UNIVERSITY OF GOTHENBURG
SCHOOL OF GLOBAL STUDIES

"We do not want to accept refugees!"

The Perception of Identity on Migration Crisis and the
Migration Crisis Implications on Hungary

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"Try not to become a person of success, but rather try to become a person of value." *~Albert Einstein*

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To you…

I thank you..

Aldoreza Prandana

Abstract

This study aims to investigate to what extent identity plays a role in Hungary's policy and stance towards the migration crisis which occurred in the middle of 2015. Since it started, Hungary has shown its strong stance against accepting refugees and the Hungarian government has been using anti-immigrant rhetorics and implementing strict migration policy, such as building fences, publishing anti-immigrant propagandas, and the recent one is the referendum on quota system proposed by the European Union as an option for a joint policy towards the migration crisis. The background will discuss the reasons why the refugees came to Europe and how the Hungarian government has reacted to that. Theoretical frameworks used in this study will help to be the base for analysis, which includes the discussions on migration, identity, drivers of fear and anxiety, and securitisation process to understand the case study of Hungary. The result, then, will point out the perception of migration and identity in Hungary, the implications of migration crisis towards Hungary's political dynamics, and what fears Hungary has towards migration issue and specifically the refugees. I would argue that the dichotomy of "Us" and "Others plays a crucial role in understanding the perception of migration and identity in Hungary, but the fears are more related to other issues, such as economy, security, political, and sovereignty.

Keywords: identity, migration, "Us" and "Others", Hungary

I. Introduction

1. Introduction to the Research

One of the markers of the year of 2015 was how the escalation of conflict in Syria resulted into the mass migration of people to Europe looking for refuge. In light of that event, Hungary has been very vocal about its concern over how the mass influx of people coming from those war-torn countries will affect Europe in a negative way. Viktor Orbán, the Prime Minister of Hungary, said that the influx of unprecedented refugees to Europe will challenge the sense of European identity and the mass migration is seen as an 'invasion' to Europe (Nolan 2015). As a response towards the problem, anti-migration policies and rhetorics had been implemented by the Hungarian government. One example is the fence that was built on the border of Hungary with Croatia.

The skepticism about migration and the negative reactions, whether from public or from the government officials, do not always attached to the occurrence of large-scale migration (Papademetriou 2012). However, this does not apply to the large-scale migration from last year. As more people are coming to seek for refuge, there is also a growth on skepticism about those people who are coming. It is influenced by the growth of terror attacks in Europe using the name of Islam at the same time the large-scale migration is happening. It becomes a problem when immigration is perceived as linked to crime and terrorism which adds to the circle of fear and anxiety of people (Papademetriou 2012).

Many rhetorics have been used by the Hungarian government to further push their policies on preventing more and more people coming from the war-torn countries to Europe, and specifically to Hungary. Identity rhetorics have been used many times within the political debates among other rhetorics.

> *"Europe is not free. Because freedom begins with speaking the truth. Today in Europe it is forbidden to speak the truth. Even if it is made of silk, a muzzle is a muzzle. It is forbidden to say that those arriving are not refugees, but that Europe is threatened by migration. It is forbidden to say that tens of millions are ready to set out in our direction. It is forbidden to say that immigration brings crime and terror to our countries. It is forbidden to point out that the masses arriving from other civilizations endanger our way of life, our culture, our customs and our Christian traditions. It is forbidden to point out that those who arrived earlier have have already built up their own new, separate world for themselves, with its own laws and ideals, which is forcing*

apart the thousand-year-old structure of Europe. It is forbidden to point out that this is not an accidental and unintentional chain of consequences, but a preplanned and orchestrated operation; a mass of people directed towards us." (Bodissey 2016)

The paragraph above is taken from the speech delivered by Viktor Orbán on 15 March 2016 during the national day of Hungary to celebrate the Hungarian revolution of 1848. It is only a small part of a long speech which highlights the identity rhetoric used to talk about migration in Hungary. Identity rhetorics, then, become very important and crucial in discussing migration issues and policies, not only in Hungary but also in Europe. This study investigates on how the mass migration of people coming to Europe affects Hungary and Hungarian national identity. It will also look at how the notion of identity is being interpreted within the political debates on migration in Hungary. Since it is clear that Hungary's stance on migration is against taking on people from those war-torn countries, this study will also look at if the identity rhetorics are the fundamental driver of the Hungarian government's stance on migration and how it affects other factors which then being used as drivers of fear and anxiety.

2. Aim and Research Questions

The aim of this study is to explore the plausible reasons following the Hungarian government's stance, rhetorics, and policies towards the mass influx of people coming to Europe revolving around the identity issues. Identity plays a crucial role at the beginning of this research as it is brought up many times by the Hungarian government when speaking about the refugees and migration issues. Therefore this research aims to seek and analyse further plausible reasons to understand Hungary's stance and actions on the recent migration crisis. There are a few research questions I seek to investigate throughout this thesis.

Main research question: To what extent identity plays a role in Hungary's policy in response to the migration crisis?

Sub-questions:
- How is the migration crisis being perceived in Hungary?
- How does the understanding of national identity affect Hungary's stance towards the migration crisis?
- What are the implications of migration crisis on Hungary's political dynamics?
- In relations to the migration crisis, what are the fears Hungary has and in what way do those fears affect Hungary?

3. Previous Research

For countries like Australia, Canada, or the United States, immigration issue is a crucial part in their historical nation-building process. In regards to the general immigration law, these countries factor in their nation's values when they receive immigrants based on different reasons, such as family reunion, economic reason or even humanitarian preference (Dauvergne 2004, 590). Dauvergne (2004, 591) also implies that migration laws are essential to the construction of nations because in order for the nation to exist, it must have both members and boundaries. The function of migration laws is to distinct members and others, and it makes the borders more meaningful for the members inside and the others who want to cross it (Dauvergne 2004, 591). In the case of Europe, however, could be seen differently than Australia, Canada, or the United States. The beginning of migration trend in Europe started in the 1950s and 1960s as the economies in most Western European countries started to grow (McLaren 2003). At that time, the labour shortage in those Western European countries created a trend of migration from other European countries to the Western Europe, which then the trend has transformed into immigration of people from non-European countries to Europe.

On the discussion of the dichotomy of "Us and "Others", the increase of the immigrant population during the last decade has affected the ethnic composition of the European countries which triggered the perceptions of "Us" and "Others" where "Others" constitute an ethnic threat to the social, political, and economic order, as well as to the cultural homogeneity and the national identity of "Us" (Kalogeraki 2012, 243). In their research, Kalogeraki (2012) compares Sweden and Greece in relations to their migrant-related attitudes and the perceived ethnic threats between in-groups (Us) and out-groups (Others) in the period of post-economic crisis 2008. In Sweden, the migrant-related attitudes turned more positively due to two reasons. First, Swedish economy did not go downward during the crisis. Second, despite the fact that the economy was not really affected, the Swedish government's goal at that time was to enhance the integration policy to invest on the new immigrants and to increase their access to the labour market. While in the case of Greece, the in-groups' migrant-related attitudes showed more resistance towards the out-groups. The perceived economic, cultural, general ethnic, and social benefits threats were also significantly higher among the Greek majority group compared to Sweden. The results showed the different perception of immigrants created tension between the in-groups/"Us" and the out-groups/"Others".

On a similar note, Baumann (1999) highlights how the notion of "war of religions" is being used to redefine conflicts between national or ethnic interests and minorities. For example, in the Netherlands, the native Dutch first perceived an influx of national minorities into the country, such

as Turks and Moroccans, as a matter of religious traits, Muslims and Islam, instead of perceiving them based on their ethnic traits. In another case, the different understanding on identifying the root cause of inequality between black and white Americans in the United States. While mainstream opinion identifies ethnicity as the root cause, African-American Muslims perceive the conflict into one between a liberating Islam and an oppressive Christianity (Baumann 1999, 23). Baumann (1999) argues that precisely because religion sounds so absolute, it can be used as a translation for other, more relative, forms of conflict between majority-minority or "Us"-"Others".

In relations to security, Huysmans (2006) highlights some examples of how refugees and immigrants are presented as a security question. First, the refugee community of Rwandese Tutsis who were forced into exile after 1959 turned into a militant force fighting the Rwandese regime, which in this case, it resembles closely to the traditional understandings of national security. Second, the framing of Muslim immigrants as a cultural threat in the United States and the European Union as representatives of a competing civilisation whose values and every manners risk undermining Western civilisation. It shows the form of threat as a non-traditional one, as it is not primarily of a military kind. The focus on this example is on the cultural expression and everyday values the immigrants have where it challenges a pre-supposed cultural homogeneity of Western societies. Third, refugees who fear persecution or whose daily life has been disrupted suddenly. The danger shifts from a community facing an external or internal threat to individuals whose human security is threatened. In this third example, the ones in danger are not the citizens of the member states of the European Union or the United States, but individuals fearing starvation or persecution on the basis of race, religion, or political opinion (Huysmans 2006, 20). This section is explored in order to see some issues revolving the issues of migration, the perception of immigrants, non-traditional security involving refugees and immigrants, as well as to highlight the dichotomy of "Us" and "Others" which have been discussed by many researchers in the past decades.

4. Relevance to Global Studies

Globalisation has many dimensions (Eriksen 2014). When talking about migration, many dimensions of globalisation can be used to correlate migration with globalisation. In this research, I only highlight the dimensions which correlate more with the study, while acknowledging that other dimensions of globalisation can correlate with migration as well, which are mobility, connections, risk, and identity politics.

Migration is mobility. Migration can be seen throughout history in different forms, from colonisation, slave trade, and now it can be seen as migrant workers and refugees. Eriksen (2014,

103) differentiates the migration phenomenon in the New World Countries of the United States, Canada, and Australia with in European countries. In the former, as settler countries, immigration is seen as a normal process. While in the latter, debates over migration policy and the integration of immigrants into the majority societies are omnipresent and include everything from immigrants' voting patterns to gender roles, the significance of religion (usually Islam), and discrimination in the labour market (Eriksen 2014, 103).

Migration is connections. As social change is believed as a coherent general phenomenon in the globalised world, the boundaries between societies and cultures are becoming increasingly contested (Eriksen 2014, 77). Fear towards a social change stems from the growth of diversity which can entail bad scenarios, such as the growth of terrorism.

Migration is risk. Risks and vulnerabilities are produced locally and globally. Many anti-immigrant rhetoric use the concept of risk to justify their actions in response to the mass influx of refugees coming to Europe. Risk as 'a culture of fear' (Eriksen 2014, 138) which means that risk is based on uncertainties of probabilities of something bad might happen in the future.

Migration is identity politics. Globalisation is fundamentally dual: it intensifies homogenisation and introduces new forms of diversity (Eriksen 2014, 153). In this research, the mass influx of refugees to Hungary shows the former in Hungary instead of the latter. The Hungarian government uses the identity rhetoric as a strategy of modernisation using the language of tradition to gain popular support from the society for its anti-immigrant policy (Eriksen 2014, 158).

5. Delimitation

One way of delimiting this study is to focus only on the migration crisis' effects on Hungary's perception on identity, migration, fears, and political dynamics. These topics will be discussed in relations to the migration crisis. I will only have a general discussion on Hungary's political dynamics after the migration crisis by focusing the discussions on how the issue is being used as a political manoeuvre by Hungary's political actors in the domestic level as well as in the regional level. However, this research will not discuss further on the political dynamics as it is believed to be consisted of more complex factors which should be discussed in another research. The idea to have a general discussion on Hungary's political dynamics is a result of the interviews which the respondents pointed out how important the migration crisis is within the Hungary's political dynamics domestically and regionally.

6. Disposition

In the first chapter, I give a brief outline of the case study of this research along with the aims and research questions which will be discussed further in this research. Discussions on this research's relevance to Global Studies and the previous research regarding the topics of identity and migration are also present in this chapter to point out where this research will fit in the debates of identity and migration.

Following the first chapter, the second chapter entails the short explanation on the migration crisis on different topics. I will start the chapter by explaining about the origin of the refugees who came to Europe during the migration crisis, and implying the reasons why the refugees fled the country, came to Europe, and did not stop at other countries they passed by in their journey. After that, I will discuss Hungary's response and actions towards the migration crisis and the mass influx of immigrants.

The theoretical framework will occupy the third chapter. This chapter elaborates the chosen theoretical frameworks to understand the research as well as the situation in Hungary in regards to migration and identity. The theoretical discussion on migration will be elaborated to understand why people migrate. Following that discussion, the debates on perceptions of identity between primordialists and constructivists will be discussed due to its importance to help explaining the conception of "Us" and "Others". Securitisation will also be discussed because it will help understanding the process of securitising social problems which are not traditionally discussed when talking about security. Lastly, the drivers of anxiety and fear over migration will be explained to become the guideline of understanding the possible drivers which constructed the stance of the Hungarian government on the migration crisis and refugees.

The methodology chosen for this research will be explained in the fourth chapter. It entails the explanation of the chosen method, the process of collecting data, difficulties during the data collection, and also the process of analysis to transform the data into finding answers for the research questions and to fulfil the aim of this research.

The fifth chapter is showing the result of the research. The discussions in this chapter are the outcome of analysing the collected data. It entails different sections discussing about Hungary's perception of the migration crisis, the perception of identity in Hungary, the effects of the migration crisis, and the fears Hungary has towards the migration crisis and refugees.

The sixth chapter entails the conclusion as well as the recommendations for future research.

The reference list occupies the last few pages of this research, followed by the appendixes regarding the methods and the method application.

II. Background

1. From Syria to Europe

The mass influx of people coming to Europe is a result of violence and conflict in the Middle East, specifically in Syria. The conflict in Syria has existed long enough, yet in 2015 it reached to a point where a massive number of people have to escape the countries to seek for protection.

The conflict in Syria, and in many other Arab countries in West Asia and North Africa, rooted deeply in problems of large-scale unemployment, high inflation, limited upward mobility, rampant corruption, lack of political freedoms, and repressive security forces (Haran 2016; Metcalfe-Hough 2015; Blanchard et al. 2015). The problems were detrimental to the stability in the national level and also in the regional level. In Syria, the escalation of the problems was shown in the political uprising of early 2011 which evolved into an insurgency after the Syrian government engaged peaceful protests with increasing repression (Blanchard et al. 2015, 9). Alongside that, the growth of extremist groups as well as the increasing counteraction from many military forces from other countries fed into the situation in Syria, and in most countries in the region facing the same problem, and triggered the problems to be more intense.

The short explanation of the Syrian conflict is necessary for this research to look at the source of why Syrians escape from their country. The social and political problems then followed by the insurgency were the reasons why the Syrians had to escape their country. The United Nations estimated about 6.6 million people are internally displaced, 4.8 million people have fled to Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, and Iraq and the insurgency have killed more than 250,000 people which half is believed to be civilians (Mercy Corps 2016; Migration Policy Centre 2016). The situation in Syria is unstable and the government cannot provide safety and protection the people need. Therefore, moving away is a better option for them. Based on the data gathered by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), over 590,000 people have arrived by sea in 2015 and almost over 630,000 new asylum claims were made to the European Union countries (Metcalfe-Hough 2015).

It is highlighted in some research (see Metcalfe-Hough 2015; Brugnola 2016) that many refugees fled to the neighbouring countries first. For example, many Afghan refugees fled to Iran or Pakistan first before heading to another countries. However, there is not much prospect of integration or even a secure living condition for them in their countries of first destination which

resulted into them moving to Europe where the right to seek asylum must be guaranteed (Metcalfe-Hough 2015, 3). Metcalfe-Hough (2015) highlights that in the case of Syrian refugees, for example, host governments in the Middle East are too overwhelmed by the massive influx of refugees and some of them become hostile, tightening borders, increasing visa or residency restrictions and in some cases they deny legal access for refugees to work. Other than the strict regulations, the issue of security comes to the discussion as well. The recent bomb attacks in Turkey and prevailing insecurity in Lebanon, for example, show that those countries cannot guarantee a safe place for the refugees.

Europe becomes a place where the refugees feel they can be secured, safe, and where they will build their new life. As outlined by the High Commissioner for Refugees, the right to seek asylum in Europe for refugees must be guaranteed (Metcalfe-Hough 2015, 3). One may argue that the increasing number of people crossing borders to Europe using irregular channels is the result of the international community failing to address conflicts, human rights violations, and other 'push' factors, such as poverty, inequality, weak governance and climate and environmental changes, which affect the refugees' life in countries of origin (Metcalfe-Hough 2015, 3). The involvement of Russia in 2015 also escalated the insecurity and instability within the Syrian and Turkish border, instead of helping to manage the conflict situation.

2. Hungary and the Refugee Crisis

Hungary, alongside Croatia, Greece, and Italy, has become one of the first destination countries for refugees who are aiming to get to Europe. However, the fact is many refugees are aiming to move towards Germany, Denmark, or Sweden, instead of Hungary. The Dublin regulation system in the European Union obliges refugees to apply for asylum in the first European Union's member country they arrived. However, during the mass influx of refugees in 2015, some problems occurred alongside the implementation of this regulation. The rule was not properly applied, as many refugees who arrived in Greece, for example, went away and reached Germany, Sweden, or Denmark and not applied for asylum in Greece (Cendrowicz and Wright 2016).

As an impact of the improper application of the Dublin regulation, the burden of preventing irregular migrants to get into Europe is affecting Hungary tremendously. Based on the Eurostat data from January until September 2015 (Juhász et al. 2015, 9), Hungary has received the most number of asylum applications compared to other countries. However, the acceptance rate of refugees getting asylum in Hungary is a different case. Juhász et al. (2015) highlight that due to Hungary's lack of experience in receiving a massive influx of immigrants and lack of experience in living with

immigrants, except for the Chinese and the Roma immigrants, the mass influx of people coming to Europe in summer 2015 came as a shock. During the year of 2015, the Hungarian government had been taking a strong stance in the issue of refugee crisis through anti-immigrants rhetorics and policies, while at the same time exploiting public fears to gain support by using the mainstream public media outlets owned by the government.

The Hungarian government use the word 'subsistence migrants', 'illegal migrants', and 'economic migrants' many times during the refugee crisis to define those people who are crossing the European borders (Juhász et al. 2015, 26). The portrayals of refugees or people who cross the Hungarian, or even European, borders play a significant role in the rhetorics used by the Hungarian government. The Hungarian government portrays the migrants as people who are not coming from war-torn countries, instead they want to take advantage of the asylum procedure to be able to settle in Europe for economic purposes only.

The rhetorics then turn into policies which spark many, including national and international actors. The Hungarian government built billboards[1] last year around the country saying that, for example, migrants are not allowed to steal Hungarian jobs. Other than that, the Hungarian government had a national consultation where the government sent surveys to every Hungarian in the country on their opinion about refugees. This survey was sent alongside a letter from the Prime Minister and his opinions on the refugee crisis in which he labels asylum seekers as 'economic migrants' and says "… economic migrants cross the border illegally pretending to be refugees, while in reality they seek social allowances and jobs." (Juhász et al. 2015, 25). To which some NGOs in Hungary and also the oppositions argued that the 'so-called' national consultation is only a way for the government to do propaganda and to insert their opinions on the Hungarian public's minds (Juhász et al. 2015, 25; Kingsley 2015). As the crisis went on, many terror attacks happened in 2015 of which the Hungarian government used to incorporate the issue of terrorism into the refugee crisis by portraying refugees as terrorists, a threatening groups of which the Hungarian government has the authority and responsibility to deal with them as threats to the Hungarian society (Kallius et al. 2016, 27; Lane 2016).

The propagandas launched by the Hungarian government, through media, building of billboards, and the national consultation survey, seem successful. According to Eurobarometer figures published in May 2015 (Juhász et al. 2015, 17), the Hungarian population considered

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[1] There are three types of messages delivered in the billboards: (1) "If you come to Hungary, you have to respect our culture." (2) "If you come to Hungary, you have to respect our laws." (3) "If you come to Hungary, you cannot take away Hungarians' jobs." These messages are written only in Hungarian.

unemployment to be most urgent problem in Hungary, and 13% of the respondents who placed immigration as the top three problems in Hungary. However, in September 2015 another survey was conducted and the number of respondents who placed immigration as the top three problems in Hungary rose to 65%. It shows the growth of negative prejudices towards refugees which has turned into a new trend within the Hungarian population.

The construction of border fences with Hungary's neighbours, Serbia and Croatia, in 2015 was the most visible anti-immigration policy implemented by the Hungarian government to immobilise refugees (Kallius et al. 2016, 27). In relation to that, the Hungarian government is planning to build a second border fence with Serbia by the end of 2016 as a preemptive action if the European Union's deal with Turkey to hold refugees in Turkey is collapsed (Batchelor 2016; Than 2016). The fences built last year had created commotion between the supporters of the fence and those against it. The commotion was related to the treatment of refugees by Hungarian authority within the border. Human Rights Watch reported that the refugees who want to cross the border after the fences were built get violent treatment from Hungarian authority (Human Rights Watch 2016).

Many people have argued that the propagandas launched and rhetorics used by the Hungarian government are merely a political tactic for them to gain public support (Juhász et al. 2015; Rovny 2016). The refugee crisis gives the opportunity for nationalist politicians to mobilise substantial supports they may need for the longevity of their political party (Rovny 2016, 4). The issue of immigration becomes political competition in Hungary, thus the political party who can exploit the issue and gain public support will be able to get more public support. Since January 2015, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and his cabinet, alongside his political party Fidesz, had planned to monopolise the issue of immigration to stabilise its electoral support and regain momentum in domestic politics by having a strong stance against immigrants, and by showing the Hungarian population that the government is determined to defend their nation from 'aliens' (Juhász et al. 2015, 24). Far-right party Jobbik has the same stance with Fidesz, however the competition between them involves who uses the anti-immigrant rhetorics first. While the other parties, for example the social democratic party MSZP (Hungarian Socialist Party, *Magyar Szocialista Párt*), the co-chairs of the green party LMP (Politics Can be Different, *Lehet más a politika*) and the small green-leftist party PM (Dialogue for Hungary, *Parbeszéd Magyarorszagért*) have positioned themselves to be against using such rhetorics (Juhász et al. 2015, 27). However, the far-right rhetorics have become more dominant in Hungary due to Fidesz' and Jobbik's influences in Hungary which are preeminent.

Emigration, however, in Hungary is also a problem, in fact it is even bigger and more crucial than immigration. Many young people move out of Hungary to work in other European countries, mostly in Western Europe. Before the issue of immigration progressed to this extent, the Hungarian migration policy is focusing on how to provide rights for Hungarians abroad and how to reduce emigration. The issue of emigration comes into the discussion of immigration due to its unequal trading (Juhász et al. 2015, 14). By 2015, up to 500,000 Hungarians emigrate while the number of immigrants has not been equally enough to cover the loss of people due to emigration. With this argument, Hungary should, instead of seeing immigration as a threat and immigrants as burdens, see them as a solution for their population problem and focusing more on creating jobs for them and Hungarians (Juhász et al. 2015; Metcalfe-Hough 2015).

III. Theoretical Framework

1. Migration and Identity

1. a. Reasons for Migration

Migration is the movement of individuals across borders. When talking about migration, two forms of migration are voluntary migration and forced migration. The forms of migration constitute, respectively, to economic reason and security reason. Voluntary migration can be understood as people leaving their home country to seek for a better life and a higher income in another country, thus it constitutes to economic reason. People who voluntarily migrate from their home country are often due to having family members in another country who were migrating beforehand voluntarily or even forced. On the other hand, forced migration is usually occurred due to security reasons: being exiled, fleeing from conflict or war, fleeing from prosecution.

The 'push-pull' model of migration talks about people moving to another country due to different factors. In a way, Papastergiadis (2000, 30) argues the 'push-pull' model as people are 'pushed' out of stagnant rural peasant economies, and 'pulled' up towards industrial urban centres. He claims some possible push factors which lead to people deciding to migrate such as population growth, less economic potential in the home country, or repressive political regimes (Papastergiadis 2000, 31). While the pull factors explain how people get attracted to move to host countries, such as preferential immigration policies offered by a state, economic benefits in the forms of state incentives or greater opportunity, personal contacts, and assist in resettlement. However, in the sociological studies of international migration, he argues that economics is such a dominant factor which overshadows social or cultural factors of why people migrate (Papastergiadis 2000, 33). On the same note, Eriksen (2014, 103) highlights that migration can be a more unsettling, confusing, and frustrating experience if it is prompted by push factors rather than pull factors.

In some cases, economic reason will suffice to explain international migration. However, the definition of migrant itself ranged from economic migrants, refugees, students, international workers, asylum seekers, and many more. It seems unfair to just acknowledge the economic reasons as the main push factor in migration. In fact, the International Organisation on Migration (IOM) defines a migrant as any person who is moving or has moved across an international border or within a state away from their habitual place of residence, regardless of (1) the person's legal status; (2) whether the movement is voluntary or involuntary; (3) what the causes for the movement are; or (4) what the length of the stay is (International Organisation for Migration 2011).

1. b. Identity in Migration

Individuals migrate with their cultural values, beliefs, or other identity characteristics embedded with each of them. The relation between migration and identity lays on how the identity of migrants is perceived. The way migrants' identity is perceived can be explained by looking at the significant debate between primordialists and constructivists. Primordialists define identity as something "given", "fixed", and "natural" based on a history of kinship and connections. Geertz (1973, 259-260) argues that one's identity is embedded since they were born into a particular religious community, having a particular racial feature, and speaking a particular language. Identity is fixed by human nature and not by social convention and practice. These beliefs in the naturalness of identity might be rooted in beliefs about alleged implications of biology, for example gender, sexuality, and ethnicity, or about theology and morality (Fearon and Laitin 2000, 848). Fearon and Laitin (2000, 849) also highlights that based on primordial view of identity, tension and friction between two or more identity groups are inevitable due to the unchanging, essential characteristics of the members of these categories.

Constructivists argue on the contrary to the primordialists in terms of identity creation. Identity is seen as something that is context-dependent, highly malleable, constructed, and constantly evolving in response to external events and processes, such as globalisation (Jackson 2005; 2009; Chandra 2012; Brubaker 2000; Fearon and Laitin 2000). Brubaker (2000, 21) argues that ethnic identity, for example, is the product of historical processes, while Brass (1991, 16) argues that ethnic identity formation is a process created in the dynamics of elite competition within the boundaries deriving from political and economic realities. When it comes to interaction between identity groups, tension and friction occur not necessarily due to the differences in characteristics, yet it could be.

Taking into account the debate between primordialists and constructivists on identity creation, one thing that can be understood is both perceptions can define who is "Us" and who is "Others". Crepaz (2008, 30) argues that constructivism and primordialism, instead of opposing each other, they actually complement each other by looking at primordial sentiments as the initial characteristics of identity which then evolved and constructed through time.

The intensification of migration, as one may argue, is affected by globalisation and it raises the important issue of "belonging" (Eriksen 2014, 103; Papastergiadis 2000, 52). There are two questions usually asked in social interaction in relation to migration and identity: *who are they?* and *where are they from?* The former regards to identity characteristic of a person, while the latter is

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related to the place or space of origin. Both identity characteristic and the space of origin are related when talking about identity formation. Primordialists may argue that natural identity characteristic is rooted in the specific place of origin, while constructivists may argue that socio-political flows and barriers, that constitute spatial configurations, also constitute and reflect the formations of identity (Papastergiadis 2000, 52). The recognition of the politicisation of the spatial are inseparable and that spatial form of the social has causal effectivity (Papastergiadis 2000, 52). Both primordialists and constructivists argue that identity characteristic and space are connected, but in a different way. One thing I interpret from this is that identity may have a space of origin, yet it can be configured by several factors, such as migration. The issue of "belonging" becomes more complicated when it is discussed with the issue of homeland. Indigenous people are facing such problems. The Australian aborigines, for example, live in the homeland they "belong" but in a society where they do not necessarily feel they "belong" (Papastergiadis 2000, 53-54).

Migration brings up the sense of "belonging" from "Our" perspective and from "Their" perspective. From "Our" perspective, people who come to our society, which constitutes certain identity characteristics, with their own identity characteristics may become either a blessing or a nuisance for our society. However from "Their" perspective, as being a stranger coming into a community which they are not familiar with will make them anxious on how they are perceived and how they will be able to survive. The construction of the stranger is embedded within a series of dichotomies, such as us-them and insider-outsider. There is a need for a more complex framework of differentiation, in the current phases of global migration, that is capable of addressing the shifting patterns of inclusion and exclusion (Papastergiadis 2000, 13). The feeling of commonness then affects the sense of belonging for both "Us" and "Them". Watson (2000, 2) argues that because individuals recognise themselves in the emotional spectrum which this sense of distinctiveness conveys, they are also prepared to recognise the significance and the importance of the notion of culture in the lives of others.

Kulcsár and Yum (2012, 197) highlight that Eastern European nations have struggled with a dual challenge regarding their identities as a part of the post-communist transformation process. The idea of democracy has required a nation to incorporate certain elements including ethnic tolerance, multiculturalism, and minority rights. The post-communist states can find those principles to be politically inconvenient because they are unaccustomed to such principles (Kulcsár and Yum 2012, 197). Kulcsár and Yum (2012) also points out that many Eastern European countries has been struggling to redefine and to rearticulate their national identity. This will affect on what the Eastern Europeans' perception is on the notion of identity and the construction of "Us" and "Others".

1. c. Immigrant's Identity and the Dichotomy of "Us" and "Others"

Government's approach on the issue of migration varies. For example, there has been a growing legitimacy of multicultural perspectives in places like Canada and Australia since the 1970s, while there is a rise of nationalistic feeling in Eastern Europe shown by the government which has been getting stronger and more apparent since last year. Both approaches are considered to be a response towards the notion of how globalisation can affect a nation.

Government has a role to deal with migration problems, whether by creating strict regulations on migration or by becoming more open towards migration and providing them with better integration programs. Watson (2000, 3) explains that if a nation is a multicultural society and one's sense of self-worth is intimately and unavoidably bound up with their cultural identity, in order to survive the state can do one of two things: it can try to eliminate the multicultural dimension of the society by rooting out all cultures other than a single one which will become dominant, or to celebrate and encourage multiculturalism in the spirit of protecting liberal tolerance. The former can be understood as coercive assimilation while the latter is about integration. The decision whether to take a nationalistic approach through assimilation or to embrace the "Others" by integrating them into the society depends on how the political elites see which response fits their national priorities (Papastergiadis 2000, 56). However, it is unjust to base their decision on their perception whether migrants are useful or not, especially in the situation of crisis where people leave their country to seek for refuge due to war and conflict (Papastergiadis 2000, 56).

Nationalist sentiment, as Gellner (1983, 1) explains it, is the feeling of anger aroused by the violation of the principle of norms, or the feeling of satisfaction triggered by its fulfilment. He also explains what constitutes norms. A nation is made from will or consent of the people and also culture. Will or consent is required to create group formation, while culture is needed as the common values which connect people (Gellner 1983, 53-55). Norm, of a nation, is born from the will or consent of people to group themselves by using the commonness (culture) they have and combined with the political institutions' support.

Culture is not only being invoked, imagined, and judged, but also being reflected, drew on, or used to manipulate the popular notions of national versus alien culture by politicians to develop policies and to give more legitimacy for the state institutions to manage the issue of migration (Vertovec 2011, 242). Migration is one of the key mode of transformations which triggers, while at the same time challenges, the issue of cultural identity (Vertovec 2011, 244). Human beings are motivated to positively evaluate themselves and their own groups in order to increase their self-

esteem by evaluating their own self-worth which put the members of an out-group on the basis of race, religion, language, nationality, sexual orientation, or any difference that exists between the in-group and out-group (Crepaz 2008, 35). Therefore it is not difficult to use the issue of migration, which has the essence of cultural identity in it, to mobilise government's agenda and to influence the public by using rhetorics and even anti-immigrant policies.

The notion of "Us" and "Others" plays a crucial part in this research, but it also applies to research on migration in general. The prejudice towards immigrants come from the distinction between "Us" and "Others". In McLaren's work (2003), majority group sees minority group as a threat towards them in two different subjects: economy and cultural. McLaren's research is explaining how the prejudice towards immigrants is created through seeing them as a threat and how having contact with immigrants does reduce prejudice towards them and help integration process to be easier. When talking about the economy subject, McLaren (2003, 915-916) refers to the concept of realistic group threat. The central idea of this concept is the prejudice towards immigrants or minority group comes from the fear of the majority of competition over resources. The fear of competition over resources may be stemmed from an anxiousness that the minority group will take jobs and government resources, to name the least, from the majority. In the case of extreme anti-immigrant prejudice in the form of expulsion, such prejudice may stem from concerns about resources being taken from the in-group collectively, rather than just from the individual (McLaren 2003, 915).

The subject of cultural threat is referred by McLaren (2003, 916-917) as symbolic threat which means that the majority fears that the minority will change the cultural entity of the society completely. The main concern of the majority group, in this case, is to protect the majority's cultural entity within the society. In their work, McLaren (2003, 916) takes the example in the United States of America where "symbolic racism represents a form of resistance to change in the racial status quo based on moral feelings that the African-American people violate such traditional American values as individualism and self-reliance, the work ethic, obedience, and discipline". The sense of "Us" and "Others" affects how the prejudice towards the immigrant/minority/"Others" is created. However, throughout their research, McLaren's findings prove that contact between members of the majority with members of the minority can reduce the prejudice the former has with the latter and help immigrants to integrate better into the European society (2003, 969).

2. Drivers of Fear and Anxiety

People's skepticism about immigration and the negative public reactions towards the issue do not always followed with a wave of large-scale immigration (Papademetriou 2012). A small-scale immigration may also be able to affect people's opinion when it happens gradually and it seems endlessly. Fear and anxiety towards migrants come along with the wave of migration itself. If getting to know a new family who just move into your neighbourhood with different cultural background, norms, and values is already hard, imagine having millions of people. Fear and anxiety "We" have are based on "Our" knowledge, and lack thereof, towards "Others". In a sense, fear relates to a clear danger that is threatening, while anxiety relates to a situation of uncertainty (Delanty 2008, 682). Delanty (2008, 682) also explains that anxiety arises when the self is threatened by dangers that do not take the form of an objective threat and where the relation between external object or reality and an internal self is not clear-cut. Papademetriou (2012) highlights five principals which are most common in understanding what drives people to have fear or anxiety over migration.

First, migration brings up an anxiety of losing one's culture or identity. The society fears that the common norms and values that bind societies together will be weakened if migrants do not adapt to the host-country's language, culture and identity, and it will be especially threatening if they are believed to harbour illiberal cultural practices (McLaren 2003, 916-917; Papademetriou 2012). This issue brings up the debates on how to deal with diversity.

Second, migration brings changes in the society, sometimes, in a rapid pace than expected. The anxiety over migration comes from the feeling that too much change has occurred too fast and it affects the society's overburdened education, health, transportation, and public safety systems (Papademetriou 2012). Papademetriou (2012) also highlights that anxiety about immigration can correlate less to the absolute numbers of newcomers than to the speed of change and its geographic concentration. People's anxiety over migration, which then turned into fear, comes from the realisation towards changes in their environment of which they perceived as very sudden and massive.

The third driver of fear/anxiety over migration is related to economics and inequality. Immigrants are often depicted as a financial burden on the host society, contributing to greater unemployment and wage depression, and straining the welfare state (Papademetriou 2012). A feature of racism in Europe today is a shift in the focus of hostility away from colour and race towards more social and cultural characteristics, for instance protecting jobs, concern about welfare benefits, and cultural incompatibilities or differences (Delanty 2008, 684). In relation to identity, the

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question of belonging becomes more critical since it affects how one feels when sacrificing part of their income to benefit "Others" (Crepaz 2008, 2; McLaren 2003, 916).

The political issue of governance and sovereignty becomes the fourth driver of fear/anxiety over migration. The loss of sovereign control to seemingly 'unaccountable' supranational bodies with a growing reach on immigration decisions further fuels popular distrust (Papademetriou 2012). Even in a society that is more accepting towards migrants, they may have a generally negative view of those people who are managing the issue. At times, the government is not fully equipped to handle the influx of people. In another times, the government does not have better policies to maintain the diversity when the migrants are already present within the society.

The increase of terrorist attack and crime linked to migration is the fifth driver of fear/ anxiety. Many terror attacks and crimes occur during or after a migration wave which add to the circle of fear and anxiety within the society (Papademetriou 2012). Crepaz, when talking about Turkey's plan to become a European Union member (2008, 7), argues that the cultural incompatibility between the European culture and the Muslim culture, and also fuelled by many terror attacks related to Islam, such as the horrific attacks on September 11, 2001, the brutal killing of Theo van Gogh in the Netherlands by a radical Muslim, the recent terror attacks happened in Paris and Brussels, and the growing Islamophobia in Europe since the early 1990s triggered by the increasing immigration of muslims into relatively homogeneous European nations, make it difficult to accept Turkey or the Muslim culture into the European Union system based on cultural grounds.

3. Securitising "Others"

The concept of securitisation is introduced by Copenhagen School to understand the process of how one issue becomes securitised. In a traditional way of thinking, security is defined as an issue that is posing an existential threat to a referent object, whether it is state, government, territory, or society (Buzan et al. 1998, 21). In reference to identity, the term of societal security underlines that the sense of society or identity is being threatened (Williams 2003, 518). Roe (2000, 140; see also Buzan et al. 1998, 24) argues that threats to societal security exist when one perceives that their identity is being endangered. Jackson (2005, 157) supports the argument by saying that threats to societal security appear not necessarily due to its apparent danger towards the society, but it is based on the society's interpretation that something will harm them. The interpretation of threat itself may or may not correspond to the realities.

The process of securitisation is done through speech acts by claiming an issue as a threat to a referent object and it needs extraordinary measures to deal with the threat (Buzan et al. 1998, 26).

In order to successfully securitise an issue, three important factors should be considered (Buzan et al. 1998, 25-27). First, there has to be an issue classified as existential threat to a referent object. Second, there has to be an emergency action to respond to the existential threat. Lastly, there has to be acceptance from the audience, or public, that the issue is threatening and in need for security measures as a response. However, securitising an issue can also be seen as a political move in order to achieve certain goals (Buzan et al. 1998, 29), such as to gain popular trust from the public or to gain support from other international actors. War on terrorism, declared after the 9/11 tragedy, is an example of securitisation of identity when the American government linked Islam with terrorism which affected the rise of prejudice and xenophobia against Muslims.

Migration, in the EU, has turned into an existential threat to the state, society, and market (Roe 2004, 279). The increased number of people coming from the war-torn countries from Africa and the Middle East, which many of them are Muslims, is seen as threatening. The linking of terrorism to the identity of Muslims is seen as a prejudice that fuels the growth of xenophobia in Europe (McLaren 2003). Securitisation is a constructed process based on the perceptions and assumptions of what could harm the society. State is an agency which has the ultimate power to influence the society to whether be supportive or opposed towards the issue of migration (Crepaz 2008, 22-23). Many scholars argue that securitising migration and identity needs to be stopped and, instead of seeing it as a security problem, to see it as more of a social problem (see for example Mitzen 2006; Roe 2004; Jackson 2005; Gartzke and Gleditsch 2006).

Threats and vulnerabilities are often confused with each other. Threats are immediate danger that demand immediate type of action, while vulnerabilities are potential risks that do not offer a clear policy response (Grayson 2009, 338). Societal vulnerability, such as migration, is being redefined as a security threat due to the similar meaning between them, as well as due to the anxiety of society over possible threat (Grayson 2009, 338). Hence, the rhetorics are used by the government to securitise the issue of immigration and anti-immigrant policies are being implemented to deal with the perceived threat.

Huysmans' research (2006) is aiming to explain a technocratic interpretation of the politics of insecurity and how the government defines threats and insecurities. Huysmans (2006, 2-3) argues that insecurity is a constructed politically and socially based on the subjective or objective nature of the threat and how much political priority it deserves. As many other researchers who explain securitisation process (see for example Buzan et al. 1998; Waever 1998), Huysmans (2006) argues that (in)security is based on how one perceives what threat is to them. Asylum, in this case, is being rendered as a security issue by being integrated, institutionally and discursively, in policy

frameworks that emphasise policing and defence by, for example, linking asylum to terrorism and then sees it as a threat (Huysmans 2006, 3-5).

In the research, Huysmans (2006, 4) also argues that the interpretation of the notion of insecurity stretches from threat definition to the political and institutional framing of policy issues in what can be referred to as 'domains of insecurity', which refer to areas of activity and interest that are traversed by, and invest social and political relations with a ratio by virtue of which insecurity is known to exist. However, this does not guarantee that the insecurity will occur, instead it is based on the assumption that it will occur. Insecurity, in this case, is politically and socially constructed by the government. Some governments portray insecurities as something that need to be responded through security measures without first defining what those insecurities are and how it will affect them in the long term. Having a security policy is a reaction towards an existential threat. Many people/government see differences as an existential threat. The use of security language to respond to a 'so-called' threat then plays a big role in affecting how the security rationality plays into the policy-making process. Huysmans (2006) argues that there are two definitions of the politics of insecurity, a contest of visions of insecurity and a contest of visions of the political. In some cases, the latter overshadows the former and it securitises non-security issues by institutionalising the problems through the use of language. It affects the current migration crisis by not seeing it as a humanitarian problem but instead it is seen as a security problem.

4. General Discussion on the Theoretical Framework

This research will use to the theoretical framework to help understanding the key themes picked from the empirical material which are important for the analytical framework. The reasons for migration and the relations between migration and identity will be explored to understand Hungary's perspective on the migration crisis and on identity. Identity, in this case, refers to diversity and the incoming of people with different cultural identities. It is important to understand how identity is perceived due to the fact that Hungary's constitution recognises thirteen national minorities and how these minorities and immigrants are perceived differently. The dichotomy of "Us" and "Others" will be explored to understand how the perception of identity affects Hungary's stance on the migration crisis.

The migration crisis and the mass influx of immigrants have been announced as threatening economic, security, political, cultural, and general ethnic order in Europe. The concept of securitisation highlights the transformation of non-security issues becoming security issues through the securitisation process of speech-acts. Through the securitisation concept, the migration crisis

and immigrants are perceived as existential threats which are being used to validate fears and anxieties as well as the use of anti-immigrant rhetoric and policy in Hungary. Therefore it is important to note that by securitising "Others", it will help in defining what the fears and anxieties towards migration and "Others" are.

IV. Methodology

1. Methodological Choices

Qualitative method of research is chosen for this particular research with the purpose of allowing the researcher, as well as the readers, to understand the process of migration, construction of identity, the situation in Hungary and the relations between them, while also answering the research questions. Creswell (2014, 4) highlights the benefits of doing a qualitative research is to explore and understand the meaning individuals or groups ascribe to a social or human problem. It also allows the researcher to make interpretations of the meaning of the data collected.

Inductive approach is taken for this research as it will allow the researcher to draw generalisable inferences out of observations during the method application (Bryman 2016, 22). The findings then will help to build a foundation of theory for the researcher in related to the topics discussed to help analyse the reoccurring themes which are brought up during the method application process. Within the qualitative research, it is necessary to have an epistemological and ontological position. For this research, interpretivism is fitting to the inductive approach as it respects the differences between people and the objects of the natural sciences and therefore requires the social scientists to grasp the subjective meaning of social action (Bryman 2016, 24).

Constructionism or constructivism is an ontological position that asserts that political phenomena and their meanings are continually being accomplished by social actors which implies that those phenomena are produced and changing through social interaction between social actors (Brymann 2016, 29). Social constructivists, as Creswell (2014, 6-9) puts it, believe that individuals seek understanding of the world by looking at varied and multiple meanings within the chosen object of research which allows the researcher to look for the complexity of views rather than narrowing meanings into a few categories or ideas. Those meanings are often constructed socially and historically through interactions and norms. It will allow the researcher to interpret the meaning and to generate a theory or pattern of meaning.

2. Semi-structured interviews

In a qualitative research, a semi-structured interview method gives the opportunity for the researcher to explore the questions asked to the interviewees. It is a good method for this research due to its ability to create a leeway for interviewees to reply, to highlight what seems important for them, and to emphasis the direction the interviewees see as necessary (Bryman 2016, 466-468).

Semi-structured interview is a flexible process which emphasises on how the interviewee frames and understands issues and events based on the topic and the questions asked. It allows the interviewer to gain access to the interviewees' perspectives on the matter without compartmentalising the response.

2. a. The Interview Process

At the beginning of planning the interviews, I had doubts whether I will have enough interviews for my research or not. I targeted people who worked in NGOs, people in the government, and also academics who were active in the topic. By the end of the day, from many emails I sent, eight people replied and seven agreed to be interviewed while one rejected. The result of having only seven people to be interviewed did discourage me a little bit. However, reaching to the end of the interview process I felt relieved of the data I collected.

Out of the seven respondents I had[2], five[3] of them work with NGOs in Budapest working on different fields. One respondent[4] works with a think-tank organisation funded by the government which have been working on the topic of migration in recent years. And I also have one respondent[5] who is a member of European Parliament from a political party in Hungary. When it comes to their position towards the issue of migration crisis, I would say that five respondents from the NGOs' stance was against the use of rhetorics by the government, while the others were agreeing on the use of such rhetorics as it was important to validate Hungary's strong stance against taking refugees.

The seven interviews were done using different interview methods. Three interviews were done directly by meeting the respondents in their office. Two interviews were done via Skype. The other two were done through email. The decision to do different methods was based on the availability of the respondents, the preferred way of interviews by the respondents, and also the problem that the researcher could not be in Budapest for a longer time to conduct the interviews directly due to visa problems. I realised that the results of the interview may differ, as the interviews done directly and via Skype required interaction through conversation which would allow me to elaborate more on the discussion. However, the interviews done via email were beneficial for this research due to its concise and straightforward answers to the questions which made it easier to

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[2] Further information about the respondents can be seen in Appendix 1

[3] Respondent 1, 2, 4, 5, 6

[4] Respondent 3

[5] Respondent 7

understand and the ideas were extracted clearly. Despite the difficulties I faced during the data collection through several interview methods, the data I gathered was valuable and more than enough to answer the research questions posed for this research. The interviews done directly and through Skype lasted for about one to one and a half hours and were recorded with the respondents' permission. The recorded interviews then turned into written transcriptions.

As mentioned before, the semi-structured interview started with an interview guide[6] I made consists of thirteen open-ended questions with the flexibility to explore more than just questions prepared. The interview guide were done with references from the study I did in advance from various sources, such as news on Hungary, organisations' reports, as well as many academic books related to the topic of migration and identity. The outcome of the interviews were interesting. Based on the number of interviews I did, it may not be a lot. However, the information I received from the respondents was more than I expected. Many of them also sent me some materials to read in regards of the migration situation in Hungary. Despite only having a small number of respondents, I believe the materials I received from them are enough to build the analysis for this research.

3. Ethical considerations

When starting my research design, I was reminded by the teachers to keep in mind the ethical considerations when applying the methodology for the research. I sum up four ethical considerations I had during the research.

3. a. Voluntary Participation

As pointed out by de Vaus (2001, 83), the participation of the respondents should be voluntary. As a researcher, I need the help of the respondents and ask them to spare their time and information to be used for my research. Knowing that helping or not helping my research is on their hands, it will allow them to open up easier once they decided to help out with my research. It will definitely be beneficial for my research as to see their willingness to share the information they have in the subject.

3. b. Informed consent

Informed consent means that the respondents should know about the basic information about the research: the purpose of the study, the identity of the researcher, and how the data will be

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[6] Information on the interview guide can be seen in Appendix 2

used afterwards (de Vaus 2001, 85; Bryman 2016, 129-131). It is necessary to inform the respondents about the basic information about the research in order to gain trust from them. Deception is another ethical consideration related to informed consent. The respondents have to be able to trust the researcher that the interviews will be used for the expressed purposes only (Bryman 2016, 133-134). Trust in this case will help with how the interview process will be done. Informed consent also relates to confidentiality (de Vaus 2001, 87; Bryman 2016, 127) and invasion of privacy (Bryman 2016, 131-133). Confidentiality and invasion of privacy refer to the use of their identity in the research and to use the data collected through the interview with them. I did not make a formal written consent for each respondent. However, I have each respondent's consent in two forms: via email and oral. I informed beforehand that the interviews will be recorded and the data will be used only for this research.

3. c. No harm to participants

Harm to participants has different forms. It can be physical or non-physical. Being involved in a research and giving an opinion about a sensitive issue could possibly give harm to the respondents. However, I assure that the questions I asked and the way the result will come out are not going to harm the respondents. The respondents I had are people who are very active and outspoken in their field of work through oral and written outlets.

3. d. Positionality

Positionality refers to myself as an individual and as a researcher. As an individual, I come from a different place and I have a different cultural background. I consider myself as an individual who appreciates diversity based on my experience by being an Indonesian who have on-hand experiences engaging in a diverse society. My individual characters will affect my character as a researcher as well. Bryman (2016, 34) highlights that values respect either the personal beliefs or the feelings of a researcher, and a researcher should be value free and objective in their research. As a researcher who has a different cultural background, I have values that may be different with people I interviewed. However, my values should not affect my research, especially the interview process.

4. Validity and Reliability

Validity and reliability within qualitative research are different than the ones within quantitative research. Validity, for Bryman (2016, 383), means that the researcher is observing,

identifying, or "measuring" what is said to be observed, identified, or measured. While Creswell (2014, 201) understands validity as when the researcher assures the accuracy of the findings by employing certain procedures. Reliability, on the other hand, indicates that the researcher's approach is consistent across different researchers and different projects (Creswell 2014, 201). One way to strengthen the reliability of qualitative research is by being as transparent as possible about the research process. Validity supports reliability. If validity cannot be proven, then reliability of the research is questioned. Bryman's explanation (2016, 382-390) on alternative criteria for evaluating qualitative research, which are trustworthiness and authenticity, will help to understand more about the validity and reliability within qualitative research.

Trustworthiness, as explained by Bryman (2016, 384-386), consists of four criteria: credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability. The research should be carried out according to the principles of good practice and a good understanding of the social world within the research findings will establish the credibility. Transferability means that the researcher can provide thick description from their research to be a database for other researchers to refer to. Dependability refers to the auditing approach of the research to ensure that complete records of the research process are kept, in another word it means transparency. Confirmability ensures the researcher is objective in doing their research without overtly allowing their personal values or theoretical inclinations to sway the conduct of the research and the findings deriving from it.

Authenticity, on the other hand, is looking at how the research is perceived and affecting other researchers (Bryman 2016, 386). The research should be able to represent different viewpoints within the society, or in another word it should be objective. It should be able to affect other members of the society to have a better understanding of what the problem is and how to engage in action to make it better. The authenticity criteria are thought-provoking, and their emphasis on the widely affecting other members of the society, including other researchers, is controversial (Bryman 2016, 386). However, the ideal of doing a research for me is to be able to affect someone in any way.

5. Process of Analysis

The empirical material contains rich and complex information which is crucial, and often the case in qualitative research, for the entirety of this research. The collected data was divided into different themes, then structured accordingly in reference to the research questions into different categories. Each category represents the topics clustered, which then transferred into the different sections in the Result and Analysis chapter. As already mentioned in the beginning of this chapter,

this research is taking the inductive approach with the possibility for the researcher to draw generalisable inferences out of observations during the process of data collection (Bryman 2016, 22). The empirical material is central in this research, as mentioned before, which was influenced from the information gathered from literature reviews done beforehand and the theoretical discussions. The analysis is based on the material gathered during the interviews as well as from the literature reviews to find information.

Throughout the interviews, there were few key topics I identified which are important for this research. The identification was done by reading through the interview transcripts and by highlighting several topics that were mentioned a lot of times during the interviews and how the respondents elaborated on those topics. Most of the respondents discussed the topics of Hungary's perception on the migration crisis, how identity is perceived in Hungary, how the migration crisis affected Hungary's political dynamics domestically and regionally, as well as the fears and anxieties Hungary has in relations to the migration crisis. These topics then became the key themes posed to highlight the empirical materials collected throughout the interviews. These key themes are also related to the theoretical framework posed in this research. In order to structure the empirical material further, I split the information into different sub-sections in each key theme. Furthermore, these key themes were explored in relations to the theoretical framework to enhance the analysis and the discussion on the empirical material.

V. Result and Analysis

1. Perception on the Migration Crisis

"The wave of immigration [in 2015] is a result of the both politically and socially destabilised Middle East region, to a great extent. We also know that migrants are arriving to Europe from all corners of the world, not affected by war or humanitarian crises. As a result, the ultimate causes for people leaving their homes may vary to a great extent." (Respondent 7)

The mass influx of refugees coming to Europe in the middle of 2015 is being perceived in different ways. To begin the discussion, I would like to highlight that some of the respondents do not like to use the term 'crisis' due to its negative connotation.

"First of all, we don't like to use the term crisis because it has a negative sense and indicates migration and refugees are causing problems. We usually use the term migration flow or refugee issue, or other phrase which is more suitable than crisis." (Respondent 4)

From the respondents' arguments about the negative connotation of 'crisis', I interpret it as creating an image of the migration wave as something that is a burden which needs to be taken care of instead of looking at it as a humanitarian problem which needs attention and assistance to help those people in trouble. Migration should not be seen as a problem due to the fact that it is not a new thing. Migration has existed since a long time ago in different forms. It may have different causes and effects for each case of migration, but as some of the respondents said, it should be approached in the right manner to lessen the negative effects of it. However, I still refer or use the term 'crisis' throughout this thesis because of the sense of urgency the term implies.

1. a. Attitude towards Migration Issue

From the interviews, there were three other migration issues related to the perception of the Hungarian government and society on the migration crisis. First, the issue of emigration of Hungarian youths to other countries, mostly to the Western Europe. During the past six years, as many as 500,000 young Hungarians move abroad for economic purposes. The declining of opportunities after the 2010 election, which gave the Fidesz party the power to rule the government, forced many young Hungarians to seek for opportunities abroad (Respondent 5). In comparison to the total of 4,5 million of active population in Hungary, 500,000 is quite high, more than 10%. Most

of them moved to the Western Europe, such as Germany, Britain, the Scandinavian countries, and even the United States of America.

Second issue is the wave of refugees from Kosovo. In the end of 2014 until the beginning of 2015, there was a huge number of Kosovars coming to Europe, mostly they wanted to go to Germany and Scandinavian countries (Respondent 1). The reaction of many European countries were different and calmer compared to the migration crisis happened in the middle of 2015. As explained by Respondent 5, the Kosovar situation was dealt in a different manner because the problem was foreseen, a short-term issue, and it did not get wider attention.

Another migration issue related to the perception of the Hungarian government on the migration crisis was the potential refugees from Ukraine. Due to the civil war occurring in Ukraine, there was a possibility of Ukrainians having to flee and seek for refugee. The opinion on this issue was different than the influx of refugees from the Middle East. The difference in attitude can be seen from how open the Hungarian government is towards Ukrainian refugees compared to Middle Eastern refugees.

"I think the Hungarian government has no problems with accepting refugees, but it is the matter of how many and where they are from. The Hungarian government declared several times if the influx comes from the Ukraine, they will accept them because it is a neighbouring country and there is a war happening, also they are culturally similar to Hungarians." (Respondent 3)

From the information I gathered during the interviews, I interpret that identity plays a role in how the migration issue and the migrants are perceived by the Hungarian government and society. As Gellner (1983, 53-55) argues, the sense of commonness through cultural or ethnic characteristics makes the political institutions and the society more willingly to give support to the group of people they feel similar with. The easiness to accept Ukrainians refugees and the reluctance to let Syrian refugees into Hungary revolve around the sense, or the lack thereof, of commonness the Hungarian government and society feel. It shows that Hungary has the capability to accept and to help refugees. But the problem of willingness to help was raised and highlighted during the interviews as Hungary's preference is to help the neighbours with similar cultural background instead of helping people with a very different cultural background (Respondent 3). This was also highlighted by McLaren (2003) when arguing the willingness of a society to help "Others" by using a part of their income. Prejudice towards "Others" affects the decision whether or not helping "Others" is acceptable for them.

One of the respondents explained that Hungary, when it comes to foreign policy related to migration issues, prefers to prioritise Hungarians in Hungary and abroad first, then helping the neighbouring countries, followed with helping out in the regional level, and helping those outside of Europe comes last (Respondent 1). Despite the image shown that Hungary does not want to accept refugees, it has participated in the UNHCR relocation program before 2015 and accepted 50 refugees directly from Syria and about 270 asylum applicants were accepted in 2015 (Respondent 2 & 3).

The migration crisis in 2015 happened so suddenly and so unexpectedly, and also many European countries were not prepared to react quickly to deal with the crisis and help the people. When talking about the 'push-pull' model of migration (Papastergiadis 2000), many respondents respond by saying that the 'pull' factor for them to come to Europe is related to the fact that either they have relatives already living in Europe, or they heard about the benefits of becoming refugees in Europe from other refugees who have arrived earlier (Respondent 1, 3, 4, & 7).

> *"The migration crisis forced each European country to revise their political and moral position on migration. But from the legal point of view, the attitude of Hungary is very simple. As a responsible European Union member state, Hungary applied the Schengen acquis on migrants and border control, both before and after the migration crisis." (Respondent 7)*

Other than identity, the suddenness and unexpectedness of the migration crisis in 2015 showed the unpreparedness of Hungary and many European countries, as well as the European Union, on an influx of people with such high number. One can also argue that the unpreparedness was factored in the shock of having such high number of people coming at the same time.

1. b. Who Were Coming During the Migration Crisis?

When talking about immigrants who came to Hungary during the migration crisis in 2015, two types of immigrants were mentioned. The first type is based on the channel they used to come to Hungary, while the second one refers to the perceived definition of immigrants based on the interviews with the respondents. Through the channel the refugees used to come to Hungary, then it is categorised into two different categories: legal or regular immigrant and illegal or irregular immigrant. The dichotomy of legal-illegal or regular-irregular was mentioned in the interviews with most of the respondents. Legal or regular immigrant refers to people who come to Hungary, or Europe, by using legal channels outside of the borders. By doing so, it is easier to monitor them when they come to Hungary, while at the same time it makes it easier and more valid for the

immigrants to come through that channel. However, the illegal or irregular immigrant refers to those who come to Hungary without proper documents and trespassing the borders illegally. Hungary prefers the immigrants, in general, to come through legal channels (Respondent 3).

Discussing further on the second type of immigrants, the perceived definition of immigrants based on the interviews with the respondents consists of three definitions or categories which are essential to understand how migration and identity are perceived in Hungary. First definition or category is immigrants are refugees. Those who came to Hungary were actually refugees in need of humanitarian help. They fled the unstable country to seek for a safe and stable place to live after going through such difficult and challenging routes to get to Hungary.

Second category of immigrants who came to Hungary is economic migrants. It is believed by the Hungarian government that those economic migrants came to Hungary by taking the advantage of the mass influx of refugees and disguised themselves like one to come to Europe and claim for asylum they do not deserve (Respondent 3).

> *"Our migration policy is simple: whoever's life or human rights are threatened in his or her home must be protected. The mass of migrants looking for financial advantages in Europe may not be considered as people with right to asylum." (Respondent 7)*

The last category is terrorists. The immigrants who came to Europe through Hungary last year was deemed as terrorists in disguise as refugees. The issue of terrorism was highlighted by the government during the crisis by linking the acts of terrorism happened to Europe with the mass influx of refugees coming at that time (Respondent 2). Despite the fact that many terrorists did come through that channel, the generalisation of refugees as terrorists was, as argued by some of the respondents, ignorance (Respondent 2 & 5).

In practice, there is no different treatment towards the immigrants who came to Hungary last year. It can be understood that the indifferent treatment was caused by the blurry understanding of immigrants. There is no clear distinction between immigrants who are refugees, economic migrants, or terrorists when it comes to how they are categorised and perceived by the Hungarian government. One thing that is clear is that many of the immigrants who came last year went through the irregular channels which made them irregular or illegal migrants. The effect of this blurry understanding of immigrants is the generalised treatment of immigrants in Hungary, where they were mostly treated as criminals.

> *"The term 'illegal migrant' was then followed by calling them as potential terrorists. There were also other political narratives used, such as calling the refugees dirty and will bring sickness to Hungary, and they are criminals. The government tried to create a*

view of refugees as deviants or enemies for the country. It was such an ideological and a

political construction, what was done by the government." (Respondent 5)

On the other hand, it can be understood that Hungary was trying to be cautious against the suspected terrorists by becoming very restrictive because they fear of the threat of terrorists coming to Europe in disguise as refugees. However, it became very problematic when the perception of migration bringing terrorists into Europe is the way the migration crisis was perceived. The generalisation of immigrants as terrorists only intensified the fear within the receiving society. From the interviews, the respondents did not elaborate further on how to differentiate between refugees, economic migrants, and terrorists. This entails that it is difficult to differentiate them in times of crisis. Nonetheless, by being cautious and more careful when accepting refugees, Hungary did not have any mechanism to assure the safety for those who were really seeking for refuge. By being restrictive and denying asylum are not really the good mechanism to maintain the safety for refugees, but more for Hungary and the Hungarian society.

2. The Perception of Identity in Hungary

2. a. Diversity in Hungary

Hungary is a homogenous country, as many respondents argued (Respondent 1, 2, 5), but it recognised thirteen national minorities[7] in its first constitution (Respondent 7). The homogeneity many respondents mentioned refers to the fact that the Hungarian language is a very dominant language, with about 99% of people using the language (Respondent 1 & 4). The recognition of the thirteen national minorities in the Hungarian constitution gave those national minorities the power to self-govern their community. However, it is only limited to their culture as they are given the cultural autonomy to make cultural events and to build educational institutions to teach their community about their culture. Despite having these recognised national minorities, some of the respondents argued that their presence in the political debate is not very significant because they are already assimilated into the society (Respondent 2). One of the respondents said that there is, however, one group that has more distinction compared to others.

"Many of the recognised minority groups are already assimilated into the society. One

minority group who has more distinction is the Roma community, yet they receive

different treatment. It is very controversial if we talk about identity because it always

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[7] This act defines the Bulgarian, Roma, Greek, Croatian, Polish, German, Armenian, Romanian, Ruthenian, Serb, Slovak, Slovene, and Ukrainian ethnic groups as the recognised national minorities in Hungary. (source: Hungary's Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Fact Sheet)

comes with refugees. When a Roma person is well-educated, he/she will be positioned

not as a Roma anymore but a Hungarian." (Respondent 2)

As I interpret from the interviews with some of the respondents, the sense of Hungarianness or being a Hungarian comes first for everyone in Hungary, despite their belonging to the other recognised minority group. The Hungarianness of a non-first generation of migrant is much stronger in this case due to the fact that they were born in Hungary and growing up using Hungarian language in their main communication with other people. Recognising national minorities in Hungary could be seen as embracing diversity of the multicultural entities within the Hungarian population (Respondent 7). However, the assimilation of identity and supported with the predominant Hungarian culture make the sense of multiculturalism and diversity less obvious within the society (Respondent 1, 2, 5).

"When we talk about multiculturalism, it is not necessarily a value-based idea. It is

simpler than that. It is about equality, representation, recognition, and acceptance

without changing individual's identity." (Respondent 5)

The Roma community has been facing problems of discrimination in Hungary. In regards to the migration crisis, one respondent said that the Roma community is getting an advantage in this situation as the hatred against them is shifted towards the refugees (Respondent 2).

Multiculturalism in Hungary can be seen in Budapest where it is perceived as a more open-minded and diverse city (Respondent 3). However, it is only limited to Budapest while other parts of Hungary are mostly less diverse. When talking about diversity in Hungary, immigrants who came to Hungary in the post-communist era were Asians, such as Chinese and Vietnamese people, people who came from Africa, and also expats from other European countries. The former two groups of people usually stay in Budapest and believed to be economic migrants, while the latter group is often living in the countrysides and not seen as economic migrants. Despite the fact that many of the former groups' member who have been living in Hungary for quite a long time and having more generations born in Hungary, they are still perceived as not fully Hungarians. One respondent highlighted that during the interview:

"The long-term economic migrants are those who want to stay forever, mostly from the

third world countries, are seen more suspiciously by the Hungarians because the

Hungarians cannot accept that these people are, in a way, similar to them. The

Hungarians do not believe that these people [for example: Chinese and Vietnamese

people] can be fully Hungarian. If they are not fully Hungarian, then they are not really

Hungarian." (Respondent 5)

On the other hand, there is a sense of respect towards immigrants who are perceived as to be more successful than the real Hungarians. Being a successful immigrant in Hungary, however, can be confusing for the Hungarian society as well. One respondent argued:

"The people who have been considered as immigrants in Hungary, since before the migration crisis, are people with higher education level, better condition, and better mindset. It means that an average immigrant in Hungary is more successful than an average Hungarian." (Respondent 4)

Diversity in Hungary can be seen through the success of immigrants in the country. However, respect towards successful immigrants comes with the fear of being less successful compared to the immigrants. The competition over resources (McLaren 2003) would affect how the immigrants are perceived by the Hungarian population. The rhetorics saying that immigrants are taking Hungarian jobs could be true in this case, but there are factors affecting the economic problems in Hungary, such as the education problem in Hungary, the high number of emigration during the past ten years, and also the lack of job opportunity for average Hungarians in the country.

When talking about if the Hungarian government sees Hungary as a multicultural country or not, one respondent said that Hungary is a multicultural country due to its recognition of the national minorities in the constitution (Respondent 7) while another argued that Hungary only sees itself as a multicultural country when it comes to business, but not necessarily a multicultural country when referring to its internal politics (Respondent 2).

The assimilative characteristic of the Hungarian society is a way for the nation to survive the globalisation. If the self-worth of a Hungarian is believed to be intimately and unavoidably bound up with their cultural identity, by eliminating the multicultural dimension of the society is one way of survival (Watson 2000, 3). As argued by Respondent 7, Hungarian society is a multicultural society because of the recognition of national minorities. In spite of that, the historical aspect of why these national minorities were recognised in the first place should be taken into consideration. By looking at that, historically Hungary is multicultural. But in the current migration crisis, the multicultural dimension of Hungary is being questioned by many due to its strong rhetorics against multiculturalism (Respondent 6).

2. b. What is Hungarian national identity?

The government's rhetoric on the issue of mass influx of refugees coming to Europe has revolved around the issue of national identity, at least the rhetorics used targeting the Hungarian society. Hence, I asked all of the respondents about the definition of Hungarian national identity. The answers I received, however, showed that defining national identity for Hungarians is very complicated.

> *"The Hungarian rhetorics have been playing the identity card quite often by saying the refugees are coming to threaten our national identity. National identity is a complex idea, and it is always changing. It is stupid to say that we have to defend Hungarian national identity. Our national identity is always changing, and has been changing since a long time ago." (Respondent 4)*

The respondents explained what makes a person Hungarian with different answers. One said that being able to speak the language and being comfortable in thinking and speaking out their mind in Hungarian is one of the characteristics of being a Hungarian (Respondent 1, 2, 4). One may also argue that respect and openness are characteristics of being a Hungarian (Respondent 7). Two other things that were mentioned by some respondents about being a Hungarian are about self-identifying oneself as a Hungarian and believing in stereotypes of being a Hungarian (Respondent 1, 2, 5). Another thing about being Hungarian is also about believing in Christianity (Respondent 4 & 5). However, the quote above mentioned the fact that Hungary's identity has been changing for a long time. Since the beginning of the immigration of the first Hungarians through the Carpathian Basin, through the history of Austro-Hungarian kingdom and the Ottoman Empire, and during the Communist era, Hungary has been having different sets of national identities.

Kulcsár and Yum (2012, 197) highlight that Eastern European nations have struggled with a dual challenge regarding their identities as a part of the post-communist transformation process. By taking a specific case of Hungary, it has to rediscover its identity back to the pre-communist time. On the other hand, the new post-communist national identities have to incorporate certain contemporary elements required of modern democratic states, including ethnic tolerance, multiculturalism, and minority rights. Since many post-communist states are unaccustomed to such principles, they find those principles to be politically inconvenient (Kulcsár and Yum 2012, 197). The fact that Hungary has been through a lot of changing in its history would also affect the process of rediscovering and rearticulating the Hungarian national identity.

As Kulcsár and Yum (2012) highlights, many Eastern European countries has been struggling to redefine and to rearticulate their national identity. It is hard to pinpoint the exact

period of time when Hungary managed to define its national identity due to the many historical experiences which made them to have to redefine its national identity many times. One respondent highlighted the important fact that Hungary's national identity has been changing for a long period of time (Respondent 4). To understand the definition of Hungary's national identity, it is not an easy task. Crepaz (2008, 30) argues that primordial sentiments could be used to define the initial characteristics of identity which then would evolve and be constructed through time. Primordialists argue that natural identity characteristic is rooted in the specific place of origin (Papastergiadis 2000, 52). In the case of Hungary, the specific place of origin is arguable. I would say that the historical process matters most in the case of Hungary, as also argued by Brubaker (2000, 21), because it had faced so many major events which made them have to change and adjust their definition of their national identity. This fits well with the constructivists' argument that socio-political flows and barriers, that constitute spatial configurations, also constitute and reflect the formations of identity as well as historical processes (Brubaker 2000, 21; Papastergiadis 2000, 52).

The feeling of "belonging" and "commonness" become very crucial in redefining Hungary's national identity, especially in the age of globalisation (Eriksen 2014, 103; Papastergiadis 2000, 52). The feeling of "belonging" and "commonness" affect how Hungary and its society perceive "Us" and "Others" dichotomy, which create the construction of "strangers" and it could be seen in Hungary during the migration crisis. The "belonging" and "commonness" for Hungary and the Hungarian society were explained by the respondents through their opinions on what Hungarian national identities are: knowing the Hungarian language, self-identification, and being Christian. The "strangers" are believed to be coming with different set of identities which would replace the Hungarian national identities, especially in terms of religion. These notions of "belonging", "commonness", and "strangers" then question the other identity characteristic of a Hungarian mentioned by one respondent, about respect and openness, which were not shown during the migration crisis. Based on the interviews, it could be argued that the respect and openness Hungary has are applied only to those who have similar characteristics with the Hungarian society, while helping "Others" is seen as a voluntary action.

3. The Implications of Migration Crisis on Hungary's Political Dynamics

"The government, who was losing popularity before the influx, decided to take a very strong opinion in this matter. The Hungarian government decided to follow an anti-migration policy and is still doing campaigns against migration in general, but it has a lot of layers implied with the policy. Before it was mostly about the typical xenophobic remarks aiming towards the internal population of Hungary. But right now it is about the relations between the European Union and Hungary and how the Hungarian government can show its power in the European level." (Respondent 4)

The quote taken from one of the interviews showed how the migration crisis affected the political dynamics in the domestic level, as well as in the European level. The discussion of this section will follow on how the migration crisis affected the internal political dynamics in Hungary. Later, the relation between Hungary and other actors, in this case are the European Union and some of the member countries, will be discussed to see how Hungary found support and criticism at the same time in the regional level.

3. a. Internal Political Dynamics

The migration crisis has affected the internal political dynamics in Hungary. The migration crisis was used in the political game between political parties to gain votes (Respondent 1, 2, 4, 5, 6). When talking about the internal political dynamics in Hungary after the mass influx of refugees, the event highlighted the intense relationships between actors in Hungary, such as the competition over power between political parties, the relation between the government and the society, and also highlighting the current government's political track records.

Before the mass influx of refugees in the middle of 2015, the Hungarian government was on the verge of losing a massive number of support from the society due to the social problems the country faced, in regards of education, social benefits, and corruption. As mentioned by Respondent 2, the Fidesz government has been punishing poor people, discriminating the LGBTQ+ community in Hungary, and reducing the amount of support and social benefit for unemployed people.

"The Fidesz government is using very bad socio-politics. It has been six years since Fidesz rule the government, and they are punishing people who are poor and discriminating LGBTQ people. Homelessness is a crime in Hungary, therefore people sleeping on the streets and public places have to pay fines. Now we have it in the Hungarian constitutional law that a family only consist of a man, a woman, and their

children. There is no hope for LGBTQ people to, at least, feel themselves as a family

because it is clearly defined in the constitution of what a family is." (Respondent 2)

Migration issue is believed to be exploited to mislead the attention from the real social problems. As argued by Kulcsár and Yum (2012, 196) nationalist argument in relation to migration issue, in this case, is often used as a cover argument by post-socialist elites seeking to divert the public's attention from other issues, such as economy failures or corruption. Democracy is seen as being muddled in corrupt party politics, economic liberalisation as tangled in the accompanying recession, and globalisation as threatening national sovereignty and culture (Kulcsár and Yum 2012, 196). Therefore the simplicity within the nationalist argument has the power to attract people who are feeling insecure with the social transformation.

"If we talk about internal critics from the society, the government does not really care.

For example, there was a big movement of teachers in Hungary this Spring [in 2015]

related to the education problems. … There were three major demonstrations happened

with about 50,000 people on the street. Viktor Orbán, the Prime minister, said it was just

a joke and he cannot take it seriously." (Respondent 2)

The momentum of migration crisis was seen as a political opportunity to exert power. The predominant conservative parties, such as Fidesz and Jobbik, are competing against each other to deliver strong messages to regain support. The nationalist sentiment was accepted very easily by the insecure and afraid population. While for the opposition, some respondents argued that their arguments to support migration were based on the political tactic to oppose the predominant Fidesz in the government without having any clear agenda on migration (Respondent 2). The dominance of the conservative government in Hungary gave a very narrow leeway for the opposition, whether it is another political party or the non-governmental organisations, to give a bigger impact on their pro-humanitarian or pro-migration arguments and actions.

Migration is an easy target to be positioned as an enemy in the political game. Identity is not necessarily the main feature on the Hungarian government's rhetoric, as argued by all of the respondents (Respondent 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7). In fact, it is a political game by exploring the sentiments of fear and intolerance of the population at large to regain and legitimise power (Respondent 5 & 6). Other factors, such as economy, identity, and security, may also be, or not directly, affected by the migration crisis. However, those factors are believed to ensure power legitimation as well. Especially for a government who is losing political support, by using those factors through nationalist arguments will be able to support their political interests, which are deemed as successful by some respondents (Respondent 1, 5, 6).

3. b. The Revival of Coalition and Rivalry

One of the implications of the migration crisis is the dividing of the European Union. The migration crisis increased the tension between the member countries to find a common solution for the crisis. The opinions were divided from the very beginning and it affected the relationships between member countries.

"Through the migration crisis, it came up that Europe right now is very divided. The strategies for the future of the European Union are very different within member states. The debate is very important to us because the supranational European Union and the joint-state union like this are not a positive thing. We do not want to be in it if the opinions are different and we have to follow the Western Europeans because it will increase and support the main Western states' interests." (Respondent 3)

The opinions on the European level are divided. The Western European countries seem to prefer to accelerate the process of asylum and the process of integration for the refugees but the Central and Eastern European countries want to maintain this level of acceptance or even to slow it down because by doing what the Western Europeans proposed is not a good solution for them (Respondent 3). The migration crisis encouraged Hungary to find allies who have the same perception on the migration crisis. The countries who strongly agree with Hungary are its Visegrad partners: Poland, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic. The migration crisis brought up skepticism towards the European Union (Respondent 2), the feeling these four countries shared. Therefore, a stronger coalition between these countries was expected. The government's preference and standpoint towards immigrants are based on the government's political background and these four governments have the similar political background (Respondent 1).

"I think what is going on in the European politics is really important for us. As a consequence of the migration crisis, the collapse of the Schengen area became a reality. The free movement of people, as an achievement for the European Union, is really crucial and important for Hungary." (Respondent 3)

The coalition between the Visegrad countries became stronger due to another factor. They needed their voice to be heard in the European level (Respondent 1), and by having the same opinion on the migration crisis was one way to do so because they would not be able to have their voice heard individually. From the literatures and interview materials, the migration crisis highlighted the ideological competition between the East and the West (Respondent 5). As the opinions are divided, the tension between the Western European countries and the Eastern European

countries is intensified. There seems to be a competition between both sides to prove that their perspective on the migration crisis is the right one. In a deeper level, the migration crisis brought up the historically-long and hidden political rivalry between two sides onto the surface. However, this kind of competition will only add to the tension and move their attention away from finding an effective answer for the question of migration crisis (Respondent 6).

In the bilateral level, Hungary's relations with its neighbouring countries were affected because of the anti-immigrant policy and rhetoric. The diplomatic relations with Serbia, Croatia, and Romania suffered during the migration crisis (Respondent 6), especially after the Hungarian government built the border fence and enforced very strict border controls. However, one respondent argued that the international criticisms Hungary received were ignoring one simple fact that Hungary was only carrying out the Dublin agreement (Respondent 7). The Dublin agreement put too much pressure for Hungary (Respondent 2). On the other hand, many countries appreciated the Hungarian government's determination to completely apply the relevant European Union legislation on Schengen and Hungary's policy was being also being implemented by some other European Union member states (Respondent 2 & 7).

4. Fears and Anxieties over Migration and the Use of Rhetorics

As explained by Papademetriou (2012), migration triggers anxieties and fears within the society. Throughout the interviews, I gained information on what anxieties and fears were, and still are, present in Hungary, which are discussed below.

4. a. Economic Competition

Immigrants are often depicted as a financial burden on the host society, contributing to greater unemployment and wage depression, and straining the welfare state (Papademetriou 2012). As explained by some respondents, immigrants who came during the migration crisis were depicted as economic migrants who are trying to take advantages from the European social benefits. However, immigrants are believed to be able to boost the Hungarian economy (Respondent 4) but that is not how the Hungarian government sees as a good way of fixing the economy (Respondent 3).

In the earlier rhetoric, the Hungarian government portrayed refugees as people who are stealing the Hungarian jobs, as it was written in one of the billboard campaigns built in the countrysides. From the interviews, many respondents said that the economic factor is not really the issue (Respondent 2, 4, 5). However, the concern over competition over resources between the

majority and the minority was a great deal in understanding the fear of migration in terms of economy (McLaren 2003). Benefitting "Others" by sacrificing "Our" income and chance in getting job opportunity became the initial rhetoric against the economic migrants. As Delanty argued (2008, 684), the focus of hostility from the majority towards the minority has shifted from the ethnic characteristics to the social and cultural characteristics of protecting "Our" jobs from "Others".

> *"Helping people will cost money. But it would be interesting to know which one will cost more money: to help people when they come as refugees or to help stopping the escalation of the conflict directly without having to have refugees." (Respondent 1)*

It is obvious that the European Union and each of the member states have spent quite a lot of money for the migration crisis. With the big amount of people already in Europe, the funding for support programs, such as integration program, will probably cost a lot. However, some respondents argued that this is only a short term problem, while in the long run the refugees will help boost the economy, especially in Hungary where some factory workers have said that they need workers (Respondent 4).

4. b. Cultural and Value Changes

> *"Altogether, I do not believe that the Hungarian population is racist. They fear, they do not understand, they are ultimately scared." (Respondent 5)*

The national identity does not seem to be affected (Respondent 4), especially in the short term (Respondent 2). However, some argued, as I interpret it, that the European identity at large will change if immigration is continuously happening and accepted.

> *"I think Hungarian identity is a part of European identity. The Hungarian government and the Prime Minister himself have said that millions of controlled irregular migrants who are coming right now to Europe and those who will come next will change totally the identity of Europe and if we are a part of the European Union and the European community, it will change our identity as well." (Respondent 3)*

When talking about this change of identity, some respondents highlighted the religious characteristic of Europe as a part of its identity. When asked about the factors which will affect the migration policy, one respondent said:

> *"First, migration supported by terrorist networks to a great extent. Secondly, instability in the Middle East and persecution of ancient communities, such as the Christians, is a serious security threat for Europe. Economically, Europe is clearly not able to take up an unlimited number of migrants. At the same time, we are economically fit enough to*

help on the spot. The European Union is a leading donor of international aid in regions affected by humanitarian crises. We are able to increase this leading role. We need to give a future for the persecuted people in their homelands, as this is their interest as well. Education and employment programmes financed by international actors can contribute to this strategic goal in an effective way." (Respondent 7)

Christianity seems to be a central part of the Hungarian identity, or the European identity as believed by the Hungarian society and government, especially with the current government who changed the constitution by putting Christianity as a part of the Hungarian identity. The fear of Islamisation of Europe was also mentioned in the interview that this notion has been used and exploited by the government in its rhetoric as a threat to the Hungarian identity (Respondent 2). One interesting thing pointed out by one respondent was that these refugees did not think about their identity that much because their priority was to find a safe place to live (Respondent 6).

"We have diversity with different languages and cultures, but we live together since more than a thousand years ago. I see Budapest as a liberal and open-minded city which has a very diverse society. But the average Hungarian citizens do not have the experience living together with people from other parts of the world, such as Americans, Africans, and Asians. From this perspective, the Hungarian government would maintain this position. We do not need hundreds of thousands of migrants to do something with our demographic or economic problems. That is not a solution for us." (Respondent 3)

The fear of identity change is rooted from the fact that many Hungarians have not experienced contacts with immigrants (Respondent 1, 3, 5). It can be argued that Hungarians have had the experience living with national minorities who are mentioned in the constitution and the Roma community (Respondent 7). However, I would argue that the contact experience between Hungarians and the national minorities mentioned in the constitution, as well as the Roma community, is different with the contact experience they are facing with the new incoming immigrants in the manner of Hungarians have had a long historical experience to engage with the national minorities and the Roma community while the incoming of immigrants, especially during the migration crisis, is a totally new experience for them. Added with the rhetorics saying that these immigrants are linked with terrorism, the fear over migration was intensified during the migration crisis.

"The xenophobia and fear towards Islam and refugees are rising. The prejudice towards Islamic culture is seeing such culture as a threat." (Respondent 2)

4. c. Insecurity

"Based on the PEW research that was published recently, Hungary has the biggest fear over terrorism in Europe which is interesting since we have not experience any terror attack yet, even compared to France." (Respondent 4)

The issue of security was mentioned quite a lot by some of the respondents. It is seen as a crucial issue in Hungary, even some argued that it is, and should be, the main concern for the Hungarian government and Europe (Respondent 3 & 7). The fear of terrorism arose after the attacks happened in Western Europe after the migration crisis.

"The first statement from Viktor Orbán came right after the Charlie Hebdo attack. Since then, we have had more attacks happened in the Western Europe. Right after these attacks, he [Viktor Orbán] always said strong messages. Now we have a new billboard campaign for the quota referendum which talks about terrorism and security questions to show and to highlight the linking between migration and terrorism, and trying to blame refugees and migration crisis for the terror attacks happened in Europe lately." (Respondent 2)

There was a notion said by the government that the refugees are bringing instability to Europe (Respondent 1). The perpetrators of the attacks happened in Western Europe were terrorists disguised as refugees. However, the generalisation of immigrants as terrorists were exploited by the government through the propaganda shown on the billboard campaigns and on television (Respondent 1 & 2). The Hungarian society was scared and they took the propaganda seriously. Speaking on the topic of the security rhetoric used by the government, one respondent argued:

"There is a weak, or even no, connection between refugees and terrorism except that ISIS is a fundamental Islamic group. But it has to be realised that these people [who are coming to Europe] are actually escaping them because they are scared of ISIS." (Respondent 5)

The only link between refugees and terrorism, I would like to agree with some respondents, is that the terrorists took advantage over the migration crisis to get into Europe. On the one hand, the European states need to assure the safety of people who are inside. On the other hand, the European states also have the responsibility to help those people who fled their countries from war and from the fundamentalist group who threatens their lives.

4. d. Losing Political Support

The discussion on using the migration crisis as a way of the political parties in Hungary to gain political support was already discussed in the section [3. a.] of this chapter. This section, however, will elaborate on the fear of losing political support which will happen, as one respondent argued, if the mass influx of refugees is being accepted and integrated into the European, and also Hungarian, society.

Fear of losing political support for the conservatives in the long run comes along with the increase number of immigrants in a country. From the interviews, I interpret that the European politics have a big impact on the internal politics of the member states. By having a big number of immigrants, it will change the course of politics and diminish the conservative ideas.

"International surveys underline that 85% of immigrants in the last decades in Europe
vote for the left-wing parties. That is surely a challenge for politics and identity more
for Europe, less for Hungary." (Respondent 7)

In the short term, it may not affect the political discourse in Hungary. However, as one respondent mentioned that whatever happens in Europe is important to Hungary (Respondent 3), it will have an effect to Hungary in the long term. National identities should be forged through representational practices that are historically and socially conditioned, multi-layered, and dispersed in order to garner support from the majority, if not all, of the constituents across a nation (Kulcsár and Yum 2012, 194). By having immigrants who are not historically and, in some cases, socially similar to the majority will question the power of the predominant political force of a nation.

4. e. Losing Sovereignty

During the interviews, the fear over losing sovereignty was discussed by saying that having uncontrolled migration as a threat to the Hungarian sovereignty. However, not many respondents mentioned about the sovereignty loss and what kind of sovereignty it is. Therefore I would interpret the information I gained from the interviews that the sovereignty in this situation is related to two interlinked points. Firstly, Hungary wants to have control over who is allowed to come and who cannot enter Hungary, that was one of the purposes of building fences within the border (Respondent 3). Secondly, sovereignty in this regards is related to the relationship between the European Union and Hungary through the common policy. The European Union suggested to have a quota system which will distribute a certain amount of refugees to each member state based on their economic capability (Rothwell and Foster 2016). If this policy is implemented, then Hungary will approximately get about 4,000 refugees distributed to them which the Hungarian government

believe as demeaning the Hungarian sovereignty (Respondent 5). These two points are interlinked because by having agreed on the quota system, Hungary is losing control over the decision making to accept or to reject refugees. The Hungarian government's stance on immigration was pretty clear that they do not want to have any refugee (Respondent 2 & 5). Therefore, the Hungarian government has been trying to speak against the quota system through propaganda. One of the major propagandas the Hungarian government had was by having a referendum on October 2nd, 2016, and asking the Hungarian population whether or not they should take refugees (Rothwell and Foster 2016). The outcome was interesting, as only about 43% of the population voted on the referendum and about 98% of people voting agreed with the government (Obordo 2016). Some critics said that such low number of voters on a referendum would question the validity of the referendum. Yet, the Hungarian government took the outcome of the referendum as a win for them and will take that result into the discussion in the European level (Obordo 2016; Rothwell and Foster 2016).

To understand the fear of losing sovereignty, it can be seen from the fact that many immigrants who came to Europe did not want to take the legal channel by applying asylum in the border. Perhaps they figured that the chance of them to get the refugee status in Hungary is pretty small (Respondent 2 & 4), or because of the fact that they did not really want to stay in Hungary and prefer to go to Germany or the Scandinavian countries which offer better benefits for them. The experience Hungary had with refugees was that when they received the status, they left. This is what some respondents said as taking advantages of Europe (Respondent 3 & 7). The Dublin agreement, then, becomes the problem for both sides. The fact that many immigrants did not want to stay in Hungary clashes with the fact that they have to be registered in the first country they entered. Such problem faced by not only Hungary but also many other European Union member states who are located in the borders, such as Greece. For Hungary, the government agrees on finding a joint solution (Respondent 7), but quota system is not really the answer for Hungary.

VI. Conclusion and Future Research

The aim of this research is to understand the perception of identity and migration in Hungary, especially in the crucial moment of migration crisis in 2015. The migration crisis triggered Hungary for showing its strong stance against taking refugees as they were believed to be threats to the well-being of Hungarians and Europeans. This thesis has explored the plausible reasons supporting Hungary's stance, rhetoric, and policy in regards to the migration crisis. Identity, as argued in the beginning of this research, seemed to be used a lot in the government's rhetoric to speak against the mass influx of immigrants coming to Hungary and Europe. However, throughout the thesis, it was found that the notion of identity played a role only on the political debate, but it was not necessarily affected directly by the migration crisis. Some respondents argued that the effect of migration crisis on the Hungarian national identity would only be seen in the long term, and it is seen as an indirect effect.

When discussing about how Hungary perceived the migration crisis and people immigrated during that time, the terms refugee, economic migrant, and terrorist were used in an overlapping manner which was detrimental to how the immigrants were perceived. The generalisation of immigrants as threats or a negativity towards the Hungarian society created a blurry perception on how the immigrants' identity was perceived. A blurry perception on immigrants' identity resulted into its translation into rhetorics and policies which the Hungarian government has been promoting, even since before the migration crisis happened.

The issue of Hungarian national identity being threatened by the mass influx of immigrants was used and propagated many times by the government. However, as some respondents argued (Respondent 2 & 4), Hungarian national identity was not, and still is not, affected. There could be a long term risk of identity changing, but it is not gonna happen shortly. Diversity of immigrants would not be a threat to Hungary because not many immigrants are present in Hungary and wanting to stay. Even if they do, assimilating into the predominant Hungarian culture is the only way for them to survive. Threat to national identity should not be problematised due to the fact that, as some respondents pointed out (Respondent 2 & 4), Hungarian national identity has been evolving throughout history and it is very dominant within the Hungarian society which makes it harder to be changed easily. As Kulcsar and Yum (2012) pointed out as well, the process of rearticulating national identity in Hungary as a post-communist country affected how the Hungarian people become very protective over their idea of national identity. At the same time, the openness of the

Hungarian society over accepting Ukrainian refugees was based on the feeling of similarity of their identity through shared history. Therefore it was easier for Hungary, as a post-communist country, to accept Ukrainian refugees than Middle Eastern refugees. This is showing how the perception of "Us" and "Others" factored in Hungary's policy over migration.

The implications of migration crisis on Hungary's political dynamics touched upon the regional and domestic issues. It affected Hungary's relations with its European Union partners, whether strengthening Hungary's alliance with Visegrad countries or challenging the relations with some Western European countries. It highlighted the political competition between Hungary and the notion of "centralisation of European Union power" by Western European states (Rothwell and Foster 2016). As for the domestic politics, the migration crisis seemed to be used as a way to get supports for the current Fidesz government while at the same time creating political debates in Hungary which showed where the political parties stand in the issue of migration.

Fears and anxieties over migration in Hungary were discussed throughout this paper. Fear and anxiety over economic loss revolved around the idea that immigrants came to take Hungarian jobs. In a sense, it will increase the probability of economic competition over resources and opportunities in Hungary and Europe, as it resembles the argument posed by McLaren (2003). However, some respondents argued that immigrants could not take Hungarian jobs because Hungarians themselves were lacking the opportunity to look for jobs even far before the migration crisis happened. On another note, the problem of mass emigration of Hungarian youths and the need for labours in some factories in Hungary should be seen as a sign that immigrants would help Hungary with those problems. Nevertheless, the Hungarian government do not approve having immigrants as an answer for Hungary's economic and demographic problems.

The second fear and anxiety over migration of cultural and value changes is based on the fact that Hungary perceives itself as a Christian country, especially under the Fidesz government. The mass influx of immigrants with different belief system, mostly Islam, is seen as a threat to Christianity and Hungary feared that it would damage the Christian values as it was believed that the immigrants came to make Islamisation of Europe happen. I would argue that there is an interconnection with the fear and anxiety of losing political support in the future as one respondent argued that immigrants would most likely to vote for liberal parties. The unpredictable influx of immigrants would have the power to change the political discourse in Europe and member states of European Union and threaten the existence of conservative parties. The fear and anxiety over the loss of sovereignty comes into discussion as well, because the mass influx of immigrants so far has been affecting the decision making process in Hungary and the European Union, and creating a

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dividing line between the supporters and the opposers of having refugees. Hungary believed that it would lose control over the decision whether to take refugees or not which would affect its sovereignty as a nation-state.

The issue of (in)security was discussed in Chapter 5 to highlight the fear and anxiety Hungary has towards migration. The terror attacks happened in Europe during the migration crisis has fuelled this fear and affected how immigrants are perceived in Hungary. It seemed like the fact that these people were actually trying to get away from the terrorist group was clouded by the judgment of seeing them as terrorists as well.

In the discussion of the theoretical framework in Chapter 3, I mentioned some of the theoretical frameworks used for this study. Eriksen (2014, 103) argues that migration can be a more unsettling, confusing, and frustrating experience if it is prompted by push factors rather than pull factors and I would argue that it affected both the immigrants and also the receiving countries. The large number of immigrants and the unpredictability of the mass immigration affected how the Hungarians ("Us") perceived the immigrants ("Others"). As Kulcsar and Yum (2012) have argued, the journey for Hungary on rediscovering its national identity is still on-going. Therefore, the mass influx of "Others" is perceived as a hindrance on their journey to rediscover themselves. The primordial sentiment played a role in how Hungary perceives its national identity, yet the essence of constructivism appeared in Hungary's historical facts. As Crepaz (2008) argues, both ideas are complementary which can be seen in Hungary. However, Hungary sees the construction of their national identity throughout the historical processes as primordial characteristic which can be threatened by the influx of immigrants. The nationalist sentiment comes from the anger of perceiving immigrants as violating the Hungarian cultural norms and there is not willingness or consent from both the Hungarians and the immigrants to find a common value. On the other hand, throughout the findings I retrieved information that the notion of identity was used to promote rhetorics and propaganda which added into how the immigrants were perceived as bad influence.

Identity itself was not affected directly, because some respondents argued that it will take a long process for the changes to happen (Respondent 4 & 5). The identity rhetoric was used at the beginning to gain public's attention to the migration crisis and to justify government's actions towards the issue. It was deemed as successful by some respondents (Respondent 1, 2, 3, 4, 5) as the government currently has more support than before the migration crisis. As Vertovec (2011, 242) argues, culture is being used to manipulate the popular notions of national versus alien culture by politicians to develop policies and to give more legitimacy for the state institutions to manage the issue of migration. Hungarian national identity was used not as an issue that was threatened and

needed to be protected, but as a motor for the government's political agenda by securitising the issue of migration through 'speech acts' (Buzan et al. 1998; Jackson 2005; Williams 2003) and see it as a security problem through linking terrorism with immigrants.

This study contributes to a number academic debates. First, it fits into the academic debate on identity and migration by looking at the construction of "Us" and "Others" dichotomy in migration. Second, it fits the academic debate on security and securitisation as it highlights the process of securitisation of migration through the linking of immigrants and terrorism which heightened the fear towards migration. Third, this research highlights the fears and anxieties over migration and how migration could affect the political dynamics whether in a regional or in a domestic level. This study also contributes to the academic debate of how identity and migration issues are used as catalysts for government to gain political support.

In regards of future research, there are many possibility of topics to be researched in regards to Hungary or to the migration crisis. I gained that information from the discussions I had with the respondents and also from reading through some literatures. I will only discuss some possible topics to be researched on in the future. When talking about the migration's impact on economy, one could do a research on comparing whether helping refugees to settle in Europe will cost less than helping to stabilise the conflict happening in their home country, as suggested by one of the respondents (Respondent 1). The migration crisis also raised the issue of the future of the European Union as it divided the opinions within member states. As blocs were created, competition between member states was also heightened. To do a research on the possibility of another Brexit situation happening with other member states would be an interesting topic to be looked further. A study on the political competition in Hungary in regards to migration and security issues between the political parties could also be discussed further.

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Appendix 1 - The Respondents

1. Respondent 1

Name: András Lőrincz

Institution: Institute of Cultural Relations Policy

Position: Founder and Chief Operating Officer

2. Respondent 2

Name: Aliz Pocsuvalski

Institution: Migszol (Migration Solidarity Group)

Position: Activist and Researcher

3. Respondent 3

Name: Balázs Órban

Institution: *Századvég* Foundation

Position: Director of Research

4. Respondent 4

Name: Marcell Lőrincz

Institution: Foundation of Subjective Values, Budapest

Position: Chief Executive Officer

5. Respondent 5

Name: Ántal Örkény

Institution: *Menedék* – Hungarian Association for Migrants

Position: President

6. Respondent 6

Name: Tudor Rosu

Institution: The Hungarian Helsinki Committee

Position: Project Coordinator

7. Respondent 7

Name: György Hölvényi

Institution: *Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt* or the Christian Democratic Party, European Parliament

Position: Member of European Parliament

Appendix 2 - The Interview Guide

1. Is there any work that your organisation do related to the migration crisis in 2015, in terms of research or more practical works?

2. What are your and the organisation's opinions on how the migration crisis has impacted Hungary?

3. How do you explain Hungary's migration policy before and after the migration crisis?

4. What are the opinions, perhaps of the government and of the public, on the massive migration last year? What has been the main focal point within the debates on Hungary's migration policy?

5. What is Hungary's stance on diversity and how does the government see it: as an asset or it hinders them?

6. What is Hungary's biggest challenge when it comes to identity politics and migration?

7. How do you define the Hungarian national identity and how does it affected by the migration crisis?

8. Is identity claim the main feature on Hungary's migration policy in response to the migration crisis?

9. What is the main characteristic of Hungary's current migration policy in response to the migration crisis?

10. Hungary has received so many criticisms on its stance on migration policy. How does the Hungarian government take the national and international criticisms and how do they respond?

11. How have the relationships between Hungary and the European Union and other European Union member countries affected by the migration crisis?

12. In your opinion, is there any other reason as of why Hungary is taking such stance on migration? Or perhaps what other factors that affect the migration policy? security, economy, political

13. How can the Hungarian migration policy be evaluated?

Note: The interview guide was used as a guideline during the interview process. Some questions were explored, while there were added questions during the interview process with the purpose of clearing up some information and/or to respond to the respondent's discussion. The questions mentioned in this interview guide were also adjusted based on the respondent's institution.