DEPTARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

GÖTEBORGS UNIVERSITET

WOMEN'S POLITICAL AMBITION AND REPRESENTATION

The democratic consequence of media sexism

Amanda Haraldsson

1: Abstract

Despite progress overall in women's rights, two areas where progress has halted are women's representation in media and politics. Women currently make up 24% of news subjects — those being interviewed, reported on or otherwise shown in the news — globally (GMMP, 2015a). Why does half of the global population and everything they do become condensed into only a quarter of the information we receive? What impact can this have on the roles women aspire to take in societies?

Women's under- and misrepresentation in media are deemed media sexism in this study. Media sexism may have a negative correlation with women's political ambitions, and help to explain why women in contexts where they have no formal barriers to political competition still choose not to compete. The study at hand argues that media sexism could reduce women's willingness to run both by producing sexism — reflecting women in a more passive, stereotypical and unpolitical reality than their actual contributions to society — and reproducing sexism, by acting as a societal mirror that portrays sexism already present in society.

The potential role of media sexism via indicators from the Global Media Monitoring Project are tested against the share of candidates to the lower house of parliament in this global cross-sectional study, supplemented by a case study of media sexism and candidates in Sweden 1979-2014. The study hypothesises that media sexism has a negative impact on the number of women willing to run, and therefore reduces the representativeness and efficiency of democracies around the world.

2: Table of Contents

**WOMEN'S POLITICAL AMBITION AND REPRESENTATION: THE DEMOCRATIC
CONSEQUENCE OF MEDIA SEXISM**

3: Political ambition and women's representation in politics and media

"… women don't participate as much as men because they can't, because they won't, or because nobody asked them" (Inglehart and Norris, 2003, p.102)

As women make up half the global population, why do they represent only 22.6% (IPU, 2016) of the world's national parliaments in 2016? Gender parity is continually making headway in many aspects of public and private life, yet political representation appears to have reached a plateau long before parity has been achieved. Regional differences in women with seats in the lower house of parliament range from a high of 41.1% in the Nordic countries to a low of 13.5% in the Pacific (IPU, 2016). Scholars disagree on whether this can be explained by a lack of demand for women in power, or a lack of supply of women willing to take on the challenge. On both sides, a kaleidoscope of factors have been shown to influence the number of women in power. Yet, despite this knowledge, women even in relatively gender equal countries are still considerably underrepresented. Women are usually an equal, and sometimes larger, percentage of the electorate (Murray, 2008, p.484) in countries across the world, which raises the question why women are found to be less politically engaged than men (Inglehart and Norris, 2003). A functioning democracy requires consent and participation, and failing to include groups into representation reduces a democracy's legitimacy (Hayes and Lawless, 2015); when a group that constitutes 50% of the world is not proportionally represented in democracies, this gives little hope to minority groups.

As some studies are suggesting that women win elections at comparable rates to men where there are no official barriers to political entry (Dolan, 2014; Lawless, 2003; Heldman and Wade, 2011), why would women continue to typically represent well below 50% of candidates to parliament even in these contexts? Variation exists not only in the share of political representatives that are women, but also in how many women enter political competition in the first place. Clearly, part of the jigsaw of women's political underrepresentation lies in women's lack of political ambition, and understanding what leads to this deficit.

A second area where women have not made the same level of progress as in other areas is media (Edström and Jacobsson, 2015). Women continue to remain under 24% of people shown in the news globally (GMMP, 2015a, p.8). This is an increase from 17% twenty years earlier (GMMP, 1995, p.10). Between 1995 and 2010 this percentage increased at a near constant rate (GMMP, 2010, p.vii), yet between 2010 and 2015 there was no change. The only world region to experience more than a 10% increase in this twenty year period is Latin America, while Africa has the same share of women shown in the news in 2015 as 1995 (GMMP, 2015a, p.32). Reducing the level of media sexism, understood in this study as both underrepresentation of women and misrepresentation of women through various means, has then also reached a plateau despite being far from gender equal.

This has been shown in the literature to have a serious consequence for women in politics; namely, media sexism's effect in hindering women in politics from success in elections. Globally, only 30% of electoral candidates shown in the news are women (GMMP, 2010, p.8). Case studies of media portrayals of women candidates in America and elsewhere have argued the direct link between sexist media coverage and women's failure in political competition. In the upcoming US presidential election, the tirade of claims in media that candidate Hillary Clinton is corrupt, a liar, a

flip-flopper and more seems never-ending. However, in the Pulitzer price-winning Politifact, a fact-checking organisation used to test the truthfulness of all the candidates, Clinton was in fact the most truthful of all the presidential candidates, including Bernie Sanders (Abramson, 2016). Despite this, out of all the presidential candidates, Clinton received the highest percentage of negative coverage and lowest percentage positive coverage of all candidates, including Donald Trump (Stein, 2016).

So far, the literature has not answered the question of how this impacts women before reaching the election. In a number of studies, Fox and Lawless (2004, 2005, 2014) study how political socialisation — political culture, family responsibilities, self-perceived qualifications and adherence to ideologically 'women's issues' — negatively impact women in terms of reducing their nascent political ambition (potential interest leading to an actual decision to run). Research on sexism in society suggests that being exposed to the sexist treatment of others will impact the observer's own career ambitions (Bradley-Geist et al., 2015). As the political underrepresentation of women can be problematised partially as a lack of willing candidates, it is imperative to understand if media sexism has such a bystander effect on women, stifling their political ambition.

As media is the primary source of information regarding political candidates and society in general (Wasburn and Wasburn, 2011; Rättvisaren, 2015; Women's Media Center, 2016; Kahn, 1994; Ibroscheva and Raicheva-Stover, 2009), the literature on gender and media, gender and elections and the intersecting literature for these concepts provides a solid argument for the necessity of better understanding the media sexism that distorts reality and limits democracies from achieving a fully representative legislature. It would be a failure within democracy to continue practising sexism if this artificially changes the course of our political representation. Our best outcomes politically may be being averted because of sexist obstacles, which would not only limit our adherence to basic human rights, but would lead us away from innovative solutions to social problems that could be better solved with a larger pool of applicants for political representation.

The thesis explores whether media sexism functions similarly to ambient sexism, i.e. observing sexism targeted at someone else impacts the bystander (Bradley-Geist et al., 2015). It will be tested whether the bystander effect will lead to lower levels of women candidacy to parliament where media sexism is high, because all women in society are bystanders to sexism targeted at women in media — portrayed as political candidates and otherwise — and if, as a result, they are less likely to see themselves as suitable for political careers. Media sexism's potential impact on women's political ambition is in grave need of exploration, because of the potentially undemocratic side-effect of less women candidates but also because media sexism is considered by some to be increasing (Ibroscheva and Raicheva-Stover, 2009).

3.1: Research aim

The aim of this study is to find how media sexism may impact women's political ambition. The research question this study aims to answer is:

Is there a link between media sexism and the share of female candidates to the lower house of parliament?

The concepts of media sexism and women's political ambition have been operationalised in such a way that their measures are comparative across space. However, it is also considered important to understand how media sexism may impact women's political ambition across time. Therefore,

additionally to a comparative cross-sectional analysis, a small-scale case study over time of media sexism and candidates to parliament in Sweden is included.

The theoretical argument that media functions both by mirroring gender inequality and perpetuating gender stereotypes is argued in the Bulgarian case study by Ibroscheva and Raicheva-Stover (2009). In other words, media both produces sexism and has a "role in the (re)production of gender norms" (Wright and Holland, 2014, p.457). This study will test if this duo-mechanism of media sexism is the case globally. The bystander effect posits that sexism impacts the ambitions of those who see sexism directed at others; this study theorises that this signalling works in two ways. Firstly, in reproducing sexism of society, media sexism may be an obstacle in terms of making men and women feel that women are less suited for politics than men. Secondly, in producing sexism regardless of the level of gender equality of society, media sexism may portray women in a distorted, and less favourable for politics, way and therefore make women consider themselves less suitable despite reality. Although the productive and reproductive aspects of media sexism cannot be separated empirically, they are how the mechanism of media sexism is understood theoretically in this study.

3.2: Contribution to literature

This study is the first cross-national quantitative study to investigate the possible link between media sexism and the share of candidates to parliament that are women. Most media and election studies, or studies into the share of women candidates, are qualitative (or mixed qualitative and quantitative) case studies (Murray, 2008; Kahn, 1994; Wasburn and Wasburn, 2011; Heldman et al., 2006; Ibroscheva and Raicheva-Stover, 2009; Wright and Holland, 2014; Dan and Iorgoveanu, 2013; etc). Some studies in related fields, such as factors impacting women candidates' success, are experimental (Koch, 1999; Bradley-Geist et al., 2015) or survey based (Hayes, 2011). However, the limitations of experimental and case studies is the difficulty in ensuring that the conditions in the cases selected or experiments conducted allow the results to be extrapolated to other settings (Koch, 1999, p.85). This study adds to two sets of literature.

First and foremost, the study adds to the literature on media sexism, by providing the first known empirical, cross-sectional study of how media sexism interplays with women's political ambition. The studies discussing the link between media sexism and the motivation women have to enter politics are low and conducted in American settings. Scholars of media sexism and its relationship with women politicians tend to consider the role that media sexism has in reducing women candidates' success, or in belittling their value if they succeed. This research will therefore add to the literature by showing whether or not media sexism has an impact that is strong enough to make women forgo political careers in the first place, in the first known cross-country analysis of this relationship.

Secondly, the study adds to the literature on women's political representation. Media sexism as a determinant of the low supply of women candidates has not been explored, and factors explaining women's lower political ambition relative to men in general is a "critical void in the research on women's underrepresentation in elective office" (Fox and Lawless, 2004, p.264); indeed, the initial choice to run for politics is a new addition to the literature on candidate emergence (Fox and Lawless, 2005). Women's political ambition has been argued to be impacted by socialisation and cultural, institutional and structural factors; media sexism may contribute to these explanations, through the reproduction role of media sexism, as well as posing an independent explanation, through the production role. Additionally, the bystander effect focus of the

study is argued not only to impact women in deciding to compete in politics, but also political gatekeepers deciding whether to nominate women who already are involved politically.

Literature in these two branches will be presented in the next section to showcase what is known, and where they may overlap in explanations of why women are under- and misrepresented. Connecting these two branches of research is done to show that as media is an extremely powerful actor in modern democracies, we need to better understand the possibly negative impact of prevailing media sexism in leading democracies away from efficient and representative outcomes. Following this literature review will be a methodology and presentation of data used. Then, an analysis of the cross-sectional data and the case study data will be conducted before the conclusion.

4: Literature review and theoretical background

"Press coverage of women candidates is often biased and prejudicial and is not better than it was in 1884. The major consequence of this is not what most people would expect: that should a woman run, the press would make it less likely for her to win. The most important consequence is that the press coverage makes more women less likely to run" (Falk, 2008, p.14)

Women's political ambition and media sexism's potential impact on it is an understudied field. Although the negative effects of media sexism on women's political success is established in literature using case studies and experiments, the conclusions drawn focus on how voters will behave in response to media sexism. Some studies question if media sexism can impact whether women consider themselves competent to compete in politics, but the question is left unanswered — no study found by this author has attempted to link levels of media sexism with women's political ambition empirically. Although the primary objective of this study is to contribute to the literature on women and media by showing how media sexism could impact women's political ambition, the literature on women's political representation is discussed because media sexism could add to the variation in this field as well.

Although the literature on media sexism and women's descriptive representation — how many women are elected to parliaments (Wängnerud, 2009) — have not often been intersected, the theoretical expectations in this study are based on the literature surrounding a) women and media and specifically media portrayals of female political candidates, b) ambient, ambivalent and other relevant forms of sexism and c) women and elections. The following literature review will begin by providing the definitions of central concepts used in this study. Following this, the literature within these three categories will be presented to reveal the gap in the literature expressed in the introduction; a lack of cross-national studies on media sexism's potential impact on descriptive representation that this study hopes to contribute to filling. Then, a discussion of the theoretical framework of this study will be introduced, by summarising some of the main explanatory factors that are likely reducing women's political ambition.

4.1: Defining sexism, media and media sexism

While progression in women's rights across the globe today is higher than ever, many would argue that there has been a stagnation or indeed decrease in progression in especially the Western World the last decade or longer. It has been shown in 57 countries that sexism enables a gender unequal status quo to remain (Brandt, 2011). But what exactly is sexism?

Mills (2003) discusses how sexism is unique to each individual, and shaped by their interactions with others and power relations. Both in studying gender and media and gender and elections does social dominance theory (SDT) play a role in understanding the hierarchical positioning of women relative to men (Ezeifeka and Osakwe, 2013; Bradley-Geist et al., 2015; Glick et al., 2000; Sibley et al., 2007 and 2009; Fraser et al., 2015). SDT refers to the extent to which individuals prefer their societies to be organised according to hierarchies (Fraser et al., 2015). Swim et al. (1995) discuss how 'old fashioned' sexism is different from 'modern' sexism, which "is characterized by the denial of continued discrimination, antagonism toward women's demands, and lack of support for policies designed to help women" (p.199). Gill (2011) similarly discusses the myriad of new forms of sexism that replace the traditional forms, and thereby make it more difficult for new generations of feminists to avoid including backlash into their own rhetoric.

Clearly, then, the concept of sexism is one that cannot easily be grasped and is constantly changing (Gill, 2011). For this study, the definition of sexism by UNESCO (2012) will be used:

> "Supposition, belief or assertion that one sex is superior to the other, often expressed in the context of traditional stereotyping of social roles on the basis of sex, with resultant discrimination practised against members of the supposedly inferior sex" (p.54).

Especially in the age of internet, media itself becomes an incredibly broad concept. A majority of the literature focuses on traditional or 'old' media, while 'new' media is beginning to gain traction in more recent literature. This not only entails cyber news, but media in the form of film, video games, advertisement, social media and more (Edström and Mølster, 2014). Because of the data availability limitations of this study (discussed in the Methodology), only traditional forms of media will be included in this study: newspaper, television and radio media.

Just as with sexism, media sexism is difficult to define. Often, terms such as gendered media, media bias and the underrepresentation of women as the 'problem of media' are used instead of the concept media sexism. Edström and Mølster (2014) comment on the difficulty of defining media (what is included and what is not), and the different views on the definition of gender equality from qualitative (equal opportunities to shape society) and quantitative (equal distribution between men and women) points of view that must be considered when analysing gender in media. This thesis defines media sexism, with consideration to the issues of gender in media and the patterns of discrimination identified in the literature, as follows:

> *Media sexism is the mis- and underrepresentation of women (or all non-males) in media, creating a false portrayal of society via a gendered lens.*

This gendered lens is skewed by: an underrepresentation of women overall; gender stereotyping in the content of media; double standards whereby women in the news are valued for appearance, family status, age and more, and need to prove their viability in other contexts, whereas men are/ do not; a misidentification of women as unsuitable for the public (and therefore political) sphere regardless of gender equality policies. As discussed by the Global Media Monitoring Project (2010), women are more likely than men to be represented as students and homemakers in media, while in all other professions, men are more likely to be represented. These differences cannot simply be explained by the media mirroring the composition of societies. For example, the share of news subjects portrayed in Swedish media as politicians that are women is 19% (GMMP, 2010, p. 76); the share of women with seats in parliament is 44% (IPU, 2015) and 12 of the 23 ministers in Swedish government are women (Regeringskansliet, 2016). The following sections will explain how the literature so far has problematised media sexism, the focus on effects of media sexism and the lack of explanations of variations in it.

4.2: Women and media

The literature on women and media is newer than the literature on women and elections, and can be characterised by national case studies using content analysis or experiments. This section will explain the logic of counting in the literature, and discuss the variation in media sexism. Then, the case studies that show the negative effects of media sexism on women's political success will be presented. Finally, the mechanisms through which media sexism works in the literature will be identified with reference to media framing theories and mediatisation.

STRESSING COUNTING

Similar to the argument of the politics of presence, the politics of representation is a growing theme in media and gender research (GMMP, 2010). The literature on gender and media is ever-growing,

and tends to focus on counting heads in order to understand media sexism (Kahn and Goldenberg, 1991; Vos, 2013; GMMP, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010, 2015a; Mathews, 2007; Edström and Jacobsson, 2015; Rättvisaren, 2015). The theoretical reasons for doing so are well-argued as a way to empirically show that women are indeed still undervalued in media content, and is summarised as follows by Edström and Jacobsson (2015):

> "the symbolism the systematic underrepresentation of women in news media reveals: that women's realities, thoughts, worlds and conditions are still not fully counted in society … When this media continually undervalues women's opinions, thoughts and actions, this is in danger of being a restraining force that does not promote a democratic, sustainable and fair societal development … men continue to dominate news media. That is why we continue to count." (p.9 [self-translation])

The importance of understanding the impact of sexism in media through counting and underrepresentation is implied by the attention media coverage warrants in election observation. Election monitors, including the OSCE and the EU Election Observation Mission, often provide a media monitoring report alongside the election reports. For example, when reporting on the low success rate of women parliamentary candidates in the 2002 election in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the OSCE attributed this firstly to their low position on party lists and secondly to the fact that "the media coverage of women candidates was extremely poor: only 3% of the airtime on television and 1% for print media space was allocated to women candidates" (OSCE, 2003, p.18). The negative impact of media sexism on women in politics appears to be widely acknowledged.

Despite methodologies often focusing on underrepresentation, misrepresentation in media is not ignored. Aspects such as: women being shown as victims, full body photographs rather than head-shots, in specific contexts such as homemaker more than men (GMMP, 2010), a focus on viability of female candidates but on policy positions of male candidates (Kahn and Goldenberg, 1991), tacit reference to the sex and other personal attributes of female candidates that did not occur for male competitors (Ross and Comrie, 2012) and more (Heldman and Wade, 2011; Bromander, 2012; Edström and Mølster, 2014) can be found in the literature.

Variation in levels of media sexism is not a point that is stressed in the literature. As it is still a growing field, and is lacking in comparative studies, the focus overall in the literature is understanding the effects of media sexism rather than variation. However, several noteworthy comparative case studies have been conducted. For example, Carlin and Winfrey (2009) compare the media portrayals of Sarah Palin and Hillary Clinton and find that despite variations in *how* media sexism was used (for example, Palin being hyper-sexualised while Clinton was demonised for not trying to be appealing), both cases showed that media sexism strengthens the glass ceiling for women politicians. Falk (2008) compares the presidential campaigns of selected female candidates in America from 1872 to 2004 not only over time but against a comparable male candidate, but the overall (and disappointing) message is that media sexism has not varied over time. Newer studies point to the necessity for the literature to better understand variation in gendered media (Hayes and Lawless, 2015).

This variation clearly exists: within case studies based in American media and politics, the majority find that media sexism does have a negative impact on women candidates and politicians, while a handful of studies based on similar methodologies and samples find that men and women were treated the same by media (Lavery, 2013; Smith, 1997) or that differential media treatments had no impact on candidates (Hayes and Lawless, 2015). These studies would suggest that media sexism has greatly reduced over time, but the single case study format is not convincing, especially in light of the results found by Falk (2008). As the literature is composed mainly of case

studies, mainly in America, there has been no way to empirically test national explanations for variation in media sexism so far. However, even sub-national factors to explain variation are not stressed in the literature.

MEDIA SEXISM AND THE SUCCESS OF WOMEN POLITICAL CANDIDATES
There are several scholars showing the impact of media on the success of female candidates. Heldman and Wade (2011) show a connection between female objectification in the media and not only the inability of the US to reach gender equality in political representation, but directly linking it to the failure of female candidates. The literature tends to focus on the traditional media mediums of newspapers, periodicals and television news. For example, Lavery (2013) examines whether there is gender bias of local television news in covering candidates for the lower house in the US and Vos (2013) finds that women politicians in Flanders are given less television coverage than men. Kahn (1994) studies the newspaper coverage of campaigns for state office between 1982-8 and finds that media bias against women candidates existed and could get in the way of women's electoral success. Wasburn and Wasburn (2011) use the magazines Time and Newsweek to conduct a content analysis on media coverage of Sarah Palin. However, the Global Media Monitoring Project (2010) finds that "the underrepresentation of women in traditional news media has been carried over into the virtual news world" (p.x).

Typically, the literature in this category consists of case studies that either establish that media sexism was present in the case, or that it directly impacted the candidates' chance of success. Wasburn and Wasburn (2011) study the case of Sarah Palin's vice presidential campaign via studying the "patterns of gendered reporting that have … dissuaded women from entering politics" (p.1027). They identify five patterns: women candidates receive proportionally less coverage than male candidates; stories on female more than male candidates focus on aspects such as appearance and family; female candidates are more likely to be trivialised and scrutinised in terms of their competence; their policy positions in women's issues will be focused on whether this is the policy area they stand on or not; the potential influence a female candidate would have if she won is questioned. The only comprehensive survey of potential candidates in America indeed finds several of these areas (such as concern about balancing political and familial responsibilities and being credible as a candidate) explain why women are reluctant to pursue political careers (Fox and Lawless, 2004, p.265).

Others identify similar media sexism patterns (Lawless, 2003; Kahn, 1994; Carlin and Winfrey, 2009; Dan and Iorgoveanu, 2013; Anderson et al., 2011). Heldman et al. (2006) find that Elizabeth Dole's 2000 campaign for president of the United States was negatively impacted by the media giving her less coverage than male candidates that had much lower public support, referring repeatedly to an interview where her husband questions her chances of success and more. Bromander's (2012) cross-sectional study of politicians in Sweden found women to be punished more harshly during scandals, both in that their scandal is covered more thoroughly and that they are held to higher standards — similar conclusions are reached by Larris and Maggio (2012) and Wright and Holland (2014). Anderson et al. (2011) find that the media coverage of Liberian president Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf made her seem like a political novelty in comparison to her competitor, despite her considerable experience in the field far outweighing his as a retired footballer.

Although it has been empirically shown that women candidates can have an easier time attaining campaign contributions in America (Political Parity, 2015), the media often undermines female candidates by stating that they will have little actual power to produce results or get funding

(Wasburn and Wasburn, 2011, p.1028; Stout and Kline, 2011, p.499), and therefore create a false reality wherein women candidates do not have funding and should not receive further funding — a prime example of the production of sexism by media. In the case of Elizabeth Dole's presidential candidacy, the media repeatedly stated that she was not going to be able to fundraise sufficiently, despite the fact that she at the time had raised comparable funds to other candidates, and this coverage hampered her ability to attain more fundraising (Heldman et al., 2006). Lithgow (2000) shows how media sexism has not decreased in Asia, despite women having attained presidency more in Asia than any other continent by 2000. This suggests that media sexism against female politicians is not only a global issue, but one that does not go away when women are established in politics.

On its own, media can be an equalising tool: "media—particularly internet and web-based technologies—can teach civic skills, bolster future civic engagement and efficacy, and increase youth political interest and voter turnout" (Fox and Lawless, 2014, p.504). As mentioned there are some studies that find media sexism to be decreasing. However, even if some candidates in more recent elections, and in relatively gender equal societies, have not been subjected to sexist portrayals in media, this does not mean that a) all candidates in these countries are treated with gender neutrality by media, b) candidates in countries where media case studies are not typically conducted are similarly experiencing lower levels of media sexism or c) media in general is not still sexist — it is likely that all media, not just political media, is influential in shaping the world view of media consumers and thereby potentially impacting the level of political ambition among women.

THE MECHANISMS OF MEDIA SEXISM
Mechanisms to understand media sexism fall into several categories that can be better understood through theories in media literature. The first is 'media bias theory'. This theory is used by Lavery (2013) and states that media frames candidates in different ways according to gender, as well as ignoring and presenting data to the public in gendered ways (Lavery, 2013, p.878). The second is the 'gendered mediation thesis'. Ibroscheva and Raicheva-Stover (2009) explain this to mean that the media agenda is male-driven and gives privilege to male-as-norm within politics. Wright and Holland (2014) argue that the media was a gendered mediator when covering the famous speech by Australian former prime minister Julia Gillard in response to sexism she had been subject to, by framing the speech as an emotional, strategic and hypocritical attack rather than defence. Referring to media as a gendered mediator, Wright and Holland (2014) mean that certain roles are expected of people based on gender, and media puts women in a double bind as they must choose between acting in the feminine way they are expected to and portraying the 'masculine' trait of powerfulness (p.456). This study argues that media frames women in this manner both by reproducing norms seen in society, but also by (intentionally or not) producing gendered norms.

Thirdly, the theory of mediatisation refers to how "media impacts the power distribution in society because the actors in society, to increasing degrees — both individual people and institutions — adapt themselves to the media's way of working and thinking, and the conditions media sets" (Asp, 2011, p.151 [self-translation]). According to Schlehofer et al. (2011), the agenda-setting power of media can be linked to evaluations of political women. Aalberg and Strömbäck (2011) use mediatisation theory to argue the importance of media for politicians, and find that women MPs in Sweden and Norway are less willing or able to adapt to media logic, and therefore are under and misrepresented in media. Together, these three theories paint a picture whereby not only does media favour the existing hierarchy of society in deciding what is salient to the public and who should be shown in what way, it also has concrete impact on the development of society

and politics. It could then be argued that patriarchal forces within society, that ensure sexism of media exists, will by default contribute to a cycle whereby the barriers broken to allow women into the public sphere are undermined and society becomes less questioning of sexism.

With these three theories and the case studies discussed in mind, the main mechanisms identified in the literature can be summarised as follows. Media has the power to shape our realities and world views. Media can mirror sexism in society, by for example showing less women in the news categories where women are underrepresented in real life, and thereby strengthen the norms and values that exclude women from these roles. In democracies with women's rights legally upheld, this could limit women's ability to move past social barriers. Media can be sticky (GMMP, 2010), and continue to portray lower numbers of women in political and other public roles in society than is actually the case, reducing their visibility and therefore potential success in elections. By showing objectifying, stereotypical versions of women, media can signal that women and traditionally female characteristics are less suitable for politics, reducing voter's confidence in women. Eventually, politicians needing to adhere to media logic may also mean that political decisions are based on media framing that undervalues women candidates.

4.3: Relevant forms of sexism

Glick and Fiske (1996) "view sexism as a multidimensional construct that encompasses two sets of sexist attitudes: hostile and benevolent sexism" (p.491). Through the Ambivalent Sexism Inventory, Glick and Fiske (1996) argue that sexism can emerge as ambivalence towards women. On the one hand, benevolent sexism is "a set of interrelated attitudes toward women that are sexist in terms of viewing women stereotypically and in restricted roles but that are subjectively positive … and also tend to elicit behaviors typically categorized as prosocial (e.g., helping) or intimacy-seeking" (Glick and Fiske, 1996, p.491). On the other hand, hostile sexism is the traditional understanding of sexism as antipathy. This ambivalence has become an intrinsic part of sexism research, being used by Sibley et al. (2009), Fraser et al. (2015), Good and Rudman (2010), Bradley-Geist et al. (2015), Brandt (2011), Schlehofer et al. (2011), Fox et al. (2015). When analysing the impact sexism has on women candidates, it must be considered that different types of sexism can have different effects. Fraser et al. (2015) explain how benevolent sexism may help women in the short term but in the long term reinforces the idea that they are not suitable for certain roles in society. Sibley et al. (2009) note how benevolent sexism over time can reinforce hostile sexism against women. The interaction of benevolent and hostile sexism can be seen in media also, and is likely to be crucial in understanding media sexism in legally gender equal societies.

Bradley-Geist et al. (2015) conduct an experiment with the findings that observing sexism, i.e. themselves experiencing ambient sexism (p.29), decreases the career aspirations and self-esteem of the bystander, and that women are more affected by the bystander effect than men. Ambient sexism describes an indirect experience whereby sexism exists in an environment and individuals within this environment are negatively affected despite not being targeted directly by the sexism (Fox et al., 2015). Examples of arguments with similar logic are rife in the literature. Wasburn and Wasburn (2011) discuss how women can be discouraged from becoming political candidates when they see current women candidates appearing disproportionately often in photographs. An article by Fuller (2008) discusses the direct impact the sexism of the 2008 US presidential election had on 'millennial' women, interviewing women in their early and mid-twenties who state that the sexism they witnessed in the campaign media has made them consider to a larger degree how their own options and ambitions must be balanced by sexist backlash. The

bystander effect suggests that women who might otherwise have considered political candidacy who observe sexism targeting women in media may be less likely to aspire to a political career.

4.4: Women and elections

Women's political representation is a more developed research area, and this section will focus only on the aspects of variation in underrepresentation that interplay with political ambition and media. Despite the majority of countries in the world legally allowing women to vote and stand for elections (Womensuffrage.org, 2015), the extensive literature on women's descriptive and substantive representation shows that there are other obstacles. The amount of women representatives that are elected is a focus of most international organisations that study women's equality (African Development Bank Group, 2015; European Institute for Gender Equality, 2015; Social Watch, 2008; UNDP.org, 2015), and many studies theorise on the effects the number of women in elected positions have on societies (Ashe and Stewart, 2012; Wängnerud and Sundell, 2012; Towns, 2008; Wängnerud, 2000) as well as what societal factors are preventing the number of women from increasing (Sundström and Wängnerud, 2014; Stout and Kline, 2011; Dolan, 2010). As this study is on a cross-national scale, selected national level factors will be focused on, namely: the potential effects of sex stereotypes, social and political institutions, electoral systems and supply and demand theories on the underrepresentation of women.

Despite finding that the way men are covered by the media leads to a more positive response from voters, Kahn (1992) finds that sex stereotypes are favourable for women, as they appear more compassionate and honest. Sex stereotypes are found to be positive for women in terms of their social issues stances and leadership but negative for competence (Koch, 1999). Wasburn and Wasburn (2011) agree that while sex stereotypes can favour women, these same positive stereotypes can alienate voters, and the focus on female candidates' personality and other traits shadows their policy positions. "Even though stereotypes of women contain many positive traits, the positive traits relate to social-emotional, not agentic dimensions, so women are portrayed as being nice but incompetent at many important tasks" (Glick and Fiske, 1996, p.492). Many in the literature find that sex stereotypes can have an impact on representation, but that it does not necessarily have an impact (Dolan, 2010 and 2014; Hayes, 2011). It is therefore unclear how stereotyping will impact women's success as candidates, and the literature does not directly question how sex stereotypes will impact their willingness to run.

Many scholars theorise about institutional factors to explain why women are still at a disadvantage in elections despite their country accepting women candidates for decades, sometimes over a hundred years (Womensuffrage.org, 2015). Among the theories are that corruption over the long term leads to an exclusion of those not within corrupt networks — women politicians — causing them to suffer in terms of representation (Sundström and Wängnerud, 2014). Other sociocultural institutions, such as nationalism (Towns et al., 2014) and ethnic patronage (Arriola and Johnson, 2013), can reinforce traditional gender roles that counteract gender equality legislation. Women are not encouraged to run for office nor do they view themselves as qualified compared to equally qualified men (Fox and Lawless, 2004). Often, political gatekeepers are explained to be a central part of the problem (Hayes and Lawless, 2015; Cheng and Tavits, 2011), and necessary agents of change in order for the status quo (the male norm) to change (Fox and Lawless, 2014). Gatekeepers can also be seen as a main obstacle that electoral gender quotas can help women overcome (Dahlerup et al., 2013). Inglehart and Norris (2003) discuss how the structural, institutional and cultural barriers to women entering politics together can explain women's stagnation in political representation, although others argue that institutional theories

Graph 4.1: % Candidates female, elections in 2015

Country	%
Micronesia	0
Comoros	2
Oman	3
Saint Kitts and Nevis	5
Marshall Islands	5
Haiti	8
Sri Lanka	9
Tuvalu	9
Benin	10
Tajikistan	11
Myanmar	13
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	14
Nigeria	15
Afghanistan	16
Ethiopia	16
Tanzania	19
Singapore	19
Turkey	24
United Kingdom	26
Estonia	27
Burkino Faso	30
Canada	30
Lesotho	30
Trinidad and Tobago	30
Denmark	31
Andorra	32
Suriname	33
Greece	35
Switzerland	35
Venezuela	37
Finland	39
Croatia	41
Poland	42
Mexico	50

Note: Of all countries with data collected in this study, these countries had elections in 2015 and the graph shows the share of all candidates that were women.

alone are not sufficient for understanding political ambition (Fox and lawless, 2004). Inglehart and Norris explain that structural barriers, such as low development, hinder women from leaving traditional roles in favour of political careers. Political culture keeps the male norm from being overcome. Political institutions entail that the "rules of the game … explain systematic differences in women's representation across relatively similar types of society" (p.132).

Among these political institutions is electoral systems. Dahlerup et al. (2013) explain how women's chances differ depending on electoral system, which interacts with electoral gender quotas (such as how long it takes until quotas bring about the desired effect). Overall, the authors argue that "systems with large district magnitudes (those using multi-member districts) give parties the ability to present a more balanced list of candidates, in which women and men need not compete for a single post in the nomination process within a party" (Dahlerup et al., 2013, p.22). Wängnerud (2009) reinforces this statement: "One of the most stable results in empirical research is that the election of women is favored by electoral systems with party lists, proportional representation (PR), and large district magnitudes" (p.54). Cheng and Tavits (2011) discuss the difficulty Canadian female candidates can have, because their single-member district plurality electoral system means that nominating candidates is a "zero-sum game: if a woman is nominated, there is no possibility of nominating a man and vice versa" (p.463).

Women's political underrepresentation is often problematised as a supply and demand issue, where supply refers to how willing women are to enter (Norris, 1993; Ashe and Stewart,

2012; Arriola and Johnson, 2013). When explaining the low supply of women candidates in candidate emergence literature, a number of factors are typically suggested, such as incumbency advantage and few women in positions that make them eligible to candidacy, but women's lack of confidence in their eligibility despite qualifications is quickly becoming an obvious determinant (Fox and Lawless, 2004). Some argue that the male-centred political atmosphere and political socialisation dampen women's ambitions (Fox and Lawless, 2014; Ezeifeka and Osakwe, 2013), suggesting the overwhelming male norm of politics needs to change before women will be fully able to join. Many studies rigidly argue either for supply or demand: Ashe and Stewart (2012) in a case study on British Columbia, Canada find that women's underrepresentation was solely attributable to demand-side discrimination. However, corruption has been found to be a factor impacting the relationship both on the demand and supply side, blurring the distinction (Sundström and Wängnerud, 2014).

This study believes that media sexism is a factor mainly contributing to women's lack of political ambition, and therefore would have a greater impact on supply. This is because of studies finding that relatively gender equal countries do not vote according to gender bias (Hayes, 2011; Dolan, 2014). Potential women candidates may be put off political careers not only because of the obstacles to success seen in the literature described in this section, but also because of the bystander effect of media sexism, portraying women in political roles negatively or not portraying them at all. However, demand may be reduced by media sexism as well: gatekeepers affected by negative portrayals of women candidates may be less likely to seek women out and nominate women candidates. Therefore, both supply and demand of women in politics are potentially impacted by media sexism.

4.5: Where media sexism fits into the puzzle

Media sexism and women's political ambition may be an important piece of the puzzle in understanding why almost all democracies around the world at different stages of development and enforcement of women's rights experience low political representation of women. Media's representation of women is undoubtedly sexist. This has been shown time and again to limit the success female candidates have, without any studies testing if women are less likely to aspire to politics as a result. The bystander effect shows that career aspirations are negatively impacted by seeing sexism targeted at others; media, especially in the age of internet, is a way to showcase sexism to the world, and this study will test if women's political ambition is impacted by this.

Several factors have been successfully shown to contribute to women's political underrepresentation: corruption, electoral system, level of development, societal norms, structural, cultural and institutional barriers. It is not the aim of this study to suggest that media sexism would operate as a deterrent to women's political ambitions as strongly as these established factors limit their success. It is argued that media sexism acts partially as a conveyor of these factors. When gender unequal realities are revealed by the content of media, by for example overwhelmingly choosing to quote male experts, this may reinforce and strengthen these realities. In this capacity, media sexism reproduces sexism of other forms. However, it is argued that on top of the reproduction role, media sexism may have an independently produced impact on women's political ambition. The case studies on women in media show a distortion of reality, by making women seem less capable and less impactful than they are, overtime leading to their reduced influence as women absorb the information they receive and alter their long term behaviour accordingly.

5: Methodology

5.1: Research design

In order to answer the research question, four hypotheses are considered against the null of no relationship between media sexism and women candidates:

> *Hypothesis 1: As media sexism increases, the share of women candidates decreases*

This study proposes that media sexism could act differently from how literature has problematised other types of sexism, by being stronger as a deterrent to women's political ambition in contexts where official barriers to political entry are lower. Therefore, the independent variable of media sexism is interacted with development and women's rights variables.

> *Hypothesis 2: The relationship between media sexism and the share of women candidates will be stronger where women's rights are high*

> *Hypothesis 3: The relationship between media sexism and the share of women candidates will be stronger where development is high*

A number of data collection restrictions prevent the analysis from including a time-series aspect. Firstly, the Global Media Monitoring Project only has the selected media sexism indicators published in 2005 and 2010. Secondly, there is no time series dataset on the share of candidates by gender. Thirdly, different time periods between elections globally means it is difficult to match changes in candidacy over time with changes in media sexism. However, as a time component would significantly improve claims of causality, a small-scale case study of Sweden will be conducted. This case study is highly concentrated and includes only newspaper media regarding government ministers, members of parliament and political candidates. The case study is not a regression analysis but rather a precursor into the possibility of lagged effects of media sexism.

> *Hypothesis 4: In Sweden, the level of media sexism in one electoral period will be correlated with the share of women candidates in the next electoral period*

The global cross-sectional analysis is the main contribution of this study. It is an Ordinary Least Squares regression, where the dependent variable is the share of women candidates to parliament and the independent variable, media sexism, has seven measures tested in three sets of models. In the first set, the seven separate indicators of media sexism are tested in bivariate and multivariate models against the dependent variable. In the second set, the independent variable is interacted with women's rights and in the third, development. This section begins by explaining the decision to not combine media sexism indicators into one index and to test interaction models. Then, a description of all variables will be given; the dependent and independent variables are also evaluated. The power and limitations of the study is discussed before the case study is explained.

SEVEN MEDIA SEXISM INDICATORS

There are two main reasons for not combining the media sexism indicators into one index, both of which would undermine construct validity. Firstly, the possibility of the different indicators having

different relationships with the dependent variable. Secondly, a desire to not dilute results by allowing high media sexism of one indicator to be masked by medium or low media sexism of the other indicators. An abstract concept requires construct validity in order to be meaningfully measured (Popescu, 2011; Thomas, 2010; Adcock and Collier, 2001; Carmines and Zeller, 1979). If indicators included in an index relate in different ways to relevant variables, such as the dependent variable and control variables selected, then the index created will not have construct validity (Carmines and Zeller, 1979). A lack of construct validity is a valid concern, used to critique established indices like the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators (Thomas, 2010).

An example of why construct validity may be a concern for an index of the media sexism indicators presented below can be seen by indicators 1) and 6). 1) gives the share of all news subjects that are women: as seen in the literature review, the more women are seen in the news, the better. The dummy variable 6) measures whether women news subjects are more likely to be shown in photographs while male news subjects are more likely not to be shown in photographs: when women are disproportionately shown in photographs, this makes them appear less serious and devalues their cognitive skills. When 6) shows that women are disproportionately shown in photos, it may occur simultaneously as women overall are being shown more in the news — indeed, the desire to sell papers could make newspapers favour women news subjects in order to use their image (Murray, 2008). Including both 1) and 6) in one index will therefore not properly display media sexism.

INTERACTION MODELS

The relationship between media sexism and women's political ambition does not exist in a vacuum. Sibley et al. (2007) interact their measure of sexism with right wing authoritarian values, finding that being high in right wing authoritarianism meant that sexism in one time period had a stronger impact on sexism in the next. Brandt (2011) finds that "sexism is more prevalent in countries that are less developed and have more gender inequality" (p.1416). However, this study assumes that media sexism specifically will be less of a deterrent to a political career if there are stronger deterrents in society. In other words, where women's rights and development are low, there are many strong deterrents in society that make women unlikely to consider political careers. In these countries, media sexism will be relatively unimportant in impacting women's political ambition. In countries without official barriers to women's political entry, the media could be one institution that does not change, and media sexism may impact women's political ambition. This study therefore finds it necessary to consider the possibility that media sexism's impact on women's political ambition is stronger where women's rights and development is high.

The following formulas explain the bivariate models in the three sets that will be analysed:

Set A: $Sh\_Wo\_Can = a + b_1 MS + e$

Set B: $Sh\_Wo\_Can = a + b_1 MS + b_2 Z_1 + b_3 (MS)(Z_1) + e$

Set C: $Sh\_Wo\_Can = a + b_1 MS + b_2 Z_2 + b_3 (MS)(Z_2) + e$

where: Sh_Wo_Can=the dependent variable of the share of women candidates to parliament; MS=the independent variable of indicators of media sexism; Z_1=an interaction variable measuring women's rights; Z_2=an interaction variable measuring development.

5.2: Operationalisation, selection and evaluation of variables[1]
MEDIA SEXISM
The patterns of media sexism discussed in the literature review are what the ideal study would compare cross-nationally. However, the only relevant global media sexism data produced in the world is the Global Media Monitoring Project (GMMP). The GMMP has been producing data once every five years since 1995, the most recent one in 2015. GMMP is a project that aims to improve ethical journalism and promote equality (GMMP, 2010). Although not all media sexism patterns are measured by GMMP, the following seven indicators from the 2010 GMMP report, which includes observations from 108 countries globally, are used[2]:

1) the share of all news subjects that are women
2) the share of all news subjects in the topic area of politics and government that are women
3) the share of all news subjects in the occupational group of politician that are women
4) the share of all news subjects portrayed in the function of expert that are women
5) the difference between the share of all news subjects mentioned by family status that are women minus men
6) a dummy variable for whether women are more likely to be shown in newspaper photographs and men are not more likely to be shown in photographs
7) the difference between the share of all stories that reinforce gender stereotypes minus challenge them

   The GMMP reports recruit nationally located coders, trained in the coding guidelines, to code one specific day of news in their country — the 2010 report shows results for news on the 10th of November 2009, a day chosen because any world event that may skew countries' results could be taken into account (GMMP, 2010). Countries' codings are weighted to account for country and population size (GMMP, 2010, p.61). For this study, the 2010 report is used because media sexism is the independent variable and as such should not be collected after the dependent variable — as the dependent variable is based on election years, not enough elections would have occurred following the 2015 GMMP report, and not all indicators of interest were published in the 2015 report. Although it is impossible for this study to definitively establish direction of causality between media sexism and women's political ambition, according to David Hume's idea of cause and effect: "(1) cause and effect must occur close together in time (contiguity); (2) the cause must occur before an effect does; and (3) the effect should never occur without the presence of the cause" (Field, 2009, p.13). Conditions 1 and 2 require the 2010 report to be used instead of 2015.

   The seven indicators above are chosen because they best represent the patterns of media sexism identified in the case study literature on women candidates. Heldman et al. (2006) explain the negative impact being shown less than male candidates had on U.S. presidential candidate Elizabeth Dole. The potentially harmful impact of gender stereotypes is shown to get in women's way in election media (Bromander, 2012; Heldman et al., 2006; Fox and Lawless, 2004). Family status being tied to women candidates shows women's identity as tied to family, not political careers (Murray, 2008; Dolan, 2014; Wasburn and Wasburn, 2011; Anderson et al., 2011). The role women are shown in (for example, in political stories, as experts or as politicians, quoted rather than shown visually) impacts what media consumers can know about women and how important they are perceived to be (Rättvisaren, 2015, p.6). These aspects are not all-encompassing to the

---

[1] Because of the low number of observations, several interesting controls are not used in the main models. See Appendix 3 for models including these controls.

[2] Indicators 5-7 are computed from the original indicators provided in GMMP (2010, p.66-107).

patterns identified in the literature; however, GMMP does not produce indicators for all aspects of media sexism.

Some scholars discussed in the literature review bring up the importance of distinguishing effects of hostile and benevolent sexism in measuring sexism, but media sexism contains elements of both that cannot be distinguished. According to Sibley et al. (2007), benevolent and hostile sexism are interrelated and exist in unison. Questioning women political candidates' viability and ability to make impact is one example of how media sexism can be hostile, while showing women more often than men in terms of their family relationships and linking them to women's issues is an example of how it can be benevolent. As there are theoretically grounded reasons for selecting the seven indicators chosen, the empirical study will be a necessary departure for future studies with more fine-tuned global media sexism indicators. However, despite selecting indicators based on literature and with hostile and benevolent sexism in mind, there is not previous comparative empirical research to base the indicator selection on. Therefore, all indicators must be tested to provide insight for future research.

SHARE OF WOMAN CANDIDATES
In a global cross-sectional study, women's political ambition cannot be directly measured in the way that case studies in the literature have measured it: via survey and experimental data. The share of candidates to the lower chamber of parliament is used as a proxy for political ambition for three main reasons. Firstly, the share of seats in the lower chamber is the standard measure in the related field of women's descriptive and substantive representation (Wängnerd, 2009). Therefore, if women's political representation and electoral success is best measured by how many seats women have in the lower house of parliament, the share of candidates to this chamber is an appropriate gauge for women's political ambition. Secondly, this measure is comparable across national settings, unlike other political candidates. Thirdly, other elected positions, for example ministers or presidents, will have much fewer candidates than parliaments do overall.

The data for the variable is collected primarily from the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU). Countries with elections between the years 2012 and 2015 are included if their lower chamber is elected via direct elections. If a country had more than one election to the lower house in this period, the more recent election is used. Missing values are found on national government websites, national electoral commission websites or through election reports by organisations monitoring or observing the election. Appendix 1 presents six countries where the data was used in the analysis but was irregular (for example, the candidates for the lower chamber are not separated from the candidates for the upper chamber, but both chambers were elected directly) and provides further details into the sources of data not found via IPU.

The measure is not perfect. Firstly, "Female candidates are more likely than men to report having been recruited to run for office, suggesting that without outside encouragement and support for a candidacy, they will be less likely than men with comparable backgrounds to emerge in the electoral arena" (Lawless, 2003, p.78). Secondly, certain countries that reserve seats for women do not require candidates for these seats to be publicly elected (Dahlerup et al., 2013, p.26). It would be more representative of political ambition to be able to see how many women put themselves forward, but this may not be possible in a comparative study without the introduction of a world-wide qualitative survey of parliamentary candidates.

SHARE OF WOMEN IN THE LOWER HOUSE[3]
As seen in the literature review, it is common to argue that women become more politically engaged when they see more women represented in parliaments. Therefore, the first control variable to consider is the share of women in the lower house. This variable is collected from the IPU, and reflects "information provided by National Parliaments by 31 December 2010. 188 countries are classified by descending order of the percentage of women in the lower or single House" (IPU, 2010).

ELECTORAL SYSTEM
Electoral system is the second control variable that will be considered. Although it is not usually linked with women's political ambition, it is heavily argued and controlled for in the literature regarding factors that improve women's ability to be elected (Dahlerup et al., 2013; Murray, 2008; Sundström and Wängnerud, 2014). The variable is collected from the Quality of Government (QoG) dataset, and reflects the World Bank's Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al., 2001). The variable is a dummy that reflects whether or not the majority of seats in directly elected parliaments are elected via proportional representation or plurality.

WOMEN'S RIGHTS
The literature uses a myriad of different techniques and variables to measure gender equality in society. This study chooses a simple additive index of three variables reflecting women's social, political and economic rights. These three variables are collected from the QoG dataset, and reflect the data from The Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Database (Cingranelli and Richards, 2010). The three variables are ordinal variables where 0 reflects the lowest, and 3 the highest, women's rights in the respective area, as of the year 2010. The additive measure created reflects 0 for lowest women's rights in all categories, and 9 reflects the highest score in each of the component parts. Although this is a fairly blunt instrument, it is meant to give the general level of women's rights in society and therefore measure similar aspects to for instance gender equality culture (Sundström and Wängnerud, 2014) and cultural, structural and institutional indicators of gender equality (Inglehart and Norris, 2003).

In the interaction models in Set B, a dummy is created out of the women's rights variable. A value of 0 in this dummy is given to countries that have below the midpoint of the rights scale (below 4.5) and a value of 1 to countries above the midpoint.

DEVELOPMENT
The UNDP's Human Development Index (HDI) measures health, wealth and education (Malik, 2013). The variable reports HDI levels in 2010 and is collected from the QoG dataset. It is chosen as a control variable because GDP, development levels generally, health and education are all important considerations in the literature on women's political representation (Brandt, 2011; Sundström and Wängnerud, 2014). The HDI variable is logged before being used in the models, to correct for being abnormally distributed. In the interaction models in Set C, HDI is used without being logged.

CORRUPTION
Wängnerud's (2009) review of the most important studies in women's representation points to several studies that empirically prove the relationship between corruption and the share of women

---

[3] Share of women in parliament is not highly correlated enough with the share of women candidates to be considered a proxy: the Pearson correlation between the two variables is 0.683.

in parliaments, although "the causal direction of the relationship is not clear" (Wängnerud, 2009, p. 58). It is important to control for whether corruption is significant also in relation to women candidates. The variable chosen reflects freedom from corruption as of 2010 (Heritage Foundation, 2014) and is from the QoG dataset. Just as with HDI, corruption is logged to improve normality of distribution.

MEDIA ACCESS
Koch (1999) and others discuss the impact media has as a spreader of information in election times. If media is not accessible to many within the population, media sexism will not have a strong pull on women. The variable for media access expresses the percentage of the population with access to media in 2012, and is taken from the Varieties of Democracy dataset.

5.3: Power and limitations of the methodology
Although a panel data study would have allowed for confidence in asserting causality, a cross-sectional study will contribute to filling the literature gap of empirically testing if media sexism impacts women's political ambitions in the first global study of its kind. Using quantitative methods was necessary in order to produce a global study, but it does mean that the study cannot account for subnational factors that are considered important in many of the case studies in the field, such as differences between municipalities and party politics, nor study the production and reproduction aspects of media sexism separately. A qualitative content analysis of media would have allowed for a more nuanced understanding of media sexism, but not allowed for an understanding of the impact this has on women candidates globally. Overall, a cross-sectional study is a necessary contribution to the literature, and the results of experimental studies and case studies would not be as applicable to other cases and future studies. Furthermore, as the next section shows, a small-scale case study of media sexism and women's political ambition in Sweden is conducted in addition to the main empirical analysis.

Although the GMMP 2010 report collected data for 108 countries, when used in models with the data collected from other sources, only 58 observations remain. As no other media sexism variable is available, this could not be avoided. Arguably, GMMP's individual country coding relies on too small of a sample to be fully representative of the entire media of that country — however, the Swedish GMMP sample results were in line with extremely comprehensive studies by Swedish media organisations (Edström and Jacobsson, 2015, p.35). Similarly, IPU did not provide information for candidates for all countries in their data. Where possible, this information has been found elsewhere, but this introduces more possibility of error into the data collection.

For the goal of testing the effect of media sexism on women's political ambition, the design is appropriate. The interactions that will be conducted are tested for development variables and women's rights. This ensures that the study has tested several avenues with the data available to understand if, and under what conditions, media sexism has a negative impact on the level of women candidates. Therefore, despite the limitations, the study believes that if significant relationships are found when controlling for the variables described above and using three sets of models (one without interactions, one interacting with development and one with women's rights), a correlation between media sexism and women's political ambition is supported.

5.4: Case study
There are two reasons this study includes a case study on Sweden. Firstly, the patterns of media sexism identified in the literature review not accommodated for in the GMMP reports are important

aspects of media sexism. By conducting coding on a selection of newspaper articles in Sweden's most widespread newspaper, Aftonbladet (Mediekompass, 2014), these additional measures of media sexism can be incorporated into the study. Secondly, as a time series study was not possible for the main analysis, the case study allows for testing the media sexism indicators over time in the case of Sweden.

Sweden is chosen because it is one of the most gender neutral countries with the highest women's development score (Edström and Jacobsson, 2015; UNDP.org, 2015). Aalberg and Strömbäck (2011) find that gender differences in relationships between media and MPs are smaller in Sweden than in Norway — they find also that gendered political reporting in particular is low in Scandinavia. Indeed, Sweden has the highest proportion of women in the news out of the Nordic countries and 7% more women than the global average (Edström and Jacobsson, 2015, p.23). 34% of politicians in Swedish news are women versus the global average of 18% (Edström and Jacobsson, 2015, p.37). Therefore, if a relationship between media sexism and share of women candidates is found in Sweden over time, a time dynamic relationship is likely to exist globally.

As the case study is a supplement to the main analysis, and not an empirical analysis, the material to be coded has been limited. Other case studies in the literature have conducted content analyses of periods ranging form a month to two years (Mathews, 2007; Ibroscheva and Raicheva-Stover, 2009; Anderson et al., 2011), while GMMP codes a variety of media for one day. This case study will instead be coding only newspaper front pages, articles mentioning politicians or candidates and political ads in Aftonbladet. The date two weeks, one week and one day before an election are selected for each of the ten elections between 1979 and 2010. If the argument made in Hypothesis 4 holds, then the media sexism in time period 1 will impact the number of women candidates to the election in time period 2. Therefore, the share of women candidates are found for the ten elections 1982 to 2014. The indicators corresponding to the GMMP indicators are coded according to the GMMP guidelines, while the additional indicators are coded according to how similar measures or concepts are discussed in the literature. More information about this coding can be seen in Appendix 2. The following indicators are collected in the case study:

A. the same indicators 2-7 from GMMP (1 is excluded as only political news are considered in the case study)
B. the difference between the share of women news subjects that are shown in a passive rather than active role minus male
C. the share of female news subjects in the occupation of politician presented as novelties
D. the difference between the share of female news subjects whose appearance is focused on minus male
E. the difference between the share of political advertisements showing specific female news subjects minus male
F. the difference between the face-to-body ratio of women photographed minus men
G. the difference between the number of female news subjects in the occupation of politician shown on the front page minus male
H. the share of female news subjects in the occupation of politician discussed mainly or only in reference to women's issues
I. the share of female reporters
J. the difference between the share of female news subjects in the occupation of politician referenced by first name when their full name or title is not given minus male
K. the difference between the share of female news subjects in the occupation of politician whose potential impact or viability in politics is questioned minus male

The indicators are chosen because of their importance in the literature. Women are often portrayed in ways that make them seem passive in the events described in media (UNESCO, 2012; GMMP, 2010; Edström and Mølster, 2014), which is in contrast to perceptions of leadership (Kahn, 1994). Presenting women candidates as novelties, by for example focusing on that they are the first woman candidate for a position, makes them appear as though they are trespassing into a male role (Heldman et al., 2006; Anderson et al., 2011). When political advertisements, made by parties or candidates themselves, choose to focus on male candidates, this can contribute to stereotyping gender roles (UNESCO, 2012). A focus on appearance can make the candidate seem less serious and therefore less of a viable political choice (Wasburn and Wasburn, 2011; Murray, 2008; Larris and Maggio, 2012; Heldman et al., 2006; Anderson et al., 2011). The face-to-body ratio describes the percentage of a person's photograph showing their face (Mathews, 2007); a lower face-to-body ratio of women depicted in intellectual occupations (such as politics) is an objective measure of media's decision to highlight women's cerebral qualities less than men's (Mathews, 2007; Konrath et al., 2012).

Women are often disproportionately shown in media regarding women's issues (Dolan, 2010), such as health care, education, family, elderly and child care (Heldman et al., 2006) and even welfare policy and equality (Wängnerud, 2000)— this can lead to a strengthening of cleavages between male and female roles in politics (Towns, 2003). The share of women reporting the news is a focus in many media sexism organisations, which suggest that women reporting the news strive to decrease the underrepresentation of women (GMMP, 2010; UNESCO, 2012). When women are referred to by their first name or Ms/Mrs while men are referred to by their full name or job title each time they are mentioned, this becomes a subtle way to frame the woman as not fully belonging in her professional role (Anderson et al., 2011; Bromander, 2012; Ibroscheva and Raicheva-Stover, 2009; Carlin and Winfrey, 2009). Whether female or only male politicians are shown on the front page signals how important they are (Heldman et al., 2006). Questioning women's competence, viability as a politician or ability to get enough funding or votes in a way that is not done for men also suggests women do not belong in the political sphere (Murray, 2008; Anderson et al., 2011, Heldman et al., 2006).

The relevant studies focusing on language and discourse (Anderson et al., 2011; Ezeifeka and Osakwe, 2013; Mills, 2003) provide a solid argument for looking deeper into sexism than just numbers. Heldman et al. (2006) argue the importance of "the tone of the coverage. Our expectation is that some of the most important gender differences in coverage may be subtle and involve the differential use of language" (p.319). This is why it is considered necessary to include media sexism indicators that are subjective, in that they include the author's subjective considerations of how language and images are used to undermine or dismiss women in political news stories. However, this introduces bias. The case study is therefore only an indication of the potential long term relationship that future research might find; the results of the case study should not be considered a confirmation of a long term relationship or lack thereof, but an indication of what the long term relationship may be.

6: Empirical analysis and results

The following analysis will test empirically if a relationship between media sexism and women's political ambition exists, and then discuss this in terms of the bystander effect and the production and reproduction mechanisms media sexism is hypothesised to work through. Should the analysis yield that a relationship exists, the hypotheses presented in the Methodology predict it will be negative.

Additional questions need answering in terms of the possible impact media sexism has on women's political ambitions. This section will first examine the validity and reliability of the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) models produced. The results will then be presented and discussed in three separate subsections. The results of the case study will then be discussed before all results are summarised.

6.1: Validity and reliability

The OLS models made in this study will only be reliable and valid if the OLS assumptions are met. Each subheading below shows how the models meet the assumptions. OLS diagnostics for models in all three sets can be seen in Appendix 5.

LINEARITY

A linear relationship is seen in all three sets. However, the number of observations in the models is only 58. This is much lower than desirable, and reduces the ability to see clearly an obvious linearity.

OUTLIERS

There are no outliers in the models in Set A or B. In Set C, Tunisia is a near outlier, so models are tested both with and without Tunisia.

MULTICOLLINEARITY

Multicollinearity, measured by Tolerance values below 0.200 and VIF values above 5.000, is not seen in Set A or C. This ensures that the variables included are not highly correlated, and all variables can therefore be included. However, Set B does experience multicollinearity in the variables that are being interacted — that is, between the media sexism indicator, development and women's rights. Some multicollinearity between variables that contain the same base variables is expected, but since multicollinearity is not seen in the interaction variables in Set C, it may imply that models in Set B are less trustworthy than those in Set A and C.

NORMALITY OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF ERRORS

All three sets show normality of errors. As the histogram in Appendix 5 shows, the mean is close to 0 and standard deviation close to 1, with a normal bell curve being seen.

HOMOSCEDASTICITY

In order for the assumption of homoscedasticity to be met, the distribution of errors around the predicted values for the dependent and independent variables cannot show a pattern and must centre around 0. The scatterplots in Appendix 5 shows no pattern in the residuals in any of the three sets, and therefore homoscedasticity is met.

6.2: Set A
CORRELATION BETWEEN MEDIA SEXISM AND SHARE OF WOMEN CANDIDATES

One out of the seven media sexism indicators reveals a negative relationship with the share of women candidates that holds up to all relevant controls and supports Hypothesis 1. The following regression table, Table 6.1, shows the OLS models of the media sexism indicator for the share of news subjects portrayed in the role of expert that are female (MS4). Appendix 4 shows the models with other media sexism indicators (from Sets A-C), where it can be seen that certain indicators are significant in bivariate models or with only a few but not all controls. The fact that other indicators did not retain significance throughout the models could be because women in news are often shown in a more negative light than men, as seen in the literature. The media sexism indicators report only the share of women in media in different roles, and do not pick up on subtle differences in portrayal. Although only one out of seven indicators are significant, there is little help from the case study literature in selecting what indicators of media sexism will be useful for empirical

Table 6.1: MS4 (Share of news subjects portrayed as Experts that are female)

	Bivariate	2	3	4	5	6	7
MS4 (expert)	0.482***	0.348**	0.336**	0.316**	0.334**	0.343**	0.337**
	(0.130)	(0.109)	(0.095)	(0.097)	(0.102)	(0.102)	(0.102)
Women in lower house		0.578***	0.456***	0.409**	0.360*	0.374**	0.347*
		(0.108)	(0.098)	(0.111)	(0.134)	(0.135)	(0.137)
Electoral system			-9.468***	-9.340***	-9.362***	-9.317***	-8.679***
			(2.179)	(2.187)	(2.199)	(2.203)	(2.266)
HDI (logged)				4.342	1.117	4.070	0.975
				(4.766)	(6.847)	(7.592)	(8.037)
Women's rights					0.600	0.992	0.878
					(0.910)	(1.008)	(1.010)
Freedom from corruption (logged)						-3.902	-5.291
						(4.301)	(4.456)
Media access							0.126
							(0.110)
Constant	15.301***	6.823*	14.119***	17.046***	13.316*	26.554	22.098
	(3.143)	(0.38)	(3.123)	(4.422)	(7.195)	(16.275)	(16.685)
R²	0.198	0.473	0.610	0.616	0.619	0.625	0.635
N	58	58	58	58	58	58	58

*p<.1, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Standard errors in brackets.

Note: OLS models for the basic, linear relationship between media sexism (expert indicator) and the share of women candidates with control variables added.

analysis; it is unlikely that share of experts is the only aspect of media sexism that will impact women's political ambition in reality.

The first model in Set A is the bivariate model including only the independent variable of MS4 and the dependent variable of the share of women candidates. On its own, MS4 explains 19.8% of the variation in the share of women candidates. A 1% increase in MS4 correlates with a 0.5% increase in the share of candidates that are women. The relationship is significant at the 99.9% confidence level (there is less than a 0.001% chance of the relationship not existing). Adding controls shows this relationship to continue being significant but at the 99% level, and with a lower coefficient: when including all the controls, a 1% increase in MS4 correlates with a 0.3% increase in the share of women candidates. MS4 and all controls together explain 63.5% of the variation in the share of women candidates.

Interestingly, not all of the controls are shown to be significant. This could be because the controls are based on what is seen in the literature to impact the success of women candidates, not women's political ambition. The only control selected based on the literature expecting it to impact women's willingness to run is the share of women with seats in parliament. Women in the lower house has a significant correlation (although the level of significance decreases from 99.9% to 90% when all controls are added) with the share of women candidates, and the correlation is positive, suggesting that with 1% more women in the lower house of parliament, 0.4% more women are willing to run as candidates. The results in these models act according to the expectation that seeing women in power will increase political ambition. This adds an interesting development to the survey based study by Fox and Lawless (2005), which finds that young people have lower political ambition when they belong to groups historically excluded from politics, because this finding suggests that the historical lack of belonging as a disincentive to running could decrease as more people have overcome the historical exclusion.

Electoral system retains a significance level of 99.9%, and is therefore highly significant throughout all models. As electoral system is a dummy variable, where a proportional representation (PR) system receives a value of 0, the models corroborate the literature on women's representation in politics by suggesting that women are better served in PR than plurality systems. The standard errors for electoral system, logged HDI and logged freedom from corruption are noticeably high. This is a problem common in models with low observations. Possibly, had there been more observations, the standard errors would have been reduced and perhaps control variables had greater significance. Although HDI, women's rights, corruption and media access are not significant, with the exception of corruption the coefficients prescribe the expected relationships.

Although there is no way with the current study to test this assertion, it is possible that corruption would have a positive rather than negative effect (and therefore, freedom from corruption a negative rather than positive effect) on women's political ambition. The literature finds that corrupt systems exclude women, and therefore reduce their chances of winning elections. However, these corrupt systems may mobilise women to try to change the system. In other words, women living with high quality of government and low corruption may feel less inclined to break gender norms by aspiring to political careers than women living under high levels of corruption. This study has no premise to test this theory, and indeed the idea that seeing corruption mobilises people to act against corruption has been argued to be incorrect because knowing the high extent of corruption can disillusion people from feeling it can be fought (Bauhr and Grimes, 2013).

Share of women in parliament and electoral system are the only significant control variables in the models. What this suggests is that the factors explaining women's political ambition

differ from the factors explaining their political success; i.e., that demand and supply of women candidates have different determinants. This alone is an interesting finding that deserves further exploration. Women's willingness to run is a different animal entirely from women's success when they do run. Firstly, there can be no assumption of perfect information: women outside of the political system are unlikely to know what their chances of success in politics are. As has been discussed, many studies have found women to have low levels of candidacy even where they have high rates of success when they do compete politically. Therefore, even if the political arena is in fact positively inclined to elect women, this will not necessarily translate to women deciding whether to pursue political careers. Secondly, and relatedly, factors that impact political ambition may have little to no impact on voters. Informal institutional factors, such as media sexism and socialisation, could have a greater impact on personal decision making than on evaluations of others — indeed, this has been suggested (Fox and Lawless, 2005). However, there is not scope in this study to solidify these claims.

Overall, the models in Set A do not contradict Hypothesis 1, because they suggest a negative relationship between media sexism and women candidates. Although only one media sexism indicator was significant when including all control variables, this does not mean that the other indicators are not important. It could mean that the other media sexism indicators are only significant over time, or that this study has not identified the most important aspects of media sexism. Both are likely, as media sexism is sticky (GMMP, 2010) and there is no previous study of this kind to aid in understanding which indicators specifically can be influential for women's political ambition. As women are shown more in the prominent role of expert in media rather than for example in terms of their personal experience or being an eye witness, they are shown as authoritative rather than passive. This variable measures both the production and reproduction aspects of media sexism depending on the country. In countries where women are established in the workforce, with upward mobility, a low share of women experts as news subjects reflects the media producing sexism, in showing society in a more gender segregated way than reality. In countries where women are instead not present in paying jobs, a low share of women experts as news subjects reflects media reproducing sexism, in reinforcing the gendered makeup of the society. In both cases, the bystander effect helps to understand why women seeing media include authoritative, expert female voices could translate into a feeling of belonging in powerful roles in society, such as politics. Models in Set B and C test if media sexism acts differently in different country contexts.

6.3: Set B
MEDIA SEXISM AND WOMEN'S RIGHTS INTERACTION

Two media sexism indicators have a relationship with share of women candidates that holds up in women's rights interaction models even when all controls are added, but this relationship is stronger where women's rights are low, the opposite of what Hypothesis 2 expected. Each media indicator is interacted with a dummy created for high and low women's rights in turn, and both MS4 (the expert indicator) and MS6 (a dummy for whether women are more likely to be shown in photos than not, and men are more likely not to be shown in photos) retain significance even when all controls are included in the model. As mentioned, there is some multicollinearity in the Set B models: the models using MS4 exceed the VIF value of 5.000 and are below 0.200 tolerance. However, the models do not fail the more lenient interpretation of multicollinearity that only requires VIF values to remain below 10.000 and tolerance values to remain above 0.100. Only the variables

involved in the interaction term (i.e., MS4 and women's rights) do not pass the stricter test, and therefore the models are still considered trustworthy.

As seen in Tables 2 and 3 respectively, MS4 and MS6 are positive while the interaction terms, MS4_rights and MS6_rights, are negative, and all are significant. Therefore, the models show that the level of women's rights impacts the effect media sexism has on the share of women candidates, as predicted by the hypothesis. As women's rights has been transformed into a dummy, when women's rights are high (above the midpoint of the women's rights scale), the equation discussed in the methodology must be considered as follows when determining the impact of media sexism on the share of women candidates:

when women's rights=0, Share of women candidates=a+b$_1$MS+e

when women's rights=1, Share of women candidates=a+b$_1$MS+b$_2$+b$_3$MS+e
=(a+b$_2$)+(b$_1$+b$_3$)MS+e

Beginning with Table 6.2, the bivariate model including only MS4, the women's rights dummy and the interaction term multiplying the two is significant. Therefore, a 1% increase in MS4 corresponds to a 0.6% increase in the share of women candidates where women's rights are low. Where women's rights are high, a 1% increase in MS4 corresponds only to a 0.1% increase (0.569-0.463) in the share of women candidates[4]. Without any controls, it is therefore very clear that the level of women's rights changes the impact media sexism has on women's political ambition according to indicator MS4. However, the hypothesis was that where women's rights are low, there are too many other factors hindering women from running that media sexism alone will not be important. Instead, the models in Table 6.2 show that where there are low women's rights, MS4 has a stronger impact than where women's rights are high. This could mean that the reproduction role of media sexism is stronger than the production role in these models: when media reproduces sexism in society, it is acting as a mirror to society, and a low share of women experts in the news would simply be reflecting the low share of women experts in society. Although this contradicts Hypothesis 2, it is a logical outcome when considering that these media sexism indicators are somewhat blunt: they cannot separate the production from the reproduction effect of media sexism, and therefore cannot determine where media sexism is a conveyor of sexism in society versus when media sexism is skewing reality by showing a more sexist society than what is the case. The hypothesis refers equally to the production and the reproduction effect, but the results seem to show that when interacting media sexism with women's rights, the reproduction effect may be stronger.

Also unexpectedly, as more controls are included, a 1% increase in MS4 corresponds to a lower share of women candidates in countries with high women's rights, but a higher share of women candidates in countries with low women's rights (models 3-6). This, although not predicted by the hypothesis, is in line with the literature and the definition laid out by this study. Media sexism is not simply about underrepresentation of women, but also misrepresentation of women. Women in media are more likely to be shown in ways non-conducive to inspiring women consuming media, including being sexualised, trivialised and patronised. It could be that in countries where there are

---

[4] The impact of women's rights in the bivariate, Table 6.2: moving from low to high women's rights corresponds with a 19.8% increase in the share of women if MS4 is 50%. If MS4 is 0, moving to high women's rights corresponds with a 20.0% increase.

Table 6.2: MS4 Women's rights interaction

	Bivariate	2	3	4	5	6
MS4 (expert)	0.569***	0.467**	0.537***	0.536***	0.539***	0.538***
	(0.140)	(0.130)	(0.106)	(0.111)	(0.111)	(0.116)
Women's rights dummy	20.038**	11.706*	17.737**	17.674**	17.956**	17.900**
	(6.052)	(6.010)	(4.969)	(5.462)	(5.488)	(6.083)
MS4_rights	-0.463*	-0.366	-0.623**	-0.622**	-0.635**	-0.633**
	(0.249)	(0.229)	(0.190)	(0.192)	(0.193)	(0.207)
Women in lower house		0.463**	0.297*	0.297*	0.330**	0.330**
		(0.133)	(0.112)	(0.113)	(0.120)	(0.122)
Electoral system			-11.170***	-11.164***	-11.151***	-11.134***
			(2.053)	(2.082)	(2.088)	(2.252)
HDI (logged)				0.169	4.050	4.004
				(5.853)	(7.481)	(7.827)
Freedom from corruption (logged)					-2.989	-3.018
					(3.572)	(3.841)
Media access						0.002
						(0.112)
Constant	8.401*	4.734	12.003***	12.115*	24.082	24.010
	(3.352)	(3.230)	(2.926)	(4.862)	(15.109)	(15.601)
R²	0.397	0.509	0.687	0.687	0.691	0.691
N	58	58	58	58	58	58

*p<.1, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Standard errors in brackets.

Note: OLS interaction models where media sexism (expert indicator) is interacted with a women's rights dummy.

low women's rights, women are mobilised from simply seeing women in agentic roles in media, such as seeing women experts. However, in countries where women have high rights, it may not be enough to see women in the news, women may instead have to also be presented as equally powerful as men in the news. Therefore, it is unclear if Hypothesis 2 is supported or not, but what is clear is that media sexism acts differently when women's rights are high versus low.

Overall, the controls in Table 6.2 act as they did in the models in Set A, seen in Table 6.1. Share of women with seats in parliament and electoral system are significant and suggest that more women in parliament and a PR electoral system are favourable for women candidates. HDI and media access are not significant, but the signs are consistent with the expectations from literature: higher development and greater share of the population with access to media is linked, though not through significant coefficients, with the share of women candidates. Corruption acts as in the Set A models.

Table 6.3: MS6 Women's rights interaction— without outlier Tunisia

	Bivariate	2	3	4	5	6
MS6 (photo)	8.769*	8.425*	6.177*	5.942*	6.143*	6.421*
	(3.881)	(3.549)	(3.019)	(3.172)	(3.254)	(3.231)
Women's rights dummy	21.406***	13.413**	12.765**	12.092*	12.089*	11.376*
	(4.054)	(4.396)	(3.695)	(4.506)	(4.547)	(4.537)
MS6_rights	-16.186**	-14.027**	-11.511**	-11.401*	-11.416*	-12.617**
	(5.372)	(4.952)	(4.194)	(4.253)	(4.291)	(4.342)
Women in lower house		0.461**	0.304*	0.301*	0.319*	0.294*
		(0.136)	(0.119)	(0.121)	(0.133)	(0.133)
Electoral system			-10.250***	-10.194***	-10.146***	-9.150***
			(2.152)	(2.182)	(2.206)	(2.304)
HDI (logged)				1.673	3.272	0.708
				(6.293)	(7.869)	(8.021)
Freedom from corruption (logged)					-1.344	-3.254
					(3.904)	(4.113)
Media access						0.156
						(0.114)
Constant	14.231***	9.030**	17.896***	18.985**	24.150	19.340
	(2.744)	(2.943)	(3.095)	(5.152)	(15.880)	(16.127)
R²	0.367	0.481	0.641	0.641	0.642	0.656
N	57	57	57	57	57	57

*p<.1, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Standard errors in brackets.

Note: OLS interaction models where media sexism (dummy, photo indicator) is interacted with a women's rights dummy.

In Table 6.3, a similar situation unravels for MS6. In the bivariate, it can be seen that without controlling for relevant factors, moving from a coding of 0 to 1 in the dummy MS6 corresponds to an 8.8% increase in the share of women candidates in countries with low women's rights — unexpected, as the literature shows that being disproportionately often shown in photographs harms women in political careers and female candidates. However, in countries with high women's rights, moving to a coding of 1 in MS6 corresponds to a 7.4% decrease (8.769-16.186) in the share of women candidates[5]. The control variables in Table 6.3 act in the same manner as in Table 6.2, and will therefore not be discussed again. Noteworthy for Table 6.3

---

[5] The impact of women's rights in the bivariate, Table 6.3: moving from low to high women's rights corresponds to a 5.2% increase in the share of women candidates when MS6 is 1, and to a 21.4% increase when MS6 is 0.

is that the models are run without Tunisia in the sample. This is because Tunisia was found to be an outlier (see Appendix 5). However, the models run with Tunisia can be seen in Appendix 4.

What was the case in models 3-6 in Table 6.2 is the case for all models in Table 6.3: high women's rights mean that MS6 has a negative impact on the share of women candidates, while low women's rights mean that MS6 has a positive impact on the share of women candidates. This again is inconclusive in terms of whether it supports Hypothesis 2. It may be that being visible at all, even disproportionately in photographs, is positive in contexts where women are often not seen at all, and that the negative effects of being shown disproportionately often in photos in media only becomes negative for women in contexts where women have relatively more power in society. For example, women in the more secular 'Western world' are perhaps more likely to be shown in highly sexualised ways in mainstream media than in other areas of the world: as being objectified in media is strongly argued to negatively impact women's ambition (Gill, 2011), this could help explain why being disproportionately shown in photos is only negative for women's political ambition where women's rights are high.

6.4: Set C
MEDIA SEXISM AND DEVELOPMENT INTERACTION

The models in Set C interact with HDI, and show that media sexism as measured by MS6 has a negative relationship with the share of women candidates only in developed countries, but a positive relationship in developing countries: as Hypothesis 3 expressed that media sexism would have a greater impact in developed countries, it is unclear if the hypothesis is supported by the data. HDI ranges from values between 0 and 1, and is therefore continuous rather than dichotomous. When discussing in this section developed and developing countries, it is not a distinction between all observations in the sample grouped into a low and high development category; instead, it is a hypothetical distinction between countries with no development and full development (unless otherwise stated).

Just as for the models in Table 6.3 of Set B, the coefficients for the independent variable and interaction terms in all models in Set C lead to an overall negative relationship between MS6 and the share of women candidates in developed countries. In the bivariate model of Table 6.4, it can be seen that moving from a coding of 0 to 1 of MS6 corresponds with a 27.0% increase in the share of women candidates in developing countries, but a 14.7% decrease (27.004-41.717) in the share of women candidates in developed countries[6]. This change from women disproportionately shown in photos being positive for share of women candidates in developing contexts but negative in developed contexts is assumed to work through similar mechanisms as when this relationship occurs in the Set B women's rights interaction models. That is, without high development women are less able to take on non-traditional gender roles, and therefore seeing women in any way represented in media is positive for encouraging women's political ambition. When there is high development, women must instead see women in media represented in gender equal ways relative to men in order to be encouraged by it, and therefore seeing women disproportionately photographed is discouraging rather than encouraging.

As there is no country in the sample, or indeed the world, that has no development or full development, it is useful to contextualise the models with what are more realistic development

---

[6] The impact of HDI in the bivariate, Table 6.4: a one unit increase in HDI corresponds to a 14.7% increase in the share of women candidates when MS6 is 1, and to a 56.4% increase when MS6 is 0.

Table 6.4: MS6 HDI interaction

	Bivariate	2	3	4	5	6
MS6 (photo)	27.004*	25.679*	22.959*	23.213*	23.809*	26.099*
	(12.107)	(10.837)	(9.579)	(9.772)	(9.904)	(9.766)
HDI	56.375***	33.513**	30.685**	29.378*	32.861*	25.799*
	(11.639)	(12.024)	(10.624)	(12.979)	(14.594)	(14.791)
MS6_HDI	-41.717*	-36.942*	-34.231*	-34.570*	-34.905*	-38.741**
	(16.614)	(14.917)	(13.169)	(13.428)	(13.537)	(13.404)
Women in lower house		0.508***	0.401**	0.389**	0.403**	0.346*
		(0.134)	(0.121)	(0.140)	(0.143)	(0.144)
Electoral system			-9.209***	-9.219***	-9.140***	-8.117**
			(2.289)	(2.312)	(2.332)	(2.349)
Women's rights				0.175	0.385	0.285
				(0.979)	(1.061)	(1.039)
Freedom from corruption (logged)					-2.586	-4.587
					(4.820)	(4.840)
Media access						0.210*
						(0.116)
Constant	-11.953	-6.928	2.172	2.427	8.100	6.369
	(7.903)	(7.193)	(6.733)	(6.946)	(12.679)	(12.434)
R²	0.318	0.464	0.591	0.592	0.594	0.620
N	58	58	58	58	58	58

*p<.1, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Standard errors in brackets.

Note: OLS interaction models where media sexism (dummy, photo indicator) is interacted with HDI.

levels. The mean level of HDI in the variable used in this study is 0.676, the highest 0.94 and the lowest 0.32. The following calculations refer to the equation introduced in the Methodology section should the value of Z be exchanged for 0.676, 0.94 and 0.32 respectively. Moving from a coding of 0 to 1 in MS6 therefore corresponds to a 1.2% (27.004-41.717(.676)) decrease for observations with mean HDI; a 12.2% (27.004-41.717(.94)) decrease for observations with maximum HDI; and a 13.7% (27.004-41.717(.32)) increase for observations with minimum HDI. Using realistic values of high and low development rather than 0 and 1 reveals the same relationship and suggests that MS6 interacts negatively with the share of women candidates only when development levels are high. Hypothesis 3 is therefore not contradicted.

Just as in the models of Table 6.1 in Set A and Tables 2 and 3 in Set B, women in parliament and electoral system are significant, although electoral system is slightly less significant throughout the models in Table 6.4 than in the first three. The other controls, women's rights and

corruption, again are not significant, and the direction of the relationships they point to (again, without significance) are the same as in the other sets of models.

Interestingly, media access becomes significant in the final model. It has a small positive relationship, whereby a 1% increase in the population with media access corresponds to 0.2% higher share of women candidates. Although media access was included in the models to ensure that controlling for media access would not override the impact of media sexism (because if people are not exposed to media, women cannot be influenced by media sexism when deciding career choice), it is interesting to see that in this set of models, greater media access can be a positive factor for women's political ambition. This is indeed an encouraging finding, as many in the literature bring up the potential media has to be a positive force for gender equality (Edström and Mølster, 2014; Schlehofer et al., 2011; Koch, 1999). If greater media access correlates with more women running for parliament, the possibilities for increasing the supply of women candidates by decreasing media sexism seem very promising.

6.5: Case Study

The Swedish case study allows for exploring possible long term effects and alternative measures of media sexism. The case of Swedish women representatives is one that can, according to Freidenvall (2013), be divided into three time periods. First, from women's suffrage to 1971 is the period of the "obligatory woman" (p.103), where parties felt like as long as there was one token woman on their list they were making enough effort to incorporate women. Second, the "51 percent minority" (p.105) refers to the time period between 1972-1993 when gender equality was salient in the electoral movements. Thirdly, 1994 to present time is the "every other one for the ladies" (Freidenvall, 2013, p.113) period, where a realisation that women's progress was not on a strictly upward moving path led to more concrete methods to break institutional norms.

The case study begins in the second phase. The share of women candidates to the Riksdag (Swedish parliament) increases overall from 36.2% in 1982 to 45.2% in 2014. The media sample is collected and coded for 1979 to 2010, since it is assumed that media sexism in one electoral period will correlate with the share of women candidates stepping forward in the next. The graphs presented therefore give candidate share in time t+1 but media sexism indicators at time t. The values for each of the three days coded (2 weeks, 1 week and 1 day before the election) is averaged to give a final value per indicator per election. The 2010 Global Media Monitoring Project (GMMP) measures for MS2-MS7 used in the empirical analysis can be compared to the case study measures in the table below. Although this shows that the measures are significantly different, the case study sample is limited to political news stories only. The case study results are not appropriate for analysing empirical data, but rather to guide discussion.

	MS2	MS3	MS4	MS5	MS6	MS7
Case study	34.45%	32.17%	32.38%	5.11%	0	13.41%
GMMP	30%	19%	24%	11%	1	56%

Graph 6.1 shows that the trends for MS2, MS3 and MS4 (representing the share of news subjects in political stories, shown in the occupation of politician and shown as experts that are women respectively) are positive over the ten election period (t). This suggests that these three indicators show a decrease in media sexism at a much greater slope than the increase in share of women candidates in the ten election timeframe (t+1). Graph 6.2 shows that the trends for MS5, MS6 and MS7 (whether women news subjects are identified more by family status than men, more likely to be shown in photographs while men are not and whether stories are more reinforcing of

Graph 6.1: MS2 (% news subjects in political stories women), MS3 (% news subjects portrayed as politician women), MS4 (% news subjects portrayed as experts women)

Graph 6.2: MS5 (% news subjects family female — male), MS6 (dummy: women more likely in photos than without but men not), MS7 (% stories reinforcing gender stereotypes — challenging)

Graph 6.3: MSB (% passive news subjects female — male), MSC (% women politician news subjects 'novelty'), MSD (% news subjects focus on appearance female — male)

Graph 6.4: MSE (% ads specific female news subjects — male), MSF (face-to-body ratio female — male), MSG (women politicians on front page — men)

Graph 6.5: MSH (% women politicians discussed only in reference to women's issues), MSI (% female reporters)

Graph 6.6: MSJ (% politician news subjects first name female — male), MSK (% politician news subjects viability questioned female — male)

gender stereotypes than challenging of them respectively) are all decreasing in the time period, also suggesting lower media sexism over time.

Graph 6.3 shows negative trends for MSB, MSC and MSD (whether women are shown more passively; if they are shown as novelties; if their appearance is focused on more). Graph 6.4 shows positive trends for MSE and MSG (political ads showing women minus men; women candidates on the front page minus men) but a slightly negative trend for MSF (face-to-body ratios women minus men). Graph 6.5 shows positive trends for MSH and MSI (women's issues being the focus when discussing women candidates; share of female reporters). Graph 6.6 shows negative trends for MSJ and MSK (first name used women minus men; impact and/or viability questioned). Therefore, all graphs show a decrease in media sexism over time, in all indicators except MSF; i.e., media sexism only increased in that women's bodies became more focused on with time while men's did not. Although Hypothesis 4 cannot be confirmed or truly tested against the data collected, it cannot be rejected either. As media sexism decreased over time, the share of women candidates shows a slight upward trend.

However, the sample is ripe with overtly sexist media throughout the ten election periods, suggesting that the measures have not been effective in capturing tones, language and other aspects of media sexism. For example, two weeks before the 2010 election, there is an interview with Centre party leader Maud Olofsson. The headline is a quote from the interview: "My first love was a mommas boy", and the caption underneath reads "Somewhere around the middle of the interview it happens. Suddenly the tears come. Minister of Enterprise and Innovation Maud Olofsson cannot keep her feelings in check when her grandmother is brought up. 'Grandmother taught me to NEVER let a man control me'" (Aftonbladet archives, 5 September 2010, p.22-23 of the sunday extra paper, [self-translation]). Of course, male politicians have interviews with the purpose of understanding their personal attributes as well, but it seems unlikely that Fredrik Reinfeldt would have such intimate and emotional questions focused on. In fact, the same day (p. 20-21 of the normal issue) the caption for a similar story about Reinfeldt and Mona Sahlin give the following headlines: "She: likes to hang out with her girlfriends", "He: loves hot dogs in all forms". Perhaps more nuance would have been detected with measures targeting language and themes.

Had the case study been collected for time periods before 1979, perhaps more variation in the share of women candidates would have been seen. However, some variation — including the first case of a decrease in women's representation since 1928 (Freidenvall, 2013, p.97) — does occur in the time period selected. Similarly, as has been noted, political media is the most gender neutral in Sweden, and Sweden has among the most gender neutral media in the world. Therefore, the sample in the case study was tough. The fact that no definitive correlations in variation (instead of only the overall trend) can be seen in the graphs does not mean that media sexism and the share of women candidates do not have a longitudinal relationship, but this case study alone certainly does not provide strong enough evidence.

6.6: Summary of results

Overall, the research question — whether there is a link between media sexism and the share of women candidates — has been answered in the affirmative, though more research must be conducted. The analysis in certain regards has posed more questions than answered. Will the relationships seen strengthen or weaken with a larger set of observations? What is the impact of corruption on women's political ambition, and could this interplay with media sexism? Would the relationships found in the regressions hold up in the long term, and with other media sexism

indicators not explored in this study? How can distinctions between production and reproduction effects of media sexism aid in confirming or contradicting the results?

The empirical analysis yielded results in support of Hypotheses 1: the basic, non-interaction OLS regression showed a relationship between media sexism and the share of women candidates in one of the media sexism indicators. The evidence for Hypotheses 2 and 3 was not conclusive, even if the results could be understood theoretically to showcase that women's rights and development levels being high means that women cannot be misrepresented, and being low means that women cannot be underrepresented, in media if women's political ambition is to be spurred on. The null hypothesis could, however, definitively be rejected as all three sets of models showed at least one media sexism indicator to be significantly correlated with the share of women candidates.

Meanwhile, the case study could not provide strong evidence for Hypothesis 4, but did provide a basis for the importance of a longitudinal study of media sexism's impact on women's political ambition, both on a case study and comparative level. The overall trends of media sexism measured did have the appropriate direction relative to the increase in women candidates, but there was not enough variation nor was the time span long enough to give any meaningful empirical evidence.

7: Conclusion

"What is presented in the mass media progressively and rapidly transforms into the truth … it morphs into the 'reality' around us, even when this 'reality' is far removed from our daily lives … Given the role of gender-unfair, gender-imbalanced news as a constitutive element in the maintenance and reinforcement of a social imaginary that excludes, discriminates against and subordinates women, we will subsequently, also to an equal measure, adopt behaviours, actions and attitudes that exclude, discriminate and subordinate." (GMMP, 2010, p.37)

To investigate media sexism and women's political ambition is to deal with a perturbing truth about democracies worldwide: gender equality in political representation cannot be achieved through changing policy without also changing mindsets. In order to best serve the interests of peoples in a democracy, these peoples must be represented (Fox and Lawless, 2005). Any factor reducing women's representation, both in media and politics, must be understood in order to aid in bringing about positive change in democracies. Women have been legally allowed into the political sphere but are still shut out from, and considered less valuable within, it. This paradox may be fuelled by the incessant reiterations of sexism found in media.

The results of this cross-sectional study answer the research question in support of the claim that media sexism has a negative relationship with women candidates using indicators gauging what share of experts in the news are women and whether women are more likely to be shown in photographs while men are not, holding up to national controls. Significant models were seen both without interactions and when testing interactions between media sexism and women's rights, and media sexism and development. This study has been the first cross-sectional study to problematise media sexism as one factor explaining the persistence of low women's political ambition. The diagram below sums up the basic cycle; the results and theory laid out by this study help to explain how sexism, portrayed through media and produced by media, can lead to lower levels of women's political ambition. The rest of the cycle needs to be extrapolated on in future research to understand the full story.

At a glance, progress seems to be had in terms of reaching gender equality in politics, but there are several instances where the opposite can be said. Guinea-Bissau went from 20% women in parliament in 1988 to 10% in 2010 (EU EOM, 2014b, p.45) and Pakistan from 16 women winning general seats in 2008 to 6 in 2013 (EU EOM, 2013a, p.45). In the 2006 Bosnia and Herzegovina parliamentary election, women were placed high up on party lists because of an adherence to new electoral quotas, yet women received only half the number of seats as in the previous election largely because they were given no space in election campaign media (OSCE, 2007). Tokenism is defined as "a subgroup making up less than 15% of the whole group" (Towns, 2003, p.7) — for democratically elected lower houses of parliament then, women are still tokens in 37% of countries as of 2016 (IPU, 2016). This study has taken this unsettling phenomenon as a point of departure, and the results support the claim that media sexism, portraying sexism in society and directly adding to sexism in society, could contribute by reducing the supply of eligible female candidates.

Despite gains in gender equality officially, social norms play a role in keeping women's political representation low. "There is currently a lack of empirical research on how signals from institutions other than political parties may constitute a hindrance for the advancement of women to political posts." (Sundström and Wängnerud, 2014, p.3). Fox and Lawless (2004) point out the lack of explanations for what brings about women's lower self-perceived qualification and why they are less likely to be encouraged to enter politics (the two strongest factors explaining women's political ambition in their survey results). The results of this study suggest that one explanation is media sexism.

This study has argued that media sexism, both by producing and reproducing sexism in society, is a hindrance to women's political representation because the bystander effect ensures that women consuming media in societies across the world see themselves as less suitable for politics. Portraying women politicians and candidates, and indeed women in general in the news, in a way that gives them less agency, less credibility or simply less space ensures that women considering candidacy must also consider if they are willing to break a norm that officially has already been altered to include them.

7.1: Recommendations for future research

Media sexism is a global issue, and its consequences need to be more fully delved into. This study found evidence for a negative relationship between media sexism and women's political ambition. However, many questions remain unanswered — such as whether the relationship holds up over the long term. Media sexism comes in many shapes and sizes that have not been explored sufficiently. Specifically, this study leaves the following recommendations.

The most important is continued efforts to understand what aspects of media sexism specifically influence women's political ambition. Certain studies have looked into how media portrays men and women differently when covering scandals (Larris and Maggio, 2012; Bromander, 2012), or found results that suggest political polls in media systematically underrate women (Stout and Kline, 2011). Specific measures depending on the type of media medium may be necessary because of differences in how women are portrayed in for example cyber media, video games and TV (Edström and Jacobsson, 2015) — measures such as women being interrupted more often than men in TV news can be compared cross-nationally, even if it is not comparable across other types of media. Media sexism can be operationalised partially as the gender composition of the newsrooms and other media leadership (Edström and Mølster, 2014). As mentioned, the tone and language of media may reveal more nuance of media sexism.

Although the cross-sectional design gave great insights in this study, future research needs to investigate thoroughly how media sexism impacts women's political ambition in panel data. This could also help to establish causality, and to determine whether the cycle laid out in the diagram above can be tested empirically. However, there are more insights to be gleamed from further investigation cross-sectionally, and on the sub-national level. This is because of the inability of the present study to incorporate several interesting control variables.

National level control variables that need to be included in future research are, most importantly, electoral gender quotas and attitudes towards women politicians. For this study, variables measuring these factors greatly reduced the already low number of observations and therefore could not be included. However, the World Values Survey variable on whether men make better political leaders than women do and the Atlas of Electoral Gender Quotas data could add to future research by showing how media sexism varies with public opinion of women politicians as well as how women candidates are promoted by quotas.

Additionally, different levels and stages of democracy could interplay in the relationship (Dahlerup et al., 2013; Ibroscheva and Raicheva-Stover; 2009). Gender empowerment indices, as previously used to understand national-level sexism and gender gaps in educational attainment (Sibley et al., 2007) could also prove influential in understanding women's political ambition and therefore alter the impact media sexism has on ambition. How long women have been legally able to stand for elections could be an influential factor to include. Finally, the possibility of intersectionality between media sexism, racism, ageism, homophobia and more mean that the results found in this study could be extrapolated upon to understand the multiplicative effect of biased media on candidates with intersecting characteristics that are historically discriminated against in politics.

On the sub-national level, the most important consideration is party politics. How parties vary on the left-right scale according to female participation and gender quotas (Dahlerup et al., 2013) and how party identification influences gender group voting (Winfrey et al., 2014) are interesting considerations for comparing how media stands up against party identification as an explanation for lower female representation and potentially lower women's ambition.

7.2: Policy implications

As media sexism has been shown in this study to have a negative relationship with women's political ambition, it is important to consider what various actors can do to reduce media sexism and the impact it has. Media institutions can improve from within, but advocacy and lobbying from outside of media is an important motivator (GMMP, 2010).

The most obvious policy implication is to continue using legislation that improves the chances women have of being elected, and that ensures they have equal power as male representatives. The results of this study show that more women in parliament encourage more candidates to step forward, which can circumvent the negative impact of media sexism. Overtime, assuming that the production of sexism by media (portraying sexism regardless of actual level of sexism in society) does not increase, having a more gender equal distribution of power within politics and all areas of public life will decrease the reproduction of sexism by media (mirroring the sexism in society). However, men must also take on the challenge of being partners in this effort. "It would be impossible to envisage or discuss, let alone adopt, quotas to enhance women's participation in politics without [men]." (Dahlerup et al., 2013, p.36).

However, policy intervention into the content of media or elections is a sensitive issue. People generally are reluctant to accept affirmative action policies (Fraser et al., 2015; Swim et al.,

1995). Likewise, even in Sweden, a country known to make strong efforts towards gender equality, politicians are reluctant to promote any policy involving media that could be considered a breach of freedom of speech, even if quotas on gender content of media have had some success in certain contexts (Edström and Mølster, 2014). Government intervention in media to reduce sexism would have difficulty in justifying itself. Therefore, it is important for other actors to get involved to take a bottom-up approach to decreasing media sexism.

Firstly, women's networks and media 'watchdog' organisations can be extremely efficient in reducing media sexism. For example, the KVINFO network in Denmark gathers information regarding women experts in a wide range of areas, and is a resource for media when an expert is needed (Edström and Mølster, 2014). Rättvisaren (2015) is a Swedish organisation that monitors media content across the country and offers their services to journalists and newsrooms on ways to be more inclusive and less stereotypical for gender and race as well as providing an expert list. In America, Name it Change it works to "identify, prevent, and end sexist media coverage of federal and gubernatorial women candidates, elected politicians, and high-profile public officials of all races. We monitor coverage by all members of the press—from bloggers to radio hosts to television pundits" (Larris and Maggio, 2012, p.1), and teaches media outlets about reversibility (if they would not say it about men, they should not say it about women) and parallelism (if they would not depict other discriminated groups in this manner, they should not depict women in this manner) among other things (p.3-5).

Secondly, and more importantly, media needs to change from within. Even if media cannot be expected to reduce their role in reproducing sexism that already exists in society, media can and should take responsibility for reducing their role in producing sexism. The simplest way to do this is to use the services offered by organisations such as those named above. Media actors can also create their own realistic goals if they focus on counting: by measuring gender composition of stories, experts and more, over the long term this can reduce gender differences in *how* men and women are represented as well (Edström and Jacobsson, 2015). Improving the gender composition of newsrooms and media boardrooms can also over time improve gender neutrality of news output (Ibroscheva and Raicheva-Stover, 2009). Often, media will give the excuse that following the recession, as well as generally during a trend towards social media and away from traditional media, gender goals cannot be achieved while focusing on keeping reader/viewership high, but this has been shown to be incorrect in several settings (Edström and Mølster, 2014).

7.3: Final remarks

In their Citizen Political Ambition survey data, Fox and Lawless (2004) found that young women showed more interest in politics but young men were more engaged in activities that were likely to lead them to campaigning themselves later on (p.268). They find that self-perceived qualification to run and encouragement to run are the most important considerations for women running (p.273) — media could give that encouragement or do the opposite. It may be that the normalisation of media sexism, and the continued lack of voice women are given, contributes to disturbing developments such as that in France, where even the highly successful current head of the IMF, Christine Lagarde, has joined forces with French women politicians from all parties to fight the rampant, sometimes violent sexism that continues to be commonplace within the confines of the French parliament (Willsher, 2016). However, perhaps this should be seen as a representation of the power women have to fight against sexism. "Our research shows the sexist attack doesn't have to be egregious to have a negative impact. But calling attention to the sexism does have an impact— a positive one." (Larris and Maggio, 2012, p.13).

Bibliography

Literature

Aalberg, T., and Strömbäck, J., 2011. Media-driven Men and Media-critical Women? An Empirical Study of Gender and MPs' Relationships with the Media in Norway and Sweden, *International Political Science Review*, 32(2), p.167-187

Abramson, J., 2016. This may shock you: Hillary Clinton is fundamentally honest, The Guardian. [online] 28 Mar. Available at: <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/mar/28/hillary-clinton-honest-transparency-jill-abramson?CMP=fb_gu> [Accessed 29 Mar 2016]

Adcock, R., and Collier, D., 2001. Measurement Validity: A Shared Standard for Qualitative and Quantitative Research, *American Political Science Review*. [online]. Available at: <http://journals.cambridge.org.ezproxy.ub.gu.se/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=93859&fileId=S0003055401003100> [Accessed 4 Mar 2015]

African Development Bank Group, 2015. Empowering African Women: An Agenda for Action — African Gender Equality Index 2015. Abidjan: Development Bank

Anderson, J., Diabah, G., hMensa, P., 2011. Powerful women in powerless language: Media misrepresentation of African women in politics (the case of Liberia), *Journal of Pragmatics*, 43(2011), p.2509-2518

Arriola, L., and Johnson, M., 2013. Ethnic Politics and Women's Empowerment in Africa: Ministerial Appointments to Executive Cabinets, *American Journal of Political Science*, 58(2), p.495-510

Ashe, J., and Stewart, K., 2012. Legislative recruitment: Using diagnostic testing to explain underrepresentation, *Party Politics*, 18(5), p.687-707

Asp, K., 2011. Mediernas prestationer och betydelse: Valet 2010. Kållered: Intellecta Infolog

Bauhr and Grimes, 2013. Indignation or Resignation: The Implications of Transparency for Societal Accountability, *Governance*, 27(2), p.291-320

Bradley-Geist, J., Rivera, I., Geringer, S., 2015. The Collateral Damage of Ambient Sexism: Observing Sexism Impacts Bystander Self-Esteem and Career Aspirations, *Sex Roles*, 73(2015), p.29-42

Brandt, M., 2011. Sexism and Gender Inequality Across 57 Societies, *Psychological Science*, 22(11), p.1413-1418

Bromander, T., 2012. POLITISKA SKANDALER! Behandlas kvinnor och män olika i massmedia?, PhD, Linné University

Carlin, D., and Winfrey, K., 2009. Have You Come a Long Way, Baby? Hillary Clinton, Sarah Palin, and Sexism in 2008 Campaign Coverage, *Communication Studies*, 60(4), p.326-343

Carmines, E., and Zeller, R., 1979. *Reliability and Validity Assessment*. Chapters 1, 2, 4. [online]. Available at: <http://srmo.sagepub.com.ezproxy.ub.gu.se/view/reliability-and- validity-assessment/SAGE.xml> [Accessed 4 Mar 2015]

Cheng, C., and Tavits, M., 2011. Informal Influences in Selecting Female Political Candidates, *Political Research Quarterly*, 64(2), p.460-471

Dahlerup, D., Hilal, Z., Kalandadze, N., Kandawasvika-Nhundu, R., 2013. Atlas of Electoral Gender Quotas. Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance

Dan, V., and Iorgoveanu, A., 2013. Still On the Beaten Path: How Gender Impacted the Coverage of Male and Female Romanian Candidates for European Office, *The international Journal of Press/Politics*, 18(2), p.208-233

Dolan, K., 2014. Gender Stereotypes, Candidate Evaluations, and Voting for Women Candidates: What Really Matters?, *Political Research Quarterly*, 67(1), p.96-107

Dolan, K., 2010. The Impact of Gender Stereotyped Evaluations on Support for Women Candidates, Political Behavior, 32(1), p.69-88

Edström, M., and Jacobsson, J., 2015. Räkna med kvinnor: Global Media Monitoring Project 2015. Gothenburg: JMG, Work report nr. 73

Edström, M., and Mølster, R., 2014. Making Change: Nordic Examples of Working Towards Gender Equality in the Media. University of Gothenburg: Nordicom

European Institute for Gender Equality, 2015. Gender Equality Index 2015: Measuring gender equality in the European Union 2005-2012. Italy: European Institute for Gender Equality

European Institute for Gender Equality, 2013. Review of the implementation of the Beijing Platform for Action in the EU Member States: Women and the Media. Luxembourg: European Institute for Gender Equality

Ezeifeka, C., and Osakwe, N., 2013. Gender representation in the 1999 Nigerian constitution: A critical discourse analysis for socio-political equity, *Discourse & Society*, 24(6), p.687-700

Falk, E., 2008. Women for president : media bias in eight campaigns. Urbana: University of Illinois Press

Field, A., 2009. Discovering Statistics Using SPSS (3rd ed). London: Sage

Fox, J., Cruz, C., Lee, J., 2015. Perpetuating online sexism offline: Anonymity, interactivity, and the effects of sexist hashtags on social media, *Computers in Human Behavior*, 52(2015), p.436-442

Fox, R., and Lawless, J., 2014. Uncovering the Origins of the Gender Gap in Political Ambition, *American Political Science Review*, 108(3), p.499-519

Fox, R., and Lawless, J., 2005. To Run or Not to Run for Office: Explaining Nascent Political Ambition, *American Journal of Political Science*, 49(3), p.642-659

Fox, R., and Lawless, J., 2004. Entering the Arena? Gender and the Decision to Run for Office, *American Journal of Political Science*, 48(2), p.264-280

Fraser, G., Osborne, D., Sibley, C., 2015. "We want you in the Workplace, but only in a Skirt!" Social Dominance Orientation, Gender-Based Affirmative Action and the Moderating Role of Benevolent Sexism, *Sex Roles*, 73(2015), p.231-244

Fuller, B., 2008. Election shows this generation of women that sexism is still alive, *Advertising Age*, 79(34), p.4-90

Gill, R., 2011. Sexism Reloaded, or, it's Time to get Angry Again!, *Feminist Media Studies*, 11(1), p.61-71

Glick, P., Fiske, S., Mladinic, A., Saiz, J., Abrams, D., Masser, B., Adetoun, B., Osagie, J., Akande, A., Alao, A., Brunner, A., Willemsen, T., Chipeta, K., Dardenne, B., Dijksterhuis, A., Wigboldus, D., Eckes, T., Six-Materna, I., Exposito, F., Moya, M., Foddy, M., Kim, H., Lameiras, M., Sotelo, M., Mucchi-Faina, A., Romani, M., Sakalh, N., Udegbe, B., Yamamoto, M., Ui, M., Ferreira, M., and Lopez Lopez, W., 2000. Beyond Prejudice as Simple Antipathy: Hostile and Benevolent Sexism Across Cultures, *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 79(5), p.763-775

Glick, P., and Fiske, S., 1996. The Ambivalent Sexism Inventory: Differentiating Hostile and Benevolent Sexism, *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 70(3), p.491-512

GMMP, 2015b. Newspaper Monitoring Guide, [pdf] Available at: <http://whomakesthenews.org/media-monitoring/methodology-guides-and-coding-tools> [Accessed 8 Jan 2016]

GMMP, 2015a. Who Makes the News? Global Media Monitoring Project 2015. London: World Association for Christian Communication

GMMP, 2010. Who Makes the News? Global Media Monitoring Project 2010. London: World Association for Christian Communication

GMMP, 1995. Global Media Monitoring Project: Women's Participation in the News. Toronto: National Watch on Images of Women in the Media

Good, J., and Rudman, L., 2010. When Female Applicants Meet Sexist Interviewers: The Costs of Being a Target of Benevolent Sexism, *Sex Roles*, 62(2010), p.481-493

Hayes, D., and Lawless, J., 2015. A Non-Gendered Lens? Media, Voters, and Female Candidates in Contemporary Congressional Elections, *Perspectives on Politics*, 13(1), p.95-118

Hayes, D., 2011. When Gender and Party Collide: Stereotyping in Candidate Trait Attribution, Politics & Gender, 7(2011), p.133-165

Heldman, C., Carroll, S., Olson, S., 2006. "She Brought Only a Skirt": Print Media Coverage of Elizabeth Dole's Bid for the Republican Presidential Nomination, *Political Communication*, 22(3), p. 315-335

Heldman, C., and Wade, L., 2011. Sexualizing Sarah Palin: The Social and Political Context of the Sexual Objectification of Female Candidates, *Sex Roles*, 65(2011), p.156-164

Ibroscheva, E., and Raicheva-Stover, M., 2009. Engendering Transition: Portrayals of Female Politicians in the Bulgarian Press, *Howard Journal of Communications*, 20(2), p.111-128

Inglehart and Norris, 2003. Rising Tide: Gender Equality and Cultural Change Around the World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

IPU, 2016. Women in Parliaments: World and National Averages. [online] 1 Feb. Available at: <http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/world.htm> [Accessed 19 Apr 2016]

IPU, 2015. Sweden (Riksdagen), Last elections, [online] Available at: <http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/2303_E.htm> [Accessed 22 Feb 2016]

Kahn, K., 1994. The Distorted Mirror: Press Coverage of Women Candidates for Statewide Office, *The Journal of Politics*, 56(1), p.154-173

Kahn, K., 1992. Does Being Male Help? An Investigation of the Effects of Candidate Gender and Campaign Coverage on Evaluations of U.S. Senate Candidates, *The Journal of Politics*, 54(2), p. 497-517

Kahn, K., and Goldenberg, E., 1991. Women Candidates in the News: An Examination of Gender Differences in U.S. Senate Campaign Coverage, *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, 55(2), p.180-199

Koch, J., 1999. Candidate Gender and Assessments of Senate Candidates, *Social Science Quarterly*, 80 (1), p.84-96

Konrath, S., Au, J., Ramsey, L., 2012. Cultural Differences in Face-ism: Male Politicians Have Bigger heads in More Gender-Equal Cultures, *Psychology of Women Quarterly*, 00(0), p.1-12

Larris, R., and Maggio, R., 2012. The Women's Media Center's Media Guide to Gender Neutral Coverage of Women Candidates + Politicians. The Women's Media Center

Lavery, L., 2013. Gender Bias in the Media? An Examination of Local Television News Coverage of Male and Female House Candidates, *Politics & Policy*, 41(6), p.877-910

Lawless, J., 2009. Sexism and Gender Bias in Election 2008: A More Complex Path for Women in Politics, *Politics and Gender*, 5(1), p.70-80

Lithgow, L., 2000. A Question of Relativity: The Role of the News Media in Shaping the View of Women in Asian Political Dynasties, *The Joan Shorenstein Center on the Press, Politics and Public Policy*, Working paper series #2000-13

Mathews, J., 2007. Hidden Sexism: Facial Prominence and Its Connections to Gender and Occupational Status in Popular Print Media, *Sex Roles*, 57(2007), p.515-525

Mediekompass, 2014. Svenska mediehus 2013/14: fakta om marknad och medier. [pdf] Available at: <http://www.dagspress.se/images/stories/TU_Svenska_Mediehus_2013-14.pdf> [Accessed 15 May 2016]

Mills, S., 2003. Caught between sexism, anti-sexism and 'political correctness': feminist women's negotiations with naming practices, *Discourse & Society*, 14(1), p.87-110

Murray, R., 2008. 'Is the Mere Presence of a Strong Female Candidate Enough to Increase the Substantive Representation of Women?', *Parliamentary Affairs*, 61(3), p.476-489

Popescu, M., 2011. European Media Systems Survey 2010: Results and Documentation. [pdf] Essex: European Media Systems Survey. Available at: <http:// www.mediasystemsineurope.org/ files/emss10all.pdf> [Accessed 2 Mar 2015]

Rättvisaren, 2015. Rättvisaren! Stockholm: Rättviseförmedlingen

Regeringskansliet, 2016. Sveriges regering. [online] Available at: <http://www.regeringen.se/ sveriges-regering/> [Accessed 12 Mar 2016]

Ross, K., and Comrie, M., 2011. The rules of the (leadership) game: Gender, politics and news, *Journalism*, 13(8), p.969-984

Schlehofer, M., Casad, B., Bligh, M., Grotto, A., 2011. Navigating Public Prejudices: The Impact of Media and Attitudes on High-Profile Female Political Leaders, *Sex Roles*, 65(2011), p.69-82

Sibley, C., Overall, N., Duckitt, J., Perry, R., Milfont, T., Khan, S., Fischer, R., Robertson, A., 2009. Your Sexism Predicts My Sexism: Perceptions of Men's (but not Women's) Sexism Affects One's Own Sexism Over Time, *Sex Roles*, 60(2009), p.682-693

Sibley, C., Overall, N., Duckitt, J., 2007. When Women Become More Hostilely Sexist toward their Gender: The System-Justifying Effect of Benevolent Sexism, *Sex Roles*, 57(2007), p.743-754

Smith, K., 1997. When All's Fair: Signs of Parity in Media Coverage of Female Candidates, *Political Communication*, 14(1), p.71-82

Social Watch, 2008. Gender Equity Index 2008: Progress and Setbacks, [pdf] Available at: <http:// old.socialwatch.org/en/avancesyRetrocesos/index.htm> [Accessed 2 Feb 2016]

Stein, 2016. Study: Hillary Clinton, not Donald Trump, gets the most negative media coverage. Vox. [online] 15 April. Available at: <http://www.vox.com/2016/4/15/11410160/hillary-clinton-media-bernie-sanders>

Stout, C., and Kline, R., 2011. I'm Not Voting for Her: Polling Discrepancies and Female Candidates, *Political Behavior*, 33(3), p.479-503

Sundström, A., and Wängnerud, L., 2014. Corruption as an obstacle to women's political representation: Evidence from local councils in 18 European countries, *Party Politics*, 2014, p.1-16

Swim, J., Aikin, K., Hall, W., Hunter, B., 1995. Sexism and Racism: Old-Fashioned and Modern Prejudices, *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 68(2), p.199-214

Thomas, M., 2010. What Do the Worldwide Governance Indicators Measure?, *European Journal of Development Research*. [online]. Available at: <http://www.palgrave- journals.com/ejdr/journal/v22/ n1/full/ejdr200932a.html> [Accessed 21 Jan 2015]

Towns, A., Karlsson, E., Eyre, J., 2014. The equality conundrum: Gender and nation in the ideology of the Sweden Democrats, *Party Politics*, 20(2), p.237-247

Towns, A., 2003. Understanding the Effects of Larger Ratios of Women in National Legislatures, *Women & Politics*, 25(1-2), p.1-29

UNDP.org, 2015. Table 4: Gender Inequality Index, Human Development Reports. [online] Available at: <http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr14_statisticaltables.xls> [Accessed 2 Dec 2015]

UNESCO, 2012. Gender-Sensitive Indicators for Media: Framework of indicators to gauge gender sensitivity in media operations and content. Paris: United Nations Educational

Vos, D., 2013. The vertical glass ceiling: Explaining female politicians' underrepresentation in television news, *De Gryter Mouton Communications 2013*, 38(4), p.389-410

Wasburn, P., and Wasburn, M., 2011. Media coverage of women in politics: The curious case of Sarah Palin, *Media, Culture & Society*, 33(7), p.1027-1041

Wängnerud, L., and Sundell, A., 2012. Do politics matter? Women in Swedish local elected assemblies 1970–2010 and gender equality in outcomes, *European Political Science Review*, 4(1), p.97-120

Wängnerud, L., 2009. Women in Parliaments: Descriptive and Substantive Representation, *Annual Review of Political Science*, 12(2009), p.51-69

Wängnerud, L., 2000. Testing the Politics of Presence: Women's Representation in the Swedish Riksdag, *Scandinavian Political Studies*, 23(1), p.67-91

Womensuffrage.org, 2015. Global Timeline: Women Suffrage and Beyong, [online] Available at: <http://womensuffrage.org/?page_id=69> [Accessed 21 Feb 2016]

Willsher, 2016. French former ministers launch attack on sexism in politics, The Guardian. [online] 15 May. Available at: <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/15/french-former-ministers-launch-attack-on-sexism-in-politics> [Accessed 16 May 2016]

Winfrey, K., Warner, B., Banwart, M., 2014. Gender Identification and Young Voters: Predicting Candidate Evaluations and Message Effectiveness, *American Behavioral Scientist*, 58(6), p. 794-809

Women's Media Center, 2016. The Problem, [online] Available at: <http://www.womensmediacenter.com/pages/the-problem> [Accessed 14 Jan 2016]

Wright, K., and Holland, J., 2014. Leadership and the media: Gendered framings of Julia Gillard's 'sexism and misogyny' speech, *Australian Journal of Political Science*, 49(3), p.455-468

Data sources

AEC, 2016. Tally room archive: Official election results. [online] Available at: <http://results.aec.gov.au> [Accessed 9 Mar 2016]

Barro, R.J., and Lee, J.W., 2013. A new data set of educational attainment in the world, 1950-2010, *Journal of development economics*, 104(2013), p.184-198

Beck, T., Clarke, G., Groff, A., Keefer, P., Walsh, P., 2001. New tools in comparative political economy: The database of political institutions, *The World Bank Economic Review*, 15(1), p. 165-176

Caribbean Elections Today, 2014. 46 candidates to contest Grenada 2013 election. [online] Available at: <http://www.caribbeanelections.com/blog/?p=2014> [Accessed 27 Feb 2016]

CAWP, 2014. Summary of Women Candidates for Selected Offices 1970-2014, [fact sheet] Center for American Women and Politics. Available at: <http://www.cawp.rutgers.edu/facts/elections/past_candidates> [Accessed 2 Feb 2016]

Cingranelli, D.L., and Richards, D.L., 2010. The cingranelli and richards (ciri) human rights data project, *Human Rights Quarterly*, 32(2), p.401-424

CNE, 2016. Organizaciones políticas: Candidatos. [online] Available at: <http://cne.gob.ec/es/estadisticas-cne/category/343-organizaciones-politicas> [Accessed 15 Mar 2016]

Commonwealth Observer Group, 2015. Trinidad and Tobago Parliamentary Elections 7 September 2015. London: The Commonwealth

Coppedge, M., Gerring, J., Lindberg, S., Skaaning, S., Teorell, J., with Altman, D., Bernhard, M., Fish, M., Glynn, A., Hicken, A., Knutsen, C.H., McMann, K., Paxton, P., Pemstein, D., Staton, J., Zimmerman, B., Andersson, F., Mechkova, V., and Miri, F., 2015. "V-Dem Codebook v5." Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project

Cracknell, R., McGuinness, F., and Rhodes, C., 2011. General Election 2010, [Final Edition Research Paper] House of Commons Library, 10/36 2 February 2011

Dahlberg, Stefan, Sören Holmberg, Bo Rothstein, Felix Hartmann & Richard Svensson. 2015. The Quality of Government Basic Dataset, version Jan15. University of Gothenburg: The Quality of Government Institute, http://www.qog.pol.gu.se

Electoral Commission, 2014. Electoral Commission releases party and candidate lists for 2014 election. [online] Available at: <http://www.elections.org.nz/news-media/electoral-commission-releases-party-and-candidate-lists-2014-election> [Accessed 2 Feb 2016]

EU EOM, 2014a. Mozambique: Final Report General Elections 15 October 2014. Brussels: European Commission

EU EOM, 2013a. Islamic Republic of Pakistan: Final Report General Elections 11 May 2013. Brussels: European Commission

EU EOM, 2013b. Paraguay: Final Report General Elections April 21 2013. Brussels: European Commission

EU EOM, 2013c. Guinée: Rapport Final Élections législatives 28 septembre 2013. Brussels: European Commission

FEC, 2015. Statistical Summary of 24-Month Campaign Activity of the 2013-2014 Election Cycle. [online] Available at: <http://www.fec.gov/press/press2015/news_releases/20150403release.shtml> Accessed 2 Feb 2016]

GMMP, 2010. Who Makes the News? Global Media Monitoring Project 2010. London: World Association for Christian Communication

Hawkins, O., Keen, R., Nakatu, N., 2015. General Election 2015, [briefing paper] House of Commons Library, Number CBP7186

Heritage Foundation, 2014. 2010 Index of Economic Freedom. [online] Available at: <http://www.heritage.org/index/download> [Accessed 10 Jan 2016]

International IDEA, 2015. Table of Electoral Systems Worldwide. [online] Available at: <http://www.idea.int/esd/world.cfm> [Accessed 11 Dec 2015]

IPU PARLINE, 2016. PARLINE Database on national parliaments. [online] Available at: <http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/parlinesearch.asp> [Accessed 14 Jan 2016]

IPU, 2010. Women in national parliaments. [online] 31 Dec. Available at: <http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/arc/classif311210.htm> [Accessed 6 Mar 2016]

La Porta, R., Lopez-de Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R., 1999. The quality of government, *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organizations*, 15(1), p.222-279

Malik, K., 2013. Human development report 2013. The rise of the south: Human progress in a diverse world. New York: United Nations Development Programme

Meinparlament.at, 2013. Nationalratswahl 2013 — Ihre Kandidatinnen and Kandidaten. [online]. Available at: <http://www.meinparlament.at/b460> [Accessed 14 Jan 2016]

OSCE, 2015a. Bosnia and Herzegovina General Elections 12 October 2014: OSCE/ODIHR Election Assessment Mission Final Report. Warsaw: OSCE

OSCE, 2014a. Turkmenistan Parliamentary Elections 15 December 2013: OSCE/ODIHR Election Assessment Mission Final Report. Warsaw: OSCE

OSCE, 2013a. Republic of Albania Parliamentary Elections 23 June 2013: OSCE/ODIHR Election Assessment Mission Final Report. Warsaw: OSCE

OSCE, 2013b. Republic of Malta Parliamentary Elections 9 March 2013: OSCE/ODIHR Election Assessment Mission Final Report. Warsaw: OSCE

OSCE, 2013c. United States of America General Elections 6 November 2012: OSCE/ODIHR Limited Election Observation Mission Report. Warsaw: OSCE

OSCE, 2012a. Republic of Belarus Parliamentary Elections 23 September 2012: OSCE/ODIHR Election Assessment Mission Final Report. Warsaw: OSCE

OSCE, 2012b. Georgia Parliamentary Elections 1 October 2012: OSCE/ODIHR Election Assessment Mission Final Report. Warsaw: OSCE

OSCE, 2007. Bosnia and Herzegovina General Elections 1 October 2006: OSCE/ODIHR Election Assessment Mission Final Report. Warsaw: OSCE

OSCE, 2003. Bosnia and Herzegovina General Elections 5 October 2002: OSCE/ODIHR Final Report. Warsaw: OSCE

Permanent Electoral Authority, 2013. The Evolution of woman representation in Romanian Parliament, *Direction of studies, documentation and monitoring the electoral process* [pdf] Available at: <http://www.roaep.ro/prezentare/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/women_Parliament.pdf> [Accessed 21 Feb 2016]

The Commonwealth, 2014. Antigua and Barbuda General Election, 12 June 2014: Report of the Commonwealth Observer Mission. London: Commonwealth Secretariat

TSE, 2014. 2014 Elections: increased women's participation in Brazilian Politics. [online] Available at: <http://english.tse.jus.br/noticias-tse-en/2014/Agosto/2014-elections-increased-women2019s-participation-in-brazilian-politics> [Accessed 9 Mar 2016]

Women's Consortium of Ukraine, 2014. Gender monitoring of parliamentary election 2014: Report. Kiev: Women's Consortium of Ukraine

Appendix 1: Additional information regarding share of women candidates

The following table describes the six unusual observations in the Share of Women Candidates variable that were included in the sample.

Country	Year	Irregularity
Austria	2013	Source for candidate breakdown gives different overall number of candidates than IPU; however, a pilot test for a new system of running was used as well as the normal system in this election. The candidate share is therefore in reference to the normal system only, not the pilot system (Meinparlament.at, 2013).
Brazil	2014	Number of candidates by gender not separated by chamber, but both chambers elected directly and therefore not considered an issue (TSE, 2014).
Greece	2015	Two elections in 2015; candidate breakdown uses January election, not June (IPU PARLINE, 2016).
Guinea	2013	Auxiliary/reserve candidates explicitly included in gender breakdown (EU EOM, 2013c).
Paraguay	2013	Number of candidates by gender not separated by chamber, but both chambers elected directly and therefore not considered an issue (EU EOM, 2013b).
Romania	2012	Number of candidates by gender not separated by chamber, but both chambers elected directly and therefore not considered an issue (Permanent Electoral Authority, 2013; UNDP, 2013).

Furthermore, the Share of Women Candidates variable was mainly gathered from the IPU PARLINE (2016) data. However, in order to increase the number of observations, efforts were made to find the candidate gender breakdown for countries where IPU only provided the gender breakdown of those winning seats, not candidates. The following table includes all countries where candidate gender breakdown was gathered from a source other than IPU, the name of the source as can be found in the bibliography and what kind of source it is.

Country	Source name	Source type
Afghanistan	OSCE, 2010e	Election observation report
Albania	OSCE, 2013a	Election observation report
Antigua and Barbuda	The Commonwealth, 2014	Election observation report
Australia	AEC, 2016	Electoral Commission website
Austria	Meinparlament.at, 2013	Parliamentary website
Belarus	OSCE, 2012a	Election observation report
Bosnia and Herzegovina	OSCE, 2015a	Election observation report
Brazil	TSE, 2014	Superior Electoral Court website
Ecuador	CNE, 2016	National Electoral Council website
Georgia	OSCE, 2012b	Election observation report

Country	Source name	Source type
Guinea	EU EOM, 2013c	Election observation report
Malta	OSCE, 2013b	Election observation report
Mozambique	EU EOM, 2014a	Election observation report
New Zealand	Electoral Commission, 2014	Electoral Commission website
Pakistan	EU EOM, 2013a	Election observation report
Paraguay	EU EOM, 2013b	Election observation report
Romania	Permanent Electoral Authority, 2013	Elecoral Authority report
Trinidad and Tobago	Commonwealth Observer Group, 2015	Election observation report
Turkmenistan	OSCE, 2014a	Election observation report
Ukraine	Women's Consortium of Ukraine, 2014	Women's network NGO report
UK	Hawkins et al., 2015	Government briefing paper
USA	CAWP, 2014; FEC, 2015	Federal Electoral Commission website and Center for American Women and Politics website

Appendix 2: Coding rules for media sexism variables in case study

As explained in the Methodology, the media sexism indicators that correspond to those produced by GMMP are coded according to the same rules as in the GMMP guidelines (GMMP, 2015b). The additional ten media sexism variables were collected according to the following guidelines.

Variable	Description and coding rules (NS=news subject)
MSB	**The difference between the share of women NS that are shown in a passive rather than active role minus male** Active: events/ideas described occur at least partially by this NS; the NS is quoted Passive: events/ideas described occur only to this NS, or the NS is mentioned outside of any event/main idea
MSC	**The share of female candidates or politicians presented as novelties** At least one mention is made to the candidates gender where it is (subjectively) not relevant and/or the candidate is presented as a token rather than a serious contender.
MSD	**The difference between the share of female NS whose appearance is focused on minus male** If the appearance (attractiveness, dress, etc and/or physical descriptions of for example looking tired) are given more than one reference.
MSE	**The difference between the share of political advertisements showing specific female NS minus male** Ads are considered to show one or several NS if it features the photo and/or name of a person (candidate or otherwise); cartoons are not included as photos
MSF	**The difference between the face-to-body ratio of women photographed minus men** Face-to-body ratio=(total distance from top of head to bottom of chin)/(total distance form top of head to lowest shown part of body in photograph) Distance is measured in one straight line roughly following the angle of the head. As guided by literature, very awkwardly posed photographs or misleading face-to-body ratios (for example, the whole body is showing but the person is lying down or the person is photographed from behind) are excluded from the calculations entirely.
MSG	**The difference between the number of female NS in the occupation of politician shown on the front page minus male** Shown: in photographs and/or referenced by name
MSH	**The share of female candidates or politicians discussed mainly or only in reference to women's issues** Women's issues/policies explained in literature review and methodology; if all or almost all mentions of the NS in the story are in reference to these.
MSI	**The share of female reporters** Including stories where writer of news story is not a journalist.
MSJ	**The difference between the share of female NS in the occupation of politician referenced by first name when their full name or title is not given minus male** If first name is used alone in even one reference, the NS is included in coding of referenced by first name.
MSK	**The difference between the share of women NS in the occupation of politician whose potential impact or viability in politics is questioned minus male** Coded as questioned if their potential impact is brought into question (if elected, would they be able to get anything done?) or their viability (are they suited for politics?).

Appendix 3: Robustness models with alternative control variables

As the cases included in the models are low, at 58 observations, the models are not able to include all interesting control variables. A standard robustness check with a different measure of the independent variable, media sexism, is not possible, since the GMMP data is the only global media sexism data found. However, as an alternative robustness check for the significance of the independent variable, the models in Set A are repeated with a different set of variables that the literature suggest are important. Electoral system and share of women in the lower house are still included in the models; however, corruption, HDI, women's rights and media access are exchanged for other control variables. The table below presents the controls that are used in these new models, as well as literature suggesting their importance and the source they are taken from.

Variable	Literature	Source and variable scale
Religion (Catholicism and Islam)	Inglehart and Norris, 2003	Variable for % pop. Catholic or Muslim, created out of two variables (% of pop. Catholic plus % of pop. Muslim) from QoG dataset (La Porta et al., 1999)
Women's education	Koch, 1999; Konrath et al., 2012; Brandt, 2011	Average years of women's education as of 2010, taken from the QoG dataset (Barro and Lee, 2013)
Nordic region	Dahlerup et al, 2013; Wängnerud, 2009	A dummy is created where Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Iceland and Finland are given a coding of 1
Women's political rights	(see discussion of women's rights variable in Methodology)	Political component of women's rights variable created; this is the 3 category variable for women's political rights from QoG (Cingranelli and Richards, 2010)

With these controls, once again only MS4 (% expert news subjects that are female) retains significance throughout all models, i.e. with all controls added (although the next appendix, Appendix 4, shows the insignificant models for the media sexism indicators that did not retain significance when all controls were added, the 'robustness' models that were insignificant are not included there).

The results for the significant set of models will only briefly be discussed. With this set of control variables, the number of observations is reduced to only 54; additionally to the fact that the control variables in Sets A, B and C being considered the most valuable, the fact that the controls used in the 'robustness' models give a lower number of observations is another reason for not using them in the main analysis. The OLS checks show that Pakistan is an outlier, but the models are not significantly different with and without Pakistan (other than electoral system losing significance in the final model when Pakistan is excluded), and therefore the model with Pakistan is presented. The other OLS checks show no issues.

As can be seen by the fact that MS4, and only MS4, is significant with all controls suggests that even with a different, relevant set of control variables, media sexism has a relationship with the share of women candidates. Of the new control variables, only religion is significant, and surprisingly considering the predictions in the literature, has an overall positive relationship with the share of women candidates. In the bivariate model, the R^2 value is very low, only 0.082 — less than half of what it is in the bivariate model in Set A, 0.198. This may suggest that in future studies, with a much higher number of observations, media sexism indicators may be able to explain much

Robustness models: MS4 with different controls

	Bivariate	2	3	4	5	6	7
MS4 (expert)	0.335*	0.272*	0.265*	0.253*	0.240*	0.247*	0.240*
	(0.156)	(0.110)	(0.108)	(0.102)	(0.105)	(0.106)	(0.108)
Women in lower house		0.787***	0.707***	0.772***	0.745***	0.791***	0.820***
		(0.107)	(0.115)	(0.111)	(0.119)	(0.135)	(0.154)
Electoral system			-4.631*	-4.512*	-4.501*	-4.819*	-4.778*
			(2.647)	(2.501)	(2.516)	(2.564)	(2.589)
Religion				0.091*	0.095**	0.085*	0.088*
				(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.038)	(0.039)
Women's education					0.282	0.271	0.308
					(0.436)	(0.438)	(0.452)
Nordic region						-3.964	-3.287
						(5.327)	(5.643)
Women's political rights							-1.465
							(3.717)
Constant	18.590***	4.137	8.386*	3.152	1.391	1.423	3.718
	(3.924)	(3.395)	(4.120)	(4.366)	(5.169)	(5.194)	(7.834)
R²	0.082	0.553	0.579	0.632	0.635	0.639	0.640
N	54	54	54	54	54	54	54

*p<.1, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Standard errors in brackets.

higher levels of variation in the share of women candidates. Overall, the models in the 'robustness' check suggest that future research with better media sexism indicators will find that this study has not been able to fully showcase the impact media sexism has on the share of women candidates.

Appendix 4: Models with insignificant media sexism indicators

The first model shown is the full set of models that represent the Table 6.3 models with the outlier Tunisia not excluded. Certain media sexism indicators in models in Sets B and C showed outliers, and are therefore presented both with and without outliers included in the models.

Table 6.3: MS6 Women's rights interaction— with outlier Tunisia

	Bivariate	2	3	4	5	6
MS6 (photo)	6.429	6.656*	4.316	3.473	3.820	4.392
	(4.123)	(3.672)	(3.337)	(3.436)	(3.531)	(3.477)
Women's rights dummy	19.065***	10.278*	9.078*	6.552	6.598	6.074
	(4.312)	(4.457)	(3.994)	(4.697)	(4.733)	(4.650)
MS6_rights	-13.845*	-11.934*	-9.292*	-8.991*	-9.038*	-10.882*
	(5.757)	(5.150)	(4.653)	(4.660)	(4.696)	(4.725)
Women in lower house		0.543***	0.421**	0.401**	0.429**	0.386**
		(0.140)	(0.129)	(0.130)	(0.143)	(0.142)
Electoral system			-9.058***	-8.911***	-8.846**	-7.587**
			(2.386)	(2.389)	(2.410)	(2.472)
HDI (logged)				6.931	9.456	5.426
				(6.791)	(8.500)	(8.651)
Freedom from corruption (logged)					-2.161	-4.714
					(4.318)	(4.482)
Media access						0.214*
						(0.124)
Constant	16.571***	9.809**	17.800***	22.320***	30.598*	23.466
	(2.861)	(3.085)	(3.468)	(5.624)	(17.480)	(17.625)
R²	0.286	0.444	0.563	0.573	0.576	0.600
N	58	58	58	58	58	58
*p<.1, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Standard errors in brackets.						

Set A, MS1

	Bivariate	2	3	4	5	6	7
MS1	0.274*	0.159	0.128	0.095	0.106	0.104	0.103
	(0.150)	(0.123)	(0.110)	(0.112)	(0.116)	(0.117)	(0.116)
Women in lower house		0.633***	0.513***	0.435**	0.466**	0.476**	0.444**
		(0.114)	(0.106)	(0.120)	(0.144)	(0.146)	(0.148)
Electoral system			-9.484***	-9.311***	-9.280***	-9.256***	-8.534**
			(2.395)	(2.381)	(2.401)	(2.419)	(2.485)
HDI (logged)				6.907	8.801	10.713	7.086
				(5.171)	(7.011)	(8.022)	(8.557)
Women's rights					-0.397	-0.169	-0.276
					(0.983)	(1.089)	(1.088)
Freedom from corruption (logged)						-2.359	-3.959
						(4.694)	(4.867)
Media access							0.143
							(0.121)
Constant	19.372***	9.563**	17.372***	22.029***	23.929**	32.164*	27.007
	(3.790)	(3.538)	(3.711)	(5.072)	(6.946)	(17.821)	(18.277)
R²	0.056	0.394	0.530	0.546	0.547	0.549	0.562
N	58	58	58	58	58	58	58

*p<.1, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Standard errors in brackets.

	Bivariate	2	3	4	5	6	7
MS2	0.060	-0.060	-0.024	-0.051	-0.050	-0.043	-0.039
	(0.110)	(0.090)	(0.080)	(0.081)	(0.084)	(0.086)	(0.086)
Women in lower house		0.676***	0.539***	0.446**	0.450**	0.459**	0.427**
		(0.117)	(0.110)	(0.122)	(0.143)	(0.086)	(0.148)
Electoral system			-9.601***	-9.230***	-9.232***	-9.236***	-8.535**
			(2.432)	(2.405)	(2.428)	(2.447)	(2.512)
HDI (logged)				8.553	8.811	10.440	6.885
				(5.168)	(7.043)	(8.107)	(8.634)
Women's rights					-0.054	0.117	0.000
					(0.986)	(1.076)	(1.077)
Freedom from corruption (logged)						-2.005	-3.641
						(4.819)	(5.002)
Media access							0.142
							(0.122)
Constant	24.599***	13.426***	20.289***	25.446***	25.726***	32.688*	27.713
	(2.524)	(2.790)	(3.029)	(4.312)	(6.725)	(18.051)	(18.486)
R²	0.005	0.381	0.519	0.543	0.543	0.545	0.557
N	58	58	58	58	58	58	58
*p<.1, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Standard errors in brackets.							

Set A, MS3

	Bivariate	2	3	4	5	6	7
MS3	0.185*	0.052	0.053	0.038	0.042	0.046	0.036
	(0.108)	(0.092)	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.083)	(0.084)	(0.084)
Women in lower house		0.640***	0.512***	0.427**	0.447**	0.458**	0.428**
		(0.118)	(0.109)	(0.123)	(0.144)	(0.146)	(0.148)
Electoral system			-9.689***	-9.441***	-9.430***	-9.401***	-8.697**
			(2.409)	(2.389)	(2.410)	(2.426)	(2.497)
HDI (logged)				7.586	8.951	11.160	7.574
				(5.107)	(7.054)	(8.078)	(8.652)
Women's rights					-0.277	-0.028	-0.118
					(0.977)	(1.075)	(1.075)
Freedom from corruption (logged)						-2.712	-4.215
						(4.731)	(4.899)
Media access							0.139
							(0.122)
Constant	22.411***	12.175***	19.512***	24.023***	25.488***	34.906*	29.747
	(2.473)	(2.766)	(3.054)	(4.283)	(6.736)	(17.775)	(18.297)
R²	0.050	0.379	0.522	0.541	0.542	0.545	0.557
N	58	58	58	58	58	58	58
*p<.1, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Standard errors in brackets.							

Set A, MS5

	Bivariate	2	3	4	5	6	7
MS5	0.082	0.100	0.130*	0.120*	0.119*	0.118*	0.111
	(0.097)	(0.077)	(0.067)	(0.067)	(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.069)
Women in lower house		0.663***	0.532***	0.450***	0.461**	0.470**	0.442**
		(0.113)	(0.103)	(0.118)	(0.140)	(0.142)	(0.145)
Electoral system			-10.155***	-9.894***	-9.886***	-9.857***	-9.197***
			(2.351)	(2.340)	(2.362)	(2.380)	(2.459)
HDI (logged)				6.847	7.546	9.442	6.354
				(4.967)	(6.905)	(7.897)	(8.420)
Women's rights					-0.138	0.083	-0.016
					(0.937)	(1.040)	(1.043)
Freedom from corruption (logged)						-2.330	-3.737
						(4.596)	(4.783)
Media access							0.125
							(0.119)
Constant	24.459***	11.167***	18.403***	22.471***	23.237**	31.355*	26.997
	(2.142)	(2.821)	(2.972)	(4.171)	(6.695)	(17.376)	(17.849)
R²	0.013	0.394	0.550	0.566	0.566	0.568	0.577
N	58	58	58	58	58	58	58
*p<.1, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Standard errors in brackets.							

	Bivariate	2	3	4	5	6	7
MS6	1.204	1.115	0.112	-1.256	-1.258	-0.961	-1.265
	(3.293)	(2.625)	(2.343)	(2.454)	(2.477)	(2.604)	(2.603)
Women in lower house		0.657***	0.530***	0.424**	0.439**	0.450**	0.413**
		(0.114)	(0.106)	(0.123)	(0.146)	(0.150)	(0.152)
Electoral system			-9.671***	-9.538***	-9.529***	-9.481***	-8.752**
			(2.433)	(2.397)	(2.420)	(2.442)	(2.502)
HDI (logged)				8.821	9.784	11.166	7.461
				(5.388)	(7.294)	(8.115)	(8.620)
Women's rights					-0.191	-0.002	-0.133
					(0.962)	(1.077)	(1.077)
Freedom from corruption (logged)						-1.982	-3.494
						(4.924)	(5.051)
Media access							0.150
							(0.122)
Constant	24.960***	12.097***	19.998***	25.948***	27.001***	33.571*	27.901
	(2.484)	(2.984)	(3.312)	(4.883)	(7.248)	(17.886)	(18.386)
R²	0.002	0.378	0.519	0.542	0.542	0.544	0.557
N	58	58	58	58	58	58	58
*p<.1, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Standard errors in brackets.							

	Bivariate	2	3	4	5	6	7
MS7	0.040	0.045	0.038	0.042	0.042	0.041	0.037
	(0.042)	(0.033)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.030)
Women in lower house		0.662***	0.537***	0.437**	0.451**	0.460**	0.433**
		(0.112)	(0.105)	(0.119)	(0.141)	(0.144)	(0.146)
Electoral system			-9.489***	-9.198***	-9.190***	-9.166***	-8.559**
			(2.387)	(2.353)	(2.376)	(2.393)	(2.464)
HDI (logged)				8.414*	9.282	11.179	7.993
				(4.996)	(6.941)	(7.935)	(8.514)
Women's rights					-0.172	0.050	-0.046
					(0.946)	(1.050)	(1.053)
Freedom from corruption (logged)						-2.345	-3.749
						(4.641)	(4.835)
Media access							0.124
							(0.121)
Constant	23.683***	10.386**	17.962***	22.591***	23.544**	31.719*	27.462
	(2.629)	(3.068)	(3.324)	(4.270)	(6.780)	(17.561)	(18.032)
R²	0.016	0.396	0.533	0.557	0.557	0.559	0.568
N	58	58	58	58	58	58	58
*p<.1, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Standard errors in brackets.							

Set B, MS1

	Bivariate	2	3	4	5	6
MS1	0.234	0.142	0.153	0.148	0.138	0.127
	(0.221)	(0.198)	(0.175)	(0.175)	(0.177)	(0.177)
Women's rights dummy	15.159*	2.630	5.015	2.728	2.091	0.364
	(7.267)	(7.204)	(6.399)	(6.819)	(6.965)	(7.104)
MS1_rights	-0.214	-0.014	-0.098	-0.100	-0.074	-0.049
	(0.295)	(0.267)	(0.237)	(0.237)	(0.244)	(0.244)
Women in lower house		0.574***	0.434**	0.419**	0.450**	0.430**
		(0.146)	(0.134)	(0.135)	(0.148)	(0.148)
Electoral system			-9.644***	-9.541***	-9.353***	-8.544**
			(2.429)	(2.441)	(2.461)	(2.553)
HDI (logged)				6.541	9.606	7.022
				(6.714)	(8.788)	(9.044)
Freedom from corruption (logged)					-2.399	-4.311
					(4.392)	(4.684)
Media access						0.145
						(0.126)
Constant	15.154**	9.891*	17.125***	20.994**	30.710	26.928
	(4.764)	(4.441)	(4.329)	(5.877)	(18.748)	(18.977)
R²	0.225	0.399	0.539	0.547	0.550	0.562
N	58	58	58	58	58	58

*p<.1, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Standard errors in brackets.

Set B, MS2

	Bivariate	2	3	4	5	6
MS2	-0.225	-0.240	-0.182	-0.192	-0.180	-0.186
	(0.226)	(0.200)	(0.178)	(0.178)	(0.184)	(0.183)
Women's rights dummy	10.406*	2.021	2.035	-0.770	-0.779	-2.421
	(4.791)	(4.728)	(4.200)	(4.964)	(5.009)	(5.181)
MS2_rights	0.150	0.179	0.154	0.168	0.163	0.185
	(0.257)	(0.227)	(0.202)	(0.202)	(0.205)	(0.205)
Women in lower house		0.571***	0.444**	0.428**	0.444**	0.421**
		(0.143)	(0.131)	(0.132)	(0.142)	(0.143)
Electoral system			-9.447***	-9.193***	-9.200***	-8.420**
			(2.424)	(2.434)	(2.456)	(2.534)
HDI (logged)				7.077	8.783	6.242
				(6.697)	(8.893)	(9.118)
Freedom from corruption (logged)					-1.327	-3.325
					(4.497)	(4.790)
Media access						0.149
						(0.127)
Constant	22.182***	15.361***	21.871***	26.051***	31.245*	27.423
	(3.309)	(3.388)	(3.442)	(5.241)	(18.377)	(18.592)
R^2	0.228	0.407	0.541	0.551	0.552	0.564
N	58	58	58	58	58	58

*p<.1, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Standard errors in brackets.

Set B, MS3 — outlier (Zimbabwe) included

	Bivariate	2	3	4	5	6
MS3	0.335	0.255	0.231	0.235	0.232	0.183
	(0.223)	(0.200)	(0.177)	(0.177)	(0.178)	(0.190)
Women's rights dummy	15.828**	7.342	7.015	4.408	4.154	2.534
	(4.748)	(4.780)	(4.218)	(4.913)	(4.980)	(5.435)
MS3_rights	-0.369	-0.292	-0.261	-0.258	-0.246	-0.188
	(0.254)	(0.227)	(0.201)	(0.201)	(0.204)	(0.218)
Women in lower house		0.551***	0.423**	0.408**	0.432**	0.420**
		(0.144)	(0.131)	(0.131)	(0.142)	(0.143)
Electoral system			-9.597***	-9.351***	-9.323***	-8.797**
			(2.394)	(2.404)	(2.423)	(2.530)
HDI (logged)				6.877	9.589	7.867
				(6.660)	(8.791)	(9.114)
Freedom from corruption (logged)					-2.075	-3.483
					(4.345)	(4.740)
Media access						0.102
						(0.134)
Constant	15.794***	9.970**	17.503***	21.422***	29.788	27.807
	(3.339)	(3.344)	(3.498)	(5.159)	(18.274)	(18.535)
R²	0.241	0.407	0.547	0.556	0.558	0.563
N	58	58	58	58	58	58

*p<.1, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Standard errors in brackets.

Set B, MS3 — outlier (Zimbabwe) excluded

	Bivariate	2	3	4	5	6
MS3	0.440*	0.350*	0.347*	0.363*	0.360*	0.316*
	(0.224)	(0.201)	(0.171)	(0.169)	(0.171)	(0.182)
Women's rights dummy	17.866***	9.426*	9.578*	6.091	5.934	4.460
	(4.740)	(4.780)	(4.064)	(4.586)	(4.659)	(5.088)
MS3_rights	-0.474*	-0.387*	-0.377*	-0.383*	-0.375*	-0.322
	(0.253)	(0.227)	(0.193)	(0.190)	(0.194)	(0.208)
Women in lower house		0.533***	0.390**	0.365**	0.379**	0.368**
		(0.140)	(0.123)	(0.123)	(0.133)	(0.208)
Electoral system			-10.366***	-10.081***	-10.060***	-9.580***
			(2.264)	(2.240)	(2.262)	(2.363)
HDI (logged)				9.765	11.284	9.718
				(6.243)	(8.178)	(8.485)
Freedom from corruption (logged)					-1.178	-2.456
					(4.044)	(4.415)
Media access						0.092
						(0.124)
Constant	13.756***	8.366*	16.115***	21.562***	26.312	24.546
	(3.413)	(3.362)	(3.321)	(4.781)	(16.999)	(17.244)
R²	0.284	0.440	0.603	0.622	0.622	0.626
N	57	57	57	57	57	57

*p<.1, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Standard errors in brackets.

Set B, MS5

	Bivariate	2	3	4	5	6
MS5	0.135	0.119	0.120	0.104	0.101	0.103
	(0.107)	(0.095)	(0.082)	(0.085)	(0.086)	(0.086)
Women's rights dummy	12.884**	4.176	2.991	0.818	0.714	0.337
	(3.932)	(4.116)	(3.575)	(4.596)	(4.632)	(4.664)
MS5_rights	-0.109	-0.049	0.040	0.060	0.066	0.036
	(0.185)	(0.165)	(0.144)	(0.147)	(0.148)	(0.153)
Women in lower house		0.569***	0.437**	0.427**	0.454**	0.434**
		(0.143)	(0.128)	(0.129)	(0.139)	(0.141)
Electoral system			-10.296***	-10.124***	-10.095***	-9.402**
			(2.383)	(2.403)	(2.420)	(2.555)
HDI (logged)				5.114	8.142	5.941
				(6.757)	(8.768)	(9.152)
Freedom from corruption (logged)					-2.302	-3.647
					(4.205)	(4.494)
Media access						0.110
						(0.128)
Constant	17.606***	10.881***	18.583***	21.765***	31.062*	27.481
	(2.690)	(2.924)	(3.096)	(5.229)	(17.779)	(18.299)
R²	0.232	0.408	0.564	0.569	0.572	0.578
N	58	58	58	58	58	58

*p<.1, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Standard errors in brackets.

Set B, MS7

	Bivariate	2	3	4	5	6
MS7	0.042	0.059	0.044	0.043	0.046	0.038
	(0.047)	(0.042)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.039)
Women's rights dummy	11.407*	4.940	4.182	0.800	1.387	-0.221
	(4.853)	(4.557)	(4.043)	(5.016)	(5.152)	(5.405)
MS7_rights	-0.004	-0.037	-0.017	-0.004	-0.015	-0.003
	(0.078)	(0.069)	(0.061)	(0.062)	(0.065)	(0.067)
Women in lower house		0.585***	0.451**	0.431**	0.464**	0.436**
		(0.143)	(0.131)	(0.132)	(0.145)	(0.148)
Electoral system			-9.470***	-9.215***	-9.153***	-8.526**
			(2.407)	(2.411)	(2.429)	(2.511)
HDI (logged)				7.684	10.745	8.271
				(6.780)	(8.656)	(9.014)
Freedom from corruption (logged)					-2.552	-3.905
					(4.438)	(4.646)
Media access						0.126
						(0.128)
Constant	17.541***	9.572**	17.551***	22.081***	31.933*	27.849
	(3.203)	(3.430)	(3.654)	(5.409)	(17.977)	(18.454)
R²	0.226	0.411	0.546	0.557	0.560	0.569
N	58	58	58	58	58	58

*p<.1, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Standard errors in brackets.

Set C, MS1

	Bivariate	2	3	4	5	6
MS1	0.004	0.115	0.204	0.170	0.145	0.186
	(0.664)	(0.591)	(0.526)	(0.540)	(0.547)	(0.545)
HDI	27.415	11.599	13.183	14.690	17.496	12.220
	(22.862)	(20.704)	(18.431)	(19.124)	(20.130)	(20.481)
MS1_HDI	0.189	0.012	-0.156	-0.091	-0.055	-0.122
	(0.963)	(0.856)	(0.763)	(0.794)	(0.803)	(0.801)
Women in lower house		0.537***	0.437**	0.462**	0.472**	0.437**
		(0.137)	(0.124)	(0.146)	(0.149)	(0.151)
Electoral system			-9.326***	-9.275***	-9.226***	-8.506**
			(2.416)	(2.441)	(2.462)	(2.518)
Women's rights				-0.365	-0.189	-0.250
				(1.085)	(1.152)	(1.148)
Freedom from corruption (logged)					-2.372	-3.890
					(4.921)	(5.049)
Media access						0.151
						(0.122)
Constant	2.803	3.977	10.269	10.293	16.075	15.048
	(15.117)	(13.431)	(12.065)	(12.169)	(17.152)	(17.085)
R²	0.241	0.412	0.543	0.544	0.546	0.560
N	58	58	58	58	58	58

*p<.1, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Standard errors in brackets.

Set C, MS2

	Bivariate	2	3	4	5	6
MS2	-0.258	-0.024	0.058	0.060	0.070	-0.030
	(0.627)	(0.558)	(0.499)	(0.513)	(0.518)	(0.522)
HDI	30.790*	17.029	14.688	14.539	17.512	9.313
	(16.304)	(14.817)	(13.259)	(14.777)	(16.722)	(18.001)
MS2_HDI	0.278	-0.093	-0.150	-0.154	-0.157	-0.011
	(0.862)	(0.768)	(0.687)	(0.711)	(0.717)	(0.725)
Women in lower house		0.553***	0.448**	0.447**	0.455**	0.422**
		(0.138)	(0.126)	(0.145)	(0.148)	(0.150)
Electoral system			-9.233***	-9.233***	-9.226**	-8.493**
			(2.439)	(2.463)	(2.483)	(2.547)
Women's rights				0.026	0.160	0.017
				(1.083)	(1.145)	(1.146)
Freedom from corruption (logged)					-1.979	-3.554
					(5.049)	(5.196)
Media access						0.150
						(0.125)
Constant	4.516	4.273	11.946	11.960	16.312	17.702
	(11.104)	(9.817)	(9.006)	(9.111)	(14.414)	(14.398)
R²	0.235	0.413	0.540	0.540	0.554	0.554
N	58	58	58	58	58	58

*p<.1, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Standard errors in brackets.

Set C, MS3 — outlier (Zimbabwe) included

	Bivariate	2	3	4	5	6
MS3	0.274	0.438	0.643	0.641	0.639	0.541
	(0.618)	(0.552)	(0.488)	(0.497)	(0.501)	(0.511)
HDI	35.963*	22.163	23.944*	24.208	27.981*	20.893
	(16.256)	(14.905)	(13.118)	(14.868)	(16.540)	(18.013)
MS3_HDI	-0.255	-0.564	-0.846	-0.841	-0.833	-0.709
	(0.851)	(0.762)	(0.674)	(0.691)	(0.696)	(0.707)
Women in lower house		0.542***	0.440**	0.442**	0.453**	0.426**
		(0.139)	(0.125)	(0.144)	(0.146)	(0.148)
Electoral system			-9.741***	-9.737***	-9.688***	-9.031**
			(2.398)	(2.425)	(2.444)	(2.531)
Women's rights				-0.041	0.151	0.067
				(1.048)	(1.114)	(1.118)
Freedom from corruption (logged)					-2.619	-3.862
					(4.879)	(5.037)
Media access						0.124
						(0.124)
Constant	-1.468	-1.070	4.638	4.598	10.482	11.630
	(11.166)	(9.944)	(8.859)	(9.002)	(14.221)	(14.270)
R²	0.242	0.410	0.552	0.552	0.554	0.563
N	58	58	58	58	58	58

*p<.1, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Standard errors in brackets.

Set C, MS3 — outlier (Zimbabwe) excluded

	Bivariate	2	3	4	5	6
MS3	0.666	0.784	1.110*	1.109*	1.104*	1.006*
	(0.627)	(0.558)	(0.471)	(0.481)	(0.485)	(0.492)
HDI	47.297**	32.806*	37.765**	37.812*	40.071*	32.900*
	(16.643)	(15.266)	(12.801)	(14.323)	(15.722)	(16.996)
MS3_HDI	-0.767	-1.014	-1.453*	-1.452*	-1.442*	-1.317*
	(0.860)	(0.767)	(0.648)	(0.663)	(0.670)	(0.678)
Women in lower house		0.524***	0.406**	0.406**	0.413**	0.386**
		(0.135)	(0.116)	(0.133)	(0.135)	(0.137)
Electoral system			-10.796***	-10.796***	-10.756***	-10.092***
			(2.230)	(2.255)	(2.277)	(2.352)
Women's rights				-0.007	0.113	0.027
				(0.964)	(1.027)	(1.028)
Freedom from corruption (logged)					-1.643	-2.903
					(4.507)	(4.642)
Media access						0.126
						(0.114)
Constant	-10.110	-8.851	-4.707	-4.714	-0.949	0.196
	(11.568)	(10.293)	(8.646)	(8.778)	(13.602)	(13.614)
R²	0.292	0.450	0.623	0.623	0.624	0.634
N	57	57	57	57	57	57

*p<.1, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Standard errors in brackets.

Set C, MS4

	Bivariate	2	3	4	5	6
MS4	0.753	0.890*	1.110*	1.160**	1.161*	1.115*
	(0.561)	(0.494)	(0.425)	(0.429)	(0.430)	(0.432)
HDI	38.692*	25.315	29.458*	22.898	27.835	22.059
	(18.463)	(16.554)	(14.153)	(16.003)	(17.074)	(17.938)
MS4_HDI	-0.606	-0.874	-1.221*	-1.262*	-1.252*	-1.191*
	(0.843)	(0.744)	(0.640)	(0.643)	(0.644)	(0.647)
Women in lower house		0.523***	0.421***	0.361**	0.374**	0.351*
		(0.127)	(0.111)	(0.130)	(0.131)	(0.133)
Electoral system			-9.821***	-9.896***	-9.827***	-9.249***
			(2.153)	(2.159)	(2.167)	(2.235)
Women's rights				0.831	1.134	1.047
				(0.939)	(1.008)	(1.010)
Freedom from corruption (logged)					-3.655	-4.804
					(4.317)	(4.452)
Media access						0.113
						(0.108)
Constant	-8.483	-7.900	-3.145	-2.066	6.162	6.765
	(11.691)	(10.278)	(8.832)	(8.934)	(13.217)	(13.219)
R²	0.336	0.496	0.640	0.646	0.651	0.658
N	58	58	58	58	58	58

*p<.1, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Standard errors in brackets.

Set C, MS5

	Bivariate	2	3	4	5	6
MS5	0.308	0.106	0.096	0.094	0.097	0.118
	(0.390)	(0.349)	(0.305)	(0.309)	(0.311)	(0.311)
HDI	38.072**	13.169	9.337	10.305	13.807	8.876
	(11.045)	(11.603)	(10.180)	(13.084)	(15.037)	(15.683)
MS5_HDI	-0.372	-0.025	0.038	0.041	0.036	-0.008
	(0.576)	(0.517)	(0.452)	(0.457)	(0.461)	(0.462)
Women in lower house		0.552***	0.452**	0.460**	0.469**	0.438**
		(0.139)	(0.123)	(0.144)	(0.146)	(0.149)
Electoral system			-9.896***	-9.886***	-9.842***	-9.159**
			(2.371)	(2.396)	(2.416)	(2.492)
Women's rights				-0.120	0.061	-0.011
				(1.004)	(1.079)	(1.079)
Freedom from corruption (logged)					-2.323	-3.699
					(4.798)	(4.954)
Media access						0.131
						(0.121)
Constant	-2.073	4.131	13.269*	13.041*	18.176	17.814
	(7.725)	(7.014)	(6.508)	(6.840)	(12.647)	(12.629)
R²	0.242	0.417	0.563	0.563	0.565	0.576
N	58	58	58	58	58	58

*p<.1, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Standard errors in brackets.

Set C, MS7

	Bivariate	2	3	4	5	6
MS7	-0.061	0.016	0.037	0.041	0.048	0.022
	(0.147)	(0.132)	(0.118)	(0.122)	(0.124)	(0.126)
HDI	26.828*	12.865	12.111	13.935	18.127	10.415
	(12.958)	(12.100)	(10.788)	(15.064)	(17.244)	(18.682)
MS7_HDI	0.178	0.053	0.009	0.001	-0.009	0.025
	(0.220)	(0.199)	(0.178)	(0.184)	(0.187)	(0.189)
Women in lower house		0.528***	0.434**	0.447**	0.459**	0.423**
		(0.137)	(0.124)	(0.147)	(0.150)	(0.154)
Electoral system			-9.165***	-9.157***	-9.121***	-8.474**
			(2.390)	(2.413)	(2.432)	(2.504)
Women's rights				-0.182	0.000	-0.039
				(1.039)	(1.105)	(1.104)
Freedom from corruption (logged)					-2.492	-3.766
					(4.870)	(5.008)
Media access						0.132
						(0.124)
Constant	3.333	3.436	10.933	10.343	15.588	16.658
	(9.181)	(8.183)	(7.552)	(8.334)	(13.249)	(13.269)
R²	0.267	0.428	0.554	0.554	0.557	0.567
N	58	58	58	58	58	58

*p<.1, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Standard errors in brackets.

Appendix 5: Validity and reliability diagnostics

Set A, Table 6.1: Linear model without interactions

Histogram
Dependent Variable: Share of Women candidates

Mean = −1.19E−15
Std. Dev. = 0.937
N = 58

Normal P–P Plot of Regression Standardized Residual
Dependent Variable: Share of Women candidates

Scatterplot
Dependent Variable: Share of Women candidates

**Diagrams on this page:**

Top left: Scatterplot of linearity including Loess line.

Top right: Scatterplot of leverage values and residuals (outliers have SDR values above 3 or below -3).

Middle left: Histogram of normality of errors.

Middle right: Normal P-P plot to reinforce normality of errors.

Bottom: Scatterplot of residuals against predicted values to show homoscedasticity.

Set B, Table 6.2: (MS4 women's rights interaction)

Set B, Table 6.3: (MS6 women's rights interaction)

Histogram
Dependent Variable: Share of Women candidates

Mean = −7.36E-16
Std. Dev. = 0.926
N = 57

Normal P–P Plot of Regression Standardized Residual
Dependent Variable: Share of Women candidates

Scatterplot
Dependent Variable: Share of Women candidates

Set C, Table 6.4: (MS6 HDI interaction)

Histogram

Dependent Variable: Share of Women candidates

Mean = −1.05E−15
Std. Dev. = 0.927
N = 58

Normal P–P Plot of Regression Standardized Residual

Dependent Variable: Share of Women candidates

Scatterplot

Dependent Variable: Share of Women candidates