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The Effect of Labor Market Disadvantage and
Mainstream Party Convergence on Anti-
Establishment Attitudes

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Abstract

Workers in precarious employment may have no incentives to support the political system. Drawing on the insider-outsider debate, and the populism and party decline literatures, this thesis first investigates David Rueda's claim that workers in precarious employment may have reasons to turn against the political establishment (the exclusion hypothesis). Second, it examines whether the effect of labor market outsidership on anti-political establishment attitudes is moderated by the ideological distance between the two largest left and right parties with regard to economic and cultural issues. As such, this thesis brings together theories of populism and anti-partyism, labor market dualization and party competition under the overarching insider-outsider divide framework.

In addition, this thesis pays considerable attention to concept operationalization. The dependent variable, anti-establishment attitudes, is treated as a latent predisposition, and computed with factor analysis. The independent variable is operationalized as both current employment status and occupational unemployment risk, acknowledging the recent debate on outsidership operationalization. I test the hypotheses with survey data from ten European advanced democracies in 2014 and find that labor market outsiders, identified by higher exposure to unemployment risk, are more likely to endorse anti-establishment attitudes. By contrast, labor market outsidership defined as temporary employment has no effect on the outcome of interest. Finally, I find qualified support for the moderating effect of party distance on hypothesis 1: party convergence on the cultural dimension is associated with a stronger effect of occupational unemployment risk on anti-establishment attitudes, while party convergence on the economic dimension is statistically insignificant.

Keywords: insider-outsider divide, labor market disadvantage, anti-establishment attitudes, party competition, depolarization, factor analysis.

Abbreviations

CFA Confirmatory Factor Analysis

CHES Chapel Hill Expert Survey

ESS European Social Survey

EU European Union

EU LFS European Labor Force Survey

GALTAN Green-Alternative-Libertarian/Traditionalist-Authoritarian-Nationalist

OLS Ordinary Least Squares

Table of Contents

1. Introduction	1
2. Anti-political establishment attitudes - concept location and specification	4
3. Insights from labor market dualization and the insider-outsider divide.....	7
3.1. Insights from the literature on party competition/ party polarization	11
4. Concept operationalization.....	15
4.1. The dependent variable	15
4.2. Individual-level independent variables	17
4.3. Country-level dependent variables	19
5. Research design - brief presentation	20
5.1. Case selection	20
5.2. Data	21
5.2.1. Individual-level predictors	22
5.2.2. Country-level predictors.....	24
5.3. Factor Analysis.....	25
6. Testing Hypothesis 1	31
6.1. Results	35
7. Testing Hypothesis 2	38
7.2. Results	39
8. Discussion	41
9. Bibliography.....	46
Appendix	55
A. Abbreviations, coding sources.....	55
B. Figures	65
C. Tables.....	71

List of Figures and Tables

Figure 1. Anti-establishment attitudes. Concept specification.....	7
Figure 2. Indicators of anti-political establishment attitudes.....	16
Figure 3. Ideological distance between the two-main left-right parties and corresponding variables.....	25
Figure 4. Recoded variables tapping specific anti-political establishment attitudes (1-4) and political trust (5-6), followed by their value labels.....	26
Figure 5: Scale properties of items tapping anti-political establishment attitudes of ESS7 respondents.....	28
Figure 6. Histograms of refined factor score (OLS method) proxying for anti-establishment attitudes by country.....	30
Table 1. Ordinary Least Square Regressions with Linearized Standard Errors and Probability Weights Added.....	32
Figure 7. Predicted probability of endorsing anti-establishment attitudes.....	35
Table 2. Linear Regression with Linearized Standard Errors and Probability Weights.....	38
Figure8. Predicted scores for anti-establishment attitudes when occupation outsidersness interacts with party convergence on GALTAN.....	40

1. Introduction

Workers in precarious employment may have no incentives to support the established political system. Low social security benefits, low wages coupled with temporary employment contracts characterize an increasing share of workforce, and draw the line between labor market outsiders and insiders who enjoy high levels of employment security and benefits. In his influential paper on insider-outsider politics in advanced industrial democracies, David Rueda concludes that mainstream political parties systematically protect the interests of insiders, and that labor market outsiders *may have reasons to turn away from mainstream options* (Rueda 2005, p.72). This claim is referred to as the exclusion hypothesis, following Marx and Picot (2013, p.167).

While often quoted in the insider-outsider politics literature (e.g., Rovny and Rovny 2017, Emmenegger et al. 2015, Marx 2014, Marx and Picot 2013), the exclusion hypothesis has only been investigated in terms of party choice and participation, rather than political attitudes¹. Concerned with voting behavior, scholars have rather assumed that outsiders' opposition towards the political establishment should manifest itself as radical right/left party-vote or abstention (e.g., Emmenegger et al. 2015, Marx 2014, Marx and Picot 2013). However, given the inconclusive results provided by this literature (Rovny and Rovny 2017), the presumed anti-establishment sentiment underlying the political preferences of labor market outsiders is worth a closer examination.

In this thesis, I approach the exclusion hypothesis from a relatively novel perspective by examining the effect of labor market disadvantage on anti-establishment attitudes, treated as a latent predisposition. Moreover, I account for the supply-side of the exclusion hypothesis, in that I consider the ideological distance between the two largest mainstream parties in a political system as a potential moderator factor in the relationship between labor market outsidership and opposition to mainstream politics. In other words, I expect the effect of outsidership on anti-establishment attitudes to be stronger as parties converge on the economic and cultural left-right dimensions, and their ideological stances become less distinguishable from one another.

The importance of studying political behavior from both a demand- and a supply-side perspective has long been noted by scholars (e.g., Oskarson and Demker 2015), and the insider-outsider divide provides the theoretical bedrock for joining individual-level and party-level

¹ Although Marx (2014) tests for the effect of labor market outsidership on political disenchantment, I argue in this thesis that his operationalization of political disenchantment is not valid.

determinants of political attitudes in a common framework. On the one hand, it allows for understanding the micro-foundations of outsiders' anti-establishment attitudes through both a rational choice and non-instrumental filter. Labor market disadvantaged workers have no incentives to support mainstream politics, since both right- and left parties are not rationally able to trade-off insiders' social security benefits and high unemployment guarantees for active labor market policies that would benefit outsiders' insertion and mobility on the labor market (Rueda 2005, King and Rueda 2008, Lindvall and Rueda 2013). Furthermore, from a non-instrumental perspective on political behavior, expressing opposition to a non-responsive political system bears psychological rewards (e.g., Marx 2016).

On the other hand, the insider-outsider supplies an endogenous explanation of party strategies in industrialized democracies by focusing on voter preferences as the link between economic conditions and partisan policy-making (e.g., Rueda 2005). Rather than a mere product of exogenous economic forces like technological and product market transformations, the segmentation of the labor market became progressively institutionalized, as governments from both sides of the political center promoted more flexible, but less secure, types of employment (Palier and Thelen 2010, Lindvall and Rueda 2013). The institutionalization of payroll-based welfare protection reforms accentuated, in turn, the divide between insiders who could pay for their social insurance, and outsiders who were excluded from the normal labor market and whose social insurance took the shape of social assistance under state responsibility (Palier and Thelen 2010, p.122). Therefore, the conflict of interest between insiders and outsiders is, at least in part, maintained by state policy, regardless of political color, and as mainstream left and right parties tend to converge on pro-insider policies (Rueda 2005), the effect of labor market disadvantage on anti-establishment attitudes may become even stronger. Consequently, by joining demand- and supply-side explanations of political attitudes within the insider-outsider divide framework, this thesis brings a theoretical contribution to the literature on outsiders' political behavior where so far only individual-level determinants have been considered.

In addition, the exclusion hypothesis is explored in a more nuanced manner by defining anti-establishment attitudes in the larger context of opposition politics and by placing the concept at the intersection between the literature on populism and the debate on the crisis of party. The operationalization of the outcome variable as a latent construct is also relatively new in the insider-outsider literature. Drawing on recent research on populism at the mass level (e.g., Elchardus and Spruyt 2016, Akkermann et al. 2014), I employ factor analysis on anti-establishment attitudes indicators, a method which yields more valid estimates of the latent trait than individual survey

items (Di Stefano et al. 2009) and reduces the measurement error that is typical to survey data (Ansolabehere et al. 2008). Moreover, I make use of the latest round of the European Social Survey (ESS 7, 2014), which offers enough indicators to construct a more accurate measure of anti-establishment attitudes (cf. Marx 2014) and to test the exclusion hypothesis in more than one country.

Furthermore, this thesis pays special attention to how labor market disadvantage is operationalized and acknowledges the theoretical and empirical implications that underlie measurement decisions (Rovny and Rovny 2017, Häusermann and Schwander 2013). For demonstration and robustness purposes, I operationalize outsidership as both temporary employment and occupational unemployment risk and show that empirical results are sensitive to operationalization. Specifically, the hypothesized relationship holds only when outsidership is operationalized as exposure to occupational unemployment risk. As such, this thesis makes an additional, albeit modest, empirical contribution to the field of insider-outsider politics by illustrating how operationalization matters for the insider-outsider literature, beyond pragmatic considerations of data availability.

In a broader sense, this thesis relates to the recent literature on populism and the “party decline” debate, in that it aims to answer a somewhat crude, yet pressing question: Why are citizens in European advanced industrial democracies, where corruption and political scandals are at a relatively low level, and the standards of living are among the highest in the world, becoming more and more frustrated with the political establishment? Put differently, what drives the public perception that mainstream political parties form an entrenched self-serving elite that has lost touch with society (Invernizzi-Accetti & Wolkenstein 2017, p.99)? Documenting the decline in partisanship and the increasing rejection of political parties as legitimate representative actors, the early literature on anti-partyism has signaled the potential of anti-establishment rhetoric for political change (e.g., Gidengil et al. 2001, p.491, Bardi 1996, Scarrow 1996). In a similar vein, Kriesi (2007, p.368) has noted the capability of anti-establishment rhetoric to radically transform the configurations of Western European politics. In this respect, studying anti-establishment rhetoric as latent predispositions among the electorate appears to be the next step in understanding the success of outsider parties, as well as the decline of traditional voter-party linkages. Finally, this thesis attempts to open the way for future research into the micro-foundations of mass anti-political establishment sentiment.

In the next section I specify the concept of anti-establishment attitudes and locate it within the

relevant literatures. Although the research questions are derived from the insider-outsider literature and play the central role in the analysis, a discussion of what this thesis understands under “anti-establishment” politics is necessary, since the concept is often confounded with related, but different terms such as populism or anti-partyism (Barr 2009). The next two chapters develop the theoretical arguments underlying the hypothesized relationship between labor market disadvantage and anti-establishment attitudes, and the moderating role of mainstream parties’ convergence. Subsequently, I introduce the reader to the various operationalization methods undertaken in the empirical analysis and focus on the theoretical and empirical reasons behind each operationalization decision. The chapter dedicated to empirical analysis opens with a brief layout of research methods, and continues with a discussion of the rationale underpinning the case selection. After presenting the three data-sets that the analysis relies on (European Social Survey Round 7, Eurostat Labor Force Surveys and Chapel Hill Expert Surveys), I explain how the independent predictors are obtained and coded. An important subsection of the analysis chapter consists in factor analyzing the indicators for anti-establishment attitudes and in deliberating between different methods of factor scores estimation, necessary for generating the dependent variable in the subsequent analysis. Additionally, I discuss the choice of the statistical models and present the main results. I find that labor market disadvantage operationalized as exposure to occupational unemployment is associated with anti-establishment attitudes, while the effect of temporary employment is statistically insignificant. The confirmed relationship appears to be stronger when the ideological distance between the two mainstream parties decreases with respect to the cultural dimension, yet the interaction between party convergence on the economic left-right dimension and outsidership is insignificant. Analysis results and their implications for future research are discussed in the final chapter.

2. Anti-political establishment attitudes - concept location and specification

The first step in understanding anti-political establishment attitudes is to distinguish the more general notion of anti-establishment appeals from similar, yet analytically different, concepts such as *anti-partyism* and *populism* (Barr 2009). Then, it is necessary to differentiate between anti-establishment political discourse at the party level, and anti-political establishment attitudes at the individual level. Accordingly, the concept of individual anti-political establishment attitudes can be located at the intersection between the more recent research on populism and the literature on anti-

partyism or “the crisis of party”².

Attributes such as *anti-party* (Poguntke 1996, Poguntke and Scarrow 1996, Gidengil et al. 2001) *anti-establishment* (Schedler 1996, Abedi 2002, Barr 2009), and *populism* (Norris 2005, Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2012) refer to a certain kind of political party or political rhetoric, whose *raison d'être* revolves around the assumption of an implacable schism between the corrupt agenda of the established political elites and the “will of the people” (Schedler 1996, pp.292-294, Barr 2009, pp.20-31). Despite the terms often being employed interchangeably, Barr (2009, p.29) signals the ambiguity surrounding this diverse terminology and the urgency of clarifying the concepts of populism, anti-establishment politics, and outsider-politics by investigating the nature, the type of voter-party linkages, as well as the locus in the party system, defining these distinct expressions of opposition politics.

Inherent to anti-establishment politics are the critique of the entrenched political elites and the call for its replacement; on this ground, the term is comparable to what the literature on the decline of parties calls anti-partyism or anti-party sentiment (Barr 2009, p.37). However, in contrast to anti-partyism, which implies a rejection of traditional governing party alternatives (Belanger 2004), anti-political establishment discourse entails an additional and explicit “elite vs. the people” dimension (Barr 2009, Stanley 2008, Schedler 1996).

According to Barr (2009), the “elite vs. the people” dimension is implied by the type of voter-party linkages promoted by anti-political establishment parties: whether plebiscitarian (top down, unmediated, direct democracy), or participatory (bottom-up participatory direct democracy)³, both representation forms originate from the imagined conflict between the established political elite and the people. Furthermore, Barr (2009, pp.38-39) suggests that while anti-establishment politics are open to both plebiscitarian and participatory democracy, populism is predominantly plebiscitarian. By contrast, Mudde and Rovira-Kaltwasser (2012, p.153) argue that populism can be organized both in *top-down and bottom-up fashion*. Nevertheless, scholars generally agree that anti-establishment politics centered on the “elite vs. the people” dimension are a necessary, but non-sufficient condition for populism, which requires an additional component that is, the idea that politics should be the expression of the “general will” of the people, or “people centrism” (Barr 2009, p.32, Stanley 2008, p.104, Mudde and Rovira-Kaltwasser 2012, p.150).


² The term “crisis of parties”, or “decline of parties”, denotes the crisis of acceptance faced by mainstream political parties and refers to *unfavorable orientations towards political parties among intellectual or political elites and the general public* (Invernizzi-Accetti & Wolkenstein 2017, Poguntke 1996, p. 319).

³ The explanations of plebiscitarian and participatory linkages come from Barr (2009, pp.37-38).

Regarding location, Barr (2009, p.44) emphasizes that not only outsiders i.e., political actors gaining prominence outside the traditional party system, but also insiders who aim to alter the status quo, frequently employ and benefit from anti-establishment rhetoric, allowing them to appear as agents of change. From this follows that anti-establishment appeals are not the domain of a single kind of party, e.g., the populist radical right as the common wisdom would imply, but a flexible instrument within the reach of any political actor at odds with the established political alternatives.

Furthermore, following Schedler (1996a), Barr (2009, p.32) places anti-establishment appeals between a loyal kind of opposition against the incumbent government and centered on policy issues, and a disloyal kind, levied against the political system per se and its fundamental principles. To conclude, anti-establishment political discourse recognizes the legitimacy of the political system, but targets its insiders i.e., the mainstream or traditional governing parties, drawing its legitimacy from an imagined cleavage between the corrupt agenda of those in power and the will of the people. The connections between anti-establishment politics, anti-partyism and populism are represented in Figure 1, below.

Figure 1. Anti-establishment attitudes. Concept specification.



Anti-establishment politics have been predominantly studied at the party level, with an emphasis on party system features as political opportunity structures for the electoral success of anti-establishment and radical right populist parties in Western democracies, particularly the erosion of class voting and decreased ideological distance on the left-right dimension (e.g., Oskarson and Demker 2015, Loxbo 2014, Spies and Franzmann 2011, Abedi 2002, Ignazi 1996). Moreover, a different subfield has focused on the emergence of anti-establishment and anti-corruption parties in Eastern Europe (Ucen 2007), with authors paying particular attention to country level factors such as corruption, unemployment and political instability (Hanley and Sikk 2016), as well as to the impact of anti-establishment niche parties on the established party system (Bågenholm 2013). If the party competition literature has made progress on identifying the systemic sources of anti-establishment parties, not much is known about the determinants of anti-establishment attitudes at the individual level, apart from what can be inferred from the anti-

partyism or populism literature.

This may be a consequence of the *conceptual cloudiness* characteristic of anti-establishment politics, a concept often conflated with anti-partyism and populism (Barr 2009). Another reason for the lack of attention to the demand-side of anti-establishment politics may be related to data availability. On the one hand, it is difficult to find accurate indicators of anti-establishment attitudes and to empirically distinguish them from related concepts such as political distrust, anti-partyism or populism. On the other hand, cross-country surveys directly measuring disenchantment with mainstream politics are even harder to find. While questions tapping into political trust are commonly asked throughout the seven rounds of the European Social Survey, to date only the ESS Round 7 (2014/2015) provides additional variables needed for measuring anti-establishment attitudes in a cross-country analysis. This thesis exploits this unique dataset (ESS 7) and aims to contribute to the anti-establishment politics literature by exploring sources of anti-establishment attitudes among the electorates of Western European democracies. Nonetheless, the resulting operationalization of anti-establishment attitudes is bound to imperfection, due to the imprecise language of the available indicators. This issue is discussed in detail in the chapter dedicated to operationalization.

Scholars have argued that anti-establishment politics can be *a powerful force for political change* (Gidengil et al. 2001, p.491, Bardi 1996, Scarrow 1996). This type of rhetoric, directed at traditional governing alternatives, is not exclusively the domain of radical right parties, but may be appropriated by any politician who wishes to present themselves as an agent of change (Barr 2009, cf. Hanley and Sikk 2016). Therefore, studying the emergence of anti-establishment politics at both the party- and the individual level is necessary if the adjacent literatures on populism and party decline are to make progress in understanding the variation in manifestations of public discontent with mainstream politics, which may be related, but conceptually and empirically unique.

3. Insights from labor market dualization and the insider-outsider divide

The main research task of this thesis is to investigate the effect of labor market disadvantage (outsiderness) on anti-political establishment attitudes. This expectation is first and foremost based in recent research on the electoral consequences of insider-outsider politics in industrialized democracies (Rueda 2005, King and Rueda 2008, Lindvall and Rueda 2013, Marx 2014, Emmenegger et al. 2015). Associated with unemployment risk, lower wages, fewer benefits, and

low social security, an outsider position in the labor market is likely to lead to anti-political system attitudes, as outsiders have no incentives to support a political system that does not represent them (Rueda 2005, King and Rueda 2008). However, the often-cited remark that labor market outsiders are more likely to oppose mainstream politics has only been investigated to a limited extent, with radical left or radical right party choice and abstention proxying for anti-establishment attitudes (e.g., Rovny and Rovny 2017, Emmenegger et al. 2016, Marx 2014). Besides, studies of outsiders' party preferences remain inconclusive, yielding different results depending on how labor market outsidersness is operationalized (Rovny and Rovny 2017). Thus, to date, it is still unclear how the insider-outsider divide translates into political preferences and attitudes towards mainstream parties.

For these reasons, I suggest examining the exclusion hypothesis in terms of attitudes towards the political system, instead of voting choice. Moreover, I argue that the insider-outsider divide is an under-researched, yet useful theory for integrating both individual and party-system determinants of political attitudes into a common framework. Theoretically, a common framework makes sense when considering the political nature of labor market dualization (Palen and Thelen, 2010), as well as the representation dilemma challenging traditional mass left parties (Rueda and Lindvall 2013).

According to dual labor market theory and the labor market segmentation literature (Davidsson and Naczyk 2009), the working class is divided between workers with higher wages, employment stability and security, benefits and career advancement opportunity, as well as higher pensions, and workers with lower wages, prone to either longer unemployment spells, or to atypical employment, with less training and less job stability, and fewer advancement opportunities (Piore 1975, in Davidsson and Naczyk 2009, p.7). These two categories belong to different labor market segments, with different functioning logics and rules, and with low chances of worker mobility between the two segments (Reich et al. 1973, in Davidsson and Naczyk 2009, p.7).

There are several explanations for dualization, ranging from a strictly economic perspective, which posits that firms adjust their strategies in response to market change and uncertainty, aiming to reduce labor turnover costs in tight labor markets, to political accounts, which consider the dualization of the working class a mean to control the labor process (Palier and Thelen 2010, p. 120). Most importantly however, is the finding that, rather than a cyclical phenomenon in which dualization strategies are sensitive to changes in unemployment and market competition, labor market segmentation has been progressively institutionalized and underwritten by state policy over

the past few decades (Marx 2016, Palier and Thelen 2010, p.120, also Rueda 2005). Therefore, the disaggregation of the working class into insiders and outsiders is at least partially, a direct consequence of party politics.

Related to what Rueda and Lindvall (2013) call a *representation dilemma*, scholars have argued that insiders and outsiders have fundamentally distinct economic interests, with the former valuing job security, and the latter benefitting more from labor market entrance opportunities and unemployment benefits (e.g., Rueda 2005, p.62). Given that the share of insiders is greater than that of outsiders, but also because outsiders participate less in politics (Verba et al. 1995, in Emmenegger et al. 2015, Rueda 2005, p.62, Lindvall and Rueda 2013), traditional labor or social-democratic parties tend to prioritize the interests of insiders (Rueda 2005, Palier and Thelen 2010, Lindvall and Rueda 2013). In addition, in spatial voting models an increase of labor market flexibility at the expense of less insider employment protection and benefits is politically infeasible even for left parties, due to insider-outsider conflict of interest and the disproportionate distribution of insiders and outsiders across the labor force (Saint-Paul et al. 1996, in Davidsson and Naczyk 2009, p.28). The alternative labor parties are left with is to liberalize atypical employment, allowing outsiders to enter the job market more easily, but without the social benefits of insiders (Marx 2016, p.203, Davidsson and Naczyk 2009, p.28). In a similar vein, Rueda (2005, 2007) argued that social-democratic parties are bound to their core constituency (insiders), causing them to only promote marginal pro-outsider reforms that do not go against insider interests.

Consequently, the insider-outsider divide influences political behavior via the risks and disadvantages related to one's type of employment and occupation, but also due to underlying party politics and policy decisions. In particular, outsiders are more likely to oppose mainstream politics, since traditional party alternatives neglect their economic interests. This expectation is underpinned by both rational choice and non-instrumental assumptions (Marx 2014, p.140). On the one hand, outsiders may oppose mainstream politics (King and Rueda 2008, p.293), to pressure traditional parties into more responsiveness (Emmenegger et al. 2015, p.194). On the other hand, rather than a rational choice, opposing the established political parties can be an expressive act, *psychologically rewarding in itself* (Emmenegger et al. 2015, p.194). Both abstaining and voting for an anti-establishment party can fulfill the need to express one's resentment and mistrust towards the political system (Marx 2014, p.140). Put differently, opposition towards mainstream politics is the manifestation of increasing political alienation among disadvantaged workers (King and Rueda 2008, p.292).

To date, there have been only a few attempts to study outsidership in relation to political behavior variables other than party choice or welfare preferences. A notable exception is the work of Emmenegger et al. (2015, p.208), in which the authors find that the relationship between labor market disadvantage and radical party vote or abstention is mediated by the respondent's level of external efficacy, while internal efficacy has no significant effect. While arguably context dependent (The Netherlands), these findings demonstrate the indirect effect of outsidership on voting behavior, making it worthwhile for scholars to focus more on latent political variables, as necessary, but not sufficient, conditions for political behavior.

Another relevant study is Marx's (2014) analysis of the effects of temporary employment on political preferences and attitudes in Europe: contrary to insider-outsider theory, temporary employees are not significantly more likely to defect from social democracy, nor to show signs of disenchantment with mainstream politics. Instead, they are more likely to support the new left (Marx 2014, p. 150). Measured as "Satisfaction with how democracy works" and "Trust in political parties", it is however not surprising that the author found no relationship between outsidership and political disenchantment, since, as scholars have argued, many democracies have experienced a general and gradual erosion of institutional trust and confidence in political parties among the public - thus, political trust is less suited a concept to explain the prevalent variation in political attitudes and behavior among citizens of advanced democracies (Norris 2005, p. 164).

In conclusion, labor market dualization theory and the insider-outsider debate provide substantial grounds for the expectation that labor market outsiders are more likely to endorse anti-political establishment attitudes. This expectation represents the main research question of this thesis, expressed in hypothesis 1:

H1: Labor market outsiders are more likely to endorse anti-establishment attitudes.

Moreover, the consequences of outsidership on political attitudes may be moderated by changes in the party system, such as depolarization on important policy issues, providing outsiders with incentives to oppose mainstream politics. The next chapter addresses this expectation in detail.

3.1. Insights from the literature on party competition/ party polarization

The second hypothesis of this thesis expects the relationship between outsidership and anti-political establishment attitudes to be moderated by the degree of mainstream parties' convergence on the economic and cultural conflict dimensions. This argument is based on the premise that the quality of party competition, i.e., the degree of ideological differentiation among political parties in a system (Sartori 1976), shapes electoral behavior by structuring choice (Evans and Tilley 2012, Dalton 2008).

Drawing on spatial models of party competition (Downs 1957), an influential line of research within the comparative political economy and party competition literatures has argued that party positioning on the Left and Right axis is influenced by both centrifugal and centripetal forces, which in turn affect voting behavior (e.g., Dalton 2008, Cox 1990, Sartori 1976). Competing for the median voter, political actors adopt relatively extreme policies under centrifugal forces, producing an ideologically polarized system, whereas under centripetal forces, they tend to promote centrist policies, converging to the center of the left-right axis (Cox 1990, Dalton 2008). Both scenarios can lead to voters' political alienation and abstention if voters perceive that their nearest party has moved too far away from their preferred policy position, and alternatively, if voters are at an equal distance from two or more party alternatives (Dalton 2008, p. 901). Moreover, both party system polarization and mainstream party convergence have been independently theorized as opportunity structures for the electoral success of challenger parties (Meguid 2008, Kitschelt 2007, cf. Ignazi 1993). In a similar vein, Kirchheimer's "catch-all" thesis states that, as parties adjust their position instrumentally, based on the position of competitors and the median voter, meaningful opposition diminishes, policy appeals are less precise, and constituencies become more volatile (Kirchheimer 1966 in Williams 2008, p. 106, Mair 2008).

From this perspective, it is reasonable to expect party convergence to enhance anti-political establishment attitudes, as they prohibit voters from differentiating among political offers. Counterfactually, polarization should decrease the probability of outsiders opposing mainstream politics, insofar as polarization heightens the social identity effects of partisanship (Lupu 2014, p.335). However, other scholars have argued that party system polarization transmits a lack of elite consensus, and indirectly creates an opportunity structure for challenger parties to exploit non-politicized issues such as immigration, morality and national pride and gather votes from those critical of mainstream politics (Arzheimer and Carter 2006, p.424, Ignazi 1996, p.559). From this perspective, outsiders, who are generally underrepresented by mainstream politics (Rueda 2005,

Rueda and Lindvall 2013), could perceive polarization as elites' unwillingness or inability to promote the policies that matter to them. To sum up, the lesson is that party competition acts as a strong supply-side predictor of political behavior, with significant effects on the erosion of party-voter linkages (Elff 2007, Evans and Tilley 2012, Rennwald and Evans 2014, Gingrich and Häusermann 2015).

Before launching into a more detailed discussion of the underlying theoretical framework, a word on the question of ideological convergence is needed. In a recent and prominent volume on the politics of advanced democracies, Beramendi et al. (2015) argue that, contrary to common wisdom, mainstream left and right parties have not converged to neoliberal economic policies, and demonstrate that there is still considerable variation among the different types of capitalism in Western Europe. Particularly, the chapter by Kitschelt and Rehm (2015) sets out to examine the sources of partisan alignments by comparing three competing explanations with different expectations about party system configuration patterns: on one hand, postindustrial realignment predicts durable partisanship effects, while dealignment and cartel party detachment predict convergence. While, Kitschelt and Rehm's (2015) analysis is very sound, including 18 industrial democracies and accounting for three different polarization measures, their final statement is rather strong for the evidence they manage to produce. In fact, Kitschelt and Rehm's (2015) results reveal considerable cross-country heterogeneity with regard to polarization⁴, but no overall trend towards polarization or convergence.

This thesis acknowledges the variance in ideological polarization between mainstream parties in Western Europe and exploits it to assess its eventual effects on voter attitudes. I do not assume that parties have converged toward the center, nor that they are polarized, yet I build on an extensive strand of literature recording shifts of major left and right parties towards the center of the Left and Right axis and their independent effects on voting behavior (Evans et al. 1995, Evans and Tilley 2012, Rennwald and Evans 2014, Gingrich and Häusermann 2015). A quick review of the literature on party competition and dealignment reveals a handful of examples: the infamous shift to the right of Blair's New Labor in Britain (Evans et al. 1999, Evans and Tilley 2012), the move to the center of social democracy on social investment (Rueda and Lindvall 2013), the weakening of left-right polarization in Western European advanced democracies (Hobolt and Tilley

⁴A constituency-based measurement yields: 6 countries experience a significant downward trend in polarization; nine experience a significant upward trend; three experience no trend; A perception-based measurement yields: 4 countries with a downward trend in polarization, two with in an upward trend and four with no trend; An expert-based measurement yields: 3 countries experience significant upward trends in polarization, three experience significant downward trends and seven experienced no trends. Note: the number of countries included in the analysis differs from measurement to measurement, due to constraints in data availability (Kitschelt and Rehm 2015).

2016, Rennwald and Evans 2014 Oskarson and Demker 2015 on the Swedish party system, Adams et al. 2012 on the Dutch party system). In a similar vein the welfare state literature notes a rightward shift on welfare issues in Liberal regimes, a narrowing of partisan differences around a pro-welfare equilibrium in Continental Europe, and general support for welfare spending across the entire political spectrum in Social Democratic countries (Gingrich and Häusermann 2015). Although they explicitly argue against the convergence thesis, Beramendi et al. nevertheless find an irregular trend of convergence towards the liberalization of temporary employment (2015, p. 11), thus corroborating previous findings from the labor market dualization literature (e.g., Rueda 2005).

Returning to the party competition literature, scholars disagree as to what ideological dimension matters more when it comes to linking mainstream parties' issue positioning and challenger parties' electoral success (Spies and Franzmann 2011). If the economic left-right dimension has long been considered as the most important cleavage line (Kitschelt 2007, Abedi 2002), more recent research has stressed the relevance of the cultural dimension when investigating radical right parties' opportunity structures (Loxbo 2014, Karreth et al. 2013, Spies and Franzmann 2011). Moreover, economic and cultural conflict lines matter for the formation of political preferences and mobilization, reinforcing each other (Kriesi et Häusermann 2015, Kitschelt and Rehm 2015, Kriesi et al. 2006). Consequently, I expect that party distance will influence the relationship between labor market disadvantage and anti-establishment attitudes with regard to both an economic and cultural dimension of party competition.

A few studies have so far investigated the link between party competition (convergence vs. polarization) and several dependent variables more or less connected to what this thesis calls "anti-political establishment attitudes". Opinions against the established political parties, labeled as anti-partyism, have been examined in British and Canadian elections (Webb 1996, Gidengil et al. 2001), whereas studies concerned with voting for challenger parties such as anti-immigration or radical right parties are more prolific (Loxbo 2014, Karreth et al. 2013, Bélanger 2004, Norris 2005, Abedi 2002). While both strands of literature agree that the radical right vote is related to anti-political establishment attitudes, there have been to my best knowledge no attempts to explain anti-political establishment attitudes from both a demand- and supply-side perspective. In the remainder of this section I review the studies this thesis builds on, even though they do not explicitly deal with anti-political establishment attitudes.

In an examination of correlates of anti-partyism in Britain, Webb (1996) finds that a lack of

perceived difference between parties is strongly correlated with hostility and/or indifference towards the party system. Additionally, the impact of social background characteristics, apart from unemployment, is generally weak. In a similar study of the 1997 Canadian election, Gidengil et al. (2001) analyze the covariates of anti-party sentiment and find that attitudes against the party system are strongly influenced by political sophistication and most of all by issue alienation. In contrast to Webb (1996), perceptions of convergence between the main party alternatives are not statistically significant (Gidengil 2001, p. 500).

Hobolt and Tilley (2016) examine voting patterns in the aftermath of the Euro crisis and find support for the “establishment punishment” explanation, according to which, the convergence of mainstream left and right parties on austerity and fiscal policy-making guidelines of the EU has led people affected by the crisis to defect from the mainstream political party alternatives. Citizens experiencing economic hardship did not merely punish the incumbent government, but all mainstream parties who during the crisis whose cues on economic issues, Europe and immigration were perceived as very similar (Hobolt and Tilley 2012, p. 986).

Another strand of literature explores the effects of mainstream party convergence on the opening of political opportunity structures for anti-establishment parties. Abedi (2002) examines the relationship between party competition and voting intention for anti-establishment parties both at single election points and overtime and finds support for the thesis that anti-establishment parties thrive in party systems where the distance between the mainstream party alternatives is smaller. This finding is corroborated by Adams et al.’s (2012) study of the Dutch party system, where depolarization between the two major political parties on the traditional Left-Right dimension has created incentives for challenger parties to mobilize new cultural issues. Furthermore, Oskarson and Demker (2015) explain the realignment pattern behind the radical right party, Sweden Democrats, as a function of both an eroded linkage between the working class and their traditional representatives, the Social Democratic Party, and the tendency towards depolarization between the two main parties (Social Democrats and Moderates).

Karreth et al. (2013, p.815) examine the consequences of “catch-all” strategies adopted by social democratic parties in Germany, Sweden, and Great Britain over time and find that moving towards the political center causes de- and realignment of core voters in the long run, while the gain in new voters is short lived, hence causing a destabilization of the party system and undermining themselves as functional political organisations. Loxbo (2014) finds similar results, when testing the effect of perceived party convergence in the fields of economic distribution and immigration

policy. In a least similar case study of Swedish voters' support for the radical right Sweden Democrats (SD), the analysis yields somewhat contrasting results: while perceived convergence on economic-distributive issues actually seems to reduce short-term support for SD, it is the perception that the mainstream parties converge on immigration policy that is more likely to increase support for SD (Loxbo 2014).

To conclude, party competition constitutes the supply-side of anti-establishment attitudes' determinants, and is hypothesized to moderate the effect of labor market disadvantage. This expectation leads to the second hypothesis examined in this thesis:

Hypothesis 2a: Labor market outsiders are more likely to endorse anti-establishment attitudes when the distance between the main left and right parties decreases with regard to the economic dimension.

Hypothesis 2b: Labor market outsiders Outsiders are more likely to endorse anti-establishment attitudes when the distance between the main left and right parties decreases with regard to the cultural dimension.

4. Concept operationalization

In this section I discuss the operationalization of the dependent variable, as well as the operationalization of the individual- and country-level independent variables, with a focus on theoretical implications and limitations of each operationalization choice.

4.1. The dependent variable

Following recent attempts to measure populism at the mass level (Elchardus and Spruyt 2016, Akkerman et al. 2014, Hawkins et al. 2012), I operationalize anti-political establishment attitudes as a latent, unobserved, variable, approximated by a series of indicators tapping into the "elite vs. the people" dimension and the anti-partyism dimension (Figure 2). Taking into account Goertz's (2006) recommendations for concept specification, I also discuss the negative pole of the dependent variable and the continuum between the two. Anti-establishment attitudes are then thought as a continuous latent variable in direct antithesis with partisanship. In between, there are milder

manifestations of anti-political establishment attitudes or of declining partisanship, such as general political distrust, party switching and ticket-splitting⁵.

Figure 2. Indicators of anti-political establishment attitudes (ESS 7)	
<i>Elite vs. the people</i>	<i>How much does the political system allow for people like you to have a say in what the government does?</i>
	<i>How much does the political system allow for people like you to have an influence on politics?</i>
	<i>How easy do you personally find it to take part in politics?</i>
<i>Anti-partyism</i>	<i>How much politicians care about what people like you think?</i>

The selection of the anti-partyism is motivated by the anti-partyism and populism literatures, which employ similar variables to measure anti-party sentiment (e.g., *Parties don't care what ordinary people think* in Gidengil 2001, p.498 and Belanger 2004, p.1062). However, an unavoidable limitation of this operationalization is the impossibility to distinguish between specific and general anti-partyism i.e., between the rejection of the established parties and the rejection of political parties in general. This caveat has previously been noted by the literature on party decline (Poguntke 1996, Poguntke and Scarrow 1996, Gidengil et al. 2001). Belanger (2004) operationalizes specific anti-party sentiment as negative ratings given to the two established-party alternatives, yet this option is not available in ESS 7 (2014/2015). Gidengil et al. (2001, p.494) argue however that, when respondents report that politicians do not care about what ordinary people think, they could just refer to traditional party alternatives, rather than parties per se. Given that ESS 7 (2014/2015) asks whether politicians, and not parties, care about what people think, I believe it is reasonable to assume that respondents actually answered with the established political elite in mind, rather than the nature of political parties.

Likewise, the indicators of the “elite vs. the people” dimension are less desirable measures of anti-elitism. Ideally, this dimension would be proxied by variables asking respondents directly if they thought that *the differences between the elite and ordinary people are larger than the differences among the people* (Akkerman et al. 2014, p.1333) or if they agreed *that ministers should spend less time behind their desks and more among the ordinary people* (Elchardus and

⁵ Political distrust is a general, prevalent attitude in democratic institutions, yet it is not equivalent to anti-establishment attitudes (Norris 2005). Party switching and ticket-splitting are associated with the erosion of partisanship and traditional voter-party linkages (Dassonneville 2016).

Spruyt 2016, p.121). To my best knowledge, such precise questions are not available in any cross-country survey, although they are sometimes asked national surveys such as in the studies cited above. Ultimately, I assume the trade-off between a single-country study with better indicators and a cross-country analysis with less desirable indicators, which makes it possible to understand the relationship of interest in a wider context and to account for cross-country variance. Additionally, I argue that the variables provided by ESS7 are good enough indicators of the anti-establishment stance, because they accentuate the distance between the political system and ordinary people via expressions such as “people like you” and “personally”. Finally, the results obtained with this imperfect operationalization of anti-political establishment attitudes should serve as a motivation to incorporate both specific and general measures of anti-partyism and anti-political elitism into cross-national surveys, given their importance for understanding voting behavior and opposition politics at the mass level.

4.2. Individual-level independent variables

Labor-market disadvantage, or outsidersness, is hypothesized as a demand-side source of anti-political establishment attitudes and operationalized as both temporary work (limited or no contract) and occupational unemployment risk. Therefore, the first research question will be tested with two different independent variables. This decision is motivated by the prevailing disagreement in the labor market dualization literature with regard to how the insider-outsider divide should best be operationalized (Häusermann and Schwander 2013, Rovny and Rovny 2017). It is true that the strand of political economy research that has revived the debate on the insider-outsider divide, has initially conceptualized outsiders as temporary workers and/or the involuntarily unemployed, with low social security, low salaries and employment precariousness (Rueda 2005, p.62, Rueda 2014, p.384, cf. Emmenegger et al. 2015, p.193, Marx 2016). Yet Häusermann and Schwander (2013, p.251) argue that temporary contracts and/or involuntary unemployment are too ephemeral socio-economic characteristics to have a stable impact on political preferences and mobilization, thus questioning their relevance as labor market disadvantage proxies for political behavior research.

What Häusermann and Schwander (2013, p.251) propose instead, is an outsidersness measure based on labor market risk derived from an individual’s occupational class, which is arguably a more stable characteristic, since *people may change from unemployment to employment within a few months, [...], but they do not change their occupational class quickly*. Häusermann and

Schwander's (2013) occupation-based operationalization of outsidersness is comparable to Rehm's (2009, 2011) operationalization of labor market disadvantage as occupational unemployment risk, yet it differs in that it explicitly accounts for gender and age as determinants of outsidersness, besides occupational class. Both approaches stress the importance of occupational class as a locus of political preference formation, based on a mechanism of *generalization and transposition* of work-related private experiences to policy preferences (Kitschelt and Rehm 2011, p.1674). Put differently, and assuming that the work place is at the center of adult social networks, people are more likely to be concerned with rising unemployment within their occupational branch, because the probability that they know someone affected or threatened by unemployment is higher (Rehm 2009, p.861).

Choosing between different operationalization-methods is not just a matter of preference or data availability; it is much more a matter of theoretical reasoning, with consequences for empirical results⁶. As Häusermann and Schwander (2013, p.251) have argued, temporary unemployment and temporary working contracts may be less informative for researchers interested in political preferences than for those preoccupied with labor market processes. Nevertheless, Marx (2016, p.104) makes the point that, while temporary work may be just a stepping stone in someone's career, only a small share of the workforce *actually* makes a successful transition to stable employment. From this perspective, temporary employment or involuntary unemployment informs voters' rational expectations about their chances for better economic prospects (Emmenegger et al. 2015, p.193, Marx 2016, p.104). Drawing on the economic voting literature, employment status can be seen as the pocketbook rule of economic evaluations, which expects voters to rationally evaluate the economy based on their personal economic situation, and to punish or reward politicians accordingly (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2007, p.519). By contrast, occupational unemployment risk can function as a sociotropic voting rule by forming voters' perceptions of the national economy.

Given the equal weight of each argument, I follow Rovny and Rovny (2017) in operationalizing outsidersness as both temporary employment and occupational unemployment risks, which the authors parsimoniously categorize as status-based and occupation-based outsidersness measures. More specifically, I restrict the group of status-outsiders to those

⁶ Rovny and Rovny (2017, p.15) demonstrate that outsidersness leads to different vote choices, depending on operationalization procedures: operationalized as employment status (temporary, part-time, unemployed), outsidersness increases the likelihood of voting for the radical left and decreases the likelihood of voting for the radical right. By contrast, when operationalized as occupational unemployment risk (both accounting and not accounting for gender and age), outsidersness decreases the likelihood of radical-left party choice, and increases that of voting for the radical right.

respondents in temporary employment, which is frequently involuntary and legally characterized by low employment security relative to full-time workers (Marx 2016, p.100). Occupation-outsiders are those respondents with an occupation characterized by high unemployment risk. Following Rehm (2009), I approximate unemployment risk exposure per occupation by occupational unemployment rates. I explain how I calculated these rates in the subsequent chapter, where I discuss the independent variables and their coding sources.

Furthermore, employing both measures of labor market disadvantage serves as a robustness check for the first hypothesis. If an occupation-based operationalization is arguably more interesting for political behavior, it is nonetheless prone to aggregation bias. Because I cannot measure occupational unemployment risk directly at the individual level, I must infer it from aggregate data, which makes it possible to assign individuals a risk that may actually never manifest (Häusermann and Schwander 2013, p.251, Rovny and Rovny 2017). By contrast, status-outsidership is measured at the individual-level as limited or no employment contract. Finally, the distinction between status- and occupation-based labor market disadvantage potentially bears different theoretical implications for the demand-side source of anti-political establishment attitudes, and thus makes it worthwhile to explore the first research question with both outsidership-measures.

4.3. Country-level dependent variables

The ideological distance between the two-main left and right parties in a political system is theorized as one possible supply-side source of anti-political establishment attitudes. In line with the party competition literature, I account for both the economic-distributive, as well as for the non-material cultural dimensions of conflict, and measure party convergence as the distance between the two-main left and right parties in a political system. The economic dimension refers to the classic question of resource allocation and redistribution (Beramendi et al. 2015, Loxbo 2014, Kitschelt 2007), while the cultural dimension is represented by the general GAL/TAN⁷ cleavage.

I am aware that, by restraining the operationalization of the country-level independent variable to the distance between only the two largest parties is a coarse approximation of mainstream politics convergence, with obvious shortcomings when it comes to systems

⁷The new politics dimension ranging from Green/Alternative/Libertarian (GAL) to Traditional/Authoritarian/Nationalist (TAN) (Hooghe et al. 2002).

characterized by a proportional representation formula. Yet, limiting the number of parties to the main traditional left and right parties is not uncommon for case studies on party competition in proportional representation systems (e.g., Oskarson and Demker 2015 in the case of Sweden, Adams et al. 2012 in the case of the Netherlands). In fact, this thesis follows Spies and Franzmann's (2011) two criteria for identifying mainstream left and right parties in both a majoritarian and proportional representation system: the share of votes (or seats) in a given national election, and the location of the two parties with respect to one another on the left-right axis.

5. Research design - brief presentation

Before hypothesis testing, I conduct a factor analysis on the indicators of anti-political establishment attitudes, to demonstrate that the selected variables can be considered as manifestations of the same latent construct. Then, I generate the predicted factor score underlying the four indicators of anti-establishment attitudes and employ it as the dependent variable for subsequent regression analyses. For robustness checks I run the main models with three factor scores calculated after different methods. The second and main analysis part models the effect of labor market outsidersness on anti-establishment attitudes in a series of ordinary least squares regressions with heteroscedastic standard error and survey weights. The third part investigates whether party distance has a moderating effect on the relationship between outsidersness and the outcome variable. The motivations and reasoning behind each research design choice are discussed in greater detail in the subsequent chapters. The analysis is conducted in STATA 14.2 and the null hypotheses that the estimated slope coefficients are equal to zero are rejected at the standard significance level of 0.05.

5.1. Case selection

The universe of cases consists of ten Western European democracies: Austria, Denmark, Germany, Finland, France, Ireland, The Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom. The case selection is first and foremost informed by the literature, but also partly limited by data availability. Following Beramendi et al. (2015, p.5), a first selection criterion is related to institutional stability and integrity, necessary to hold constant potential country-level confounders such as systemic corruption, variability of the rule of law and citizens' compliance with institutional rules, hence the study of advanced industrial democracies. Because the dependent

variable is measured with the European Social Survey 7 (2014), the analysis is limited to European countries. Second, the two Southern European countries available in the ESS 7, Spain and Portugal, are excluded since the involvement of the European Union in budgetary policies, and the austerity and privatisation measures that followed (Otjes and Katsanidou 2017), can be expected to be the main source of citizens' anti-establishment attitudes, rather than the insider-outsider divide.

Finally, the universe of cases excludes Central and Eastern European countries, where party systems are less institutionalized, less legitimate in the eyes of the public, and are still to develop stable societal connections (Kriesi 2014, p.374). For these reasons, the claim that outsiders are more likely to oppose mainstream politics partly because social democratic or labor parties fail to fulfil their traditional role of protecting labor interests does not apply to Central and Eastern Europe because the party-voter linkages in these polities did not go through a solidification period, in the sense of Lipset and Rokkan's thesis (1967) after the fall of Communism. As such, the emergence of anti-establishment parties in Central and Eastern Europe is not as much related to representation, but to corruption and government performance (Kriesi 2014, p.374).

5.2. Data

The analysis is based on the European Social Survey Round 7 2014/2015 (ESS7), the EU Labor Force Survey (EU-LFS) and the Chapel Hill Expert Surveys (CHES 1999-2014, 2014). ESS7 (2014/2015) is an academically-driven survey administered in over 30 countries which monitors attitudes and values, containing a series of European social indicators. ESS7 provides the ideal set of individual level variables required by this thesis, namely questions which can together proxy for specific anti-political establishment attitudes, as well as socio-structural predictors and control variables for alternative explanations. To date, ESS 7 (2014/2015) is the only cross-national survey measuring attitudes against the political establishment⁸, which makes the analysis dependent on this survey and thus limited to a one-point in time cross-national comparison. Finally, the ESS7 (2014/2015) includes population, design and poststratification weights, which I account for according to the ESS documentation at hand⁹.

The EU-LFS is the largest European household sample survey providing quarterly and annual

⁸ The European Values Survey (combined with the World Values Survey) includes several questions which could successfully proxy for anti-political establishment attitudes, however I could not use it because those variables had no observations.

⁹ https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/docs/methodology/ESS_weighting_data_1.pdf (last accessed 5.04.2017).

data on labor participation and unemployment, which are necessary for computing occupational unemployment rates and generating the individual-level independent variable. Based on expert evaluations, the Chapel Hill Expert Surveys (1999-2014 and 2014) estimate party positioning on a large set of policy issues for national parties in several European countries, including the economic left-right and the cultural dimensions, and keep track of recent party formations and their categorization into party families. Both data files are used in order to generate the country-level independent variable.

The coding of the dependent variable, anti-establishment attitudes, is presented in detail in the factor analysis section. In the remainder of this section I only discuss the coding decisions behind the independent predictors, including control variables and alternative predictors.

5.2.1. Individual-level predictors

The independent variables are occupation-based outsidersness and status-based outsidersness, following the main demarcation line between the most common conceptualizations of labor market disadvantage, as suggested by Rovny and Rovny (2017). Status-based outsidersness is proxied by a dichotomous variable from the ESS7 survey, in which respondents with temporary and no work contracts are coded as outsiders, and respondents with unlimited work contracts as insiders.

The variable occupation-based outsidersness was computed according to the specifications given by Rehm (2009) and Rovny and Rovny (2017). First, I computed Rehm's (2009) formula¹⁰ of occupational unemployment rates by country for the year 2013¹¹ and for the main nine occupations according to the International Standard Classification of Occupation ISCO08, excluding the armed forces due to data unavailability. The values plugged in the formula come from the following annual EU-LFS series: Employment by occupation (*lfsa_egais*) and Previous occupation of the unemployed (*lfsa_ugpis*) (available in the Appendix).

Rehm's (2009) measurement of outsidersness is a binary variable, with the national average of occupational unemployment as the cut-off value between insiders and outsiders. However, this

¹⁰ Occupational unemployment rate = [Nr. of unemployed in occupation j / Nr. of unemployed in occupation j + Nr. of employed in occupation j] x 100.

¹¹ Since I hypothesize that respondents exposed to unemployment risk in their occupational line are more likely to endorse anti-establishment attitudes, I deem it appropriate to compute these risks for the year prior to ESS7(2014/2015) because I assume that there is a lagged effect of actual unemployment on respondents' perception of unemployment risk.

arbitrary cut-off value can be misleading for countries with very high unemployment rates and very high means, as well as for cases where occupations with unemployment rates just below the mean are relegated to the category of insiders, leading to considerable information loss. In order to improve the quality of the independent variable, I generate a continuous variable capturing the corresponding unemployment rate for each occupation, by country. In other words, each respondent of the ESS7 (2014/2015) survey is assigned an unemployment rate based on his occupation and country of origin, calculated with Rehm's formula. As Häuserman and Schwander (2013, p.252) emphasize, a continuous measure of occupation-based outsidersness is superior to a binary measure in that it accounts for the variability in unemployment rates across groups, which can ultimately be interpreted as "degrees of outsidersness"¹².

Each model contains a battery of socio-structural variables that are common for analyses of political attitudes: age¹³, gender, education¹⁴, income¹⁵, union-membership and migrant status (Marx 2014, p.142, Norris 2005 p.153). According to Häuserman and Schwander (2013), women and young people under 40 are more prone to labor market vulnerability, and thus expected to score higher on the anti-political establishment attitudes scale. By contrast, a higher income, a higher education level, as well as union membership stand for labor market advantage, and so are hypothesized to decrease one's likelihood of endorsing anti-establishment attitudes. In contrast, non-unionized workers are more likely to endorse anti-political establishment attitudes because, on one hand they face employment precariousness to a higher extent than insiders (King and Rueda 2008, p.279), and on the other they rely more heavily on economic evaluations when forming political opinions (Marx 2016, p.101). Finally, a dummy variable recording migrant status is necessary, since migrant workers may be overrepresented in temporary jobs, and thus in the outsiders group (Marx 2014, p.143).

Alternative explanations of anti-political establishment attitudes are accounted for by adding control variables deemed relevant by the adjacent populism and anti-partyism literatures. First, as Norris (2005, p. 161) argues, citizens' anti-establishment attitudes could be driven by support of populist radical right parties. The ESS7 (2014/2015) asks respondents to choose the political party

¹² In contrast to the measure of outsidersness employed in this thesis, Häusermann and Schwander's (2013, p.254) continuous measure is based on the difference between the workforce average and the group-specific rate of atypical and unemployment rate, with groups being defined based on occupation, sex and gender.

¹³ Recoded into a dummy variable: 0 "People under 40" 1 "People older than 40", because in most Western European countries a "substantial share of people in their 30s must still be counted as labor market entrants" Häusermann and Schwander (2013, p.253).

¹⁴ Education is measured on 7 levels: *Less than lower secondary, Lower secondary, Lower tier upper secondary, Upper tier upper secondary, Advanced vocational, Lower tertiary, Higher tertiary.*

¹⁵ Income is measured on 10 deciles.

they feel particularly close to from a closed list of both mainstream and niche parties in each country. In order to measure radical right support, I generated a dummy variable for every respondent reporting they were feeling close to any radical right party. The radical right parties were selected based on the CHES (1999-2014) dataset, for the year 2014 (see Appendix).

Second, as Marx (2014) suggests, post-materialist value orientations may have an impact on party choice and political preferences, and therefore can be hypothesized to influence anti-political establishment attitudes. I have chosen three variables asking respondents if a) a country's cultural life is undermined or enriched by immigrants, b) if gays and lesbians should be free to live as they wish, and c) if the European unification should go further or has gone too far. Disagreement with the first two statements, as well as answering that the EU project has gone too far, may tap into radical right attitudes and thus are expected to increase a respondent's score on the anti-establishment attitudes scale. The three questions are representative of the new transformed post-materialist conflict dimensions (Häusermann and Kriesi 2015), although they may also capture a salience component, whose indirect effect I am unable to isolate in this analysis and which should be considered when interpreting the coefficients of these three variables in the regression results.

Other potential sources of anti-establishment attitudes accounted for are dissatisfaction with the national government and political mistrust which can stem either from a dose of "normal" criticism (Loxbo 2014, Oskarson and Demker 2013), or from disappointment that the preferred party is not in government (Norris 2005). Additionally, I include a measure of satisfaction with the economy in order to control away the effects of sociotropic evaluations of the economy on political attitudes (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2007).

5.2.2. Country-level predictors

The ideological distance between the two-main left and right parties in each of the countries included in the analysis is the difference of the estimated party positions on the economic left-right, GALTAN and immigration policy dimensions. The two-main left and right parties were identified by their vote share in the national election most prior to 2014 in CHES (1999-2014) and the policy positions for each party were identified in the CHES (2014)¹⁶. In the CHES datafiles parties' policy positions take on non-integer values ranging from 0 (extreme left) to 10 (extreme right).

¹⁶ The reason for not using only CHES (1999-2014) is that data for Switzerland is available only in CHES (2014). Information about the two Swiss biggest parties in 2014 was obtained from: <https://www.parlament.ch/de/%C3%BCber-das-parlament/archiv/archiv-fraktionen> (last accessed 4.26.2017).

Consequently, party distance variables range from either 0 (when the distance between parties is non-existent) to 10 (when the distance is absolute).

Because I am interested in the effect of narrower party positions, I reversed the sense of the variables from min->max, to max->min, and rescaled them so that max = 0 (absolute divergence) and min = 1 (absolute convergence), which simplifies the interpretation of the interaction effects. Each party distance variable can take on any (non-integer) value between 0 and 1, which makes it possible to treat them as continuous predictors. Figure 3 displays the policy dimensions included in the analysis with their corresponding party distance variable.

Figure 3. Ideological distance between the two-main left-right parties and corresponding variables.	
pid_LRecon	Ideological distance on the general economic left-right dimension.
pid_GALTAN	Ideological distance on the GAL/TAN dimension ¹⁷ .

5.3. Factor Analysis

In line with more recent research on political attitudes and values (Elchardus and Spruyt 2016, Akkerman et al. 2014, Ansolabehere et al. 2008), I construct a scale of anti-establishment attitudes by employing factor analysis, a method often used in psychology and education sciences to capture dimensions or predispositions that are directly unobservable e.g., intelligence, abilities, happiness. As Ansolabehere et al. (2008) emphasized, constructing a scale with factor analysis is a far better method of capturing political opinions than the commonly employed individual survey items because it reduces the unavoidable measurement error that is characteristic to survey data¹⁸.

Therefore, anti-establishment attitudes are theorized in this thesis as a latent predisposition, unobservable, but measurable as a linear composite of the indicators selected from the ESS 7 (Salkind 2010). The first step is then to investigate whether the observable indicators are endogenously determined by an underlying latent construct tapping specific anti-political establishment attitudes. However, a potential measurement caveat is related to the concept of

¹⁷ Green/Alternative/Libertarian–Traditional/Authoritarian/Nationalist

¹⁸ More precisely, the measurement error is reduced at a rate equal to $1/k$, where k is the number of items included in the scale.

political trust, which is expected to highly correlate with anti-political establishment attitudes, and yet to be independent from it, as suggested by Norris (2005) or Oskarson and Demker (2015). Hence, construct validity depends on empirically distinguishing between anti-political establishment attitudes and its correlates such as political distrust.

Fortunately, the ESS7 (2014/2015) provides a wide array of variables capturing different concepts of political attitudes, including both political trust and anti-establishment feelings (Figure 4). Using confirmatory factor analysis, I examine if the covariance structure of these manifest variables is determined by different but correlated latent factors, and then extract the factor measuring only specific anti-political establishment attitudes for further hypothesis testing.

Figure 4. Recoded variables tapping specific anti-political establishment attitudes (1-4) and political trust (5-6), followed by their value labels.	
xnoinflgov	<i>Political system does not allow people to have a say in what the government does.</i>
xnoinflpol	<i>Political system does not allow people like you to have an influence on politics.</i>
xpolitnocare	<i>Politicians don't care what people like you think.</i>
xhardpartpol	<i>How hard is it for you to take part in politics?</i>
xnotrustparties	<i>No confidence in political parties.</i>
xnotrustpolit	<i>No trust in politicians.</i>
All items have been formulated in reverse of the original statement.	

Factor analysis refers to a set of statistical methods employed to establish the number of distinct constructs accounting for the pattern of correlations among observable variables¹⁹ in a given dataset (Fabrigar and Wegener 2011, p.4). When the number of common factors and the specific measures each common factor is supposed to determine are defined a priori by the researcher, then Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) is appropriate (Fabrigar and Wegener 2011, Salkind 2010, Harrington 2008). Factor analysis partitions the observed variance of a manifest variable into a common variance, accounted for by the common factor (communality), and a unique variance, unaccounted for by the common factor, and consisting of a specific variance and an error variance (Fabrigar and Wegener 2011, p.7). Put differently, CFA provides information about the structure of correlations among manifest variables, i.e. common factors, as well as estimates of the influence of each common factor exerted on each of the observed variable, i.e. factor loadings, and

¹⁹ I employ the terms manifest variables, observable variables and indicators interchangeably.

uniqueness scores for each item (Fabrigar and Wegener 2011, p.4). Therefore, CFA is particularly useful for construct validation and for construct development, such as a scale of anti-political establishment attitudes.

Regarding data characteristics, all indicator variables have a high number of categories (0 to 10) and each has a value of 0 recording when a respondent does not agree at all with the statement, which allows for the data to be treated as interval, i.e., the distance between categories to be considered equal (Harrington 2010). However, it is possible to compute factor analysis for binary, continuous and ordinal data by obtaining factor solutions from a polychoric correlation matrix, relaxing the continuous and multivariate assumption imposed by the default Pearson's correlation matrix²⁰. According to Holgado-Tello et al. (2010, p.165), factor analysis of ordinal data based on polychoric correlations reproduces the measurement model better and results in more robust factors. Furthermore, the number of non-missing observations is considerably large (18974), thus alleviating any sample-size concerns (Herrington 2010).

The first factor analysis yields one factor with an eigenvalue of 3.41, accounting for 0.98 of the variance and all variables have a uniqueness score lower than 0.42, except for the variable measuring how easy it is to participate in politics *xhardpartpol*. For simpler structure, I implement two commonly employed rotation solutions (Harrington 2010): oblique/ *varimax* and orthogonal/*promax*. After the varimax rotation, the variable loadings on each factor suggest that the first factor mainly determines the variables related to anti-political establishment attitudes, while the second factor underlies variables measuring political trust. This finding strengthens the argument for analytical differentiation between the concepts of political trust and anti-political establishment attitudes.

Nevertheless, even if conceptually distinct, it does make sense to assume that anti-political establishment attitudes and political distrust correlate with one another. This can be easily checked with the *promax* option and the *estat common* matrix, yielding a correlation coefficient of .67 between the two factors. The variables *xnoinflgov*, *xnoinflpol*, *xpolitnocare* and *xhardpartpol* load higher than the generally accepted lower bound of .45 (Akkerman et al. 2014, p.1332) on the first factor, with eigenvalue 3.41, and accounting for 0.84 of the total variance. Next, I specify the CFA model by including only the anti-establishment items (rotation: *varimax*) and retain the factor with the largest eigenvalue (2.15). The factor loadings for each item, the eigenvalue of the retained factor and scale reliability index are displayed in Figure 5.

²⁰ www.stats.idre.ucla.edu/stata/faq (last accessed 6.04.2017).

Figure 5: Scale properties of items tapping anti-political establishment attitudes of ESS7 respondents.		
Anti-political establishment attitudes Cronbach's alpha=0.83 Eigenvalue=2.15 Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy=0.79 Factor Determinacy Coefficient=0.902 ²¹	Factor Loading²²	Uniqueness
<i>Political system does not allow people to have a say in what government does.</i>	0.76	0.42
<i>Political system does not allow people like you to have an influence on politics.</i>	0.83	0.32
<i>Politicians do not care what people like you think.</i>	0.73	0.39
<i>It is hard for you personally to participate in politics.</i>	0.60	0.64
chi2(6) =3.0e+04, p>chi2=0.0000		

Based on the retained factor solution (Figure 5), I generate three factor score estimates based on three different methods that will serve as proxies for latent variables in the subsequent analysis, representing the *scores that would have been observed for a person if it had been possible to measure the factor directly* (Brown 2015, p.31). The literature on factor analysis generally distinguishes between coarse and refined methods for factor score computation (DiStefano et al. 2009, Grice 2001). Coarse factor estimates are obtained by averaging the sum of the factor indicators, and standardization and weighting are also common practices (DiStefano et al. 2009). In contrast, refined factor scores are linear combinations of the observed indicators, and their computation requires complex statistical procedures that account for both the shared variance between the items and the common factor, as well as the error term variance that is unique to each item and unmeasurable (DiStefano et al. 2009).

While coarse factor scores are more easily interpretable and less dependent on the estimation sample, refined factor scores are considered in the factor analysis literature superior estimates of the underlying latent construct, yielding unbiased and highly correlated estimates of the true factor score (Brown 2015, Salkind 2010, DiStefano et al. 2009, Grice 2001). Furthermore, refined factor estimates can be computed using ordinary least squares regression which predicts the location of each respondent on the underlying factor by standardizing and weighing the observed indicators by

²¹Obtained after installing the command FSDDET in Stata 14.2 (Author: Mehmet Mehmetoglu, Norwegian University of Science and Technology).

²²After oblique rotation.


their regression coefficients, also accounting for the correlation among observed variables (DiStefano et al.2009). Another common factor prediction method is Bartlett's approach which is similar to the multivariate OLS approach described above, but produces unbiased estimates of the true factor scores by using maximum likelihood estimation (DiStefano et al. 2009). Nevertheless, the choice of estimation method unavoidably involves a trade-off between validity and correlational accuracy (Salkind 2010, DiStefano et al. 2009, Grice 2001). Therefore, this thesis employs three different factor score estimates as robustness checks for subsequent regression models.

Based on Figure 5, I generate a coarse factor estimate equal to the sum of each indicator weighted by its factor score coefficient obtained with an OLS regression. The literature on factor analysis considers this coarse factor estimation procedure to be superior to other methods such as averaged sums or weighting by factor-loadings, insofar as it yields higher levels of validity and correlational accuracy (Salkind 2010, Grice 2001). Then I generate two refined factor scores using OLS regression, which maximizes validity, and the Bartlett approach, which maximizes correlational accuracy (gives unbiased estimates). Due to space constraints, I only present results obtained with the OLS factor score as the dependent variable, but replicated results with the other two coarse and refined scores are available in the Appendix.

Figure 6 shows the total and cross-country distribution of the factor score, anti-establishment attitudes, which will serve as the dependent variable in the subsequent analysis. This distribution can be compared to that of the coarse factor score (Figure 6a) and to the Bartlett score (Figure 6b). From Figure 6 one can see that the values of the factor score are distributed continuously with values closer to 10 representing higher scores on the anti-political establishment scale²³.

²³ The dependent variable takes on positive non-integer values ranging from 0 to 10.77105; N=20,242; Missing values=1,072.

Figure 6. Histograms of refined factor score (OLS method) proxying for anti-establishment attitudes by country.



From the histogram labeled “Total” in the right downward corner of Figure 6 one can see that the factor score values tend to cluster towards the right of the x-axis, with the mean at 6.4, showing a general tendency towards anti-establishment attitudes among respondents – visible in the relatively high intercepts in the subsequent regression models. There is also interesting variation at the country level. In Austria, France, Germany, Ireland and the United Kingdom the distributions of the factor score are negatively-skewed, showing a tendency towards anti-establishment attitudes, as compared to Sweden, Finland, the Netherlands, Denmark or Switzerland. This indicates unobserved country-level heterogeneity, which is of course to be expected even for this small sample of Western industrialized democracies, with different institutional patterns, political systems, welfare regimes and economies. Additionally, the presence of outliers towards the end of the x-axis may raise concerns that the variable is not normally distributed and thus inappropriate for linear regression. However, for large samples ($N=20,242$), parameter estimation would still be valid and the distribution of the t statistic would approximate correctly even without the normality assumption holding (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2011, p.17).

6. Testing Hypothesis 1: Are labor market outsiders more likely to endorse anti-establishment attitudes?

The continuous nature of the refined factor score proxying for anti-establishment attitudes suggests that linear regression is an appropriate method for testing hypothesis 1. As indicated by Figure 6, the data appears to be clustered by country and hence the error terms may be correlated with one another at the country level, which would violate the independence assumption of ordinary least square regression and lead to underestimated standard errors and overestimated test statistics, increasing the possibility to falsely reject the null hypothesis (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2011). Multilevel analysis, modeling both individual and country-level effects, would be the ideal option for cross-country data if the number of clusters were higher. Although some scholars still approve the use of multilevel analysis when the number of level-2 groups is as low as 10 (e.g., Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2011, p.159), recent research has demonstrated that multilevel models based on maximum likelihood estimation underestimates standard errors and causes the same Type-1 problem as ordinary regression even with 20 or more level-2 clusters (Stegmueller 2013, p.749). However, as Huang (2016, p.178) points out, *not every clustered dataset requires multilevel modeling*. Instead, a design-based approach which accounts for sampling design features such as clustering and stratification by computing standard errors using the TS linearization variance estimation method is more desirable (Huang 2016, p.179, Hahs-Vaughn et al. 2011). In addition, an ordinary least square regression with dummies for clusters can be used to keep group-level heterogeneity constant (Huang 2016).

A design-based approach can easily be implemented in Stata 14.2 by adjusting the dataset for survey analysis and using the prefix *svy* before regression commands. I first generate a new weight variable equal to the product of the design and population weight variables²⁴ available in ESS 7 (2014), as recommended in the ESS 7 Data weighting guide (2014) for cross-country analyses. Then I declare the new weight as a probability weight in the *svyset* command in Stata 14.2, together with the primary sampling unit (*idno*) and strata (*country*)²⁵. The standard errors returned by regression commands prefixed by *svy* are computed with TS linearization methods, as recommended by Huang (2016).

Hypothesis 1 is first tested with the status-based operationalization of labor market

²⁴ Design weights correct for sample selection bias (individuals have different probabilities of being selected into the sample) and population size weights correct for the variance in the population size across countries, ensuring that each country is represented in proportion to its population size (ESS 7 Documentation 2014).

²⁵ ESS 7 (2014) Data Protocol.

disadvantage, which is a dummy variable recording the type of employment contract (Model 1), as well as with the occupation-based outsidersness (Model 2). Each model includes socio-demographic characteristics, and additional control variables for alternative explanations of anti-establishment attitudes are subsequently included in Models 2a and 2b. Model 3 keeps country effects constant. The results are presented in Table 1. For robustness checks, Table 1a in the Appendix replicates Model 3 with the coarse factor score and the Bartlett score as dependent variables (Models 3a and 3b).

Table 1. Ordinary Least Square Regressions with Linearized Standard Errors and Probability Weights Added					
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 2a	Model 2b	Model 3
Scores for anti-political establishment attitudes (refined factor score)					
Status-based Outsidersness (contract type)	-0.10 (0.07)				
Occupation-based outsidersness (occupational unemployment risk)		0.06*** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)	0.03** (0.01)
Female	0.21*** (0.05)	0.17*** (0.05)	0.12** (0.05)	0.13*** (0.05)	0.13*** (0.05)
Age (younger than 40)	-0.02 (0.06)	-0.03 (0.05)			
Age (continuous)		0.01** (0.00)	0.02*** (0.00)	0.01*** (0.00)	0.01*** (0.00)
Education (EISCED)					
Lower secondary (Base category: Less than lower secondary)	-0.51*** (0.11)	-0.50*** (0.11)	-0.07 (0.09)	-0.02 (0.09)	-0.06 (0.09)
Lower tier upper secondary	-0.30** (0.10)	-0.27** (0.10)	0.14 (0.08)	0.03 (0.07)	-0.07 (0.08)
Upper tier upper secondary	-0.73*** (0.12)	-0.65*** (0.11)	-0.36*** (0.09)	-0.30*** (0.08)	-0.30*** (0.08)
Advanced vocational	-0.77*** (0.11)	-0.65*** (0.10)	-0.13 (0.09)	-0.21** (0.08)	-0.28*** (0.08)
Lower tertiary	-1.28*** (0.12)	-1.17*** (0.11)	-0.46*** (0.10)	-0.44*** (0.09)	-0.46*** (0.09)
Higher tertiary	-1.41*** (0.12)	-1.24*** (0.11)	-0.57*** (0.10)	-0.60*** (0.09)	-0.65*** (0.09)
Income in deciles					


2d Income decile (Base category: 1st Income decile)	0.13 (0.12)	0.03 (0.11)	0.06 (0.10)	0.11 (0.09)	0.10 (0.09)
3d Income decile	-0.05 (0.12)	-0.09 (0.11)	0.14 (0.10)	0.11 (0.09)	0.09 (0.09)
4th Income decile	-0.13 (0.12)	-0.15 (0.12)	0.05 (0.10)	0.04 (0.09)	0.04 (0.09)
5th Income decile	-0.24 (0.12)	-0.24* (0.12)	-0.01 (0.10)	-0.05 (0.09)	-0.05 (0.09)
6th Income decile	-0.25* (0.12)	-0.24* (0.12)	0.02 (0.10)	0.02 (0.09)	0.02 (0.09)
7th Income decile	-0.37** (0.12)	-0.38*** (0.11)	-0.06 (0.10)	-0.10 (0.09)	-0.09 (0.09)
8th Income decile	-0.41*** (0.12)	-0.42*** (0.12)	-0.04 (0.10)	-0.10 (0.09)	-0.11 (0.09)
9th Income decile	-0.63*** (0.13)	-0.60*** (0.12)	-0.19 (0.10)	-0.14 (0.09)	-0.16 (0.09)
10th decile	-0.89*** (0.13)	-0.80*** (0.12)	-0.27** (0.10)	-0.26** (0.09)	-0.27** (0.09)
Migrant status	-0.22* (0.09)	-0.23** (0.08)	0.10 (0.07)	0.19** (0.06)	0.21** (0.06)
Non-union membership	0.41*** (0.06)	0.43*** (0.06)	0.32*** (0.05)	0.17*** (0.04)	0.10* (0.05)
Feeling close to a radical right party	0.38*** (0.09)	0.38*** (0.09)	-0.11 (0.08)		
Disagreement: Gays and lesbians free to live life as they wish			0.06 (0.04)		
Country's cultural life undermined by immigration			0.28*** (0.03)	0.19*** (0.02)	0.20*** (0.02)
EU unification already gone too far			0.26*** (0.03)	0.15*** (0.02)	0.17** (0.02)*
Dissatisfaction with the national government			0.87*** (0.03)	0.36*** (0.03)	0.35*** (0.03)
Dissatisfaction with the national economy			0.32*** (0.03)	0.18*** (0.03)	0.21*** (0.03)

Distrust in political parties				0.46*** (0.01)	0.44*** (0.01)
Country fixed effects	No	No	No	No	Yes
Constant	7.40*** (0.13)	7.09*** (0.13)	3.32*** (0.14)	2.25*** (0.13)	2.60*** (0.15)
Observations	14133	15849	15080	15017	15017
R²	0.095	0.092	0.355	0.494	0.505
Standard errors in parentheses * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$					

6.1. Results

From Model 1 it follows that status-based labor market disadvantage has no significant effect of anti-establishment attitudes, whereas Models 2, 2a, 2b and 3 show that occupation-based outsidership has a positive and statistically significant effect on the outcome variable. While the size of the estimated coefficient decreases from 0.06 to 0.03 as more predictors are added to the equation, the corresponding p-values are consistently below 0.01. In Model 3, when all demographic characteristics, alternative explanations, and country effects are controlled for, a one unit increase in occupational unemployment risk (occupation-outsiderness) is associated with a 0.03 increase in the anti-establishment score, with certainty estimated between 0.01 and 0.5. The returned R-squared is 0.50, which indicates that Model 3 with the entire set of predictors and country fixed effects accounts for roughly half of the variation in anti-establishment attitudes.

Figure 7. Predicted probability of endorsing anti-establishment attitudes (fitted after Model 3)



The fact that the two variables intended to measure labor market outsidership do not have the same expected effects corroborates previous research emphasizing the importance of operationalization in the insider-outsider literature (Rovny and Rovny 2017, Schwander and Häusermann 2013). Particularly, Schwander and Häusermann (2013, p.251) argue that status-based operationalizations are less suitable when investigating political behavior, given that employment-status and type of contract are too ephemeral conditions to have a stable impact on political

behavior and preferences. From this perspective, an insignificant effect of status-based outsidersness on anti-political establishment attitudes could suggest that individuals do not form their opinions towards the political establishment based on their employment contracts. By contrast, the significant effect of occupation-defined outsidersness indicate that voters' evaluations of the political system are partly determined by their relative position in the labor market and the unemployment risk associated with their occupational sector. Relative to the economic voting literature, this finding can be interpreted as evidence for the sociotropic voting rule.

Across all models 1-3, the effects of socio-demographic predictors are, in general, as expected: women are significantly more likely to oppose the political system as compared to men, which is not surprising considering that women are more often than men in a disadvantaged labor market position (Häusermann and Schwander 2013). Moving from a lower to a higher educational category, as well as from a lower to a higher income decile gradually decreases the likelihood of endorsing anti-establishment attitudes, holding all other variables constant. Moreover, respondents who do not belong to a union are significantly more likely to score high on the outcome variable, a plausible consequence of lower social benefits and lower unemployment protection associated with non-unionized jobs (Marx 2014). Likewise, respondents born outside the country of residence are significantly more likely to oppose the political system, which could be an effect of migrants being overrepresented in temporary jobs (Marx 2014), hence with higher unemployment risks. Finally, contrary to previous expectations the effect of age truncated at the cut value of 40 years is not significant, yet replacing the dichotomous variable with a continuous age variable in Model 2b yields a significant and positive effect of age, suggesting that older people are more likely to endorse anti-establishment attitudes.

Testing for alternative explanations reveals several surprising findings: first, feeling close to a populist radical right party has no significant effect on anti-establishment attitudes once controls for values and satisfaction with the government and the economy are included. Second, disagreement with the statement that lesbian and gay persons should be free to live as they want has no significant effect on the outcome variable either. However, the variables measuring negative attitudes towards immigration and EU integration both have significant and positive effects on the dependent variable, corroborating previous research on the importance of value orientation for political behavior (Karlsen and Aardal 2016, Leimgrubber 2011, Ansolabehere et al. 2008).

The significant effect of dissatisfaction with the economy suggests the relevance of sociotropic economic evaluations for political attitudes (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2007), whereas

the significant effect of dissatisfaction with the government, can be interpreted either as an accountability effect (citizens are unsatisfied with the poor performance of the government) or a partisanship effect (citizens are critical of the new government because it excludes their preferred party from power).

Finally, the variable measuring distrust in political parties is highly significant, indicating that, a one unit increase in distrust is associated with a 0.44 increase in anti-establishment attitudes, holding all other predictors constant. The large coefficient size is not surprising, since the variables distrust in parties and anti-establishment attitudes are highly correlated and intuitively related. Nevertheless, as the factor analysis has shown, the two indicators do not load on the same factor score, nor are they perfectly correlated. As such, political distrust appears to be a necessary, but not sufficient condition for anti-establishment attitudes. To conclude, even after accounting for socio-demographic characteristics and alternative explanations, occupational unemployment risk still has a significant and positive effect, suggesting that labor market outsiders are more likely to endorse anti-establishment attitudes. Based on these grounds, hypothesis 1 is confirmed.

In the remainder of this section I conduct a series of robustness checks for Model 3 (including the whole set of predictors plus country fixed effects). A residuals plot, as well as a quantile normality plot for residuals show that residuals are approximately normally distributed, satisfying the assumptions of ordinary least square regression (Figures A, B in the Appendix). The variance inflation factors for the independent variables in the equation indicate no signs of multicollinearity between predictors (mean VIF = 2.64). Finally, Models 1 and 3 return linearized standard errors which are robust to heteroscedasticity i.e., non-constant error variance, which is typical for survey data due to unequal sampling probability. However, in addition to being unequally distributed, the error terms may also be clustered within countries. Clustering standard errors relaxes the independence assumption²⁶, yet the method is also sensitive to the number of clusters, significantly increasing the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis when the number of groups is below 50 (Cameron and Miller 2014, p.341). For comparison purposes, I rerun Model 3 with clustered standard errors (at the country level) but recommend that the reader should keep in mind that the model is not appropriate for such a small number of clusters (Model 3c). Moreover, the model is unable to jointly test the significance of the entire set of regression coefficients, since it runs out of degrees of freedom (the number of clusters is significantly smaller than the number of predictors). In Model 3c the coefficient of occupation-outsiderness is still statistically significant at the $p=0.01$

²⁶ Williams, R. (2015). Heteroscedasticity. University of Notre Dame. Available from: <https://www3.nd.edu/~rwilliam/stats2/l25.pdf> (last accessed 13.05.2017).

(see Table 1a in the Appendix).

7. Testing Hypothesis 2: Are labor market outsiders more likely to endorse anti-establishment attitudes as the distance between the two largest Left and Right parties decreases?

I test hypothesis 2 by including two interaction items of occupation outsidersness with party distance on the GALTAN and economic dimensions into the full equation model with predictors and country fixed effects (Model 4 below). I remind the reader that I recoded the party distance variables so that a higher value means a smaller distance that is, more convergence. For robustness checks I run Model 4 with the Bartlett factor and the coarse factor as dependent variables (see Models 4a and 4b, Table 2).

Table 2. Linear Regression with Linearized Standard Errors and Probability Weights			
	Scores for anti-establishment attitudes		
	Model 4	Model 4a	Model 4b
	Refined factor score (OLS method)	Refined factor score (Bartlett method)	Coarse factor score (indicators weighted by factor score coefficients)
Occupation-based outsidersness (occupational unemployment risk)	-0.09 (0.06)	-0.12 (0.07)	-0.09 (0.05)
Outsidersness*Convergence GALTAN	0.12* (0.06)	0.16* (0.07)	0.12* (0.06)
Outsidersness* Convergence Economic Left-Right	0.04 (0.03)	0.05 (0.04)	0.04 (0.03)
Country's cultural life undermined by immigration	0.20*** (0.06)	0.24*** (0.03)	0.20*** (0.02)
EU unification has already gone too far	0.16*** (0.02)	0.20*** (0.03)	0.17*** (0.02)
Dissatisfaction with the national government	0.35*** (0.03)	0.43*** (0.04)	0.35*** (0.03)
Dissatisfaction with the national economy	0.20*** (0.03)	0.26*** (0.04)	0.21*** (0.03)
Distrust in political parties	0.44*** (0.01)	0.54*** (0.01)	0.45*** (0.01)

Same socio-demographic as in Model 3 characteristics included	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country fixed effects included	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	2.72*** (0.16)	3.33*** (0.20)	2.73*** (0.16)
Observations	15017	15017	15017
R^2	0.5	0.504	0.504
Standard errors in parentheses * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$			
Tables displaying coefficients and standard errors for the full set of socio-demographic predictors and countries are available from the author on request.			

7.2. Results


The interaction between unemployment risk and convergence on the economic dimension is insignificant regardless of factor score estimation, yet the interaction between unemployment risk and convergence on the GALTAN dimension is positive and significant at $p < 0.05$. These results are consistent across all three factor estimation methods (Table 2). The effect of the interaction item suggests a conditional relationship between occupation-based outsidership and party convergence on the cultural dimension. In other words, when party convergence is 0, a one unit increase in occupational unemployment risk is associated with a 0.12 increase on the anti-establishment attitudes scale. Alternatively, for respondents with 0 occupational unemployment risk, a 1 unit increase in party convergence is associated with a 0.12 increase on the anti-establishment attitudes scale.

Figure 8 displays the effect of unemployment risk on anti-establishment attitudes, conditional on party convergence. As expected, one can observe a gradual increase in predicted anti-establishment attitudes as party convergence scores get closer to 1. Moreover, Denmark, Sweden and Finland are the countries where the convergence score on GALTAN is closest to 1, enhancing the effect of labor market outsidership on opposition to the political establishment. This finding corroborates previous research on the effect of party competition on opportunity structures for radical right parties. For example, Spies and Franzman (2011) find that mainstream party convergence on the cultural dimension has a significant effect on the electoral success of radical right parties, whereas the effect of convergence on the economic dimension is insignificant.

Likewise, Loxbo (2014) finds a significant and positive effect of Swedish citizens' perceived convergence between mainstream parties with regard to immigration policy on the electoral success of the radical right party, Sweden Democrats.

At the opposite pole is Switzerland, where the mainstream parties are extremely polarized on the cultural dimension, seemingly reversing the effect of labor market disadvantage on anti-establishment attitudes. This finding corroborates Lupu's (2014) argument that polarization increases the social identity effects of political parties. In addition, Switzerland is a special case, with its largest right party (Swiss People's Party) taking on more extreme right positions on the cultural dimension in comparison to the other Swiss parties (Thompson 2014, p.242). In fact, Spies and Franzmann (2011, p.1051) argue that the Swiss People's Party is difficult to separate from the extreme radical right party itself. Therefore, the distance between the Swiss People's party and the largest social democratic party may stimulate social identity effects especially among labor market outsiders, who are more likely to endorse anti-immigration and pro-nationalist rhetoric (Ortega and Polavieja 2012, O'Rourke and Sinnott 2006, Mayda 2006).

Figure8. Predicted scores for anti-establishment attitudes when occupation outsidersness interacts with party convergence on GALTAN. The dependent variable is the refined factor score computed with OLS method.



Finally, I respecify Model 4 by clustering the standard errors at the country level, in order to compare the results with the ones in Models 4a-4c obtained by survey setting the data (Model 4d in Table 2b, Appendix). The new model with clustered standard errors yields a positive, but statistically insignificant effect of the interaction between outsidersness and party convergence on GALTAN, as the p-value increases slightly over the accepted level of $p=0.05$. Nevertheless, given the low number of clusters, it is doubtful that such a model is appropriate in the first place (Cameron and Miller 2014). In addition, the clustered errors model is not able to test all coefficients at ones since the number of predictors relative to the number of countries causes the model to run out of degrees of freedom. At the same time, the fixed effects model prefixed by the *svy* command already accounts for clustering at the country level and unequal error variance (Huang 2016). Consequently, I only present the results from the clustered errors model for transparency purposes, and conclude that Model 4 provides qualified support for Hypothesis 2b.

8. Discussion

This thesis provides qualified support for the exclusion hypothesis in the insider-outsider divide literature. As Rueda (2005) suggested in his influential paper on insider-outsider politics in advanced industrial democracies, labor market outsiders are indeed more likely to oppose mainstream politics. However, the hypothesis does not hold when labor market disadvantage is operationalized as Rueda had originally intended, namely as fixed-term or temporary contracts (2005, p.63). One possible explanation is the argument that temporary employment is too ephemeral an economic condition to have an impact on workers' political preferences (Häusermann and Schwander 2013), although as Marx (2016, p.104) points out, only a fraction of the workforce actually transitions into stable employment. From this perspective, current employment status may be able to predict political preferences, yet its effect may be mediated by workers' prospects for upward mobility (Marx 2016), and implicitly by education and skills. In other words, if workers do not expect their employment status to improve in time, then they may turn against the political establishment. In a similar vein, workers with higher education and skills may consider their fixed-term contract to be only a temporary step before stable employment, and have no job-status related reason to turn against the political establishment.

Rather than limited employment contracts, occupational unemployment risk is arguably a more reliable predictor of political preferences and attitudes, since individuals are nested in specific social and occupational groups, which shape political preferences and expectations about future

labor market risks (Häusermann and Schwander 2013, Kitschelt and Rehm 2014, Rehm 2011, 2009). Accordingly, this thesis has demonstrated that labor market disadvantage, defined as occupational unemployment risk, is indeed associated with anti-political establishment attitudes, thus providing qualified support for the exclusion hypothesis. This occupation-based operationalization resembles the one created by Häusermann and Schwander (2013) in that it is continuous and can be interpreted as “degrees of outsidersness”. At the same time, in contrast to employment contracts, occupational unemployment risk is not directly related to specific, legally defined benefits, which mark the line between insiders and outsiders. While anyone may lose their job at some point throughout their lives, not everyone falls on the same social security net, and outsiders fall harder than insiders. Drawing on labor market segmentation theory, a more accurate definition of outsidersness must include two additional dimensions that capture the extent of social protection, but also the chances of employment recovery and upward mobility individuals can expect after losing their job (see Dancygier and Walter 2015). For this reason, it is necessary to account for institutional differences when explaining the micro-foundations of labor market outsiders’ political behavior. Future research should further examine how this relationship varies by the type of welfare regime, in addition to labor market policy reforms (Rueda 2005).

Regarding the demand-side of the exclusion hypothesis, this thesis finds qualified support only for the hypothesis that party convergence on the cultural dimension enhances outsiders’ anti-establishment attitudes. Contrary to previous theoretical expectations, labor market outsiders are not more likely to turn against mainstream politics when parties converge on the economic dimension. While previous research on radical right voting reached similar conclusions (Loxbo 2014, Spies and Franzmann 2011, Arzheimer and Carter 2006), this finding is nevertheless puzzling. As scholars have argued, both left and right parties tended to promote pro-insider labor market reforms, at the expense of outsiders (e.g., Palier and Thelen 2010, Rueda 2005), so why are outsiders not responding to parties misrepresenting their economic interests? One possible explanation is that party convergence on the economic left-right dimension, associated with a decline in class voting, decreased the salience of economic issues (Loxbo 2014, Evans and Tilley 2012). Moreover, economic left-right depolarization may moderate the effect of cultural depolarization by creating an opportunity structure for radical right parties to bring non-economic issues such as immigration or globalization in the public’s attention (Spies and Franzmann 2011). Therefore, as Spies and Franzmann (2011, p.1061) emphasize, future research should investigate the interaction of both ideological dimensions to understand the role party competition plays in structuring political behavior.

Going back to the significant interaction between party convergence on the cultural dimension and occupational unemployment risk, this finding corroborates previous research stressing the relevance of party competition on non-economic issues (Loxbo 2014, Spies and Franzmann 2011, Meguid 2008, Ignazi 1993) and is supported by theories of labor market competition. Accordingly, respondents with low levels of human capitals i.e., education and skills, are more likely to oppose immigration, which they perceive as a threat to their employment status (Ortega and Polavieja 2012, O'Rourke and Sinnott 2006, Mayda 2006). Furthermore, low human capital is also associated with skill specificity i.e., non-portable skills across occupations, and therefore with higher risks of unemployment or income loss (Iversen and Soskice's 2001). Moreover, exposure to job offshorability and internationalization of labor competition with foreign born citizens, prompt workers with low skills to oppose immigration and economic opening (Dancygier and Walter 2015). From this perspective, workers in occupations with higher unemployment may be more likely to endorse anti-establishment attitudes when the distance between mainstream parties on GALTAN issues is low, leaving room for radical right parties to raise the salience of cultural issues, and this effect appears to be mediated by human capital and social insurance institutions (Dancygier and Walter 2015).

Another potential avenue for future research is to replicate this thesis with better data. Ideally, I would study the relationship between labor market disadvantage and anti-establishment attitudes with panel data, which allows to track the effect of the independent variable over time, and with a bigger number of countries, to ensure external validity beyond the group of European advanced democracies. In addition, although respondents have been found able to accurately detect polarization in the party system (Lupu 2014), an even more efficient way to examine the effect of party distance on attitudes would have been to operationalize the variable as respondents' perceptions of polarization, following Loxbo's (2014) study of party convergence and electoral support for Sweden Democrats. Rather than relying on expert evaluations of party distance, measuring party polarization directly at the individual level alleviates concerns of ecological fallacy. Therefore, a cross-sectional survey with repeated rounds with an extended set of questions tapping both into feelings about the political establishment, and assessing voters' perceptions of party policy positions would enhance both the internal and external validity of this analysis.

These shortcomings notwithstanding, this thesis has shown that the insider-outsider divide can function as a common framework integrating both demand- and supply-side explanations of political attitudes. Moreover, by drawing on the literatures on populism and radical right party support, this thesis has reconfirmed the relevance of more obvious explanations of anti-

establishment attitudes. Particularly, political values expressed as agreement with the statements that a country's culture is undermined by immigration, and the European integration has gone too far, seem to have a large and positive effect on anti-establishment attitudes, suggesting that value orientations play an important role in citizens' evaluations of mainstream politics. These results also indirectly corroborate Karlsen and Aardal's (2016) recent paper in which values structure political behavior by determining the set of acceptable party alternatives a voter can choose from. From this perspective, it appears that extreme value orientations could be associated with an empty set of (mainstream) party choices, at least from the mainstream political menu, although future research should establish to what extent this effect is inflated by issue salience.

Furthermore, the high effect of dissatisfaction with the economy on anti-establishment attitudes suggests that voters base their evaluations of the political system on sociotropic rules, which confirms previous research in political economy (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2007). Another interesting finding is that respondents feeling close to a radical right party were not more likely to endorse anti-establishment attitudes once dissatisfaction with government and the economy were controlled for. This indicates that, contrary to conventional wisdom, opposition to mainstream politics and radical right party affiliation are not directly connected, but mediated by economic evaluations and government critique. Specifically, it shows that anti-establishment attitudes are not the mere product of the anti-establishment propaganda of the radical right, but a function of prospective and sociotropic evaluations, value orientations and general political and institutional distrust. More importantly, distrust in politicians and distrust in parties, and indicators of anti-establishment attitudes do not appear to be determined by the same underlying latent construct. Instead, the two sets of indicators suggest two correlated but empirically distinct attitudinal measures, which confirms the argument in the literature on radical right voting that political trust is not sufficient to account for all the variation in public forms of political discontent in Western Europe (Norris 2005).

Lastly, I have shown that anti-establishment attitudes can be operationalized as a latent factor, yet future research needs to investigate the relationship between latent anti-establishment predispositions and manifest forms of opposition politics, in order to answer the bigger questions of dealignment and electoral volatility. For instance, drawing on Emmenegger et al. (2015), one concrete research task would be to untangle the mechanisms underlying participation and party choice, by studying the interaction of anti-establishment attitudes with external and/internal political efficacy. Another research question is related to the potential of anti-establishment attitudes for political change, which, may manifest itself in both conventional and non-conventional

forms of political participation, e.g., protest or boycotts. More specifically, the association between labor market disadvantage and anti-establishment attitudes can be understood as a form of contentious politics, insofar as labor market outsiders in advanced industrial democracies bear a latent political leverage over the established elites. According to the political process model of social movements (McAdam 1982, pp.39-40), excluded groups possess at all times the latent capacity to alter the status-quo by social insurgency and the manifestation of this latent potential is contingent, among other factors, on political opportunity structures. Alternatively, wide-spread public discontent can give rise to political opportunity structures for challenger parties, legitimizing their anti-establishment claims. A final thought on this matter is that anti-establishment attitudes are partly fueled by insider-outsider politics, which ultimately pertains to a representation problem with vast consequences for the political system. The transformation of European political systems eventually depends on how political elites will handle the insider-outsider representation dilemma, as well as on potential coalitions between different sections of the workforce. In this regard, the way forward seems to start at the junction of demand- and supply-side theories of political behavior with theories of institutional change.

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Appendix

A. Abbreviations, coding sources

B. Figures

C. Table

A. Abbreviations, coding sources

Table A. List of country name abbreviations									
AT	Austria	FR	France	DK	Denmark	GB	Great Britain	NL	Netherlands
CH	Switzerland	DE	Germany	FI	Finland	IE	Ireland	SE	Sweden

Table B. Coding sources of all variables included in the analysis.							
Variable labels	Observations	Mean	Standard Deviation	Min	Max	Description	Source
Dependent Variables							
Refined Anti-political establishment attitudes (Factor score with OLS)	19,170	6.535362	2.258919	0	10.77105	Predicted factor score with ordinary least squares procedure, after factor analysis. Maximizes the validity of the factor score estimate.	ESS 7 (2014)
Refined Anti-political establishment attitudes (Bartlett score)	19,170	8.01	2.78	0	13.21	Predicted factor score with the Bartlett method (maximum likelihood estimation). Yields an unbiased estimate of the true factor.	ESS 7 (2014)
Coarse anti-political establishment attitudes (Averaged sum of items)	19,170	6.06	2.05	0	10	Averaged sum of the variables loading on the retained factor, after factor analysis.	ESS 7 (2014)
Indicator-variables for refined factor score and coarse factor score (approximate names due to space constraints)							
<i>No influence on political system.</i>	19,874	6.029888	2.539719		10	Recoded after <i>psppi1</i> to measure the inverse of the original statement.	ESS 7 (2014)
<i>No say in what government does.</i>	19,859	6.099602	2.490216		10	Recoded after <i>psppsgv</i> to measure the inverse of the original statement.	ESS 7 (2014)
<i>Politicians don't care what people think.</i>	19,960	6.259519	2.42777		10	Recoded after <i>ptcppl1</i> to measure the inverse of the original	ESS 7 (2014)

						statement.	
<i>Hard to take part in politics.</i>	19,719	5.950707	2.654822		10	Recoded after <i>etapapl</i> to measure the inverse of the original statement.	ESS 7 (2014)
Independent Variables: Individual Level							
Occupation-outsidersness	18,731	4.554266	3.592838	.6	21.36	Occupational unemployment rate, computed for each selected country, after the formula: Unemployment rate in occupation $J = [(nr. \text{ unemployed in } J) / (nr. \text{ unemployed in } j + nr. \text{ employed in } J)] \times 100$ (Rehm 2009, p.875).	EU-LFS (2013) Lfsa_ugpis Lfsa_egais
Status-outsidersness	16,639	-	-		-	Type of contract, recode of <i>contrtype</i> : limited + no contract = outsider; unlimited contract = insider.	ESS 7 (2014)
Independent Variables: Country Level							
Party convergence Economic Left-Right	20,242	0.7924387	0.2644384		1	Difference in Economic Left-Right position between the two largest parties in a political system. The variable has been rescaled to take values from 0 (min divergence) to 1(max convergence).	CHES 2014
Party convergence GALTAN	20,242	.7087168	.2365226		1	Difference in Economic Left-Right position between the two largest parties in a political system. The variable has been rescaled to take values from 0 (min divergence) to 1(max convergence).	CHES 2014
Independent Variables: Socio-structural factors							
Gender	20,242	-	-		-	1=Male 2=Female	ESS 7 (2014)
Age (cut at 40)	20,242	-	-		-	Recode of <i>agea</i> : 0=Older than 40 1=Younger than 40	ESS 7 (2014)
Education	20,242	-	-		7	Recode of <i>eisced</i> , maintains the levels of the original variable ²⁷ .	ESS 7 (2014)
Income (deciles)	17,609	5.371287	2.839834		10	Household's total net income from all sources, in deciles.	ESS 7 (2014)
Migrant	20,237	-	-		-	Recode of <i>brncntr</i> (Respondent	ESS 7

²⁷ The original variable *eisced* represents the international standard classification of education (ISCED): 1 - Less than secondary, 2-lower secondary, 3-lower tier upper secondary, 4-upper tier upper secondary, 5-advanced vocational, 6-lower tertiary education, 7-higher tertiary education.

						born in country): 0=Native 1=Migrant	(2014)
Non-union membership	20,161	-	-		-	Recode of mbtru (Trade union membership): 1=Yes (currently + previously) 0=No	ESS 7 (2014)
Independent variables: Alternative explanations							
Country's cultural life Undermined or enriched by immigration	19,901	-	-		2	Recode of <i>imueclt</i> so that a higher value measures anti-immigration sentiment: 0=(Cultural life enriched) 1=(Neutral) 2=(Cultural life undermined)	ESS 7 (2014)
EU unification go further or gone too far	19,388	-	-		2	Recode of <i>eufft</i> so that a higher value measures anti-EU sentiment: 0=(Unification go further) 1=(Neutral) 2=(Unification too far)	ESS 7 (2014)
Gays and lesbians to live as they wish	20,242	-	-		2	Recode of <i>freehms</i> so that a higher value captures disagreement: 0=(Agree strongly+Agree) 1=(Neither agree nor disagree) 2=(Disagree, disagree strongly, refusal + don't know + refusal)	ESS 7 (2014)
Dissatisfaction with the economy	19,942	-	-		4	Recode of <i>stfeco</i> so that a higher value captures dissatisfaction. Categories ordered from 0 (no dissatisfaction) to 4(max dissatisfaction).	ESS 7 (2014)
Dissatisfaction with the national government	19,707	-	-		4	Recode of <i>stfeco</i> so that a higher value captures dissatisfaction. Categories ordered from 0 (no dissatisfaction) to 4(max dissatisfaction).	ESS 7 (2014)
Distrust in political parties	19,908	-	-		10	Recode of <i>stfeco</i> so that a higher value captures distrust Categories ordered from 0 (no distrust) to 10(max distrust).	ESS 7 (2014)
Feel close to a radical right party	20,242	-	-		1	Dummy variable created by counting how many times a radical right party ²⁸ was the answer to the question "Do you feel close to a political party in particular?" 0 = no (the respondent did not answered that question by	ESS 7 (2014)

²⁸ CHES (199-2014) is the coding source for radical right parties, except for Switzerland. See the sources below, in the Appendix.

						marking a radical right parties) 1 = yes (the respondent answered by marking a radical right party)	
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NB1: The original names of the ESS 7 (2014) variables are written in italics.

NB2: Binary and categorical variables have no mean therefore the corresponding cells are left empty. For binary variables, the min and the max are simply the values the variable takes on.

NB3: For the complete names of the factor indicator variables, please see Figure 1.

Table C. Coding sources of occupational unemployment risk. All values are obtained from Eurostat's Labor Force Surveys (2013), unless otherwise noted. The units are expressed in thousand.

Austria	Employment by occupation [lfsa_egais]	Unemployment by previous occupation [lfsa_ugpis]	Resulting occupational unemployment rate (Rehm 2009)²⁹
Managers	176.3	5.1	2.81
Professionals	653.6	15.6	2.33
Technicians and associated professionals	781.9	23.5	2.91
Clerical support workers	419.1	19.4	4.42
Service and sales workers	720.0	49.1	6.38
Skilled agricultural, forestry, fishery workers	162.7	5.7 ³⁰	3.38
Craft and related trade workers	546.2	29.9	5.19
Plant and machine operators and assemblers	233.0	14.8	5.97
Elementary occupations	326.9	36.9	10.14
Denmark	Employment by occupation [lfsa_egais]	Unemployment by previous occupation [lfsa_ugpis]	Resulting occupational unemployment rate (Rehm 2009)
Managers	49.8	4.4 (lfsa_ugpis 2010)	8.11
Professionals	697.2	22.5	3.12
Technicians and associated professionals	445.1	18.8	4.05

²⁹ Unemployment rate in occupation j = [Unemployed in occupation j / (Unemployed in occupation j + Employed in occupation j)] x 100.

³⁰ Source: Arbeitsmarktdaten online (2013), Arbeitslose nach Berufen (AL301), available from iambweb.ams.or.at/ambw (accessed 8.5.2017).

Clerical support workers	192.2	14.5	7.01
Service and sales workers	529.8	43.2	7.53
Skilled agricultural, forestry, fishery workers	52.1	2.2	4.05
Craft and related trade workers	233.2	15.2	6.11
Plant and machine operators and assemblers	143.1	13.0	8.32
Elementary occupations	267.4	32.1	10.71
Germany	Employment by occupation [lfsa_egais]	Unemployment by previous occupation [lfsa_ugpis]	Resulting occupational unemployment rate (Rehm 2009)
Managers	1,666.2	32.1	1.89
Professionals	6,439.7	115.8	1.76
Technicians and associated professionals	8,531.7	168.3	1.93
Clerical support workers	5,176.7	214.4	3.97
Service and sales workers	5,510.4	326.7	5.59
Skilled agricultural, forestry, fishery workers	540.4	25.3	4.47
Craft and related trade workers	5,103.2	280.1	5.2
Plant and machine operators and assemblers	2,324.8	129.4	5.27
Elementary occupations	3,115.4	308.0	8.99
Finland	Employment by occupation [lfsa_egais]	Unemployment by previous occupation [lfsa_ugpis]	Resulting occupational unemployment rate (Rehm 2009)
Managers	67.4	4.7 (lfsa_ugpis 2010)	6.51
Professionals	561.2	15.3	2.65
Technicians and associated professionals	445.3	12.9	2.81
Clerical support workers	159.2	8.0	4.78
Service and sales workers	468.6	26.0	5.25

Skilled agricultural, forestry, fishery workers	79.7	4.1	4.89
Craft and related trade workers	271.9	18.8	6.46
Plant and machine operators and assemblers	183.6	10.5	5.41
Elementary occupations	152.6	18.2	10.65
France	Employment by occupation [lfsa_egais]	Unemployment by previous occupation [lfsa_ugpis]	Resulting occupational unemployment rate (Rehm 2009)
Managers	1,740.4	36.7	2.06
Professionals	4,345.4	87.2	1.96
Technicians and associated professionals	5,222.2	145.1	2.7
Clerical support workers	2,349.4	95.8	3.91
Service and sales workers	4,198.4	208.3	4.72
Skilled agricultural, forestry, fishery workers	823.8	32.0	3.73
Craft and related trade workers	2,232.6	113.6	4.84
Plant and machine operators and assemblers	1,817.2	128.1	6.58
Elementary occupations	2,540.1	171.0	6.3
Ireland	Employment by occupation [lfsa_egais]	Unemployment by previous occupation [lfsa_ugpis]	Resulting occupational unemployment rate (Rehm 2009)
Managers	139.9	9.3	6.23
Professionals	409.8	15.8	3.71
Technicians and associated professionals	197.0	16.9	7.9
Clerical support workers	184.8	19.2	9.41
Service and sales workers	362.7	41.9	10.35
Skilled agricultural, forestry, fishery workers	73.0	3.1	4.07
Craft and related trade workers	175.9	47.8	21.36

Plant and machine operators and assemblers	103.6	15.8	13.23
Elementary occupations	163.7	35.3	17.73
The Netherlands	Employment by occupation [lfsa_egais]	Unemployment by previous occupation [lfsa_ugpis]	Resulting occupational unemployment rate (Rehm 2009)
Managers	554.4	4.7	0.84
Professionals	1,939.2	11.9	0.6
Technicians and associated professionals	1,285.7	12.0	0.92
Clerical support workers	792.8	13.6	1.68
Service and sales workers	1,538.4	16.7	1.07
Skilled agricultural, forestry, fishery workers	144.5	No alternative sources available.	Missing.
Craft and related trade workers	670.0	11.4	1.67
Plant and machine operators and assemblers	315.2	4.9	1.53
Elementary occupations	711.2	6.7	0.93
Sweden	Employment by occupation [lfsa_egais]	Unemployment by previous occupation [lfsa_ugpis]	Resulting occupational unemployment rate (Rehm 2009)
Managers	262.4	5.1	1.9
Professionals	1,160.2	27.7	2.33
Technicians and associated professionals	776.5	28.8	3.57
Clerical support workers	270.3	19.3	6.66
Service and sales workers	933.2	85.4	8.38
Skilled agricultural, forestry, fishery workers	69.8	6.8	8.87
Craft and related trade workers	456.0	29.6	6.09
Plant and machine operators and assemblers	350.5	29.7	7.81

Elementary occupations	235.9	42.0	15.11
Switzerland	Employment by occupation [lfsa_egais]	Unemployment by previous occupation [lfsa_ugpis]	Resulting occupational unemployment rate (Rehm 2009)
Managers	355.2	7.9	2.17
Professionals	1,040.1	19.6	1.59
Technicians and associated professionals	805.0	15.5	1.88
Clerical support workers	401.9	9.2	2.23
Service and sales workers	683.1	24.4	3.44
Skilled agricultural, forestry, fishery workers	124.3	1.1	0.87
Craft and related trade workers	552.0	15.2	2.67
Plant and machine operators and assemblers	159.5	6.3	3.79
Elementary occupations	175.3	5.1	2.82
United Kingdom	Employment by occupation [lfsa_egais]	Unemployment by previous occupation [lfsa_ugpis]	Resulting occupational unemployment rate (Rehm 2009)
Managers	3,058.4	45.2	1.45
Professionals	7,086.5	97.2	1.35
Technicians and associated professionals	3,662.7	69.8	1.87
Clerical support workers	2,826.5	84.6	2.9
Service and sales workers	5,453.1	175.8	3.12
Skilled agricultural, forestry, fishery workers	284.9	5.2	1.79
Craft and related trade workers	2,431.8	67.0	2.68
Plant and machine operators and assemblers	1,400.6	44.5	3.07
Elementary occupations	2,548.7	133.7	4.98

Table D. Abbreviations of parties included in the analysis

1. Largest parties to the left of the center in 2014 (selected by seat share in national election most prior to year 2014)

Party abbreviation	Party name (English)	Source
SPD	Social Democratic Party of Germany (Germany)	CHES 1999-2014
SD	Social Democrats (Denmark)	CHES 1999-2014
PS	Socialist Party (France)	CHES 1999-2014
Lab	Labour (Ireland)	CHES 1999-2014
PvdA	Labour Party (Netherlands)	CHES 1999-2014
Lab	Labour Party (United Kingdom)	CHES 1999-2014
SPÖ	Social Democratic Party of Austria (Austria)	CHES 1999-2014
SDP	Social Democratic Party of Finland (Finland)	CHES 1999-2014
SAP	Worker's Party - Social Democrats (Sweden)	CHES 1999-2014
S	Social Democratic Party (Switzerland)	https://www.parlament.ch/de/%C3%BCber-das-parlament/archiv/archiv-fraktionen (9.5.2017)

2. Largest parties to the right of the center in 2014 (selected by seat share in national election most prior to year 2014)

CDU	Christian Democratic Union of Germany (Germany)	CHES 1999-2014
V	Venstre, Liberal party of Denmark	CHES 1999-2014
UMP	Union for Popular Movement (France)	CHES 1999-2014
FG	Family of the Irish (Ireland)	CHES 1999-2014
VVD	People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (Netherlands)	CHES 1999-2014
Cons	Conservative Party (United Kingdom)	CHES 1999-2014
ÖVP	Austrian People's Party (Austria)	CHES 1999-2014
KOK	National Coalition Party (Finland)	CHES 1999-2014
M	Moderate Party (Sweden)	CHES 1999-2014
V	Swiss People's Party (Switzerland)	https://www.parlament.ch/de/%C3%BCber-das-parlament/archiv/archiv-fraktionen (9.5.2017)

3. Radical right parties in 2014

NPD	National Democratic Party of Germany (Germany)	CHES 1999-2014
DF	Danish People's Party (Denmark)	CHES 1999-2014

FN	National Front (France)	CHES 1999-2014
MPF	Movement for France (France)	CHES 1999-2014
SF	We Ourselves (Ireland)	O'Malley (2008)
PVV	Party for Freedom (Netherlands)	CHES 1999-2014
UKIP	United Kingdom Independence Party (United Kingdom)	CHES 1999-2014
BZÖ	Alliance for the Future of Austria (Austria)	CHES 1999-2014
FPÖ	Freedom Party of Austria (Austria)	CHES 1999-2014
PS	True Finns (Finland)	CHES 1999-2014
SD	Sweden Democrats (Sweden)	CHES 1999-2014

Table D. Main Left-Right party positions (Source: CHES 2014) and computed party distance.

Country	Main Left-Right Parties	Policy Dimensions	
		Economic Left-Right	GAL/TAN
Denmark	V	7.30	5.70
	SD	3.90	5.20
	Party distance	3.40	0.50
Germany	CDU	5.92	6.00
	SPD	3.50	4.15
	Party distance	2.42	1.85
France	UMP	7.33	7.17
	PS	3.83	3.36
	Party distance	3.50	3.80
Ireland	FG	7.13	6.38
	Lab	4.13	3.75
	Party distance	3.00	2.63
Netherlands	PvdA	3.22	3.00
	VVD	8.33	5.13
	Party distance	-5.11	-2.13
United Kingdom	CONS	7.86	6.14
	LAB	3.86	3.43

	Party distance	4.00	2.71
Austria	OVP	6.40	7.20
	SPO	2.80	4.00
	Party distance	3.60	3.20
Finland	KOK	8.22	4.75
	SDP	3.44	3.22
	Party distance	4.78	1.53
Sweden	M	7.67	4.67
	SAP	3.43	3.62
	Party distance	4.24	1.05
Switzerland	SVP/UDC	7.50	9.38
	SP/PS	2.00	1.63
	Party distance	5.50	7.75

B. Figures

Figure 1: The relationship between anti-partyism, anti-establishment rhetoric and populism.




Figure 2. Indicators of anti-political establishment attitudes (ESS 7)

<i>Elite vs. the people</i>	<i>How much does the political system allow for people like you to have a say in what the government does?</i>
	<i>How much does the political system allow for people like you to have an influence on politics?</i>
	<i>How easy do you personally find it to take part in politics?</i>
<i>Anti-partyism</i>	<i>How much politicians care about what people like you think?</i>

Figure 3. Ideological distance between the two main left-right parties and corresponding variables.

pid_LRecon	Ideological distance on the general economic left-right dimension.
pid_GALTAN	Ideological distance on the GAL/TAN dimension ³¹ .

Figure 4. Recoded variables tapping specific anti-political establishment attitudes (1-4) and political trust (5-6), followed by their value labels.

xnoinflgov	<i>Political system does not allow people to have a say in what the government does.</i>
xnoinflpol	<i>Political system does not allow people like you to have an influence on politics.</i>
xpolitnocare	<i>Politicians don't care what people like you think.</i>
xhardpartpol	<i>How hard is it for you to take part in politics?</i>
xnotrustparties	<i>No confidence in political parties.</i>
xnotrustpolit	<i>No trust in politicians.</i>
All items have been formulated in reverse of the original statement.	

Figure 5: Scale properties of items tapping anti-political establishment attitudes of ESS7 respondents.

Anti-political establishment attitudes Cronbach's alpha=0.83 Eigenvalue=2.15 Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy=0.79	Factor Loading³²	Uniqueness
<i>Political system does not allow people to have a say in what government does.</i>	0.76	0.42
<i>Political system does not allow people like you to have an influence on politics.</i>	0.83	0.32
<i>Politicians do not care what people like you think.</i>	0.73	0.39
<i>It is hard for you personally to participate in politics.</i>	0.60	0.64

³¹ Green/Alternative/Libertarian–Traditional/Authoritarian/Nationalist

³²After oblique promax rotation.

Figure 6. Histograms of the refined factor score (OLS method) proxying for anti-political establishment attitudes.




Figure 6a. Histograms of the coarse factor score proxying for anti-political establishment attitudes.




Figure 6b. Histograms of the refined Bartlett score proxying for anti-establishment attitudes.




Figure A. Model 3 residuals plot




Figure B. Model 3 quantile normality plot




Figure 7. Model 3 predicted probability of endorsing anti-establishment attitudes





Figure 8. Model 4 conditional margins plot. Predicted scores for anti-establishment attitudes when occupation outsidersness interacts with party convergence on GALTAN.



C. Tables

Table 1. Ordinary Least Square Regressions with Linearized Standard Errors and Probability Weights Added					
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 2a	Model 2b	Model 3
Scores for anti-political establishment attitudes (refined factor score OLS)					
Status-based Outsiderness (contract type)	-0.10 (0.07)				
Occupation-based outsiderness (occupational unemployment risk)		0.06*** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)	0.03** (0.01)
Female	0.21*** (0.05)	0.17*** (0.05)	0.12** (0.05)	0.13*** (0.05)	0.13*** (0.05)
Age (younger than 40)	-0.02 (0.06)	-0.03 (0.05)			
Age (continuous)		0.01** (0.00)	0.02*** (0.00)	0.01*** (0.00)	0.01*** (0.00)
Education (EISCED)					
Lower secondary (Base category: Less than lower secondary)	-0.51*** (0.11)	-0.50*** (0.11)	-0.07 (0.09)	-0.02 (0.09)	-0.06 (0.09)
Lower tier upper secondary	-0.30** (0.10)	-0.27** (0.10)	0.14 (0.08)	0.03 (0.07)	-0.07 (0.08)
Upper tier upper secondary	-0.73*** (0.12)	-0.65*** (0.11)	-0.36*** (0.09)	-0.30*** (0.08)	-0.30*** (0.08)
Advanced vocational	-0.77*** (0.11)	-0.65*** (0.10)	-0.13 (0.09)	-0.21** (0.08)	-0.28*** (0.08)
Lower tertiary	-1.28*** (0.12)	-1.17*** (0.11)	-0.46*** (0.10)	-0.44*** (0.09)	-0.46*** (0.09)
Higher tertiary	-1.41*** (0.12)	-1.24*** (0.11)	-0.57*** (0.10)	-0.60*** (0.09)	-0.65*** (0.09)
Income in deciles					
2d Income decile (Base category: 1st Income decile)	0.13 (0.12)	0.03 (0.11)	0.06 (0.10)	0.11 (0.09)	0.10 (0.09)

3d Income decile	-0.05 (0.12)	-0.09 (0.11)	0.14 (0.10)	0.11 (0.09)	0.09 (0.09)
4th Income decile	-0.13 (0.12)	-0.15 (0.12)	0.05 (0.10)	0.04 (0.09)	0.04 (0.09)
5th Income decile	-0.24 (0.12)	-0.24* (0.12)	-0.01 (0.10)	-0.05 (0.09)	-0.05 (0.09)
6th Income decile	-0.25* (0.12)	-0.24* (0.12)	0.02 (0.10)	0.02 (0.09)	0.02 (0.09)
7th Income decile	-0.37** (0.12)	-0.38*** (0.11)	-0.06 (0.10)	-0.10 (0.09)	-0.09 (0.09)
8th Income decile	-0.41*** (0.12)	-0.42*** (0.12)	-0.04 (0.10)	-0.10 (0.09)	-0.11 (0.09)
9th Income decile	-0.63*** (0.13)	-0.60*** (0.12)	-0.19 (0.10)	-0.14 (0.09)	-0.16 (0.09)
10th decile	-0.89*** (0.13)	-0.80*** (0.12)	-0.27** (0.10)	-0.26** (0.09)	-0.27* (0.09)*
Migrant status	-0.22* (0.09)	-0.23** (0.08)	0.10 (0.07)	0.19** (0.06)	0.21** (0.06)
Non-union membership	0.41*** (0.06)	0.43*** (0.06)	0.32*** (0.05)	0.17*** (0.04)	0.10* (0.05)
Feeling close to a radical right party	0.38*** (0.09)	0.38*** (0.09)	-0.11 (0.08)		
Disagreement: Gays and lesbians free to live life as they wish			0.06 (0.04)		
Country's cultural life undermined by immigration			0.28*** (0.03)	0.19*** (0.02)	0.20*** (0.02)
EU unification already gone too far			0.26*** (0.03)	0.15*** (0.02)	0.17** (0.02)*
Dissatisfaction with the national government			0.87*** (0.03)	0.36*** (0.03)	0.35*** (0.03)
Dissatisfaction with the national economy			0.32*** (0.03)	0.18*** (0.03)	0.21*** (0.03)
Distrust in political parties				0.46*** (0.01)	0.44*** (0.01)

Country fixed effects	No	No	No	No	Yes
Constant	7.40*** (0.13)	7.09*** (0.13)	3.32*** (0.14)	2.25*** (0.13)	2.60*** (0.15)
Observations	14133	15849	15080	15017	15017
R²	0.095	0.092	0.355	0.494	0.505
Standard errors in parentheses * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$					

Table 2. Linear Regression with Linearized Standard Errors and Probability Weights

	Scores for anti-establishment attitudes		
	Model 4	Model 4a	Model 4b
	Refined factor score (OLS method)	Refined factor score (Bartlett method)	Coarse factor score (indicators weighted by factor score coefficients)
Occupation-based outsidersness (occupational unemployment risk)	-0.09 (0.06)	-0.12 (0.07)	-0.09 (0.05)
Outsidersness*Convergence GALTAN	0.12* (0.06)	0.16* (0.07)	0.12* (0.06)
Outsidersness* Convergence Economic Left-Right	0.04 (0.03)	0.05 (0.04)	0.04 (0.03)
Country's cultural life undermined by immigration	0.20*** (0.06)	0.24*** (0.03)	0.20*** (0.02)
EU unification has already gone too far	0.16*** (0.02)	0.20*** (0.03)	0.17*** (0.02)
Dissatisfaction with the national government	0.35*** (0.03)	0.43*** (0.04)	0.35*** (0.03)
Dissatisfaction with the national economy	0.20*** (0.03)	0.26*** (0.04)	0.21*** (0.03)

Distrust in political parties	0.44*** (0.01)	0.54*** (0.01)	0.45*** (0.01)
Same socio-demographic as in Model 3 characteristics included	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country fixed effects included	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	2.72*** (0.16)	3.33*** (0.20)	2.73*** (0.16)
Observations	15017	15017	15017
R^2	0.5	0.504	0.504
Standard errors in parentheses * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$			
Tables displaying coefficients and standard errors for the full set of socio-demographic predictors and countries are available from the author on request.			

Table 1a. Robustness checks for Hypothesis 1 (Model 3)

	Model 3a (linearized SE)	Model 3b (linearized SE)	Model 3c (clustered SE)
	Scores for anti-establishment attitudes		
	Coarse factor score (Indicators weighted by factor score coefficients)	Refined factor score (Bartlett method)	Refined factor score (OLS method)
Occupation-based outsidersness (occupational unemployment risk)	0.03*** (0.01)	0.04** (0.01)	0.03** (0.01)
Female	0.13*** (0.03)	0.16*** (0.04)	0.13** (0.03)
Age	0.001*** (0.00)	0.001*** (0.00)	0.01** (0.00)
Education			
Lower secondary (Base category: Less than lower secondary)	-0.06 (0.09)	-0.07 (0.11)	-0.06 (0.13)

Lower tier upper secondary	-0.07 (0.08)	-0.08 (0.10)	-0.07 (0.08)
Upper tier upper secondary	-0.30*** (0.09)	-0.36*** (0.10)	-0.30 (0.15)
Advanced vocational	-0.28*** (0.08)	-0.33*** (0.10)	-0.28* (0.11)
Lower tertiary	-0.46*** (0.09)	-0.55*** (0.11)	-0.46** (0.12)
Higher tertiary	-0.65*** (0.09)	-0.79*** (0.11)	-0.65*** (0.10)
Income in deciles			
2d Income decile (Base category: 1st Income decile)	0.11 (0.09)	0.13 (0.11)	0.10 (0.13)
3d Income decile	0.09 (0.09)	0.11 (0.11)	0.09 (0.09)
4th Income decile	0.04 (0.09)	0.05 (0.11)	0.04 (0.07)
5th Income decile	-0.05 (0.09)	-0.05 (0.11)	-0.05 (0.06)
6th Income decile	0.02 (0.09)	0.03 (0.11)	0.02 (0.07)
7th Income decile	-0.09 (0.08)	-0.11 (0.11)	-0.09 (0.03)
8th Income decile	-0.11 (0.09)	-0.13 (0.11)	-0.11** (0.02)
9th Income decile	-0.16 (0.09)	-0.19 (0.11)	-0.16** (0.04)
10th decile	-0.27** (0.09)	-0.33** (0.11)	-0.27*** (0.05)

Migrant status	0.21** (0.06)	0.24** (0.08)	0.21 (0.18)
Non-union membership	0.10* (0.05)	0.12* (0.06)	0.10 (0.08)
Country's cultural life undermined by immigration	0.20*** (0.02)	0.24*** (0.03)	0.20** (0.05)
EU unification has already gone too far	0.17*** (0.02)	0.20*** (0.03)	0.17*** (0.03)
Dissatisfaction with the national government.	0.36*** (0.03)	0.43*** (0.04)	0.35*** (0.03)
Dissatisfaction with the national economy	0.21*** (0.03)	0.26*** (0.04)	0.21*** (0.03)
Distrust in political parties	0.45*** (0.01)	0.54*** (0.01)	0.44*** (0.01)
Country dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	2.60*** (0.15)	3.17*** (0.19)	2.47*** (0.17)
Observations	15017	15017	15017
R²	0.504	0.504	0.505
Standard errors in parentheses * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$			

Table 2b	Model 4d (Clustered SE)
	Scores for anti-establishment attitudes Refined factor score (OLS method)
Occupation-based outsidership (occupational unemployment risk)	-0.09 (0.06)
Outsidership*Convergence GALTAN	0.12 (0.10)
Outsidership* Convergence Economic Left-Right	0.04 (0.03)

Country's cultural life undermined by immigration	0.20*** (0.06)
EU unification has already gone too far	0.17*** (0.03)
Dissatisfaction with the national government	0.35*** (0.03)
Dissatisfaction with the national economy	0.21*** (0.03)
Distrust in political parties	0.41*** (0.01)
Same socio-demographic as in Model 3 characteristics included	Yes
Country fixed effects included	Yes
Constant	2.69*** (0.15)
Observations	14948
R²	0.520
Standard errors in parentheses * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$	