BLOOD AND BALLOTS
THE EFFECT OF VIOLENCE ON VOTING BEHAVIOR IN IRAQ

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Abstract

Iraq is a very diverse country, both ethnically and religiously, and its political system is characterized by severe polarization along ethno-sectarian loyalties. Since 2003, the country suffered from persistent indiscriminating terrorism and communal violence. Previous literature has rarely connected violence to election in Iraq. I argue that violence is responsible for the increases of within group cohesion and distrust towards people from other groups, resulting in politicization of the ethno-sectarian identities i.e. making ethno-sectarian parties more preferable than secular ones. This study is based on a unique dataset that includes civil terror casualties one year before election, the results of the four general elections of January 30th, and December 15th, 2005, March 7th, 2010 and April 30th, 2014 as well as demographic and socioeconomic indicators on the provincial level. Employing panel data analysis, the results show that Iraqi people are sensitive to violence and it has a very negative effect on vote share of secular parties. Also, terrorism has different degrees of effect on different groups. The Sunni Arabs are the most sensitive group. They change their electoral preference in response to the level of violence.

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1. INTRODUCTION

In the period between 2005 and 2014, Iraq had four general elections. The results of those elections show clearly that Iraqis voted according to their ethno-religious affiliation. Due to the fact that the violence in Iraq is remarkably high, then it should affect the economic, social and political life of all citizenry, including political preferences. I believe there are strong evidences that violence played a major role in politicization of ethno-religious cleavages in Iraq. This is worth exploring, because voting for ethnoreligious on the expense of secular nationalists parties lead to a paralyzed parliament that cannot agree on any effective legislation and which is unable to monitor the performance of the government (Barnes 2011, Cordesman and Khazia 2014). According to the Iraqi constitution the country is a parliamentary democracy with a proportional electoral system. With this institutional arrangement it is hardly able to produce a single political entity/party that is able to receive more than half of the votes. Hence, the governments are inevitably formed through coalitions of rival political parties that are deeply focused on representing ethnoreligious cleavages. The process of the formation of the Iraqi cabinets requires months or even more than a year to be accomplished due to the tough bargaining that aims to maximize the share of each ethnic/religious group of power and resources. This would affect the provision of civil order and basic public services like health, education, clean water and electricity which have already deteriorated.

During the period between the establishment in 1920 and the 2003 US-led invasion, Iraq used to have very strong secular traditions (Wimmer, 2007). During the monarchy period (1920-1958) there was no single religious party. In that time, political parties were mainly liberal, social nationalists and pan-Arabist. And in the period of series of military coups and single party rules (1958-2003) the main political parties were the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) and Baath party (Dawisha 2009, Eppel 2004). However, in the late 1960s, Iraq witnessed a rise of Islamists parties like A-Dawaa Islamic Party and The Islamic Party (Al-Juburi, 2012). But, after the first democratic elections in January 30, 2005 Iraq faced the rise of ethnoreligious political powers. The period of post-2003 is characterized by severe communal violence and witnessed severe politicization of sub-national identities. Therefore, party cleavages have transferred from pan-Arabism verses liberal and social nationalist to ethnoreligious. As I stated earlier, the reason behind this phenomenon is violence.

There are many prominent scholars that have studied the effect of terrorism on voting preference in several countries like Bosnia, Israel, Spain and Turkey. All the studies on those countries proved that terrorism has significant effect on voter's political choices. The findings show that terrorism mobilizes voters and shape their political preferences. It increases the level of turnout in the most of the cases and vote share of the right-wing parties. (Berrebi and Klor 2006 and 2008, Kibris 2010 and Bosnia 2010). However, despite the everyday terrorist attacks and sectarian conflict, there is no single study that takes into account the effect of violence on electoral outcome in Iraq. The literature that covers the ramifications of terrorism on voting behavior in Iraq is few and far between and characterized by overwhelmingly descriptive and normative discussions that lack strong empirical evidences. The inadequacy of the literature is not due to the irrelevancy of the topic, but rather the lack of data accessibility. Moreover, elections and voting itself are a new political practice in Iraq.

In this paper, I argue that as the level of ethnoreligious violence increases in Iraq, the share of votes of secular-national parties' decreases. This hypothesis is based on the assumption that identities are socially constructed and individuals have many identities for instance, national, ethnic, religious, tribal, regional etc. In the divided societies the level of politicizing of ethnic or sectarian identities depends on the socio-political context of each country. Violence is one of the most significant factors that politicize the sub-national identities (Fearon and Laitin 2000, Schmidt and Spies, 2013 Wood 2008 and Gilligan 2014). The occurrences of the ethno-sectarian violence will increase inter-group solidarity and distrust towards people from other groups. The ethnoreligious parties have more capacity to attract the voters who claim very strong ethnoreligious identities. The secular parties that have no claim of representing any particular group will face very hard time to convince the voters of the party's catch-all policies. Unfortunately, Iraq fulfils all the requirements that encourage the ethnoreligious voting behavior. The country is too heterogeneous, consisting of three separate ethno-religious groups- the Shiite, Sunni and the Kurds. Moreover, since the invasion in 2003, Iraq has gone through pervasive communal violence.

I would like to mention, that I do not claim that violence can explain everything about ethnoreligious voting in Iraq. In fact there are many potential decisive factors that increase the politicization of ethnicities and religions, for instance the political history, geography, economy, the constitutional design and electoral system of the country. Many scholars argued that fragmented societies are more susceptible to ethnic politics (Lijphart 1977, Dahl 1971, Rabushka and Shepsle 1972), while others blame the constitutional design and electoral

systems in prompting ethnic voting (Reilly 2001, Fish and Kroenig, 2006, Campos and Kuzeyev, 2007).

I believe this paper might be the first attempt to empirically and systematically study the consequences of violence on electoral outcome in Iraq. This study is based on the actual electoral choices of people in the country instead of voter's perceptions in surveys. To measure the effect of violence on party choice in Iraq, I used a unique dataset that includes civil terror causalities one year before the election, the results of the four parliamentary elections in Iraq of January 30, 2005 December 15, 2005 2010 and demographic and socioeconomic indicators on the provincial level. By employing the time series cross sectional analysis technique, the results proved that there is a strong negative correlation between violence and the share of secular party of votes. These results coincide with the results of similar studies that were conducted in Israel, Spain, Turkey and Bosnia (Berrebi and Klor 2006 and 2008, Kibris 2010 and Bosnia 2010). This paper also attempts to contribute to the few existing literatures on violence and election in Iraq and to expand our knowledge about this phenomenon in the countries that have similar social and political context.

In the following chapters I am going to review the already existing literatures that cover the topic of terrorism and electoral outcome. Following the literature review, I will focus on theoretical approach where I will explain the causal mechanism of how violence shapes people identities and political preferences. In the fourth chapter I will discuss the research design, methods and the quality of selected data. Next I will present the empirical analysis and its results. In the last chapter I will present the conclusion and discussion on the sociopolitical implication, contribution of this research to political science and the possibilities of future researches.

2. PREVIOUS LITERATURE ON TERRORISM AND VOTING

In this section I will overview the state of art on terrorism and election literature in general, and then focus on Iraq. The section ends with a paragraph on the main shortcoming in the literature that needs to be covered by this research.

2.1 Previous Literature on Terrorism and Elections

Terrorism and election is a field of study that is relatively new, and hence the amount of literature is small (Kibris 2010, Gurr 1988, and Rapoport, & Weinberg, 2000). We know relatively much about the cause's forms and the strategies of terrorists (Crenshaw, 1983) but we need to extend our knowledge on the consequences of terrorism (Berrebi and Klor 2008, Kibris 2010). There is a general agreement on the negative impact terrorism has on targeted states' economies, social integration and political stability. People are sensitive to violence, but there is a little agreement on voter's reaction towards terrorism.

The research has generated two main common findings. First, terrorism encourages voting for right-wing political parties and second, it leads to government replacement. Some studies use a comparative quantitative approach. For example, Williams and others studied the effect of terrorism on the probability of government stability in 18 parliamentary democracies from 1960s to 2003. They concluded that terrorism increases the likelihood of changing incumbents. However, the right-oriented governments have more capacity to absorb terrorist shocks (Williams et al, 2012). Gassebner and others examined the impact of terrorism on electoral accountability by using a model that includes 800 elections from 115 countries between 1968 and 2002. They find a positive relationship between terrorism and government replacement, and the effect increases according to the severity of the attacks (Gassebner et al 2008). Other studies are single case oriented, using both quantitative and qualitative methods of analysis (Torcal and Rico 2004, Van Biezeni 2005, Berrebi and Klor 2006 and 2008, Kibris 2010).

There are some interesting papers on Bosnia, Israel, Spain and Turkey which are also ethnically divided nations like Iraq. Those papers find that terrorism has a very strong influence on voting behavior. Terrorism mobilizes people and affects their political choices. Terrorism increases the level of turnout and has a positive effect on the share of right-wing parties. This conclusion has been reached in all of the mentioned countries above. For example, Kibris (2010) has empirically analyzed the effects of Turkish soldiers murdered by the Kurdish faction the PKK on voting behavior in Turkey between 1991 and 1995. She finds

that Turkish people are very sensitive to terrorism. When the level of terror fatalities increase the voting for right-wing parties increases as well, because right-wing governments are less inclined to concessions and are more likely to use military instead of political solutions to the Kurdish question in Turkey.

Berrebi and Klor examined the relation between terrorism and voters' preferences in Israel. The authors used the terrorist attacks in Israel between 1990 and 2003 and data from public opinion polls on Israelis' political preferences. The authors find that the support for right-wing political parties increases after the incidents of terrorist attacks increases, and Israel become more vulnerable to terrorism when left-oriented political parties are in power (Berrebi and Klor, 2006).

Berrebi and Klor later on in 2008 elaborated their model on the relation between terrorism and party choice by using actual voting choice rather than the people preferences that expressed in the newspapers poll. They examined the timing and geographical effects of terrorism, which means the effect of the number of civil fatalities in a given locality one year before elections on voting choice. The results show that the support for right-wing parties increases in targeted locality and increases in support for left-wing parties outside the targeted localities. Also terrorism increases the left-right polarization of Israeli society (Berrebi and Klor, 2008).

An unpublished manuscript deals with the Bosnian case, where the authors estimate the war time violence and ethnic voting. They used the data on causalities from the ethnic conflict in ex-Yugoslavia and the election results in Bosnia before and after the conflict. The results of this paper proved that people who were exposed to ethnic war horrors are more prone to vote on ethnic basis. The authors argue that ethnic conflict increases intra-ethnic cohesion and distrust towards people from other ethnicities (American Journal of Political Science. Manuscript Number: AJPS-38906).

There is a respectful amount of literature on the effect of terrorism on Spanish electoral outcome since the March 11, 2004 Madrid's terrorist attack (Powell 2004, Van Biezen 2005, Gassebener et al 2008, Montalvo 2011). The Madrid attacks make the Spanish case very interesting, because it happened several days after the attacks. The findings were a bit contradictory on the effect of terrorism on the election outcome, but all the literature suggests that the attacks have not only affected the voting preferences, but have also increased the level of the turnout. Al-Qaeda took responsibility for the attacks as a response to the Spanish troop participation in the invasion of Iraq. As a result of that, in the election the Spanish voters

blamed the incumbent center-right political parties for deploying the army in Iraq. According to Montalavo, the terrorist attacks have significantly affected the Spanish election. The election results of the voters who voted in advanced prior to attacks showed that the popular party received more votes than the left opposition. This means if the terrorist attacks would not have occurred, the Aznar would have won the election (Montalavo, 2012). Once again, what happened in Spain illustrates that terrorists act strategically. They knew that the attacks will push the Spaniards to vote for the left opposition which promised to withdraw the Spanish troop from Iraq if they win the election. Therefore, most of the scholars have linked the center-right incumbent government foreign policy with terrorism. As it is quite well-known, terrorism is not a new phenomenon in Spanish political arena. ETA, the separatist faction in the Basque region has conducted many terrorist attacks in Spain. But this is the first time that the country is exposed to terrorism due to the foreign policy.

Van Biezen believes that if the ETA was behind the Madrid's March 11 attacks then the center-right parties would not be defeated in the election. Rather, they would have received more votes, because right-wing governments in Spain are more decisive to counter the ETA organization. But when Al-Qaeda announced its responsibility (external threat), that made the Spaniards blame the government's foreign policy of war on terror and the invasion of Iraq (Van Biezen, 2005). The author's interpretation of the effect of ETA's terrorism on election outcome is in compliance with both Kibris, 2010 and Berrebia and Klor 2008 findings which suggest that terrorism encourages voting for the right wing parties. According to Powell, the popular party knew very well that by pinning the Basque separatists on Madrid's attacks definitely would increase the chances of Aznar's government to be reelected. Therefore, Aznar personally phoned the major Spanish newspaper editors to make sure that the blame will be on ETA. One night before the election, the Spanish police found strong evidences that Al-Qaeda was behind the attacks (Powell, 2004). Therefore, millions of Spanish people demonstrated for being been cheated by the government and as a consequence, the left opposition won the election.

Bali used survey data based on individual level to measure the effects of the Madrid's terrorist attacks on the 2004 election outcome. The author concluded that the attacks led to a mobilization of citizens who are usually less likely to vote, like young and less educated citizens. It also mobilized the supporters of the center and left political parties. Bali suggests that both the foreign policy of the Aznar's government and the timing of the attacks had maximized the effect of terrorism on voting choice (Bali 2007). Torcal and Rico confirmed

the findings of Bali (2007) and Van Biezen (2005). The authors suggest that the reason behind the center-right parties' defeat in the election is due to the increases in the turnout. The attack has mobiles the voters that are usually not engaged in politics to vote against the government regardless of the ideological orientation of the government (Torcal & Rico, 2004).

These findings are confirming the hypothesis of Gassebner et al (2008) and Berrebi and Klor, (2008) on the terrorism and government replacement. However it contraindicates the hypothesis of Williams and coauthors (2012) about the capacity of the right-wing parties to absorb the ramifications of the terrorist shocks. Montalavo believes the Madrid attacks have a significant impact on government replacement. The analysis suggests that the incumbent government would have received much more votes if the attack never happened (Montalvo, 2012).

Both comparative and single case studies with different methodical approaches suggest that terrorism has a serious impact on the electoral outcome; therefore I believe we need both approaches. By comparing we can see the resemblances and difference between various geographical zones and whereas focusing on a specific country will enrich our knowledge about the correlation of other social, demographical and political arrangements with violence on voting outcome.

2.2 Literature on Terrorism and Elections in Iraq

Unlike the countries mentioned above, the effect of terrorism on electoral outcome in Iraq is very scarce. There is no unified body of literature that studies terrorism and election in Iraq as inter-correlated phenomenon. Instead of that, the papers are either studying the election or the terrorism. The body of literature on election in Iraq is mostly descriptive and often used qualitative methods (Daneil and Pollack 2003, Fuller 2003, Ono 2005, Schwartz 2005, Dawisha and Diamond 2006, Wimmer 2007, Barnes 2011, Berman et al 2011, Al-Tmimi 2013). Although the literature is filled with theoretical expectations on violence and ethnic politics, it lacks strong empirical analysis. The scholars are clearly emphasis the rule of ethnosectarian political parties and the profound ethnosectarian voting trend in Iraq. However, there are no clear causal mechanisms that explain the effect of violence on voting behavior. Most of the scholarships argue that the democracy itself is one of the most reasons that cause the ethnosectarian violence in Iraq (Daneil and Pollack 2003).

According to Wimmer (2007) Iraq is prone to ethnic politics. This is due to the fact that the country encompasses many ethnic and religious groups that have been persecuted for many

decades. The weakness of trans-ethnic civil organizations would turn the democracy itself to a mean of intensifying the ethnosectarian conflicts. But other scholars believe that after the implosion of the central government, democracy would be the best peaceful mechanism to overcome ethnosectarian conflict in Iraq (Byman and Pollack 2003). The major political powers in Iraq are mainly ethnoreligious by their nature such as Shiite, Sunni and Kurds (Schwartz 2003). In order to avoid the politicization of ethnicity we need to tune the constitutional design and electoral system of the country (Dawisha and Diamond, 2006 and Wimmer (2007). The Americans believed that the parliamentary with proportional representation electoral system will guarantee equal chances for all ethnic and religious groups to be represented. Soon after the invasion, the Coalition Provisional Authority CPA formed the Iraqi Governing Council IGC in July 2003, that is consists of 25 members who reflect the ethnoreligious structure of the country. It includes 13 Shiite, 5 Sunni, 5 Kurds and 2 for minorities. In the opinion of many students of Iraq's politics that the IGC was the corner stone of the institutionalization of ethnic and religious cleavages in Iraq post-2003 (Dawisha, 2009).

However there are some interesting papers that are quantitatively studied the origin, motivation and tactics of terrorism in Iraq (Hafiz 2006 and 2007, Inglehart et al, 2006 Berman et al, 2011, Romano, 2914). For instance Hafez studied why some fractions used suicide terrorism more than others. He used quantitative data on terrorist attacks in different regions of Iraq and he concluded that suicide terrorism is used by the fractions which have no hope to participate in the political process and which aim to cause a regime collapse (Hafez, 2006). Berman and coauthors studied the effect of the provision of public services and jobs on the level of the joining insurgency in different ethnosectarian regions background. They used panel data that includes level of violence, socioeconomic indicators and budget spending on the provincial level in Iraq. The findings support that the provision of sufficient public services can minimize the severity and the support for insurgency Iraq (Berman et al, 2011).

Inglehart and coauthors studied the effect of violence and level of trust among the difference ethnosectarian groups of Iraq. They conducted a survey where they interviewed 2700 citizens representing all lingual, ethnic-sectarian groups from most of the regions of the country. The findings not surprisingly showed that due to the ethnosectarian violence, there is overwhelming feeling of in-group solidarity and high level of distrust of those who are not co-ethnic (Inglehart et al, 2006). I argue that the results of Inglehart's study have very

importance political implications. Because the widespread feelings of distrust among the rival ethnoreligious groups in Iraq can be seen in election results.

Finally, there is no single study that control for the effect of violence on electoral outcome in Iraq. This serious inadequacy is not because of the insignificance of the topic rather is due to deficiency of data. In order to examine the effect of violence on voting behavior in Iraq, we need reliable dataset which is not available yet in Iraq. We need credible sources to measure the level of violence, political parties, election results, and many socioeconomic variables. Therefore, I argue that my study might be the first attempt to systematically and empirically measure the ramifications of violence on voting behavior in Iraq.

3. THEORETICAL APPROACH

3.1 Violence and Politicization of Ethno-Religious Identities

This chapter aims to establish a theoretical basis for the empirical analysis. This can be done through clarifying the casual mechanism between violence and voting outcome in divided societies. Using a social constructivist approach, this study argues that violence increases the salience of sub-national identities like ethnicity and religion, by making individuals retreating to their primordial identities. Violence significantly contributes to politicizing ethno-sectarian identities and hence, violence shifts the voting to ethno-religious parties and reproduces the social cleavages through political system.

Constructivists argue that our norms and values are socially constructed; our understanding to reality is based on those constructed concepts. An Individual's behavior represents the reflections of communal beliefs. Individual interpretation of reality cannot be considered as more accurate than other interpretation, since it is not possible to compare them against any objective knowledge of a neutral reality (Haack, 1993). Therefore I believe that a constructivist approach is very appropriate to understand the level of politicization of ethno-religious identities in divided societies (Bacchi and Eveline 2010, Bryman 2008 and Marsh and Stoker, 2010: p87).

Constructivists believe that ethnic identities are socially constructed (Abrams and Hogg 1990, Fearon and Laitin, 2000). Individual's identities are not constant over time; they are flexible and change according to changing political and economic circumstances (Chandra, 2012). People can possess many identities that reflect various social backgrounds like language, religion, sect, tribe or region (Chandra 2012, Posner 2004 and Wilkinson 2004). In the absence of strong universal identity (national) socioeconomic interest become less important and voting preferences and parties competition are directed towards group representation (Tavits and Letki, 2014). Sub-national identities act as a filter that analyses information before making political decisions. Therefore ethnicities can play a decisive rule in the stability of the political system (Birnir, 2006). Also, the ethno-religious heterogeneous countries suffer from the competition between different ethnic or sect groups to claim nationhood, each struggle to be the predominant one and the one which is identical to the state *"Staatsvolk"* (Wimmer, 2003). Hence, the competition is not over power and resources only but also over the state identity. The societies that suffer from severe identity tensions, the rule of state-identity become more salience than economic and any other considerations. The strong ethno-

religious identification makes it both desirable for political factions and ethnic groups to assemble along ethnic lines (Schmidt and Spies, 2013) and then it will be very difficult to escape the centrifugal predispositions that separate the society. Also, the degree of politicizing of ethnic groups in divided societies depends primarily on the level of representation and inclusion in decision making and the different groups' share of the resources and public services (Birnir, 2006). Thus, the merely ethno-religious cleavages are not the sole reason for polarization unless it is associated with discrimination and imbalance in power sharing (Fearon, and Laitin 2000, Wimmer 2003).

I argue that inter-communal violence negatively affect the solidarity of the multi-group societies. The violence generates sensitive and strong sub-national identities that are based on ethnicity/religion/language which depends on the motivation for the violence. Therefore, the support for group representation inclusive parties survives long time after the conflicts.

When the state fails to enforce the law, the intra-violence pushes most people to hunkering down behind their religion or ethnicity group looking for protection. For those who refuse to take a side in the conflict will become more vulnerable to the risk of being targeted by rival groups because targeting neutrals will be less expensive and with no serious consequences. Then individuals will retreat to their primordial identities, which become stronger over time, because a weak government cannot protect people from arbitrary violence neither guarantee the equality in front of the law (Wimmer, 2003). The existential survival of the individuals and the group to which they belong will take the highest priority (Ingelhart et al, 2006). The bad externalities of intra-communal violence may last quite long even after the violence level went down (Gilligan, 2014)

Recognizing ethnic or religious identity and as a protection shield against the potential risks from others, enhances the pride in sub-identity on the expense of national identity. It also leads to the creation of positive images on people who share same sub-identity and create a negative stereotype of people of other denominations (Fearon, and Laitin 2000). In practice, this means that in-group cohesion and distrust of people from out-group increases. Threats to existential security like massive waves of terrorism and mutual ethnic violence make all individuals' preferences disappear in favor of group survival.

"Survival values are functional under these conditions, but they force people to focus on the well-being of one's in-group, viewing outsiders with suspicion and distrust. At the same time, these conditions induce people to close ranks against dangerous outsiders, producing rejection of outsiders

and in-group solidarity. This syndrome of rejection of outsiders, combined with rigid conformity to in-group norms and established traditions, bears some resemblance to the cluster of traits described in the Authoritarian Personality literature, but while the Authoritarianism thesis attributed these traits to rigid child-rearing practices, our interpretation attributes them to existential insecurity" (Ingelhart et al, 2006).

Thus these sub-national identities become more important and the whole political game rotates along ethnic/religious loyalties. Ethno-religious parties will take advantage of playing the ethno-religious card. In the election campaigns such parties focus primarily on claims such the representation and struggle for ethnic/religious groups' rights. In such circumstances, secular-national parties face a very hard time to convince the public of the importance of national unity and citizenship as the engine of political game. Consequently, voting preference no longer depends on economy or issue politics rather it based on group survival/preference (Tavits and Letki, 2014). If the level of violence is too high then people will prioritize security and group existential survival when they vote (Ingelhart et al, 2006).

The intensifying of ethno-religious identities does not require that all people are exposed to violence directly. The intra-conflicts are always associated with massive internal displacement. People who do not take part in the communal conflict fled to the safe co-group regions. The displaced people will definitely tell stories about the brutal violence they suffered from in their original places. Also, media and different sources of outlet coverage on casualties and incidents make people from different parts and groups of the country aware of their cohort's losses.

In these circumstances with increasing in-group cohesion and distrust of out-group, I argue that the ethnic/religious community adopts a substantial role in the individual's survival and identity. Individual awareness of personal safety and welfare will be more connected with the security and wealth of their community. The individuals of each group will perceive their personal interest is coinciding with group interest. It's hard to be allowed to listen to any other points of view that do not put the narrow interests of the ethnic/ religious group above all other considerations (Schmidt and Spies, 2013). In other words if you do not vote for the co-ethnic/religious candidates then you will risk your group survival and interests.

Unsurprisingly, political parties that advocate a specific ethnic/religious identity are more prone to mobilize voters from groups which they claim to represent, because they will benefit from in-group solidarity and out-group distrust communal feelings within each group. Once

they are in office they will adopt policies that favor their own group interest. Then, the electoral process will rely on the ethno-religious clientele's circles. They will exploit the masses' fear of terrorism and indiscriminate violence, as well as fear of exclusion and marginalization of the rival group dominant, in order to maximize their electoral gains. Therefore, ethno-religious political parties will adopt an extreme exclusionary discourse during electoral campaigns, highlighting the number of terrorist incidence and terror fatalities and blaming other ethnic or religious groups for terrorism. I argue that this is exactly the dynamics or the logic of violence and ethno-religious voting behavior.

All in all, I argue that the identities are socially constructed. People have many identities like ethnicity or religion. In divided societies the level of politicizing ethnic or sectarian identities depends on the socio-political context of each country. Violence is one of the most significant factors that politicize ethnic/religious/sectarian/lingual/triable identities. The occurrences of the ethno-sectarian violence will increase in-group solidarity and out-group distrust. The ethno-sectarian political parties have more chances to benefit from sympathy and votes of the ethnic or sect that they claim representing her. Secular-national political parties that adopt universal political programs have lower chances to convince the voters from rival groups. As a result, the ethnic-sectarian voting behavior will continue long time even after concession and settlement. The ethno-sectarian parties will reproduce itself over and over in each election until the memories of mutual violence ceases and practical and vital universal policies are implemented.

However, this study does not claim that violence explains everything about voting behavior in divided societies. In fact, there are many factors that potentially contributed to this kind of voting outcome. Those factors could be historical, geographical and institutional. The literature suggests that the constitutional design and electoral design are very decisive in divided societies. Many scholars argue that fractionalized societies are prone to instability and ethnic politics (Lijphart 1977, Dahl 1971, Rabushka and Shepsle 1972). While some others argue that diversity is good for open politics, divers societies are not necessarily a prisoner of ethnic politics (Reilly 2000). The institutional arrangements are responsible for mediating the competition among rival ethnic/religious groups. Good and well-designed institutions are more capable to peacefully contain power struggle the divided nations (Reilly 2001, Fish and Kroenig, 2006, Campos and Kuzeyev, 2007). For example parliamentary with proportional representation system encourages ethnic parties and representation (Gerring et al 2004, Gerring et al 2005, Persson et al 2003 and Oates 1999). Last not least the timing can reveal

different outcome. Elections that take place in newly established democracies instantly after a severe ethno-religious conflict are more likely to produce higher level of ethno-religious voting. The Bosnians case is good example about the importance of timing. The ethnic voting trend decreases over time, the vote's share of ethnic parties are constantly decreased in 2006, 2010 and 2014 elections.

As with any social phenomenon or problem there are countless of variables that can affect the outcome. Controlling for all the potential variables is a very nice idea, but it requires a lot of reliable empirical data and an advanced and appropriate methodological tool to handle. Even in the papers that measured the effect of terrorism of election outcome in other countries like Israel, Spain and Turkey the authors have not given any considerable explanation of the other potential variables that have been discussed above. However, most of the papers in the previous research have controlled for socioeconomic indicators in examining the relationship between violence and voting behavior, which is very reasonable idea indeed. Therefore, in this paper I want to make it clear that I am aware of other potential mediator variables, but the focus will be on the effect of violence in divided societies on ethnic-religious voting behavior, considering the time and spatial variation of violence and socioeconomics indicators. Other potential explanations are left for qualitative analysis.

Figure 1: Mechanism of voting behavior

3.2 Hypothesis

To sum the two previous chapters, in the last two decades there has been an increasing interest in the research of terrorism and voting behavior. Based on overview of the existing literature and theoretical approach, the testing the effect of violence on electoral outcome in a country like Iraq is rarely conducted. The main shortcoming in the literature on elections and violence in Iraq is the lack empirical analysis. Most of the research cover the violence and elections in democratic countries and argue that the violence mobilize the voters and effects their voting preference. According to the theoretical discussion in the previous chapter, the hypothesis expressed as follow:

Violence has a negative effect on the vote share of secular parties and a positive effect on the vote share of ethno-sectarian parties.

It would be a great idea to test how violence shapes the Iraqi people voters' reaction toward the incumbent government, but since 2003 all Iraqi governments were based on coalitions that includes all political parties in the parliament. Also, most of the political coalitions among various political parties were very flexible. Therefore, it is very hard to know which political party is the government and which belongs to the opposition. Hence, it is very difficult to put the blame on any particular political party. However, based on the available evidence it is very plausible to believe that there is a strong causal mechanism between violence and ethno-sectarian voting in Iraq, as violence reinforces the ethno-sectarian identities, increases in-group cohesion and distrust of other groups.

4. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS OF ANALYSIS

This chapter aims to discuss the case of Iraq, research design, and methods of data selection as well as the analysis that is used to test the hypothesis. This is an empirical study that uses panel data analysis, OLS regression. The data that is used in this research are secondary data that officially have been compiled and published by various International, National organizations and NGOs, governmental and quasi-governmental agencies. Before the discussion of the methodological consideration, I will discuss the case of Iraq.

4.1 The Case of Iraq: Heterogeneity, Violence and Elections

Unfortunately enough, Iraq fulfils all conditions for a pervasive politicization of ethnicity and ethno-sectarian voting behavior. First, the country is too heterogeneous that have many ethnicities and religions (Wimmer, 2007). The demographic composition of the country include Shiite Arab (55%) Sunni Arab (18.4 %) Kurd (21.1%) as well as Turkmen, Assyrian and others small indigenous groups (about 5%) (The Gulf Project 2000, see the ethnoreligious composition map of Iraq Appendix. 6). Second, the country suffers from persistent sectarian and arbitrary violence since the invasion in 2003. Third, the presence of ethno-sectarian political parties that dominant the Iraqi political scene and competing in a fairly regular elections.

After the US-led coalition invasion, the Coalition Provisional Authority CPA issued two majors laws which dissolved the Iraqi army and secret police and banned the Ba'ath Party from participation in the new political process. Both the army and the Ba'ath party were predominantly controlled by Sunnis (Dawisha, 2009 and Eppel, 2004). The consequence of those two decisions is a progressive Sunni insurgency. At the beginning, the Sunni insurgents targeted the Americans and Iraqi security forces, but overtime they start to wage attacks on softer targets that included the civilians from Shiite and Kurd communities who rejoiced the collapse of Saddam's regime and supported the new established one. In response to that, Shiite militias attacked the Sunni neighborhoods in retaliation to the suicide terrorism (Dawisha and Diamond 2006). After that, the skirmishes transformed into severe sectarian warfare between Sunni and Shiite, especially during the period between 2006 and 2007.

The Sunni insurgency groups include the national Islamist (e.g Islamic Army in Iraq) and former Baathist groups, military and security service personnel in addition to the local and international Salafists Jihadists (e.g Al-Qaeda). All those groups aim to force Americans to

leave Iraq. However, they have different plans for post-liberation time. The Baathists' and alike' intention is to restore the role of the former Baathist rule in Iraq, as well as to reduce the growing political influence of the Shiite and Kurds, while the international Jihadists aim to turn Iraq into a base for global jihadism (Hafiz 2006).

The Jihadists use suicide terrorism and explosives attacks primarily on Shiite communities, aiming to spike a civil war between the Shiite and Sunni, where they can play the Sunni protector role in the face of the Shiite hegemony. Civil war leads to regime collapse and hence turns Iraq to a terrorist's heartland. The Baathists are less likely to create a civil war because they are aware that the Sunni will take the burden of the casualties if they fight against the Shiite majority. Therefore, they concentrate their attacks on the Americans and Iraqi security forces (Hafiz 2006).

On the other hand, the Shiite militia groups, which are entirely Islamist, include the Mahdi Army, Badr Organization and others. The most active Shiite militia is Mahdi Army which aims to force Americans to leave Iraq at the beginning and after the militia engaged in the Sunni-Shiite communal warfare. The militia was engaged for years in serious conflicts with the Iraqi government in the middle and the south of the country, due to the struggle over controlling the Shiite community.

The map of violence in Iraq is somewhat complicated, but in general can be divided as follows: The Sunni factions fight the Americans, the Iraqi government and Shiite communities (to a lesser extent Kurds), while the Shiite militias fight the Americans, to lesser extent the Iraqi forces, Sunni factions and other competing Shiite militia. In this thesis I am interested in the effect of civilian deaths resulting from non-state actors on political choices of Iraqi people, whether the perpetrators are Sunni or Shiite, nationalist Islamists, Baathists, former military officers, or local and international Jihadists.

It worth to mention, that the level of violence is varies across different regions. The highest grade of violence is mainly concentrated in the sectarian heterogeneous regions and in the regions where Sunni are the majority of the population. The three Kurdish provinces were the least violent region. In the south of Iraq, the Shiite majority region, there was much lower sectarian violence, however the main trend of violence was between the competing Shiite militias and Iraq government.

After the massive waves of violence in all over the Iraq, the U.S. government sent more troops to Iraq in order to restore the civil peace in an operation called "The Surge". New Sunni tribal fighters financed and trained by the Americans called Sons of Iraq (SoI) participated in confronting the Sunni radical factions like Al Qaeda and the like. At the same time, the Iraqi government waged considerable campaigns to contain the influence of Shiite militias in Baghdad and south of Iraq.

Since the summer of 2008, the security situation has gradually improved. The level of violence has significantly declined. However, the arbitrary sectarian violence never came to an end. The period between 2009 and 2012 witnessed considerable decreases in the level of violence. The annual average of casualties reached to about 5000, while in 2006 and 2007 was about 30000 in all over Iraq. This means the security situation improved by 90% comparing to 2006-2007- the bloodiest two years. Moreover, the period between 2009 and 2012 were the most relative calm years in Iraq since the US-led invasion (IBC, See figure 2). And as the violence fluctuated over time, the vote share of secular parties did so as well.

Figure 2: Level of civilian causalities in all over Iraq from 2003 to 2015

Source: Iraq Body Count https://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/

4.2 Panel Data Analysis and Official Statistics

As this research aims to explore the relationship between violence and voting behavior in Iraq, then Longitudinal or Panel data analysis is the most appropriate design to conduct this research. This design allows the researcher to capture the changes of the social phenomena over time, because it contains information collected from the same variable for the same unit of analysis at different points in time (Finkel 1995, Hsiao 2003, Bryman 2008). Also, the longitudinal analysis has been used in most of the previous papers that traced the voting behavior and terrorism (Berrebi and Klor 2006 and 2008, Bali 2007, Kibris 2010 and the Bosnian case*). This paper argues that there is a strong relationship between the level of violence and party choice in Iraq. In order to test the hypothesis of this research, I will use Multiple Linear Regression Models which is used to explore the relationship between the dependent and the independent variables (Greene, 2008). The models of this paper are projected by applying Ordinary Least Square OLS technique. According to Bartels (2009) it is important to decide whether to estimate the models by using random or fixed effect. One way to test whether this assumption holds is to estimate both a random- and a fixed effect model and then conduct a Hausman test. The *Hausman test* takes the squared difference of the estimated coefficients between the random and fixed effects models over the difference in the estimated variance for the coefficients. The test is based on a chi-square distribution where the null-hypothesis is that the random effects model is the correct model.

There are several advantages of using panel data design. For example it enables the researcher to infer a casual mechanism between the variables that represent the case under study. Due to the fact that panel data has at least two observations in different points of time of the same variable, this means that there are possibilities to reveal social change and with improving the understanding of causal influences, better able to deal with the problem of ambiguity about the direction of causal mechanism (Bryman 2008).

However and according to Bryman there are some theoretical and practical problems that associated with using panel data which summarized as follow: sample attrition, timing or juncture to conduct more waves of data collection, little apparent planning and panel conditioning effect (Bryman, 2008 p 49-52). Fortunately enough, and since I am using data that already exists and which is based on actual electoral choice and not survey data (except socioeconomic indicators), most of the disadvantages do not apply this research model.

The data that is used in this research are official data. There are many advantages of using official statics in social science research. For example it saves both time and cost for the researcher, because it is already exists. These kinds of data are often characterized by high quality because it gathered and prepared by very qualified persons. The most important thing is that official statistics gives the opportunity for longitudinal analysis and reanalysis of the same social phenomenon from different approach in the future. Because most of the time research questions emerges from the existing literature and available information (Bryman, 2008 p 296-300). However there are some limitations that emerge with using official statistics. The most important one is the absence of key variables, which means the researcher needs some important variables that are not exist in the data. For example there are very few socioeconomic variables from Iraq on local level. There were some very good indicators that well-fit this research model but unfortunately does not includes all regions or have conducted for one time only. The second limitation is the lack of control over the data quality and lack of familiarity of data (Bryman, 2008 p 300). Although the data are obtained from well-established institutions, but the author has no control over data quality or management.

4.3 Data Selection and Method of Collection

In this section I will discuss and motivate the data selection, methods of collections and the implication of the selected data, as well as a discussion on the limitation of those data based on relevant literature and empirical practices. The data are classified into independent, dependent and control variables.

The data on civil casualties obtained from a non-profit international organization the Iraq Body Count (IBC). The data on party choice are extracted from the Iraqi elections results which conducted by the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) and United Nation Mission Assistance to Iraq (UNAMI). The data on ethnic and religious composition of Iraq are from the Empirical Studies of Conflict Project (ESOC) and the Gulf/2000 Project at the School of International and Public Affairs of Columbia University in New York City. The data on socioeconomic status are collected from the United Nation Development Program (UNDP) and Central Statistical Organization in Iraq (CSO).

The biggest challenge of this research was the data and collection. The model of this analysis relies on a unique dataset that includes information from different sources. To get a piece of information it requires tens of correspondents and phone calls, sometimes taking weeks. Especially the Iraqi governmental agencies are very hesitant in offering official statics. Due to

the decades of authoritarian regimes, the Iraqi bureaucratic apparatus consider most of the information matters of national security.   For example the IHEC refused to offer any information on sub-provincial electoral results, and the Iraq Central Statistical Organization CSO refused to offer any information on other potential control variables like GDP per capita, inflation rate, unemployment and under-5 mortality rates.

There are considerable amount of data available in the Iraqi governmental and quasi-governmental agencies, NGOs, political parties and media archive, but it is too fractionalized and needs to reshape and recoded in order to make useable for quantitative analysis. I will quote here from Arain A. Aamir the Director, UN Integrated Electoral Assistance & UN Principal Electoral Advisor UNAMI correspondent when I asked him for the electoral data. He wrote "The data available is enormous and like anything else in Iraq these days badly managed too. I am also mindful of the fact that no sensitive information goes out contradicting privacy of individual concerned".

4.3.1 Independent Variable: Data on Civil Casualties

To measure the level of violence I used the number of civil casualties per one thousand citizens one year before election resulting from terrorist activities on provincial level. When measuring the effect of civil fatalities, considering the population size in each region is important, because the expectation that violence have much more effect in smaller regions. For example the death of ten civilian in a city that has couple of hundreds of thousands inhabitants has more effect comparing to Baghdad that has about 7 million inhabitants. The other alternative to measure the violence is the number of terrorist attacks, but I think using the civil casualties is more accurate. According to literature the severity of terrorist attacks is very meaningful. Assumedly, the attacks that yield more casualties have more effect on voting behavior (Gassebner et al 2008). Therefore, counting the terrorist incidents might be misleading in this case, because various attacks differ in severity. Some are very big and causes tens of deaths and others can be less harmful. Hence the number of casualties has more capacity to stimulate the feeling of threat to existential security according to the theoretical approach of this study.

Actually, there are too many political and religious, national and international factions that cause the death of civilians in Iraq. According to IBC "Since March 2003 a number of wars have been fought in Iraq: aggressive, humanitarian, pre-emptive, civil; they have taken the form of air raids, shootings, executions, mortar attacks, IED explosions and car bombs; they have been fought by several parties, some Iraqi, others non-Iraqi, some occupying, others

state-controlled, some insurgent, while others terrorist. There are perhaps as many as 40 different groups, but the major groups of armed insurgency are, Ba'athists, Iraqi nationalists, Sunni Islamists, Salafi/Wahhabi "jihadists", Shi'a militias, foreign Islamist volunteers. In addition, there are US-led coalition forces and Iraqi government forces".

The IBC provide very detailed information about the victims of violence, the location, the timing, the weapon and the perpetrators. I classified the propagators into two groups. First are the anti-government and occupation actors and the unknown as one group, because both of those two propagators are considered terrorist factions and use very harmful methods to achieve their goals, killing thousands of civilians every month. Therefore, regardless of the terrorist faction orientation whether it is radical Islamist or Baathist and whether aiming to regime collapse or to coerce the Iraqi government they treated the same in this model. Second are the US-led coalition and Iraqi forces. I will compare the effect of deaths among civilians caused by American and Iraq forces to those which caused by terrorist and insurgent groups on voting behavior. "Deaths from terrorist attacks are far more salient than those from other causes" (Inglehart et al, 2006 p 495). Following there are two tables that show the classification of the main propagators and weapons that cause civilian death in Iraq.

Table 1: Preparators and weapons that are used in murdering the Iraqi civilians.

Preparator	US-led Coalition	US-led Coalition & Iraqi Forces	Iraqi Forces Without Coalition Forces	Anti-government/occupation Actors	Unknown Actors

Weapon	Explosives	Air Attack	Gunfire	Suicide Attack

Source: Iraq Body Count https://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/

4.3.2 Dependent Variables: Data on Political Parties, Elections and Party Choice

Elections results and Party Choice

To measure ethno-sectarian voting behavior I will use the percentage of ethno-sectarian parties votes received in the general elections of January 30th, 2005; December 15th, 2005; March 7th, 2010; April 30th, 2014. The data on elections are obtained from the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) and The United Nation Mission Assistant to Iraq (UNAMI). I classified the political parties either secular-nationalist or ethno-sectarian parties. The secular-nationalist parties are those who have no claim to represent or advocate any

particular group, they are secular and cross-ethnic/religion organizations. The ethno-sectarian parties are those which claim the representation of a specific ethnic or sect group, namely the Shiite, Sunni and Kurd parties. I argue that using people's actual voting preference to measure voting behavior is the best available option. It is much more accurate and more comprehensive comparing with survey data. However, the election results provided by the IHEC include the wining political parties only. It is preferred to have data on the whole electoral results that include the parties and candidates who below the electoral divider (the minimum number of votes to win one seat in the parliament).

As matter of fact there are hundreds of thousands of wasted votes every election because of the electoral system. Most of the hidden votes are represents independent candidates, small parties or party lists which are mainly secular. However we cannot assume it is completely represents secular voting choices since the IHEC in Iraq has not yet published the whole voting results. I argue that those wasted or hidden votes are very important and have strong statistical significance if it possible to include it in the analysis. For example the January and December 2005 elections the published results represent entirely the wining political parties. In 2010 elections the total number of wasted votes in all over Iraq was about one million out of 10,5 million votes. While in 2014 the number was more than two millions out of 12,5 million votes.

Political Parties

Iraqi political parties can primarily be divided into two main groups- the ethnoreligious and the secular. The ethnoreligious can be further divided into ethnic and religious. The ethnic are mainly the Kurdish, Turkmen, and pan-Arabism parties. The religious parties are mainly Shiite and Sunni. The Christian parties are both ethnic and religious, because the Christian minority in Iraq has their own indigenous. The mainstream parties are Islamist (which can be either Shiite or Sunni), ethnic (like Kurdish and pan-Arabism) and other small parties that represent various linguistics and religious minorities (Dawisha and Diamond, 2006). Despite that the secular parties are the oldest in Iraq, they have relatively little influence on Iraq politics today.

The Shiite's political parties' (e.g. Dawah Islamic Party, Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council SIIC and Sadrist Movement) campaign primarily focus on that the Shiite are the majority. They have been persecuted for a very long time and now they have the right to rule Iraq. Also, they emphasize continuation to fight hard terrorism and make sure that the Saddamists-Baathists

will not become part of the new political life of the country. Sunni political parties' (e.g. Islamic Party and Iraqi Front for National Dialogue) campaigns focus on the fact, that the Sunni are exposed to too many grievances in the new regime after 2003. The de-Baathification and dissolving former army were meant to punish them. They believed that the Shiite political powers are overrepresented, have dominated the Iraqi policy making process and de-Arabized the country through their strong ties with the Islamic Republic of Iran. In sum, the Sunni's parties main demands, they want to restore Sunnis' rights, to recognize anti-American and anti-state paramilitary factions as legitimate national groups, which have a legitimate reasons to fight occupation (when Americans were in the country 2003-2011), to abolish anti-Baath policies and to emphasize the Arabic identity of Iraq. The other mainstream political parties are the ethnic Kurdish (e.g. Patriotic Union of Kurdistan OUK, Kurdistan Democratic Party KDP and Gorran). They focus mainly in their campaigns on more autonomy from the center and to change the conditions of oil and natural resources investment and distribution. The secular political parties like the Iraqi Communist Party, Iraqi National Accord, and the Civil Democratic Alliance focus more on promoting the Iraqi national identity, minimizing religious, sectarian and ethnic cleavages, state building based on meritocracy and to fight corruption. Due to the absence of the classical left-right scale in Iraqi political system, I used secular versus ethno-sectarian division, where secular represents the left/liberal values and ethnoreligious represents the conservative or right-wing (See the list of political parties in Iraq, Appendix 6).

4.3.3 Control variables

Demographic: Data on Ethnic and Religious Groups

Since the conflict and voting behavior in Iraq is based on ethno-religious loyalties, I will use the demographic composition of each province to reveal the effect of ethno-sectarian background on voting choice. The literature suggests that in multiethnic societies the elections act, in general as, a census that determines the size of different ethnic groups in a given country. Iraq is very diver's country that has many ethnic and religious groups. Ethnically, it composes of Arabs (75%), Kurds (17%), Turkmen (2%), Chaldeans, Assyrians, and Armenians (5%) of the population. Religiously, mainly are Shiite (60%) and Sunni (35) Muslims (both Arabs and Kurds), Christians (Chaldeans, Assyrians and Armenians), Kurdish Yazidis and a small number of Kaka'i , Shabaks , Sabean Mandaeans and Jews (almost of whom were forced to leave the country). The main locations for Shiite Arab are in the middle and south-east of the country. The Sunnis are concentrated in the western and northern Iraq.

Kurds live mainly in the far north of the autonomous Kurdistan region, in addition to Ninawa, Kirkuk, Salah ad Din and Diyalah governorates (see Table 2 the Appendixes 1, 4 and 5). The percentage of the Iraq's ethnoreligious groups are based on estimations of the Gulf 2000 Project, the Empirical Studies of Conflicts, the European Parliament report on minority rights in Iraq 2015 and the previous literature (Eppel 2004, Dawisha and Diamond 2006, Dawisha 2009 and Wimmer 2007).

Table 2: Ethnic and religious groups in Iraq.

Ethnicities	**Arabs** **Kurds** **Turkmen** **Chaldeans-Assyrians** **Armenians**
Religions	**Shiite Muslims** **Sunni Muslims** **Christians** **Yazidis** **Kaka'i** **Sabean/Mandaean** **Jews**

Sources: European Report on Iraq's minority rights

Socioeconomic Indicators: Education, Health, Infrastructure and Economics

The literature on economy and voting behavior suggest using the GDP per capita, unemployment and inflation rates as control variables (Kinder 1979, Nannestad and Paldam 1997, Lewis-beck and paldam 200). Unfortunately, those variables are either unavailable on provincial level in Iraq or not published and very hard to get. Therefore, I will use several indicators from a series of deprivation of human condition reports conducted by the UNDP and ICSO of Iraq. Those variables represent the deprivation in different public services sectors. The deprivation is a measure that shows how bad is the quality of the provision of public services in each province in the different sectors: education, health, housing, household economic and infrastructure. The reason behind choosing this data is because it is the only one that covers all the provinces and has been conducted more than one time. In addition, those variables are characterized by high quality and accuracy. They are coming from a nation-wide surveys conducted by the UNDP and ICSO in 2004, 2007, 2011 and 2014.

4.4 The Limitation of the Selected Data

The main concern about the data that is used in this research is the level of units of analysis. Iraq is administratively divided into 18 provinces, the provinces are subdivided into 120 districts (Qaza) and the districts also subdivided into sub-district (Nahiya) and there are 320 of these. Most of the data on Iraq is available on provincial level only. Hence, the limitation of this model data is about the degree of disaggregation rather than the quality or the reliability, because the data are the product of very experienced and highly professional institutions. It is credible and with high quality. The problem is about the deficiency of data on lower levels than provincial. The aggregation of the data on provincial level makes it possible to conduct a quantitative analysis, since the number of units of analysis is (18) multiplied by (4) Iraqi general elections (Harrell, 2001).

It is better to have larger number of observations (n) when running quantitative research analysis, because more observations produce better statistical significance. In this research, if we use data on district or sub-district level would provide much more accurate results. Almost in all the papers that have empirically analyzed the topic of violence and voting behavior used data on district (municipality) level (Berrebi and Klor, 2006 and 2008, Kibris 2010). For example the Central Bureau of Statistics in Israel provides information on voters, turnout and election results even at the level of polling station. Likewise the Turkish Institute of Statics has information on elections at least on district level.

When it comes to violence we have records on provincial level only. Actually, this ignores the fact that in many provinces with relatively good security situation, some districts and sub-districts are completely free from terrorist attacks and terror casualties. However, even districts that have not suffered any terrorist attacks/violence, but are part of the province that has suffered an instance of terrorism, would be counted as being have exposed to terrorism. For example, since 2003 Muthanna province south of Iraq with almost entirely Shiite population witnessed three explosive care incidents two of them occurred in As-Samawah city district and one in Al-Rumaytha district. The rest of the districts and sub-districts have never been attacked, however we calculate the whole Muthanna province as one unit of analysis which means ignoring within the province variation in the level of violence. The same principle goes for each parameter. Also, it is worth to mention that there is a very close national and international media coverage, national and international censuses on terrorism in Iraq like Iraqi Body Count IBC. The Iraqi official agencies (like Ministry of Health MoH, Ministry of Interior MoI and the National Security Agency) have very detailed information on

terror incidents and fatalities on municipality level. However, this information is not made publically available and a person needs a special permit to have an access to such information.

And as the socioeconomic indicators can vary across regions, Iraq is like most of the developing countries, characterized by the concentration of most of the resources and public services in the center, while the peripheries suffer from neglecting and poor quality of public services. The center is often meant to be the capital city and the major metropolitan and the periphery is the small localities and rural areas. This means there are differences between and within the provinces. According to the UNDP and ICSO survey reports there is actually great deal of difference in the quality of public services between different part of the country and between the urban and ruler areas within the same region.

4.5 Operationalization and Specifications of the Models

The dataset of this research has the minimum number of observations for implementing Panel Data Models. The unit of analysis is the province (n=18) in four general elections (n=72). To estimate the models of this study, I will use the statistical software package "Stata". The focal relationship of this analysis is between violence and party choice. The independent variable is the civil casualties per thousand inhabitants one year before election; the dependent variable is the vote share of secular parties in the Iraqi parliamentary elections results of January 2005, December 2005, 2010 and 2014. Control variables are the ethnoreligious composition and socioeconomic indicators. The ethnoreligious was coded 1, 2 and 3 that indicates that the observation occurs into "Arab", "Kurd" or "Mixed" province. The socioeconomic indicators include: population size, education, health, household economic status and infrastructure. If one unit of civil casualties increase the vote share of secular parties decreases by one unit. The Models were estimated in a form, where i-province, t-year, ij= the change of voting behavior between and within the provinces:

Figure 3: The relationship between violence and party choice.

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Model 1:

The Vote share of Secular parties = β10 + β11 x Terror Casualties $_{it}$

Model 2:

The Vote share of Secular parties = β20 + β21 x Terror Casualties $_{it}$ + β22 state causalities $_{it}$ + β23 Sunni $_{it}$ + β24Kurd $_{it}$ + β25Mixed $_{it}$ + β26Education $_{it}$ + β27 Health $_{it}$ + β28Infrastructure $_{it}$ + β29 Housing $_{it}$ + β210 Household Economic Status $_{it}$

Model 3:

The Vote share of Secular parties = β30 + β31 x Terror Casualties $_{it}$ + β32 state causalities $_{it}$ + + β33Education $_{it}$ + β34 Health $_{it}$ + β35 Infrastructure $_{it}$ + β36 Housing $_{it}$ + β37 Household Economic Status $_{it}$ + β38 $_{ij}$ Province Dummies $_{it}$

Model 4:

The Vote share of Secular parties = β40 + β41 x Terror Casualties $_{it}$ + β42 state causalities $_{it}$ + β43 Education $_{it}$ + β 44Health+ β29Infrastructure+ β45 Housing + β46 Household Economic Status $_{it}$ + β47 $_{ij}$ Province Dummies $_{it}$ + β48 $_{ij}$ Year Dummies

Table 3: Statistical Summary of the Data

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Year	72	2008.75	3.586948	2005	2014
Population	72	1609244	1229660	514000	7255278
No of seats/province	72	15.25	13.23434	5	70
Registered voters	72	934781.5	816368.8	301970	4599000
Tota lvotes	72	704514.9	986856.5	12989	7851093
Turnout	72	.6620278	.159331	.02	.984
Electoral divider	72	40114.59	11113.93	1443.222	62365
Shiite parties votes	70	.4792459	.3557445	0	.9024582
Sunni parties votes	72	.0939445	.1921317	0	.9169017
Kurdish parties votes	72	.2153776	.3650053	0	.997
Minority parties votes	71	.0070944	.0275501	0	.1754
Secular parties votes	72	.1306277	.142479	0	.632
Social groups	72	2.111111	1.250978	1	4
Ethnicity	72	1.611111	.8316885	1	3
Sect	72	1.722222	.8087936	1	3
statenum	72	9.5	5.224536	1	18
Terror casualties	72	547.1528	1237.082	0	8227
Terror casualties/population	72	.0002336	.0003222	0	.0015543
US/gov casualties	72	70.59722	228.8806	0	1800
US/gov casualties	72	.000048	.0001773	0	.0014274
Casualties of terror and US/gov	72	617.75	1300.078	0	8566
Casualties of terror and US/gov/population	72	.0002816	.0003907	0	.0017201
Deprivation of Education	72	35.46389	10.61214	15.1	55.9
Deprivation of Health	72	26.675	9.264361	7.6	54.4
Deprivation of Infrastructures	72	61.00833	19.19218	27	93.1
Deprivation of Housing	72	28.02222	11.65879	3.9	50.3
Deprivation of Household Economic status	72	47.27889	13.68972	17	80.4

Source: IBC, UNDP, SCO Iraq and UNAMI

5. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

5.1 Voting Behavior in Iraq

Before starting implementing Panel Data Analysis, I will review the voting behavior in Iraq, using simple statistical analysis. The period between 2005 and 2014 there were four general elections that took place. 2005 is year in which Iraq had three elections. Within 11 months Iraqi people voted to elect a transitional parliament, then in a referendum for Iraq's permanent constitution and finally for the first permanent parliament. The first ever democratic multiparty election was held on January 30th, 2005 to elect the Transitional National Assembly (TNA). Among other things, the main task for the transitional parliament was to draft a permanent constitution and prepare the country for a general election. The election boycotted by the vast majority of Sunnis. The level of turnout in Sunni provinces was very low- Anbar 2,8%, Ninawa 17% and Salah Adin 29%. In contrary to that, the Kurds strongly participated, where the turnout of Kurdish provinces was the highest in the country (about 90%). Likewise the Shiite turnout (67, 11) was above the national average (about 59, 11%). The 275 seats of the new parliament dominated by a Shiite coalition, Iraqi National Alliance INA (140 seats) and Kurdistan Alliance (75 seats). While the secular Iraqi list and other nationalist parties received (43 seats); the remaining seats went to other small ethno-sectarian parties. Sunni's political parties received 6 seats only. The total number of Sunnis in the parliament was 17 out of 275 members (about 6%) most of them belonging secular political parties. The estimates refers that about 75 percent of Sunni opted to boycott the election. However, the committee of the constitution invited several non-elected Sunni leaders to participate in drafting the constitution (Dawisha and Diamond, 2006). . In the end the TNA managed to draft the constitution and On October 15th, 2005 about 78% of Iraqis approved the draft document with a turnout of 63% in a referendum. Both Shiite and Kurd overwhelmingly voted for the constitution while the majority of Sunni voted against it. The voting on constitution showed that people voted for or against based on ethno-sectarian grounds (see appendix 11).

As in the first election, Sunni boycotted the election and then became the biggest loser and underrepresented. In second election of December 15th, 2005 of the four-year Council of Representatives CoR it Sunni show strong willingness to participate. Despite the deteriorated security situation, the national turnout increased from (59,11) to (77%) due to the massive Sunni participation. The average Sunni and Kurd regions turnout was over above 85%, while

the Shiite and mixed regions and Baghdad was (71%) which is below the national average (71%). The total Sunni members in the parliament have increased from only 17 to about 60. Both of the two 2005 elections are characterized by voting that based on ethno-sectarian loyalties.

The 2010 election was a benchmark for the students of the elections in Iraq. It was the only one among the four elections so far that witnessed a victory of the secular-national political forces. The Iraqi National List (secular) received about 25% of the total votes in all over Iraq, followed by the two major Shiite coalitions; the State of Law (24%) headed by the former prime minister Nori Al-Maliki and the Iraqi National Alliance (18%) and the Kurdistan Alliance (15%). However, the Iraqi National List failed to gather the required majority to form the government. The two major Shiite coalitions and Kurds succeeded to form the majority and give the Iraqi List very small room for maneuvering. Nori Al-Maliki kept his position as a prime minister. A year after the elections the Americans and Iraqi government signed an agreement (The Strategic Frame Agreement) which stipulated the withdrawal of Americans troops, and the U.S. commitment to support Iraq on the issues of security and economy.

The Sunnis who enormously voted for the Secular Iraqi National List felt that they had been cheated. The security situation declined, followed by massive Sunni protests against the Prime Minister Nori Al-Maliki. The U.S. left Iraq with inefficient Iraqi forces that are ill armed and incapable to contain the reemerging Sunni insurgency and Shiite militias influences on domestic politics (Cordesman and Burke 2010, Cordesman, and Kahzia 2014). In this atmosphere of the communal tension, the 2014 election witnessed a decline in the share of secular parties of votes, while the ethno-sectarian parties restored their share of votes that they received in the first two elections. Therefore, I argue that there is a very strong correlation between security situation, the sectarian conflict and voting behavior in Iraq (See Figure 3). There is a positive relationship between the scale of violence and ethno-sectarian voting. As was discussed in the theoretical approach (chapter 3), pervasive violence in heterogeneous societies intensifies ethno-sectarian voting behavior. The theory complies perfectly to explain voting behavior in Iraq. With the prevailing violence, the series of the elections resulted in deeply divided parliament along ethnic and sectarian lines. The exception was the 2010 election due to the improvement of security situation and the decrease of sectarian incidents, which support the theoretical assumptions of this study that claim that violence and ethnic

voting behavior goes together hand to hand. (See Figures 2 and 3 and Tables 3 and 4 and Appendix 12).

Table 4: Distribution of Iraqi parliamentary seats according to party ethno-sectarian affiliation

Party Aflifiation	Jan. 2005 seats	Dec 2005 seats	2010 seats	2014 Seats
Shiite	145	130	159	172
Sunni	6	58	6	47
Kurd	77	58	57	62
Secular	43	26	95*	39
Other	4	3	8	8
Total	275	275	325	328
Turnout	59,11%	77%	62,3%	64,86%

Source: High Independent Electoral Commission in Iraq and United Nation Mission Assistant to Iraq UNAMI

Figure 3: Violence and secular voting in Iraq

Source: HIEC, United Nation Mission Assistant to Iraq UNAMI and Iraq Body Count IBC.

5.2 Regression Analysis

From the bivariate scatter I find strong indications for the presence of heteroscedasticity in general and a couple of influential cases in particular (See figure 4). For this reason, I start out with conducting a plain OLS regression followed by a post-estimation of influential cases, here measured by Cook's D, Qadissiya 2014 (D=9.63) and Anbar 2005 (D=8.87) stands out and have distance values way above the usual cut-point of 1.

Figure 4: Regression analysis, terror casualties and secular voting

The Cook's D is the combination of distance and deviation in relation to other observations and the distance measure tells us how much influence a specific observation has on the overall regression slope. In a bivariate regression, a majority of the cases have a Cook's D value between 0 and 1. Cases that deviates from the overall pattern usually have a D-value above 1, which means that the specific case is affecting the regression slope to an un-proportional high extent compared to the other observations and that the slope coefficient would change if the deviant case(s) is (are) removed. In this particular case Qadissiya and Anbar does, as mention, have a rather high Cook's D-value. However, the result remains roughly unchanged even though these two particular cases are being removed. In order to conduct a more formal test of the presence of heteroscedasticity, which is a violation of the OLS-assumptions, I performed a Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test. In the test, the null hypothesis is based on the assumption that the regression disturbances are independent-normal with the variance ($\sigma2$). The test is statistically significant (chi2 = 26.17) and thus yields a more formal indication of that the

variance of the error-term is non-constant across observations. Basically, it tests to what extent is heteroscedasticity a significant problem, or rather present in the pattern of the data. If the test is significant, the solution is either to a) add more data or b) to conduct within- and between regression analyses. Due to the fact that it is difficult get more data on Iraq, and then I will go for b solution.

The clustered structure of the data implies that I need to correct for the between unit variation, and even better, to model both the between- and within unit effects simultaneously. For this purpose a random effect model, with random intercepts (and slopes) can be applied. However, the random effect model assumes that the unit's error term is not correlated with the predictors, which allows for time-invariant variables to play a role as explanatory variables (Clarke & Linzer 2014).

One way to test whether this assumption holds is to estimate both a random- and a fixed effect model and then conduct a Hausman test. The Hausman test takes the squared difference of the estimated coefficients between the random and fixed effects models over the difference in the estimated variance for the coefficients. The test is based on a chi-square distribution where the null-hypothesis is that the random effects model is the correct model. A large difference between the coefficients from the two models then implies that the null hypothesis is rejected, while a small difference implies that the null-hypothesis is not rejected and hence that the random effects model is the most efficient. The results from the Hausman tests for the two models in this paper results in a rejection of the null-hypothesis in both cases and that fixed effects are preferable over random effects (Bartels 2009). In order to illustrate the clustered structure of the data and the within province correlations, I have plotted bivariate scatterplots from a random effect model in the figures below.

1 2 3 4 5

6 7 8 9 10

11 12 13 14 15

16 17 18

V1_pop

● Fitted values: xb + Zu　　——— Fitted values

Graphs by group(governorate)

Figure 5: Bivariate scatterplots from a random effect model of violence and secular voting.

An interesting finding, and also one of the schoolbook examples of when fixed or random effects models should be used, is here illustrated by the positive correlation between casualties and secular voting in the first bivariate OLS model. In the three following models where I control for either ethnoreligious groups or province dummies, the effect from the main independent variable is shifting direction and becomes strongly negative. Hence, the more casualties from terrorism the less do citizens vote for secular parties and this result holds under control for a row of potential rival explanations. The question of causality is, however, an intricate. Is it in provinces where voters already are very religious or where ethnoreligious identities already are strong that I find more terror or are the terror bombings actually causing the voting for non-secular parties? The solution to this problem is to include a one year lag in the independent variable. This approach does not entirely solve the issue of causality but at least it partly does so. By including the number of casualties from terrorism the year before the election I can at least be certain on that the order of the events is correct. Also, the correlation between (civil casualties by terrorist) and (civil casualties by Americans and Iraqi forces) is (r=.15) is not much at all actually so killing sprees by the Americans doesn't seem to coincide with terror attacks (see table 5).

In model 1- a plain OLS was conducted, where terror casualties is the independent variable and secular voting the dependent variable. In model 2, one more independent variable (civil casualties by Americans and Iraqi forces) is included and the ethno-religious affiliation

(Shiite, Sunni, Kurd and mixed) and socioeconomic indicators (education, health, infrastructure, housing and households economic) are added as control variables. In model 3 the two independent variables are left from Model 2 and the socioeconomic indicators and province dummies variables are used as control variables. Province dummies are used to control for the change in secular voting within the provinces. In model 4, the same variables as in model 3 are used and year dummies are included in order to control for the change of secular voting between the provinces. The following part is the discussion of the results of the four models. Also, check for error term and multicollinearity was conducted (see Table 5).

Table 5: Multiple Regression Models on Secular Voting in Iraq (OLS with fixed effects)

	Model 1 Sec.Gov.	Model 2 Sec.Gov.	Model 3 Sec.Gov.	Model 4 Sec.Gov.
Terror Casualties	131.537**	-147.951*	-264.649**	-191.610**
	(50.460)	(59.244)	(74.127)	(56.320)
Gove Casualties		78.587	111.318*	86.121*
		(89.169)	(38.653)	(33.284)
Sunni (Ref. Shiite)		0.257***		
		(0.074)		
Kurd (Ref. Shiite)		-0.034		
		(0.062)		
Mixed (Ref. Shiite)		0.196***		
		(0.056)		
Education		-0.003	-0.008*	-0.005
		(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Health		-0.002	-0.002	-0.004
		(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Infrastructure		0.002	0.004	0.004*
		(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Housing		0.001	0.001	-0.000
		(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Households Economic		0.001	0.002	0.004
		(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Provins-dummies	no	no	yes	yes
Year-dummies	no	no	no	yes
Constant	0.100***	0.093	0.178	-0.006
	(0.020)	(0.111)	(0.137)	(0.204)
R2-within	.12	.25	.30	.52
R2-between	.74	.86	.02	.00
R2-overall	.09	.50	.03	.13
Rho	0	0	.60	.66
No. Of obs.	72	72	72	72
No. Of groups	18	18	18	18

However, the results of this analysis show that the voters in the Sunni and mixed regions are the most sensitive to violence, while other groups are also sensitive to a lesser degree. Although the factor of violence is of significant importance, other factors such as history and the degree of ethnoreligious identity also might explain the variation of sensitivity to violence among different ethno-religious groups.

To interpret the outcome from this regression equation important to remember that the dependent variable measure the support for secular parties in percentages in Iraqi provinces over four elections, under control for a row of different background variables. The main independent variable is the number of casualties per thousand inhabitants measured one year before the elections in each province. The mean value for secular voting is (.131) while the mean for casualties per thousand inhabitants is (.0002). Since the numbers are so small, the coefficients are difficult to interpret. Simply I find that the effect is very large but what does it mean in terms of change in percentages for secular voting? One way to interpret the effect or rather, to make the scale interpretable is to standardize. Hence, if the take the coefficient from the effect of casualties on secular voting in model four and multiply it according to the standard deviation in casualties per thousand inhabitants (-191.6097*0.0003222) we receive a value of (-.062) which simply means that if the number of casualties per thousand inhabitants is changing with one standard deviation, voting for secular parties is decreasing with about 6 percentage points. The effect is thus quite small but statistically significant. At the same time, the Pearson's r is .298 between the dependent and the independent variable so we know that they are intermediately related. Taken together, these results indicate a significant relationship between terror attacks and secular voting.

6. CONCLUSION

Iraq has made great progress through the hard process of transforming from authoritarian to plural governing. Since January 30, 2005 Iraq has practiced many multiparty elections on local and national levels, which had the minimum requirements to have been considered as fair and just according to many international observers (Sir Harold Walker & Sir Terence Clark 2005). With the implementation of elections, both Iraqi people and international community hope that coups and revolutions would stop, which they eventually did so far. Elections have become the most important path of determining who occupies official positions in the legislative, executive and judicial powers to a certain extent. Moreover, Iraqi people show their strong believe in the democratic practice through their genuine willingness to participate in elections, where the average of turnout is above 60%. On the other hand, Iraq is one of the most unfortunate nations in the world, as it suffers from prevalence of sectarian violence and indiscriminate terrorism. I argue that violence is one of the main reasons behind the rise of ethnoreligious parties and the fading of secular parties. This hypothesis is based on the assumption, that identities are socially constructed. People have many identities; it could be national, ethnic, religious, tribal, lingual, etc. I argue that the communal violence leads to an increase of saliency of primordial identities. It increases inter-group solidarity and distrust towards people from other groups. Violence makes people vote for parties and candidates who comply with their ethnoreligious background.

Using a unique dataset that includes the civilian victims of terror attacks one year before election and the results of the four general elections that took place in Iraq in January 2005, December 2005, March 2010 and April 2014, I measured the effect of terror casualties on the secular voting. The results show a strong negative correlation between the level of violence and the vote share of secular parties. Secular parties represent the left and ethnoreligious represent the conservative or right wing. It was interesting to see that including terror casualties and vote share of secular parties in a simple regression analysis produces a positive relationship between those two variables. However, controlling for ethno-sectarian affiliation and socioeconomic indicators changes the direction of the relationship to strongly negative. This relation holds by adding different variables, there were different levels of sensitivity toward violence of different ethno-sectarian groups. The Sunni Arabs is the most group that changed its voting preference in response to the level of violence. As was discussed in the theory section, there are other potential factors that affect party choice of the various groups of the Iraqi people. It could be internal, historical, institutional, cultural and international

factors. For example, Kurds are a minority that suffered from assimilation policies in the whole Middle East region. Voting for Kurdish parties is one way to introduce significant achievements that improve the conditions of Kurdish people. Likewise, despite that Shiite forms the majority of the population in Iraq they are a minority within Arab and Islamic realm. They have suffered from discrimination and have been neglected for many decades. Voting for Shiite parties might be the most proper way for them to avoid persecution. For the Sunni Arabs who have been the ruler elites of Iraq since the establishment in 1920, and since they are a minority, voting for secular parties is the most appropriate formal channel to avoid Shiite hegemony. Because voting on ethno-sectarian biases would always result in Shiite majority in parliament. For the Kurds it does not matter a lot when comparing with Sunni Arabs, because they have their own autonomous administrative region in the far north of the country and are semi-independent in issues of security and finance. Furthermore, it might require much more time for Kurds and Shiite to get rid of the negative externalities of the tyranny of the previous regimes of Iraq. However, this thesis proved that the more civil casualties caused by -terrorism/communal violence, the less people vote for secular parties. However, the findings show that the Iraqi voter follow his/her ethno-sectarian group voting preferences. It is clear that voting primarily serves the interest of the group.

The results of this study are coinciding with the results of similar studies that were conducted in the well-established democracies Berrebi and Klor (2006 and 2008), Kibris (2010). People are sensitive to terrorism. Violence mobilizes people and affects their political choices. Iraqi people are just like other people in different parts of the world- they show high sensitivity toward terrorism.

Unfortunately, it is quite hard to examine whether terrorism makes Iraqi people punish the government or not, because all the parties in parliament are represented in the government. In the discourse of the political parties, all parties blame each other for the failure in delivering sufficient public service and security. However, according to practice, the Prime Minister's (always Shiite) party is considered to be the government, Sunni are the opposition and the Kurds are something in between.

This thesis attempts to contribute to the few existing literature on violence and election in Iraq and to expand our knowledge about this phenomenon in the countries that have a similar social and political context. However, there is much room left for future researches. This area of research has a lot of potential and is very promising. By investing more in empirical data

i.e. providing much more disaggregated data on elections and other potentially correlated variables, we can obtain more concrete results that can develop our understanding about ethnicities, religions, violence and politics. -An important issue to highlight is that this research makes the myth of the election being the reason of a country's disintegration invalid**.** Some scholars argue that Iraq's sandy soil is not fertile enough for democracy due to the country's geopolitical and ethnoreligious predispositions (Wimmer, 2007, Byman and Pollack, 2003). But, in this paper I proved that violence is responsible for ethnic politics in Iraq. Controlling for violence makes people focus more on issues like employment, public service and economic growth instead of ethnoreligious politics. Enhancing the security situation and enforcing the principle of the rule of law will give the chance to the citizens to think twice when they cast their votes. Hence, it means to have a consistent government, that can guarantee the integrity and the prosperity of the country and to have an active opposition that monitors the performance of the government.

Since the results of this analysis show that Sunni Arabs are the most sensitive to violence, increasing security measurement in their regions and focusing on using efficient procedure that minimize the casualties among civilians would result in less ethno-sectarian politics in Iraq. Finally, the results show that it is not in the interests of ethnic and sectarian parties to eliminate the violence totally in Iraq, because it means the loss of many of their electoral gains that they have made under the circumstances of sectarian unrest. A degree of communal skirmishes that don't leads to regime collapse is in favor of those parties.

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8.APPENDICES

## Appendix 1. Ethnoreligious Groups Distribution

Province	Population 2014	Ethnoreligious Composition
Anbar	1,720000	Absolut Sunni/Arab majority
Babylon	1,800000	Shiite/Arab with Sunni minority
Baghdad	7,255278	Overwhelming Arab Majority /Mixed Shiite/Sunni/Christian
Basra	2,601790	Shiite/Arab and Sunni and Christians Minorities
Diyala	1,480000	Mixed Arab/Kurd/Sunni/Shiite
Dahuk	1,300000	Kurd mainly Sunni
Erbil	1,800000	Kurd mainly Sunni and other small minorities
Karbala	1,094000	Absolut Shiite/Arab
Missan	1000000	Absolut Shiite/Arab
Muthanna	735905	Absolut Shiite/Arab
Najaf	1,300019	Absolut Shiite/Arab
Ninawa	3,675000	Mixed Arab/Kurd/Sunni/Shiite/Christians and other small minorities (majority Sunni Arab)
Qadisiya	1,162000	Mainly Shiite/Arab
Salah El Din	1,473000	Sunni/Arab majority with Shiite and Kurd
Sulyamaniya	1,931561	Kurd mainly Sunni
Tamim/Kirku	1,169171	Mixed Kurd/Arab/Turkmen/Sunni/Shiite and Christian
Thi-Qar	2,021474	Shiite/Arab and Sunni Minority
Wasit	1,275000	Shiite/Arab

Appendix 2. level of turnout according to ethnoreligious affiliation.

Year	Shiite Regions	Sunni Regions	Kurd Regions	Mixed	National
Jan 2005	67,11	15,5	87	42	59,11
Dec 2005	71,2	77	90,5	75,32	77
2010	57,78	63,85	74,63	62,5	62,3
2014	68,31	49,45	75,46	62,52	66,12
Average	66,1	51,45	81,89	60,58	64,68

-Turnout (%) of the parliamentary elections according to ethno-religious affiliation.

Appendix 3. Administrative map of Iraq

Appendix 4. Ethnoreligious composition of Iraq

Appendix 5. Ethnoreligious affiliation of the Iraqi provinces

Ethnoreligious	Shiite	Babylon, Basrah, Karbla, Missan Muthanna, Qadisiya, Najaf, Thi Qar, Wasit
	Sunni	Anbar, Salah Eldin
	Kurd	Dahuk, Erbil, Suliamaniya
	Mixed	Baghdad1, Diyala2, Kirkuk3
Ethnicities	Arab	Anbar, Babylon, Basrah, Karbla, Missan, Muthanna, Qadisiya, Najaf, Ninawa, Thi Qar, Wasit
	Kurd	Dahuk, Erbil, Suliamaniya
	Mixed	Diyala, Kirkuk3, Ninawa2
Religions	Shiite	Babylon, Basrah, Karbla, Missan Muthanna, Qadisiya, Najaf, Thi Qar, Wasit
	Sunni	Dahuk, Erbil, Sulaimaniya, Anabar, SalahEdin, Kirkuk, Ninawa
	Mixed	Baghdad1, Diyala2

Note: M1= Shiite Majority, M2=Sunni Majority, M3= Kurd Majority

Appendix 6. Political parties in Iraq

Ethno-religious Party affiliation		**Political Party**
Shiite	**Islamist**	-Islamic Dawa party - Sadrist Movement -Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq ISCI (previously Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq) -Virtue Party *Fadeela* -National Reform Trend
	Nationalist	-Iraqi National Congers
Sunni	**Islamist**	Islamic Party
	Pan-Arabism-nationalist	-Iraqi National Dialogue Front *Al-Hiwar* -Muttahidoon - Renewal List -The Iraqis -Al-Hadba -Reconciliation and Liberation Bloc
Kurd		Kurdistan Democratic Party KDP Patriotic Union of Kurdistan PUK Movement for Change *Gorran* Kurdistan Islamic Union KIU Kurdistan Islamic Union

Secular	-Iraqi National Accord -Civil Democratic Alliance -Iraqi Communist Party -National Democratic Party -Constitutional Monarchy Movement -Assembly of Independent Democrats
Other	Iraqi Turkmen Front Turkmen People's Party

Appendix 7. Election results January 30, 2005

Party or Alliance	Affiliation	Total National Votes	Percent of national Vote	national Seats
Iraqi National Alliance	Shiite	4,075,292	50,07	140
Kurdistan Alliance	Kurd	2,175,551	26,73	75
The Iraqi List	Secular	1,168,943	14,3628	40
Iraqis	Sunni	150,680	1,8514	5
Turkmen Iraq Front	Minority	93,480	1,1486	3
National Independent Cadres Elites	Shiite	69,938	0,085	3
Nation Union	Secular	69,920	0,085	2
Islamic Group of Kurdistan	Kurd	60,592	0,0,0744	2
Islamic Action Organization	Shiite	43,205	0,0,053	2
National Democratic Alliance	Secular	36,795	0,0,045	1
Al-rafideen National List	Minority/ Christian	36,255	0,0,044	1
Liberation and Reconciliation Gathering	Sunni	30,796	0,037	1

Appendix 8. Election results December 15, 2005

Party or Alliance	Affiliation	Total National Votes	Percent of national Vote %	national Seats
United Iraqi Alliance	Shiite	4691945	43,78	128
Kurdistan Alliance	Kurd	1786775	16,67	53
Iraqi Accord front	Sunni	1484181	13,84	44
Iraqi national List	Secular	829985	7,74	25
Iraqi National Dialogue Front	Sunni	405077	3,77	11
Al-Risaliyun	Shiite	128868	1,20	5
Kurdistan Islamic Union	Kurd	119245	1,11	2
Reconciliation and Liberation Bloc	Sunni	97575	0,91	3
Turkmen Front	Minority	71294	0,66	1
Rafidain List	Minority/ Christian	33948	0,4	1
Iraq Nation Party/Mithal Al Alusi	Secular	32,245	0.3	1
Yazidi Movement for Reform and Progress	Minority	21,908	0,2	1

Appendix 9. Election results March 7, 2010

Party or Alliance	Affiliation	Total National Votes	Percent of national Vote	national Seats
Iraqi National Movement (al-Iraqiya)	Secular	2779805	24,3	91
State of Law Coalition	Shiite	2723698	23,81	89
National Iraqi Alliance	Shiite	2047972	17,9	70
Kurdistan Alliance	Kurd	1635037	14,29	43
Movement for Change (Gorran)	Kurd	402018	3,51	8
Unity Alliance of Iraq	Secular	148692	1,3	4
Iraqi Accord Front (Twafik)	Sunni	233609	2,04	6
Kurdistan Islamic Union KIU	Kurd	214222	1,87	4
Islamic Group of Kurdistan IGK		141855	1,24	2
Minorities		61,153	457481	8

Appendix 10. Election results April 30, 2014

Party or Alliance	Affiliation	Total National Votes	Percent of national Vote	national Seats
State of Law	Shiite	3141835	27,04	92
Saddrist movement	Shiite	953615	8,20	34
AlMuwatin coalition	Shiite	951214	9,07	29
Kurdistan Democratic Party KDP	Kurd	1038002	7,33	25
Muttahidoon	Sunni	680690	5,85	23
Al-Iraqiyaa	Secular	569651	5,90	21
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan PUK	Kurd	324858	6,71	21
Al-Arabiya Coalition	Sunni	324858	2,7	10
Gorran	Kurd	451858	3,88	9
Iraq Alliance	Secular	153672	1,32	8
Islamic Virtue Party	Shiite	211257	1,81	6
National Reform Trend	Shiite	192763	1,65	6
Diyala Identity	Sunni	159605	1,37	5
Kurdistan Islamic Union KIU	Kurd	165856	1,42	4
Kurdistan Islamic group KIG	Kurd	137594	1,18	3
Nieneva national Alliance	Shiite	112563	0,68	3
Civil Democratic Alliance	Secular	112563	0,96	3
Loyalty to Al-Anbar	Sunni		0,50	3
Iraqi Turkmen Front	Minority	71492	0,61	2
Iraq Loyalty Alliance	Secular	67796	0,86	2
Competence and People Gathering	Secular		0,57	2
Unity of Iraqi (Wehdet Abnaa Al-Iraq	Secular		0,40	2
Others				

Appendix 11. Iraq's constitutional referendum, October 2005

Province	Votes	For %	Against %	Ethno-religious Affiliation
Anbar	259919	3,04	96,9	Sunni Arab
Babylon	543779	94,56	5,44	Shiite Arab
Baghdad	2,120615	77,7	22,3	Mixed
Basra	691024	96.2	3.98	Shiite Arab
Diyala	476980	51,27	48,73	Mixed, Arab/Sunni/Shiite/kurd
Dahuk	389198	99,13	0,87	Kurd
Erbil	830570	99,36	0,64	Kurd
Karbala	264674	96,58	3,42	Shiite Arab
Missan	254067	97,79	2.21	Shiite Arab
Muthanna	185710	98,65	1,35	Shiite Arab
Najaf	299420	95,82	4,18	Shiite Arab
Ninawa	718758	44,92	55,08	Mixed/Sunni Arab majority
Qadisiya	297176	96,74	3,32	Shiite Arab
Salah El Din	510152	18,25	81,75	Sunni Arab
Sulyamaniya	723,723	98,96	1,04	Kurd
Tamim/Kirku	542,688	62,91	37,09	Mixed Kurd/Arab/Turkmen/Sunni/Shiite
Thi-Qar	462710	97,15	2,85	Shiite Arab
Wasit	280128	95,7	4,3	Shiite Arab
Total	9,852291	78,59	21,41	

Appendix 12. Ethno-religious affiliation and turnout (%) of the parliamentary elections

Year	Shiite Regions	Sunni Regions	Kurd Regions	Mixed	National
Jan 2005	67,11	15,5	87	42	59,11
Dec 2005	71,2	92	90,5	75,32	77
2010	57,78	63,85	74,63	62,5	62,3
2014	68,31	49,45	75,46	62,52	66,12
Average	66,1	51,45	81,89	60,58	64,68

Source: HIEC and United Nation Mission Assistant to Iraq UNAMI

Appendix 13. "Stata" Do-File

```
clear all
import excel using "C:\Users\gusnajiam\Desktop\Stata anlysis\Plimenary test data.xlsx", clear firstrow
destring turnout, replace
destring D_*, replace
drop Y D_houc
drop if governorate ==""
label define ethgr 1 "Shiite" 2 "Sunni" 3 "Kurd" 4 "Mixed"
label value Ethnic_co ethgr
ren Ethnic_co Soc_group
gen Ethnicity = .
replace Ethnicity = 1 if Soc_group == 1
replace Ethnicity = 1 if Soc_group == 2
replace Ethnicity = 2 if Soc_group == 3
replace Ethnicity = 3 if Soc_group == 4
label define ethnic 1 "Arab" 2 "Kurd" 3 "Mixed"
label value Ethnicity ethnic
gen Sect = .
replace Sect = 1 if Soc_group == 1
replace Sect = 2 if Soc_group == 2
replace Sect = 2 if Soc_group == 3
replace Sect = 3 if Soc_group == 4
label define sect 1 "Shiite" 2 "Sunni" 3 "Mixed"
label value Sect sect
tab Sect
reg  SE_v V1 Year
gen V1_pop = V1/Population
scatter turnout V1_pop if Year == 2014
reg  SE_v V1_pop i.Year
gen V2_pop = V2/Population
gen V_Tpop = V_Tot/Population
order governorate Year Population N_seats Reg_voters totalvotes turnout El_div SH_v SU_v Kurd_v M_v SE_v
Soc_group V1 V1_pop V2 V2_pop V_Tot V_Tpop
egen statenum = group(governorate)
xtset statenum Year
xtline SE_v, overlay
twoway ///
```

```
                    (scatter SE_v V1_pop if Ethn == 1) ///
                    (scatter SE_v V1_pop if Ethn == 2) ///
                    (lfit SE_v V1_pop if Ethn == 1) ///
                    (lfit SE_v V1_pop if Ethn == 2)

use "C:\Users\gusnajiam\Desktop\Stata anlysis\dataset_sd.dta", clear
xtset statenum Year
esttab m1 m2 m3 m4, cells(b(star fmt(%9.3f)) se(par)) stats(r2_a N, fmt(%9.3f %9.0g) labels(R-squared))     ///
legend label collabels(none) varlabels(_cons Constant)
sysuse auto
eststo clear
eststo: xtreg weight length turn , fe i(rep78)
estadd local fixed "yes" , replace
eststo: xtreg weight length turn , re i(rep78)
estadd local fixed "no" , replace
esttab , cells(b) indicate(turn) s(fixed N, label("fixed effects"))
```

hausman test
```
use "C:\Users\gusnajiam\Desktop\Stata anlysis\dataset_sd.dta", clear
xtreg SE_v V1_pop, fe
estimate store fe
xtreg SE_v V1_pop, re
estimate store re
hausman fe re
***
hist SE_v, norm
hist V1_pop, norm
```

* Bivariate Secular voting - Violence
```
*xtreg y x, fe
```
* Multivariate Secular voting - Violence +
```
xtreg SE_v V1_pop i.Soc_group
reg SE_v V1_po
twoway (scatter SE_v V1_pop, mlabel(governorate) ytitle(Support for secular parties (mean)) xtitle(No of terror
related causalties/cap. (mean)) caption("b=131.537" "R2=.09" "N: 72")) (lfit  SE_v V1_pop) , scheme(s1mono)
```

* Multivariate Secular voting - Violence +++

```
*i.Soc_group D_Edu D_Hlt D_inf D_hou D_eco D_lsi
sum SE_v V1_pop
xtreg SE_v V1_pop
estimates store m1, title(Model 1)
xtreg SE_v V1_pop V2_pop i.Soc_group D_Edu D_Hlt D_inf D_hou D_eco
estimates store m2, title(Model 2)
xtreg SE_v V1_pop V2_pop D_Edu D_Hlt D_inf D_hou D_eco, fe cluster(statenum)
estimates store m3, title(Model 3)
xtreg SE_v V1_pop V2_pop D_Edu D_Hlt D_inf D_hou D_eco i.Year, fe cluster(statenum)
estimates store m4, title(Model 4)
```

*produces table in paper
```
esttab m1 m2 m3 m4, cells(b(star fmt(%9.3f)) se(par)) stats(r2_a N, fmt(%9.3f %9.0g) labels(R-squared))     ///
legend label collabels(none) varlabels(_cons Constant)
```

**standardized interpretation of coeficcient from model 4.
```
sum SE_v V1_pop
```

```
display -191.6097*0.0003222

**beta
sum SE_v V1_pop
xtreg SE_v V1_pop, fe
display -189.5716*0.0003222
display 0.06107997/0.142479
xtreg SE_v V1_pop V2_pop D_Edu D_Hlt D_inf D_hou D_eco Year, re
xtmixed   SE_v  V1_pop  V2_pop  D_Edu  D_Hlt  D_inf  D_hou  D_eco  Year  ||  statenum:  V1_pop,  mle
covariance(unstructured)
predict prmodel, fitted
sort statenum prmodel
twoway (scatter prmodel V1_pop ) (lfit prmodel V1_pop ), by(statenum)  scheme(s1mono)

*sysuse auto
eststo clear
eststo: xtreg SE_v V1_pop V2_pop i.Soc_group D_Edu D_Hlt D_inf D_hou D_eco , fe i(statenum)
estadd local fixed "yes" , replace
eststo: xtreg SE_v V1_pop V2_pop i.Soc_group D_Edu D_Hlt D_inf D_hou D_eco , re i(statenum)
estadd local fixed "no" , replace
esttab , cells(b) indicate(V2_pop) s(fixed N, label("fixed effects"))

**checking for outliers.
reg SE_v V1_pop V2_pop i.Soc_group D_Edu D_Hlt D_inf D_hou D_eco Year
predict D, cooksd
tab D
gen influ=0
recode influ (0=1) if D>1
reg SE_v V1_pop V2_pop i.Soc_group D_Edu D_Hlt D_inf D_hou D_eco influ

***NORMALITY DISTRIBUTION OF ERROR TERMS
reg SE_v V1_pop V2_pop i.Soc_group D_Edu D_Hlt D_inf D_hou D_eco
predict estu if e(sample), rstudent
hist estu, normal
reg SE_v V1_pop V2_pop i.Soc_group D_Edu D_Hlt D_inf D_hou D_eco
predict x2, xb
predict esta, rstandard
scatter esta x2
reg SE_v V1_pop V2_pop i.Soc_group D_Edu D_Hlt D_inf D_hou D_eco
hettest
estat imtest, white

*Multicoelineraity
reg SE_v V1_pop V2_pop D_Edu D_Hlt D_inf D_hou D_eco i.Soc_group
estat vif
reg SE_v V1_pop V2_pop D_Edu D_Hlt D_inf D_hou D_eco
estat vif
reg SE_v V1_pop if Ethnicity == 1
reg SH_v V1_pop if Ethnicity == 1
reg SU_v V1_pop if Ethnicity == 1
reg SE_v V1_pop if Ethnicity == 2
reg SE_v V1_pop if Ethnicity == 1
```