'* and *'clandestines'* (May 2015b). The government do not identify with the refugees and doubt the honesty of the asylum claim of the people arriving to Europe. The quote above (May 2015e) shows that it explicitly rejects a definition of the UK as an immigration country, therefore I categorise the identity construction as *exclusive.*

At the Tory conference, May says that Britain have a *'proud history of a (...) support for refugees.' 'Let Britain continue this tradition.(...) Let Britain be a beacon of hope.'* (2015e). We can feel compassion *'with our heart'* but must act *'with our head'*, Cameron says

(2015b). The quotes above show an *antagonism* between a security and humanitarian approach to migration and refugees, since both options are possible within the discourse. But they highlight that the humanitarian obligation is 'moral', not political. So, a humanitarian discourse still exist in some extent, since the UK regard themselves a liberal democracy supporting the Human Rights principle and need to provide sanctuary for refugees. They solve this antagonism by being against irregular migration but positive towards refugees, which though become very few according to their classification.

Concerning the EU, it is framed as *'the biggest single market in the world'* (Cameron 2015e), and is only accepted since it serves national economic gains. Cameron is *'only interested in two things: Britain's prosperity and Britain's influence',* and call it *'too bossy'* and *'too interfering'* (Cameron 2015e). There is no affective connection to the EU, or any identification or solidarity shown. The government proudly underlines the British choice to keep the EU and their currency at a distance. The European identity is predominantly unstable and thus positioned in the *domain of the political*, as a contested mark of identity.

The referent object is the British people, migration is to be controlled to serve the Britons and not to endanger their welfare or employment. The referent subject are the irregular migrants and refugees coming to Europe: the *'illegal migrants'* and *'clandestines'* (May 2015c). They are treated as guilty until the contrary has been proved. The identity examination shows that the national interest is prioritised higher than a humanitarian or European perspective. So, there is a security discourse around the 'refugee crisis', which is much more emphasized than a humanitarian discourse. This *exclusive* British identity construction legitimizes a securitization of migration, which would otherwise prove difficult or even impossible.

Worth mentioning is that the earlier established terrorist linkage is weak or absent in the material. The terrorism and migration are however often discussed in close connection to each other but not clearly linked, making it a borderline case. One can conclude that some kind of blurring the borders between the topics occurs, probably with the aim at spilling over some of the fear of the latter to the former.

To conclude the first part of the analysis, a government-led securitization of migration has occurred in the UK during the 2015 'refugee crisis' in Europe, through a focus on the 'illegality' aspects, saying that uncontrolled migration is a threat to the British society. The

temporal intertextuality and stability also highlights that the earlier established security-migration discourse is still present, but that the recent situation has fuelled the nationalistic rhetoric, making the potential threat towards the society bigger than the gains of helping. So possibly, the British case is an example of using securitization to reaffirm an already strict asylum policy rather than legitimizing an entirely new approach.

The threat (of refugees and migrants) is kept abstract, aiming at dehumanize and criminalize the migrant. The 'illegality' of the migrant is legitimising the (controversial) measures and migration policy, because if they were seen as genuine refugees, it would be much harder to securitize migration.

## 4.2 GERMANY

### Security constructions

In the end of August 2015, Germany decided to sidestep the EU Dublin regulation, of humanitarian reasons and to relieve the transit countries such as Greece and Hungary from some of its responsibility, according to the government (Merkel 2015b). They did not send back refugees arriving to another EU country first, as the regulation demands[ix]. As an effect of the situation, on September 29 the government introduced a new 'Asylum Procedures Acceleration Act'. Much of the analysed material builds on this new piece of legislation.

The analysis shows that there is a discursive change in connection to these changes in asylum policy, therefore this section begins with interrogating the first period stretching form April to the end of August. How is the 'refugee crisis' perceived at this stage? Merkel stated that the most important thing to do is *'to prevent that more victims die, on our doorstep, in the most agonizing way. That does not correspond with our values'*[x] (Merkel 2015a, April 20)

During the first period, the governmental discourse is never articulating a 'crisis'. Instead, it is seen as a tragedy of which the migrants are 'victims'. It does not construct any linkage between the refugees and how they could impact the national context. The situation is separated from domestic issues. The *nodal point* is *'tragedy'*, forming a chain of equivalence with *'sorrow'*, *'human trafficking'* and *'smuggling'* and contrasted with *'life saving'*, *'safety for refugees'* and *'joint European action'*. Besides, immigration minister Özugus explicitly criticises the earlier discourse (before 2005) when migration was described as *'threatening'*. Instead, it is good for the German society and economy to receive and integrate migrants. Özoguz stresses integration and even rejects the political use of *'economical migrant'* since

*'we must understand what kind of misery they arrive from'.*[xi] Here we have a clear antagonism compared to the British discourse, which builds upon the nodal point *'uncontrolled immigration'* equated with *'abuse of the system'*. In sum, the situation is framed as a *'tragedy'*, but not an urgent *'crisis'* (never articulating the word). The criteria of threat construction and securitizing moves are thus not met, and there is no securitization of migration during the first period.

*The second period* is marked by a discursive change in the end of August. In the material, this is first shown during a national press conference on actual political themes, where the refugee situation was given the highest priority.

> *'Germany is a strong country, and since we have so done much, the aim has to be that we can do this. We can do it, although there are obstacles in the way, it must be worked out and the government will do everything in its power to (...) accomplish that.*[xii] (Merkel 2015b, August 31)

The public announcements of the chancellor increase in frequency and she is now addressing the situation as a *'historical trial'*[xiii] (2015d) and a *'national exertion for a national overall mission'*[xiv] (Merkel 2015b). *'Right of asylum – there is no alternative'*[xv] (Merkel 2015c).

Regarding the threat construction in the second period, the tone changes. There is now a high level of urgency, which increases until the end of the investigated period. The discourse thus meets the first criteria an existiential threat construction, but with another dynamic - security for who, against whom? Now, the refugee situation is perceived as a *'challenge'* and an *'urgent emergency'*[xvi] towards Europe and Germany, which can bring both problems and possibilities. Merkel also says that the first concern concerning refugees should not be about potential threats, instead we should ask: *'what are the possibilities?'*[xvii] (Merkel 2015b).

The nodal point organizing the discourse is *'historical trial'*, and in the *chain of equivalence* it is backed up by (often repeated) signs such as *'humanitarian exception'*, *'European values'*, *'responsibility'*, *'Right of asylum'*, *'the German constitution/rule of law'* (*'Rechtstaat'*). Other opposing signs mark the threat against this challenge: *'nationalism'* and *'xenophobia'* (Merkel 2015b, Maizière 2015e, Özogus 2015b).

These findings displays an interesting dynamic. Firstly, in contrast to the UK, urgent security concerns are expressed around the *European cooperation,* which can be seen as a referent object. The EU should make the refugee reception work, otherwise it is not the Europe they

have pictured (Merkel 2015b). If the EU fails to cooperate on the refugee question, it will be *'destroyed'* (Merkel 2015c). Secondly, security is mentioned in relation to the safety of refugees (not the German people). They are *'in need of protection',* thus constituting a second referent object. The threats from which the EU need to be protected is fragmentation and nationalism (Merkel 2015b, Buzan et al 1998:148). The second *referent subject* is xenophobia; racism and hostility against the refugees is expressed vividly as a major security problem (Maizière 2015d).

## Security measures

The second period was preceded by the temporary abolition of the Dublin regulation, already discussed above. The second corresponding measure is the creation of the 'Asylum Procedures Acceleration Act'. It has a twofold aim: quicker integration and quicker deportation (Maizière 2015e). This act is important since it is directly linked to the 'refugee crisis'. Commenting in the Parliament, the interior minister said that *'we are acting united. We hadn't had the same consensus for this law for six, or two, months ago'* (Maizière 2015e).

Does the securitizing move have the purpose to legitimize extraordinary political actions for security reasons? The German government motivate the abolition of Dublin for reasons of security and survival of the European Union and for the refugees for (the referent objects)[xviii] (Merkel 2015b), thus meeting the second criteria.

## Identity constructions

> *'This inclusive history is the foundation for a good, functioning immigration society and a new, common German identity'*[xix] *(Özoguz 2015a). 'Germany is an immigration country.' (Merkel 2015b)*

> *'When we start to excuse ourselves in situations of emergency, then it is not my country. And I believe that, in the moment, it was correct'*[xx] *(*Merkel 2015c). Here referring to the decision to abolish the Dublin regulation.

> *'People that hates refugees, also hates our country'*[xxi] (Maizière 2015e).

There is a clear *intertextuality* over time and between actors concerning identity issues in Germany and it is clear that the later announcements draws upon the earlier. Since there are no discursive breaks this section will not be divided into different time periods as was necessary regarding security constructions.

In the German refugee and migration discourse, the national identity is never constructed in opposition against Europe or refugees. The 'we' even refers more often to the European solidarity than to national identity, it also includes immigrants (Özoguz 2015a), and Islam[xxii] (Merkel 2015b). Merkel (2015c) describes the EU as a 'precious treasure'[xxiii], where common European values are shared. Subsequently, the government frames an *inclusive* national identity.

The German discourse focuses on *'Europe'* as the nodal point, positively connected to signs such as *'solidarity', immigration country'* and *'understanding'*. In contrast we find *'right-wing extremism', 'prejudice', 'intolerance'* and *'immigrant bashing'*[xxiv] (Maizière 2015d, Merkel 2015b, Özogus 2015b) The national identity is then placed in the domain of the political, since there is an ambiguity whether to prioritize the German or the European solidarity highest. The antagonism is also obvious since *'nationalism'* is articulated as a threat towards European cooperation. They try to solve it by prioritizing the European solidarity higher than the German, by saying that European security implies national security.

Immigration is placed in *the domain of objectivity*, it is a part of the society. Merkel and Özoguz express a wish to make up for an obscure national past, justifying the obligation to help refugees. They claim that there are room for migrants and refugees (the referent object) but not for racism (the referent subject), which is condemned. Xenophobic tendencies are pictured as a greater threat than migration, against which the country 'must act unified'.

The government thus constructs an *inclusive* national identity since they do not want to reduce the 'pull-factors' that makes Germany a popular immigration country. Immigration is not pictured as a national problem because it has always been *a part of the society*.

The results from Germany thus show a rather different pattern than in the British case. Firstly, irregular migration and refugees has not been securitized in any coherent or clear way. Since the analytical framework has been constructed to detect securitization moves and threat constructions, the findings from Germany prove a more complex case than that of the UK. Secondly, the difference between the actors within the government is somewhat bigger in how the situation is articulated, so there is consequently less intertextuality in the material. Thirdly, also related to intertextuality concerning the process and time perspective, there is a discursive break in the material, changing the tone and urgency towards the end of august 2015.

Finally, the temporal dimension is more prominent in the German case, especially regarding the first research question on security constructions. In the second period, the criterion of an 'existential threat' is met, however with another logics than in the British case. Further, the abolition of the Dublin regulation goes beyond the normal 'rules of the game', therefore corresponding well with the securitization framework and meeting the second criterion. It is clearly controversial and therefore needs justification, which they create by framing nationalism (European fragmentation) and xenophobia as a threat towards the EU cooperation and the refugees.

# 5. CONCLUSIONS

This dissertation demonstrates that the 'refugee crisis' in 2015, and migration related to it, has been securitized by the British government, but not by the German. In the UK, the *'uncontrolled immigration'* is framed as a security threat and the migrant a burden to the British society - to labour market, to border security and to welfare (May 2015e). This legitimizes controversial measures such as restricted asylum and tougher border control.

Thanks to a methodological openness in regards to how securitization can occur in relation to migration, I was able to detect an unexpected form of securitization in the German discourse, where the security concerns are raised not against but *for* the migrants, instead picturing xenophobia as a security threat, and nationalism and fragmentation a threat towards the European values. The European project is at stake, which is justifying the need to act with all possible measures. Thus, the German government rather describes a *humanitarian* and *European crisis* than a migration crisis. However, since detecting other kinds of securitization process was not the main focus, this issue of a possible *'securitization of nationalism'* calls for future investigation.

Additionally, the emphasis on some kind of 'crisis' seems to be necessary for - or vastly facilitating - a securitization process. The German discourse went from 'tragedy' to 'historical trial' when the securitizing move occurred. Consequently, this articulation of urgency and an exception did not exist before the escalation of the 'crisis'. This contributes valuable insights to the theory: security rhetoric can be used to justify a stricter migration

policy, but also to legitimize extraordinary actions in favour of migrants and to protect the EU.

The study confirms that securitizing moves are used by the current governments to legitimize their specific actions in connection to the 'refugee crisis'. An important difference is that the two governmental discourses categorise the same group of people differently. Briefly, *asylum seekers* in Germany are *illegal migrants* in the UK. Thus, the antagonism around the 'refugee' marks a continuing relevance of a discursive approach to security. Security is an intersubjective process, and 'migration is what states make of it'.

The identity analysis shows clearly different dynamics in the two cases. In the British discourse, the group towards which they show loyalty is much more coherent, meaning the British people. In Germany, this is more diverse, and identification towards different levels is shown: the humanity and refugees, the German people and the European Union. These are social signals to the national population, migrants and other states, that has an impact on international politics and affects the migration pattern. The identity interrogation thus corresponded well with their response to the situation, strengthening a continuing relevance of the speech act approach and the social constructivist dimensions of securitization theory.

Finally, this study highlights a notable difference towards earlier research, since there are no explicit references to terrorism. This supports Boswells (2007) claim that the image of desperate refugees and well-organized terrorist network does correspond badly, making it impossible for the governments to create a causal linkage between them. The 9/11 terrorist linkage is possibly 'out-dated' as a legitimate reason, stressing the need for updating the research field concerning securitization of migration.

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# APPENDIX

## ENDNOTES AND ORIGINAL QUOTES

[i] Germany granted asylum of 174'545 refugees between January – September 2015(BAMF 2015). During the same period, the UK had granted asylum to a total of 2'085 refugees (German Federal Ministry of the Interior 2014). UK have historically taken in refugees in moments of crisis and war and accommodated 10'000 jews after the Kristallnacht (HC Deb 2015-09-08).

[iii] The British Minister responsible for integration is the Minister of Community and Social care. Among all her governmental work, nothing concerns migration. GOV.UK. (n.d.). Retrieved December 9, 2015.

[iv] On September 8, 2015, an Emergency Debate was held on the subject of the 'refugee crisis', which is a debate 'in the House of Commons on a matter that should have urgent consideration' (Parliament.uk 2015).

[v] The government is focusing on 'the smuggling and criminal aspects of the crisis' (Brokenshire September 16, 2015)

[vi] '(…) this Bill will build on the government's work since 2010 to crack down on abuse and build an immigration system that truly benefits Britain – by deterring illegal migrants from coming and making it harder for those already here to live and work in the UK' (Brokenshire 2015)

[vii] 'It is often said, often by advocates of open door immigration, that Britain is by definition a country of immigrants. In fact compared to the countries of the new world, a compared by the countries of Europe with their shifting land borders, we have until recently always been a country of remarkable population stability. The people, who have moved here down the generations, have played a massive part in making this country what it is. But we need our immigration system to continue that British tradition of gradual moderate sensible change. We must control who comes to our country. That is how as a country we have always been able to show great responsibility to the people who need our help in their darkest moments' (May 2015e).

[viii] 'For those economic migrants seeking a better life, we will continue to work to break the link between getting on a boat and getting settlement in Europe, discouraging those who do not have a genuine claim from embarking on these perilous and sometimes lethal journeys. For those genuine refugees fleeing civil war, we will act with compassion and continue to provide sanctuary' (Cameron 2015c).

[ix] In the end of October, the Dublin regulation was reintroduced by home minister Thomas de Maizière.

[x] 'Und wir werden drittens – das ist in diesen Tagen das Allerwichtigste – alles tun, um zu verhindern, dass weitere Opfer im Mittelmeer, vor unserer Haustür, auf quälendste Art und Weise umkommen. Das vereinbart sich nicht mit unseren Werten. Um Glaubwürdigkeit zu haben, aber auch, um unseren Werten, die wir hier zu Hause bei uns pflegen, zu entsprechen, müssen wir unsere Anstrengungen verstärken.' (Merkel 2015a)

[xi] 'Es ist von einem deutschen Wohnzimmer heraus, leicht mal so ein Wort wie Wirtschaftsflüchtling in den Mund so nehmen. Wir sollten und überlegen was für Not, was für wirtschaftlichen Not oft Mals dahinten stecken können. Deswegen ist es so wichtig dass wir legale Zugangsmöglichkeiten schaffen wollen' (Özoguz 2015b)

[xii] Deutschland ist ein starkes Land, und das Motiv muss sein, wir haben so vieles geschafft, so wir schaffen das. Wir schaffen das, obwohl es etwas in Wege steht, muss es überwunden werden, muss daran gearbeitet werden und der Bund wird alles in seiner Macht stehende machen (...) um genau das durchzusetzen.'

[xiii] 'Historische Bewährungsprobe' Merkel 2015d

[xiv] 'Wir nennen es ein Nationaler Kraftanstrengung für eine Nationale Gesamtaufgabe' (Merkel 2015b)

[xv] 'Recht von Asyl - es gibt keine Alternative' (Merkel 2015c)

[xvi] 'Akute Notsituation' (Merkel 2015c)

[xvii] 'Ich glaube, wir sollten nicht als Erstes wieder die Diskussion darüber führen, wo die Gefahr liegt, sondern auch schauen: Wo ist die Chance?'(2015b)

[xviii] 'Ansonsten - das glaube ich schon, wenn wir über das nächste große Problem, nämlich die Flüchtlinge, reden - gibt es ein hohes Maß an Übereinstimmung darüber, dass Italien zu entlasten ist. Man kann nicht sagen: Alle Flüchtlinge, die dort ankommen, müssen, nur weil sie jetzt über das Mittelmeer kommen, von Italien behalten werden. Das Dublin-Abkommen funktioniert nicht mehr so, wie es einmal war, weil sich die Situationen verändert haben. So wird es wichtig sein, dass sich jeder von uns für Europa und für die Gemeinsamkeit einsetzt, und dann kommen wir schon voran.' (Merkel 2015b)

[xix] 'Diese gemeinsame Geschichte ist das Fundament für eine gute, funktionierende Einwanderungsgesellschaft und eine neue, gemeinsame deutsche Identität.' (Özoguz 2015a)

[xx] 'Wenn wir uns in Notsituationen anfangen uns zu entschuldigen, dann ist es nicht mein Land. Und ich glaube das es in der Impuls das richtige war.' (Merkel 2015c)

[xxi] 'Menschen die Flüchtlinge hassen, hassen auch unsere Land.' (Maizière 2015e)

[xxii] Merkel says that Islam naturally belongs to Germany. Migrants and 'guest workers' have already changed our country. 'I have stated many times that Germany is an immigration country.'[xxii] (Merkel 2015b)

[xxiii] '(…) ein kostbarer Schatz' (Merkel 2015c).

[xxiv] Rechtsextremen Pöbeleien muss mit aller Härte des Rechtsstaats entgegengetreten werden' (Maizière 2015d)