**DEPTARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE**

# ANTI-IMMIGRANT PARTY SUCCESS

-The insider-outsider divide and the role of labour market policies and institutions in 19 countries.

**Sara van der Meiden**

# Abstract

The structure of the labour market in industrialized economies has changed during the last decades. There has been an increase in atypical employment, such as limited contracts. This development has resulted in a dualization of the labour market between permanent workers, *insiders*, and temporary workers, *outsiders*. Some argue that this has implications for political behaviour and that the insider-outsider divide constitute new groups for political mobilization. Alongside with the changes on the labour market have new types of parties' emerged, anti-immigrant parties. New evidence suggest that labour market policies and institution can mitigate the success of anti-immigrant parties, because it compensates for the cost and risk of unemployment. This thesis aim to investigate the relationship between the insider-outsider divide, voting for anti-immigrant parties and the role of labour market policies and institutions. By conducting several multilevel logistic regressions, this thesis show that there is no significant association between type of contract and voting for anti-immigrant parties. There are some evidence of an association between labour market policies and institutions and voting for anti-immigrant parties. Contrary to what expected theoretically, the higher spending on active labour market policies in a country, the higher probability to vote for anti-immigrant parties. No interaction effect is found: being an outsider or insider does not affect voting for anti-immigrant parties differently depending on the design of labour market policies in a country.

**Keywords:** anti-immigrant parties, insider-outsider theory, labour market policies, institutions.

# Table of Contents

## Introduction

Labour markets in advanced European countries have experienced large changes the last decades due to globalization and de-industrialization (Marx 2014). Labour markets are today characterized by uncertainty and job insecurity (Chung & Mau 2014; Berglund & Wallinder 2015). Part time jobs, temporary contracts and agency work are increasingly common in industrialized economies (Burgoon & Dekker 2010). There has been a trend towards a dualization of the labour market and a rise in non-standard employment, that is, other contract types than permanent full-time jobs (Marx & Picot 2014). This new group is called *outsiders* and include people that for instance are temporary employed, and diverge from *insiders*, permanent workers, in terms of job security. There is an ongoing debate about the political implications of this labour market transformation. Rueda (2005) argues that outsiders are not represented by Social Democratic parties, and that economic insecurity due to an insecure labour market position may lead to political radicalization or alienation, such as voting for anti-immigrant parties. While some have found empirical evidence that the insider-outsider divide[1] have implications for political preferences (Lindvall & Rueda 2012; Marx & Picot 2013), other scholars dispute that type of employment contract should have an impact on political preferences (Emmenegger 2009; Häuserman & Schwander 2012).

Alongside with the structural changes and transformation of the labour market, anti-immigrant parties have emerged in several party systems in Europe. The same process that have changed the labour market, globalization and denationalization, has also led to the formation of a new structural conflict in Europe (Kriesi et al. 2006). A recent study by Halikiopoulou and Vlandas (2015) show that labour market institutions affect voting patterns for anti-immigrant parties[2]. Labour market institutions affect people's risk assessments, which in turn affects voter support for anti-immigrant parties. Labour market regulations and generous unemployment benefits can thus mitigate the effect of unemployment on anti-immigrant party success and diminish the support that otherwise should have risen.

This thesis will further investigate what causes demand for anti-immigrant parties and the role of labour market policies and institutions. This thesis aim to answer whether insiders and outsiders diverge in their preference for anti-immigrant parties, and how labour market policies

---

[1] The term insider-outsider and employment contract is in this thesis used interchangeable.
[2] Halikiopoulou and Vlandas (2015) study is done on European Parliament election data, which is a special context since it is a second order election. This study takes the mechanism to the national context. The mechanism, that labour market policies should matter for anti-immigrant party success, is relevant on the national level because it traces back to fundamental characteristics of the welfare state.

affect these preferences. The proposed mechanism is that labour market policies and institutions can moderate the feeling of insecurity as a consequence of an insecure employment contract. Labour market policies and institutions affect how individuals perceive their economic security and the cost and risk of unemployment. More specifically, this thesis investigate if people with insecure employment contracts are less likely to vote for anti-immigrant parties in countries with more generous labour market policies and institutions. Previous studies have almost exclusively focused on either the individual level or the contextual level when explaining anti-immigrant party success and researchers calls for more studies that model micro and macro levels jointly (see e.g. Lubbers et al. 2002; Arzheimer 2009). This study contributes to filling this void by doing such joint modelling.

Previous studies have shown that labour market policies and institutions matter for anti-immigrant party success because they affect individuals' assessment of cost and risks[3]. At the same time, there is evidence that the increased dualization of labour markets affect citizens' political behaviour and party preference (Rueda 2005; Lindvall & Rueda 2012; Vulkan 2015). This thesis argues that anti-immigrant sentiments should be seen as a consequence of both individual level characteristics as well as labour market context, more specifically how labour market policies and institutions are designed. This thesis contributes to the research field of anti-immigrant parties, the labour market literature and institutional theory by combining the three strands of literature.

After presenting the aim and the research questions, this thesis continues with a definition of anti-immigrant parties and what in previous research have been identified as reasons for their electoral success. Thereafter, theory and previous research connected to the topic of the thesis are discussed. Then, methods and data are presented which is followed by a presentation of the results. Finally, the findings and the results are summarized and discussed.


## Aim and research questions

There is ambiguity in the literature whether the insider- outsider divide have implications for political behaviour and political preferences. Therefore, this thesis will first investigate if insiders and outsiders diverge in their probability of voting for anti-immigrant parties. Second, according to institutional theory generally and Halikiopoulou and Vlandas' (2015) study at the

---

[3] Halikiopoulou and Vlandas (2015) show that labour market institutions condition the support for anti-immigrant parties on the aggregated level. However, it is important to note that the trend on the aggregated level does not have to be valid at the individual level.

macro level more specifically, institutions affect political preferences and can condition the support for anti-immigrant parties. Consequently, this thesis will examine whether labour market policies and institutions reduce the support for anti-immigrant parties by modelling micro and macro level factors jointly. The suggested mechanism is that labour market policies impair feelings of insecurity. Individuals who feel less insecure on the labour market are less likely to support anti-immigrant parties.

The research questions of this thesis are:
1. How does employment contract affect voting for anti-immigrant parties?
2. How do labour market policies and institutions affect voting for anti-immigrant parties?
3. Does employment contract affect voting for anti-immigrant parties differently depending on the design of labour market policies and institutions in a country?

The focus on demand side explanations, but does not deny supply side factors. Labour market policies and institutions are not claimed to be the main explanation to the emergence of anti-immigrant parties. Rather, given that there exist a supply of anti-immigrant parties in a country, which voters are more likely to support anti-immigrant parties? Here, employment contract is theorized to affect voting for anti-immigrant parties, but it is also important to understand the conditioning role of labour market policies and institutions.

## Definition and explanations to the success of anti-immigrant parties

### *Definition of anti-immigrant parties*
There is no consensus in the literature on a definition of parties belonging to the anti-immigrant party family. There are several labels in the literature such as 'radical populist right' (Mudde 2007), 'far right' (Halikiopoulou & Vlandas 2015) 'radical right' (Rydgren 2007) or 'extreme right' (Ignazi 2003). The lowest common denominator of parties that are given these different labels is what Mudde (2007) calls 'nativism'. Nativism is an ideology that combines xenophobia and nationalism and the concept incorporates racism, ethnocentrism and anti-immigrant sentiments. The nation state should be as homogenous as possible, and non-native elements such as persons, ideas and polices, are seen as a threat to the nation state. In this thesis, the parties are labelled anti-immigrant parties (van der Brug et al. 2005; Dahlström & Sundell 2012; Erlingsson et al. 2012; Loxbo 2014). There are two reasons why this more policy-oriented

definition purposed by van der Brug et al. (2005) will be used. First, as several scholars point out, the anti-immigration issue is the core message of all parties belonging to this party family (Rydgren 2007; 2008). One of few common denominators of the parties is that they have a harsh stance on immigration (Arzheimer 2009). Therefore, parties that are mentioned under the different labels above and have the immigration issue as their main political concern will be included in the study. Second, anti-immigrant parties cannot easily fit in to the left-right dimension and it is not self-evident that parties in this group should be placed on the right end of the left-right dimension (Dahlström & Sundell 2012). The Nordic countries serve as a good example of this. Jungar & Jupskås (2014) has shown that the largest anti-immigrant parties take a centrist position on the left-right dimension. Therefore, using a terminology that places these parties on the right side is not satisfactory.

### *Previous research on what explains the electoral success of anti-immigrant parties*

Research on what explains the success of anti-immigrant parties has become a minor industry since these parties started to gain electoral success during the last decades. Research usually groups together different types of explanations in *demand* and *supply side* factors when explaining the electoral success of anti-immigrant parties. Demand side explanations focus on different factors that have changed the attitudes, beliefs and preferences of the voters. Supply side explanations focus on the political programs that anti-immigrant parties offer, the role of party organizations, and a number of political opportunity structures such as the role of the electoral system and how mainstream parties or the media handle the new parties (Rydgren 2007)[4]. This thesis connects to the demand side literature, which refers to theories capturing factors that increase the demand for anti- immigrant parties. Demand side explanations are governed by an overarching rationale that conditions in society determine the success of parties (Halikiopoulou and Vlandas 2015). Broadly, demand side factors are divided into two groups; one that emphasise the importance of economic factors and one that stress cultural factors. Some argue that economic factors such as rising unemployment, economic crisis, low income, deprivation or expectations of deprivation create favourable conditions for anti-immigrant parties (Betz 1994; Rydgren 2007). The economic argument stresses the perceived competition over scarce economic resources. Here, the two most influential theories are *the modernization*

---

[4]The success of anti-immigrant parties has resulted in tremendous scientific interest. For thorough literature reviews on the topic see Kitschelt (2007) or Rydgren (2007).

*loser's theory* and *the relative deprivation theory*. According to the modernization loser's theory, societal changes such as globalization have led to new structural conflicts in Western Europe. Anti-immigrant parties have emerged as "a consequence of a profound transformation of the socioeconomic and sociocultural structure of advanced Western European democracies" (Betz 1994:26-27). Or more specifically, as a consequence of the transformation from an industrial to a post-industrial economy. As a result of increased individualization, this transition is characterized by differentiation, fragmentation and dissolution. These developments increase the importance of flexibility and individual entrepreneurship in order to adapt to the rapid changes in society. Hence, the people that possess these characteristics are supposed to be winners in post-industrial societies. Losers on the other hand, are people who are unable to cope with the economic, social and cultural modernization, which are struck in full or partial employment and run the risk of falling outside society (Betz 1994). Losers in this socio-economic change are more probable to vote for anti-immigrant parties (Betz 1994; Swank & Betz 2003; Rydgren 2007). The structural conflict between winners and losers is expected to constitute a new base for political mobilization (Kriesi et al. 2006). Likewise, the relative deprivation theory focuses on the frustration and worries rising from feelings of relative deprivation as a consequence of worsening economic conditions. These feelings are caused by disappointing comparisons with one's past, or other social groups, when one's life trajectory suddenly deviates from what is expected (Rydgren 2007). Both these theories assume that certain groups are more prone to vote for anti-immigrant parties, because people, based on their current situation, are deprived or are expecting deprivation in their situation.

However, more recent studies have been increasingly contended that cultural explanations, such as perceived cultural threat of immigration, matter more than economic explanations. Conflict over scarce resources does not only have to be economic: group interest can also clash over cultural identities and values. In general, people's preference of anti-immigrant parties is explained by a perceived cultural threat as a result of increased immigration (Oesch 2008; Lucassen & Lubbers 2012). However, there seem to be a variation among social groups: for workers, economic attitudes such as fear of wage dumping and welfare competition are more important explanations for voting for anti-immigrant parties, compared to the middle class. Cultural grievances are also important for understanding the support for anti-immigrant parties among the class categories with the weakest labour market position (Oesch 2008). Thus, the support for anti-immigrant parties seems to be a combination of economic and cultural explanations.

At the context level, the correlation between unemployment rate and anti-immigrant party voting have showed inconclusive results. Some find an insignificant relationship (Lubbers et al. 2002, Swank & Betz 2003), others a negative relationship (Arzheimer & Carter 2006) or dependent on other factors such as level of immigration (Golder 2003). Jackman & Volpert (1996) show a positive and significant relationship between level of unemployment and voting for anti-immigrant parties.

Although the scientific interest in anti-immigrant parties has increased in line with their growing success, most studies either employ small-N methods focusing on few cases, which complicate generalizability, or large-N studies focusing on individual level voting patterns (Halikiopoulou & Vlandas 2015). There are few studies examining the impact of different economic factors at the macro level and researchers call for more studies that model micro and macro level explanations jointly (see e.g. Arzheimer 2009; Lubbers et al. 2002), and this thesis aims to contribute with such joint explanation. More specifically, this thesis investigates what role economic insecurity based on labour market position and labour market policies have on anti-immigrant party success, by modelling both macro and micro level factors, which rarely has been done before.

## Insider-outsider theory, economic insecurity and political behaviour

It is debated whether class still matters when explaining voting behaviour (see e.g. Brooks et al. 2006) and some even argue that the insider-outsider divide is challenging or even replacing class as the main organizing principle (see e.g. Vulkan 2015). All advanced welfare states have experienced pressure from labour flexibility and lower labour costs due to growing international competition and growing service sectors. Since deregulation of employment protection is politically difficult, temporary employment has been created in order to increase flexibility on the labour market (Marx & Picot 2014; Marx 2014). This has resulted in an increase of temporary employment in many European countries since the 1980s (King & Rueda 2008).

That temporary employment is a common feature, thus to a varying degree, of European labour markets can be seen in figure 1. Figure 1 shows the proportion of temporary employees as percentage of the total number of employees in the countries included in this study.

**Figure 1**. Temporary employees, aged 15-64 years, as percentage of the total number of employees by country (%)



**Note**: The countries that are presented in this figure are those who are included in the analysis. The percentages for each country come from a year between 2008-2013.
**Source**: Eurostat

The *insider-outsider theory* is the most prominent approach in economics to explain differences in job security. In a nutshell, insider-outsider theory argues that labour markets are divided into two segments with conflicting interest. Insiders are those employed in full-time permanent jobs whereas outsiders are those who are unemployed, employed full-time in fixed-term and temporary jobs, employed part time or studying (Rueda 2005). This means that an insider's and an outsider's position are defined by an individual's objective position in the labour market. Additionally, the mobility between the two groups of insiders and outsiders is generally low (Marx & Picot 2014).

Labour markets in Western Europe are today increasingly dualized with significant differences in job security between insiders and outsiders (Häusermann & Schwander 2012; Rueda 2014). In the labour market literature, insiders and outsiders are assumed to diverge in their policy preference, because outsiders face higher risks than insiders (Rueda 2005; 2007). Job insecurity is usually defined as an individual's fear of job loss (De Witte 1999). Often a distinction is made between a subjective and objective side of job insecurity. Objective job insecurity refers to actual risk of job loss, by considering the precariousness that temporary jobs means compared to permanents jobs. The subjective side is more a matter of the individual's own perception of their own situation. Two persons that in the objective sense have the same

contract type may interpret their situation in different ways. However, people who feel insecure on the labour market are more often people with a precarious position, indicating that job insecurity not only is of subjective nature. Blue-collar workers, low skilled employees, people with temporary contracts are to a greater extent perceiving themselves as insecure. Hence, job insecurity, despite its subjective character, is a good reflection of an individual's real chances on the labour market (De Witte 2005). Other scholars distinguish between an affective and cognitive side of job insecurity (see e.g. Anderson & Pontusson 2007). The cognitive side refers to the individual's own assessment of the likelihood of losing a job, which may include error judgement. A positive correlation has been found between the actual risk of job loss and the individual's own evaluation of the risk of job loss. The affective side refers to the emotional reaction to the potential calculation of losing one's job. The affective side refers to the individual's limited means to handle the threat (Berglund et al. 2014).

Job insecurity leads to greater economic insecurity, and there is prevalent evidence that economic insecurity affects people's view on the political system and their voting behaviour (see e.g. Mughan & Lacy 2002; Rueda 2005; Marx 2014). However, the empirical evidence of an effect of the insider-outsider divide on party preference is disputed. Two single country studies have found evidence of this, which qualifies the relevance of the insider-outsider divide as important for party choice (see Lindvall & Rueda 2012; Marx & Picot 2013). On the contrary, a comparative study by Emmenegger (2009) finds that temporary workers do not diverge systematically from permanent workers in their political preference.

The precariousness of the work situation based on type of contract, temporary or permanent, affects feelings of job security (Vulkan 2015). People in the labour market differ in their resources and how exposed they are to risks. Since the 1970s insiders are less exposed to unemployment and they also benefit from that outsiders act as buffer: outsiders are affected the hardest by economic fluctuations. Thus, insiders and outsiders are unequally exposed to risks: time-limited contracts means higher economic insecurity, which may affect political preferences. Temporary workers are particularly exposed to the risk of unemployment (Marx & Picot 2014). Hence, the insider-outsider divide have gained ground in relation to party preference and it is important to take it into consideration when understanding politics and policy development (Rueda 2005; Lindvall & Rueda 2012; Oskarson 2012; Vulkan 2015).

Another reason why the insider-outsider divide might be relevant in understanding the rise of anti-immigrant parties is that the divide creates a strategic dilemma for Social Democratic parties. Social Democratic parties usually promote labour interest, but all labour is not equally

vulnerable to unemployment. Social Democratic parties have strong incentives to consider insiders their main constituency. This is because insiders are more politically active; they outnumber the outsiders and are therefore an electorally more relevant group for Social Democratic parties (Rueda 2005). This might force outsiders to opt for more radical policy alternatives because they feel ignored and overlooked by mainstream parties (Rueda 2005; Rueda 2007; Lindvall & Rueda 2012). Hence, according to insider-outsider theory, temporary workers are not only insecure, but also politically marginalized.

To sum up, this thesis argues that the reason why the insider-outsider divide should translate into party support for anti-immigrant parties is twofold: (1) insiders and outsiders diverge in political preference due to differences in job security which is expected to fuel demand for anti-immigrant parties[5]. People who feel relatively deprived are more likely to support anti-immigrant parties (Betz 1994), (2) outsiders turn away from mainstream political parties because of political marginalization or alienation (Rueda 2005).

The argument of this thesis is that economic situation following from one's labour market position could explain why people vote for anti-immigrant parties. People who are disadvantaged or marginalised compared to other groups are more likely to exhibit anti-immigrant attitudes (Demker 2014). People in a more vulnerable economic situation are expected to support anti-immigrant parties to a greater extent than people in safer economic situations because of perceived economic threats as a consequence of their job insecurity. But in order to understand under which circumstances people vote for anti-immigrant parties it is also important to understand the role of labour market policies and institutions.


## Institutions, labour market policies and voting for anti-immigrant parties

That institution's affect citizens' political attitudes and behaviour is discussed in the extensive literature on institutional theory, and in the policy feedback literature (Kumlin & Stadelmann-

---

[5]There are some studies done on job insecurity and voting for anti-immigrant parties using other indicators of job insecurity than the insider-outsider divide. In a study by Bornschier & Kriesi (2013), job insecurity is measured by a factor referring to whether respondents have been unemployed in the past few years and how likely unemployment is in the next twelve months. Measured in that way, job insecurity plays no role in determining the vote for anti-immigrant parties. There is also some evidence that subjective insecurity is related to welfare-chauvinism attitudes; people who feel more threatened in their position are less willing to include immigrants into the welfare system (Mewes and Mau 2012).

Steffen 2014). Political institutions shape, constrain and affect the behaviour and preferences for both citizens and elites. Government constraints put on individuals are important sources of political behaviour (Pierson 1993). Consequently, policy feedback is the process in which enacted policies affect political preferences and action among citizens (Mettler & Soss 2004). Pierson (1993) identifies two ways in which feedback effects are likely to occur. First, institutions create both incentives and constraints for political participation, hence affecting what individuals see as possible or not. Second, in order for a policy to generate some sort of response from the public, the policy must be *visible* i.e. policy information must be spread among the public and *traceable* i.e. the public must be able to connect the policy outcome to actions taken by the government in order to respond to it. Put differently, if a policy feedback effect should occur, the citizenry must be able to directly or indirectly experience the products provided by the state through transfers or services (Solevid 2009).

In the context of this study, the policy feedback effect is twofold. First, policies are part of forming the insider-outsider divide. Governments can obstruct or facilitate the trend towards more non-standard employment such as temporary work. The structure of the workforce is a consequence of government policies, or the lack thereof. If there is an increased segmentation between people in the workforce, these newly created social categories can constitute new voting groups. If these groups diverge in their political preferences, it is a consequence of economic circumstances relative to the other group. Second, policies also shape the economic prospects of the new social group. The generosity of employment compensation in a country matters for individuals' perceptions of their economic insecurity. Policies shape the economic outlook of the two different groups. If these two groups, insider or outsider, differ systematically in their job security because of existing policies or a lack of government intervention it can be expected that these groups also differ in political preferences, which party they vote for, which could create a feedback effect into the political process (Marx & Picot 2014).

There are a few studies that empirically have tested the relationship between labour market policies and institutions or how welfare state arrangements affect voting patterns for anti-immigrant parties. Although they are all using other indicators than this thesis, they study the relationship between institutions and the electoral success of anti-immigrant parties in different ways. Halikiopoulou and Vlandas (2015) show that labour market policies and institutions play a role in explaining cross-country differences in the success of anti-immigrant parties. Labour market policies and institutions influence people's cost and risk assessment: where

unemployment benefits and dismissal regulations are high, unemployment has no effect on voting for anti-immigrant parties, but where either one of them is low, unemployment leads to higher support for these parties. Hence, they find that the design of labour market policies and institutions condition the impact of unemployment on anti-immigrant party support. Generous unemployment benefits can in itself reduce the support for these parties. The welfare state affects people's risk assessments that the voter support for parties that want to stop or reduce immigration is affected - regulation on the labour market and generous unemployment benefits will diminish the support that otherwise would have risen.

Swank and Betz (2003) analyse how globalization affects the support for anti-immigrant parties. They find a compensating effect of welfare state institutions on anti-immigrant party success. In a macro level model, they find that countries with high level of social protection are less likely to exhibit successful anti-immigrant parties because generous welfare state policies compensate and mitigate economic insecurity. However, both Halikiopoulou and Vlandas (2015) and Swank and Betz (2003) analyse the impact of institutions on the macro level, ignoring the micro level. Arzheimer's (2009) study, which aim is to explain cross country variation in anti-immigrant party success using multilevel modelling, shows that unemployment benefits play a role in support for anti-immigrant parties[6].

In sum, there is no consensus in the literature on how welfare state institutions and labour market regulations affect feelings of insecurity. While some argue that institutions, measured through levels of social expenditure as percentage of GDP and unemployment benefit replacement rate, explain varying levels of job security across countries (Anderson & Pontusson 2007) others conclude that institutions have minimal impact of feelings on security when other macro-economic and labour market contexts are taken into consideration (Chung & van Oorschot 2011). The different results seem to differ due to type of institutional arrangement. Chung and van Oorschot (2011) find that active labour market policies (ALMPs) and passive labour market policies (PLMPs) such as unemployment benefits, make people feel more secure rather than institutions that help individuals keep their current jobs, such as employment protection legislation (EPL).

Thus, there are some evidence that suggest that labour market institutions or certain welfare state arrangements can depress the success of anti-immigrant parties and feelings of insecurity,

---

[6] Arzheimer (2009) and Halikiopoulou and Vlandas (2015) are using different indicators for measuring labour market policies.

and that institutions can have a 'protective' effect on the electoral success of anti-immigrant parties.

## Theoretical conclusion, proposed mechanism and hypotheses

This thesis have so far discussed, theoretically, why employment contract should affect voting behaviour for anti-immigrant parties, and the role of labour market policies and institutions. By combining these different strands of literature, this section will lay out the conclusion of the theoretical discussion, the proposed mechanism and present the hypothesis of the thesis.

### *Why insiders and outsiders should diverge in their political preference for anti-immigrant parties and the role of labour market policies and institutions*

Labour markets have, due to structural changes and transformations as a consequence of globalization, de-nationalization and increased international competition, changed the last decades. This is especially visible in the emergence of growing service sectors, and an increase in atypical employment such as temporary contracts instead of permanent contracts. According to Rueda (2005) these changes have created two segments on the labour market, insiders and outsiders, whom diverge in job security. Insiders and outsiders are assumed to diverge in their political preferences, as a consequence of their employment contract. Having an insecure employment contract give rise to feelings of economic insecurity, or relative deprivation compared to the other social group, and is in this thesis theorized to cause demand for anti-immigrant parties. Citizens that perceive themselves in an economically vulnerable or marginalized position may be more afraid of increased competition from immigrants[7]. One of several theoretical explanations in research on what cause demand for anti-immigrant parties is that people vote for these parties because they feel deprived, or are expecting deprivation and a worsening economic situation. Hence, outsiders are in more economic vulnerable positions, and are therefore expected to vote for anti-immigrant parties to a higher extent than insiders. Insiders and outsiders may also be unequally entitled for different unemployment insurances, which make outsiders more insecure than insiders.

> Hypothesis 1 (H1): Due to higher economic risk, the probability of voting for anti-immigrant parties is higher among outsiders compared to insiders.

---

[7] That increased immigration result in an actual competition over for example jobs has no support in research, people rather presuppose that increased immigration may result in increased competition (Demker 2014).

Recent studies have shown that labour market policies and institutions can have a 'protective' effect on anti-immigrant party success. Of the labour market institutions that are set up to provide security for individuals, the main focus in previous research has been on ALMPs, PLMPs and EPL. ALMPs and PLMPs have been shown to decrease feelings of insecurity on the labour market (see e.g. Chung & van Oorschot 2011), and support for anti-immigrant parties should therefore be lower in countries with more generous labour market policies.

Hypothesis 2a (H2a): More generous labour market policies lower the voter's probability to vote for anti-immigrant parties.

What role EPL plays for providing security for workers is ambiguous. EPL makes it harder for employers to dismiss workers, and some argue that EPL increase feelings of insecurity, whereas other argue that EPL do not have any significant impact of individual's security perceptions (Chung & van Oorschot 2011). However, there are some evidence that strictness of EPL is related to voting support for anti-immigrant parties: Halikiopoulou & Vlandas (2015) show that unemployment fuels support for anti-immigrant parties less in countries with strict EPL for permanent workers.

Hypothesis 2b (H2b): The stricter EPL, the lower the probability to vote for anti-immigrant parties.

Turning back to the role of the insider-outsider divide, the effect of employment contract on anti-immigrant party support is assumed to be lower in countries with more comprehensive and generous labour market policies and more protective institutions. Labour market policies and institutions compensate for the feeling of insecurity as a consequence of an insecure employment contract (Arzheimer 2009). A more comprehensive policy, with more generous labour market policies, leads to people feeling less threatened compared to people in countries with less generous labour market polices. ALMPs and PLMPs have in previous research shown to matter for people's feeling of security (see e.g. Chung & van Oorschot 2011) and there are, as discussed above, some evidence that the strictness of EPL play a role. This thesis argues that people in more protected countries (i.e. where spending on ALMPs and PLMPs is larger or EPL

is stricter) are less likely to vote for anti-immigrant parties and this despite a relatively insecure employment contract. In countries with more generous labour market policies, people believe that institutions will help if one ends up in a precarious position. The risk of unemployment and economic loss due to an insecure employment contract can thus be compensated for by labour market policies and institutions.

> Hypothesis 3 (H3): The probability to vote for an anti-immigrant party is lower among outsiders in countries with more generous labour market policies and institutions, compared to outsiders in countries with less generous labour market policies and institutions.

The hypotheses are visualized in figure 2. H1 represent the direct effect of the insider-outsider divide on the probability of voting for an anti-immigrant party. H2a and H2b is the direct effect of labour market policies and institutions on voting for anti-immigrant parties. H2a and H2b test the impact of macro level factors such as labour market policies and institutions on the probability of voting for anti-immigrant parties. H3 represent the conditioned relationship of labour market policies: if labour market policies affect voting on anti-immigrant parties differently depending on type of contract.

**Figure 2**. Theoretical model

```
                    ┌─────────────────────────┐
                    │ Labour market policies  │
                    │ and institutions        │
                    └─────────────────────────┘
                              │           \
                              │            \  H2a+b
                           H3 │             \
                              │              \
                              ↓               ↘
┌──────────────────────┐         ┌────────────────────────────────┐
│ Employment contract  │────────→│ Voting for anti-immigrant party│
└──────────────────────┘   H1    └────────────────────────────────┘
```

This thesis argues for a causal chain that goes from employment contract, which affect feelings of security on the labour market, to increased likelihood of voting for anti-immigrant parties.

The opposite causal order, that voting for anti-immigrant party affect a person's employment contract does not seem probable.

In the following section will the data and methods, which are used to test the hypothesis empirically, be presented.

## Data, selection of cases and operationalizations

### *Data*

The individual level data comes from European Social Survey (ESS). ESS is an academically driven cross-national survey that has been performed every two year since 2001. The aim of ESS is to investigate people's attitudes, beliefs and behaviour in European countries. A cross-sectional sample of the population in each country is selected and interviewed face-to-face (ESS 2016). ESS is suitable for the empirical analysis because it includes questions on both employment contract and voting behaviour. The empirical findings in this thesis are based mainly on ESS round 7 from 2014. Where data from the ESS survey from 2014 is missing, data from a previous year is used in order to get as large sample and cover as many countries as possible. In table 1 are the ESS years used for each country reported. In total 19 countries are included in this study. Some countries are excluded due to missing context data and some countries are excluded because they do not have a successful anti-immigrant party[8]. This thesis only includes countries where at least one anti-immigrant party has won political representation. To end up in the sample a requirement is that the country have an anti-immigrant party in any round of the ESS[9]. Table 1 show the proportion and the actual number of individuals in the sample who state that they have voted for an anti-immigrant party[10].

---

[8]ESS includes in total 36 countries. 14 countries are omitted in the analysis because they do not have a successful anti-immigrant party. Three countries (Croatia, Romania and Bulgaria) are omitted due to missing data on either the indicators for labour market policies or employment protection legislation.

[9]It could be argued that countries where the immigration issue has *not* been politicized, i.e. where no anti-immigrant parties exist, also should be included in the analysis. Including negative cases should just expand the sample on one side. The aim of this thesis is, given that it exists a supply of anti-immigrant parties, see how labour market policies and institutions affect voting for these parties.

[10] See appendix 2 for full names and sources of coding for the anti-immigrant parties.

**Table 1.** Countries, parties and number of observations

| Country | ESS year used | Anti-immigrant-party (AIP) | N observations (voters only) in sample | N AIP voters in sample | Proportion of AIP voters in sample (%) | Score in corresponding election (%) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Austria | 2014 | FPÖ, BZÖ | 1094 | 166 | 15,2 | FPÖ: 20.5, BZÖ: 3.53 |
| Belgium | 2014 | VB, FN | 1360 | 78 | 5,7 | VB: 3.7, FN: <1 |
| Switzerland | 2014 | SVP, LEGA | 671 | 135 | 20,1 | SVP: 27, LEGA: 1 |
| Czech Republic | 2014 | Usvit | 1121 | 44 | 3,9 | 6,9 |
| Denmark | 2014 | DF | 1179 | 143 | 12,1 | 13,9 |
| Estonia | 2014 | EKRE, EIP | 1029 | 12 | 1,2 | EKRE: 2,1, EIP: 0,4 |
| Finland | 2014 | PS | 1345 | 187 | 13,9 | 19,1 |
| France | 2014 | FN | 1060 | 126 | 11,9 | 13,6 |
| Great Britain | 2014 | UKIP | 1401 | 104 | 7,4 | 12,7 |
| Greece | 2010 | GD, LAOS | 1271 | 56 | 4,4 | GD: 0,3, LAOS: 5,6 |
| Hungary | 2014 | Jobbik | 855 | 159 | 18,6 | 16,7 |
| Italy | 2012 | LN | 536 | 8 | 1,5 | 4,1 |
| Lithuania | 2014 | TT | 1045 | 101 | 9,7 | 7,3 |
| Netherlands | 2014 | PVV | 1353 | 109 | 8,1 | 10,1 |
| Norway | 2014 | FrP | 1083 | 136 | 12,6 | 16,3 |
| Poland | 2014 | PiS | 779 | 261 | 33,5 | 29,9 |
| Sweden | 2014 | SD | 1437 | 71 | 4,9 | 12,9 |
| Slovenia | 2012 | SNP | 644 | 10 | 1,6 | 1,8 |
| Slovakia | 2010 | SNP | 1111 | 37 | 3,3 | 5,1 |

A comparison between the anti-immigrant parties score in the election and score in ESS suggest that the ESS survey underestimates anti-immigrant parties' success to a large extent. This is not something new: underestimation of the success of anti-immigrant parties is a constant feature of surveys. This is often explained by socially conformist behaviour. People do not want to admit that they voted for an anti-immigrant party, because these parties are stigmatized. This combined with that voters who support anti-immigrant parties participate less in surveys compared to other voters leads to underestimation. Previous studies often notice the problem of underestimation, and state that it is important to bear in mind rather than solving it in any specific way (see e.g. Oesch 2008). The problem of underestimation results in it being harder to get significant results.

Data for the context variables is taken from either OECD statistics or Eurostat. Following Halikiopoulou and Vlandas (2015), data for all context variables, both for labour market indicators and the context control variables, are taken from the year before the election in each country take place. The rationale behind this is that voters evaluate the situation prior to the election.

## Dependent variable

The dependent variable, voting for anti-immigrant party, is measured using the question "what party did you vote for in the last election". The variable is dichotomized and recoded so that 1 means voting for an anti-immigrant party and 0, all other parties. Two problems of validity are related to the dependent variable. First, as Marx and Picot (2014) note, there might be a problem using the survey question on vote choice in last election since we do not know the respondent's employment contract at the time of the election. This has implications for the validity of the measurement. Therefore, following Marx and Picot (2014) the party identification variable "is there a particular party that you feel closer to than all the other parties?- which one?" will also be used as dependent variable as robustness check. Second, another problem related to the dependent variable is that people forget what they voted for in the last election (Waldahl & Aardal 1982). Ultimately, the best measure would have been a question on current vote intention or party sympathy at the moment. The ESS survey does not include such a question and therefore the question of vote choice in last election is used. These two validity problems related to the dependent variable are important to bear in mind, because they may affect the results and conclusions that can be drawn. However, this thesis tries to account for these problems by using the party identification variable as dependent variable to check the robustness of the results.

## Focal independent variable

The focal independent variable measuring the insider-outsider divide, employment contract, is operationalized using the question that asks the respondents if they have a work contract that is of unlimited or limited duration. This variable is recoded so that 1 means limited, i.e. including respondents with limited contract, and 0 means all the respondents with unlimited contract. In this thesis it is expected that type of contract, if you are an insider or outsider, affect your probability to vote for anti-immigrant parties. Individuals with limited work contract are expected to be more insecure, because they have less job security, and are therefore theorized to be more likely to vote for anti-immigrant parties.

People who are marginalized on the labour market, or perceive themselves as disadvantaged vis-à-vis other groups, are more likely to support anti-immigrant parties[11].

*Intervening variables at contextual level*

The country-level institutional variables are level of spending on ALMPs, PLMPs, and the EPL index for permanent and temporary workers. This thesis expects that labour market policies and institutions both have an independent effect on voting for anti-immigrant parties and an interaction effect. When the indicators for labour market policies or institutions are interacted with type of contract, the labour market policies and institutions affect people with limited and unlimited contracts probability to vote for anti-immigrant parties differently. Outsiders in countries with more generous labour market policies and stricter EPL are less likely to support anti-immigrant parties compared to outsiders in countries with less generous labour market policies and less strict EPL.

ALMPs and PLMPs is the percent of GDP that a country spends on these policies. The larger proportion, the larger percent of a country's GDP is spent on ALMPs and PLMPs.

ALMPs main aim is to help individuals back to work once becoming unemployed. ALMPs include spending on public employment services and administration, labour market training, programs for youths when in transition from school to work, programs to provide or promote employment for unemployed and programs for disabled. ALMPs are assumed to make workers more secure because they increase the skills of unemployed, by training programmes as well as by helping in job search activities (Chung & Mau 2014).

PLMPs are unemployment benefits, and provide economic security for those who have lost their jobs. Unemployment benefits provide security for workers because they mean that workers have income security if they become unemployed (Chung & Mau 2014; Anderson & Pontusson 2007).

The two EPL indices are developed by OECD and refer to rules concerning dismissal of employees; for individual layoffs, for collective layoffs and rules for temporary contracts (Berglund & Wallinder 2015). The EPL indices are ranging from 0 to 6, meaning the higher EPL index, the lower risk of losing a job. The higher the EPL index, the stricter the job

---

[11]According to insider-outsider theory, outsiders are people who are unemployed, employed temporary contracts, employed part time or studying (Rueda 2005). In this thesis, only people with limited contract are considered outsiders and are coded in the outsider category. People with no contract are excluded in the analysis. It is important to have in mind that this thesis only test this part of the insider-outsider divide. However, the exact same regressions where also ran where people with no contract where coded in the outsider category, and the overall result are the same as when they are excluded.

protection is in a country. EPL is put in place to protect workers from unfair dismissal. In this thesis, two measures of EPL are used, EPL for regular contracts and EPL for temporary contracts. EPL for regular contracts protects people from individual and collective dismissals. EPL for temporary contracts refers to the rules affecting standard fixed-term contracts and temporary-work-agency employment (OECD 2004). The two indicators for regular and temporary workers cannot be directly compared to each other, it only serves as cross-country comparisons of the strictness of the respective contract type (Marx & Picot 2014). Table 2 present the labour market indicators for the 19 countries included in this study.

**Table 2.** Country level determinants: labour market characteristics

| Country | ALMPs (% of GDP) | PLMPs (% of GDP) | EPL for regular contracts (0-6) | EPL for temporary contracts (0-6) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Austria | 0,55 | 1,25 | 2,44 | 2,17 |
| Belgium | 0,53 | 2,05 | 2,99 | 2,42 |
| Switzerland | 0,49 | 0,74 | 2,1 | 1,38 |
| Czech Republic | 0,14 | 0,23 | 2,66 | 2,13 |
| Denmark | 1,36 | 1,74 | 2,27 | 1,79 |
| Estonia | 0,13 | 0,85 | 2,07 | 2,29 |
| Finland | 0,83 | 1,71 | 2,17 | 1,88 |
| France | 0,66 | 1,36 | 2,165 | 1,96 |
| Great Britain | 0,05 | 0,33 | 1,68 | 0,48 |
| Greece | 0,14 | 0,46 | 2,85 | 3,17 |
| Hungary | 0,7 | 0,34 | 2,07 | 2 |
| Italy | 0,34 | 1,56 | 3,03 | 2,71 |
| Lithuania | 0,18 | 0,29 | 2,42 | 3,21 |
| Netherlands | 0,68 | 1,36 | 2,88 | 1,17 |
| Norway | 0,41 | 0,34 | 2,31 | 3,04 |
| Poland | 0,59 | 0,34 | 2,39 | 2,33 |
| Sweden | 1,07 | 0,68 | 2,52 | 1,17 |
| Slovenia | 0,39 | 0,66 | 2,7 | 2,5 |
| Slovakia | 0,15 | 0,66 | 2,63 | 2,17 |

**Note:** Version 3 for the EPL indices are used. The EPL indices exist in three version each. Version 1 and 2 does not incorporate all the data items of version 3. Therefore, version 3 should always be used if it is available.
**Source**: OECD statistics and Eurostat

Higher level of spending on ALMPs and PLMPs, and a stricter EPL, are expected to influence people's feelings of security, and in a second step their probability to vote for anti-immigrant parties. People in more protected countries are less likely to vote for anti-immigrant parties because they feel more secure. The indicators of ALMPs, PLMPs and EPL are well-established measurements in the labour market literature when investigating the role of labour market institutions and policies (see e.g. Chung and van Oorschot 2011; Chung and Mau 2014; Berglund and Wallinder 2015).

*Control variables at individual and contextual level*

At the individual level, the model includes the control variables gender, age (four categories), domicile and educational level. These socio-demographic characteristics have in previous research been identified as important for understanding who votes for anti-immigrant parties[12]. Male voters tend to be overrepresented among the electorate of anti-immigrant parties (Givens 2004). There are also differences between age groups; young people are more susceptible to the appeal of anti-immigrant parties (Arzheimer 2009), although there is some evidence that the age differences are diminishing or even reversed (Demker 2014; Sannerstedt 2016). Highly educated are less likely to vote for anti-immigrant parties compared to people with low education (Kitschelt 2007). Educational level is defined by the international standard classification of education (ISCED). People on the countryside are more inclined to vote for anti-immigrant parties compared to people living in cities (Demker 2014). The control variables also affect the focal independent variable: temporary employed are more often young people (OECD 2016). People with low education are more often temporary employed compared to people with higher education. However, there are no large gender differences in temporary employment, and thus only affects the dependent variable as described above (Eurostat 2016).

A variable that captures cultural factors of anti-immigrant feelings will be included as a rival independent variable. Previous research is inconclusive whether people oppose immigration due to economic or cultural reasons, and some argue that cultural factors matter more than economic factors. The variable measuring cultural determinants is based on the question in ESS where respondents have to position themselves on the following statement: "Country's cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants". This is a measure of cultural factors that has been used in previous research multiple times before when testing rival hypothesis between economic and cultural factors (see e.g. Oesch 2008; Halikiopoulou &

---

[12] For details on exact coding procedure for all variables see appendix 1.

Vlandas 2015). In all models a control variable for ESS round is included as well as country fixed effects to eliminate country heterogeneities.

Three control variables at the contextual level will also be included to account for potential country level confounders. These are unemployment rate, total immigration and real GDP growth and are the most important context control variables identified in previous research. Unemployment rate as percentage of total is included because it captures the largest problem in the labour market and receives a lot of attention from the public. When unemployment is high, it could lead to exclusionist's reactions from the in-group (Coffe´ et al. 2007). However, the empirical test of how level of unemployment affect voting on anti-immigrant parties have showed varying results, some find an insignificant relationship (Lubbers et al. 2002, Swank & Betz 2003), others a negative relationship (Arzheimer & Carter 2006). Jackman & Volpert (1996) show a positive and significant relationship between level of unemployment and voting for anti-immigrant parties. Whether total immigration to a country have an impact on support for anti-immigrant parties is still an open question, some find support that more immigration increases the support for anti-immigrant parties, whereas others do not find such a relationship (Rydgren 2008). Real GDP growth is included to control for the overall economic progress in a country. The reason for including Real GDP is that it is expected that people in worse economic times are more likely to vote for anti-immigrant parties. One reason behind this assumption is that competition between people increase when resources are scarce (Coffe et al. 2007).

The years chosen for the control variables at the context level follows the same logic as the indicators for labour market policies and institutions: data is taken from the year prior the election in each country.

*Statistical method*

Since voting for an anti-immigrant party, which is the dependent variable, is dichotomous taking on the values 0 or 1, logistic regression is an appropriate method. However, the data have a hierarchical structure including variables measured at different levels. The first level includes individuals and the second level includes country-level variables such as labour market policies and institutions. This is because national variation is assumed to have consequences on individual inhabitants: people in more protected countries are assumed to be less likely to vote for anti-immigrant parties. If data is nested, the independence assumption is violated. But by using multilevel-modelling the problem of dependency between observations can be solved (Hox 2002). Multilevel models allow that both intercepts and slopes vary across contexts, which

is beneficial if the interest is in cross-country differences (Field 2009). The advantage with multilevel models is that it allows researchers to understand whether lower level variables change as a function of higher-order moderating variables. Such cross-level interaction is used when investigating the conditioning role of labour market policies and institutions as expressed in H3. This thesis expects that lower level relationships depend on higher-level factors (Aguinis et al. 2013).

The analysis is structured as follows: several multilevel logistic regressions are conducted, and the result for respective labour market policy or institution will be presented in four tables. The results will be presented in several steps. First, an empty model will include only the dependent variable. Here the intra-class correlation (ICC) coefficient is interesting since it shows how much variation in the dependent variable that is at the country level. Second, an analysis is done only including the individual level variables and country fixed effects, in order to test hypothesis 1, if people with limited contract are more likely to vote for anti-immigrant parties. Third, the bivariate relationship between respective indicator for the labour market policy or institution will be added in order to test hypothesis 2a and 2b, how spending on labour market polices or the strictness of EPL affect voting for anti-immigrant parties. Then, all individual level and context controls will be included in one model. Degrees of freedom relate to the number of observations that are free to vary in a model (Field 2009). In order to save degrees of freedom due to a relative small number of countries, the numbers of context controls are reduced compared to what is presented above. Only context controls which are significant are included in the final analyses, meaning that unemployment rate is excluded in the analysis when investigating the role of ALMPs, and all context controls are excluded in the analysis of PLMPs. Unemployment rate and total immigration is excluded in the analyses of EPL[13]. All models discussed so far allows for a random intercept but fixed slope. The second last model includes all variables but allows for a random slope effect for type of contract. The random slope model allows the explanatory variable, type of contract, to have a different effect for each country. In the last model a cross-level interaction between respective labour market policy or institution and type of contract is included to test hypothesis 3. Inclusion of the random slope effect of type contract means that moving from unlimited to limited contract means different things in different countries. If the results are robust for these specifications and the coefficient for the random slope decreases between the two last models, less unexplained variance is left

---

in the model meaning that the indicator for labour market policy or institution explains a part of the variation (the standard deviation decrease).


## Results

In this section the results of the empirical analysis will be presented. The analysis starts with a null specification model. Model 0 in table 3 include only the dependent variable, voting for anti-immigrant party[14]. In model 0 the ICC coefficient is most interesting. The ICC value, 0,208, can be translated into 20,8 percent, meaning that 20,8 percent of the variability in the dependent variable is at the country level. This means that multilevel logistic regression is an appropriate tool to account for the nested data.

Furthermore, in model 1 the focal independent variable, type of contract, is included together with all individual level control variables in order to test hypothesis 1. There is no significant association between type of contract and voting for anti-immigrant parties, the expected positive relationship is not found. Hypothesis 1 is thus not supported.

---

[14]The tables in the result section just show the coefficients for the variables of main interest, namely type of contract, respective indicator for labour market policy or institution and the interactions. See appendix 3 for full tables where all coefficients for the control variables are presented. Concerning the individual level controls, they mainly follow the expected pattern. Predicted probabilities for the significant individual level controls was calculated, holding all other variables constant. Females are less likely to vote for anti-immigrant parties compared to men. The predicted probability to vote for an anti-immigrant party is 7,1 percent among males compared to 5,1 percent among females. People with tertiary education are less likely to vote for anti-immigrant parties compared to people with less than lower secondary education. The predicted probability to vote for an anti-immigrant party for people with the highest education is 3,2 percent, whereas it is 7,5 percent for people with the lowest educational level. Older people are less likely to vote for anti-immigrant parties compared to the youngest. The predicted probability to vote for an anti-immigrant party is 4,3 percent for an individual who is 65 years or older compared to 6,5 percent for an individual who is between 15-29 years old. People living on the countryside are more likely to vote for anti-immigrant parties compared to people living in bigger cities. The predicted probability to vote for an anti-immigrant party among people living in a big city is 5,3 percent, compared to 7,2 percent among people living in a farm or on the country side. People who agree on the statement that immigration undermine cultural life are more likely to vote for anti-immigrant parties. The predicted probability to vote for an anti-immigrant party is 1,8 percent for an individual who have the lowest value on the culture variable (i.e who think cultural life is enriched by immigration) compared to 24,1 percent for an individual with the highest value on the culture variable (i.e who think cultural life is undermined by immigration). Cultural factors and educational level is thus the strongest individual level predictors for voting for anti-immigrant parties. The context controls show that an increase in the number of immigrants to a country, the higher probability to vote for anti-immigrant parties. One unit increase in real GDP growth, the higher probability to vote for anti-immigrant parties.

**Table 3.** Multilevel logistic regression results. Effect of ALMPs on voting for anti-immigrant parties.

| | Model 0 | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 | Model 5 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Type of contract (0 unlimited, 1 limited) | | -.036 (.092) | | -.036 (.092) | -.062 (.118) | -.419 (.238) |
| ALMPs | | | 1.183* (.581) | 1.296** (.499) | 1.263* (.522) | 1.243* (.497) |
| Type of contract*ALMPs | | | | | | .587 (.320) |
| *Individual level controls* | No | Yes | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| *Country level controls* | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| | | | | | | |
| Fixed intercept | -2.512*** (.217) | -4.650*** (.635) | -3.097*** (.351) | -4.268*** (.558) | -4.234*** (.575) | -4.200*** (.559) |
| Random intercept | .930 (.160) | .833 (.143) | .840 (.145) | .626 (.109) | .624 (.110) | .621 (.109) |
| Random slope (type of contract) | | | | | .163 (.200) | .132 (.212) |
| ICC | .208 | | | | | |
| Log Likelihood | -4690.882 | -4118.551 | -4688.995 | -4113.353 | -4113.237 | -4111.428 |
| Countries | 19 | 19 | 19 | 19 | 19 | 19 |
| N | 15,918 | 15,918 | 15,918 | 15,518 | 15,518 | 15,518 |

**Note**: Dependent variable vote for anti-immigrant party (0- all parties, 1- anti-immigrant party).
Standard errors in parentheses, significance levels: *** $p<0.001$, ** $p<0.01$, * $p<0.05$.

In model 2 the variable for spending on ALMPs is included. There is a significant positive relationship between level of spending on ALMPs and probability to vote for anti-immigrant parties. Contrary to what expected in hypothesis 2a, the more countries spend on ALMPs the higher probability to vote for anti-immigrant parties. Model 3 includes all control variables at the individual and contextual level and the significant relationship between spending on ALMPs and voting for anti-immigrant parties remains positive and significant. Model 4 is identical to previous model, but allows for a random slope of type of contract. The results are robust for these specifications. In model 5 a cross-level interaction between type of contract and ALMPs is done, in order to test hypothesis 3: if level of government spending on ALMPs affects people's probability to vote for anti-immigrant parties differently between contract types. Model 5 show that there is no significant interaction effect. There is no significant difference between people with unlimited and limited contract. The trend is the same irrespective of type of contract. The relationship between ALMPs and voting for anti-immigrant parties remain positive and significant. In table 3 it can also be seen that the random slope coefficient for type of contract decreases between model 4 and 5, indicating that less unexplained variance is in the model after including ALMP, hence ALMPs explain a part of the variation.

To visualise the result, figure 3 shows the predicted probability to vote for an anti-immigrant party under different levels of ALMP, for all contract types, while all other variables are held at their means.

**Figure 3.** Predicted probabilities to vote for anti-immigrant party under different levels of ALMPs.



**Note**: Adjusted Predictions with 95% confidence intervals.

Figure 3 shows that the more a country spends on ALMPs, the higher probability to vote for anti-immigrant parties[15].

As a robustness check, the same regressions where ran with party identification as dependent variable[16]. These analyses confirm the results: the more a country spends on ALMPs, the higher probability to identify with an anti-immigrant party. The coefficient for ALMPs is significant, and goes in the same direction, the more spending on ALMPs, the higher probability

---

[15] The reason why the confidence intervals are large on higher values on ALMPs is because there are fewer observations with higher values on ALMPs compared with lower values.
[16] All the tables for the regressions with party identification with anti-immigrant party as dependent variable can be found in appendix 4.

to identify with anti-immigrant parties. There is no significant interaction effect. So far, the robustness check confirms the results.

Table 4 present the results from the analyses between level of spending on PLMPs, type of contract and voting for anti-immigrant parties.  Model 1 shows the bivariate association between PLMPs and voting for anti-immigrant parties. There is no statistically significant association between spending on PLMPs and voting for anti-immigrant parties.

**Table 4.** Multilevel logistic regression results. Effect of PLMPs on voting for anti-immigrant parties.

|  | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Type of contract (0 unlimited, 1 limited) |  | -.037 (.092) | -.089 (.125) | -.197 (.223) |
| PLMPs | -.060 (.380) | .130 (.323) | .0979 (.322) | .123 (.320) |
| Type of contract*PLMPs |  |  |  | .111 (.181) |
| *Individual level controls* | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| *Country level controls* | No | No | No | No |
| Fixed intercept | -2.458*** (.402) | -4.287*** (.651) | -4.183*** (.663) | -4.189*** (.653) |
| Random intercept | .929 (.160) | .758 (.132) | .750 (.132) | .749 (.131) |
| Random slope (type of contract ) |  |  | .195 (.189) | .208 (.179) |
| Log Likelihood | -4690.870 | -4116.961 | -4116.612 | -4116.421 |
| Countries | 19 | 19 | 19 | 19 |
| N | 15,918 | 15,518 | 15,518 | 15,518 |

**Note**: Dependent variable vote for anti-immigrant party (0- all parties, 1- anti-immigrant party).
Standard errors in parentheses, significance levels: *** $p<0.001$, ** $p<0.01$, * $p<0.05$.

Model 2 includes all control variables at the individual level and model 3 adds the random slope effect of type of contract. The association between PLMPs and voting for anti-immigrant parties becomes positive but is not statistically significant. Model 4 includes the interaction between PLMPs and type of contract. The interaction is not statistically significant, meaning that there is no significant difference between people with unlimited and limited contract. Taken together, the results show that there is no significant association between level of spending on PLMPs and voting for anti-immigrant parties, or a statistically significant interaction effect.

The same regressions where ran with party identification as dependent variable. The overall results for PLMPs are the same as with vote for anti-immigrant party as dependent variable, with just some minor differences. No support for hypothesis 2a is found, rather there is evidence pointing in the other direction than expected theoretically.

Turning to the result of the EPL, table 5 present the results from the analysis of EPL for regular workers, type of contract and voting for anti-immigrant parties. Model 1 shows the bivariate association between EPL for regular workers and voting for anti-immigrant parties. Model 1 shows that there is no significant association between strictness of EPL for regular workers and voting for anti-immigrant parties.

**Table 5.** Multilevel logistic regression results. Effect of EPL for regular workers on voting for anti-immigrant parties.

|  | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Type of contract (0 unlimited, 1 limited) |  | -.036 (.092) | -.100 (.129) | -.035 (.842) |
| EPL regular | -1.037 (.575) | -.490 (.596) | -.538 (.587) | -.543 (.593) |
| Type of contract*EPL regular |  |  |  | -.027 (.343) |
| *Individual level controls* | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| *Country level controls* | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Fixed intercept | .016 (1.414) | -2.859 (1.771) | -2.619 (1.763) | -2.607 (1.776) |
| Random intercept | .856 (.148) | .744 (.131) | .734 (.130) | .734 (.130) |
| Random slope (type of contract ) |  |  | .212 (.186) | .210 (.189) |
| Log Likelihood | -4689.378 | -4116.712 | -4116.259 | -4116.256 |
| Countries | 19 | 19 | 19 | 19 |
| N | 15,918 | 15,518 | 15,518 | 15,518 |

**Note**: Dependent variable vote for anti-immigrant party (0- all parties, 1- anti-immigrant party).
Standard errors in parentheses, significance levels: *** $p<0.001$, ** $p<0.01$, * $p<0.05$.

In model 2, type of contract and all relevant control variables at individual and contextual level are added. The coefficient for EPL is not statistically significant. Model 3 allows for a random slope effect and in model 4 the interaction between type of contract and EPL for regular workers is added. Taken together, there is no significant association between strictness of EPL for regular workers and voting for anti-immigrant parties. The interaction is not statistically significant.

The same regressions where ran with party identification as dependent variable. In the robustness check, a significant negative association is found in a bivariate analysis between EPL for regular workers and identifying with anti-immigrant parties. The significant relationship disappears when control variables are added. Taken together, the results from the robustness check goes in the same direction and confirms the results.

Lastly, in table 6, the results from the analysis of EPL for temporary workers, type of contract and voting for anti-immigrant parties are presented. Model 1 tests the bivariate association between EPL for temporary workers and voting for anti-immigrant parties. There is no significant association between strictness of EPL for temporary workers and voting for anti-immigrant parties.

**Table 6.** Multilevel logistic regression results. Effect of EPL for temporary workers on voting for anti-immigrant parties.

|  | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Type of contract (0 unlimited, 1 limited) |  | .036 (.092) | -.081 (.124) | .214 (.332) |
| EPL temporary | -.194 (.311) | -.447 (.343) | -.412 (.346) | -.431 (.340) |
| Type of contract*EPL temporary |  |  |  | -.145 (.157) |
| *Individual level controls* | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| *Country level controls* | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Fixed intercept | -2.106** (.686) | -2.799** (1.249) | -2.843** (1.244) | -2.778** (1.241) |
| Random intercept | .922 (.158) | .726 (.128) | .720 (.127) | .719 (.127) |
| Random slope (type of contract ) |  |  | .184 (.192) | .165 (.206) |
| Log Likelihood | -4590.689 | -4116.230 | -4115.984 | -4115.565 |
| Countries | 19 | 19 | 19 | 19 |
| N | 15,918 | 15,518 | 15,518 | 15,518 |

**Note**: Dependent variable vote for anti-immigrant party (0- all parties, 1- anti-immigrant party).
Standard errors in parentheses, significance levels: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.

In model 2, type of contract and all relevant control variables at individual and contextual level are added. The coefficients for type of contract and EPL remain insignificant. Model 3 allows for a random slope effect and model 4 includes the interaction between EPL for temporary workers and type of contract. Taken together, the results show no significant association between strictness of EPL for temporary workers and the probability to vote for anti-immigrant parties. There is no statistically significant interaction effect.

The same regressions where ran with party identification as dependent variable. In contrast to when voting for anti-immigrant party was used as dependent variable, the results are significant[17]. These analyses find the expected negative relationship: the stricter the EPL for

---

[17]The regression table and a plot presenting predicted probabilities are presented in appendix 4.

temporary workers, the lower the probability to identify with an anti-immigrant party. A significant interaction effect is also found between type of contract and EPL for temporary workers. Since these results only are visible in the robustness check, no large conclusions should be drawn from them. Despite that the robustness check show a weak tendency towards that stricter EPL for temporary workers lower the probability to identify with anti-immigrant parties, hypothesis 2b is rejected.

To sum up, the overall results are conclusive. There is no significant relationship between type of contract and voting for anti-immigrant parties. People with limited contracts are *not* more likely to vote for anti-immigrant parties compared to people with unlimited contracts. Hypothesis 1 is thus not supported. Contrary to what hypothesis 2a expects, the empirical analysis shows the higher level a country spend on ALMPs, the higher the probability to vote for anti-immigrant parties. There is no significant association between level of spending on PLMPs and voting for anti-immigrant parties. Hypothesis 2a is not supported, rather, there is evidence pointing in the opposite direction. The empirical analysis do not presents evidence of an association between strictness of EPL and voting for anti-immigrant parties. There are no convincing evidence suggesting that the stricter EPL, the lower provability to vote for anti-immigrant parties. Hypothesis 2b is thus not supported. No support is found for hypothesis 3, no moderating effect of labour market policies and institutions are found in the cross-level interactions between labour market policies or institutions and type of contract. Labour market policies or institutions do not moderate the impact of type of contract on voting for anti-immigrant parties. There is no different effect of labour market policies or institutions between contract types[18].

**Concluding discussion**

This thesis started out with the observation that the structure of the labour market in industrialized economies has changed during the last decades. There has been an increase in atypical employment, such as limited contracts and part time jobs. Some argue that this has implications for political behaviour and that the insider-outsider divide can constitute new groups for political mobilization. Alongside with the changes on the labour market have new types of parties' emerged- anti-immigrant parties. New evidence suggests that labour market

---

[18]All regressions in this thesis were also run without the variable measuring cultural determinants of anti-immigrant attitudes. Because there is a divide in previous research whether economic or cultural attitudes matter more. If the culture-variable is excluded, no differences in the overall results are found.

policies and institution can mitigate the success of anti-immigrant parties, because they compensate for the cost and risk of unemployment (Halikiopoulou & Vlandas 2015). This thesis aim was to investigate the relationship between the insider-outsider divide, voting for anti-immigrant parties and the role of labour market policies and institutions. The proposed mechanism was that features of the welfare state, labour market policies and institutions, could reduce feeling of insecurity as a consequence of an insecure position on the labour market. More specifically, this thesis tested whether people with insecure employment contracts are less likely to vote for anti-immigrant parties in countries with more generous labour market policies and institutions. The overall results point in the same direction: few associations between type of contract, labour market policies and institutions and voting for anti-immigrant parties is found. There is no support for hypothesis 1, that is, no significant association between type of contract and voting for anti-immigrant parties. Outsiders are not more prone to support anti-immigrant politics compared to insiders. Some evidence of an association between labour market policies and institutions and voting for anti-immigrant parties is found. Contrary to what was expected by hypothesis 2a, the *higher* level of spending on ALMPs in a country, the *higher* probability to vote for anti-immigrant parties. There are no evidence suggesting that the stricter EPL, the lower provability to vote for anti-immigrant parties. Hypothesis 2b is thus not supported. No interaction effect is found: type of contract, being an insider or outsider, does not affect voting for anti-immigrant parties differently depending on the design of labour market policies in a country. Hence, no support for hypothesis 3 is found in the analysis.

This thesis have both empirical and theoretical contributions. Empirically, a first test of the insider-outsider divide and how it affects anti-immigrant party success has been performed. According to the empirical analysis the insider-outsider divide does not qualify as structuring political behaviour. The insider-outsider divide does not constitute new groups for political mobilization as suggested by Rueda (2005), at least not when it comes to anti-immigrant politics. Thus, the relevance of the insider-outsider divide in structuring people's voting behaviour needs more thorough tests. Another empirical contribution is the test of the relationship between labour market policies and institutions and voting patterns for anti-immigrant parties, which rarely have been done before. Theoretically, this thesis further elaborated on the institutional argument and on the new evidence put forward in a recent study by Halikiopoulou and Vlandas (2015). This thesis took the mechanism and tested it on the national context. Contrary to what Halikiopoulou and Vlandas (2015) show, the empirical analysis show no 'protective' effect of labour market policies and institutions. The empirical

analysis partly shows that type of labour market policy or institution matter for voting preferences, but in a different direction than expected. Labour market policies and institutions seem to affect voting for anti-immigrant parties, but further theorizing and more empirical tests are needed to uncover the mechanisms and how different labour market policies and institutions matter for voting behaviour.

Some points need to be mentioned concerning that the empirical results deviates from what was expected theoretically.

First, one potential explanation could be that the argument put forward in this thesis is rooted in an economic argument. This thesis wanted to test the economic argument at the macro and micro level jointly, which rarely has been done. But as stated above, previous research is inconclusive whether economic or cultural factors matter more for anti-immigrant party success. The argument that economic insecurity based on an insecure labour market position should translate into support for anti-immigrant parties may not hold because cultural factors matter more than economic factors. The empirical analysis also confirmed that the variable measuring cultural factors was a strong predictor for explaining voting for anti-immigrant parties.

Second, as suggested by Rueda (2005), the insider-outsider divide may lead to political radicalization and alienation and translate into political preferences. According to the empirical analysis of this thesis this does not hold, at least not for anti-immigrant parties. Other societal divides, such as class position, might still be stronger in explaining voting behaviour. Type of contract might also have different consequences for peoples feeling of security on the labour market depending on class position. For example, low skilled workers in a precarious positon might feel more insecure than high-skilled workers in temporary contracts.

Third, the concept of welfare chauvinism needs to be mentioned. The theory of welfare chauvinism suggests that in-groups exclude out-groups because they fear losing what they have in terms of welfare benefits. The theory suggests that people in more comprehensive welfare states are more negative towards immigration to protect the welfare system (Faist 1994). Hypothetically, this could be a partial explanation to the found association: that increased levels of spending on ALMPs are positively related to voting for anti-immigrant parties. However, there seems to be mixed evidence for the welfare chauvinism theory: it has also been found that people in more encompassing welfare states are more positive towards out-groups (see e.g. Crepaz & Damron 2008). The relationship between the role of the welfare state institutions and

voting for anti-immigrant parties seems to be complex and needs more research to uncover the mechanisms at work.

Fourth, one reason why the results of the empirical analysis differ from what was expected theoretically could be related to the availability of data. One problem that already has been mentioned is related to the survey data and that anti-immigrant parties generally are underestimated in surveys. If these parties consequently are underrepresented, it is harder to get significant results. It might also have helped if it was possible to expand the number of countries in the empirical analysis. 19 countries are on the low side when it comes to multilevel modelling but this thesis maximized and included as many countries as possible, but some countries are omitted due to missing context data. Expanding the number of countries might yield a different result.

Lastly, there might be a time aspect that this thesis does not capture. Countries with higher level of spending on for example ALMPs might have had even higher level of spending in the past. People may experience relative deprivation because the level of social spending on labour market policies is lower than earlier. It might therefore be the *change* in level of social spending that matters rather than the current level. If the level of social spending in a country have moved from, for example, very high to fairly high, and the size of anti-immigrant parties at the same time varies the association can become contrary to what's expected This is a problem when using cross-sectional data where you only get a snapshot of reality. Panel data at the individual level matched with macro level indicators would have been ultimate and is one way to further investigate the research questions. If comparative individual level panel data becomes available, one way to continue could be to focus on the change in level of social spending and change in strictness of employment protection instead of the actual level and see if it yields a different result. Since this thesis partly shows, and previous studies have shown, that labour market policies and institutions affect voting behaviour, and more specifically the success of anti-immigrant parties, it is important to advance the research in this area.

# References

Aguinis, H., Gottfredson, R. K., & Culpepper, S. A. (2013). Best-practice recommendations for estimating cross-level interaction effects using multilevel modeling. *Journal of Management*, April 2, 1-39.

Anderson, C. J., & Pontusson, J. (2007). Workers, worries and welfare states: Social protection and job insecurity in 15 OECD countries. *European Journal of Political Research*, 46(2), 211-235.

Arzheimer, K. (2009) Contextual Factors and the Extreme Right Vote in Western Europe, 1980-2002. *American Journal of Political Science*, 53(2), 259–275.

Arzheimer, K. & E. Carter (2006). Political opportunity structures and right-wing extremist party success. *European Journal of Political Research*, 45(3), 391-418.

Berglund, T., Furåker, B., & Vulkan, P. (2014). Is job insecurity compensated for by employment and income security?. *Economic and industrial democracy*, *35*(1), 165-184.

Berglund, T., & Wallinder, Y. (2015). Perceived Employability in Difficult Economic Times: The significance of education systems and labour market policies. *European Societies*, 17(5), 1-26.

Betz, H-G. (1994) *Radical right-wing populism in Western Europe*. New York: St. Martins Press.

Bornschier S. & Kriesi H (2013) "The changing face of class politics" in Rydgren, Jens (ed.) *Class politics and the radical right*. London: Routledge.

Brooks, C., Nieuwbeerta, P., & Manza, J. (2006). Cleavage-based voting behavior in cross-national perspective: Evidence from six postwar democracies. *Social Science Research*, 35(1), 88-128.

van der Brug, W., Fennema, M., Tillie, J., (2005). Why some radical right populist parties fail and others succeed. *Comparative Political Studies,* 38(5), 537–573.

Burgoon, B., & Dekker, F. (2010). Flexible employment, economic insecurity and social policy preferences in Europe. *Journal of European Social Policy*, 20(2), 126-141.

Chung, H., & Mau, S. (2014). Subjective insecurity and the role of institutions. *Journal of European Social Policy*, 24(4), 303-318.

Chung, H., & Van Oorschot, W. (2011). Institutions versus market forces: Explaining the employment insecurity of European individuals during (the beginning of) the financial crisis. *Journal of European Social Policy*, 21(4), 287-301.

Coffé, H, B. Heyndels & J. Vermeir (2007). Fertile grounds for extreme right-wing parties: explaining the Vlaam Blok's electoral success. *Electoral Studies*, 26(1), 142-155.

Crepaz, M. M., & Damron, R. (2008). Constructing tolerance: How the welfare state shapes attitudes about immigrants. *Comparative Political Studies*.

Dahlström, C. & Sundell, A. (2012). A losing gamble. How mainstream parties facilitate anti-immigrant party success. *Electoral Studies,* 31(2), 353-363.

Demker, M. (2014). *Sverige åt svenskarna: motstånd och mobilisering mot invandring och invandrare i Sverige*. Stockholm: Atlas.

De Witte, H. (1999). Job insecurity and psychological well-being: review of the literature and exploration of some unresolved issues. *European Journal of Work and Organizational Psychology*, 8 (2), 155–178.

De Witte, H. (2005). Job insecurity: Review of the international literature on Definitions, prevalence, antecedents and consequences. *Journal of industrial psychology,* 31(4), 1-6.

Emmenegger, P. (2009). Barriers to entry: Insider/outsider politics and the political determinants of job security regulations. *Journal of European Social Policy*, 19(2), 131-146.

Erlingsson , Gissur Ó.  Karl Loxbo & Richard Öhrvall (2012) "Anti-Immigrant Parties, Local Presence and Electoral Success." *Local Government Studies*, 38(6), 817-839.

ESS (2016) European Social Survey. Retrieved 2016-06-13, from
http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/about/

Eurostat (2016) Temporary employment, retrieved 2016-08-11 from
http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/submitViewTableAction.do

Faist, T. (1994), Immigration, integration and the ethnicization of politics. *European Journal of Political Research*, 25(4), 439–459.

Field, A. (2009). *Discovering statistics using SPSS: (and sex and drugs and rock 'n' roll)*. (3.ed.) Los Angeles: SAGE.

Givens, T. E. (2004). The radical right gender gap. *Comparative Political Studies*, 37(1), 30-54.

Golder, M. (2003). Explaining variations in the success of extreme right parties in Western Europe. *Comparative Political Studies*, 36(4), 432-466.

Halikiopoulou, D. & Vlandas, T. (2015). Risks, Costs and Labour Markets: Explaining Cross-National Patterns of Far Right Party Success in European Parliament Elections. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 54(3), 636-655.

Hox, J. J., Moerbeek, M., & van de Schoot, R. (2010). *Multilevel analysis: Techniques and applications*. Routledge.

Häusermann, S. & Schwander, H. (2012) "Varieties of Dualization? Labor market segmentation and Insider-Outsider Divides Across Regimes" in Emmenegger, Patrick (ed.) *The age of dualization: the changing face of inequality in deindustrializing societies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Ignazi, P. (2003). *Extreme right parties in Western Europe*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Jackman, R. W. & K. Volpert (1996 ). Conditions favouring parties on the extreme right in Western Europe. *British Journal of Political Science*,26(4), 501-521.

Jungar, A-C. & Jupskås, A.R. (2014). Populist Radical Right Parties in the Nordic Region: A New and Distinct Party Family?. *Scandinavian Political Studies*, 37(3), 215–238.

Kitschelt, H. (2007) Growth and Persistence of the Radical Right in Postindustrial Democracies: Advances and Challenges in Comparative Research. *West European Politics*, 30(5), 1176-1206.

Kriesi, H., Grande, E., Lachat, R., Dolezal, M., Bornschier, S., & Frey, T. (2006). Globalization and the transformation of the national political space: Six European countries compared. *European Journal of Political Research*, *45*(6), 921-956.

Lindvall, J. & Rueda, D. (2012) "Insider-Outsider Politics: Party Strategies and Political Behavoiur in Sweden" in Emmenegger, Patrick (ed.) *The age of dualization: the changing face of inequality in deindustrializing societies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Loxbo, K. (2014). Voters' Perceptions of Policy Convergence and the Short-term Opportunities of Anti-immigrant Parties: Examples from Sweden. *Scandinavian Political Studies*, 37(3), 239–262.

Lubbers, M., Gijsberts, M. & Scheepers, P. (2002), "Extreme right-wing voting in Western Europe". *European Journal of Political Research,* 41: 345–378.

Lucassen, G. & Lubbers, M. (2012). Who Fears What? Explaining Far-Right-Wing Preference in Europe by Distinguishing Perceived Cultural and Economic Ethnic Threats. *Comparative Political Studies,* 45(5), 547-574.

King, D., & Rueda, D. (2008). Cheap labor: the new politics of "bread and roses" in industrial democracies. *Perspectives on Politics*, 6(02), 279-297.

Kumlin, S. & Stadelmann-Steffen, I. (red.) (2014). *How welfare states shape the democratic public: policy feedback, participation, voting and attitudes*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.

Marx, P., & Picot, G. (2013). The party preferences of atypical workers in Germany. *Journal of European Social Policy*, 23(2), 164-178.

Marx, P. (2014). Labour market risks and political preferences: The case of temporary employment. *European Journal of Political Research*, 53(1), 136-159.

Marx, P. & G. Picot (2014) "Labour market policies and party preferences of fixed-term workers" in Kumlin, Staffan and Stadelmann-Steffen, Isabelle (eds.). *How welfare states shape the democratic public: policy feedback, participation, voting and attitudes*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.

Mettler, S., & Soss, J. (2004). The consequences of public policy for democratic citizenship: Bridging policy studies and mass politics. *Perspectives on politics*, 2(1), 55-73.

Mewes, J and Mau, s. (2012) "Unraveling working class welfare chauvinism", in S. Svallfors (Ed.) *Contested welfare states: Welfare attitudes in Europe and beyond*. Stanford University Press.

Mudde, C. (2007). *Populist radical right parties in Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mughan, A., & Lacy, D. (2002). Economic performance, job insecurity and electoral choice. *British Journal of Political Science*, 32(3), 513-533.

Oesch, D. (2008). Explaining Worker's Support for Right-Wing Populist Parties in Western Europe: Evidence from Austria, Belgium, France, Norway, and Switzerland. *International Political Science Review,* 29(3): 349-373.

OECD (2016) Temporary employment. Retrieved 2016-08-11, from https://data.oecd.org/emp/temporary-employment.htm

OECD, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development *(*2004*) Employment Protection Regulation and Labour Market Performance.* Paris*:* OECD Employment Outlook *(OECD).*

Oskarson, M. (2012) "Innanförskap och utanförskap som politisk skiljelinje" in Weibull, Lennart, Oscarsson, Henrik & Bergström, Annika (eds.) *I framtidens skugga: fyrtiotvå kapitel om politik, medier och samhälle : SOM-undersökningen 2011*. Göteborg: SOM-institutet.

Pierson, P. (1993). When effect becomes cause: Policy feedback and political change. *World politics*, 45(4), 595-628.

Rueda, D. (2005). Insider-Outsider Politics in Industrialized Democracies: The Challenge to Social Democratic Parties. *American Political Science Review*, 99(1), 71-74.

Rueda, D. (2007). *Social democracy inside out: partisanship and labor market policy in industrialized democracies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Rueda, D. (2014). Dualization, Crisis and the Welfare State. *Socio-Economic Review,* 12(2), 381–407.

Rydgren, J. (2007). The Sociology of the Radical Right. *Annual Review of Sociology,* 33, 241-262.

Rydgren, J. (2008). Immigration sceptics, xenophobes or racists? Radical right-wing voting in six West European countries. *European Journal of Political Research,* 47(6), 737–765.

Sannerstedt, A. (2016) "Sverigedemokraternas sympatiörer: fler än någonsin" in Ohlsson, Jonas, Ekengren Oscarsson, Henrik and Solevid, Maria (eds.) *Ekvilibrium: SOM-undersökningen 2015*. Göteborg: SOM-institutet.

Solevid, M. (2009). *Voices from the welfare state: dissatisfaction and political action in Sweden*. Dissertation. Göteborg : Göteborgs universitet, 2009.

Swank, D. & Betz, H-G. (2003). Globalization, the welfare state and right-wing populism in Western Europe. *Socio-Economic Review,* 1(2), 215-245.

Waldahl, R., & Aardal, B. O. (1982). Can We Trust Recall-Data? Scandinavian Political Studies, 5(2), 101–116.

Vulkan, P. (2015). *The microfoundations of flexicurity: employees' well-being and attitudes to labour market policy in a Swedish and Nordic welfare state setting*. Dissertation. Göteborg: Göteborgs universitet, 2016

# Appendix 1: Descriptive statistics, definitions and sources of variables

| Variable | N | Mean | Std.Dev | Min | Max | Description | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Vote for anti-immigrant party | 15,518 | .096 | .295 | 0 | 1 | The dependent variable is recoded so voting for anti-immigrant party is coded as 1, 0 otherwise. Only respondents who chose an alternative is included. Not applicable, refusal and don't know answers are excluded. | ESS |
| Employment contract | 15,518 | .126 | .332 | 0 | 1 | The independent variable, employment contract, is measured using the question "Do/did you have a work contract of unlimited or limited duration?" The variable is recoded where 0 means unlimited and 1 limited. No contract, Not applicable, refusal, don't know and NA are excluded. | ESS |
| Age | 15,518 | 2.715 | .966 | 1 | 4 | Age is recoded into 4 age groups; (1) 14-29, (2) 30-49, (3) 50-64 and (4) 65+. Missings are excluded. | ESS |
| Gender | 15,518 | .541 | .498 | 0 | 1 | Gender is recoded to 0 men, 1 women. Missings are excluded. | ESS |
| Education | 15,518 | 3.490 | 1.187 | 1 | 5 | Educational level is defined by the international standard classification of education (ISCED) and recoded into 5 groups. (1) less than lower secondary, (2) lower secondary, (3) upper secondary, (4) post secondary and (5) tertiarty education. Missings are excluded. | ESS |
| Domicile | 15,518 | 2.856 | 1.207 | 1 | 5 | Domicile Is based on the question "Which phrase on this card best describes the area where you live?" (1) A big city, (2) the suburbs or outskirts of a big city, (3) a town or a small city, (4) a country village or (5) a farm or home in the countryside. Refusal, don't know and no answer are excluded. | ESS |
| Immigration bad for culture | 15,518 | 4.336 | 2.476 | 0 | 10 | Respondents have to position themselves on | ESS |

| | | | | | | the following statement: "Country's cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants". They choose a number between 0 (Cultural life undermined) and 10 (Cultural life enriched). The order of this variable is reversed, meaning that in this analysis a higher value on the scale indicate more negativity. | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PLMPs | 15,518 | .935 | .588 | 0,23 | 2,05 | Spending on passive labour market policies, % of GDP in Euros. | Eurostat |
| ALMPs | 15,518 | .532 | .360 | 0,05 | 1,36 | Spending on active labour market policies, % of GDP in Euros. | Eurostat |
| EPL regular | 15,518 | 2.418 | .344 | 1,68 | 3,03 | Strictness of employment protection – individual and collective dismissals (regular contracts), version 3. | OECD |
| EPL temporary | 15,518 | 2.017 | .697 | 0,48 | 3,21 | Strictness of employment protection- temporary contracts, version 3. | OECD |
| Unemployment rate | 15,518 | 8.541 | 3.379 | 3,2 | 16,7 | Unemployment rates represent unemployed persons as a percentage of the labour force. The labour force is the total number of people employed and unemployed. Unemployed persons comprise persons aged 15 to 74. | Eurostat |
| Real GDP growth | 15,518 | .988 | 2.662 | -5,5 | 6 | Real GDP growth rate – volume. Percentage change on previous year. | Eurostat, OECD |
| Total immigration | 15,518 | 90.196 | 104.123 | 1,199 | 430 | Yearly inflow of foreign population to country (1000s). | International migration database, OECD statistics |

# Appendix 2: Sources of coding of anti-immigrant parties

| Country | Anti-immigrant party | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Austria | Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ), Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZÖ) | Immerzeel, T., et al. (2015) Competing with the radical right: Distances between the European radical right and other parties on typical radical right issues, *Party Politics*, 1-15. |
| Belgium | Flemish interest (VB), National Front (FN) | Immerzeel, T., et al. (2015) Competing with the radical right: Distances between the European radical right and other parties on typical radical right issues, *Party Politics*, 1-15. |
| Switzerland | Swiss peoples party (SVP) , Ticino league (LEGA) | Immerzeel, T., et al. (2015) Competing with the radical right: Distances between the European radical right and other parties on typical radical right issues, *Party Politics*, 1-15. |
| Czech Republic | Usvit | Parties and elections in Europe (2013). Retrieved 2016-08-09, from http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/czechia.html. |
| Denmark | Danish peoples party (DF) | Immerzeel, T., et al. (2015) Competing with the radical right: Distances between the European radical right and other parties on typical radical right issues, *Party Politics*, 1-15. |
| Estonia | Estonian Conservative Peoples Party (EKRE), Estonian independence party (EIP) | Immerzeel, T., et al. (2015) Competing with the radical right: Distances between the European radical right and other parties on typical radical right issues, *Party Politics*, 1-15.; Det slutna Europa (Expo and Svenska Dagbladet). Retrieved 2019-08-09, from http://detslutnaeuropa.se/eesti-konservatiivne-rahvaerakond-ekre/. |
| Finland | True Finns (PS) | Immerzeel, T., et al. (2015) Competing with the radical right: Distances between the European radical right and other parties on typical radical right issues, *Party Politics*, 1-15. |
| France | National Front (FN) | Immerzeel, T., et al. (2015) Competing with the radical right: Distances between the European radical right and other parties on typical radical right issues, *Party Politics*, 1-15. |
| Great Britain | Ukip | Immerzeel, T., et al. (2015) Competing with the radical right: Distances between the European radical right and other parties on typical radical right issues, *Party Politics*, 1-15. |
| Greece | Golden Dawn (GD), LAOS | Immerzeel, T., et al. (2015) Competing with the radical right: Distances between the European radical right and other parties on typical radical right issues, *Party Politics*, 1-15.; Vasilopoulou, S., & Halikiopoulou, D. (2015). *The Golden Dawn's 'Nationalist Solution': Explaining the Rise of the Far Right in Greece*. Springer. |
| Hungary | Jobbik | Immerzeel, T., et al. (2015) Competing with the radical right: Distances between the European radical right and other parties on typical radical right issues, *Party Politics*, 1-15. |
| Italy | Northern League (LN) | Immerzeel, T., et al. (2015) Competing with the radical right: Distances between the European radical right and other parties on typical radical right issues, *Party Politics*, 1-15. |
| Lithuania | Party Order and Justice (TT) | Rydgren, J. (Ed.). (2012). *Class politics and the radical right*. Routledge. |
| Netherlands | Party for the Freedom (PVV) | Immerzeel, T., et al. (2015) Competing with the radical right: Distances between the European radical right and other parties on typical radical right issues, *Party Politics*, 1-15. |
| Norway | Progress party (FrP) | Immerzeel, T., et al. (2015) Competing with the radical right: Distances between the European radical right |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| | | and other parties on typical radical right issues, *Party Politics*, 1-15. |
| Poland | Law and Order (PiS) | Pankowski, R., (2010) *The Populist Radical Right in Poland: The Patriots,* Oxon: Routledge; Harrison, S. and Bruter, M. (2011). *Mapping Extreme Right Ideology: An Empirical Geography of the European Extreme Right*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan; Pankowski, R and Kormak, M., (2013) 'Radical Nationalism in Poland: From Theory to Practice' In R. Melzer & Serafin, S. (Eds.), *Right-wing extremism in Europe: Counter-strategies and Labor-Market Oriented Exit Strategies.* Friedrich Ebert Foundation. |
| Sweden | Sweden Democrats (SD) | Immerzeel, T., et al. (2015) Competing with the radical right: Distances between the European radical right and other parties on typical radical right issues, *Party Politics*, 1-15. |
| Slovenia | Slovene National party (SNS) | Immerzeel, T., et al. (2015) Competing with the radical right: Distances between the European radical right and other parties on typical radical right issues, *Party Politics*, 1-15. |
| Slovakia | Slovak National party (SNS) | Immerzeel, T., et al. (2015) Competing with the radical right: Distances between the European radical right and other parties on typical radical right issues, *Party Politics*, 1-15. |

# Appendix 3: Full tables of multilevel logistic regressions

**Table 7.** Multilevel logistic regression results. Effect of ALMPs on voting for anti-immigrant parties.

| | Model 0 | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 | Model 5 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Type of contract (0 unlimited, 1 limited) | | -.036 (.092) | | -.036 (.092) | -.062 (.118) | -.419 (.238) |
| ALMPs | | | 1.183* (.581) | 1.296** (.499) | 1.263* (.522) | 1.243* (.497) |
| Type of contract*ALMPs | | | | | | .587 (.320) |
| *Individual level controls* | No | Yes | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Gender (0 male, 1 female) | | -.352*** (.059) | | -.351*** (.059) | -.351*** (.059) | -.352*** (.059) |
| Age (ref: 14-29) | | | | | | |
| 30-49 | | .158 (.105) | | .160 (.105) | .160 (.105) | .166 (.105) |
| 50-64 | | -.113 (.108) | | -.110 (.108) | -.110 (.108) | -.103 (.108) |
| 65+ | | -.430*** (.115) | | -.426*** (.115) | -.424*** (.115) | -.418*** (.115) |
| Education (ref: less than lower secondary) | | | | | | |
| Lower secondary | | .201 (.139) | | .210 (.139) | .212 (.140) | .208 (.140) |
| Upper secondary | | .007 (.129) | | .016 (.129) | .018 (.130) | .014 (.130) |
| Post secondary | | -.174 (.144) | | -.168 (.144) | -.166 (.144) | -.168 (.144) |
| Tertiary | | -.891*** (.148) | | -.884*** (.148) | -.882*** (.148) | -.886*** (.148) |
| Domicile (ref: Big city) | | | | | | |
| Suburbs or outskirts of big city | | .163 (.115) | | .159 (.115) | .158 (.115) | .162 (.115) |
| Town or small city | | .072 (.089) | | .075 (.089) | ..075 (.089) | .078 (.089) |
| Country village | | .179* (.090) | | .182* (.090) | .182* (.090) | .186* (.090) |
| Farm or home in countryside | | .321* (.134) | | .319* (.134) | .317* (.134) | .324* (.134) |
| Immigration bad for culture (0 cultural life enriched, 10 cultural life undermined) | | .284*** (.013) | | .285*** (.013) | .284*** (.013) | .285*** (.013) |
| *Country level controls* | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Real GDP | | | | .241* (.091) | .242* (.091) | .242* (.091) |
| Unemployment rate | | | | | | |
| Immigration | | | | .004* (.002) | .004* (.002) | .004* (.002) |
| Fixed intercept | -2.512*** (.217) | -4.650*** (.635) | -3.097*** (.351) | -4.268*** (.558) | -4.234*** (.575) | -4.200*** (.559) |
| Random intercept | .930 (.160) | .833 (.143) | .840 (.145) | .626 (.109) | .624 (.110) | .621 (.109) |
| Random slope (type of contract) | | | | | .163 (.200) | .132 (.212) |
| ICC | .208 | | | | | |
| Log Likelihood | -4690.882 | -4118.551 | -4688.995 | -4113.353 | -4113.237 | -4111.428 |
| Countries | 19 | 19 | 19 | 19 | 19 | 19 |
| N | 15,918 | 15,918 | 15,918 | 15,518 | 15,518 | 15,518 |

**Note**: Dependent variable vote for anti-immigrant party (0- all parties, 1- anti-immigrant party).
Standard errors in parentheses, significance levels: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.

**Table 8.** Multilevel logistic regression results. Effect of PLMPs on voting for anti-immigrant parties.

| | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Type of contract (0 unlimited, 1 limited) | | -.037 (.092) | -.089 (.125) | -.197 (.223) |
| PLMPs | -.060 (.380) | .130 (.323) | .0979 (.322) | .123 (.320) |
| Type of contract*PLMPs | | | | .111 (.181) |
| *Individual level controls* | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Gender (0 male, 1 female) | | -.352*** (.059) | -.352*** (.059) | -.353*** (.059) |
| Age (ref: 14-29) | | | | |
| 30-49 | | .158 (.105) | .160 (.105) | .162 (.105) |
| 50-64 | | -.113 (.108) | -.112 (.108) | -.109 (.108) |
| 65+ | | -.430*** (.115) | -.427*** (.115) | -.425*** (.115) |
| Education (ref: less than lower secondary) | | | | |
| Lower secondary | | .200 (.139) | .203 (.140) | .202 (.140) |
| Upper secondary | | .005 (.129) | .007 (.130) | .006 (.130) |
| Post secondary | | -.177 (.144) | -.173 (.144) | -.173 (.144) |
| Tertiary | | -.893*** (.148) | -.892*** (.148) | -.893*** (.148) |
| Domicile (ref: Big city) | | | | |
| Suburbs or outskirts of big city | | .167 (.115) | .166 (.115) | .167 (.115) |
| Town or small city | | .075 (.089) | ..076 (.089) | .076 (.089) |
| Country village | | .182* (.090) | .182* (.090) | .182* (.090) |
| Farm or home in countryside | | .323* (.134) | .322* (.134) | .323* (.134) |
| Immigration bad for culture (0 cultural life enriched, 10 cultural life undermined) | | .284*** (.013) | .284*** (.013) | .284*** (.013) |
| *Country level controls* | No | No | No | No |
| Real GDP | | | | |
| Unemployment rate | | | | |
| Immigration | | | | |
| Fixed intercept | -2.458*** (.402) | -4.287*** (.651) | -4.183*** (.663) | -4.189*** (.653) |
| Random intercept | .929 (.160) | .758 (.132) | .750 (.132) | .749 (.131) |
| Random slope (type of contract) | | | .195 (.189) | .208 (.179) |
| Log Likelihood | -4690.870 | -4116.961 | -4116.612 | -4116.421 |
| Countries | 19 | 19 | 19 | 19 |
| N | 15,918 | 15,518 | 15,518 | 15,518 |

**Note**: Dependent variable vote for anti-immigrant party (0- all parties, 1- anti-immigrant party).
Standard errors in parentheses, significance levels: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.

**Table 9.** Multilevel logistic regression results. Effect of EPL for regular workers on voting for anti-immigrant parties.

| | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Type of contract (0 unlimited, 1 limited) | | -.036 (.092) | -.100 (.129) | -.035 (.842) |
| EPL regular | -1.037 (.575) | -.490 (.596) | -.538 (.587) | -.543 (.593) |
| Type of contract*EPL regular | | | | -.027 (.343) |
| *Individual level controls* | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Gender (0 male, 1 female) | | -.353*** (.059) | -.353*** (.059) | -.353*** (.059) |
| Age (ref: 14-29) | | | | |
| 30-49 | | .158 (.105) | .160 (.105) | .160 (.105) |
| 50-64 | | -.114 (.108) | -.111 (.108) | -.112 (.108) |
| 65+ | | -.431*** (.115) | -.427*** (.115) | -.427*** (.115) |
| Education (ref: less than lower secondary) | | | | |
| Lower secondary | | .202 (.139) | .205 (.140) | .205 (.140) |
| Upper secondary | | .005 (.129) | .007 (.130) | .008 (.130) |
| Post secondary | | -.177 (.144) | -.172 (.144) | -.172 (.144) |
| Tertiary | | -.893*** (.148) | -.891*** (.148) | -.891*** (.148) |
| Domicile (ref: Big city) | | | | |
| Suburbs or outskirts of big city | | .167 (.115) | .166 (.115) | .165 (.115) |
| Town or small city | | .075 (.089) | ..076 (.089) | .076 (.089) |
| Country village | | .184* (.090) | .183* (.090) | .184* (.090) |
| Farm or home in countryside | | .324* (.134) | .323* (.134) | .323* (.134) |
| Immigration bad for culture (0 cultural life enriched, 10 cultural life undermined) | | .284*** (.013) | .284*** (.013) | .284*** (.013) |
| *Country level controls* | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Real GDP | | .154 (.081) | .155* (.078) | .155* (.078) |
| Unemployment rate | | | | |
| Immigration | | | | |
| Fixed intercept | .016 (1.414) | -2.859 (1.771) | -2.619 (1.763) | -2.607 (1.776) |
| Random intercept | .856 (.148) | .744 (.131) | .734 (.130) | .734 (.130) |
| Random slope (type of contract) | | | .212 (.186) | .210 (.189) |
| Log Likelihood | -4689.378 | -4116.712 | -4116.259 | -4116.256 |
| Countries | 19 | 19 | 19 | 19 |
| N | 15,918 | 15,518 | 15,518 | 15,518 |

**Note**: Dependent variable vote for anti-immigrant party (0- all parties, 1- anti-immigrant party).
Standard errors in parentheses, significance levels: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.

**Table 10.** Multilevel logistic regression results. Effect of EPL for temporary workers on voting for anti-immigrant parties.

| | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Type of contract (0 unlimited, 1 limited) | | .036 (.092) | -.081 (.124) | .214 (.332) |
| EPL temporary | -.194 (.311) | -.447 (.343) | -.412 (.346) | -.431 (.340) |
| Type of contract*EPL temporary | | | | -.145 (.157) |
| *Individual level controls* | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Gender (0 male, 1 female) | | -.353*** (.059) | -.353*** (.059) | -.353*** (.059) |
| Age (ref: 14-29) | | | | |
| 30-49 | | .158 (.105) | .160 (.105) | .159 (.105) |
| 50-64 | | -.114 (.108) | -.112 (.108) | -.113 (.108) |
| 65+ | | -.431*** (.115) | -.428*** (.115) | -.430*** (.115) |
| Education (ref: less than lower secondary) | | | | |
| Lower secondary | | .202 (.139) | .204 (.140) | .204 (.140) |
| Upper secondary | | .006 (.129) | .009 (.130) | .006 (.130) |
| Post secondary | | -.176 (.144) | -.172 (.144) | -.175 (.144) |
| Tertiary | | -.892*** (.148) | -.890*** (.148) | -.893*** (.148) |
| Domicile (ref: Big city) | | | | |
| Suburbs or outskirts of big city | | .165 (.115) | .165 (.115) | .166 (.115) |
| Town or small city | | .075 (.089) | ..075 (.089) | .077 (.089) |
| Country village | | .182* (.090) | .183* (.090) | .182* (.090) |
| Farm or home in countryside | | .324* (.134) | .323* (.134) | .324* (.134) |
| Immigration bad for culture (0 cultural life enriched, 10 cultural life undermined) | | .285*** (.013) | .284*** (.013) | .284*** (.013) |
| *Country level controls* | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Real GDP | | .227* (.099) | .220* (.098) | .220* (.097) |
| Unemployment rate | | | | |
| Immigration | | | | |
| Fixed intercept | -2.106** (.686) | -2.799** (1.249) | -2.843** (1.244) | -2.778** (1.241) |
| Random intercept | .922 (.158) | .726 (.128) | .720 (.127) | .719 (.127) |
| Random slope (type of contract) | | | .184 (.192) | .165 (.206) |
| Log Likelihood | -4590.689 | -4116.230 | -4115.984 | -4115.565 |
| Countries | 19 | 19 | 19 | 19 |
| N | 15,918 | 15,518 | 15,518 | 15,518 |

**Note**: Dependent variable vote for anti-immigrant party (0- all parties, 1- anti-immigrant party).
Standard errors in parentheses, significance levels: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.

# Appendix 4: Robustness checks

**Table 11.** Multilevel logistic regression results. Effect of ALMPs on identifying with anti-immigrant parties.

|  | Model 0 | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 | Model 5 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Type of contract (0 unlimited, 1 limited) |  | -.052 (.098) |  | -.051 (.098) | -.069 (.141) | -.244 (.287) |
| ALMPs |  |  | 1.357 (.704) | 1.631** (.609) | 1.714** (.607) | 1.590* (.626) |
| Type of contract*ALMPs |  |  |  |  |  | .285 (.399) |
| *Individual level controls* | No | Yes | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| *Country level controls* | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Fixed intercept | -2.427*** (.263) | -5.171*** (.772) | -3.097*** (.427) | -4.767*** (.679) | -4.971*** (.725) | -4.878*** (.724) |
| Random intercept | 1.120 (.198) | 1.020 (.175) | 1.018 (.181) | .769 (.136) | .799 (.144) | .794 (.143) |
| Random slope (type of contract) |  |  |  |  | .345 (.136) | .347 (.137) |
| ICC | .276 |  |  |  |  |  |
| Log Likelihood | -3932.158 | -3246.563 | -3930.449 | -3241.637 | -3238.981 | -3238.719 |
| Countries | 19 | 19 | 19 | 19 | 19 | 19 |
| N | 12,079 | 11,812 | 12,079 | 11,812 | 11,812 | 11,812 |

**Note**: Dependent variable party identification with anti-immigrant party (0- all parties, 1- anti-immigrant party).
Standard errors in parentheses, significance levels: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.

**Table 12.** Multilevel logistic regression results. Effect of PLMPs on identifying with anti-immigrant parties.

|  | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Type of contract (0 unlimited, 1 limited) |  | -.052 (.098) | -.088 (.154) | -.204 (.277) |
| PLMPs | -.218 (.460) | -.003 (.418) | .001 (.419) | -.031 (.425) |
| Type of contract*PLMPs |  |  |  | .123 (.240) |
| *Individual level controls* | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| *Country level controls* | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Fixed intercept | -2.233*** (.484) | -4.754*** (.828) | -4.819*** (.915) | -4.776*** (.901) |
| Random intercept | 1.116 (.197) | .975 (.168) | .987 (.172) | .986 (171) |
| Random slope (type of contract ) |  |  | .358 (.141) | .364 (.141) |
| Log Likelihood | -3932.045 | -3245.674 | -3243.278 | -3243.143 |
| Countries | 19 | 19 | 19 | 19 |
| N | 12,079 | 11,812 | 11,812 | 11,812 |

**Note**: Dependent variable party identification with anti-immigrant party (0- all parties, 1- anti-immigrant party).
Standard errors in parentheses, significance levels: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.

**Table 13.** Multilevel logistic regression results. Effect of EPL for regular workers on identifying with anti-immigrant parties.

| | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Type of contract (0 unlimited, 1 limited) | | -.051 (.098) | -.122 (.158) | -.601 (.994) |
| EPL regular | -1.740** (.655) | -1.152 (.737) | -1.246 (.783) | -1.235 (.754) |
| Type of contract*EPL regular | | | | .206 (.418) |
| *Individual level controls* | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| *Country level controls* | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Fixed intercept | 1.809 (1.601) | -1.541 (2.190) | -1.144 (2.452) | -1.189 (2.345) |
| Random intercept | .955 (.168) | .915 (.158) | .915 (.159) | .916 (.159) |
| Random slope (type of contract ) | | | .380 (.153) | .373 (.153) |
| Log Likelihood | -3929.033 | -3244.520 | -3242.092 | -3241.972 |
| Countries | 19 | 19 | 19 | 19 |
| N | 12,079 | 11,812 | 11,812 | 11,812 |

**Note**: Dependent variable *party identification with anti-immigrant party (0- all parties, 1- anti-immigrant party).*
Standard errors in parentheses, significance levels: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.

**Table 14.** Multilevel logistic regression results. Effect of EPL for temporary workers on identifying with anti-immigrant parties.

| | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Type of contract (0 unlimited, 1 limited) | | -.052 (.098) | -.048 (.138) | .607 (.345) |
| EPL temporary | -.553 (.358) | -1.078** (.395) | -1.181** (.384) | -.975* (.405) |
| Type of contract*EPL temporary | | | | -.356* (.180) |
| *Individual level controls* | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| *Country level controls* | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Fixed intercept | -1.268 (.789) | -1.309 (1.439) | -1.285 (1.400) | -1.641 (1.483) |
| Random intercept | 1.057 (.187) | .820 (.142) | .866 (.157) | .845 (.148) |
| Random slope (type of contract ) | | | .330 (.132) | .258 (.137) |
| Log Likelihood | -3931.018 | -3242.492 | -3239.484 | -3237.628 |
| Countries | 19 | 19 | 19 | 19 |
| N | 12,079 | 11,812 | 11,812 | 11,812 |

**Note**: Dependent variable *party identification with anti-immigrant party (0- all parties, 1- anti-immigrant party).*
Standard errors in parentheses, significance levels: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.

**Figure 4.** Predicted probabilities to identify with anti-immigrant party, under different levels of EPL for temporary workers, among people with unlimited and limited contract.



**Note**: Adjusted predictions with 95% confidence intervals.