



UNIVERSITY OF GOTHENBURG

WHOSE PEACE?

"A content of ideas analysis of the underlying norms of democratic involvement in peacemaking – as improvers of circumstances for legitimate peace processes, or as complicating idealist norms."

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Abstract:

In peacemaking, methods of inclusion are extensively pushed for with the main motivation that it gives the peace process a greater legitimacy. But exclusion is also deemed necessary as it is required to reach an agreement without getting it spoiled by extremists. In the fall of 2016 the Colombian people rejected the agreement reached between the Colombian Government and the guerrilla group FARC in a referendum. This is an example of the tension that exists between the inclusive, idealist approaches to peacemaking, and the more exclusive, pragmatic approaches. Identifying and investigating this tension in the official documentation from the Colombian, and the similar Northern Ireland, peace processes constitutes the aim of this thesis. The official documentation is analysed using a content idea analysis (Swe. Innehållslig idéanalys) to identify expressions of inclusion and exclusion in the agreements. The expressions, formulated as either statements or arguments, are then assessed in their validity against both previous research and experiences. This way the idealism, or pragmatism, of the arguments can be more easily demonstrated. The ideas of democratic inclusion, and the tension between the two approaches are then discussed using a theoretical framework on legitimate statehood, opposition, and deliberate democracy. The study finds that both peace processes are using a much more inclusive, than exclusive language but considering the need for exclusion, and the socially constructed nature of democratic legitimacy, the practice of exclusion needs to be accommodated within our understanding of legitimate democracy.

Key words:

Peacemaking, democracy, legitimate statehood, inclusion, exclusion, Colombia, Northern Ireland, content idea-analysis, negotiation

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1. Introduction

“A government of the people, by the people, for the people”, first used by Abraham Lincoln, is a dominant understanding of how a modern legitimate state is to relate to its population. Historically this have however not been the dominant understanding of legitimate statehood. Throughout history a vast prism of diverse perspectives on legitimate statehood, and ‘state – population’ relations, have been prevalent. The historical texts by first Machiavelli, and later Hobbes, on legitimate statehood provides two perspectives which differ greatly from contemporary liberal democratic ideals. They both argue from a perspective where the state has an apparent hierarchal advantage over its population and where that is the way it should be for a state to remain legitimate. The state’s supreme power in relation to its population is what constitutes the legitimacy. This may seem like an outdated mindset, but it yet lingers in some of the remaining dictatorships. What is more common is the ‘strong man’ politics which according to Rachman (2015, 2 November) is becoming more popular, where there are tendencies of this more authoritative understanding of legitimacy. In a modern setting the contemporary writings of Chantal Mouffe (Mouffe & Martin, 2013) about political opposition renders the concept of a ‘government of the people’ suddenly more of an unattainable utopia. As she claims that no consensus or agreement is possible without exclusion, the modern liberal democratic legitimate statehood would be ‘government of *most* of the people’.

It is within this context that the *democratic peacemaking discourse* becomes interesting to investigate further.

The idea of democratic involvement as a legitimator of peace negotiations and peacemaking is highly prevalent and enjoy a broad support in the academic field of International relations (e.g. Nilsson, 2009; Licklider, 2003; Hampson, 1996; Zanker, 2014). It builds primarily on the idea that the peace becomes more durable when the affected communities and parties of the conflict are engaged in the process and feel ownership of the peace. There are different methods to involve the relevant population. Three of these methods are either by, referendum – letting the population vote on the peace agreement, by political inclusion of warring parties and stakeholders in the negotiations and post-conflict arrangements, or by inclusion of civil society in the process – the latter being the most prevalent method in the literature. These methods constitute the core understanding of democratic inclusion in peace processes throughout this thesis. The idea of democratically legitimated peace is however not universally accepted and praised, it does have its backsides which has been pointed out by the

academic community. I find that these negative consequences often go along the line of a pragmatic approach to the peace process. Such an approach emphasises that the efficiency of the negotiation process increases by excluding actors (e.g. Paffenholz, 2014, p.72), which ultimately saves lives by shortening the conflict. This contrasts with the positive consequences which I tend to see as the more idealist approach. The idealist approach is willing to sacrifice efficiency – or potentially any agreed deal – for the sake of reaching a durable peace built on inclusion-based legitimacy and democratic proliferation. This tension is recognised and discussed, though with varying terminology and background, by many in the academic community (see e.g. Touval & Zartman, 2003; Nilsson, 2012; Paffenholz, 2014; Kew & Wanis-St. John, 2008).

This theoretical discussion on legitimate peace, priorities and the internal tension between these priorities is clearly relevant in the modern political landscape. As the Colombian government struck a deal with the insurgency/terrorist group FARC in 2016 after over 50 years of conflict the people of Colombia were asked to decide whether they accepted the deal or not through a referendum (Dickinson, 2016, October 3). On the second of October, the peace agreement was declined by a margin of 0.4 percentage units. The shocking result, that a people which has been at war for over half a century chooses to decline a peace agreement, was what motivated the topic of this essay. Although the referendum constituted the most prominent failure of the entire peace negotiation process, the leaders had a tough choice to make. They could have excluded the population from the decision-making on the agreement – as the opinion polls suggested a low confidence for the process (WOLA, 2015, June 30) – and risked that the agreement would be shunned by the people once it had been voted through in congress. The other option was preferred, they included the people through a referendum, risking that all the progress they had made would be rejected, but with the opportunity of anchoring the peace among the people by giving it democratic legitimacy. We will never know what would have happened if the first option would have been chosen.

2. Research issue

Peace agreements and other official documents which set out the terms under which the process is to proceed are essential to any conflict. As they also demonstrate the tension which is to be investigated, such documents comprise the core of the empirical material analysed in

this thesis. These documents are however not used to analyse the peace which did or did not follow from the agreements but rather to analyse the statements and arguments made in the agreements which prioritise certain practices of inclusion or exclusion and link it to our understandings of legitimate statehood and governance. The focus of this thesis is not to see what approach to peace is better, idealistic or pragmatic, but rather to show where they differ, where they merge, and argue for their respective contextual rationality from a theoretical perspective based on previous research, experience, historical ideas of statehood, and contemporary ideas about democracy.

The tension between the idealist and pragmatic approach is demonstrated by applying a *content of ideas analysis* (Vedung, 1977; Bergström & Boréus, 2012, p.146) of the peace processes' official documentation. The peace processes chosen for this study have been picked through the rationality of the *indirect method of difference* (Esaiasson, Gilljam, Oscarsson & Wängnerud, 2007) where two similar cases but with different outcomes are compared. These peace processes are analysed using the content of ideas method, to categorise the peace processes' statements and arguments into categories of inclusion and exclusion. This makes it possible to discuss them in terms of idealist or pragmatic approaches to democratic inclusion in the peace process, and the tension between the two. The statements and arguments are identified from official documentation such as ceasefire agreements, joint statements, process updates and the final peace agreement. The official documentation is however accompanied with the necessary contextual background information needed to understand the contents of the documentation. The analysed peace processes are the one between Northern Ireland and the IRA, and the Colombia – FARC peace process. The conflicts are chosen for their general similarities, in terms of background and methods, but where the outcomes in the final peace agreement referendum differ. Analysing two peace processes gives the possibility of comparing, thus creating a deeper understanding of how peace processes are conducted, without attempting to analyse an excessive amount of peace processes too shallowly. The two conflicts and their relevant agreements comprise the core of the thesis and the analysed material.

The content of ideas analysis of the documents is elaborated in the latter stages of the thesis by putting the identified discourse surrounding the ideas of democratic peacemaking back into the context described in the introduction. By contrasting these ideas to the historical ideas of statehood and governance, based on the writings of Machiavelli and Hobbes, and Mouffe's modern ideas about the paradoxical relation between democratic inclusion and consensus, the

study aims to expand our understanding of the foundational ideas which has led us to the practices and priorities that dominate today. The analytical tools, as well as the historical and modern theories, are explained in greater detail in the “Methodology” and “Theoretical framework” sections.

3. Research aim

The aim of this thesis is to identify the expressions of inclusion and exclusion in documents from two conflicts, to investigate the tension between the idealistic objective of inclusively legitimised peace and the pragmatic objective of shortening the conflict in peace negotiations – focused on historical and contemporary theories of legitimate statehood.

4. Research questions

- “To what extent does the peace processes differ in their respective tendency to emphasise the importance of democratic inclusion?”
- “How are the statements and arguments for, or against, inclusiveness in the peace processes constructed in the official documentation?”
- “To what extent are the practices proposed in the arguments pragmatically justifiable by previous research and experience as efficient peacemaking practices?”
- “How are these contemporary ideas of democratic peacemaking rendered contextually rational considering the changing understanding of legitimacy?”

5. Delimitations

To identify and investigate these expressions of inclusion and exclusion the thesis does not concern itself directly with studying the practical outcomes of implemented peace negotiations. Nor does it analyse *unofficial* documents or newspaper articles which may stress the importance of democratic inclusion. The prior is primarily because the Colombian peace

is too recent to in any reliable way analyse whether the peace negotiations led to a durable peace or not. Both choices are however also motivated by the time constraints. Without restrictions on which data should be prioritised it would be difficult to analyse such amounts of data qualitatively and reliably within the scope of this study. Analysing the practical outcomes of the peace negotiations constitute a far more multi-faceted matter, related to implementation of the agreement, which would also require more time than is given for this thesis. The alternative, to analyse the documents quantitatively, was not considered to be relevant for this study's aim as such a method would imply counting "democratic concepts", rather than investigating the tension thoroughly.

Only statements and arguments concerning inclusion and exclusion is included in the result as that is the focus. Statements and arguments concerning itself with other practical matters of democratic construction are for that reason not included. They would not be relevant within the scope of this study.

To analyse the documents, Vedungs (1977) content idea analysis have been preferred over a more detailed language focused discourse analysis. This is to be able to identify the ideas expressed in the documents, and analyse their validity, on a more general basis without getting in too much into vague linguistic details. This thesis does not perform elite interviews, nor does it include data collection in the countries it discusses. Such methods could have given greater clarity to the process, what priorities were made and why. But the fact that this is a limited Bachelor level thesis renders both above-mentioned methods unrealizable.

6. Disposition

The thesis starts with an explanation of its *method and methodology*, to clearly describe what sort of analysis this is, and how the issues of reliability and validity were considered.

Following on the method and methodology comes the *theoretical framework* which first describes previous research, then theories on legitimate statehood, and finally theories concerning democracy. The first part on previous research is used to clearly formulate what is constituting the 'democratic peacemaking discourse' in this study. The second part describing legitimate statehood starts out with Machiavelli and Hobbes historical theories which are then complemented with modern theories centred around the liberal democratic system and its legitimacy. The third part on democracy describes how democracy is conceptualised as

deliberative democracy in this study. After this the result start with a short introductory explanation of how the result is presented. The result of the analysis of the two peace processes is presented into two main sections, The Northern Ireland peace process, and the Colombian peace process. The two peace processes respectively are presented by first describing the background, then moving on to the analysis of the documents and finally ending up with a summary of the main points of the analysis. The analysis of the documents includes both to identify the expressions and to assess their validity. The validity assessment serves as a method to identify that which is pragmatic regardless of being inclusive or exclusive practices. The result then moves on to a deeper analysis of the tension between the pragmatic and idealist approaches. The thesis finish off by first providing a conclusion of the main deductions made and then reflecting on what further researched is needed on the issue.

7. Method & methodology

7.1 Methodology

The thesis is a qualitative study which applies an inductive method (Danermark, Ekström, Jakobsen & Karlsson, 2002, pp.85-88) as it analyses the documents by generalising and categorising the arguments for and against inclusion after reading the documents. A quantitative study could have made it possible to analyse a greater number of conflicts, and to have a larger sample of documents from the peace processes. It would however have made it difficult to investigate the tension, as the study would have been measuring, rather than interpreting, the expressions of inclusion and exclusion. Such an approach was not seen as equally relevant at this point.

This thesis has an ontological and epistemological foundation best captured by the ideas of critical realism (Sprague, 2005, pp.43-44; Danermark et al., 2002). It is an approach which acknowledge the existence of patterns and natural laws which we can perceive, though recognising that our interpretations of the world differ which thus forms our knowledge in different ways. Science, and knowledge, then becomes a continuously evolving practice which tries to capture the truth although the interpretations of that truth will always change and thus may, and should, always be challenged. There are tendencies of social constructivism and hermeneutics in this study. There is a recognition of the constitutive capacity of ideas and language which is central to a constructivist approach (Hobden &

Hobson, 2002, p.24), and the study recognise the importance of context to adequately interpret the documents which is key to a hermeneutic approach (Bergström & Boréus, 2012, p.31). But the study also aims to find the answer to the bigger meta-question of whether idealism limits the pragmatism of peace processes. With this understanding of reality and knowledge the ‘investigation of the tension’ and ‘deeper understanding of underlying ideas’ also has a pragmatic purpose by challenging our idealist or pragmatic practices on a more objective basis thus trying to disconnect the practices from their moral grounds. Thus we may challenge practices which are based on irrational ideas or bring forth practices which have been rejected due to norms that aren’t necessarily inherent for that specific practice, with the ultimate goal of improving peace processes.

Applying a realist, or at least more positivist (Mikkelsen, 2005, p.135), approach the analysis of inclusion and exclusion might have been more focused on the practical implications of the choices made in the documents, and how they should objectively be assessed. This thesis tries to do that with the most objectively assessable statements, but then takes it further. It questions the pragmatic, and seemingly idealist, motives for or against inclusion, and tries to understand what renders them rational in this context. This would potentially have been missed with a more positivist approach.

7.2 Method

The *content based method of political idea analysis*¹ (Swe. *innehållslig idéanalys*) has according to Bergström and Boréus (2012, p.146) a descriptive function, and constitutes the main method used in this thesis.

The application of the method tends to revolve around political debates and the ideological logic of the arguments (Bergström & Boréus, 2012, p.146). The official documentation from the peace processes does not constitute a political debate by itself but the documentation includes motivations of statements and actions which constitutes the essence of an argument. Thus, the application of a content idea analysis is helpful when identifying the logic of the political arguments from the peace processes along the “ideological” lines of pragmatic or idealist approaches to democratic peacemaking.

¹ In this study the shorter term ‘content idea analysis’ is used.

Vedung (1977) proposes a six-step method. The first step is to find the problem that is to be investigated, and to formulate the lines along which the problem is to be analysed (Ibid, ch.2). In this study the problem is the tension between the pragmatic approach of exclusion and the idealist approach of inclusion, which is primarily analysed using a pro et contra-method (Ibid, pp.36-38). The second step is to interpret the statements. Here Vedung (1977, p.59) emphasises the difference between the content of the statements and the meaning of the statements, especially when analysing diplomatic language (Ibid, pp.70-71). He proposes an elaborate method of interpretation aimed at getting an ever more precise understanding, through for example taking into consideration the context of the statement (Ibid, pp.74-77). The third step in the whole process is the relevance assessment. Vedung (1977, p.113) starts by stating that the first test is to make sure that the argumentation isn't functional – concerning itself with the source of the idea rather than the empirical and logical rationality of the idea – in that case the argument is irrelevant and may be disregarded in a content idea analysis. Thus, the content idea analysis should not concern itself with the source of the statement more than to the degree that the statement is understandable and appropriately interpreted. To test the relevance of the arguments one may also look for arguments founded on respect for certain persons, deductions without grounds, or arguments that answers another question than the one intended – all such arguments may also be disregarded. The fourth step is to assess the logical foundation of the arguments (Ibid, ch.5). Such an assessment requires the testing of whether the argumentations are logically presented, through the identification of possible contradictions, paradoxical value statements, and logical meta-assessments. The fifth step is to assess the truthfulness – referred to by Vedung, and in the result of this study as validity – in statements about the reality of things (Vedung, 1977, ch.6). This step is about trying to prove the statements which in this study is a key step to identifying the pragmatism of both inclusive and exclusive practices, by assessing the validity of the arguments against previous research and experience. The sixth step is similarly to assess the truthfulness, or at least reasonableness of value statements (Ibid, ch.7). This is a difficult task which according to Vedung (1977, pp.175-178) is possible by breaking down the value statements to their motivations and test the truthfulness of those components.

Vedung (1977) is offering an extensive framework for the content idea analysis. All the steps, except the last one, have been followed to some extent in this study, but due to word-count limitations only the interpretations and validity assessments are presented in the result.

The sixth step of assessing value statements is not pursued at all in this study. To test the truthfulness of value statements in two full peace process would be an overly challenging task within the scope of this study. Furthermore, the critical realism foundation of this essay is making it less relevant to decide whether the value statements – regarding democracy and peace – are ‘true’ or not as they still possess power in our understanding of them as true (Danermark et al., 2002, pp.15-17).

7.3 Sampling

The conflicts chosen for this thesis have been purposely chosen based on their characteristics, following the logic of the *indirect method of difference* which sets out to compare two similar cases but with different outcomes (Esaiasson et al., 2007, pp.130-133). They are thus not in any way a random sample of conflicts. The Irish and Colombian conflicts were chosen at the very start of the research formulation due to their similarities, but with different outcomes. Among these similarities is the decades long intra-state conflict with several failed attempts at peace, the presence of several factions of armed groups, and primarily their use of referendum as a ratification method (UCDP, 2017a, 2017b; Geoghegan, 2016, 11 March). They are not entirely similar, as conflicts never are, but their relative similarity rendered them suitable for applying an indirect method of difference, especially since one voted yes and the other no in the final referendum.

The data collected for this thesis needs to primarily cover two areas. The first one is the official documents from the peace negotiations. This data is to the greatest extent possible collected from the UN’s official peace agreement database (UN, n.d.). The necessary official documents from the peace negotiations that are not present in the database have been collected from other reliable academic sources, or sources linked to the peace processes. This is primarily the case in the Colombian conflict. This is due to the author’s limited proficiency in Spanish and that the official documents on the UN database from the Colombian peace process are almost exclusively in Spanish. The one Colombian peace process document in English from the UN database, the *General Agreement for the Termination of the Conflict* (UN, 2012), is supported by other official statements in English, gathered from the Washington Office on Latin America’s [WOLA] Colombia peace blog (WOLA, 2017) or from the official webpage of the negotiations (Mesa de Conversaciones, n.d.). These other sources were chosen to not impair on the reliability by applying poor translations. The one Spanish document still included in the analysis is the final agreement which was rejected in

the referendum. It is not analysed in its entirety but referred to in a few cases where WOLA had summarised and translated parts of the document. The document was included in this study as it was deemed too vital to the peace process to exclude. In the Northern Ireland peace process the documents not retrieved from the UN database are included to see what the IRA/Sinn Féin expressed in the process as unofficial talks with them were conducted despite their official exclusion. The documents include an IRA ceasefire statement (CAIN, 2016a) and a joint statement from the talks between Gerry Adams of Sinn Féin and the British official John Hume (CAIN, 2016b). The statements are official in the sense that IRA and Sinn Féin respectively communicated the statements through their official channels. Both were collected from the Northern Ireland conflict archive of Ulster University (CAIN, 2017).

The second area the data need to cover is the background of the conflicts. For this area, the world-renowned Uppsala Conflict Data Program [UCDP] constitutes the main source of information. The background information is supported and verified by other independent sources. This area is vital to achieve a deeper contextual understanding of the negotiations where such matters as historical obstacles to the negotiations, the interests that needed to be accommodated, and the key parties of the conflict, can be explained. It should be emphasised that this data is supportive in relation to the analysis rather than constituting the core material which is analysed. A reliability issue would occur if the analysis included elements that are not mentioned in official documentation without having sufficient reason to do so.

7.4 Methodological considerations

Using an empirical material primarily constituted by formal official documents and agreements released by governments or/and other political organizations leads to a problem concerning the documents' ability to describe the actual negotiation process and the following post-conflict peacebuilding process. This potential disconnect between the documents and the reality on the ground is a substantial issue that I am aware of. If the purpose of the thesis was to explain the successes or failures of peace attempts based on the content in the documents the disconnect would be fundamentally problematic. But as the current purpose is to investigate the tension between idealistic and pragmatic approaches and to analyse the dominating contemporary ideas rather than practices, the empirical material's possible disconnect with the practical reality is not as problematic. The ideas identified in the agreements reflects the peacemaking processes' norms, which is the focus, rather than the conflicts' all diverse issues or the practical implementation of the agreements.

The analytical elaboration in the latter part of the thesis on legitimate statehood, democracy, and exclusion is partly problematic as it is Eurocentric. It is focusing on writings by Machiavelli and Hobbes' which are complemented by contemporary western theoreticians. This is problematic considering that this thesis applies these theories on ideas expressed in documents from a South American conflict. This is a minor problem but considering the influential position of the UN on social sustainability, democracy and the formalities of peace agreements (Weiss, Forsythe, Coate, & Pease, 2014, pp.366-379), it is questionable whether the discourse on these specific topics differ greatly from other places in the world. And as the UN is an institution established in a Western setting dominated by countries from that same region (Weiss, et al., 2014, pp.1-2), a Eurocentric approach is if not suitable, at least not as problematic as if a South American, African or Asian culture would have been central to the analysis of these documents.

8. Theoretical framework

8.1 Previous research – democratic peacemaking

Starting an account of previous research within this area necessitates one important distinction. The discourse here defined as the *democratic peacemaking discourse* is not to be confused with the *democratic peace theory*. The democratic peace theory claims that democratic states tend to not wage war against each other (Ray, 1995). The democratic peacemaking discourse, as envisaged in this thesis, rather concerns itself with the legitimacy of peacemaking processes through the democratic inclusion of the conflict's stakeholders, which renders the peace more durable. Much of the literature on this topic concerns itself with the inclusion of civil society (e.g. Kew & Wanis-St. John, 2008; Paffenholz, 2014; Zartman, 2008; Nilsson, 2008; Zanker, 2014). Paffenholz (2014) is also focused on the inclusion of civil society in her research but formulates a 9-point list of different models of inclusion. With this list (Ibid, pp.76-77) as a guideline I will below try to cover what I see as the three main models of inclusion. Although Paffenholz (2014) differentiates further based on the role of the included, and only concern herself with inclusion of civil society, I find her framework flexible enough to explain the inclusion of other actors too. Although being intent on broadening the understanding of legitimisation inclusion, civil society constitutes a suitable starting point for covering previous research.

Kew and Wanis-St. John (2008, p.18) articulately captures the essence of ‘Why?’ inclusion is needed by addressing the fact that civilians, despite being the primary victim of conflict, often is excluded from the peacemaking. This they claim is a moral dilemma where the legitimacy of the process is in serious doubt. Involving civil society groups as representatives is then one method of achieving legitimacy and inclusion of the ‘civilians’ by proxy (Ibid). It is an increasingly discussed method within peace research and international negotiation studies, but it has also, as is noted by Kew and Wanis-St. John (Ibid), been practiced and strongly emphasised by the UN. The benefits of civil society inclusion are at least twofold as is described by Bell and O’Rourke (2007) when they explain how civil society can be utilised for the purposes of both providing legitimacy and expertise to a peace process. The research on the topic had however until recently been primarily researched through case studies which motivated Nilsson’s (2012) recent statistical investigation of the improvement of peace processes through inclusion of civil society. She did a study of 83 different cases of civil war peace agreements and found a significant statistical improvement of the conflicts’ durability in the cases where civil society actors were included (Ibid, pp.255-258). However, the key argument against inclusion is that an agreement is never achieved at all due to “hardliners” spoiling the negotiations (Paffenholz, 2014; Kew & Wanis-St. John, 2008; Nilsson, 2012; Licklider, 2003; Zartman, 2008; Zanker, 2014). The inclusion of civil society isn’t unproblematic. Paffenholz (2014, pp.72-73) describes how civil society is sometimes just another supporter of one of the sides in the conflict thus not increasing the diversity of representation, but rather reinforcing one side in a partisan manner, leading to a decreased legitimacy. She also argues that in such occasions it is often very difficult to find the appropriate representatives. This is something Kew and Wanis-St. John (2008, p.32) also discuss within the scope of the Burundi peace process where local civil society was severely de-legitimised as groups were only taking a partisan role in the process.

Political inclusion of the different warring parties or other stakeholders in the negotiations, as well as in post-conflict political arrangements, is often rejected with arguments similar to those for exclusion of civil society. Licklider (2003) describes how mediators often are more inclined to negotiate with few and more ‘moderate’ actors. This as the negotiations are generally complicated by the inclusion of more parties (Raiffa, 2004). Licklider (2003, p.701) states that this is a huge mistake as the more ‘extreme’ parties and stakeholders can easily destabilise the situation if left outside of the negotiations, especially before the peace process is thoroughly underway. This renders the attempts on full inclusion of the warring parties

necessary. Licklider (Ibid) does however argue that despite the need for inclusion of the 'extremists', they should not be given too much power in the negotiations. If the peace process is kept stable long enough by the relative accommodation of the extremists' demands, then the moderates on both sides may manage to form a strong enough coalition to achieve a stable agreement without the support of the extremists. Licklider (2003, p.701) is, like Kew and Wanis-St. John's (2008) example of Burundi above, arguing that insufficient representation may cripple the legitimacy of the whole peace process which ultimately also undermines future attempts on peacemaking. Lanz (2011) argues that there are two main factors determining what actors are included and excluded in the negotiations. The first one is the mediator's notion of which actors that need to be included to effectively reach a durable peace, and the second is whether the actors are in line with the global norms that are promoted by the peacemakers (Ibid, p.291). Considering these reasons for inclusion and exclusion the tension between the two becomes influential even to the legitimacy of the peace process. On one side the peacemaking process gains an increased legitimacy if the necessary stakeholders for a more durable peace are included. But the global legitimacy of the mediator can become seriously compromised – which risks spreading to the process – if they include actors that are breaking with the global norms of peacemaking (Ibid, p.281). In Lanz's (2011, p.282) table of reasons for exclusion and inclusion are "intransigent hardliners" and actors that "unnecessarily complicate peace negotiations" classified as 'Factors of Exclusion'. This is reiterated by Stedman (1997) who claims that the exclusion of certain smaller actors is necessary to not get the process 'spoiled' by hardliners. It goes partly against what Licklider (2003) argues above and the general understanding of inclusion as a means for durability.

These matters are primarily concerned with the inclusion at the negotiation table but in most conflicts the negotiating partners expect political inclusion even after the conflict, which is why 'post-conflict arrangements' is included in 'political inclusion'. Miedema (2010) is discussing this from a case study of Fiji's reforms in 1997. She claims, in the context of ethnic conflict, that inclusive political institutions in the post-conflict situation have the benefit of building a greater trust, or "inter-ethnic social capital", between the groups of the conflict. This will in the longer run lead to a greater legitimacy for the peace among all the people of the country as well as less divisions between the now cooperating ethnic groups. Joshi (2013) demonstrates in his article his statistical evidence that the emergence of a political process in the aftermath of a civil conflict, although especially in peacekeeping situations, increases the

durability of the peace. This he bases on an analysis of “post-civil war data from between 1946 and 2005” (Ibid, p.363).

Finally, the legitimisation of the peace process through inclusion can be achieved through the application of a referendum. Paffenholz (2014, pp.86-87) describes “Public Decision Making” as a standard feature of democratic peacemaking efforts as decision makers and the negotiating parties can find legitimacy for their efforts through a majority decision of the population through referendum. She mentions that through the legitimacy given from a referendum the power in negotiations of possibly spoiling hardliner outliers is diminished. The referendum does however also constitute a risk, if the support for the negotiations is less than expected (Ibid, p.86). In such occasions the peace process may be halted if the referendum constitutes an early mandate tool, or if it is a final ratifying tool then the whole peace process may be declined. Loizides (2014, p.243) describes the method similarly but also identifies the two main necessities of effective use of referendum as a peacemaking tool: the appropriate application of “leadership” and “timing and early consultation with the public”. He elaborates on leadership by mainly focusing on the leadership’s role in opinion forming and to achieve the necessary support for the continuation of the peace process, or the implementation of the peace agreement (Ibid). On “timing and early consultation with the public” Loizides (2014, pp.243-245) means that a good sense of public opinion makes it easier to time when to use the referendum tool to secure the appropriate mandate for a comprehensive peacemaking process. Lee and MacGinty (2012), similarly to Loizides’ argumentation, point out the fragility of referendums as a peacemaking tool and that the timing and preparations are the most important factors. They point out from analysing five cases of peacemaking referendums that the exclusion of minorities or other groups, both in terms of negotiating the reforms formulated in the agreement and by not informing certain groups sufficiently about the core issues of the referendum, constitute a major reason of failed referendums (Lee & MacGinty, 2012, p.59).

Throughout the description of previous research above, the tension between the aim of securing legitimacy and durability for the process, and to reach an agreement, has been demonstrated. It is along these lines that legitimising inclusiveness in peacemaking processes is understood and analysed, with both the possibilities and risks of inclusion.

8.2 Legitimate statehood

The elaboration and problematisation of the pragmatic/idealist tension, which follows on the analysis of the documents, sets out to discuss the role of democratic values, governance, and legitimate statehood. However, the literature on governance and statehood accumulated over the last few millennia is too vast to cover as a mere elaboration of the content idea analysis in this study. Thus, the aim is rather to put the result back in the context which was described in the introduction of this thesis, to better understand the different perspectives on state legitimacy – and ultimately legitimate peace – still present today by an examination of both historical and contemporary theories. The scope of this following account of theories is limited to a few theoreticians selected to appropriately demonstrate the divide. One that is not included is Foucault who, although writing extensively on governmentality, was not deemed entirely relevant in this thesis.

- *Historical theories*

The historical writings of Machiavelli and Hobbes are dominated by theories of power and the obligation of the state to be powerful in relation to other states but also towards its own people. Machiavelli breaks from the previous idea of Christian morality as a source of legitimate wielding of power and instead argues that obtaining power makes you the legitimate authority by your possession of power alone (Nederman, 2014). Thus a strong ruler and a powerful state is, by its very authoritarianism alone, legitimate. Hobbes (Dean, 2010, pp.123-124) similarly claims that the state enjoys some sovereignty which is independent of its subjects. But contrasting with Machiavelli Hobbes is a social contract theorist who argues that the state has a responsibility towards its people just as they have responsibilities towards the state. Dean (2010, p.254) eloquently describes Hobbes' absolutist form of government as "the 'state' is inherent in but greater than any particular institutions that comprise a civil government.". Which place the state at a clear hierarchal advantage in relation to the population. Both Machiavelli and Hobbes are regarded as two of the first realists within political philosophy (Luke, 2017) as they both shared an idea about people as fundamentally greedy, antisocial and competitive (Encyclopædia Britannica, 2017b). This is also the key aspect connecting the two theoreticians, both claim the weaknesses of the people render a strong ruler necessary to keep the society and state in order.

- *Contemporary theories*

Gilley (2006, pp.500-501) uses a definition of state legitimacy formulated as: “*a state is more legitimate the more that it is treated by its citizens as rightfully holding and exercising political power*“. This captures one of the main differences between democratic and more authoritarian understandings of legitimate governance and appropriate state - population relations. That the populations support, or lack of it, is what constitutes the relative legitimacy enjoyed by the state. Habermas (1994) describes the liberal democratic approach as understanding the government as an “apparatus of public administration” which is in line with the interests of society. This liberal democracy oriented perspective of state legitimacy is further elaborated upon by Beetham (1991). He identifies two broad categories of legitimisation features. The first one concerns itself with the political system with elections, majority rule and the “popular will”, and the second with the economic capitalist system based on private ownership and free choice (Ibid, pp.163-164).

This contemporary understanding of democratic legitimacy enjoys a broad recognition in the academic world, although it is probably more established in the realm of international policy making. Rothstein (2015) discuss this matter as he questions democracy as the primary source of political legitimacy. He argues that electoral democracy is often perceived as an equivalent of political legitimacy, partly due to its ‘equality’ in one person one vote, but by looking at the examples provided (e.g. Iraq & Yugoslavia) this quickly appears unfounded. Rothstein (2015) proposes instead that political legitimacy may in many cases be based rather on quality of governance than the presence of democratic elements. He claims that political legitimacy ultimately derives from the absence of “corruption, discrimination, and similar violations of the principle of impartiality in exercising political power” (Ibid, p.325). However, Rothstein (Ibid, p.326) argues that all political systems eventually lose touch with ‘reality’ and that democracy, with its element of legitimate political opposition, thus serves as a relatively well functioning political system to force the political elite to not lose touch with ‘reality’. Ensuring that the system keeps its political legitimacy through high-quality governance anchored in the opinion of the people.

The element of opposition has been discussed by many but Chantal Mouffe (Mouffe & Martin, 2013) is one of the most influential theoreticians on the subject. She is highly critical towards “third-way” or “radical centre” politics where the left/right divide in politics is blurred and the oppositional element of politics is curbed (Ibid, pp.157-159). Mouffe (Ibid, pp.167-171) is critical towards the dominant understanding of democracy as ‘liberal-

democracy' as she claims that liberalism and democracy have inherently different and non-reconcilable understandings of equality.² She argues that a consensus is only reachable through exclusion, which brings us back to the question of legitimacy. Mouffe (Ibid, p.174) then argues that as a fully inclusive consensus is not achievable, democratic legitimacy will always be a product of hegemony and exclusion.

8.3 Democracy

Coming from the discussion above on democratic legitimacy, as well as the earlier account of research on democratic peacemaking, a distinction of the term *democracy* is required.

Although this is a broad concept with a multitude of different systems and possible interpretations, the concept must be at least partially clarified.

Democracy is rule by the people. The concept has however been developed thoroughly since its early practice in ancient Greece (Encyclopædia Britannica, 2017a). The understanding of democracy applied in this study is one which derives much of its roots from the writings of Rawls (1971). His democratic framework as a non-utilitarian understanding of democracy, where all are entitled basic human rights and liberty, sets a good foundation for a contemporary understanding of democracy. It is often discussed under the name *deliberative democracy* (Young, 2000) in academic settings and the concept encapsulates both the ideas of Rawls (1971) and the concept of social sustainability. Young (2000, pp.21-25) describes deliberative democracy as one of discussion, inclusion, rational collective decisions and equal say in the process. Elster (1998, p.5) further describes the system, and refers to the roots of the theory with writings from Rawls and Habermas, by noting that it is based on the principle that legitimate political choices “must be the outcome of deliberation about ends among free, equal and rational agents”. Deliberative democracy is, as Elster (Ibid, p.8) is stating, a multi-faceted concept with many different interpretations – too many to cover within the scope of this study (see e.g.; Elster, 1998; or Young, 2000). However, the key to understanding the use of the concept in this study is the importance of equality of rights, inclusion, and rational decision-making through discussion.

² Mouffe describes how the individualistic nature of liberalism clashes with the idea of democracy as it entails a sense of homogeneity. She explains how liberalism and democracy have different understandings of equality where liberalism asserts the equality of each individual, while a democracy requires to be able to distinguish between those who belong to the 'demos' and those who do not, thus making inequality a necessity for democracy. For a longer explanation see Mouffe and Martin (2013, ch.10).

9. Results

The result from the analysis of the peace processes is presented individually. First the background of the peace process is described to inform the reader of the context from which the documents have been interpreted. Then the content idea analysis of the documents is introduced by presenting the arguments and statements identified as pro-inclusion or exclusion. A classification of the statements and arguments is first done through a distinction along the lines of different methods of inclusion: through referendum, through civil society, and through political inclusion of the different parties. Most arguments are pro inclusion, but in the cases where pro exclusion arguments are present – or where inclusion arguments are absent – this is also indicated and analysed. If further distinction is needed within these categories, it is applied based on the arguments’ characteristics. These statements are then also assessed in terms of validity based on their truthfulness, if they are not considered value-based arguments. By the end of each peace process analysis a summary of that individual analysis is presented. Finally a deeper, more reflective, analysis of the accumulated result is provided to clearly connect the result not only to previous research but also to the theories on legitimate statehood and democracy.

9.1 – Northern Ireland

9.1.1 – Background

The conflict in Northern Ireland was one with roots far back in history as the relationship between the Irish people and the British colonisers has been problematic since the 17th century. The conflict has primarily revolved around the British’ role as colonisers, and the religious discrimination of Irish Catholics by English protestants. Both were worsened after the decision to split Ireland into North and South in the early 1920’s following the independence of the south (UCDP, 2017b). The peace process that is analysed here is however limited to the conflict between the resistance movement known as the Provisional IRA and the Governments of Northern Ireland and the United Kingdom, commonly referred to as the “troubles”. UCDP (2017b) refer to it as a three decade long “*violent period*” from 1968 to 1998, and as *active*³ from 11th of August 1970 when the first battle-related death was recorded. The start of the conflict is also often intertwined with the emergence of the

³ UCDP focus on battle-related deaths to define a conflict as active or inactive. It was often difficult to determine whether the deaths were battle-related or not due to the difficulty of differing between IRA members and civilians but in 1970 the conflicts first battle-related death was registered.

Provisional IRA (UCDP, 2017b; English, 2004, pp.144-147). The IRA, the Irish Republican Army, was initially from the 1920's serving as the newly founded independent Ireland's army and was composed by volunteers that had fought for the independence of all Ireland (UCDP, 2017b; English, 2004, pp.42-43). In 1969 following several years of weakening both in resources and aims (English, 2004, pp.81-85) the Provisional IRA broke away from the Official IRA (as they had to call themselves after the divide). The Provisional IRA wanted to, in contrast to the Official IRA, to pursue a unified Ireland rather than just achieve equal treatment of Irish Catholics. The Provisional IRA quickly surpassed the Official IRA in support and strength and soon became known as simply IRA as the old IRA faded away (UCDP, 2017b; English, 2004). The violence increased and they were particularly known for using car bombs especially in Northern Ireland in the 1970's but also in the UK and abroad from the 1980's onwards. Although other violent groups were active in the conflict, the IRA remained the main one throughout the conflict (UCDP, 2017b). The conflict calmed down in the 1990's as attempts at peace through dialogue were pursued. Initially without including Sinn Féin⁴, due to a reluctance from the IRA to start decommissioning before the negotiations and a reluctance from the other parties to accept a ceasefire as a sufficient 'commitment to exclusively peaceful methods' (Ibid). Eventually a ceasefire was agreed as a sufficient 'commitment' and inclusive negotiations could pursue. The result was the Good Friday peace agreement including the principle that any change to the status of Northern Ireland had to come through a majority decision by the people of Northern Ireland, the IRA and other violent non-governmental groups were to be disarmed, and constitutional changes were to be done to ensure the representation of both Catholics and Protestants in the Northern Irish government (UCDP, 2017b; English, 2004, pp.297-302). The following referendum decided to keep Northern Ireland in the UK but to accept the peace agreement.

9.1.2 – Analysis

The documents analysed include the Anglo-Irish Agreement (UN, 1985), the Downing-street Declaration (UN, 1993), the 'A New Framework Agreement' (UN, 1995), the Good Friday Agreement (UN, 1998), the IRA Ceasefire Statement from 1994 (CAIN, 2016a), and the Joint statement issued by John Humes and Gerry Adams on 18th of July 1997 (CAIN, 2016b). These documents were chosen on a basis of relevance where the first four documents are central to the process in that they are building upon each other. The two latter documents are

⁴ The political branch of the IRA also aiming for a unified Ireland, and often used as a proxy for the IRA in the peace talks.

included to show the response from IRA, and their political proxy Sinn Féin, which were constant parts of the process although often excluded from the official negotiations. The statements were also mentioned either in the official agreements (UN, 1995, p.1) or by UCDP (2017b) and on that basis chosen as relevant in relation to an analysis of the process.

Referendum inclusion

The arguments and statements categorized as in favour of inclusion through referendum are plentiful throughout the official documents (UN, 1985, 1993, 1995, 1998). A statement which is reiterated, although later elaborated, in all the following documents is on the status of Northern Ireland. It states that “any change to the status of Northern Ireland would only come about with the consent of a majority of the people in Northern Ireland” (UN, 1985, p.3). This is a clear statement which, although it does not in this stage mention a referendum, lays the foundation for what the process will eventually lead up to. In this first case it is formulated as a statement rather than an argument as it lacks a motivation, but in other similar cases the statement is elaborated upon with motivations of “peace, stability and reconciliation”, “stability and well-being” (UN, 1993, p.2) or by value-based motivations of the inherent goodness of democratic values (UN, 1998, p.3). The arguments’ main point is that inclusion through referendum is necessary for a ‘stable peace’ which is emphasised at several occasions in different wordings (UN, 1993 pp.2-3, 1995 p.2,3,13). This is generally accepted as likely in the democratic peacemaking discourse, however, Lee and MacGinty (2012), Paffenholz (2014), and Loizides (2014) also point out the fragility of the tool as a failed referendum may spoil the whole process. The lack of evidence for the argument undermines its truthfulness and renders, both the arguments based on claims about stability and the ones with only a reference to the inherent goodness of democracy, value-based arguments. The presence of such arguments should be noted but no attempt on assessing their validity will be pursued.

No arguments or statements were found which could be interpreted as being against inclusion through referendum or majority public decision making.

Civil society inclusion

The arguments concerning the inclusion of civil society are sparse. In the Good Friday Agreement (UN, 1998) where the operational aspects of the agreement have been formulated civil society is included in a few operational post-conflict aspects. The establishment of a consultative forum which is “comprising the social partners and other members with expertise in social, cultural, economic and other issues” (UN, 1998, p.15) is suggested without any real

motivation. In the same document is the inclusion of civil society organisations in reconciliatory work and work with the victims also emphasised as ‘having a vital role in consolidating peace and political agreement’ (Ibid, p.20). It is also stated that the commission on policing for Northern Ireland “should consult widely, including with non-governmental expert organisations” (Ibid, p.25). This consultation is not directly motivated in that clause but in the first clause on “policing and justice” is an indirect motivation formulated as an aim for the policing to “recognise the full and equal legitimacy and worth of the identities, senses of allegiance and ethos of all sections of the community in Northern Ireland” (Ibid, p.23).

The validity of the first statement (UN, 1998, p.15) is impossible to analyse as no concrete motivation is provided, and thus no truthfulness is possible to assess. The statement arguing that inclusion of civil society in reconciliatory work “has a vital role in consolidating peace and political agreement” (UN, 1998, p.20) can however be assessed in its validity. It does correlate with the quantitative findings by Nilsson (2012, pp.255-258) that inclusion of civil society lead to a more stable peace. Despite the obvious contextual differences, and thus outcomes, between different peace processes the statement must be acknowledged as an objectively valid argument. The final statement saying that “non-governmental expert organisations” will be consulted on the topic of policing and justice (UN, 1998, p.25) is more complex in terms of interpretation as no motivation is included in the same clause. The motivation is instead found in the first four clauses on policing and justice, all setting out the issue of achieving trust and legitimacy from both communities as the key aspect of the necessary policing reformation (UN, 1998, p.23). The validity and truthfulness of such an argument is thus dependent on the ability of civil society inclusion to achieve trust for the legal system in conflicts between divided communities. Bell and O’Rourke (2007, pp.302-303) address this issue as they claim that civil society organisations are used in cases where reformation of legal institutions not only need the expertise that civil society organisations possess but also need to legitimise the new institutions. Although no statistically verified data is provided on the issue the argument in the document should be seen as valid as it is based on experience from other peace processes.

No arguments or statements were found that could be interpreted as being against the inclusion of civil society. The general lack of mentions about civil society or other non-governmental organisations in all documents up until the Good Friday Agreement (UN, 1998) is however noteworthy.

Political inclusion

The arguments and statements concerning political inclusion, or exclusion, both in terms of negotiations and post-conflict political arrangements were plentiful but also the most difficult to interpret. Especially as the language of diplomacy often consciously include vagueness, which Vedung (1977, pp.70-71) is also emphasising. There are however examples of statements and arguments both in favour of inclusion and exclusion, and some that has more of a dual or vague nature. The statements and arguments in favour of political inclusion primarily differ in their emphasis on either inclusion of *the two “traditions” or “communities” in post-conflict political arrangements*, or inclusion of *IRA/Sinn Féin or other violent non-governmental actors in the negotiations*.

Statements in favour of the inclusion of the *two communities* were found in all the investigated documents (UN, 1985, 1993, 1995, 1998; CAIN, 2016b) except for IRA’s Ceasefire Statement from 1994 (CAIN, 2016a). It is however only a few of these that can be interpreted as concerning themselves with *post-conflict political arrangements* instead of just the general accommodation of ‘interests’ or ‘rights’. In the Anglo-Irish Agreement (1985, p.6) under Article 4, on the devolving of certain responsibilities to Northern Ireland, it is formulated that both Governments recognise that “devolution can be achieved only with the co-operation of constitutional representatives within Northern Ireland of both traditions there”. This statement is primarily saying that both traditions need to cooperate politically but it is motivated by the previous clause stating that they work for “peace, stability and prosperity...by promoting reconciliation, respect for human rights...social and cultural cooperation” (Ibid, p.6). In ‘A New Framework Agreement’ (1995, p.4) under the heading ‘Constitutional issues’ it is stated in Clause 14 that due to the “depth of divisions between the two main traditions in Northern Ireland... [a] new approach to the traditional constitutional doctrines on both sides” is required. This is then followed up by Clause 22 saying that the Irish and UK government “strongly favour and will support provision for cross-community consensus in relation to decisions affecting the basic rights, concerns and fundamental interests of both communities” (Ibid, p.6). In the Joint statement by John Hume and Gerry Adams 1997 (CAIN, 2016b) they state that “A just and lasting settlement will only be achieved if it ... has the allegiance of both traditions. Such a solution requires change, political and constitutional”. All the three statements above are examples of how it has throughout the process by different actors been argued that political inclusion of both ‘traditions’ is required, motivated by a claim to lasting or stable peace. The validity of such an

argument rests upon whether or not the inclusion of clashing “communities” in post-conflict institutional reforms renders the peace more stable. Miedema (2010, pp.311-331) argues in the context of ethnic conflicts – which is similar to the Northern Ireland ‘communities’ situation – that the feeling of ownership of state institutions helps to develop “inter-ethnic social capital” which in turn stabilises the conflict. This she however only backs up by exemplifying how the all-encompassing feeling of ownership was ignored in Fiji 1997 where the constitution was rewritten without taking this into account leading up to a new coup in 2000 (Ibid, p.315). Considering that the lack of “inter-ethnic social capital” – or trust between the two communities – was one of the key aspects of the conflict (UCDP, 2017b), addressing the issue is reasonably a stabilising factor. The arguments’ validity can thus be recognised as reasonable but not necessarily certain.

The arguments for the inclusion of *IRA/Sinn Féin or other non-governmental violent groups in the negotiations* are easy to find in the statements by IRA and Sinn Féin. In IRA’s ceasefire statement from 1994 (CAIN, 2016a) they state that “A solution will only be found as a result of inclusive negotiations” and in the joint statement by Hume and Adams 1997 (CAIN, 2016b) they argue that “inclusive negotiations are the only way of reaching agreement and achieving a just and lasting peace for all the people of this island”. The validity of these two statements is difficult to test, as whether a solution without them at the negotiating table is possible is to some extent up to themselves. Excluded parties can, as is stated by for example Licklider (2003), easily ‘spoil’ the peace process. Thus the validity of the statement is to some extent prone to the actions of the IRA, but it may also be regarded in relation to the general need for inclusion set out by Licklider (2003). He, just as Stedman (1997) and Lanz (2011), states that some exclusion is necessary to achieve a peace deal but that one must include the ‘necessary’ actors. These are of course hard to pin-point, but as IRA/Sinn Féin constituted the largest non-governmental actor they should be regarded as ‘necessary’ for a negotiated end to the conflict and thus the statements are rendered valid.

In the other documents (UN, 1985, 1993, 1995, 1998) the statements related to the inclusiveness of the negotiations are more often of an excluding than including nature. In both the Anglo-Irish Agreement (UN, 1985, p.2) and in the Downing Street Declaration (UN, 1993, p.3) there are clear rejections of violently pursued political goals and any actors affiliated with such violence. In Clauses 7 and 10 of the Downing Street Declaration (UN, 1993, pp.3-4) is the Irish and UK Governments expressing that unity and peace may only be achieved with peaceful means and that all parties that want to be part of the negotiations must

“establish a commitment to exclusively peaceful methods and... abide by the democratic process” (Ibid, p.4). The diplomatic language of these statements complicates the interpretation but read with the background in mind, the statements are clearly excluding. The IRA/Sinn Féin saw a ceasefire as a sufficient “commitment to exclusively peaceful methods” while the other negotiating parties argued for – and excluded on that basis – a decommissioning as the sufficient ‘commitment’ (UCDP, 2017b). Thus these clauses were excluding. Both statements respectively were motivated by their preceding clause (clause 6 & 9 in UN, 1993) where they were emphasising the need for trust: “Every effort must be made to build a new sense of trust between those communities” (Ibid, p.3) and “to build the trust necessary to end past divisions, leading to an agreed and peaceful future” (Ibid, p.4). It should be noted that this notion of trust is emphasised in the IRA/Sinn Féin statements too (CAIN, 2016a, 2016b) but the different understandings of “commitment to exclusively peaceful methods” are what makes it difficult. The validity of these statements is based on the notion that peaceful means are necessary to achieve and increase trust between the two communities, but where the line is drawn for peaceful means is rendering the validity of these statements impossible to determine.

9.1.3 – Summary

The documents from the Northern Ireland peace process contained many interesting examples of inclusion/exclusion arguments. One prevalent argument was the ‘stable peace argument’ which argued in favour of inclusion with the motivation of an increased stability of the peace. The argument was identified in all three inclusion categories, although the wordings differed between the cases they all had a general emphasis of a more ‘consolidated’, ‘stable’ or ‘lasting’ peace through inclusion. Some of the other examples demonstrated especially well both problematic and interesting aspects of the tension between the pragmatic and the idealist approach. One was the arguments for the inclusion of both communities in post-conflict arrangements. This is an inclusive practice, but to see it as a solely idealist approach becomes problematic considering the centrality of the religious divide to the conflict. The inclusion of the two communities was a necessity to achieve a peaceful agreement, thus also becoming pragmatic. Another example is the exclusion of the IRA on the grounds of their lacking “commitment to exclusively peaceful methods”. This is an excluding practice, but to consider it to be a pragmatic approach – in the sense of achieving a peace efficiently – is highly problematic. The exclusion can be seen as based on idealist norms about what practices can be accepted from an actor included in a democratic peace process, but it may also be seen as a

way to achieve greater legitimacy from those who see the IRA as a non-legitimate actor and don't want them included in the peace.

9.2 – Colombia

9.2.1 – Background

The intra-state conflict in Colombia has been on-going for over half a century as it has its roots in the violent period of the late 1940's and 1950's when liberal guerrillas were organising violent attacks against other villages. It eventually led up to a political solution where the liberals were included on the government's side despite previously having stated their intention to overthrow the government (UCDP, 2017a). After the deal the communists were the new target for state violence and in 1966 the 'Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia' or FARC (Eng. Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia), the main non-governmental warring actor, was formed and is still active today (UCDP, 2017a; Bergquist, Peñaranda, & Sánchez, 2001). The left-wing guerrilla group was first formed as 'the Southern Bloc Guerrilla' in 1964, but changed its name to FARC two years later. The other main guerrilla group ELN was also formed in 1964 and has also had a major impact on the conflict (Ibid). This peace process and analysis does however primarily concern itself with the negotiations between the Colombian Government and FARC although occasional invitations to "other guerrilla forces" (UN, 2012) appear in the documents. FARC have throughout the conflict had its strongest support in the rural areas of the country where they also were able to harness the profits from the coca leaf which added yet another dimension to the conflict as it became intertwined with the international drug trade (UCDP, 2017a; Bergquist et al., 2001, p.24). In the early 1980's attempts were made to find a political solution to the conflict where negotiations led to the eventual demilitarization and inclusion of several guerrilla groups in Colombian politics. These attempts were however spoiled by the extensive assassinations of previous guerrilla members by the far-right paramilitary groups, and no all-inclusive solution was found (UCDP, 2017a). In 2012 the negotiations between FARC and the Colombian Government - with president Santos in the lead - were once again officially opened after several years of hard-line strategy under the previous president Uribe (UCDP, 2017a). They set out the principles for the negotiations in the *General Agreement for the Termination of the Conflict and the Construction of a Stable and Lasting Peace* (UN, 2012). Although initially stating that the negotiations were to be finished in a couple of months it took until 2016 before the agreement was concluded. It was then rejected in a referendum on the 2nd of October 2016

with a margin of 0.4 percentage units. A new agreement was formulated through negotiations with the oppositional ‘No’-side, led by ex-president Uribe, by accommodating some of their interest into the new revised version of the old agreement (WOLA, 2016, November 15), but this analysis is limited to the process until the referendum.

9.2.2 – Analysis

The main documents included in the analysis is the “General Agreement for the Termination of the Conflict” (UN, 2012), the “First Joint Report of the Dialogue Table between the Government of the Republic of Colombia and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People’s Army, FARC – EP” (Mesa de Conversaciones, 2013, June 21), the “Joint Comunicado, Havana, November 6, 2013” (Mesa de Conversaciones, 2013, November 6), and a summary of the final peace accord announcement called “Excerpts From the August 24 Announcement of a Final Peace Accord Between the Colombian Government and the FARC” (WOLA, 2016, August 25). The version of the final agreement that was rejected in the referendum, “Acuerdo Final para la Terminación del Conflicto y la Construcción de una Paz Estable y Duradera” (WOLA, 2016, November 15), is only analysed sparsely as no English version of the document is available, and the process of translating such a, language wise, difficult material may limit the reliability of the analysis.

Referendum Inclusion

No mentions of referendum in either positive or negative wording was found in any of the documents until the final agreement (WOLA, 2016, November 15). In the final document the upcoming referendum was mentioned at least at two occasions (Ibid, pp.5,179). At neither of the occasions was it accompanied with a clear motivation.

The general absence of any statements or arguments emphasising the importance of majority decisions or even mentions of a referendum as the ratification method is important to note here. Without starting to analyse unofficial documents, it is important to contextualise, especially considering that the referendum already early on was pushed by the Government and Santos but opposed by FARC (WOLA, 2013, November 15). This renders the referendum a contested topic during the course of the negotiations, that this was not articulated in the documents is important to note.

Civil society inclusion

Mentions of civil society inclusion was plentiful and formulated with different motivations and aims. In the first document (UN, 2012, p.1) they state that “it is important to broaden

democracy as a condition to build solid foundations for peace” and in the next clause sending an “invitation to the entire Colombian society, as well as to the organisations of regional integration and the international community to accompany this process”. This is later in the document complemented with a decision to establish a mechanism for receiving citizen proposals “to guarantee the widest possible participation” (Ibid, p.3). In the *First Joint Report* (Mesa de Conversaciones, 2013, June 21, p.5) the invitation of “experts on the agrarian topic and its problem issues, and of leaders and members of peasant associations” to the negotiating table was motivated by “the purpose of getting firsthand knowledge of the opinions, experiences and analyses regarding the situation on the Colombian countryside”.

These three examples are significant in the sense that they represent the three main ways in which civil society inclusion is motivated in the documents. The first example motivates the inclusiveness by a claim that democracy, and civil society, is an important “condition to build solid foundations for peace” (UN, 2012, p.1). This reference to *solid* foundations for peace has led the argument to be categorized as a *stable peace argument*. The second example is arguing for the citizen and civil society inclusion, through a mechanism for proposals, with the motivation of “to guarantee the widest possible support” (UN, 2012, p.3). As this example is referring to an inherent goodness of democratic principles and inclusion it has been categorized as a *value-based argument*. The third example is using a more pragmatic motivation of the inclusion of civil society representatives and experts as they claim it was to get “firsthand knowledge of the opinions, experiences and analyses regarding the situation on the Colombian countryside”. This example is categorized as a *problem-solving argument*. All these three categories will now be elaborated.

Another example of a *stable peace argument* is present in the *First Joint Report* (Mesa de Conversaciones, 2013, June 21), this is however complemented with a similar argument in the *Joint Comunicado* (Mesa de Conversaciones, 2013, November 6) although it rather stresses the importance of inclusion to achieve peace. In the former the Comprehensive Rural Reform [CRR], which was formulated with great help from civil society, is described as built on “equity and democracy, thus contributing to avoid repeating the conflict and to the construction of a stable and long-lasting peace” (Mesa de Conversaciones, 2013, June 21, p.7). In the latter they are arguing that “The construction of peace requires citizen engagement in public interests matters” (Mesa de Conversaciones, 2013, November 6, p.1). These arguments’ validity is primarily based on the truthfulness of the notion that the inclusion of civil society is either necessary for creating peace or keeping the peace stable. As Nilsson

(2012) has proved the statistical connection between civil society inclusion and the stability, or durability, of peace these arguments can be recognized as valid on a general basis despite the possibility that this peace will not endure.

In terms of other *value-based arguments* there are a few good examples, one of which is where they argue that the inclusion of civil society in two different forums have been “an example of plural and democratic deliberation, befitting of a peace process” (Mesa de Conversaciones, 2013, June 21, p.7). Other examples are when they argue for citizen participation motivated by “the purpose is to empower citizens through participation” (Mesa de Conversaciones, 2013 November 6, p.2), an argument which is further motivated by a guarantee “to channel citizen demands, including guarantees for peaceful mobilization, protest and peaceful coexistence within the context of broadened democracy” (Ibid). The above-mentioned examples are value-based arguments as they don't provide any other motivation than references to democratic ideals and norms such as the right to protest, empowerment through participation, and that peace processes ‘should be’ democratic. These value-based arguments are, as was stated in the method section, not being tested in terms of validity but it is important to note the presence of these arguments especially in relation to the tension between the idealist and pragmatic which is the focus of this study, and with the background that certain international democratic norms exist when it comes to how a peace process is to be conducted (Bell & O'Rourke, 2007; Lanz, 2011). Although these value-based arguments only constitute a minority of the civil society inclusion arguments in the Colombian peace process documents analysed here, they are examples of arguments rather based on an idealist notion of how peace processes are to be conducted rather than the pragmatism of how to achieve the best possible peace as quickly as possible.

The *problem-solving arguments* are especially present in the documents consisting of finished operative clauses. For example, in the *First Joint Report* (Mesa de Conversaciones, 2013, June 21, p.5) where they included civil society “with the purpose of getting firsthand knowledge of the opinions, experiences and analyses regarding the situation on the Colombian countryside”. Later in the same document are the discussion Forums to which civil society was invited described as having “provided substantial and fundamental contributions for the development of the items of the Agenda” (Ibid, p.7). Receiving the lacking information, from civil society and experts that know it best, for informed decision-making is a clear problem-solving issue. Another example of this was identified in the *Joint Comunicado* (Mesa de Conversaciones, 2013, November 6, p.2) as they state that they will

facilitate a forum on how to guarantee rights for political opposition with the “participation of spokespersons from social organizations and movements, experts and scholars, for the submission of their proposals”. In the same document is the inclusion of civil society in observer roles motivated with “Increased citizen control over the administration and public management contributes to transparency and the fight against corruption” (Ibid). In the *Final Agreement* (WOLA, 2016, November 15, p.185) it is also stated on the topic of verification of the document, that they “may consult institutes with capacity in the field or other institutions and organizations of the civil society that can contribute to the verification of the implementation of the agreements”. Four out of the five above mentioned statements are examples where civil society inclusion is motivated based on their ability to provide expertise, information and proposals. One is motivated with the increased transparency when civil society is given observer status in relation to the implementation of the agreement. These statements’ validity is thus based on the truthfulness of these motivations. That civil society can provide expertise and valuable information on many topics is a well-established fact (e.g. Kew & Wanis-St. John, 2008; Corell, 1999). That the civil society invited to provide information and proposals in the Colombian peace process possessed the necessary expertise is not certain but it is likely considering the amount and diversity of actors invited to the forums (Mesa de Conversaciones, 2013, June 21, pp.6-7). This renders the first line of argumentation valid, both from a general perspective and specifically for this peace process. That inclusion of civil society leads to a greater transparency, and accountability, is emphasised in the contemporary academic literature (Nilsson, 2012) where they especially stress the importance of this in the implementation phase (Paffenholz, 2014, p.74; Kew & Wanis-St. John, 2008, p.24). Thus, both statements should be noted as valid as they are well backed up by findings in international peace research.

Political inclusion

Statements and arguments related to the area of political inclusion were identified in all the analysed documents, although the *Joint Comunicado* (Mesa de Conversaciones, 2013, November 6) focused on “Political participation” contain the majority of the statements. The statements differed in terms of both motivations and the sort of political inclusion intended. The main distinction I will be making here is between the *negotiation inclusion*, the *post-conflict inclusion of FARC in political life*, and the *general rights of political opposition post-conflict*. This distinction is difficult, especially considering that the political opposition rights of the public and of FARC often are intertwined and difficult to keep apart. For that reason

are only statements clearly linked to the future political position of FARC included in their category.

The statements and arguments linked to the *negotiation inclusion* are seen already in the first *General Agreement* (UN, 2012, p.1) where they clearly state that “construction of peace is a matter for society as a whole that requires the participation of all, without distinction, including other guerrilla forces that we invite to join this effort”. Although ELN, or any other guerrilla forces for that matter, didn’t join the negotiations until after it was ratified (WOLA, 2017, April 4) this is a clear argument for the inclusion of such groups. The argument is motivated with the claim that all of society should be included to create peace. This is later repeated in the *Announcement of the Final Agreement* (WOLA, 2016, August 25) where the FARC negotiator says “We hope that the ELN may find its own path, so that the peace that we long for may be completed fully, and in so doing involving all Colombians”, once again emphasising the importance of an entirely inclusive peace. These arguments are based on motivations of the importance of including all of society to achieve a full peace. The validity of these arguments is questionable considering that an academic concurrence exists concerning that some exclusion is necessary to reach an agreement (e.g. Raiffa, 2004; Lanz, 2001; Stedman, 1997) which is easier in the latter stages of a peace process (Licklider, 2003, p.701). They do, however, state that inclusion of the major parties to the conflict is necessary. Considering that ELN together with FARC has been two of the main guerrilla forces since the very beginning of the conflict (UCDP, 2017a), ELN should possibly be considered ‘necessary’ to include. Thus the argument that total inclusion is necessary to achieve peace should be considered a false, and purely idealist, statement. That negotiations with ELN is important to achieve an inclusive or ‘full’ peace can however be considered valid, on the prerequisite that ELN is deemed one of the major parties to the conflict.

Two statements related to the *post-conflict inclusion of FARC in political life* were identified in the documents. The first one is in the *Joint Comunicado* (Mesa de Conversaciones, 2013, November 6, p.3) where a security system, especially formed for the political activity of FARC, was argued for “to ensure the protection of those who exercise politics based on the respect for life and the freedom of thought and opinion. Its aim is to strengthen and deepen democracy and contributes towards the creation of an environment of coexistence and tolerance”. This must be interpreted with the many assassinations of demilitarised guerrilla members from previous peace attempts in mind. That makes the motivation of this statement two-sided. On one side, it is a value-based argument by the references to ‘freedom of thought

and opinion' and 'strengthen and deepen democracy' as motivation enough in itself. On the other side, it is also a complete necessity to provide protection for the demilitarised FARC members to ensure that their inclusion in political life doesn't constitute a death sentence. The other statement is found in the *Announcement of the Final Agreement* (WOLA, 2016, August 25) where President Santos defends the inclusion of FARC in political life by referring to the democratic principles: "They [FARC] must, just like any partisan organization, convince citizens through proposals and arguments in order to be elected". This is an argument which basically tries to argue for the political inclusion of FARC by saying that it is better that they are included in the system where the population then can choose not to vote for them rather than that they remain a guerrilla force which impose themselves upon society. Such an argument's truthfulness may be defended considering Joshi's (2013) statistical findings that a post-conflict democratic process increases the durability of peace. However, there are alternatives to a negotiated end to the conflict, such as a continued offensive against the guerrilla, which Uribe was committed to for a long time (Economist, 2016, August 27). From that perspective, as Santos is not saying anything about the durability, the argument should be seen as a value-based argument. It is however important to note that the inclusion of FARC still needs to be motivated just before the ratification referendum. This could be seen as an example of 'leadership' opinion forming which Loizides (2014, p.243) emphasise, although the timing would be considered poor as Loizides argue for an early consultation. The two statements on *post-conflict inclusion of FARC in political life* are thus difficult to assess in terms of validity as both contain motivations which are partly value-based. But as both also back up their motivations with more sturdy claims based on historical or statistical facts they are rendered partially valid.

The arguments for general rights of political opposition post-conflict were all found in the *Joint Comunicado* (Mesa de Conversaciones, 2013, November 6). The first one is arguing that "to consolidate peace, institutional changes will be made to facilitate the creation of political parties and the transformation of social organizations and movements with political vocation into their political parties or movements" (Ibid, p.3). This is followed up by an argument for support to the new political parties to "ensure the necessary political pluralism in the construction of peace" (Ibid, p.3). Both arguments are motivating the rights and inclusion by references to the construction or consolidation of peace. This is a valid point – in much the same way as when analysing the arguments for the inclusion of FARC above – considering the statistical findings by Joshi (2013) that a peace is more likely to survive when

accompanied with a democratic post-conflict process. One more argument is raised on the issue, for the “territorial integration and political inclusion of zones particularly affected by the conflict and abandonment” (Mesa de Conversaciones, 2013, November 6, p.3) motivated by the need to give them adequate representation in the political system again. This must be considered a value-based argument as no reason for the representation is provided, it is instead built on the normative values of democracy that all people should be represented.

Exclusion

No statements were identified in the analysed documents which were interpreted as pro exclusion. This is noteworthy for two primary reasons. First, the negotiations were conducted by the sitting Government thus excluding the oppositional ‘No’-side with the previous president Uribe until after the failed referendum (WOLA, 2016, November 15). Secondly, the inclusion of ELN was, although given room for in the General Agreement (UN, 2012), never given more attention despite their role as a second ‘necessary’ partner. Neither of these exclusions were explained despite being crucial to the peace process. With this said it might have been that it was stated in other documents than the ones analysed here, or simply that these matters were communicated through other mediums such as news or public speeches.

9.2.3 – Summary

In the Colombian peace process too were ‘stable peace arguments’ identified although they were complemented with arguments focusing on the ‘creation of peace’. The stable peace arguments were primarily applied to motivate the inclusion of civil society while the creation of peace arguments were applied to both civil society inclusion and political inclusion. Other arguments that were especially interesting are the calls for inclusion of ELN or ‘other guerrilla forces’ in the peace process which is an idealist notion in the sense that it is inclusive and potentially complicating. That they weren’t part of the negotiations may thus be seen as a pragmatic decision, as long as it wasn’t ELN’s decision. The inclusion of civil society as ‘problem solvers’ was also interesting in the sense that it is an inclusiveness which is motivated with pragmatic ideals of efficiency considering that they could get help with information collection and policy proposals. Lastly, the lack of arguments and statements concerned with referendum inclusion especially, and exclusion generally is once again important to note, although analysing the lack of something is difficult – both from a reliability and validity perspective and from a purely operational perspective. The lack of statements regarding a referendum seems to be a consequence of FARC’s opposition to it

(WOLA, 2014, March 4) and the fact that the peace process was generally seen by the public as a worse solution than a military elimination of FARC (WOLA, 2015, June 30).

9.3 – The pragmatic/Idealist tension

In the two peace processes just analysed, statements and arguments have been identified as either valid, not valid, value-based, or complex mixes where the statements are partly valid. This classification was done through an application of previous research and experience from the conflicts to decide whether the statements' claims and motivations correlated with tested practices focused on achieving peace, which should be the ultimate goal of any peace process. The existing tension between the idealist and pragmatic approach to peace negotiations which was described in the introduction, and then elaborated in *Previous research*, primarily set out the difference between the two as constituted by their respective willingness to include, or exclude, parties from the peace process. It is however important to note that these distinct lines drawn between the two appear much more blurred after considering the arguments presented in the documents and the research on successful peace negotiations. Some examples of this is:

- The long-stretching exclusion of IRA from the peace talks which is a case of exclusion but hardly a case of pragmatism as their exclusion seriously delayed the agreement.
- The extensive inclusion of civil society as an advising actor in the Colombian process which yet must be recognised as a pragmatic tool as it enabled them to efficiently both receive information and formulate proposals.
- The inclusion of both 'communities' in post-conflict arrangements which is in its inclusive nature idealist but considering that this divide was central to the conflict the inclusion must also be seen as pragmatic as no other peaceful solution was present.

Contemplating these concepts of inclusion/exclusion and idealist/pragmatic approach it quickly becomes apparent that both what is idealist, and maybe even more fascinatingly, what is pragmatic is highly dependent on the context, both in time and space.

The pragmatism described above, and the deductions made in the analysis, are all based on one common condition, that the peace should be achieved together, peacefully. However, as a conflict may also end with the elimination, or at least capitulation, of one side this is just another demonstration of the contemporary norms of how peace is ideally to be achieved. Going back to the writings of Machiavelli and Hobbes, the legitimacy of the state was

dependent on the power it wielded. In that context, and under those conditions, the norms would have been different. The power to eliminate your opponent would have rendered the state legitimate, rather than their willingness to together with their enemy achieve an inclusive agreement. This as a realist idea of individuals', and other actors', inherent greed and corruption makes an agreement unreliable and undesirable.

The modern conception of legitimacy through popular support in a democracy, with universal suffrage at the centre of that idea, is aimed at achieving legitimacy through the equal say in political life by use of the referendums, but it is important to remember that it does not have an inherent ability to create legitimacy. Instead, as Rothstein (2015) proposes, legitimacy may be conceived from 'good governance', being to keep in touch with reality and accommodate the interests of the public. This severely undermines the necessity of the referendum as a legitimacy tool, at least from a pragmatic standpoint. Considering the fragility that a referendum entails in a peace process (e.g. Paffenholz, 2014; Lee & MacGinty, 2012; Loizides, 2014). The democratic ideal to use a referendum to create legitimacy is not a necessity if legitimacy was conceived of as either the demonstration of power or the performance of good governance. But considering that deliberate democracy perceives legitimate political choices as "the outcome of deliberation about ends among free, equal and rational agents" (Elster, 1998, p.5), other democratic ideals than the referendum may still be necessary to achieve 'good governance'. First, many of the democratic practices are useful when trying to stay in touch with 'reality' and popular interests (Rothstein, 2015), something which is necessary to perform 'good governance'. Secondly, the norms of democratic legitimacy, although being a social construct, enjoy a huge support globally, being spread through the UN and the liberal capitalist system (Beetham, 1991), rendering these democratic practices' usage, rather than impact, a sign of 'good governance'.

The writings of Mouffe (Mouffe & Martin, 2013) about opposition and the impossibility of achieving consensus without exclusion does however make the ideals of deliberate democracy suddenly seem paradoxical. The idea that democracy should be a form of inclusive rational decision-making through discussion with equal say and rights to everyone becomes difficult to sustain if the exclusion of opposing views is necessary to reach an agreement at all. Following this line of thought the ideals of democratically legitimised peace appear as non-ideal for reaching a conclusion to the conflict, without some elements of pragmatic exclusion.

10. Conclusion

The conclusion is divided into three separate parts. The first part is to summarise the findings of the thesis, and to answer clearly the research questions. The second part discusses what contributions the thesis can claim to have made to the field. The third and final part proposes necessary fields of further research on the issue.

- “To what extent does the peace processes differ in their respective tendency to emphasise the importance of democratic inclusion?”

A few differences between the two processes have been identified. First of all, the Northern Ireland peace process is using arguments in favour of a popular majority decision on the final agreement, which is an example of inclusion through referendum, throughout the whole process. This is a distinct difference as no argument for, nor against, any type of majority decision was mentioned in the documents of the Colombian peace process until the final agreement. Although both peace processes generally used an inclusive language it is important to see that while the Northern Ireland documents included some sparse arguments for exclusion, no mentions or arguments for exclusion were identified in the Colombian peace process. Furthermore, the Colombian peace process is emphasising the importance of including civil society to a much greater extent. The Northern Ireland peace process do argue for the inclusion of civil society but primarily in the later operative agreements and not as extensively as in the Colombian documents.

- “How are the statements and arguments for, or against, inclusiveness in the peace processes constructed in the official documentation?”

The longer answer to this question is provided in the result where the statements and arguments are presented but some key characteristics can be identified. The ‘stable peace argument’ was used in both processes where they argue that the inclusion leads to, or is necessary for, the stability of the peace. Value-based arguments were also frequent in both processes as arguments referring to the strengthening of democracy, or other types of democratic ideals, as having an inherent value regardless of whether it will make it easier to reach a peace. This constituted a clear example of the tension between the idealistic and pragmatic. Thirdly, both processes used at least to some extent the inclusion of civil society as a ‘problem solver’ in the sense that civil society was to help with providing information, counselling or to monitor.

- “To what extent are the practices proposed in the arguments pragmatically justifiable by previous research and experience as efficient peacemaking practices?”

Once again is the longer answer provided in the result where the validity of the different arguments is presented respectively. On a general basis however the majority of the arguments were perceived as valid, or pragmatically justifiable, by considering previous research and the historical experiences from the conflicts. Some arguments were not seen as valid, were difficult to assess, or simply not assessed. The only entirely invalid argument was in the Colombian peace process where they were arguing for complete inclusion as a necessity for peace, which is easily falsified considering that there are many examples of other ways to achieve peace. Some cases were more difficult to assess, such as the political inclusion of FARC, or the exclusion of IRA because of lacking ‘commitment to peaceful means’, both of which was argued for with motivations that were partially value-based. Then there were also the arguments that were entirely value-based, and thus not assessed in their validity, but they are interesting expressions of democratic norms’ centrality to peace processes of this sort, and the tension between those norms and the pragmatic practices.

- “How are these contemporary ideas of democratic peacemaking rendered contextually rational considering the changing understanding of legitimacy?”

The application of idealist understandings of democratic involvement in peacemaking is rendered both rational and pragmatic primarily since the norms of liberal democracy enjoy a widespread support, and because democracy as a concept is perceived of as inherently desirable. That is for example probably partly the reason Santos was so persistent on using a referendum despite the negative public opinion. These norms, although they are socially constructed, are thus able of having a positive impact on peace processes where these norms are considered desirable and thus generates legitimacy. It is however important to consider that the positive effects of these democratic norms are to a great extent dependent on contextual conditions, in time and space. If the practices of democratic peacemaking were applied in 15th century Europe the outcome would have been greatly different, this is also most likely true for certain parts of the world today in the 21st century where these norms don’t enjoy the same support. The Irish Catholics would probably not have been invited for talks if the conflict had occurred in the time of Hobbes, or in today’s Turkey where PKK are combated (Al Jazeera, 2017, April 25).

- Contributions

Despite already mentioning that most research within this field are case studies, and that more quantitative studies are required, I chose to do a comparative case study. But as it attempts to broaden the discussion on inclusion as a legitimacy tool in peace processes it is not merely a repetition of previous research. Instead of focusing primarily on one of the three I believe the legitimacy inclusion should be treated as a broader concept involving inclusion through civil society, referendum, negotiations and post-conflict arrangements. The study also identifies and formulates categories of inclusion arguments which may be applied on other peace processes. Apart from these more ambitious contributions this thesis showed how the language of the Northern Ireland, and the Colombian, peace process differs in terms of emphasis of inclusion. It shows how the arguments from these processes were constructed and to what extent they were based on justifiable reasons of achieving peace. However, this study only cover two similar intra-state conflicts, the official documentation, and not the entirety of the official documentation. The claims made are thus not generalizable for any other conflicts and is only valid for the documents analysed from these conflicts. If other documents or unofficial coverage of the peace processes would have been analysed, other results would have been probable.

- Further research

To bring this research further it needs to be complemented with both more qualitative and quantitative research. In terms of further qualitative research the extensive use of inclusive language, and the general lack of exclusive language needs to be investigated in other peace processes. It would be especially interesting to investigate peace processes of countries that are not liberal democracies, that are not using a referendum as the final ratification tool, and conflicts where the government has a minor role in the conflict due to either its non-involvement in the conflict or its lack of authority. These examples constitute cases where the democratic nature of the peace process would be anticipated to be less obvious, or where the actors would be less incentivised to adhere to international democratic norms as they aren't international actors in the same sense. In terms of quantitative studies all the methods of inclusion described as democratic peacemaking methods needs to be investigated further. More comparative research, like Nilsson's (2012) on civil society, is necessary to investigate the other methods of inclusion too. Research which successfully manage to also include failed peace processes in its sample, while examining the different kinds of inclusion, would give a better understanding for the risks of inclusion rather than just the opportunities.

11. Final reflections

Although a peace process may require reconciliatory language of inclusion and cooperation the theories provided by Mouffe, and the academic experience (Licklider, 2003; Lanz, 2011; Stedman 1997), all point out the need for at least partial exclusion. But if the language of exclusion is too much linked to oppression or authoritarianism for the sensitive situation of a peace process, we must mitigate the sensitivity of exclusion and achieve a wider acceptance for exclusion within democracy. It is not that exclusion is not present, in the Northern Ireland conflict IRA were excluded and in Colombia the opposition and ‘No’-side was excluded, but it is not mentioned. The continued discursive reproduction of these ideals through for example the documents analysed in this study, but also international institutions official documents on peacemaking, is not benefitting the international efforts to achieve peace. If, as in the documents in this study, most issues of exclusion remain hidden, the language of exclusion will remain sensitive. While recognising the difficulty of the situation, it does seem like a better accommodation of acceptable exclusion must be achieved without for that sake ruining the valuable ideals of inclusion. As has already been emphasised in this study, it is apparent that the virtues of democracy are socially constructed, thus if at least the limited exclusion necessary in peace negotiations may be constructed as ‘good’ then we might be able to achieve peace more efficiently. This would however take for granted that achieving peace is the main aim. If instead the main aim is democratic proliferation, then the value-based arguments and the lack of arguments concerning sensitive exclusionary issues are given a new explanation. The foundational meta-question is thus not whether idealist inclusion hinders pragmatic peacemaking but rather if pragmatic peacemaking hinders democratic proliferation.

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