



GÖTEBORGS  
UNIVERSITET

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

# Has the Arab Spring Led toward Democratic Gains?

Examining the democratic implications of the recent  
uprisings in the Arab world using different data  
sources

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Master's Thesis:	30 higher education credits
Program:	Master's Programme in International Administration and Global Governance
Date:	January 30, 2018
Supervisor:	Kristen Kao
Words:	16 423

## Abstract

What happened in the Middle East and North Africa after 2011? Did the millions of people in the MENA-region who demanded democracy experience democratic gains?

Approaching seven years on, more than ten Arab countries have attempted at regime reform and to some degree, succeeded. By the blunt measures of overthrow versus not, only six countries succeeded to oust their leaders; in terms of democratization, only Tunisia is viewed as a success story. Although Tunisia witnesses a constitutional reform with a transition to a presidential-parliamentary state, there remain implications that the reformed state is making investments in institutions which may develop to democracy's detriment. Yet, other countries have yet to experience any reforms in the least. Theories concerning why some Arab countries lack the requisites for a democratic transition have been manifold, and this masters-thesis will, together with quantifiable data on changes in the MENA-region, contribute to the existing literature on democratization in the MENA-region. In comparing quantifiable data from two different sources, this study concludes that, despite the inability to generalize the outcomes due to limited data, the democratic changes since the Arab Spring have only been sustainable in Tunisia.

**Keywords:** *Middle East, Arab Spring, Democratization, Authoritarianism, Polyarchy*

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## 1. Introduction

Have the series of uprisings occurring in Arab majority countries between late 2010 and 2013 – also referred to as the *Arab Spring*<sup>1</sup> – led to democratic gains?

The almost immediate upheavals in other Arab countries following the Tunisian “Jasmine Revolution” in late 2010 surprised scholars within the political field (Gause, 2011). There are scholars who assume that nothing changed in the Arab world as a collective (Sakbani, 2015), yet in some cases, there were significant reforms.

Previous research on the Arab Spring’s implication on democracy has shown much interest for countries with overthrown presidents. The aftermaths of the Arab uprisings have hence been divided into a dichotomy between overthrow versus survival of executive leaders. This focus has been at the expense of other important developments on the ground, both during and after the Arab Spring.

Take Morocco for example, where the parliament will now choose the Prime Minister, rather than him being appointed by the King (Hussain & Howard, 2013) or Algeria, where a 19-year state of emergency law was lifted in 2011 (Dessi, 2011). Civil societies and organizations have during this timeframe been able to negotiate with their rulers, even if they were not able or willing, to overthrow them (as in Kuwait, Algeria and Morocco).

Scholars who argue against the dichotomous representation of overthrow versus persistence claim that the goal of protesters during the Arab Spring was not to overthrow their regimes (Lucas, 2014) – rather to negotiate for gradual political liberalization (Yom & Gause, 2012). Hence, this thesis will not emphasize overthrows when asking: Has the Arab Spring led toward democratic gains?

This study will measure the existing level of democracy by comparing democratic components in 2006, to those in 2016. Five Arab countries are chosen for these comparisons – Tunisia, Egypt, Algeria, Jordan, and Morocco in order to answer whether the Arab Spring has led to democratic gains. Changes may include steps towards democratization in some cases which are overlooked in previous research on this topic, but it may also include backsliding or further entrenchment into authoritarianism.

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<sup>1</sup> Also known as the Arab Awakening The term Arab Spring has been coined inspired by what was referred to as Prague Spring, a political liberalization of Czechoslovakia which occurred in 1968.

Using the fine-grained data sources of the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project, as well as survey results from the Arab Barometer (AB), this thesis employs a novel way to study the implications of the Arab Spring on democratization.

This unique combination of data sources requires an additional focus point. This thesis evaluates these contemporary data sources' significance in answering whether the Arab Spring led to democratic gains. AB and V-Dem are used for describing changes in democratic components from varying angles. By comparing expert-data with the domestic popular opinion from people in the affected countries, we gain a better understanding of different means of measuring democratic gains – or lack thereof. Referring to surveys will increase our ability to be critical of the existing literature on whether the Arab Spring has led toward democratic gains.

This study will answer whether the events of the Arab Spring have led to any democratic gains, using the following order; section 2 will introduce previous research on why democracy in the Arab world deserves research, and how the uprisings of late 2010 may have impacted the notion of the Arab world's insusceptibility to democratize. Section 3 will describe the theoretical framework which will guide this thesis in answering whether the Arab Spring has led toward democratic gains.

Further on, an elaborate description of the data sources used in this thesis is included in section 4. The dependent variable of this study will be indicators of democratic gains,<sup>2</sup> with the independent variable being the uprisings of the Arab Spring (2010-2013) – an impactful event which was expected to create serious change throughout the region. The 5<sup>th</sup> section will justify the selection of cases, while briefly introducing their political backgrounds. The 6<sup>th</sup> and final section will discuss the findings of this study to conclude whether the Arab Spring led toward democratic gains, and how data from surveys and country-experts may be useful when asking such a question.

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<sup>2</sup> Listed under 4.1.3 Statistical Description

## 2. Why study the Arab Spring – a Literature Review

The uprisings among Arab countries between late 2010 and 2013 shared the goal of pushing regimes to implement democratic reforms. Accordingly, when asked what the main reasons behind the Arab Uprisings were, the most popular answers across the MENA-region were “Civil and political freedoms, and emancipation from oppression” (Arab Barometer, 2013), closely followed by “Betterment of the economic situation”.<sup>3</sup> The series of upheavals in the MENA-region, triggered by these demands – and at times causes of civil wars – are referred to as the Arab Spring.<sup>4</sup>

The region’s oil riches, military ties to political affairs, and religious, linguistic, and cultural similarities are known contributors to the Arab world’s evasion of democratic transitions during democracy’s second and third waves (Huntington 1991; Ross 2001; Lust 2004), which together formulate the concept of “Arab Exceptionalism”. These uprisings of Arab Spring, given the notion of Arab Exceptionalism, were unexpected for political scholars, and led to speculations around a fourth wave of democratization (Abushouk, 2016; Henry, Ji-Hyang, & Lee, 2012).

Scholars have in the aftermath of the Arab Spring focused on; the stability of autocracies in the region until 2011 (Bellin 2012), its relation to oil resources and economic independence (Brownlee et al. 2015), and perhaps most complex of all: identifying the main reasons for the almost simultaneous uproars among Arab countries in 2011 (Anderson 2011). Scholars’ classical approaches, as well as contemporary adjustments made as a result of the Arab uprisings, are discussed below.

### 2.1. “Arab Exceptionalism”

“Arab Exceptionalism” is the more elaborated, theoretical explanation for the absence of democracy in the Arab world despite democratic waves elsewhere (Bellin, 2012; Huntington, 1991; Ross, 2012). One classical approach to the Arab exceptionalism stems from Samuel P. Huntington’s article (1991), which discusses the similarities between the second and third democratic wave, and why these globally spread waves left the Middle East and Africa

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<sup>3</sup>The consequences of neoliberal economic reforms (such as promoting privatizations) have exacerbated the already existing income-inequalities and corrupt activities, mainly in Egypt and Tunisia. Consequently, only connected and elite groups are affording to privatize public goods or own companies affiliated with international trade (Anderson, 2011).

<sup>4</sup> Referred to interchangeably as Arab Uprisings

unaffected (Huntington, 1991). He views culture as a factor separating the Middle East from North- and Latin America. The absence of support for democracy by Islamic leaders and the religious culture in the MENA-region is, according to Huntington, counterintuitive to democratic progress (Huntington, 1991:28) – an argument from the school of *modernization*.

Aside from the cultural/religious similarities, the countries' oil-resources are viewed as exceptional to the region, as explained through the *Rentier-State Theory*. International oil-rents, or financial aid of kinds, tend to reduce citizens' incentive to challenge the autocracy (Ross, 2009), while financially keeping the government empowered and expanding.

Authoritarian, or *personalist* states, also rely on military loyalty which is yet another variable which makes the Arab world "exceptional" in its insusceptibility of democracy. Oil-rents facilitate employment of public officials and the military force. Yet, such behaviors are not exclusive to oil-rich countries. The sections below will elaborate on the above-mentioned variables of Arab Exceptionalism.

### ***Modernization Theory***

One major challenge in reaching democratic transitions is known as the imposed social and religious constraints within the MENA-region (Ross, 2001; Inglehart & Baker, 2000; Huntington, 1991; Przeworski & Limongi, 1997). The dynamics between such constraints and lack of democratic transitions in the MENA-region can be explained through the "modernization theory".

While the school of modernization theory provides different mechanisms for political development, the foundation of the theory focuses on a country's ability to industrialize (Inglehart & Baker, 2000). Classical approaches claim that economic development resulting from industrialization will most likely lead to political and democratic progress (Przeworski & Limongi, 1997). The lack of industrialization, due to oil-rents and financial aids in the MENA-region, makes this theory relevant in predicting their possibility of democratization.

Cultural and religious influences on the political status-quo in the MENA-region are argued to result in the lack of industrialization and thus lack of democratic gains (Huntington, 1991; Inglehart & Baker, 2000). While Huntington argues for secularism as the prerequisite for democratic development, Inglehart and Baker who are of a more contemporary standpoint believe that maintaining traditional values and achieving democratic gains are not mutually exclusive (Inglehart & Baker, 2000). Inglehart and Baker add, that while secularity may



contribute to economic gains, its impact on democratic gains is too path-dependent and fluid (Inglehart & Baker, 2000:49). Both schools do however refer to Islamic countries to support their arguments.

While the political emphases on traditional and religious values are not exclusive to the MENA-region by any means, it is one of the more frequently discussed attributes when studying Arab-majority countries. A controversial argument which amplifies the classical notion of the modernization theory, is that Islamic countries which base their constitution on Sharia laws<sup>5</sup> alone are governed in a way which counteracts a democratic transition (United States Institute of Peace, 2002; Brownlee et al., 2015).

However, contemporary literature on the significance of Islam on democratization, which consists primarily of qualitative research, claims the prevalence of Islam is of no significance to the survival of democracy. A concrete argument in favor of this claim is made by Linz and Stepan;

“It should be better known than it is—particularly in most Arab countries—that close to 300 million Muslims have been living under democracy for each of the past ten years in the Muslim-majority countries of Albania, Indonesia, Senegal, and Turkey. If one adds the roughly 178 million Muslims who are natives of Hindu-majority India, the total number of Muslims living in democracies outside the West begins to approach half a billion.” (Linz & Stepan, 2013:17).

### ***Challenges of a Rentier-state: Oil's impact on democratization***

In previous literature, the unique ability of Arab authoritarians to remain in power is largely explained by their oil-riches, and international foreign aid granting leaders economic independence from their citizens (Bellin, 2012). These factors together make up what is known as the Rentier State Theory (RST) (Mahdavy, 1970).

Oil-exporting countries, such as a majority of Middle Eastern states, have the ability to be economically self-sufficient due to oil-rents paid by importing countries. This economic self-sufficiency stretches to the extent where leaders may choose to collect low/no taxes from their citizens (such as those in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Libya), yet continue to fund the central government due to a large portion of their national wealth containing oil-rents (Ross, 2009).

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<sup>5</sup> Traditional Islamic laws

As a result, public goods and welfare services are easily provided in exchange with people's satisfaction with their status quo, and thus helps maintain existing inequalities or lack of democracy (Herb, 2005). Consequently, subordination by the public in exchange for access to oil-rents occurs, in other words, clientelism and corruption increases (Bellin, 2012).

It is important to note that oil-poor countries, referred to as "pseudo-rentier" states, also benefit from such aid (Kienle, 2012). Such states benefit from foreign financial- or military support due to their strategic geographic locations or appeal as political alliances (Yom & Gause, 2012). Oil-poor countries such as Jordan, Yemen, and Egypt can be considered within this category of pseudo-rentier [see Table 1.]. These countries derive a lot of government financing from foreign sources, such as Western democracy promotion or security efforts, as well as Gulf-backed aid packages to strengthen their government.

The temporary thrills of such expenditures are known as one of the largest instigators of the uprisings of 2011 in pseudo-rentier states (Gause, 2011).

**Table 1.** Oil-Rent per Capita of Arab States

<u>Rentier-States</u>	Oil-rent/Capita	Population (million)	<u>Pseudo-Rentier-States</u>	Oil-rent/Capita	Population (million)
Qatar	\$ 67,741	2.5	Tunisia	\$ 4,145	11
Kuwait	\$ 34,358	4	Jordan	\$ 3,400	8
Bahrain	\$ 22,481	1.4	Morocco	\$ 3,136	35
Saudi Arabia	\$ 21,265	32	Egypt	\$ 2,594	90
Oman	\$ 16,357	4.2	Yemen	\$ 1,093	26
Libya	\$ 5,489	6			
Algeria	\$ 4,761	40			

This table is inspired by Michael Ross' measure of oil-rents with respect to population size. Comparing oil-income to population size is more informative than referring to its portion of a country's total GDP since the outcome will be based on a percentage of GDP and is therefore often misleading (Ross, 2009:4). The numbers are from 2015 and derived from The World Bank (<https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PETR.RT.ZS>).

Importing countries have responded through military or political interventions when their trade-partners have experienced domestic unrest (Brownlee et al. 2015; Geddes et al. 2014; Hinnebusch, 2015). Libya and Iraq are two famous examples of the aftermaths of foreign interventions. In referring to these two cases, research claims that intervening in rentier-states often result in the exacerbation of ongoing, domestic conflicts. The relationships with the United States mainly, in addition to France and Britain, have been analyzed repeatedly in

order to decipher whether international interventions, resulting from oil-wealth, can lead to democratic progress (Hinnebusch 2015; Yom & Gause 2012).

### ***Military loyalty***

Military loyalty arguably determines the lifespan of authoritarians (Geddes et al. 2014). The events of Arab Spring have put this notion to the test in combination with the effects of oil-riches (Brownlee et al. 2015; Linz & Stepan 2013). When allowed more political influence, the military often operates to the detriment of democratic transitions, particularly if the institution is ethnically linked to the country's leader, as the case of Libya (Geddes et al. 2014). With such linkage, also known as a personalist regime, the military gains confidence in surviving anti-regime uprisings. Responding to uprisings with violence are thus more likely to occur, which is mainly why military loyalty is viewed as challenging for democratization (Bellin, 2012; Geddes et al. 2014).

Eva Bellin is one author who studies the mechanisms between a personalist state and democratization in the MENA-region (Bellin, 2012). Regarding the Middle East, Bellin explains this relationship in the following way;

“Extraordinary access to rent and international support, combined with the less extraordinary proliferation of patrimonially organized security forces and low levels of social mobilization, together gave rise [...] to coercive apparatuses<sup>6</sup> that were endowed with extraordinary capacity and will to repress. This capacity and will to repress accounted for the region's exceptional resistance to getting swept up in the third wave of democratization”. (Bellin, 2012:129)

Oil-rents and foreign aid act as safety-nets for the military. A personalist state, which receives high oil-revenues, is less likely to punish its military for abuse of power, as seen in Libya and Bahrain since 2011 (Brownlee et al. 2015).

However, when the military operates independent of the head-of-state, they may oppose the establishment entirely. This occurred in Egypt and Tunisia and gained much attention and praise for the military's reluctance to use violence as means of silencing the protesters, but rather supported them in their quest for a new leadership. Egypt and Tunisia are both oil-poor countries.

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<sup>6</sup> Bellin's definition of the coercive apparatus is the military and head of state who are interlinked and reluctant to divide their political power with outsiders.

There is evidently a contrast in military operations between oil-rich and oil-poor countries, which supports Bellin in that “extraordinary access to rents and international support” (2012:129) plays a pivotal role in authoritarian persistence and that the military apparatus is one channel through which democratization is affected.

Arab exceptionalism is multifaceted. Some of the more discussed factors behind the region’s exceptionalism are discussed in this section to introduce the reasons behind the lack of democracy in the MENA-region. This thesis will complement the mentioned theories with empirical data derived from surveys and expert-datasets, concerning five countries which experienced mass-protests between late 2010 and 2013. More on the background of the protests and the current challenges of the MENA-region will be explained in the next section.

## **2.2. What is the Arab Spring?**

When the street vendor Mohamed Bouazizi self-immolated in Tunisia due to poor living standards in December 2010, it was not assumed that multiple revolutions in the neighboring countries would follow (Kienle, 2012). Scholars within the political field describe the almost immediate upheavals following the Tunisian “Jasmine Revolution” as unforeseeable (Gause, 2011).<sup>7</sup>

While definitions of what the Arab Spring entails may vary, most scholars believe it comprises the protests and regime changes which have taken place among the Arab countries<sup>8</sup> caused by demands for political reforms, between December 2010 and late 2013 (Brownlee et al. 2015).

Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco<sup>9</sup> are the five countries which experienced large protests<sup>10</sup> against their heads of state between late 2010 and 2013. The next section will elaborate on what the main causes of the upheavals were, before discussing what literature believes has been the aftermath of the Arab Spring.

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<sup>7</sup> M. Kamrava was not as surprised by the wave of uprisings in the Arab world. He argues that these uprisings had already happened – however on a smaller scale, in 2005 (Kamrava, 2014).

<sup>8</sup> This thesis refers to the Arab world as the group of countries inhabited by an Arab-majority population where the national language is Arabic.

<sup>9</sup> Iraq, Yemen and Syria have been excluded from this list because the civil wars and foreign interventions in the countries during the Arab Spring make it difficult to examine the impact of the Arab Spring alone.

<sup>10</sup> Choosing McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly’s (2001) definition of an uprising as events where a country faces 1) peaceful mass-protest<sup>10</sup> lasting multiple days, 2) occupation of popular sites and cities and 3) spread of protest across cities (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2001).

### 2.2.1. Motivations for Protest

People's expectations when organizing demonstrations during the Arab Spring have been to establish democratic components, such as competitive elections and freedom of expression (Gause, 2011). Demand for democratic progress is argued to be the largest driving force of the Arab uprisings. The aim of this thesis is therefore to as much as possible, answer whether the protests of Arab Spring have led toward democratic gains.

The protests, mostly driven by disenfranchised youths, upper middle class and grass-root organizations in the Arab world gained worldwide attention. Civil societies grew in countries which allowed for institutionalization to take place (Egypt and Tunisia in particular), and the support for a Western variety of democracy gained a pivotal platform which came to lead the upheavals (Lynch, 2016).

Almost all countries which have experienced the Arab Uprisings have a young population – almost 50% of the population in Morocco, Yemen, Tunisia, Libya, and Bahrain are under the age of 25.

<b>DataBank – World Development Indicators (modeled ILO estimate)</b>			
Total unemployment rate (% of total labor force) (2009)		Unemployment, youth total (% of total labor force ages 15-24) (2009)	
Algeria	10.2	Algeria	21.5
Egypt	9.4	Egypt	27.3
Tunisia	13.3	Tunisia	30.4
Jordan	12.9	Jordan	28.6
Morocco	9.1	Morocco	18.1

The left-side table shows the total unemployment rates in the five case-countries. The table to the right lists the proportion of the total unemployed population between the ages 15-24. Data is calculated according to measures from International Labor Organization (ILO). Data is derived from WorldBank.

<http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=2&series=SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS&country=DZA,YEM,EGY,TUN,JOR,MAR>

Tunisians, Egyptians, and Jordanians have experienced a minimum of 25% unemployment rate among their youth (Arab Barometer, 2016a). Judging from their slogans, lack of jobs has been a major driving force for the upheavals (Lynch, 2016; Worth, 2014).

Demands for political reform were prioritized differently across borders. According to Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynolds (2015) “Morocco, Algeria and nearly all Gulf monarchies protests [...] did not concentrate political disaffection on incumbent rulers—as occurred in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Syria, and Bahrain.” (Brownlee et al. 2015:18). Such countries’ concerns mainly revolved around the existing economic and social inequalities experienced by minorities – as seen in Kuwait, Algeria, and Morocco.

Presidencies in large experienced the most powerful uprisings, which is argued to be caused by lack of a fixed successor (Bellin, 2012). The three first countries experiencing the Arab Spring (Libya, Tunisia, and Egypt) exemplify such attitude – all three countries overthrew their presidents.

Existing research on the impact of Arab Spring on democratization is for most part qualitatively conducted, with reference to Arab Exceptionalism as predetermining the likelihood of democratization in the MENA-region. This study will contribute to the existing knowledge of the aftermath of Arab Spring, by relating details of democracy with empirical evidence from surveys and expert data. The relevant definition of democratic gains is elaborated in section 4.1 before this thesis refers to empirical data in order to answer whether the Arab Spring has led toward democratic gains.

### **2.3. The aftermath of the Arab Spring**

Despite the variables which have contributed to the aftermaths of the Arab uprisings, scholarly work has yet to clarify why some Arab countries have achieved democratic gains, while others have experienced an even more authoritarian regime than before the Arab Spring.

This section will reiterate rentierism and international influence on the MENA-region to understand their impacts on the uprisings of Arab Spring.

#### **2.3.1. Rentierism**

The Western countries’ decision to intervene in the Arab Spring countries’ domestic conflicts has affected the probabilities of democratic transitions in the region (Hinnebusch, 2015). An extensive sum of scholarly research on the implications of foreign interventions in the MENA-region has focused on the role of United States in particular.

For instance, economic interests are deemed to have enforced the U.S-led military intervention in Libya. This intervention exacerbated an already divided country and arguably led to their ongoing civil war. U.S. interventions in oil-poor Syria have led to a similar aftermath (Önis, 2012).

American support of the Egyptian army helped determine the fast pace with which the country managed to oust its president (Kienle, 2012). On the other hand, a moderate amount of international interventions in Tunisia has played a pivotal role in their successful democratic progress (Hinnebusch, 2015).

Pseudo-rentier Egypt and Jordan have likewise received much of the United States' support in forms of development aid. In addition to economic gains, geographic and politically strategic components of some Arab countries have determined much of foreign countries' roles in the outcomes of the Arab Spring.

Oil-rents have enabled monarchies such as Oman, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia to increase subsidies and wages after the uprisings of 2011 in order to distract people from demanding reform – a successful tactic in preventing people from taking to the streets (Lucas, 2014). Even pseudo-rentier monarchies such as Morocco and Jordan have spent their foreign aid on generous subsidies and wages to gain control over the demonstrations of 2011 (Yom & Gause, 2012).

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To conclude the chapter on existing literature, it is helpful to summarize the many countries' characteristics in accordance with the notion of Arab exceptionalism. Many scholars have viewed successful replacement of presidents as an omen for democratic progress. In examining five countries with different outcomes for their executive leaders, this thesis also offers an insight into whether replacing incumbents is in fact a good sign for democratic progress.

The table below lists the various characteristics of eleven Arab countries which had over 10 000 protesters, and the most turbulent year for each country. The aim of this table is to, in a systematic fashion, describe the differences among Arab states in terms of electoral systems and oil-reserves.

**Table 2.** List of countries involved in the Arab Spring and their characteristics

<b>Country</b>	<b>Population</b>	<b>Extent of protests</b>	<b>Oil</b>	<b>Regime type</b>	<b>Civil war</b>	<b>Overthrow*</b>
Algeria	40 million	+10 000 (2011)	<b>Yes</b>	Presidency	<b>No</b>	<b>No</b>
Bahrain**	1,4 million	+100 000 (2011)	<b>Yes</b>	Monarchy	<b>No</b>	<b>Yes</b>
Egypt	90 million	+10 million (2013)	<b>No</b>	Presidency	<b>No</b>	<b>Yes</b>
Jordan	8 million	+10 000 (2012)	<b>No</b>	Monarchy	<b>No</b>	<b>Yes</b>
Kuwait**	4 million	+10 000 (2011)	<b>Yes</b>	Monarchy	<b>No</b>	<b>No</b>
Libya**	6 million	+10 000 (2011)	<b>Yes</b>	Presidency	<b>Yes</b>	<b>Yes</b>
Morocco	35 million	+10 000 (2012)	<b>No</b>	Monarchy	<b>No</b>	<b>No</b>
Saudi Arabia**	32 million	+50 000 (2012)	<b>Yes</b>	Monarchy	<b>No</b>	<b>No</b>
Syria**	16 million	+100 000 (2011)	<b>Yes</b>	Presidency	<b>Yes</b>	<b>No</b>
Tunisia	11 million	+100 000 (2010)	<b>No</b>	Presidency	<b>No</b>	<b>Yes</b>
Yemen**	27 million	+1 million (2013)	<b>No</b>	Presidency	<b>Yes</b>	<b>Yes</b>

\*Overthrow in monarchies refers to the replacement of Prime Ministers – not Kings.

\*\*Syria, Libya, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Bahrain are not included among the case-countries due to lack of data resulting from their current volatile state, international interventions and states' censorship effort.

### **3. Theoretical Framework**

Democratic gains can be conceptualized in numerous ways depending on what type of democracy we are interested in. This section will refer to two theories on democracy – the “Polyarchal regime” and “participatory democracy”. A polyarchal regime requires high levels of transparency from state-institutions to ensure the equal treatment of all members of society. The aim of a participatory democracy is to provide all members of society with the equal opportunity to participate in political and social spheres. Both are important for understanding the requirements in a democratic state.

These theories will together justify the choice of datasets used in this thesis. Using databases such as Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) and Arab Barometer (AB) will concretize whether the Arab Spring has led toward democratic gains.



### 3.1. What are Democratic Gains?

There is an extensive amount of literature on what democratic transition entails.

Contemporary political science concern emancipative values and gender equality for already established democracies (Welzel, 2014), whereas classical approaches focus on transparency of the leadership and higher public participation (Dahl, 1971), the state's ability to secure rule of law (Olson, 1993) its relation to the economy (Miltzer & Richard, 1981), and the importance of social engagements on democratic performance (Putnam, 1993).

This section highlights Robert Dahl's "Polyarchal regime" while incorporating Robert Putnam's "participatory-democracy" in order to conceptualize democracy. These theories include fundamental requirements of a democratic system and are therefore topical when speaking about new democracies, such as those which may flourish in the MENA-region as a result of the Arab Spring.

#### 3.1.1. Robert Dahl's Polyarchal Regime

While a selected few govern an oligarchy, and one powerful actor governs a monarchy, Dahl's polyarchal regime is governed by the masses - for the masses (Dahl, 1984).

Following this definition, a polyarchal regime is responsible for guaranteeing and protecting the masses' ability to elect the rightful leader – free from outside influences such as bribery or coercion (Dahl, 2006). According to Dahl, a polyarchal regime needs to include institutions which provide and protect the following components;

- ✓ “universal suffrage
  - ✓ suffrage coextensive with the right to run for public office
  - ✓ fairly conducted elections accompanied by negligible or no coercion
  - ✓ extensive protection of free expression, including criticism of the government, the regime, society, the dominant ideology, and so on.
  - ✓ the existence of alternative and often competing sources of information and persuasion not under the control of the government
  - ✓ a high degree of freedom to form relatively autonomous organizations of great variety, including, most crucially, opposition political parties
  - ✓ relatively high responsiveness of the government to voters and election outcomes.”
- (Dahl, 1984:228-229)

In other words, the institutions required for a polyarchal regime must protect the citizen's right to elect the candidate whose agenda favors their everyday life. Voters should be encouraged, without coercion, to cast their votes in an election.

The possibility to run for office despite one's religion, ethnic background, or gender must also be secured in order to ensure a fair representation of the country's aggregate population. In the case of unforeseen outcomes from elections, institutions involved in conducting elections shall be transparent in their work and provide evidence to confirm the results of the election.

Furthermore, people must be confident in expressing their disagreements with their regime, without risking their safety or freedom. State-institutions should hence refrain from censoring alternative sources of information, which may argue against the current regime, and/or be in favor of another ideology.

Establishing these institutions is a prerequisite for any existing polyarchal democracy. What makes such a democracy important is its governance by the masses – for the masses. Enabling the equal political participation of all members of a country, as well as their ability to monitor and, if necessary, punish the behaviors of their incumbents, are the characteristics which separate such a democracy from an authoritarian state. The section below will further explain how the existence or absence of these institutions can be measured.

### **3.1.2. How is the Polyarchy Index measured?**

Inspired by Robert A. Dahl (1971), Coppedge and Reinicke designed a Polyarchy-Scale in 1986, which has abbreviated the seven conditions in Dahl's Polyarchal state into four broader categories. Each category includes components which contribute to their level of polyarchy, and the performance of each component is scaled between 0-4 or 0-3. "0" indicates a non-democratic performance of the component, while the highest score is given to the components which are best aligned with the Polyarchy framework.

The four categories are; Free and fair elections, freedom to organize, freedom of expression, and a measure of availability of alternative sources (Coppedge & Reinicke, 1990:51). The expert-database called Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) provides this thesis with the measurements and helps graph the development of indicators relevant to democratic gains.

Before introducing the data, an additional theory on democratization is included. The following theory concerns participatory-democracy, and albeit more abstract than the

Polyarchy Index, it is applicable to the way we interpret the impact of the Arab Spring on social freedoms.

### **3.1.3. Participation as prerequisite for democratization**

Robert D. Putnam (1993) looks at already-existing democracies and analyzes their causal mechanism. One of his remarkable works, “What Makes Democracy Work”, is a comparative case-study between northern and southern Italy, where correlations between hierarchal state-structures and democratic performance are investigated.

In this body of work, Putnam found that regions with close ties between their incumbents and civilians had more economic and political development, whereas the areas without cooperation between civilians and public officials faced corrupt activities and lack of growth in democracy (Putnam, 1993).

He concludes that, for democracy to work, a state must promote:

- ✓ civic engagement (through civil society organizations (CSO's))
- ✓ solidarity and trust
- ✓ political equality
- ✓ and creation of associations (Putnam, 1993)

According to Putnam (1993), in order to achieve these components, “social capital” is required. This type of capital builds upon networking and civic engagement concerning different social matters. Investing in social capital contributes to solidarity, through improving people’s perception and treatment of others as their equals. Networking platforms and association-groups which advocate equal treatment strengthen a bond among its members, as they contribute to more trust and a culture of reciprocity of favors (“norm of reciprocity” (Putnam, 1993:101)).

In conclusion, the level of democracy increases when people feel supported by their fellow citizens. Putnam’s social capital aims to create such an environment where people can work together, alongside their public officials and political leaders, to impact their country for the better. For this, the state is required to invest in institutions which promote civic engagement.

### 3.1.4. Hypothesis

Two data-sources are chosen for answering whether the Arab Spring led toward democratic gains. One data-source provides domestic popular opinion on the levels of democracy in each country (Arab Barometer). Another data-source refers to empirical data accumulated by country-experts (V-Dem), who scale the levels of democracy in each country. By comparing the findings of these two sources, this thesis assesses whether democratic gains took place in the MENA-region as a result of the Arab Spring – using fine-grained data for a more nuanced perspective.

Since the two data-sources look at the same five countries, the first hypothesis claims that their findings will mirror one another:

H<sub>1</sub>: Five Arab majority-countries have experienced democratic gains as a result from the uprisings of the Arab Spring (2010-2013). Expert-data from V-Dem and domestic public opinion from Arab Barometer surveys will show democratic progress for the five Arab after 2013 than before/during the Arab Spring.

V-Dem and Arab Barometer offer different perspectives on what democratic gains mean. One perspective is derived from country-experts' and scholars' understanding, and the other is based on the perception of people experiencing democracy. This may result in different outcomes in the data, which leads to a second hypothesis. If this hypothesis is accurate, the outcome of this thesis would reject the null hypothesis:

H<sub>2</sub>: The empirical findings from Arab Barometer do match those from V-Dem. It is safe to claim that democratic gains have occurred in the MENA-region.

Having two hypotheses in this study will both claim whether the Arab Spring has led to democratic gains (H<sub>1</sub>), while also shining light on the significance of using two different data-sources to answer such a research question (H<sub>2</sub>).

## **4. Methodology & Research Design**

The majority of research on democracy after the Arab Spring use qualitative methods. This thesis will focus on quantitative data to answer whether the Arab Spring has led toward democratic gains.

This study looks at five case-countries (Tunisia, Egypt, Algeria, Jordan, and Morocco). Survey-data conducted during 2006<sup>11</sup> and 2016, together with expert-data will describe democratic changes in the MENA-region. A brief analysis of the findings will follow, with reference to Arab Exceptionalism and the mentioned theoretical frameworks, to answer whether the Arab Spring has led to democratic gains.

### **4.1. Research Design**

Survey-data (Arab Barometer) is compared to expert-data (V-Dem) to assess whether the Arab Spring has led toward democratic gains. Both datasets include the five case-countries (Tunisia, Egypt, Algeria, Jordan, and Morocco).

AB and V-Dem both measure their findings on Likert-type scales. This thesis will illustrate their findings using different methods. This is because V-Dem data is more visually comprehensive, while the survey data (AB) needs more processing to determine whether change in people's perception of democratic gains are significant.

Hence, V-Dem data is pictured using graphs, and statistical analyses are carried out on AB surveys. The outcome of graphs and statistical analyses, must both show an increase in polyarchy-scores, after the Arab Spring (2010-2013), in order for democratic gains to be assumed.

#### **4.1.1. Independent variable: The Arab Spring**

The Arab Spring (2010-2013) – a period of massive protests throughout the MENA-region – was a critical juncture for democracy in the Arab world. Countries which carried out mass-protests were experiencing larger income-gaps and poorer living standard (Anderson, 2011). The high unemployment-rate among the higher-educated youth aggravated the people, who

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<sup>11</sup> Data from 2007 may be included for Arab Barometer.

did not receive support from their political leaders. Hence, the uprisings in Arab countries in the beginning of the 2010's were expressions of their dissatisfaction with their status-quo.

Many scholars claim that it was the persistence of authoritarian rule which led people to protest (Kienle, 2012; Kamrava, 2014; Bellin, 2012). The republican countries involved were ruled by the same presidents for more than twenty years (Tunisia, Yemen, Algeria, Egypt, and Libya). The monarchies were governed for longer by the same families (Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Jordan, and Kuwait).

What made the protests of Arab Spring impactful was their simultaneous formation across the MENA-region. Considering their socio-political uniqueness (Arab Exceptionalism), scholars claim that these protests could lead to a democratic transition in the MENA-region. This study assesses whether the protests of Arab Spring did realize this claim.

#### **4.1.2. Dependent variable: Democratic gains**

The dependent variable, democratic gains – will be measured using two different sources of data.

The five countries which will be examined are Tunisia, Egypt, Algeria, Jordan, and Morocco due to the sufficient data available on both Arab Barometer (surveys) and V-Dem (expert-data).

The surveys used to in this thesis are provided by the Arab Barometer.<sup>12</sup> This database offers fixed editions, also referred to as waves. Wave I (2006-7) represents people's perception of the level of democracy prior to the Arab Spring. Wave IV (2016) describes people's perception of democratic components after the Arab Spring. WII (2011) will be included for Tunisia and Egypt, due to their absence from WI.

Expert-data on the other hand, is derived from Varieties of Democracy.<sup>13</sup> Each case-country's democratic progress between 2006 and 2016<sup>14</sup> is scaled on a Polyarchy Scale, and the results are compared between years. The Polyarchy Scale [see section 3.1.2.] is interpreted through

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<sup>12</sup> <http://www.arabbarometer.org/content/online-data-analysis>

<sup>13</sup> The Institute for Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) combines different external indices for a better overview of different countries during different time-periods (Coppedge et al. 2016).

<sup>14</sup> Years may vary based on available data

the Electoral Democracy Index, which encompasses all four categories mentioned by Coppedge and Reinicke (1990).

Variables in the following list are measured by country-experts on a Likert-type 4 point scale, where “4” indicates a positive outcome toward democratizing, and “0” equal non-democratic characteristics (Varieties of Democracy, 2017b). A Multiplicative Polyarchy Index (MPI) has been applied to each sub-index as a lens through which the weakest components (those which score the lowest) affect the outcome.

This method of aggregation is preferred because it does not present the average of each component alone, but illustrates the consequences brought by declining democratic components (Varieties of Democracy, 2017a:48). The aim of the MPI is therefore to prevent the illusion of democratic gains, while other important democratic components decline (Varieties of Democracy, 2017a).

Below is the list over the selected democratic components, inspired by Dahl’s Polyarchal regime;

### ***The Polyarchy Index***

#### **Electoral Democracy Index (EDI)**

- a. Clean Elections Index
  - i. Election Management Body (EMB) autonomy
  - ii. EMB capacity
  - iii. Election free and fair
  - iv. Election government intimidation
  - v. Election other electoral violence
  - vi. Election other voting irregularities
  - vii. Election vote buying
  - viii. Election voter registry
- b. Expanded Freedom of Expression Index
  - i. Freedom of academic and cultural expression
  - ii. Freedom of discussion
    1. Freedom of discussion for men
    2. Freedom of discussion for women
  - iii. Government censorship effort – Internet
  - iv. Government censorship effort – Media
  - v. Harassment of journalists
  - vi. Media bias

- vii. Media self-censorship
- viii. Print/broadcast media critical/perspectives
- c. Freedom of association index
  - i. Barriers to parties
  - ii. CSO (Civil Society Org.) entry and exit
  - iii. CSO repression
  - iv. Elections multiparty
  - v. Opposition parties autonomy
  - vi. Party Ban

I have removed two sub-indices from the Electoral Democracy Index, due to their lack of relevance to the research question. Although vital components of Robert Dahl's Polyarchal Regime, these two sub-indices are more related to formal institutional policies and were not the highlighted challenges in the MENA-region during the Arab Spring. Therefore, studying the two in addition to the more relevant components such as civil liberties and quality of election would be too ambitious for the scope of this thesis. The excluded sub-indices are each explained below.

“Elected officials index” – This index concerns the structure and authority of parliament, by asking questions regarding head-of-state's ability to appoint ministers, how party members of various chambers are elected etc. Including these components would distract from the research question. Neither do they concern monarchies, which result in unequal information.

“Share of population with suffrage” – This index shows the share of the population with suffrage. Because the population with suffrage remained the same after the Arab Spring, I view this index as not relevant to the aim of this thesis.

The three sub-indices in this study will summarize the essential components of a polyarchal regime as defined by Coppedge and Reinicke's Polyarchy-Scale (1990). These sub-indices are translated into graphs for a visual mapping of democratic changes.



### ***The Arab Barometer***

The Arab Barometer (AB) conducts its surveys in Arab countries exclusively. Wave I (2006-2007) will be compared to its Wave IV (2016).<sup>15</sup> Wave I does not include Egypt and Tunisia which is when Wave II (2011) will be included instead.

Wave I (or II) helps describe the probable reasons for the uprisings in 2011, whereas results from people's responses in Wave IV will demonstrate whether democratic gains were achieved in the case-countries.

Respondents place their answers along 4-point Likert-types scales<sup>16</sup> which measure the extent of their agreement or disagreement with the question/statements made.<sup>17</sup>

The Polyarchy Index is the criterion behind the selection of questions/statements which will describe people's understanding of the democratic changes occurring in their countries since the Arab Spring. The questions/statements selected are;

**Table 3. Survey questions**

<b>AB Questions:</b>
1. In general, how would you evaluate the last parliamentary elections that were held on [date]?
2. "I'm going to name a number of institutions. For each one, please tell me how much trust you have in them: The elected council of representatives (the parliament)."
3. To what extent do you think that "freedom to express opinions" is guaranteed in your country? "Freedom to join a political party"
4. In your opinion, are people nowadays able to criticize the government without fear?*
5. In your opinion, to what extent is your country democratic?***
6. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? "A democratic system may have problems, yet it is better than other systems."

<sup>15</sup> <http://www.arabbarometer.org/content/ab-waves>

<sup>16</sup> 1=strongly agree, 2=agree, 3=disagree, and 4=strongly disagree

<sup>17</sup> one question has ten-points

\*The type of response changes from a Likert-type scale to a dichotomous "yes/no" response from Wave II onwards. Responses from WI on this question are hence merged.

\*\* This question uses a ten-point Likert-type scale.

**Analytical framework**

Results from V-Dem and AB, concerning pathways of democracy in five Arab countries after the Arab Spring, are compared to one another to answer whether democratic gains have occurred. The table below relates survey questions, and V-Dem components to the theory of a Polyarchal Regime, as stated by Robert A. Dahl (1984). The linkages between AB and V-Dem are explained further down. They are divided into the four categories in the polyarchal regime (as formulated by Coppedge and Reinicke (1990)).

**Table 4. Analytical framework: V-Dem components and Survey-data**

<p><b>Dahl’s Polyarchal Regime:</b> (Dahl, 1984:228-229)</p>	<p><b>“Varieties of Democracy” components</b></p>	<p><b>Questions:</b></p>
<p>✓ “Relatively high responsiveness of the government to voters and election outcomes.” ✓ “Accompanied by negligible or no coercion” ✓ “Fairly conducted elections”</p>	<p><u>Clean Elections Index</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Election other voting irregularities</li> <li>2. Election vote buying</li> <li>3. Election government intimidation</li> <li>4. Election other electoral violence</li> <li>5. Election voter registry</li> <li>6. EMB (Election Management Body) autonomy</li> <li>7. EMB capacity</li> <li>8. Election free and fair</li> </ol>	<p>1. “In general, how would you evaluate the last parliamentary elections that were held on [date]?”</p>
<p>✓ “Suffrage coextensive with the right to run for public office.”<sup>19</sup> ✓ “A high degree of freedom to form relatively autonomous organizations of great variety, including, most crucially, opposition political parties.”</p>	<p><u>Freedom of association index</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Civil Society Org. (CSO) entry and exit</li> <li>2. CSO repression</li> <li>3. Elections multiparty</li> <li>4. Opposition parties autonomy</li> <li>5. Party Ban</li> <li>6. Barriers to parties</li> </ol>	<p>2. “Trust in Parliament” 3. “Freedom to join a political party”</p>

<sup>19</sup> Not included among V-Dem indicators due to lack of relevance to the trajectories of Arab Spring.

<p>✓ “Extensive protection of free expression, including criticism of the government, the regime, society, the dominant ideology, and so on.”</p> <p>✓ “The existence of alternative and often competing sources of information and persuasion not under the control of the government”</p>	<p><u>Expanded Freedom of Expression Index</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Freedom of academic and cultural expression</li> <li>2. Freedom of discussion             <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Freedom of discussion for men</li> <li>b. Freedom of discussion for women</li> </ol> </li> <li>3. Harassment of journalists</li> <li>4. Government censorship effort – Internet</li> <li>5. Government censorship effort – Media</li> <li>6. Media bias</li> <li>7. Media self-censorship</li> <li>8. Print/broadcast media critical</li> <li>9. Print/broadcast media perspectives</li> </ol>	<p>4. In your opinion, are people nowadays able to criticize the government without fear?</p>
<p>The remaining two questions are used to summarize changes in people’s perception of democracy.</p> <p>Their inclusion is important for understanding people’s overarching understanding of the democratic performance in their country, while deciding whether democracy is the most favored political structure.</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>5. “To what extent is your country democratic?”</li> <li>6. “A democratic system may have problems, yet it is better than other systems”</li> </ol>	

The following definitions are borrowed from Varieties of Democracy (2017a) and Arab Barometer (2011).

Clean Election Index: The government’s attitude toward election quality and political freedom is translated in this index. According to people, how impartial are those who count the votes (8)? Are those monitoring the elections (the EMB 6 & 7) independent of the regime? Are there repercussions (i.e. harassment) for those who do not wish to vote (3 & 4), or are they inclined to vote through bribery (1 & 2).

Question: The related question will inform us if voters experienced their last legislative election to be conducted fairly and without coercion.

Freedom of Association Index: This index lists political groups which are governed by the people. People can change their political lives through “freedom to form relatively autonomous organizations” (Dahl, 1984:228) such as political parties (6) and civil societies (1). Such groups should not face harassments and repression by the government (2 & 5). Different political ideologies ought to be eligible to compete in elections (3) and free from government interventions (4).

Question: “Trust in parliament” addresses whether the elected parties are trustworthy.<sup>20</sup>

“Freedom to join a political party” describes people’s sentiment towards their ability to express their political ideologies, without facing harassments.

Expanded Freedom of Expression Index: This index measures the extent to which individuals can speak on political topics in private and public spheres (2) or on cultural platforms (1) without facing harassment by i.e. the police or government.

Are professional journalists censored by the government when questioning the status quo (4, 5, & 6)? Do these journalists fear for their safety (3) and must thus censor themselves (7) to avoid harassment? The absence of these censorship allows the media to broadcast/print opinions which criticize the regime (8) and offer new ideas (9).

Question: People’s perceived freedom to criticize their regime, government, society or “the dominant ideology” and their freedom to observe such discussions are scaled in this question.

Questions on levels of democracy: The Arab Barometer has not specified the type of democracy that is referred to in question 5 and 6. Therefore, the most basic concept of democracy (free elections and freedom of expression) is assumed.

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<sup>20</sup> The discourse on the impact of trust on the perception of a country’s democratic performance in the Middle East is a continuously discussed topic (Spierings, 2017; Brixi et al. 2015), yet this thesis has touched on the elemental surface of the concept of trust, as it applies to the Polyarchal Regime’s contribution with autonomous political actors.

Popular opinion on these two questions will help determine whether people in five Arab countries have experienced more of democracy since the Arab Spring.

#### **4.1.3. Statistical description**

Data from both Arab Barometer (AB) and V-Dem are calculated through SPSS. Calculating survey data will differ slightly from the method used for V-Dem data. The aim is to compare their outcomes between 2006 and 2016.<sup>21</sup>

V-Dem data will demonstrate the extent to which the five case-countries have obtained polyarchal regimes as a result of the Arab Spring, through linear graphs created in SPSS. The changes discovered will be compared to changes in people's perception based on data from AB.

People's attitude toward democratic components in their country before the Arab Spring must improve by 2016, and the expert-data must show evidence of positive change in order for democratic gains to be assumed as an aftermath of the Arab Spring. The different ways in which expert-data and surveys answer whether the Arab Spring led to democratic gains will also provide insight to how different contemporary data sources operate.

This section explains why the methods used in this thesis are appropriate for this research question, and describes how they work.

#### ***Survey data***

Surveys from Arab Barometer will show popular opinion on democratic performance in five Arab countries. Answers from two different years will be compared in order to answer whether the Arab Spring led to democratic gains. A sophisticated method (MWU) of interpreting the results is chosen to make up for unequal samples of respondents (Corder & Foreman, 2009).

#### ***Method***

A non-parametric Mann Whitney U-test (MWU) is chosen. This method is appropriate for unequally distributed independent samples as is the case when respondents are independent from each other.

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<sup>21</sup> Years vary due to available data

The MWU-test calculates the mean scores of ranked data. This test generates z-scores which help calculate the p-value (Field, 2009). Medians (Mdn) will be reported due to large sample sizes and the categorical data. The statistical significance comes from the MWU-test and is based on the difference between mean ranks, while medians which are the reported results, help show popular response.<sup>22</sup>

After calculating the MWU-test, changes in answers between two surveys ought to be statistically significant in order to assume that people in Arab-majority countries have experienced significant change in their country's democratic performance (whether for good or bad).

The statistical significance level is set at a standard  $p < 0.05$  (2-tailed). The formulas used to calculate the reported values are mentioned in the appendix [under Formulas]. The asymptotic significance level is chosen to determine whether differences between responses are statistically significant. This version of significance level is reported due to the larger sample sizes.

### ***Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem)***

A more simple approach is used to illustrate expert-data findings. Again, SPSS will be used to decipher the change in democratic components in the Arab world since the Arab Spring, by mapping democratic changes between 2006 and 2016.<sup>23</sup>

The V-Dem data is more visually comprehensive. Four multiple-line graphs are attached for each country – one demonstrates the overall Polyarchy Index (in the appendix), and the remaining three look closer at each sub-index.

The statistics for the sub-indices range from 0 – 4<sup>24</sup>. The statistics for the overall Polyarchy Index will range from 0 – 1 (Varieties of Democracy, 2017b).

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<sup>22</sup> Statistical significance may occur between groups, despite equal medians, since the mean ranks are more finely calculated. In these cases, statistical significance rejects the null hypothesis, though it may be confusing due to equal medians (UCLA IDRE, 2017).

<sup>23</sup> Years may vary based on available data.

<sup>24</sup> A higher score equals higher level of democracy

#### **4.1.4. Limitations**

As mentioned in the section above on V-Dem, the available data has been too limited to offer a just representation of the democratic changes between 2006 and 2016. There are no solutions for such limitations, but doing the most with the data which is available.

Another limitation is the absence of some case-countries from the Arab Barometer's waves. The two most discussed countries in political science on the Arab Spring (Egypt and Tunisia) are missing from Wave I (2006-2007). Therefore, the Wave II (2011) surveys from these countries describe people's perception of democracy during the Arab Spring.<sup>25</sup>

Furthermore, AB's formulations of questions and responses vary from Wave I with the other waves. This thesis will use the latest formulations of questions since they have applied since 2011.

The vagueness of the impact of level of trust may also alter its significance in this study. Yet, including it offers a more in-depth understanding for the popularity of political representatives. This knowledge will help determine whether Arab citizens in five case-countries are confident in the democratic performance of their incumbents since the Arab Spring.

The inability to generalize the democratic implications of the Arab Spring for all of the MENA-region is the greatest setback for this thesis. The limited available data makes a broader research unattainable at the moment, but the constant updates in databases gives hope for the ability to generalize democratic gains resulting from protests in the MENA-region in the future.

## **5. Case-selection**

As mentioned in section 2, oil, military apparatus, and cultural/religious values play important roles in disconnecting the MENA-region from the rest of the world. Cultural and religious attributes are however not in line with the focus of this thesis, mostly due to its lack of impact on democratic transitions as mentioned in the previous literature (Gause 2011; Linz & Stepan 2013).

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<sup>25</sup> WII has included Egyptians' perception of their 2009 elections.

Moreover, oil and the military's political influence are considered impactful for the MENA-region after the series of protests during 2010-2013 [Table 2]. This thesis does not intend to test the mechanisms between these attributes and democratic gain, yet acknowledges their influence on the aftermaths of Arab Spring.

An initial selection of case-countries included countries which experienced mass-protests with +10 000 participants. This list included four additional countries – Kuwait, Libya, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia. They were excluded due to lack of data.

The remaining five countries (Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco), have data available for at least three survey-waves on AB [Table 5]. This study prefers data from Wave I as the starting point. Tunisia and Egypt's absence from Wave I has required the inclusion of WII.

Far more than these five countries were affected as a result of the uprisings (Brownlee et al. 2015). The lack of quantifiable data and foreign interventions (Syria, Bahrain, Libya, Yemen, and Iraq), and lack of upheavals and political reform (Oman and Qatar) have made gathering information about all countries involved in the Arab Spring a difficult task.

This section proceeds by explaining the political backgrounds of the case-countries, as well as factors leading to their upheavals.

**Table 5.** Countries included in each wave

Country	AB Wave 1 (2006-7)	AB Wave II (2010-11)	AB Wave III (2013)	AB Wave IV (2016)
Tunisia		X	X	X
Egypt		X	X	X
Algeria	X	X	X	X
Jordan	X	X	X	X
Morocco	X		X	X

## 5.1 Tunisia

Tunisia's first president, Habib Bourguiba ruled the country for thirty years (1956-1987) following its independence from France in 1956 (Brownlee et al. 2015). Former army leader Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali succeeded Bourguiba in 1987 and remained in office until 2011 when he was ousted by a military coup.



December 17, 2010 sparked the Tunisian “Jasmine Revolution” and marks the beginning of the Arab Spring. The cause of this revolution was to show solidarity with a street vendor named Mohammed Bouazizi, who set himself on fire in front of the police station in Ben Arous. His struggles with police brutality, lack of job and sufficient income, gathered thousands of people into the streets of Sidi Bouzid, Kasserine, and Tunis as a sign of unity and desperation for change.

These protests led to military interventions, and the city of Kasserine lost 20 people. The result was nationwide protests for three weeks (Aljazeera, 2011). As a result of military intervention under the leadership of General Rachid Ammar, Ben Ali was exiled by the military the 14<sup>th</sup> of January 2011 (Kienle, 2012). Gen. Ammar reformed the Tunisian constitution. Among his reforms were more gender equality and less police brutality (Henry, Ji-Hyang, & Lee, 2012). He resigned in 2013.

## **5.2. Egypt**

The British political colonization of Egypt was terminated in 1952. The Egyptian military’s role was critical in gaining political independence (Henry et al. 2012). The military’s efforts were, again, pivotal in their trajectories of the Arab Spring.

Egypt’s president, former army leader Hosni Mubarak, served as the head of state since 1981. The murder of a civilian (Khaled Said) by a police officer on 6<sup>th</sup> of June, 2010 sparked a social media-movement called “We are all Khaled Said” (Kienle, 2012), which gained worldwide attention. The support from neighboring countries and the West exemplified how critical social media-engagement could be for a country’s domestic political affairs (Hussain & Howard, 2013). Street protests which followed resulted in Mubarak’s overthrow and the election of Mohamed Morsi (representative of Muslim Brotherhood) as his successor.

His political agenda which concerned conservative, Islamic reforms were met with nationwide protests, led by army general Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. With almost 11 million participants in the capital Cairo, this protest resulted in the overthrow of Morsi in 2012. Al-Sisi replaced the Muslim Brotherhood-leader.

The revolutions in Egypt are often compared to those of Tunisia. In both, grass-roots organizations wanted a regime change, and both successfully toppled their leaders due to the military alliance. However, the advantages of their political reforms are dissimilar.

### 5.3. Algeria

After a violent revolution against the French colonizers, Algeria gained independence in 1962. The National Liberation Front (FNL) led the political and economic reforms which stabilized Algeria as an independent state. FNL faced challenges to their political reforms by the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS). Conflicts between the two ideologies led to a bloody civil war, which lasted for seven years (1991-1998) (Mallat, 2016). The FNL has however maintained its grip on power.

President Abdelaziz Bouteflika leads the country for his fourth consecutive term (1999-2019). Prior to the elections, people of the capital Alger took to the streets due to dissatisfactory neoliberal economic reforms which had led to the exacerbation of already existing income-gaps (Brownlee et al. 2015).

Protests have been numerous. However, the thought of reliving a civil war made Algerians more reluctant in pushing for their demands (Bellin, 2012). In addition, re-electing Bouteflika is predicted to counteract necessary economic reforms, while improvements in the political sphere look more promising. Bouteflika lifted a 19-year-old state of emergency (it helped to justify authorities' harassment of Islamist oppositions to protect the establishment (Kao & Lust, 2017)), as well as removed language barriers in favor of minorities in 2012 (Entelis, 2016).

### 5.4. Jordan

Jordan is a monarchy, which gained its independence from the British Empire in 1921. The Hashemite dynasty has ruled since, and the current King Abdullah II has been in power since 1999. King Abdullah II has an overwhelming executive and legislative authority, among which has included the ability to appoint the Prime Minister (Tobin, 2012).

High unemployment rates and police brutality drove people to the streets of the capital Amman in January 2011. The largest protest during this period consisted of 10 000 people, led by the largest opposition party; Islamic Action Front (IAF) (Tobin, 2012). Government loyalists committed violent counterattacks against the protesters, supposedly due to Prime Minister Marouf al-Bakhit's orders. He was asked to resign by the people in October 2011. The King has since appointed two other Prime Ministers.

## 5.5. Morocco

This monarchy gained independence from France in 1956, after which the Alaouite dynasty continued its reign. After his father and predecessor passed in 1999, King Mohammed VI attempted at modernizing Morocco's constitution. King Mohammed VI's initial work supported the marginalized and poor areas of Morocco. One attempt at bettering the country was through neoliberal economic reforms, which led to an increase in corruption and income-gaps (Gause, 2011). February 2011 marks the beginning of the Moroccan Arab Spring.

The king's largest Islamist opposition party, the Justice and Development Party (PJD), instigated much of the protests leading to the Moroccan Arab Spring and is currently the largest party in the multiparty parliament of Morocco (Hussain & Howard, 2013). Their aim has been to counteract attempts at modernization, by i.e. preventing gender-equal policies from ratification, or arranging a 12,000 body-protest as a sign of discontent (Maghraoui, 2001). Prime Minister Saadeddine El-Othmani (PJD) is tasked by the King to reform the government.


## 6. Results

After gathering the results, they will be presented for each case-country in three steps. Step 1 includes a direct comparison between expert-data (V-Dem) and the corresponding survey question (AB).

Step 2 summarizes the findings from the comparisons. Step 3 will present the statistical analysis of the survey data, using the Mann Whitney U-test, through reporting the test outcome, median response, and the effect size that shows the proportion of changes between responses across survey waves. This structure clarifies differences between data sources, while interpreting whether the Arab Spring led to democratic gains.


Years vary for each country, based on the available data. Hence, the outcomes do not offer a fair representation of changes occurring between 2006 and 2016.

### 6.1. Tunisia




<u>V-Dem</u> (2009-2014)	<u>Arab Barometer</u> (2011-2016)
<p><u>Clean Election Index:</u></p> <p>All indicators improved by 2014. Violence carried out by non-governmental entities was the only indicator with more democratic performance already in 2009 (Varieties of Democracy, 2017a:102).</p> <p>The democratic levels were maintained since 2011, when the pressure on the administration to better represent is people was at its peak.</p>	<p><u>”Last election was free and fair”:</u><sup>26</sup></p> <p>When asked in 2011, 1% of Tunisians believed that the 2009 elections (the last elections before the Jasmine Revolution) were “completely free and fair”.</p> <p>This number increased to 25.2% in 2016. The opinions concerned the 2014 elections.</p>

<sup>26</sup> Ben Ali’s regime banned international organizations from conducting surveys on political topics in Tunisia. Hence, no data regarding people’s perception of democracy is available prior to 2011.



<u>V-Dem</u>	<u>(2013-2016)</u>	<u>Arab Barometer</u>	<u>(2011-2016)</u>
<p><u>Freedom of Association Index:</u> All indicators improved by 2014.</p>	<p><u>“Trust in Parliament”:</u> In 2013, only 8% felt great trust for their parliamentarians. This number was 6% in 2016.</p>	<p><u>”Freedom to join political parties”:</u> 35.7% experienced “guaranteed freedom” to join a political party in 2011.</p>	<p>37% agreed with this claim in 2016.</p>
<p>No parties were banned, nor had barriers to enter parliamentary elections. These levels were maintained since 2011.</p>	<p>The legislative elections concerned during these surveys were conducted in 2011 and 2014, respectively.</p>	<p>This outcome mirrors the V-Dem data. No barriers or bans were experienced since 2011, so this attitude is expected.</p>	



<b><u>V-Dem</u></b> (2009-2016)	<b><u>Arab Barometer</u></b> (2011-2016)
<p><b><u>Expanded Freedom of Expression Index:</u></b> All indicators improved by 2016.</p> <p>Media-related indicators did not perform as good as those related to freedom of discussion. They remained however moderately democratic (+2.00).</p>	<p><b><u>“People are able to criticize their government without fear”:</u></b> 85% of respondents believed in having this freedom in 2011. Fewer people agreed in 2016 (79.8%).</p>

<b><u>What has been people’s overall perception of democracy in Tunisia?</u></b>	
<p><b><u>To what extent is your country democratic?</u></b> Only 1.1% of Tunisians viewed their country as “completely democratic” in 2011. This percentage increased to 10% in 2016.</p>	<p><b><u>“A democratic system may have problems, yet it is better than any other system”:</u></b> 23% of the respondents strongly agreed with this statement in 2011. This number increased to 49% in 2016.</p>

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People’s view on the quality of their elections vary more than the expert-findings, yet the pattern remains the same (a sharp increase during the Arab Spring, met by a decline in 2016). Unity among Tunisians continued after the Arab Spring. Openly criticizing the government ceased to have violent repercussions and allowed for discussions around democratizing to take place, regardless of differing ideological backgrounds. This has, according to Hinnebusch (2015), been crucial for achieving high polyarchy-scores.

Co-operation as such may be the reason behind the highly democratic multiparty elections of 2015, and thus more freedom to join political parties.

Democracy remains the most popular political system according to Tunisians, yet they believe they have a long way to go. Scholars, however, claim the first country which stood up against its leader in 2010 has achieved a “polyarchal regime” (Hinnebusch, 2015).

A Mann-Whitney U test was run to determine if there were statistically significant differences between responses in waves before versus after the Arab Spring using the difference between mean ranks. The median (Mdn) and effect size (r) will be reported for each question.

Differences in the mean ranks were statistically significant for all questions between 2011 and 2016.

	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.
<i>U</i> =	133358,000	566917,000*	555219,000	610594,000	354713,000	434618,000
<i>p</i> =	,000	,000	,034	,000	,000	,000
<i>r</i> =	,754	,070	,045	,124	,267	,188

What do the different medians (Mdn) mean?

Question 1-4,6 - (Mdn=1.00)=”Strongly Agree”

(Mdn=2.00)=”Agree”

(Mdn=3.00)=”Disagree”


(Mdn=4.00)=”Strongly Disagree”

Question 5 -(Mdn=+5.00)= Level of respondent’s country’s democracy (1-5=low levels) (6-10=high levels)

1. The attitude toward fairness and freeness of the latest legislative election in Tunisia saw a positive shift (*Mdn*=2.00) in 2016 compared to that in 2011 (*Mdn*=4.00). This difference was statistically significant ( $r=45\%$ ).
2. Tunisians were not asked about their sense of trust for their parliamentarians in 2011. However, when asked in 2013 and 2016, the median response was a strong disagreement with the trustworthiness of their incumbents (*Mdn*=4.00). This outcome was statistically significant ( $r=5\%$ ).
3. In 2011, Tunisians agreed with being free to join a political party in 2011, as much as they did in 2016(*Mdn*=2.00). The difference was statistically significant ( $r=5\%$ ).
4. People of Tunisia were not afraid to criticize their government in 2011 (*Mdn*=1.00) or 2016 (*Mdn*=1.00). This difference was statistically significant ( $r=13\%$ ).
5. The perceived level of democracy in Tunisia remained on the same level (*Mdn*=5.00) across all waves. The findings were statistically significant ( $r=19\%$ ).
6. Finally, Tunisians viewed democracy as the best system in both years (*Mdn*=2.00) for 2011 but grew more fond of democracy in 2016 (*Mdn*=1.00). This change in attitude toward democracy as the best system was statistically significant ( $r=13\%$ ).

\*2013 versus 2016

## 6.2. Egypt




**V-Dem** (2005-2014)

**Arab Barometer** (2011-2016)




<p><u>Clean election Index:</u> All indicators improved by 2014.</p> <p>Level of free- and fairness of elections, together with voter irregularities skyrocketed after the Arab uprisings.</p>	<p><u>“The last national [legislative] election was free and fair”:</u> 8.4% viewed their 2010 elections as “completely free and fair”. This number increased to 46.3% in 2016.</p>
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<p><b><u>V-Dem</u></b> (2005-2015)</p>	<p>(2013-2016)</p>	<p><b><u>Arab Barometer</u></b></p>	<p>(2011-2016)</p>
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<p><u>Freedom of Association Index:</u></p> <p>All indicators saw an improvement in the beginning of the Arab Spring. They were however short-lived. Results for 2015 show a monopolization of CSO engagement by the government.</p> <p>Autonomy of parties are very low/non-existent according to the latest data from V-Dem (2015).</p>	<p><u>“Trust in Parliament”:</u></p> <p>4% sensed a “great extent of trust” for their parliamentarians in 2013. This number increased to 21% in 2016.</p> <p>The parliaments concern elections from 2010 and 2014 respectively.</p>	<p><u>“Freedom to join political parties”:</u></p> <p>This freedom was “guaranteed to a great extent” according to 61% respondents in 2011. This number decreased to 15% by 2016.</p> <p>The findings mirror the V-Dem data’s illustration of government intolerance for a free political engagement.</p>
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<p><b><u>V-dem</u></b> (2005-2016)</p>	<p><b><u>Arab Barometer</u></b> (2011-2016)</p>
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<p><u>Expanded Freedom of Expression:</u> All indicators worsened by 2016.</p> <p><u>Background:</u> All indicators experienced a peak in 2011, when the Arab Spring was at its most intense.</p>	<p><u>“People are free to criticize their government without fear”:</u> 92% agreed with this statement when asked in 2011. 51% did so in 2016.</p>
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<p align="center"><b><u>What has been people’s overall perception of democracy in Egypt?</u></b></p>	
<p><u>How democratic is Egypt?:</u> Egyptians viewed their country as somewhat democratic, based on the larger portion selecting scale-point “5” on this question in 2011 (24.5%)<sup>27</sup>. “5” was the most popular option in 2016 as well, and the largest portion (46%)<sup>28</sup> scaled Egypt along the less-democratic half of the scale.</p>	<p><u>A democratic system may have problems, yet it is the best system:</u> This question was not asked in 2016. There were no major changes in attitude between 2011 and 2013. A larger portion of Egyptians strongly agreed with this statement in both waves (29.3% in 2011 and 28% in 2013).</p>

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Polyarchy-scores were low during the Arab Spring, but they have improved during the following years. However, the same public-will that led to the overthrow of Mubarak and Morsi, have obstructed a smooth transition of political ideology. Egyptian’s dissatisfaction with their leaders demonstrates a common dilemma of democracy – one powerful leader will not satisfy an ideologically diverse population. While a majority of Egyptian Islamists favored the Muslim Brotherhood and Muhammed Morsi, a large and secular population is in favor of his overthrow.

The current regime under Abdel Fattah el-Sisi has been met with a challenging and highly demanding Egypt which has led to his desperate attempts at subduing the population through criminalizing street protests and restricting freedom of expression. In addition to the skeptic

<sup>27</sup> 45.7% selected points 6-10. 3.4% were identified as missing in this question.

<sup>28</sup> 33.4% selected points 6-10. 20.5% were identified as missing in this question.

domestic popular opinion, we can conclude that Egypt has not obtained democratic gains as a result of the uprisings.

A Mann-Whitney U test was run to determine if there were statistically significant differences between responses in waves before versus after the Arab Spring based on the difference in mean ranks. The median response (Mdn) and the effect size (r) will be reported for each question.

Responses for Egypt 2011 and 2016 were very similar. Q5 has the only non-statistically significant outcome, and therefore maintains the null hypothesis.

	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.
$U =$	174975,500	304604,500*	209116,500	406505,000	511824,000**	534325,500
$p =$	,000	,000	,000	,000	,064 <sub>a</sub>	,000
$r =$	,678	,000	,565	,472	,075	,040

#### What do the different medians (Mdn) mean?

Question 1-4,6 - ( $Mdn=1.00$ )="Strongly Agree"

( $Mdn=2.00$ )="Agree"

( $Mdn=3.00$ )="Disagree"

( $Mdn=4.00$ )="Strongly Disagree"

Question 5 - ( $Mdn=+5.00$ )= Level of respondent's country's democracy (1-5=low levels) (6-10=high levels)

1. The attitude toward fairness and freeness of the latest legislative election in Egypt saw a positive shift in 2016 ( $Mdn=1.00$ ) compared to that in 2011 ( $Mdn=3.00$ ). This outcome was statistically significant ( $r=40\%$ ).
2. Egyptians, alike Tunisians, were not asked in 2011 about their sense of trust for their parliamentarians therefore, results from the later stages of Arab Spring (WIII 2013) will be used for comparison. In 2016, people in Egypt were more trusting of their parliamentary incumbents ( $Mdn=2.00$ ) than in 2013 ( $Mdn=4.00$ ). This outcome is statistically significant ( $r=0\%$ ).
3. Egyptians were not as optimistic about their freedom to join a political party in 2016 ( $Mdn=3.00$ ) as in 2011 ( $Mdn=1.00$ ). The difference is statistically significant ( $r=32\%$ ).


4. People of Egypt strongly agreed with having the ability to criticize their government without fear in 2011 (*Mdn*=1.00) as well as in 2016 (*Mdn*=1.00). There were statistically significant changes ( $r=30\%$ ).
5. Egyptians perceived their country equally democratic in 2011, as they did in 2013 (*Mdn*=5.00). The difference was not statistically significant ( $r=5\%$ ).
6. This question was not asked in 2016. Egyptians agreed that democracy is the best form of government in 2013 (*Mdn*=2.00) and 2011 (*Mdn*=2.00). There is a statistically significant difference in responses despite equal medians ( $r=4\%$ ).

X<sub>a</sub>: Difference was not statistically significant.

\*2013 versus 2016

\*\*2011 versus 2013


### 6.3. Algeria



\*"Election voter registry" is identical to "Election government intimidation".


<b><u>V-Dem</u></b> (2007-2012)	<b><u>Arab Barometer</u></b> (2006-2016)
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<p><u>Clean election Index:</u></p> <p>Indicators related to lack of corruption and fairness of elections improved by 2012.</p> <p>There were no parliamentary elections since the Arab Spring.</p>	<p><u>“The last [legislative] election in my country was held free and fair”:</u></p> <p>14% viewed the 2002 elections as completely free and fair, when asked in 2006.</p> <p>This number decreased to 10% in 2016, concerning the 2012 elections.</p> <p>The lack of legislative elections since the Arab Spring is a limitation in understating the quality of Algerian elections.</p>
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<p><u>V-Dem</u> (2007-2016)</p>	<p><u>Arab Barometer</u> (2006-2016)</p>
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<p><u>Freedom of Association Index:</u> All indicators worsened by 2016.</p> <p>Indicators related to association improved during the Arab Spring, presumably resulting from the protests.</p>	<p><u>“Trust in parliament”:</u> 7% had a great of trust for their parliamentarians when asked in 2006. This percentage decreased to 4% among respondents of 2016.</p> <p>The responses from 2016 regard elections during, and not after, the Arab Spring (2012).</p>	<p><u>“Freedom to join political party”:</u> 18% “strongly agreed” with this statement in 2006, which increased to 29% by 2016.</p>
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<p><b>V-Dem</b> (2007-2016)</p>	<p><b>Arab Barometer</b> (2006-2016)</p>
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<p><u>Expanded Freedom of Expression Index:</u> Most indicators remained stagnant from 2007 and 2016.</p> <p>Slight improvements were made in freedom of expression through different channels. They were short-lived.</p>	<p><u>“People are able to criticize their government without fear”:</u> 58% agreed with this statement in 2006.<sup>29</sup> 55% agreed in 2016.</p>
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<p align="center"><b><u>What has been people’s overall perception of democracy in Algeria?</u></b></p>	
<p><u>How democratic is Algeria?</u> A larger portion of respondents chose low level of democracy for Algeria in 2006 (44% “1-5”) – this half of the scale received 58% in 2016. This indicates a perceived decline of the Algerian democracy.</p>	<p><u>A democratic system may have problems, yet it is the best system:</u> 27.4% “strongly agreed” with this statement in 2016, which is a 0.5% increase from the 2006 data (26.9%).</p>

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Unfortunately, the Clean Election Index does not provide enough data to rightfully make assumptions about the democratic gains in Algeria in the area of election quality. This also negatively impacts the interpretations from “Freedom of Association” data. There are no solutions for lack of available data.

What stands out in the AB results from Algeria is that the change in Algerians’ perception of their parliament does not mirror the changes made in the polyarchy-scores between 2006 and 2016. The “Freedom of Association”-graph shows a deterioration of all indicators by 2016, compared to their 2006-scores. Yet Algerians’ trust for, and perceived freedom to join political parties improved by 2016. These results do not explain why fewer people viewed their last legislative elections as free- and fair in 2016.

These differing outcomes may indicate a sense of hopelessness among the Algerian people, based on what the available data provides. Aggravations of democratic components since

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<sup>29</sup> Merging 1 & 2



2011, combined with people's current reluctance to demand political reforms, increase the possibility that the Algerian Spring is at a halt and may re-occur in a more aggressive manner in the future.

A Mann-Whitney U test was run to determine if there were statistically significant differences between responses in waves before versus after the Arab Spring using the difference between mean ranks. The median (Mdn) and effect size (r) will be reported for each question.

The alternative hypothesis is claimed for questions 1, 2, 4, and 6 for Algeria in 2006 versus 2016. Differences between questions were statistically significant.

	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.
<b>U =</b>	395190,000	578172,500	566563,500	280419,500	475850,500	574146,500
<b>P =</b>	,000	,000	,383 <sub>a</sub>	,000	,877 <sub>a</sub>	,000
<b>r =</b>	,135	,135	,018	,511	,003	,075

#### What do the different medians (Mdn) mean?

Question 1-4,6 - (Mdn=1.00)="Strongly Agree"

(Mdn=2.00)="Agree"

(Mdn=3.00)="Disagree"

(Mdn=4.00)="Strongly Disagree"


Question 5 -(Mdn=+5.00)= Level of respondent's country's democracy (1-5=low levels) (6-10=high levels)

1. The attitude toward fairness and freeness of the latest legislative election in Algeria did not change between 2006 and 2016 (Mdn=3.00). This outcome was statistically significant (r=8%).
2. People strongly disagreed with the ability to trust their parliamentarians in 2016 (Mdn=4.00), which was an exacerbation of their attitude in 2007 (Mdn=3.00). This difference was however not statistically significant (r=6%).
3. People's ability to join political parties was perceived to be equally present in 2006, as in 2016 (Mdn=2.00). The median response for 2013 was however more promising (Mdn=1.00). The difference in people's perceived freedom to join political parties was not statistically significant (r=10%).

4. People of Algeria were less afraid to criticize their government in 2016 (*Mdn*=1.00) as they were in 2006 (*Mdn*=2.00). This difference was statistically significant ( $r=33\%$ ).
5. Algerians perceived their country as equally democratic in 2016 as they did back in 2007 (*Mdn*=5.00). This difference was not statistically significant ( $r=0\%$ ).
6. Conclusively, Algerians' preference of democracy as the best form of government remained the same in 2016 (*Mdn*=2.00) against 2007 (*Mdn*=2.00), where the median respondent agreed, rather than disagreed with the statement. The difference was statistically significant ( $r=6\%$ ).


X<sub>a</sub>: Difference was not statistically significant.

### 6.4. Jordan



<b><u>V-Dem</u></b> (2007-2016)	<b><u>Arab Barometer</u></b> (2006-2016)
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
<p><u>Clean election index:</u> All indicators (beside EMB Capacity) improved by 2016.</p> <p>For Jordan, a major step toward democratizing was to replace the infamous SNTV electoral system with proportional representation (PR) before the September 2016 election. This reform is accounted for in this graph and shows promising developments.</p>	<p><u>“Last election was free and fair”:</u> The four available waves for Jordan only give insight to two elections – one in 2003 and another in 2013.</p> <p>2003 elections were viewed by 29% as “completely free and fair” when asked in 2006, which decreased to 19% regarding the 2013 elections (from 2016 surveys). The latest election of 2015 is not included.</p> <p>The 2016 wave does not account for the latest election, after the removal of SNTV. This can explain the decline seen in the results. Future research may show a drastic improvement in peoples attitude regarding fairness of their 2015 elections.</p>
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<p><u>V-Dem</u> (2007-2016)</p>	<p><u>Arab Barometer</u> (2006-2016)</p>
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<p><u>Freedom of association index:</u> All indicators show sign of pre-existing moderate levels of democracy (+2.00). Not much has changed in this monarchy since the Arab Spring.</p> <p>One can argue that announcing the PR system presumably had a large impact on the freedom of association, since it encourages more parties to compete despite ideology (“elections multiparty”)<sup>30</sup>, although the 2016 data does not show signs of dramatic change.</p>	<p><u>“Trust in Parliament”:</u> 19.8% had “great deal of trust” for the parliament in 2006. 5.5% did so in 2016.</p> <p>Again, more updated information about elections after implementing the PR system is required.</p>	<p><u>“Freedom to join political parties”:</u> 8% “strongly agreed with this statement in 2006. This number only rose by 2% in the upcoming 10 years. (10.3% in 2016).</p> <p>Changes in tolerance toward differing political parties have not been dramatic, according to the graph.</p>
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<sup>30</sup> [https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/09/16/jordans-holding-elections-next-week-heres-what-to-expect/?utm\\_term=.728e78ee1902](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/09/16/jordans-holding-elections-next-week-heres-what-to-expect/?utm_term=.728e78ee1902)



<b><u>V-Dem</u></b> (2007-2016)	<b><u>Arab Barometer</u></b> (2006-2016)
<p><u>Expanded freedom of expression:</u> Indicators related to freedom of discussion had inherently better democratic levels than the remaining indicators. They also continued to rise after the Arab Spring.</p> <p>Journalistic work has been met with less freedom since the Arab Spring, which performed previously at low levels of democracy (Varieties of Democracy, 2017a:251).</p>	<p><u>“People are able to criticize their government without fear”:</u> 10.8% answered yes to this question in 2006.<sup>31</sup> This number increased to 59.2% in 2016.</p>

<b><u>What has been people’s overall perception of democracy in Jordan?</u></b>	
<p><u>To what extent is your country democratic?:</u> The second half of the scale, which is the positive half, consists of 60% of the</p>	<p><u>“A democratic system may have problems, yet it is the best system”:</u></p>

<sup>31</sup> Merging 1 & 2

<p>respondents in 2006 – with 11.7% viewing Jordan as “completely democratic”. Those who believe that Jordan is a “complete democracy” covered only 11.8% in 2016, but the positive half of the scale was less popular in Wave IV (55%).</p>	<p>26.3% “strongly agreed” with this statement in 2006. This view of democracy increased to 34% in 2016.</p>
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Unfortunately, the latest AB data does not cover the 2016 elections using the PR system. Hence, judging from the polyarchy-scores in “Clean Election”-graph, election quality-related indicators sustained their level of democracy from 2013. The change in the voting system may have been the reason. This, again, alters the understating of the “Freedom of Association” graph and surveys – much like the limitations experienced with the case of Algeria.

Based on the V-Dem measurements, Jordan achieved democratic gains in some respect. The “Expanded Freedom of Expression”-graph, together with survey data, show improvements in freedom of discussion. Media-outlet related indicators, on the other hand, have declined since the Arab Spring. The polyarchy-scores for media-related indicators were the lowest among all polyarchy variables.

However, the overall domestic perception of democracy highlights that the Jordanian democracy requires more work. More people were fond of this political system in later years, yet restrictions on civil liberties may terminate a democratic transition.

A Mann-Whitney U test was run to determine if there were statistically significant differences between responses in waves before versus after the Arab Spring the difference between mean ranks. The median (Mdn) and effect size (r) will be reported for each question.


Only the question on freedom to join a political party saw non-significant changes.

	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.
<i>U</i> =	384573,000	729050,000	529761,000	151588,500	550116,500	684849,500
<i>p</i> =	,000	,000	,926 <sub>a</sub>	,000	,001	,023
<i>r</i> =						

	,146	,361	,002	,696	,068	,045
<u>What do the different medians (Mdn) mean?</u>						
Question 1-4,6 - ( <i>Mdn</i> =1.00)= "Strongly Agree"						
( <i>Mdn</i> =2.00)= "Agree"						
( <i>Mdn</i> =3.00)= "Disagree"						
( <i>Mdn</i> =4.00)= "Strongly Disagree"						
Question 5 - ( <i>Mdn</i> =+5.00)= Level of respondent's country's democracy (1-5=low levels) (6-10=high levels)						
1.	Jordanians agreed that the latest legislative election was free and fair with minor issues in 2006 ( <i>Mdn</i> =2.00) as well as in 2016 ( <i>Mdn</i> =2.00). This outcome was statistically significant ( <i>r</i> =10%).					
2.	People strongly disagreed with the trustworthiness of their parliamentarians in 2016 ( <i>Mdn</i> =4.00). This was a remarkable decline from their trust for their incumbents in 2006 ( <i>Mdn</i> =2.00). This outcome was statistically significant ( <i>r</i> =25%).					
3.	Jordanians disagreed with having the freedom to join a political party in 2006 ( <i>Mdn</i> =3.00) as well as in 2016 ( <i>Mdn</i> =3.00). There was no statistically significant difference ( <i>r</i> =0%).					
4.	People of Jordan were not as afraid to criticize their government in 2016 ( <i>Mdn</i> =1.00) as they were in 2006 ( <i>Mdn</i> =3.00). This outcome was statistically significant ( <i>r</i> =45%).					
5.	Jordanians' perception of their country's level of democracy in 2006 ( <i>Mdn</i> =7.00) showed no sign of improvement in 2016 ( <i>Mdn</i> =7.00). This outcome was statistically significant ( <i>r</i> =6%).					
6.	Conclusively, Jordanians' attitude toward democracy as the best form of government remained the same in 2016 ( <i>Mdn</i> =2.00) as it was in 2006 ( <i>Mdn</i> =2.00). The outcome was still statistically significant ( <i>r</i> =4%).					


X<sub>a</sub>: Difference was not statistically significant.

### 6.5. Morocco




<b><u>V-Dem</u></b> (2007-2016)	<b><u>Arab Barometer</u></b> (2013-2016)
<p><b><u>Clean Election Index:</u></b></p> <p>There is a mixed development among these indicators until 2016. Almost all worsened by 2016.</p> <p>The democratic performance of these indicators is at large very low.</p>	<p><b><u>“Last [legislative] election was free and fair”:</u></b></p> <p>13% viewed elections in 2011 as completely free and fair. This percentage decreased to 12% in 2016, concerning the same election.</p> <p>Both WIII and WIV concern election in 2011. Elections in 2006 are invalidated due to fraud allegations, leading to another election in the consecutive year. AB WI was conducted before the 2007 general elections.</p>





<b><u>V-Dem</u></b> (2007-2016)	<b><u>Arab Barometer</u></b> (2006-2016)
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<p><u>Freedom of Association Index:</u> All indicators had moderate levels of democratic performance according to V-Dem (+2.00). They also mostly improved after 2011.</p> <p>With the largest opposition group (PJD) as leading party in parliament for a second term, the Moroccan regime shows tolerance for contesting ideologies in its politics. The increase in “opposition parties’ autonomy” can also be explained as a result of this tolerance (Zerhouni, 2016).</p>	<p><u>“Trust in Parliament”:</u> 10% greatly trusted their parliamentarians in 2006. This number decreased to 2% by 2016.</p> <p>The concerned elections took place in 2006 and 2011, respectively.</p>	<p><u>“Freedom to join a political organization”:</u> 27.6% strongly agreed with having such freedom in 2006. The number was 47.4% for 2016.</p>
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<u>V-dem</u> (2007-2016)	<u>Arab Barometer</u> (2006-2016)
<p><u>Expanded Freedom of Expression Index:</u> Most indicators have largely stagnated since 2007.</p> <p>Media-related indicators are performing more poorly than the rest by stagnating on low levels of democracy.</p>	<p><u>“People are able to criticize their government without fear”:</u> 35.7% Moroccans believed they were free to criticize their government without fear in 2006. This number rose to 70% by 2016.</p>

<u>What has been people’s overall perception of democracy in Morocco?</u>	
<p><u>How democratic is Morocco?</u> The largest portion of respondents selected “5” in 2006 (19%). Score “5” was also the most popular response in 2016, again, with 19% of respondents choosing it. The first half of the scale accumulates a larger portion of the popular opinion in 2016 (57.7%), similar to 2006 (53.3%).</p>	<p><u>“A democratic system may have problems, yet it is better than other systems”:</u> Those “strongly agreeing” with this statement decreased by 25% by 2016 (52.2% in 2006 versus 27.4% in 2016).</p>

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Lack of information on all elections since the Arab Spring affects how democratic changes are mapped. Information on the perception of quality of elections is therefore limited in the case of Morocco.

The case of Morocco has had some similarities to Jordan. Both are pseudo-rentier monarchies, which as a result of the Arab Spring have encouraged a more nuanced legislative body to take shape,<sup>32</sup> as well as allowing more freedom of discussion on political topics.

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<sup>32</sup> Jordanian elections are include many parties, and Morocco’ parliament is authorized to appoint the MP.

Morocco is however unique to other case-countries, as it is the only country where people trust their parliament more than they did prior to the Arab Spring, while enjoying more freedom to join a political party.

Another outcome, which is unique to Morocco, is the citizens' overall view of democracy. On the one hand, Morocco's perceived level of democracy has not improved. On the other, Moroccans grew less fond of democracy by 2016. This is an interesting development of perception of democracy among Moroccans, which deserves more research.

A Mann-Whitney U test was run to determine if there were statistically significant differences between responses in waves before versus after the Arab Spring the difference between mean ranks. The median (Mdn) and effect size (r) will be reported for each question.

The alternative hypothesis is claimed for question 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6 from Morocco.

	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.
<i>U</i> =	272903,000	599884,500	463435,500	143626,000	553253,000	474338,500
<i>p</i> =	,000	,000	,000	,000	,103 <sub>a</sub>	,000
<i>r</i> =	,265	,083	,235	,713	,035	,216

What do the different medians (Mdn) mean?

Question 1-4,6 - (*Mdn*=1.00)="Strongly Agree"

(*Mdn*=2.00)="Agree"

(*Mdn*=3.00)="Disagree"

(*Mdn*=4.00)="Strongly Disagree"

Question 5 -(*Mdn*=+5.00)= Level of respondent's country's democracy (1-5=low levels) (6-10=high levels)

1. The attitude toward fairness and freeness of the latest legislative election in Morocco saw a positive shift in 2016, with most people agreeing with the claim (*Mdn*=2.00), compared to that in 2006 where people disagreed with the statement (*Mdn*=3.00). This difference was statistically significant (*r*=20%).

2. People were less trusting of their parliamentary incumbents in 2006 (*Mdn*=4.00) than in 2016 (*Mdn*=3.00). Regardless, Moroccans viewed their parliamentarians as untrustworthy. This difference was statistically significant (*r*=6%).
3. Moroccans strongly agreed with having the freedom to join political parties in 2016 (*Mdn*=1.00). This freedom was less experienced in 2006 (*Mdn*=2.00). The findings were statistically significant (*r*=16%).
4. Moroccans were not afraid to criticize their government in 2016 (*Mdn*=1.00) as they were in 2006 (*Mdn*=3.00). This difference was statistically significant (*r*=44%).
5. People of Morocco perceived their country equally democratic in 2006 (*Mdn*=5.00) as they did in 2016 (*Mdn*=5.00). This outcome was not statistically significant (*r*=3%).
6. Conclusively, Moroccans were less convinced that democracy was the best form of government in 2016 (*Mdn*=2.00) compared to their perception of the political system in 2006 (*Mdn*=1.00) (*r*=11%).

X<sub>a</sub>: Difference was not statistically significant.

### How do the changes in response vary among the case-countries?

The following table ranks case-countries based on their difference in perception of democracy between the years. This table aims to simplify the understanding of scope of change in democratic components for each case-country according to popular opinion. The tables which pertain to each wave are included in the appendix.

<u>Question</u>	<u>Countries ranked based on largest change in perception of democracy</u>				
	<u>(% of WIV – WI (or WII))</u>				
	1	2	3	4	5
“The last [legislative] national election was free and fair”	<b>Tunisia</b> <b>+57.5%</b> <b>(WII)</b>	<b>Egypt</b> <b>+53.9%</b> <b>(WII)</b>	<b>Morocco</b> <b>+16.8%</b>	<b>Algeria</b> <b>-19.5%</b>	<b>Jordan</b> <b>-18.8%</b>
“Trust in parliament”	<b>Morocco</b> <b>-2.1%</b>	<b>Algeria</b> <b>-12.5%</b>	<b>Jordan</b> <b>-38.1%</b>	<b>Egypt</b> <b>***</b>	<b>Tunisia</b> <b>***</b>
“People are free to join political	<b>Morocco</b>	<b>Jordan</b>	<b>Tunisia</b>	<b>Algeria</b>	<b>Egypt</b>

parties without fear”	<b>+5.4%</b>	<b>+3.2%</b>	<b>-2.3%</b> <b>(WII)</b>	<b>-49.9%</b>	<b>-58.9%</b> <b>(WII)</b>
“People are free to criticize their government without fear”	<b>Morocco</b> <b>+31.6%</b>	<b>Jordan</b> <b>+24.6%</b>	<b>Algeria</b> <b>+15.1%</b>	<b>Tunisia</b> <b>-10.5%</b> <b>(WII)</b>	<b>Egypt</b> <b>-41.1%</b> <b>(WII)</b>
On a 10-point scale, please state to what extent do is [respondent’s country] democratic?	<b>Tunisia</b> <b>+10.6%</b> <b>(WII)</b>	<b>Egypt</b> <b>+6%</b> <b>(WII)</b>	<b>Jordan</b> <b>+1.5%</b>	<b>Morocco</b> <b>-0.5%</b>	<b>Algeria</b> <b>-7.7%</b>
“A democratic system may have problems, yet it is better than other systems”	<b>Jordan</b> <b>+2%</b>	<b>Tunisia</b> <b>-3.7%</b> <b>(WII)</b>	<b>Algeria</b> <b>-7.2%</b>	<b>Morocco</b> <b>-13%</b>	<b>Egypt</b> <b>***</b>

This table illustrates the difference between changes when comparing popular opinion from WI (WII) with WIV. Judging from the outcomes, Morocco has experienced positive changes in three of six questions. In other words, Moroccans’ attitude toward democratic components in their country has improved the most among the five case-countries. Tunisia is in second place, with most improvements in perceived level of democracy and free elections.

**Conclusion**

This study assesses whether the series of protests known as the Arab Spring has led to democratic gains. A wave of protests across eleven Arab countries<sup>33</sup> between 2010 and 2013 signify the critical juncture known as the Arab Spring. Millions of protesters took to the streets of Arab-majority countries, demanding better living standards and democratic governance.

By asking whether the Arab Spring has led to democratic gains, I as well as researchers examining the Arab Spring, refer to the impact of protests in 2010 to 2013 on democratic

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<sup>33</sup> [Table 2]

progress. Such a question requires a fine-grained quantitative study on whether the series of protests known as the Arab Spring have in fact led to democratic gains.

Hence, this thesis looks at data from surveys and compares them to expert-data on democratic performance regarding five Arab countries. The observed components are inspired by Robert Dahl's theory of a Polyarchal regime which is a fundamental conceptualization of democracy, where both fair, competitive elections and civil liberties are required.

This ambitious choice of data has posed a number of limitations for this thesis. In many cases, quality of election could not be mapped due to lack of data from surveys because they were conducted before the elections. This limitation affected the understanding of Jordan the most, I believe, because the anticipated change in electoral system from the biased SNTV to the more popular PR system has not been accounted for in the Arab Barometer.

Also, the absence of Egypt and Tunisia from WI (2006) limits the information on the status quo in the two countries prior to the Arab Spring. The earliest surveys from 2011 do concern 2009 elections for Egypt, yet questions on freedom of expression and trust reflect the circumstances during, not before, the Arab Spring.

It needs mentioning that, this thesis has not included all countries involved in the Arab uprisings, which alters the generalizability of the Arab Spring's impact on democratic gains in the MENA-region.<sup>34</sup> When met with obstacles such as lack of available data, there are no solutions to make up for missing information. Regardless of these setbacks, I have attempted at answering whether the Arab Spring has led to democratic gains, without the expectation to generalize the outcomes.

As a coincidence, all countries which have been absent, except Yemen, have been rentier-states. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Bahrain for instance, three oil-rich monarchies, experienced nationwide protests in 2011 but were all diminished due to generous subsidies provided by the state (Yom, 2016).<sup>35</sup>

Speaking of rentier-states, Algeria is the only rentier-state among the five case-countries, and the remaining four are pseudo-rentier states. Oil-rents in Algeria have enabled the provision of generous subsidies to silence protesters, much like rentier monarchies. This tactic

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<sup>34</sup> Iraq, Bahrain, Yemen, Libya, Kuwait, and Syria are all absent from the latest versions of both data sources

<sup>35</sup> Their oil-riches cannot be claimed to be the reason for their absence from data, but can contribute to why they have not been discussed or received attention as much as the other, five case-countries in this thesis.

succeeded easily, since Algerians refrained from using an aggressive approach in fear of another civil war, unlike the attitudes seen in Egypt and Tunisia. Close political ties between the government and the military were also discouraging.

Two pseudo rentier-states, Egypt and Tunisia, have gained much attention because of their experiences with politically autonomous militaries. The military forces' participation in the Arab Spring was crucial for the overthrow of both presidents. However, their absence from WI on AB leads to a limited comparison of the two countries' aftermaths from the Arab Spring.

Egypt and Tunisia remain the most studied cases in relation to the Arab Spring. A critical difference between the two is the gravity of ideological fractionalizations, which has altered the levels of organization among opposition groups. As reported in the introducing part on Tunisia, Ben Ali was effectively succeeded by Ammar Rachid, while Mubarak's overthrow led to what many Egyptians viewed as "backsliding" of political ideologies, hence, a rapid removal of Morsi. Egypt's current President el-Sisi, likewise, has failed to satisfy people's demands. This can be linked to the impact of culture and modernization on the likelihood of democratization.

The case of pseudo-rentier monarchies (Jordan and Morocco) is more complex. While a more diverse parliament hints at more political freedom, King Abdullah II and King Hassan VI maintain much of the political power. Moreover, the empirical data in this study illustrates a beginning of restrictions against media-platforms and freedom of cultural expression.

### ***So has the Arab Spring led to democratic gains?***

The question is complex to answer, as the definition of democratic gains is multifaceted. The operationalization of democratic gains in this study, the polyarchal regime, requires high-quality elections, as well as institutions which protect freedom of expression and association. Empirical data from the five case-countries<sup>36</sup> shows that while some variables of polyarchy were changed for the better after the Arab Spring, other variables momentarily improved or even worsened.

For instance, free-and fairness of elections improved, both in V-Dem and according to people. However, trust for elected parliamentarians worsened after the Arab Spring. At first glance,

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<sup>36</sup> The data from V-Dem and AB has not covered the same elections for Egypt and Jordan.



these two outcomes oppose each other, since the first implies a fair representation of people's political preference, whereas the latter claims that people do not have faith in their representatives.

While the impact of trust on people's view of democracy has been mentioned at face-value in this study, the contradicting development between perceived fairness of elections and trust for parliamentarians deserves more attention. What statements or behaviors from incumbents have made Arab citizens in Tunisia, Algeria and Jordan to doubt their parliamentarians?

The methods and materials used to answer whether the Arab Spring has led to democratic gains are ambitious and limited. The answer to whether the Arab Spring led to democratic gains can therefore not be generalized for the MENA-region. Yet, expert-data for the five case-countries in this thesis only show improvements in all democratic components for Tunisia. Tunisia's well-known success-story from the Arab Spring is not as clear when looking at the popular opinion from the Arab Barometer surveys, which I believe deserves more research when determining democratic gains in Tunisia.

The absence of international interference, oil, and ideological fractionalization has contributed to the positive outcomes, which will hopefully be sustainable.

While democratic components such as electoral democracy and freedom of association/expression have improved to different extents since 2011, people are dissatisfied with their country's democratic performance – more now than before the Arab Spring. This raises the question of whether one of the most favored definitions of democracy (polyarchal regime) is equally acceptable as democracy in the MENA-region, or if that region views democracy in another way. We are familiar with the demand for democracy as one of the main instigators of the Arab Spring – but are we familiar with the definition of democratic gains according to those who took to the streets? This speculation deserves further research.

Regarding the usage of different data-sources for describing democratic change, ***how do survey data and expert-data describe the aftermaths of the Arab Spring?***

Surveys from Arab Barometer (AB) have mirrored the V-Dem findings in their pattern of change. Only when surveys were conducted before elections, did the results differ with those from V-Dem. Nonetheless, AB has offered additional material for determining whether the

Arab Spring led toward democratic gains in observing people's preference of democracy (question 6), as well as their perception of its performance in their country (question 5).

Graphs on the complete Polyarchy Index (Appendix) illustrate improvements of electoral democracy, freedom of association, and expression by 2013 for all five countries. However, continued improvements occurred only in the monarchies, and survey-tables in the appendices also show depreciations in the perceived level of democracy since the Arab Spring (2013).

It would be an understatement to claim that the democratic gains and declines seen in the data only result from the protests of the Arab Spring. International interventions, the military, cultural and ideological differences, etc., have all played significant roles in the observed pathways. Furthermore, topics which have not been included in this study such as the impact of political will, international relations and economic contributors on democratic changes in the MENA-region deserve more research.

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
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## Appendix Tunisia

### V-Dem - Polyarchy Index



### Arab Barometer

Variable	2011 – September (WII)	2013 – February (WIII)	Difference between the years 2011-2013	2016 – May (WIV)	Difference between the years 2011-2016
In general, how would you evaluate the last parliamentary elections that were held on Oct. 25 <sup>th</sup> 2009 (WII)	<p>Completely free and fair: 0.9%</p> <p>Free and fair but with minor problems: 0.5%</p>	<p>Completely free and fair: 56.7%</p> <p>Free and fair but with minor problems: 18.6%</p> <p>Free and fair, with major</p>	<p>Completely free and fair/ with minor problems: +73.9%</p> <p>Free and fair, with major problems/Not free and fair: -74.1%</p>	<p>Completely free and fair: 25.2%</p> <p>Free and fair but with minor problems: 34%</p> <p>Free and fair, with major</p>	<p>Completely free and fair/with minor problems: +57.8%</p> <p>Free and fair, with major problems/Not free and fair: -54.9%</p>

<p>Oct. 23<sup>th</sup> 2011 (WIII)</p> <p>Oct. 26<sup>th</sup> 2014? (WIV)</p>	<p>Free and fair, with major problems: 1%</p> <p>Not free and fair: 86.8%</p> <p>Cant choose/decline to answer: 10.8%</p>	<p>problems: 8.3%</p> <p>Not free and fair: 5.4%</p> <p>Cant choose/decline to answer: 10.9%</p>	<p>Cant choose/decline to answer: -0.1%</p>	<p>problems: 14.7%</p> <p>Not free and fair: 18.2%</p> <p>Cant choose/decline to answer: 8%</p>	<p>Cant choose/decline to answer: -2.8%</p>
<p>“I’m going to name a number of institutions. For each one, please tell me how much trust you have in them: The elected council of representatives (the parliament).”</p>	<p>Not Asked</p>	<p>A great deal of trust:7.9%</p> <p>Quite a lot of trust:23.4%</p> <p>Not very much trust:14.6%</p> <p>No trust at all:47.8%</p> <p>Don’t know/decline to answer:6.3%</p>	<p>No data</p>	<p>A great deal of trust:6%</p> <p>Quite a lot of trust:14.2%</p> <p>Not very much trust:21.2%</p> <p>No trust at all:49.7%</p> <p>Don’t know/decline to answer:9%</p>	<p>A great deal/Quite a lot of trust:-11.1%</p> <p>Not very much/No trust at all:+8.5%</p> <p>Don’t know/decline to answer:+2.7%</p> <p>(compares 2013 to 2016)</p>
<p>To what extent do you think that “freedom to express opinions” is guaranteed in your country?</p> <p>“Freedom to join a political party”</p>	<p>Guaranteed to a great extent:35.7%</p> <p>Guaranteed to a medium extent:32.4%</p> <p>Guaranteed to a limited extent:10.8%</p>	<p>Guaranteed to great extent:53.7%</p> <p>Guaranteed to medium extent:26.3%</p> <p>Guaranteed to limited extent:5.6%</p>	<p>Guaranteed to great/medium extent:-24.1%</p> <p>Guaranteed to limited extent/not guaranteed: -3.3%</p> <p>Don’t know/Decline to answer:-8.2%</p>	<p>Guaranteed to great extent: 37%</p> <p>Guaranteed to medium extent: 27.4%</p> <p>Guaranteed to limited extent: 8.5%</p>	<p>Guaranteed to great/medium extent:-3.7%</p> <p>Guaranteed to limited extent/not guaranteed: -13.7%</p> <p>Don’t know/Decline to answer:+7.6%</p>




	Not guaranteed:7.6 %  Don't know/Decline to answer:13.4%	Not guaranteed:9.3 %  Don't know/Decline to answer:5.2%		Not guaranteed: 19%  Don't know/Decline to answer: 8.1%	
In your opinion, are people nowadays able to criticize the government without fear?	(Strongly) agree: 85.1%  (Strongly) disagree: 9.2%  I don't know: 5.3%  Missing: 0.4%	Yes: 85.4%  No: 12.8%  I don't know: 1.7%  Missing: 0.1%	(Strongly) agree /Yes:+0.3%  (Strongly) disagree/No:3.6%  I don't know: - 3.6%  Missing: -0.3%	Yes: 79.8%  No: 17.7%  I don't know: 2.6%  Missing: 17%	(Strongly) agree /Yes: -5.3%  (Strongly) disagree/No: +8.5%  I don't know: - 2.7%  Missing: +16.6%
In your opinion, to what extent is your country democratic?"  (1(complete dictatorship) -10 (complete democracy) + there is no democracy, not important, cant choose/decline to answer (not read). Low level (1-5) High level (6-10)	Complete dictatorship: 4.3%  1: 3.4%  2: 7.1%  3: 12.1%  4: 14.2%  5: 22.1%  6: 11%  7: 5.8%  8: 3.5%  9: 1.1%  Complete democracy: 3.3%  Not important/ Cant choose/	No democracy whatsoever: 13.5%  2: 8.7%  3: 9.5%  4: 12.4%  5: 21%  6: 9.5%  7: 7.1%  8: 5.9%  9: 1.2%  Democratic to the greatest extent possible: 2.2%  Not important/ Cant choose/	Low level of/Complete dictatorship: - 0.5%  High level of/Complete democracy: -1.3%  Not important/ Cant choose/ decline to answer: -3.5%	Complete dictatorship <sup>37</sup> : 3%  2: 4.8%  3: 7.7%  4: 7%  5: 24.6%  6: 7.3%  7: 9.5%  8: 7.1%  9: 2.1%  Complete democracy: 10%  Not important/Can't choose/decline	Low level of/Complete dictatorship: - 12.7%  High level of/Complete democracy: +12.3%  Not important/ Cant choose/ decline to answer: -3.5%



<sup>37</sup> This wave has merged "1" with "complete dictatorship".

	decline to answer: 12.1%	decline to answer: 8.5%		to answer:8.6%	
To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?	Strongly agree: 23.1%	Strongly agree: 33.8%	Strongly agree: +10.7%	Strongly agree: 48.9%	Strongly agree: +25.8%
	Agree:46.9%	Agree:36.3%	Disagree:-10.6%	Agree: 36.8%	Agree:-10.1%
	Disagree:6.6%	Disagree:8.6%	Strongly disagree: +2%	Disagree: 5.4%	Disagree:-1.2%
“A democratic system may have problems, yet it is better than other systems.”	Strongly disagree:1.2%	Strongly disagree:6.6%	Don't know: +5.4%	Strongly disagree: 4.1%	Strongly disagree: +2.9%
	Don't know: 21.9%	Don't know:14%	Decline to answer:+0.4%	Don't know/Decline to answer: 4.8%	Don't know/Decline to answer:+4.5%
	Decline to answer:0.3%	Decline to answer:0.7%			

## Appendix Egypt

### V-Dem - Polyarchy Index





**Arab Barometer**

Variable	2011- June/July (WII)	2013 – March/April (WIII)	Difference between the years (2011-2013)	2016 – May (WIV)	Difference between the years (2011-2016)
In general, how would you evaluate the last parliamentary elections that were held on  Nov. 28 <sup>th</sup> 2010 (WII & III)  Oct. 17 <sup>th</sup> 2015 (WIV)	Completely free and fair: 8.4%  Free and fair but with minor problems: 2.9%  Free and fair, with major problems: 2.6%  Not free and fair: 82.4%  Cant choose/decline	Completely free and fair: 21.7%  Free and fair but with minor problems: 15.5%  Free and fair, with major problems: 12.5%  Not free and fair: 30.6%  Cant choose/decline to answer: 19.6%	Completely free and fair/with minor problems: +25.9%  Free and fair, with major problems/Not free and fair: - 41.9%  Cant choose/decline to answer: +15.9%	Completely free and fair: 46.3%  Free and fair but with minor problems: 19.5%  Free and fair, with major problems: 8.6%  Not free and fair: 12.8%  Cant choose/decline to answer: 12.9%	Completely free and fair/ with minor problems: +55.2%  Free and fair, with major problems/Not free and fair: - 62.3%  Cant choose/decline to answer: +8.8%


	to answer: 3.7%				
“I’m going to name a number of institutions. For each one, please tell me how much trust you have in them: The elected council of representatives (the parliament).”	Not asked	A great deal of trust:4.2% Quite a lot of trust:13.3% Not very much trust:16.1% No trust at all:59.3% Don’t know/Decline to answer:7.1%	No Data	A great deal of trust:20.8% Quite a lot of trust:26.8% Not very much trust:26.9% No trust at all:17.4% Don’t know/Decline to answer:8.1%	A great deal/Quite a lot of trust:+20.1% Not very much/No trust at all:-37.1% Don’t know/Decline to answer:+1% (compares 2013 to 2016)
To what extent do you think that “freedom to express opinions” is guaranteed in your country?  “Freedom to join a political party”	Guaranteed to a great extent: 61.1% Guaranteed to a medium extent: 29% Guaranteed to a limited extent:2.7% Not guaranteed: 1.6% Don’t know/decline to answer: 5.6%	Guaranteed to a great extent: 42.1% Guaranteed to a medium extent: 22.9% Guaranteed to a limited extent:15.1% Not guaranteed: 10.5% Don’t know/decline to answer: 9.4%	Guaranteed to great/medium extent:-25.1% Guaranteed to limited extent/not guaranteed: +25.3% Don’t know/decline to answer:+3.8%	Guaranteed to great extent:15.2% Guaranteed to a medium extent:21.3% Guaranteed to a limited extent:11.3% Not guaranteed:31.3% Don’t know/decline to answer:21%	Guaranteed to great/medium extent:-53.6% Guaranteed to limited extent/not guaranteed: +37.3% Don’t know/decline to answer:+15.4%
In your opinion, are people nowadays able to criticize the	Yes: 92.5% No: 5.4%	Yes: 83.1% No: 14.4%	Yes: -9.4% No: +9% Cant choose/decline	Yes: 51.3% No: 45.8%	Yes: -41.2% No: +40.4%

government without fear?	Cant choose/decline to answer: 2%	Cant choose/decline to answer: 2.4%	to answer: +0.4%	Cant choose/decline to answer: 2.8%	Cant choose/decline to answer: +0.8%
In your opinion, to what extent is your country democratic?"  (1(complete dictatorship) -10 (complete democracy) + there is no democracy, not important, cant choose/decline to answer (not read). Low level (1-5) High level (6-10)	No democracy whatsoever: 3% 1: 2.4% 2: 3.7% 3: 6.3% 4: 10.9% 5: 24.6% 6: 13.4% 7: 12.9% 8: 10.4% 9: 3.5% Democratic to the greatest extent possible: 5.5% Cant choose/decline to answer: 3.4%	There's no democracy: 14.4% 1: 9.8% 2: 15.4% 3: 13.4% 4: 5.6% 5: 12.8% 6: 4.7% 7: 4.8% 8: 1.5% 9: 0.8% Complete democracy: 1.6% Not important/Can't choose/decline to answer: 13.2%	Low level of/Complete dictatorship: +20.4%  High level of/Complete democracy:- 32.3%  Not important/ Cant choose/ decline to answer: +11.8%	No democracy whatsoever: 3% 1: 2.3% 2: 3.8% 3: 11% 4: 8.9% 5: 20.2% 6: 10.6% 7: 11.2% 8: 6.2% 9: 2.2% Democratic to the greatest extent possible: 3.2% Not important/ Cant choose/ decline to answer: 2.1%	Low level of/Complete dictatorship: +1.1%  High level of/Complete democracy: - 12.3%  Not important/ Cant choose/decline to answer: 2.1%
To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?  "A democratic system may have problems, yet it is better than other systems."	Strongly agree: 29.2% Agree:42.5% Disagree:14.6% Strongly disagree: 5% Cant choose/decline	Strongly agree: 28.5% Agree: 37.9% Disagree:6.8% Strongly disagree:6% Cant choose/decline to answer: 20.8%	(Strongly) agree: -35.3%  (Strongly) disagree: - 6.8%  Cant choose/decline to answer: +7.1%	Not Asked	No data

	to answer: 13.7%				
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## Appendix Algeria

### V-Dem – Polyarchy Index



### Arab Barometer

Variable	2007- October (WI)	2013 – March/April (WIII)	Difference between the years 2007- 2013	2016 – May (WIV)	Difference between the years 2007- 2016
In general, how would you evaluate the last parliamentary elections that were held on May 30 <sup>th</sup> , 2002 (WI)	Completely free and fair: 14.4%	Completely free and fair: 11.1%	Completely free and fair/ with minor problems: +10.2%	Completely free and fair: 10.7%	Completely free and fair/ with minor problems: - 6.2%
May 10 <sup>th</sup> 2012 (WIII & WIV)	Free and fair but with minor problems: 23.3%	Free and fair but with minor problems: 36.8%	Free and fair, with major problems/Not free and fair: - 6.2%	Free and fair but with minor problems: 19.8%	Free and fair, with major problems/Not free and fair: +10.7%
	Free and fair, with major	Free and fair, with major		Free and fair, with major problems: 12.6%	

	<p>problems: 13.4%</p> <p>Not free and fair: 24.4%</p> <p>Cant choose/decline to answer: 24.5%</p>	<p>problems: 12.2%</p> <p>Not free and fair: 19.4%</p> <p>Cant choose/decline to answer:20.6%</p>	<p>Cant choose/decline to answer:- 3.9%</p>	<p>Not free and fair: 35.9%</p> <p>Cant choose/decline to answer: 21.1%</p>	<p>Cant choose/decline to answer: -3.4%</p>
<p>“I’m going to name a number of institutions. For each one, please tell me how much trust you have in them: The elected council of representatives (the parliament).”</p>	<p>A great deal of trust:7.3%</p> <p>Quite a lot of trust:18.8%</p> <p>Not very much trust:22.2%</p> <p>No trust at all:41.5%</p> <p>Don’t know/Decline to answer:10.2%</p>	<p>A great extent: 7.8%</p> <p>A medium extent: 32.3%</p> <p>A limited extent:27.5%</p> <p>Absolutely do not trust it:27.5%</p> <p>Don’t know/Decline to answer:4.9%</p>	<p>A great/medium extent of trust: +14%</p> <p>Limited extent/no trust at all:-9.7%</p> <p>Don’t know/Decline to answer:- 5.3%</p>	<p>A great deal of trust:4.7%</p> <p>Quite a lot of trust:11.8%</p> <p>Not very much trust:24.6%</p> <p>No trust at all:55.3%</p> <p>Don’t know/Decline to answer:3.6%</p>	<p>A great deal/quite a lot of trust:- 9.6%</p> <p>Not very much/ no trust at all:+18.2%</p> <p>Don’t know/Decline to answer:-6.6%</p>
<p>To what extent do you think that “freedom to express opinions” is guaranteed in your country?  “Freedom to join a political party”</p>	<p>Strongly agree: 18.1%</p> <p>Agree:34.8%</p> <p>Disagree:17%</p> <p>Strongly disagree: 9.8%</p> <p>Cant choose/decline to answer: 20.3%</p>	<p>Guaranteed to great:50.4%</p> <p>Guaranteed to medium extent:29.7%</p> <p>Guaranteed to limited extent: 7.9%</p> <p>Not guaranteed: 1.2%</p> <p>Cant choose/decline</p>	<p>Guaranteed to great/medium extent:+28.2%</p> <p>Guaranteed to limited extent/not guaranteed: - 7.7%</p> <p>Cant choose/decline to answer: - 9.6%</p>	<p>Guaranteed to great extent: 29.2%</p> <p>Guaranteed to medium extent: 28.9%</p> <p>Guaranteed to limited extent:20.7%</p> <p>Not guaranteed:14.3%</p> <p>Don’t know/decline to answer:6.9%</p>	<p>Guaranteed to great/medium extent:+3.2%</p> <p>Guaranteed to limited extent/not guaranteed: +8.3%</p> <p>Don’t know/decline to answer:-13.4%</p>




		to answer: 10.7%			
In your opinion, are people nowadays able to criticize the government without fear?	(Strongly) agree: 45%  (Strongly) disagree: 37.9%  Cant choose/decline to answer: 17%	Yes: 62.8%  No: 26.6%  Cant choose/decline to answer: 10.6%	(Strongly) agree/Yes: +17.8%  (Strongly) disagree/No: - 11.3%  Cant choose/decline to answer: - 6.4%	Yes: 60.4%  No: 36.3%  Cant choose/decline to answer: 3.3%	(Strongly) agree/Yes: +15.4%  (Strongly) disagree/No: - 1.6%  Cant choose/decline to answer: -13.7%
In your opinion, to what extent is your country democratic?"  (1(complete dictatorship) -10 (complete democracy) + there is no democracy, not important, cant choose/decline to answer (not read). Low level (1-5) High level (6-10)	Complete dictatorship: 29% 2: 6.5% 3: 8.8% 4: 9.5% 5: 10.5% 6: 7.2% 7: 7.4% 8: 5.4% 9: 2.8% Complete democracy: 3.6% Not important/ Cant choose/ decline to answer: 20.3%	Complete dictatorship: 1.3% 2: 2.1% 3: 4.5% 4: 7.8% 5: 15.7% 6: 13.5% 7: 19% 8: 18.7% 9: 7% Complete democracy: 3.1% Not important/ Cant choose/ decline to answer: 7.4%	Low level of/Complete dictatorship: - 22.8%  High level of/Complete democracy: +34.9%  Not important/ Cant choose/ decline to answer:-12.9%	Complete dictatorship: 6% 2: 8% 3: 11.6% 4: 14.4% 5: 18% 6: 10.6% 7: 9.8% 8: 5.1% 9: 3% Complete democracy: 1.6% Not important/ Cant choose/ decline to answer: 26.7%	Low level of/Complete dictatorship: +14.9%  High level of/Complete democracy: +6.1%  Not important/ Can't choose/ decline to answer: +6.4%
To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?	Strongly agree: 26.9%  Agree: 42.1%	Strongly agree: 18.4%  Agree: 51.8%	(Strongly) agree: +3.2%	Strongly agree: 24.7%  Agree: 51%	(Strongly) agree: +6.7%  (Strongly) disagree: +6.2%

<p>“A democratic system may have problems, yet it is better than other systems.”</p>	<p>Disagree: 9% Strongly disagree: 5.2% Cant choose/decline to answer: 16.8%</p>	<p>Disagree: 11.7% Strongly disagree: 2.2% Cant choose/decline to answer: 15.8%</p>	<p>(Strongly) disagree: -0.3% Cant choose/decline to answer: -1%</p>	<p>Disagree: 15.1% Strongly disagree: 5.3% Cant choose/decline to answer: 3.9%</p>	<p>Cant choose/decline to answer: -12.9%</p>
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## Appendix Jordan

### V-Dem - Polyarchy Index



### Arab Barometer


Variable	2007 – March (WI)	2013 – Dec.- January (WIII)	Difference between 2006 & 2013	2016 – May (WIV)	Difference between 2007 & 2016
In general, how would you evaluate the last parliamentary elections that were held on June 17 <sup>th</sup> , 2003 (WI) Nov. 9 <sup>th</sup> , 2010 (WIII) Jan. 23 <sup>rd</sup> , 2013 (WIV)	Completely free and fair: 28.9 % Free and fair but with minor problems: 25% Free and fair, with major problems: 10.4% Not free and fair: 23.8% Cant choose/decline to answer: 24.2%	Completely free and fair: 8.3% Free and fair but with minor problems: 20% Free and fair, with major problems: 13.9% Not free and fair: 41.6% Cant choose/decline to answer: 16.2%	Completely free and fair/ with minor problems: - 25.6% Free and fair, with major problems/Not free and fair: +21.3% Cant choose/decline to answer: - 8%	Completely free and fair: 24.6% Free and fair but with minor problems: 27.7% Free and fair, with major problems: 12.6% Not free and fair: 23.6% Cant choose/decline to answer: 11.6%	Completely free and fair /with minor problems: -1.6% Free and fair, with major problems/ Not free and fair:+2% Cant choose/decline to answer: -13.6%
“I’m going to name a number of institutions. For each one, please tell me how much trust you have in them: The elected council of representatives (the parliament).”  (trust in parliament)	A great deal of trust:19.8% Quite a lot of trust:35.2% Not very much trust:16.1% No trust at all:22.4% Don’t know/Decline to answer:6.6%	A great deal of trust:11.5% Quite a lot of trust:28.4% Not very much trust:18.2% No trust at all:39.9% Don’t know/Decline to answer:2.1%	A great deal/ Quite a lot of trust:-15.1% Not very much/ no trust at all:+19.6% Don’t know/Decline to answer:- 4.5%	A great deal of trust:5.5% Quite a lot of trust:15.2% Not very much trust:13.6% No trust at all:44.7% Don’t know/Decline to answer:21%	A great deal/ Quite a lot of trust:-34.3% Not very much/ no trust at all:+19.8% Don’t know/Decline to answer:+14.4%

<p>To what extent do you think that “freedom to express opinions” is guaranteed in your country?  “Freedom to join a political party”</p>	<p>Strongly agree: 8%  Agree:27.3%  Don’t agree:33.8%  Don’t agree at all: 17.1%  Cant choose/decline to answer: 13.7%</p>	<p>Guaranteed to a great extent: 21.3%  Guaranteed to a medium extent: 32.3%  Guaranteed to a limited extent:19.1%  Not guaranteed at all: 17.3%  Cant choose/decline to answer: 10.1%</p>	<p>Guaranteed to great/medium extent:+18.3%  Guaranteed to limited extent/not guaranteed: - 27.3%  Cant choose/decline to answer: - 3.6%</p>	<p>Guaranteed to great extent:12.9%  Guaranteed to medium extent:31.2%  Guaranteed to limited extent:16.3%  Not guaranteed:29.4%  Don’t know/decline to answer:10.3%</p>	<p>Guaranteed to great/medium extent:+8.1%  Guaranteed to limited extent/not guaranteed: - 5.2%  Don’t know/decline to answer:-3.4%</p>
<p>In your opinion, are people nowadays able to criticize the government without fear?</p>	<p>(Strongly) agree: 44.5%  (Strongly) disagree: 44.5%  Cant choose/decline to answer: 9.9%</p>	<p>Yes: 71.6%  No: 23.9%  Cant choose/decline to answer: 4.6%</p>	<p>(Strongly) agree: +27.1%  (Strongly) disagree: - 21.6%  Cant choose/decline to answer: - 5.3%</p>	<p>Yes: 74%  No: 25.4%  Cant choose/decline to answer:0.6%</p>	<p>Yes: +30.5%  No: +19.1%  Cant choose/decline to answer:-9.3%</p>
<p>In your opinion, to what extent is your country democratic?”  (1(complete dictatorship) -10 (complete democracy) + there is no</p>	<p>Complete dictatorship: 3.6%  2: 2.7%  3: 2.5%  4: 4.9%  5: 19.7%  6: 12%  7: 14.3%</p>	<p>Complete dictatorship: 4.4%  2: 3.6%  3: 4.9%  4: 6%  5: 24.8%  6: 13.7%  7: 13.8%</p>	<p>Low level of/Complete dictatorship: +7.8%  High level of/Complete democracy: - 8.2%  Not important: +0.3%</p>	<p>Complete dictatorship: 3.7%  2: 1.9%  3: 2.5%  4: 4.6%  5: 18.8%  6: 10.1%  7: 16.5%</p>	<p>Low level of/Complete dictatorship: - 1.9%  High level of/Complete democracy: +8.2%  Not important: +1.3%</p>

<p>democracy, not important, can't choose/decline to answer (do not read). Low level (1-5) High level (6-10)</p>	<p>8: 13.2% 9: 7.9% Complete democracy: 11.7% Not important/Cant choose/decline to answer: 7.2%</p>	<p>8: 12.7% 9: 5% Complete democracy: 5.7% Not important/Cant choose/decline to answer: 5.6%</p>	<p>Cant choose/decline to answer: -1.9%</p>	<p>8: 17.4% 9: 7.3% Complete democracy: 14.8% Not important/Cant choose/decline to answer: 2.4%</p>	<p>Cant choose/decline to answer: -6.1%</p>
<p>To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? “A democratic system may have problems, yet it is better than other systems.”</p>	<p>Strongly agree: 26.3% Agree: 47.9% Disagree: 10.1% Strongly disagree: 2.2% Cant choose/decline to answer: 13.3%</p>	<p>Strongly agree: 26.2% Agree: 48.2% Disagree: 14.7% Strongly disagree: 2.8% Cant choose/decline to answer: 11.5%</p>	<p>(Strongly) agree: -3.8% (Strongly) disagree: +5.6% Cant choose/decline to answer: -1.8%</p>	<p>Strongly agree: 33.8% Agree: 51.1% Disagree: 9.1% Strongly disagree: 3% Cant choose/decline to answer: 3%</p>	<p>(Strongly) agree: +10.7% (Strongly) Disagree: -0.2% Cant choose/decline to answer: -10.3%</p>

## Appendix Morocco

### V-Dem - Polyarchy Index



**Arab Barometer**

Variable	2007 – September (WI)	2013 – April/June (WIII)	Difference between 2007 & 2013	2016 – May (WIV)	Difference between 2007 & 2016
In general, how would you evaluate the last parliamentary elections that were held on	Completely free and fair: 13.8%	Completely free and fair: 17.7%	Completely free and fair/ with minor problems: +19.5%	Completely free and fair: 12%	Completely free and fair/ with minor problems: +15.9%
Date missing, 2006 (WI)	Free and fair with minor problems: 13.3%	Free and fair with minor problems: 28.9%	Free and fair, with major problems/Not free and fair: - 7.8%	Free and fair with minor problems: 31%	Free and fair, with major problems/Not free and fair: -- 24.8%
Nov. 25 <sup>th</sup> 2011 (WIII & WIV)	Free and fair, with major problems: 11.5%	Free and fair, with major problems: 16.3%	Cant choose/decline to answer: - 11.7%	Free and fair, with major problems: 11%	Cant choose/decline to answer: +6.9%
		Not free and fair: 23.7%			

	Not free and fair: 36.3%  Cant choose/decline to answer: 25.1%	Cant choose/decline to answer: 13.4%		Not free and fair: 12%  Cant choose/decline to answer: 32%	
“I’m going to name a number of institutions. For each one, please tell me how much trust you have in them: The elected council of representatives (the parliament).”  (Trust in parliament)	A great deal of trust:10.6%  Quite a lot of trust:14.3%  Not very much trust:20.8%  No trust at all:47.5%  Don’t know/Decline to answer:7%	A great deal of trust:7.8%  Quite a lot of trust:20.4%  Not very much trust:21.9%  No trust at all:43.9%  Don’t know/Decline to answer:6%	A great extent/deal of trust:-2.6%  Quite a lot of trust/medium extent:+6.1%  Not very much trust/limited extent:+1.1%  No trust at all/absolutely do not trust it:-3.6%  Don’t know/Decline to answer:-1%	A great deal of trust:2.3%  Quite a lot of trust:22.3%  Not very much trust:35.2%  No trust at all:32.8%  Don’t know/Decline to answer:7.5%	A great extent/deal of trust + Quite a lot of trust/medium extent:-0.3%  Not very much trust/limited extent + No trust at all/absolutely do not trust it: -0.3%  Don’t know/Decline to answer:+0.5%
To what extent do you think that “freedom to express opinions” is guaranteed in your country?  “Freedom to join a political party”	Strongly agree: 27.6%  Agree:36.8%  Disagree:18.2%  Strongly disagree: 7.3%  Cant choose/decline to answer: 10.1%	Guaranteed to a great extent: 40.7%  Guaranteed to a medium extent: 25.3%  Guaranteed to a limited extent: 15.3%  No guarantee: 12.9%  Cant choose/decline to answer: 5.9%	Guaranteed to great/medium extent:+1.6%  Guaranteed to limited extent/not guaranteed: +2.7%  Cant choose/decline to answer: -5.2%	Guaranteed to a great extent: 47.1%  Guaranteed to a medium extent:30.1%  Guaranteed to a limited extent:8.2%  No guarantee: 4%  Cant choose/decline	Guaranteed to great/medium extent:+13.4%  Guaranteed to limited extent/not guaranteed: +13.2%  Cant choose/decline to answer: +0.2%

				to answer: 10.3%	
In your opinion, are people nowadays able to criticize the government without fear?	(Strongly) agree: 34.7%  (Strongly) disagree: 57.4%  Cant choose/decline to answer: 6.9%	Yes: 60.9%  No: 30.5%  Cant choose/decline to answer: 8.5%	Yes: +26.2%  No: -26.9%  Cant choose/decline to answer: +1.6%	Yes: 70%  No: 20%  Cant choose/decline to answer: 10%	Yes: +35.3  No: -37.4%  Cant choose/decline to answer: +3.1%
In your opinion, to what extent is your country democratic?"  (1(complete dictatorship) -10 (complete democracy) + there is no democracy, not important, cant choose/decline to answer (not read). Low level (1-5) High level (6-10)	Complete dictatorship: 16.3% 2: 7.8% 3: 6.7% 4: 8.2% 5: 19% 6: 7.7% 7: 5.6% 8: 7.1% 9: 3.7% Complete democracy: 9.8%  Not important/ Cant choose/ decline to answer: 7%	Complete dictatorship: 12.5% 2: 15.3% 3: 16.3% 4: 11.5% 5: 15.7% 6: 7.4% 7: 4.9% 8: 4.5% 9: 2.2% Complete democracy: 2.6%  Not important/ Cant choose/ decline to answer: 7.1%	Low level of/Complete dictatorship: +15.4%  High level of/Complete democracy: -12.3%  Not important/ Cant choose/ decline to answer:+0.1%	Complete dictatorship: 3.5% 2: 5% 3: 10.8% 4: 10.3% 5: 18.7% 6: 16.5% 7: 12.7% 8: 7% 9: 1.4% Complete democracy: 0.8%  Not important/ Cant choose/ decline to answer: 18.3%	Low level of/Complete dictatorship: -10.7%  High level of/Complete democracy: +4.5%  Not important/ Cant choose/ decline to answer: +11.3%
To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?	Strongly agree: 52.2%  Agree: 32.4%  Disagree: 4.5%	Strongly agree: 23.3%  Agree: 45.7%  Disagree: 13.8%	(Strongly) agree: -15.9%  (Strongly) disagree: +15.6%	Strongly agree: 27%  Agree: 51.8%  Disagree: 5.7%	(Strongly) agree: -5.8%  (Strongly) disagree: -1%



<p>“A democratic system may have problems, yet it is better than other systems.”</p>	<p>Strongly disagree: 3.1%</p> <p>Cant choose/decline to answer: 8%</p>	<p>Strongly disagree: 9.4%</p> <p>Cant choose/decline to answer: 7.8%</p>	<p>Cant choose/decline to answer: - 0.2%</p>	<p>Strongly disagree: 0.9%</p> <p>Cant choose/decline to answer: 5.4%</p>	<p>Cant choose/decline to answer: -2.6%</p>
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### Formulas

<p><math>U = n \ln 2 + (NI(NI+1))/2 - RI</math></p> <p>(Field, 2009:544)</p>	<p>Mann Whitney U-test – used in calculating the p-value to determine whether the difference in groups is statistically significant (Rx = sum of ranks for group x).</p>
<p><math>p = (U-u)</math></p>	<p>Asymptotic p-value – determines whether null hypothesis should be chosen over alternative hypothesis (i.e. when there is no difference between the groups). If <math>p &lt; 0.05</math>, the null hypothesis will be rejected for an alternative hypothesis (Field, 2009).</p>
<p><math>r = Z/\sqrt{N}</math></p>	<p>Effect size – divides the z-score given by the MWU-test with the square root of the total number of cases. The effect size calculates the statistical power of the outcome in proportion to the total variance.</p> <p>“r = .10 (small effect): In this case, the effect explains 1% of the total variance.</p> <p>r = .30 (medium effect): The effect accounts for 9% of the total variance.</p>

	$r = .50$ (large effect): The effect accounts for 25% of the variance.” (Field, 2009:57)
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### Summary of change between survey-waves

#### WI (2006-7) / WII (2011)

<u>Question</u>	<u>Countries ranked based on most (strongly) agreeing with the statements (%)</u>				
	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>
“The last [legislative] national election was free and fair”	<b>Jordan (71.1%)</b>	<b>Algeria (50%)</b>	<b>Morocco (36.2%)</b>	<b>Egypt (11.9%)</b>	<b>Tunisia (1.7%)</b>
“Trust in parliament”	<b>Jordan (58.8%)</b>	<b>Algeria (29%)</b>	<b>Morocco (26.7%)</b>	<b>Egypt (%) MISSING</b>	<b>Tunisia (%) MISSING</b>
People are free to join political parties without fear	<b>Egypt (95.4%)</b>	<b>Morocco (71.6%)</b>	<b>Tunisia (66.7%)</b>	<b>Algeria (66.4%)</b>	<b>Jordan (40.9%)</b>
People are free to criticize their government without fear	<b>Egypt (92.4%)</b>	<b>Tunisia (90.3%)</b>	<b>Jordan (49.4%)</b>	<b>Algeria (45.3%)</b>	<b>Morocco (38.4%)</b>
“A democratic system may have problems, yet it is better than other systems”	<b>Morocco (91.8%)</b>	<b>Tunisia (89.4%)</b>	<b>Jordan (85.8%)</b>	<b>Algeria (82.9%)</b>	<b>Egypt (78.6%)</b>

On a 10-point scale, please state to what extent do is [respondent's country]democratic?	<b>Jordan (64.6%)</b>	<b>Egypt (47.9%)</b>	<b>Morocco (38.9%)</b>	<b>Algeria (37.8%)</b>	<b>Tunisia (25.4%)</b>
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### Wave IV (2016)

<b>Question</b>	<b>Countries ranked based on most (strongly) agreeing with the statements (%)</b>				
	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>
“The last [legislative] national election was free and fair”	<b>Egypt (65.8%)</b>	<b>Tunisia (59.2%)</b>	<b>Jordan (52.3%)</b>	<b>Morocco (43%)</b>	<b>Algeria (30.5%)</b>
“Trust in parliament”	<b>Egypt (47.6%)</b>	<b>Morocco (24.6%)</b>	<b>Jordan (20.7%)</b>	<b>Tunisia (20.2%)</b>	<b>Algeria (16.5%)</b>
People are free to join political parties without fear	<b>Morocco (77%)</b>	<b>Tunisia (64.4%)</b>	<b>Jordan (44.1%)</b>	<b>Egypt (36.5%)</b>	<b>Algeria (16.5%)</b>
People are free to criticize their government without fear	<b>Tunisia (79.8%)</b>	<b>Jordan (74%)</b>	<b>Morocco (70%)</b>	<b>Algeria (60.4%)</b>	<b>Egypt (51.3%)</b>
On a 10-point scale, please state to what extent do is [respondent's country]dem	<b>Jordan (66.1%)</b>	<b>Egypt (53.6%)</b>	<b>Morocco (38.4%)</b>	<b>Tunisia (36%)</b>	<b>Algeria (30.1%)</b>

ocratic? (6-10)					
“A democratic system may have problems, yet it is better than other systems”	<b>Tunisia (85.7%)</b>	<b>Jordan (84.9%)</b>	<b>Morocco (78.8%)</b>	<b>Algeria (75.7%)</b>	<b>Egypt (%) ***</b>