



DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

# THE PARIS DECLARATION ON AID EFFECTIVENESS AND DONOR COORDINATION:

## A Comparative Study of The United States, Canada and China in Ghana

**Author: Tani Tindame**

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## **ABSTRACT**

International development agencies, as well as government partners, agreed on five principles that aim at making aid more effective through the Paris Declaration (PD) in 2005. These Principles include ownership, alignment, harmonisation, managing for results and mutual accountability. The principles aim at making aid effective and predictable. Most importantly, donors agreed to coordinate their activities with other donors to reduce aid fragmentation. Contrarily, some have argued that both donors and recipient have embraced Paris "mainly in form, rather than in substance" and that the PD is dying (Brown, 2016). As a recipient country itself, Ghana has been one of the active players in ensuring aid effectiveness in accordance with the Paris Agenda. The country has however been slow to development. As a result, this research aims to investigate and take a closer look at how donors have implemented the PD in the country. The research takes the approach of a comparative study of the United States, Canada, and China in Ghana. The main research method used in this study is a qualitative research method. The study revolves around a single case study of Ghana but analysis three different donors in their implementation of the Paris Declaration in the country.

The study found that before the Paris Declaration, development assistance in Ghana was ineffectiveness. Though Ghana was among the top aid recipients in Africa, socio-economic development was slow. Issues of corruption and macroeconomic mismanagement led to the poor economic performance and Ghana has then been described "a chronic case of economic failure" (Toye, 1991). Moreover, coordination among donors was nearly non-existent as donors did what they want with their money. The study, however, notes that after the adoption of the Paris agreement, the state of development aid in Ghana is seeing an improvement and donors are coming together to work on projects which is eventually reducing issues such as effort duplication, aid fragmentation and transaction cost.

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<b>AAA</b>	Accra Agenda for Action
<b>AfDB</b>	African Development Bank
<b>CDD</b>	Ghana Centre for Democracy and Development
<b>CSOs</b>	Civil Society Organizations
<b>DAC</b>	Development Assistance Committee
<b>DBS</b>	Direct Budget Support
<b>ERP</b>	Economic Recovery Programme
<b>HDI</b>	Human Development Index
<b>HLF</b>	High-level Forum
<b>IEA</b>	Institute of Economic Affairs
<b>IMF</b>	International Monetary Fund
<b>ISSER</b>	Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic Research
<b>MDBS</b>	Multi-Donor Budget Support
<b>MDG</b>	Millennium Development Goals
<b>MF&amp;RI</b>	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration
<b>MoFEP</b>	Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning
<b>NDPC</b>	National Development Planning Commission
<b>NGO</b>	Non-Governmental Organization
<b>ODA</b>	Official Development Assistance
<b>OECD</b>	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
<b>PR</b>	Paris Declaration
<b>PRs</b>	Poverty Reduction Strategies
<b>SAP</b>	Structural Adjustment Programme
<b>SSA</b>	Sub-Saharan Africa
<b>SWAp</b>	Sector Wide Approach
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>US</b>	United States
<b>USAID</b>	United States Agency for International Development

## **Chapter 1: Introduction**

### **1.1. Introduction**

The history of development aid itself dates back for more than fifty years. However, issues surrounding its effectiveness have received renewed scholarly attention in recent years and authors remains divided on their viewpoints as some countries remained in extreme poverty in spite of massive aid inflows while others have achieved self-sustainable development. Strong initiatives, however, such as the Rome Declaration on Aid Harmonisation in 2003 and the Marrakech Declaration in 2004 have in their unique ways tried to sanitise the aid domain in the quest for more effectiveness.

On the 2nd of March 2005, the aid community eventually agreed to bring more meaning to aid through the principles of ownership, alignment, harmonisation, managing for results, mutual accountability and stronger coordination among donor countries in the international system. The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, therefore, created more room for recipient's involvement in aid design and urged donors to align their aid with recipients' national development plan for greater effectiveness. It is believed that, though these principles may seem few, they are far-reaching and have the potential to "revolutionise global development cooperation" (Brown, 2016). According to Severino et al., the Paris Declaration "appears as a first attempt to tackle international policy coordination problems in the field of development aid" (Severino & Ray, 2010). It is worth noting that, the lack of coordination among donors was a significant challenge in the aid domain which eventually led to acute aid fragmentation and effort duplication. Wood further explains that the in-built evaluation and monitoring system contained in the Declaration itself is to give some "teeth" and a knowledge-base to the political Declaration (Wood, 2010). As Stern et al. put it, "the Paris Declaration remains the dominant international statement on the aid relationship, including how the main actors in that relationship are expected to carry out their responsibilities to make the greatest possible contribution to development effectiveness." (Stern et.al 2008).



Yet after a decade of existence, studies conducted evaluating the impact of the PD in signatory countries or how much has actually changed in donor practices and behaviour ‘on the ground’ is in majority, quite disappointing. In a recent study conducted by Brown, he stated that “collectively, donors have failed to put the new norms into practice and if anything, donors have strengthened their capacity to impose their priorities on recipient governments.” (Brown, 2016). As Chandy put it, “commitments are regularly professed but rarely fulfilled” in international development cooperation (Chandy, 2011).

As a result, this thesis closely examines the implementation of the PD on aid effectiveness and donor coordination in Ghana by looking at three major country donors (United States, Canada, and China). This research is timely as there are enthusiasm and desire in the international community to know the impact the PD has had on donors' behaviour. Since the PD mostly has to do with how signatories have implemented it, the study explores implementation theories such as of top-down rational implementation model, bureaucratic street-level behaviour model and policy-action model. It is important to highlight that in Ghana, Multi-Donor Budget Support (MDBS) mechanism is the main framework utilised to facilitate aid activities. This is however done under the authority of the the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, which is the main office or state agency mandated to constitutionally coordinate and facilitate development assistance between Ghana and its donors for the successful implementation of the PD.

The study found that prior the PD, the state of development aid in Ghana was regarded as problematic because though Ghana was receiving more foreign aid than the average African nation (US\$ 12 billion between 1975 and 2002), development did not match the aid inflows (Jerve & Nissanke, 2008). Coordination among donors was very poor, and duplication of projects, as well as transaction cost was present. However, since the adoption of the PD, Ghana is able to own its development plans to some extent, and donors align with those projects. Coordination among donors is improving as donors such as many donors has come together to work on projects such as the School Feeding Programme in Ghana. The Pdcan be sid to have come to sanitise the development assistsnce in Ghana to some extent. However, despite these improvements, much more needs to be done to improve the aid activities as issues of donor indirect policy prescription, secret conditionalities and corruption still persist. The study found that Ghana would intentionally propose to its donor’s projects that they are likely to sponsor; which makes ownership and alignment for example meaningless.

## **1.2. Historical Background to Development Assistance in Ghana**

According to Herbst, Ghana at independence was better off than most African countries which could then be compared to some Asian countries such as South Korea, Malaysia and Singapore (Herbst, 1993). Forty years later, the situation reversed. It was believed that successive governments adopted the wrong policies which provoked economic destruction. From being a relatively rich country in Africa and ranked as middle-income in the 1960s, Ghana plunged back to a low-income country in the 1970s. Severe corruption, macroeconomic mismanagement and chronic overvaluation of the Cedi led to the poor economic performance. As Toye put it, "It may seem harsh to say so, but, just as Ghana pioneered political independence from the colonial masters in Africa, so also has she pioneered a set of self-destructive economic policies which many more recently decolonized African countries have also followed", He further argued that between the period of 1970 to 1983, things got even worse as real GDP at market prices fell by some 11% and did not see any improvement until 1985.

From 1983, getting back on track saw Ghana implementing the first wave of the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP) which later became known as the Economic Recovery Program (ERP). As Mensah stated, by the mid-1990s "the old fetishism of protectionism has yielded to an even stronger free-market enterprise...with terms such as privatization, divestiture, deregulation and liberalization dominating the continent's development discourse". (Rothchild, 1991). The Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) was later adopted in 1983 to date. The IMF initiative was designed to give developing countries "easy" access to concessionary loans and grants, as a new commitment towards poverty reduction where Ghana was the owner of its development (Abugre, 2000).

By the mid-1980s Ghana was said to have established macroeconomic stability and was one of the best economically performing countries in sub-Saharan Africa despite a massive decline in the international prices of gold and cocoa (Toye, 1991). Leechor stated that "Donors have played a major role in both shaping the adjustment program and financing the attendant costs" (Leechor, 1994). During this period, aid was effective not only because of its flow but due to the conditioned political environment in Ghana and the country was making ample progress as the number of people living in extreme poverty has progressively dropped over the last years (Gyimah-Boadi, 2004). Though poverty rates have reduced, unemployment remains fairly high,

and per capita incomes are also not favourable. Given this history, it is appropriate that this study examines the impact the Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness, as aid has played a major role in the interplay of factors that affect growth and development in Ghana.

### **1.3. Research Aims and Objectives**

This thesis aims at examining different donor practices in implementing the PD. The thesis makes a comparative case study of the United States, Canada, and China as part of top 10 major donors in Ghana. This thesis shall also examine the state of the development assistance in Ghana before the PD and possible changes afterwards. The research shall also look at the pattern in donor performance to identify how the targeted donors perform in implementing the PD in Ghana as well as identifying any possible differences or similarities. The thesis will further examine an important element of the PD which is donor coordination on developmental projects in Ghana. On the basis of the above-stated aim, this study seeks to achieve the following objectives:

*To assess and examine pre and post PD aid coordination in Ghana.*

*To investigate how the PD is being implemented by donors.*

*To determine the impact of the Paris Declaration.*

*Identify the challenges of the PD faced by Ghana and donors.*

### **1.4. Research Questions**

This thesis conducts a comparative study of three donor countries (US, Canada, and China) in Ghana and looks further into the extent to which the five principles of ownership, alignment, harmonisation, managing for results and mutual accountability have been applied. Moreover, given that the country has been very active in pushing the Paris agenda, any fragmented or incomplete study on the PD in Ghana may not do justice to the research. In an attempt to understand and fully grasp the contours of this landscape in Ghana, this study asks one single overarching research question:

*Has development assistance to Ghana been affected by the Paris Declaration? And, in particular, has the Paris Declaration improved the aid coordination of major donors, like the United States, Canada, and China?*

In order to digest this main question, the following sub-research questions are raised and addressed.

*Was there development assistance to Ghana prior to the adoption of the Paris Declaration? And If there was, which form did it take?*

*How has the implementation of the Paris Declaration been in Ghana?*

*What accounts for the differences in the Paris Declaration implementation in Ghana?*

*How does the implementation of the Paris Declaration look in the Ghanaian educational sector?*

### **1.5. The Significance of the Study**

The Paris Declaration represents an unprecedented effort to aid effectiveness in the developmental aid arena. It has many expectations placed on its shoulders as far as aid effectiveness is concerned. Therefore, it is important to conduct more amplified and rigorous studies in order to evaluate its performance, identify specific issues in implementation and provide policy recommendations for its success. Those reported issued or challenges will need to be addressed scientifically by providing more data on the phenomena of interest. By looking at the PD in the contest of Ghana while analysing it from the perspective of a variety of donors, the finding regardless of what they are would equip enable donors and recipients alike to have enough clarity to improve and strengthen policies and practices in accordance with the Paris agreement.

The research would also highlight the challenges that may hinder the effectiveness of the Declaration and its intended purposes in Ghana. It would also strengthen existing knowledge of the functioning of development assistance. In sum, the research contributes towards a better understanding of the PD in the African context and is useful for any policy formulation, implication and evaluation for both parties. Moreover, for all those interested in exploring

issues underlying aid effectiveness in Africa, this research will come a long way to enrich our understanding of original empirical material obtain from interviews and other first-hand information. It is my hope that by stimulating intellectual appetite within this domain of study, more scholars will be inspired and encouraged to further research in the light of circumstances surrounding aid to Africa.

## **1.6. Structure of the Study**

This thesis is comprised of six Chapters, and the sequencing is as followed. Chapter 1 predominantly presents an introduction to the study. It starts with a brief description of the history of development aid in Ghana so as to enable the research to conclude on any possible impact of the Paris Declaration in the country. It elaborates on the statement of the problem for which this thesis judged it necessary to conduct a research on the PD in Ghana. Subsequently, the research aims and objectives are outlined and the research question is presented closing with the structure of the study.

Chapter 2 gives an insight into the origine an the role the PD. This Chapter illustrates under which circumstances donors and recipients have come to collective responsibility sharing such as the PD. The literature review in this chapter presents the general impact of the PD, the state of donor coordination, and in particular with regards to our selected major donors operating in Ghana.

Chapter 3 starts by mirroring the PD in relation to the education sector in Ghana. It looks at the implementation process and how they are infused in Ghana's education sector. Chapter 4 discussed the conceptual framework alongside with the theoretical foundations of this research. The Chapter ends with some hypothesis that will be verified in Chapter 6 which discusses the results.

In Chapter 5, an explanation of the chosen research method is given. The Chapter explains reasons for selecting these three donors. In other words, it explains why the study chooses to focus on three particular donors among the multitude of donors that exist and operate in Ghana; thus, the case selection. The chapter also shared more light on the research design and data

collection strategy. The Chapter also provides some ethical considerations that the study followed.

Chapter 6 provides a general overview of the findings based on Chapters 4 and 5 from a theoretical perspective. Finally, this thesis concludes by summarising the findings. Based on the findings, an analytical comparison is presented as to know whether there are similarities or differences in the way our major donors implement the PD. In the Appendix section, one will find the list of various institutions contacted as well as the interview guides for donor agencies and the government of Ghana.

## **Chapter 2: Literature Review**

### **2.1. The Origin and the Role of the Paris Declaration**

The international aid system traces its origin to post World War II. It however became profound during the Cold War. Meanwhile, the international system itself remains constantly evolving and has expanded its territory to include a series of international institutions. Foreign aid was used as a political tool during the Cold War era and was used by both parties to support countries they believed to be allies or potential allies. The primary objectives of foreign aid according to the World Bank (2007) was 1) to promote long-term growth and poverty reduction in developing countries and 2) to promote the short-term political and strategic interests of donors as defined within the framework of Cold War politics. It is worth noting that objective was used as an important tool for the disbursement of foreign aid by recipient countries in the context of Cold War politics (World Bank, 2007).

The end of the Cold War was accompanied by significant progress toward a new aid architecture that re-visited aid policies and sought to make aid more effective. Foreign aid then shifted from supporting allies to a more deeper involvement of promoting economic and sustainable development in the developing world. The international community was now more concerned with tangible results in the lives recipient countries; thus, the improvements in the lives of the world's poorest people. This new direction of development aid was better said than

done. In practice, it made very little progress in achieving its goals at least in Africa during the post-Cold War. Sundberg and Gelb, taking note of this slow progress, strongly argue in 2005 that aid did not meet the required expectations (Sundberg & Gelb, 2006). On the question of whether all of the aid provided by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development – Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) to sub-Saharan African countries, nearly \$650 billion made any difference? Sundberg and Gelb noted that this will not make any different. They further noted that this figure would, in reality, be gross if contributions from emerging donors such as China, India and other non-DAC donors were to be added to the equation.

Following the better aid agenda, the World Bank and other international lending institutions incorporated significant requirement to foreign aid. An element such as "good governance" was used as a core strategy to bring about aid effectiveness (Santiso, 2011). The United Nations followed suit with this initiative and demanded that good governance was to be practised to achieve effective development and poverty alleviation outcomes. The United Nations adopted the Millennium Development Goals with well defined, attainable and quantifiable goals. Sundberg and Gelb, taking a close look at the MDGs trajectory suggests the international aid regime is seeing and experiencing a positive change. (Sundberg & Gelb, 2006).

Yet in the quest to improve to some extent the initiations of the World Bank and the United Nations, country ministers responsible for promoting development as well as leaders of various multination institutions met in Paris on 2nd March, 2005 to adopted the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness aimed at re-thinking the manner in which aid is delivered and managed (Paris Declaration, 2005: 1). Signatories to the PD believe that aid works, but it could work better. According to Stern et al, the Paris Declaration originated as far back as 1967 and can be linked to the Commission on International Development. Subsequent series of donor-initiated aid strategies and reforms received particular attention in the 1990s and the years leading up to the Paris Declaration (Stern et al., 2008). Wood et al., in the synthesis report of the Phase I evaluation of the implementation of the PD in 2008 state that the PD "provides a practical, action-oriented roadmap with specific targets to be met by 2010" (Wood et al. 2008). The evaluation phase II of the PD carried out in 2011 by Quinn Patton Jean Gornick found that "9%

of partner country respondents reported that the evaluation was "very useful" or "somewhat useful" in calling attention to the Paris Declaration in their country. (Quinn & Gornick, 2011).

## **2.2. Pre-Paris Declaration Efforts**

Acknowledging the aid ineffectiveness in the 1990s, major donor countries took a closer look at their partnership with recipients. In 1969, the Pearson Commission Report documented partnership as central to aid relationship (Helleiner, 2000). Thereafter, the aid regime underwent a serious transformations. These transformations were in the form of four (4) international agreements or meetings, thus, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the Monterrey Consensus on Financing for Development, the Rome Declaration on Harmonisation and the The Joint Marrakech Memorandum.

### **2.2.1. The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)**

In September 2000, 170 heads of states unanimously adopted the MDGs showing their commitment to a partnership for a "peaceful, prosperous and just world". Audinet and Haralambou argue that world leaders agreed to work together to ensure that "the right to development" a reality for everyone and free mankind from the miserable and dehumanising conditions of extreme poverty (Audinet & Haralambous, 2005). The MDGs embodied eight goals and 18 targets. The connection between the goals meant that the goals were not to be implemented independently but in a mutually inclusive manner. The goals were also time-bound targets to be reached by 2015. Akiyama and Kondo, however, cautioned that, if countries do not meet the goals by 2015, aid field will experience "donor fatigue" (Akiyama &Kondo, 2003). At a country level, some goals such as education health, and poverty reduction have been achieved. However, because in regions such as sub-Saharan Africa much was not seen. Addison et al explained that aid had not worked better under the MDGs because of "fungibility, insufficient alignment between donor and recipient government policies, commercial tying, the proliferation of donor activities within recipient countries, and insufficient policy coherence within and among donor activities". (Holsti, 1969). nevertheless, the MDGs represents the forging of a global partnership for development.



### **2.2.2. The Monterrey Consensus on Financing for Development**

In March 2002, the United Nations hosted the International Conference on Financing for Development at Monterrey, Mexico; also known as the Monterrey Consensus. The agenda was to identify and develop sustainable means of making sure that there is constant availability of funds to achieve the target set by the United Nations conferences and summits. Participants in the Monterrey Consensus forward their commitment to increasing financial and technical cooperation in the areas of international monetary, financial and trading ((UN, 2002, OECD, 2003, OECD, 2003; UN, 2003; OECD, 2005a). Menocal and Mulley stated that most importantly, the emphasis was re-placed on good governance practices and strong partnership between donors and recipients for effective aid (Menocal & Mulley, 2006). The Consensus can also be described as essentially a "North-South compact" using good domestic policies and good governance to bargain resources.

### **2.2.3. The Rome Declaration on Harmonization**

In February 2003, 25 bilateral donor country representatives, 28 aid recipient country leaders and more than 40 multilateral and bilateral financial institutions endorsed the Rome Declaration on Harmonisation in Rome, Italy. (World Bank, 2003). According to Gerster and Harding, the Rome Declaration aimed at donor transparency thereby leading to lower transactional cost. (Ashong, & Gerster, 2010). Therefore, partner countries were encouraged to design and align their development plans in a harmonised way with recipient countries as a country-based approach that accepts country ownership, government leadership and the engagement of civil society was necessary to guide a harmonised aid. In this perspective, regional initiatives such as the work by the Economic Commission for Africa addressing harmonisation issues were encouraged.

#### **2.2.4. The Joint Marrakech Memorandum**

In 2004, the heads of the African Development Bank (AfDB), Asian Development Bank, Inter-American Development Bank (ADB), the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), and World Bank, and the chairman of the OECD-DAC met to renew their commitment to strengthen partnership in aid management (ADB, 2004). The Marrakech Memorandum was organised to address the issue harmonisation among aid agencies. This means that both development agencies and receiving countries must work together for a better aid implementation process as well as monitoring and evaluation. (MfDR, 2007). Ghana hosted the fourth roundtable in 2008 (MfDR, 2008).

#### **2.3. The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, its Normative Aspect**

The PD on Aid Effectiveness, was endorsed after the second HLF of Paris in March 2005. Both donors and aid recipient countries pledged to work together toward a better aid effectiveness. They also agreed to avail themselves for scrutiny in applying the five principles 12 specific indicators of the PD. (OECD, 2008a). Targets were set for the year 2010 for the signatories to monitor and evaluate progress. (Paris Declaration 2005: 1). This means that beyond making a list of good intentions, Paris also produced a clear scorecard to hold stakeholders accountable for what they promised. As Oxfam Briefing Note in 2012 put it, aid effectiveness was finally gaining momentum in the global development scene (Oxfam Briefing Note, 2012).

The OECD DAC notes three reasons why PD can positively impact aid effectiveness. First and foremost, they note that the PD is more realistic and action-oriented because of its five key principles. The PD has a greater outreach compared to the Rome conference considering the larger number of participants and the broad consultation of aid actors (OECD, 2006a: 50-51). Secondly, the 12 indicators help with impact evaluation thereby potentially leading to achieving results. (OECD, 2006a: 52). Third, the PD set different mechanisms in place to ensure accountability.(OECD, 2006a: 53). According to Steinle and Correll, the five principles, viewed in a uniform way send a signal that "the current state of donor-partner country relations is ineffective and must change" since donors tend to create series of stand-alone projects and

programmes largely donor-driven by their own interests with little delegation to recipient countries (Steinle & Correll, 2008). As said earlier, the PD set five principles supported by twelve indicators for monitoring and evaluation purposes with a goal of achieving by 2010. This section, therefore, presents a brief content of these principles below.

### **2.3.1. Ownership**

Ownership is the first of the five key principles of the PD. This section of the PD emphasises recipient countries involvement in the aid implementation process. But only being involved in the process but recipient countries have to take a leadership role in the aid administration process. This section of the PD clearly states that the recipient countries shall "exercise effective leadership over their development policies, and strategies and coordinate development actions" (Paris Declaration, 2005: 3). The OECD suggests that allowing recipient countries to take an active role in their own development process can lead to aid effectiveness. (OECD, 2007b). Developing countries that are aid oriented have developed mechanisms in developing their own national priorities and strategies for development with the aim of making it easier for donors to identified key sectors that requires assistance. According to this section of the declaration they "commit to exercise leadership in developing and implementing their national development strategies through broad consultative processes" (Paris Declaration, 2005: 3).

### **2.3.2. Alignment**

Alignment is linked with the element of ownership. Alignment under the PD implies that donors align aid in accordance with the recipient countries' short and long term development strategies. (Paris Declaration, P. 16-31, 2005). In the past, duplication of aid programs, as well as non-alignment with recipient country's development strategies, has proven unsustainable. Though this does not mean that all donors will have the same conditionalities, the different conditionalities rather become a coordinative effort to achieve the ultimate goal of supporting developmental programs in line with the country's development policies. (Paris Declaration, 2005: 3).

### **2.3.3. Harmonisation**

Harmonisation, according to the PD implies that donors work to "implement common arrangements" and simplify the procedures required to receive aid" or simply put, "Donors commit to aligning to the maximum extent possible behind central government-led strategies" (Paris Declaration 2005: 6). This will eventually reduce high cost of frequent country visits by donors and time in monitoring and evaluation. As discussed earlier, the proliferation of aid delivery due to uncoordinated donor activities has been slowing aid effectiveness because of the manner in which it causes a burden on recipients' governments and increases transaction costs. According to Stern, the acknowledgement of the importance of donor coordination has been seen from the Monterrey Consensus to the Marrakech conference. PD building on a long-time effort and transparency on information sharing on the part of both donors and recipient countries for aid effectiveness and harmonisation. Donors have increasingly resulted to the Sector-wide Approach (SWAp) which encourages a programme-based approach. According to Andersen, the SWAp was a response to aid coordination problem. (Andersen, 2000).

### **2.3.4. Managing for Results**

According to this section of the PD "Managing for results means managing and delivering aid in a way that focuses on the desired results and uses the information to improve decision-making" (Paris Declaration 2005: 8). While it is recommended that recipient countries develop monitoring and evaluation mechanisms that will measure the results at the country and project level, donors are encouraged to consider the country's Performance Assessment Framework (PAF) in designing, implementing and supporting recipient country's. This means that both actors in the aid arena must develop a transparent system of data collection be effective enough to assess whether or not aid is having any impact on the desired result. According to this section of the PD, "Partner countries and donors jointly commit to working together in a participatory approach to strengthening country capacities and demand for results-based management" (Paris Declaration, 2005: 8).

### 2.3.5. Mutual Accountability

The Mutual Accountability principle of the PD draws its inspiration from the basic definition of accountability. Aid outcomes need to be measured, and impact determine. Someone must be accountable for the outcome whether desirable or not. In this section of the PD, this accountability responsibility is shared among both donors and recipient countries. (OECD, 2007b; OECD, 2009f). According to this section of the PD, mutual accountability means that "donors and recipients are accountable for the outcome development cooperation". (Paris Declaration, Pf. 47-50, 2005).

According to Steer et al., the PD has played an important role in identifying the parties accountable and establishing a general framework to implement this accountability process. (Steer et al., 2009). According to this section of the PD, accountability, "strengthen public support for national policies and development assistance". "Partner countries commit to reinforcing participatory approaches by systematically involving a broad range of development partners when formulating and assessing progress in implementing national development strategies" (Paris Declaration, 2005: 8). The graph bellow shows the pyramid of the PD with its main five shared principles.



Source: *Aid Effectiveness 2005–10: Progress in Implementing the Paris Declaration*, OECD Publishing, OECD (2011)

## **2.4. The Impact of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness**

Has the PD affected development assistance in any way? In other words, have donors and partner countries fulfil their commitments regarding the PD? General surveys and evaluation conducted so far have shown that, even though some progress has been made, in most part, the results are disappointing. The PD is said to have problems because its goals were criticised to be too ambitious. In 2011, Chandy revealed that out of the 13 targets set by the Paris meeting, only one was met by 2010. For example against the 2005 baseline, only little progress was observed. Again the 2011 survey confirmed that donors are still using systems of tied aid based on the 78 sample countries observed. Even though commitments in the international system are rarely fulfilled, this was still very low in terms of result (Chandy, 2011). Aid fragmentation is still prevalent and many countries have not been able to assume the leadership role as prescribed by the PD for greater aid effectiveness because most recipient governments institutions (30 to 40 fragile states) lack the capacity or adequate systems and policies that could put both donor and recipient on the same page. Hyden, for example, explained that issues of power play a critical role in the way the PD is implemented. (Martin, 2008). Nunnenkamp et al. argue that "aid fragmentation persisted after the Paris Declaration and coordination among donors have even weakened" (Nunnenkamp et al. 2013). And "failure to face up to these issues of power may undermine the credibility of the commitments in the Paris Declaration". He moreover stated that "the situation created by the Paris Declaration is such that, by delegating more authority to partner governments to decide policy priorities and manage resources, the development partners find themselves with less opportunity to know exactly what is going on." (Hyden, 2008).

In the African context for example, scholars such as Moyo in her book "Dead Aid" argue with hard evidence that we must destroy the myth that aid works at all because access to capital and good policies, can transform even the poorest country (Moyo, 2009)., Moyo stated that "evidence overwhelmingly demonstrates that aid to Africa has made the poor poorer, and the growth slower" (Moyo, 2009). Recent World bank estimate (2016) noted that the number of Africans who are poor decreased from 56% in 1990 to 43% in 2012 and though poverty in Africa has declined, the number of poor has augmented (World Bank Poverty Report 2016). Calderisi, using the "African character" will pinpoint Africa's internal faults to the continent's poor performance (Calderisi, 2003). Tarp, however, suggests that, the fact that, just because aid

failed to bring significant development in Africa is not synonymous to aid not working (Tarp, 2010). Cassen also argues that aid is not a failure in all cases as it does fulfil the intended outcome in some cases (Cassen, 1994). According to Riddell, recent case studies of aid have not endeavoured to answer the "big questions" about whether aid really effective or not. Rather, they are focusing on problems that reduce aid's effectiveness and learning lessons from the past. (Ridell, 2014).

Nevertheless, Glennie argues that the irony of the PD is that despite the countless flaws that one may attribute to it, that PD has brought fair balancing of power. (Glennie, 2011). In 2011, for example, the evaluation of 32 countries in the context of the PD shows substantial progress as it was observed that most recipient countries are broadening their level of ownership, having better and comprehensive national development plans, improving their quality their public financial management systems and creating more space for the integration of civil society organizations who help actors to increase transparency than it was observed in 2005.

#### **2.4.1. The Accra Agenda for Action and the Busan Meeting**

After the Paris meeting, three follow up monitoring surveys on the PD implementation progress in 2006, 2008 and 2011 were respectively conducted. Each forum was aimed at making an improvement from the previous. Accra further refined the commitments agreed in Paris. The Accra meeting saw an addition of four more areas to the PD. Additionally, the fifth principle of the PD was changed from "mutual accountability" to "making mutual accountability real". Accra discussed challenges in promoting aid effectiveness, highlighted the role of civil society as well as South-South corporation (Accra High-Level Forum, 2008e). Though CSOs could not access the negotiating table, it was noted that it was the first time, they were recognised as development actors in their own right, even, and acknowledged their efforts in addressing the quality of aid.

Reliable results took time despite the ambitious agenda agreed in Paris and Accra. Donors were said to lack political will while developing countries gave out full commitment leading to high performance. A Final evaluation meeting, the Fourth High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (HLF-4) or the Busan Agenda, was held in Korea in 2011. The importance of this meeting self-

explains the unprecedented attention given to aid effectiveness in the international community. Unlike previous forums, the Busan forum brought together the largest and diverse range of state and non-state developmental actors. Participants were over 3 000 participants ranging from heads of states, ministers, parliamentarians, heads of international organisations, civil society organisations, representatives from the private sector, academia and Youth Forum. Busan promoted the "Building Blocks" initiative which was an initiative meant to showcase and promote best practices and highlight sample successful projects undertaken by developing themselves. The Busan meeting also highlighted the "global light, country-focused". This means that development assistance would be rooted in the needs and priorities of developing countries.

#### **2.4.2. The Impact of Donor Coordination on Aid Effectiveness**

Many studies such as that of Carbone have reported that there is a strong link between donor coordination and aid effectiveness as poor coordination decrease chances of a positive outcome (Browne, 1990; Edwards, 1999; Lancaster, 1999; Tarp, 2000; Morse and McNamara, 2006; Banerjee, 2007; Carbone, 2007; Riddell, 2007). Donor individual interest(s) tend to sometimes be conflictual with the interest of other donors as donors tend to put more emphasis on their own program design and allocation of resources (Lancaster, 1999). A condition that eventually leads to the unwillingness or incapability of recipients to manage aid flows (Sobhan, 2002). Schubert and Robinson identified the fact that multiple donors in one single recipient country create excessive administrative burden on the recipient's personnel which in some case caused the redundancy of projects leading to aid ineffectiveness (Little & Clifford, 1965; Cassen, 1994; Amis & Green, 2002; Degnbol-Martinussen & Engberg-Pedersen, 2003; Ranis, 2006; Banerjee, 2007; Lancaster, 2007a; Riddell, 2007; Carlsson, Schubert & Robinson, 2009). Morse and McNamara explain that lack of coordination and cooperation among aid agencies lead to duplication and inefficiency (Morse & McNamara, 2006). Knack and Rahman argue that aid fragmentation weakens the quality of bureaucracy in highly aid-dependent countries (Knack & Rahman, 2007). Easterly argue that because donors want "to give to all sectors in all countries", the administrative costs for both recipients and donors becomes high (Easterly, 2007).



Sjöstedt, however, argue that though international development assistance declared commitment to promoting donor coordination, "how this objective plays out in practice, or how feasible and realistic it is, have rarely been evaluated." (Sjöstedt & Sundström, 2017). Nevertheless, evidence shows that in the context of the PD, donors have not effectively coordinated their activities in relation to the country's development strategies and have less and less involved recipient countries in aid management process.

### **2.4.3. Coordination of Major Donors in Ghana**

In Ghana, donor coordination is said to be "moving rapidly" to the extent that the government has appointed a microfinance coordinator who is to represent the government before the MoFEP. It is important to note that, Ghana's involvement in the promotion of aid coordination began years before the event of the PD. In 1999, the World Bank launched the Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF) programme selecting 12 pilot countries among which Ghana was part. The mandate of the CDF was to encourage a synergy of projects rather than stand-alone projects.

### **2.4.4. The United States**

Prior to the PD, the U.S. mainly undertook its own project without much consideration of coordination between other donors on one hand and with the government of Ghana on the other hand. A notable example is the U.S. funded Primary Education Project (PREP) from 1990 to 1995. This project was initiated as a response to the Education for All (EFA) Conference which saw many countries pledging their support to primary school development in Ghana. (Casely-Hayford and Palmer, 2007). The lack of coordination saw other donors such as the World Bank and UK undertaking similar projects with similar objectives. (World Bank, 2004). This lack of coordination led to duplication of effort and ineffectiveness by increasing transactional cost and overstretch of government personnel. (ibid). The USAID Quality Improvements in Primary Schools (QUIPS) impact study concluded that there was no significant change in the educational sector after 5 years of implementation. (USAID/Ghana, 2005). According to

Ratcliffe and Macrae, this duplication of efforts made these projects highly inefficient and led to a lot of waste. (Ratcliffe and Macrae, 1999).

Coordination between donors (US) and the government of Ghana was also poor. According to Mettle-Nunoo and Hilditch this lack of coordination was the biggest barrier to efficient and effective support of programs in Ghana. (Mettle-Nunoo and Hilditch, 2000). Things were however different after the PD. The U.S. assigned the responsibility of its project coordination with other donors to the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). (Lawson, 2013). Donor coordination was also integrated into the various U.S. aid mechanisms such as the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), and the Global Health Initiative.

The U.S. took further actions regarding the PD specifically. In March 2006, USAID issued a directive to all field missions to comply with the PD commitment on donor coordination. (ibid). As stated by the USAID guidance of the PD agreement between the U.S. and other donors is to "look for ways to complement and mutually reinforce one another's programs in support of partner plans,". (USAID, 2006). Cooperation and coordination among and between U.S. aid agencies, other donors and the government of Ghana became the order of the day and from then formed an integrated part of aid administration in the country. (ibid). In July 2012, USAID updated its Automated Directives System (ADS) to further emphasis coordination between them and other donors as well as the government. It went further to even encourage joint funding of project between donors in the country. (USAID, 2012)

#### **2.4.5. Canada**

Canada played an active role in aid coordination among donors in Ghana after the PD. One of such efforts was playing a leading role in the formation of the Ghana Joint Assistance Strategy (G-JAS). (Network on Debt and Development). The JAS aimed at reinforcing the PD agreement in Ghana. It is meant at reinforcing existing efforts towards aid coordination in the country. It achieved this by using harmonised approach to aid delivery among donors and government of Ghana as well as preventing duplication and individualistic approach to aid delivery in Ghana. Together with the European Union, the U.K. Department for International Development,

German Development Cooperation, and the World Bank, the JAS provides a road map as well guidance on how to reinforce aid coordination in Ghana. As part of its design, Civil Society Organizations are to monitor this aid coordination effort for 4 years (2007-2010). (ibid)

Another effort to encourage coordination by Canada was its support for the Multi-donor Budget Support (MDBS) initiative in Ghana. (Svensson, 2000). This initiative is to facilitate the continuous flow of aid to the Ghanaian government in financing developmental projects. What makes this initiative innovative is the fact that it allows continuous aid flow to the government while ensuring that donor partners do not duplicate efforts and to ensure policy harmonisation among donors thereby reducing transactional cost.

#### **2.4.6. China**

China's approach to aid in Ghana before the PD was different from that of the west. It usually comes without conditions and interference in the country's politics. This feature of Chinese aid causes coordination problems in itself. (Lancaster, 2007). China's principle of non-interference is at the very root of the country's foreign policy making it very difficult for aid coordination with other donors in Ghana. (Pehnelt, 2007).

The PD however encouraged China to coordinate its aid programs with the west. In December 2011 China agreed to be part of a global partnership on aid effectiveness. (The guardian, 2011). This means better coordination between China and other donors as well as with receiving country's government. During the Busan conference on aid effectiveness, Mitchell, the international development secretary said, "It just wouldn't have made sense for a global deal on aid effectiveness to go ahead without the involvement of China and other major players in international development,". This goes a long way to confirm China's important role in aid coordination. For example, USAID together with China have assigned Senior Development Counsellors and established its office in Beijing to work with the Chinese agencies on coordinating aid in Ghana. (Lawson, 2013)

Aside the case of our major donors, other examples of donor coordination, (some multilateral) in Ghana include the World Bank working together with Germany to provide technical support

for microfinance in the rural area in Ghana. The World Bank and the International Fund for Agricultural Development working together on the Rural Financial Services Project. Last but not the least, the African Development Bank, Denmark and the UNDP working together on MicroStart Project in support of Association of Rural Banks.

### **Chapter 3: The Impact of the Paris Declaration on the Ghanaian Educational Sector**

The importance of aid effectiveness in the educational sector in Ghana cannot be overemphasised. This is due to the fact that education strongly influences prospects for achieving the country's long-term development goals as well as global objectives that are stipulated in the MDGs. It was common for many countries in Africa to pay special attention to education right after independence as it was seen as an instrument to accelerate social and economic development. Ghana was no exception. When Ghana gained independence in 1957, it immediately embarked on ambitious plans of access to education for all. This was done mainly through local government authorities on behalf of the central government as stipulated by the Education Act of 1961 (Act 87) (Akyeampong, 2008; 2017).

Kwame Nkrumah, the first president of the Republic of Ghana, two days before independence while addressing the Legislative Assembly said: "We must seek an African view to the problems of Africa. ... Our whole educational system must be geared to producing a scientifically-technically minded people. ... Only with a population so educated can we hope to face the tremendous problems which confront any country attempting to raise the standard of living in a tropical zone" (McWilliam and Kwamena-Poh, 1975:94). Ghana has since seen increase commitment to all sectors of education. The sector received support from a range of various aid stakeholders including bilateral and multilateral.

#### **3.1. Ownership**

Under the country ownership principle of the PD, partner countries are to take a leadership role in developing, implementing and evaluating programs. Though they are expected to achieve

this together with donors, the country's involvement in the process is paramount. (Paris Declaration, 2005). The findings point out to the fact that Ghana indeed owns its development policies for education. This is seen in the form of the Ghana Education Strategic Plan (ESP) which all aid stakeholders are expected to support and situate their interventions within if they want to make any significant impact in the sector. Education Strategic Plan, 2003-2015, is the main education sector programme for Ghana. The programme has been the launching in May 2003 by the Ministry of Education.

Most importantly, the ESP adopts a Sector Wide Approach (SWAp) to the management, financing and policy implementation of the sector. The SWAp promotes increased participation of all donor engaged in education and encourages them to coordinate their activities with the Ministry of Education (MoE, 2007). Consequently, the ESP received active support from donors who needed a more stable way to apply the SWAp into the education sector by feeding government coffers as established by the Paris Declaration. The 2003 to 2015 Ghana Education Strategic Plan has seen revision to a new version said to have taken into consideration weaknesses from the previous one and was release in 2010. It covers a ten year period after which a detailed evaluation will be conducted. This new version of the ESP clearly indicates that donors fully support the government efforts at improving education. Under the Sector Wide Approach, both financing and implementation of programs by the government and stakeholders are coordinated within various frameworks such as the Ghana Joint Assistance Strategy (G-JAS), the Multi-Donor Budgetary Support (MDBS) and Direct Sector Support (DSS).

### **3.2.Alignment and Harmonization**

Alignment under the PD states that "donors base their overall support on partner countries' national development strategies, institutions, and procedures" (Paris Declaration, 2005: 3).

Education is a key component of the overall Ghana growth and poverty reduction strategy II (GPRS II) framework that has received strong commitments from DPs on alignment and harmonization principles. Before the Paris declaration, Ghana and its donors have put in place harmonised mechanism aimed at facilitating alignment with country policies and systems. For example, Ghana's Public Procurement Act, promulgated in December 2003, assessed in 2006 was to obtain a country-wide overview of public procurement performance in the country. Laws

and statutes such as the Public Procurement Act play a vital role in how actors involved in procurement are enabled or constrained. As Ingram and Clay put it, "actors pursue their interests by making choices within constraints" (Ingram & Clay, 2000). The Ministry of Education provides its leadership in this sector. To ensure aid effectiveness and coherence, there is a monthly review of sector performance by the Ministry and its development partners.

### **3.4. Managing for results and Mutual Accountability**

Managing for results and mutual accountability principles of the Paris Declaration encourages both Development Partners and Partner Countries to commit themselves to periodic checks. These monitoring and evaluations are conducted to determine and measure the program outcome. This condition places high expectations on development partners. According to these principles of the PD, there should be measurable indicators and countries should have a framework for monitoring and evaluation. This framework should most importantly be transparent and should aim at assessing the country's development strategies and sector programmes in place. However, the extent of evaluation remains a question to be answered. In Ghana, The National Education Sector Annual Review (NESAR), offers an opportunity for all sector stakeholders to participate in an annual review.

In Ghana, this accountability process has resulted in the institution of the Annual Education Sector Operational Plan (AESOP) which is known as the district level as the Annual District Education Operational Plan (ADEOP). These annual reviews provide opportunities for the education stakeholders including both government and civil society organisations to brainstorm on better ways of improving the sector. However, whether these meetings make a real difference in the sector is another point for debate. Unfortunately, there was no much data on how these reviews are conducted nor documents relating to the outcome of those meetings. This could be an interesting independent study to conduct.

## **Chapter 4: Conceptual and Theoretical Framework**

### **4.1.1. Conceptual Framework**

Based on the above literature reviews on aid effectiveness and donor coordination, this chapter seeks to introduce the conceptual frameworks of the study. Key concepts of the study are defined in this chapter. Here, the research tries to define two main concepts that are key to a profound understanding of the topic at hand. Thus, the definition of "foreign aid" itself and the meaning of "aid effectiveness" in a broader sense then moves on to theoretical frameworks of the study. At the end of the theory section, two main hypothesis are formulated.

### **4.1.2 Foreign Aid**

According to Deborah Brautigam, defining what foreign aid is should be "fairly straightforward, but it is not" (Brautigam, 2009). The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) provides a standard definition for foreign aid or foreign assistance as financial flows, technical assistance, and supplies that are (1) intended to promote economic development and welfare and (2) are provided as either grants or subsidized loans (Hynes & Scott, 2013). According to the World Bank, Foreign has to do with official development assistance that are meant for developing countries. It can take the form of both grants and concessional loans that have at least a 25% grant component (World Bank, 1998). Ekiring also defines foreign aid as an international transfer of capital, technical assistance, and military to another state (Ekiring, 2000).

### **4.1.3. Aid Effectiveness**

Doucouliaos and Paldam defined aid effectiveness as "the effect of aid on development, notably accumulation and growth" (Doucouliaos & Paldam 2006). Morrissey earlier explained the understanding of aid effectiveness itself requires an analysis of "where a positive significant coefficient on the aid variable is interpreted as evidence that aid was effective in increasing

growth performance" (Morrissey, 2001). Bourguignon and Sundberg, However, warn that such definition of aid effectiveness factoring only economic growth and poverty reduction not only suffers from attribution problem but is narrowed and seems not to take into account the relationship between aid and final developmental outcomes (Bourguignon & Sundberg, 2007). This means that these two variables should be taken into account when evaluating aid effectiveness.

According to Roberts, aid effectiveness means that "aid is effectively meeting the needs of the people by having a positive impact during the following project implementation" (Roberts, 2009). As Cox et al. put it, aid effectiveness is 'how far aid project objectives have been achieved' (Cox et al., 1997). Definition of aid effectiveness is affected by time context due to the ever dynamic nature of the field and ever-changing perspectives and development of new theoretical approaches. For instance, from the 1950s to 1960s, economists such as Rostow and Chenery-Strout provided the rationale for aid as being effective at micro and macro levels. By the 1970s, the analysis of aid effectiveness was then expanded to the concept of social development as seen in the studies of Browne, Allen and Thomas, Tarp, Desai and Potter (Browne, 1990; Allen & Thomas, 2000; Tarp, 2000; Desai & Potter, 2002).

In 2005, the PD changed the landscape and definition of what aid effectiveness is. It widens this definition from previous ones. The PD sees aid effectiveness as the as a process where the recipient country enjoys the full benefits of aid. (Roberts, 2009). The aim of the PD goes beyond aid management and meeting of objectives and specifically defined aid effectiveness as the "arrangement for the planning, management, and deployment of aid that is efficient reduces transaction costs and is targeted towards development outcomes including poverty reduction" (Stern, 2008).

## **4.2. Theoretical Framework**

The success or failure of any policy implementation, especially that of the Paris Declaration, which is internationally oriented comes down to the "behaviour" that each signatory to the Declaration adopts in implementation. (Goggin, 1986). Meanwhile, the complex and dynamic



nature of the subject matter cannot be underestimated as various factors influence policy implementation. Therefore, in order to properly evaluate the implementation of the Paris Declaration by the United States, Canada and China in Ghana, it is important to analyse the specific dynamics, environment and context in which it was implemented. Critical factors such as commitment, institutional environment, donor's self-interest, contextual factors and inter-organisational co-operation come to shape and influence the behaviours of the actors involved in the implementation process (Brynard, 2009). However, with the PD, there is no one clear-cut definition and mechanism of successful policy implementation. It is important to note that, successful policy implementation is no guarantee for performance successful outcome. Given this inherent policy implementation issues, this study uses various policy implementation theories as the foundation of the research.

As previously discussed, ineffective aid is unanimously recognised as a problem in the international aid regime. Based on the continued piling of unsuccessful aid cases, aid stakeholders gathered, designed and collectively signed a policy agenda that is believed to bring about the long-time desired aid expectation, thus, aid effectiveness. In light of this, the PD focused on implementation and addressing issue surrounding it. Pressman and Wildavsky argue that the different stages of a policy circle, thus, policy design, implementation, and evaluation do not stand on their own, but rather mutually inclusive (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1984). While some implementation theories emphasise "success" or "failure" of policy implementation (Parsons, W. 1995), some models of implementation are organisation-related (Zald et al., 2005). Sabatier and Mazmanian noted that the political structure of recipient countries have a unique ability to legitimise programmes through policy initiative (Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1979).

#### **4.2.1. Top-Down Rational Implementation Model**

The top-down rational implementation model has four components. The first three are developed by Pressman and Wildavsky and the last; most importantly developed by Parson. According to Pressman and Wildavsky, the first implementation can refer to “a process of interaction between the set of goals and actions geared to achieving them” (Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1979). The second, implementation analysis should be understood in a way that “simple sequences of events depend on complex chains of reciprocal interaction”. Thirdly, the

the various stages of policy implementation are not mutually exclusive but interrelated so that every stage of the process relies on the previous. (Pressman, 1984). Finally, According to Parsons, implementation “requires a top-down system of control and communications, and resources to do the job” (Parson, 1995). In other words, as Parsons put it: “decision makers should not promise what they cannot deliver” (Parson, 1995). Majone and Wildavsky, for instance, argue that "good chain of command" and a 'capacity to coordinate and control" are essential ingredients for an effective top-down implementation system. (Majone & Wildavsky, 1979).

Pressman and Wildavsky's model, however, cannot fully explain the various policy implementation and outcomes among our donors. It can, however, explain in part policy style of the PD. In this sense, its inherent vulnerabilities or problems affect all our donor subjects as a conditioning factor (Dunsire, 1978). In other words, the failure of some donor agency to implement the PD is the very top-down approach inbuilt vulnerability in producing failure. According to Hogwood and Gunn, it is crucial to consider "potential problems of implementation in the process of designing policies in order to maximise the probability of its effectiveness" (Gunn, 1978). Elmore noted that this approach ignores the dynamics and inner workings of the implementation process itself (Elmore, 19789). Critiques such as Ryan, moreover argue that the top-down implementation model tends to highlight implementation vulnerabilities without offering solutions to them (Ryan, 1999).

#### **4.2.2. Bureaucratic Street-Level Behaviour Model**

Lipsky, author of the bureaucratic street-level or bottom-up model behaviour model, criticises the top-down model. He argues that the top-down model suffers from practical deficiency and theoretical at its best. (Lipsky, 1980). He then developed the street-level bureaucrat framework to tackle this deficiency with the aim of understanding the reason behind the differences in organisation goal and practices in aid administration. (Lipsky, 1980). This subsequently makes it important to understand the outcome of these policies from the point of view of recipient countries. (Barret, 2004).

In our context, we apply the street-level behaviour model to donors at the international level in relation to receiving countries as a national institution. Contrary to forwarding mapping theory, the backward mapping does not exclude the power of decision-makers on the policy outcome as a result of aid program implementation. However, Barret et al. emphasised that the bottom-up approach suffers from the problem of discretion policy framework. Lower level bureaucrats can decide to change policies (Barret & Fudge, 1981). Hogwood and Gunn, also argue that it may be nearly impossible to logistically or physically suppress those vulnerabilities from the lower level actors during policy formulation. Bardach concluded that either top-down or bottom-up frameworks, the implementation process may be seen by political actors as a means to political power gain (Bardach, 1980). Therefore, neither top-down model nor the street-level model is free from human influence by nature which revolves around self-centredness and power consciousness.

#### **4.2.3. Policy-Action Model**

In turning policies into actionable programs, both the street-level implementers and top-down policymakers try to maximise their self-interest. Barret and Fudge stated that this conflict among the various actors could be as a result of two things. The recipient country's government either formulated an inappropriate policy or the donor simply refuse to accept the receiving country's policy and are therefore unwilling to implement it. The Policy-action model follows what is believed to be the appropriate policy circle which includes both donors and recipient initiating the developmental process together for effective policy implementation and outcome. (Parsons, 1995). Majone and Wildavsky argue that the policy-action model is dynamic as it is constantly adapting itself to the dynamics of the policy process. According to Barret and Fudge "...however, the policy-action model places emphasis on the issues of power and dependence, interests, motivations and behaviour compared to both top-down and bottom-up approach" (Barret and Fudge, 1981: 29; Parsons, 1995). As seen above, no model can provide all answers as each one only illuminates a segment of the whole picture. Therefore, they must be viewed in a complementary and not competitive nor conflicting way since they all come with their own strengths and weaknesses.

The theoretical framework of this study indicates that policy implementation, especially that of an international policy such as the PD is inherently complex. However, among the three policy implementation theories reviewed, (top-down rational implementation model, bureaucratic street-level behaviour model and policy-action model, the top-down model applies most to the PD. Therefore, this thesis would expect that in Ghana,

- 1) *The general implementation of the PD in Ghana will be effective but at a slow pace.*
- 2) *Donor coordination in Ghana sees improvements.*

Top-down implementation model, together with strong commitments other parts of both actors can result in a positive change that in turn leads to successful program implementation. The top-down approach suggests that the PD be implemented with good coordination among both parties in order to achieve aid effectiveness. Political commitments are therefore supposed to be imposed from the top level. It is, however, worth noting that in order for a successful implementation process, the concerns and aspirations of the bottom level should be taking into account. This is why this study speculates that, for a country like Ghana facing poor management and weak administrative capacity issues (Arthur, 2016), the PD may be slow to reach full implementation. However, because the country has shown political commitment through its strong implementation of the PD, we can expect a positive outcome to a large extent.

Moreover, because none of the theories presented above is particular to the PD, a synthesis or combination of these theories is interchangeably used during implementation. Nevertheless, the thesis believes that foreign aid management system in Ghana will be positively impacted through the PD. This is partly due to the fact the country has shown continues commitment to the principle of aid effectiveness. In terms of donor coordination, the thesis expects a positive outcome, thus, stronger coordination of activities among donors on projects. The thesis bases these expectations again, on the element of commitment from donors to make the PD, the solution to aid fragmentation and supplication cost that then contributed to aid ineffectiveness.

## **Chapter 5: Analytical Approaches**

### **5.1. Methodology**

The research methodology used in this study is a qualitative research technique. It is aimed at collecting necessary data to establish to what extent the implementation the Paris Declaration has been effective in Ghana by investigating three major donors in the country mainly the United States, Canada, and China. Both primary and secondary data has been used to ensure a more reliable evaluation process as well filling in the gap with disadvantages associated with each type of source. This thesis, therefore, employs key informant interviews and the triangulation of text analysis as main tools in order to answer the research questions. While key informant interviews lend in-depth first-hand accounts of the nuances and context description, texts analysis provides detailed descriptions on a linguistic level for better interpretation (Aberbach & Rockman, 2002).

### **5.2. Case Selection**

#### **a) Why Ghana?**

The United States' Marshall Plan to Europe remains one of the most successful aid designs in the post Second World War era. Though this plan was intended to help, Western Europe recover from its ruins and reconstruct itself after the war, the idea to help Africa sprung from it. According to the World Bank, aid has since played a major role in Africa's economic growth, and development with noticeable aid flows to Sub-Saharan Africa rising and exceeded 11% of Gross National Product in 1994 (World Bank, 1995).

Like many other ordinary developing economies in Africa, Ghana has identified foreign aid as a key vector to economic growth and sustainable development. Therefore, Ghana's economy heavily relies on a large influx of foreign aid. Since independence in 1957, Ghana has received donor support due to the fact that the country has developed convincing developmental programs (World Bank, 2007). Many aid scholars have referred to Ghana as a 'donor darling' and "success story" (Opoku, 2010). According to Hughes, "Ghana's contemporary success can be ascribed to an increasingly co-operative and mutually reinforcing relationship between the

Ghanaian government and the international community”, emphasising on it its strong relationships with the donor community. He further stated that "for almost half a century Ghana has been a laboratory for a succession of domestic and internationally crafted developmental and macroeconomic prescriptions" (Hughes, 2005). King argued that, pre-dating the Paris Declaration, the country had its own principles for aid which are very similar to those in the Paris Declaration and well visible in the education sector (King, 2011). Maybe this could explain why an early evaluation of the Paris Declaration's implementation in Ghana by Quartey et al. was quite positive (Quartey et al., 2010). Ghana received a total of US\$ 12 billion in official aid between 1975 and 2002. (Jerve & Nissanke, 2008). Estimates made by OECD in 2011 revealed that Ghana received \$1,583 million in aid. This represents 3% of all development assistance to Africa (OECD, 2011). In a recent study, Brown stated that foreign donors have transferred up to US\$525 million per year for Ghana general budget support (Brown, 2016).


However, this colossal aid flows to the country have not always translated into tangible development. First, despite having achieved middle-income Status in 2010, Ghana only ranks 119 out of 188 countries on the 2016 Human Development Index (HDI, 2016). Signs of vulnerability and poverty remain in many parts of the country, especially in the northern region where 25% of the population lives below the poverty line. Second, Economic growth has been uneven, resulting in growing inequalities within and across regions. In the agricultural sector, for example, more than 80% of farmers live below the poverty line. Yet, the sector is the largest employer (High Commission of Canada in Ghana, 2017) Third, unemployment remains the biggest problem confronting Ghana today. In 2015, a survey conducted by the Institute of Economic Affairs, (IEA) across regions in Ghana revealed that, out of the 1,500 respondents, 25.80%, indicated that unemployment is the most important problem in Ghana. (IEA, 2015). Similarly, in 2016, the World Bank revealed that about 48% of the youth in Ghana are jobless (Mubarik, 2016). This current state of affairs in Ghana makes one wonder if foreign aid has had any positive impact on the country's growth and development.

Since signing the Paris Declaration, Ghana has lead the campaign for aid effectiveness in the global discourse. Its hosted in 2008, the Third High-Level Forum or the Accra Agenda for Action. On its latest Country Report on the evaluation of the implementation of the PD published in 2016, Quartey et al. noted that challenges to aid effectiveness in Ghana still remain high

despite reforms in the aid sector. This study, therefore, seeks to investigate and critically assess the implementation of the PD on Aid Effectiveness and donor coordination as an international policy instrument with the potential of achieving aid effectiveness in Ghana by looking at the implementation behaviour of US, Canada, and China in Ghana.

**b) Rational for choosing our three donors**

Statistics revealed that the United States, Canada and China are part of the top 10 major donors to Ghana. Other major unilateral and bilateral donors include Great Britain, Holland, Germany World Bank, the EU, the IMF and UN agencies; still providing conditional or tied aid/loans (on a reduced) scale. However, new or emerging donors such China are making their presence felt on the African continent with Ghana being in turn part of their top 10 recipient in Africa. China claims that their aid is untied or without conditionality solely based on a win-win situation. However, many scholars believe that, China’s aid to Africa or Ghana is tied or conditioned in the sense that those developmental projects that are undertaken by China in recipient countries like Ghana are undertaken by Chinese workers. The two graphs bellow show the top 10 DAC donor countries to Ghana as well as for Africa as a whole in net bilateral disbursements. Therefore, the first rational for selecting our understudy donors is that they do appear as top or major donors not only in Africa but in Ghana. It is important to note that because China is not a DAC member, one may not see the country listed on the statistical classification below.



Source: *Ghanabusinessnews.com*

### Top 10 DAC donor countries to Africa

	2013	2014	2015	3-year average	% of DAC countries
1 United States	9 667	9 338	9 320	<b>9 442</b>	33%
2 United Kingdom	3 922	4 346	4 203	<b>4 157</b>	14%
3 Germany	2 397	3 016	3 036	<b>2 816</b>	10%
4 France	3 168	2 929	2 292	<b>2 796</b>	10%
5 Japan	2 092	1 558	1 765	<b>1 805</b>	6%
6 Canada	1 519	1 362	1 086	<b>1 323</b>	5%
7 Sweden	1 167	1 109	873	<b>1 050</b>	4%
8 Norway	1 046	947	673	<b>889</b>	3%
9 Netherlands	858	761	635	<b>751</b>	3%
10 Switzerland	567	651	629	<b>616</b>	2%
Other DAC countries	3 662	3 259	2 522	<b>3 148</b>	11%
<b>Total DAC countries</b>	<b>30 068</b>	<b>29 274</b>	<b>27 035</b>	<b>28 792</b>	<b>100%</b>


Source: *Development Aid at A Glance Statistics by Region, Africa, 2017 Edition*

Aside the above reason, Firstly, the selection of these three donors is justified due to their long-term relationships with Ghana. The second consideration has to do with the amount of aid as all donors except China have a similar volume of aid to Ghana. It is worth noting that, Unlike the OECD-DAC donors, China rarely release detailed documentation on its foreign aid activities. As Strange et al. put it, "this lack of transparency makes it notoriously difficult, to speculate on what is really in the bucket" (Strange et al., 2015). Third, because the US and Canada are considered traditional donor while China as "new" donor. China is particularly of interest because it is a non-DAC donor but signatory to the PD. The current international aid regime has become more diverse and more dynamic in regards to diversified stakeholders ranking from small and medium size donors and source of capital as well as donor interest. The global aid regime has seen new players. Franklin and Giovannetti predicted that the 2008-2009 economic crisis would compel traditional aid donors to lower their development assistance towards Africa and create space for new donors (Franklin & Giovannetti, 2011). The study, therefore, chose the US, Canada, and China, all of whom are signatories of the PD.



The United States was one of the first countries to establish diplomatic relations with Ghana after independence in 1957. U.S. foreign aid to Ghana is implemented by what is called the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). USAID works towards capacity building by increasing agricultural production especially targeting small and medium farm holders, employment opportunities, improving the quality of health services and education as well as strengthening local government institutions (USAID, 2009). According to the Bureau of African Affairs, U.S. Relations with Ghana (2017), the Peace Corps program first batch of volunteers were sent to Ghana working in education, agriculture, and health across the country and most importantly, Ghana was the first country to host the first cohort of Peace Corps. The figure below shows US development assistance to Ghana from 2005-2016.


**Figure 1: US development cooperation to Ghana according to different data sources, 2005–2016**



Source: IATI, Foreignassistance.gov, and OECD/DAC/CRS data.


Canada’s first development assistance to Africa was in Ghana. Bilateral relations between the two countries are said to remain strong. Moreover, Canada occupies one of the top spots as a bilateral donors to Ghana. According to Ghana-Business report in 2017, “the Government of Canada contributed more than \$135 million in official development assistance to Ghana.” between 2015–2016. In April 2015, in order to enhance transparency and accountability concerning the resources that Canada transferred to Ghana, the two countries signed a Mutual Accountability Framework hoping for the achievement of better development results. According to the High Commission of Canada in Ghana annual report 2017, Canada's bilateral development program prioritised areas of sustainable economic growth, climate-smart agriculture, access to and use of affordable and nutritious foods; access to sanitation and

hygiene services in under-served areas and the promotion of gender equality. The chart below shows the top twenty Canadian International assistance from 2015-2016 with Ghana being the third largest recipient.



Source: *Global Affairs Canada: Statistical Report on International Assistance 2015-2016*

China has increased its foreign development assistance to Ghana in recent years. Most of these aids are somehow motivated and intended to achieve a win-win situation for both countries. Different from the traditional aid donors like IMF which has previously imposed conditionality on its aid, China's aid in most cases comes in the forms of grand infrastructural projects such as roads, theatre halls, sportive venues to name a few. Ghana enjoys numerous construction projects sponsored by the Chinese government. China's recent assistance to Ghana includes \$562 million for the construction of the Bui dam. The construction of the dam was expected to employ 2,900 Ghanaians and 500 Chinese and to be completed by 2012 and indeed was inaugurated in December 2013 as planned (Tsikata et al., 2008). It is no secret that it very difficult to obtain data on Chinese aid flows, however, the graph below shows that Ghana is part of the top Chinese aid recipient in Africa.



Source: *AidData*

### 5.3. Research Design

It is without a doubt that, this thesis intends to employ a Case Study approach. Yin, whose article is still considered as one of the best edition to case study research explains that, a case study is right when one tries to *investigate* a modern phenomenon involving real-life context in an in-depth manner, especially in a situation where the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clear (Yin, 2003). These very characteristics strongly correlate with the contours of this research which aims at *investigating* how the implementation of the PD and donor coordination has evolved so far in Ghana. It is important to note that, the PD itself is a contemporary phenomenon of only thirteen years old at the time this research is taking place.

Therefore, I will be employing a *Single Case Study* design whereby the identifiable single case will be Ghana while the embedded units in my research will be the US, Canada, and China. During my initial investigation, I was faced with the selection of which country to analyse. Soon, it became clear that Ghana has been the most involved in the PD and indeed received tremendous developmental assistance from the selected donors' understudy. However, arriving

at this conclusion was based on a set of self-imposed country selection criteria or requirements outlined as follows. The case must have:

- a) *A regional acknowledgment of its influence so that the findings would carry a certain weigh of general applicability*
- b) *The country must have been somehow involved in this PD or at least gone through a review*
- c) *The diplomatic relation of that country to the selected donors must have been considerable*

The nation of Ghana matches the above criteria based on the following: First, Ghana is one of the most stabled democracies in west-Africa; a sub-region troubled by conflicts. Ghana was the first to have won independence from colonial rule in Sub-Sahara Africa, therefore, remains a model in terms of governance and leadership. Second, Ghana enjoys numerous aid flows from the selected donors (Tsikata et al., 2008).

#### **5.4. Sampling**

Ghana is a relatively big country with a population of 27,499,924 spread over 10 regions. The study is conducted mostly in the capital city, Accra which grouped most state institutions as well as embassies which represent donor agencies. Because the study is based on the Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness which is mostly entrusted on to the government of the recipient countries and aid officials who are mostly located in the capital, the participants are chosen from this location. Participants are classified into two main categories. Thus, from donors, represented by donor agencies in the host country Ghana and the government of Ghana represented by it civil servants. It is important to note that in Ghana, the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, is the main office or state agency mandated to constitutionally coordinate, harmonize and facilitate development assistance as well as donor coordination in Ghana; most importantly, the implementation of the PD in Ghana. In this sense, officials from MoFEP remain great tool of information as they are involved in the events and discussions of the PD on a day to day basis.

The respondent from donor agency count two (2) officials from USAID, two (2) officials from the Chinese embassy and two (2) officials High Commission of Canada in Ghana. Respondents from the Ghanaian government include two (2) officials from Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, two (2) officials from National Development Planning Commission, two (2) officers from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration. This purposeful sampling ensured that other officials who are not working at the MoFEP do have knowledge about the PD in Ghana.

## **5.5. Data Collection and Analysis**

Data analysis in case studies remains one of the least developed and most difficult aspects of doing case studies and can seem daunting. (Yin, 2003). Marshal and Rossman warned that bringing order, structure and interpretation to data collected in such instances is time consuming, messy, ambiguous and lack procedure that can be systematically and analytically applied. However, this does not mean that qualitative methodology lacks rigor but rather achieves results in a different way to a quantitative study. Data collection for this study will be both primary and secondary.

In regards to primary sources, this study adopts purposive sampling which according to Palinkas "involves identifying and selecting individuals that are especially knowledgeable about or experienced with a phenomenon of interest" (Palinkas et al, 2015). The research then conducts semi-structured interviews with open-ended questions to collect information through telephone, email and Skype interviews with a diversity of actors playing key roles in the implementation of the PD. This was important in capturing diverse views and experiences. An important feature of a case study is the use of multiple data sources which is a strategy that enhances the research credibility (Yin, 2003). Secondary sources include books, articles, reviews and publication that are oriented towards the PD.

After collecting the data from the interviews, this study used coding (indexing) or thematic content analysis to analyse the data and to refine interpretation (Bryman, 2012). Transcripts were read multiple times to get familiar with the data then labeling of relevant pieces, categories, common patterns and themes across a data set. Once the necessary steps were completed, the study described the connection between the codes (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009).

The connections that exist between these coded eventually represent the main results of this research. This represents a new knowledge about the PD from the perspective of the participants.

### **5.6. Quality and Assurance of Research**

On the question of generalizability, I understand that there is a prevailing belief among researchers that single case studies are not suited for validity and generalizability because the case is comfortability chosen by the researcher and moreover, it is nearly impossible to widely apply the findings in real life. The validity of a contemporary phenomenon such as aid continues to be one of the toughest. However, to ensure that, even though this research highlights a single case study, the importance of this study to both academia and political actors cannot be overemphasized.

Also, there are many criticisms towards data gotten from the interview via email. While some argue that, the interviewer is unable to read facial expression and body language, make eye contact or hear the voice tone of the interviewee, data gotten from email interview is as reliable as that obtained through online research (Denscombe, 2008). Therefore, remain a great tool for data collection as they generate contextual nuance and give room for longer answers (Aberbach & Rockman, 2002). Email interviews rather give amplified time for the respondent to provide thoughtful and pressure-free answers. This is not to say that email interview is the best but rather highlight the fact that they are not to be neglected in academia.

### **5.7. Ethical Considerations**

Since aid effectiveness is a very opinionated topic drawing different viewpoint, it is important for me to have some ethical guidelines to ensure the quality of data and results. According to Tracy, ethics is an essential ingredient for quality research work. Therefore, procedural ethics is something that this research was aware of as it deals with the consent of my participants. Weak consents can usually lead to poor data (Tracy, 2013). So, this study created and cultivated trust with its participants, protecting and respecting their confidentiality and privacy as

promised. The research ensured therefore that collected data are stored in locked systems and consent giving before sharing them with others. Even in the use of pseudonyms, extreme caution must be taken (Tracy, 2013) Finally, I intend to acknowledge my respondents of their contributions to the research by sharing my findings with them in the hope that, they might pick up from where I paused.

## **Chapter 6: Findings And Analytical Discussions**

This chapter presents an overview of the various findings from the interviews conducted. It provides a detailed analysis of the findings of the PD in Ghana in relation to the research questions. Interviewees came to a general agreement that the principles of the Paris Declaration has contributed positively to aid effectiveness in Ghana.

### **6.1. Findings and Discussion on the Recipient (Ghana)**

The study revealed that development assistance in Ghana prior to the adoption of the Paris Declaration was ineffective. One interviewee from the MoFEP stated that *“there was no proper framework for ensuring the effectiveness of aid. Both Ghana and its donors were doing what they assume to be right for the country”* Though a general lack of coordination between Ghana and its development partners was said to be a fundamental problem or challenge, it was also mentioned that the action plans of the government did not always correlate with that of its various donors. Because projects and programs of both the Ghanaian government and the donors were different or sometimes antagonistic, this resulted into nagging differences in project formulation which in turn resulted into huge transaction costs, wasting of *“precious”* resources, duplication of activities and overburdened Ghana aid officials. Another respondent from the National Planning Commission argued that *“As for the money, it was coming plenty, and it could have changed our economic and social situation to the best, but we love corruption. We were not using the money for the intended purposes, and most money just disappears like that without even the possibility of tracing them or at least knowing what else it was used for”*

With regards to how donors themselves behave prior the adoption of the PD, this study referred to other secondary sources and several publications which revealed that donors themselves did little to make their money make the intended difference. For example, the Ghana Aid Policy and Strategy documents, confirm the view of the chaotic situation in which foreign aid was administrated prior to the adoption of the Paris agenda in Ghana. As stated in the report of the 2011 Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness for Ghana (IDEG), *“It was common practice for development partners to create aid programmes composed of a series of stand-alone projects that were largely donor-driven, circumventing national institutions and delegating relatively little responsibility to develop country governments”*. (IDEG, 2011: 8).

However, after the adoption of the PD, positive changes were noticed. One of which most respondents mentioned to be the recognition and legitimacy the of civil society organisations that are constantly *“keeping an eye on us”* they say. An official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration (MFA&RI) mentioned that civil society now has a growing platform and increasing role in aid architecture in Ghana which was not the case prior to the adoption of the Paris Declaration. It is worth noting that, the Declaration itself paid no much attention to the role or importance of civil society organisations, however, for the first time, during the Busan meeting, unprecedented space was given to civil society organisations to participate in the making of better aid agenda. As one of the respondents will elaborate on, *“I think the most effective aid infrastructure has been the interest of CSOs in monitoring aid usage in Ghana. The Aid Alliance Ghana, STAR-Ghana, etc. and other collaborative efforts at aid expenditure tracking can be attributed to the aftermath of the Paris declaration.”*

On the question of coordination among donors before the Paris Declaration, all respondents stated that there was no coordination among donors before the Paris Declaration. Every donor was embarking on a project that is of interest to them regardless of whether another donor was doing the same or same or not. Duplication of projects was a reality in Ghana. As a respondent put it, *“The multiplicity of the implementing players leads to the duplicity of efforts and sometimes confusion as to who does what.”* A respondent of the Finance Ministry stated that *“There was much-uncoordinated funding of donor projects.”* However, ever since the adoption of the Paris Declaration, positive change has been felt among donors in coordinating their activities to some extent. *“For example, Migration Management in Ghana has involved the*



*IOM, ICMPD, GIZ.*” This indicates that, again, the PD plays a major role in making foreign aid in Ghana, an efficient investment. Also, it was mentioned that “*the School Feeding programme has been supported by Holland, Denmark, Japan etc.*” It can, therefore, be concluded that the adoption of the PD in Ghana, has improved donor coordination in Ghana per the perspective of the interviewees.

In general, in the opinion of the respondents, the aid has been relatively effective in Ghana especially at the sectoral level. A respondent from the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MoFEC) stated that “*I think Aid has supported the social services (NHIS), healthcare (Malaria), education (Budgetary allocation), infrastructure (Roads etc.) among others. To that extent, yes aid has been effective in Ghana*”. This suggests that foreign aid has had a positive impact on the country’s economic and social life and this effectiveness is measured by the outcome of an aid-oriented program or the positive transformation of a particular sector that has been touched by foreign aid.

With regards to the effectiveness of the Paris Declaration in the country, the study was confronted with mixed answers. While some believe that the PD has been very effective, some respondents seem skeptical about the subject matter. One respondent stated that “*Paris Declaration, Paris Declaration, what has it changed here in Ghana? Are we not still corrupt? We are still doing the same old dirty things, stealing money that is supposed to help poor people for our own private gain. Me I don’t see any change*”. Another interviewee stated that “*I am not sure if the Paris Declaration has brought any change around here but I hear it a lot nowadays. Perhaps it is doing something, but for now, I can't say. Maybe let's wait a few more years and see.*” However, some respondents argue that the PD has been very effective in Ghana but only in the area of ownership. On the positive side, an official from the National Development Planning Commission (NDPC) stated that, “*You see for example we formulated the Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda (GSGDA) to enable our donors to effectively support our own country leadership, policies, institutions and systems and this is what is happening because the principles were such that if a donor wants to introduce a project, it must be in respect to our set priorities contained in the GSGDA.*”

Most interviewees actually believe that the education sector is the best example of the positive impact of the PD in Ghana. The Education Strategic Plan (ESP) has continuously helped the sector to achieve effectiveness especially in the areas of ownership, alignment and has made the sector more predictable than it was before the adoption of the Paris agreement. A respondent from the Ministry of Finance also stated that “... *the donor community has also become more assertive in ensuring value for money in their aid-funded projects.*” This send a signal that the PD has brought some improvement to what was before the doption of the Declaration.

Some respondents believe despite these positive impacts that the country still has more to do to harvest the full benefit of the agreement. As one of the respondents put it, “*Of course some donors have made adjustments in ensuring their cash is well spent, but beyond that, there is very little in the sense of difference at the projects consumption end. Aid expenditure tracking reveals huge wastage and corruption downstream and sustenance of the dependency culture.*” It is important to note that in 2004 for example, which is before the adoption of the PD, Ghana was ranked 64 out of 145 countries in term of corruption perceptions (TI, 2004). However, in 2017, it became surprising after expectations felt short as the country ranking was not better. In 2017, Ghana was ranked 81 out of 180 most corrupt countries in the world (TI, 2017). This is a reminder that, the PD may be the solution to aid ineffectiveness but a much more political will is needed from the recipient’s country to provide better administration to foreign aid.

The study also found that, though there have been some improvements in alignment, foreign aid is still falling short in aligning with the country’s development priorities. Many respondents made mention of numerous challenges. A respondent from the MFEP stated that “*For example, we are claiming ownership and alignment when conditionalities surrounding most aid deals and inflows are kept secret or at least not revealed to our knowledge with donors are still prescribing us the content of our policies.*”

In working with donors, one aspect that has been difficult is that the government of Ghana lack or have weak capacity in dealing with donors. Ghanaian officials working with country donors say that it is more difficult with traditional donors. First, the country is currently dealing with a multitude of donors and second the growing influence of “emerging” or “new” donors such as China is said to be impacting the countries development strategies negatively. In the words of

a respondent from the National Planning Commission, *“Who can deny that we formulate development strategies to please them just for the money? We need the money, and for example China has plenty so we do what we can to get it period”*. Another official from the MFA&RI put this in a quite different way by stating that *“Because we need the money, and sometimes urgently, we do consider what could be acceptable to our donors, the good thing is that, we know what they want to invest their money in, so it won’t look like they are imposing it on us”*.

With regards to advanced donors such as the US, respondents stated that the bureaucracy involved make it difficult to get projects done. As a respondent put it, *“Too much bureaucracy, which consumes part of the original sum.”* It can be deduced here that, it seems that emerging donors such as China have a way of creating a certain positive reputation for themselves by putting a less bureaucratic burden on their recipients than advanced donors. The heavy bureaucracy, seen earlier Chapter 2 slows aid effectiveness and confirm the expectations of this thesis. *“At least there's focus and output. They fund Tamale Sports Stadium, and that's it, instead of funding ministry of sports budget and not seeing the Tamale sports stadium standing.* As one respondent stated. *Sector-Wide Support was argued to be “good for institutional development but not for the effectiveness of projects” because “without monitoring, wastage is a guaranteed outcome and that’s why we have ministries buying 7series BMWs to inspect road projects.”*

A government official made an interesting argument that most training courses they receive as government officials are offered by the donors and doing so, the donors make sure that their policy preferences and ideologies are spread among the trainees who happen to be government official, most of them working in the field of development assistance. As he put it, *“after all these people train us, so what do you expect?”*. This suggests that, though the PD can be considered to help Ghana own its development policies and that donors have aligned with these policies, it might not be totally the case. Donors are still having their way in one way or the other on what they wish to spend their money on. However, it is not always that donors get the opportunity to align their funds with what they want. This study discovered that sometimes, donor and recipient’s interest are so opposite that aid projects and programmes have to be abandoned. One respondent stated that *“The clash of interests from both the donors and the recipient’s end results in some aid funded projects being abandoned.”* Other respondents made

quite a similar remark by stating that *“sometimes a simple location of an aid project could result in a project failure. It is like we want a school built in Kumasi and they want it in Cape Coast”* unfortunately, the thesis was not provided with any concrete example of which project(s) were abandoned due to the donor-recipient clash of interest in Ghana. Aside this clash of interest, numerous reasons have been cited for causes of project failure in Ghana. These causes include monitoring, corruption, political interference, change in government and bureaucracy (Damoah et al., 2015). Although reported cases of project failure are present, an intensive consultation of the literature revealed that research devoted to the subject matter is rarely done (Ayee, 2000).

## **6.2. Findings and Discussion on Donor Agencies in Ghana**

This section presents findings about the effectiveness of the Paris Declaration in Ghana from the perspective of three donors thus, the United States, Canada and China. Consequently, the respondents are officials working at the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Republic of Ghana, and the High Commission of Canada in Ghana.

Collectively, interviewed donor agency officials in Ghana stated that before the Paris Declaration, coordination among them (donors) was a difficult aspect of the entire aid management system. They also acknowledged that the lack of coordination was contributing to waste of money as projects were getting duplicated and transaction cost heavy. As a Canadian aid official put it, *“Yes there was no cooperation whatsoever among us, even now it is still difficult to reach agreement on simple projects because of our clash of interests, but I can say that coordination is now better than ever because of the efforts of the Paris Declaration.”* This suggests that that in Ghana, donor coordination is getting better after the adoption of the Paris Declaration. A respondent from the USAID stated that *“We always support donor coordination efforts, especially in the area of development corporation. For example, most of our aid inflows, are channelled through multilateral institutions. This is one way to show that we do coordinate with other donors or at least provide the platform for it.* However, how well these initiatives help in the implementation of the PD is questionable.

This positive view of improved donor coordination in Ghana is not completely shared with officials from the Chinese Embassy. They stated that because they share a completely different ideology with traditional donors, it makes it difficult to cooperate on projects. As an official from the Chinese embassy stated, “*We all want to help, we are all helping, but just using different strategies and sometimes our strategies are not really welcomed*”. This indicates that donor coordination in Ghana may have seen an improvement but not necessary at all donor's levels. New and old donors are not finding the right balance to cooperate on projects. While countries like the United States and Canada mostly provide aid to achieve goals such as democracy, education and health, countries like China are mostly present in infrastructure projects. This can be seen as different priorities.

Collectively, donor agency officials in Ghana stated that they provide aid in accordance with the five principles of the PD, thus, ownership, alignment, harmonisation, mutual accountability and management for results. In regards to ownership, donors stated that they allow Ghana to draw its own priorities and they, in turn, align or adhere to those policies as prescribed by the PD. This assertion implies that Ghana and its development partners work together to achieve positive results. Moreover, most respondents cited the Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda (GSGDA), 2010–2013, as well as GSGDA II 2014–2017 as policy frameworks that they work closely with. These national development policy frameworks were put in place after the PD based on a broad consultation among the government officials. As one of the Chinese aid officials put it, “*aligning with the development priorities of Ghana is not much of a problem for us because they usually coincide with own ambitions for the country*”. The study also discovered that traditional donors such as the United States and Canada use the Multi-Donor Budget Support (MDBS) to show alignment to government policies while China continue to embark on a project based approach.

It is important to remember that, the implementation of the PD in Ghana is intrusted one main framework; namely the Multi-Donor Budget Support. However, its operational framework is conducted in two different stages. First, through the Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS)

which is to provide the poverty reduction plans of the government of Ghana and second, the Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) which is tasked to allocate resources to implement the projects of the GPRS according to present appealing priorities. It is important to note that the MDBS is the most important among them. The main goal of the MDBS according to Quartey is “To ensure a continuous flow of aid to enable the government to finance its poverty-related expenditures”. (Quartey et al., 2016).

An official from the USAID stated that “*We use the government system to transfer funds through the Multi-Donor Budget Support (MDBS) and Sectoral Budget Support. That is how we make a great contribution to the education and the health centre for example*”. Here, it appears that Ghana has in place institutions that make the implementation of the PD easier for its donors. Another Canadian aid official stated that “*It is because of frameworks like the Multi-Donor Budget Support that we as donors know that one donor cannot do it all. In the education and health sector, for example, we can see the chart of how many donors are participating and how well or not the government is spending our money.*” As seen in Chapter 2, the top-down implementation theory, which is peculiar to the PD “requires a system of control and communications, and resources to do the job” (Parson, 1995). Here, it can be deduced that there is a certain level of communication between Ghana and its donors. This result shows that the theoretical expectations of this thesis get empirical support from the interviewees to some extent. Some studies have also noted that in Ghana, donor alignment with the government strategies or development policies is not that much of a challenge because there is good communication between donor and recipient. Most donor officials mention sectors such as health and education to be working well since the adoption of the PD.

However, donor officials also collectively, noted that the implementation of the development plans themselves are far from being satisfactory to them. For instance, one donor official stated, “... *they say they want this or that and we align with it as we transfer the funds, but it is another thing altogether to see that project being implemented*”. Also, the change of regime was another point raised by another donor agency as a difficult aspect in working with the government of Ghana. Oduro argues that in countries like Ghana, “competitive clientelist and electoral politics” for example makes it difficult to follow or bring projects to maturity because

once a new government takes power, new policies and projects that they consider priorities will be drowned and the old ones abandoned. (Oduro et al., 2014). Moreover, donors stated that sometimes government presents projects that are “*too many, most of which are vague*” Brown stated that “the existence of multiple, overlapping plans in Ghana makes it difficult to identify what in fact is being owned. Incoherence among them adds further confusion to the picture clarity. This “lack of clarity—perhaps even quality—fundamentally undermines the content and therefore the concept of ownership” (Brown, 2016).

With respect to management for the result and mutual accountability, for example, interviewed donors noted that the government of Ghana makes it flexible for them to achieve the above-mentioned principles. One donor official stated that “*The level of trust between us and the government was quite low because it becomes intense when we demand what our money was used for in the absence of result(s) but I can say that after the Paris Declaration, we underwent many dialogues, especially on Public Financial Management that opened room(s) for more trust between us.*” This leads to believe that both Ghana and its donors are working together to make aid flow more accountable. Another respondent from the USAID stated that “*I believe that the MDDBS annual review meeting is making a great deal of progress towards management for result and mutual accountability. Now when we have these meeting we see a lot of CSO representatives which really force the government to be more open in its expenditure. This is a good thing because it allows us all to provide some feedback on public expenditure and financial management of the country.*” An interviewee from the USAID also stated that “*We regularly publish information on our websites and in the press; especially when a new financial deal is closed between us and the government*”. As seen in Chapter 4 (theory section), the PD implementation principles suggest donors look out for political commitments. Based on the findings, Ghana seems to fulfil that requirement to some extent.

### **6.3. Analytical Discussion**

#### **a) How do Donors (US, Canada And China) Differ in Their Implementation of the PD?**

Even though all donor seems to affirm that they are all working towards the implementation of the PD, the results of the interviews show important variations in their implementation behaviour. While the uneven number of donors selected, signal an inherent limitation of any proper comparison, the interviews shed significant light onto both the progress made and challenges that donors face individually in implementing their Paris. Among the three donor cases studied, it was evident that the U.S and Canada have shown greater progress in implementing the PD in comparison with China which shows a reluctance towards Paris. This is because as compared to the advanced donors (United states and canada) who align with the Multi-Donor Budget Supports and Sector-Wide Approach (SWAps) as encouraged by the paris agreement, new donors such as China provides Project Base Approach. In other words, they show reluctance in transferring funds into government coffers to implement projects and prefers being directly on the projects themselves.

In this regard, it seems that China has interpreted the PD in a slightly differently way as they do not use Multi-Donor Budget system but project base approach to align with countries strategies. The question is what explains the existing difference in implementation behaviour? Perhaps, this trend is present because the US and Canada are DAC members; therefore are bound by certain expectations or perhaps because of their status of traditional donor's vis a vis China which is an emerging donor, especially in Africa. The PD has been clear on the fact that "Development Assistance works best when it is fully aligned with national priorities and needs". Although donors argue that they have fully given way to recipient countries to own their own development strategies, evidence on the ground seems to suggest otherwise. Policy prescription overshadows ownership in one way or the other, making alignment devoid of its meaning. However, if there is something donors are making unanimous progress in, then it is a general acknowledgement that the inclusion of civil society is an important ingredient for the advancement of the Paris agreement. CSOs remain the other counter party that help keep



development efforts on-track by drawing attention on outcome. In other words, CSOs have helped put greater emphasis on transparency for both donor and partner countries.

#### **6.4. Discussions of Limitation of the Study**

Data collection and analysis was challenging. It is however worth noting that those challenges were expected and as a result, measure were put in place to ensure quality data collection and processing. The study was carried out within a fairly short period of time because of the requirement to meet academic deadline. The study conducted a total of 12 interviews with respondents in Ghana, more specifically in Accra the capital where most government institution abreast with aid-related issues as well as selected donor agencies are located. The interview was conducted during a period of two and half months beginning mid-February to the end of April. With regards to donors, the study conducted a total of 6 Interviewees were officials from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Republic of Ghana, and the High Commission of Canada in Ghana. With regards to the government of Ghana, six interviews were granted with officials from the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, the National Development Planning Commission and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration.

The quantity of data appropriate for this research was affected by time constraints. For example, the thesis did not get responses from the officials from Centre for Democratic Development, Accra, Ghana. Also, the thesis was not able to get the response from lecturers from the University of Ghana at the Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic Research and of the Political Science Department as planned. Secondary data, however filled in the gap. This study has however served as a good starting point for future researchers interested in aid effectiveness in Ghana.

## **Conclusion**

As indicated in this paper, there was very little effort in achieving aid effectiveness in Ghana prior to the adoption of the Paris Declaration. As stated by Quartey, Ghana was "low and volatile". Little attention was paid to Ghana national development plans and strategies. Donor coordination and specialisation in aid projects was less effective with little or no positive outcome as aid projects were implemented in isolation. This was because, or among other reasons, "each donor wants to plant its own flag almost everywhere" (World Bank, 1998). Moreover, evaluation of aid effectiveness was poor and slow. These further constitute a challenge to properly evaluating aid activities in the country. A central challenge, then, was to develop a consensus on what constituted successful development assistance. Severino described the PD as the first attempt in tackling international coordination problems in the field of aid as donors agreed to eliminate duplication of efforts (Severino, 2010) which in turn, will make aid project "as cost-effective as possible" (OECD 2005: paragraph 3). The PD stretched that aid fragmentation weakens effectiveness while a rational approach can enhance division of labour and reduce transactions cost (OECD 2005: paragraph 33).

This study found that coordination among donors in Ghana has improved as more donors associate to work on projects in the country. Also, there seems to be more value for donor money as donors, and government officials themselves acknowledged that sectors such as education and health are improved because of the PD. Corruption is a major issue that needs to be tackled in achieving the goal for aid effectiveness. The PD can be said to be quite positive in Ghana though there are still challenges both from the donors and Ghana in applying some of its principles. A more rigorous study is therefore needed to measure the applicability of the findings to other developing countries and whether different patterns may be observed. It is important to identify how seriously the PD is taken and how partner countries negotiate more strongly with donors.

This study emphasizes that, even though the Paris Declaration can be said to be 13 years old, from the international system's perspective, it is fairly new. The adherents to the PD are numerous, and not all countries have the same paste of implementation as context (history, language, experience, level of development, capacity, memory, and trust) has to be factored. Therefore, much more time or years need to be granted to the PD to make any strong claim on

its effectiveness. Donors are using various mechanisms including general budget support in the form of the MDDBS, or sector budget support and Sector Wide Approaches and project aid to effectively support Ghana's country leadership, policies, institutions and through those aid modalities. In general, the Paris Declaration has led to great improvements in aid administration and management in Ghana. That said, it is however important to note that a lot more challenges remain. The country may need to show more political will towards aid effectiveness by effectively and efficiently dealing with corruption; an issue raised by most respondents as a severe obstacle to aid effectiveness in Ghana. In sum, as one of the Guardian's article put it, "Yes, the Paris declaration on aid has problems, but it's still the best we have" (The Guardian, 2011).

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## **APPENDICES**

### **Appendix I. List of Institutions who helped during Data Gathering for the Study**

United States Agency for International Development (USAID)

Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Republic of Ghana

High Commission of Canada in Ghana

Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning

National Development Planning Commission

Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration.

### **Appendix II. Interview Guides**

Research Topic: **The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and Donor Coordination: A Comparative Study of the United States, Canada and China in Ghana**

#### **Questions for Aid recipient country (The Government of Ghana)**

Q1.0. To what extent, in your view has foreign aid achieved effectiveness in Ghana?

Q1.1. To what extent, in your view has the Paris Declaration achieved effectiveness in Ghana?

Q2.0. What does aid effectiveness mean to you?

Q2.1. How obvious is aid effectiveness in Ghana?



Q3.0. Can you explain the changes in Ghana-Donor relationship after the Paris Declaration if any?

Q3.1. Please enumerate the positive changes:

Q3.2. What has been the challenges?

Q4.0. Can you elaborate on the state of cooperation in aid administration in Ghana prior to the Paris Declaration?

Q4.1. Can you elaborate on the state of cooperation in aid administration in Ghana after the Paris Declaration?

Q4.2. Could you state sample joint project (s) in Ghana by two or more donors?

Q5.0. Donors like China have a propensity of providing aid on individual project bases while advanced donors give budgetary support. In your view, which approach better results in aid effectiveness in Ghana?

Q6.0. Could you elaborate on the positive side of aid from advanced donors in relation to the Paris Declaration?

Q6.1. Could you elaborate on the difficult side of aid from advanced donors in relation to the Paris Declaration?

Q6.2. Could you elaborate on the positive side of aid from emerging donors in relation to the Paris Declaration?

Q6.3. Could you elaborate on the difficult side of aid from emerging donors in relation to the Paris Declaration?

Q7. Can you recommend other relevant sources of information?

Q8. Are there any additional comments?

**Thank you!**

### **Questions to Donor Agencies in Ghana**

Q1.0. Do you make attempts to improve aid 'ownership' in Ghana?

Q1.1. If yes, please explain how?

Q1.2. If no, please explain why?

Q2.0. Do you adhere to the Paris Declaration 'alignment' principle while providing aid in Ghana?

Q2.1. If yes, please explain how?

Q2.2. If no, please explain why?

Q3.0. Do you adhere to the Paris Declaration 'harmonisation' principle while providing aid in Ghana?

Q3.1. If yes, please explain how?

Q3.2. If no, please explain why?

Q4.0. Do you adhere to the Paris Declaration 'managing for results' principle while providing aid in Ghana?

Q4.1. If yes, please explain how?

Q4.2. If no, please explain why?

Q5.0. Do you adhere to the Paris Declaration 'mutual accountability' principle while providing aid in Ghana?

Q5.1. If yes, please explain how?

Q5.2. If no, please explain why?

Q6.0. Can you elaborate on the state of cooperation in aid administration in Ghana prior to the Paris Declaration?

Q6.1. Can you elaborate on the state of cooperation in aid administration in Ghana after to the Paris Declaration?

Q6.2. Could you state sample joint project (s) in Ghana that both you and other donors have undertaken together?

Q7.0. What has been the challenges from your organisation point of view in implementing the Paris Declaration in Ghana?

Q7.1. What has been the challenges from your organisation point of view in working with the government of Ghana in relation to the Paris Declaration?

Q8. Can you recommend other relevant sources of information?

Q9. Are there any additional comments?

**Thank you!**