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THE EUROPEAN UNION AS A GLOBAL COUNTER-TERRORISM ACTOR

Normative or Selfish Power?

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Abstract

Based on its self-identification, as a normative power and 'force for good' in the world, this analysis explores the role of the European Union (EU) as an international counter-terrorism actor. A major part of the EU's counter-terrorism policy outside its own borders is the use of aid to prevent terrorism by combating radicalization. This study examines both whether the EU does in fact use aid as a counter-terrorism tool, and what approach it takes in doing so. The EU is assumed to either follow a normative power approach in which it combats terrorism globally, or a self-interested approach in which it only becomes active if its own interests are at stake. A regression analysis is conducted, examining the effect of the level of terrorism on the EU's aid commitments. The analysis uses panel data covering 1,358 country-years between 2006 and 2015. The results show that a greater frequency and severity of terror attacks increases EU aid commitments, regardless of whether the EU itself is targeted. This confirms the hypothesis that the EU takes a normative power approach to counter-terrorism. Therefore, it can be considered a global 'force for good' in this policy area.

Keywords: CFSP; counter-terrorism: European Union; foreign aid; normative power

List of Abbreviations

APC	African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
EC	European Commission
EDF	European Development Fund
EEAS	European External Action Service
ENP	European Neighbourhood Policy
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
ESS	European Security Strategy
EU	European Union
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GTD	Global Terrorism Database
HR/VP	High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Commission Vice President
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
ODA	Official development assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
START	National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
TFEU	Treaty on the Functioning of European Union
UN	United Nations
US	United States (of America)

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I. Introduction

There is no doubt about the hugely beneficial role the European Union (EU) and its predecessor organizations[1] played in the reconciliation of post-war Europe and the establishment of lasting peace amongst its member states. Since its creation, the EU has expanded its reach and influence, portraying itself increasingly as a global 'force for good' (Franck and Söderbaum 2013a). Perhaps most visibly, the EU boasts with being the "largest donor of development aid in the world" (EC 2018d). Collectively, the EU and its member states contribute more than 50% of global aid flows. About 20% of European aid – 10% of global aid – is administered by EU institutions directly, "with the primary aim of eradicating poverty" (EC 2018c). However, this self-portrayal stands in stark contrast to recent remarks made by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Commission Vice President (HR/VP) Federica Mogherini. Speaking at the 2017 Munich Security Conference, she said:

> *"It is not charity: investing in development, investing in the Sustainable Development Goals, investing in humanitarian [aid], is not charity. It is an investment, a selfish investment, in our security" (Mogherini 2017).*

This view of development as a tool to be used selfishly in accordance with the EU's own interests contradicts the 'force for good' narrative and poses the question what kind of role the EU truly occupies as an international donor. Were Mogherini's comments merely intended to sell the EU's continued efforts to create global peace and prosperity to a sceptical audience, or are they an indication that the 'force for good' narrative is no more than window-dressing for the egoistic action of an increasingly global power?

The EU's counter-terrorism policy provides an interesting testing ground for this contradiction. Terrorism has been a consistently recurring topic in the public debate since the 9/11 attacks and the global 'war on terror'. It is regularly perceived as one of the most important issues facing the EU (EC 2018e). In its policy, the EU has committed to "combat terrorism globally" (Council of the European Union 2005a, 6) and to "make Europe safer" (ibid.). This dual purpose hints at the same identity conflict being present in the EU's role as a counter-terrorism actor as it is in its role as a development actor: Are the EU's global actions in counter-terrorism simply the egoistic extension

[1] For reasons of clarity, throughout this study 'EU' is used not only to refer to the European Union, but also to its predecessor, the European Community. The 'European Union' was not officially established until the Treaty on European Union (also known as Treaty of Maastricht), which was signed on February 7th 1992 and entered into force on November 1st 1993 (EU 2018c; 2018d).

of efforts to prevent terrorism within its borders, or is the EU a global 'force for good', combating terrorism where it occurs to make the world a better place?

Fittingly, as one of the EU's main competencies in foreign policy, aid is an important part of the EU's strategy to fight terrorism outside its own borders (Keohane 2008). However, this proclaimed use of aid as a counter-terrorism tool has so far never been subjected to a thorough analysis. The aim of this study is therefore twofold: **To determine whether the EU in fact does use aid systematically as a counter-terrorism tool; and in doing so, to determine how the EU behaves as a counter-terrorism and development actor – as a global 'force for good' or as an egoistic power.**

II. The EU as an International Actor – A 'Force for Good' in the World?

Since its beginning as a limited customs union after the end of the second World War, the EU has come a long way. It has become one of the most important global actors of the world in a variety of policy areas. Traditionally, these have been trade, development, and the promotion of democracy and human rights, but increasingly they also include foreign and security policy (Franck and Söderbaum 2013a). The EU is a unique construct in the international sphere – an organization situated somewhere between an international organization and a nation state because of the partial transfer of sovereignty from its members to the supranational level. Despite being recognized as an international actor, the EU could not be considered a traditional power in the bipolar Cold War environment. The traditional power concept is based on an actor's military strength (Diez 2013), of which the EU as a predominantly economic union had none. Situated in the middle of the East-West divide of the global power structure, developing own military capacities was little more than a thought experiment during the Cold War (Howorth 2017). Its members instead were embedded in the sphere of United States (US) hegemony though the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In this environment, Duchêne (1972; 1973) explained the global influence of the EU with the concept of a 'civilian power'. According to him, the nuclear deterrence stalemate between the Eastern and Western blocs had made civilian means of influencing world politics disproportionately important, as nobody could reasonably expect to exercise sufficient military force to impact the existing status quo. Therefore, the EU as a strong economic power enjoyed substantial global influence without any military capacities of note. However, the civilian power theory was not universally accepted. As its most prominent critic, Hedley Bull (1982) did not see the EU's predominantly civilian behaviour as a source of power, but as a weakness (Aggestam 2012). He cited the loss of proxy wars in the 'Third World' as proof that the nuclear stalemate did neither prevent military conflicts nor predetermine their outcomes. Therefore, military power had not become irrelevant and traditional power remained the predominant measure of influence; a form of power the EU did not possess. In realist fashion, Bull (1982, 151) does not even recognize the EU as anything more than an "instrument[…] of cooperation amongst governments", which leads him to claim that "'Europe' is not an actor in international affairs, and does not seem likely to become one" (ibid.).

1. Normative Power Europe

With the end of the Cold War and the slow withdrawal of the US as a security guarantor and the emergence of new inner-European conflicts in the Balkans, the EU began to move towards a more active security role. With the Treaty of Maastricht, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) became one of the three pillars of the EU. The Treaty further laid the groundwork for the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), which was established in June 1999 as part of the CFSP (European Communities 1992; Manners 2002). These moves towards a more traditional power somewhat invalidated the previous debate on the EU as an international actor, which was based on the EU's civilian nature. In response to the changed context, Manners (2002) moved the discussion away from the civilian vs. military power argument by labelling the EU a 'normative power' with its own, distinct approach to global politics (Franck and Söderbaum 2013a). Civilian power and normative power both are "concepts premised on the idea of the declining utility of military power" (Aggestam 2008, 3). The difference in normative power lies in a move away from the Westphalian world view. Manners (2002) no longer emphasises the state-like characteristics of the EU or physical measures of power – be it economic or military (Bickerton 2011; Manners 2002). Instead, the EU's (normative) power lies in is its ability to spread its norms globally and thus "shape conceptions of 'normal'" (Manners 2002, 239). While not the only international actor trying to promote its norms or world view – the US and its long history as a norms promoter is a prominent example (Diez 2005; Sjursen 2006a) – Manners (2002) observes a 'normative difference' in the EU based on three characteristics:

- its *historic context* as a post-war peace project opposing the nationalism of the war era;
- its *hybrid polity* as an actor somewhere between a traditional international organisation and a nation state, which tends to emphasise common principles; and
- its *political-legal constitution* consisting of treaties based on the normative principles of democracy, the rule of law, social justice and human rights.

He further argues that this normative basis defines the EU's identity as an international actor:

> *"[The] most important factor shaping the international role of the EU is not what it does or what it says, but what it is" (Manners 2002, 252).*

This distinguishes the EU not only in its identity, but also in its actions. In contrast to other global players, "which are usually driven by geopolitical interests" (Franck and Söderbaum 2013a, 6), its normative basis "predisposes [the EU] to act in a normative way in world politics" (Manners 2002, 252). Contrary to the strategic promotion of norms practiced by other powers (Diez 2005), the EU is therefore considered naturally inclined to do so.

2. Normative Power and Other Power Concepts

Much of the academic discussion around normative power has dealt with its relationship to other power concepts. It is important to be aware of these in order to understand the EU as a normative actor.

2.1. Normative and Civilian Power

Since normative power is ideational in nature (Diez and Manners 2007), it does not rely on traditional means of exercising power. This has caused some confusion about the distinction between normative and civilian power. Diez (2005) argues that rather than being distinct concepts, both are embedded within each other. This claim is not necessarily evident from Duchêne's (1972; 1973) original work, but based on more recent iterations of the civilian power concept, which see a civilian power as bound by values and principles (Diez 2005). Multiple other authors do not clearly distinguish between civilian and normative power, instead intermingling both into one concept when examining EU actorness (e.g. Hettne and Söderbaum 2005; Sjursen 2006a; 2006b). In a direct response to Diez' (2005) critique by Manners (2006c) and a subsequent common contribution (Diez and Manners 2007), the difference between the two types of powers are outlined more clearly: First, normative power does allow for the use of military means, which has become a reality for the EU since the creation of the ESDP. Second, civilian power relies on material measures of power, while normative power is based on the non-material ability to shape global norms. Third, civilian power assumes a self-interested actor, while a normative power acts based on universal norms. Forth, a Westphalian view of the international system is the basis of civilian power, while normative power assumes a world society, making it a decidedly post-Westphalian concept (Diez and Manners 2007; Manners 2006a).

2.2. The Realist Critique

The normative power concept has been strongly contested from a (neo-)realist point of view. The neorealist approach implies a view of the world where states are the main actors and exist in a constant state of security competition in an anarchical global system. Security and power are their main concerns; other issues such as human rights or ethics are secondary. Cooperation is not impossible but hard to establish and maintain, and only exists as long as it serves the interest of the states involved. International organizations and institutions like the EU can therefore not be considered actors in their own right. Instead, they are merely an expression of their members'

interests (Hyde-Price 2006).[2] This view of the global system is the basis of the traditional power concept and assumes a self-interested motivation behind all actions.

At the same time as Manners (2002) first published his theory, Kagan (2002) famously returns to Bull's (1982) criticism of the EU's civilian approach, rejecting the post-Westphalian approach. He attributes Europe's powerful role to its geostrategically advantageous position in the middle of the two great powers during the Cold War. Europe's true lack of power due to its missing military capacity, has become openly evident with the Cold War ending. Its continued civilian approach is strategically motived, as it shifts competition away from military power to an arena where Europe is able to compete with and potentially curtail the hegemon US. Following a similar logic and view of the global system as Kagan (2002), Hyde-Price (2006; 2008) explicitly criticizes the normative power concept from a realist perspective. He argues that the rise of the EU as an international power was only possible under the security umbrella of the US and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the bipolar Cold War environment. Inherent in his world view, the EU it is not considered an actor of its own (Hyde-Price 2006; 2008). Instead, it is seen as an instrument to further its member states' "collective economic interests" (Hyde-Price 2008, 31) and – to a lesser degree – is used for "collectively shaping the regional milieu" (ibid.). While Hyde-Price (2006; 2008) acknowledges that the EU is also used to propagate normative values such as the promotion of human rights or democracy, these issues are considered 'second-order' concerns. Not unimportant or uninfluential per se, they rank second to more vital interests and are therefore often sacrificed to reach other goals. Hyde-Price shares Bull's (1982) and Kagan's (2002) view of the EU's power as dependent on the outside security structures which enabled its rise due to its military weakness. However, within this framework, the EU is able to act as a collective hegemon, using its considerable economic power strategically to "impose [its] values and norms on the post-communist East" (Hyde-Price 2006, 227). Rather than an expression of its normative power, the EU's normative influence is therefore considered an expression of its economic clout.

In the eyes of its realist critics, normative power therefore neither matters nor exists; all that ultimately determines an actor's strength are traditional forms of power. The post-Westphalian view of a globalized world where nation-states no longer are the sole entities exercising power is roundly rejected. Given the re-emergence of military power concerns caused by the Balkan wars after a relative absence due to the post-Cold War, 'end of history'-euphoria[3], realist consequently

[2] Realism and the related neorealism are two of the most influential theories of international relations. Its discussion would go far beyond the scope of this thesis. Hyde-Price (2006) provides a good summary of the main proposition of neorealism in his paper, which the brief overview here is based on.

[3] After the end of the Cold War, Francis Fukuyama famously argued that this victory of the Western system of liberal democracies represents the 'end of history', with the Western model being the pinnacle of ideological evolution bound to fully take over the world. (Fukuyama, Francis. 1992. *The End of History and the Last Man*. New York: Free Press)

argue that the EU needs to expand its military capacities in order to keep its current influence (Hyde-Price 2006).

2.3. Normative vs. Traditional Power

While the debate about the EU as a normative or traditional power often takes the form of a contest between both concepts, they are not mutually exclusive (Smith 2011; Whitman 2013). Rather than being a contradiction of other forms of power, normative power can be interpreted as a new, distinct means of exercising power (Whitman 2013). The compatibility of normative power with other concepts is implied in its assumption of a normative basis and the resulting predisposition to act normatively. Since 'normative' action is the only requirement, this includes all potential ways of exercising power (Diez and Manners 2007; Manners 2002). This also means that the use of traditional power is not independent of normative power. Since his original contribution, Manners (2006b) has identified the EU's push towards becoming a more strategic actor and its new competence to deploy military missions as a threat to its normative power. Especially the potential prioritization of military intervention and strategic actions in EU foreign policy over norm-based human security motivations poses a danger. Consequently, Diez and Manners (2007, 180) postulate a trade-off: the more a normative power uses traditional power instruments like military means or economic pressure, "the less it becomes distinguishable from traditional forms of power, because it no longer relies on the power of norms itself". However, Manners (2006b, 195) also argues that military actions carried out "under a UN mandate, in a critically reflexive context, on a clear, normative basis", could allow the EU to keep its normative power despite the use of non-civilian methods.

3. Normative Power EU – Fact or Fiction?

The notion of the European Union as a normative power has not only influenced much of the current academic literature, but also the EU's self-perception of its role in the world. According to Diez (2005), the discourse around normative power served as the basis for the construction of a common EU identity as a distinct global actor. This integration of the concept into the EU's identity is reflected in multiple comments made by José Manuel Barroso, then president of the European Commission (EC). Not only did Barroso refer to the EU as "one of the most important, if not the most important, normative powers in the world" (Peterson 2008, 69), he also specifically named the EU's normative power as the source of its 'comparative advantage' in the world (Barroso 2010). As a self-identified normative power, the EU tends to portray itself as a 'force for good' in international politics: An actor guided by and promoting a firm set of liberal norms and values (e.g. Aggestam 2008; Bickerton 2011; Franck and Söderbaum 2013b; Hyde-Price 2008; Sjursen 2006a; Wood 2009). Accordingly, in its online presence and its communications, the EU

emphasises human rights and equality as its core values, as well as its role as a promoter of peace and democracy (see e.g. EU 2018a; 2018b).

3.1. The Practical Implications of Normative Power

Manners (2002) does not explicitly address what being a normative power means for the EU and its foreign policy in practice. Therefore, it is also unclear whether its self-perception matches the normative power concept. However, much of the practical implication of being a normative power is connected to how norms are diffused, a key characteristic of a normative power (De Zutter 2010). In his seminal paper, Manners (2002) lists six ways the EU uses to spread its norms, which Forsberg (2011) further distils down to four more tangible mechanisms of norms diffusion. They are

- *Persuading others*, for example through rhetoric, diplomacy, arguments, manipulation or information campaigns;
- *Invoking norms* through the activation of commitments already made and the use of authority;
- *Shaping the discourse of what is normal*, affecting others through their adoption of the discourse − similar to but subtler than persuasion, as it works indirectly; and
- *The power of example* when the EU as a normative actor takes on a model role, setting standards for others and prompting imitation of its practices, potentially by causing group pressure to do so.

Manners' (2002; 2006b) two core ideas of being able to shape international norms and acting on a normative basis are reflected in these mechanism. The first mechanisms describe ways to shape norms, while *the power of example* captures the idea of the EU acting on a normative basis. This last mechanism has been the focus of many applications of the normative power concept, which tend to omit the other dimension from their conceptions of normative power. These studies assume that a normative power EU would base its actions on its norms and values, and put those before its strategic interest (see e.g. Aggestam 2012; Sjursen 2006a; Whitman 2013; Wood 2009; Youngs 2004). This requires internal as well as external consistency in the EU's actions, as they "can only be considered norm-driven if there is an observable continuity over time and cases" (De Zutter 2010, 1111). Therefore, consistency is what ensures the EU's legitimacy as a normative power, especially when leading by example. Bengtsson and Elgström (2012) support this view, calling legitimacy essential for the EU's ability to diffuse norms and thus project power globally. Manners (2008) himself notes that normative power is only sustainable if it is perceived as legitimate.

In light of this, the EU's 'force for good' narrative may in fact reduce the EU's capacity as a normative power, rather than help to shape the discourse or persuade others of the EU's normative legitimacy. Aggestam (2008, 7) argues that the narrative can send "a message of Europe as morally superior", potentially creating a rift between the EU and the 'others'. Bengtsson and Elgström (2012) note that many countries outside its immediate vicinity do not fully share the EU's perception of itself as a normative actor. Instead, their view of the EU includes notions of imperialism, patronisation, or condescension. This is caused by the EU "saying on thing and doing another" (ibid., 106) – a mismatch between the 'force for good' narrative and the EU's actions[4]. Such inconsistencies in the EU's behaviour negatively impact the EU's international legitimacy as a normative power.

A difficulty in the application of Manners' (2002) theory lies in its normative basis. Accusing the normative power concept as "under-theorized" (Sjursen 2006b, 172), some authors have criticised the lack of a clear definition or of identifying features, both of the concept and of what constitutes 'normative' action (Pace 2007; Sjursen 2006b). This is not necessarily a fault in the theory, but an issue inseparable from its normative approach. Due to the nature of norms, what can be considered 'normative' inherently defies universal agreement. Generally, norms are defined as "a standard of appropriate behavior for actors *with a given identity*" (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 891, emphasis added). This identity means a dependence on the respective community or society, which judges its members' (non-)conformity to its norms (ibid.). As long as there is no one global society, the EU's norms and values are therefore not universal, but contested by other international actors, and sometimes even by its own members (Aggestam 2008; Diez 2013). This means that 'normative' cannot be clearly defined and has serious implications for the legitimacy of a normative power EU. Legitimacy is a prerequisite for normative power (Bengtsson and Elgström 2012; Manners 2008). To be considered legitimate as a normative power requires recognition as such from other actors (De Zutter 2010). If the norms propagated by the EU are not universally accepted, its legitimacy as a normative power will be questioned by those who contest them (Aggestam 2008; Bickerton 2011; Sjursen 2006a).

The EU's norms are enshrined in the Treaty on European Union:

> *"The Union's action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity,*

[4] Whether or not this actually is the case is further explored in section II.3.2 below.

> *the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law" (EU 2012a, Article 21).*

However, as mentioned above, these norms are not universal. A potential solution to this problem could be the creation of a cosmopolitan law (Bickerton 2011; Sjursen 2006a). For the EU, this would entail binding itself and others on a set of mutually agreed common rules, which – based on human rights – emphasise the rights of each individual over the rights of sovereign states. Such rules would constitute universally agreed norms and therefore clear criteria by which to judge the EU as a normative power. However, cosmopolitan law is neither easy to create nor uphold.

The closest real-life equivalent to such cosmopolitan law is the *Charter of the United Nations*, which all United Nations (UN) member states must abide by. In its preamble, the signatories express their "faith in fundamental human rights" (UN 1945, Preamble), which are further specified in the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UN 1948) and correspond largely to the EU's own norms. While the existence of a norm in international documents such as these is a first step towards universality, several other factors like the exact wording as well as the degree of ratification and implementation also determine whether a norm is truly universal (De Zutter 2010). In this case, the commitment to human rights through the multilateral system of the UN is also not particularly binding, as there are no reliable mechanisms to enforce potential breaches (Sjursen 2006a). While no true cosmopolitan law, the norms described in the UN human rights declaration nevertheless are the most universal norms in existence today. Due to the similarity with those of the UN, the EU's own norms can be used as a reasonable benchmark to evaluate its actions as a normative power against.

3.2. Actions Speak Louder Than Words

> *"The descriptive self-representation of the EU as a normative power is not disputed per se. What is deeply contested is whether this identity is significant to how the European Union acts in global politics and whether the EU has a normative impact" (Aggestam 2012, 467).*

Despite the EU's own narrative, the existing evidence on the EU as a normative power paints a mixed picture:

On the one hand, a number of studies show a normative influence in the EU's foreign policy. Manners (2002) himself includes a case study of the EU's pursuit to abolish the death penalty in his original article, in which he demonstrates both a normative global impact of the EU, and a normative motivation behind its actions. Scheipers and Sicurelli (2007) analyse the EU's behaviour in

the establishment of the International Criminal Court and in the negotiations leading up to the Kyoto Protocol. In both cases, the EU not only successfully portrayed itself as a leading actor in the effort to establish universal norms and as a proponent of multilateralism and binding international law, it also followed up its rhetoric with early adoptions and ratifications of the relevant treaties. In doing so, it demonstrated consistency and credibility as a normative actor and a willingness to bind itself to the norms it propagated. This is an example where the EU's narrative positively contributed to its normative power. Riddervold (2010) examines the EU's position during the negotiation of the Maritime Labour Convention. Testing whether strategic cost-benefit rationalities or ethic-normative considerations determined the EU's stance, she finds support only for the latter hypothesis. She shows that the EU took the role of a human rights promoter, even in direct conflict against its own economic interests.

On the other hand, there is ample evidence for strategic considerations determining EU policy and trumping its norms. Returning to Manners' (2002) example of the fight against capital punishment, it should be noted that three countries retaining the death penalty, the US, China and Russia (Amnesty International 2018), currently are the EU's first, second and fourth important trade partners (EC 2018f). This demonstrates that the EU is not especially forceful in pursuing its critical stance on the death penalty when faced with powerful counterparts and where other (economic) interests are at stake. Additionally, this provides a good example for the limited universality of the EU's norms regarding capital punishment, which is clearly not shared by these other nations (De Zutter 2010). Hyde-Price (2008, 43) also calls out that economic interests trump human rights concerns in the EU's position towards China, labelling out the EU's framing of its foreign policy as ethical or normative as "hypocrisy". Looking at European human rights promotion in the autocracies China and Russia in general, Panebianco (2006, 145) confirms this: "[When] dealing with crucial political or economic partners, pragmatism prevails over the defence of values and principles". This is seen as part of a double standard, where less powerful or important states tend to suffer more consequences for human rights violations in their dealings with the EU (Panebianco 2006). Wood (2009) calls out a rather selective use of EU sanctions and strong economic relationships through the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) with many countries with poor human rights records as examples of the EU acting strategically rather than normatively. In an analysis of the EU's behaviour in the energy sector, he finds that the EU only has limited capacity and commitment to act in accordance with its own normative basis. Due to the EU's dependence on resource-rich countries, it cooperates with a number of autocracies. This effectively supports these human-rights abusing regimes due to their control of national oil and gas supplies. This represents a rather pragmatic and self-interested approach. Scrutinising the EU's promotion of human rights in general, Youngs (2004) finds both normative and strategic

considerations to be present. He demonstrates that security concerns strategically motivate the EU's funding decisions, that its policy decisions often factor in political developments with human rights considerations, and that they are made on the political rather than the technical level. He concludes that "normative and instrumentalist dynamics can be seen to set parameters for each other, with scope remaining for choice within these common boundaries" (ibid., 431).

While not an exhausting overview of the literature, these examples are representative of the EU's inconsistency as a normative actor. The EU's adherence to its own norms as well as its impact as a normative power varies greatly across policy fields and cases. In some instances, the EU has been shown to prioritise normative considerations over strategic interests. In others, strategic considerations have selfishly taken precedence over normative ones. Therefore, the EU's normative power remains limited (see also Aggestam 2008; 2012; Whitman 2013). Forsberg (2011, 1183) perhaps captures the practical meaning of normative power best, when he describes it as an ideal-type rather than a factual characterization of the EU as an international actor, albeit "one which the EU approximates more closely than other great powers".

III. The EU as a Counter-Terrorism Actor

In this study, the EU's counter-terrorism policy serves as a new testing ground for the EU's normative power and its 'force for good' narrative. This policy area represents an especially strong test for the EU's resolve as a normative power, as it deals with issues of national – or in this case European – security. Not only is this policy area strongly associated with traditional power considerations, but also one where the EU tends to act more strategically (Hettne and Söderbaum 2005). Since this study examines the EU as an international actor, the focus here will be on the international dimension of the policy.

1. The Counter-Terrorism Strategy

Despite a significant history of terrorism in Europe, the EU did not have a counter-terrorism policy of its own until 2005. Counter-terrorism for a long time was considered the sole responsibility of its member states, which were reluctant to pursue EU-level integration in matters of national security (Ferreira-Pereira and Martins 2012). This began to change when the 9/11 attacks created the EU-wide perception of a new and immanent global threat. Combined with the emerging 'global war on terror' led by the US, this prompted the EU to put counter-terrorism on its agenda (Brattberg and Rhinard 2012; Ferreira-Pereira and Martins 2012; Monar 2015). Only days after the attack, the EU created its own action plan and in a statement committed to the fight against global terrorism, declaring it one of its 'priority objectives' (European Council 2001a). The EU and its member states collectively supported the US-led military operation against Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan (European Council 2001b). At the same time, the EU diverged from the US in its view on terrorism, seeing terrorists as criminals rather than combatants in a war (Council of the European Union 2002; Keohane 2008; Monar 2015). In the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS), terrorism was identified as the first of five interrelated 'Key Threats' to European security in a post-Cold War environment where full-scale wars against EU members have become increasingly unlikely (European Council 2003; MacKenzie 2010). Despite this, the new threat did not lead to any substantial policy decisions until the EU experienced major terrorist attacks inside its own borders. Only the March 2004 bombings in Madrid and the July 2005 bombings in London caused the EU to respond with its own fully developed policy, the 2005 *European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy* (Ferreira-Pereira and Martins 2012; Monar 2015).

The strategy is based on the four pillars *prevent*, *protect*, *pursue* and *respond* (Council of the European Union 2005b). Its goal is to "combat terrorism globally while respecting human rights,

and make Europe safer, allowing its citizens to live in an area of freedom, security and justice" (ibid., 6). The EU sees terrorism not only as a threat to itself and its member states, but as a "threat to all states and all peoples" (ibid., 6), resulting in a "responsibility for contributing to global security and building a safer world" (ibid., 7). Accordingly, all of the four pillars have not only an internal but also an external component. Overall, there is a stronger focus and more detailed outlook on inner-European action (Ferreira-Pereira and Martins 2012; Keohane 2008).

The strategy describes a comprehensive, long-term and global approach to counter-terrorism. The reason for this may lie in the European history of terrorism. Through their dealing with European terrorist groups,

> *"EU governments have learnt that terrorism is a means rather than an end. In other words, European governments try to focus not only on the types of attacks that terrorists intend to carry out, but also on why these people become terrorists and why sections of society support them; and they generally agree that terrorism can only be defeated with a long-term political approach" (Keohane 2008, 135).*

Counter-terrorism from this point of view is not a clearly defined policy area on its own. Instead, it requires the interplay of multiple actors and agencies across a variety of policy areas (Argomaniz, Bures, and Kaunert 2015; Keohane 2008; MacKenzie 2010).

A substantial portion of counter-terrorism is considered part of national security policy. Since this policy area stands at the very core of a country's sovereignty, EU member states have traditionally been reluctant to transfer related competencies to the supranational level (Keohane 2008; Monar 2015). The EU's acknowledges its limited power in its strategy, emphasising that the primary responsibility for counter-terrorism remains within the national responsibility of each member state (Council of the European Union 2005b). Domestically, the EU therefore envisions a merely coordinating and facilitating role for itself (Argomaniz, Bures, and Kaunert 2015; Ferreira-Pereira and Martins 2012). Internationally, the EU paradoxically seems less restricted. It favours multilateral and bilateral action together with international partners instead of unilateral action at the forefront of the 'global war on terror' (Council of the European Union 2005b; EEAS 2016; Ferreira-Pereira and Martins 2012). Out of the four pillars of the EU strategy, *prevent* is the one with the most international focus, dealing with the causes of terrorism. To combat radicalisation and recruitment, the EU wants to address and improve the socio-economic environments contributing to radicalisation. With this goal in mind, the strategy calls for global action through assistance programmes and international organizations. It further aims to assist third countries in *protecting* themselves from terrorists through cooperation in transport security and arms control, in *pursuing* terrorists in their territory in order to disrupt terrorist operations, and

in *responding* to terrorist attacks adequately and manage ensuing consequences (Council of the European Union 2005b). In practice, this boils down to diplomatic efforts aimed at the promotion of dialogues and a strengthened multilateral approach, and the provision of financial and technical assistance (Keohane 2008).

2. International Counter-Terrorism

The external dimension of the EU's policy remains fairly vague in the strategy and in subsequent action plans, which has caused some criticism among observers. Keohane (2008, 131) sarcastically summarizes the problem by stating that "it appears the EU will have to solve the world's problems if it is to truly tackle international terrorism". Nevertheless, the external dimension plays an important part in EU counter-terrorism documents, reflecting a two-fold rationale: First, the EU recognizes the global nature of the terrorist threat, much of which originates in and is connected to developments outside its territory. Second, counter-terrorism represented an opportunity for the EU to expand its foreign policy (Ferreira-Pereira and Martins 2012). With its creation pre-dating 9/11, the CFSP originally was not envisioned to include counter-terrorism, which at the time was considered a purely national issue. However, since the emergence of an European counter-terrorism strategy the issue has been embedded in the CFSP as well as the subordinate Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), the successor to the ESDP (Ferreira-Pereira and Martins 2012; Martins and Ferreira-Pereira 2012; Monar 2015). Consistent with this development, the EU has used its international approach to counter-terrorism as a vehicle to further develop and streamline its role as a global security actor (Ferreira-Pereira and Martins 2012). This coincided with the overall progression of the EU towards a more comprehensive foreign policy through the Lisbon Treaty. Signed in late 2007 and entering into force in late 2009, the treaty strengthened the role of the EU as an international actor. It granted greater competencies to the EU and aimed to strengthen and consolidate the European CFSP, most prominently with the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS) (Ferreira-Pereira and Martins 2012; Renard 2012).

Consequently, the question of the EU's 'actorness' in global counter-terrorism has been the subject of academic discussion. The literature recognises not a sudden, but rather a gradual emergence of the EU as an international counter-terrorism actor. A number of scholars diagnose limited capabilities in the EU's counter-terrorism efforts, or an unwillingness to use existing tools to the full extent of their possibilities. The EU has therefore been called a 'paper tiger' (Bures 2006; 2011), a weak actor (Beyer 2008), a partial actor (Brattberg and Rhinard 2012), or not of note (MacKenzie 2010) in global counter-terrorism. Nevertheless, the EU has shown significant progress. The current consensus in literature is that "the European Union has accomplished a surprising amount" (Argomaniz, Bures, and Kaunert 2015, 196) and become an internationally

significant and recognized actor (Brattberg and Rhinard 2012; Monar 2015) in counter-terrorism since the creation of the European strategy more than a decade ago. Despite this, the extent of the EU's ability to act and the quality and coherence of its actions remains the subject of discussion (Argomaniz, Bures, and Kaunert 2015).

IV. A Normative Counter-Terrorism Actor?

With counter-terrorism being a part of the CFSP, the EU's actions in this policy field are inevitably linked to the EU's character as an international actor. Given the prominent position of the normative power theory in the discourse and the mixed empirical evidence of the EU's normative performance, two questions arise: What does it mean to be a normative counter-terrorism actor, and can the EU be considered one?

Manners (2006a, 408) explicitly addresses this in the normative power context, arguing that the emergence of global terrorism has let to militarisation processes in the EU, which he defines as "prioritising military aims and means over existing normative concerns". Due to the complex interaction between normative and military power he cautions against an 'unreflexive' inclusion of military aims in the EU's foreign policy, as this might negatively impact the perception and legitimacy of the EU as a normative power. Already in 2006 he observed a shift towards a more strategic approach caused by the war on terror, as evident from the EU's apparent tolerance of US human rights violations in the form of torture and extraordinary rendition. A normative power, he argues, should instead promote its values and principles and "address the entire sequence of mobilisation, complex causes, radicalisation processes and active symptoms of terrorism" (ibid., 413). In terms of the EU's counter-terrorism strategy, this closely corresponds to its first pillar, terrorism *prevention*. As described in section III.1, this is also the part of the strategy most associated with the external dimension of the strategy, making it the logical focus of this analysis. In general, foreign aid and the promotion of bi- and multilateral agreements and dialogue are the core components of the international dimension of the EU's counter-terrorism policy (Keohane 2008). Out of these, the use of development aid[5] as a counter-terrorism tool represents the best possibility to examine the EU as a (normative) counter-terrorism actor.

1. Aid as a Counter-Terrorism Tool

In the context of terrorism prevention outside its borders, the EU aims to combat factors in other countries contributing to radicalisation. In its *Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism*, these are identified as

> *"poor or autocratic governance; states moving from autocratic control via inadequate reform to partial democracy; rapid but unmanaged modernisation; and lack of political and economic prospects, unresolved international and domestic*

[5] 'Aid', 'development aid', and 'foreign aid' are used interchangeably throughout this study.

> *strife; and inadequate and inappropriate education" (Council of the European Union 2005a, 12.).*[6]

To address these issues, the EU set itself the goal to

> *"promote even more vigorously good governance, human rights, democracy as well as education and economic prosperity, and engage in conflict resolution. We must also target inequalities and discrimination where they exist and promote inter-cultural dialogue and long-term integration where appropriate" (Council of the European Union 2005b, 9).*

Within its strategies, the EU names assistance programmes and dialogue as the means to do so (Council of the European Union 2005a; 2005b). Aid is referenced explicitly as a tool which can address factors contributing to radicalisation and thus "help erode the support base for terrorist networks and movements" (EC 2005, 9). The EU promises to "step up its assistance to support partner countries' and regional organisations' efforts" (ibid.). In the EU's view, its aid programme is therefore linked to its counter-terrorism policy as a tool to combat radicalisation and thus prevent terrorism.

Counter-terrorism and aid are connected through their integration into the EU's CFSP. Since 2003, when aid was referred to in the ESS as a tool to address global security challenges (European Council 2003; Faust and Messner 2005), development policy has increasingly been considered part of the CFSP in a push for more policy coherence (Carbone 2013; EC 2011; EU 2006; Hadfield 2007; Tannous 2013). Previously considered separate policy areas, the 2007 Lisbon Treaty enabled a more integrated foreign policy approach, with the newly created EEAS assuming an important role in development policy (Furness and Gänzle 2016; Keukeleire and Raube 2013; Tannous 2013). Despite this, the EU states that "development is a central goal by itself" (EU 2006, 7.). European development policy today has therefore become an independent policy and "an integral part of EU's external action" (Tannous 2013, 332) at the same time.

1.1. Why Aid?

The choice to focus on aid within the EU's counter-terrorism policy to test its normativity was made for two main reasons:

First, it represents a foreign policy area where it is possible to study decisions made autonomously by an EU body, the EC (see e.g. Carbone 2010; Dearden 2008). Aid is a policy area of shared

[6] The EU does not describe those factors as causally necessary or sufficient conditions for radicalization, merely as potentially contributing factors. A more detailed description of the EU's perspective on radicalization and its causes can be found in the Appendix of EC (2005).

competences where both supranational institutions and the individual member states are active (EU 2006; 2012b; Orbie and Versluys 2008). Most EU member states have their own individual aid budgets and operations. However, roughly one fifth of European official development assistance (ODA)[7] −17,1 billion US dollars ($) in 2016 (EC 2018b) − is administered by the EC directly. On this multilateral level, the EC decides on the allocation of aid, based on policy decision made jointly by the member states in the EU Council (Schneider and Tobin 2013). Despite this formal separation of competences, the EC also retains influence on development policy (Carbone 2007; Orbie and Versluys 2008). This puts the EC in a powerful position with strong control over the European aid programme. In its own words

> *"**The EU is not simply the 28th European donor**. While the Commission implements 20 % of the collective EU aid effort, it also acts as coordinator, convener and policy-maker" (EC 2011, 3).*

The possibility to separate aid streams and analyse aid administered on the supranational level represents an advantage over the focus on the EU's other counter-terrorism tools. It allows a relatively isolated analysis of the supranational actor EU and its normativity in a policy area of where it enjoys a powerful role. In contrast, the power distribution and the distinction between the EU and its member states is less clear in its effort to promote dialogues and facilitate international agreements.

Second, aid is the EU's most significant tool of external counter-terrorism policy in terms of resources and therefore cost for the EU. Multilateral EU aid in the amount of 9% of the total budget[8] is administered by the EU (Tannous 2013). The EU's own aid budget is larger than that of all of its member states save Germany and the United Kingdom (EC 2018b), an exceptional fact given its otherwise comparatively small financial means (Orbie and Versluys 2008). Its other counter-terrorism tools are mainly diplomacy and communication, which are relatively cheap. While a normative focus in these may entail audience costs such as a loss of legitimacy if not coupled with corresponding actions, the EU already promotes a normative power narrative, regardless of its counter-terrorism policy. It can therefore be assumed that no or very little additional costs for the EU are created this way. Due to its costs, aid is presumably more contested and therefore more likely to be influenced by other interests than the EU's other tools. The focus on aid therefore allows for a stronger test of the EU's normative conviction.

[7] ODA refers to the amount of development aid as defined by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. For a definition and further information on what is included in ODA figures, see OECD (2018a).
[8] However, less than 9% of the EU's budget are spent on foreign aid, as this number includes the EDF, which is funded through direct contributions from member states (Tannous 2013).

1.2. The Effect of Terrorism on Aid

While aid in the European counter-terrorism context has so far not been addressed in a meaningful way in the literature, several scholars have examined the relationship between aid and terrorism. Previous research mostly focussed on how aid affects terrorism, rarely the other way around. Of the studies looking on the effects of terrorism on aid, all but one examine aid given by the US exclusively. The US is the dominant player in the War on Terror and known for its strategic use of aid (Boutton and Carter 2014; Fleck and Kilby 2010; Moss, Roodman, and Standley 2005).

In initial explorations of the topic, Moss, Roodman, and Standley (2005) as well as Fleck and Kilby (2010) examine how US aid has changed with the War on Terror. Both observe an overall increase in aid levels. Comparing aid three years prior and after the 9/11 attacks, Moss, Roodman, and Standley (2005) find no systematic effects of the War on Terror. However, they excluding a number of extreme outliers such as Iraq and Afghanistan, which saw a sharp increase in aid post-9/11. This leads them to conclude that there may not have been an overall policy change, but a case-driven change in aid levels instead. Separating a country's selection as an aid recipient and the level of aid received, Fleck and Kilby (2010) conduct a panel study covering half a century up until 2006. They show that countries were more likely to receive aid during the War on Terror, but that it did not influence the amount of aid given once selected. They further find that the relative weight of recipient needs for aid allocation has decreased with the overall increase in aid, indicating a policy shift towards more strategic concerns during the War on Terror. Moving away from the simple War on Terror indicator, Boutton and Carter (2014) examine the effect of the level of terrorism on aid, covering the years 1976-2006. Their approach is the closest to the one chosen in this study, but with a different theoretical basis. They test whether US aid responded to all terror attacks, based on the assumption that all terrorism poses a security threat to a global superpower, or only in self-interest when the US itself or its allies are threatened. Also disaggregating aid into selection and aid levels, they show that only terror attacks on US interests as well as US casualties consistently have a positive effect on the likelihood of receiving aid, as well as the level of aid received. Additionally, attacks on US allies lead to higher military but not economic aid, while attacks against other nationalities do not have any significant effects on aid. This confirms that the US does use aid as a counter-terrorism tool, but it does so in a predominantly self-interested way.

Finally, Dreher and Fuchs (2011) investigate the effect of terrorism on aid given by the 22 members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) during 1971-2008. They include only transnational terrorist attacks targeting donor countries or other DAC members in their analysis, assuming a strongly self-interested motivation for the use of aid as a counter-terrorism tool. In a first step, they observe an overall increase in aid with the advent of the War on Terror, yet this

increase does not follow trends in terror attacks. Like Fleck and Kilby (2010) as well as Boutton and Carter (2014) they separate selection and aid levels in a two-step model. The results indicate that countries where terror attacks originate are no more or even less likely to receive aid; however, once selected, aid levels increase.

The studies summarized here serve as valuable guideline for research into the EU's use of aid as a counter-terrorism tool, without contributing to this research question directly. Although the data used by Dreher and Fuchs (2011) does include multilateral EU aid, there are no disaggregated results for the EU available. This makes it impossible to determine whether their results apply to EU aid as well.

2. The EU as a Multilateral Aid Donor

To understand the EU's use of aid for counter-terrorism, it is important to first understand the EU as a development actor. The EU has been an independent aid donor since its early beginnings in the 1950s (Tannous 2013), in an effort to streamline European development policy (Carbone 2010). Since then, multilateral aid channelled through the EU has expanded in scope. Today, the EC administers roughly on fifth of total European aid (EC 2018b), channelled through a variety of programmes and instruments (Carbone 2007). The reason for giving aid multilaterally is often seen in potential efficiency gains as well as a stronger focus on development goals in the allocation and use of aid: It removes problems arising from a lack of coordination between multiple donors and reduces the influence of national interests (Schneider and Tobin 2013).

2.1. European Development Policy and Actorness

In December 2005, around the same time it adopted its counter-terrorism strategy, the EU agreed on a new development policy: The *European Consensus on Development* (Carbone 2010; EU 2006).[9,10] It outlined a new approach to development, after the EU had become increasingly criticised for a lack of clear objectives and an excessive bureaucracy during the 1990s (Carbone 2013; Dearden 2008; Orbie and Versluys 2008). In the Consensus the EU therefore stresses a needs- and performance-based, objective and transparent approach to development, targeting those countries most in need. It states that

> *"the primary and overarching objective of EU development cooperation is the eradication of poverty in the context of sustainable development" (EU 2006, 5.).*

[9] Subsequently referred to as the 'Consensus'.
[10] Following the UN's adoption of new global development goals, the *New Consensus on Development* replaced the policies discussed here in 2017. Since the observation period of this study ends with 2015, this recent update of the EU's development policy is not discussed here.

This principle was also introduced into the Treaty on the Functioning of European Union (TFEU)[11] with the 2007 Lisbon Treaty (EU 2012b, Article 208), and is further echoed in the EU's next major policy document, the 2011 *Agenda for Change*[12]. In the Agenda, the EU also reiterates the needs-based allocation of aid, demanding the use of its resources "where they are needed most to address poverty reduction and where they could have greatest impact" (EC 2011, 11, emphasis removed).

The EU undisputedly is a development actor in its own right. Early on, the EC held the view that the EU-level aid programme is

> *"neither just an addition to the bilateral aid allocated by its member states, nor aid by an international development organization devoid of self-interest. Instead, the [EU] has been allocating development assistance according to its own particular criteria that do not necessarily reflect a mere aggregation of the member states' interests but express the [EU]'s potential to act as an original international economic actor in its own right" (Tsoutsoplides 1991, 647).*

For a long time, the EC has viewed international development as a policy area where its control over the allocation of aid allowed it to establish the EU as an international actor with its own agenda. Today, the EU's development policy is firmly linked to its identity as an international actor. This is formally acknowledged in Article 208 of the TFEU, which states that its development policy "shall be conducted within the framework of the principles and objectives of the Union's external action" (EU 2012b).

As a part of EU foreign policy, development policy thus reflects the EU's self-perception as a normative power, demonstrating a normative distinctiveness (Orbie et al. 2017). In accordance with Manners' (2002) concept, the policy covers both aspects of normative power: First, it includes the promotion of the EU's values. The Consensus emphasises that

> *"EU partnership and dialogue with third countries will promote common values of: respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms, peace, democracy, good governance, gender equality, the rule of law, solidarity and justice" (EU 2006, 13.).*

This is reiterated in the Agenda, where human rights, democracy and the rule of law are considered 'key elements' of good governance (EC 2011). The adherence to these principles is seen as crucial to the sustainability of development efforts, both in the Consensus and in the Agenda (EC

[11] The EU's constitutional basis, its legal framework, consists of two main treaties: The Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of European Union.
[12] Subsequently referred to as the 'Agenda'.

2011; EU 2006). Second, the EU commits itself to acting on a normative basis. The policy promises to help those most in need and to use the available resources efficiently, prioritizing development over any strategic interests (Carbone 2013). This is consistent with the EU's 'force for good' narrative and promotes the normative value of eradicating poverty. However, in stating 'objective' criteria for the allocation of resources based on recipient needs, the EU binds its legitimacy as a normative power to the consistent adherence to these very criteria.

2.2. Determinants of European Aid

An examination of the EU's aid allocation can reveal whether or not the EU in fact adheres to these criteria. The question of what determines foreign aid is the subject of a large body of literature. Most research assumes either a donor's own strategic interest in a recipient country – an argument based on a realist world view – or the needs of the recipients (and their political or economic performance) to determine aid allocations (Kim and Jensen 2018; Reynaert 2011). Global aid patterns generally point towards recipient needs and donor interests both playing a role (e.g. Alesina and Dollar 2000; Berthelemy 2006). According to its policy, the EU claims to give aid based on recipient needs and recipient performance in issues like good governance and human rights (EU 2006). However, only few authors have conducted systematic research on the determinants of EU multilateral aid.

Several existing studies cover a time before the policy discussed here, limiting their relevance for this analysis. Similar to global aid patterns, Bowles (1989) and Tsoutsoplides (1991) find evidence for recipient needs and strategic interests both determining EU aid. Other authors' results show predominantly recipient needs (Grilli and Riess 1992) or predominantly strategic interests (Zanger 2000) to affect aid, allowing no clear picture to emerge. On the recipient needs side, indicators like the Human Development Index (Grilli and Riess 1992), the per capita gross domestic product (GDP) (Bowles 1989) or the balance of payments (Tsoutsoplides 1991) have seen significant effects. Among indicators for donor interests, economic interests seem to matter little to nothing, while measures for political ties such as colonial affiliation were consistently found to be significant predictors (Bowles 1989; Tsoutsoplides 1991; Zanger 2000). However, all these studies are limited either in their scope or their methods. Their results should therefore be viewed with some reservations. Nevertheless, they serve as a useful guideline for further research.

More recently, Reynaert (2011) employed a fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis to identify the conditions for EU aid allocations to 7 Mediterranean countries. She tests four different models: donor interests, recipient needs, recipient performance in good governance, and recipient performance in economic reforms. While the recipient needs and the donor interests models cannot explain EU aid allocation, both performance models have explanatory power. The economic

reforms model performs best. However, due to the small-N design, the external validity of these results is limited. Examining the potential influence of EU member states' interests on EU aid allocation, Schneider and Tobin (2013) explore the independence of the EU's development policy from its member states, based on data on aid given to 146 countries from 1977 to 2006. They focus on the influence of dominant members and interest coalitions, demonstrating their ability to affect EU aid. Out of the recipient needs and donor interests indicators included in the analysis, GDP per capita (recipient needs) as well as colonial ties (political interests) were found to be significant. In a similar approach, Kim and Jensen (2018) test whether EU aid policy is driven by member states or the institutional setup. The results of a factor analysis confirm the hypothesis that the institutional constraints of EU policy-making lead to aid patterns similar to those of member states with restrictive human rights criteria. An analysis of panel data on 151 countries between 1981 and 2011 demonstrates that an improved human rights record increases EU aid. They also find significant effects for recipient needs (for the indicators GDP per capita and infant mortality), but not for donor interests. However, their analysis does not include any measures for political interests, only accounting for economic relationships. These more recent studies paint a picture of the EU more in adherence with its own development policy. Recipient needs play a significant role in aid allocation. Somewhat contrary to expectations, the recipient's' human rights performance also plays an important role in practice, while in the policy this only becomes a stronger policy focus with the 2011 Agenda. However, donor interests still retain some influence on EU aid allocation.

2.3. Securitization of Aid

The view on aid as not just an independent policy area but also an instrument to reach other policy goals has caused a debate about its politicisation. National (geo-)strategic interests have always influenced national aid (Woods 2005), while multilateral aid donors like the UN or the EU are often considered to be more responsive to the needs of recipients and more focussed on development outcomes than their own strategic interests (see e.g. Bowles 1989; Schneider and Tobin 2013). Much of the debate on the politicisation of aid is centred around the increased 'securitization' of development policy (see e.g. Faust and Messner 2005; Furness and Gänzle 2016; Keukeleire and Raube 2013; Woods 2005). Securitization, a term coined by Wæver (1995), refers to "the process of presenting an issue in security terms, in other words as an existential threat" (Buzan and Hansen 2009, 214) An issue is considered securitized, if this framing as a security issue is accepted by other actors (Buzan and Hansen 2009; Wæver 1995). However, to what extent this applies to European development policy is still being debated.

The advent of the war on terror and the rise of the EU as an international actor has indisputably led to an increased recognition and focus on the connection between security and development

in European policymaking (Carbone 2013; Faust and Messner 2005; Hadfield 2007; Woods 2005). This is visible in the Consensus, which states:

> *"Without peace and security development and poverty eradication are not possible, and without development and poverty eradication no sustainable peace will occur" (EU 2006, 40.).*

The Agenda further notes that "the objectives of development, democracy, human rights, good governance and security are intertwined" (EC 2011, 2). However, this view of security and development as complimentary arguably represents nothing more than an acknowledgment of real-life interdependences and complexities. In contrast, securitization is only considered to be present when security interests trump development policy (Furness and Gänzle 2016; Keukeleire and Raube 2013). In their analyses of the phenomenon, Furness and Gänzle (2016) as well as Keukeleire and Raube (2013) show a partial or limited, but existing securitization of the EU's development policy. The use of development funds for peacekeeping operations, as part of the strategy against the proliferations of weapons of mass destruction, or to stabilize war-torn countries such as Afghanistan or Iraq are seen as clear examples of this (Furness and Gänzle 2016). Similar influences can even be observed in humanitarian aid (Dany 2015). The use of aid as a counter-terrorism tool also represents a potential case of securitization.

V. Testable Implications

The conflicts in the EU's policies, which prompted this study, have become clearly visible upon closer inspection. In both development and counter-terrorism policy, the EU on paper adheres to its self-perceived role as 'force for good' in the world, striving to facilitate development, reduce poverty, and combat radicalisation and terrorism globally. This is based on the EU's self-identification as a normative power, which promotes its norms and consistently acts according to its normative basis.

Regarding its development policy, existing studies shows this to be only partially true, as strategic interests often trump normative considerations. Not only needs-based criteria, but also political relationships have been found to significantly determine aid allocations. Additionally, a fairly high proportion of aid has been allocated to middle income countries rather than those most in need (Tannous 2013). Obviously, strategic interests do play a role in aid allocation. The increasing securitization of aid further confirms this. Securitization is present if security concerns are prioritized over development goals, again indicating strategic motivation. All this contradicts the EU's self-representation as a needs-based, normative donor, demonstrating a gap between the EU's rhetoric and its policy implementation. This lack of normative consistency reduces its legitimacy as a normative power, and therefore its global normative influence.

A similar conflict between strategic and normative interests can be observed in the EU's counter-terrorism policy. On the one hand, its proclaimed goal to fight terrorism globally as well as its comprehensive approach as a counter-terrorism actor are in line with its normative 'force for good' narrative. On the other hand, its counter-terrorism strategy emphasises European security and was clearly not created in response to the emergence of terrorism per se, but to attacks on EU member states within their borders. This points towards selfish security concerns as an important driver behind the EU's counter-terrorism efforts. While a self-centred initial motivation does not necessarily make the EU a self-interested counter-terrorism actor, together with Hettne and Söderbaum's (2005) observation that the EU tends to act self-interested on security issues, there is sufficient cause to doubt the EU's narrative as a normative actor. However, this narrative so far has not been systematically tested.

As discussed in section IV.1.1, the EU's use of aid constitutes the best available indicator for the EU's character as a counter-terrorism actor. Since aid is a major part of the EU's global counter-terrorism efforts and both are included in the CFSP, there is the potential for spillover effects

between the policy areas. This is especially true since counter-terrorism by default is not an individual, independent policy area but the combination of multiple ones, with development policy playing a prominent role. The EU's inconsistency as a normative development actor demonstrated by the influence of strategic interests could therefore spill over to its approach to counter-terrorism and lead to a self-interested use of aid as a counter-terrorism tool. However, previous research has described cases within the same policy area but with different degrees of normative motivation present. It is therefore also possible that the policy areas of development and counter-terrorism do not affect each other. This leaves the option open, that the EU uses aid normatively as a counter-terrorism tool.

Consequently, there are two contradicting assumptions about the EU' as a counter-terrorism actor: It either follows a normative power approach or acts predominantly out of self-interest. Due to its reliance on aid as a testing ground, this analysis makes the base assumption that the EU in fact does use aid systematically to combat terrorism. This may seem trivial, given its rhetoric as well as the high amounts of aid given to terror-prone countries like Afghanistan and Iraq (Furness and Gänzle 2016), but has yet to be methodically tested. Whether or not the EU's use of aid as a counter-terrorism tool represents a case of securitization can be used as a proxy for its motivation. Securitization exists if security concerns – in this case the fight against terrorism – trump development concerns. However, due to the interdependence of security and development a development actor must recognize and address security concern in its development policy in order to identify the appropriate way to reach its development goals. The use of aid as a counter-terrorism tool can be part of this effort. Terrorism negatively impacts a country's security situation and is therefore detrimental to development. As long as development stays the main priority, the fight against the causes of radicalization and terrorism via aid can be considered a necessary condition to reach this goal, as it creates the conditions to do so effectively.

As a self-identified normative power, the EU's overarching goal in development is to fight poverty. If it truly uses aid normatively as a counter-terrorism tool, this has to be integrated into overall aid allocation and follow the same principles. This means that for a normative power, terrorism becomes another criterion to objectively consider in a needs-based approach, in order to ensure the consistency required retain its legitimacy. Therefore, aid as a counter-terrorism tool should be allocated where there is more terrorism, as this is where it is more needed. This leads to the following first hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1 (H_1): *The higher the level of terrorism in a recipient country, the more aid will be given to that country by the EU.*

In contrast, a self-interest actor would only be expected to use aid as a counter-terrorism tool where its own security interests are concerned, rather than where terrorism endangers development goals or the local security situation. Following Boutton and Carter's (2014) logic regarding the US, a self-interested counter-terrorism actor EU should only increase its aid if itself is the target of terror attacks. Since the EU's aim is to ensure the well-being of all its peoples (EU 2012a), this includes attacks on any of its member states, while attacks on other targets should not affect its aid allocation. Accordingly, the second hypothesis is formulated:

Hypothesis 2 (H_2): *The higher the level of terrorism targeting the EU or its member states in a recipient country, the more aid will be given to that country by the EU. The level of terrorism targeting other targets in a recipient country does not systematically influence the level of aid given to that country by the EU.*

This second hypothesis does not necessarily contradict the first hypothesis. If the EU only responds to terrorism on EU targets, this could also lead to significant results for H_1. Both hypotheses therefore need to be evaluated jointly. If the H_2 is confirmed, this contradicts the assumption of H_1 that the EU responds to terrorism in general.

To ensure comparability with the first hypothesis, the focus in H_2 remains on terrorist attacks taking place in recipient countries. While attacks within the EU itself arguably are more likely to influence EU policy, they can often not be easily attributed to a 'source country' outside the EU. Furthermore, a number of perpetrators of recent high-profile attacks, such as in Nice (Chazan, Morgan, and Turner 2016), Paris (Reuters 2015), Barcelona (Musseau 2017; Oms 2017), and Manchester (Burke 2017; Stephen 2017), were long-time residents or EU nationals and radicalised within Europe. These attacks within Europe should therefore predominantly lead to domestic or inner-European policy responses. Their exclusion from this analysis consequently is not expected to significantly bias its results.

A rejection of both hypotheses would imply that the EU simply does not use aid systematically as a counter-terrorism tool.

VI. Data and Methods

The hypotheses postulated above are tested with cross-sectional time-series data (panel data) on EU aid, covering a total of 1,358 country-years across 137 countries for the time span between 2006 and 2015. Since the EU's counter-terrorism policy is dated November 2005, 2006 was chosen as the starting date – the first year where its implementation can be expected to affect aid allocation. The choice to end the observation in 2015 was made because of the high influx of refugees which began in the second half of the year, often referred to as the European 'refugee crisis'. The crisis shook the European and national political systems, and funds in excess of €10 billion over a three year period were reallocated from the EU budget to address the causes of irregular migration (EC 2017b). Even a third of this represents a significant percentage of the roughly €20 billion in total ODA commitments made in 2015. The crisis further prompted a change in EU development policy towards an increased focus on migration and its causes (EC 2017a; EU 2016; European Council 2015). The exclusion of more recent data after 2015 therefore prevents the likely introduction of bias caused by this policy shift.

1. Dependent Variable

The dependent variable of this analysis, foreign aid, is measured with the amount of ODA commitments made by the EU per recipient country and year[13]. ODA is the most used measure for aid levels in the literature. Data on ODA is provided by the OECD (2018b) and given in constant 2016 US dollars. Aid commitments rather than disbursements were chosen, since they better reflect policy decisions than disbursements, which are influenced by a number of additional factors that could introduce unwanted biases into this analysis (see Berthelemy 2006; Berthélemy and Tichit 2004). Since the data does not include zero-values, country-years with missing values were coded as countries not receiving aid in the respective year. The data for therefore covers the whole observation period for all countries in the dataset[14]. Out of the 1,358 observations, no aid was given 179 times.

[13] In the OECD data, the EU as a donor independent from its member states is referred to as 'EU institutions'.

[14] Five countries were excluded the data for several years instead of being coded as not receiving aid during this time. This was done to prevent artificial inflation of the data, based on two reasons. First, Croatia was removed from the data after 2012, because it became an EU member state in 2013. After this date, Croatia was no longer covered under the EU's foreign policy, instead becoming an internal matter. Second, South Sudan (2011), Kosovo (2008), Serbia, and Montenegro (both 2006) only became independent countries during the observation period (Taylor 2014). Therefore, they were only included from the first year after their independence or the first year when commitments were recorded, whichever happened earlier (South Sudan: 2012; Kosovo: 2009; Montenegro: 2006). The OECD data for Serbia shows yearly aid commitments since 1994, however, it is unclear how the data deals with the split of Serbia and Montenegro. Therefore, Serbia was only included from 2007 onwards, the year after its independence.

Aid policy is assumed to lag behind current developments due to political, budgetary and administrative constraints. Therefore, aid commitments are likely to respond to the level of terrorism in the previous year (Boutton and Carter 2014). The variable is accordingly observed one year later (t) than the independent variable ($t-1$). Additionally, this prevents potential endogeneity issues (Kim and Jensen 2018). Excluding country-years when no aid commitments were made, the independent variable ranges from $10,000 to $3.48 billion during the observation period. With a mean yearly commitment of $94.2 million and a median of only $36.1 million, the variable is highly skewed to the right and includes a number of outliers. Following convention in the aid literature (e.g. Alesina and Dollar 2000; Boutton and Carter 2014; Kim and Jensen 2018; Schneider and Tobin 2013), this is dealt with by taking the natural log of the dependent variable[15].

2. Independent Variable

Data from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) (LaFree and Dugan 2007; START 2018b) was used to construct the independent variables for this analysis. The GTD is the only freely available global database on terrorism of its scale, and one of the most-used resources in terrorism research. It is the only comparable database which records both domestic and transnational terror attacks (LaFree and Dugan 2007). This makes it the data source of choice for this analysis, which considers the potential influence of both forms of terrorism. As many datasets, the GTD has a number of specific properties researchers need to be aware of. A detailed discussion of this can be found in Appendix 1. The level of terrorism is observed at time $t-1$. Data on terror attacks was therefore used from 2005 through 2014.

Two different measures of the level of terrorism per country-year were created for each hypothesis. For the normative power hypothesis (H_1), the variables are based on all attacks taking place in a given county and year. For the self-interested actor hypotheses (H_2), the variables are split into one based on attacks on the EU, and one based on attacks on other targets. Attacks on the EU were defined as attacks on EU institutions, EU citizens, the property of EU institutions, member states or EU-based companies, and local employees of EU companies and agencies, if they were targeted due to their employment with the EU entity. A detailed description of how non-EU and EU targets were separated can be found in Appendix 2. Since the GTD collects terrorism events globally, country-years without corresponding terror attacks were coded as having no attacks.

The first set of variables measure the frequency of terror attacks in a given country-year. They constitute three simple counts of the number of terror attacks, both aggregated and disaggregated according to target.

[15] Following Kim and Jensen (2018), zero values in the data were set to 1 before logging, resulting in the value 0 after the transformation. This is necessary since the log of 0 is not defined.

Table 1: The hypotheses and their corresponding variables. All variables are measured per country-year.

Hypotheses	**Variables**
H_1: normative power hypothesis	*V1: No. of total terror attacks* *V2: No. of total casualties through terror attacks*
H_2: self-interested actor hypothesis	*V3: No. of terror attacks on EU targets* *V4: No. of casualties through terror attacks on EU targets* *V5: No. of terror attacks on non-EU targets* *V6: No. of casualties through terror attacks on non-EU targets*

Recent research has argued that fewer, higher-profile terror attacks may have more effect than many small attacks, due to a higher resulting level of attention (Conrad and Greene 2015). Following this logic, the second set of variables measures the severity of terror attacks rather than simply their frequency. They represent a count of the casualties, the people killed and wounded by terrorist attacks, aggregated for each country-year. The variables are based on the same events as the first set of variables. They were created by adding up the victim numbers provided by the GTD rather than merely counting the events. Table 1 provides an overview of all independent variables.

During the observation period, 57,604 terror attacks in 583 out of 1,358 country-years took place, resulting in 336,924 casualties. Out of these, only 437 attacks with 1,439 casualties in 142 country-years targeted the EU, making those attacks very rare events.

3. Controls

In the Consensus, the EU professes to allocate aid based on the needs and performance of recipient countries, listing several criteria:

> *"The needs criteria include population, income per capita and the extent of poverty, income distribution and the level of social development, while the performance criteria include political, economic and social progress, progress in good governance and the effective use of aid, and in particular the way a country uses scarce resources for development, beginning with its own resources" (EU 2006, 65.).*

Based on this, as well as the previous research summarized in section IV.2.2, a number of control variables were included in the analysis to capture other influences on aid besides terrorism. Like the independent variables, controls are observed at time $t-1$. This is common practice in the literature (e.g. Boutton and Carter 2014; Dreher and Fuchs 2011; Kim and Jensen 2018), done to address endogeneity issues and because socio-economic indicators are generally observed and

responded to with some delay. Following conventions (ibid.), several of the variables are logged in order to deal with outliers resulting from their skewed distributions.

A first set of controls measures the needs and performance of recipients. To account for recipient needs, variables with the (logged) *population size*, the (logged) *per capita gross development product (GDP)* in 2010 constant US dollars, as well as the rate of *infant mortality* per 1.000 births as an indicator for the level and distribution of poverty are included in the models. The data source for these are the World Bank's (2018) World Development Indicators. To reflect immediate needs, the (logged) number of *people affected by natural disasters* is included.[16] Since humanitarian aid in response to disasters is generally immediate, this variable is observed together with ODA commitments at time t. Data was taken from The Emergency Events Database EM-DAT (CRED 2018). A country's economic performance is measured with its yearly *GDP growth* (The World Bank 2018). The *political rights* and *civil liberties* indicators from Freedom House's (2018) Freedom in the World reports are used as measures for a country's political and social progress, as well as its adherence to human rights. The scale for both ranges from 1 to 7, with 1 indicating the highest levels of both. The Freedom House data was chosen over the more widely used Polity IV democracy score for its inclusion of the human rights dimension as well as better data coverage, especially its inclusion of Palestine (the West Bank and Gaza Strip regions in the data)[17]. Since Freedom House and Polity scores are strongly correlated (~ -0.8 for both Freedom House dimensions), both measures should lead to similar results.

A second set of controls account for the EU's political and strategic interests. The analysis includes three time-invariant dummy variables for each country to measure the EU's political relationships and interests: one for *colonial ties* to any EU member state, taken from data provided by Hensel (2014); one for a recipient country's inclusion in the EU's *European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)*; and one for membership in the *African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP)*. Both ENP and ACP countries enjoy a special development relationship with the EU. Aid to ENP countries is centralised in its own funding mechanism, the European Neighbourhood Instrument (EC 2016). The EU-ACP relationship is currently formalised in the Cotonou Agreement on development, trade and political cooperation (ACP 2018; EC 2018a). Based on Eurostat (2018) data,

[16] The data records a start date and an end date for single events. In several instances (e.g. epidemics), start and end date were not in the same year. Based on an inspection of the relevant cases, it was judged likely that the number given in the data represented the aggregate number of people affected over the duration of the event, rather than at the same time. In these cases, the number of people affected was therefore divided by the duration in years, and this fraction was attributed to each year during the event.

[17] While ODA and other variables report data on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as one unit, Freedom House data is split between Israeli-Occupied Territories and Palestinian Authority-Administered Territories until 2010, and between West Bank and Gaza Strip in subsequent years. Since numbers for both are consistently very similar (generally not diverging by more than 1 point), the mean of both was used to create the variables for this study.

another variable with the (logged) *volume of trade* in goods in million Euros measures the EU's economic interest in a recipient country.

Finally, a Breusch-Godfrey test identified serial correlation in the data, a known issue with panel studies. This points towards aid inertia, which has already been demonstrated in previous studies (Boutton and Carter 2014; Schneider and Tobin 2013). Therefore, a lagged version ($t-1$) of the dependent variable was also included in the control.

4. Model Specification

The dependent variable of this study, ODA commitments, is bounded by 0 on one side, making it a censored variable (Berthelemy 2006). Neumayer (2002) and Berthelemy (2006) provide a useful summary of the resulting implications for the model selection: A censored variable cannot be examined with standard linear regression models, as this could introduce selection bias. There are three potential model types suitable for such a variable: a two-stage model, a Heckman selection model, and a tobit model. A two-stage model reproduces a two-stage decision-making process, where the donor first decides on which countries are selected as aid recipients, and subsequently on how much aid the selected countries receive. Both decisions are assumed to be independent of each other. A Heckman selection model assumes the same two-stage selection process but does not require both stages to be independent. Instead, this model calls for the inclusion of a variable which significantly impacts the selection step, but not subsequent decisions on aid levels. Finally, a tobit model relaxes the assumption of a two-stage approach, estimating selection and aid levels in one step. In contrast to the other models, it requires the same set of variables to impact both whether the dependent variable is zero and what values it takes. Additionally, the effect of these variable on both has to be in the same direction. All these models are based on somewhat different assumptions about the underlying data. To minimize bias, the model which best fits reality must be selected.

In its development policy, the EU does not differentiate between a selection of countries to receive aid and the corresponding aid level. Instead, it generally refers to the allocation of resources (EU 2006). It therefore seems highly unlikely, that potential decisions along a two-stage process are made independently from each other. This makes a two-stage model unsuited for this analysis. This description in the policy also implies that there is no factor present which only influences the selection step of the process, violating the assumptions of the Heckman selection model. However, the EU's policy fits the assumption of the tobit model. First, it is very plausible that selection and aid levels are not decided on in a two-stage process, but at the same time. Second, a reasonably confident assumption can be made that the independent variables and controls included in this analysis influence both whether a country receives no aid at all and how much aid it receives,

and that they do so in the same direction. No contradicting insights regarding these assumptions could be gained from the literature. Therefore, a tobit model was chosen for this analysis.

One disadvantage of the chosen approach are potential country-specific effects in the data, which are usually addressed with fixed effects models. However, fixed effects cannot be easily introduced into a tobit model, which instead assumes random effects (Berthelemy 2006). Since several previous studies employed Heckman selection models (Boutton and Carter 2014; Dreher and Fuchs 2011; Fleck and Kilby 2010), a set of such models with country-fixed effects was initially estimated as a robustness check for the tobit models. When all variables were included, these showed an insignificant inverse Mills Ratio, indicating that the assumption of a two-stage selection should be discarded in favour of a one-stage model. Accordingly, a set of linear panel models with fixed effects was instead estimated as a robustness check, excluding all country-years without aid commitments. A closer examination of the data further justifies this choice. A comparison of all recipient countries with the list of UN member states revealed that the EU gives no aid to 23 countries outside its own borders.[18] These are all 'developed' countries (based on economic and human development measures, see The World Bank 2018; UNDP 2016) or city states aligned with EU members. Rather than not choosing these countries as aid recipients, they likely are not 'eligible' to receive aid in the first place. In contrast, countries which received aid recently can be considered at least potential recipients. A close examination of the 179 country-years in the data where no aid was given showed that between one third and one half of cases were part of a multiple-year series without any new aid commitments, predominantly towards the end point of the observation period. If aid commitments were made in the years prior, they were on average less than a third of the aid commitments made to all other countries in the data. Development indicators in countries not receiving aid commitments were decidedly higher than in countries which did. Cases without new aid commitments towards the end of the observation period could therefore indicate that a country is no longer in the pool of potential recipients rather than not being selected. Given the lower average level of previous aid, gaps in new commitments could also be due to previous commitments still being disbursed over a multi-year period. Overall, this lends some credence to an alternate assumption that the EU does not select only specific countries to receive aid, but instead gives aid to all potential recipients, justifying the exclusion of cases without new commitments.

Several tests were performed on the fixed effects model to determine its ideal configuration. An F-test was used to confirm the choice of a fixed effects model over a standard OLS model, while a

[18] These are: Andorra, Australia, Bahamas, Bahrain, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Iceland, Israel, Kuwait, Liechtenstein, Monaco, New Zealand, Norway, Oman, Qatar, Russia, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Korea, Switzerland, the United Arab Emirates, and the United States of America. Additionally, for the years 2005 and 2006 there was no ODA to Bulgaria and Romania, which subsequently joined the EU in 2007.

Hausman test showed that a fixed effects model was preferable to a random effects model. Lastly a Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier Test indicated significant time effects. Therefore, both country-fixed and time-fixed effects are included in the robustness models.

VII. RESULTS

The results of the tobit models are reported in Table 2. Four separate models were calculated: one with the aggregated and one with the disaggregated counts for both the frequency and the severity of terrorist attacks. Models (1) and (2) both test the normative power hypothesis (H_1). The number of terror attacks (1) as well as the number of casualties through such attacks (2) both have a significant positive effect on the level of aid commitments. The attacks coefficient is significant at the 10% level and the casualties coefficient at the 5% level, making the latter a more reliable predictor. Due to the logged independent variable, effect sizes unfortunately cannot be directly interpreted.

While these results represent a first step towards confirming the normative power hypothesis (H_1), this can only be done together with the confirmation or rejection of the self-interested power hypothesis (H_2). H_2 expects a difference in the effects of terror attacks on aid commitments, depending on their target. Terror attacks on the EU are expected to increase aid commitments, while attacks on other targets are expected to have no effect. Should H_2 be confirmed, this would mean that H_1 has to be rejected, since the positive aggregate effect of terrorism on aid discovered in models (1) and (2) would then be driven exclusively by attacks on the EU. The tests for H_2 are represented in models (3) and (4), in which the number of attacks (3) and the number of casualties (4) is disaggregated into those targeting the EU and those targeting others. Any results other than those expected by H_2 would reject it, and, given the results of models (1) and (2), at the same time confirm H_1.

No significant effects are found for any of the disaggregated independent variables in models (3) and (4). H_2 therefore has to be rejected, which at the same time confirms H_1. The non-significance of the variables for non-EU attacks and casualties is somewhat puzzling given the positive effects of the aggregate variables used in models (1) and (2). Due to the very low number of attacks on the EU, the variables based on attacks on non-EU targets are highly correlated with the aggregated variables (0.99 in both cases). A potential explanation for this could be that EU attacks and casualties drive a fairly large portion of the effect, despite the insignificance of the respective measures. In fact, the EU attacks measure only barely misses the 10% significance threshold, which adds some uncertainty to the results. Nevertheless, this finding confirms the base assumption that the EU in fact does use aid as a counter-terrorism tool.

Table 2: The Effect of Terrorism on EU Aid Commitments (Random Effects Tobit)

	ODA Commitments (log)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Attacks_{t-1}	0.001*			
	(0.0005)			
Casualties_{t-1}		0.0001**		
		(0.0001)		
EU Attacks_{t-1}			0.102	
			(0.067)	
$\text{Other Attacks}_{t-1}$			0.001	
			(0.001)	
$\text{EU Casualties}_{t-1}$				0.015
				(0.013)
$\text{Other Casualties}_{t-1}$				0.0001
				(0.0001)
Population_{t-1} (log)	0.430***	0.434***	0.433***	0.439***
	(0.126)	(0.126)	(0.126)	(0.126)
$\text{GDP per capita}_{t-1}$ (log)	−0.886***	−0.893***	−0.891***	−0.889***
	(0.175)	(0.175)	(0.174)	(0.175)
Mortality_{t-1}	0.004	0.003	0.002	0.003
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
$\text{Affected by Disasters}_{t}$ (log)	0.029	0.030	0.029	0.029
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)
GDP Growth_{t-1}	−0.016	−0.016	−0.015	−0.016
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
$\text{Political Rights}_{t-1}$	0.054	0.053	0.056	0.054
	(0.131)	(0.130)	(0.131)	(0.130)
$\text{Civil Liberties}_{t-1}$	−0.269	−0.276	−0.278*	−0.280*
	(0.168)	(0.168)	(0.168)	(0.168)
$\text{Trade Volume}_{t-1}$ (log)	0.024	0.023	0.026	0.023
	(0.097)	(0.097)	(0.097)	(0.097)
Colonial Ties	−0.839***	−0.814***	−0.864***	−0.837***
	(0.292)	(0.292)	(0.292)	(0.293)
ENP	2.409***	2.446***	2.392***	2.447***
	(0.411)	(0.412)	(0.411)	(0.412)
APC	0.470	0.458	0.512	0.496
	(0.314)	(0.312)	(0.314)	(0.314)
$\text{ODA Commitments}_{t-1}$ (log)	0.315***	0.314***	0.312***	0.312***
	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)
logSigma	1.284***	1.283***	1.283***	1.283***
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Constant	6.569***	6.597***	6.608***	6.513***
	(2.361)	(2.359)	(2.358)	(2.359)
N	1,358	1,358	1,358	1,358
Log Likelihood	-3,420.328	-3,419.710	-3,419.190	-3,419.114
AIC	6,870.657	6,869.419	6,870.381	6,870.228
BIC	6,948.863	6,947.626	6,953.801	6,953.648

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01
(Standard Error in Brackets)

Table 3: The Effect of Terrorism on EU Aid Commitments (Fixed Effects Linear Panel)

	ODA Commitments (log)			
	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Attacks_{t-1}	0.0004			
	(0.0003)			
Casualties_{t-1}		0.0001*		
		(0.00005)		
EU Attacks_{t-1}			0.021	
			(0.033)	
$\text{Other Attacks}_{t-1}$			0.0004	
			(0.0003)	
$\text{EU Casualties}_{t-1}$				0.002
				(0.006)
$\text{Other Casualties}_{t-1}$				0.0001*
				(0.00005)
Population_{t-1} (log)	−2.696*	−2.706*	−2.607*	−2.671*
	(1.474)	(1.469)	(1.481)	(1.473)
$\text{GDP per capita}_{t-1}$ (log)	−1.028*	−1.033*	−0.988*	−1.022*
	(0.555)	(0.554)	(0.559)	(0.555)
Mortality_{t-1}	0.023	0.024	0.024	0.024
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Affected by Disasters_t (log)	−0.003	−0.003	−0.003	−0.003
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
GDP Growth_{t-1}	−0.001	−0.001	−0.001	−0.001
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
$\text{Political Rights}_{t-1}$	−0.003	−0.006	−0.006	−0.007
	(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.086)
$\text{Civil Liberties}_{t-1}$	−0.106	−0.110	−0.109	−0.113
	(0.139)	(0.139)	(0.139)	(0.139)
$\text{Trade Volume}_{t-1}$ (log)	0.055	0.056	0.057	0.057
	(0.134)	(0.134)	(0.135)	(0.134)
$\text{ODA Commitments}_{t-1}$ (log)	−0.014	−0.014	−0.014	−0.014
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
N	1,179	1,179	1,179	1,179
R^2	0.020	0.021	0.020	0.021
Adjusted R^2	-0.129	-0.127	-0.129	-0.128
F Statistic	2.069**	2.190**	1.916**	2.002**
	(df = 10; 1023)	(df = 10; 1023)	(df = 11; 1022)	(df = 11; 1022)

*p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01
(Standard Error in Brackets)

The results of the fixed effects linear panel models are reported in Table 3. The specification of models (5) through (8) is analogous to models (1) through (4), except for the exclusion of the country-level dummies measuring political interests, which are captured by the county-fixed effects. The results of the tobit models are partially confirmed by the linear panel models. Only the number of total casualties remains as a significant predictor for aid (at the 10% level) (6) in the models testing H_1, while the number of attacks loses its significance (it only becomes significant at the 15% level) (5). This confirms that casualties are the stronger predictor for ODA commitments. The coefficient sign remains the same as in the tobit models, with more casualties leading to more aid. Going on to the test of H_2 in models (7) and (8), the panel model shows a significant positive effect of the level of non-EU casualties as expected (8). This increases the confidence in the confirmation of the normative power hypothesis H_1, since it represents a stronger rejection of the self-interested actor hypothesis H_2 regarding the severity of terrorist attacks.[19]

Out of the controls included in the analysis, GDP per capita and the population size consistently show significant effects on aid commitments throughout all models. Confirming the results of previous research, a higher GDP per capita leads to lower ODA commitments. A larger population is associated with higher ODA commitments in the tobit models, but with lower ODA commitments in the linear panel models. This apparent contradiction can be explained with the inclusion of country-fixed effects in the linear panel models: more populous countries are allocated more aid in absolute terms, but less aid per capita than countries with a smaller population. According to the tobit models, countries included in the ENP receive significantly higher ODA commitments, but commitments are significantly lower for former colonies of EU member states. The latter result is somewhat puzzling, since the effect has the opposite direction as expected. Disaggregating this variable for the different former colonial powers in the EU could lead to a better understanding of this finding in further research.

Lastly, the lagged dependent variable has a highly significant positive effect on current ODA commitments, confirming the existence of aid inertia. Due to the inclusion of time-fixed effects, this variable becomes insignificant in models (5) through (8).

[19] Boutton and Carter (2014) suggest that the first attacks in a country year could be the ones most likely to elicit a response from a self-interested actor. As the number of attacks increase, subsequent attacks are assumed to decrease in their effect. Whether there was an attack at all should therefore cause the strongest response. Following this notion, an additional set of models was estimated with simple dummies for the presence of attacks and casualties in each country year instead of count variables. Dummies for the presence EU attacks and casualties in the H_2 tobit models were the only significant effects, lending some support for the self-interested actor thesis. However, since these effects disappear in the fixed-effects models, they likely represent country or time-specific effects rather than evidence for a self-interested actor EU. This could also be the explanation for the insignificance of the non-EU target independent variables in models (3) and (4).

VIII. Discussion

As the findings show, the EU not only uses aid systematically as a counter-terrorism tool, it also does so taking a normative approach. It increases aid in response to higher levels of terrorism, following a strategy to address the factors contributing to radicalisation. While there is some indication that it also bases this on the simple frequency of terror attacks, the number of victims was found to be the more important factor. What started as a self-interested policy response to attacks on European soil has become a global effort to eradicate terrorism where it appears. In this regard, the EU can indeed be considered a global 'force for good'.

Because of the apparent contradiction to its self-perceived role as a normative power, the EU's potential strategic motivation in its foreign policy was a starting point of this analysis. Rather than refuting the existence of this strategic motivation, the results of this study arguably demonstrate that self-interest does not preclude acting for the benefit of everyone. In a globalised world, security threats such as terrorism can no longer be seen as isolated problems requiring specific solutions, as the world has become increasing complexity and interconnected. This is resonated in Mogherini's (2017) view of aid as a selfish action and an investment in European security: Improving the socio-economic conditions on another continent can be beneficial for the security situation within the EU. However, for a normative power this represents a dangerous balancing act. The EU should be careful that its own interests do not take precedence over the interests it propagates with its 'force for good' narrative, in order to ensure its legitimacy as a normative power.

Since the EU was proven to use aid as a counter-terrorism tool, this poses the question of the effectivity of this approach. Its usefulness in combatting terrorism depends on whether aid in fact does reduce radicalisation and terrorism. There are two potential mechanisms which could cause such an effect:

On the one hand, aid can reduce terrorism through an increase in repressive action in the recipient country. The resources necessary can either stem directly from aid funds, or become available through a substitution effect, when the services provided through foreign aid enable a recipient country to reduce its own level of service provision and therefore free funds (e.g. Azam and Delacroix 2006; Azam and Thelen 2008; 2010; Bandyopadhyay, Sandler, and Younas 2011). On the other hand, economic and political growth and development can reduce existing grievances and thus prevent radicalisation, cutting off the supply of new recruits for terrorist organisations

(Bueno de Mesquita 2005; Savun and Hays 2011; Young and Findley 2011). This is in line with the EU's own professed motivation behind its use of aid in counter-terrorism.

While there is some evidence for the overall effectivity of aid regarding the reduction of terrorism (Azam and Delacroix 2006; Azam and Thelen 2010), it appears to be counterproductive when increasing repressive action (Savun and Hays 2011). There is also significant doubt of a positive effect of aid through increased development and poverty reduction. This is caused by considerable uncertainty regarding both whether aid increases the level of development and whether the level of development affects the level of terrorism (Krueger and Malečková 2003; Young and Findley 2011). Instead, current research sees the political and human rights conditions as the most important determinants of the level of terrorism in a country (Dreher, Gassebner, and Siemers 2010; Piazza and Walsh 2009; Shor et al. 2014). Accordingly, aid in these sectors has been found to reduce terrorism in recipient countries (Savun and Tirone 2017).

Judging from its allocation pattern, the EU already takes human rights into account by giving more aid to recipients with a better human rights situation (Kim and Jensen 2018). This can be understood as an effort to incentivise countries with a poor human rights record to improve their performance in order to receive more aid. However, there is currently not sufficient evidence to judge the effectivity of this approach. Furthermore, the Consensus reflects a view of human rights as a performance criterion for the allocation of aid, with the overarching goal to reduce poverty (EU 2006). The *improvement* of a recipient country's human rights therefore does not appear to be a particular focus of the EU's development policy. If the EU want to increase its impact as a global counter-terrorism actor, the improvement of terror-prone countries' human rights records should become a priority in its aid allocation.

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Appendix 1

Properties of the Global Terrorism Database (GTD)

The GTD has a number of specific properties to be aware of, since they have the potential to bias the outcome of this analysis:

First, terrorist attacks are defined by the GTD as "the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation" (START 2018d, 10, emphasis removed). In practice, to be included in the data, a potential incident must be intentional, include the threat or use of violence, and be perpetrated by subnational-actors. Additionally, it has to fulfil two out of the following three criteria:

- A political, economic, religious, or social goal is present;
- It conveys a message to a larger audience than the immediate victims;
- It happened outside the context of legitimate warfare. (ibid. 2018d)

This definition is designed very broadly, including acts often omitted from other definitions of terrorism such as attacks against property and military personnel.[20] The data is therefore prone to overreporting and consequently an underestimation of observed effect sizes and significance, since some incidents might be perceived as crimes instead of terror attacks (Berkebile 2015). Enders, Sandler, and Gaibulloev (2011) identify the inclusion of attacks on military personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan as the main driver for a recent divergence in the number of observed attacks between the GTD and another large-scale terrorism dataset. However, these kinds of attacks are often seen as terror attacks or part of the War on Terror in the European public discourse (e.g. Associated Press 2004; Burke 2008). Therefore, they are likely to illicit the same counter-terrorism response as other attacks. Consequently, the choice was made to utilize all events recorded in the database in the analysis.

Second, like many worldwide event datasets, the GTD is based on systematically collected media reports. As such it is prone to biases in its data collection resulting from different levels of coverage and the quality of media landscapes (START 2018d). Incidents are generally less likely to be recorded if they happen in less accessible, remote areas or where the level of press freedom is low (Drakos and Gofas 2006; Weidmann 2016). A country's regime type has also been shown to influence the way and which events are reported on (Baum and Zhukov 2015). Overall, this means

[20] See de La Calle and Sanchez-Cuenca (2011) and Weinberg, Pedahzur, and Hirsch-Hoefler (2004) for a discussion on definitions of terrorism.

that terrorist attacks in less developed, less democratic countries are less likely to generate media reports. The GTD further requires at least one source deemed to be high-quality to document an attack, which is again less likely in the same group of countries. This means that terrorism in these countries is presumably underreported in the data. While this is a serious concern in many studies with terrorism as the dependent variable, here the effect caused by terrorism as the independent variable is analysed. More specifically, this study examines policy decisions based on the level of terrorism, which implies a reliance on the observed rather than the actual level. To observe the level of terrorism, the EU as a power without own intelligence capacities is generally expected to rely on the same freely available sources as the GTD. Therefore, this bias should not significantly affect the results[21].

Third, the GTD has a complicated history. Over the years, multiple different institutions administered and collected data, which led to multiple changes in methodology and therefore periods of under- and overreporting (Enders, Sandler, and Gaibulloev 2011; Sandler 2014; START 2018d). [22] During the observation period of this study, the methodology changed two times, after 2007 and after 2011. Both times this is partly responsible for an observed increase of the number of attacks collected, but it is unknown to what degree (START 2018a; 2018c).

[21] If the EU did indeed have to capacity to observe the actual level of terrorism, the extent of any policy response would be larger than expected from the data given, due to its underreporting of the level of terrorism. The observed effect on aid in these countries would therefore be overestimated in the results.
[22] Somewhat astonishingly, the data for 1993 was lost when the box containing the data (back then recorded on paper) fell off a moving truck!

Appendix 2

Coding Procedure for the Disaggregation of EU and non-EU Attack Targets

The disaggregation of attacks according to EU and non-EU targets was achieved with the following procedure:

In a first step, all terror attacks relevant for the analysis were determined based on their date and location. Terror attacks outside the time frame of the independent variable, 2005-2014, were discarded, as were attacks taking place inside the borders of the EU. Attacks taking place inside Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania, which joined the EU during the observation period, were only included for the time before their EU membership. Second, the GTD offers data on up to three targets per event, including their nationality. In a first step, all attacks with one of these variables indicating an EU member state were selected, yielding a total of 401 events targeting the EU. The lack of a designator for the EU itself as a target as well as known issues with coding inaccuracy and inconsistency of the GTD (Berkebile 2015), prompted a further examination of the remaining data. A cursory search revealed several further events targeting EU institutions or other EU interests not initially captured. Most of these were missed because the targets were insufficiently coded as only international or multinational rather than including the nationalities of the targets involved.

In a second step, the target descriptions of all remaining events were therefore searched for the names and respective adjectives of all EU member states and the EU itself[23]. This resulted in another 135 events, which were then hand-coded based on the event summary and the target descriptions provided in the dataset. Events were coded as targeting the EU, if the target was one or multiple EU citizens, an EU institution or agency, or national entities of EU member states, including NGOs, aid agencies and companies. Attacks on local staff of relevant entities were included as well, provided the attack was linked to their work for such an entity. Another 102 relevant attacks were identified, bringing the total number of attacks targeting the EU within the observation period up to 503. Due to missing data on other variables, not all of those could be included in the final dataset.

[23] The exact search terms were: "austria", "belgi", "cypr", "czech", "danish", "denmark","estonia", "finnish", "finland", "french", "france", "german", "greek", "greece", "hungar", "irish", "ireland", "italy", "italian", "latvia", "lithuania", "luxembourg", "malta", "maltese", "dutch", "netherlands", "polish", "poland", "portug", "slovak", "sloven", "spanish", "spain", "swed", "engl", "scot", "wales", "welsh", "united kingdom", "brit", "bulgaria", "romania", "croat", and "Europe" (case-insensitive), as well as "EU" and "UK" (case-sensitive).

Individual coding decisions for the hand-coded events as well as respective event and target descriptions can be found in Table A 1.

Table A 1: Individual coding decisions for manually coded cases.

Event Summary (GTD)	Target Description (GTD)	Coding Decision (1 = EU Target):
01/01/2005: A suicide bomber killed four people employed with the security firms Kroll Inc. and Bearing Point after ramming his vehicle into theirs in Baghdad, Iraq. The bomb exploded near Baghdad's green zone killing three British workers and an American. The bomber was targeting a US manned checkpoint near the green zone. No group claimed responsibility for the bombing.	*US Military personnel stationed in Baghdad's green zone; American and British workers in Baghdad; British and American employees of Kroll Inc. in Baghdad*	***1***
03/16/2005: A large explosion was reported in the offices of an Iraqi newspaper in Baghdad, the Baghdad Mirror, which is a weekly English newspaper. No casualties or damage were reported. No group claimed responsibility for the attack.	*English Weekly Newspaper in Baghdad*	***0***
08/02/2005: An explosion caused by a small device planted in a trash bin injured four people in Antalya, Turkey. No group claimed responsibility for the bombing and local authorities believed that explosion could have been accidental.	*Businesses in a market in Antalya; Tourists visiting Antalya including one French man; Civilians in Antalya*	***1***
08/10/2005: Unknown perpetrators planted a small bomb in a trash bin that exploded in Port-of-Spain, Trinidad and Tobago. The bomb did not result in any casualties or damage. No group claimed responsibility for the attack.	*Port-of-Spain civilians*	***0***
01/11/2006: Four foreign workers for the Royal Dutch Shell company were taken hostage by an armed group in three boats in Niger Delta region, southern Nigeria when they were abducted from a support vessel. The outcome of the kidnapping was unknown, and no group claimed responsibility.	*Royal Dutch Shell Company workers*	***1***
01/14/2006: Attackers hurled a grenade into a compound used by a European team monitoring Sri Lanka's truce, damaging three vehicles but injuring none. No group claimed responsibility	*European team monitoring Sri Lanka's truce*	***1***
01/30/2006: Masked gunmen broke into the European Union (EU) office in Gaza City, Palestine to demand that employees close it, while about 15 other masked gunmen waited outside with an assortment of weapons. The group left after about half an hour, and no one was injured. The Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade claimed responsibility for the attack which was a protest against portrayals of Mohammed published in Danish cartoons.	*EU office in Gaza City*	***1***
04/04/2006: A missile attack was launched against the British Consulate during the commemoration of the anniversary of the coronation of Queen Elizabeth II when gunmen launched four missiles that landed within the consulate's area. No group claimed responsibility for the attack.	*British Consulate in Basra*	***1***
04/04/2006: Salah Jali al-Gharrawi, an accountant with the Agence France Presse in Baghdad, Iraq, was kidnapped as he left the AFP Baghdad office. No group claimed responsibility for the attack.	*Salah Jali al-Gharrawi, accountant for Agence France Presse*	***1***

04/06/2006: Remote-controlled explosives attached to a bicycle seriously wounded a German soldier on a Bundeswehr patrol and killed an Afghan civilian and wounded three in Kunduz province, Afghanistan. The attack was carried out by an unidentified perpetrator. No group claimed responsibility for the attack.	*German soldiers*	***1***
04/12/2006: An interpreter who had been working with British troops in Basra, Iraq, had been kidnapped on April 12 was found dead the next day. No group claimed responsibility for the attack.	*Interpreter working with British troops in Basra*	***0***
04/15/2006: A member of President Jalal Talabani's Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) party was kidnapped in Kirkuk, Iraq. No group claimed responsibility for the attack.	*Member of President Jalal Talabani's Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) party*	***0***
07/03/2006: A time controlled explosive device went off in a Herat, Afghanistan University. The classroom in which the bomb was planted was designated for female classes. There was one fatality and eight injuries. The perpetrator group is unknown but some have speculated that the Taliban is behind the attack. No group claimed responsibility for the attack.	*Herat University English Language Department*	***0***
07/05/2006: A German aid vehicle was ambushed in southern Sudan. There were at least six fatalities and eleven injuries. In addition, one person was missing after the attack. The Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) was suspected of being the perpetratror group. However, the LRA has denied involvement.	*German Agency for Technical Cooperation vehicle in southern Sudan carrying non-German employees*	***1***
08/02/2006: Taliban insurgents attacked a Danish camp in Musa Qala, Afghanistan, seriously wounding one soldier .	*Danish camp*	***1***
08/15/2006: A suicide car bomb exploded at the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan [PUK] organization center in Mosul, Iraq. Nine were killed and thirty-six were injured. No claim of responsibility was reported.	*Patriotic Union of Kurdistan [PUK] organization center in Mosul*	***0***
10/29/2006: Seventeen Iraqi police instructors and two translators were killed on their way home from a British-run training school near Basra, Iraq. The workers were stopped by unidentified gunmen in Basra's al-Kibla area and killed. The bodies were taken by the attackers back to the vicinity of a British base and scattered around the area. There was no claim of responsibility.	*Iraqi police instructors and translators working for a British-run police training school near Basra.*	***0***
05/19/2007: A Taliban suicide bomber blew himself up in a market in Kunduz, Afghanistan killing 8 people and wounding 16 others. 3 of the 8 people killed were German soldiers. It is unknown who the intended targets were. A Taliban spokesman, Zabihullah Mujahed, claimed responsibility for the Taliban.	*Military personnel including German soldiers; Afghan civilians in a market in Kunduz*	***1***
06/26/2007: Masked tribal perpetrators attired in black robes, who identified them only as PPA, kidnapped an official of the Danish organisation and his driver at gunpoint at rugged Thanchhi area of Bangladesh as they were travelling on a boat.	*Aid workers of Danish organization*	***1***
11/14/2007: Taliban insurgents shot and killed an Afghan teacher for teaching English in Sayed Karam, Afghanistan, sparking a gun battle that left two militants and two policemen dead in addition to the original victim.	*English Teacher; Police Responding to first shooting*	***0***
11/16/2007: Taliban insurgents shot and killed a 16 year old boy in Sayed Karam in Afghanistan's Paktia Province after they discovered him teaching English to a group of students. The boy reportedly did not heed an earlier warning directing him to stop teaching the courses.	*A teenage boy teaching English*	***0***

01/13/2008: Two International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Dutch soldiers were killed in attacks by the Taliban in southern Uruzgan province. Taliban militants took responsibility for the attack in a statement posted on their website.	*Dutch soldiers*	***1***
02/19/2008: In a series of related incidents, a bomb was detonated in front the European Mission Headquarters in Kosovska Mitrovica. No causalities resulted from this incident, and only minor property damage occurred. Mlada Bosna, a Serb organization whose name translates to "Young Bosnia", claimed responsibility for this attack.	*European Mission building*	***1***
03/18/2008: Taliban members attacked a convoy of Spanish Provincial Reconstruction Team in Badghis Province, Afghanistan.	*Spanish provincial reconstruction team*	***1***
03/26/2008: Three German soldiers from a NATO unit were wounded in a blast from a roadside mine planted by Taliban militants in the Chardara district in Kunduz Province, Afghanistan. The soldiers' tank was also damaged.	*German soldiers*	***1***
03/26/2008: A Danish soldier was killed and another was wounded when their patrol came under attack from small arms and mortar fire from Taliban insurgents in Helmand province, Afghanistan.	*Danish soldiers*	***1***
03/30/2008: Two British Marines were killed when a roadside explosion blew up their vehicle during a routine patrol near the Kajaki Dam in Helmand province, Afghanistan. The perpetrators were not known.	*British soldiers*	***1***
04/08/2008: On or around Tuesday, in Chaharikar, Parvan, Afghanistan, assailants kidnapped two civilians, a driver and a doctor working for Kinderberg, a German non-governmental organization (NGO). The hostages were released on an unspecified date in 04/2008. No group claimed responsibility.	*Two employees of a German non-governmental organization*	***1***
4/21/2008: On Monday, a member in the PUK party and three of his guards were injured in an improvised explosive device detonation that targeted their convoy in Tayaran intersection in downtown Kirkuk, At Ta'mim, Iraq. There were no claims of responsibility for the incident.	*A member of the PUK political party and his guards*	***0***
05/09/2008: On Friday afternoon at 12:10, two Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP) militants riding a red Tata Magic van delivered a package containing a Chinese made hand grenade packed in paper to the Robert English School at Canchipur in the Imphal West district, Manipur province, India. Upon delivering the bomb, the militants told the school receptionists that the package was a "gift" from the KPC to the school principal. Police then defused the explosive device preventing any loss of life or injuries.	*The Robert English School*	***0***
05/26/2008: On Monday morning in Awoba, Rivers, Nigeria, rebels detonated an improvised explosive device against a Royal Dutch oil pipeline causing no injuries but killed 11 soilders in a fire fight after the bombing. The Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta claimed responsibility.	*Royal Dutch oil pipeline*	***1***
07/26/2008: On Saturday, two Russians, two Ukrainians and one Pole were abducted by Nigerian militants from the tug boat, the Hercules, in Nigeria. No demands have been made.	*Two Russian crew members of the Hercules;* *One Polish crew member of the Hercules was targeted;* *Two Ukrainian crew members of the Hercules were targeted*	***1***

08/13/2008: On Wednesday, at an unknown time, in Ataq, Shabwah, Yemen, tribesmen released a French engineer of Algerian origin, after holding him hostage for one day. There were no reported casualties.	*The target was a french engineer.*	***1***
2/22/2008: Al-Qa ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQLIM) kidnapped two Austrian tourists as they were vacationing in Tunisia. In a recorded statement, AQLIM declared that the kidnapping was in response to the massacre of "our brothers in Gaza"; they also sent out a warning to Western tourists planning to vacation in Tunisia. The two hostages, Wolfgang Ebner and Andrea Kloiber, were released in Mali on October 31, 2008.	*Wolfgang Ebner and Andrea Kloiber, two Austrian tourists in Tunisia*	***1***
11/14/2008: On Friday, in Pristina, Serbia, an improvised explosive device was thrown at the Pristina office of the internationally appointed administrator for Kosovo, the International Civilian Representative. There was no reported casualties. There was no reported damage. There were no claims of responsibility.	*The target was a European Union office.*	***1***
11/14/2008: On Friday evening at 1730, in Pristina, Kosovo, assailants detonated an improvised explosive device in the yard of the European Union's International Civil Representative Office, damaging the building, but causing no injuries. The Army of the Republic of Kosovo claimed responsibility.	*The European Union's International Civil Representative Office*	***1***
11/30/2008: On Sunday afternoon at 1430, a suicide bomber detonated his vehicle-borne improvised explosive device near a German diplomatic convoy, killing three civilians, injuring six others, and damaging at least two vehicles. No group claimed responsibility.	*A German diplomatic convoy*	***1***
12/19/2008: On Friday evening, at 1700, in Kvemo-Khviti, Shida Kartli, Georgia, assailants fired upon an Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) vehicle carrying three observers, causing damage to the vehicle but no injuries. No group claimed responsibility.	*An Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe vehicle*	***0***
02/10/2009: On Tuesday night at 0300, militants abducted two European Union monitors, working for the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, near the Georgian village of Adzvi, in the Gori district. According to the Georgian Interior Minister, the hostages were moved to the village of Akhalgori. From there, their locations were lost. The nationalities of the victims has not been released. No group has claimed responsibility for this attack.	*Two European Union monitors were targeted in Georgia.*	***1***
03/16/2009: On Monday, in Nembe, Bayelsa, Nigeria, suspected armed militants in gunboats attacked an oil flow station, operated by Royal Dutch Shell, in the southern Niger Delta. Colonel Rabe Abubakar, spokesman for the military taskforce in the western Niger Delta, said the facility was attacked by gunmen in five speedboats at Nembe in Bayelsa state. No casualties were reported in the incident, and no damage resulted. No group claimed responsibility.	*The target was a Royal Dutch Shell oil flow station.*	***1***
4/8/2009: Suspected insurgents ambushed a vehicle carrying security personnel in Al Aouana, Jijel province, Algeria. The assailants opened fire on the vehicle the secruity guards were traveling in; three guards were shot and killed. The victims were employed by a Portuguese-Brazilian consortium that was constructing marina facilities in the area. No group claimed responsibility for the incident.	*The private security guards for a Portuguese-Brazilian consortium*	***0***

06/21/2009: On Sunday, in Muzhava, Samegrelo-Zemo Svanet'i, Georgia, an improvised explosive device exploded as a European Union Monitor Mission convoy was passing, killing a Georgian medical worker, wounding a Georgian doctor, destroying one vehicle, and damaging one other. No group claimed responsibility.	*The target was a European Union Monitor Mission convoy.*	***1***
07/06/2009: On Monday, in Sar Sabad, Taywara (Teyvareh), Ghowr, Afghanistan, assailants entered a residence and fired on and killed an employee of the French non-governmental organization MADERA (Mission d'Aide au Développement des Economies Rurales en Afghanistan). No group claimed responsibility, although it was widely believed the Taliban was responsible.	*An employee of the French non-governmental organization MADERA was targeted in the attack.*	***0***
09/27/2009: On Sunday, in Kart-e-Parwan, Kabul, Kabul, Afghanistan, armed assailants threw a grenade at the former British embassy building, damaging the building but causing no casualties. No group claimed responsibility.	*The former British embassy building was targeted in the attack.*	***0***
10/07/2009: An explosive device detonated near an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) patrol outside of Siahvashan, Herat, Afghanistan. At least one Spanish soldier was killed and five other Spanish soldiers were injured in the blast. No group claimed responsibility for the attack.	*Spanish Patrol*	***1***
11/26/2009: On Thursday afternoon, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) bureau official, Raheem Agha Bakhtiyar, who ran in Saadiya, Khanaqin district, was killed when an improvised explosive device went off in front of his house in Sa diyah, northeast of Ba'quba, Iraq. No damage was reported. No group claimed responsibility.	*The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) bureau official Raheem Agha Bakhtiyar,*	***0***
12/30/2009: On Wednesday, two French journalists, their driver and the Afghan interpreter were kidnapped by Taliban gunmen in Shira Khil and Omar Khil areas in Tagab District, Kapisa Province, Afghanistan. They came to Tagab District from Sorobi District of Kabul Province without informing security forces. On 12/31/2009, the police went to Tagab District to investigate the incident. They spoke to local residents and did not gain any information about the French journalists. The Taliban demanded a cash ransom as well as the release of a militant commander, in a statement released on 01/6/2010. The Taliban released another video of the French journalists on 2/14/2010.	*French journalists*	***1***
06/27/2010: On Sunday evening around 2100, in the neighborhood of Rohero in Bujumbura, Burundi, unidentified assailants fired two grenades at a house on Muyinga Avenue where European Union (EU) election observers were staying for Burundi's upcoming presidential election. No damages or casualties were reported as only one of the grenades detonated. No group claimed responsibility for the attack but it was widely believed that the ex-rebel National Liberation Forces (FNL) or another opposition party was responsible.	*European Union (EU) election observers*	***1***
12/20/2010: On Monday afternoon, in the Recoleta neighborhood in the Retiro area of Buenos Aires, Argentina, an improvised explosive device detonated outside a Frances Bank. The blast damaged windows and the entrance of the building but resulted in no casualties. The explosion also scattered a number of pamphlets denouncing repression of the Qom indigenous community. No group claimed responsibility, although the attack has been attributed to the Anarkista Jorge Banos Front of the Everyone For The Homeland Movement (MTP) anarchist group.	*A Frances Bank*	***0***

12/30/2010: On Thursday night at 0200, a small bomb exploded at the entrance of the Greek Embassy in Buenos Aires, Argentina. The blast broke some windows, caused minor damage to the building's facade and caused an unknown amount of property damage to nearby vehicles and other buildings on the block but resulted in no casualties as it was unoccupied at the time of the attack. Initial reports suggest a Molotov Cocktail was thrown at the embassy; however, the majority of sources report that an explosive device was used in the attack. No group has claimed responsibility.	*The Greek Embassy in Buenos Aires, Argentina,*	***1***
10/10/2011: On Monday afternoon, in Almar, Faryab, Afghanistan, four Afghan employees of the French aid organization Agende a'Aide a la Cooperation Technique Et au Development (ACTED) were kidnapped while returning from hygiene training at a mosque by unidentified militants during an ambush of the Najar village. Three of the employees were community health trainers and one was a driver. Their vehicle, a Toyota Hilux Surf, was also seized. It was reported that all the hostages were freed unharmed the next day on Tuesday 10/11/2011. No group claimed responsibility but the Taliban were suspected.	*Four workers from the French aid organization Agende a'Aide a la Cooperation Technique Et au Development (ACTED)*	***1***
11/6/2011: Unidentified insurgents opened fire on a military patrol near Ludina, Badghis province, Afghanistan. The military patrol, along with snipers, and Spanish military advisers, had taken position on a hillside in order to protect troops moving through the valley. The assailants shot and killed staff sergeant Joaquin Moya Espejo; he was the first Spanish soldier killed by gunfire in the country since 2002. No group claimed responsibility for the incident.	*Spanish patrol*	***1***
11/9/2011: An explosive device detonated in Babaji, Helmand province, Afghanistan. A British soldier on patrol in the vicinity of the device was killed in the blast. No group claimed responsibility for the incident.	*British soldier*	***1***
11/16/2011: An explosive device detonated in the Mirmandab area of Nahr-e Saraj, Helmand province, Afghanistan. The device was targeting the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF); one soldier from Great Britain was killed in the blast. No group claimed responsibility for the incident and specific motive is unknown.	*British soldier*	***1***
11/16/2011: A suicide bomber drove his explosive-laden vehicle into a convoy in southern Mosul city, Nineveh province, Iraq. Hraim Kamal Agha, the head of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), was part of the convoy; he was not harmed in the explosion. However, three civilian passers-by were injured. No group claimed responsibility for the attack and specific motive is unknown.	*Hraim Kamal Agha, the head of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK); Civilians in the vicinity of Hraim Kamal Agha's convoy*	***0***
11/25/2011: Members of Al-Qa ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQLIM) abducted three tourists from Amanar restaurant in the city of Timbuktu, Timbuktu region, Mali. The hostages included Stephen McGown, a South African and British dual national; Johan Gustafson, a Swedish national; and Sjaak Rijke, a Dutch national. A fourth man, a German national, was shot and killed when he resisted getting into the assailants' vehicle. Rijke's wife was also present, but managed to evade capture. Rijke was unexpectedly freed during an operation by French special forces in April 2015. In June 2015 a video was posted online in which McGown and Gustafson call on the governments of South Africa and Sweden to secure their release, but make no reference to negotiations or ransom. Gustafson was released in June 2017, and McGown was ultimately released in August 2017 following payment of a $4.2 million ransom.	*Tourists in Timbuktu, including German, Dutch, Swedish and British-South African nationals*	***1***

11/29/2011: An explosive device detonated in Baghlan Markazi district, Baghlan province, Afghanistan. The blast was targeting a vehicle of international forces' soldiers; at least one German soldier was wounded. No group claimed responsibility, although officials believe that the Taliban was involved.	*German vehicle*	***1***
11/29/2011: Unidentified gunmen opened fire on a university professor in the Zarghoonabad area of Quetta city, Balochistan province, Pakistan. Muhammad Danish, a lecturer with the Science and Informational Technology department, was traveling to Balochistan University when assailants on motorcycles shot and killed him. The assailants fled and no group claimed responsibility for the attack. Specific motive is unknown; however, sources report that the incident appeared to be a sectarian killing.	*Muhammad Danish, a university professor*	***0***
11/30/2011: A sticky bomb attached to a vehicle detonated in the Military district of southern Kirkuk city, Kirkuk governorate, Iraq. The vehicle belonged to a member of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK); he was killed in the blast and his car was badly damaged. No group claimed responsibility for the incident and specific motive is unknown.	*A civilian member of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)*	***0***
12/06/2011: A British soldier was killed in an improvised explosive device (IED) attack while on an engineering reconnaissance mission in the Deh Adham Khan area of Nahr-e Saraj district, Helmand province, Afghanistan. Following the attack, the soldier, Elijah Cooper Bond, was transferred to the Queen Elizabeth hospital in Birmingham, UK, where he died of his wounds on Thursday, December 8, 2011. There were no reports of any additional injuries or property damage in the incident. No group has claimed responsibility for the attack.	*British soldier: Elijah Cooper Bond*	***1***
12/21/2011: Five Polish soldiers were killed in Rawza, Ghazni, Afghanistan, when their vehicle drove over a buried roadside bomb. The troops were part of a the NATO- led International Security Assistance Force. The Taliban claimed responsibility for the attack through text messages sent to journalists after the attack, but no specific motive was reported. There were also no reports of the number of people wounded.	*Polish Soldiers*	***1***
12/22/2011: An explosive device detonated south of Kabul city in Afghanistan. The blast was targeting a military vehicle; one British soldier from the Royal Marines was killed in the blast and a second British soldier from the Royal Air Force died days later from his injuries. No group claimed responsibility for the incident.	*British soldiers*	***1***
01/04/2012: An armored vehicle ran over a landmine in Golestan district, Farah province, Afghanistan. One Italian soldier was wounded in the blast. No group claimed responsibility for the attack.	*Italian Convoy*	***1***
01/20/2012: A 21-year-old Afghan soldier attacked French troops at a French and Afghan National Army shared base in Tagab district, Kapisa province, Afghanistan. Four French soldiers were killed in the attack, and 15 were hurt. The Taliban claimed responsibility, saying that they had recruited the soldier. The soldier claimed that he did it because of a video of United States Marines urinating on dead bodies.	*French Soldiers*	***1***
01/24/2012: An explosive device detonated, targeting a patrol of soldiers taking part in a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) operation in Nad Ali district, Helmand province, Afghanistan. An Estonian soldier was injured in the attack. No group claimed responsibility for the incident.	*Estonian Defense Forces Patrol*	***1***

01/26/2012: A suicide bomber detonated an explosives-laden vehicle in Lashkar Gah city, Helmand province, Afghanistan. The suicide bomber was targeting a British Provincial Reconstruction Team. Four people were killed and 31 injured in the attack. The Taliban claimed responsibility for the incident.	*British Provincial Reconstruction Team Convoy; Civilians*	***1***
01/27/2012: An explosive device detonated near a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) patrol in Khar Nikah area, Nahri Saraj district, Helmand province, Afghanistan. A Gurkha soldier serving with the British Army was killed in the attack. No group claimed responsibility for the incident, but sources attributed it to the Taliban.	*British Patrol*	***1***
03/07/2012: Six Northern Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) soldiers were killed when their vehicle struck a roadside bomb in Durai Junction, Kandahar province, Afghanistan. The Taliban claimed responsibility for the attack in a statement posted on their website.	*British Soldiers*	***1***
03/09/2012: Two gunmen shot and killed Doloh Dengla, a former member of the Tambon Plonghoi Administration Organization, in Ban Tulo area, Pattani province, Thailand. No group claimed responsibility for this incident, but officials suspected separatists.	*Doloh Dengla*	***0***
03/18/2012: Gunmen shot and killed Joel Shrum, an American, in Taizz city, Ta'izz Governorate, Yemen. Shrum had been teaching at a Swedish institute in the city. Ansar al-Sharia claimed responsibility for the attack, stating that Shrum was killed because he was spreading Christianity among Muslims.	*English Teacher: Joel Shrum*	***0***
03/21/2012: An explosive device detonated in Mirandab area, Helmand province, Afghanistan. A British soldier from the Second Battalion, Mercian Regiment, was killed. No group claimed responsibility for this attack.	*British Soldier*	***1***
03/24/2012: Assailants fired mortars at a military base in Gulistan district, Farah province, Afghanistan. One Italian soldier was killed, and five other people were injured. No group claimed responsibility for the attack; however, sources attributed it to the Taliban.	*Italian Base*	***1***
04/11/2012: An explosive device detonated near North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) troops in Nade-e Ali district, Helmand province, Afghanistan. One soldier was killed in the blast. No group claimed responsibility for the incident.	*British Soldier*	***1***
04/21/2012: Gunmen kidnapped three International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) workers, including a French national, in Al Hudaydah governorate, Yemen. Two of the hostages, both Yemeni, were released soon after the abduction. The French national was released on July 13, 2012. No group claimed responsibility for the initial abduction; however, sources indicated that the French victim was at one point handed over to Al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). It was AQAP who eventually released the hostage.	*French Aid Worker*	***1***
04/27/2012: Assailants opened fire on a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) patrol in Nahr-e Saraj district, Helmand province, Afghanistan. One solider was killed in the attack. No group claimed responsibility for the incident; however, sources attributed it to the Taliban.	*British patrol*	***1***
05/03/2012: An explosive device detonated next to a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Special Operations Squadron in southern Afghanistan. Three Lithuanian soldiers were injured in the blast. No group claimed responsibility for the attack.	*Lithuanian Special Operation Squadron Patrol*	***1***

05/04/2012: Assailants fired mortars at the Forward Operating Base Ouellete in Nahri Saraj district, Helmand province, Afghanistan. Two British North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) soldiers were killed in the attack. The Taliban claimed responsibility for the incident, stating that it was part of a spring offense in southern Afghanistan targeting Afghan and foreign troops.	*Forward Operating Base Ouellette: British Soldiers*	***1***
05/04/2012: An explosive device detonated near a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) soldier in Zabul province, Afghanistan. A Romanian soldier, Florinel Enache, was injured in the blast. No group claimed responsibility for the incident.	*Romanian 280 Infantry Battalion Soldier: Florinel Enache*	***1***
05/07/2012: Assailants with automatic weapons attacked a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) patrol comprised of Italian soldiers in Badghis province, Afghanistan. No one was injured and none of the vehicles were damaged in the shooting. No group claimed responsibility for the attack.	*Italian Forces Patrol*	***1***
05/09/2012: Two gunmen opened fire on Mohamed Ahmed Fanah, a coordinator for Islamic Relief United Kingdom, in Baidoa city, Bay region, Somalia. Fanah was killed in the gunfire. No group claimed responsibility for the incident.	*Mohamed Ahmed Fanah, an aide worker with UK based Islamic Relief Organization*	***0***
05/12/2012: Two men wearing Afghan National Police (ANP) uniforms opened fire on North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces in Girishk city, Nahri Saraj district, Helmand province, Afghanistan. Two British soldiers were killed in the attack, as well as one assailant when soldiers returned fire. One assailant was also injured in the ensuing gunfire. No group claimed responsibility for the incident.	*British Soldiers*	***1***
06/01/2012: Assailants opened fire on a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) foot patrol in Nahre Saraj district, Helmand province, Afghanistan. One British soldier was killed in the attack. The Taliban claimed responsibility for the incident.	*British Foot Patrol: Corporal Michael Thacker*	***1***
06/02/2012: Assailants attacked a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military patrol in Nahre Saraj district, Helmand province, Afghanistan. One British soldier was killed in the attack. No group claimed responsibility for the incident.	*British Soldier*	***1***
06/09/2012: A suicide bomber wearing a burqa detonated, targeting a joint military patrol in Pul-e-khwaja village, Kapisa province, Afghanistan. In addition to the bomber, seven people, including French soldiers and interpreters, were killed; five soldiers and four civilians were also injured. The Taliban claimed responsibility for the incident.	*Joint Patrol; French Patrol*	***1***
06/13/2012: An explosive device detonated in Nahre Saraj district, Helmand province, Afghanistan. A British North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) soldier was killed in the blast. No group claimed responsibility for the incident.	*British Soldier: Lance Corporal James Ashworth*	***1***
06/15/2012: A roadside bomb detonated in Farah city, Farah province, Afghanistan. Four Italian North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) soldiers were injured in the blast. No group claimed responsibility for the incident.	*Italian Soldiers*	***1***
08/10/2012: Assailants attacked a British soldier in Nad Ali district, Helmand province, Afghanistan. One British soldier, Matthew David Smith, was killed in the attack. No group claimed responsibility for the incident; however, the Afghan Ministry of Defense attributed it to the Taliban.	*British Soldiers*	***1***

08/15/2012: Assailants kidnapped Professor Cyprian Onyeji in Enugu city, Enugu state, Nigeria. Three police officers guarding the professor were wounded in the abduction. Onyeji, the vice chancellor of Enugu State University of Science and Technology (ESUT), was released on August 24, 2012. No group claimed responsibility for the incident.	*Vice Chancellor: Cyprian Onyeji*	***0***
08/17/2012: Assailants attacked a checkpoint in Nahr-e Saraj district, Helmand province, Afghanistan. One British soldier, Guardsman Jamie Shadrake, was killed in the attack. No group claimed responsibility for the incident.	*British Guardsman: Jamie Shadrake*	***1***
08/25/2012: A joint Afghan and Italian military patrol discovered an explosive device along a road near Farah city, Farah province, Afghanistan. As they were defusing the device, assailants opened fire on the patrol. The troops returned fire, causing the assailants to flee. There were no reported casualties in the attack, and the soldiers successfully defused the device. No group claimed responsibility for the incident.	*Italian Soldiers*	***1***
08/31/2012: Assailants remotely detonated a roadside bomb and then opened fire on the provincial deputy governor's convoy in Jangal Bagh area, Baghlan-e-Markazi district, Baghlan province, Afghanistan. The deputy governor, Hambullah Danishi, was unharmed, but three of his guards were injured in the attack. No group claimed responsibility for the incident.	*Convoy of Deputy Governor: Hamdullah Danishi*	***0***
09/14/2012: A roadside bomb exploded on a vehicle carrying Duane Groom, a British soldier, in Nahr-e Saraj district, Helmand province, Afghanistan. Groom died in the attack. No group claimed responsibility for the incident.	*British Soldier: Duane Groom*	***1***
09/18/2012: Gunmen opened fire on a Federal Investigative Agency (FIA) officer in Garden area, Saddar Town, Sindh province, Pakistan. The officer died in the gunfire. No group claimed responsibility for the incident.	*Danish Shabbir*	***0***
09/28/2012: An Australian and a British tourist were kidnapped during a canoeing trip in Cuyabeno Wildlife Reserve, Sucumbios province, Ecuador. The two tourists were returned unharmed on September 29, 2012. No group claimed responsibility for the incident; however, authorities attributed it to the Black Eagles, a Colombian group.	*British and Australian Tours*	***1***
10/24/2012: Assailants attacked North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) soldiers in Nahr-e Saraj district, Helmand province, Afghanistan. Two British soldiers died in the attack. No group claimed responsibility for the incident	*British Soldiers*	***1***
10/25/2012: Assailants opened fire on a military patrol in Si Av village, Bakwa district, Farah province, Afghanistan. An Italian trooper was killed and three others injured in the clash. No group claimed responsibility for the incident; however, Afghan security officials attributed it to the Taliban.	*Italian soldiers*	***1***
10/26/2012: An explosive device detonated, targeting a convoy of Italian soldiers in Khormaleq area, Farah province, Afghanistan. There were no reported casualties; however, an armored vehicle was damaged in the blast. No group claimed responsibility for the incident.	*Italian Soldiers*	***1***
01/05/2013: Assailants kidnapped two European tourists in Rutshuru area, Kisheguru district, North Kivu province, Democratic Republic of the Congo. The abductees, a German and an Austrian, were rescued by security forces on or before January 16, 2013. The victims were not injured, although the assailants stole the abductees' personal belongings. Officials attribute the incident to the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR).	*European Tourists*	***1***

01/14/2013: Assailants attacked a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military base in Lashkar Gah district, Helmand province, Afghanistan. One British soldier was killed in the attack. No group claimed responsibility for the incident.	*British Soldier: Kingsman David Shaw*	***1***
01/14/2013: Three police officers opened fire on a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military convoy of Italian soldiers in Bala Bolouck town, Farah province, Afghanistan. There were no reported injuries among the NATO soldiers. The Taliban claimed responsibility for the incident, stating that the police officers had joined their group.	*Italian convoy*	***1***
01/23/2013: An explosive device detonated on a group of Polish North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) soldiers on patrol in Shelgar area, Ghazni province, Afghanistan. A member of Poland's Elite Special Forces Unit (GROM), Krzysztof Wozniak, was killed in the attack and two soldiers were injured. The Taliban claimed responsibility for the incident.	*Polish Elite Special Forces Unit (GROM) Soldier*	***1***
03/06/2013: An explosive device planted along a road detonated near a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) vehicle in Bala Buluk district, Farah province, Afghanistan. Two Italian soldiers and their Afghan interpreter were injured in the explosion. The Taliban claimed responsibility for the attack.	*Italian Convoy*	***1***
04/14/2013: A roadside bomb detonated near a military patrol in Zawa area, Shindand district, Herat province, Afghanistan. Two Italian soldiers were wounded in the attack. The Taliban claimed responsibility for the incident.	*Italian Convoy*	***1***
04/30/2013: A roadside bomb detonated in Nahr-e-Saraj district, Helmand province, Afghanistan. The blast targeted a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military patrol. Three British soldiers and nine civilians were killed in the explosion. Six other soldiers were injured in the attack. The Taliban claimed responsibility for the incident.	*British Patrol*	***1***
05/04/2013: Assailants opened fire on Afghan National Army (ANA) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) troops near Baghlan city, Baghlan province, Afghanistan. One German soldier was killed and another was wounded in the attack. No group claimed responsibility for the incident.	*German Soldiers; Soldiers*	***1***
05/27/2013: A suicide bomber detonated an explosives-laden vehicle near a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) patrol in Kansak area, Bala Baluk district, Farah province, Afghanistan. Two Italian soldiers and two civilians were injured in the explosion. The Taliban claimed responsibility for the attack.	*Italian Convoy*	***1***
06/08/2013: An assailant threw a hand grenade at North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) soldiers in Farah city, Farah province, Afghanistan. One Italian soldier was killed in the blast and three more soldiers were injured. The Taliban claimed responsibility for the incident.	*Italian Soldiers*	***1***
06/10/2013: A roadside bomb detonated in eastern Ghazni province, Afghanistan. One North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) soldier from Poland was killed in the blast. No group claimed responsibility for the incident.	*Polish Patrol*	***1***
06/20/2013: Assailants kidnapped a former United States (US) soldier in El Retorno town, Guaviare department, Colombia. The victim, Kevin Scott Sutay, was in the country as a tourist at the time of his abduction. In July 2013, The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) claimed responsibility for the attack, and offered to release Sutay as a good will gesture prior to peace talks. Sutay was released on October 27, 2013.	*Tourist: Kevin Scott Sutay*	***0***

07/09/2013: An Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) soldier opened fire on North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) soldiers at Kandahar Airfield, Kandahar province, Afghanistan. One Slovakian NATO soldier was killed and at least five other soldiers were injured in the attack. The assailant was taken into custody after the incident; however, he escaped soon thereafter. At a later date, the Taliban claimed responsibility for the attack and confirmed the shooter was in their company.	*Czech Patrol*	***1***
07/19/2013: An explosive device detonated in front of a Spanish Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) center in Qala-e-Naw, Badghis province, Afghanistan. One Afghan guard was injured in this attack. No group claimed responsibility for this incident.	*Spanish Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Center*	***1***
07/26/2013: A roadside bomb detonated as a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led vehicle operated by Italian soldiers passed by in Adraskan district, Herat province, Afghanistan. The vehicle was damaged in the blast; there were no reported injuries. No group claimed responsibility for the incident.	*Italian Vehicle*	***1***
08/05/2013: An explosive device attached to a vehicle detonated in Cotabato City, Maguindanao province, Philippines. The blast targeted the vehicle of Cynthia Gulani-Sayadi, a city administrator. She was unharmed in the explosion; however, at least eight people, including two of Gulani-Sayadi's bodyguards, were killed and another 30 were injured. No group claimed responsibility; however, sources suspect that Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Movement (BIFM) was behind the attack.	*City Administrator: Cynthia Frances Guiani-Sayadi*	***0***
09/19/2013: Assailants fired on a European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) convoy near Zvecan village, Kosovska Mitrovica district, Kosovo. One EULEX officer from Lithuania was killed in the assault. No group claimed responsibility for the attack.	*Convoy of Lithuanian Officer: Audrius Shevcevicius*	***1***
09/22/2013: A roadside bomb detonated near a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) patrol in eastern Afghanistan. Two Romanian soldiers, Vasile Popa and Adrian Postelnicu, were killed in the explosion. No group claimed responsibility for the attack.	*Romanian Patrol*	***1***
10/15/2013: Assailants shot and killed a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) soldier in Helmand province, Afghanistan. No group claimed responsibility for this attack.	*British Soldier*	***1***
10/17/2013: Assailants fired rockets at a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) operational base in Shindand district, Herat province, Afghanistan. No casualties were reported. No group claimed responsibility for the incident.	*Italian Operational Base*	***1***
10/20/2013: Assailants attacked North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) soldiers on patrol in Shindand district, Herat province, Afghanistan. No casualties were reported, and no group claimed responsibility for the incident.	*Italian Soldiers*	***1***
11/05/2013: A suicide bomber detonated an explosives-laden vehicle near a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) patrol in Kamparak area, Helmand province, Afghanistan. In addition to the bomber, a British NATO soldier was killed and five others were injured in the blast. No group claimed responsibility for the incident.	*British Patrol*	***1***

11/20/2013: Assailants riding a motorcycle opened fire on a group of Shias in the Qasbah colony area of Karachi city, Sindh province, Pakistan. Two people were killed and one person was injured in the attack. This was one of two related attacks in Qasbah colony on this day. No group has claimed responsibility for the coordinated incidents.	*Shia Civilians: Zeeshan Haider, Danish Rizvi*	***0***
11/27/2013: Gunmen opened fire on a vehicle carrying Afghan employees of the French aid organization Agency for Technical Co-operation and Development (ACTED) in Faryab province, Afghanistan. Six people were killed and one other person was injured in the attack. No group claimed responsibility for the incident; however, authorities attributed the attack to the Taliban.	*French Aid Workers*	***1***
12/16/2013: Assailants fired mortars at a camp housing United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) peacekeepers in Kidal town, Kidal region, Mali. There were no damages or casualties reported. No group claimed responsibility for the attack.	*Kidal French Camp*	***1***
02/12/2014: Assailants kidnapped a British teacher working for the American Education and Training Organisation (AMIDEAST) in Sanaa city, Amanat Al Asimah governorate, Yemen. The teacher was released in exchange for a ransom worth $237,262.20 on July 26, 2014. No group claimed responsibility for the incident.	*British Teacher: Mike Harvey*	***1***
03/14/2014: Assailants opened fire on Siriporn Srichai in Luboyirai area, Pattani province, Thailand. Srichai, a Buddhist English teacher, was killed in the attack. No group claimed responsibility for the incident.	*Buddhist English Teacher: Siriporn Srichai*	***0***
03/15/2014: Assailants abducted two police officers in Tumaco municipality, Narino department, Colombia. Authorities found the bodies of the officers on March 18, 2014. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) claimed responsibility for the incident.	*Officers: Edilmer Munoz, Major German Mendez Pabo*	***0***
03/25/2014: Assailants abducted two United Nations (UN) officials in Haddah neighborhood, Sanaa city, Amanat Al Asimah province, Yemen. The two officials were rescued on the same day. No group claimed responsibility for the incident; however, sources attributed the abduction to Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).	*Italian and Yemeni Officials*	***1***
03/30/2014: A suicide bomber detonated an explosives-laden vehicle targeting Romanian North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) soldiers in Shari Safa district, Zabul province, Afghanistan. One soldier was killed and five people were wounded, including three soldiers. The Taliban claimed responsibility for the incident.	*Romanian Convoy; Civilians*	***1***
04/09/2014: Assailants threw a grenade at French peacekeeping soldiers in Bangui city, Bangui prefecture, Central African Republic. Two soldiers were injured in the blast. No group claimed responsibility for the incident.	*French Peacekeepers*	***1***
05/00/2014: Sometime between May 1 and May 31, 2014, assailants abducted Colonel Edward Dawes from his vehicle in Juba, Central Equatoria, South Sudan. Dawes, a British United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) peacekeeper, was injured in the kidnapping before escaping a few hours later. No group claimed responsibility for the incident.	*Vehicle of British Colonel Edward Dawes*	***1***

07/08/2014: A suicide bomber detonated an explosives-laden vehicle near a health center in Qalandar Khel village, Bagram district, Parwan province, Afghanistan. In addition to the assailant, five Czech soldiers from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), two Afghan police officers, and 10 civilians were killed in the blast. Seven people were also wounded in the attack. The Taliban claimed responsibility for the incident.	*Czech Patrol;* *Officers;* *Health Center*	***1***
07/13/2014: Assailants opened fire on a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) patrol in Bagram district, Parwan province, Afghanistan. One soldier was wounded in the attack. No group claimed responsibility for the incident.	*Czech Patrol*	***1***
07/24/2014: Assailants on a motorcycle opened fire on a taxi carrying two Finnish aid workers for the International Assistance Mission (IAM), a Christian medical charity, in Herat city, Herat province, Afghanistan. The two aid workers were killed in the attack. No group claimed responsibility for the incident.	*Finnish Aid Workers*	***1***
08/02/2014: Assailants attacked a European Union Force RCA (EUFOR RCA) patrol traveling with an International Police Unit (IPU) patrol in Bangui city, Bangui autonomous commune, Central African Republic. No casualties were reported in the attack. No group claimed responsibility for the incident.	*Patrol;* *Polish International Police Unit (IPU)*	***1***
09/14/2014: Assailants opened fire on two employees of Ecopetrol oil company in Teorama town, Norte de Santander department, Colombia. The two employees were killed in the attack. The National Liberation Army of Colombia (ELN) claimed responsibility for the incident.	*Employees: German Ariza, Jairo Aguilar*	***0***
09/15/2014: Assailants attacked the residence of Mahmud al-Naku in Tripoli city, Tripoli district, Libya. Two relatives of al-Naku, the Envoy to the United Kingdom in Libya, were abducted in the attack. The outcome of the abduction is unknown. No group claimed responsibility for the incident.	*Relatives of Envoy to the United Kingdom* *Mahmud al-Naku: Abd-al-Karim al-Naku, Hamzah Umar al-Naku*	***0***