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DEMOCRATIC ADVANTAGES IN CORRUPTION CONTROL

New Evidence from Anti-Corruption Cases across 154 Countries

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ABSTRACT

Does democracy reduce corruption? While much recent research has focused on the ability of citizens in democracies to hold politicians accountable through regular elections, other institutional features of democracy such as a free press and independent civil society may also strengthen accountability by lowering the costs of monitoring and sanctioning malfeasance. Using an original dataset of high-profile corruption cases across 154 countries, I find a strong positive relationship between democratic institutions and anti-corruption enforcement. Moreover, this relationship obtains after restricting attention to states without free and fair elections, suggesting that even in countries where citizens cannot reliably exercise accountability through the ballot, liberalization of the civic sphere can help hold malfeasance in check.

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Introduction

Does democracy reduce corruption? In recent years, this question has been a topic of much debate, mostly focusing on the interaction between democratic citizens and their elected officials. On the one hand, democracy has been posited to reduce corruption and political malfeasance by providing citizens with both the information and the means to hold politicians accountable through periodic elections (Adserà, Boix and Payne, 2003; Brunetti and Weder, 2003; Ferraz and Finan, 2008; Persson, Tabellini and Trebbi, 2003). On the other hand, studies have shown that voters do not always punish corrupt politicians at the polls (Ackerman, 2005; Chang, Golden and Hill, 2010; Chong et al., 2015; Eggers, 2014; Klačnjaja and Tucker, 2013; Persson, Rothstein and Teorell, 2012; Wantchekon, 2003), and electoral competition may even encourage the proliferation of corrupt practices by driving up the demand for illicit campaign donations (Golden and Chang, 2001; Montinola and Jackman, 2002; Rock, 2009). In short, it remains an open question whether democracy reduces corruption by strengthening accountability through electoral channels.

However, in focusing on electoral accountability, the literature has largely ignored alternative avenues by which democratic systems may hold corruption in check. In this paper, I consider whether democracy may help in the fight against corruption by strengthening accountability *across government agencies*. In particular, I focus on the activities of the judiciary and other government bodies (e.g. prosecutors, anti-corruption agencies, ombudsmen, legislative ethics commissions) charged with monitoring and sanctioning corrupt behavior. Such *intra*-governmental oversight has often been referred to as *horizontal* accountability, to be distinguished from the *vertical* (i.e. electoral) accountability exercised by voters (Grimes, 2013; O'Donnell, 2001). Compared to vertical accountability, horizontal accountability is likely to be more effective in deterring corruption, as it directly targets both elected politicians *and* bureaucratic officials, and its operation is not restricted to election periods (Grimes, 2013).¹

I hypothesize that democratic institutions can strengthen horizontal accountability through several mechanisms. Here, I focus in particular on the liberal components of democracy, as embodied by a free press and independent civil society. These institutions fulfill an important “fire alarm” function in democratic systems by uncovering and publicizing wrongdoing, thereby alerting enforcement bodies to incidences of abuse and triggering formal investigations and sanctions. In addition, the attention of the media and civil society groups may increase the pressure on oversight agencies to “do something” about corruption, while simultaneously insulating them from political interference in unwelcome cases (Grimes, 2013; Smulovitz and Peruzzotti, 2000). In transactional terms, these features of democratic systems should reduce the costs to law enforcement of monitoring and sanc-

¹In addition, when the state itself is seen as actively taking a stand against corruption, this may send the message that malfeasance is no longer the “norm” (Manion, 2009), and thereby reduce the moral justifiability of such behavior.

tioning the abuse of office. As a result, we should observe a positive relationship between media and civil society freedom and anti-corruption enforcement *ceteris paribus*.

Empirically, I examine this prediction using an original dataset measuring horizontal accountability constructed from qualitative information on high-profile corruption cases covering 154 countries over the period 2004-2014. I show that my accountability measure is meaningfully correlated with perceived corruption levels across countries, and that countries with greater media and civil society freedom also exhibit higher levels of anti-corruption activity. The link between democratic institutions and horizontal accountability is robust to the inclusion of controls for possible confounding variables, as well as to alternative modeling assumptions. Finally, the same conclusions apply even after dropping “electoral” democracies from the estimation. These last results suggest that, even in countries where citizens cannot reliably exercise accountability through the ballot (Bauhr and Grimes, 2014; Klačnja and Tucker, 2013), greater media and civil society freedom can nonetheless support mechanisms of horizontal oversight that help hold corruption in check.

This paper makes three contributions to research on democracy and corruption. First, in contrast to much of the debate over whether democracy can strengthen accountability through elections, I highlight the importance of intra-governmental oversight in the fight against corruption, and further link accountability outcomes to features of liberal democratic systems. This research is amongst the first to address the specific question of why political systems vary in terms of the effectiveness of anti-corruption enforcement (c.f. Alt and Lassen, 2008, 2014; van Aaken, Feld and Voigt, 2010). Secondly, my results demonstrate the importance of considering substantive aspects of democracy apart from elections. While elections provide one means of keeping malfeasance in check, this paper highlights how components of liberal democracy related to press and civil society freedom can support accountability through non-electoral channels. Finally, I introduce what is, to my knowledge, the only extant dataset measuring horizontal accountability across countries. This dataset has the potential to open up new avenues of research by allowing scholars to directly test arguments about the causes and consequences of anti-corruption control.

In the next section, I review the existing literature to draw out some testable hypotheses linking institutional features of democratic systems to greater horizontal accountability. Afterwards, I introduce my original dataset of anti-corruption enforcement, and describe the construction of the dependent variable. I also discuss the explanatory and control variables used in the analysis to follow. Finally, I present my estimation results and robustness checks, and conclude with a discussion of contributions and directions for future research.

Related Literature

Given growing recognition of the social, economic and political costs of corruption, the past three decades have witnessed an explosion of interest in the issue of corruption control. The intellectual foundation animating many anti-corruption efforts builds upon the logic of principal-agent theory (Klitgaard, 1988; Persson, Rothstein and Teorell, 2012; Rose-Ackerman, 1999). Under this model, principals (citizens or rulers) delegate some task (providing public services) to agents (public officials), but agents also have incentives and opportunities to abuse their discretion for private gain. Anti-corruption efforts aim to curb such (mis-)behavior by reducing information asymmetries between principals and agents and / or increasing the severity of sanctions, thereby deterring corruption at the margin (Becker and Stigler, 1974; Van Rijckeghem and Weder, 2001).

Responsibility for monitoring abuses and imposing sanctions lies in the hands of formal agencies such as prosecutors, courts and anti-corruption commissions with formal powers of law enforcement (O'Donnell, 2001). However, there is enormous variation in the capacity of these agencies to exercise their monitoring and sanctioning powers. Evidence suggests that the effectiveness of oversight institutions depends critically upon the skills and numbers of their staff and the material resources at their disposal (Alt and Lassen, 2014), as well as the degree of independence enjoyed by prosecutors and judges (Alt and Lassen, 2008; van Aaken, Feld and Voigt, 2010).

These last results shed light on the fact that, in executing their powers of oversight, law enforcement officials are subject to a number of transactions costs. First, as many scholars have noted, law enforcement authorities often have inadequate time and resources to investigate all potential instances of malfeasance (McCubbins and Schwartz, 1984; Sunshine and Tyler, 2003). As a result, much corruption may simply go undetected.²

A second type of cost involves political interference in investigative, prosecutorial and judicial procedures. More specifically, when the career prospects of police officers, prosecutors and judges depend upon other political actors, law enforcement officials may shy away from vigorously pursuing “sensitive cases” for fear of offending powerful interests. Such retaliation can range from reductions in salary to demotion and even termination of employment (van Aaken, Feld and Voigt, 2010). In addition, overly-zealous investigations may result in weakened legal mandates or a sudden withdrawal of institutional resources (Lawson, 2009; Wrong, 2010). In sum, the potential for political interference can significantly erode the effectiveness of horizontal accountability.

Keeping these costs in mind, the literature also suggests ways in which democratic institutions can support the capacity of oversight agencies. Here, I focus in particular on features of liberal

²This is likely to be especially true in cases of *collusive corruption* where both parties benefit from the transaction and therefore have strong incentives to keep quiet. By contrast, in cases of *extortive corruption*, the injured party has some incentive to report the abuse, although “blowing the whistle” remains costly.

democracy associated with a free press and independent civil society, as both of these institutions have their own incentives to engage in the fight against corruption. In the media's case, market competition and the desire to "tell a good tale" push news outlets towards investigative reporting that uncovers and publicizes incidences of abuse. With respect to civil society, anti-corruption NGOs such Transparency International serve as platforms to unite concerned citizens, and can further motivate engagement by building awareness, coordinating civic activities, and resolving collective action problems (Grimes, 2013).

One important role played by these institutions involves the sounding of "fire alarms" to expose corruption and provide evidence against wrongdoers (Adserà, Boix and Payne, 2003; Brunetti and Weder, 2003; Freille, Haque and Kneller, 2007; Smulovitz and Peruzzotti, 2000). For example, the downfall of Austrian MEP Ernst Strasser resulted directly from an undercover "sting" operation conducted by journalists from Britain's *Sunday Times* newspaper, who caught Strasser on camera offering to amend European legislation in exchange bribes. Civil society groups have also played an important role in both reporting illicit behavior directly to law enforcement (Manion, 2009), and acting as "parallel auditors" of government service provision. As a result of these activities, law enforcement agencies are able to gather evidence much more cheaply, and therefore bear fewer monitoring costs.

Secondly, with respect to the threat of retaliation, a free media and civil society can significantly raise the costs of political interference by creating visibility and mobilizing citizens in support of the rule of law. Even powerful political actors will think twice about quashing unwelcome cases when the media and civil society NGOs have engaged the public's attention.³ For instance, Grimes (2013) recounts how the prosecuting authority in a Brazilian municipality leveraged civil society support to defend itself against political meddling in its investigations of widespread administrative corruption. By the same token, public scrutiny may also increase the costs of institutional *inaction*. For example, recent popular protests in Guatemala upped the incentives for lawmakers to lift prosecutorial immunity for President Otto Pérez Molina, who was subsequently ordered to stand trial on a multitude of charges linked to a wide-ranging customs scam. These examples show how, by focusing a spotlight on law enforcement and the judicial process, media and civil society organizations can counter the temptation to cover up instances of wrongdoing, and provide investigators, prosecutors and judges with both the incentives as well as the necessary "breathing room" to act.

In summary, these considerations imply that features of liberal democracy associated with media and civil society freedom should reduce the transactions costs facing formal oversight agencies. We should therefore observe higher levels of anti-corruption activity in democratic settings. These

³In electoral democracies, these costs can include the destruction of public officials' political capital and reputations, which can have consequences politicians' future job prospects (Smulovitz and Peruzzotti, 2000). However, even in autocracies, public officials may face substantial "audience costs" if they are seen to be abetting corruption (Gillespie and Okruhlik, 1991; Lawson, 2009).

arguments are consistent with existing empirical studies of the relationship between the media, civil society and country corruption levels. For example, Adserà, Boix and Payne (2003) and Brunetti and Weder (2003) show that lower (perceived) corruption exists in countries with (a) wider circulation of newspapers per capita and (b) better Freedom House “press freedom” scores, respectively. Similarly, Grimes (2013) finds that the density of civil society organizations is positively associated with better governance outcomes, and that this effect is driven by countries with supportive democratic institutions.

The present paper contributes to this body of work in two ways. First, with few exceptions (c.f. Grimes, 2013; Smulovitz and Peruzzotti, 2000), much of the literature focuses on the media and civil society’s role in fostering *electoral accountability* by providing citizens with the information and organization necessary to identify and punish corrupt politicians at the polls (Adserà, Boix and Payne, 2003; Chang, Golden and Hill, 2010; Chong et al., 2015; Ferraz and Finan, 2008; Treisman, 2000; Winters and Weitz-Shapiro, 2013). By contrast, I highlight how these institutions can also support *horizontal accountability* by serving as vital “fire alarms” and “political buffers.”

Secondly, existing cross-national research relies mostly upon empirical models using perceptions-based measures of corruption as the dependent variable. In these cases, scholars are left to infer the level of accountability from perceived corruption outcomes. However, the level of corruption may be determined by a variety of factors including economic growth, political culture, etc., and therefore provides only a very poor proxy of accountability. The present study addresses this problem by introducing a direct measure of the dependent variable of interest - horizontal accountability - in order to precisely test the proposition that media and civil society freedom is associated with more active formal investigation and prosecution of wrongdoing.

Data Description

Anti-Corruption Enforcement

In this section, I present my strategy for measuring the level of intra-governmental enforcement activity. Conceptually, this variable can be operationalized as some function of either (a) the number of implicated corrupt officials, or (b) the number of formal corruption cases. The first quantity is important for estimating the *capture rate*, or the percentage of all corrupt individuals who are punished, while the second ratio is related to the *audit rate*, or the chance of being caught for any single act of malfeasance. While the *audit rate* is arguably a cleaner indicator of deterrence, I operationalize the enforcement level in relation to the *capture rate* for reasons described below.

To measure the number of implicated officials, I begin with Freedom House’s *Freedom in the World* (FITW) reports covering 154 countries over the period 2004-2014. These reports provide qualitative

information on developments pertaining to political rights and civil liberties within each country during the previous calendar year. Importantly for my purposes, the FITW reports also contain a paragraph or section (organized in recent years under the heading “Functioning of Government”) describing problems with corruption within the country, as well as any anti-corruption efforts that the country has undertaken. This qualitative information serves as the raw material for my coding of enforcement activity.

As with any effort to transform qualitative information into quantitative data, the researcher is faced with a series of choices and tradeoffs in defining an appropriate coding scheme. Below, I describe my coding criteria in detail, providing examples where necessary, so that the choices I have made are as transparent as possible. Readers can then decide for themselves whether they are convinced about my operationalization of the dependent variable. Furthermore, this description can also serve as a basis for replication, amendment or extension of the dataset in future work.

As a threshold question, since my theory concerns the relationship between features of democracy and the extent to which the authorities are taking action against corruption, we must first define the set of institutions to be included within “the authorities.” While the FITW reports contain information about accountability arising from a plethora of sources (e.g. cases where private individuals expose wrongdoing), here I am primarily concerned with intra-governmental oversight. Thus, a case is only counted if a formal public body (e.g. a prosecutor, a parliamentary committee, a court, police) initiates some sort of action against the target of the allegation.

In principle, we can also differentiate amongst different outcomes ranging from investigations to indictments to prison sentences. Along this spectrum, a jail sentence clearly sends a much stronger signal about the strength of oversight mechanisms compared to a preliminary investigation, and we may wish to code this distinction. However, in practice, the FITW reports often do not follow a case to its final disposition.⁴ An even greater complication is introduced by the fact that judicial processes can often drag on over an extended period of time, as cases are opened, dropped, and then re-opened with the discovery of new evidence, convictions are appealed and overturned, and prison sentences are commuted. Thus, even if the FITW reports *did* follow the same case over from its inception to the present, we can still never know the case’s “final” disposition. Rather, in the majority of instances, the FITW reports only provide a snapshot of enforcement efforts at a given point in time. For these reasons, I eschew providing a more detailed coding of the exact “level” of accountability. Instead, a case enters the dataset if *any* formal action - ranging from police investigations all the way up to prison sentences - is mentioned.

⁴For example, the 2011 report on the United States notes that former Illinois governor Rod Blagojevich was convicted on multiple counts of corruption related to his attempt to sell Barack Obama’s vacant Senate seat, but fails to mention his 14-year prison sentence imposed later that year.

Third, I focus on enforcement actions taken against public officials (i.e. politicians and bureaucrats). Investigations and prosecutions of private businessmen and companies are not counted, unless they are linked to a public official. In practice, this leaves out cases where (mostly) European and American companies are sanctioned for bribing foreign leaders. For example, when former Costa Rican President Rafael Ángel Calderón was convicted for taking \$800,000 in bribes from the Finnish firm Instrumentarium, this incident is coded as a 1 for Costa Rica and a 0 for Finland, even though the Finnish government initiated a formal investigation of the embezzlement scandal.

A fourth concern is to ensure that cases are roughly comparable across countries in terms of the importance of the individuals who are targeted. For example, suppose that Country X arrests 100 university professors for taking bribes in exchange for doctoring exam grades, while Country Y arrests the sitting president for stealing millions from the state pension scheme. Should we count Country X as having experienced 100 enforcement events, compared to a single event in Country Y? Clearly, our intuition is that the capture of a “big fish” is more important than the punishment of “small fry,” but how should we operationalize this distinction?

One solution may be to code perpetrators based on their formal titles, and then weight each case by how highly perpetrators are placed within the governmental food chain. However, the practicality of this solution depends upon attaching the appropriate weights to each position, and this process can become quite muddy. For example, how should we weight, say, the Education Minister against the mayor of a major metropolitan area, who might also be a prominent member of one of the main political parties (compare: Arne Duncan vs. New York city mayor Rudy Giuliani)? As these examples illustrate, even if we had detailed country knowledge for all 154 countries in the dataset, we might still have no clear intuition as to who counts as the big(ger) fish.

One practical way around this problem is to simply count any target of an enforcement action who is mentioned *by proper name* in the FITW reports. The logic behind this coding rule is that “small fry” are just statistics (e.g. “three government ministers”), but “big fish” (e.g. Rudy Giuliani) have specific names. In effect, this coding rule increases the comparability of observations in the dataset by restricting attention to high-profile culprits. Substantively, this restriction might also provide a “cleaner” measure of accountability, since agencies that are able to take action in high-level cases are arguably sending a stronger signal of their seriousness in fighting corruption.

Having just stated the “proper name” rule, I make an immediate exception: specifically, I include cases in the dataset involving multiple *unnamed* defendants *if* a scandal has become so iconic in the popular mind that *the case itself* has taken on a proper name. Examples include the “Anglo-Leasing” scandal in Kenya, which involved several senior members of President Mwai Kabaki’s government, and the Marbella trials in Spain, which have been dubbed the country’s “biggest ever” corruption trials. These cases are so prominent that (I suspect) the only reason the FITW report does not name any individual is because the report’s author has decided to use the popular umbrella


Table 1: Summary of Coding Rules

Rule	Description
Formal Authorities Rule	The anti-corruption action must be taken by a formal public body (e.g. a prosecutor, a parliamentary committee, a court, police). Actions taken by media, private or non-governmental institutions (e.g. an NGO initiates an investigation) do not count.
Accountability Equivalence Rule	Any formal action taken by one of the above bodies is counted equivalently. No distinction is made between different “levels” of accountability (e.g. preliminary investigations vs. indictments vs. convictions).
Public Official Rule	Only offenses committed by a country’s public officials are counted towards that country’s total. Offenses committed by private businessmen and / or firms (often in the course of bribing foreign officials) are omitted.
Proper Name Rule	Only those events where the defendant or perpetrator is specifically named are counted (e.g. cases involving “three government ministers” without further identifying information about the defendants are not counted).
<i>Exception: Proper Names</i>	Cases involving large-scale scandals (e.g. “Anglo-Leasing” or “Marbella”) are exempt from the Proper Name Rule, even if no defendant is specifically identified by name.
No Multiple Cases Rule	Multiple cases or indictments against a single named defendant are collapsed and counted as a singular instance of the imposition of horizontal accountability.

moniker instead. In practice, since these cases often involve multiple individuals who *would have been named* (and therefore counted as separate observations in the dataset), the inclusion of these cases is likely to introduce a downward bias in the count of implicated individuals. In the analysis below, I estimate alternative models with and without the inclusion of these “multiple individual” cases.

A final issue concerns how to treat multiple cases involving the same person. For example, Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi has been involved in over 20 legal cases during his political career. In principle, we might think that it would be desirable to count each case as a separate “enforcement event,” as opposed to counting Berlusconi as a single “implicated individual.” This brings us back to the question of whether we want to operationalize the *audit rate* or the *capture rate*. But while we may think that the *audit rate* is more desirable as a measure of deterrence, in practice, such multiple counting becomes impractical, not least because the FITW reports fail to specifically mention the majority of Berlusconi’s (many) trials. In addition, in a conceptual level, it can become difficult to

Figure 1: Histogram of Enforcement Against Named Individuals



distinguish each case as truly independent crime, as some cases are clearly linked in terms of the chain of events, even though separate charges were filed.⁵

To avoid these issues, I have elected instead to count the *number of different named individuals* in each country against whom formal action was taken over the period 2004-2014. Conceptually, the resulting variable captures the degree to which (high-ranking) members of the political class are exposed to prosecutorial and judicial oversight over the decade. Although the construction of this measure is undoubtedly sensitive to the series of choices and simplifying assumptions I have made, it nonetheless provides us with a broad picture of patterns of anti-corruption enforcement across countries. Table 1 summarizes all of the coding rules just discussed, while the raw case data are presented in the Online Supplement.

⁵For example, the long-running perjury trial against Berlusconi and his lawyer David Mills stems from allegations that the former Italian PM paid Mills \$600,000 in 2000 in exchange for providing favorable testimony in two separate trials against Berlusconi from the late 1990s. In a separate case from 2003, Cesare Previti - another of Berlusconi's lawyers - was found guilty of bribing Judge Renato Squillante in order to secure a favorable legal climate in relation to an earlier case alleging that Berlusconi had (surprise!) bribed judges in the 1980s.

Across all 154 countries in my sample, the mean number individuals against whom enforcement action was taken over the decade is 2.27 ($sd = 2.99$), and the median is 1. As shown in Figure 1, the distribution is highly skewed with a long right-hand tail. In fact, 53 countries (34% of the sample) recorded no anti-corruption enforcement over this period, while 34 countries (22% of the sample) recorded actions taken against four or more individuals, with one country (Indonesia) as the clear outlier with 22 individuals formally implicated. Appendix A presents the full list of country-level counts.

Enforcement Activity and Corruption Levels

However, before directly entering this number into our estimations, we must be cognizant of the fact that the enforcement count is actually the product of two data generating processes. More specifically, the number of implicated individuals reflects both (a) the vigilance of formal oversight agencies, as well as (b) the total number of corrupt individuals “available” to be caught. Thus, a low enforcement count can characterize countries as different as Switzerland (where there are simply few wrongdoers to sanction) and Somalia (where we can safely infer that oversight agencies are ineffective).


This feature of the data can be seen in Figure 2, which graphs the enforcement and country corruption levels. The x-axis displays estimates of the perceived corruption level within a country provided by Transparency International’s “Corruption Perceptions Index” (TI), averaged between 2004-2014. I have reversed the usual scale such that more positive values indicate higher corruption. The y-axis shows the enforcement counts over the same period. For aesthetic reasons, Indonesia (with its 22 implicated individuals) is not in the picture. From the Figure, we see a clear non-linear, non-monotonic relationship between enforcement activity and the corruption level within a country: few individuals face accountability in low corruption countries, as well as in extremely high-corruption countries, which again supports the contention of two data generating processes.

Since conceptually the aim is to capture only the vigilance of formal oversight agencies, we must adjust the raw counts to account for the underlying corruption level. In the regressions below, I therefore control for the country’s TI score as a proxy for the total number of corrupt officials “available” to be caught. In this way, I am able to disentangle these two data generating processes and operationalize the *capture rate* as a function of the level of enforcement activity.

Explanatory Variables

For my main explanatory variables, I draw upon data from the “Varieties of Democracy” (V-Dem) project coding various features of democratic institutions (Coppedge et al., 2015). First, to capture

Figure 2: Enforcement and Country Corruption Levels



the degree of media freedom within a country, I use V-Dem indicators relating to (a) government censorship of print and broadcast media, (b) harassment of journalists, (c) the extent of media self-censorship, and (d) the existence of print and broadcast media outlets that criticize the government.⁶ Next, to measure the independence of civil society organizations, I use the V-dem indicators relating to (e) the free entry and exit of civil society organizations in public life, and (f) the extent to which the government represses civil society organizations. All items are scaled such that positive scores indicate greater independence from the ruling regime.

In principle, variables measuring media and civil society freedom may vary independently, which would allow us to check the relative importance of each of these mechanisms. However, in practice, the correlation between the various measures is extremely tight, even though we are measuring conceptually distinct dimensions of liberal democratic systems. As shown in Table 2, averaging each variable within countries over the entire decade 2004-2014, every pairwise correlation coefficient is greater than 0.80, and a factor analysis yields a Cronbach's alpha score of 0.97. In light of this high

⁶The exact question wordings and answer categories are provided in the Online Supplement.

Table 2: Correlation between Liberal Democracy Measures

	Media Independence			Civil Society		
	(a) Censor	(b) Harass	(c) Self-Censor	(d) Critical	(e) Entry	(f) Repress
(a) Censor	1.000					
(b) Harass	0.897	1.000				
(c) Self-censor	0.898	0.859	1.000			
(d) Critical	0.879	0.837	0.908	1.000		
(e) Entry	0.831	0.783	0.830	0.844	1.000	
(f) Repress	0.882	0.864	0.836	0.822	0.885	1.000

Note: 147 countries. All variables are constructed averaging the yearly V-Dem scores from 2004-2014. In general, year-to-year correlations are extremely high (results not shown).

correlation, I combine all variables into a simple average *Liberal Democracy Index (LibDem)* which is standardized to have mean = 0, s.d. = 1.

In addition to the Liberal Democracy Index, I also include a host of control variables in the analyses below. First, I control for the population size of the country. This control is important because, holding the corruption level constant, more populous countries may simply contain a greater number of high-level public officials, which may yield a higher measure enforcement activity. Moreover, the FITW Reports may be biased towards more in-depth coverage of more “important” countries. In particular, as detailed in the methodology section of the report, country information is compiled by around 90 experts and analysts from the academic, think tank and human rights communities, using sources such as news articles, academic papers, NGO reports and individual professional contacts. As the number of countries in the report exceeds the number of experts, it is clear that not every country is covered by its own set of native analysts. And since non-native experts (and the secondary sources they consult) are likely to pay more attention to developments in large countries, my dataset may skew towards counting a greater number of prosecutions in more populous states, simply as an artifact of the way in which the FITW reports are compiled. To account for both potential sources of bias, in my analyses below, I control for country population size (logged), using data from the United Nations population statistics.

Second, I control for some element of state failure. In cases of state failure, countries may not prosecute corruption because they are too busy trying to contain violence and insurgency within their borders. In addition, for much the same reasons just described, it may be difficult for FITW authors to gather corruption-related information in contexts where the state struggles to maintain order. To the extent that non-democracies are also more insecure, these considerations may also bias our estimates of the relationship between democracy and accountability. To control for these potential confounds, I use data from the “security apparatus” subcomponent of the Fund for Peace’s “Failed States Index.” This variable rates states on the extent to which they experience pressures

related to internal conflict, small arms proliferation, riots and protests, fatalities from conflict, military coups, rebel activity, militancy, bombings, and political prisoners. Countries are scored on a scale of 1 - 10 (mean = 5.6, s.d. = 2.4), with higher values indicating greater insecurity.

In addition, I also add controls for “cultural” variables drawn from the literature that may be correlated with both democratic institutions and stronger horizontal accountability. The first is a measure of the strength of “traditional” cultural norms that erode the distinction between public and private spheres, crowding out impersonal “arms-length” relationships with personal and network solidarities (Banfield, 1958; Olivier De Sardan, 1999; Ekeh, 1975; Geertz, 1973; Husted, 1999; Lipset and Lenz, 2000; Scott, 1969). In this context, prosecutors and judges may fail to act against corrupt actors if they believe that legal norms clash with prevailing social norms. Traditional cultural norms are usually assumed to weaken with (economic) modernization, and thus it is natural to operationalize this concept using GDP per capita. However, per capita GDP is also highly correlated with the Transparency International’s corruption measure.⁷ To minimize multicollinearity, I have alternatively chosen to use the percentage of rural population as a proxy for “traditionalism,” on the assumption that urbanization encourages the development of impersonal values. Data are drawn from Unesco’s Institute for Statistics.

Second and relatedly, the literature has posited that religious traditions may influence the stringency of anti-corruption enforcement. As noted by Treisman (2000), “Where more ‘hierarchical religions’ - Catholicism, Eastern Orthodoxy, Islam - dominate, challenges to office-holders might be rarer than in cultures shaped by more egalitarian or individualistic religions, such as Protestantism” (p.403). Accordingly, I control for the percentage of the country’s population that adheres to a “hierarchical religion,” using data taken from (La Porta et al., 1999).

Third, variation in law enforcement activity may differ across legal systems. More specifically, some “legal cultures” may be more rule-bound than others. For example, Treisman (2000) notes that,

In Britain and some of its former colonies, scholars have noted an almost obsessive focus on the procedural aspects of law...By contrast, in many other cultures social order is associated not so much with adherence to procedures as with respect for hierarchy and the authority of offices...A willingness of judges to follow procedures even when the results threaten hierarchy...clearly increases the chance that official corruption will be exposed. (p.403)

To capture this element of legal culture, I control for whether the country in question is a former British colony, on the assumption that - regardless of the contemporary legal system is based in the common law or civil law - the legal traditions implanted during the colonial period continue to

⁷For a discussion of possible reasons, see Treisman (2007).

influence patterns of judicial practice today. This coding is taken from Hadenius and Teorell (2007). Appendix B reports the summary statistics for the variables just introduced.

Analysis

To examine the statistical significance of this non-linear relationship, I estimate the following negative binomial model, which accounts for the fact that the dependent variable consist of count data:⁸

$$Enforce_i = \alpha + \beta_1 LibDem_i + \beta_2 TI_i + \Theta X_i + \epsilon_i \quad (1)$$


where $Enforce_i$ represents the count of implicated individuals in country i between 2004 and 2014, $LibDem_i$ represents the country’s standardized media and civil society freedom index score averaged over the entire decade, TI_i represents the country’s average (perceived) corruption level as rated by Transparency International for the same period, X represents a vector of country-level controls, and ϵ_i represents heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors.

The measure of enforcement activity is robustly and positively correlated with $Libdem$, conditional upon the underlying corruption rate (Table 3, model 1). The bivariate relationship between democracy and accountability is roughly linear (Figure 3). The coefficient in model (1) implies that the increase in democracy scores associated with going from a high-corruption, non-democratic country like Russia ($Libdem = -0.85$) to a high-corruption, democratic country like Romania ($Libdem = +0.79$) is associated with an increase in 54 log points $\times 1.64 = 89$ log points, or approximately 242 percent, in the enforcement level. To qualitatively illustrate this difference, while Russian anti-corruption efforts were mostly targeted at political opponents of the Kremlin such as energy mogul Mikhail Khodorkovsky, Romania managed to convict several powerful politicians during the decade, including ex-Prime Minister Adrian Năstase, the President’s brother (Mircea Băseșcu), the leader of a major political party (Dan Voiculescu), and several cabinet ministers.

The coefficient on $Libdem$ is robust to the inclusion of log country population and country insecurity (model 2). In addition, both log population and insecurity are significantly correlated with $Enforce$ in the predicted direction: larger countries record a higher count of implicated officials, and accountability appears to be weaker in failed and failing states. In fact, as we might expect, weak states such Somalia, Chad, CAR, Sudan, DRC, and Iraq record very little enforcement activity (see Appendix A). Also note that the inclusion of covariates does not change the coefficient on $Libdem$. These results indicate that higher accountability in democratic contexts is not simply

⁸The Poisson model can be rejected at high levels of confidence because of over-dispersion of the outcome variable (result not shown).

Figure 3: Enforcement and Liberal Democracy



an artifact of the fact that the FITW may contain more sparse coverage of corruption events in smaller, less secure countries.

Models 3 through 7 of Table 3 include controls to test for alternative theories linking cultural or historical factors to enforcement activity. Here, despite the arguments made in the literature, I find no support for the link between enforcement and (a) percentage rural of population as a proxy for modernization, (b) protestant culture, or (c) British legal traditions. The only notable association is between the percentage of Muslims within the population and lower enforcement, although this result may simple reflect the fact that countries in the North Africa and Middle East region record very little anti-corruption activity.

Beyond the inclusion of control variables, I also conduct a series of sensitivity tests (Table 4). Model 1 replicates the main result with a full set of statistically significant controls. Note that, once we control for the percentage Muslim population, *Insecurity* is no longer statistically significant at conventional levels (although it is still correctly signed). As shown in models 2 and 3, the strong relationship between the anti-corruption enforcement and *Libdem* is robust to different functional forms: it holds if the dependent variable is estimated using a poisson regression model, as well as an

Table 3: Country Characteristics and Enforcement Levels, 2004 to 2014

	Dependent Variable: Count of Implicated Individuals						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
LibDem	0.54*** (0.18)	0.53*** (0.14)	0.53*** (0.14)	0.53*** (0.14)	0.53*** (0.15)	0.49*** (0.14)	0.53*** (0.14)
TI	0.13* (0.08)	0.23** (0.10)	0.24*** (0.09)	0.18 (0.11)	0.23** (0.10)	0.22** (0.10)	0.23** (0.10)
Pop. (logged)		0.30*** (0.06)	0.30*** (0.06)	0.31*** (0.06)	0.31*** (0.06)	0.30*** (0.06)	0.31*** (0.06)
Insecurity		-0.13* (0.07)	-0.12* (0.07)	-0.10 (0.07)	-0.13* (0.07)	-0.10 (0.07)	-0.13* (0.07)
% Rural			-0.23 (0.55)				
% Protestant				-0.67 (0.62)			
% Catholic					0.01 (0.26)		
% Muslim						-0.61** (0.31)	
British							-0.03 (0.21)
Constant	-0.00 (0.49)	-4.97*** (1.14)	-4.96*** (1.15)	-4.80*** (1.28)	-4.96*** (1.16)	-4.96*** (1.19)	-4.98*** (1.13)
N	147	146	146	139	141	141	146
Log Likelihood	-292.2	-276.9	-276.8	-263.7	-269.9	-268.3	-276.9
R^2	0.026	0.068	0.068	0.069	0.067	0.072	0.068

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

ordinary least squares specification with $\log(1+Enforce)$ as the dependent variable. The results do not change much if cases involving multiple unnamed individuals (e.g. “Anglo-Leasing”) are dropped from the sample (model 4), nor if Indonesia (a clear outlier) is excluded (model 5).

Finally, models 6 and 7 address the concern that these results may be the product of an ecological correlation. More specifically, it could be the case that, compared to the rest of the world, the group of established “old” democracies in Western Europe and North America have both (a) liberal democratic institutions and (b) more active anti-corruption enforcement. Thus, the relationship we observe between *Enforce* and *LibDem* in the overall sample may be driven by the fact that this

Table 4: Country Characteristics and Enforcement Activity: Sensitivity Analysis

	Dependent Variable: Count of Implicated Individuals						
	Negative Binomial (1)	Poisson (2)	OLS log(1+Enforce) (3)	Negative Binomial (4)	Negative Binomial (5)	Negative Binomial (6)	Negative Binomial (7)
LibDem	0.49*** (0.14)	0.48*** (0.16)	0.25*** (0.07)	0.47*** (0.15)	0.43*** (0.14)	0.52*** (0.13)	0.50*** (0.14)
TI	0.22** (0.10)	0.23*** (0.08)	0.15** (0.06)	0.24** (0.11)	0.20** (0.10)	-0.02 (0.12)	0.01 (0.13)
Pop. (logged)	0.30*** (0.06)	0.28*** (0.08)	0.19*** (0.04)	0.29*** (0.07)	0.26*** (0.06)	0.34*** (0.07)	0.41*** (0.07)
Insecurity	-0.10 (0.07)	-0.09 (0.06)	-0.09* (0.05)	-0.11 (0.08)	-0.10 (0.07)	-0.04 (0.07)	-0.02 (0.06)
% Muslim	-0.61** (0.31)	-0.43 (0.32)	-0.28 (0.18)	-0.57* (0.32)	-0.69** (0.31)	-0.37 (0.41)	-0.58* (0.30)
Constant	-4.96*** (1.19)	-4.70*** (1.42)	-2.56*** (0.67)	-4.78*** (1.23)	-4.19*** (1.10)	-4.05*** (1.06)	-5.86*** (1.23)
Note:				Named Indiv. Only	Drop Indonesia (Outlier)	Region Fixed Effects	Drop "Old" Dems
N	141	141	141	141	140	141	113
Log Likelihood	-268.3	-310.1	-143.2	-265.1	-262.1	-260.6	-201.6
R^2	0.072	0.165	0.236	0.062	0.065	0.099	0.110

Robust standard errors in parentheses


*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

group of states is simply unique from the rest of the world along both these dimensions, implying that it is not democratic institutions *per se* which facilitate greater anti-corruption enforcement.

I examine this issue in two ways. First, column 6 includes fixed effects for world regions.⁹ Here, I find that even restricting our attention to variation *within* world regions, democratic institutions are still robustly correlated with greater enforcement activity. Secondly, in column 7, I remove the subset of established democracies from the sample. The coefficient on *Democracy* remains largely unchanged. In other words, even amongst autocracies and weakly institutionalized democracies, those countries that enjoy greater civic freedoms associated with liberal democracy are also more likely to “take action” against corruption.

⁹These are: (1) Eastern Europe / CIS, (2) Latin America / Caribbean, (3) North Africa and the Middle East, (4) Sub-Saharan Africa, (5) Western Europe, North America and Australia, and (6) Asia.

Figure 4: Liberal Democracy Scores in Countries without Elections



Finally, I consider the extent to which the relationship between democracy on horizontal accountability works independently of electoral channel. More specifically, in the subset of countries which do *not* hold free and fair elections, is greater media and civil society freedom nonetheless associated with higher accountability? The logic behind this approach is as follows: although we cannot know whether citizens will “vote the bums out” if they are offered the chance to participate in competitive elections, we can be sure that this mechanism is closed off where elections do not exist. Therefore, studying the relationship between *Enforce* and *LibDem* in this subset of countries can provide a clean look at whether features of democracy associated with civil society and media freedom can foster greater horizontal accountability, independently of the electoral channel.

Here, I focus on three recent and widely-cited classifications of electoral democracy provided by Boix, Miller and Rosato (2012), Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010), and Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014). Appendix C describes these measures in greater detail. Broadly, regimes are classified based on criteria relating to political contestation and (with the exception of Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland, 2010) electoral participation. The use of three alternative codings for electoral democracy based on somewhat different classification criteria serves as a robustness check, although the correspondence between the three measures is quite high (see Appendix C for more details). As these are country-year data, and my analysis is cross-sectional, I collapse the time dimension by coding a country as an electoral democracy (autocracy) only if it remains a democracy (autocracy) throughout the period 2004 - end of the dataset’s coverage. In other words, transition regimes are excluded from the analysis below.

Figure 4 displays the distribution of *LibDem* for each of the three subsets of non-democratic regimes. Recall that *LibDem* is standardized in the full sample to have mean = 0 and s.d. = 1. In these subsets, the mean is substantially lower (between around -0.9 to -1.0), although we see that there is still meaningful variation in the extent to which countries permit civil society and media freedom.

Table 5: Enforcement Activity Excluding Electoral Democracies

	Dependent Variable: Count of Implicated Individuals		
	Boix et al. (2012)	Cheibub et al. (2010)	Geddes et al. (2014)
	(1)	(2)	(3)
LibDem	0.46* (0.27)	0.62*** (0.23)	0.48 (0.29)
Ti	-0.44*** (0.12)	-0.34** (0.15)	-0.39*** (0.14)
Pop. (logged)	0.48*** (0.07)	0.48*** (0.08)	0.40*** (0.09)
Constant	-4.53*** (1.37)	-5.04*** (1.52)	-3.38** (1.58)
N	56	57	50
Log Likelihood	-72.17	-78.06	-69.68
R^2	0.136	0.129	0.099

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

In fact, there are a handful of countries that score between 0 and 0.5 on *LibDem*, which corresponds to roughly the degree of civic freedoms obtaining in countries such as Lebanon or Pakistan.

Next, I re-estimate the relationship between *Enforce* and *LibDem*, controlling for *TI*, for only this restricted subset of countries. Given the small sample sizes, to reduce multicollinearity, I include the log of population as the only control. Results are shown in Table 5. We see that, even after excluding electoral democracies as defined by Boix, Miller and Rosato (2012) and Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010), greater media and civil society freedom is still significantly associated with better accountability (models 1 and 2). If we restrict our attention to the smaller group of autocracies as defined by Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014), the estimated coefficient is still positive, although the significance level falls just outside the 10% range. Importantly, the substantive size of the coefficients in all three regressions are very similar to those from Table 3, although we are now considering only the least democratic countries in the sample. In other words, this analysis suggests that even in countries where accountability *cannot* be reliably exercised through the ballot box, a modicum of “democratic” freedom for the media and civil society can nonetheless help hold corruption in check.

Conclusion

To summarize, this paper has investigated the relationship between democratic institutions and horizontal accountability, defined as *intra*-governmental oversight exercised by the judiciary and

other government bodies charged with monitoring and sanctioning corrupt behavior. Specifically, this study focuses on the importance of liberal components of democracy - as embodied by a free press and independent civil society - in supporting oversight agencies by reducing the transactions costs facing these institutions. Empirically, I leverage qualitative information on anti-corruption activities to construct an original dataset of horizontal accountability covering 154 countries over the years 2004 - 2014. I find that, measured over the last decade, formal anti-corruption activity is strongly correlated with media and civil society freedom across countries. Moreover, these results hold even excluding “electoral” democracies from the sample, suggesting that even in countries lacking *vertical* accountability, greater freedom in the civic sphere can nonetheless make a difference in the fight against corruption.

These last results highlight the importance of studying prosecutors, the judiciary, anti-corruption commissions and other law-enforcement agencies as sources of accountability. While much of the literature focuses on accountability as exercised through the *ballot*, electoral mechanisms of corruption control may be imperfect for several reasons. For example, citizens may lack information about malfeasance committed by public officials (Bauhr and Grimes, 2014; Chang, Golden and Hill, 2010; Chong et al., 2015; Winters and Weitz-Shapiro, 2013), and even if citizens become aware of public perfidy, corruption is simply one issue amongst many (e.g. partisanship, economic conditions, etc.) that citizens must consider when deciding to support or punish a particular politician (Konstantinidis and Xezonakis, 2013; Zechmeister and Zizumbo-Colunga, 2013). Finally, as previously noted, electoral accountability can only be exercised every few years, and it cannot directly target *unelected* public officials (Grimes, 2013). For these reasons, elections constitute a “blunt” and often ineffective instrument for keeping corruption in check.

In this context, the everyday job of controlling corruption falls to formal oversight agencies. It is therefore somewhat surprising that, until recently, relatively little research has sought to explain variation in the activity and effectiveness of these monitoring bodies (Alt and Lassen, 2008, 2014; Lawson, 2009; Meagher, 2005; van Aaken, Feld and Voigt, 2010). I contribute to this line of scholarship by examining horizontal accountability from a comparative cross-national perspective, and identifying the features of democracy that support anti-corruption enforcement by altering monitoring and sanctioning costs.

Second, in relation to the larger democracy literature, my results illustrate the importance of considering substantive aspects of democracy apart from elections in corruption research.¹⁰ As Coppedge et al. (2011) argue, democracy can be approached as a multidimensional concept which encompasses aspects of civil liberties, checks and balances, direct participation, deliberation, minority rights and substantive equality (c.f. Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland, 2010). Elections may be key

¹⁰Of course, the ultimate choice between “thick” and “thin” measures of democracy depends on the research question (Collier and Adcock, 1999).

for controlling corruption, or they may be ineffective, or even counter-productive, but they constitute only one dimension of a larger set of democratic rules and practices. My results suggest that even in the absence of free and fair elections, efforts to liberalize other aspects of the political system (e.g. the media and civil society) can shape corruption outcomes by strengthening formal oversight mechanisms. In this vein, additional research might fruitfully study how changes along alternative democratic dimensions can affect accountability and levels of corruption more generally.

Finally, this paper contributes empirically to the literature on governance and accountability by introducing an original dataset of anti-corruption enforcement covering 154 countries over the decade 2004-2014. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first extant cross-national dataset that directly aims to capture accountability outcomes (investigations, prosecutions, convictions, etc.), rather than ultimate corruption levels. The measure thus fills a niche in the set of available governance indicators, and has the potential to open up novel avenues for future research.

In particular, the empirical focus on anti-corruption enforcement introduced in this paper could be usefully extended in several directions. First, due in large part to limitations in coverage in the FITW reports, I was not able to construct a full timeline of the corruption cases included in the dataset. However, one could, in principle, build a detailed case history of all of these cases from newspaper reports that includes the timing of investigations, prosecutions and convictions, as well as the time lag between when a scandal first breaks and when it is finally resolved. This level of granularity would allow scholars to more directly study the efficiency of oversight mechanisms, as well as the determinants driving the progression of a case through the legal system.

In addition, a deeper analysis of this temporal dimension could yield interesting insights into global trends in the fight against corruption: for example, has the rate of anti-corruption investigations and prosecutions increased over time? Future scholars could also advance existing lines of research addressing questions such as whether investigations are more likely to precede or follow leadership transitions (Bågenholm, 2013; Bågenholm and Charron, 2014), or whether anti-corruption efforts are effective in stabilizing a ruling regime (Fan and Grossman, 2001; Gillespie and Okruhlik, 1991; Lawson, 2009)? My ultimate hope here is that, by identifying a set of high-profile corruption cases, this dataset can contribute as a springboard for future research.

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Appendix A: Country Counts of Implicated Individuals: 2004 - 2014

Country	TI CPI Score	
	Count of Implicated Officials: 2004 - 2014	Average: 2004 - 2014 (scale reversed)
New Zealand	1	0.62
Denmark	1	0.67
Finland	1	0.73
Sweden	1	0.84
Singapore	2	0.84
Switzerland	0	1.11
Netherlands	0	1.28
Norway	0	1.35
Australia	0	1.36
Canada	5	1.44
Luxembourg	0	1.66
United Kingdom	4	2.00
Germany	1	2.03
Austria	3	2.07
Ireland	0	2.49
Japan	1	2.51
Belgium	0	2.67
United States	2	2.68
Chile	0	2.87
France	9	2.89
Uruguay	0	3.28
Qatar	0	3.49
Spain	5	3.51
Estonia	3	3.51
United Arab Emirates	0	3.66
Slovenia	3	3.75
Portugal	2	3.76
Israel	8	3.92
Cyprus	0	3.95
Botswana	2	4.09
Taiwan	5	4.15
Cape Verde	0	4.64
Oman	0	4.70
Bahrain	0	4.73
South Korea	7	4.73
Hungary	2	4.93
Mauritius	3	4.96
Jordan	2	5.04

Continued on next page

Country	Count of Implicated Officials: 2004 - 2014	TI CPI Score
		Average: 2004 - 2014 (scale reversed)
Costa Rica	10	5.06
Lithuania	10	5.06
Malaysia	4	5.16
Czech Republic	7	5.27
Poland	3	5.30
Latvia	6	5.41
South Africa	5	5.45
Italy	3	5.47
Slovakia	1	5.50
Kuwait	2	5.54
Namibia	1	5.56
Tunisia	1	5.64
Turkey	0	5.79
Cuba	3	5.88
Greece	2	5.94
Croatia	2	5.96
Saudi Arabia	0	6.06
Ghana	3	6.10
Bulgaria	6	6.13
El Salvador	5	6.17
Montenegro	0	6.18
Rwanda	0	6.19
Brazil	4	6.24
Colombia	3	6.29
Georgia	1	6.35
Lesotho	2	6.35
Romania	10	6.37
China	10	6.44
Peru	8	6.44
Macedonia	1	6.45
Thailand	5	6.47
Serbia	0	6.47
Suriname	2	6.49
Panama	1	6.55
Jamaica	0	6.58
Morocco	0	6.59
Burkina Faso	0	6.63
Mexico	6	6.63
Sri Lanka	2	6.65
Senegal	3	6.70
India	2	6.71
Swaziland	0	6.71

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Country	Count of Implicated Officials: 2004 - 2014	TI CPI Score
		Average: 2004 - 2014 (scale reversed)
Djibouti	0	6.85
Gabon	1	6.88
Malawi	6	6.91
Egypt	1	6.92
Algeria	2	6.96
Moldova	3	6.97
Mongolia	1	6.97
Benin	2	6.97
Madagascar	0	6.98
Liberia	3	6.98
Zambia	9	7.01
Tanzania	2	7.01
Albania	6	7.02
Armenia	0	7.03
Argentina	5	7.03
Dominican Republic	1	7.06
Mali	0	7.08
Guatemala	4	7.13
Lebanon	0	7.13
Bolivia	6	7.16
Gambia	0	7.20
Mozambique	2	7.22
Vietnam	1	7.24
Mauritania	1	7.27
Niger	3	7.30
Philippines	5	7.32
Ethiopia	2	7.34
Indonesia	22	7.35
Nicaragua	2	7.38
Syria	0	7.38
Uganda	0	7.39
Togo	0	7.39
Eritrea	0	7.43
Nepal	4	7.45
Belarus	0	7.46
Kazakhstan	2	7.46
Honduras	1	7.46
Ecuador	1	7.46
Iran	0	7.47
Comoros	2	7.50
Ukraine	1	7.52
Russia	3	7.56

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Country	Count of Implicated Officials: 2004 - 2014	TI CPI Score
		Average: 2004 - 2014 (scale reversed)
Sierra Leone	0	7.59
Pakistan	4	7.60
Cameroon	3	7.67
Nigeria	8	7.69
Laos	0	7.69
Libya	0	7.69
Azerbaijan	1	7.69
Yemen	0	7.70
Paraguay	0	7.72
Kenya	3	7.75
Central African Republic	1	7.77
Cote d'Ivoire	1	7.78
Zimbabwe	2	7.79
Bangladesh	6	7.79
Congo	0	7.82
Kyrgyzstan	4	7.86
Tajikistan	0	7.88
Guinea-Bissau	0	7.90
Burundi	0	7.93
Cambodia	1	7.93
Angola	0	7.94
Venezuela	3	7.95
Guinea	1	7.99
DRC	0	8.01
Equatorial Guinea	0	8.10
Uzbekistan	1	8.16
Turkmenistan	0	8.18
Chad	0	8.21
Haiti	0	8.23
Iraq	0	8.28
Myanmar	1	8.40
Somalia	0	8.84

Appendix B: Summary Statistics of Variables used in Regressions

Variable	Mean	(Std. Dev.)	Min.	Max.	N
Enforce	2.27	(2.99)	0	22	154
LibDem	0	(1)	-2.99	1.59	147
TI	5.97	2.05	0.62	8.84	154
Pop. (logged)	16.23	(1.51)	13.09	21.02	153
Insecurity	5.60	(2.43)	1	9.96	153
% Rural	0.43	(0.22)	0	0.9	153
% Protestant	0.10	(0.19)	0	0.98	147
% Catholic	0.31	(0.36)	0	0.97	149
% Muslim	0.25	(0.37)	0	1.00	149
British Colony	0.26	(0.44)	0	1	154

Appendix C: Description of Electoral Democracy Measures

Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010). As explained on page 69, for a regime to be democratic, both the chief executive office and the legislative body must be filled by elections. Contestation occurs when there exists an opposition that has some chance of winning office as a consequence of elections. This entails three features:

- Ex ante uncertainty: the outcome of the election is not known before it takes place.
- Ex post irreversibility: the winner of the electoral contest actually takes office.
- Repeatability: elections that meet the first two criteria occur at regular and known intervals.

In operationalizing the above features, a regime is classified as a democracy if it meets the requirements stipulated in all of the following four rules:

1. The chief executive must be chosen by popular election or by a body that was itself popularly elected.
2. The legislature must be popularly elected.
3. There must be more than one party competing in the elections.
4. An alternation in power under electoral rules identical to the ones that brought the incumbent to office must have taken place.

Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014). As explained on page 6 of the codebook, democracy is defined as a regime in which the executive achieved power through

- a. A direct competitive election in which at least ten percent of the total population (equivalent to about 40 percent of the adult male population) was eligible to vote; or
- b. Indirect election by a body, at least 60 percent of which was elected in direct reasonably fair, competitive elections (defined in the same way as for directly elected executives); or
- c. Constitutional succession to a democratically elected executive.

In addition, elections are not considered reasonably competitive if

- One or more large party is not allowed to participate; and / or
- There are widespread reports of violence, jailing, and/or intimidation of opposition leaders or supporters; and/or
- There are credible reports of vote fraud widespread enough to change election outcome (especially if reported by international observers); and/or
- The incumbent so dominates political resources and the media that observers do not consider elections fair.

Boix, Miller and Rosato (2012). As explained on pages 1530-1531, a country is defined as democratic if it meets the following conditions for both contestation and participation:

1. The executive is directly or indirectly elected in popular elections and is responsible either directly to voters or to a legislature.
2. The legislature (or the executive if elected directly) is chosen in free and fair elections.
3. A majority of adult men has the right to vote.

Table 7: Correspondence between Various Electoral Democracy Classifications

	Cheibub et al. Dem = 0	Cheibub et al. Dem = 1	missing
Boix et al. Dem = 0	50	3	4
Boix et al. Dem = 1	4	76	1
missing	2	4	
			N overlap = 133 corr = 0.89
	Geddes et al. Dem = 0	Geddes et al. Dem = 1	missing
Boix et al. Dem = 0	47	1	9
Boix et al. Dem = 1	1	75	5
missing	6	1	
			N overlap = 124 corr = 0.97
	Cheibub et al. Dem = 0	Cheibub et al. Dem = 1	missing
Cheibub et al. Dem = 0	48	3	5
Cheibub et al. Dem = 1	1	73	9
missing	5	1	
			N overlap = 125 corr = 0.93