

Putin: Post Crimea, Pre Election

A Content Analysis of Vladimir Putin's Many Faces in Swedish
and Finnish Press during 2016

Gothenburg University

Master's programme "Kommunikation med inriktning mot offentlig förvaltning
och myndigheter"

2017

Author: Fanny Alice Thalén

gusthafa@student.gu.se

Supervisor: Orla Vigsø

Content

1. Introduction.....	1
2. Aim and Research Questions.....	4
3. Background	5
3.1 The Other	5
3.2 Russophobia	6
3.3 Finnish–Russo Relations.....	6
3.4 Finlandisation.....	8
3.5 Swedish–Russo Relations	8
3.6 The Crimean Crisis.....	9
3.7 2018 Election	10
4. Previous Scientific Studies and Other Materials.....	11
4.1 Exploring a Partially Academic Lacuna.....	11
4.2 First Person	11
4.3 Putin as Celebrity and Cultural Icon	12
4.4 The German Image of Putin during the Crimean Crisis.....	15
4.5 Comparing Political Journalism	17
4.6 Images of Putin during the Ukraine Crisis.....	19
4.7 Short Summary	20
5. Theory	21
5.1 Framing theory	21
6. Method	24
6.1 Sampling.....	24
6.2 Reliability.....	25
6.3 Validity	26
6.4 Method Criticism and Discussion.....	26
7. Material.....	28
7.1 Selection	28
7.2 Modus Operandi	28
8. Results	30

8.1 Quantitative Analysis	30
8.2 Main Frames	31
8.3 Sub Frames	32
8.4 Comparisons	35
8.5 Short Summary of Findings	39
8.6 Qualitative Analysis	40
9. Conclusions.....	45
9.1 Framing	45
9.2 Sub Frames	46
9.3 Comparing the Findings in HBL and SvD	50
9.4 Summary of Findings	51
10. Further Studies	53
Sources	54
Appendices.....	57
Appendix 1	57
Coding Scheme	57
Appendix 2.....	64
Result sheets	64
Appendix 3.....	66
List of articles coded	66
Appendix 4.....	72
Units chosen for close-reading	72

Sammanfattning

Syftet med studien är att undersöka hur Svenska Dagbladet och Hufvudstadsbladet framställde Rysslands president Vladimir Putin under 2016 med hjälp av gestaltningsteori (framing).

Studien visade att den dominerande allmänna gestaltningen var s.k. spelgestaltning (game framing) i bägge publikationer.

Putin, när han omnämndes, var ofta en sidokaraktär. Beskrivningarna var i regel fria från värdeord, men han framställdes likväl ofta som farlig eller hotfull. Detta skedde i mycket högre grad i Svenska Dagbladet än i Hufvudstadsbladet. Putin gestaltades på många olika sätt i texterna, men de andra persongestaltningarna var mindre frekvent förekommande.

Nyckelord: *Gestaltningsteori, kvantitativ innehållsanalys, Svenska Dagbladet, SvD, Hufvudstadsbladet, HBL, Vladimir Putin, Ryssland*

Abstract

The aim of this study is to analyse how Svenska Dagbladet and Hufvudstadsbladet framed Russia's president Vladimir Putin during 2016 using framing theory.

The study showed that the dominating overall frame was game framing in both publications.

Putin, when mentioned, was often a side character. The descriptions of him were as a general rule free from value laden words. Nevertheless, they managed to frame him as dangerous and aggressive on a regular basis. This occurred much more frequently in Svenska Dagbladet than in Hufvudstadsbladet. Several other sub-frames were used to describe his person, but they appeared less frequently.

Keywords: Framing theory, quantitative content analysis, *Svenska Dagbladet*, *SvD*, *Hufvudstadsbladet*, *HBL*, *Vladimir Putin*, *Russia*

1. Introduction

In old days men had the rack. Now they have the press. That is an improvement certainly. But still it is very bad, and wrong, and demoralising. Somebody – was it Burke? – called journalism the fourth estate. That was true at the time, no doubt. But at the present moment it really is the only estate. It has eaten up the other three. The Lords Temporal say nothing, the Lords Spiritual have nothing to say, and the House of Commons has nothing to say and says it. We are dominated by Journalism. In America the President reigns for four years, and Journalism governs for ever and ever.

– O. Wilde (1891, p. 309)

A modern myth, a political enigma. Ruler of a country that spans eleven time zones. Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin is many things. This thesis concerns itself with said man because he is one of the longest sitting rulers of Russia. To be more precise, it concerns itself with the way the man and politician Vladimir Putin is portrayed in two Nordic newspapers during 2016.

When Putin likely finishes his current term in 2018, he will have ruled Russia as a president and prime minister for almost two decades and thus significantly shaped Russia's way after the Soviet union dissolved. If Putin is re-elected in 2018, he will have spent more years in the highest echelons of power in Russia than for example, Joseph Stalin.

Looking at the way news organisations portray presidents is nothing new. Plenty of research on how American presidents are presented and framed exist, both in the States and in a foreign context. However, this is not true for recent Russian leaders. This needs to change, with the times and with the changes that have occurred on the political stage in recent years.

Currently there are, to the undersigned author's knowledge, no essays on this topic that are being written in Sweden. This is remarkable and should be remedied post haste since we are talking about our (geographically speaking) closest super power, with whom we have several common interests (such as the Baltic Sea). The little research there is, in addition, is mainly qualitative, making it difficult to be sure of what is happenstance and what is an actual trend, without also consulting one's gut feeling.

This thesis is therefore a unique contribution to better understanding the Nordic idea of Vladimir Putin, a man that everybody knows *of* but next to nothing *about*. Unlike much

of the previous research, this study avoids specific and very limited time periods such as the Crimean crisis, and instead has a more holistic approach in order to avoid extremes. It also serves as a possible future reference point for comparisons to other future Russian leaders, or even to previous images of Putin, should one feel so inclined.

Several scholars (see de Vreese et al., 2017) inquire after non-election time framing research. This makes 2016 a solid choice. 2016 was, in many ways, a rather calm year for President Putin. There was no reelection to think about, Crimea was largely cemented as Russian and so far the trade embargo hadn't been too detrimental. The major point of tension was the Syrian war, and towards the end of the year, the allegations that Russia had been involved in the American presidential election. In short, the year was about as normal as it would ever get in world politics.

One might ask oneself why not focusing on policy papers instead of news articles? The reasoning behind that is easy. The media is often known as the third or fourth estate, a testament to its importance and power when it comes to the work of regular civil servants. One might have to do as the politicians say, but the third estate (sometimes called the fourth estate, depending on what kind of government), in turn, holds a sway over them.

Any press officer worth her salt knows that whatever the public opinion is, she must take it into account when she formulates her message(s) since communication does not exist in a (political) vacuum. Same rings true for journalists. As Götz wrote

”Needless to say, these questions [of Russia–Western relations] are of utmost relevance, not only for scholars in the ivory tower of academia but also for government officials in Washington, Brussels, Kiev, and elsewhere”. (Götz, 2016, p. 250-251)

One question that arose during the time spent conducting this study was ”where does Russia end and Putin begin?” and ”why focusing on Putin and not Russia simply Russia?” The reasoning behind this is, as Shevtsova (2005) writes, that power is *personal* in Russia. Power is centered on one person, and currently that person happens to be Putin. According to her, this is not uncommon in Russia, the same was true for Putin's predecessors, and is a contributing factor to why the leader usually handpicks his successor: it is the safest way to not end up behind bars once you have abstained from power. As we will come to see, previous research points in the same direction: Putin is the narrative nucleus in plenty of news reporting about Russia. However, it will here be explored if this remains true for this study, too.

At first glance, this topic might seem to stray a bit from my chosen degree programme that focuses on organisational communication. However, it is not that far-fetched. As a person whose aim is to work within a public organisation that specialises in Nordic–Russian/Eastern Europe relations, solid knowledge of Vladimir Putin is an asset. Putin’s approval ratings are acceptable, and most expect him to continue in office for another six years from 2018–2024. This means that Putin and his politics will continue to affect the work in different ministries for years to come. As will the way we portray and view him shape our interpretations of his actions.

Furthermore, this study shows how large media organisations chose to do this portrayal. While the individual journalist surely matters, there are cultures and expectations in media organisations that affect the tone and the angles chosen. Publishers are not exempt from context. What is suitable and what isn’t is not just a solo decision, regardless of how appealing the idea of the lone writer/truth seeker/journalist is. Instead, the authors are often recurring, and frequently chosen to write about a specific subject because the ones above them in the hierarchy felt like they did well in previous cases. In this broader sense, this study is external organisational communication, as communicated by specific, chosen individuals.

2. Aim and Research Questions

The aim of this essay is to examine and compare how Vladimir Putin is positioned and assessed in the Swedish newspaper *Svenska Dagbladet* and the Finnish newspaper *Hufvudstadsbladet* after Crimea and before the 2018 election. The comparison is made because Sweden and Finland have much in common, but historically speaking, very different experiences of Russia. As we will see further along, Sweden is known for their Russophobia and Finland for their Finlandisation.

The research aim will be reached through a quantitative content analysis against the theoretical backdrop of framing analysis, paired with a qualitative close reading of four of the texts.

- A. To what extent are the newspapers using either an issue, a game or a strategy frame in their texts when writing about Putin and his endeavours?
- B. How is Putin's person positioned and assessed in the articles?
- C. Where do the newspapers differ in their portrayal, and where do they agree? (Based on the previous questions).

3. Background

3.1 The Other

The Other (introduced by Hegel in the late 18th century) is a concept long used in anthropology and sociology. It was popularised in media studies thanks to Edward Saïd's seminal work "Orientalism" (1978), but the concept of the Other in this particular field have roots all the way back to Mikhail Bakhtin. Bakhtin claimed already during the 1920's that the Other had the status of an epistemological, as well as an ontological necessity: the subject cannot know itself or the world without the Other since meaning is born where consciousness meets, i.e. in discourse (Neumann, 1999, p. 13, Bakhtin, 1990).

In his work "Uses of the Other – "The East" in European Identity Formation", Iver B. Neumann argues that the idea of the East is a fundamental part in creating and building European identity. He asserts that when Europe "discovered" Russia they treated it very differently from other faraway places like the Indies. Neumann writes that this was the first whiff of a trend where Europe tends to treat Russians "... as what can be called the liminal case of European identity." (Neumann, 1999, p. 67)

Russia is said to be close, but not there yet. In other words, they could be us [the West], but they are not there yet—instead they serve as a mirror into the Western past, before Europe became what they decided was "civilised" (Neumann, 1999). During the course of centuries, Russia has been depicted as many different things in the West. However, during more recent times it has been represented as a both socially and economically backward place (Neumann, 1999, p. 97). Initially, the February revolution did seem like a good thing according to the West, but this soon changed (Neumann, 1999, p. 99). By the 1920s Soviet (Russia) was viewed as a threat, but only one among many (Neumann, 1999).

However, during the Cold War they were upgraded to The Threat Par Excellence (Neumann, 1999, p. 100). Neumann writes that

"The other inscribed itself in the temporal dimension of the European self's identity by giving a name to a period of its history. Indeed, the Soviet initiative to end the Cold War was made among other things by means of issuing an application to join Europe: The slogan of the "Common European Home." (Neumann, 1999, p. 102)

At the time of the release of Neumann's book, representations of the Nordics' large Eastern neighbour chiefly concerned itself more with the possible future Russia, rather than the present (Neumann, 1999, p. 107).

Partially Russia is/has been viewed as a learner of Western practices, and through becoming more like the West they are expected to be less of a threat (Neumann, 1999, p. 108). However, recent events have given some the impression that Russia is doing the opposite of this, and this might affect the framing of Vladimir Putin.

3.2 Russophobia

Generally, Russophobia is described as a fear of or intense dislike toward Russia and Russian phenomena, its politics, or customs of the former Soviet Union (the Oxford Dictionary). While Neumann might be Norwegian, he does not often delve specifically into the Nordic countries' relationship with Russia and their feelings towards the country in his books. However, in an edition of *Østforum*, a journal for Eastern European Studies from a Nordic perspective, researchers shed light onto their respective countries' relationships with Russia a few years back through the prism of narratives in newspapers and foreign policies.

Johnny Rodin, in his opening editorial of the above-mentioned journal, concludes that Russia is a crucial point of reference for all Nordic countries. Rodin describes Russia as the Significant Other in accordance with Neumann's canonised work on Russia as Europe's other. He writes "Ryssland är antitesen som bekräftar den svenska och nordiska självbilden." ("Russia is the antithesis that confirms the Swedish and Nordic self-image") (Rodin, 2010, p. 126, author's own translation) and "Det nordiska >>jaget<< kan alltså i hög grad ses som en reflektion av den ryska >>andre<<." (The Nordic >>I<< can thus to a high degree be viewed as a reflection of the Russian >>Other<<) (2010, p. 122, also author's own translation). Below, we will go deeper into Finland's and Sweden's relationship with their great neighbour.

3.3 Finnish–Russo Relations

In *Ryssland i Finlands i historia: några särdrag som påverkar* (2010) Vihavainen writes that it is common to refer to History with a capital H when talking about Russian–Finnish relations. In his article, which also is one of the texts in the aforementioned *Østforum*, he calls the shared history a "unique" and a hard-earned legacy, not to be wasted or ignored. According to Vihavainen the discourse of Russo–Finnish relations is different from those in the other Nordic countries (Vihavainen, 2010).

Despite the fact that Russia has been the biggest threat against Finland's existence and political autonomy on several occasions, Finland has maintained very close ties with their Eastern neighbour (Vihavainen, 2010). One example of this is trade. Russia was one of Finland's biggest trade partners until 2014. However, after the annexation of Crimea this was affected by the embargo that was placed on Russia.

Vihavainen argues that "ryssänviha", or Russophobia first appeared during the 1700s due to Finland being a ravaged buffer zone during the Russo-Swedish wars. It should also be noted that "viha" means "hate" in Finnish, and is in many ways a stronger feeling than just general "fear". However, back when the term was coined, the word "Russians" was also applied to Finnish speaking ethnic Karelians (Tarkiainen, 1986 in Vihavainen, 2010).

In 1809, Sweden lost Finland to Russia, and Finland consequently spent more than a century as a part of the Russian commonwealth. When independence was gained in 1917, it came at a high price in form of a civil war between the Whites and the Reds. It also led to a very strong dislike of Russians in Finland, since the common opinion was that Russia was behind the Reds, and thus to blame for the war. The White troops won, if there is such a thing as a victory after a civil war like that.

WWII (the Winter War and the Continuation War) did little to rehabilitate the negative view of Russians. However, the relations improved after the war, in many ways thanks to the agrarian Party's leader, and later President, Urho Kekkonen. Nevertheless, the term "finlandisation" was coined during this era by American and German social scientists who argued that Finland was under Soviet's red thumb, and in a way had lost a large chunk of its independence. This was denied by many Finns. Vihavainen is of a different opinion. "One can rightly claim that during the 1970s and still by the 1980s that Russia was not something that one hated or feared, au contraire. One had become surprisingly uncritical." (Vihavainen, 2010, p. 192)

Vihavainen (2010) concludes that Russia has always been too big to have an equal relationship with. Thus, the isolation politics from the past decade has been beneficial for Finland, and maybe for Russia, too. According to Vihavainen, Russia has been wars and mayhem, but also possibilities. From 1917, until now, the people in the two countries have lived separately, but with today's globalisation, this is slowly changing. Where that will lead the countries remains to be seen.

3.4 Finlandisation

As mentioned above, Finlandisation (Finnish *suomettuminen*; Swedish: *finlandisering*) is a term that was coined during the Cold War. It refers to the process (or result) of having to favour, or at least not openly oppose a much bigger country, despite the fact that the countries are not political allies (Nationalencyklopedin, 2016). This allows the smaller/less powerful country to keep its (nominal) independence and its own political system (Nationalencyklopedin, 2016).

The name of the term stems from "Finland" and the country's actions and policies towards the Soviet Union during the Cold War (Nationalencyklopedin, 2016).

The term has negative connotations and while mainly describing Finland's actions during the cold war, it has also been used to describe other imbalanced power relations between various countries.

3.5 Swedish–Russo Relations

Sweden and Russia have fought wars at eleven separate occasions. The relationship between the countries has historically largely been one of tension. In the beginning they were rivals when Sweden was a "super power", but later the bigger of the two countries has been viewed as an existential threat against the now much smaller and less powerful one.

In short: Sweden has been taking Russia into consideration ever since the 1600s. However, since the iron curtain fell Sweden has joined the EU and is thus part of a big power alliance where Russia isn't particularly welcome. Sweden has also not shied away from criticising Russia when it comes to human rights and similar topics. What could possibly enable this behaviour? Maybe the fact that Sweden is no immediate neighbour (but still very close) and is neither dependent on Russia's hydrocarbon arsenal, nor trade extensively with them? Dahl argues that one reason for Sweden's ability to "stand up to" a bigger country is that Sweden could be called a "moral superpower", which gives them certain rights and a certain amount of power (Dahl, 2006). The expression 'moral superpower' has been used by influential Swedish politicians such as Reinfeldt and is a "thing" even beyond academia (see Sydsvenskan, 2009 and Marcal, 2015 for a few examples).

The fact that different EU countries have unique relationships with Russia is something that several international relations scholars and organisations have charted. One of them is The European Council of Foreign Relations (ECFR).

ECFR is an international think-tank that states in their description that they "build coalitions for change and promote informed debate about Europe's role in the world.". Among their trustees we find names such as Carl Bildt and Helle Thorning-Schmidt. ECFR writes in a report that they have found five different categories of relationships that an EU country might have with Russia. They range from 'trojan horses', 'strategic partners', 'friendly pragmatists' and 'frosty pragmatists' to 'new Cold-warriors' (Leonard & Popescu, 2007).

Sweden is, together with eight other countries, categorised as a 'frosty pragmatist' (p. 42, 45). That means that "While keeping business interests high on the agenda, the governments of these countries have not refrained from criticising Russia's human rights record and failings on democracy." (Leonard & Popescu, 2007, p. 42)

In contrast, Finland is categorised as a "friendly pragmatist". That means that they, according to this report, have a

"... less close but still significant relationship with Russia, in which business interests come first. Their policy tends to follow pragmatic business interests, opting for a path of least resistance in political dispute." (Leonard & Popescu, 2007, p. 42)

3.6 The Crimean Crisis

When talking about Putin in 2016, it is impossible not to mention the Crimean crisis. Describing what happened during the crisis in less than an A4 even more so. The narrative is fraught with tension, and in some ways varies, depending on one's perspective.

In short, the "crisis" started in November 2013 when Ukraine's then president, Viktor Yanukovich, was faced with a country heading towards a financial disaster (BBC, 2014). He had to make a choice between a deal with the EU in order to increase and strengthen integration and trade, or accepting a 15 USD billion loan from Russia, which would mean moving towards a planned "Eurasian union" with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. He chose the latter option (BBC, 2014).

This sparked protests on Maidan in Kiev. The president and his associates tried to assert control and put an end to them, but this the protesters turned out to have hydra like qualities. The protestors were from different camps, coming from very different factions: liberals, moderates, technocrats, pro-European activists and far-right nationalists (BBC, 2014).

By mid February, the number of deaths among the protestors had reached well into the hundreds and a peaceful resolution seemed less and less likely. On the 21st, protestors

overtook the Yanukovich's residence and he fled to Russia, not only fearing for his life, but to also avoid the charges that were likely to be brought up due to the killed protesters (BBC, 2014).

Towards the end of the protests, Russia performed a surprise military drill close to the Ukrainian border and at the Black Sea base on Crimea. Around the same time, armed soldiers in unmarked uniforms took over regional government buildings and airports around the peninsula. Russia claimed they were local self-defence groups and had nothing to do with Russia. (BBC, 2014)

Crimea, being more autonomous than many other regions in Ukraine, voted in a new government and decided to hold a referendum on whether Crimea should become a part of Russia or not (The referendum was only meant to "confirm" a parliamentary vote to secede, and only had two options: join Russia or enhance Crimea's independence). A majority voted for a reunion with the great neighbour (BBC, 2014). It should be noted that around 60% of the people living on the peninsula identify as ethnic Russians and that The Soviet Union gave Crimea to Ukraine in 1954, during a time when no one entertained the possibility that the Soviet Union might cease to be.

3.7 2018 Election

The 2018 presidential election in Russia takes place on the 18th of March next year (2018). The original plan was to hold it on March 11th, but a group of Members of Parliament in Moscow voted to have it moved so that it coincides with the fourth anniversary of the above-mentioned annexation of Crimea (it was the date when Putin publicly declared that Russia was seizing the peninsula).

If the first round of the election results in no one attaining an absolute majority, then a second voting round will take place on the 8th of April three weeks later.

Vladimir Putin is eligible to stand for reelection, but has not confirmed, at the time of writing, that he will do so yet. However, in early August he hinted at it when he spoke at a public gathering near Lake Baikal in the Russian Republic of Buryatia (TASS, Interfax).

Who else will be running is not yet set in stone, but among the names listed we find Alexei Navalny, Anatoly Batashev, Grigaory Yavlinsky och Vladimir Zhirinovskiy. However, unless a strong enough challenger is found, the presidential election will largely be nothing but a referendum on public confidence for the incumbent president.

4. Previous Scientific Studies and Other Materials

4.1 Exploring a Partially Academic Lacuna

As stated in the introduction, this part, previous research (or rather, the lack thereof), is both the strength and the weakness of this study. A strength since it makes this study unique, and a weakness since it means that making comparisons with other studies is difficult, and to see if the results obtained here line up with previous findings is more of a challenge.

Nevertheless, the university's database access paired with language skills resulted in some findings. While largely not research that pertains to the Nordic countries, it is nevertheless research that concerns itself with the image of Vladimir Putin in both an Eastern and Western context.

We begin with the image that was planned by Putin and his associates in his autobiography *First Person*, and then move on to independent writings on the topic.

4.2 First Person

The main reason for including *First Person* (2000) as reading material is that it is a starting point for this research area, and is a good measuring tool as it shows how Putin and the *piarchiki* (the charming Russian word for PR people) want to portray him, the image they want to create.

First person (2000) could be described by a book reviewer as a "campaign biography." Surely, Putin had already been elected when it came out, but due to his tabula rasa status, the biography was needed by the *piarchiki* in Kreml's high towers to establish him as a likeable person. The book consists out of six interviews with three different journalists, as well as talks with Putin's (now ex) wife and two children.

The book is divided into nine parts and they are chronological in order. All parts are named after different aspects of his person that the journalists (and likely the *piarchiki*) want to highlight. As an example: Part five is called the Spy. Part six is the Democrat, seven the Bureaucrat, and so on.

In this study's coding scheme, some of the frames are in part based on the aspects first mentioned in this book, such as Putin's KGB past, and his hyper-masculinity.

In the first part of the book, Putin tells the journalist how he was an unspoken leader in school for a while, his dedication to his judo club (despite hardships) and his former teacher describes him as very dedicated and ambitious, after having grown up and left his rascal days behind him (Putin, 2000).

In part two Putin describes himself as having been "... a pure and utterly successful product of Soviet patriotic education" (Putin, 2000, p. 42). He also talks of a "negative" character assessment he received: "Later, when I went to intelligence school, I once got an evaluation, where they wrote the following as a negative character assessment: " A lowered sense of danger". (Putin, 2000, p. 36) This lays well into the humble-bragging of the book, and yet helping the image of the Tough Macho Man.

The book repeatedly implies how well suited he is for presidency. For example, a retired colonel at the Red Banner Institute said about Putin "You need organisational abilities, a certain degree of tact, and a businesslike manner. It seemed to me Putin had all that. He was a steady student, without slips" (2000, p. 53) and a few lines down, "There were no slips. There were no incidents. There was no reason to doubt his honesty and integrity." (Putin, 2000, p. 53)

Putin's wife described him as plain and dull in the beginning (Putin, 2000, p. 59), and when asked what then drew her to him, she answered "Perhaps it was his inner strength, the same quality that draws everybody to him now." (Putin, 2000, p. 59)

The book also highlights his past as an FSB agent (Federal Security Services of the Russian Federation). On page 73 one of the journalist who interview him comments on this "They wanted to portray you as a super-spy. And you're denying everything." (Putin, 2000, p. 73), and later, on page 85, he is characterised as an everlasting agent, despite having left the bureau.

The book manages to frame Putin as a not too exciting character, while still leaving enough breadcrumbs so that the reader can suspect that there is something more than just a fastidious bureaucrat. It portrays him as a steadfast and capable leader with few or no vices. In short, just what Russia wanted after the rather turbulent years with Gorbachev.

4.3 Putin as Celebrity and Cultural Icon

In the academic anthology *Putin as a celebrity and cultural icon* (ed. Helena Goscilo, 2013) eight researchers from different fields examine different aspects of Putin's persona. Through these different portrayals of Putin, the authors try to assess how Putin's media image is constructed and presented in various media outlets.

Not all of the findings made in this volume are of use to this study, despite them all being interesting. Therefore, only the findings relevant to this study and other previous findings are presented here in a slightly condensed version. Since most of these studies are qualitative in their nature, it is impossible to say how general they are, but the arguments are compelling.

In the article *Putin's performance of masculinity: the action hero and macho sex subject* Helena Goscilo writes that

"Historically, three cultural paradigms codifies heroic masculinity – a cultural construct and social practise shaped by the ethos of a given society, albeit traditionally posited in essentialist terms: those of (1) the warrior, (e.g., Alexander the Great), (2) the philosopher (e.g., Socrates), and (3) the ruler, who optimally synthesizes the other two (e.g., Pericles)." (Goscilo, 2013, p. 183).

All in all, Goscilo concludes that Putin fills the criteria for a *ruler*. However, one significant contributing reason for this is because he came after Yeltsin, who was mentally weak towards the end, overall in bad shape, and Putin was the opposite of that. Also, after the Kursk incident Putin managed to create an image of thoughtfulness, competency while also showcasing his athleticism at opportune moments. (2013, p. 184) Later in the article she further discusses how Putin uses plenty of military imagery, fashion and expressions despite having no military background.

The military discourse, or perhaps the personalisation of the military discourse is also found by Ryazanova-Clarke in a later chapter. She writes that during the (now a Russian classic) "direct line with the president", Putin is constructed as not only a president but also a clear military commander for the Russian nation (p. 121). This framing occurs through Putin using military terminology and slang during the interview, and the presenter using his military title (Commander in Chief), rather than "President Putin". This frame does not occur in his own autobiography, and is likely a later addition to his "persona package". However, as we will shortly see, this matches with later findings of Putin being an aggressor as well as the tendency to favour persons over organisations. Goscilo (2013) actually describes Putin as Russia's ultimate celebrity" and an "objet d'art", in short the ultimate main character (Goscilo, 2013, p. 6).

A few chapters into the book one reaches Cassidy and Johnson's article *A personality cult for the postmodern age: reading Vladimir Putin's public persona. A cult of personality in a medialised world* (2013, p. 45). Cassidy and Johnson write that a cult

of personality is nothing foreign in Russia, but unlike the ones that flourished in the Soviet Union the current one is ever changing and dynamic (Cassiday and Johnson, 2013, p. 46). Putin's cult differs from Stalin's in that it "...does not appear to exist primarily as a result of 'official coercion'" (Cassiday and Johnson, 2013, p. 46). Another difference is that when people attend rallies in favour of Putin they do so because of some profit, not because they are avoiding punishments (Cassiday and Johnson, 2013). Instead, this cult "...represents the product of distinctly postmodern social and communicative relations." (2013, p. 3)

Mikhailova also comments on the topic and writes

"On this basis one may suggest that Putin-era society represents the ultimate instance of a postmodern society of the spectacle, generating a simulacrum of democracy in which the entertainment provided by politicians offers a surrogate for an (absent) political life."

(Mikhailova, 2013, p. 78)

The question that arises is what the spectacle is in Western newspapers? Is this image a surrogate for something else as well? Such as actual information about current policy questions, issues that currently affect the country?

Putin was a tabula rasa, onto whom journalists (as well as politicians and regular citizens) could project traits that they desired him to have. New media also means significantly less control over the image (p. 49). Due to social media "Putin mania" is polysemantic, and easy to tailor to a sub group's needs.

Perhaps this is also true outside of Russia, that a certain type of Putin is what we need in order for our narrative to work out. And is our Nordic idea of him polysemantic as well, or do all things point in one direction only? The Russian image of him is quite engrossing. Levada, based on polls of the Russian people, described the image of Putin like this:

"A former KGB officer with a confident walk and shy smile, a tough administrator of disarming simplicity, a market-orientated reformer willing to increase state control over the market, and a touching father who can fly a jet and uses military slang in his speech". (Fartyshev, 2004, p. 35 in Mikhailova, 2013, p. 65)

While overall, this anthology is an invaluable contribution to understanding the way Putin is presented it has its weaknesses. First and foremost the articles tend to focus on Russian sources only and to not compare them to sources from other countries, which

leads to the aspects of Otherness not being paid a lot attention. This also means that they, for better and for worse, only observe Putin when his control over his image is at its strongest, and not what it looks like when the journalists have fewer restraints.

4.4 The German Image of Putin during the Crimean Crisis

Das Bild Russlands in den deutschen Leitmedien – die Berichterstattung über Russland und Wladimir Putin im Rahmen der Ukrainekrise (The image of Russia in leading German Media During the Ukraine Crisis) is a book by Danny Schmidt from University of Erfurt in Germany (2016). The book analyses the image of Russia and Putin during the Crimean crisis in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Süddeutsche Zeitung and Der Spiegel.

In this qualitative discourse analysis Schmidt tries to show and explain how reality is created and influenced by media. Through his analysis he uncovers patterns in the narratives surrounding the crisis and points towards which mechanisms influence them. Some of his findings coincide with those of Goscilo among others, and others are more unique. Below we will take a further look at the findings, newspaper by newspaper.

4.4.1 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung

The narrative in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) is very much personalised through Putin and Merkel (a "personalising discourse") (Schmidt, 2016, p. 82). As prominent sub-themes he describes the 'military discourse', about strategies and possibilities. The military aspect of Putin also occurs in Cassidy and Johnsons findings (2013, see above).

Schmidt further writes that the military discourse is connected to the personalised discourse where "...Putin is portrayed as a player...". (Schmidt, 2016, p. 85)

Another, slightly different part of the strategy/military discourse is the media wars and how Putin utilises it (Schmidt, 2016).

Another important discursive trend Schmidt observes is the "enterprise discourse" (Schmidt, 2016, p. 88). This discourse contains themes such as the EU, sanctions, but also other values such as freedom and justice (Schmidt, 2016, p. 88-89). According to Schmidt, FAZ favours Western values such as freedom, equality and justice, and, according to their line, produces fairly conservative journalism (Schmidt, 2016). FAZ also makes a clear difference between Us and Them (Schmidt, 2016, p. 89). As seen when we read Neumann's *Uses of the Other. The 'East' in European Identity Formation*, this finding was to be expected. That the military discourse is one of the more prominent themes lines up with the idea of Putin as a military man also found in

Goscilo et al. (2013), despite having no such past. However, as the president is also the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, Putin, nowadays, holds the final responsibility for it.

4.4.2 Süddeutsche Zeitung

Also in Süddeutsche Zeitung (SZ), Schmidt notices the 'enterprise discourse', the 'military discourse' as well as the prominent 'personalising discourse'. However, the most prominent discourse is the military one that is created through words such as Warfare, Peace talks and Aggression (Schmidt, 2016). Both Putin and Russia are portrayed as dangerous and at war.

Another discourse that is slightly more common here than in FAZ is the 'historic discourse'. It is created through such themes as "will Putin recreate the Soviet Union"? This idea connects to a wider set of ideas, such as the Cold War and the different blocs according to Schmidt (2016, p. 93). It also implies that Putin is dangerous (assuming that we fear the military and political implications it holds). This speculative type of journalism generally belongs under the game framing umbrella and is generally common in news journalism (de Vreese et al., 2017).

Drawing on the different blocs, it becomes apparent that again, the Us and Them idea regarding Western Europe and Russia as described by Neumann is largely intact. Schmidt finds that SZ focuses more on Putin's person than the FAZ (Schmidt, 2016, p. 96). This, again, lines up with the findings made by Van Aelst et al., where individual politicians are more mentioned more often in news texts than institutions (2017, p. 128). Schmidt also observes that the SZ, despite their liberal, left-leaning identity, produces sentences that are more on the liberal to conservative side on the spectrum (Schmidt, 2016).

4.4.3 Der Spiegel

According to Schmidt's findings the Spiegel articles do not discuss the info wars (Schmidt, 2016). However, they, like FAZ and SZ, rehash ideas through the historical discourse, for example by reactivating the collective symbol "Hitler" (Schmidt, 2016, p. 101). They also reproduce the dichotomy of the rational West and the emotional East (Schmidt, 2016) as also mentioned by Neumann (1999). This is especially true for an unpredictable Putin who gets to embody this when he is portrayed as if he is mainly led by his emotions in his decisions (Schmidt, 2016, p. 103). In addition, the personalisation discourse (occurs again) is used on specific people and emphasises their human characteristics (Schmidt, 2016, p. 103).

Putin as the aggressor is common sense in the narrative (Schmidt, 2016). This also lines up with the findings by Cassidy and Johnson (2013). Schmidt further writes that Putin is almost always personalised in the texts, and almost never occurs in his function as the democratically elected head of state for one of the world's most powerful countries (Schmidt, 2016).

When summarising his findings in his final chapters, Schmidt writes that the personalising discourse plays the most important part in the reporting. "The narrative nucleus is Putin as central and discourse leading subject in the news coverage of the crisis." (Schmidt, 2016, p. 144). Taking this into account, focusing on Putin only in a study, rather than Russia in general seems very justifiable. This is also consistent with the findings made by Von Aelst et al. (2017) that we will look deeper into below.

Overall, the research is well executed and the different discourse categories have been useful when creating a coding schedule and defining the parameters. However, what is lacking is the transparency in what influenced his own analysis. The analysis seems to be fair, but opening up about one's own background and thoughts would be beneficial for the reliability in a qualitative discourse analysis.

4.5 Comparing Political Journalism

Fresh from the printing press, *Comparing Political Journalism* (ed. C. de Vreese, F. Esser and D.N Hopman, 2017) has gathered a large number of researchers from all over the world to conduct an in depth quantitative study of what shapes and influences political news coverage. In total, they covered 16 countries during a constructed fortnight (14 days during three months) (de Vreese et al., 2017, p. 16). The reasoning behind this is that it will avoid sample distortions (such as exceptional events such as elections and terror attacks to mention a few).

As it happens, Sweden is one of the countries participating. Finland, however, is inconveniently absent from the study. Nevertheless the book gives a good overview of trends in political journalism.

According to the authors of this book, there are six key concepts for political news journalism research: Strategy framing, interpretative journalism, negativity, political balance, personalisation and soft versus hard news (de Vreese et al., p. 3) This book is where they put this theory to practice. Much like this study, they decided on a research design with comparable countries (de Vreese et al., p. 11).

The study poses several hypotheses for every key aspect. Their third hypothesis regarding the strategy frame aspect is that "The amount of game and strategy frames is higher the closer in time the country is to a major election." (2017, p. 36). They found that their hypothesis was confirmed. They also found that elite newspapers were more likely to use the game strategy frames than so called mass marked newspapers (2017, p. 47).

One of their other findings was that one-third of the materials analysed had traces of interpretative journalism (de Vreese et al., p. 51).

As stated by de Vreese (2009, 2017), game and strategy frames are generic news frames and can thus be used on a variety of issues. According to Aalberg et al. (2017), certain types of issues are more likely than other to be strategy framed. The game frame is for example more likely to be present in public policy issues and during election times. They argue that it is important to apply this kind of research not only during election times, but also on "regular" news (p. 35). This has been a shortcoming of the vast majority of framing studies but this thesis does its share to even the numbers.

The game frame refers to news narratives where politics are portrayed in game terms: who is winning or losing an election, up and downs in public opinion, speculations about policy outcomes and potential collaborations over the party borders (de Vreese et al., 2017, p. 37). They found that the levels of game and strategy framing are according to their findings much lower when there is no election during the corner (p. 39).

A strategy frame, on the other hand, is found in news narratives where the emphasis is on motives for certain actions, where one positions oneself on issues, strategies for reaching a certain political goal. How a politician makes choices about her leadership and personal traits also fall under this category (de Vreese et al., 2017, p. 37). Mentions of press behaviour is also under this frame umbrella (de Vreese et al., p. 37).

These two frames are viewed as different dimensions of an overall macro frame, so in order to differentiate between them, the researchers decided that the dominant frame was dependant on length, frequency, and also that special attention should be given the headline and lead paragraph in case of uncertainty (de Vreese et al., 2017, p. 39)

They decided, after their trial run to use a generic "strategic game frame" and not separate the two, despite them making a theoretical distinction between them. They write that "Our empirical analysis does not support constructing two separate dimensions for game and strategy frames." (de Vreese et al., 2017, p. 40) Their factor analysis carried out did not support their idea of the strategy and the game frame as two separate

dimensions. (de Vreese et al., 2017, p. 49) They write that focusing on one single dimension, however, does not affect the main conclusions (de Vreese et al., 2017, p. 49). This is an interesting change from previous research by the same group, and if they will stick to it in the future remains to be seen.

Another of the key concepts is personalisation. Personalisation "...refers to the growing importance of a select number of individual politicians at the expense of institutions such as political parties or governments." (Aelst et al, 2017, p. 112–113). They further write in their chapter of the book that this trend is generally supported by empirical studies , with very few exceptions. (Aelst et al., 2017, p. 114).

This book offers a unique operationalisation of comparative political journalism. However, the insight in their processes was limited which was frustrating since it often was kept at a rather abstract level. An increased transparency in their coding processes would have been an interesting and beneficial addition.

This book is of high relevance to this study. Not only is it one of the most recent large contributions to the field of framing theory, but it also compares the results between different countries overall, i.e., not during one specific event, which again makes its conclusions more applicable overall.

4.6 Images of Putin during the Ukraine Crisis

In the only article included in this chapter we finally find a study that involves the trinity of this essay: Putin, a Swedish newspaper and Finnish news media organisations of different kinds. In "Lännessä olemme, itään katsomme" (In the West we are, to the East we look/gaze) Jarkko Kangas, Markus Ojala and Mervi Pantti (2015) explore the image of Putin and Russia that a select number of major news outlets create with their choice of images by applying framing analysis.

The aim of their study was to answer three questions: how did the chosen media outlets frame the Ukraine crisis picture-wise, what role did Vladimir Putin play in the images, and what kind of ideas and discourses regarding Russia surfaced? The materials were chosen from Helsingin Sanomat (FI), YLE (FI), MTV3 (FI), Dagens Nyheter (SE), the Guardian (UK) and Die Welt (DE). In total they analysed just over 570 units.

Focusing on the Finnish findings on Putin's role only, they conclude that during the MH17 crisis, Putin was portrayed as "... syytettynä, vahvana johtajana ja toisena" (2015, p.199) (accused, a strong leader and other). However, during the Minsk negotiations that

followed Putin was portrayed as ”...vastuullinen, johtaja, arkkivihollinen ja voittaja” (2015, p. 200) (responsible, leader/boss, arch enemy and winner).

They also found that foreign publications (the Swedish one included) emphasised Russia's role in the events that transpired more than the Finnish publications did (2015, p. 201). While, again, more transparency regarding the process would have been interesting they reach several interesting conclusions and the sheer amount of texts (500+) assures us that they can point towards clear trends.

4.7 Short Summary

- First person is not research, but a spin doctored piece that is almost two decades old. It portrays Putin as the piarchiki wanted him to be in the early days of his presidency: a boring, trustworthy family man with an edge (provided by his FSB past).
- In Goscilo's anthology from 2013 Putin is mainly viewed through Russian sources. He is shown to be a macho man, a leader and as a personification of Russia through his cult of personality. However, his cult of personality is suspected of being entertainment and a surrogate for a lacking actual political life.
- Schmidt finds several interesting discourses regarding Putin and Russia in his studies. Those who pertain to Putin specifically and are of special interest are the personalisation discourse, Putin the player, Putin the dangerous/the aggressor.
- Comparing Political Journalism discusses key concepts for political news journalism research. Some of their more interesting findings include the popularity of personalisation of news and that game/strategy framing continue to be the most popular framing method for news media organisations to use.

5. Theory

5.1 Framing theory

Framing theory first saw the dim light of day in a poorly lit university corridor when the renowned sociologist Erving Goffman brought about his book "Frame Analysis" in the mid seventies. Since then, the theory has evolved, grown, and proven to also be of great use in the field of communication studies.

A "frame" can be found in any conversation, media or other human way of expression. The way something is framed is likely to influence a person to react or respond in a certain way (Deverux, 2009). This of course makes framing an interesting tool for researchers who are into strategic political communications since politics, in the end, often is about being approved by ones voters and getting re-elected.

Jesper Strömbäck, perhaps Sweden's most well known framing theoretician, builds his research and contributions to framing theory on the framing theory of Robert Entman. Entman is today considered a groundbreaker in the field of framing theory and communications studies. His definition of framing is one of the most famous and commonly used:

To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, casual interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described.

(Entman, 1993, p. 52)

Entman wrote that a frame can be identified by "[...] the presence or absence of certain keywords, stock phrases, stereotyped images, sources of information and sentences that provide thematically reinforcing clusters of facts or judgments". (Entman, 1993, p. 52)

When Strömbäck first started writing about news framing he wrote that there were four different ways to frame political news: Issue, trivia, sensation or game frames (Strömbäck, 2004). However, in his more recent research he utilises primarily the issue, game and strategy frame (Strömbäck, 2009). In the book *Comparing Political Journalism* (2017) where Strömbäck makes a contribution, they have however seemingly decided to skip the Issue frame. This essay, however, will use the issue frame as it is an efficient way to see how well journalist follow the ideals of reporting.

Prof. Jesper Strömbäck writes that media frame stories and reality through the inclusion and exclusion of certain information and individuals (2000). This in turn makes the reader interpret and understand the text in a specific way (Strömbäck, 2000). Strömbäck (and others) thus takes a rather constructivist approach with the concept of reality and in short breaks with the tradition of thought /epistemological-philosophical idea that started with Plato, and that in modern times was championed by prominent thinkers such as Hume and Leibniz.

Strömbäck instead views the media not as a mirror, but as a rather small part of it since there is a limit to how many different perspectives a text can contain before it becomes incomprehensible. This inevitably will give any reader of any given text a reconstructed view of the world (Strömbäck, 2004).

Framing theory however, still suffers from the question "What is a frame?". Despite there being several different views on this question, some definitions are used more than others. I have, in this essay, chosen to use Jamieson and Capella's definition from 1997. They suggest three criteria that a news frame should fulfil. It should

- i. " [...] have identifiable conceptual and linguistic characteristics.
- ii. [...] be commonly observed in journalistic practice.
- iii. [...] be possible to separate and distinguish the frame reliably from other frames."

(Jamieson and Capella, 1997, p. 47)

Strömbäck and his collaborators have defined the main frames in the subsequent way: *Issue framing*: This frame puts emphasis on tangible happenings, what has happened, what has been brought up or is something that in an obvious way relates to political content (Strömbäck, 2004, 2009). In short, this frame refers to objective political content and real actual/objective conditions in reality that are relevant to the political content (Ibid.) *Issue framing* is what most media scholars would like to see as it is closest to the current journalistic ideals.

Game framing is part of a bigger macro frame (Aalberg et al., 2017, p. 38). This frame focuses on politics as a game. The emphasis is on who is winning or losing something, whether it be elections, debates or public opinion (gallups and vox pops). Speculations about elections, including possible coalitions also belong in this frame (Strömbäck, 2009, Aalberg et al., 2017, p. 37)

On the other side of the same macro frame coin we find the *strategy frame*. This frame covers news stories where the emphasis is on *interpretations* of politicians' (or

parties') motives, their tactics and strategies for achieving their goals, political or policy ones. Why this action? Why this position on this issue? Campaign strategies are part of this, too. In this frame, the choices regarding leadership and integrity are found. (Aalberg et al., 2017, p. 37) Other things that also are part of this frame is media strategies and press behaviour (Aalberg et al., 2017)

However, this essay's main focus is Putin, and it will therefore use sub frames (variable 7–16). The *raison d'être* for sub frames is to make the analysis more nuanced and to get a closer look on how his image is built.

6. Method

For this essay a mainly quantitative method is employed, backed up by a smaller qualitative component for increased transparency.

What makes Content Analysis (CA) a vital tool for not only communication researchers, but also press officers and their like is that it allows one to "... construct indicators of world views, values, attitudes, opinions, prejudices and stereotypes, and compare these across communities." (Bauer and Gaskell, 2000, p. 134). All these things are crucial when developing new communication plans, policies and when looking into what went wrong (see Murphy's law).

There are about six different CA research designs (Bauer and Gaskell, 2000, p.135). This study is a longitudinal, cross-sectional analysis, which means that it compares texts about one specific theme (Putin) from different sources, over a longer time period.

6.1 Sampling

There are several things that are important to keep in mind when sampling the text units. One is representativeness. In a well made content analysis the exclusion or inclusion of any one unit should be of no importance, all sampling units should be replaceable by each other (Bauer and Gaskell, 2000, p. 137). Another factor is the size of the sample. A carefully and systematically collected smaller sample is better than a bigger one if it is one based on convenience (Bauer and Gaskell, 2000, p. 137). Sample size is in the long run a question of practicality — is it doable? This study codes 67 articles from SvD and 49 from HBL. That equals every fourth article that mentions Putin during 2016. Lastly, the units of sampling and coding are of great importance to sampling. In this study one article equals one (1) unit.

Theory and research material are brought together by coding and classifying the sampled materials. However, every realistic and pragmatist content analysis researcher knows that this takes time: there needs to be sufficient piloting, then amendments and then more piloting before the "real" analysis begins (Bauer and Gaskell, 2000).

Quality in content analysis is not a black and white matter, despite that it is considered a rather empirical approach and is full of numbers. The reason for this is that it is a social construction. So how does one achieve a desirable and objective outcome? According to Bauer and Gaskell, one does that when one delivers interesting results that can withstand scrutiny (Bauer and Gaskell, 2000). They also add that coherence and transparency are two other important criteria for evaluating how well executed a study is

(Bauer and Gaskell, 2000). With 'coherence' they mean that the analysis is consistent internally and that all codes flow from the same principle, rather than simply coding what pops up in one's mind (Bauer and Gaskell, 2000).

Regarding transparency they conclude that it is of utmost importance to provide the readers with a summary list of all codes and frequency distribution for each code (Bauer and Gaskell, 2000, p. 143). Documenting the coding process with great care and detail helps the researcher to achieve public accountability, as one simultaneously enables other researchers to replicate the study, should they so desire (Bauer and Gaskell, 2000).

6.2 Reliability

In short, reliability is an ostentatious word for when interpreters of a text are in agreement. It can be achieved in different ways. For example the same researcher may make a first coding, then wait some time, and then make a second interpretation in order to determine intrapersonal reliability (2000, p. 143). Nevertheless, demanding perfect reliability is asking the impossible where human judgement is used, which means that one instead must reflect upon what a sufficient level of reliability is (Bauer and Gaskell, 2000).

Another factor is that reliability might differ between different codes, some of them might be more open to interpretation or more likely to be influenced by prior experiences than others (Bauer and Gaskell, 2000, p. 144) In short, reliability is decided and limited by how complex the coding frame is. Lowered reliability might also point towards a polysemic text, i.e., that it can be interpreted in several different ways (Bauer and Gaskell, 2000, p. 144).

According to Bauer and Gaskell, "Reliability only indicates an objectified interpretation, which is not a necessary condition of a valid interpretation." (2000, p. 145). In their opinion, content analysis coded by actual humans "...suffers from overscrutiny that at times approaches a reliability fetish." (Bauer and Gaskell, 2000, p. 148–149)

One strength of content analysis, however, is that it is systematic and often public since it is common practice to use materials that occur naturally, such as newspapers.

Citations, out of context can very easily mislead or manipulate. In order to display to the readers how the interpretations are made and how valid they are, in addition to consistent, I have decided to add a qualitative element to this essay. Thus, In addition to the quantitative analysis, I will also perform an in depth analysis of four (4) articles, to demonstrate my thoughts and reasonings.

Content analyses often focus solely on frequencies, which leads them to forgetting about rarities and what is absent. Naturally, CA can in principle code absence too, but usually leans towards coding presence. The idea is that the qualitative part of this analysis will help countering that.

6.3 Validity

If an analysis' results represent the text, it could be said that the study has good validity (Bauer and Gaskell, 2000). However, there are several forms of validity. Regarding the data, it is desirable that the codes relate to the units in the texts, commonly called semantic validity (Bauer and Gaskell, 2000). Then there is sampling validity, which means that the sample accurately represents the whole available body of texts. Lastly, there is construct validity that has to be taken into consideration. That is, that the coding frame must concretise the theory behind the analysis.

Bauer and Gaskell have a rather pragmatic understanding of the topic

"The validity of a CA must be judged not against a 'true reading' of the text, but in terms of its grounding in the materials and its congruence with the theory of the researcher, and in the light of his or her research purpose."

(Bauer and Gaskell, 2000, p. 133).

6.4 Method Criticism and Discussion

As with the vast majority of all academic productions, further research is needed to confirm and strengthen the results further. Regardless of that the number of units should give us an idea of whereto the wind is blowing.

Bauer and Gaskell (2000) write very fondly of transparency, and in order to increase the transparency in this study, certain aspects of this study should be publicly addressed and acknowledged. First of all, all photographs of Putin and others have been left out. While omitting them was a deliberate move, it could be argued that the images work as "attention catchers", that what might be most important to a reader is the headline and the photo that belongs to it (if the article has photos). In short, images matter because they help to "lure in" the readers to read on. Assuming that the photo in some ways affect how the text is perceived altogether is not too far-fetched. However, since many images are stock images, do we know if the journalist herself choses the image? Or is it some other instance in the office that makes this decision? I chose to exclude them, assuming that most journalists do not actively write an article with a specific photo in mind.

Another limitation to the project was Retriever because the database generated two articles that didn't even mention Putin and cut some of the articles in half when saving the files for printing, meaning that every article had to be double checked manually in order for me to see if indeed the whole article had been analysed. While I have coded large numbers of news texts before, the experience is still limited. To counter that I re-coded 12 articles after having done them all, to check intracoder reliability. I also considered it necessary as one sees more when one codes text no. 76 than text no. 4.

Also, there is the risk of subjectivity. Subjectivity is a human condition that cannot be helped. I have, however, tried to battle it and in order to be as transparent as possible I have created a thorough coding book, and shown my thought patterns in four qualitative interpretations of some of the articles. That way, any reader can hopefully decide for herself if she finds my analysis skills sufficient and my interpretations valid.

7. Material

Why news articles? Because the text corpus is the way a community expresses and represents itself (Bauer and Gaskell, 2000, p. 133).

7.1 Selection

The materials chosen for this study were two conservative newspapers, one from Sweden and one from Finland. Svenska dagbladet (henceforth SvD) describes itself as ”obunden moderat” (SvD, 2017), i.e., liberal conservative and was founded in 1884.

Hufvudstadsbladet was founded in 1864 in Helsinki and describes itself as ”oberoende borgerlig liberal”, which also means liberal conservative (Berg, 2015). Both newspapers are politically independent. Both are written in Swedish and reach a nationwide audience. The reasons for selecting them are that they are similar in their views, are high up on the press freedom index (Freedom House, 2017), and have a close and shared history while still having very different relations with Russia (see previous chapters).

SvD is the third largest morning paper and is made in Stockholm. It is today owned by the Norwegian conglomerate Schibsted. They call their editorial liberal conservative. Editor-in-chief since 2013 is Fredric Karén. Hufvudstadsbladet is the largest Swedish-language newspaper in Finland. It is located in Helsinki. Editor-in-chief is currently Susanna Ilmoni.

7.2 Modus Operandi

This sub-chapter explains how the procedure was executed. Every article is viewed as one (1) unit of analysis. The articles from SvD and HBL were retrieved from the Swedish media archive called Retriever.

Retriever media archive is an online archive that provides full text newspapers from primarily Sweden and its neighbouring countries. It thus contains both SvD and HBL. When picking the materials from Retriever, no difference is made between print materials and web materials due to the fact that they often are the same. Also, in a time where many people read their newspapers online only, ignoring the online content would be a mistake.

In order to find articles where Putin is mentioned, his name, Vladimir Putin was typed into the search field. After that certain restrictions were added. In the first round, the perimeters Svenska Dagbladet, the time frame 01.01.2016–31.12.2016. This yielded hundreds of hits. In order to narrow it down to a reasonable amount, every fourth

article was downloaded for coding (the articles were first sorted in chronological order, then the selection was made). The same actions were then repeated with HBL.

When analysing four texts in a more qualitative manner in order to create the desired transparency, a randomiser was used to pick them. A quick visit to *random.org* resulted four numbers (one fills out a form to generate numbers and the site then uses atmospheric noise to create true randomness). The same site was also used by de Vreese et al. (2017) in their study.

8. Results

8.1 Quantitative Analysis

In this part of the essay the results of the data collected will be shown and explained. In total, there were 67 articles from Svenska Dagbladet and 49 from Hufvudstadsbladet. Together, more than 100 articles were analysed. However, since the materials from the individual newspapers are less than 100 articles, all numbers will be displayed both in absolute numbers and in percentages and not only in percentages. We will start with the bigger picture and then break it up in more detailed pieces. Ergo, we will start with the main frames (first both newspapers together, then separately) and after that move on to the subframes.

Before we start crunching numbers, let us take a short moment to take a quick refresher: What frame is what? First of all, *The dominating overall frame* refers to the general frame of the text, i.e framing in the title, lead paragraph and body text combined.

The issue frame refers to actual political decisions, opinions and actions. *The game frame* in turn refers to how the political game is played, who sides with whom and what it might lead to. *The strategy frame* refers to interpretations of actions, why this is happening and what the motives are. This frame is closely linked to the game frame.

Other refers to titles that don't fit any of the frames mentioned above while there still is a connection to politics.

Not applicable refers to titles that either don't exist or lack any connection to politics. For a more thorough description, please see the coding book and scheme in appendix 1.

8.2 Main Frames

Dominating Main Frames in SvD and HBL combined

		Amount of articles using a frame	%
Issue frame		10	9 %
Game frame		43	37 %
Strategy frame		9	8 %
Other		35	30 %
Not applicable		19	16 %
	Total:	116	100 %

43 of 116, i.e almost two-fifths of the texts were dominated by the game frame. Second largest frame in this category is somewhat surprising the Other frame. This could imply that there is a rather large number of "soft news" where Putin occurs as a character.

The bronze winner is Not applicable, which hints at a future discussion of our need to mention Putin also when we do not talk of politics. Lastly, the Issue frame and the Strategy frame were the least common ones at 10, and 9, respectively.

Frame in title in SvD and HBL combined

		Amount of articles using a frame	%
Issue frame		14	12 %
Game frame		27	23 %
Strategy frame		8	7 %
Other		42	36 %
Not applicable		32	28 %
	Total:	116	100 %

Formulating titles is an artform. The most common frame here is Other, around 35% of the titles have that frame. Quite a large number of titles are Not applicable, almost one-third of them do not relate to politics. 27/116 are game framed and only 8 titles are strategy framed.

Frame in lead paragraph in SvD and HBL combined

		Amount of articles using a frame	%
--	--	----------------------------------	---

Issue frame		16	14 %
Game frame		31	27 %
Strategy frame		6	5 %
Other		39	34 %
Not applicable		24	21 %
	Total:	116	100 %

The most prevalent frame is, again, Other, closely followed by the Game frame (31 out of 116 lead paragraphs). Once more a quite large number of lead paragraphs do not relate to politics (24/116), a few are Issue framed and focuses on matters (16) and a very small number are explaining and strategy framed in nature (6).

Frame in body text in SvD and HBL combined

		Amount using a frame	%
Issue frame		10	9 %
Game frame		40	34 %
Strategy frame		10	9 %
Other		32	28 %
Not applicable		29	25 %
	Total:	116	100 %

The most common frame in the body texts is the Game frame, about one-third are mainly framed this way. 32 are framed as Other, and 29 as Not Applicable. Both the Issue frame and the Strategy frame occur in 10 texts.

Looking at the numbers it becomes apparent that they are very similar to the numbers of the Overall dominating frame above. However, *Not applicable* differs the most as the number of body text being not applicable are much higher here than in the overall dominating frame. This points towards the fact that, indeed, titles and lead paragraphs do a lot for deciding what the overall dominating frame is, especially when in doubt. These numbers align fairly closely with those of "frame in title" and "frame in lead paragraph".

8.3 Sub Frames

Putin's narrative role in SvD and HBL combined

Main character		27	23 %
Side character		89	77 %

Almost 75% (89 of 116) of the article use Vladimir Putin as a side character and as a main character in 27 articles. This is a somewhat bewildering finding. The question that now arises is: is this common for leaders of global superpowers?

Father of the country frame in SvD and HBL combined

Yes		1	1 %
No		115	99 %

Putin as the Father of the country only occurs in one (1) of 116 articles.

Putin the Man frame in SvD and HBL combined

Yes		1	1 %
No		115	99 %

Another rare frame, Putin is described as a manly man in only one of 166 articles. Whether this is caused by different ideas of masculinity and what a leader should be like, or simply that it is superfluous to explicitly state because the idea is already so etched into our consciousness, is impossible to say. To catch more subtle nuances, a qualitative approach is needed.

Putin the FSB agent frame in SvD and HBL combined

Yes		3	3 %
No		113	97 %

Three (3) of the articles allude to Putin's past as an FSB agent. The rest (113) do not. This implies that we either do not care for his past, or, again, that it is so commonly known that stating it again is unnecessary.

Putin the aggressive/dangerous frame in SvD and HBL combined

Yes		22	19 %
No		94	81 %

Putin is deemed as dangerous or somehow threatening in 22 out of 116 texts (almost one-fifth). This lines up with previous research made by Kangas et al., and Schmidt.

Putin the dictator frame in SvD and HBL combined

Yes		4	3 %
-----	--	---	-----

No		112	97 %
----	--	-----	------

Putin is declared an autocratic or undemocratic leader in four (4) articles out of 116.

Putin the morally questionable frame in SvD and HBL combined

Yes		10	9 %
No		106	91 %

In just under one-tenth of the articles Putin is framed as a person of moral flexibility.

Putin the peace maker frame in SvD and HBL combined

Yes		6	5 %
No		110	95 %

Putin is framed as a president who wants to contribute to peaceful solutions in six (6) texts. In the rest he is not.

Putin the person frame in SvD and HBL combined

Yes		1	1 %
No		115	99 %

In total, Putin's private life is mentioned once (1). In the rest of the articles (115) it is not.

How is Putin assessed in SvD and HBL combined?

			%
Favourably		6	5 %
Unfavourably		17	15 %
Neutrally		93	80 %

Putin is portrayed in a favourable way in six (6) texts, in a negative manner in 17 and neutrally in the rest of them (93). "Neutrally" is a bit deceiving as we saw earlier that he is portrayed as aggressive, which in many ways is negative. This is the sort of frame that is notoriously difficult to quantify. This Aspect only codes "blatant" assessments, but the implicit ones are ignored since they are very difficult to quantify. Nevertheless, the category "Putin the aggressor" (above) gives another inkling.

8.4 Comparisons

Having looked at the two newspapers together it is time to separate them and look at where the two newspapers differ in their portrayal.

Dominating Frame

	SvD	SvD %	HBL	HBL
Issue frame	6	9 %	4	8 %
Game frame	27	40 %	16	33 %
Strategy frame	5	7 %	4	8 %
Other	21	31 %	14	29 %
Not applicable	8	12 %	11	23 %

Comparing the newspapers we see that (in terms of percentage) the game frame is more common in SvD than in HBL and that the Not applicable is more prevalent in HBL than in SvD. The Issue frame and the Strategy frame are equally (un)common in both newspapers. Other is more common in SvD than in HBL.

Frame in title

	SvD	SvD %	HBL	HBL %
Issue frame	7	10 %	5	10 %
Game frame	17	25 %	10	20 %
Strategy frame	0	0 %	3	6 %
Other	26	39 %	16	33 %
Not applicable	17	25 %	15	31 %

Again, the newspapers are fairly close in their framing patterns. However, they clearly differ in their tendency to use Other and the Game frame where SvD is more likely to use both. It is slightly more common in HBL to mention Putin just for the sake of mentioning him in contexts that are not political. This could be an indicator of the slightly different relationship the two countries have with Russia. A possible explanation as to why SvD is more likely to mention him in a setting that is political but not fully game or strategy framed could simply indicate that their titles are rather polysemantic, or that the photos (that are not taken into account here) would have cemented the titles into a strategy/issue/game frame instead.

A possible explanation for the low number of strategy frames in the titles is that titles are short, and a strategy explanation usually requires more characters.

Frame in lead paragraph

	SvD	SvD %	HBL	HBL %
Issue frame	8	12 %	8	16 %
Game frame	20	30 %	11	22 %
Strategy frame	4	6 %	2	4 %
Other	23	34 %	16	33 %
Not applicable	12	18 %	12	24 %

As far as lead paragraph patterns go, several things emerge: Both newspapers are unlikely to use the Strategy frame here, and Not applicable is fairly common in both (but more so in SvD). It is also abundantly clear that SvD is more likely than HBL to use a Game frame in their lead paragraph (just under one-third vs. one-fourth). HBL is slightly more likely to mention Putin in articles that do not pertain to politics. As we saw above in frames in titles, the amount of Strategy frames is very low. Same happens here and is possibly also because the lead paragraph is such a limited space.

Frame in body text

	SvD	SvD %	HBL	HBL %
Issue frame	7	10 %	3	6 %
Game frame	23	34 %	17	35 %
Strategy frame	10	15 %	4	8 %
Other	19	28 %	13	27 %
Not applicable	18	27 %	11	22 %

The most uncommon frame is the Issue frame in both newspapers, and the most common is the game frame (one-third). SvD is more likely to frame their body texts strategically. Other is used in roughly 3/10 cases by SvD and in just under one-fourth in HBL. Not applicable is also more common in SvD, but only by 5 percentage points.

Narrative Role

	SvD	SvD %	HBL	HBL %
Main Character	17	25 %	10	20 %
Side Character	50	75 %	38	80 %

In SvD, Vladimir Putin is a main character in the article in one-fourth of the articles, and in one-fifth in HBL. As a side character he appears in three-fourths of SvD's articles and in four out of five articles in HBL. In short, the man appears more often as a main character in SvD.

Father of the country

	SvD	SvD %	HBL	HBL %
Yes	1	1 %	0	0 %
No	66	99 %	49	100 %

This frame only occurs once, and in one newspaper: SvD.

Putin the Man

	SvD	SvD %	HBL	HBL %
Yes	1	1 %	0	0 %
No	66	99 %	49	100 %

Same as above, this frame only occurs once, and in one newspaper: SvD.

Putin the FSB agent

	SvD	SvD %	HBL	HBL %
Yes	2	3 %	1	2 %
No	65	97 %	48	98 %

This is an uncommon frame in both newspapers, but statistically speaking it is more common in SvD (3%) than in HBL (2%).

Putin the dangerous

	SvD	SvD %	HBL	HBL %
Yes	18	27 %	4	8 %
No	49	73 %	45	92 %

Putin is portrayed as dangerous more often in SvD than in HBL. In HBL he is described as dangerous in 8% of the articles, but in 27% in SvD.

Putin the dictator

	SvD	SvD %	HBL	HBL %
Yes	3	4 %	1	2 %
No	64	96 %	48	98 %

The authoritarian frame is uncommon, but more common in SvD where 4% of the articles use this frame than in HBL where only 2% do so.

Putin the crook

	SvD	SvD %	HBL	HBL %
Yes	6	9 %	4	8 %
No	61	91 %	45	92 %

In just under one-tenth of the articles Putin is framed as a person of moral flexibility.

Putin the peace maker

	SvD	SvD %	HBL	HBL %
Yes	3	4 %	3	6 %
No	64	96 %	46	94 %

Putin the peace maker frame, how uncommon it might be overall, occurs more frequently in HBL than in SvD, 6 % vs. 4%.

Putin the Person

	SvD	SvD %	HBL	HBL %
Yes	0	0 %	1	2 %
No	67	100 %	48	98 %

This is a very uncommon frame and mentions of Putin's private life only occurs once in HBL, but never in SvD.

How is Putin assessed?

	SvD	SvD %	HBL	HBL %
Favourably	5	7 %	1	2 %
Unfavourably	15	22 %	2	4 %
Neutrally	47	70 %	46	94 %

Here, the newspapers differ the most in their subframing. While "complimenting" Putin is a rare practise in both, it occurs slightly more frequently in SvD (7%) than in HBL (2%). SvD is however much more likely to assess Putin in a negative manner than HBL (22% vs only 4%). SvD is neutral in seven out of ten articles, but HBL is neutral

more often, in 94% of their texts. This gives cause for looking deeper into the idea of finlandisation and Sweden as a moral super power.

8.5 Short Summary of Findings

- Both newspapers are mainly fond of the Game Frame.
- The least likely overall frame is the Strategy Frame, very closely followed by the Issue Frame.
- None of them is very likely to use any of the suggested sub frames, apart from the "Putin the dangerous" frame.
- Putin is most commonly used as a side character.
- The newspapers are largely in sync in their framing. Where they differ the most is their usage of "Putin the dangerous" frame, which SvD uses more often.
- However, both newspaper generally do not use value laden words to describe him and are in that way neutral of him in their assessments but SvD is more likely to frame Putin in a unfavourable way.
- The least common sub frames are Putin the person, Father of the country and Putin the Man.
- The high number of Other and Not applicable could imply that Putin is mentioned a lot in soft news or in a distinctly non-political capacity.

8.6 Qualitative Analysis

In order to better compare this study's findings with those of prior ones, a shorter qualitative element was needed. The reason for this is that the vast majority of the previous research found is qualitative in its nature. It is also viewed as an opportunity to see what possible glitches the quantitative approach might have left us with, and maybe give us some ideas for further research.

The procedure for this analysis was the same for all four articles. First, the explicit utterances were collected and analysed, and after that a second close reading followed where more emphasis was put on choice of wording and what it could implicate. In short, all the articles were read through. After that, one text at a time was focused at and then read through again with a highlighter (used on the more explicit findings), and lastly given comments in the marginals and arrows to the more subtle/implicit ones and reasons why they were interpreted in a certain way.

The four articles can be found in appendix 4 in the back.

SvD article #15: "V ser hopp i det sänkta ryska försvarsanslaget"

In this article ("The Left party sees hope in the lowered Russian defence spendings"), the title is fairly open, not a winner and a loser per se, but also not an explanation, why is this happening. Nevertheless, it clearly pertains to politics. The closest would be a speculation about an outcome, which firmly places this in the gaming category.

In the lead paragraph the "why" is slightly more developed. However, the first part of the lead paragraph is Issue framed (he finds the political proposal hopeful/good), and the ending has a touch of game frame, Hans Wallmark from an opposing party thinks the Russians are not to be trusted/playing some sort of game.

The body text is a mix of several different frames, but the dominating frame is the Issue frame since it is a matter of two political opinions and comments upon a budget suggestion.

Here, V and M are pitted (their opinions) against each other. That the Swedish Left Party are so hopeful and the Moderate party so sceptical plays into the historical narrative where the reds have always viewed Russia with kinder eyes than the conservatives. The historical discourse (as also found in Schmidt, 2016) occurs with comments on Soviet times and that Cold War made in the text.

Putin's name only occurs once, in the beginning of the body text. This cements him as an important and a responsible (guilty/responsible) character. There is no need to

mention him any further now. The Other has a face/name and we can just go on calling it Russia. It also poses Putin as a ruler/leader, and it seems like he alone makes this decision. Putin (the president, not mentioned to also be commander in chief) is behind the arms race. That is a threat according to most, present coder included. He is thus a (passive) aggressor. Interesting is that he is described, as the president to behind it and not as commander in chief, which would have been a more prudent title (and also explanation). However, it plays nicely with the narrative of Putin as a sole regent. "Gloss over" is a word that clearly connotes scepticism and also, in a way, siding with the cause that is glossed over by Putin.

SvD article #48: "Putin vill säkra dubbelseger"

Putin is mentioned first thing in the title, in the lead paragraph of the article "Putin wants to secure a double victory". This cements him as a main character of the text, despite it being about the Eurovision song contest. The title is a very obvious game frame (it alludes to sport language) and the lead paragraph hints at a political game behind the ESC curtains. In the body text the focus is on who is winning and losing by Russia hosting the competition.

Putin is framed as a competitive president who says that sexual minorities are not treated poorly in Russia. Assuming the reader has read several articles that say the opposite, Putin indirectly becomes a liar. Putin is portrayed as an excellent player of the political game "... men vinner han [Lazarev] kommer segern användas som en symbol för att visa att situationen för homosexuella är okej." (".... But if he (Lazarev) wins, the victory will be used as a symbol to show that the situation for homosexuals is fine.")

The Othering occurs when Putin says that there is no LGBTQ discrimination going on. This is viewed as untrue and is "not done" in the Western world. Well, it does happen but it is largely condemned (especially in the Nordic countries). That a president would condone it sure is Other (strange) and different from the enlightened Us. This indirectly positions Sweden as the moral superpower (see Dahl, 2006). This article is also a clear example of what Iver B. Neumann's ideas that Russia is what the East used to be, a mirror into its own past (1999).

Putin wants to win. This portrays him as competitive (aggressive?) and also as a shrewd businessman who knows what to do to win the public opinion. It is also expressed that Russia/Putin only cares about how this looks to the outside, not to find any real solution to the issue. This article is speculating about a possible victory and what it would mean. The text makes it sound like Putin is orchestrating this almost personally. Like in Schmidt's findings (2016), Putin is the aggressor, the power seems personal (like in de

Vreese et al., 2017). What other organisations that might have played parts (lobby groups and whatnot) are not mentioned. He is an indisputable main character, and more villain than hero in our Western eyes. It is about politics, but also not since it is officially about the Eurovision. The article has several layers and its polysemantic nature makes it a challenge to code.

In line with what Kangas et al. found (2015) Putin is the Other, a leader, and responsible for what is happening. This affair might be smaller than Crimea but the patterns do repeat themselves.

HBL article #20: HBL Obama och Putin möttes i Kina

The article "Obama and Putin met in China" deals chiefly with a meeting of two political giants. The title is a clear issue frame according to the coding schedule, and the same is true for the lead paragraph. The body text is a little bit more difficult since it pertains to the issue (Syria talks), but the majority of it focuses on who is siding with whom (Russia with Assad and the US with the opposition, but both are against ISIS) and the political game around the meeting.

Again Putin is mentioned first, and then, lastly, it is mentioned that that meeting between Putin and Obama is nothing but political diplomatic window dressing and that the more crucial talks are held between Lavrov and Kerry. This is almost remarkable as this would imply that Putin isn't almighty and makes all decisions.

The tensions between the US and Russia in the Syrian war are mentioned, but it is also explained that they have a common enemy (ISIS) . This (sort of) mitigates the enemy idea and makes Russia less Other since they too oppose the terrorist organisation. Nevertheless, Russia is framed as "worse" since they side with "... enväldige presidenten Bashar al-Assad", i.e., they are siding with a dictator (bad), and the US are siding with the opposition (who per definition must be better since they are not dictators). Also, here Western values shine through, just like Schmidt found in FAZ (2016).

Same is true for the personalisation discourse, that the article spends more time talking about Putin here implies that he is the system. Also this coincides with Schmidt's findings. In this way, the reporting from during the Crimean Crisis is not so different from the 2016 one.

Not so much what was dealt with during the meeting is included in the text, which in a way a Game frame since two standpoints are pitted against each other and this is all about siding or not siding with another. No Strategy frame like "why do they meet",

etc. No issue? It is just briefly mentioned that they talked about things, one of the topics being Syria. That the topics are of little importance implies that rather the meeting in itself was (will they side or not) the important thing. Nevertheless, it is an Issue frame to say that they have met. But quite a thin one, and the passepartout is firmly game.

HBL article #02: "Ingen trodde Trump skulle vinna - förutom vi"

The "No one thought Trump would win - apart from us" title is obviously about politics, clearly about winning and losing, and also implies that the talker is good at predicting and playing the political game. In the lead paragraph we see Putin described as a relaxed and sure man, a person who knows who the winner is (hint: it is him). Putin's answers, paired with the comments about him using a strategy, etc., cements this. Here, he is the indisputable main character.

An article about Putin holding this sort of press conference is reminiscent of a King giving audience and holding court. It also cements the idea of him as the most important political figure in Russia (which lines up with de Vreese et al.'s findings from 2017 about the personalisation of politics and how individuals are more important than institutions).

The article says "he says this" (which points towards this, like you can't blame your failures on us), but then he smiles like a cat who got the cream (which opposes that implicitly). This description also alludes to him being unpredictable, and in the long run, untrustworthy and possibly dangerous.

"...det här är något Putin excellerar i, att säga en sak utåt men samtidigt signalera att han kanske har gjort exakt det han anklagas för." ("... this is something Putin excels at, to say one thing outwardly but simultaneously signalling that he might have done exactly what he is being accused of.") is a typical example of the game frame. This article is in many ways a more journalistic approach to a similar situation analysed by Lara Ryazanova-Clarke found at the end of each presidential term (2013).

Putin is the Other in this text. This occurs through several different comments. First of all, he is said to embarrass specifically female journalists and saying tasteless things. This is contrary to the Nordic idea of equality (and feminism) as a chief ideology. Another way of Othering him is through pitting him against the US in the Syria war (assuming that the US is part of the West like Sweden and Finland).

The journalist interprets Putin's facial expressions (he looks satisfied and self assured) and what might be the reason behind this (the American Election). Interestingly enough, the journalist manages to also only imply the involvement, and never outright say that he did it (a feat worthy of a journalist who has covered Russia for several years). She describes these actions as "power tools" that Putin uses to show that Russia is at an advantage.

Putin is also (framed as) slightly aggressive when he says that "We are stronger than any potential attacker—in our defence, in our history, in our traditions and in our will to defend." He somewhat softens it by adding that this is in the case they would get attacked. Nevertheless, it has already been proclaimed and is now out there. In short, Putin is the Other, powerful, leader, smug and smooth shit stirrer who will come out of any kerfuffle with clean enough hands to avoid punishment.

This article corresponds well to the personalisation discourse as the most important discourse around Putin as found by Schmidt (2016). There is no mentioning of other political organisations that might also have had a hand in the occurrences mentioned. The findings in the article also correspond with the Other as found by Kangas et al., as well as a leader as found by Kangas et al. (2015) and to a degree, Goscilo (2013), too. However, the characteristics of a leader as found by Goscilo (2013) were not as clearly present.

All the descriptions of him make Putin seem patriarchal, talking down to his sweet, silly children and is perhaps the closest we have been to the idea of Putin as a Father of the Country that was found in Goscilo (2013).

9. Conclusions

9.1 Framing

Let us begin by trying to answer the first of the research questions, to what extent are SvD and HBL using different main frames in their articles?

The most common frame used in articles where Putin is mentioned is the Game frame. This rings especially true for SvD. This means that the news (mainly politics) are treated in a manner that likens them to sports, games or wars. This lines up with previous findings (Strömbäck, 2009, de Vreese et al., 2017). This despite the fact that during 2016 there was no election for Putin to participate in (other than the American, some would say). One possible reason for the Game frame to be so predominating is that it is an "easy" frame that does not require much prior knowledge and research from the journalist or the reader.

However, what it does it that it obscures Putin's political agenda. Due to that he also remains an undefined possible threat which allows one's fantasy to run rampant. Every time an interpretation or and a prediction is made and then proved wrong, the idea of Putin as an unpredictable (and in the long run untrustworthy) leader grows stronger.

Strategy framing was uncommonly used by both newspapers. That such a low percentage of the units utilised it could mean that de Vreese et al. (2017) were right when they simply blended the Game Frame and the Strategy frame, but then again, doing so creates an undesirable loss of nuance. After all, a frame that focuses so much on the "why" is a frame that is vital for a reader to make sense of the world.

Issue framing turned out to be quite unpopular among both the news organisations. An issue frame would give us more facts, would let us know more about what policies Putin has signed, vetoed, etcetera. However, looking at the results it is very apparent that we know very little of what actually happens, very little why, but a lot about what could happen, and who is currently winning and losing in the global political game. Founding one's reality on "whatifs" seems a rather dubious practice. Moving on to the two jokers in every coding scheme, Other and Not applicable something interesting happens. Looking at Dominating overall frame, they make up almost half of the frames.

Why is so much coded as *Other*? One reason is that there is no election going on in Russia right now, and that we therefore focus less on politics. Another could be the limited knowledge journalists have about Russia (there is not only a language barrier, but also a cultural barrier), which in turn makes it difficult to use the Strategy frame, and the Issue frame. Then again, that is probably also why the game frame is so common—you are allowed to speculate as a journalist. These things are characteristic of the Game frame, and looking at the findings in this study, 43/116 articles had the game frame as their dominating frame. That equals 37% and is thus very similar to the findings of de Vreese et al. (2017) where they found that around one-third of the data analysed in their study were Game framed. They also stated that game frames and strategy frames are more common the closer one is to an election (De Vreese et al., 2017). Here, we know that the election is yet far away, but still they prevail.

Perhaps Other is a sign of a compromise. Maybe journalists are unwilling to write too much game, but lack the background knowledge to write proper strategy frames? Lastly, Not applicable and its prevalence might in part be due to the doping scandals, where it was common practise to mention Putin as it often was alleged that Kremlin somehow might have been involved. Or, perhaps, simply Not applicable occurred so often because Putin is omnipresent in our consciousness, and referring to him in a non-political setting only shows how conscious we are of him, and how much of a household name he really is.

9.2 Sub Frames

Having looked at the main frames, it is now time to move on to the second research question and look deeper into the way Putin's person was positioned and assessed in the two newspapers.

A boogey man on the side lines

Having coded more than 100 articles from 2016 certain tendencies and patterns emerge. First of all: Putin is mostly a side character in the texts. He is usually mentioned in passing, or in relation to another Politician, who is more important in the text. This thesis can't, unfortunately, claim to explain why this is the case. Why is the leader of our (geographically speaking) closest super power often nothing but a side show in our news coverage and what purpose does he serve when he occurs? Perhaps the American Election played its part here. The allegations that Russia had meddled in the US election surely prompted mentioning Putin a lot, especially since personalisation is such an important trick.

Schmidt (2016, p. 144) found that during the Crimean crisis, Putin was the leading (and central) subject in the news coverage. However, that crisis is "over" in this material and these texts offer data from a more "general" and, first and foremost, longer time period. That Putin is a side character in so many instances might indicate that Putin is not always the narrative nucleus.

The portrayal does not always follow pattern

Another interesting tidbit that became obvious was that the portrayal of Vladimir Putin does not entirely follow the pattern of previous research. Looking at the sub frames several of them rarely ever occur:

It is highly uncommon that he is portrayed as an autocratic leader. Then again, officially Russia is a democracy. Calling him a dictator straight out would be taking quite a clear stand. He was after all elected. One could argue that the election lacked any real opponents and that parts of the proceedings were a bit shoddy, but nevertheless he won and retains fairly high approval ratings.

Putin's past as a FSB agent is not popular to mention, but it occurs. The reason for this (after all, it was several decades ago) is difficult to pinpoint exactly in this analysis, but it could be that it is used as a narrative tool to imply Putin's general shadiness. He is not even once portrayed as a father of the country or as a macho man in the Nordic newspapers organisations included in this study. His private life is mentioned in one rare case.

Why do the frames not follow pattern? Looking at the findings from Goscilo et al. (2013), it seems like there should have been an abundance of references to his masculinity, how he in a fatherly way takes care of the country, etcetera. There could be several reasons for this. Different operationalisations and media cultures are surely parts of this, as well as a different idea of masculinity. Another reason might be that this essay has focused on the letter part of the articles and the images have been discarded. Perhaps they would have contributed to a higher number of these frames being found.

A reason why Putin is not described as a manly man in these texts could be because the idea of masculinity partially differs between different cultures. The Russian idea of masculinity could be viewed as over the top or "funny" to the Nordic eye. However, it could also be because looks should be irrelevant when it comes to political news. All in all, not using all the sub frames could be interpreted as a small win for more neutral reporting.

Another possible theory, however, is that it is already superfluous. After all, Putin is one of the longest sitting leaders in Russia and most opinions regarding him have likely already been formed and cemented.

No value laden words

Rather unexpectedly, there are few clear assessments of President Putin. Putin is almost never explicitly good or bad in the texts, he is just "nothing" or rather, "neutral". However, this result is slightly misgiving. In every article about the Syrian War where the peace negotiations/discussions between the US and Russia are mentioned it is often clear to the reader that the writer has sided with the US stance on the question and the fact that Putin says no to the suggestions, or is openly doing something that might harm the American idea of peace makes him an indirect villain. There are more subtle ways to pass judgement than to state it straight away. Unfortunately a quantitative analysis can't catch all of that in its standardised net.

Yet he is dangerous

What this analysis did catch, however, was that Putin is partially portrayed as threatening and aggressive. He is described as unpredictable and he is said to cause tension in global politics with his actions. In several articles he is sometimes tossed in as some sort of political boogey man, an undefined threat. This corresponds to the findings made by Kangas et al. in 2015, where they found that Putin was portrayed as an "aggressor" and as the "arch enemy".

A similar finding was made by Schmidt (2016) in the articles of the German newspaper Frankfurter Allgemeine. Schmidt also found what he called a "historic discourse" that was made up by themes like "is Putin aiming for the creating a new Soviet" (2016). I chose not to have a specific frame for that, instead I let such threatening (implying that several countries would cease to be is a fair threat) speculations be part of the "Putin is dangerous" frame.

Assuming that being threatening is, in a way, an unflattering portrayal, we can conclude that HBL does so to a lesser degree than SvD, who is more likely to straight out assess him in a negative manner. The HBL reluctance could be interpreted as a sign of finlandisation, where it is tried to avoid being too outspoken in favour of keeping in favour with their much bigger neighbour. A possible reason for a Swedish newspaper so criticise him more publicly is that Sweden is a Moral Super Power (Dahl, 2006), and thus has a "responsibility" to do so.

And a little bit crooked

Putin is not often written about in contact with "crooked things", but his friends are. Sometimes it is implied that Putin is cut from the same cloth, but nothing can be proven so far, which is probably one reason why so few articles that mention a moral flexibility.

Yet he sometimes strives for the greater good

However, as much as Putin is crooked he also says he wants to make peace in different conflicts (Ngorno-Karabakh, Syria). The Peace maker frame was not found in any of the literature that is listed as Previous Research. Kangas et al. (2015) did not find him to be a peace maker during the Minsk negotiations, instead he was found to be guilty/responsible, the arch enemy and the winner (Kangas et al., 2015.).

This frame was not mentioned in any of the previous research, and more qualitative and quantitative research should be made to explore it further and evaluate its usefulness. Nevertheless, it shows that, sometimes, Putin gets another dimension in the texts.

A sometime autocrat

It does not happen often, but calling Putin an autocrat happens. It could be argued that that is a value laden statement.

A very private president

Not much is known about Vladimir Putin, other than the things he freely admitted to in his autobiography and things that he has been obliged to make public, such as his divorce (even if it took a very long time). Nevertheless it is interesting that nothing is mentioned of his current love life, his children or anything in that area. In comparison to the love life of many of the French presidential candidates, Anders Borg, Trump or even Sauli Niinistö, Putin's life seems entirely barren of any sort of close bonds or anything that isn't presidential. In that sense, the myth of Putin as some sort of super human with no need for petty things like the love, he also remains a manly man above the rest of us, an island with no need for anyone. Power is enough to make him successful and satisfied. Kangas et al. (2015) found that he was portrayed as a "leader" in their data, and the same seems to be true here.

This is a contrast to Schmidt's findings where he found that Putin mostly was personalised in the text, and rarely was portrayed as his function, i.e. as the democratically elected head of state (2016). Could be a sign of the kind of personalisation that de Vreese et al. (2017) always push?

9.3 Comparing the Findings in HBL and SvD

Looking at the third research question and the differences in the reporting made by the two news organisations, it seems like SvD is more prone to distinct proclamations than HBL.

Looking at the main frames, they largely follow each other, apart from the Not applicable frame, where HBL is much more likely to use it as the Overall dominating Frame (23% vs. 12%). This could be because the East, and Putin is closer, mentally and geographically speaking in Finland, hence more reason to mention him in non-political instances as well.

Proceeding to the sub frames, we suddenly have more nuances at our disposal. Vladimir Putin's narrative role is to a large degree the same in the two newspapers, even if HBL is slightly more prone to having him as a main character than SvD.

The idea of Putin as the Father of the country is such a rare occurrence that it is of no significance in both newspapers. Same is true for Putin the FSB agent.

However, something very interesting happens when we move over to the frame "Putin the dangerous". Putin is coded as dangerous in 27% of the SvD articles, but only in 8% of HBL's texts. That is a big difference and is an aspect that could be examined further and more in depth in a later study.

Putin is rarely described as a dictator, but when it happens it more often happens in the Swedish publication. The fact that SvD chose to call a democratically elected leader as such is interesting since several researchers argue that yes, the elections were tampered with, but Putin would have won regardless.

Putin's moral is largely viewed the same in both HBL and SvD, and Putin the peacemaker-frame is the same. However, it should be noted that Putin the peace maker is a slightly more common frame than Putin the dictator, though not by much. Putin's private life does not occur often in neither publication.

Lastly, looking at the direct assessments of Putin, we once more see the biggest difference between the two news organisations. SvD describes him with unfavourable words in 22% of the cases, and HBL in only 4% of them. To a certain degree, this corresponds to the findings of the sub frame Putin the Dangerous. In short, the biggest

difference between the two countries is that Sweden is more open about disliking Putin and finding him to be a dangerous character.

This might hint at the Swedish tendency to pose as a moral super power, and the Finnish tendency towards Finlandisation where one cannot treat Russia like any other neighbouring country.

9.4 Summary of Findings

Largely, the findings made in the brief qualitative analysis point in the same direction as those found in the major quantitative analysis. Nevertheless, certain things "popped" in these four texts.

First of all, the similarities with the findings made by Kangas et al. (2015) become more obvious. This is interesting, considering that they focused on the images. This could indicate that excluding the images might have had a smaller impact on the results than first thought. This is good news for this study.

The qualitative analysis also found certain frames that seemed to be pervasive also in Schmidt's research (2016). Especially the personalisation discourse and the historical discourse were prominent. Next to none of the traits touted in Putin's autobiography were found, indicating that the Russian idea of him and the Western idea of him differ from each other.

The findings made by Gosילו (2013) are not entirely applicable, likely because they focused on findings in Russian media. Apparently, the way Russia writes about Putin differs from the way Nordic journalists do.

It is also apparent how personal power is in many of the units, and how the publications enjoy emphasising his omnipresence/power. It also points towards the findings of de Vreese et al. and their finding that it is becoming increasingly common that newspapers, when writing about politics, talk about individuals instead of organisations, organs and structures (2017).

Summarising the findings from the quantitative approach, this study shows that the game frame is the most popular frame to use overall, also during non-election times. The least popular frame is the issue frame. So far, all findings are in accordance with the findings of de Vreese et al. (2017).

Putin is portrayed as a player by Gosילו et al., and De Vreese et al. found that the game frame is the most common news frame. Same is true here. Personalisation was

also found by Aelst et al. (2017) and is in part also found here, but since his private life rarely ever is mentioned, we can conclude that Putin is indeed personal, but not private. However, if we continue by looking at the separate "aspects" of Putin found in these articles they only partially match with previous findings. The least match occurs, unsurprisingly with Putins autobiography. Not only is it the oldest text, but entirely subjective and uncritical on the whole..se the ideals of masculinity are ever changing, and differs vastly between Sweden, Finland and Russia.

Another reason why the findings of this study not always matches with the findings of this book is, again, because the materials used for their studies are largely Russian, and thus have a much larger influence "from above", and the sky is not what is implied here.

Moving on to what Schmidt (2016) found, there were no hard proof of the historic discourse in the quantitative analysis, but traces of it in the qualitative. This indicates that this discourse could be delved into further. Schmidt also found that the personalisation if the news was an important element in his findings. This became especially apparent in this study in the qualitative analysis of a select number of articles. Also, Schmidt found that Putin (and Russia) are dangerous and at war, which this study also caught. This study has focused less on the military aspect of Putin, but tangents it in the frame Putin as a leader, and this frame is not often reoccurring.

Lastly, Kangas et al. (2015) found him to be (among other things) a leader, and aggressive, the arch enemy and winner. This also rings partly true in this study. If he is described as dangerous and aggressive in this study, the arch enemy fits, despite his morals rarely ever coming into question. Kangas et al. also found that Finnish publications put less emphasis than foreign ones on Russias role in the Crimean Crisis. Perhaps is the Swedish love for being more critical than Finland about Russia in 2016 a trace from this behaviour?

What this does all of this mean for the study of Putin in Swedish and Finnish press in relation to previous research? That there seems to be a pattern in the West, but charting it is not done yet.

10. Further Studies

Researching an area that is A. political, and B. Russian is a recipe for uncertainty. The vast country's political landscape is known for its rapid changes and the proceedings' opaqueness until the very last moment. This means certain that ideas for future studies might not be possible when the time comes. Nevertheless, suggestions will be made below.

First of all, a study of the massmedial coverage of the presidential election in 2018 is a given suggestion. This kind of study could be done both with Russian and foreign news sources, and a comparison between them is also an interesting possibility. If Alexei Navalny isn't hindered from participating in it and Putin does not decide to retire early, it will likely be a massmedial carnival with excellent opportunity to see how the younger opponent and Putin will be framed in comparison, both visually and in the texts. This idea was suggested by undersigned already in 2015 (Thalén, 2015), but nevertheless it is still a relevant proposal.

However, another suggestion for further studies is more "general" studies, i.e not event specific (like Crimea or an election). Since Vladimir Putin is one of the longest sitting leaders of any super power there is also a golden opportunity to study changes and trends over time, both in Russia and abroad. It would be beneficial with more longitudinal research that allows us to delve deeper into the idea of Us and Him, of our idea of Russian politics and Putin. Preferable would be if this could be carried out in different countries so that it could be explored further what Putin "is", not only in countries such as the Nordics but also in other European countries that have been part of the Soviet union, for example. In order to fully understand the idea of Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin we must allow our findings of Putin's portrayal to be polysemantic and slightly contradictory to begin with, until a critical mass has been reached and we can be entirely sure of the bigger patterns.

Sources

- Aalberg, T., Strömbäck, J., Vreese, C. (2011). *The framing of politics as strategy and game: A review of concepts, operationalizations and key findings*. Journalism no 13(2) p. 162 –178 DOI: 10.1177/1464884911427799
- Aalberg, T., de Vreese and Strömbäck, J. (2017). Strategy and Game framing. In *Comparing Political Journalism*. London: Routledge.
- Van Aelst, P., Sheaffer, T., & Hubé, N. (2017). and Stylianos Papathanassopoulos. Personalization. In *Comparing Political Journalism*. London: Routledge.
- Bakhtin, M. M. (1990). *Author and hero in aesthetic activity*. Art and answerability, 4, 256.
- Bauer, M. W., & Gaskell, G. (Eds.). (2000). *Qualitative researching with text, image and sound: A practical handbook for social research*. Sage.
- BBC. (2014) Ukraine crisis. Timeline. Published 13112014. Last retrieved 04092017 from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26248275>
- Berg, J. (2015, January 13th). Ett utvidgat torg för vassare opinion in Hufvudstadsbladet. Hufvudstadsbladet. Last retrieved 04092017 from <http://gamla.hbl.fi/opinion/ledare/2015-01-13/705641/ett-utvidgat-torg-vassare-opinion>.
- Cappella, J.N. & Jamieson, K.H. (1997). *Spiral of cynicism: the press and the public good*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Cassidy, J. A., & Johnson, E. D. (2013). A Personality Cult for the Postmodern Age. *Putin as celebrity and cultural icon*. New York: Routledge, 37-64.
- Dahl, A-S. (2006). Sweden: Once a moral superpower, always a moral superpower? *International Journal*, 61(4), 895-908.
- Devereux, E. (red.) (2007). *Media studies: key issues and debates*. London: SAGE
- Dimitrova, D & Strömbäck, J. (2005). *Mission accomplished? Framing of the Iraq War in the elite newspapers in Sweden and the United States*. *International Communication Gazette* 10/2005; 67(5). DOI: 10.1177/0016549205056050
- Entman, R. M. (1993). *Framing: Toward clarification of a fractured paradigm*. *Journal of communication*, 43(4).
- Freedom House. (2017) Freedom of the Press 2017. Last retrieved 04092017 from <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/freedom-press-2017>
- Gosciolo, H. (red.) (2013). *Putin as celebrity and cultural icon*. London: Routledge.
- Götz, E. (2016) Russia, the West, and the Ukraine crisis: three contending perspectives, *Contemporary Politics*, 22:3, 249-266, DOI: 10.1080/13569775.2016.1201313
- Kangas, J., Ojala, M., & Pantti, M. (2015). Lännessä olemme, itään katsomme Ukrainan kriisin kehykset ja Venäjän esitykset suomalaisissa mediakuvisa. *Media & viestintä*, 38(4).

- Leonard, M., Popescu, N., & European Council on Foreign Relations. (2007). *A power audit of EU-Russia relations* (Vol. 9). London: European Council on Foreign Relations.
- Marcal, M. (2015, March 1st). *Pengarna står mot idealen, S*. Aftonbladet. Last retrieved 03-11-2017 from <https://www.aftonbladet.se/ledare/ledarkronika/katrinemarcal/article20394892.ab>.
- Mikhailova, T. (2013). 3 Putin as the Father of the Nation. *Putin as Celebrity and Cultural Icon*, 80, 65.
- Nationalencyklopedin, finlandisering. <http://www.ne.se.ezproxy.ub.gu.se/uppslagsverk/encyklopedi/lang/finlandisering> (retrieved 2017-09-01)
- Neumann, I.B. (1999). *Uses of the other: "the East" in European identity formation*. Manchester: Manchester Univ. Press.
- New American Oxford Dictionary. Version 2.2.1 (169). *Agent*. Apple Inc.
- Putin, V.V. (2000). *First person*. London: Hutchinson
- RadioFreeEurope. (2017). Putin Says He'll "Think About" Running For Fourth Term. Last retrieved 03-11-2017 from <https://www.rferl.org/a/putin-mulling-fourth-term-president-russia/28658455.html>.
- Retriever (2015). *The most extensive digital news archive i Scandinavia*. Last read 03-11-2017 at <http://www.retriever-info.com/en/category/news-archive/>
- Rodin, J. (2010). Nordiska perspektiv på Ryssland. *Nordisk Østforum*. 24 (2)
- Ryazanova-Clarke, L. (2013). The Discourse of a Spectacle at the End of the Presidential Term. *Putin as Celebrity and Cultural Icon*, 80, 104.
- Schmidt, D. (2015). *Das Bild Russlands in den deutschen Leitmedien: Die Berichterstattung über Russland und Wladimir Putin im Rahmen der Ukrainekrise* (Vol. 12). Frank & Timme GmbH.
- Shevtsova, L.F. (2005). *Putin's Russia*. (Rev. and expanded ed). Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
- Strömbäck, J. (2000). *Makt och medier: samspelet mellan medborgarna, medierna och de politiska makthavarna*. Lund: Studentlitteratur.
- Strömbäck, J. (2004). *Den medialiserade demokratin: om journalistikens ideal, verklighet och makt*. (1. ed.) Stockholm: SNS publ.
- Strömbäck, J. (2009). *Den medialiserade valbevakningen* in L. Nord & J. Strömbäck (Ed.), *Väljarna, partierna och medierna: en studie av politisk kommunikation i valrörelsen 2006* (p. 127-167). Stockholm: SNS förlag
- Strömbäck, J & Esser, F. (2009). *Shaping Politics: Mediatization and Media Interventionism*. In Knut Lundby (Ed.), *Mediatization: Concept, Changes, Consequences*. New York: Peter Lang, 205-223
- Svenska Dagbladet, (2017). Om SvD. Retrieved 01-09-2017 from <https://kundservice.svd.se/omsvd/>

- Sydsvenskan, Editorial. (2009, July 5th). Historiska Perspektiv. Sydsvenskan. Last retrieved 03-11-2017 from <https://www.sydsvenskan.se/2009-07-04/historiska-perspektiv>.
- Thalén, F. (2015). *'Change Russia, Start with Moscow': A Comparative Framing Analysis of the Portrayal of Alexei Navalny and the Moscow Mayoral Election During 2013 in Die Welt and The Moscow Times* (Dissertation). Luleå: Department of Arts, Communication and Education, Luleå University of Technology. Retrieved from <http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:ltu:diva-48569>
- Vihavainen, T. (2010). Ryssland i Finlands historia: Några särdrag som påverkar nutiden. Nordisk Østforum. 24 (2)
- Vreese, C.H.D., Esser, F. & Hopmann, D.N. (red.) (2017). Comparing political journalism. London: Routledge.
- Wilde, O. (1891). The Soul of Man under Socialism.

Appendices

Appendix 1

Coding Scheme

Selected newspapers: Svenska Dagbladet, Hufvudstadsbladet.

Time period: 01012016-31122016

Selected texts: All chosen texts are from SvD and HBL and are accessible through the Swedish media archive Retriever.

Unit of analysis: Complete articles, unless otherwise stated.

This coding scheme is partly based on one created by Jesper Strömbäck in *Väljarna, partierna och medierna* (2009) in chapter 5. Den medialiserade valbevakningen. However, it has been changed and adapted to fit my own purposes and research questions better.

1. Newspaper: _____
2. Code: _____

Election / Urval

3. Frame in titel
 1. Issue frame
 2. Game frame
 3. Strategy frame
 4. Other
 5. Not applicable
4. Frame in lead paragraph (ingress)
 1. Issue frame
 2. Game frame
 3. Strategy frame
 4. Other
 5. Not applicable
5. Frame in body text
 1. Issue frame
 2. Game frame
 3. Strategy frame
 4. Other

5. Not applicable

6. Dominating frame
 1. Issue frame
 2. Game frame
 3. Strategy frame
 4. Other
 5. Not applicable

7. How is Putin used in the narrative?
 1. At length/as a major character in the text
 2. In passing/as a side character

8. Are frames of Putin as a Father present?
 1. Yes
 2. No

9. Is Putin The Man frame present?
 1. Yes
 2. No

10. Is Putin the former FSB-agent frame present?
 1. Yes
 2. No

11. Is Putin the aggressive/dangerous frame present?
 1. Yes
 2. No

12. Is the Putin as a would-be dictator frame present?
 1. Yes
 2. No

13. Is the Putin the morally questionable present?
 1. Yes
 2. No

14. Is Putin the peace-maker frame present?
 1. Yes
 2. No

15. Is Putin as an individual fram present?

1. Yes
2. No

16. How is Vladimir Putin judged?

1. Favourably
2. Unfavourably

Code instructions

1. Newspapers

Every newspaper is given a number according to the following system:

1. 100 - - Svenska Dagbladet
2. 200 - - Hufvudstadsbladet

2. Code

Every article is given a number according to the following system:

100 01, 100 02, etc. for Svenska Dagbladet,
200 01, 200 02, etc. for Hufvudstadsbladet.

Main frames

3. Framing in title

Title frames refer to frames found in the articles' main title along with possible subtitles or sub headings. In the coding scheme there are Issue frame, Game frame and Strategy frame as alternatives. There are also Other and Not applicable.

1. For the title to be coded as *issue framed*, it must mainly refer to **objective (political) actions** and decisions that have been made, such as Putin went to a summit, vetoed a new law or decided to dismantle the Duma. **Political proposals**, such as commentary on a new budget, participation in political events or meetings, **any political views a person might express** (such as, "The EU is good/bad for us") are all indicators of issue framing.

2. *The game frame* in title refers to titles that focuses on how **the political game is played**. **Who is winning and losing in politics in general** (the rivalry between Putin and Obama, how do they "play" each other), but also more specifically in elections, legislative debates or rising or sinking in the approval ratings. **Speculations about outcomes** also counts as game frames (for example who will win the election, whose policy will be more popular/get voted through, **who will side with whom**). Important

indicators that this frame is present is that **sport or war terminology or metaphors** is used, and words such as winners and losers.

3. *The strategy frame* is used if the title is an interpretation of politics (**why is this happening, what will this lead to and why is Putin acting like this**) and politicians **motives for their actions**, what means and tactics they use to get what they want, whatever it may be (usually policy or political goals). The strategy frame is also used if the title is about *how* someone campaigns. It also encompasses talk of media strategies, also taking into account coverage of press behaviour. If the title is about politicians as individuals rather than representatives for a political party it is too to be coded as strategy framing.

4. *Other* refers to titles that don't fit any of the frames mentioned above while there still is a connection to politics.

5. *Not applicable* refers to titles that either don't exist or lack any connection to politics.

4. Frame in lead paragraph (ingress)

"Lead paragraph" refers to the "introduction paragraph" of the article. It is sometimes in bold. The alternatives are *the game frame, the issue fram and the strategy frame* and *other*. *Other* is used if the frame does not fit one of the former, and *not applicable* is used in those instances where the text lacks a lead paragraph.

5. Frame in body text

Body text refers ro the "text" in the article, i.e., with no regard to title, lead paragraph, etc.

If no frame can be determined, the text should be coded as *other*. *Not applicable* is to be used in the unlikely event that the article lacks body text.

6. Dominating frame

Options: Issue frame, Game frame, Strategy frame, Other and Not applicable. Not applicable is to be used in the unlikely event that the text has no frames dominating frame, i.e., no frames have been found in the text.

Here, the whole text is taken into consideration as a whole entity. In unclear or complicated cases special emphasis should be put on the title and the lead paragraph do settle the overall frame.

Sub frames

The following variables refer to whether a frame is present or not. This means that they are coded based on their incidence. How dominating they are not taken into consideration and a text can thus contain multiple kinds of these frames.

7. How is Putin used in the narrative?

1. At length/as a major character in the text. Example: When he is the only person mentioned by a name in the text or when the majority of the text pertains to him and his actions, whether it be commentary on them or through quotes directly from him.
2. In passing. Example: name dropped when a Russian doping scandal is being brought to light during the Olympics or when Putin's name is just one name among many listed as participating in a political event of some sort)

8. Are frames of Putin as a Father present?

1. *Yes* if the article in some way talks about Putin as a father figure for the nation (Отец Отечества). Example: articles where Putin is described with "family terminology" or as a shepherd for the masses.
2. *No* if he isn't.

9. Is Putin The Man frame present?

1. *Yes* if Putin is portrayed as more manly than the average male, as aggressive or if the text alludes to his physique and athletic prowess. Also *Yes* if Putin is portrayed as sexually appealing to women (or men). This can happen through mentions of his popularity with any of the sexes, or comments pertaining to his looks.
2. *No* if he isn't, or if the comments about his appearance are negative.

10. Is Putin the former FSB-agent frame present?

1. *Yes* if the article mentions his former employment at the FSB, or his present/past close ties with the organisation.
2. *No* if it does not.

11. Is Putin the aggressive/dangerous frame present?

1. *Yes* if Putin is portrayed as (part of) the source of a high level of conflict or threatening the text (he wants Russia to strengthen their nuclear arsenal, "his" occupation of Ukraine or is declining peace talks). If the conflict is real or fabricated is of no consequence. If Putin openly criticises someone or something, it is to be coded as *yes*. This is also true for cases when his opinion is set against someone else's view. If another person is quoted saying that Putin is an incendiary, or the journalist formulates

it should also be coded as a *yes*.

2. *No* if the level of conflict is very low or absent. A low level of conflict could be a minor disagreement on a small issue that is of no importance to global happenings, peace talks or similar. (Minor tensions are often a requirement for something to register on the journalistic radar).

12. Is the Putin as a would-be dictator frame present?

1. *Yes* if the text says that he is striving for greater personal power or using undemocratic means to achieve something. Also *yes* if Putin is compared to previous political leaders that had the same tendency (Russian or any other nationality). *Yes* if Russia is called an autocracy or dictatorship, or he an autocrat/dictator.

2. *No* if he isn't.

13. Is the Putin the morally questionable frame present?

1. *Yes* if the article refers to alleged morally and legally dubious action such as corruption charges, mob/oligarch connections or other crimes that are tied to him on some manner. Also *Yes* if his political actions are portrayed as prompted by greed or illusions of grandeur.

If the accusations are true or not is irrelevant.

2. *No* if these things are not brought up.

14. Is Putin the peace-maker frame present?

1. *Yes* if Putin is portrayed as a stabilising force, as a voice of reason, or interested in cooperation with other countries to achieve peace or maintain good relations with another country.

2. *No* if he isn't.

15. Is Putin as an individual frame present?

1. *Yes* if the article discusses or mentions his private life.

2. *No* if it doesn't.

16. How is Vladimir Putin judged?

1. *Favourably* if he is described in mainly positive terms using flattering words and angles in the article (such as "he is a competent leader" or "he is a hero to his people").

2. *Unfavourably* if he is described with negative words and in an overall unflattering light ("he is single handedly ruining relations with Europe and destroying the domestic policy reform"). 3. Vladimir Putin is to be coded as *Neutral* if both good (he has high

approval ratings) and bad (mentions of shady dealings with unsavoury individuals) are mentioned or if the descriptions of him are balanced in some other way.

1. Hufvudstad sbladet	2. Article	3. Frame in title	4. Frame in lead paragraph	5. Frame in body text	6. Dominating frame	7. Narrative role	8. Putin as the Father of the country	9. Putin the Man	10. Putin the FSB-agent	11. The dangerous/aggressive	12. Putin the dictator	13. Putin the morally questionable	14. Putin the peace maker	15. Putin the Person	16. How is Putin judged?	
	20001	5	4	4	4	4	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	3
	20002	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	3
	20003	5	5	5	5	5	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	3
	20004	4	4	4	4	4	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	3
	20005	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	3
	20006	5	5	5	5	5	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	3
	20007	5	2	2	2	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	3
	20008	4	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	3
	20009	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	3
	20010	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	3
	20011	4	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	3
	20012	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	3
	20013	4	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	1
	20014	4	4	4	4	4	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	3
	20015	4	3	3	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	3
	20016	2	4	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	3
	20017	4	4	4	4	4	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	3
	20018	4	4	4	4	4	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	3
	20019	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	3
	10020	1	1	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	3
	10021	5	5	5	5	5	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	3
	10022	5	5	5	5	5	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2
	10023	1	4	4	4	4	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	3
	10024	5	5	5	5	5	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	3
	10025	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	3
	10026	5	4	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	3
	10027	4	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
	10028	4	4	4	4	4	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	3
	10029	4	4	4	4	4	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	3
	10030	4	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	3
	10031	2	5	4	4	4	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	3
	20032	2	5	5	5	5	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	3
	20033	5	5	5	5	5	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	3
	20034	5	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	3
	20035	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	3
	20036	5	5	5	5	5	1	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	3
	20037	5	5	5	5	5	1	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	3
	20038	1	4	4	4	4	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	3
	20039	5	5	5	5	5	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	3
	20040	4	4	4	4	4	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	3
	20041	3	3	3	3	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	3
	20042	3	4	4	4	4	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	3
	20043	4	4	3	3	3	1	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	3
	20044	5	4	4	4	4	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	3
	20045	4	4	4	4	4	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	3
	20046	4	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	3
	20047	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	3
	20048	5	5	5	5	5	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	3
	20049	3	1	3	3	3	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	3
TOAL AMOUNT OF																
1. Issue frame/Yes		5	8	3	4	10	0	0	1	4	1	4	3	1	1	
2. Game frame /No		10	11	17	16	39	49	49	48	45	48	45	46	48	2	
3. Strategy frame		3	2	4	4											46
4. Other		16	16	13	14											
5. Not Applicable		15	12	11	11											
		49	49	48	49	49	49	49	49	49	49	49	49	49	49	49

Appendix 3

List of articles coded

- > "Att utvisa hade varit väntat", Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-12-31
- > Nya aktörer styr i Syrienspelet, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-12-30
- > Sorgedag utlyst efter flygkrasch, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-12-26
- > Donald Trump: "Låt det bli kapprustning", Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-12-24
- > MÖRDAD AMBASSADÖR BEGRAVD, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-12-23
- > Polisbricka öppnade väg för mördaren, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-12-21
- > Blodiga dåd spelar populister rätt i händerna, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-12-21
- > Obama: Nätattackerna oroar mig, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-12-17
- > Vi lever i en amerikansk rysare med osäkert slut, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-12-15
- > Varför blev Putin president?, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-12-11
- > Rysk aktivist åter i rätten, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-12-07
- > Putin markerar mot "vänner", Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-12-02
- > Putin utser ny minister, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-12-01
- > Fransk "Thatcher" nu kandidat i presidentval, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-11-28
- > V ser hopp i det sänkta ryska försvarsanslaget, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-11-24
- > Konservativ uppbackning för Trump, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-11-19
- > Ryskt statligt stöd till bilbranschen, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-11-16
- > Motstånd mot gasledning kan stödja Ukrainas sak, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-11-15
- > Öst mot väst i Moldaviens val, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-11-12

- > Är undergången här?, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-11-06
- > Trump har redan vunnit, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-11-03
- > Le Pen lånar miljoner av arabvärlden till kampanj, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-10-27
- > Isig relation kan tina en grad, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-10-15
- > Svensk splittring om kärnvapen, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-10-11
- > Barnen är isvindarnas offer, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-10-05
- > Ännu en storm för skandalernas man, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-10-01
- > Avlidne Peres hyllas av många, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-09-29
- > Folkomröstning hotar Bosniens väg mot EU, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-09-24
- > Storseger men apatin växer, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-09-20
- > Danmark nobbar rysk Arktis-invit, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-09-13
- > Ökat tryck på regeringen stoppa ny rysk gasledning, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-09-09
- > Abe och Putin vill sluta fred, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-09-04
- > Plötslig rysk militärövning, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-08-26
- > Fyra nya namn och en nyvunnen vänskap, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-08-15
- > Putin och Erdogan överens, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-08-10
- > Efter alla skandaler - avgörandet är här, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-08-01
- > "Trump i samma falang som Le Pen och Putin", Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-07-29
- > Städernas Fågel Fenix är full av kulturskatter, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-07-27
- > Wada-rapport bekräftar ryskt fusk, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-07-19

- > "Man vill skrämman obekväma röster", Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-07-10
- > Björklund vill se ett starkare EU, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-07-04
- > Dags att spela schack mot populismen, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-06-30
- > Blandade känslor för brexit i USA, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-06-25
- > Jimmie Åkesson och Putin - bögnas bästa vänner, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-06-19
- > "Putins makt är beundransvärd", Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-06-17
- > Bättre relation till Kreml dröjer, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-06-06
- > Natoambitioner retar Ryssland, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-05-16
- > Putin vill säkra dubbelseger, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-05-09
- > Putin tar ett stort steg mot mer makt i rymden, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-04-30
- > Fängslad pilot kan bytas mot ryska soldater, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-04-20
- > Skattesandalen pressar politiker, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-04-12
- > "Det var fantastiskt då jag, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-04-08
- > Strider trots eldupphör i Nagorno-Karabach, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-04-04
- > Oredans tid är här, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-03-28
- > Alla ombord omkom vid krasch i snöstorm, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-03-20
- > "Psykologiskt spel av Putin", Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-03-16
- > I Ryssland är missnöje förenat med livsfara, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-03-11
- > Rojalistisk yra även i Ryssland, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-03-04
- > TUSENTALS RYSSAR, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-02-28

- > Rysk militär pekas ut för nedskjutning, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-02-25
- > På Östersjön går politikens vågor höga, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-02-09
- > Turkiet: Ny rysk flygkränkning, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-01-31
- > Skakigt inför fredssamtal, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-01-25
- > Ryska rubeln rasar i takt med oljan, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-01-22
- > Kina i fokus när mäktiga minglar, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-01-19
- > Utbetalningen till KI-kirurg stoppas, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-01-09
- > Spår i sanden var det enda som blev kvar, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-01-06
- > Jörn Donners Finland är rikt och veligt, Hufvudstadsbladet, 2016-12-31
- > ”Ingen trodde att Trump skulle vinna - förutom vi”, Hufvudstadsbladet, 2016-12-24
- > Över 70 har dött av badoljan i Sibirien, Hufvudstadsbladet, 2016-12-23
- > ”Olika åsikt om Ryssland hindrar inte militärt samarbete”, Hufvudstadsbladet, 2016-12-18
- > Pragmatism bakom Trumps ryska giv, Hufvudstadsbladet, 2016-12-15
- > Dags att stänga av Ryssland, Hufvudstadsbladet, 2016-12-10
- > Upplagt för fransk chock, Hufvudstadsbladet, 2016-11-29
- > Rysslandsforskare och rysk diplomat rök ihop i riksdagen, Hufvudstadsbladet, 2016-11-24
- > Ärkekonservativa klara för Trumpjobb, Hufvudstadsbladet, 2016-11-19
- > EU:s enighet testas, Hufvudstadsbladet, 2016-11-16
- > Bulgarien får Rysslandsvänlig president, Hufvudstadsbladet, 2016-11-15

- > ”Amerikanska folket vill samma sak som Putin”, Hufvudstadsbladet, 2016-11-10
- > Clinton nytt hopp för splittrat USA, Hufvudstadsbladet, 2016-10-30
- > Bombstoppet i Aleppo ser ut att hålla, Hufvudstadsbladet, 2016-10-20
- > ”Finland ska vara redo för hackares attacker inför presidentvalet”, Hufvudstadsbladet, 2016-10-13
- > MILITÄR ”Ryssland uppviglas av andras svaghet”, Hufvudstadsbladet, 2016-10-03
- > Avlidne Shimon Peres hyllas brett, Hufvudstadsbladet, 2016-09-29
- > FN-chefen anklagar syriska regimen, Hufvudstadsbladet, 2016-09-21
- > Diane James ny ledare för Ukip, Hufvudstadsbladet, 2016-09-17
- > Obama och Putin möttes i Kina, Hufvudstadsbladet, 2016-09-06
- > Kritik mot rysk stjärndirigent, Hufvudstadsbladet, 2016-08-28
- > Otto var som vanligt upprörd, Hufvudstadsbladet, 2016-08-18
- > Ryssland Putin anklagar Ukraina för ”terror på Krim”, Hufvudstadsbladet, 2016-08-11
- > Vegas sommarpratare Fred skämtar om Åland, Hufvudstadsbladet, 2016-08-05
- > Civilsamhället måste kräva ett slut på det militära maktspelet, Hufvudstadsbladet, 2016-07-16
- > Lämplig balans i relationerna, Hufvudstadsbladet, 2016-07-12
- > Trump och Putin oroar Sveriges försvarsminister, Hufvudstadsbladet, 2016-07-05
- > Putin sade fel och så är det med den saken, Hufvudstadsbladet, 2016-07-03
- > Turkiet Turkiet värmer upp relationer till Ryssland och Israel, Hufvudstadsbladet, 2016-06-29

- > Nyanserande samtal, Hufvudstadsbladet, 2016-06-27
- > Ett spel för gallerierna, Hufvudstadsbladet, 2016-06-19
- > EM Putin Rysslands trumfkort, Hufvudstadsbladet, 2016-06-12
- > Österbottens Tidning, Hufvudstadsbladet, 2016-06-09
- > Sakkunskapen måste avgöra, Hufvudstadsbladet, 2016-06-01
- > Nykomlingen utmanar ringräven, Hufvudstadsbladet, 2016-05-28
- > Problemet med den ryska mentaliteten, Hufvudstadsbladet, 2016-05-09
- > Köp av hampfrön kan leda till registeranteckning, Hufvudstadsbladet, 2016-04-29
- > Putin kritiserade Turkiet i frågestund, Hufvudstadsbladet, 2016-04-15
- > Management by perkele har de, Hufvudstadsbladet, 2016-04-10
- > Rapporter om strid trots eldupphör, Hufvudstadsbladet, 2016-04-04
- > Fennovoima är en del av den ryska strategin, Hufvudstadsbladet, 2016-03-24
- > Putin skyller på myndigheterna, Hufvudstadsbladet, 2016-03-17
- > Icke-allierade är vi inte, Hufvudstadsbladet, 2016-03-06
- > ”De slåss mot en död människa”, Hufvudstadsbladet, 2016-02-26
- > Syrien Obama till Putin: Sluta bomba, Hufvudstadsbladet, 2016-02-15
- > Putins gökunge i Groznyj, Hufvudstadsbladet, 2016-02-04
- > ”Putin godkände troligen mordet”, Hufvudstadsbladet, 2016-01-22
- > IAAF-ledningen hjälpte doparna att komma undan, Hufvudstadsbladet, 2016-01-15
- > Ryssland BBC: Nato hot i rysk säkerhetsstrategi, Hufvudstadsbladet, 2016-01-02

Units chosen for close-reading

16 HUFVUDSTADSBLADET

Lördag 24 december 2016

Nyheter

Berlinmisstänkt
svor trohet till IS

Terrorism Mannen som jagats i hela Europa för julmarknadsdådet i Berlin sköts ihjäl i Milano. I en video som IS propagandakanal har publicerat svär Anis Amri trohet till terrorgruppen.

– Jag har i dag talat i telefon med min italienske kollega. Han har personligen bekräftat för mig att den ihjälskjutne personen är samma person som den misstänkte gärningsmannen i dådet på julmarknaden på Breitscheidplatz, säger Tysklands inrikesminister **Thomas de Maizière** på en presskonferens.

Enligt italienska medier blev tunicisern **Anis Amri** stoppad i en rutin-kontroll på Piazza I Maggio, efter att ha anlänt med tåg till stationen Sesto San Giovanni i norra Milano.

– Han öppnade omedelbart eld med en pistol, och den italienska polisen sköt då ihjäl honom. Italienska myndigheter har redan gjort en jämförelse av fingeravtrycken och kunde på så vis fastställa identiteten, säger **Thomas de Maizière**.

Utvisa fler

Det de Maizière kallar ”framgång i utredningen” har inte ändrat hotnivån, som är fortsatt hög i Tyskland, förklarar han.

– Nu när denne terrorist inte längre utgör en fara, är tiden inne att pra-

ta om konsekvenser. Jag kommer inom kort att ha ett samtal med min kollega (Tysklands justitieminister) **Maas** om detta, säger han.

Tysklands förbundskansler **Angela Merkel** säger på en pressträff att en rad nödvändiga åtgärder nu ska vidtas för att snabbt stärka säkerheten i landet. En sådan åtgärd är att öka antalet personer som utvisas från landet när de har fått avslag på sin asylansökan, enligt Reuters.

Merkel har också framfört just sådana krav till Tunisien.

– Jag sade till Tunisien president att vi måste snabba på deporteringarna och öka antalet personer som skickas tillbaka, säger hon på pressträffen.

Trohet till IS

I en video som har lagts upp på nätet av IS propagandakanal Amaq svär **Anis Amri** trohet till terrorgruppen och uppmanar till hämnd och attacker mot ”korsfararna” i Europa, uppger Reuters.

Amri befann sig bara timmar efter attentatet utanför en ökad mos-

ké i Berlin, visar övervakningsfilmer som public service-kanalen Rundfunk Berlin-Brandenburg (RBB) har tagit del av. Bönelokalen på Perleberger Strasse i norra Berlin är ett känt tillhåll för sympatisörer till Islamiska staten (IS). Amri ska även ha varit på platsen vid minst två tillfällen förra veckan, 15 och 16 december.

Enligt tyska nyhetssajter fanns det inga underrättelseuppgifter om att han därefter sökt sig till Italien.

Fler bevis

I takt med att polisutredningen fortskrider pekar allt fler bevis mot Amri. I lastbilen som användes vid attacken mot julmarknaden på Breitscheidplatz fanns en handling i hans namn. Dessutom har hans fingeravtryck hittats i förarhytten. Enligt **Thomas de Maizière** är det ställt bortom rimligt tvivel att **Anis Amri** har befunnit sig i lastbilen.

Tidigt i torsdags morse slog specialenheten inom polisen till mot tre adresser i Berlin: en lägenhet på Lychner Strasse i Prenzlauer Berg, en annan på Grossbeerenstrasse i



ÖPPNADE ELD. Den misstänkte Berlinterroristen **Anis Amri** sköts till döds i en eldstrid med polisen i Milano. Amri sköt först mot polisen. Här följer polisen och kriminalteknikerna Amris kropp från nyfikna förbipasserandes blickar. FOTO: LEHTIKUVA

Kreuzberg och moskén i Moabit, rapporterar RBB. Insatsen ledde dock inte till några gripanden.

Anis Amri hade stått under bevakning i Tyskland sedan i mars. Landets säkerhetstjänster kände till att han varit i kontakt med ledande salafiter och han misstänktes ha planerat ett rån för att finansiera vapen-

”Ingen trodde att Trump skulle vinna

ANALYS

Vladimir Putin gav ett avspänt och säkert intryck under sin årliga gigantiska presskonferens i Moskva. Han antydde med ett leende att han tidigt förstod att Donald Trump skulle vinna presidentvalet i USA.

ANNA-LENA LAURÉN



Vladimir Putins årliga presskonferens brukar vara en blandning av show, information och buskis. Ofta har Putin tagit tillfället i akt att generera kvinnliga journalister eller låta undslippa sig någon smaklös spetsfundighet.

I fjol såg vi en president i försvarsställning promenera in.

I år är det snarare en person som verkar se fram emot att få säga till den västerländska pressen: Vad var det jag sa.

I fjol lät han nästan bara rysk regional press ställa frågor, nu släppte han fram både Wall Street Journal, BBC och NBC och höll på i över fyra timmar, en timme längre än sist.

Över 1 400 journalister hade ackrediterat sig.

Det är svårt att låta bli att dra slutsatsen att valet av **Donald Trump** – och Trumps val av ministrar – har gjort Putin betydligt villigare att möta den internationella pressen.

Belätet leende

På frågan om den ryska inblandningen i amerikanska presidentvalet svarar Putin först så här:

– Det är meningslöst att skylla sina egna misslyckanden på utomstående faktorer. Republikanerna är i majoritet även i senaten. Är det också värt fel? En betydande del av det amerikanska folket har en syn



ALLA BLICKAR PÅ PRESIDENTEN. I år höll Putin på i över fyra timmar på sin årliga presskonferens. Över 1 400 journalister hade ackrediterat sig. FOTO: AFP / LEHTIKUVA/NATALIA KOLESNIKOVA

på hur världen ska styras som sammanfaller med vår. Det är en bra grund för att bygga relationer mellan två mäktiga länder som USA och Ryssland.

Sedan tillägger Putin:

– USA har fått en president som kände av strömningarna i samhäl-

let. Ingen trodde att han skulle vinna. Förutom vi.

Publiken skrattar. Applåderar. Och Putins belätna leende säger mer än tusen ord.

Det här är något som Putin excellerar i – att säga en sak utåt men samtidigt signalera att han kanske

har gjort exakt det han anklagas för. Men det går inte att bevisa. Det är ett maktmedel, ett sätt att visa att man har övertaget. Putin använde samma taktik när Ryssland annekterade Krim.

– Precis som Trump sade: Ingen vet vem som hackade in sig hos De-



UTREDS. Karolinska Institutet står som medansvariga för experimenterandet med konstgjorda luftstrupar som kirurgen Paolo Macchiarini (bilden) utfört, visar Sten Heckschers utredning. FOTO: EPA/CARLO FERRARO.

FAKTA

Flera utredningar

- Det pågår ett tiotal utredningar kring kirurgen Paolo Macchiarinis verksamhet i Sverige.
- Förra veckan presenterade utredaren Kjell Asplund, professor emeritus och före detta generaldirektör för Socialstyrelsen, en utredning av Macchiarinis kliniska verksamhet vid Karolinska universitetssjukhuset. Denna utredning visade att sjukhuset brutist i ansvar på ett flertal allvarliga punkter.
- Under måndagen presenteras en utredning av Karolinska institutets agerande. Denna utredning leds av Sten Heckscher, före detta ordförande för Högsta förvaltningsdomstolen.
- I februari avgick institutets dåvarande rektor, Anders Hamsten, till följd av turema kring Paolo Macchiarini.

Källa: Kjell Asplund och Karolinska institutet

Karolinska struntade i regelverken

Karolinska institutets hantering av Macchiarini-ärendet genomsyras av slarv och nonchalans mot lagar och regler.

SVERIGE – Det har brutist i nästan allt, konstaterar utredaren Sten Heckscher.

Karolinska institutet (KI) är medansvarigt till att det experimenterades med konstgjorda luftstrupar på svårt sjuka patienter. Dessutom anställdes kirurgen, och fick sin anställning förlängd, under ytterst

olämpliga former. Det visar en extern utredning som pekar på en rad allvarliga brister i hur KI hanterat Macchiarini-ärendet.

– Det har brutist i nästan allt. Från hur man har hanterat ärenden till att de inte har iakttagit grundläggande förvaltningsrättsliga regler. Det hela är väldigt slarvigt, säger utreda-

ren Sten Heckscher.

Någon anställningsintervju genomfördes aldrig och några referenser var det inte tal om. Detta trots att det fanns mycket tydliga varningssignaler från Macchiarinis tidigare arbetsgivare.

– Jag har anställt folk i hela mitt liv och jag har aldrig, i något ärende, sett maken till negativa referenser. Macchiarini saknar omdöme, bryr sig inte om etiska tillstånd eller att skapa team och rent allmänt är han hypoman. Minst. KI fick denna information, men den följdes aldrig upp. I så fall hade han nog aldrig anställts, säger Sten Heckscher.

Eftersatt kultur

Inte ens när Macchiarinis förordnande skulle förlängas tre år senare, var det någon som reagerade. Dessutom, visar utredningen, fanns en flagrant arrogans från institutets sida mot lagar och regler.

– Det är en nonchalans mot regler och processer som upprepas på punkt efter punkt och det är allvarligt. Förvaltningskulturen på KI verkar eftersatt, säger Sten Heckscher.

Hitills har Macchiarini-ärendet

” Jag har anställt folk i hela mitt liv och jag har aldrig, i något ärende, sett maken till negativa referenser. Macchiarini saknar omdöme, bryr sig inte om etiska tillstånd eller att skapa team och rent allmänt är han hypoman. Minst. KI fick denna information, men den följdes aldrig upp. I så fall hade han nog aldrig anställts.

Sten Heckscher, utreder Macchiarini-ärendet.

resulterat i att rektorn avgått och så sent som i fredags meddelade institutets styrelseordförande, Lars Leijonborg, att även han kastar in handduken.

– Det är ett stort förändringsarbete som nu ska dras igång. Jag skulle ändå sluta i april och det är bättre om en och samma person får vara med under hela den här resan, säger Lars Leijonborg.

TT: Vilket ansvar har du för det som har hänt?

– Vår förvaltningskultur bygger mycket på tillit. Vi har en delegationsordning där systemet bygger på att varje befattningshavare tar sitt ansvar. Andra personer i det här dramat har fått varningssignaler som de har valt att bortse ifrån, men jag upplever inte att vi i styrelsen fått det. För mig är det exempelvis helt ofattbart hur rekryteringen gick till, säger Lars Leijonborg.

Heckscher, däremot, tycker att Leijonborgs avgång är "oansvarig".

– Han skulle ha kunnat ta sitt ansvar bättre genom att stanna på jobbet och leda arbetet med ett förändra KI. Det är en illa vald tidpunkt.

FNB-TT-JOHAN NILSSON/CARL CATO

Obama och Putin möttes i Kina

USA:s och Rysslands presidenter förde enskilda förhandlingar under en och en halv timme i samband med G20-toppmötet i Kina i går.

KINA Barack Obama och Vladimir Putin diskuterade bland annat Syrien, och Obama sade att diskussionerna varit raka och konstruktiva.

Det kan ha varit sista gången som Obama, som lämnar presidentposten vid årsskiftet, och Putin träffades.

Enligt Vita huset gick presidenterna inte in på detaljer utan ansvar för dem ligger på utrikesministrarna. USA och Ryssland har försökt nå samförstånd för att få slut på striderna i Syrien så att bland annat civila i Aleppo kan få humanitär hjälp.

– Om ett avtal kan nås vill vi nå det så fort som möjligt, med tanke på den humanitära situationen. Men vi måste också försäkra oss om att det blir ett fungerande avtal, sade en informator vid Vita huset.

Strax innan presidenterna möttes ska utrikesministrarna John Kerry och Sergej Lavrov ha avslutat sina förhandlingar utan resultat.

Ministrarna lär träffas igen inom de närmaste dagarna.

Ryssland stöder enväldiga presidenten Bashar al-Assads styrkor i kriget medan USA ställt sig bakom de oppositionella som strider mot Assad.

Stormaktens gemensamma fiende är terrororganisationen IS. FNB-AFP



Sergej Lazarev, Rysslands "Lazer Boy", kan ta hem en symboliskt viktig seger – som också kommer att bli en propagandaseger för president Putin. FOTO: CLAUDIO BRESCIANI/TT

Putin vill säkra dubbelseger

– **Putin säger att det inte finns någon diskriminering mot hbtq-personer i Ryssland. Man vill locka Europa med Sergej Lazarevs låt "You're the only one".**

Det säger Tatjana Vinnitjenko, ordförande för Hbtq Ryssland inför Eurovisionfinalen.

Sergej Lazarev kallas för Lazer Boy och är en av Rysslands populäraste artister just nu. Imorgon framträder han i första semifinalen, och på lördag kan han med den favoritpipade låten "You are the only one" säkra Rysslands vinst i Eurovisionfinalen.

– Han sjunger "du", och syftar inte på en "hon" i den engelskspråkiga versionen. På ryska sjunger han om en tjej, han ska tilltala kvinnan, säger Olga Baranova, ansvarig för Hbtq Rysslands Moskva-region.

Olga Baranova menar att låten har översatts på ett strategiskt sätt för att locka den schlagertvåvåldiga gayvärlden utanför

Ryssland. Men i Ryssland marknadsförs Lazarev som en sexsymbol för kvinnor.

– Det passar den ryska publiken bättre. Det skvallras om att han är gay eller queer men det är omöjligt att veta.

En seger i Eurovisionfinalen innebär att det vinnande landet får vara värdland för nästa års tävling. Om Ryssland vinner blir det i så fall första gången sedan de nya striktare anti-gaylagarna infördes – som likställer hbtq-symboler med propaganda.

Införandet av lagen om "homosexuell propaganda" år 2013 innebar även att främjandet av så kallade "icke-traditionella sexuella relationer" förbjöds.

Enligt Tatjana Vinnitjenko, ordförande för Hbtq Ryssland, pågår en trend som innebär att även mindre framgångar, till exempel i Eurovision, kan vara nyttiga för hur Ryssland uppfattas i andra länder.

– President Vladimir Putin

bryr sig om att vinna. Genom Lazarev vill man locka Europa till Ryssland, säger Tatjana Vinnitjenko, och fingrar på sitt regnbågsfärgade halsband.

Att hbtq-personer skulle vara diskriminerade är en känslig fråga, menar hon.

– Putin säger att det inte finns någon diskriminering mot hbtq-personer i Ryssland. Han menar inte att Lazarev är gay, men vinner han kommer segern att användas som en symbol för att visa att situationen för homosexuella är okej.

Samtidigt tror Tatjana Vinnitjenko att om Ryssland vinner så kommer man att försöka tvätta bort likhetstecknet mellan gayvärlden och spektaklet som omger Eurovision.

Vad betyder Lazarevs framgångar för hbtq-rörelsen i Ryssland?

– Uppmärksamheten är bra om den riktar mot hbtq-personers utsatthet. Men det är svårt att förutse. Om aktivister protes-

terar kan de bli fängslade i samband med evenemanget, säger Olga Baranova.

Tatjana Vinnitjenko menar däremot att det inte kommer att vara några officiella problem för gayvärlden att komma till Ryssland.

– Myndigheter kommer att säga att man vill att fansen ska vara här. Men de ska inte skylla med att de är gay. Symboler som de viftar med i sina hemländer kommer de inte kunna visa öppet, säger Tatjana.

Regnbågsflaggor och andra så kallade "homosexuella" symboler är förbjudna i Ryssland. De betecknas som propaganda och kan leda till att personer fängslas om symbolerna bärs offentligt, i synnerhet vid demonstrationer.

Vid en eventuell rysk seger – hur kan fans som beskriver sig som gay känna sig trygga i Moskva nästa år?

– Hbtq-personer kommer att resa till Moskva om det blir en rysk seger, men de kan inte uttrycka sig på samma sätt som hemma. Det handlar inte bara om symboler, man kan inte kan hålla varandra i handen. Ingen ska behöva riskera att bli nedslagen i tunnelbanan, säger Tatjana Vinnitjenko.

En sak kan man vara säker på. Om Eurovision hålls i Ryssland nästa år blir det en imponerande show. Finalen 2009 på Olympiastadion i Moskva har gått till historien om en av de dyraste i tävlingens historia.

Sergej Lazarev är omätligt populär i Ryssland. Enligt medieuppgifter har han sagt att Eurovision Song Contest symboliserar internationell harmoni. Han beskriver tävlingen som en fristad där man kan uttrycka sig fritt oavsett sin religion eller sexuella läggning.

MARIA GEORGIEVA
maria.georgieva@svd.se

Åtta egyptiska poliser dödade

Åtta civilklädda poliser har dömts i en attack av oidentificerade män, beväpnade med automatvapen, söder om Kairo. Männens ska ha klivit ur en liten pick-up, stoppat polisbilen, överöst den med kulor och sedan flytt. Terrororganisationen IS tar på sig attentatet, uppger AFP. IS och andra jihadistgrupper har dödat flera hundra poliser och soldater de senaste åren. TT-REUTERS



FOTO: JONATHAN HAYWARD/AP

Svårt att tämja elden i Kanada

Skogsbranden i Kanada har drivit hundratalsentals människor på flykt och det kan dröja månader innan den är under kontroll. 500 brandmän sliter med att begränsa eldens framfart, vissa av dem har jobbat i 40 timmar i sträck för att släcka "besten", som branden döpts till i medierna. Lågorna har slukat 200 000 kvadratkilometer, en yta stor som två tredjedelar av Gotland. TT

Grekland har "i princip" nått målen för reformerna.

EU-kommissionens ordförande **Jean-Claude Juncker** till tyska medier inför dagens möte i Bryssel, där eurogruppen möts för att diskutera möjliga skuldåttnader.

73 dog i afghansk bussolycka

Minst 73 personer har dödats i en olycka i Afghanistan där två bussar krockade med en tankbil, uppger hänvisar hälsodepartementet enligt AFP. Olyckan inträffade i provinsen Ghazni i östra Afghanistan.

Alla tre fordonen började brinna efter krocken som skedde på huvudvägen mellan huvudstaden Kabul och staden Kandahar i söder. TT

V ser hopp i det sänkta ryska försvarsanslaget

26

Vänsterpartiets försvarspolitiska talesperson Stig Henriksson tycker att det är hoppfullt att Ryssland aviserar att man kommer att kraftigt minska anslagen till försvaret de kommande åren, och hoppas att kapprustningen nu kan brytas. Hans Wallmark, försvarspolitisk talesperson för Moderaterna, tvivlar dock på de ryska siffrorna.

Enligt den ryska regeringens budgetförslag kommer försvarsanslagen nästa år utgöra 3,3 procent av Rysslands BNP, vilket SvD avslöjade i går. Det är en kraftig minskning jämfört med årets siffror, där försvarsbudgeten utgör 4,7 procent av BNP.

Sedan president Vladimir Putin inledde upprustningen av försvaret för snart tio år sedan har anslagen aldrig tidigare minskat. Den ryska regeringen tvingas nästa år göra nedskärningar på grund av sitt budgetunderskott, enligt Rysslandskännaren och

före detta överstelöjtnanten Jörgen Elfving.

Stig Henriksson, försvarspolitisk talesperson för Vänsterpartiet, hoppas budgetförslaget kan bryta kapprustningen mellan Ryssland och Väst.

–Att man nu tvingats bromsa sin uppbyggnad hoppas jag kan vara starten för att den oroande rustnings- och övningsspiralen i vårt närområde kan brytas, säger han.

Han menar att den ryska upprustningen sedan millennieskiftet är oroande. Men samtidigt ska man komma ihåg att det ryska försvaret kraftigt nedmonterades efter Sovjetunionens fall, menar Stig Henriksson.

–Det är ju därför till och med Saudiarabien har en större militärbudget än Ryssland.

Hans Wallmark, försvarspolitisk talesperson för Moderaterna, är inte lika hoppfull om den ryska försvarsbudgeten. Han ser inget tecken på en minskad

rysk upprustning, och menar att budgetförslaget kan vara missvisande.

–Jag har inga indikationer på att Ryssland skruvar ner sina ambitioner. Det är fortsatta upprustnings- och reformeringsprogram när det gäller försvarsmakten. Det krävs mer än att man ordnar

”**Om Vänsterpartiet vill ägna sig åt att bortförklara rysk upprustning så får det stå för dem.**

Hans Wallmark, M:s försvarspolitiska talesperson

den här typen av budgetredovisning, säger han.

Han ger inte heller mycket för Stig Henrikssons påpekande om det ryska försvaret under 1990-talet.

–Om Vänsterpartiet vill ägna sig åt att bortförklara rysk upprustning så får det stå för dem, säger han.

Hans Wallmark säger att hans källor menar att den ryska aggressiviteten fortsätter, bland annat genom rysk underrättelseverksamhet i Europa, provokationer kring Östersjön och desinformation.

–Det försämrade beteendet trollos inte bort med en budgetpost eller två, säger han.

SvD har sökt försvarsminister Peter Hultqvist (S) för en kommentar.

PER KUDO
per.kudo@svd.se

SvD.se →
Putin tvingas till kraftig sänkning av militärutgifter

procent av de boende på den svenska landsbygden har förtroende för regeringen, jämfört med 35 procent i storstäderna. Även förtroendet för riksdagen är betydligt lägre på landsbygden, 22 procent jämfört med 32 i storstäderna. Det visar statistik från Som-institutet, som publiceras i Dagens Nyheter. **TT**

Trippelmördare kan ställas inför rätta i Libanon

Livstidsdömd trippelmördaren Martin Saliba som flydde från Sverige innan domen avkunnades kan komma att dömas enligt libanesisk lag.

–Offrens familjer kan kräva öga för öga – tand för tand, säger islamologen Jan Hjärpe till SVT Nyheter Väst.

Libanon beslutade nyligen att inte lämna ut Saliba till Sverige med motiveringen att den dömd är libanesisk medborgare. **TT**

DAIKIN VÄRMEPUMPAR

**VI FÖLJER INTE,
VI LEDER**

BÄST I TEST!
KVI:S TEST AV VÄRMEPUMPAR OKT 2016



Daikin Ururu Sarara R35 är bäst i test! Bäst resultat i KVIs test av luftvärmepumpar (okt 2016) fick Daikins Ururu Sarara R35, som även fick högsta poäng i Folksamns test och belönades med Bra Val 2015 och 2016. Detta mycket tack vare R32 som köldmedium, som både är framtidsäkert och mer miljövänligt. Läs mer på daikin.se/testvinnare

Ururu Sarara R35 är ett högpresterande flaggskepp från Daikin med den högsta verkningsgraden och bästa effekten av alla. Ururu Sarara R35 är inte bara en otroligt bra luftvärmepump, den är ett komplett klimatsystem som renar, ventilerar, befuktat och avfuktat efter behov.

Det var ju det vi sa: Vi följer inte, vi leder!



Världsledande Daikin utmanar med teknik, funktion och trygghet långt över det vanliga.

Läs mer om Daikins produktutbud, garantier och hitta närmaste återförsäljare på www.daikin.se

Daikin – när du vill ha det bästa

DAIKIN
Innovationer sedan 1924