



UNIVERSITY OF GOTHENBURG

Department of political science

How important is winning?

Democratic experience and system support in young democracies

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Author: Mira Lindner

Supervisor: Georgios Xezonakis

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Abstract

Research has shown that there is a sizable difference between new and old democracies in terms of the effect of 'winning' on system support. This study traces the *development* of the winner and loser gap, in relation to system support, exclusively for young democracies. Based on findings from previous research and theory I develop and test one hypothesis regarding these dynamics. My analysis focuses on 21 countries that have become democracies in the third wave of democratization or later. Findings from multilevel models indicate that, in accordance with my main hypothesis, the winner/loser gap tends to decrease in new democracies overtime.

Keywords: System support, winner/loser, new democracies.

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1. Introduction

In “the last decade, democracy has become virtually the only political model with global appeal, no matter what culture” (Inglehart/ Norris 2003: 70). This makes acquiring a deeper understanding of the inner workings of democracy an important research endeavor. One of the key pillars of liberal democracy are free and fair elections. However, ‘as democratic elections are designed to generate unequal outcomes’ it is important to trace citizens’ attitudes towards democracy based on the outcomes of these elections. Significant gaps in system evaluation between electoral winners and electoral losers carry important implications for a country’s democratic development.

Past studies have shown that this gap does exist (see Anderson et al. 2005). As a general rule those that, on election day, find themselves in the political majority (winner) tend to be more satisfied with democracy than those who are not represented in the government coalition (losers) (Blais/ Gellineau 2007). One of the key findings in this literature is that this ‘gap’ in satisfaction (or system support¹) is moderated by political institutions. For example, losers in majoritarian systems are less satisfied with democracy than losers in proportional “systems” (Anderson/ Guillory 1997). This past work has focused mainly on established democracies and gave little attention to new democracies. Anderson et al. (2005) shifted the focus to some extent when they compared the winner and loser gap in old and new democracies. Anderson's seminal book on the topic, showed that in younger democracies the winner-loser gap tends to be more pronounced than in older democracies. However, the book and multiple papers, reviewing and addressing similar questions have not yet touched the issue of how the winner and loser gap *develops* across time in new democracies. The goal of this paper is to address this question, as it is especially important to trace attitudes towards the system in younger (and possibly more fragile) democracies. The issue here is if the winner and loser gap, which has proven to be wider in young than in old democracies, remains as wide, increases or decreases over time. A decrease of the gap would

¹ In the remainder I use the terms ‘satisfaction’ ‘system support’ or ‘trust towards the system’ interchangeably. While I appreciate conceptual differences between these terms, for the purposes of this dissertation, I use them to indicate the degree of favorable attitudes/evaluations of the democratic system as a whole.

suggest that overall public opinion becomes more 'at ease' and trusting towards the political system indicating an increase in democratic support overall. If the opposite were to be the case, alarm bells would ring regarding the future of democratic institutions and governance in young democracies. As recent history has shown, countries which have newly become democracies often struggle to establish the institutions and bring about the governance outcomes that would make 'democracy work'. This is likely to be reflected in heterogeneous levels of system support.

This dissertation does not only contribute to the rich literature on winner and losers but also on the general academic debate on the determinants of system support and its development over time. The exclusive focus on third wave democracies and the time component that is integral to my analysis, largely missing from the literature thus far, will make a good contribution to the literature on the dynamics of system support in old and new democracies. I develop one main hypothesis in this paper which is later tested using World Value Survey data in a set of 21 Third Wave (and later) democracies. Findings from multilevel models indicate that, in accordance with my main hypothesis, the winner/loser gap tends to decrease in new democracies overtime.

The paper is divided up in the following parts: the literature review will give an overview of the relevant literature and create a base for the theoretical contribution. In the theoretical part will I use a learning/ socialisation argument to develop expectations regarding system support between winners and losers in new democracies. This is followed by the methodical discussion of the variables, which leads into the results section. In the concluding discussion I reflect on the results and the overall research project.

2. Literature review

Most studies on democratic system support or legitimacy are driven by the classical work of David Easton (1965). Political systems are viewed as open system, which is exposed to influences which are driven by other systems. For a system to survive it has to have the capability to respond to those influences (positive or negative) and the system has to simultaneously “adapt to the conditions under which they find themselves” (Easton 1965: 18). Hence citizens expect that their government responds appropriately in most circumstances, with taking into consideration if the input is from negative or positive nature. Political support (by citizens) or the absence of it can emerge in the forms of attitudes or behaviours, and will affect the political system. According to Easton two levels of citizen support emerge out of this basic design, the first is specific support, which focuses on the appointed and elected officeholders, who have to install and implement political decisions within the state. Diffuse support is expressing more symbolic emotions towards the states and its agencies (Norris 2011). Specific support should be affected by governmental performance, that is ‘the perceived decisions, policies, actions, utterances or the general style of ... authorities’ (Easton 1975: 437). Diffuse support, “representing as it does attachment to political objects for their own sake, will not easily dislodged because of current dissatisfaction with what the government does” (Easton 1975: 445). Yet the political system relies on a balance of both types of citizen support. To have a balanced political system over a longer period of time, the system counts on a reserve of diffuse supporters. They keep the support stable in periods where the government performance is insufficient, even if it is only for a short-period of time. If a change in diffuse support occurs, it should take place slowly as its origin is found in socialisation and social learning (Easton 1957, 1965, 1975). However, a lack of specific support over a longer period of time can provoke as well a general notion of dissatisfaction with the political system. Other scholars have argued along similar lines; they see specific support as a necessity to keep a government in power, while diffuse support is required to uphold the political system in the country as the primary form of government (Dalton 2002). Yet Easton’s differentiation between diffuse and specific support has mainly been successful on a conceptual level, however not on an empirical level. The issue lays within the surveys, as they fail to measure diffuse and

specific support the Eastonian way, as they measure some form of support. Further empirical issues originate through the empirical assessment of the relationship between citizens and state (Küchler 1991).

Since this concept first appeared, a wide variety of factors have been identified that could influence how people perceive their political system, or what affects system support in general. This body of research on system support can be divided into two main strands. First, research taking 'a macro-perspective emphasizing formal system properties, and a micro-view emphasizing citizens' attitudes and actions' (Weatherford 1992: 149). The macro-perspective focuses on the proper allocation of democratic institutions which lead to accountability, responsiveness, and representation. These pillars are strongly associated with system support (Anderson et. al, 2005; see also Lipset 1960; Pitkin 1967; Huntington 1968; Dahl 1971; Lijphart 1984). Other studies have concluded that constitutional arrangements significantly related attitudes as well (e.g Lijphart 1999). For example, citizens tend to be more satisfied in consensual systems than in majoritarian systems (Lijphart 1999; Anderson and Guillory 1997). Further, findings suggest that polarization across the party system affects satisfaction with democracy (Ezrow/ Xezonakis, 2011). Also the economic situation in a country can influence the overall support and trust towards the political system (Norris 1999c, Clark et al. 1993, Gilley 2006). Hence if a country's financial situation is rather poor and will continue to be so in the near future, citizen will be less satisfied with the system until the financial situation turns (Rosenstone 1982).

Second, micro-studies concentrate on the individual-level and are concerned with the underlying attitudes towards democratic political systems as well as the citizens' participation in the political process (Anderson et. al, 2005, Lipset 1960; Almond/ Verba 1963; Barnes et al. 1979; Jennings et al. 1990). Long held beliefs and values (political culture an al Almond/ Verba, 1963) which are transmitted through socialization are important components of system support (Norris 1999a; see also Ingelhart 1990). This body of research has established that that citizens, who are more engaged within the political system (both on a psychological or in participatory faction) or those who have

greater trust in the maintenance of the system tend also to demonstrate higher levels of support (Finkel 1985; Anderson/ Guillory 1997). As citizens are not fond of political change (Whitefield/ Evans 1994) governmental stability could also increase satisfaction with democracy when the government responds in their view appropriately. The democratic political system can also be affected through citizens' desire to predict political process, thus if citizens can to some extent foresee the process, hence voters can predict if their party will win or lose, an increase in satisfaction should emerge (Evans/ Whitefield 1993; Whitefield/ Evans 1994; Anderson/ O'Connor 2000).

The winner loser debate

The regular holding of elections, is one of the crucial institutional features which distinctively marks a democracy as a political system. Therefore, it should not be surprising that the literature on legitimacy and political involvement suggests that elections have the capability to enhance legitimacy, through voters' participation in the electoral process (Anderson et al. 2005). The electoral process is to some extent an effect of system support as voting is not only a way for citizens to influence governmental processes but it is as well a way for the government to strengthen citizens' involvement in the system. Citizen engagement is viewed by participatory political theorists as a key element in increasing people's awareness and to nurture a democratic citizen (Pateman 1970; Thompson 1970). Ginsberg (1982) counters by arguing that elections have the capacity to tie citizens to the political system and strengthen government control. Leaving the discussion on the normative interpretation on the effects of elections on citizens to the side, a number of empirical studies have shown that people's attitudes towards their government have become more positive after having participated in elections (Clarke/ Acock 1989; Clarke/ Kornberg 1992).

Elections, however have outcomes and carry specific implications for distinct groups. Research on system support suggests that differences in satisfaction/ support levels relate to an individual's status as a political 'winner' or 'loser' (Anderson and Guillory

1997). As a general rule those that, on election day, find themselves in the political majority (winner) tend to be more satisfied with democracy than those who are not represented in the government coalition (losers) (Blais/ Gellineau 2007). One of the key findings in this literature is that this 'gap' in satisfaction (or system support²) is moderated by political institutions. For example, losers in majoritarian systems are less satisfied with democracy than losers in proportional "systems" (Anderson/ Guillory 1997). Anderson and Guillory (1997) argued that "the nature of a country's institutions and status as part of the political majority or minority interact in their effect on satisfaction with democracy" (1997: 68). Electoral minorities in a consensual system are better protected as the system provides the minority with a voice in the decision making process, compared to a majoritarian system where winners tend to gain the absolute say and are in a position to impose their will on those in the minority. Hence the winner loser gap in consensual systems is smaller (see also Lijphart 1998).

The classic work by Anderson and Guillory has been appraised and further refined by a number of researchers. We know, that the degree of satisfaction for the electorate during elections is affected by the expectation of victory or defeat (Blais/ Gelineau 2007; Sargent 2002). Research has also shown that electoral losers are in general more dissatisfied with the performance of the government and more interested in a political change (Bowler/ Donovan 2000; Bowler et al. 2002). Overestimation of the electoral prospects of one's own party during the campaign can create 'surprised' losers which have an even more negative view of the democratic system (Hollander, 2014; Blais/ Gelineau 2007). A negative stand also emerges if the so-called 'loser' is too long in the minority; it either leads to disillusionment with the political regime or citizen dropout (Anderson et al. 2005). Especially in systems where the winning and losing concept is relatively new, losers have to learn how to lose (Anderson/ Mendes 2006), if that does not occur the loser will continue to be more negative with regard to the democratic

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institutions. As the loser tends to be more critical towards the system, satisfaction with the overall system can be boosted by an electoral win (Singh et al. 2011).

Furthermore, party identification also seems to be a sustainable component of the winning and losing concept among others. Singh et al. (2012) suggest that the enduring psychological attachments to political parties can have a positive effect on the individual's satisfaction with the government if the preferred party wins. The psychological component has to be taken into consideration when discussing the gap; for example, when voters can predict a negative electoral outcome in advance, voters who predicted correctly (their party would lose) tend to express higher levels of satisfaction than those who were surprised by the loss (Brehm 1956, 1962; Stricker 1964; Cigler/ Getter 1977; Joslyn 1998). Moreover, people try to maintain a certain consistency in their beliefs and attitudes (Festinger 1957, 1964; Abelson/ Rosenberg 1958; McGuire 1968) yet they develop expectations towards the system over time. Given that this growth of expectations across time occurs, the citizens will start to believe in the predictability of the political process which therefore affects their trust towards the democratic system (Evens/ Whitefield 1993; Anderson/ O'Conner 2000). Ruiz-Rufino (2013) steps away from the electoral minority and majority discussions and puts forward the idea to solely focus on ethnic majorities within the research field. The downside of this process is that it is only applicable in multi ethnic contexts.

Finally, the effect of winning or losing on system support seems to be moderated by an individual's' experience with democracy. The argument here is that the effect will depend on a socialisation processes. For example, there has been some discussion on how the level of satisfaction can vary between young and old democracies and Anderson et. al (2005) has shown that the winner and loser gap actually differs across settings. As citizens of young democracies have not yet had the opportunity to 'acclimatise' to the winning and losing process their inexperience can lead to a more zero sum conception of politics and therefore to less trust towards the system. On the other hand, in older democracies citizens with mature party systems, strong output institutions and citizens long process of socialization in democratic politics this gap tends to be smaller.

These latter findings are what motivates this research project. Findings above suggest democratic experience is crucial in determining levels of system support. However, we know very little about how the latter develops overtime in new democracies. More specifically I am interested here in the tracking of the winner and loser gap in an effort to provide an appraisal and a democratic 'health check' that to my knowledge is missing from the literature thus far.

3. Theory and Hypotheses - The development of attitudes towards the system in new democracies.

The Anderson et al. (2005) study presented above suggests that in nascent democracies 'losing' (and 'winning') is interpreted in a different way than in old democracies. The question that arises, and forms the main question of this dissertation, is if and how this 'interpretation' changes overtime. Initially, support levels between the two groups might diverge due to a number factors. The sizable amount of new losers, for example, could now be drawn from a pool of voters who would have been winners in the old system (Anderson et al. 2005). Hence those former winners are now less satisfied with the system as their interests are no longer a priority, as it would have been in the former non democratic state. Anderson et al. (2005) displayed this in their empirical testing with the example of former soviet countries (105 -106).

Another factor could be that especially the first elections in a young democracy are often contests between different ideologies with divergent political, social and economic visions (Anderson et al. 2005). Those first elections are also power struggles as parties strive for control as they are the ones setting up the system and make decisions on how the country should be run (Boix 1999). The governance outputs originated by various political camps can also influence the winner and loser gap (Anderson et al. 2005). In all these cases parties and voters might be engaged in more zero sum conception of politics which will be evident in their attitudes and behaviour. Consequently, voters of

young democracies who do not belong to the majority feel even more left out by the system.

For levels of support between winner and losers to converge a learning or socialization process needs to take place. At least this is where the theoretical argument and empirical findings in the comparison between young and old democracies suggest (Anderson et al. 2005).

The learning processes can occur on two different levels, the first is on a system level. On a cross national level differences can be produced by “variations in political cultures and histories, as well as the novelty of democratic institutions, that may attenuate or intensify experience of losing” (Anderson et al. 2005: 91)

The second takes place at an individual level. As individuals develop their expectations towards the political system across time, citizens' ability to predict the political process should consolidate and therefore the citizens' attitude towards the system should change accordingly (Evans/ Whitefield 1993; Whitefield/ Evans 1994; Anderson/ O'Connor 2000). Citizens in a new democracy are forced to learn democratic procedures from the ground up, and they have to grasp democracy under conditions of uncertainty which can be very irritating for electoral losers. Yet it is expected that as time passes citizens become more comfortable with system change and therefore the losers become more accepting about their loss (Whitefield/ Evans 1994). Ideally, after the socialization process occurred, there would be no significant gap in terms of democratic satisfaction between electoral winners and losers.

There are additional arguments that suggest that in the long run citizens will feel less threatened by electoral outcomes. Losers are likely to feel heard by the government, and experience the protection and inclusion that the democratic system affords to minorities. To have a constant increase of satisfaction among sophisticated citizens, the presence of functional and fair political institutions is, of course, of importance. Those institutions are also important during the socialization phase as they, along with the other factors

positively influence the learning curve. Greater stability is likely to occur as time passes: “Constitutions that are observed and last for a long time are those that reduce the stakes of political battles. Pretenders to office can expect to reach it; losers can expect to come back” (Przeworski 1991: 36).

Citizens’ perception of the role and outcome of elections can vary as it depends on their position on the learning curve. Trust among the citizens will be higher the longer democracy has been a status quo because as they learned that there will be further elections. With the experience of recurring elections and the peaceful transfer of power, citizens in older democracies will eventually come to believe that any kind of “election outcome will not fundamentally reorient the relations of power or the outcomes produced by the system” (Anderson et al. 2005: 93). Simply put - losing can be experienced without major backlash towards the system itself.


Following the above discussion, the desirable (and to some extent expected from theory) path for a new democracy would be that the winner and loser gap narrows over time. Of course both sides will never be completely synchronized in terms of satisfaction yet it would be desirable that the attitudes of the occasional losers do not deviate dramatically from the occasional winners. This pattern can be observed in most of the more established democracies as citizens acquired the knowledge that even if they find themselves in the political minority that their interests will be represented to some extent and their rights respected.

Therefore:

H1 - As years of democratic experience increase, the effect of winning/losing on system support will decrease.

Figure 1 below presents this hypothesis in a stylised fashion.

Figure 1. Winning/Losing and system support in New Democracies



T1, T2, and T3 refer to years of democratic experience, hence to the length of time country has been a democracy. The lines represent the effect of winning at these three different time points. At very early age this effect appears steeper, but that line flattens the more experience with democracy is acquired.

I recognise here that there are arguments (and to some extent empirical findings) that contest the above rationale. The initial dissatisfaction among citizens does not have to dribble away as would be expected. It could remain due to an overall cynicism towards the government, depending on what the new political system actually delivers or how successfully it aggregates diverging interests. If the country remains shaken by high levels of corruption and weak institutions of governance one would expect that the course of events will not resemble exactly what has been described before and it is likely that will affect winners and losers in a similar way. Still one would expect that in the adverse scenario the gap will either increase or remain constant. The test that I perform below will provide opportunities to test whether these alternatives are a more accurate description of the dynamics of system support in young democracies.

4. Methodical discussion

Case selection

Taking into consideration the discussion by Bogaards (2012) on using democracy indexes to define the level of democracy for one country, the paper uses a combined filter of Freedom House and the polity index for its case selection. The countries analyzed have to fulfill four requirements; have 3.5 or higher on the freedom house index, a 6 or higher on the polity index, belong to the third wave of democratization or later and have uninterrupted years of democracy in the period under investigation. As the latest update on the polity score was from 2013 and 2015 for the freedom house index, there were some cases where the country was below 6 according to the polity score but above a 3.5 on the freedom house index, in that case it was still considered. The freedom house index was weighted more heavily in this case as it had comparatively newer and more accurate data. Twenty-one countries from the WVS satisfied the conditions outlined above (see Appendix C for information on which countries are included in the sample).

The Dependent Variable:

System support has been operationalized by researchers through the use of various survey items. The most frequently used is 'the satisfaction with democracy' or SWD. While this item is heavily criticized in the literature, there are many instances of it being useful and accurate. Some papers use SWD to measure 'regime performance' (Dalton 2004; Norris 1999a; 1999b). Linde and Ekman raise the point that to measure support for the principles of democracy, SWD is not the right indicator as "it is an item that taps the level of support for how the democratic regime works in practice" (2003: 405). Concerns are also expressed as the indicator correlates with certain measures of support like executive approval or partisan preferences (Canache et al. 2001; Klingemann 1999; Kornberg and Clarke 1994). Other proponents of SWD dismiss the possibility, for SWD as an indicator for system support, as it taps into the support for authorities (Fuchs et al. 1995; Lockerbie 1993; Toka 1995). However, others interpret SWD as an item that sums different indicators and therefore 'provides a useful overall

summary measure of satisfaction with existing democratic political systems' (Clark et al. 1993 pp.1003). On the side of critics Norris argues that SWD as a measurement item should be avoided as it can mean different things to different respondents and Rose et al. challenge SWD as respondents might vary in the standards applied when judging satisfaction (1998). Further critics show that the empirical evidence which exist and links SWD with political institutions refer mainly to Western European democracies (for example, Finkel et al. 1989; Seligson 1993; Lopez-Pina et al.1994; Rohrschneider 1999) and leave the new democratic component untouched. Therefore, further investigation is warranted to ascertain if SWD is equally important to comprehend citizens' satisfaction with political institutions in new democracies (Ruiz-Rufino 2013).

Yet Anderson (2002) argues that even though strong correlations between several survey questions suggest conceptual overlapping, this does not mean that the different measures compute exactly the same theoretical phenomenon. Others argue along the same line; Ezrow/ Xezonakis (2014) show that SWD remains a useful 'hybrid' indicator that measures important aspects of system support. To sum up, 'in the absence of a better item, the satisfaction with democracy measure is a reasonable (albeit imperfect) indicator that we can use to test our theories' (Anderson 2002 pp. 10).

Even though the concept and the usage of SWD is heavily discussed, no real adequate solution is proposed on how to capture SWD therefore this research paper will use it as a variable by taking into consideration some of the criticism and trying to optimize it as best as possible. The standard question on SWD in the WVS would be "Satisfaction with the way democracy develops", however this question was only asked in two waves and therefore a compatible solution had to be found. Canache et al. discuss repeatedly that the standard SWD variable correlates with three different levels of support; "support for incumbent authorities, system support, and for democracy as a form of government" (Canache et al. 2001: 515). This correlation could be due to respondents' misinterpretation or judgment of the standard SWD question. As Canache et al. perform a number of test to perceive if SWD touches those three levels of support they find that SWD tapes in all three levels of support. This means that in some aspect each of those levels measure some aspects of SWD. From a theoretical argumentation the system support option would be the closest, Canache et al. include confidence in parliament,

armed forces, civil service, police, judicial system and political system. Further Magalhães (2014) discussed further options on how to measure satisfaction with democracy without using the standard question. The paper presented that a combined variables held best up in multiple test where the variable was compared to two other options. The combined variable incorporated “Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections?”, “Having experts, not governments, make decisions according to what they think is best for the country.”, and “Having the army rule.”.

From an analytical point of view an even better way to measure system support, hence citizens’ support towards the government, would be to use relevant questions in the WVS survey to form indices that would capture the concept I am interested in. In this case I have opted for two indices that conform to established practice in the literature and have used by other researchers in the past. The first is based on Norris (1999a, 1999b) and Canache et al (2001) arguments and combines citizens’ confidence in political parties, government and parliament. The second variable incorporates three more: confidence in the civil service, police force and armed forces (for a total of six). The variable along Norris argument ranges from 3 (being very dissatisfied with democracy) to 12 (being very satisfied with democracy). The variable which incorporates 6 variances of confidence towards state institutions ranges from 6 (being very dissatisfied with democracy) to 24 (being very satisfied with democracy). From this point forward I will refer to this as SFD (Support for Democracy). SFD is, I believe, a better fitting term to describe the areas that the variables are measuring. Further information on the variables can be found in Appendix A and B.

The Independent Variables

For this study the independent variables are: *electoral winner/ loser* (the variable of interest) *and interest in politics, economic performance evaluations, and demographic characteristics* as control variables. Each variable is discussed below.

Electoral Winner or Loser

From a theoretical standpoint winning or losing is about an individual's allegiance to the party in or out of power. As discussed in the framework political allegiance and electoral outcomes are connected, as the feeling of winning and losing is linked with an individual's electoral choice. To examine the general effects of winning or losing with regard to individual attitudes towards the government, the outcomes of elections have to be matched with the answers given by individuals on their political choice.

The categorization of an individual as an electoral winner or loser can be achieved through the support of a survey question that asks the respondent which party the individual voted for at the last national elections. According to Anderson and colleagues (2005) if that question is not asked in the survey, a question asking the respondent which party they would vote for if there would be an election can be used as a proxy. The responses given will then be linked to the information about which party or parties controlled the government at the time the survey was conducted. Therefore, the individual who responded was aligned with the party/ parties in government are categorized as being in the majority (winners). Those whose answers were the individual would have voted for another party is categorized as being in the minority (loser).

Yet the question is open to measurement issues as voters are likely to falsify their statements. They are more likely to say that they voted for the winning party than stating which party they actually voted for. A further measurement obstacle is that the question can be formulated in two ways, the first is which party they voted for in the latest election and the second which party they intended to vote for in the upcoming election. Both questions have issues but best would be to combine the data. However, most surveys which include questions about voter's choice and questions about beliefs in government include only one of the two possibilities on voter choice question. Due to the data availability, the winner/ losers indicator is based either on the past vote or the intentional vote (Anderson et al. 2005). The WVS questions the participants about which party they would vote for at the moment the survey was conducted, yet due to often long time intervals between the last election and the survey, preferences could have changed.

Based on the literature it is expected to see a clear gap between winners and losers in terms of their level of satisfaction towards democracy (Anderson/ Guillory, 1997; Anderson et al 2005).

Interest in Politics

Interest in politics is another frequently used indicator in models of system support. Interested citizens are likely to be more informed. Within the WVS there are two possible proxies for this variable. One is measuring the general political interest while the other is how important politics is in the life of the participant. Both options have some theoretical shortcomings, but both could be used, therefore a simple frequency analysis was conducted to gain an overview on the distribution of the answers. The result showed that they are pretty much equally distributed, yet the variable - "Interest in Politics" showed to have a better distribution and is to some extent closer to the theoretical argument therefore this is the one I used. Former studies have shown that citizens, who are interested in politics, tend to show higher levels of satisfaction than those who are generally not interested in politics (Finkel 1985; Anderson and Guillory 1997). Therefore, a positive relationship between 'interest in politics' and 'satisfaction with democracy' is to be expected.

Perception of economic performance

Citizens' evaluation of the system output is key for every study which examines satisfaction with democracy. Performance evaluation influences the reputation of political institutions and the political system as a whole. Leaning on Anderson and Guillory (1997) paper, which argues that economic performance as a proxy for system output can affect citizens' satisfaction with democracy. They further argue that those survey participants who evaluate the economic performance negatively are likely to be less satisfied with the democratic processes. It is expected that the overall effect of economic satisfaction on SFD would be positive. Anderson and Guillory measure economic performance on a sociotropic and egocentric level, however the WVS data only covers the socio tropical approach.

Demographic Variables

Lastly, I will control for standard sociodemographic variables; Age, gender, education, employment status (Appendix A). It is to expect that with age citizens become more supportive towards democracy as they experienced democratic socialisation. It is anticipated that the educational variables show that citizens with low education are more supportive than those with higher levels of education. Similar findings are expected for employment, that those with employment are more supportive than those who are unemployed.


The test of my hypothesis will be done through the use of an interaction term that is included in the model. This interaction term is comprised by a measure of a country's experience with democracy and the status of winner and loser. In this case the age of democracy in years is the variable that is used to gauge experience with democracy. The sign of this interaction compared to the main effects of the winner loser variables (and to some degree but not wholly its significance) will give an indication as to whether H1 is supported, as explained in the results section.

5. Results

Does the winner and loser gap narrow with the years of democratic experience in new democracies? Figure 2 displays preliminary evidence on an aggregate level. Some countries support the hypothesis while in others the gap remains stable or even increases. To investigate how the winner and loser gap in relation to support for democracy develops over time, plotting the levels of system support for the two groups under investigation for one of the two dependent variables (the combined index of trust for political parties, the parliament and government). The graphs track the gap across time, hence they combine data from 1989 to 2014 (6 waves). For some countries there has been a WVS for each of the five waves, while for others a WVS questionnaire has been fielded only once or twice. Hence countries with one wave have been excluded as no timeline can be established. Also it is harder to explore the true behaviour of the gap with countries which only have been questioned twice, if compared to countries which

have been questioned more often. It is more challenging to predict the general behaviour of the gap, with countries that only participated in two waves, yet a general sense is still given.

Figure 2. Winner-Loser Gap across time by country



As it can be observed in the display above some countries behave exactly as suggested in the hypothesis (eg. Colombia, Uruguay and South Africa). However, there are cases where the gap first narrows and then widens again (eg. Argentina and Chile); it is difficult to speculate why this the case but internal political issues could be held responsible for this trend. In cases where only two waves have been included in the analysis very mixed results can be observed, in some cases the gap increases dramatically after being relatively small (Taiwan and Albania). The immense change could suggest highly polarising political issues during elections or democratic failure. However, there are cases where the gap closed or remained constant (Georgia, Indonesia and Brazil),

however in the cases of Indonesia and Brazil the gap is very narrow which would support hypothesis 0.

Nevertheless, there is one case which behave rather strangely: in theory it is to be expected that losers are general less satisfied with democracy than winners, yet in the case of Mexico losers are at some points more satisfied than winners. During the time where the losers were more supportive of the government was in the course of the legislation of PAN, in the legislation periods before and after PRI was in the majority. During the PAN legislation there was still a high number of PRI supporters which to some extent explains the reversal of winners and losers' satisfaction. An alternative explanation is that that PAN did not behave as voters hoped for and therefore were less satisfied with democracy.

5.1 The effects of individual and country-level variables on satisfaction with democracy

The analysis resulted in two tables; the first displays the data analysis with the SFD variable that was formed by the more parsimonious index used to in Figure 2 (three questions about confidence about political parties, parliament and government, or what one would call 'input' institutions). In the second table an identical analysis, mainly designed as a robustness check, has as a dependent variable the index formed of confidence in police, government, parliament, civil service and armed forces ('input' and 'output' institutions together). Both variables have their limitations as noted earlier but they afford a more efficient test of my hypotheses.

The following table presents results from the first dependent variable.

Table 1. Multilevel regression analysis of satisfaction with democracy (SWD_Norris)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Winner	0.826 ^{***} (0.148)	0.802 ^{***} (0.143)	1.279 ^{***} (0.391)
Age of democracy		-0.0291 ^{**} (0.0126)	-0.0182 (0.0139)
Interest in Politics		0.444 ^{***} (0.0264)	0.439 ^{***} (0.0238)
Gender1		-0.0491 [*] (0.0280)	-0.0459 (0.0286)
Not completed elementary education		0.440 ^{***} (0.0881)	0.415 ^{***} (0.0754)
Completed elementary education		0.249 ^{***} (0.0594)	0.235 ^{***} (0.0548)
Not completed university education		-0.0331 (0.0513)	-0.0357 (0.0505)
Completed university education		-0.205 ^{***} (0.0524)	-0.201 ^{***} (0.0495)
Unemployed		0.0925 (0.0622)	0.0816 (0.0565)
Age		-0.000479 (0.00207)	-0.000243 (0.00184)
Satisfaction with financial situation		0.0343 ^{**} (0.0142)	0.0368 ^{***} (0.0122)
Winner*Age of democracy			-0.0300 (0.0186)
Constant	6.289 ^{***} (0.108)	5.538 ^{***} (0.250)	5.363 ^{***} (0.245)
Country Level Variance	0.764 ^{***} (0.0586)	0.698 ^{***} (0.0604)	0.703 ^{***} (0.0597)
Individ level Variance	2.085 ^{***} (0.0353)	2.039 ^{***} (0.0339)	2.036 ^{***} (0.0331)
AIC	246950.2	208858.6	208728.5
BIC	246986.0	208981.8	208860.4
Waves	5	5	5
Countries	21	21	21
Observations	57262	48932	48932

Standard errors in parentheses
^{*} $p < 0.10$, ^{**} $p < 0.05$, ^{***} $p < 0.01$

The results of the multilevel regression analysis confirm the existence of the gap. Even when controlled for factors that can influence people's attitudes towards the government in all three models winners' express higher satisfaction/support than losers as suggested by the positively signed and significant coefficient for the winner variable. Model 1 shows a simple bivariate analysis with only the winner and loser variable. In Model 2 it can be observed that the coefficient remains significant and correctly signed after the control variables have been added. The models further show that survey participants who have completed university education are more dissatisfied with the political system than participants with basic education. This pattern can be observed frequently when education is used as a control factor in SFD analysis (for example Anderson et al. 2005: 104). The analysis also finds that there is a positive effect on satisfaction with democracy if citizens are interested in politics. Other demographic variables have weak impacts in this Model, it can be noted that male participants are less satisfied with democracy and that participants who are satisfied with their financial situation are more satisfied with democracy. Model 3 incorporates the interaction effect between the winner and loser gap and the years of democratic experience. As is the case, and has been my expectation, the winner loser variable exerts a positive effect on the support for democracy variables in models 1 and 2. In model 3 the winner/loser variable effect should be interpreted as the effect of winning in nascent democracies. If H1 is to be supported I would expect that the interaction term would have minus sign suggesting a *decreasing effect* of winner on support as the age of democracy increases. If the alternative scenarios (underlined in the theory section) were to be supported I would expect a positive sign suggesting an increasing effect of winner as we move along the values of the age of democracy. The results show that the interaction term is correctly signed but is borderline statistically insignificant at the $p=.101$ level. In order to have a more accurate picture of the potential moderating effect we plot this effect in Figure 3. The graph suggests that the decreasing effect is present and statistically significant along the values of the age of democracy variable until about the 29th year at which point the confidence intervals cross zero suggesting the gap between winners and losers is not statistically significant in these cases. This evidence provide support for H1.

Figure 3. Estimates of winner-loser gap (SWD_Norris)




Table 2 displays a similar analysis with an alternative SFD variable as described previously. The SFD variable in this case also includes confidence in armed forces, police forces, and civil services. It is to be expected that the results differ to some extent from table 1, but the overall findings should remain constant.

Table 2. Multilevel regression analysis of satisfaction with democracy (SWD_Combined)


	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Winner	1.213 ^{***} (0.215)	1.166 ^{***} (0.211)	2.068 ^{***} (0.536)
Age of democracy		-0.0484 [*] (0.0247)	-0.0280 (0.0266)
Interest in Politics		0.631 ^{***} (0.0439)	0.621 ^{***} (0.0403)
Gender		-0.0447 (0.0461)	-0.0383 (0.0470)
Not completed elementary education		0.721 ^{***} (0.165)	0.673 ^{***} (0.144)
Completed elementary education		0.471 ^{***} (0.102)	0.445 ^{***} (0.0959)
Not completed university education		-0.145 (0.104)	-0.149 (0.103)
Completed university education		-0.449 ^{***} (0.0916)	-0.441 ^{***} (0.0872)
Unemployed		0.0948 (0.101)	0.0742 (0.0916)
Age		0.00358 (0.00386)	0.00405 (0.00351)
Satisfaction with financial situation		0.0850 ^{***} (0.0232)	0.0896 ^{***} (0.0202)
Winner*Age of democracy			-0.0565 ^{**} (0.0252)
Constant	13.46 ^{***} (0.197)	12.18 ^{***} (0.478)	11.85 ^{***} (0.475)
Country Level Variance	1.420 ^{***} (0.122)	1.349 ^{***} (0.138)	1.354 ^{***} (0.136)
Individ. Level Variance	3.577 ^{***} (0.0643)	3.498 ^{***} (0.0648)	3.492 ^{***} (0.0639)
AIC	295849.9	250806.5	250657.6
BIC	295885.5	250929.1	250788.9
Waves	5	5	5
Countries	21	21	21
Observations	54861	46894	46894

Standard errors in parentheses
^{*} $p < 0.10$, ^{**} $p < 0.05$, ^{***} $p < 0.01$

Model 1 shows the pure effect of winning, which is statistically highly significant. This effect does not change as additional control variables are added to the model (model 2). The analysis shows that those who are interested in politics are more satisfied with democracy than those who are not interested. The results also show that survey participants who had only an elementary education are more positive towards the system than those who had a university education. Further, participants who are satisfied with their financial situation are more positive towards the system than those who are not financially satisfied. Model 3 then includes the interaction effect of winners and losers with the years of democracy. The interaction effect in Model 3 is negative and statistically significant.

Figure 4 will show an estimate on how the gap will behave over time. The graph suggests that a decreasing effect is present and statistically significant along the values of the age of democracy variable until about the 27th year. At 27th the confidence intervals cross zero suggesting the gap between winners and losers is not statistically significant in these cases. This evidence again provide support for H1.

Figure 4. Estimates of winner-loser gap (SWD_Combined)



Taken together table 1 and 2 provide a similar picture with H1 being supported. Yet the tables show different levels of significance and strength of the interaction, which can be expected as the two dependent variables are somewhat different. A similar picture can be seen for the control variables with small differentiations in the two tables but no major disparities.

6. Conclusion

The objective of this paper was to track the dynamics of system support in new democracies. Based on learning/socialization theoretical argument I developed one hypothesis regarding the difference in system support between winners and losers and the development of that gap through time. Results from multilevel regression models showed that the gap narrows as years of democratic experience increase, the findings remain constant even when alternative versions of the SFD variable were considered.

Limitations of the study are for one the construction of the 'experience of democracy' variable and also of the SFD variable, further issues arose through the documentation of the WVS data. The 'age of democracy' is not a perfect indicator of experience as countries enter the models at various stages of democratic development and this experience is not tracked across countries in the same way. I have run the above models using the WVS wave as proxy (and controlling for age of democracy) for experience and results point to similar conclusions.

The discussion on system support indicators is broad, and a lot of criticism has been raised towards variables as they ones used here. Yet the literature does not suggest any alternative that could have been appropriate to measure SFD besides using the available questions. For the conducted analysis the standard question (satisfaction with democracy) was not available therefore an appropriate solution had to be found. The option which was used is based on previous research and has proven to be theoretically and empirically robust. The empirical tests with both 'support for democracy' variables also add to the robustness of my results.

In a position to reflect on the thesis, it would maybe have been more appropriate to rework my SFD variable. The variables as they are now measure for one the input side of politics while the other measures a combination of input and output. It can be discussed if it would have been more adequate to construct a variable that mainly is concerned with the output side of politics. However, I concluded for myself that a combined variable (input and output) might be a better fit for my study. The WVS

documentation was especially in the earlier waves not as clear as it was needed for the analysis when the survey was conducted. The issue with that is if the survey was conducted in the same year as the election, detailed information is needed for when exactly the survey took place, because it was key that the survey would be carried out after the elections occurred. Some of the information given about the exact time of the survey was incomprehensible, which led to that some countries which would have fitted in the initial requirements were not in the survey.

During the starting phase of this analysis great anticipation regarding whether the theoretical idea that was developed would be supported. If the findings would have been that the gap is not narrowing or even expanding across time, it would have been an interesting result to show. However, it would have been also worrying as it would have suggested that new democracies might never reach similar levels in terms of system support as more established democracies. Such results would imply that new democracies much longer stay in a state of transition, which then could create general questioning if democracy is the right system. In one respect, my results provide a more optimistic view about system support in new democracies.

In the future, new research could focus tracking whether the type of transition, that took place in new democracies, influence the gap's development across time. That is whether variations in system support are systematically related to a) the types of previous democracy regimes (e.g military dictatorship or other) and b) whether the transition was peaceful or violent. Such a studies would give further insight into the dynamics of system support in new democracies. Lastly the problem with the SWD variable should clearly be given some attention. Most scholars only use the WVS waves where the standard question for SWD was used, or limit themselves with datasets which focus more on a particular region, for example Western Europe.

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7. Appendix

Appendix A

Data from wave 2-5 from the World value survey

Satisfaction with Democracy. SWD_Norris: Computed variable of “Confidence: Political Parties”, “Confidence: Parliament”, “Confidence: The Government” the variable ranges from no confidence (3) to high confidence (12).

SWD_Compined “Confidence: The Police”, “Confidence: Parliament”, “Confidence: The Government”, “Confidence: Political Parties”, “Confidence: Armed Forces”, “Confidence: The Civil Services” the variable ranges from no confidence (6) to high confidence (24).

Winners. “If there were a national election tomorrow, for which party on this list would you vote? Just call out the number on this card. If don’t know: Which party appeals to you most?” If matches with the governing party (1), if it matches with the opposition (0).

Personal Economic Performance. “How satisfied are you with the financial situation of your household?” Scale ranges from 1 to 10.

Education. “What is the highest educational level that you have attained?” No formal education (1), Incomplete primary school (2), Complete primary school (3), Incomplete secondary school: technical/vocational type (4), Complete secondary school: technical/vocational type (5), Incomplete secondary: university-preparatory type (6), Complete secondary: university-preparatory type (7), Some university-level education, without degree (8), University-level education, with degree (9).

Age. Participants actual age.

Gender. Male (1) or Female (2).

Interest in Politics. “How interested would you say you are in politics?” Very interested (1), Somewhat interested (2), Not very interested (3), Not at all interested (4).

Employment status. “Are you employed now or not? If yes, about how many hours a week? If more than one job: only for the main job” Full time employee (1), Part time employee (2), Self employed (3), Retired/pensioned (4), Housewife not otherwise employed (5), Student (6), Unemployed (7), Other (8).

Experience with Democracy. The amount of years the country had experience with democratization at the point where the survey took place.

Appendix B

Table 3. Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Mean	Std. Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Satisfaction with Democracy (Combined)	13.88	3.96	6	24
Satisfaction with Democracy (Norris)	6.56	2.28	3	12
Winner	0.35	0.48	0	1
Interest in Politics	2.22	0.96	1	4
Not completed elementary education	0.11	0.31	0	1
Completed elementary education	0.15	0.36	0	1
Not completed university education	0.07	0.25	0	1
Completed university education	0.15	0.35	0	1
Unemployment	0.12	0.32	0	1
Gender	0.49	0.5	0	1
Age	40.35	16	15	99
Satisfaction with Financial situation	5.58	2.63	1	10

Appendix C

Table 4. Included countries and waves

Countries	Waves
Albania	3, 4,
Argentina	3, 5, 6,
Brazil	2, 5, 6,
Chile	2, 3, 4, 5, 6,
Tiwan	4, 5, 6,
Colombia	3, 6,
Georgia	4, 5, 6,
Hungary	3, 4, 5,
India	2, 3, 4, 5,
Indonisa	4, 5,
South Korea	5, 6,
Mexico	2, 3, 6,
Moldova	4, 5,
Peru	3, 4, 5, 6,
Philippines	4, 6,
Poland	3, 5, 6,
Slovenia	3, 5, 6,
South Africa	3, 4, 5, 6
Spain	2, 3, 4, 5, 6,
Ukraine	3, 5, 6,
Uruguay	3, 5, 6,

W2= 1990-1994 W3= 1995-1998

W4= 1999-2004 W5= 2005-2009

W6= 2010-2014

Appendix D

Table 5. Parties which won the election before the survey

Country	Years of question	Elections	Parties in government
Albania	1998	1997	Partia Socialiste - Socialist Party
Albania	2002	2001	Partia Socialiste - Socialist Party
Argentina	1995	1995	Justicialista Party
Argentina	2006	2003	Cristina Fernandez Kirchner/ Justicialista Party
Argentina	2013	2011	Cristina Fernandez Kirchner
Brazil	1991	1989	PRN
Brazil	November/ December - 2006	October- 2006	PT
Brazil	2014	2010	PT
Chile	1990	1989	Partido Demócrata Cristiano, PDC / alliances with other party but not mentioned after in survey
Chile	1996	1993	Partido Demócrata Cristiano, PDC / alliances with other party but not mentioned after in survey
Chile	2000	1999/2000	Partido Por la Democracia, PPD/ alliances with other party but not mentioned in survey
Chile	2006	2005/2006	Partido Socialista /Concertación Renovación Nacional/ Alianza por el Cambio - Antes Alianza por Chile
Chile	2011	2010	DPP
Tiwan	2006	2004	DPP
Tiwan	March 2012	January - 2012	KMT/ PFP
Colombia	1997	1994	Liberal
Colombia	2012	2010	Partido de la U
Czech Rep.	1991	1990	Civic forum
Czech Rep.	1995	1992	Obcanska Demokraticka Strana (ODS) - Civic Democratic Party
Estonia	1996	1995	Eesti Koonderakond - Estonian Coalition Party
Estonia	November - 2011	March -2011	Eesti Reformierakond (RE) - Estonian Reform Party
Georgia	2009	2008	United National Movement Kartuli Otsneba-Demokratiuli Sakartvelo (Georgian Dream- Democratic Georgia)
Georgia	2014	2013	Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége (FIDESZ-MPP)
Hungary	December - 1998/ January 1990	May - 1998	Magyar Szocialista Part (MSZP) - Hungarian Socialist Party (ex Communists)
Hungary	2009	2006	

Country	Years of question	Elections	Parties in government
India	1990	1989	Janata Dal (Secular) - (JDS)/ alliances with other party but not mentioned in survey
India	1995	1991	Indian Congress (Socialist)
India	2001	1999	Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP)/
India	2006	2004	Indian Congress (Socialist)
Indonisa	2001	1999	Emerging Nation Party (PKB)
Indonisa	2006	2004	Democratic Party (PD)
South Korea	2005	2004	Democratic Party
South Korea	2010	2008	The Grand National Party
Mexico	1990	1988	PRI - Institutional Revolutionary Party
Mexico	1996	1994	PRI - Institutional Revolutionary Party
Mexico	2001	2000	PAN -National Action Party
Mexico	February 2012	January 2012	PRI - Institutional Revolutionary Party
Moldova	1996	1994	Partidul Democrat Agrar din Moldova (PDAM)
Moldova	2002	2001	Communist Party of Moldavia
Moldova	2006	2005	Communist Party of Moldavia
Peru	1996	1995	Cambio 90- Nueva Mayoría
Peru	July - 2001	April - 2001	Perú Posible
Peru	December- 2006	April - 2006	Partido Aprista Peruano APRA
Peru	2012	2011	Gana Perú
Philippines	2000	1998	Laban ng demokratikong (LDP)
Philippines	2012	2010	Partido Liberal ng Pilipinas - Liberal Party of the Philippines (LP)
Poland	1997	1993	SLD - Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej (Alliance of Democratic Left)
Poland	December - 2005	September - 2005	PiS - Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (Law and Justice)
Poland	2012	2011	PO Platforma Obywatelska (Civic Platform)
Romania	2005	2004	Partidul Democrat (PD) - Democratic Party
Romania	2012	2009	Partidul Democrat-Liberal
Slovenia	1995	1992	Liberal Democracy of Slovenia (LDS)
Slovenia	2005	2004	Social Democratic Party (SDS)
Slovenia	2011	2008	Socialni demokrati (SD)
South Africa	1990	1989	National Party (NP)
South Africa	1996	1994	African National Congress (ANC)
South Africa	2001	1999	African National Congress (ANC)
South Africa	2006	2004	African National Congress (ANC)
South Africa	2013	2009	African National Congress (ANC)

Table 5. Continues on next page

Country	Years of question	Elections	Parties in government
Spain	1990	1989	PSOE (Partido Socialista Obrero Español) - Spanish Socialist Workers Party
Spain	1995	1993	PSOE (Partido Socialista Obrero Español) - Spanish Socialist Workers Party
Spain	March - 2000	November - 2000	PP (Partido Popular) - Peoples Party (1981: AP)
Spain	2007	2004	PSOE (Partido Socialista Obrero Español) - Spanish
Spain	February/ March - 2011	November - 2011	PSOE (Partido Socialista Obrero Español) - Spanish
Ukraine	1996	1994	Komunistychna Partiya Ukrainy (KPU) - Communist Party of Ukraine
Ukraine	November - 2006	March - 2006	Party of regions
Ukraine	2011	2007	Party of regions
Uruguay	1996	1994	Partido Colorado
Uruguay	2006	2004	Frente Amplio

Appendix E

Table 6. Age of democracy

Countries	Years of question	Year of becoming democratic	Age of democracy
Albania	1998	1991	7
Albania	2002	1991	11
Argentina	1995	1983	12
Argentina	2006	1983	23
Argentina	2013	1983	30
Brazil	1991	1988	3
Brazil	2006	1988	18
Brazil	2014	1988	26
Chile	1990	1990	0
Chile	1996	1990	6
Chile	2000	1990	10
Chile	2006	1990	16
Chile	2011	1990	21
Tiwan	2006	1989	17
Tiwan	2012	1989	23
Colombia	1997	1991	6
Colombia	2012	1991	21
Georgia	2009	1991	18
Georgia	2014	1991	23
Hungary	1990	1989	1
Hungary	2009	1989	20
India	1990	1977	13
India	1995	1977	18
India	2001	1977	24
India	2006	1977	29
Indonisa	2001	1999	2
Indonisa	2006	1999	7
South Korea	2005	1988	17
South Korea	2010	1988	22
Mexico	1990	1988	2
Mexico	1996	1988	8
Mexico	2001	1988	13
Mexico	2012	1988	24
Moldova	2002	1991	11
Moldova	2006	1991	15
Peru	1996	1979	17
Peru	2001	1979	22
Peru	2006	1979	27
Peru	2012	1979	33

Table 6. Continues on the next page

Countries	Years of question	Year of becoming democratic	Age of democracy
Philippines	2000	1986	14
Philippines	2012	1986	26
Poland	1997	1989	8
Poland	2005	1989	16
Poland	2012	1989	23
Slovenia	1995	1991	4
Slovenia	2005	1991	14
Slovenia	2011	1991	20
South Africa	1990	end of apartheid in 1994	1994
South Africa	1996	1994	2
South Africa	2001	1994	7
South Africa	2006	1994	12
South Africa	2013	1994	19
Spain	1990	1975	15
Spain	1995	1975	20
Spain	2000	1975	25
Spain	2007	1975	32
Spain	2011	1975	36
Ukraine	1996	1991	5
Ukraine	2006	1991	15
Ukraine	2011	1991	20
Uruguay	1996	1984	12
Uruguay	2006	1984	22
Uruguay	2011	1984	27