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ATTITUDES TOWARDS IMMIGRANTS IN LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

The Effect of Welfare Institutions

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Abstract

Polls show that immigration is one of the most important issues when citizens are asked to rank different policy topics. Individual attitudes towards immigrants are important, as public opinion to some degree influences politics and policies in a country. Moreover, it is important for the integration of immigrants in a country, as they need to be employed by natives and welcomed into the social activities. Previous research on developed countries has found that more comprehensive welfare institutions lead to more positive individual attitudes towards immigrants. This study advances the literature and examines the relationship between welfare institutions and attitudes towards immigrants, in the context of less developed countries. Four mechanisms found in previous research on developed countries are in this study contextualized into a weaker institutional setting in less developed countries. In this study, two different dimensions of attitudes to immigrants are examined: the cultural and the material dimension. Using individual data from the World Values Survey including at least 39 countries the relationship between welfare institutions and attitudes towards immigrants is examined. The data is explored by using a multilevel logistic regression including controls for several relevant factors, both at the individual and country level, emphasized in previous research. The analysis shows that welfare institutions have a positive influence on citizens' attitudes to immigrants along the material dimension, while the result for the cultural dimension is not as robust and is sensitive to the specific modeling.

Keywords: attitudes, immigrants, integration, welfare institutions,

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1 INTRODUCTION

Immigration is frequently considered in the top of public policy concern and for example in the 2015 Autumn Eurobarometer immigration is positioned as the most important issue (European Commission, 2015:13). Individual attitudes towards immigrants are an important factor when trying to understand immigration and integration policies. It is essential to know why individuals support more or less immigrants coming into their country, because the public opinion to some degree shapes politics and policies (Esipova et al., 2015:37f; Tunon and Baruah, 2012:151). Moreover, public attitudes affect the status and wellbeing of immigrants and contribute to the environment where immigrants feel either acceptance or dislike from the people in the country (Tunon and Baruah, 2012:151). A positive integration of immigrants is dependent on that people in the country are willing to employ immigrants and welcome them to their social activities

A lot of the previous research has tried to explain why individuals have certain attitudes towards immigrants and immigration. It has been found that individual attitudes towards immigrants and immigration depend on several different factors at the individual level, as for example economic interest (Kessler, 2001:24; Malchow-Møller et al., 2008:257; Mayda, 2006:526f; O'Rourke and Sinnot, 2006:857; Scheve and Slaughter, 2001:144), cultural and ethnic identity (Burns and Gimpel 2000:222f; Card et al., 2012:110f; Chandler and Tsai, 2001:186; Citrin et al., 1997:874f; Dustmann and Preston, 2007:26; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2010:79; Sides and Citrin, 2007:500), and level of education (Dustmann and Preston, 2006:29; Gang et al., 2013:187f; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2010:79; Kessler, 2001:19ff; Wilkes et al., 2008:325f).[1]

Determinants at the country level is not as thoroughly explored (Kleemans and Klugman, 2009:6; Semyonov et al., 2008:8) but some determinants have been found in previous research, as for example level of immigration into a country (Van Oorschot and Uunk, 2007:77f), the national economic context (Facchini and Mayda,

[1] See Ceobanu and Escandell (2010) and Hainmueller and Hopkins (2014) for an overview of common determinants of attitudes to immigrants in developed countries.

2009:312f; Kleemans and Klugman, 2009:18), ethnic fractionalization (Reeskens and Van Oorschot, 2012:131; Mau and Burkhardt, 2009:225f), and comprehensiveness of welfare institutions (Boräng, 2012:155: Crepaz, 2008:156; Crepaz and Damron, 2009:457). The main focus of this thesis is welfare institutions as a country level determinant for individual attitudes towards immigrants. This contextual determinant has not previously (to the best of my knowledge) been used when studying attitudes towards immigrants in the context of less developed countries, which is the focus of this thesis.

A common feature for most of the research on attitudes towards immigrants is the focus on developed countries, mostly in Europe and North America where large opinion surveys are conducted regularly (Lawrence, 2011:146; Money, 2010:2; Orcés, 2009:134; Whitaker and Giersch, 2015:1538). The neglect of the remaining countries is severe as more than half of the global migration is occurring outside the developed countries and this severely hampers the comparative scope of the current research. A complete understanding of the determinants shaping attitudes towards immigrants cannot be attained until the lens is broadened to include the neglected parts of the world (Money, 2010:2).

The aim of this thesis is to examine if the comprehensiveness of a country's welfare institutions influence citizens' attitudes towards immigrants in a broad range of countries, including primarily developing and non-OECD countries. The contribution of this thesis is twofold: The first contribution is theoretical as the theory behind previous studies needs to be revised and developed to fit in the context of less developed countries. The second contribution is empirical, as this thesis empirically test the relationship between welfare institutions and attitudes towards immigrants in a broader set of countries. The empirical literature is advanced to include not only developed countries but also less developed countries with different institutional settings.

In this thesis a multilevel logistic regression analysis is used with survey data on the individual level from the sixth wave (2010-2014) of the World Values Survey

(WVS) to map individuals' attitudes towards immigrants in at least 39 countries.[2] Attitudes towards immigrants are examined at two different dimensions: the cultural and the material dimension. The result of this thesis demonstrates that the comprehensiveness of welfare institutions have a positive effect on attitudes towards immigrants when a material dimension is considered. In contrast, the result for the cultural dimension of attitudes is not as robust and is sensitive to the specific modeling.

The thesis is organized as follows: In the next section (2.1) the institutional theory guiding the study is presented. This is followed up by a section (2.2) on the previous findings on the relationship between welfare institutions and attitudes towards immigrants in developed countries. This section explores two different dimensions (the cultural and the material) of attitudes towards immigrants and the mechanisms behind the influence of the comprehensiveness of welfare institutions on attitudes towards immigrants. In the following section (2.3) a review of the literature on attitudes towards immigrants in less developed countries is presented, followed by section 2.4 where the mechanisms from the literature on developed countries are contextualized to less developed countries and two hypotheses for the study are presented. This is followed by a methodological section (3) where the chosen method and the different variables are described and justified. The results for the two different dimensions are presented in section four followed by a final section (5) with discussion and conclusions.

2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Institutional Theory

One important assumption for the study of welfare institutions' influence on citizens' attitudes is that institutions are able to shape the public opinion. According to March and Olsen (1989:160), "*institutions are collections of interrelated rules and routines that define appropriate actions in terms of relations between roles and situations.*" Additionally, institutions are characterized by their ability to influence individuals' behavior for generations. It is claimed that institutions posses a legitimating capacity, able to influence individuals to behave in violation of their own self-interest (March

[2] The number of countries varies between the two different dimensions and the different models in the analysis but the lowest number of countries is 39.

and Olsen, 1989:22f). Institutions provide a moral guide and act as filters for interpretation and action (Hall and Taylor, 1996:939; Immergut, 1998:20).

According to Rothstein (1998:135ff), institutions and policies affect opinions, interests, values, preferences and ideology. When an institution is created it reflects what political actors consider as morally right and it also influences what future actors will regard as morally correct. The ethics in a society are therefore an outcome of previously installed institutions. Social norms are an outcome of the institutional environment that has been created by political decisions. Svallfors (2003:496) claims that institutions stipulate 'normalcy', propose to the citizens what is possible to achieve, and what is regarded as impermissible.

The development of the welfare state generates moral capabilities to the people because of its moral objectives. It is claimed that the institutionalization of public welfare provision broadens the moral perspectives of the people and they will be more supportive towards welfare institutions (Mau, 2004:53f). Furthermore, it has been argued that welfare states contain not only formal social policy engagements but also a communal pattern of established solidarity and opinions of social fairness (Arts and Gelissen, 2001:296; Crepaz and Damron, 2009:439ff; Jaeger, 2006:159). This is culturally and historically rooted in welfare institutions that continuously influence individual norms and values (Jaeger, 2006:159).

To summarize, there is evidence supporting that institutions in general and welfare institutions in particular influence peoples' attitudes. In the next section the relationship between welfare institutions and attitudes towards immigrants is explored.

2.2 Welfare institutions and attitudes towards immigrants

Historically, immigration and comprehensive welfare institutions have commonly been presented as a conflicted combination. According to Freeman (1986:52), the welfare state is closely connected to the nation-state and needs boundaries to distinguish members from non-members. A generous welfare system has been regarded as incompatible with immigration and it has been discussed if a comprehensive welfare system can survive large-scale immigration. T. H. Marshall (Cited in Kymlicka, 2015:5) claims that the welfare state is related to a social membership in a community and not universal humanitarianism. In contrast, more recent studies present evidences

that the threat from immigrants to comprehensive welfare institutions is exaggerated (Banting et al., 2006:83; Mau and Burkhardt, 2009:225f).

At the individual level, two different dimensions of attitudes towards immigrants have been discovered in the previous research. The first dimension is native resentment and this is motivated by perceived dissimilarities in religion, ethnicity and race (Crepaz and Damron, 2009:439). This dimension covers a more cultural dimension with a diffuse fear of the other, for example that immigrants are criminals and rapists. There is also a perceived threat from immigrants to the cultural traditions of the country (Crepaz, 2008:65).

Second, welfare chauvinism is the fear among native citizens that immigrants take their jobs, homes and abuse the welfare system (Faist, 1994:440). Welfare chauvinism infers that immigrants are attracted to the country due to its generous welfare benefits. There is a competition for scarce resources and immigrants are perceived as a net loss, meaning they contribute with less than they receive (Crepaz and Damron, 2009:439). Moreover, it implies that *"immigrants are less entitled to welfare benefits and services than the native population"* (Van der Waal et al., 2013:165). This captures the material dimension of immigrant attitudes, the perceived increased competition over scarce resources due to immigrants. In line with this dimension citizens in countries with more comprehensive welfare institutions could be more negative towards immigrants to protect the labour market and welfare system.

However, in contrast to the theory of welfare chauvinism it has been found that citizens in more comprehensive welfare states tend to have more positive attitudes towards immigrants (Boräng, 2012:155; Crepaz and Damron, 2009:457; Ervasti et al., 2008:203). Crepaz (2008:ch5) distinguish between the cultural and material dimension and discovers that more comprehensive welfare institutions decrease welfare chauvinism, but does not find a significant effect along the cultural dimension of attitudes. Several mechanisms behind the influence of welfare institutions on attitudes to immigrants have been suggested by previous research on developed countries. First, the broad solidarity in a country can be an important factor influencing attitudes towards immigrants. The moral basis of the welfare state has been described as a moral obligation to care for other citizens and especially individuals with less

resources or in a vulnerable phase of life (Bergmark et al., 2000:241). Welcoming immigrants into the country and integrate them into the society is an act of solidarity, which has some common features with the tasks of the welfare state. Namely, to assist individuals in need and in a vulnerable situation (Boräng, 2015:221). More comprehensive welfare institutions are beneficial for creating a more wide-ranging solidarity, as the conflicts over redistribution are reduced rather than reinforced (Boräng, 2015:219; Rothstein, 1998:163f). It has been found that this broad national solidarity can be extended to non-citizens, where the division between citizens and immigrants is lessened in countries with more comprehensive welfare states (Crepaz and Damron, 2009:457). Arts and Gelissen (2001:297) conclude that there is a convincing correspondence between the comprehensiveness of welfare institutions and the level of solidarity among the citizens. Thus, the more wide-ranging solidarity in more comprehensive welfare states can potentially lead to more positive attitudes towards immigrants among the citizens. The solidarity of helping people in need should be more intrinsic among people living in a country where this is commonly done by the state for its citizens.

The mechanism of broad solidarity can influence attitudes at both the cultural dimension and the material dimension. A broader solidarity in a country should lead to less racism and the perceived cultural threat from immigrants should also be relieved. The broader solidarity should make native people more understanding towards immigrants' struggle and therefore be more welcoming towards immigrants along both dimensions. However, an important distinction between migrant workers and refugees is missing in this study, which could make this mechanism less significant. Boräng (2012:145ff) discovers that the positive effect of more comprehensive welfare states on attitudes towards immigrants is more prominent when considering refugees in comparison to migrant workers. This distinction is not made in the WVS and therefore this mechanism may not be as important as if the distinction was made between different types of immigrants.

Second, according to Kumlin and Rothstein (2005:360f), more comprehensive welfare institutions can promote higher levels of generalized trust in a society. This is believed to be driven by the redistribution of resources through welfare institutions increasing the economic equality and equality of opportunity, which could lead to

more generalized trust (Larsen, 2007:99f; Rothstein and Uslaner, 2005:44; Uslaner and Brown, 2005:889). When there is a high unequal distribution of resources, individuals at the top and bottom do not regard themselves as sharing the same fate. Where inequality is high, individuals will have more pessimistic expectations of the future (Uslaner and Brown, 2005:869). A more even distribution of resources consolidates collective values and experiences in society. If welfare is distributed more unequally, negative stereotypes of different groups will be more present and mistrust and tensions will become more widespread (Kääriäinen and Lehtonen, 2006:46).

The level of trust in a country can influence individuals' attitudes towards immigrants. Boräng (2015:221) argues that immigration policy has two main objectives: to guarantee that people in need of protection receive protection and to reject protection to people in no real need of protection. The decision is often taken under uncertainty and therefore two basic problems arise: either individuals in need of protection get rejected or people in no need of protection receive protection. Individuals with higher levels of generalized trust should to a larger extent believe that immigrants coming into the country really are in need and not only coming in order to abuse the welfare system. Consequently, they are more concerned that people in need of protection are rejected. People with lower levels of generalized trust should be more concerned with immigrants not in need of protection abusing the welfare system and thus be more negative and suspicious towards immigrants.

The mechanism of generalized trust should be relevant for both the cultural and material dimension of attitudes towards immigrants. The higher trust to other people should decrease the cultural resentment towards immigrants as they in general are seen as more trustworthy. The preconceptions of immigrants as criminals, rapists and threats to the culture should be lessened with higher trust in other people. At the material dimension higher generalized trust should lead to preferences of more equitable treatment of all people, including immigrants. Citizens should for example be more positive to include immigrants in the labour market.

The third mechanism is that welfare institutions can influence citizens' perceptions of the capacity of the state. In countries with comprehensive welfare institutions the state has taken a large responsibility and demonstrate a capability and willingness to

carry out extensive duties related to social solidarity (Boräng, 2015:220). Svallfors (2003:496f, 513f) argues that certain institutions influence perceptions of what the state is capable of doing and what it should do. Furthermore, individuals in countries with more comprehensive welfare institutions are more positive to state intervention in comparison to citizens in countries with less comprehensive welfare institutions. Therefore, as Boräng (2015:222) argues, in more comprehensive welfare states citizens are used to and expect the state to protect people. They believe the state has the capacity to handle the situation and to offer protection and security and therefore the attitudes towards immigrants will be more positive. This should be relevant for both the cultural dimension and the material dimension. The cultural dimension should be affected, as a high capacity of the state to accomplish acts of solidarity should lead to more solidarity among the people, as discussed on the first mechanism. With a more widespread solidarity the cultural threat from immigrants should be relieved. At the material dimension the capacity of the state can reduce the fear of being unemployed due to increased competition from immigrants. A high capacity of the state indicates that they can take care of people if they get unemployed or stimulate the job market to create more jobs.

The fourth mechanism is the increased notion of general economic safety in society. Citizens in countries with more comprehensive welfare institutions should feel safer as they are better protected against poverty. If individuals become sick or unemployed there are social safety nets protecting them from ending up in severe poverty. This may not influence attitudes at the cultural dimension but welfare chauvinism could be decreased with more general economic safety, as the fear of competition can be lessened if people feel that they are protected. In comparison, if you are not protected the perceived increased competition from immigrants should be more fearful. The increased risk of ending up in severe poverty could lead to more negative attitudes towards immigrants, especially, the ones who feel an immediate threat to their income. This is in line with Semyonov et al. (2006:444) who argue that the perceived threat of the foreign population is reduced with increased economic prosperity. Thus, more prosperous people should in general feel economically safer in a society, as they are less dependent of welfare institutions and benefits.

To summarize, in this section it has been revealed that welfare institutions can have a positive influence on attitudes towards immigrants. The four mechanisms believed to explain this relationship are (1) more widespread solidarity, (2) higher generalized trust, (3) higher perception of state capacity, and (4) higher general economic safety. These mechanisms have all been discovered when studying attitudes towards immigrants in developed countries with well-established welfare institutions. This limits the understanding of how these mechanisms function in the context of the less developed countries, which is the focus of this study. As stated in the introduction, the intention of this study is to advance this literature and broaden the understanding by examining a broader set of countries, mostly including less developed countries. But, before moving on to contextualize these mechanisms in less developed countries, the next section reviews previous research on attitudes towards immigrants in the context of less developed countries.

2.3 Attitudes towards immigrants in less developed countries

As mentioned in the introduction, most previous research on determinants of attitudes towards immigrants has been focused on developed countries, mainly in Europe and North America (Kleemans and Klugman, 2009:2; Lawrence, 2011:143; Money, 2010:2; Orcés, 2009:134; Whitaker and Giersch, 2015:1536ff). However, there are a few studies with focus on attitudes towards immigrants in a broader set of countries including many developing and non-OECD countries.

Esipova et al. (2015:1) study 140 countries worldwide by using the Gallup's World Poll and discover that in all major regions in the world, except Europe, people are more likely to favor immigration to stay at the current level or be increased. People in Europe are in a global perspective most negative towards immigration, as a majority wants less immigration into their country. This further proves the importance to include a broader set of countries in studies on attitudes towards immigrants to expand the understanding.

Kleemans and Klugman (2009) use three rounds of the WVS (1995/1996, 2000/2001 and 2005/2006) covering 86 countries around the world. They find that in countries with higher levels of GDP people are more negative to letting immigrants in but more supportive for equitable treatment once they are in the country. They believe

in equal treatment on the labour market and are less likely to be against living next to an immigrant. Furthermore, they argue that in countries with higher levels of unemployment people have more negative attitudes towards immigrants (Kleemans and Klugman, 2009:18). They confirm the conclusions from many other studies on developed countries, that higher levels of education are related to more positive attitudes towards immigrants. However, this is only true in rich countries, while it is the opposite in poorer countries (Kleemans and Klugman, 2009:17). Mayda (2006:527) finds a similar result for education when she includes developing countries in her analysis. This further highlights the importance of including a broader set of countries with larger variation between them.

Whitaker and Giersch (2015) examine attitudes towards immigration in Africa and use the WVS (2000-2002 and 2005-2007), which includes 11 countries in Africa. They discover that people in countries with higher levels of democracy are more negative towards immigration (Whitaker and Giersch, 2015:1552). They argue that this is a consequence of increased political competition, leading to more widespread anti-immigrant rhetoric. Immigrants are often seen as easy targets for politicians looking for someone to blame. Also, the value of citizenship increases as it incorporates the right to vote, hence more democratic countries have more to protect from outsiders (Whitaker and Giersch, 2015:1541f). However, Orcés (2009:146f), examining attitudes to immigrants in Ecuador, finds that individuals supporting democratic values are more positive to immigrants in comparison to people supporting more authoritarian values. Furthermore, Whitaker and Giersch (2015:1551) discover that in African countries with more ethnic diversity people are more opposed to immigration. This suggests that a more diverse society not necessarily is more welcoming towards foreigners. When immigrants are added to an already unstable mix they may be regarded as yet another group competing for power and resources

Examining attitudes towards immigrants in Latin America, Lawrence (2011:161) finds that the current inflow of immigrants into a country is a more important determinant than the total number of migrants in a country. In countries that experience increasing immigration people are more negative toward immigrants. At the individual level, the economic self-interest is the most important determinant of

immigration attitudes. People that are less well-off and dissatisfied with their current economic situation feel more threatened by immigrants. The less importance for cultural determinants may be due the shared linguistic and religious identity between most migrants and citizens in Latin America (Lawrence, 2011:161).

None of the previous studies on attitudes towards immigrants, covering less developed countries, consider the possible influence of welfare institutions on attitudes towards immigrants. Therefore, to advance this strand of literature this study will examine the influence of welfare institutions on attitudes towards immigrants in the context of less developed countries. In the next section, the mechanisms between welfare institutions and attitudes towards immigrants, discovered in studies on developed countries, are examined in the context of less developed countries.

2.4 Welfare institutions in less developed countries

The institutional theory maintaining that institutions are able to shape individual attitudes, requires that welfare institutions have been in place long enough to shape peoples' basic norms and opinions. According to Arts and Gelissen (2001:287), individuals have to be accustomed to the welfare institutions and their social situations. It is only when welfare institutions have been in place for some time that people have had the chance to collect the necessary knowledge to behave in a socially accepted manner. For the previous studies on the influence of welfare institutions on attitudes towards immigrants this has not been a problem, as they examine developed countries with well-established welfare institutions. However, it may not be realistic to believe that the same institutional influence on citizens attitudes exists in less developed countries with a weaker institutional capacity. Thus, the mechanisms from the literature on welfare institutions and attitudes towards immigrants need to be contextualized in a weaker institutional setting. Since this has not been done before, there is no concrete guidance in previous literature and therefore the theorizing in this section is grounded on what reasonable can be expected from certain mechanisms in the context of less developed countries.

The creation of generalized trust among the citizens through welfare institutions can be more problematic in less developed countries. Sukkim (2010:292f) argues that the building of trust is more challenging in less developed countries, as they have

additional constraints and are not able to do things necessary for building generalized trust. For example, with weak institutions corruption can flourish and if citizens discover that civil servants are corrupt they generalize this to be true for all citizens (Rothstein and Stolle, 2003:199). Thus, the experience of wrongdoings in the public authorities erodes the generalized trust between citizens. Weak welfare institutions are also related to this problem, as more comprehensive welfare institutions are dependent upon a high institutional trust. With a low trust in institutions citizens would not trust welfare institutions to redistribute their resources and the state's capacity to collect taxes from other citizens. Furthermore, the world is more unequal now than at any point since the World War 2 and the largest rise in inequality has occurred in developing countries, particularly those with large economic growth (UNDP, 2013:1). This is a further obstacle for building trust as it is argued that more economic equality and equality of opportunity are leading to more generalized trust (Larsen, 2007:99f; Rothstein and Uslaner, 2005:44; Uslaner and Brown, 2005:889).

The mechanism of generalized trust is a demanding mechanism requiring a high institutional capacity. It is unlikely that many of the less developed countries have the institutional capacity to instill a higher generalized trust among the people through welfare institutions. Thus, this mechanism may not have a significant impact in this study where less developed countries are examined.

The mechanism of broader solidarity can be related to the mechanism of generalized trust. With less trust in society the broad solidarity should also be decreased. If one do not trust most other people in the society one may not feel cohesion and solidarity with them. With less trust people can be more solidary with friends and families but the broad solidarity should be less prevalent. The importance of welfare institutions can also be decreased, as people rely more on friends and families for security against poverty. With less importance on welfare institutions the effect of welfare institutions on the broader solidarity should be significantly smaller. As with the mechanism for generalized trust, widespread solidarity should require a high institutional capacity to be increased by welfare institutions. The state needs to demonstrate that it can accomplish certain acts of solidarity, in order to influence the solidarity in society. In less developed countries with a weaker institutional capacity this should be difficult to realize. A further obstacle for this mechanism, as discussed

before, is the lack of distinction between refugees and migrant workers in this study. Because Boräng (2012:145ff) discovers that the positive effect of more comprehensive welfare institutions on individual attitudes towards immigrants are more prominent for refugees compared to migrant workers. Hence, the mechanism of a broader solidarity in society due to comprehensive welfare institutions may have little impact in this study on less developed countries.

The mechanism of general economic safety can be more important in less developed countries, as people in general are poorer and in a more vulnerable situation. In this setting, welfare institutions should increase the notion of safety for more people in comparison to welfare institutions in a developed country. However, citizens that perceive themselves to be in a vulnerable situation may be more afraid of the increased competition from immigrants, as in a weaker institutional setting their safety are less guaranteed. The trust in state institutions to help you if you end up in a precarious situation may in general be lower in a weaker institutional setting. But the different levels of welfare institutions should be able to make a bigger impact on this mechanism. It does not require much to install some basic social safety nets to increase the individual economic safety. It does not require a long process of shaping the behavior of the citizens as the previous mechanisms discussed above. When social safety nets is installed and proven to work the general economic safety in society should rapidly be increased. Thus, this mechanism should theoretically be the most influential in the context of less developed countries. As discussed in the section describing the mechanisms in developed countries, the mechanism of general economic safety should primarily influence attitudes along the material dimension.

The mechanism of state capacity goes hand in hand with the reasoning above that the citizens' perceptions of the institutional capacity of the state may be lower in less developed countries. The state capacity in these countries should in general be lower but the expectation from the citizens should reasonable also be lower. With low expectations it may not require much in order to influence citizens' perceptions of state capabilities. The introduction of functioning social safety nets discussed above may be enough to influence people to be more positive toward the state's capacity. When institutions start delivering positive outcomes in a context where this is rare the perceptions of the state capacity should be enhanced. However, the state capacity is

probably estimated by more parameters than social safety nets. Citizens' perceptions of health care, education, police etc. should also matter when they estimate the institutional capacity of the state. Thus, it should require a more complete functioning of state institutions in comparison to the mechanism of general economic safety. Welfare institutions could also in less developed countries influence citizens' perceptions of the state capacity but the impact should be small in the set of countries studied in this thesis.

To sum up this section, the mechanisms discovered when examining developed states can, to different degrees, also exist in less developed countries with a weaker institutional setting. More widespread solidarity and higher generalized trust are demanding mechanisms that could be a less prevalent outcome of welfare institutions in less developed countries. The mechanism of the perceptions of state capacity is also relatively demanding and may be less prevalent in the set of countries included in this study. The mechanism of general economic safety is the least demanding and should potentially be the most influential among the mechanisms when studying less developed countries. As previously discussed, the mechanism of general economic safety is more likely to be relevant for the material dimension of attitudes towards immigrants. It is worth mentioning that this study cannot empirically test which specific mechanism is accountable for the relationship between welfare institutions and attitudes towards immigrants.

The theoretical framework explored above lead to two hypotheses that will be tested in this thesis:

- Hypothesis 1: More comprehensive welfare institutions lead to more positive attitudes towards immigrants.

- Hypothesis 2**:** The effect of welfare institutions on attitudes towards immigrants should be more pronounced at the material dimension in comparison to the cultural dimension when less developed countries are studied.

The next section describes and justifies the chosen methods and variables for this study.

3 METHODOLOGY

A quantitative approach will be used to test the two hypotheses with individual level data from the WVS and country level data from different sources. The individual data from WVS is nested in different countries and it is assumed that *"citizens are exposed to structural and organizational features that are the same for all of them but vary across groups"* (Crepaz and Damron, 2009:453). So the individual attitudes towards immigrants can be driven by the institutional context on the country level and the use of a simple OLS regression would produce incorrect results. Instead, to properly account for the nested data a multilevel analysis is appropriate to capture the different contextual levels in the data (Field, 2014:815f; Snijders and Bosker, 2012:1). Another feature that needs to be considered is that the two dependent variables used in the study are dichotomous (see section 3.2.1), meaning they only have two values, either 0 or 1. For dichotomous dependent variables it is appropriate to use a logistic regression (Snijders and Bosker, 2012:289ff) and therefore the chosen method for this study is a multilevel logistic regression.

3.1 Data

The individual data is retrieved from the WVS, which is a survey exploring individual values in different countries around the world. The sixth wave of WVS from 2010-2014 includes 57 countries[3] and around 85000 respondents (World Values Survey, 2016a). Common problems related to public opinion studies are systematic measurements error due to the order of questions and wordings, interviewer effects,[4] and social desirability bias[5] (Crepaz, 2008:63,266). Moreover, in comparative attitudinal research it can be problematic to establish cross-national validity. There is a risk that not values and attitudes differ but the connotation and definition of the different concepts in different languages (Svallfors, 1997:287; Svallfors, 2003:502f). WVS uses standardized questionnaires that have been developed and improved during the years. These are translated into the local languages and independently translated back into

[3] See descriptive statistics (3.3) for a list of all the countries included in this study.
[4] For example, the interviewer's gender or race can influence the respondent to answer in certain ways.
[5] Social desirability bias means that the respondent adjusts his answer so it corresponds to what is thought to be the common norm in society.

English to control the accuracy of the translation. Additionally, the questionnaire is tested before it is used to find possible translation problems. If a question is problematic to use in a certain country it is omitted from that country's questionnaire (World Values Survey, 2016b). Interviews are conducted face-to-face and supervised by academic researchers (World Values Survey1, p. 4). Data from WVS is commonly used in academic publications and is considered to have both high reliability and high validity. Because of the wide coverage of countries around the world and the inclusion of many less developed countries it is the most suitable individual survey data for this thesis. Other frequently used surveys for attitudes towards immigrants, like the International Social Survey Programme, European Social Survey and Eurobarometer mainly concentrate on developed countries and does not cover the countries targeted in this thesis.

3.2 Operationalization

3.2.1 Dependent Variables

To capture both the cultural and material dimension of attitudes towards immigrants, two different questions from the WVS are operationalized as dependent variables. The first question is: *"On this list are various groups of people. Could you please mention any that you would not like to have as neighbors?"* (World Values Survey2, p.3), where one answering option is 'Immigrants/Foreign Workers'. The variable is coded as 0=mentioned and 1=not mentioned. Thus, a value of zero means the respondent has negative attitudes towards immigrants and a value of one reflects more positive attitudes towards immigrants. This question reflects anti-immigrant attitudes along the cultural dimension and attitudes towards the multicultural consequences of immigration. This is natives' resentment to immigrants living and coming to their country and simply the fact that an individual is an immigrant makes that person unwanted as a neighbor. The indicator would be even better if the answering option only included 'Immigrants' and not 'Foreign Workers'. Because the negative connotation to having 'foreign workers' as neighbor could be based on the assumption that they have taken jobs from native citizens and therefore also includes a material dimension. Despite this possible shortcoming it has been used in previous research to indicate the cultural dimension of attitudes towards immigrants (Crepaz, 2008:74ff) and it is the best available measure along the cultural dimension.

The second dependent variable is the following question from the WVS: *Do you agree, disagree or neither agree nor disagree with the following statements? When jobs are scarce, employers should give priority to people of this country over immigrants* (World Values Survey2, p.3). This variable is coded as 0=Agree and 1=Disagree and the third alternative 'neither agree nor disagree' is not included.[6] Hence, a value of zero means more welfare chauvinism and a value of one reflects less welfare chauvinism and more positive attitudes towards immigrants. In contrast to the first dependent variable, this variable primarily captures the material dimension of attitudes towards immigrants, where natives fear the increased competition and the economic consequences from immigration. Crepaz (2008:152ff) also uses this question to capture the material dimension of attitudes towards immigrants.

3.2.2 Independent Variable

The independent variable of welfare institutions is operationalized by using the variable for Social Safety Nets (SSN) included in the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI). BTI from 2010 consists of 128 countries selected according to the criteria that they are not yet fully consolidated democracies and market economies, and are considered as sovereign states (BTI, 2010a:6). BTI is an expert survey where one country expert for each country examines how well different criteria are fulfilled, by providing both written evaluations and scores. Another expert then evaluates the report and the scores are compared with other scores in the region. Finally, the BTI Board, consisting of scholars and professionals, makes a final review before the reports are included in the index (BTI, 2010b:22).[7]

A problematic issue with this expert survey is that only one expert is responsible for examining a wide range of subjects, as for example economic performance, sustainability, political and social integration, and steering capability. This is a broad range of subjects that are difficult to evaluate and rate. It should be the case that the responsible expert consults other experts in the different fields but this is not certain. Furthermore, country comparisons between countries with expert evaluations can be problematic, as they interpret and understand questions and wordings differently. Despite these problems with expert surveys they are commonly used in academic research. BTI is trying to avoid these weaknesses by having a reviewer examining the

[6] Crepaz (2008:154) also excluded "neither agree nor disagree" when coding this variable.
[7] For more information on the survey and its methodology see (BTI, 2010a).

results to include more than one expert opinion on the different subjects. According to Kitschelt (2015:5f), BTI is a trustworthy source, which potentially can fill some of the voids that currently exist when it comes to empirical measures of social policy outside the developed world.

The question covering welfare institutions included in the survey is: *"To what extent do social safety nets exist to compensate for poverty and other risks such as old age, illness, unemployment or disability?"* (BTI, 2010a:31). The score ranges between 1-10 and is divided into four different levels explained to make the scoring more coherent between the countries. The score levels are as following:

"*1-2= There are no state or societal measures for inclusion or compensation. Poverty is combated hardly at all, or only ad hoc. Healthcare is deficient for broad segments of the population.*
3-5= Rudimentary measures to avert social risks exist, but are extremely segmented in terms of territory, social stratum and sector. The country cannot combat poverty systematically on its own.
6-8= Social networks are well developed in part but do not cover all risks for all strata of the population. Considerable portions of the population are still at risk of poverty.
9-10= There is a solid network to compensate for social risks, especially nationwide health care and a well-focused prevention of poverty."
(BTI, 2010a:31)

Concerning welfare institutions in predominantly less developed countries, BTI SSN is an appropriate indicator. Another indicator commonly used for welfare institutions is Esping-Andersens categorization of welfare regimes, but it does only include a few countries and all of them are developed. A second frequently used indicator is social expenditures as percent of GDP. This indicator is available for a wide range of countries and would be possible to use. However, social expenditure is too blunt to capture important aspects of the welfare institutions (Crepaz, 2008:142) and there are conceptual and empirical weaknesses to use social expenditures to evaluate welfare institutions (Scruggs and Allen, 2006:56). A classic example is from the United Kingdom when the Thatcher Government made major cuts in unemployment and sickness

benefits. Yet, the spending on unemployment increased because the number of unemployed dependent on benefits increased. Consequently, only looking at the expenditures would lead to the contradictory conclusion that the Thatcher Government expanded welfare programs and benefits, while they actually were phased out (Esping-Andersen, 1990:19).

3.2.3 Control Variables

This section presents variables at the country and individual level included in the study to control for different effects, which could influence the relationship between welfare institutions and attitudes towards immigrants. It could be argued that the different dimensions of attitudes would need different control variables. However, since this study wants to compare the results of the cultural and material dimension it is appropriate to use the same control variables for the two different dependent variables.

3.2.3.1 Country level[8]

In previous research it has been found that the national economic context, usually indicated by GDP (Gross Domestic Product), influences individuals' attitudes towards immigrants. Kleemans and Klugman (2009:18) find that individuals in countries with higher GDP are more negative to allowing people to come into the country. According to Semyonov et al. (2006:444), improved economic conditions lead to more positive attitudes towards out-group populations. Therefore, GDP seems to affect attitudes to immigrants and is included as a control variable at the country level.[9] Data on GDP per capita[10] is based on purchasing power parity and is retrieved from The World Factbook for 2010 in 2010 US dollars.

According to group threat theory individuals identify themselves with one or more groups and conflicts arise due to competition and diverse interests. Considering immigration, this means that immigrants as a minority group threaten the majority group of natives. This produces negative attitudes towards the immigrant minority group. One explanation is the struggle over scarce resources where immigrants are perceived as a threat to the wellbeing of the native majority group (Ervasti et al., 2008:189; Ma-

[8] See Appendix 2 for the scores for each country on the country level variables.
[9] It could also be argued that GDP Growth could influence attitudes towards immigrants, as this would indicate if the economic situation is improving or declining. The competition from immigrants may be more threatening when the economic situation in a country is getting worse. This has been tested for but did not significantly change the result and is not included in the analysis.
[10] Only GDP in the rest of the study.

nevska and Achterberg, 2011:438; Schlueter and Scheepers, 2010:287f). When the minority group grows it becomes a more intimidating contender for scarce resources, such as jobs and welfare benefits. Group threat theory can also be explained by individuals' perceptions of a cultural threat. The native majority group fears that the minority group of immigrants threats their cultural traditions (Ervasti et al., 2008:189f). Van Oorschot (2006:37) finds that immigrants are regarded as the least deserving group for welfare benefits when compared with elderly, sick and disabled, and unemployed. Therefore, large inflows of immigrants into a country can also influence welfare institutions, as the support among the citizens may decrease when immigrants perceived as undeserving receive welfare benefits. To take this into account a control variable of net migration per 1000 inhabitant[11] from The World Factbook for the year of 2010 is included in the study. The perception of a threat should be increased if there is a large inflow of immigrants into the country. It is believed that this effect is larger than the total number of foreign-population in a country. A stable stock of foreign-population does not have the same effect as a heavy inflow of immigrants into a country (Lawrence, 2011:161). A large inflow of immigrants into the country should also make the subject more exposed in media and therefore make citizens more aware of immigration. This may fuel citizens' perceptions of a threat posed by the minority group of immigrants.

Related to the control variable on Net Migration it has been discovered in previous literature that the level of ethnic fractionalization in a country can have a negative influence on attitudes towards immigrants (Reeskens and Van Oorschot, 2012:131; Whitaker and Giersch, 2015:1551), while Mau and Burkhardt (2009; 224) argue that this effect is exaggerated. According to Alesina and Glaeser (2004:134) the degree of ethnic fractionalization in a country affects the amount of welfare spending, where more diverse societies allocate less resources on welfare spending. To control for ethnic fractionalization in a country, Fearon's (2003) index for ethnic diversity is retrieved from the QoG Standard Dataset. This index identifies 822 ethnic groups in 160 countries and measures the likelihood that two randomly selected individuals in a country belong to different ethnic groups. The index covers only groups that had at least one percent of the country's population. The variable ranges between 0 indicat-

[11] Net migration in the rest of the study.

ing a perfect homogeneity and 1 indicating a highly fragmented population (Quality of Government, p.229f).[12] [13] It is recoded to range between 0-10 to receive a result that is easier to interpret.

Whitaker and Giersch (2015:1552) find evidence that higher levels of democracy lead to more opposition to immigrants in African countries. They argue that the value of citizenship increases as it entitles citizens to vote and this lead to more protectionist attitudes towards immigrants. They also point out a more widespread distribution of anti-immigrant rhetoric as a reason why anti-immigrant attitudes are more frequent in countries with higher levels of democracy (Whitaker and Giersch, 2015:1541). It has also been discovered that democracy can influence welfare institutions (Esping-Andersen, 1990:15) and more specifically the development of social policies in developing countries (Carbone, 2012:171f). The variable fh_ipolity2 from the QoG Standard Dataset reflecting the level of democracy will be included as a control variable. It combines the scores in the Freedom House for political freedom and civil liberties with the score on the Polity Index in the Polity IV dataset. The score ranges between 0 and 10 where 0 reflects least democratic and 10 most democratic (Quality of Government, p. 68). According to Hadenius and Teorell (2005:36f), the combined measure of Freedom House and Polity IV is the most appropriate for democracy.

In the next section is the control variables at the individual level presented and discussed.

3.2.3.2 Individual level[14]

Education is considered to be an important factor at the individual level influencing individuals' attitudes towards immigrants. It has been found in previous studies on attitudes towards immigrants that more educated individuals are more positive towards immigrants (Boeri, 2010:663; Chandler and Tsai, 2001:186f; Gang et al., 2013:188; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2010:79). It is argued that more educated individuals have more liberal attitudes, due to either a less vulnerable position in the labour market or an association between education and certain attitudes to culture (Dustmann and Preston, 2007:3). However, Kleemans and Klugman (2009:17)

[12] For more information about the construction and methodology of the index see Fearon (2003).
[13] See Posner (2004) for a discussion on common problems of measuring ethnic fractionalization.
[14] See Appendix 3 for more details on the individual level variables.

discover that the positive effect of education only is true in richer countries while the effect is the opposite in poorer countries. To control for education the following question from the WVS will be included: "*What is the highest educational level that you have attained?"* (World Values Survey2, p. 19).[15]

According to Semyonov et al. (2006:444) and Lawrence (2011:161) economic prosperity decreases the perceived threat of the foreign population. At the individual level this is controlled for with an individual income variable. This indicates the individual economic situation the respondents perceive themselves to be in. Respondents place themselves on a scale ranging from 1-10 where 1 is the lowest and 10 the highest income group in the country.

Another individual level characteristic included in the study is the respondents' age. In previous research it has been found that age is negatively related to immigrant attitudes, where older respondents are more negative towards immigrants (Chandler and Tsai, 2001:181; O'Rourke and Sinnot, 2006:856). This can for example be due to specific differences in cultural attitudes or a fear that extensive immigration negatively will affect the pension system with an increased fiscal burden (O'Rourke and Sinnot, 2006:843). A control variable for the respondents' age from the WVS is included in the study. Also gender will be included in the study, as it has been found in previous studies on attitudes towards immigrants that females are more positive to higher numbers of immigrants coming to the country (Chandler and Tsai, 2001:181; O'Rourke and Sinnot, 2006:856). This variable is also retrieved from the WVS and is coded as 0=Male and 1=Female.

Moreover, it has been pointed out that whether a person is born in the country or an immigrant in the country influence attitudes towards immigrants. Just and Anderson (2015:198f) discover that immigrants in a country have more positive attitudes to increased immigration. They argue that this is due to kinship and solidarity with other newcomers established in their shared experiences. They also have a better understanding of why people migrate and the troubles associated with migration. But also self-beneficial considerations such as opportunities to reunite with

[15] See Appendix 3 for specific coding.

relatives can be a reason why immigrants are more positive to further immigration. Thus, it is appropriate to control if the respondents are born in the country or an immigrant. The WVS includes the following question suitable for controlling this: "*Were you born in this country or are you an immigrant?*" (World Values Survey2, p. 19). The answers are coded as 0=Born in the country and 1=Immigrant in this country. This indicator may not be perfect, as an individual can still perceive herself as an immigrant although she is born in the country. In contrast, an individual born outside the country but are well integrated in the host society may feel more like a citizen than an immigrant in the country. But in general this indicator should cover the intended characteristic of the respondent.

Unemployment has been discovered to be influencing individuals' attitudes towards immigrants (Gang et al., 2013:187; Nagayoshi and Hjerm, 2015:155; Semyonov et al., 2008:8). Immigrants are perceived as an easy target when people look for someone to blame their ill on. Media and politicians pointing out immigrants as the reason behind high unemployment rates in the country can further intensify and legitimize the blaming of immigrants. To control for unemployment the question regarding employment from the WVS is included. The variable has been recoded so 1=Unemployed and 0=Other.[16] [17]

3.3 Descriptive Statistics

Before looking at the outcome of the multilevel logistic regression some descriptive statistics for the variables included in the study are presented in Table 1.

[16] See Appendix 3 for the original coding.
[17] The unemployment level in a country could also possibly affect the attitudes towards immigrants, as higher unemployment levels in a country could indicate a large threat to the economic situation and a weak national economic context. This has been tested but did not significantly impact the result and is not included in the analysis.

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for all variables included.[18]

Variable	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Immigrants as Neighbors	64175	0.73	0.44	0	1
Native priority when jobs are scarce	50490	0.16	0.37	0	1
BTI SSN	65707	5.89	1.76	2	10
GDP	65707	14413.36	20743.48	400	145300
Net Migration	65707	-0.35	3.43	-4.41	15.65
Democracy	65707	5.77	2.88	0.25	10
Ethnic Fractionalization	64665	4.47	2.42	.04	8.80
Gender	65707	0.52	0.50	0	1
Age	65707	40.37	15.85	16	99
Education	65707	5.59	2.40	1	9
Income	65707	4.9	2.1	1	10
Born in country or immigrant	62459	0.04	0.19	0	1
Unemployed	64508	0.10	0.30	0	1

Because part of the contribution of this study is the new context of less developed countries, it is relevant to display the countries included. The countries included in this study are: Algeria, Azerbaijan, Argentina, Armenia, Bahrain, Belarus, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia, Georgia, Ghana, India, Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Singapore, Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Yemen, Zimbabwe.[19] These are the countries included in both the sixth round of the WVS and the Bertelsmann Transformation Index from 2010.

The result of the multilevel logistic regression is presented and analyzed in the following section.

[18] See Appendix 4 for information on correlations between the different variables.
[19] There are 47 countries included in both BTI and WVS. But the two questions used as dependent variables have not been asked in all countries, therefore the total number of countries in the different analyses are not 47. There are also some loss of cases in the control variables used in the study, as can be seen in the tables presenting the result.

4 RESULTS

In this section the results of the multilevel logistic regression is presented with two different sub-sections, one for the cultural dimension and one for the material dimension of attitudes towards immigrants.

4.1 Cultural Dimension

The result from the multilevel logistic regression for the cultural dimension is presented in Table 2 below. Model 0 is an empty model only including the dependent variable covering if the respondent would mind to have an immigrant as neighbor. The important aspect of Model 0 is the Intraclass Correlation (ICC) showing the portion of the total variability in the dependent variable explained between countries (Field, 2014:816ff). The ICC coefficient is .248, which can be transformed to 24.8 percent. Thus, 24.8 percent of the total variability in the dependent variable is explained at the country level and this confirms the necessity of a multilevel analysis to account for the nested data.

In Model 1 the independent variable BTI SSN, indicating the comprehensiveness of welfare institutions in the countries, is included. Hypothesis 1 predicted that more comprehensive welfare institutions would lead to more positive attitudes towards immigrants. However, BTI SSN is insignificant and does not seem to influence the dependent variable. This is also shown by the unchanged ICC coefficient proving that the unexplained variability at the country level is the same after the introduction of the independent variable. In Model 2 GDP is added as a control variable at the country level. As GDP is troubled with a skewed distribution the log of GDP is used in the analyses.[20] With the inclusion of GDP the independent variable, BTI SSN, becomes significant and has a positive influence on peoples' attitudes towards immigrants, in line with hypothesis 1. Thus, when GDP is controlled for there is a positive effect of welfare institutions on citizens' attitudes towards immigrants. This is reasonable as BTI_SSN and GDP is rater highly correlated (0.5*).[21] GDP has a significant negative effect on individuals' attitudes towards immigrants on the cultural dimension. Hence,

[20] The mean of Log GDP is 9.043 with 1.041 in standard deviation. It ranges between 5.991 and 11.887.
[21] See Appendix 4

individuals in more prosperous countries are more prone to be negative towards immigrants at the cultural dimension compared to individuals in poorer countries. This is in line with the finding of Kleemans and Klugman (2009:18) that people in more prosperous countries are more negative towards letting immigrants into the country.[22] However, it goes against the finding by Semyonov et al. (2006:444) that economic prosperity lead to more positive attitudes towards the foreign population.

In Model 3 Net Migration is included as a control variable but does not have a significant influence on the people's attitudes towards immigrants. In Model 4 the level of democracy is introduced but this does not demonstrate a significant influence on attitudes towards immigrants. Thus, previous findings of a negative relationship between level of democracy and attitudes towards immigrants are not found in this study. The inclusion of Democracy eliminates the significant positive effect of welfare institutions found in model 2 and 3.

[22] The cultural dimension can be more representative to letting immigrants into the country and the equitable treatment more represents the material dimension of jobs. Thus, according to Kleemans and Klugman (2009:18) people in richer countries should be more negative towards immigrants at the cultural dimension.

Table 2: Multilevel Logistic Regression Analysis. Dependent variable: Immigrant as neighbor. 0=mentioned (more negative attitudes) and 1=not mentioned (more positive attitudes).[23] [24]

	Model 0	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Fixed Effect							
Country Level							
BTI SSN (1-10)		.002 (.083)	**.254* (.131)**	**.255* (.137)**	.177 (.143)	.101 (.150)	.185 (.151)
Log GDP			**-.547** (.227)**	**-.548** (.250)**	**-.458* (.235)**	-.393 (.254)	**-.553** (.265)**
Net Migration				-.003 (.041)	.010 (.041)	.015 (.042)	.004 (.057)
Democracy (Less 0-10 More)					.070 (.055)	-.092 (.057)	-.083 (.059)
Ethnic Fractionalization (Low 0-10 High)						-.103 (.065)	-.071 (.069)
Individual Level							
Gender (Male=0 Female=1)							**.054*** (.020)**
Age							**-.003*** (.001)**
Education (Low 1-9 High)							**.031*** (.005)**
Income (Low 1-10 High)							.008 (.005)
Immigrant (Native=0 Immigrant=1)							**.347*** (.055)**
Unemployment (Other=0 Unemployed=1)							-.043 (.034)
Constant	**1.283*** (.154)**	**1.274** (.518)**	**4.730*** (1.514)**	**4.737*** (1.517)**	**3.979** (1.607)**	**4.160** (1.695)**	**4.826*** (1.794)**
Random Effect							
Intercept	1.083 (.229)	1.083 (.229)	.960 (.204)	.960 (.204)	.928 (.197)	.898 (.193)	.855 (.190)
Log Likelihood	-33260	-33260	-33257	-33257	-33256	-32533	-30675
AIC	66525	66526	66523	66525	66525	65080	61376
BIC	66542	66553	66559	66570	66580	65143	61493
ICC	.248 (.039)	.248 (.039)	.226 (.037)	.226 (.037)	.220 (.036)	.214 (.036)	.206 (.036)
Countries	46	46	46	46	46	45	42
N	64175	64175	64175	64175	64175	63133	58699

Note: ***p≤.01 **p≤.05 *p≤.10. Standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable is the question: Could you please mention any that you would not like to have as neighbors? Where one answering option is 'Immigrants/Foreign Workers' (World Values Survey2, p.3).
Sources: BTI Social Safety Nets (Bertelsmann Transformation Index, 2010); GDP (The World Factbook, 2010); Net Migration (The World Factbook, 2010); Democracy [fh_ipolity2] (Teorell et al., 2013); Ethnic Fractionalization [fe_etfra] (Teorell et al., 2013). All individual level data is retrieved from the WVS Wave 6, 2010-2014 (World Values Survey3).

[23] The multilevel logistic regression has been tested without possible outliers in Net Migration (Zimbabwe and Kuwait) and GDP (Qatar). This did not lead to any significant changes in the result.
[24] The analysis has also been done without the countries that are missing at the material dimension (Tunisia, Algeria, Iraq and Lebanon) to control that these specific countries are not accountable for the different results between the dimensions. The result remained when these countries were removed from the analysis.

In Model 5 Ethnic Fractionalization is included in the regression but does not have a significant effect on the attitudes towards immigrants. In model 5 including all control variables at the country level no variable is having a significant influence on individual attitudes towards immigrants.

In Model 6 the control variables at the individual level are introduced making it the full model. In the full model there is no significant effect of welfare institutions on individual attitudes towards immigrants. Thus, there is no support for Hypothesis 1 when the cultural dimension is considered. The only significant influence at the country level is a negative effect of GDP demonstrating that cultural resentment is more prevalent in more prosperous countries. At the individual level it is demonstrated that females are more positive to immigrants in comparison to males. Moreover, immigrants, younger people and more educated individuals are also more positive towards immigrants. The results of the individual level variables mainly confirm the results found in previous studies, except that income and unemployment are insignificant.[25] Considering the ICC (.206) for model 6 it demonstrates that the full model is improved and explains more than the previous models. However, it also shows that a portion of the variability at the country level is still unexplained. To explore the different models further we can look at the Log Likelihood, AIC and BIC and for all three measures a lower number is demonstrating a better fitting model. They all demonstrate that the full model is the best fitting model of the ones tested in the analysis.

To interpret the results in more detail the odds ratios are presented in Table 3 below. Odds ratios show *"the ratio of the odds of an event occurring in one group compared to another"* (Field, 2014:880). If the value is higher than one it indicates that an increase in the independent variable leads to an increased odds for the outcome to occur. A value below 1 indicates that an increase in the independent variable leads to a

[25] Kleemans and Klugman (2009:17) found that the positive effect of education was reversed in poorer countries. However, this study does not make an interaction between GDP and Education that would enable a similar conclusion.

decreased odds of the outcome to occur (Field, 2014:767).[26] The odds ratios are good indicators for the impact of one variable on another (Crepaz, 2008:172).

Table 3: Multilevel Logistic Regression for model 6 (full model) presenting odds ratios. Dependent variable: Immigrant as neighbor.

Cultural Dimension	Odds Ratio
BTI SSN	1.204 (.182)
GDP	**.575**** **(.152)**
Net Migration	1.004 (.057)
Democracy	1.086 (.064)
Ethnic Fractionalization	.931 (.064)
Gender	**1.055***** **(.021)**
Age	**.997***** **(.001)**
Education	**1.031***** **(.005)**
Income	1.008 (.005)
Immigrant	**1.414***** **(.078)**
Unemployed	.958 (.033)

Note: ***p≤.01 **p≤.05 *p≤.10. Standard errors in parentheses.

The only significant influence at the country level is GDP where one step up at the log of GDP (ranging between 5.99 and 11.89) decreases the odds of being positive towards immigrants with 42.5%. At the individual level, being a woman increases the odds of being positive towards immigrants with 5.5% in comparison to men. The negative effect of age implies that for a one year older individual the odds of being positive towards immigrants decrease with 0.4%. One step up at the education indicator (scale 1-9) increases the odds of more positive attitudes with 3.1%. The last significant effect at the individual level is if the respondent is an immigrant. This demonstrates that the odds of being positive towards immigrants are increased with 41.4% for an immigrant compared with a native citizen.

[26] These odds should not be confused with sports betting where a higher odds means that an event is less likely to occur. Here a higher odds implies that an event is more likely to occur.

An alternative analysis was made where the control variables were added, only together with the focal independent and dependent variable.[27] Net Migration and Ethnic Fractionalization did not have a significant effect and were therefore excluded in the final model. In this alternative modeling the effect of welfare institutions on the cultural dimension of attitudes was significant (p=.084), although only at the 90 percent significance level. Therefore the effect of welfare institutions on the cultural dimension of attitudes is sensitive to the specific modeling and cannot be considered as robust.

To summarize, no significant effect (or a very weak effect depending on the modeling) of welfare institutions on individual attitudes towards immigrants at the cultural dimension is discovered in this analysis. Thus, Hypothesis 1 maintaining that welfare institutions have a positive effect on individual attitudes towards immigrants does not hold true when attitudes at the cultural dimension are examined. However, there is significant influence from the level of GDP at the country level and from gender, age, education and immigrant at the individual level, on attitudes towards immigrants at the cultural dimension.

The results for the material dimension are presented in the next section.

4.2 Material Dimension

In Table 4 below the results for the multilevel logistic regression covering the material dimension of attitudes towards immigrants are presented. Model 0 is an empty model and only includes the dependent variable for the material dimension, asking the respondents if natives should be prioritized over immigrants when jobs are scarce. The ICC coefficient is .164 indicating that 16.4 percent of the variability in the dependent variable is at the country level. In Model 1 the independent variable BTI SSN indicating the comprehensiveness of the welfare institutions in a country is added. There is no significant influence from the comprehensiveness of welfare institutions on the attitudes towards immigrants. However, when GDP is added in Model 2 a significant positive effect from more comprehensive welfare institutions on attitudes towards immigrants is discovered. Therefore, when GDP is controlled for and held at zero the effect of welfare institutions becomes significant, as was also the case at the

[27] See Appendix 5.

cultural dimension. This is as expected as BTI SSN is rather highly correlated with GDP (0.5*), as can be seen in Appendix 4. The negative effect of GDP is not significant.

In Model 3 Net Migration is included but does not significantly influence attitudes towards immigrants and the positive effect of welfare institutions remains when Net Migration is introduced in the analysis. Democracy is included in Model 4 and does not influence attitudes towards immigrants but the inclusion made the previously positive effect of welfare institutions on attitudes towards immigrants insignificant. Ethnic Fractionalization is introduced in Model 5 and is demonstrating a significant positive effect on attitudes towards immigrants. This implies that more ethnic fractionalization in a country lead to more positive attitudes towards immigrants. This goes against Whitaker and Giersch (2015:1552) who found that more ethnic fractionalization leads to more welfare chauvinism and is more in line with Mau and Burkhardt (2009:225) who argue that the negative effect of ethnic fractionalization on attitudes towards immigrants is exaggerated. With the inclusion of Ethnic Fractionalization the effect of welfare institutions becomes significant again.

In Model 6 the control variables at the individual level is added to complete the full model. The inclusion of the individual-level variables increased the positive effect of welfare institutions on attitudes towards immigrants. In the complete model it is established that more comprehensive welfare institutions lead to more positive attitudes towards immigrants at the material dimension. This is in line with both Hypothesis 1 claiming that more comprehensive welfare institutions lead to more positive attitudes towards immigrants and Hypothesis 2 stating that the effect of welfare institutions in less developed countries should me more pronounced at the material dimension. The negative effect of GDP is significant in the full model demonstrating that people in more prosperous countries are more negative towards immigrants in comparison to people in poorer countries. Ethnic Fractionalization is also showing a significant positive effect on the attitudes towards immigrants.

Table 4: Multilevel Logistic Regression Analysis. Dependent variable: When jobs are scarce natives should be prioritized. 0=Agree (more negative attitudes) and 1=Disagree (more positive attitudes).[28]

	Model 0	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Fixed Effect							
Country-Level							
BTI SSN (Less 1-10 More)		.067 (.066)	**.120* (.112)**	**.193* (.111)**	.171 (.126)	**.230* (.128)**	**.304** (.127)**
Log GDP			-.276 (.191)	-.264 (.189)	-.238 (.202)	-.296 (.214)	**-.422* (.221)**
Net Migration				.030 (.032)	.033 (.033)	.030 (.033)	.027 (.044)
Democracy (Low 0-10 High)					.016 (.045)	-.001 (.046)	-.012 (.046)
Ethnic Fractionalization (Low 0-10 High)						**.098* (.053)**	**.125** (.055)**
Individual Level							
Gender (Male=0 Female=1)							**.140*** (.027)**
Age							**-.004*** (.001)**
Education (Low 1-9 High)							**.013** (.007)**
Income (Low 1-10 High)							**.060*** (.007)**
Immigrant (Native=0 Immigrant=1)							**.476*** (.074)**
Unemployment (Other=0 Unemployed=1)							-.003 (.045)
Constant	**-1.829*** (.124)**	**-2.232*** (.414)**	-.532 (1.243)	-.586 (1.232)	-.787 (1.346)	-.931 (1.417)	-.659 (1.482)
Random Effect							
Intercept	.646 (.144)	.631 (.140)	.602 (.134)	.590 (.131)	.588 (.131)	.556 (.125)	.508 (.119)
Log Likelihood	-20640	-20640	-20639	-20639	-20638	-20334	-18447
AIC	41286	41287	41286	41288	41289	40682	36920
BIC	41304	41313	41322	41332	41342	40743	37034
ICC	.164 (.030)	.161 (.030)	.155 (.029)	.152 (.029)	.152 (.029)	.145 (.028)	.134 (.027)
Countries	43	43	43	43	43	42	39
N	50490	50490	50490	50490	50490	49504	46086

Notes: ***p≤.01, **p≤.05, *p≤.10. Standard Errors in parentheses. Dependent variable: Do you agree, disagree or neither agree nor disagree with the following statement? When jobs are scarce employers should give priority to people of this country over immigrants. (World Values Survey2, p3).
Sources: BTI Social Safety Nets (Bertelsmann Transformation Index, 2010); GDP (The World Factbook, 2010); Net Migration (The World Factbook, 2010); Democracy fh_ipolity2 (Teorell et al., 2013); Ethnic Fractionalization (Teorell et al., 2013). All individual level data is retrieved from the WVS Wave 6, 2010-2014 (World Values Survey3).

At the individual level the results are almost the same as the analysis for the cultural dimension. Women, younger people, more educated and immigrants are all more

[28] The multilevel logistic regression has been tested without possible outliers in Net Migration (Zimbabwe and Kuwait) and GDP (Qatar). This did not lead to any significant changes in the result.

positive towards immigrants. In contrast to the cultural dimension, income has a significant positive effect on attitudes towards immigrants at the material dimension. This is supporting the theory developed in this thesis about the increased economic security and the stronger effect at the material dimension. The ICC shows that the best performing model is the full model (Model 6) including all the variables. Log Likelihood, AIC and BIC examining the fit of the different models also demonstrate that the full model is the best performing model.

To make the results more intuitive and easier to grasp the odds ratios for the full model are presented in Table 5. From the odds ratios it is noticeable that one positive step on the index for welfare institutions leads to a 36% increase in odds that respondents disagree with the statement that natives should be prioritized when jobs are scarce. Thus, there is a 36% higher odds that respondents are more positive towards immigrants along the material dimension moving one step (scale 1-10) at the index for welfare institutions.

Table 5: Multilevel Logistic Regression Analysis of model 6 (full model). Dependent variable: When jobs are scarce natives should be prioritized.

Material Dimension	Odds Ratio
BTI_SSN	**1.356**** **(.172)**
Log GDP	**.656*** **(.145)**
Net Migration	1.027 (.045)
Democracy	.988 (.046)
Ethnic Fractionalization	**1.133**** **(.062)**
Gender	**1.150***** **(.031)**
Age	**.996***** **(.031)**
Education	**1.014**** **(.007)**
Income	**1.062***** **(.007)**
Immigrant	**1.610***** **(.115)**
Unemployment	.997 (.045)

Note: ***p≤.01, **p≤.05, *p≤.10. Standard Errors in parentheses.

For ethnic fractionalization there is an increased odds for positive attitudes of 13% moving one step (scale 0-10) to increase ethnic fractionalization. At the individual level the odds that respondents are more positive towards immigrants at the material dimension is increased with 15% for women in comparison to men. Increasing the education with one step (scale 1-9) increases the odds for positive attitudes with 1.4%. Furthermore, a one step increase in income (scale 1-10) leads to a 6% percent increase in odds of being positive towards immigrants. Being an immigrant increases the odds of being positive to other immigrants with 61%.

To visualize the result, a graph of predicted probabilities are showed below in Graph 1. Graph 1 displays the predicted probabilities of positive attitudes towards (a higher value means more positive attitudes) immigrants at the material dimension at different levels of welfare institutions (BTI_SSN).

Graph 1: Predicted probabilities of attitudes towards immigrants at the material dimension at different levels of welfare institutions. All other variables held at their means.



Note: See Appendix 6 for details on the margins used in this graph.

As expected, there is a positive curve showing that more comprehensive welfare institutions lead to higher probability of positive attitudes towards immigrants at the material dimension. The confidence intervals are large at the high values of

BTI_SSN, as only a few countries in this study have such high scores on welfare institutions. For example, only Slovenia receives the highest score of 10 and only four countries receive a score of 9 on welfare institutions. The results indicate that there is no significant difference when improving welfare institutions with one step on the scale between 1-10. However, when moving between, for example, level 4 and level 7 there is a significant higher probability of positive attitudes towards immigrants at the material dimension in the country with a value of 7 on welfare institutions. This could be exemplified by comparing Egypt with a score of 4 on welfare institutions and Romania with a score of 7. The mean of the attitudes along the material dimension (0=Negative and 1=Positive) in Egypt is .029 whereas in Romania the mean is .133.

As for the cultural dimension, an alternative analysis was made with the country level control variables introduced with only the focal relationship.[29] The effect remained strong and the significance level increased to p=.009 from p=.036. Thus, the results of the material dimension are not sensitive to the specific modeling, as was the case with the result of the cultural dimension.

To summarize, at the material dimension welfare institutions have a positive effect on peoples' attitudes towards immigrants. This confirms both Hypothesis 1 maintaining that more comprehensive welfare institutions have a positive effect on attitudes towards immigrants and Hypothesis 2 claiming that the effect should be more pronounced at the material dimension. It was also discovered that the level of GDP has a significant negative effect on individual attitudes at the material dimension while citizens in more ethnic fractionalized countries are more likely to be positive to immigrants. At the individual level the results were almost the same as for the cultural dimension, as higher educated, younger people, women and immigrants are more positive towards immigrants. However, in contrast to the cultural dimension the level of income has a significant effect on individual attitudes along the material dimension.

[29] See Appendix 5.

5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

The aim of this study was to examine the relationship between welfare institutions and individual attitudes towards immigrants, and to advance this strand of research by focusing on less developed countries. Two hypotheses have been tested where Hypothesis 1 suggested that more comprehensive welfare institutions lead to more positive attitudes towards immigrants, while Hypothesis 2 stated that the effect of welfare institutions on attitudes towards immigrants should be more pronounced along the material dimension. The results confirm Hypothesis 2 that more comprehensive welfare institutions lead to more positive attitudes towards immigrants at the material dimension but the effect of welfare institutions on attitudes towards immigrants at the cultural dimension was sensitive to the specific modeling. Hypothesis 1 is only partially confirmed, as the influence of welfare institutions is only significant and robust along the material dimension. A weak positive effect at the cultural dimension was attained when the specific modeling was changed but cannot be considered as a robust finding. The result is in line with Crepaz (2008:197f) who also discovers a positive effect of welfare institutions at the material dimension of attitudes towards immigrants but not at the cultural dimensions when studying developed countries.

The contribution of this thesis has been twofold: First, this thesis has advanced the theory of the influence of welfare institutions on attitudes towards immigrants for developed countries, to the context of less developed countries. It has contributed with a theoretical ground for future studies to build upon and develop further. Second, this thesis has conducted a broad empirical examination of the relationship between welfare institutions and attitudes towards immigrants, in the previously unexplored context of less developed countries. Moreover, the contrasting results for the material dimension and the cultural dimension prove that it is essential to distinguish between different types of attitudes towards immigrants. If the different dimensions are grouped together, important aspects of the attitudes will be missing and fewer conclusions can be drawn from the result. It can also lead to wrongful conclusions as the dimensions may take each other out and show no result when there actually are important results when they are distinguished.

The results of this study suggest that the mechanism of general economic safety is most attainable for less developed countries. Note that this is based on the reasoning of the different mechanisms in the theoretical framework, as the mechanisms were not empirically tested in the study. The mechanisms of broader solidarity, higher generalized trust and state capacity do not seem to have as strong influence when less developed countries are examined. A policy implication following this is that welfare institutions that improve the economic safety of the citizens may be prioritized in less developed countries with large inflows of immigrants. The result implies that when working against anti-immigrant attitudes in less developed countries, it is important to know the reason behind the negative attitudes. If it is a conflict connected to resources and the material dimension, the result of this study suggests that it can be relieved by improving welfare institutions related to the economic safety of the citizens. This result could influence and guide the work of organizations working with implementing and developing institutional settings in developing countries. Increasing the positive attitudes towards immigrants could enhance the possibilities for a successful integration of immigrants in the country.

There are limitations related to the available data used for the analysis. The dependent variables from the WVS may not be perfectly representative to the two different dimensions of attitudes, as discussed in the methodological section. This is a common problem for studies using data that are not specifically collected for the actual study. This problem should be less critical for this study as the questions from the WVS have been used similarly along the two dimensions of attitudes in previous research. Data on welfare institutions in developing countries is scarce and more alternatives to BTI are needed in order to further advance the literature on the effect of welfare institutions on attitudes towards immigrants in developing countries. Another limitation of the data is the failure to distinguish between economic migrants and refugees, as this could be important for the effect of the different mechanisms (particularly broader solidarity) between welfare institutions and attitudes towards immigrants.

Hopefully, this study will inspire more future research on the effect of welfare institutions on attitudes towards immigrants in the developing world. Future research

should try to advance the theory laid out in this thesis further and explore the different mechanisms in the context of less developed countries in more detail. It would also be suitable to distinguish between different kinds of immigrants like refugees and migrant-workers, as the influence from the different mechanisms should be different for different categories of immigrants. It may be beneficial to study attitudes towards immigrants in the developing world over time to see how and why they change in relation to the development of welfare institutions in a country. However, as stated above, improved data on welfare institutions in the developing world is needed to advance the research in this specific area.

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World Values Survey3, Wave 6 2010-2014 Official Aggregate v.20150418. World Values Survey Association (www.worldvaluessurvey.org)

7 Appendixes

APPENDIX 1

Number of respondents per country.

Country	Observations	Percent
Algeria	1199	1,82
Azerbaijan	1002	1,52
Argentina	983	1,50
Armenia	1090	1,66
Bahrain	971	1,48
Belarus	1519	2,31
Brazil	1453	2,21
Colombia	1479	2,25
Chile	919	1,40
China	2055	3,13
Ecuador	1200	1,83
Egypt	1523	2,32
Estonia	1519	2,31
Georgia	1191	1,81
Ghana	1552	2,36
India	1538	2,34
Iraq	1189	1,81
Jordan	1195	1,82
Kazakhstan	1500	2,28
Kuwait	1108	1,69
Kyrgyzstan	1473	2,24
Lebanon	1175	1,79
Libya	2050	3,12
Malaysia	1299	1,98
Mexico	1928	2,93
Morocco	1061	1,61
Nigeria	1759	2,68
Pakistan	1200	1,83
Peru	1187	1,81
Philippines	1199	1,82
Poland	929	1,41
Qatar	1042	1,59
Romania	1467	2,23
Russia	2415	3,68
Rwanda	1527	2,32
Singapore	1922	2,93
Slovenia	1020	1,55
South Korea	1195	1,82
South Africa	3397	5,17
Thailand	1144	1,74
Tunisia	1153	1,75
Turkey	1571	2,39
Ukraine	1500	2,28
Uruguay	973	1,48
Uzbekistan	1469	2,24
Yemen	967	1,47
Zimbabwe	1500	2,28

Source: World Values Survey, Wave 6, 2010-2014.

APPENDIX 2

Country Level Scores

Country	BTI Social Safety Nets (1-10)	GDP Capita PPP	Net Migration rate per 1000 population	Democracy (0-10)	Ethnic Fractionalization (0-1)
Algeria	6	7400	-0,28	4,25	.320
Azerbaijan	5	11000	-1,42	2	.188
Argentina	6	14700	0	8,67	.255
Armenia	6	5800	-4,16	5,83	.134
Bahrain	9	40400	0	0,83	.551
Belarus	6	13400	0,38	1,17	.372
Brazil	7	10900	-0,09	8,67	.550
Colombia	5	9800	-0,68	7,17	.656
Chile	8	15500	0	10	.497
China	5	7400	-0,34	1,17	.154
Ecuador	5	7800	-0,66	7,08	.655
Egypt	4	6200	-0,21	3,42	.164
Estonia	9	19000	-3,29	9,75	.511
Georgia	4	4800	-4,16	7,33	.490
Ghana	5	1600	-0,61	9,08	.846
India	4	3400	-0,05	8,5	.811
Iraq	3	3600	0	4,08	.549
Jordan	5	5300	-2,81	3	.509
Kazakhstan	6	12500	-3,28	2,25	.664
Kuwait	8	51700	15,65	2,42	.708
Kyrgyzstan	5	2200	-2,58	5,92	.679
Lebanon	4	14200	-2,43	6,08	.780
Libya	8	13800	0	4,58	.151
Malaysia	7	14700	-0,4	6,5	.596
Mexico	6	13800	-3,38	7,83	.542
Morocco	4	4900	-3,88	3,58	.479
Nigeria	4	2400	-0,1	5,58	.805
Pakistan	3	2400	-2,36	6,08	.532
Peru	5	9200	-0,93	8,5	.638
Philippines	5	3500	-1,31	7,83	.161
Poland	9	18800	-0,47	10	.047
Qatar	8	145300	-4,41	1,25	--
Romania	7	11500	-0,27	8,92	.230
Russia	7	15900	0,28	4,75	.333
Rwanda	4	1100	1,11	2,33	.180
Singapore	8	62200	4,79	4,5	.388
Slovenia	10	28400	0,4	10	.231

South Korea	8	30200	0	9,08	.004
South Africa	6	10700	-3,13	8,92	.880
Thailand	6	8700	0	6,75	.431
Tunisia	6	9500	-0,38	6,67	.039
Turkey	7	12300	0,53	7,67	.299
Ukraine	6	6700	-0,1	6,92	.419
Uruguay	9	13600	-0,14	10	.218
Uzbekistan	5	3100	-2,84	0,25	.485
Yemen	3	2600	0	1,99	.078
Zimbabwe	2	400	12,87	1,99	.366

Sources:
BTI Social Safety Nets (Bertelsmann Transformation Index, 2010)
GDP Capita PPP (The World Factbook, 2010)
Net Migration Rate per 1000 population (The World Factbook, 2010)
Democracy: [fh_ipolity2] (Teorell et al., 2013)
Ethnic Fractionalization: [fe_etfra] (Teorell et al., 2013)

APPENDIX 3

Individual Level Variables

Education

V248: What is the highest educational level that you have attained? [NOTE: if respondent indicates to be a student, code highest level s/he expects to complete]:

Highest educational level attained	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
No formal education	4150	6.32	6.32
Incomplete primary school	4089	6.22	12.54
Complete primary school	6862	10.44	22.98
Incomplete secondary school: technical/	4859	7.39	30.38
Complete secondary school: technical/ v	13151	20.01	50.39
Incomplete secondary school: university	5509	8.38	58.78
Complete secondary school: university-p	11509	17.52	76.29
Some university-level education, without degree	4833	7.36	83.65
University - level education, with degree	10745	16.35	100.00
Total	65707	100.00	

Income

V239. On this card is an income scale on which 1 indicates the lowest income group and 10 the highest income group in your country. We would like to know in what group your household is. Please, specify the appropriate number, counting all wages, salaries, pensions and other incomes that come in.

Income group	Freq.	Percent
1	5079	7.73
2	4478	6.82
3	7317	11.14
4	8934	13.6
5	14224	21.65
6	10414	15.85
7	8159	12.42
8	4865	7.4
9	1340	2.04
10	897	1.37
Total	65707	100.00

Born in country or immigrant

V245. Were you born in this country or are you an immigrant?
1 I am born in this country.
2 I am an immigrant to this country.

Respondent Immigrant	Freq.	Percent
I am born in this country	60241	96.45
I am an immigrant to this country	2218	3.55
Total	62459	100.00

Employment

V229. Are you employed now or not? If yes, about how many hours a week? If more than one job: only for the main job (code one answer):
Yes, has paid employment:
1 Full time employee (30 hours a week or more)
2 Part time employee (less than 30 hours a week)
3 Self employed
No, no paid employment:
4 Retired/pensioned
5 Housewife not otherwise employed
6 Student
7 Unemployed
8 Other (write in):_____

Recoded: 1=Unemployed and 0=All other values

Employment Status	Freq.	Percent
All Other	58018	89.94
Unemployed	6490	10.06
Total	64508	100.00

APPENDIX 4

Correlation Matrix including all variables.

	Immigrants as neighbors	Native priority jobs	BTI SSN	GDP	Net Migration	Democracy	Ethnic Frac.	Gender	Age	Education	Income	Immigrant	Unemployment
Immigrants as neighbors	1												
Native priority jobs	.07*	1											
BTI SSN	-.06*	.01*	1										
GDP	-.09*	-.02*	.51*	1									
Net Migration	.01*	.01*	.00	.12*	1								
Democracy	.02*	.03*	.31*	-.16*	-.24*	1							
Ethnic Frac.	-.08*	.06*	-.21*	-.07*	-.11*	.22*	1						
Gender	.02*	.02*	.01*	.00	-.03*	-.01	-.04*	1					
Age	-.02*	-.04*	.15*	.03*	-.04*	.07*	-.12*	.03*	1				
Education	-.01*	.01*	.16*	.13*	-.01*	.00	.00	-.05*	-.21*	1			
Income	-.02*	.06*	.05*	.14*	.06*	-.08*	.09*	-.03*	-.14*	.25*	1		
Immigrant	.01*	.02*	.08*	.08*	.00	-.06*	-.02*	.02*	.09*	.02*	-.01	1	
Unemployment	-.00	.01*	-.08*	-.05*	-.01*	.05*	.08*	-.04*	-.11*	-.03*	-.09*	-.02*	1

*= Correlation is significant at 95% confidence level

APPENDIX 5

Alternative Regression Tables

Cultural Dimension: Multilevel Logistic Regression Analysis. Dependent variable: Immigrant as neighbor. 0=mentioned (negative attitudes) and 1=not mentioned (positive attitudes).

	Model 0	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Fixed Effect							
Country Level							
BTI SSN (1-10)		.002 (.083)	**.254*** **(.131)**	.001 (.083)	-.047 (.085)	-.014 (.150)	**.237*** **(.137)**
Log GDP			**-.547**** **(.227)**				**-.570**** **(.229)**
Net Migration				.006 (.043)			
Democracy (Less 0-10 More)					**.096*** **(.053)**		-.061 (.054)
Ethnic Fractionalization (Low 0-10 High)						-.101 (.067)	
Individual Level							
Gender (Male=0 Female=1)							**.053**** **(.020)**
Age							**-.003***** **(.001)**
Education (Low 1-9 High)							**.027***** **(.005)**
Income (Low 1-10 High)							**.008*** **(.005)**
Immigrant (Native=0 Immigrant=1)							**.331***** **(.054)**
Unemployment (Other=0 Unemployed=1)							-.041 (.034)
Constant	**1.283***** **(.154)**	**1.274**** **(.518)**	**4.730***** **(1.514)**	**1.278**** **(.519)**	**1.005*** **(.523)**	**1.830**** **(.654)**	**4.508**** **(1.567)**
Random Effect							
Intercept	1.083 (.229)	1.083 (.229)	.960 (.204)	1.082 (.229)	1.012 (.214)	1.024 (.220)	.858 (.188)
Log Likelihood	-33260	-33260	-33257	-33260	-33258	-32536	-31405
AIC	66525	66526	66523	66528	66525	65080	62833
BIC	66542	66553	66559	66565	66561	65116	62932
ICC	.248 (.039)	.248 (.039)	.226 (.037)	.248 (.039)	.235 (.038)	.237 (.039)	.207 (.036)
Countries	46	46	46	46	46	45	43
N	64175	64175	64175	64175	64175	63133	59740

Note: ***p≤.01 **p≤.05 *p≤.10. Standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable is the question: Could you please mention any that you would not like to have as neighbors? Where one answering option is 'Immigrants/Foreign Workers' (World Values Survey2, p.3).
Sources: BTI Social Safety Nets (Bertelsmann Transformation Index, 2010); GDP (The World Factbook, 2010); Net Migration (The World Factbook, 2010); Democracy [fh_ipolity2] (Teorell et al., 2013); Ethnic Fractionalization [fe_etfra] (Teorell et al., 2013). All individual level data is retrieved from the WVS Wave 6, 2010-2014 (World Values Survey3).

Material Dimension: Multilevel Logistic Regression Analysis. Dependent variable: When jobs are scarce natives should be prioritized. 0=Agree (negative attitudes) and 1=Disagree (positive attitudes).

	Model 0	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Fixed Effect							
Country-Level							
BTI SSN (Less 1-10 More)		.067 (.066)	**.120* (.112)**	.065 (.065)	.054 (.069)	.096 (.066)	**.299*** (.114)**
Log GDP			-.276 (.191)				**-.441** (.212)**
Net Migration				.033 (.033)			
Democracy (Low 0-10 High)					.025 (.042)		
Ethnic Fractionalization (Low 0-10 High)						**.092* (.053)**	**.114** (.052)**
Individual Level							
Gender (Male=0 Female=1)							**.140*** (.027)**
Age							**-.004*** (.001)**
Education (Low 1-9 High)							**.013** (.007)**
Income (Low 1-10 High)							**.060*** (.007)**
Immigrant (Native=0 Immigrant=1)							**.477*** (.072)**
Unemployment (Other=0 Unemployed=1)							-.003 (.045)
Constant	**-1.829*** (.124)**	**-2.232*** (.414)**	-.532 (1.243)	**-2.214*** (.409)**	**-2.296*** (1.346)**	**-2.784*** (.502)**	-.495 (1.403)
Random Effect							
Intercept	.646 (.144)	.631 (.140)	.602 (.134)	.617 (.137)	.626 (.139)	.594 (.134)	.515 (.121)
Log Likelihood	-20640	-20640	-20639	-20639	-20640	-20335	-18447
AIC	41286	41287	41286	41287	41288	40679	36916
BIC	41304	41313	41322	41323	41323	40714	37013
ICC	.164 (.030)	.161 (.030)	.155 (.029)	.158 (.030)	.160 (.030)	.153 (.029)	.135 (.027)
Countries	43	43	43	43	43	42	39
N	50490	50490	50490	50490	50490	49504	46086

Notes: ***p≤.01, **p≤.05, *p≤.10. Standard Errors in parentheses. Dependent variable: Do you agree, disagree or neither agree nor disagree with the following statement? When jobs are scarce employers should give priority to people of this country over immigrants. (World Values Survey2, p3).
Sources: BTI Social Safety Nets (Bertelsmann Transformation Index, 2010); GDP (The World Factbook, 2010); Net Migration (The World Factbook, 2010); Democracy fh_ipolity2 (Teorell et al., 2013); Ethnic Fractionalization (Teorell et al., 2013). All individual level data is retrieved from the WVS Wave 6, 2010-2014 (World Values Survey3)

Appendix 6

The table below presents detailed information about Graph 1, displaying probabilities for attitudes towards immigrants at the material dimension at different levels of BTI_SSN.

BTI_SSN	Margins	95% Confidence Interval	
		Low	High
1	.033 (.021)	-.007	.074
2	.045* (.022)	.002	.088
3	.060** (.022)	.017	.103
4	.079*** (.020)	.040	.118
5	.105*** (.016)	.074	.135
6	.137*** (.014)	.110	.164
7	.177*** (.026)	.126	.228
8	.225*** (.050)	.127	.323
9	.283** (.082)	.122	.444
10	.349** (.120)	.113	.584

Note: ***p≤.001, **p≤.01, *p≤.05. Standard Errors in parentheses.