OPERATIONAL MILITARY VIOLENCE

A Cartography of Bureaucratic Minds and Practices

Anders Malm

Swedish Defence University

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

Abstract

Western use of military violence is becoming increasingly centralised, partly through the use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (or more commonly referred to as "drones" in the literature). Drone technology allows control and command of military operations to be put under one roof, and as military organisations traditionally have a close dependence on technological developments, procedures and regulations for centralised command and control have developed in close concert with advances in drone technology. Apart from technological innovations, there are other aspects that contribute to the growing centralisation of military violence. The increasing military sensitivity about public and media criticism regarding casualties and 'collateral damage' underlines the need for Western military organisations to take central control of military missions and the use of violence.

What are the characteristics and consequences of this centralisation and how does it affect military practitioners' relation to violence? The literature on military violence has slowly become aware that something has happened in Western military organisations' relations to the use of force and has made some attempts to answer these questions. The tentative (short) answer is that military violence is becoming increasingly bureaucratised in the wake of this centralisation, and its human consequences are lost in bureaucratic routines and procedures. But so far the research on the bureaucratisation of violence has been delimited to investigations of either the theoretical procedures themselves (e.g. analysis of military doctrines), or field studies of drone operators or airmen's work of 'dropping bombs'. A major gap in the literature exists as the main organisational function for retaining control and command over violence – the operational level and the staff work performed there – is largely left aside in the research. Of particular interest here is how the work at operational levels of military organisations contributes to a bureaucratic institutionalisation of violence.

This thesis aims to fill some of this gap through ethnographic investigations of operational military work and the training of 'targeteers' – staff officers working with the operational governance of military violence. In addition, the thesis also sets the current bureaucratisation of violence in a modern historical perspective, where the nation of Sweden stands as an example of how political incentives for military reformations form the foundation of a bureaucratisation of violence. The results of these investigations illustrate *how* bureaucratisation of violence leaves death and violence aside, and offers detailed insights into how the procedures, routines and the language of bureaucracy form the main points of reference for military practitioners' view of their work. In addition, the analysis shows how military masculinity is reshaped from traditional warrior ideals to encompass norms of 'the rational bureaucrat'. What is salient in these results is that they open up an otherwise closed off part of military practice and facilitates for public debates about military violence. Particularly regarding the central findings that some military practitioners do not regard violence as an outcome of their work, and that the bureaucratic operational work operates to reduce and even remove the (enemy) Other as a (human) point of reference in contemporary military work.

Sammanfattning på svenska

Centralisering är en genomgående trend i västvärldens organisering och användning av militärt våld. Delvis för att den teknologiska utvecklingen, särskilt gällande sådana insatser som sker med obemannade flygande farkoster, möjliggör en centraliserad styrning av våldsanvändningen. Centralisering av ledning sker alltså delvis för att militära organisationer traditionellt sett har en nära relation mellan teknologisk utveckling och doktrinär utveckling av ledningsmetoder. Men vid sidan om teknologiska drivkrafter för den ökande centraliseringen finner vi socialt relaterade orsaker. Särskilt den ökade känsligheten för kritik gällande förluster av militär personal och civila skapar ett behov för västvärldens militära organisationer att i allt högre utsträckning ta central kontroll över militära operationer och dess våldsanvändning.

Men hur karakteriseras den här centraliseringen, vilka är dess konsekvenser och hur påverkar centraliseringen den militära personalens relation till våld? De här frågorna tar sig lite olika uttryck i litteraturen om militärt våld, men gemensamt är att intresset för dem ökar i den akademiska diskursen. I dagsläget kan forskningen kring de här frågorna kort sammanfattas i att militärt våld i allt ökande utsträckning blir byråkratiserat som en följd av den här pågående centraliseringen, och de humanitära konsekvenserna av militärt våld går därmed förlorade till följd av de byråkratiska rutiner och processer som omgärdar dagens militära våldsanvändning. Forskningen kring byråkratiseringen av våld har dock hittills begränsats till antingen studier av militära doktriner eller utgjorts av fältstudier av operatörer och personal i fältlika förhållanden. Detta innebär att den centrala militära organisationsformen för att skapa förutsättningar för, och utöva ledning över militär våldsanvändning – den operativa nivån och det stabsarbete som utförs där – inte är representerad i forskningen. Institutionaliseringen av byråkratiseringen av våld genom det arbete som den operativa nivån utför utgör därför ett särskilt viktigt område att belysa.

Den här avhandlingen syftar till att belysa hur operativt stabsarbete samt övning av s.k. 'targeteers'- stabsofficerare som arbetar med planering och genomförande av operativt våldsanvändning - fungerar som en del av byråkratiseringen av våld. Genom etnografiska undersökningar av dessa praktiker, samt genom att sätta den rådande byråkratiseringen av våld i ett modernt historiskt perspektiv (där Sverige utgör ett exempel), bidrar den här avhandlingen till att fylla delar av den brist som utlämnandet av operativa praktiker utgjort i den tidigare forskningen. Resultatet av undersökningarna visar *hur*, genom vilket typ av språk/narrativ och vilka sociala relationer, byråkratiseringen av våld formas och hålls på plats i den militära praktiken. Utöver detta visa även avhandlingens undersökningar hur militär maskulinitet omformas av byråkratiseringen av våld, från traditionella 'krigar-ideal' till att istället omfatta ett normativt ramverk där den 'rationelle byråkraten' utgör norm. Framträdande i avhandlingens resultat är att den operativa praktik som tidigare varit avskärmad från allmän insyn blir belyst och analyserad, vilket möjliggör för fortsatt fördjupad debatt och forskning kring konsekvenserna av byråkratiseringen av militärt våld. Särskilt gällande de resultat som indikerar att militär (och civil) personal på den operativa nivån inte ser våld som en effekt av deras arbete, samt att resultaten visar att den Andre (fienden) förminskas, och till och med utraderas som en (mänsklig) referenspunkt i det operativa arbetet.

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Acknowledgements

Military violence is a particularly unpleasant and to some extent boring topic for most people. And for Swedes, having not been at war for 200 years as the popular saying goes, talk about military matters is mostly a question of older men sharing anecdotes from their time as a conscript. Anecdotes that few, apart from older men, find more than mildly interesting (and that is a generous estimation). One must bear the unpleasantness of the topic in mind when reflecting on the support of others in a project that actually goes 'all-in' in the question of how the inescapable presence of death and violence are managed in military practice. In addition, being an ethnographer can be truly troublesome when it comes to social situations where friends and relatives ask the standard question of "how are things going with your thesis?". I have spotted the fear of long tedious answers glinting in their eyes, and noticed how the social temperature in the room drops to low levels in horrific anticipation when the question has been articulated. So my solution has been to minimise their dread and offer answers based on where I am in the process (a functional answer, rather than a philosophical/scientific one) and to some extent lie and just say "the research proceeds according to plan". Many of my relatives and friends reside on the outside of academic circles and prefer to talk about subjects which relate to kids, food and wine, sports, cars/motorcycles, events in the local community, films, books and music. In short, those things that matter for most people and are central for living a life in a community. In light of this, the support from my supervisors, Professor Marie Demker and Associate Professor Dan Öberg, has been of utmost importance and value. Marie, with her long experience in academia and 'down to earth' personality, has offered me a steady hand in guiding me through the long process of completing this project. Dan, with his expertise in critical military studies and initiated knowledge of war studies and gender research, has complemented the supervision of my project in an important way. A dynamic duo to be sure!

Unfortunately for my colleagues at the University of Gothenburg and the Swedish Defence University in Stockholm, I have had a general intention of presenting my drafts at seminars as often as possible. For their generous support on such occasions I would like to thank (by no particular rank, but in a type of unnecessary order) Adrian Hyde-Price, Jan Ångström, Lisbeth Aggestam, Lisa Justesen, Fredrik Dybfest Hjortén, Robert Frisk, Henrik Friberg-Fernros, Jerker Widén, Ann-Marie Ekengren, Karl Sörenson, Maria Eriksson Baaz, and Stefan Borg. In addition, I would like to thank Håkan Edström and Carl Dahlström for their support as directors of studies for PHD-studies at the Swedish Defence University and at the University of Gothenburg respectively. The language section at the Swedish Defence University must be mentioned too, and in particular Mara Kreslina whose persistent help with my English has been of the utmost importance. Furthermore, I would like to thank Ann Towns and Helena Olofsdotter Stensöta for their initiated reading of my (nearly) completed thesis. Ann and Helena

provided me with that last amount of very important feedback that was much needed for me to be able to finalise the project.

So, how is it to arrive in an unfamiliar city and be introduced to the unknown working culture of academia, whilst facing the fact that you somewhere along the way have left your position and (quite promising) twenty-year career in the military, to follow some undefined notion of 'wanting to do research'? Horrifying of course. But something that softened the blow was, apart from a general friendliness amongst the staff at the University of Gothenburg, the group of PHD-candidates that I found myself belonging to. In a short period of time, I came to realise that Kety, Petrus, Marina and Karin were smart and stylish people, holding standards that I still strive to achieve. I wish all of you the best of luck and general sunniness in work and life!

Finally, a word about the Swedish Armed Forces and my colleagues working there. It may be surprising for someone on the 'outside' of the Swedish military that an officer writes a critical study of military violence – perhaps there is a general idea that military personnel should stay in line and not voice critical opinions? Conversely, I have written such a study and not once during my field studies have any of my military colleagues voiced any critique about my choice of subject (but naturally, other types of critical questions have been voiced). This is important to highlight as it reflects a strength in the Swedish military culture. It is from my point of view a strength to allow critical voices to be heard, but it is also not something to take for granted. I therefore hope that the Swedish military continue to cultivate a military professionalism which allows research based critique be a natural part of what it means to be a military officer.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

Remarkably, military and civilian leaders have even been successful in convincing people that the military rarely engages in killing. (Lutz 2014, 187)

This thesis' main research subject, bureaucratised military violence, was initially chosen to provoke a change in my own thinking about military practice. Setting aside the fact that I wanted to challenge myself to engage with the question of what role military violence plays in military practice, the following chapter outlines the academic relevance of studying this topic. But before going into the details which set this thesis in an academic setting, I would like to share an autoethnographical text that I wrote during the time of my fieldwork at the Swedish Armed Forces Headquarters. My intention with this story is to offer some initial insight into how the violent aspects of the military practice tend to disappear, only to appear as disruptions to the otherwise distant 'reality' of war.

"The Officer, the Child and the Tank"
Eight years ago, I brought my then 3-year old daughter to the garrison where I worked. It is a unit where the Armed Forces educate many different types of specialists and officers within technical maintenance. At this point, I had been stationed there for two years, mainly as head of army officer training. For some reason that now escapes me, I took my daughter with me on this day in early autumn. Probably something with the kindergarten being closed. Anyhow, after having spent a couple of hours in my office (my whiteboard was by then covered with her drawings), I decided that it was time for some air (and lunch). I took her by the hand and we walked off towards the mess hall. Me in my camouflage and she in her jumpsuit. I remember her hair feeling like silk under my fingers as I tousled it. It was quite a walk but she managed in good spirits. At this age, she was extraordinarily close to laughter and positive to going places. After having lunch (and both of us getting many encouraging comments from colleagues), I asked her if she wanted to see some of the things that my colleagues work with. My plan was to take her with me to the area where the practical education was done on tanks, armed combat vehicles and the like. Perhaps she wanted to climb into a tank? She had never seen any of this stuff so she nodded and started going in her usual good mood.

After a while I lifted her up and carried her, sitting on my arm. As we approached the training area, we made a turn and one of the tanks came into view. It was still approximately 100 meters away, but she instantly started to cry. I asked her what was wrong, and I was quite baffled since she had been in such good spirits just a second ago. She cried and hugged me, clinging with her arms around my neck. I

stopped walking and tried to reason with her. It was obvious to me that she thought that the tanks looked scary. I asked her, very gently I might add, if she wanted to go on. But no. She pointed at the tanks and expressed her view: they are dangerous and we should not go anywhere near them!

I found myself half-heartedly trying to convince her otherwise, but she would not budge. And I couldn't blame her because she was actually right. So we headed back to my office. I remember being a bit confused: I had expected her to be awed and curious about our stuff, not afraid.

Later that night I told my wife what had happened. I was stunned by the fact that our daughter could see the potential danger of the tank, without ever having seen one before.

The event stays in my mind. It is 8 years since it happened. And now it comes back to me as I one morning, on arrival to the Operational staff, see a colleague with a pram. He has his baby boy with him who lies in the pram as his father changes into his uniform. At first I do not take any notice about this but smile at the boy, trying to get his attention. But as I wander off and start to think about the position of parenthood, as an identity that coexists with the military Self, the memory described above comes back to me. I find that the physical presence of children in the daily military practice works against a silencing of violence. Children can enforce a reflection upon the potential violence that otherwise lies hidden in the practice. The tank takes different forms in our minds. So does an operational plan for an international mission. We create the reason for existence for these material aspects of our practice, their place in our work and the purpose of them while we coexist with them on a daily basis. This process of meaning-making carves away some otherwise quite obvious traits: the tank, and the operational plan, 'solve' our problems by the use of violence. And this destructive force is not necessarily precise and efficient, as a bureaucratised understanding of violence otherwise suggests.

Somehow the messiness of violence is brought up to the surface when children enter the military context. Child soldiers, the death of children in armed conflicts, the strong emotional attachment that most parents feel towards them, all of these things create cracks in established military understanding of violence. At least for me being a parent myself, and thus having the privilege of combining this position of identity with the subjectivities of an officer.

Problem and Main Focus of the Research

There are many ways of interpreting the story about the officer, the child and the tank, but here it is meant to illustrate how daily military practice tends to sediment and naturalise certain ways of understanding military violence. The narrative points to how the activities and language of military practice have the power to reduce the impact and meaning of violence, to a mere 'product' that can be viewed and used 'rationally'. In other words, the story is not here to put emphasis on the child and her ability to see the tank for what it 'is'. Instead, the narrative's main purpose is to elucidate the process of 'revelation' and reflection that takes place in the mind of the officer. A process of unearthing the fact that the violence of 'his' practice is peripheral and to some extent, even has disappeared from 'his' understanding of the military practice. Consequently, this thesis' main problem, *how the inescapable presence of violence and death are managed, neutralised or silenced in military prac-*

tice, can be discerned in the story by how the narrative illustrates the elusiveness of violence in the mundane day-to-day routines of military work.

Put differently, the idea driving this investigation is that military discourse has the power to affect our understanding of violence and makes us only comprehend certain specific parts of military use of force. Therefore, it is the linguistically and socially constructed concept of violence, in this thesis regarded as *a military practice of preparing for, and using force,* which lies at the heart of the investigation. There are many different avenues to how violence as a social phenomenon can be approached, such as political or structural violence, but here I engage with the organised violence that the state institution (the military) facilitates through its practices.[1]

Previous research (which I discus at length in Chapter 2) on the question of how military organisations relate to the fact that their practice has a potential for violence and destruction has in many cases been focused on aspects of close combat. In this research, the debate often closes in on soldiers'/officers' justification for killing, and the dehumanising effects of such justifications (Bar and Ben-Ari 2005; e.g. Bourke 1999; Kooistra and Mahoney 2016). Others have been more inclined in their research to explain how violence and death in the military are managed, neutralised or silenced by analysing politically initiated reformations of Western military organisations. Here the reformation of Western military organisations into operators of 'crisis management' and participants in 'new wars' is on the one hand debated to have had the effect of mitigating and reducing the use of military violence (Farrell 2005; Reed, Ryall, and Dannatt 2007; Thomas 2001; Vennesson et al. 2009). What this research implies is that Western military organisations are not as violent as they used to be, and that these reformations reduce the need for military personnel to relate to the violent aspects of their practice. On the other hand, critics of this interpretation of the effects of using military force as a type of 'crisis management' argue that military personnel handle their relation to death and violence through practice-related language that sweeps away the 'unpleasantness' of violence, and leaves a discursive focus on technicalities and procedures to represent the act of using military violence (Coker 2001; Delori 2014; Duncanson 2011; Christophe Wasinski 2017). Of particular interest in this latter body of research is the fact that the context

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[1] Violence – there are many ways to approach the concept of violence. Common in the literature on war is a tendency to lean on the Clausewitzian understanding, where violence has an inherent *physical* meaning of forcing an opponent to comply with your will (Clausewitz 1991, 29–31; Jordan et al. 2016, 2–3). Violence is in this body of literature often left aside, or treated as a self-evident (physical) aspect of war, and the research instead focuses on the concept and 'nature' of war (Van Creveld 1991; e.g. Gat 2001; Smith 2005). In contrast, poststructural writings on violence "[…] includes such phenomenologically elusive categories as psychological, symbolic, structural, epistemic, hermeneutical, and aesthetic violence." (Hanssen 2000, 9). Here, discourse, and in particular the power to delimit and shape human subjectivities, comes to the fore in research on what violence is and how it takes different shapes in our society (e.g. Agamben 1998; Shapiro 2012). In this thesis I approach military violence as a concept that is *discursively situated* (by military discourse/practice) as having a physical meaning. Which means that I do not approach violence as having an essential core, or nature, but as constructed by language and social relations to take a shape as having a specific meaning. In other words, I adhere to the statement "[T]he social and cultural dimensions of violence are what gives violence its power and meaning." (Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois 2004, 1). I do not proclaim that there is a 'truth' to military understanding of violence. Instead I investigate what the military practice creates in terms of a homogenised understanding of violence.

of these investigations of technicalities and procedures do not directly engage in operational military work. I will throughout the thesis come back to why operational military work is of specific interest when adding to the already existing body of research that critically engage in the question of how military organisations relate to the potential death and violence of their practice, but as this thesis' investigations rest on an ambition to fill this gap in the litterature, some short words on this over-looked part of military practice should be presented early on.

1.1 Operational Military Work

The research that emphasises the importance of analysing military use of language, and military subjects' relation to the materiality of their practice, has identified some key conclusions about how language and objects are used in the military to manage the violence and death of the practice. In simple terms, these conclusions identify a removal or reification of the Other (the person on the receiving end of violence) from the practice-related language (Cohn 1987; Delori 2014; Holmqvist 2013b; e.g. McDonald 2013). In addition, the research identifies a tension in the military management of violence between what the military subject actively does to make violence come into existence, and what the materiality of the practice (technological objects (such as drones), routines, 'kill-list' and procedures of staff work and targeting-practices) makes possible 'on its own' (e.g. D. Gregory 2011a; Niva 2013; Schwarz 2016). Both of these areas of conclusions (related to language and to materiality) have in recent studies been used to point at an increasing *bureaucratisation of violence* in the military practice, where violence is reshaped into what Peter Asaro (2013: 215) calls "bureaucratized labor" (Bonditti and Olsson 2016; see also: K. Grayson 2012; Kyle Grayson 2016; I. Shaw and Akhter 2014; Öberg 2016).

It is important to point out that bureaucratisation of Western military organisations has been studied since the days of Max Weber, but then in relation to how bureaucracy relates to military professionalism and how military-civil relations have been changed through processes of bureaucratisation (Böene 1990; Janowitz 1974; Ritzer 1975; Toronto 2017). Indeed, the military organisation has in this body of literature been designated as "the ideal-type rational bureaucracy" and has as such been studied from an organisational, leadership and management perspective (Gwyn 1990, 118). But what contemporary critical IR-research is pointing at when investigating bureaucratisation of military use of force, is that military violence must receive the same attention that historically has been given to issues of military leadership, civil/social control over the military and organisational aspects of bureaucratisation.

However, the research that points to this increasing bureaucratisation of violence has not, as of yet, engaged with the language and materiality of operational military work on a deeper level of inquiry. IR-research has produced some excellent studies that comprise analyses of operational doctrine/procedures (Nordin and Öberg 2015), or use of weapons (drones) in control of the operational military level (Holmqvist 2013a; Schwarz 2016), or for that matter, the use of operational 'kill-lists' in target-

ing practices (J. Weber 2016). But from an 'empirical' perspective, insight in how bureaucratised labour operates so as to create military understandings of violence in the daily and sometimes mundane workings of operational staff work is limited. From my point of view, this limited insight includes knowledge about which, and how, social rules and norms, such as certain types of masculinities, plays a part in creating accepted and normalised military relations to the deaths and violence made possible by military bureaucratised practices. This is to some extent not surprising as 'real' operational work is often clouded in secrecy and is very hard for researcher to gain access to. But the military operational level, with its meetings, procedures and social relations, must be considered if we as IR-researchers are to gain further insight into how bureaucratised military violence operates and takes shape as a main point of reference in military ways of managing death and violence. This is partly due to the fact that the operational practice is central for realising military missions and creating/organising the fundamental needs for the use of military force (Vego 2008). In addition, the operational practice is also pivotal in the process that establishes legitimacy for using military violence on specific targets, a process which constructs who and what is to be deemed a 'viable' target (NATO 2016). But also because arguably, contemporary operational military work is a context where bureaucracy thrives and even sets the boundaries for what the operational practice is. The operational military level is in other words a place made up by bureaucratised labour, and should as such be thoroughly investigated if we are to learn more about how the bureaucratisation of military violence operates.

In summary, to focus on operational military work means that this thesis' main problem, *how the inescapable presence of violence and death are managed, neutralised or silenced in military practice*, can be investigated through the following supporting questions:

- what are the main subjects or points of reference in operational military discourse? In particular, how does military staff practice shape understanding of violence and death?
- how are military subjects' relation to violence shaped through the transformative language and materiality of NATO targeting lists and practical procedures?
- how does reification and misrecognition of the Other exist and operate in the bureaucratised labour of operational staff practice and in the practice of targeting?
- how does the bureaucratisation of violence relate to military masculinities? In particular, what values and norms come in forefront in the construction of military masculinity in the context of bureaucratised labour at an operational staff?

These questions are more to the point motivated by my discussions of previous research and discourse theory in the next chapter, and are presented here to clarify the 'empirical' focus of this thesis – military staff work in support of operations and military work with targeting procedures. But the question still remains: whose operational military work is it that I speak of? In the next section I will discuss the

national context of my research and what it brings to the table when investigating bureaucratised understandings of violence. After this discussion, the concluding section of this introductory chapter outlines the disposition of the thesis, including a discussion on the material used in my investigation.

1.2 The Research Context of Operational Work and Bureaucratised Labour

The operational work that I aim to study in this thesis is located in Sweden and performed mainly by Swedish officers and civil servants. My intent with this approach is that answers to the supporting questions posed above can be gained through my level of access to, and knowledge of, Swedish operational staff work. But also by studying an annual international exercise held in Sweden where officers and civil servant (both Swedish and belong to several other Western countries) train in in the procedures of NATO operational targeting. But apart for my somewhat unique position in being able to gain access to 'real' operational work, and to engage in military training from an insider perspective, Swedish operational work also offers some key features which arguably positions this context of research as a 'place' where bureaucratised military violence can be closely investigated.

First of all, as I point out in the next chapter, it is not Sweden in itself that forms my main interest in researching bureaucratised violence. But the nation's long tradition of regulating and creating procedures for its governmental control over the management of violence, particularly through the conscript system, has had the effect of infusing bureaucratic norms and discourse into Swedish operational military practice. Influenced by the political visions of the People's Home (*Folkhemmet*), the Swedish conscript system reformed during the 20th century to not only be a way of filling the military ranks, but to educate and 'mature' the male part of the Swedish population (Agius 2006; Sundevall 2017). The political focus on creating a 'people's army', and as such making use of the people's collective defence force (*folkets samlade värnkraft*), created a relatively large mass (between 600 000 – 700 000) of soldiers for foremost the Army to administer during the major part of the 20th century (Agrell 2011, 45; Sturfelt 2014; see also: Åselius 2005). In short, a central outcome of political visions/ideas for how the Swedish military was organised during the 20th century was that the main purpose of political policies concerning military reformations comprised issues of organisation, training, armament and mobilisation (Agrell 2011, 45). This political focus on systematising and rationalising the Swedish military was not exclusive for the military organisation, as the ideas of the People's Home and the construction of the Swedish Welfare State brought about a major expansion of the Swedish state and an increase in employment of bureaucrats of various types. This is an expansion and bureaucratisation that stands out as more voluminous and politically salient in comparison to other Western states, at least during the latter part of the 20th century (Premfors et al. 2009, 60–61). What this means is that the military in Sweden has been formed into an organisation where bureaucratised military practices flourish and that the construction of Swedish mili-

tary ways of managing its violent practices has an interlinked relation to how other governmental institutions have historically developed during the 20th century.

In a more contemporary perspective, in the last 15-20 years Sweden has striven to reform its Armed Forces so as to achieve a high level of interoperability with NATO, partly as an active member of Partnership for Peace (PfP), but also through technical and doctrinal adjustments, and by placing Swedish officers in NATO staffs on a regular basis (Agrell 2011, 118, 153; Andrén 2002, 137–39, 158–61). In contrast to the large volume of soldiers and the relatively 'low-tech' level of military materiel characterising the Swedish military during the better part of the 20th century (with exception of the Swedish Air Force, which has historically held a comparatively high technological level (see: Wennerholm 2006)), these reformations have drastically reduced numbers and stocks in the Swedish military. In relation to increasing interoperability and gaining the right level of freedom of action for engaging in international operations on a larger scale, the Swedish military (through political decisions) has put the conscript system on ice, professionalised their soldiers, replaced old materiel with modern systems, and reformed the officer ranks to include non-commissioned officers (Agrell 2011).

From a practitioner's point of view, these reformations have had the effect of creating a high level of professionalism in operational work by Swedish staff officers. During discussions with officers and other representatives from other countries in my work as Military Adviser at the Swedish Armed Forces Headquarter, I often encountered a general view in the international military community that Swedish staff officers are regarded as 'top notch'. Such comments were often linked to the Swedish officers' high level of proficiency in the English language, and their thorough education and training in NATO procedures for planning and conducting military operations. The Swedish contemporary context of bureaucratised violence is as such characterised by being strongly influenced by NATO discourse. In relation to this, it may be useful to point out that Sweden has had an 'active' foreign policy during the latter half of the 20th century (Andrén 2002, 151). Since the 1950s and up to the time of writing Sweden has engaged its military forces in military operations in places like Congo, Lebanon, Liberia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and Afghanistan, to mention a few. Despite what may be indicated by recognising Sweden as a non-aligned country in peace, and neutral in times of war, the more recent of these operations has been conducted under NATO-leadership. This close cooperation with NATO is explained by a more recent reformation of Swedish foreign policy which identifies NATO as an important actor for creating peace and stability, and in addition, uses UN-mandates as a guarantee for NATO missions being legitimate for Swedish participation (Agrell 2011, 153; Bergman-Rosamond 2011, 62).

On a final note, Swedish operational practice is to a large degree populated by mostly male officers who started their military service in a masculinised conscription system (a conscript system which, at the time of writing, is being reformed and partly reinstated again) (Kronsell and Svedberg 2001). But it is also a context where

policy changes, such as gender equality in military service, must be effectuated (Egnell, Hojem, and Berts 2014). Sweden is known for its 'progressive' reformation work when it comes to issues of equality and gender (Borchorst and Siim 2008; Olah and Gahler 2014; Towns 2002; however, the nation's actual progressivism in these issues is a question of debate, see: Towns, Karlsson, and Eyre 2014).[2] This means that Swedish operational work is a practice where 'traditional' military masculine norms meet with formalised work with gender reforms that may endanger and set established notions of military identity in motion. From my perspective, the Swedish context of operational work, seen as a meeting place between traditions of old and modern reforms, can offer further insights into how bureaucratised violence relates to masculine ideals and gender reformation processes.

In conclusion, the Swedish context of military operational work offers both a research environment coloured by a long institutional tradition of 'functioning' governmental bureaucracy, and a context influenced by a contemporary influx of NATO procedures and doctrines. And in addition, the Swedish context also provides a research environment where far-reaching liberal societal discourses of equality and gender mainstreaming are in tension with masculine traditional ideals. Added to this, the fact that I have the opportunity to access a rarely studied practice, situated in this Swedish context, must be exploited as it may provide further insight into how death and violence is managed, neutralised or silenced in military practice.

1.3 Material and Disposition

In this concluding section of this introductory chapter, I discuss 'material' in the meaning of why I have chosen to focus my investigation on specific parts and aspects of military operational work. Thereafter I summarise the chapter by providing a disposition of the thesis, aiming to offer some guidance in how the main problem and its subsequent research questions will be unravelled and answered.

Material and Time

As described below, in the disposition of the thesis it is the ethnographical part of my investigation that has contemporary operational work in focus. But my investigations of bureaucratised military violence also include a historical part. The historical analysis forms a backdrop to the ethnographical studies of 'real' operational military work and training in operational procedures of targeting. It is in place to illustrate how bureaucracy pervades the Swedish military practice during the early and mid-part of the 20th century, and it is meant to offer insight into *how* the contemporary operational work that I investigate further on, rests on historically constructed discourses of bureaucratised violence. Or expressed differently, the historical investigation aims to clarify how the research context of operational work has gradually been

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[2] Sweden's 'progressiveness' in these matters is also reflected in its organisation of the military as the nation harbours the Nordic Centre for Gender in Military Operations (NCGM). This centre is located together with the Swedish Armed Forces International Centre (SWEDINT) and offers international courses (accredited to NATO standards) and seminars on issues of gender (see: SWEDINT 2016).

politically influenced, and militarily narrated, to include a specific type of bureau-cratised relation to violence and death.

The 'data' analysed in the historical investigation has been selected purposely to be representative for the discursive field that I want to investigate. The instructions, manuals and regulations that I analyse are in other words central in constructing narratives of military violence, as they are produced to support the training of sol-diers and officers in order for the Army[3] to excel in the use of violence. In extension, the 'data' is representative for the analysis also through the central place these doc-uments have had in Swedish military practice. They are with very few exceptions all retrieved from the archives of the Army Command and they are by their construction as manuals and regulations crucial for any practitioner that worked with enhancing the 'effective' use of violence during the early and mid 20th century. To my knowledge, no other set of documents exists that can in the same focused way por-tray how military relations to death and violence is historically constructed in the Swedish Army. Since the question driving the historical analysis is not *if* 20th centu-ry military violence is managed through some form of bureaucratisation, but as stated in the chapter, *how* violence and death are bureaucratised, the focus is on the 'data' being representative for outlining central aspects of Swedish military dis-courses on violence.

When it comes to the time frame of my study, I have delimited the historical part of my investigation of military bureaucratised violence as set to be constructed under times of industrial modernisation and in particular, as related to the major military events of the 20th century. Therefore, the historical analysis is delimited to early and mid 20th century as this period of time comprises on the one hand politically initiated reformations of the Swedish military which aims at creating efficient system of managing large numbers of conscripts and materiel. On the other hand, this time period also includes a modernisation of the Swedish military tactical relation to the use of violence, which is reflected in how the military increases its production of military regulations, instructions, information pamphlets and handbooks. I have thus identified this time period as central to how the modern Swedish military forms the discourses that today 'pave the way' for a further bureaucratisation of military man-agement of violence and death.

The ethnographical part of my investigation takes place between 2015 and 2017. This is a period of intensive reformation and further modernisation of the Swedish military. The international focus that has dominated much of the operational work of the Armed Forces in the beginning of the 20th century still remains, but a shift to-wards a new type of national focus is emerging. There is a general consensus in the Swedish military that the organisation needs to 'take back' those valuable lessons of

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[3] This is another delimitation: I have had my focus on material depicting practices of the Swedish Army and as such removed the possibility to investigate if portrayal of navy and/or air force practices change something in the discursive construction of violence. I have included some material written for the strategic level, or for general use in the armed forces, to compensate for this weakness in the analysis.

the 20th century's national defence organisation to counter the turmoil that has developed in close proximity to Sweden. The situation in Crimea and Ukraine, and Russia's increase in military exercises and defence expenditure are used as motives for this shift in focus (Försvarsmakten 2016b). This situation creates an operational environment in the Armed Forces Headquarters which is characterised by both support to ongoing international operations, mainly the MINUSMA[4] mission in Mali, and efforts to 're-invent' national operational planning. Operational work must in this context be able to manage both international (NATO) procedures and regulations, but also develop to find ways of managing the use of force in ways that meet the national and regional requirements. In other words, this time period allows for a study of how bureaucratised labour moves from being framed in a context of international 'crisis management' operations, to also comprise more traditional national defence operations. This research context can be particularly fruitful for learning more about how bureaucratisation relates to military violence as previous research, which indicate an increasing bureaucratisation of Western military violence, is placed in a context of international 'crisis management', and has not, to my knowledge, taken in account these types of contemporary shifts to a military operational focus on national defence. As the time frame in which my research takes place includes a reformation towards national defence, the research context allows for critical reflections on the question if bureaucratisation of violence has to do with 'crisis management' or if it is situated in other military discourses. The supporting research questions have been designed to allow for my research to be responsive to the possibility for a tension between how violence is managed in different types of military operational contexts (international/national), as they are specifically about focusing on the workings of bureucratisation of violence, but still general enough to allow for different types of operational activities.

Disposition

The next chapter aims at placing my research problem in a context of previous research on military ways of managing, neutralising and silencing death and violence but the chapter also offers a theoretical framework for my studies of discourses and bureaucratisation. When it comes to theory I have chosen to rely on poststructural theories of language and social practices, to facilitate analyses of how language and materiality are intertwined in constructing military subjects' relations to violence. But in order to facilitate my research of contemporary operational work and training with procedures of targeting I have also added a methodological support for engaging in the ethnographical study of military practice. Chapter 3 aims to achieve this

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[4] MINUSMA ‒ The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali. A mission made possible by UN resolutions 2100 (2013) and 2164 (2014), where Sweden contributes with an Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Task Force, Air transportation assets and a National Support Unit (logistics). In total approximately 320 personnel (Regeringen 2017).

by laying bare my ethnographical and self-reflexive approach to studying military practices.

The empirical analysis of military violence is initiated after these two chapters on previous research/theory/methods. In Chapter 4 I lay the foundation for studying contemporary operational work by conducting a modern historical discourse analysis of the research context. This analysis aims to clarify how the research context of operational work has gradually been politically influenced, and militarily narrated, to include a specific type of bureaucratised relation to violence and death. It is my intention that this chapter will provide a deeper and more comprehensive understanding of how military violence can be formed by political incentives and military narratives into a type of bureaucratised understanding of violence.

Chapter 5 engages with the question of how 'real' military staff practice shapes understandings of violence and death. The chapter includes analyses of how reification and misrecognition of the Other operate in the bureaucratised labour of operational staff practice. But it also investigates how bureaucratisation of violence relates to the construction of military masculinities. In short, the chapter engages in illustrating and analysing what values and norms come into the forefront when military subjects perform bureaucratised labour in an operational staff. My ambition with the chapter is that it should offer insight into some previously un-recognised/identified conditions and aspects of how military violence is managed, suppressed and neutralised through operational work.

To deepen our knowledge of military understandings of violence, and in particular, bureaucratised ways of engaging in the use of military force, the thesis then proceeds to investigate operational targeting practices. Chapter 6 comprises an ethnographical study of how military subjects' relation to violence is shaped through the transformative language and materiality of NATO targeting lists and practical staff procedures. The analysis of military violence is in this chapter meant to move from the focus on 'general' operational staff work that is the basis for Chapter 5, to the 'nitty-gritty' details of how operational work with targeting is performed and how this work takes form as a type of bureaucratised labour of violence. In achieving this, the chapter traces how 'targets' are constructed, and offers an analysis of how military subjects are trained to relate to death and violence in a specific way, using data collected from three successive international staff exercises.

In Chapter 7, the central findings from the three empirical chapters are discussed in relation to the supporting research questions and the overarching problem for this thesis. I also provide a discussion about possible ethical problems related to bureaucratised labour, and some suggestions for further research.

2

Chapter 2: Previous Research and Theory

2.1 Introduction

The literature which engages with the question of how the inescapable presence of violence and death are managed, neutralised or silenced in military practice can on a general level be divided into two major areas – the liberal 'optimists' and the critical war/military researchers (Delori 2014). As Delori (2014: 518) points out, these two 'camps' of researchers agree that Western military organisations have changed how they conceptualise, organise and conduct warfare since the end of the Cold War, but they disagree on the effects of these changes (see also: Kaldor 2012, chap. 8 for a similar discussion).

On the one hand, the liberal, optimistic argument explains the reduction or neutralisation of the presence of violence in the military practice as a consequence of Western, and in particular, European military organisations being reformed into organisations with 'crisis management' at their core (Vennesson et al. 2009). As organisations of crisis management, the Western military is narrated to control and minimise their use of violence. This liberal narrative is constructed using technologically based arguments of a precise and surgical use of weapons, and through the use of political policies of humanitarian aid and liberation from anti-democratic movements. The liberal positive interpretation of how Western military forces manage the fact that they use violence rests thus on factors that indicate that Western military organisations are in control over, and have minimised, their use of violence (Pinker 2011). In addition to this interpretation of the reformation of Western military organisations is the idea that public aversion to casualties and the rapid media coverage of conflicts results in a widespread understanding of "the human consequences of conflict" (Tuck 2016, 439). In short, the liberal argument rests on a conviction that military operations are not as violent as they used to be, and that when violence is used it is in a controlled (both technologically and legally), efficient and ethical way (Farrell 2005; Reed, Ryall, and Dannatt 2007; Thomas 2001; Wheeler 2002). It follows then, from the liberal arguments, that military force has become more 'humanitarian' and that agents of the military practice have these reformations as their

main points of reference when managing the fact that their practice can inflict violence against the 'Other'.

The problem with this 'optimistic' position is that it does not step outside of the liberal frame of analysis, and as such takes for granted that changes to military doctrines, rules of engagement and technology are used for increasing the military capacity for 'doing good', in what Christopher Coker critically calls "humanitarian wars" (Coker 2001, 148; see also: Duncanson 2011). Those of us who write in the field of critical war/military studies are skeptical to this approach on several levels, but common to most critique of this liberal 'framing' is that it leaves out the fact that use of military force is 'legitimised' (made possible) by liberalism in the first place (Asad 2007; M. Hardt and Negri 2005; Reid 2006). I will therefore in the following discuss four ways of interpreting and analysing contemporary military practice that offers alternative (to the liberal research) explanations and understandings of how Western military organisations relate to their violent practice.

But before going into the details of these four approaches to military use of force, I want to shortly discuss how the concept of militarism functions as a common ground for this critical research. This discussion is in place to introduce research in Critical Military Studies and to underline how this field of study provides the overarching guidelines for my investigations of military understandings of violence.

Critical Military Studies and militarism

In its core, investigating military understandings of violence is a type of research that belongs to a fairly new and emerging sub-field of Political Science and International Relations – Critical Military Studies. This new path of research has emerged as a response to the lack of critical research that actually invests efforts in understanding the changing character of war. Or in the words of Barkawi and Brighton (2011):

> War, then, is in the situation of being both taken for granted in its meaning and radically underdeveloped as an object of inquiry. It is only in the wake of this realization that we can see that, in contrast to disciplinary objects such as politics or economy, the most basic questions regarding the ontology and epistemology of war have hardly been asked, much less have they issued in a substantial body of theory. (Barkawi and Brighton 2011, 127)

Having studied the 'nature' of war to some extent during my time in various military schools, Barkawi's and Brighton's claim first struck me as quite cursory. Is it not so that established works such as "The Art of War" (Sun and Giles 2007) and "On War" (Clausewitz 1991) together with all the countless attributing authors would stand against their claim? On the contrary, what Barkawi and Brighton are pointing at is the tendency to treat war as an exceptional event and to separate war (and the military institution) as belonging to the 'outside' of an ordinary peaceful society. This tendency in social and political research brings about a number of blind spots

for the impacts that understandings of war and military violence have on how society, with its institutions and exercise of political power, are conditioned (Barkawi and Brighton 2011, 141–42). Central to Critical Military Studies is thus that research must resist seeing the military institution as self-given in society, but rather as a product of social and political ideas and practices (Rachel Woodward 2014, 51).

Critical Military Studies is a broad field of research when it comes to empirical investigations and theoretical approaches, but recently the field has focused on the workings of militarism (Eastwood 2018; Mabee and Vucetic 2018; Stavrianakis and Stern 2018). This interest in militarism connects to understandings of military use of force through how militarism indicates that there is a societal embedded conviction that military violence is 'useful' for conflict resolution. But traditionally, militarism has been understood to indicate an ideology where military matters and the use of military force are seen as an ideal, underlining a higher status in society for those who work in the military institution. Some argue that this way of understanding militarism no longer holds theoretically, as defining militarism as an ideology indicates a delimitation to investigate ideals and values, nor empirically, as such ideas and values are scarcely found to hold a central place in the societies of our contemporary world (see also Morgan 1994, 173; Stavrianakis and Selby 2013, 12). This is, however, a claim which, in the wake of the recent renewed interest in militarism, has come to be debated to some extent through the argument that militarism understood as an ideology provides incitements for formulating ideological critique that can underline an anti-militarist debate and position (e.g. Eastwood 2018).

Much research in the name of Critical Military Studies (CMS) has embraced a wider understanding of militarism due to the limitations which 'traditional' understanding of militarism puts on the critical study of military practices (Stavrianakis and Selby 2013). In particular research that takes into account how the preparation for, and use of, military force is entrenched and normalised in and by societal practices reap the benefits of a *sociological* understanding of militarism (also: Eastwood 2015, 674; McSorley 2014; Stavrianakis and Selby 2013, 14; Åhäll 2016). Here this sociological understanding and approach to the phenomenon of militarism provides a wider array of ways of studying military influences in society. This understanding allows for studying the phenomenon of militarism from all of the perspectives singled out by the ideological, behavioural or for that matter, institutional way of understanding the workings of militarism (Robinson 2016, 258). An example of such sociologically inspired investigations of militarism is research that analyses such diverse corpora of data as how certain video games or arms trade treaties comprise underlying support for the existence and value of military force (Robinson 2016; Stavrianakis 2016).

Thus, understanding militarism from a broader sociological point of view does not just open up otherwise unseen avenues of research, it also creates opportunities for a deeper analysis of how social relations are constructed to sustain a naturalisation and embeddedness of military practice (on the "normal" and "given" aspect of militarism

(US context), see Lutz 2014). What the sociological understanding of militarism brings to the table when it comes to investigating how the presence of violence and death are managed, neutralised or silenced in military practice is precisely this critique – that military practice is closely interlinked with other societal practices which work to 'normalise' military violence. My investigation of the bureaucratisation of violence in military practice draws from this development on militarism, as this type of research poses such questions as how (by what means) military violence is embedded in the daily routines of a (military) practice. From my point of view, this research on militarism thus holds a position as a wider 'umbrella' under which my study is situated.

And on a final note, if we (in Critical Military Studies, and IR in general) are to approach militarism analytically with the help of sociology, it would be pertinent to at least inquire briefly into how the sociologist debate relates to the existence of militarism in society. Without going too far into detail, there are indications in this debate that modern sociology, inspired by Weber and Durkheim, (also) has treated the military as a separate entity of human society, thus leaving the sociology of war, in the spirit of Janowitz, to encompass the internal workings of the military institution (Burk 1993). But recently there has been a call for a more 'holistic' understanding of the workings of militarism in the literature on the sociology of war, which chimes well with how the debate has developed in CMS (West and Matthewman 2016, 489).

In other words, contemporary debates in sociology and war also point to the importance of allowing research that comprises *everyday practices* take a more central role in the study of the workings of militarism and military understandings of violence. But what both CMS and the sociology of war debates on militarism endanger, when turning the analytical focus on the embedded militarism of practices that exist in 'civil' society, is losing sight of the mundane and daily workings of military practice. What my investigation tries to achieve is to unfold the existence of a military lifeworld which is stipulated on a reciprocal relationship with the developments of 'ordinary' society. In other words, my study adheres to the recent call to see the legitimation of military violence as a product of how society develops, but it does so without stepping outside of the military institution itself. This approach rests on a conviction that the modernisation and bureaucratisation of society, and thus of organised violence, actually create further possibilities of using military force. Possibilities that lie in how this development of society and organised military violence brings with it institutional legitimacy to, and a certain 'truth' about, military practice (Malešević 2017, 24–25).

With that introduction to the field of CMS, it is time to engage with the details of how critical research approaches the question of how the inescapable presence of violence and death are managed, neutralised or silenced in military practice. The following four sections will discuss research that is closely related to this question,

starting with how gendered and technological language creates a distance to the violent realities of military practices.

2.2 Researching Military Understandings of Violence: a question of analysing gendered and technologised language.

Although CMS has renewed the academic debate on militarism and on how military use of force can be investigated, one of the main contributions on how militarism and gendered language are interlinked in the *construction of understandings of military violence* was made during the 1980s. Carol Cohn's (1987) reflexive ethnographical study of US nuclear defence strategists and intellectuals is widely spread and cited among such areas of research as the ethnographic method (Gusterson 1993), feminist studies (Brown 1992), military masculinities (Duncanson 2013; Hutchings 2008) and Critical Military Studies (H. Gray 2016; Stavrianakis and Stern 2018) to mention but a few.

In Cohn's meeting and interaction with the daily practice of nuclear defence intellectuals, she is struck by the "abstraction and removal" regarding what she sees as the "reality" of the "professional discourse" (Cohn 1987, 688). In other words, that the language of these analysts and strategists managed to legitimise US nuclear strategy without relating to the human consequences of using weapons of mass destruction. Cohn (1987: 690) calls this language "technostrategic" as it uses technological and nuclear strategic terms to form a "clean" nuclear weapons discourse. This discourse is "clean" in the perspective that it removes the deadly aspect of nuclear war from the practitioners' relation to the military violence they help to construct and make possible. Cohn finds that the language employing sexual imagery used by defence intellectuals and their physical desire to touch the weapons themselves are central aspects of this removal of death from their practice (Cohn 1987, 695–96). In addition to this observation of the centrality of gendered language, Cohn also found that to be able to interact with her interlocutors, she needed to learn their language and talk to them using the technostrategic concepts of the nuclear discourse (Cohn 1987, 708). In this process of learning, Cohn discovers that she starts losing her grip on in which 'reality' she lives in: that of the critical scholar or that of the defence intellectual, where in the latter nuclear weapons naturally are 'rational' objects for providing stable international relations. This is an experience where she finds that she starts to believe in (or rather take for granted) impossible things, such as the possibility to engage in a "surgically clean counterforce strike" with nuclear weapons (Cohn 1987, 713). In short, Cohn discovers that the language of nuclear defence intellectuals can militarise her own mind as the "racy, sexy, snappy" concepts used to rationalise and legitimise weapons of mass destruction have a seductive and transformative power (Cohn 1987, 704, 716).

My interest in military operational work comprises several similarities to Cohn's study. First of all, she illustrates the importance of establishing an 'insider' position

when studying military understandings of violence, as such access offers detailed knowledge of which subjectivities and acts of identification are central to shaping understandings of violence. Secondly, Cohn's testimony of the transformative power of military language opens up for further research on how different versions of such language operate to normalise and silence the deadly aspect of military violence. In the context of US nuclear strategic defence discourse we learn from Cohn that technological terms and a dimension of sexual discourse of the practice are central to this process of normalisation and silencing. But what happens when formalised bureaucratic language and the restricted areas of operational planning are investigated in a context of a small state's use of 'conventional' (as opposed to nuclear weaponry) military violence? Are technological terms and sexual discourse still the main ways of distancing the military subject from the violent and human consequences of using military force? These questions underline that my investigation intends to add something to what Cohn has taught us regarding how military violence is understood in military practices, by adding a different context (of practice-related language and military violence) to the previous research presented in this chapter. Although I adhere to Cohn's analysis, it is still the case that her context has an 'estranged' relation to violence, in that nuclear weapons have a strategic status as objects of deterrence, and the use of them is confined to a few (horrifying) moments in history.

In addition to adding a context where violence is actively used and managed in the name of 'crisis management' (and preparations for national defence), I also provide a different position as 'insider' in comparison to Cohn: I come from an opposite situation of having to learn the language of critical scholars in order to elucidate how contemporary operational military language has a transformative and seductive power, similar or different to that which Cohn illustrates in the US context. In addition, my background as a military officer with 20 years of using military 'transformative' language, and having worked in close proximity to different versions of military masculinities during these years, may provide further insight into how language and gender construct military understandings of violence. In simple terms, Cohn was rewarded with analytical insights through her struggle to learn the nuclear language, but what I offer is a context of research where the researcher (me) struggles for the opposite: to un-learn the military operational language in order to find out how death and violence are suppressed in my context of research. Here my 'unique' position as a male military officer can provide access to both physical and conceptual 'locations' in which the impact of military language and gendered social relations are open for further study (I expand on this further below when I discuss research of military masculinities). I will return to my position as 'insider' in Chapter 3 where I discuss reflexive ethnography and autoethnography, and in particular, what these methods of research offer in terms of using the researcher's experiences of interacting with the context of research as a source of 'data'.

The third and final similarity with Cohn's study that I want to stress relates to her conclusion that the nuclear weapons themselves (and not humans) are the ones that posit the answer to the analytical question of "who (or what) is the subject here?"

(Cohn 1987, 711). In other words, I want to examine what the main subject or points of reference are in operational military discourse. Naturally, the aim is to walk in the footsteps of Cohn to try and single out how "abstraction and removal" of human and deadly consequences of military violence exist and operate in 'my' research environment.

This final point of 'who' or 'what' is the main subject of military discourse brings me to the second area of research that I want to discuss, and that is the debate on the materiality of war. This is a debate that revolves around the question of how materiality operates as a point of reference for subjects that work with, or are otherwise affected by, military violence in various ways, and it has brought about several insights that relate to my study.

2.3 Researching Military Understandings of Violence: a question of studying the materiality of war

The focus on gendered and technologised language described above has a closely related approach to investigating how violence is 'rationalised' through the materiality of war, where justification of military violence is "studied from the embodied experience of those who are in it, including soldiers in the field" (Christophe Wasinski 2017, 2). In research on the materiality of war technical capabilities and jargon are, as in Cohn's research, central to how violence and death are managed by military organisations and their practitioners. But this research has moved beyond analysing discourse as language and is engaged with " […] mundane physical idioms, intercorporeal interactions, structures of feeling and sensory practices that occur across and between various constituencies, both civilian and military." (McSorley 2014, 105–6). Here the experience of war and military related activities are investigated in order to shed light on how military violence 'lives' in the bodies and practices of those exposed (including military personnel, 'adversaries' and victims) to such experiences (Parashar 2013; Sylvester 2013). In this body of research, military practices are also investigated from the perspective of how mundane and seemingly 'harmless' activities, such as taking part in a military fitness movement, connect such feelings as pleasure and camaraderie to understandings of what military practice is all about (McSorley 2016).

On a general level, research on the experiences of war and violent practices illustrates how military violence is managed, gendered, reshaped or justified though a broad empirical context, from the dehumanising abuse of dead bodies in war (T. Gregory 2016), via the military control over the dead soldier's body (Christophe Wasinski 2008) and its 'ownership' of veterans' damaged bodies (MacLeish 2015), to the practices of militant women (Parashar 2011). In this strand of literature, the materiality of war is connected to the use (and abuse) of the human body and how this creates subjectivities that help 'rationalise' and 'normalise' military violence (see also: Baaz and Stern 2009; Zehfuss 2009). Common in this research is that, in line with Cohn's observation, it critically finds military discourse (and much of IR-

research on war (Parashar 2013)) as 'empty' of a relation to dead and injured humans. To counter this lack of relation to dead and injured humans, several studies follow in the footsteps of Elaine Scarry's (1985) research where injuring bodies is set as central to the 'function' of war (T. Gregory 2016; Lutz 2014; McSorley 2014; Sylvester 2012; Wilcox 2014). This approach is not exclusively used in research that approaches military violence from the material perspective, and I will therefore, further below, reconnect to how the human body is represented in military discourse and critical research, and how this relates to my study.

But the research on the materiality of war also focuses more specifically on technology and the objects of warfare. Inspired by Bruno Latour's (among others) take on how "material 'things' are active in the production, stabilisation and reproduction of social order" this is an internal (to the critical security/military study paradigm) critique of how constructivists and poststructuralists have "[…] seen technology and material things as exogenous and apolitical" (Bourne 2012, 155). This trope of materiality of war-research studies human experiences of being 'caught up' in the material production of war and military violence, as an addition to the bodily focus discussed above. Examples of such studies are Caroline Holmqvist's research on drones, where she illustrates how the material (the drone) and the human (its operator) are intertwined in a reciprocal social relation (Holmqvist 2013a). Additionally, in a study of how British military personnel working with air support "make sense of their actions", Christophe Wasinski find that military means condition how these practitioners relate to violence (Christophe Wasinski 2017, 1, 14). In other words, that war is experienced "through the lens of technical tools" and that the materiality of military practices plays an active role in creating that which counts as the 'reality' of war (Christophe Wasinski 2017, 14). In short, research that is concerned with the materiality of war adds at least two aspects of physical dimension to the transformative effects of language that Cohn speaks of: Firstly, the physical act of training, preparing and engaging in different types of military practices are in this body of research found to shape the subject's and society's understanding of military death and violence (Higate 2012; McSorley 2016). Secondly, technology and material objects are central to how military subjects rationalise and legitimise their own (violent) practices, and military technology and material has as such a discursive meaning that goes beyond its technological use (Der Derian 2009). In other words, research on the materiality of war illustrates how technology and its interconnected relationship with bureaucracy creates 'systems and processes' through which military violence is not just made possible – it is reshaped into what can be called "bureaucratized labor" (Asaro 2013, 215).

In contrast to Cohn's focus on language in a technological environment of 'mutually assured destruction' through the use of nuclear weapons, this more recent body of literature has its empirical focus on drones and the processes of killing 'made possible' by these weapon systems (D. Gregory 2011b, 2011a; Holmqvist 2013a; Niva 2013; Schwarz 2016). In particular, targeted killings have been found to operate in ways that strongly resemble corporate or non-military institutional management, in

turn leading to a bureaucratisation of killing (Bonditti and Olsson 2016; see also: K. Grayson 2012; Kyle Grayson 2016, 101–3; I. Shaw and Akhter 2014, 214; Öberg 2016, 1139). In short, this research unmasks a practice of military violence as sustained by subjects that do not deal with violence and death at all, but with routines and regulatory practices of 'targeting' (Nordin and Öberg 2015).

One example of materiality in this bureaucratised context of killing is the 'kill-lists' produced by vast and complex databases. Jutta Weber investigates how "the 'disposition matrix' – a kill/capture list and database is a key device in the US government's global 'war on terror'" by analysing how the materiality of databases is constructed to continuously produce new targets (J. Weber 2016, 107). Weber finds that the database/kill-list intertwines human and non-human decisions on who or what are designated as 'targets':

> A core part of the construction of the 'disposition matrix' consists of extremely vague categorisations of what counts as terrorism and what is a 'central' node in a 'terrorist network'. The 'disposition matrix' depends on maintaining secrecy about what makes somebody 'eligible' to be included in it or to become the target of a drone strike or a raid. It relies on metadata and on data mining tools such as SNA (which is opaque even to the analysts themselves), often follows a purely quantitative logic and/or ignores the social, political and cultural context, in which the data are gathered. (J. Weber 2016, 120)

As pointed out by Weber, of the few studies that exist so far on the details of 'targeting processes' (e.g. McNeal 2014), none has engaged critically with what the intertwined relationship between human and non-human decisions entails and how the reliance on databases and lists might project a 'rationality' to military violence. My study continues Weber's work by engaging in ethnographical investigations of how military subjects are shaped by the subjectivities of targeting lists and procedures. By studying NATO targeting practice through the critical lenses of discourse, materiality and (discussed below) the misrecognition and reification of the 'enemy', I strive to illuminate how the 'opaqueness' of this practice plays a role in shaping military subjects' understanding of violence.

In sum, the literature on how the materiality of war reshapes military (and political) understandings of violence points to a social context of military use of force that has moved from the 'battlefield' to the daily life of governmental institutions – it is in other words in the routines and management of military staffs that the technological and the social meet. It is in this meeting, that my study of operational staff practices connects to the research on materiality and war as I intend to offer further insight into how a military staff practice shapes violence and death through bureaucratic routines and the workings of daily social relations. My study (of a military staff and of targeting) has the ambition to provide further insight into how this closed off context (for civilian researchers) operates to sustain and make possible a 'rationalisation' of military use of force. This is arguably a much-needed contribution as the previous research discussed here has not, as of yet, engaged in ethnographical studies of how the processes and routines of operational staffs work to manage, neutral-

ise or silence the presence of violence and death in military practice. Although others have shown that the growing bureaucratisation of killing is reshaping how violence is understood through readings of doctrines and policy documents (Nordin and Öberg 2015), medical reports of drone operators and media sources (Asaro 2013) and analyses of US presidential directives and drone technology (I. Shaw and Akhter 2014), there is as of yet no study that actually engages in how this bureaucratisation operates in military staffs. Naturally, this is not the case because military staffs have no relevance in this matter, but due to the restricted access and high level of secrecy that surrounds such military practices (e.g. Rachel. Woodward and Duncanson 2017, 84, 212).

And on a final note, the research on the materiality of war engages with the embodied experiences of those that are in the midst of making military violence possible (among others), but one category of personnel that has not yet gained any closer attention is the people who by military standards "connect [the] tactical battles with [the] strategic goals" (Angstrom and Widen 2015, 73). What operational staff work does (in more plain terms) is thus to concretise and make military missions possible to conduct, which makes this practice a central part of the Western way of warfare (Vego 2008). The lack of attention to the operational practices of contemporary military organisations underlines the need for asking the question of how operational staff work includes "bureaucratized labor" (Asaro 2013) and how such labour enacts a military management of the fact that death and violence are a part of the military practice?

As of yet, the relational aspect of violence (that it inflicts death and injury to another human) has not explicitly been addressed in this review on previous research. The next section will engage in this aspect of violence and illustrate what research on military violence has to say about how the 'enemy' is constructed in Western military discourse.

2.4 Researching Military Understandings of Violence: a question of reification and misrecognition of the enemy

As pointed out by Kevin McDonald (2013), classical descriptions of what military violence is (such as a strategic instrumental way of damaging an opponent) miss out on two dimensions: firstly that violence establishes a relationship with the victim, and secondly, that violence is something that is experienced and embodied by those involved in its making and its 'effects' (McDonald 2013, 139; see also: M. Shaw 2003). Research on this latter aspect of military violence has been discussed above and in this section I will engage with studies that connect how violence and death are managed, neutralised or silenced in military practice with processes of distancing the military 'Self' from violence, and dehumanising 'the enemy'. Importantly, I am not engaging in the debate that concerns 'face-to-face' killing, as my interest, as with most of the research that I present in this chapter, concerns the daily 'production' of violence. In other words, I focus on analysing how military violence is made

possible and rationalised by routines, procedures and the social relations governing such military practices. I mention this because there are debates about military understandings of violence based on how dehumanisation/humanisation operates in soldiers' justification of killing in close combat (Baggaley and Shon 2018; Bar and Ben-Ari 2005; e.g. Bourke 1999, 2006; Jones 2006; Kooistra and Mahoney 2016). Arguably, the bureaucratisation of violence comprises a different empirical context of dehumanisation, compared to that of close combat.

Reification and misrecognition (sometimes 'non-recognition' (Holmqvist 2013b)) are two concepts that are commonly used in research that has interest in the discursive and material aspects of 'rationalising' violence. As, for instance, in Mathias Delori's study of how French fighter aircraft pilots and high ranking officers "make sense of the act of killing" in the 2011 Libya War (Delori 2014, 516). Following the works of Judith Butler and Axel Honneth, Delori approach misrecognition as on the one hand pointing at those *social processes* which contribute to the 'Other' in war not being represented and recognised in military practice. But misrecognition also indicates a *discursive* and *material* shaping of military subjects to not acknowledge that the 'Other' exists, or counts, as a human (see also: Butler 2010, 14–17; Honneth et al. 2008, 18). In short, what Delori (2014: 517) discovers in his sociological study is "[…] that the victims of violence by a Western state are not framed as an object of hatred, or of ritual sacrifice, or of military strategy, or as anything else.". The discovery that the existence of the Other is left out of the discursive and material (here: procedures and routinised practices) regime of French airmen's relation to death and violence resonates well with Cohn's observations discussed earlier. But Delori extends Cohn's analysis to the context of contemporary liberal warfare where the interlocutors in the study legitimise their work by making use of humanitarian discourse, and to a case where violence has been in actual use. In addition, Delori notes that misrecognition is connected to a process of *reifying* through the bureaucratisation and addition of new technologies in military organisations. But as pointed out by Delori, his results cannot be applied to the whole range of transformed practices through which Western military organisations wage war, as he reflects that "[…] 'targeted' and 'deliberate' killings are based on a different logic or set of principles" compared to that of his context of study (Delori 2014, 527). Nevertheless, his study exemplifies how the contemporary research on military understandings of violence analytically moves between the discursive effects of language, via the materiality of war, to the disappearance of the Other from military discourses on violence (see also: Holmqvist 2013b; Nordin and Öberg 2015).

Importantly, reification is in this body of research used to point out how dehumanisation and distancing processes operate to 'objectify' in military discourse. To mention a few examples, soldiers are portrayed as fixed entities and are conceptualised as cogs in a military machine of killing (C. Wasinski 2011), or the 'Other' is represented through coordinates and as 'targets' (also, on reification through gender, see: Marhia 2013; Christophe Wasinski 2017). The concept of reification can thus both point to an internal (to the military institution) representation of 'Self' or identity,

but also elucidate a process of objectifying or minimising the representation of the enemy 'Other'. As in the words of Thomas Lindemann:

> […] minimisation of the Other's agency can be presented as an 'objectification' of the Other (in the sense of not recognising the Other as a being with needs and capabilities for reaction). This latter form of minimisation is also referred to as 'reification', which is the act of considering the Other as a mere object or an inanimate thing, and this is the most obvious manifestation of instrumental nonrecognition. Reification can occur following a market-based logic. This purely instrumental disposition toward the Other is conditioned by a vision of the world that involves a reification of the Self and of the Other as well as a trivialisation of violence in the name of any law of necessity, market, national security, or the future of nations. (Lindemann 2014, 490)

Lindemann argues here that reification of the 'Self' and the 'Other' is connected to a trivialisation of violence and this is where my study interconnect to the research on how death and violence 'make sense' to military practitioners. In addition to my interests stated above, an additional purpose of investigating how social relations and processes of identification operate in a Swedish military staff and a context of 'targeting' is to provide further insight into how the bureaucratisation of violence operates so as to comprise a reification of the Other. In other words, operational staff work and targeting practices should be analysed in line with this current focus in contemporary research on how discourse and materiality convene to reify both the military subject, but also the representation of the 'Other'.

As of yet, I have not engaged in detail with how the gendered aspects of discourse and materiality relate to how death and violence are managed, suppressed or silenced in military practice. The research discussed above has strong connections to studies of military masculinities, including gendered language and practices within military organisations, and I will therefore discuss such research in the next and final section of this review of previous research.

2.5 Researching Military Understandings of Violence: a question of analysing Military Masculinities

Even though the research on how death and violence are represented in military discourse/practice might seem 'fractured' between the analysis of transformative language, materiality and the reification of 'Self' and 'Other, it is not. Not only do these different perspectives in Critical Military Studies (and research on IR and militarism) often engage in several of these approaches of analysing military violence in one and the same study, they are also often joined by a focus on investigating gendered aspects of transformative language, materiality and representations of the military 'Self' and the 'enemy Other'. As my own study follows in the footsteps of such research, I will here provide a review of studies that explicitly engage in military masculinities and their relation to how violence 'makes sense' for military subjects.

Feminist research on military masculinities and violence has been in the forefront when it comes to the materiality of war, both in the aspect of embodied experiences of war, and in the perspective of human interaction with technology and processes of bureaucracy (Dyvik 2016; Eichler 2011; Enloe 2015; Higate 2007; Wilcox 2014). An important focus for this research has been to investigate how masculinities are militarised in different types of contexts and social constructs, and not to assume a specific content or core to military masculinity (Eichler 2014, 82; Hutchings 2008, 401; Swain 2016; see also: R. Woodward and Neil Jenkings 2011). As Maya Eichler puts it:

> Militarised masculinities take many forms and are constituted at multiple sites. They need to be understood as diverse and changing rather than as monolithic and static— and as context-specific rather than universally the same. (Eichler 2014, 90)

Put simply, as long as the military institution continues to change, so will military masculinities, which indicates that analysing the ongoing bureaucratisation of military violence is deeply connected to analysing military masculinities (Wilcox 2014). The links between masculinities and violence are of interest when analysing military use of force as most military organisations (still) consist of a majority of men, and the military represents a 'legitimate' wielder of state violence. Furthermore, it lies in the interest of the state that the military comprises types of masculinities that attract continuous recruitment and sustainment of the military institution (Higate and Hopton 2004, 435). Research on masculinity also suggest that versions of masculinity connect to the use of force in how they underline what is considered 'lawful' and 'legitimate' use of organised violence, and what is considered "deviant, transgressive, disruptive, or illegitimate violence" (Stachowitsch 2015, 381). Masculinity is thus on the one hand identified as part of the narratives that tell the tale of what military service comprises *and* how organised violence holds a position as legitimate on a state macro-level.

But masculinities are also, as indicated further above and more in line with this thesis' interest, intertwined in the construction of military understandings of violence in specific contexts of discourses and materialities. One example of such research where a specific context of violence is investigated from the perspective of embodied materiality and masculinities, is Synne Dyvik reading of Norwegian soldiers' memoirs from the war in Afghanistan. Dyvik finds that these soldiers' " […] combat experiences should be understood as productive gendered performances of a particular kind of militarised masculinity, symbolically associated with Vikings and warriors."(Dyvik 2016, 134). What we learn here is that these militarised masculinities are, from the embodied experiences of soldiers in combat, closely connected to the "sensory experience of sex" and Dyvik offers insights into how violence and death in military practice is gendered through links between different bodily activities (Dyvik 2016, 143). Through this analysis, Dyvik manages to disrupt the "official narratives of peacebuilding, development and reconstruction" legitimising Norway's engagement in the war as the bodily experiences described in these memoirs

reveal another 'truth' about war – "one where the horror, joy, thrill, desire and excitement of war […] are placed front, right and centre" (Dyvik 2016, 134, 143).

In close concert to this embodied aspect of masculinity and violence we find research that engages with the question of how the materiality of war 'produces' military violence (in the 'Lautorian' sense discussed earlier on). Here militarised masculinities are studied in relation to how technology reshapes gendered relationships between material and humans, as well as between war and violence. The previously mentioned focus on drones and airstrikes is extended to this research, for example in Lorrain Bayard de Volo's analysis of how the 'safe' environment of the drone pilot challenges established connections between 'warrior masculinity' and the use of violence (Bayard De Volo 2016). Bayard de Volo exemplifies how new technology and its implication for how military violence is used work to surpass "[…] the traditionally valorised masculine attributes associated with heroism", and instead deepens the notion of protection in the construct of military masculinities due to the discourses that legitimise use of drone strikes in the name of protection (Bayard De Volo 2016, 72–73). Simultaneously, as a result of the protected status of the drone pilot him/herself, this socio-technological relationship between human and machine is also feminised, in that the drone pilot does not 'risk' anything (other than her/his mental health) (see also: Daggett 2015, 367). This exemplifies the complex workings of gender in how military practices develop through use of new technology. But what I want to stress here is, as Cristina Masters points out, that "[T]he inscription of technology with masculinity fundamentally constitutes technology as rational, objective and the source of moral knowledge claims." (Masters 2005, 122). In other words, technology holds a central position in not 'just' how military violence is approached by military subjects, materiality also helps to reconstruct military masculinities so as to strengthen the practitioner's sense of 'Self' as part of a 'rational' practice.

But when it comes to research that engages in the materiality of war and gender, technology seems to equate materiality, which is understandable due to the attention drone strikes have received in this field of research. But as pointed out in the sections above, drone strikes do not exist in a 'vacuum', and the use of 'precision' technology has created a bureaucratisation of military practices especially in operational staffs where work is done to plan, prepare and execute targeted missions. And although much has been written on military masculinities and their relation to violence, the bureaucratisation of violence has received little attention. Put simply, the materiality of processes, routines and 'kill-lists' is missing from the literature on military masculinities and their gendered relation to how military organisations manage, suppress or hide the use of force.

By linking masculinities to the sustainment and construction of routinised and daily military practice I can leave technology, or the experiences of actual war fighting aside, and instead focus on how masculinities are interlinked with a bureaucratised management of violence. Consequently, my study of operational staff practice un-

derlines previous conducted research which elucidates that masculinity is something that is learned through particular language and social relations (e.g. Baaz and Stern 2009). And it adds an arguably important but under-studied context of military practice to this body of research. This approach thus fills some of the gap left by previous studies of military masculinity which often have relied on data collected from soldiers, lower ranks of officers' corps, recruits, veterans or military personnel that do not 'fit' in hegemonic versions of military masculinity (Duncanson 2009; Enloe 2015; Higate 2007; J. Hockey in Jamieson 2014; e.g. Johnson 2010; Myrttinen, Khattab, and Naujoks 2017).

On that note, I will in the next two sections proceed with a discussion on theory. The main point with the following sections is to identify how research on military understandings of violence can find support in theories on discourse and bureaucratisation. The chapter is then summarised in section 2.8, where I outline the supporting research questions generated by the research discussed here and the theoretical 'take-aways' from my discussions on theory. The supporting research questions are as such aimed at filling some of the 'gaps' that currently exist in critical research on military understandings of violence, but also to sustain my investigations with theoretical support.

2.6 Discourse theory – analysing language and materialities

Discourse theory can arguably be philosophically challenging, even mystifying (as testified by some of my students and colleagues), and to be fair, sometimes more complex than it needs to be. In contrast, to avoid "lapsing into a self-indulgent theoreticism" (Torfing 2005, 25), my intention here is to keep my discussion on theory on discourse and its relation to materiality short, easy to follow and in close relation to the study of military violence.

To start with, the concept of discourse is widely used in the research discussed above, many times without a particular definition connected to its use and it sometimes indicates a certain language used in a practice (Daggett 2015) or (public) debate (I. G. R. Shaw and Akhter 2012). But in the poststructuralist tradition, discourse indicate more than 'just' *use* of a particular type of practice- or debate-related language. Discourse is a concept that indicates an analysis of how *language and practice* include certain sets of human subjectivities and ways of identification, and exclude others (D. R. Howarth 2013, 4; Torfing 2005, 8–9). Put simply, this means that in contrast to *describing* a particular use of language, a poststructural analysis of discourse searches for how both language and materiality *create ideas about what is true and real about a particular (political or) social practice* (see also: Laclau and Mouffe 1985, 93–95). This can be exemplified by Cohn's investigation, where analysing a particular discourse (of US strategic use of nuclear weapons) aims at elucidating the transformative power of language, through which a nuclear strike can be understood as 'surgical' and 'clean'.

In concrete terms, analysing discourse in relation to investigating how violence and death are managed, suppressed or silenced in military practice, means, one the one hand, that the researcher must listen to the language of military practitioners and read the documents that they treat as central to their practice. In doing so, the researcher can, as in the case of Carol Cohn's study, identify how this language is constructed (pinpointing what terms, concepts, images and assumptions about the world it comprises) and analyse how this construction creates a specific *meaning* to what military violence is and what violence does. The analytical part is an interpretive move that is based on the researcher's own subjectivities and relations to the context of research, and to offer the reader insights and illustrations (quotations, pictures etc.) of the analysed language/images is therefore of central importance (Glynos and Howarth 2007, 184–86). Naturally so that the reader can, in turn, critically review the researcher's interpretation and analysis.

On the other hand, the researcher 'must' also engage in what the discourse comprises in terms of activities – what the subjects' do and what material/objects they interact with (Glynos and Howarth 2007, 104–5, 109). I put 'must' in quotation marks here because it is not always the case that researchers have the possibility to analyse the discourse at hand in this way. It can be impossible for several reasons, such as lack of funds for fieldwork or denied access. But as illustrated by the research discussed above, to engage with *how* technology, processes, routines, bodily activities and/or objects provide meaning to subjects and the social practices they engage in, is central for understanding how the material aspect of discourse operates. Arguably, to leave out the materiality of a practice when analysing it from a discursive perspective, is to delimit the span of analysis and risk losing key insights into how the practice and its subjects are socially intertwined (McSorley 2014).

Both of these research activities are closely connected to the broader analytical question, previously exemplified by Cohn (1987), of what, or who, is the main point of reference for the subjects in the research context. The terms used in poststructural discourse theory regarding this question are the concepts of subjectivities and identification, and they divide the analysis of 'point of references' into two areas: that of subjectivities, meaning that the researcher engages with how the subject (a practitioner, agent of an practice or the researcher her/himself) performs as an active social agent (or in Howarth's words "a radical subject"), deliberately reforming points of reference by identifying "with new objects and ideologies" (D. R. Howarth 2013, 247). In other words, what Cohn (1987) did when she decided to learn the technostrategic language of the defence intellectuals. In my investigation the concept of subjectivity will be used when I analyse my ethnographical observations, in order to be able to capture how subjects in the military operational practice are forced to realign and reconstruct their points of reference. In other words, the concept of subjectivity and the theories behind it give clues to analysing *how* a military subject aligns him/herself with a 'new' subject position which, in relation to my research context, embodies a specific (learned) understanding of what military violence is and how it is used.

The second concept providing support when analysing the question of 'points of reference' is that of identification. The concept is in discourse theory used to point at meaning-making (social) relations that link agents, objects and groups together and also separate them from others. These relations can, in turn, be divided into two types of processes: A process of linking concepts, objects and social practices into a homogenous narrative that has the function of creating a natural belonging and 'togetherness' for subjects and groups. And, in addition, it is a process of separating other concepts, objects and practices from this narrative in order to provide subjects and groups with the distinct notion of what they are not (providing an aspect of difference) (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, 113–15). Allow me to return to Mathias Delori's (2014) study of how French fighter aircraft pilots and high ranking officers "make sense of the act of killing", as it offers a good example of how these processes can be analysed. Delori finds that the main points of reference for these military practitioners are the material parts of their practice, and that in their discourse "the bomb" is used to create a narrative which, paradoxically, leaves out the 'enemy Other' from their conceptualisation of their practice. Put in simple terms, this means that these pilots identify with "the bomb", and that this object provides a 'social glue' that shapes how they make sense of their practice: "the bomb" is to be delivered at a specific geographical coordinate, and that is what the job is all about (Delori 2014, 526; see also: Christophe Wasinski 2017, 7). The misrecognition of the 'enemy Other' that Delori discovers in his 'data' is thus made possible through a process of identification with a material object, as this process leaves out the narration of an 'Other' in the discourse – as Delori puts it "enemies are the blanks in the contemporary discourse" (Delori 2014, 525). I will use the theoretical idea of identification in the analyses of operational staff work and targeting that follows in Chapters 5 and 6, so as to pinpoint how subjects make use of social relations to form a notion of what the practice is about. But also, interlinked with this, what materiality it is in the work they do that matters for how the daily military practice is maintained and follows certain routines.

Furthermore, by studying how Delori analyses the discourse of French fighter aircraft pilots, we can see that poststructural discourse analysis where the material aspect of a practice is taken into account, operates through analytical lenses that search for what it is in the discourse that enables a certain 'truth' about violence to emerge. This brings me to a final point that I need to discuss before leaving the theories of discourse, and that is the use of history when analysing discourses.

Historical analysis of the emergence of bureaucratised labour

Poststructuralist ways of analysing discourse are indebted to Foucault for the insights his research has brought to how discourses form notions of what is 'true' or 'natural' in different societal practices (Torfing 2005, 7–9). For Foucault, analysis of how such notions had come into existence was closely connected to historical readings and investigations of how societal practice had been shaped by what he called

'events'. That is, 'events' are in Foucault's terminology "the emergence and trans-formation of practices" such as "the birth of the prison, the birth of the clinic, the birth of the welfare state " (Walters 2012, 18). This is important to stress as the in-vestigation at hand aims to investigate how violence and death are managed, neutral-ised or suppressed in military practice due to how violence has transformed into 'bureaucratised labour'. Since bureaucratisation does not just suddenly come into existence, the question arises how the bureaucratisation of violence has come into existence in the first place? Or expressed differently: Through what reformations, political ideas and societal changes and experiences has bureaucratisation pervaded the military discourse/practice?

Relatedly, Inspired by Laclau and Mouffe, Torfing formulates an historically in-clined purpose of discourse analysis (in addition to elucidat the power of transforma-tive language), which is "[…] to describe, understand and explain how and why particular   discursive   formations   were   constructed,   stabilised   and transformed."(Torfing 2005, 19). What this means is that in order to understand how bureaucratisation has pervaded the (Swedish) military institution, I must engage with "[…] the contingent political processes leading to the formation of particular struc-tures and institutions and particular accounts of the preferences and interests of the social actors […]" (Torfing 2005, 22). In concrete terms, I approach this task in two ways, as Torfing indicates that the analysis should comprise both political processes and the interests of social actors. Firstly I must engage with the historical question in relation to those political processes that have reformed the Swedish military, in order to gain insight into how (through what political means) bureaucratised military dis-course and practice have come into being. Secondly, I need to engage in what way the social actors, the military practitioners in other words, are a part of this transfor-mation. My interpretation of these two parts of the historical analysis is that in em-pirical terms, I will on the one hand review and describe what others have to say about political processes that reformed the Swedish military during the early and middle part of the 20th century. Then I will proceed to analyse how the military discourse of the practitioners took form during this time period. This latter part will be guided towards analysis of military instructions, pamphlets and books that have been central for the practitioners' conceptualisation of what military violence is. I discuss both the material and the timeframe in more detail in Chapter 4, where this historical analysis takes place.

Summary

The main 'take-aways' from poststructural discourse theory can be summarised as follows:

I approach the concept of discourse to include language, practice and material as-pects of practices. By observing and analysing the meaning-making (transformative) power of language, moments of identifications and the subjectivities found in the operational staff work and in the targeting-practice, my focus is on how military

subjects and practices form specific understandings of violence. I use these latter concepts to support my ethnographical investigations to guide my observations towards the social relations between practitioners, but also between actors-objects (I will discuss my specific method for ethnography in the next chapter). My analysis of contemporary practices is preceded by a historical analysis of Swedish narratives on the use of military force, which serves to clarify how the bureaucratised discourse of military violence has come to exist. The historical part of the investigation is divided into two areas: that of political processes and reforms which have made bureaucratisation a part of military discourse/practice, and that of military narratives which help form a specific meaning of what violence is.

This brings me to my final task in this chapter, and that is to, in more precise terms, clarify what the concept of bureaucratisation comprises in this thesis.

2.7 Bureaucratisation

The study of bureaucracy is as old as the modern state and much has been written about what bureaucracies are and how they should function (e.g. Albrow 1970). Importantly, my task in this thesis *is not to contribute specifically to the study of bureaucracy* as it is military understandings of violence that stand in focus here. But as my study of violence relies upon the 'fact' that previous research has identified bureaucratisation as a central aspect of how Western military institutions have transformed their relation to violence, it is pertinent to inquire if and how theories of bureaucratisation can offer some support in my task. I will therefore provide a brief overview of how the concept of bureaucratisation has developed, and what it entails. Naturally, I do not claim to create a 'generalisable definition' of bureaucratisation, but I will highlight a development of the concept to pinpoint some central aspects of this phenomenon, which will help me in my analyses of military violence.

A suitable start must be by taking support from Max Weber. As a widely recognised sociologist who studied how the modern state came into being and its developments, Weber's approach to bureaucratisation has influenced much of the early writings on bureaucracy. Weber has a 'rational' approach to bureaucratisation, as illustrated by this quote:

> Bureaucratisation offers above all the optimum possibility for carrying through the principle of specialising administrative functions according to purely objective considerations. Individual performances are allocated to functionaries who have specialised training and who by constant practice learn more and more. The 'objective' discharge of business primarily means a discharge of business according to calculable rules and 'without regard for persons.' (M. Weber 2009, 215 [1922])

Bureaucratisation is here connected to an ideal of 'objective considerations' and a process of learning to apply rules and to disregard specific human factors. This approach has long been the dominant view of how bureaucratisation is identified: as a

'rational' and hierarchical imposed control over administrative functions (Barker 1993, 410). The removal of the 'person' is specifically of note here, as it aligns with how the critical research discussed earlier on has identified a process of reification in contemporary Western warfare which has moved from the classical 'demonising' of the enemy, to a complete disregard of the enemy's existence as a human. Nevertheless, as pointed out by Hill (2005), the 'rational' and hierarchical approach to bureaucratisation has in later developments been subject to critique in the bureaucracy literature, as it hampers the administrative subject's 'space' for making own judgments. In other words, that in this Weberian ideal, bureaucratisation as a process of 'learning to abide to the rules' becomes too rigid, and mitigates the administrative agent's own initiative to enhance the effectiveness of the practice (Hill 2005, 202–12). Indeed, Weber identified this problem himself and coined the term "iron cage" which describes, in short, how an increasing 'rationalisation' of bureaucracy will eventually impose such a high level of hierarchical control to an organisation that its effectiveness will falter. Here the agent who is in the mist of this type of bureaucratisation "cannot squirm out of the apparatus into which he has been harnessed" (Barker 1993).

James Barker (1993) provides an overview of how this problem of hierarchical control and faltering effectiveness has been identified in the research on bureaucracy and organisations, and he conducts an ethnography of an organisation that shifts into self-managing teams (from hierarchical control). He finds that researcher and practitioners alike have presented a solution to the problem of the 'iron cage' and the implications of hierarchical control, through a type of bureaucratic organisation that relies on concertive control:

> Workers achieve concertive control by reaching a negotiated consensus on how to shape their behavior according to a set of core values, such as the values found in a corporate vision statement. […] This negotiated consensus creates and recreates a value-based discourse that workers use to infer "proper" behavioral premises: ideas, norms, or rules that enable them to act in ways functional for the organisation. (Barker 1993, 411–12)

Here bureaucratisation becomes closely connected to the creation of a "value-based discourse" in which the subject is socialised into a specific behaviorally pattern. It is a type of bureaucratisation process which is dependent on consensus and acceptance of certain norms and rules, and, in addition, ideally a 'flat' organisation. Paradoxically, Barker finds that this type of bureaucratisation of an organisation creates an even stronger 'iron cage', since the consensus-based norms and values turn into rules to obey, and the teams in his investigation eventually started to impose more administrative guidelines on themselves (Barker 1993). In addition, this type of bureaucratisation is harder for the agents to identify because "[I]n a concertive system […] the workers create a value-based system of control and then invest themselves in it through their strong identification with the system [note to Barker and Cheney, 1994]" (Barker 1993, 434). What this means is that the agent of the practice is, as Barker (1993: 434) points out, "socially constructed by the system they have created.", but not completely aware of how this construction operates.

For this thesis, these aspects of bureaucratisation suggest that the bureaucratisation of violence should be investigated in terms of how the military practice is dependent on social rules and norms to function, in particular how hierarchal control relates to consensus-based discourse in the bureaucratised practice. In other words, to investigate if there is a consensus-based value discourse in the operational practice, and if so, how it relates to the social relations of the practice. Such an inquiry might identify how the actors of the practice embody bureaucratised violence, and also help to identify with what means bureaucratised violence is constructed. Arguably, bureaucratisation is a term that emphasises a study of how agents of a practice interact in relation to each other, through the use of references to, and abiding by, formal and informal rules. Rules that they have created themselves in consensus, in order to stabilise and make the work more efficient, and rules that are imposed into the practice by formalised procedures and routines. As a reminder from previous discussions, the discourse theoretical 'framework' for this thesis suggests that this materiality (the procedures, routines, databases and lists of the practice) have a constructive role to play in the practice – the material and the agents are intertwined in a social relation. This chimes well with the observations made by Barker, and his argument that bureaucratisation can take the form of a value-based discourse, made up of social rules and norms.

In conclusion, having discussed previous research on how military practitioners relate to the violent aspects of their work, and how discourse theory offers some key insights into how such relations can be studied, this brief meeting with theories on bureaucratisation offers further support to the emphasis previous research and discourse theory put on investigating social interactions with the materialities of a practice. I will now summarise and outline how the discussions in this chapter point to certain supportive research questions.

2.8 Summary of Previous Research and Theory: Supporting research questions

My initiating discussion on the renewed interest in militarism, and specifically, the sociological approach to investigating mundane and daily activities with connections to the use of military force, has several attachments to research that engages in military violence. Specifically, the research discussed in the first part of the chapter sets the spotlight on the importance of investigating those underlying conditions that create a 'common sense' to an understanding where military violence is seen as 'productive' and 'efficient' (see also: Foucault 2003, 45–46; Shapiro 2012, 64). But what is of specific interest here is how previous research on how military organisations manage the inescapable presence of death and violence in their practice has not, as of yet, engaged in those daily routines and practices which have been labeled 'bureaucratised labour' (with some few exceptions, discussed above).

As I have tried to illustrate in my review of previous research, approaches where language, materiality, conceptualisations of the military 'Self' and the 'Other', as well as investigations in military masculinities, have rewarded us with much knowledge about how military subjects relate to violence. But as the military practice develops, so does this relation to violence. And since much of the research on the materiality of war indicates that Western military use of force is moving towards a further bureaucratisation, through the military dependency of 'kill-lists', databases, routines and formalised procedures, further investigations are called for. My 'unique' position of being able to gain access to two military practices (operational staff work and the training of 'targeteers'), where such materialities are central in the preparation, conduct and evaluation of military missions, offers opportunities to fill some of this gap. This means that the context of Sweden, as a Western state that actively uses its military force in international missions is less important compared to the type of military practice this context facilitates for me as a researcher to investigate. In other words, although my investigation of military operational practices is located in Sweden, the main contribution to previous research is not Sweden *per se*, but the possible insights in bureaucratised labour of violence this context offers.

Furthermore, when engaging in the study of daily military work, previous research on military masculinities accentuates the importance for the analysis to take into account how military subjects make use of masculine 'norms' in ways which sustain the naturalisation of use of military violence. In other words, research on materiality and military masculinities (not to indicate that these are necessarily separate fields of study) emphasises the study of practice-related social relations and use of language. These are relations and discourse that help maintain a homogenised and de-politicised understanding of military violence.

In sum, what the previously conducted research indicates in terms of questions tentatively still left unanswered, in relation to the overarching question of how the inescapable presence of violence and death are managed, neutralised or silenced in military practice, is the following:

- what are the main subjects or points of reference in operational military discourse? In particular, how does military staff practice shape understandings of violence and death?
- how is military subjects' relation to violence shaped through the transformative language and materiality of NATO targeting lists and practical procedures?
- how does reification and misrecognition of the Other exist and operate in the bureaucratised labour of operational staff practice and in the practice of targeting?
- how does the bureaucratisation of violence relate to military masculinities? In particular, what values and norms come in forefront in the construction of military masculinity in the context of bureaucratised labour at an operational staff?

The historical background to how bureaucratisation has come into being in my context of research is in addition to the questions above a necessary first step in the analysis. A description and analysis of how bureaucratisation 'takes hold' of the Swedish military when it is reformed into its modern form can bring further depth to the otherwise contemporary focused analysis of military understandings of violence. It is, in other words, the theoretically established importance of creating a historically grounded understanding of how discourses emerge, which motivates the analysis of historical narratives in the thesis. This first step in the analysis is thus meant to complement my main contemporary analyses of operational staff work and of NATO targeting processes, so as to offer deeper insight into how using military violence has come to comprise aspects of bureaucratic labour.

When it comes to theoretical 'tools', previous research and theories on discourse and bureaucratisation suggest that analysis of military language and practice should be, on the one hand, directed towards how identification is constructed. In particular, this analysis is made possible by searching for how military language contains points of reference where relations to death and violence are made up through processes of bureaucratisation (e.g. rationalisation/ordering/structuring the military practice), relations to materiality (e.g. technology, lists, databases, routines and use of the body), and processes of reification. On the other hand, the analysis can be supported by a complementary focus on how subjectivity 'plays out' in military operational practice. In other words, observing and analysing how subjects' interact and share particular points of reference in the language and materiality of operational practice. In both these theoretical avenues, the analysis should conclude how identification and subjectivity create certain norms and social rules for how death and violence are managed, neutralised or silenced in military practice. This focus on norms/social rules rests upon how theories of bureaucratisation and of analysing language/materiality suggest that practitioners' own understanding of their practice is anchored in consensus-related agreements on what is a 'natural' and 'correct' way of interpreting and conducting their practice. Analysing social rules and norms thus comprises a focus on human relations as they offer ways of identification and subjectivities for the agents of a practice. But the analysis should also include how identification and subjectivities are made possible by the meaning-making power of discourse. And in addition how the language and materiality of the practice sediments, or stabilises, the social rules and norms that make the practice function in a particular way.

On that note, I move on to engage with ethnography and reflexive methods of researching military practice.

3
Chapter 3: Ethnographic Method

In this chapter I motivate and outline my way of utilising ethnographic methods and in particular, discuss why and how autoethnography is used in my search for the social relations, rules and norms that are central to how violence and death are managed, neutralised or silenced in operational work. This chapter thus expands upon how methods of ethnography can be used to capture the constantly ongoing reproduction and sedimentation of social relations and norms/rules that are a part of how operational work is formed. It is in other words the value-based discourse, previously discussed as a part of how bureaucratisation takes shape, that is to be 'captured' by my ethnographical approach.

The research problem points to investigations of the way in which the military itself contributes to a bureaucratisation of violence by how the institution conceptualises, articulates and understands violence. Therefore I need to investigate how operational work 'functions' in ways that create and sustain a self-imposed (bureaucratised) way of working (planning, sustaining and executing the use of force). Hence the decision to engage in studies of operational practice that, on the one hand, sustains and plans for the use of force through its daily work (Chapter 5) and, on the other hand, governs the direct use of operational violence (Chapter 6). As indicated by Glynos and Howarth, ethnographical work is preferred when a researcher engages in finding the social relations, rules and norms of a particular practice (Glynos and Howarth 2007, 176). In addition, materiality and language have, by my review of previous research, been pinpointed as important aspects of investigating military violence. This underlines the need for a discussion on how these aspects of the research environment are managed by my ethnographical approach.

Consequently, this chapter starts with providing a brief overview of ethnography and proceeds thereafter to a discussion of post-structural critique of ethnographic research methods. As this critique is partly based on the possibilities of further use of reflexivity in ethnographical work, the chapter elaborates on what an auto-ethnographical research method comprises. The chapter then moves on to provide more details on how auto-ethnography has been used when investigating military practice. This includes a methods summary where I outline my specific use of ethnography and auto-ethnography, and how these research methods are supported by post-structural theory. The chapter is concluded with a discussion on research ethics.

3.1 Ethnography

This section will provide a brief discussion on what ethnography comprise in contemporary research and how this style of research (ethnography is not a single method) is relevant for my study. It will not engage in a historical walkthrough of how ethnography has spread from anthropology to sociology and political science, as there are several other works that already provide excellent descriptions of this development (see: Atkinson and Coffey 2001; Brewer 2000; introduction in: Neyland 2008). Nevertheless, the term 'ethnography' is notoriously hard to define, but it can be said to point to a type of research that engages in different types of social and cultural environments (such as indigenous, urban or work-related domains) and does so with ambitions to create accounts for (own, others or group) experiences (e.g. Atkinson and Coffey 2001, 4–5; Atkinson and Hammersley 2007, 1–2). As ethnography can mean many different things depending on the trope of research, 'definitions' of ethnography tend to lean on practical aspects of ethnographical investigations, as discernable in Willis's and Trondman's (2000) classical launching article for the journal "Ethnography":

> What is ethnography for us? Most important, it is a family of methods involving direct and sustained social contact with agents and of richly writing up the encounter, respecting, recording, representing at least partly in its own terms the irreducibility of human experience. (Willis and Trondman 2002, 394)

From my point of view, what Willis and Trondman (2000) suggest is that ethnography comprises a collection of methods which are joined together in the researcher's effort to shed some light on the complexities intrinsic to the social context of the research at hand. 'Experiences' is a key word here, as it is the ethnographer's involvement in a social context of research that separates this type of research from other methodologies (O'Reilly 2005, 2–3). In other words, to achieve some level of involvement, ethnography points in the direction of a method of participant observation. Or as Atkinson and Coffey (2001) puts it: "Observation and participation (according to circumstance and the analytical purpose at hand) remain the characteristic features of the ethnographic approach" (Atkinson and Coffey 2001, 4–5). But the focus on involvement in the social context of research means that 'ethnography' is not simply another word for 'participant observation'. To achieve some level of involvement, the researcher needs to engage in conversations with the subjects of the social context (Atkinson and Coffey 2001, 5; O'Reilly 2005, 3). But also, in some cases, the researcher needs to subject him/herself to the social rules and norms that 'govern' the social context in order to experience 'at first hand' how this context comprises certain subjectivities (Adams, Jones, and Ellis 2015, 50). In short, to carry out ethnographic work is to observe, participate, talk, feel and reflect. And, as pointed out by Willis and Trondman in the quote above, to "richly" write down the 'outcomes' of these activities.

Furthermore, what is indicated by the term ethnography is that the research strives to unfold the complexities, social identities and interactions of the context of research (Bloome et al. 2005, xvi). To engage in ethnographic research is thus to explore a specific context and its relation to the theoretical questions that fuel the research. Which means that the research often starts with a broadly defined interest (for instance in particular actors, a context or a set of practices) and through a longer period of interaction with the research context then narrows down to more closely defined areas of interests (Atkinson and Hammersley 2007, 3–4). Nevertheless, the detailed and exploratory character of ethnography studies can be sustained, or guided, by theories that offer analytical insight into how, as in my case, a practice is made to function on a day-to-day basis (Willis and Trondman 2002, 396). And every researcher's ethnographical approach should include a description of how the researcher relates (and in some cases makes use) of how "[…] reflexivity, one's own role in the construction of social life […]" plays a part in the field work and analysis (O'Reilly 2005, 3).

The following sections aim to provide both such a description of how reflexivity is a 'factor' in my ethnographical approach, and a discussion on how post-structural theory has informed my ethnographical research.

3.2 Poststructural Critique of Ethnography

This section comprises a discussion of how reflexivity has been debated in terms of how the researcher's own thoughts, feelings and status as participant should, or should not, be included in the ethnographical approach to, and analysis of, the fieldwork. This is important to discuss, as my ethnographic work is conducted in a research context which has shaped my own identity through my years of military service as an officer. I will discuss my own situation as partly military officer, partly researcher, in the concluding part of this chapter, and will here, to facilitate that discussion, offer some of the main points of the debate regarding reflexivity. But this short section also offers some insight into the debate that relates reflexivity to discussions on how language and materiality should be approached in ethnographical work.

In "Writing Culture" Clifford & Marcus display some cross-references to the very same academics (among others: Lyotard, Foucault and Derrida) that have inspired the expansion of discourse theory. Stimulated by insights from the emerging post-structuralism, the reflexive turn provoked radical changes in ethnographic work. Foremost, the insight that history has a contingency to it, that there are no certain sets of 'facts' or 'truths' in the *social* world, and that claims made by researchers are made from a position of power, underline this connection to post-structuralism in "Writing Culture" (Clifford and Marcus 1986, 6, 7, 10–11). The authors suggest that the ethnographic writer should turn to him/herself in order to produce ethnographic texts that incorporate these insights (Ibid, p. 22-23). "Writing Culture" is, in retro perspective, indeed a text that stands for the 'reflexive turn' that encompassed the

debates of ethnographical research during the 1980s. Many years after its publishing, Davies, the author of "Reflexive Ethnography" (1999) strives to counter what she calls the "destructive force" in social research, which is a force that has taken self-reflexive insights and drawn them to the extreme (Davies 1999, 5). By this she means that the constant pressure on researchers to self-reflect and to critically investigate their inner motives and preconceptions creates an inward spiral that prevents any possibility to find something more than just the researcher's inner life in their work (Ibid, p. 7). In order to counter this tendency (which she relates to the post-structuralist movement in science), Davies asks:

> Thus the question arises as to whether this inward spiral can be broken without losing the insights into the reflexive nature of knowledge. Is knowledge of anything other than knowledge of reflexivity possible? And if so, how is it achieved? The answer may lie in consideration of the dual nature of social research: that it depends both on some connection with that being researched and on some degree of separation from it. (Davies 1999, 10)

Posing this question in relation to critique against the relativism that is (at least in the writer's eyes) imbued with post-structuralism, some other ontological starting point must be identified for ethnographic work. Davies wants to hold on to some "very valuable insights" that are inherent in post-structuralism (the identification of power-relations and the multitude of meaning in language), and at the same time reject the anti-essential logic of this train of thought (Davies 1999, 17). Hence the turn towards critical realism which 'allows' a separation between the 'real' and our ideas about reality. This ontological shift can also be seen in Lilie Chouliaraki's and Norman Fairclough's work where they develop the ontological foundation of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). This latter theoretical/methodological approach also takes issue with the 'relativism' of post-structuralism and seeks to find something outside of the meaning-making effects of language and signs (they take issue with Derrida's infamous claim that "there is nothing outside the text") (e.g. Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999, 8, and Chapter 6; Dilley 1999, 23–24).

In both of these cases, I see traces of Roy Bhaskar's central (to critical realism) argument that the subject of human science includes both social objects and beliefs about social objects (Bhaskar 2011, 101). However, these similarities seem to me to be imbued with the same difficulty: where and how does the researcher's reflexivity stop, and the causality of the objects that are under investigation start? Or expressed differently: where and how do the researcher's language, signs and practice *not matter* to the transformation of the researcher's experiences (observations, conversations) into a written ethnography (or, for that matter, discourse analysis)? From a poststructural position, this question is as central as it is to those who work with critical realism as their ontology of choice. But instead of getting stuck with a division between the subjectivity of language, and the objectivity of objects (an apparent risk for a critical realist), I focus upon the context bound relationship between discourse and materiality, which I discuss in section 2.3 (the materiality of war) of the previous chapter. What this means is that my ethnography must take into account the 'fact' that the materiality of my research context (its procedures, lists, objects etc.)

may influence and 'produce' a specific social order for operational work to function in the way it does.

Furthermore, the "everyday or unmarked" is central when the ethnographer aims to capture discourses in the field as "… they contain information about language ideology, socialisation, and ways in which gender, age, ethnic identity, and power relationships are linguistically constructed and conceived" (Farnell and Graham 1998, 422). This underlines that capturing the language and materiality of violence is not just about noting the specific language used by the practitioners in the field. From my point of view, a poststructural ethnography also includes observations of what objects, places, bodily expressions and relations are connected to the use of language. In other words, the investigation of operational military work must include observations of practitioners, including my own, central 'objects' of identification and avenues of subjectivity, when interacting with the daily work at an operational staff.

The above discussed connections between the materiality of social order and the striving to take into account the researcher's reflexivity into ethnographical work, chimes with more recent discussions on autoethnography and subjectivism (the latter not entirely interchangeable with poststructuralist interpretations of the concept of subjectivity, but indeed similar):

> In this context, subjectivism is welcomed and seen as a resource (McLeod, 2011), as the body is assumed to be a central site for socio-political meaning-making (Spry, 2011). However, as Sparkes (2003) robustly argues, subjectivism should not be confused with solipsism or self-indulgence. The subjectivist stance in autoethnography is predicated on quite the opposite: that culture flows through self and vice versa (Ellis & Bochner, 1996), and that *people are inscribed within dialogic, socially shared, linguistic and representational practices* (Bakhtin, 1984; Frank, 2005) through their daily occupations. The self is therefore understood as a social and relational rather than an autonomous phenomenon (Church, 1995). (see: Short, Turner, and Grant 2013, 4–5, my italics).

The process of inscription mentioned here is in my view a way of pointing to the process of subjectivity where the subject dislocates itself from one subject position and forms into another. In this sense, the above quote from "Contemporary British Autoethnography" (2013) captures the essence of my theoretical and methodical approach to my fieldwork. Here, the 'field' is not just the physical location of the practice of interest, nor just the people performing these practices, it expands to my analysis of my own field notes. Blurring the concept of 'the field' is thus another consequence of the reflexive turn (see also: A.C.G.M. Robben and Sluka 2012, 27–29).

Having discussed reflexive ethnographical research and its connections to materiality and social order, and having ended up with the term 'autoethnography', the next section will offer some insight into what this term entails.

3.3 Autoethnography

If ethnography is about describing and analysing 'culture' and social experiences of 'others', and reflexivity is about taking into account the researcher's own experiences of interacting with (e.g. recording, writing, participating) agents and cultural environments into the analysis, what is autoethnography? This section tries to answer this question through a short discussion about how cultural embeddedness and the researcher's own knowledge and experiences of the research context have found a methodological 'place' in the concept of autoethnography. But it also engages in a discussion on how the long tradition in ethnographic work of utilising narratives (such as anthropologists use of "life histories") has come, through the 'reflexive turn' to include the stories told by the researchers themselves (Chang 2008, 44–45). These two areas of discussion (cultural embeddedness and the use of personal narratives) are arguably central to creating an understanding of autoethnography. Particularly as productive scholars in this type of writing outline autoethnography as:

> [Autoethnography is] an approach to research and writing that seeks to describe and systematically analyse (*graphy*) personal experience (*auto*) in order to understand cultural experience (*ethno*) [note to]: (ELLIS, 2004; HOLMAN JONES, 2005). […] A researcher uses tenets of *autobiography* and *ethnography* to *do* and *write* autoethnography. Thus, as a method, autoethnography is both process and product. (Ellis, Adams, and Bochner 2011, 345 (italics in original))

What this quote clarifies is that autoethnography points to research methods that allow for the researcher to use his/her own experiences to better understand and analyse the workings of the particular culture or social phenomenon of interest. The following two parts of the section comprise discussions that aim to clarify how autoethnography as a method is understood to contribute to my fieldwork.

Dissolving the boundaries between Self/Others and outsider/insider

Every fieldwork has its specific challenges. The reciprocal relationship between fieldworker and the people/practices of study is always bound by context and formed by personalities (see Angrosino and Rosenberg 2011, 468 f. for a discussion on this). In traditional fieldwork, challenges were often connected to language use and forms of 'blending in', while post-modern fieldwork comprises challenges that are connected to letting suppressed voices be heard without making a colonial (Western) imprint on the field environment (Davies 1999, 15). Most common among professional fieldworkers (and the 'inventors' of fieldwork) - the anthropologists - is that challenges spring from a situation where the researchers have very little practical experience of the culture they are to observe (see: Barley 1983 for a rather amusing account of this). In addition, ethnographic researchers often have 'outsider' imprinted on their persons (comprised of different gender/skin colour/language/customs/cloths/ethical standpoints etc. than the people they aim to study) which thus forms a base for their specific challenges when entering 'the field' (DeWalt and DeWalt 2011, 30, 35–37).

My challenges have sprung from quite the opposite relation to my 'field'. They are connected to my split roles as military officer and researcher as well as to my deep knowledge of the practices that are to be studied. As an officer with my rank and educational background I can blend in all too well. Not just my interlocutors but also I myself may forget that I am in place to do research, and not to, for instance, enhance the operational planning process that I aim to study. For instance, the articulations that are connected to the military practices are so natural to me that they may pass unnoticed. The risk is obviously that I 'miss out' on central aspects of language and practice that provide deeper knowledge of military understandings of violence. Writings of autoethnographical methods accentuate the 'fact' that these reflections are quite commonly the main criticism of research conducted by people in my position (see Chang 2008, 45 for a discussion on this). Such critique is often met by the argument that 'insiders' can shed light on aspects of the context at hand with a higher grade of representation and legitimacy than an 'outsider' can, bringing fourth details that outsiders tend to miss out on (MacIsaac, Irwin, and Mather 2009, 10–11). In addition, Glynos and Howarth point to the importance of acquiring a measure of *expertise* in the practice that is to be studied, in order to sort out which social relations and rules/norms drive the practice (Glynos and Howarth 2007, 184–85).

Insomuch, a 'halfie' ethnographer, in contrast to the 'outsider' is one who stands between differently defined subject-positions where one of these positions is in use by the researcher's subjects of interest. Or in simpler terms: 'Halfies' do fieldwork in social contexts that are 'their own'. Lila Abu-Lughod defines this term as "…people whose national or cultural identity is mixed by virtue of migration, overseas education, or parentage." (Fox and King 1991, 466). But more recent use blurs the distinction between the narrow definition given by Abu-Lughod and the meaning of expressions like the 'native' ethnographer, or the 'insider' (e.g. Dauth 2009; A.C.G.M. Robben and Sluka 2012, 20). This diffusion of the term supports suggesting that the term 'halfie' points to more than a mixed national or cultural identity, or at least an expansion on what cultural identity means.

In my case, my background as a military officer provides me with an embedded knowledge of operational military 'culture' which, in the light of the development of the term 'halfie', makes me (tentatively) label myself a 'halfie' ethnographer. In other words, autoethnography can be understood as a label for a research method where researchers have been in a position where they investigate an institution or social context that they themselves have had a 'non-research' role in (Chang 2008, 44). Just to mention a few different contexts: Former patients doing research on health care (Ellingson 1998); inhabitants of segregated urban suburbs participating in police work conducted in these areas (Fassin 2013); and medical personnel working as nurses for ethnographic purposes (Savage 2000). In short, autoethnography is being used when the ethnographical research is conducted by an 'insider' or a 'native' ethnographer, *and the researcher's own experience of the culture* is used as 'data' in the analysis of the field work. I will, further below, discuss this in more

detail in relation to how I have constructed my auto/ethnographical research approach with support of concepts from poststructural discourse theory.

As indicated by the initiating part of this section on autoethnography, cultural embeddedness cannot provide a complete description of what autoethnography is, as this term (much like ethnography) has several applications and meanings depending on the researcher and the research environment (for a long list of labels that can be connected to the term autoethnography, see: Chang 2008, 47–48). But in common with the main part of these different uses of autoethnography, in addition to the cultural embeddedness that I point to above, is the use of different types of *narratives* in the ethnographical research. The next part of this section on autoethnography aims to shed some light on the use of narratives in autoethnographical work.

Narratives and the use of story-telling

Autoethnographers construction of 'data', derived from one's own experiences of fieldwork or one's own encounters with the social world, often takes the form of personal stories (Ellis 2001; e.g. Holt 2003; Humphreys 2005; Savage 2000). Such use of narratives has developed during the last decade of IR-writing, either in the form of autobiographical, autoethnographical or other approaches that include use of narratives, to hold a position as a "[…] legitimate field of scholarly inquiry." (Ravecca and Dauphinee 2018, 1). Insomuch, to position the use of narratives in IR-research as 'legitimate' facilitates discussions on the use of personal stories as 'data', from a question of 'if it's really research', to more constructive topics. One central such topic is how self-narratives can be of use in creating a deeper understanding of the human complexities that the researcher aims at exploring (e.g. Brigg and Bleiker 2010; Short, Turner, and Grant 2013).

But there has been a tendency in autoethnographical research to try to 'fit in' with the rules and norms of 'conventional' research, impossibly trying to adhere to ideals such as the researcher analysing his/her data from an 'objective' position (L. Anderson 2006; e.g. Bochner and Ellis 2006). Or as aptly put by Ellis et al.:

> When researchers do autoethnography, they retrospectively and selectively write about epiphanies that stem from, or are made possible by, being part of a culture and/or by possessing a particular cultural identity. However, in addition to telling about experiences, autoethnographers often are required by social science publishing conventions to analyse these experiences. (Ellis, Adams, and Bochner 2011, 348)

Fortunately, the debate has moved on from how autoethnography can be fitted into (positivist) research ideals, and now comprise questions of how the use of narratives can provide disruptions to established notions of how the central elements of a research context function (Edkins 2013; Naumes 2015). In other words, the 'gains' offered by the use of self-reflexive stories in political science can be located in how such stories chime (well/poorly) with theoretical notions that explain and provide

understanding of that which is being investigated. Ravecca and Dauphinee (2018), in a recent article on the use of narratives in IR-research, conclude that personal, self-reflexive stories have a central place in the research, when the narratives 'engage' with theoretical understanding of a particular research problem:

> What is important for us here is to examine how the reader might see theory working through narratives, as well as to recognise what a text offers (or does not offer): Does it solidify a position? How does it deal with other accounts of the world? How does the narrative then enable different possibilities around translation between the text, the reader, and the author? (Ravecca and Dauphinee 2018, 11)

From my position as a 'halfie' researcher, this use of personal stories is productive for my analysis of military understandings of violence as this offers a way for me to elucidate how discourses and materiality belonging to bureaucratised relations to military violence is a part of my own subjectivity and ways of identification. Furthermore, by including personal notes and reflections in my investigations of operational work, I can shed some light on *how* mundane and daily work with military matters comprise moments of identification with bureaucratised military discourse. I will come back to this in section 3.5 where I discuss the details of my use of ethnography and autoethnography.

In sum, autoethnography means (at least for its use in this thesis) that I, the researcher/officer, utilise my own experience and cultural embeddedness of the research context to deepen my analysis of social relations and use of language/materiality in the military practice. My main technique for elucidating this autoethnographical method is by including stories and reflections from my research endeavors, and to discuss these narratives from a perspective of how they offer insights into the management, suppression or silencing of death and violence. In short, personal stories and research notes are used to open up a space for the reader to engage in the analysis of how operational military work (through its avenues of subjectivity and moments of identification) constructs understandings of violence.

3.4 Autoethnography and military practice

This section offers a short discussion of the problems and possibilities of using autoethnography in relation to researching military practice. After this section I will proceed to a summary of my interpretation of the autoethnographical method and how I use discourse theory and specifically, the concepts of subjectivity and identification in support of my ethnographical investigations.

Autoethnographical research of the military is remarkably underrepresented in political science and IR. As MacIsaac et al. (2009) notes in one of few autoethnographical texts within the military context "Contemporary qualitative researchers will not likely neglect reflexivity. Yet, the concept is largely absent in studies of military organisations, and, in an age of post-modern academia, this is somewhat puzzling."

(see also: Gait and Mao-Shai 2010, 279–80; MacIsaac, Irwin, and Mather 2009, 4). This may be a result of the 'bad relation' between anthropologists and the military, which stems from accusations of colonialism in the early days of the academic genre, and the scandals of the 1960s US-army Project Camelot (where anthropologists were used as 'intelligence gatherers') (Fluehr-Lobban gives an extensive overview in: Farnell and Graham 1998, 174–78). More recent uses of anthropologists in military contexts, the Human Terrain Teams (HTTs), have not quelled this aversion to anthropologists getting involved in military matters (González 2008; McFate and Laurence 2015, chap. 2; Antonius C G M Robben 2009). As it is, transformative language and objects of inscription construct military culture, which creates a fear among researchers of getting seduced by the strong culture in the military. 'Going native' in a morally challenging practice like the military might cause the ethnographer to forget the ideals and ethics driving the ethnographic work.

Furthermore, from the military science perspective, autoethnography might be too 'radical' for the main body of researchers working with military matters, as it is a form of research heavily informed by poststructural theory (as previously discussed) (e.g. Higate and Cameron 2006, 229–30). The poststructural intake collides quite heavily with those that understand all things connected to the military institution in the 'Huntington-tradition', where realism is the bread and butter of the researcher's theoretical/methodological approach. The (perhaps) Lutheran-inspired critique that autoethnography is 'self-indulgent' may also contribute to the absence of autoethnography in ethnographical studies of the military. This latter critique is quite thoroughly met by researchers adopting the methodology. For example, by using arguments related to how the exposure of personal feelings, discussions of ethical problems and the exposure of how meaning is imbedded in social relations creates a deeper understanding of the context of research (see Sparkes 2002, 210 ff.).

Conversely, as indicted previously in this chapter, in many settings outside the military several ethnographers have found that the more 'contaminated' they get by the cultures, contexts and/or subjects that they meet in the field (the more 'biased' they get in the light of traditional positivistic ideals), the more they can learn about how meaning is created in the field of study (Ellingson 1998, 494). Fragmentation of identity seems to be best captured by describing the researcher's process of alteration, often going from theoretically conversant to culturally immersed by entering the 'field' of study. Thus, by exposing the researcher's alteration of 'self', by using a reflexive method of investigation, it is possible to learn how identity is formed in specific environments (e.g. Subedi 2006). Further on I will describe my attempt to create a bridge between these positions where immersion in culture and ethnographic work can go hand in hand in research of military practices.

Autoethnography can support researchers with experience of war practices, or the use of force if you will, to come to terms with what 'effects' such experiences can have on their research. Or in the words of Oded Löwenheim (2010):

> By writing this autoethnographical account, I became highly sensitive to and aware of the importance of personal voice, style, and selfhood in academic texts, as well as of the personal and societal implications of suppressing these dimensions. (Löwenheim 2010, 1045)

As an Israeli IR-scholar with close personal experience of war, Löwenheim discovers that 'mainstream' IR-theory can help him detach from these experiences, but at the cost of academically producing something 'real' about war (see also Doty 2004 for an intriguing text on identity and writing IR). But including 'the personal voice' in analysis does not come without cost. Ethical and methodological implications are therefore discussed at the end of this chapter and in my concluding chapter, where I describe how this type of reflexivity is beset with limitations of research and personal peril, and naturally how such perils are mitigated in my investigation. As noted by several in this trope of research, autoethnography functions best when the reflexivity added by the researcher actually provides something new or disruptive to such aspects of IR that otherwise are set as 'facts' or not seen. Indeed, much of the academic literature adhering to autoethnography or autobiography referred to above, remains closely connected to using narratives of personal experiences as 'data' in their research. But consequently, this cannot be interpret as a method where 'any' story or experience of the researcher will suffice as autoethnography must be closely connected to the problem and aim of the research (Brigg and Bleiker 2010; Dauphinee 2010; Edkins 2013; for an introduction and methodlogical critique, see Naumes 2015).

Therefore, the next section will provide such connections between research problem, theory and method, in order to clarify how my ethnographical research has been conducted.

3.5 Summary: My use of Auto/Ethnography and discourse theory

My method of researching contemporary operational military work can in simple terms be described as participating in different central practices, observing and interacting (talking) with the agents, and recording my observations and conversations by taking notes (and in some cases using a digital recorder). This short description indicates a traditional ethnographical investigation, as it points to the main features of what 'defines' ethnography (discussed early on in this chapter). But as indicated in my discussion on autoethnography, and the description of my research problem found in Chapter 1, to simply say that I conduct ethnographical research leaves too much of the details and focus of the research process aside. Therefore, this section offers a more precise description of how (poststructural) theory, ethnography and autoethnography underpin my approach to investigating operational work. This includes a short discussion of how I use self-narratives in the ethnographical work and the section is concluded by a discussion of how my 'halfie' position is used in my efforts to shed light on how violence is constructed and sustained in operational work.

Nevertheless, the focus that my supporting research questions puts on discourse, social relations and materiality is something that I have derived from previous research, poststructural theory and theories of bureaucratisation. Insomuch, the supporting research questions point the ethnographical research to take support in central elements of poststructural theory that can offer a deeper understanding of how (military) subjects relate, manage and understand violence. Particularly in how the questions guide the ethnographical work to try to 'capture' ways of subjectivity and moments of identification, without losing sight of how the military language comprises meaning-making discourse.

When it comes to my approach to researching operational military work, I have drawn much from the recent development in autoethnography in the way others have approached their context of research and utilised their own reflexivity in order to achieve the aims of their research (e.g. Bulmer and Jackson 2016; Ellingson 1998; Fassin 2013; Hockey 1996; Kirke 2010; McSorley 2016; Savage 2000). For instance, as indicate by my previous discussions on how bureaucratisation takes shape (via hierarchical control and/or through concertive control), bureaucratised understandings of violence are arguably not likely to be 'purely' technocratic or 'rational', i.e. bereft of human considerations. On the contrary, research on bureaucratisation indicate that bureaucratised labour is formed by norms and social relations found in daily military practice, which makes the act of analysing military violence something personal.

Consequently, taking a place in the research environment, noting behaviour, language and bodily markers is quite a traditional approach among researchers in the social sciences, and even so to include the researcher's own process of analysis. But to use this process and turn it inside out, letting the reflexive parts of the researcher's role in the environment of study rule the outcome of research (the focus of the written text) is not an uncontested way of writing an account of fieldwork. Some want to resist the reflexive turn discussed above that during the 1980s and 1990s altered much of the theoretical and methodological literature on ethnographic work, and as such still holds on to traditional norms of research. Central to their critique of reflexivity is to what extent fieldwork (and accounts of fieldwork) provides "reliable data concerning human behaviour" and they search for "regularities in human behaviour" to provide means for "building generalisations" (Dewalt & Dewalt in Farnell and Graham 1998, 290). My role as a 'halfie' stands against these traditional research norms and so does my thesis problem. To suppress or silence the use of military violence is perhaps a global problem, both politically as well as militarily, but my intention in the thesis is to discuss the implications of how violence acquires a certain meaning in operational work. And because this is the practice where I have had my identity formed during years of service, it would be unsound to argue that this 'contamination' of my 'self' does not stand in the way of taking the 'objective' stand that is promoted by the traditional values of research. Using poststructural theory for achieving a deeper understanding of these things is not a solution to this situation, it

is a way of highlighting my own process of subjectivity as researcher/officer and at the same time providing me with theoretical concepts for discussing the research questions from my 'inside' position.

Self-narratives and personal reflections

My use of personal storytelling is limited in my research as I wanted the context of the social environment to 'speak' as a story to the reader. Instead, I aim to utilise an autoethnographical technique of my own, by adding shorter reflections to the analysis, rather than giving longer personal accounts. To clarify my personal struggle with my own understanding of military violence, I will mark these narratives with 'LtCol Malm'[5], as 'his' reflections are intended to become mirrors of what it is that holds bureaucratised labour in a position of hegemony. Thus, in my use of myself as an indicator for what it is in the practice which dispositions my mind as bureaucratic, I adhere to the above discussed call for integrating the 'I' in International Relations, if yet in a somewhat different way. Despite this seemingly 'schizophrenic' writing and complex approach to the research environment, it is my intention to keep the analysis as clear and open to the reader as possible. Here I break with some traditions in poststructuralist writings where the contingent status of ontology and Self call academics to 'destabilise' their texts, making them hard to access.

> A poststructural autoethnography might embrace multidimensionality, might aim to construct texts that are not easily ingested, that turn around and around so that we are encouraged (or forced or led) to a place of thinking differently and with more complexity about the world and our places within it. (Gannon 2006, 488)

In the 'Derridian' tradition, aptly summarised by Gannon (2006) in the quote above, it is the researcher's task to set notions of a 'core Self' in motion. As much as I enjoy reading Derrida myself, I cannot aspire to similar ambitions with my approach to writing poststructural autoethnography. But on the other hand, my aim with using versions of 'Self' in the analysis relies on setting established notions of what military operational practice is, and how such practice relates to understandings of violence, in motion.

Defining the 'field' of study and 'making use' of discourse theory

Here I will describe the main strategy and methodical considerations which I have relied upon to meet the challenges that are related to my 'bicultural' or 'halfie' position. The text is written in a way that elucidates the process of becoming a 'halfie' and includes some details of personal choice and relations. This is a common approach in autoethnographical work and it is meant to provide some transparency of

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[5] LtCol is an abbreviation for Lieutenant Colonel, which was my military rank at the time of my ethnographical study. In Western military organisations, this rank often implies a person who has extensive training as a staff officer and, at least in the Swedish context, indicates that the officer is proficient at working with battalion and brigade-sized units.

the researcher's position from where observations are made (see Richardson (2000) in: Holt 2003, 23).

Social relations (and use of language/objects) are that which make operational work function in that they regulate the practice with rules and structures of interaction, but they also 'define' the practice (Glynos and Howarth 2007, 145, 159). As previously mentioned, I have come to the conclusion from my review of previous research and theories of discourse and bureaucratisation that investigating social relations, norms and rules is a plausible way of finding out how military operational work operates in shaping military understandings of violence. A concrete output from this can be illustrated by my observation scheme (basically a paper with codes and concepts highlighting my main interests of observation, see Appendix 2) which includes not just terms that aim to remind me to search for how meaning-making is facilitated by the use of language. Since my theoretical 'framework' describes the formation of subjects' understanding of violence as a reciprocal relationship with the practice itself, as discussed in Chapter 2, I have also added concepts that aim to help me become, or stay, aware of social relations and agents' interaction with material objects. In addition, the observation scheme has been outlined with excerpts from post-structural research theory/method in order to help me re-connect with my own position as a researcher. I have added this as I in the wake of my first trials of fieldwork realised that I had a tendency to slip into my military 'Self' during observations of military practice. A revelation that guided me into a specific way of analysing my field notes (I expand on this below). In addition, the analytical work that I made early on in my research process, investigating political reformations and historical military narratives (Chapter 4), provided me with some hints of what I could expect in terms of what a value-based discourse on bureaucratised military labour comprise. The historical part of the investigation has as such not only a purpose of deepening our understanding of how military violence becomes bureaucratisied in Sweden during the 20th century, it has also helped me prepare for my ethnographical work.

In the 'tradition' of autoethnography, I will now convey an excerpt (written as a research note two years after having engaged in the PhD-project) which illustrates how my field notes can reflect 'movement' between subject positions, and as such underline an analysis of how the practice at hand is shaping a particular understanding of violence:

In my first, and in the majority of the second year as a PhD-candidate I avoided contact with the Swedish Armed Forces as much as possible, devoting my time to academic study of research methods and theories of science. My studies started with a quite broad theoretical approach, supported by the premade courses for PhD-candidates at my university. Since I previously have had a curiosity for critical studies and philosophical debates regarding the role of language as a powerful creator of social reality, my studies soon entered the field of post-structuralism. I noticed early on that this 'field' of study collided in some severe ways with my military mind, in the way Foucault, Derrida, Lyotard, Laclau and Mouffe, among several others, conceptualised things like 'truth', 'law', 'justice', 'science' and 'power'. My military way of thinking, utilising things (humans as well as material objects) for an effective purpose (obtaining

military goals) and seeing the world filled with static objects that are controlled by man, were painfully eroded by insights in the non-objectivity and construction of the social world. Despite this process of identification with alternative worldviews, my mind still lingers around how to best utilise these (to me) new insights to create research that can improve our way of governing organised use of force.

Having during my second year enjoyed courses in ethnography and discourse theory/method I entered the field (started my fieldwork by participating in a large international staff exercise run by the Swedish Armed Forces). I was confident that my new analytical eye would capture how the practice at hand conforms to a certain dominant understanding of violence. When starting to read through my field notes (some months after this initial fieldwork) I realised that I had had certain overconfidence in my ability to stand firm in the critical research ontology. The field notes were a blend of military-related notes that comprised the quality of the staff work and possible improvements in operational thinking, as well as academically connected notes that outlined how the practice at hand related to how the operational work neutralises or silences certain aspects of death and violence.

When going through the notes after the first encounter with the field, it struck me that these 'lapses' in my field notes were actually in themselves imprints of the interaction between different subject positions: One the one hand, I had created a new discursive space where I could identify with discourse and objects in the academic research environment to which I now belonged. On the other hand, as soon as I entered the 'field', old ways of identifications (such as putting on my uniform and interacting with military colleagues) 'pulled' me back into my military way of thinking. This was a confusing experience as my task was to do research (to become 'a researcher') and not to work as a 'staff officer'. However, after studying literature on reflexivity in ethnographical work, and discussing this 'problem' with my supervisors, I realised that my own ways of subjectivity were a central part of the research. The recent growing interest in self-reflexive research and suggestions for methodological developments, point in a similar direction:

> Therefore, one question that we can pose to a narrative is: how does the author enact responsibility for the subjectivity she inhabits? There are various strategies through which individual narratives might accomplish this because there are different forms and logics within narrative structures and forms. (Ravecca and Dauphinee 2018, 5)

What this focus on ways of subjectivity means for my research is that my way of 'drifting' between different discursive fields should be elucidated by my autoethnography narratives. But it also means that I should use my field notes, my supporting questions and my observation scheme to support disruptions of my own military mind, so as to capture how the research environment (the military staffs that I am a part of) reconstructs understandings of violence through the social relations and norms of daily and mundane, routinised work. I have therefore decided to analyse my field notes in search for moments where I 'drift' from 'researcher' to 'staff officer' and vice versa. My intention is that this will help me to further deepen the analysis of how the military practice comprises social rules/norms and language that are central to how violence and death are managed, neutralised or silenced in opera-

tional work. In other words, my 'drifts' between 'researcher' and 'staff officer' outline discursive breaks between different ontologies that comprise different meanings of what military violence is. As I see it, this is thus a practical example of what Laclau (inspired by Žižek) points out when he discusses how a subject (me in this case) in a process of identification moves between different subject positions (the critical researcher – the producing PhD-candidate – the military officer) (see Žižek in Laclau, 1990, p. 250). This approach, visualising the researchers struggle in the analysis, chimes with other, similar developments of the theoretical and methodical field of autoethnography (Ellingson & Ellis in Holstein and Gubrium 2008, 448–49; Ravecca and Dauphinee 2018; Short, Turner, and Grant 2013, 1–2).

Furthermore, my field notes reflect articulations that create and reinforce meaning in operational work, but it is not until these notes are analysed further that the cultural 'bipolarity' discussed above can be identified. In other words, the analysis of field notes must be concentrated to the parts where my military thinking is disrupted by sudden insights given by academic discourse. But the analysis of these 'drifts' must also include a focus on what it is in the research environment that draws me into my military way of thinking. As such, this technique facilitates a way for me to identify the 'pull' of the military context, and specifically, what this context does to optimise a specific way of understanding violence. Hockey, one of few with a military service record who conducts critical ethnographic research on the military, has also pointed at this type of involvement of the researcher:

> Participant observation more than other methodological strategies, requires that the researcher be the prime and direct instrument of data collection, and this inevitably involves the immersion of the researcher's self in the research process. (Hockey 1996, 13)

Although this reflexive way of using my notes is one technique for the conduct of my analysis, I will also utilise more 'traditional' ways of extracting which social relations and materiality/language it is that govern and contextualise the practices that I investigate. By adhering to developments in ethnographical studies, where the 'mundane' conversations with practitioners are used as ways of collecting data, noting daily small talk will be one way of finding the rules and norms of the practices (e.g. Gudeman and Rivera 1990). Through this technique I can include my interlocutors in the research by asking them questions about some aspects of the practices that I, from a research perspective, find odd or out of place with the context of the practice.[6] But I also intend to engage the practitioners in discussions where I bring up part of the 'fabric' of the social relations and language/materiality that I discover. Through these conversations I strive to gain a more complex insight into the social rules and norms of the practice, as some parts of these discussions may reveal emotional engagement regarding some parts of the practice, more than others.

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[6] In retrospect, I have also, in those cases where these conversations have had a direct impact on my analysis, transcribed and sent such notes to my interlocutors for their consideration. Furthermore, I have circulated drafts of Chapter 5 to the personnel working at the operational staff where I conducted my fieldwork, in order to 'include' them in the analytical process. This has not been possible for Chapter 6, as the fieldwork was conducted in several different exercises in which the participants were, to a large extent, different each time.

In summary, my ethnographical and autoethnographical method is focused on social relations, norms and emotions in order to capture how military understandings of violence are constructed. In addition, previous research and theories on discourse and bureaucratisation facilitates a discourse analysis of my field notes by pointing the analysis in the direction of how social relations are made up by specific language and social interaction with the materiality of the practice. Importantly, un-orthodoxy has not been a goal in itself, but as pointed out by Robben and Sluka (2012):

> […] the elements of contemporary ethnography include experimental form and method, reflexivity on the part of the ethnographer, collaboration and multiple authorship, and the details of fieldwork dialogue and experience. (A.C.G.M. Robben and Sluka 2012, 20).

In other words, I break away from 'traditional' ways of 'doing' ethnography but will still go to great lengths to maintain a 'systematic' and 'transparent' tactic of research. For instance, by using a technique of including excerpts of my field notes in the design of the chapters as one such way of achieving a certain degree of transparency. Nevertheless, as indicated by the discussion above, this way of conducting research and opening up for the use of reflexivity brings about an exposure of underlying currents of social relations and emotions, not only among the practitioners that I study, but also belonging to myself. This brings about a need to discuss the ethical implications of this research strategy and method, which the following concluding section of this chapter will outline.

3.6 Ethics: Challenges and Practical Solutions

In this section I will discuss those aspects of research ethics that I see as most challenging in relation to my methods and interest of study. The discussion is concentrated to three 'areas' of research that are reccurring in my investigation of contemporary military practices, and these are: 'interlocutors', which is a category comprising my colleagues in the Swedish military; 'researcher reflexivity', which expands on ethical considerations that concern my own being; and finally 'institution', which represents the Swedish Armed Forces as representing an institution in Swedish society.

Possible Damage to my Interlocutors

> You have to live the experience of doing research on the other, think it through, improvise, write and rewrite, anticipate and feel its consequences. (Ellis 2001, 615).

By noting behaviour, use of language, power relations and emotional responses in interaction with my colleagues in the Armed Forces, I certainly put them at risk. It is quite clear that sometimes the frequent exit and entering of new people in my research environment creates problems both with the possibility to adhere to the principle of informed consent and with the possibility to let interlocutors see what I have

noted from our interactions (Etherington 2004, 82). In addition, my appearance as an officer offers possibilities for a close interaction with other officers, but it also provides situations where they might tell me things that they regret, or that they do not see our conversations as natural parts of my data collection. Furthermore, the narratives or vignettes that others provide me with while they work with violent practices are not mine *per se*, and they might comprise details that in turn can identify other people in unwanted ways (Chang 2008, 55; Ellis 2009, 307, 341). Finally, my possibility to choose parts of their stories and leave out others (which is a natural aspect and a 'must' of the research process) puts me in a position of power where treading carefully will not completely balance this 'upper hand' (Cunliffe and Karunanayake 2013, 365; Etherington 2004, 83 ff.). To summarise, I have the possibility to set them in a position where they appear to harbour a relation to violence and death that they do not adhere to, recognise, or are willing to share.

It is thus easier said than done to incorporate and mitigate all of the ethical dilemmas that might occur in the process of participant observation. The quote above from Ellis (2001) condenses the iterative activity required in order to adhere to 'the ethics of the other' in ethnography, but such an activity cannot be outlined in detail beforehand. I have through careful examination of experiences from other academics in similar situations found that ethical awareness when entering the field supports the possibility to anticipate and to prevent harming interlocutors (Dauphinee 2010, 808; Ellis 2009, 308–9). But apart from such a generic ethical identification, I have in order to protect my colleagues from harm created some more practical ethical points: as a general rule, persons are given pseudonyms even if this does not guarantee complete anonymity (which is more or less impossible to guarantee in ethnography) (Ellis 2009, 350; Berry (2005) in: Hughes, Pennington, and Makris 2012, 216–17). Furthermore, when wearing my uniform, I will place a name-tag, in good view on the uniform, with the word "RESEARCHER" written on it, to indicate my status as an observer.[7] In addition, when the situation permits, I will take the opportunity to remind my colleagues of my status as researcher by simply saying that "I would like to quote you on that" or something similar that may elucidate the reason for my presence. This will always be applied when conversing 'one-to-one', where I deem it easier to slip such comments into the conversation, compared to participating in group discussions. In addition, I will make sure to send my written text (draft of Chapter 5) to my main point of contact (or Officer of Primary Responsibility, OPR) for my investigation of the operational staff work, and also to those I have interacted with on a daily basis (a weaker variant of 'member checking') (Pennington (2007) in: Hughes, Pennington, and Makris 2012).

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[7] In retrospect - As the Swedish military has a culture where name-tags are central objects for identifying the 'status' of colleagues, I quickly found out that my 'researcher-tag' actually provided openings for practitioners to talk to me about my research. It came to function, in many ways, as an 'ice-breaker' (way of providing social openings in conversations) when I met practitioners that I had not had interacted with before. It was an unintended but welcome effect of taking measures that would remind my interlocutors of my status as researcher.

On a final note, at the beginning of each exercise that I will participate in (for the construction of Chapter 6) I will present myself to those working at the part of the staff that I intend to observe, and describe my research. I will also clarify that I record meetings and other interaction between the participants in the exercise. Furthermore, I aim to clarify that their names will not be used in my research, but that I cannot guarantee their anonymity. This is due to the fact that every participant is registered with name, nation and position for each exercise by the organisers, and it is as such possible for someone with access to that data to cross-reference my 'data' and find out exactly who had which position during my fieldwork. In both the case of Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, my interest in language, social relations and in ways of working should be stated in order to make it clear for the interlocutors that I am not to engage in describing their 'personal traits', which may reduce possible concerns of being 'exposed' in the research. Which brings me to the next part of this discussion on research ethical deliberations connected to my research: the 'exposure' of myself.

Problems of exposing the researcher's reflexivity

My autoethnographical approach brings with it benefits of accessibility (personal 'data' can always be retrieved) and, as mentioned above, a possibility to interpret the research context from an 'inside' position. But this does not come without a cost. Autoethnographical narratives often include feelings, thoughts and experiences, some of which can be very personal (e.g. Wall 2008, 44). It is clear that the autoethnographer through this practice puts him/herself in a position of vulnerability. I have an approach where my reflexivity is read in the light of theoretical concepts and philosophical thoughts found in poststructural theory, but this does not 'conceal' details of my persona. By letting my drafts be read in smaller forums and taking advice from research colleagues, I strive to be able to balance the including/excluding of personal detail. Nevertheless, it is of more importance to deliberate and take into account possible ethical problems (and practical solutions) regarding damage to 'others' (as above), and, as in the following passage, what my research might endanger when it comes to the Swedish Armed Forces as a representative institute for Swedish society.

Possible damage to the Swedish Armed Forces

> As citizens who study their own countries' security systems, local researchers cannot ignore their position with regard to national security issues and how it affects both their research and social surroundings. (Gazit and Maoz-Shai 2010, 279).

It is not likely that my research will place the military *institution* in a position where it may have its practices questioned by the public or by the press. Swedish public debates rarely touch upon military matters and one critically written thesis among many others will not change that. No, my ethical concerns related to the Swedish Armed Forces as an institution in society instead focus on questions of national

security. Gazit & Maoz-Shai (2010) discuss the methodological challenges they meet when doing autoethnographical research in the Israeli army, and as expressed by the quote above they too identify research ethics to comprise questions of national security. For them, this could be situations where criticising violations of human rights stood against possible gains for Israeli citizens' safety. For me, the challenge of not conflicting with interests of national security takes a more practical form: it is a question of collecting and accounting for data without revealing that which could be harmful to Sweden in case of deteriorating international security. I will not record any sessions when I observe 'real' practices of operational planning and instead use handwritten notes. As in all my notes I use pseudonyms and fictional names of geographical places if I need to take them in at all.

My interest is, as often pointed out, in the language used while preparing for the use of force, and how the behaviour of practitioners provide indications of social rules and relations central to the practice, and as such not the specifics of the operational work. In other words, no aspect of classified information is to be used in my thesis. I may sometimes recount what meetings I participate in have comprised, but I will do so in general terms such as 'economics' or 'issues of logistical concern', which, for those with military experience, is not hard to guess that meetings regarding operational matters sometimes comprise. Nevertheless, one type of risk that I will expose the Armed Forces to is that a potential aggressor might see 'weaknesses' in how Swedish operational practice is performed and how operational violence is understood. The only respond I have to this problem is that much of the way operational practices are performed in Sweden, mirrors operational work taking place in many other countries of the Western world (the practice of 'targeting' is typically one such part of the operational work, see Chapter 6 for more on this). In other words, unintentionally revealed 'weaknesses' are most likely already known to those that are interested in Western operational practice.

With that discussion on research ethics my examination of the 'what and how' of my research has come to an interim end, and the next three chapters will move on to the actual analysis of how military violence and death are managed, neutralised or silenced in operational work.

4

Chapter 4: Historical Narratives of Bureaucratisation

> Words, ideas, images constitute the discursive support for military conflict; they should be understood not as though they are mere froth without consequences, but as crucial aspects of the destructive reality of violent conflict itself. (Pick 1996, 14)

The "reality of violent conflict" that Pick points at in this quote is constructed discursively both by the military practice itself, but also by the way violent conflict is narrated. In the following chapter, historical accounts of military practice will help us understand how language and images depict a 'reality' where military violence and death are neutralised and silenced. In addition, as previous research indicates that violence and death are neutralised and/or silenced partly by the removal of the dead body from military discourse, the analysis will engage with how such removal operates in military discourse. It is, as such, the "discursive support" for the construction of military understandings of violence that is examined in the chapter, through a close reading of military instructions, pamphlets and other historical documents that depict modern historical Swedish 'war-practices'.

This historical investigation aims, in other words, to clarify how the research context of operational work has gradually been politically influenced, and militarily narrated, to include a specific type of bureaucratised relation to violence and death. The investigation is divided into two areas in order to achieve this: that of political processes and reforms which has made bureaucratisation a part of military discourse/practice, and that of military narratives which help to form a specific meaning for what violence is. To illustrate this I have outlined two supporting questions for this chapter:

1. How (by what rationalities/reforms) was the Swedish military bureaucratised and modernised during the early and mid 20th century?

This question is in the following answered by discussing previous research on Swedish political reforms of the military, and offers insight into how military discourse is politically reshaped during the early and mid 20th century. The second question is:

2. How (by what themes of military narratives) are violence and death presented, naturalised and/or silenced in the *portrayal* of Swedish military practice?

And this question is meant to offer insight into how the discursive process of meaning-making, initiated by political reforms, is stabilised and naturalised by the use of narratives.

Initially, the next section will briefly connect some points made in the previous chapters to the analysis done here, in order to highlight the impact the thesis' epistemological setting has on the conduct of analysis (this includes a discussion on how the selection of 'data' has taken place). Thereafter the chapter proceeds to discuss how political reformations bureaucratised and modernised the Swedish military in the early part of the 20th century. This section is then followed by a 'disruptive' story (section 4.3) about death and violence which is meant to contrast the subsequent analysis (which thus takes place in section 4.4) of how military narratives of the early 20th century portray death and violence. The chapter then repeats this order – section 4.6 discusses political reforms belonging to the mid 20th century, and is followed by another disruptive story about military death and violence, in turn followed by an analysis of military narratives created during this time-period. The chapter is then concluded with a discussion on how the analysis offers insights into the supporting questions posed above.

4.1 Details on the method and selection of 'data'

In this chapter, themes are used to group and sort articulations that are in frequent use for depicting military practice. The themes has grown out of an process of reading the material several times and in this process, I have noted how military practices of violence and death are illustrated through the use of common societal discourses. But the themes has also been crystalized through my analysis of the political changes and reforms that helped shape the modern Swedish military. As such, these themes are to concretise what points of reference historical military narratives comprise for creating a 'natural' and 'rationalised' military relation to death and violence. To illustrate such points of reference as themes in the analysis is an approach based on the thought of interdiscursivity, that is that a discourse on a topic (e.g. military violence) relates and makes use of other discourses in order to create meaning for this topic (Wodak 2009, 40). A discourse of "education" can, for instance, help portray a certain 'truth' of military violence, as we shall see in the forthcoming pages. What these themes do is to form narratives that comprise a discourse which neutralises and/or silences certain aspects of death and violence, in a time-period where stories of actual use of military violence contest such silencing through horrifying accounts of the 'reality' of conflict (as two world wars are fought during this time-period). The chapter thus elucidates *how* military narratives claiming to tell the 'truth' regarding military violence are constructed and used in military discourses. In other words, the chapter outlines how the military manage to conceal the impossibil-

ity of bureaucratised understandings of violence, i.e. the destructive and arbitrary aspects of violence, through the narrative themes of production and education, order and bureaucracy, technology and masculinity (analysed below).

Furthermore, the addition of military narratives analysed has been limited by how the data 'thickens', that is, when I could not find narratives that brought more to the essential theme than the previously analysed archive material provided (thus homogenising the discourse), I stopped adding material to the analysis (Milliken 1999, 234). The large body of data analysed in the chapter has been retrieved by extensive searches in Swedish archives containing military regulations, instructions, information pamphlets and handbooks. In these searches, the idea of intertextuality, meaning that no text stands alone as it always is in a relational position when it conveys meaning, has played an important role when making choices of delimitation to the span of data (Pouliot 2010, 72; Wodak 2009, 39). In concrete terms, Intertextuality has meant that I, as an example, noticed early on in my searches that the term 'machine gun' was in frequent use in the material. This meant that I intensified and extended my search and guided the process of selecting data, consequently including handbooks, regulations and instructions that touch upon the existence of the 'machine gun' in military practice (e.g. "Machine gunner – Instruction", 1923, Stockholm). All literature analysed has been noted and can be found in Appendix 1 for further consideration. Intertextuality has as such been used as a first step for narrowing down the span of archive material considered for analysis, but I have also concentrated archive material into two time periods: 1914-1939 for WWI; 1939-1964 for WWII in order to simplify the structure of the analysis.

In the following, each section containing analysis of discourses of violence will be initiated by a review of the major political changes that affected the reformation of the Swedish military in the respective time-periods. Such reviews are from a discourse analysis perspective particularly useful as critical explanations of how certain language and materiality of a practice are made possible in the first place (Glynos and Howarth 2007, 141). They also entail the possibilities for reformation of practices and the infusion of new signifiers for military narratives to build upon. Therefore, the analysis below is directed at such political reformations that are central to how the military practice is depicted and shaped, such as the implementation and development of 'armed' neutrality and its rationalisation of the production of conscripts. As this chapter has the construction of military narratives as its prioritised target of analysis, I have delimited the span and analytical depth of my discussion to include political reformations that strongly affected the 'who' and 'what' of the military in the early and middle 20th century. Fortunately, there already exists research on how the Swedish military was conceptualised and reformed during this time period which to some extent mitigates the 'weakness' of my choice to concentrate analytically on military narratives in this chapter (e.g. Dahlström, Söderberg, and Olofsson 2002; Sturfelt 2008; Zetterberg 1988). This research has also helped me identify the most central political reformations in the span of 1900-1965.

Furthermore, the discourse analysis outlined below also includes illustrations/narratives of what 'types' or aspects of military violence are *excluded* in the way official military discourses on violence are formed during the early and mid 20th century. This is a methodological way of strengthening the contingent position of the analysis and underlines the fact that there is no 'natural' way that our understanding of military violence must have been developed into its current status (Glynos and Howarth 2007, 155). The illustrations/narratives of death and violence are also in place to counter the 'seductive' force that lies in the meaning-making produced by official military instructions and regulations. At least to me, having been formed by military discourse during 20 years of service, disruptive depictions of military violence help to analytically see the impossibilities of military bureaucratised violence. Section 4.3 offers the first of these illustrations/narratives of death and violence and it is put in the forefront in the chapter's analysis of military narratives as it is meant to comprise a critical backdrop to the subsequent analysis of bureaucratisation of military violence.

On that note, I move on and engage in discussing the political reforms that shape the modern Swedish military.

4.2 Political Reformations of the early 20th Century – How Bureaucracy is Instilled in the Modern Swedish Military

In this section I discuss some impacts of the political policy of neutrality on the reformation of the Swedish military, and I also note how the aspiring bureaucratisation and professionalisation of the military during this time create certain themes in how military violence is narrated. As touched upon elsewhere, this discussion is needed in order to offer a background to how military discourse relates to political reformations of the (military) practice.

Neutrality as political pragmatism

One central political reform during the early 20th century was initiated when Sweden declared itself a neutral nation on August 3, 1914 (on neutrality as a Swedish political myth, see: Agius 2006, Chap.4). But as Lina Sturfelt (2008) shows in her investigation of Swedish belief systems during WWI, a strong antagonistic relation followed the declaration. She elucidates that neutrality was at the time a concept heavily loaded with negativity; feelings and abilities like shame, greed, cowardliness, decadence and unmanliness were infused into the concept of neutrality by its anti-pacifistic opponents (Sturfelt 2008, 187–91). In addition to this, Zetterberg (1988) clarifies that the strong pacifistic and anti-militant societal forces that endorsed neutrality were to a large degree separated from the parliament and the ruling government in the early 20th century. The ruling liberals/social democrats were mostly in agreement with the right wing regarding the modernisation and development of the Swedish Armed forces (Zetterberg 1988, 25). From 1901 to 1909 the right wing government increased Swedish defence spending's from 40 percent to

comprise approximately half of the total state budget. But in the 1911 elections when the more anti-militaristic political left (liberals and social democrats) were in majority, the initial ambition to reduce defence spending's was lost in the wake of the following defence commissions (Zetterberg 1988, 9–11). Instead, the dissolution of the pact with Norway (1905) and the neutrality declaration created a need to build a strong military that could help Sweden cope with the defence burden alone. Neutrality has in a sense (quite ironically) worked as a fuel for militarising the Swedish society in the way it has been used to motivated defence reforms (e.g. Holmén 1985, 43 f.). The antagonism following the Swedish proclamation of neutrality, the strong societal anti-militaristic movement and the political unity regarding the reformation of the military all stand against each other in this political context, as they suggest different types of politics. Neutrality gives something to all of these positions: neutrality gives the pro-militaristic forces an argument to strengthen the Armed Forces and it gives the anti-militaristic movement satisfaction as it promotes an important anti-war position. Thus, this policy was used politically in the reformation of the Armed Forces, but it did not pervade the Swedish Armed Forces practices with anti-violent articulations (e.g. Zetterberg 1988, 23). The military (and other societal institutions like the press) made use of this political reform to motivate violent practices: the story about the lone defender, standing on higher moral ground, protecting the Swedish nation and the King from the 'underdeveloped masses' of Europe, was born to motivate a military knowledge in the use of violence (see Sturfelt 2008, 195–215 for a details on this narrative; see: Zetterberg 1988, 85 on the important position of "the King"). In conclusion, neutrality was during its early years as a political strategy a *pragmatic* policy, more than a normative political stand against the use of force.

In other words, neutrality had to be combined with narratives of military practice that could merge the diverging positions of anti-militarism and militarism. And it was in the societal use and efficient production of conscripts, discussed more to the point below, that the political policy of neutrality could find incitements to create a narrative that could mitigate the problem of diverging norms and the antagonism inherent in these two positions. Much more could be said about neutrality, but for practical reasons I now move on to other major changes affecting the military.

Democratisation – societal reform with effects on the military

In Swedish society during this time, as a reflection from other western societies, bureaucracy was reformed to not just include the traditional managements of logistical account of goods and economics. This change is connected to the political idea that positions in societal institutes were to be separated from the persons holding them (see Weber (1987) in: Rolf 1998, 217–18). As such, the political reformation of bureaucracy in society underpins the creation of a signifying system of social relations (rules/norms) that provide the necessary functions for the military to adhere to this change. Examples of this are the regulation of positions (i.e. a career system) and the increasing creation of books and instructions that provide the terms for how the military should be managed. Bureaucracy can be seen as the primer for creating

the massive amount of 'non-practices' that the modern military eventually has come to comprise. That is, when analysed, military practice is shown to withhold many activities omitting violence, as the amount of time a soldier or officer is exposed to violent practices during their time of service is exceptionally small (see for example M.D. Feld in van Gils (ed.) 1971, p.271 f.). This makes the military 'unique' in comparison to other state institutions and has historically led researchers to conclude, for instance, that military weakness for bureaucracy is in general explained through this phenomenon of "non-practice" (e.g. Van Doorn 1968). As visualised below by the analysis of the archived material, this reformation, or societal development, made it possible to narrate about military practice in ways that made it harmonise more with other societal practices, such as education.

Closely related to bureaucratisation, the political will to create a more modern, professional military provided the Swedish military with a plethora of new settings for how military discourse could to develop. To be able to implement the reformation of the Armed Forces (initiated by the 1901 Parliament defence policy) and as such create the necessary facilities and organisations for recruitment and training of conscripts, the military institution needed to develop a modern professionalism (Zetterberg 1988, 89–92). The massive funding of the Armed Forces was not only used for technical improvements, it was also used to build barracks and garrisons where new recruits could be accommodated and trained. In addition, the physical changes also provided the military with new settings from which professionalism was to develop, with its possibility to increase control of the soldier's body and its provision of need to develop regulations for life in the garrisons. Here the infusion of professionalism was underpinned by the political will to create a military where 'the people' had a dominant role. Besides the need for securing a steady influx of new recruits, the creation of the conscript system ensured a development of societal values in the military and provides a counterweight to the strong (traditionally and previously legislated grounded) military relation to Swedish royalty. Provided with large masses of 'common folk', the military would have to move towards a professionalisation, and democratisation was to follow in its wake (Zetterberg 1988, 88–89). In addition, the Swedish officers' training underwent small transformative changes that reflected some of the major developments in Swedish society, particularly by incorporating the societal effort to reduce the social division of classes into the preconditions for acceptance to the programme (Norberg 1992, 264–70). Government bills in 1914 and 1920 aimed to prevent the officer corps from being disconnected from the norm-development of the rest of society, by making sure that cadets needed to undergo pre-course training together with non-commissioned officers. It was also stressed that 'anyone' (minus all women and those men deemed unfit for service) should have the possibility of becoming an officer (traditionally an occupation for sons of the nobility) (Åselius 2005, 37). But this possibility was in practice diminished by the academic requirements for admission to the course (a degree from high school/upper secondary school (Upplysningar rörande utbildning till officer på aktiv stat och i reserven vid armén. 1939, 5)) as such a level of education was out of reach for many of working class background.

In accordance to the governmental aim of securing societal values amongst the officer corps, candidates had to undergo the same basic training as any other soldier and also serve as a non-commissioned officer before being eligible for acceptance to the officer course. As such, the establishment of *education* and *production* (of conscripts) as major components in the construction of officers' understanding of military practice can be traced back to this 'democratisation' of the military institution. This 'first impression' of the military profession has certainly been influential in several aspects regarding the construction of Swedish military identity (e.g. how production/education is influential in creating non-practices in the military). However, my interest in this chapter is not focused on the 'non-practices' (practices disconnected from the use of violence) of the military. The point here is to clarify that this establishment of common education in the Swedish system for becoming a soldier, or officer, has infused the military practice with discourses describing how violence is to be trained while educating conscripts.

In sum, the early 20th century brought with it political reforms that promoted the infusion of modernisation, bureaucracy, professionalisation and education as discourses into the military. The military with its intimate connection to Royalty and suspicion against the political left resisted the anti-militaristic movement in society by focusing on the 'positive' parts of neutrality: the creation of a military strong enough to resist attacks from an even stronger foe (see also: Agius 2006, 73). Here the need to create an efficient and productive flow of conscripts, with its interconnected micro practices of developing training, logistics, garrisons and new technology became, as seen below, a central driver for which articulations, signifiers and meaning-making processes became accessible for the narration of military violence. As such, there is little that indicates that political policies at the beginning of the 20th century had infused the Swedish military identity formation with some form of anti-violent positions. Instead, the reformations of the Swedish military practice used 'non-military' discourses to articulate the 'new' identity of the military. However, it is important to note that this modernisation was something that created space for and underlined ideas of educating the 'masses' in 'non-military' issues with the purpose of creating 'good citizens'. Thus, it is here that the Swedish military starts to be considered a place for something more than 'just' the defence of the nation. Or in the words of Sundevall (2017):

> While the parliamentary majority was reluctant to deduct time from the military curriculum or invest considerable finances on non-military instruction, policymakers and social commentators on education shared, and frequently repeated, their understanding of a desire for military service to turn young men into both citizens and soldiers. This highlights the militarised and deeply masculinised understanding of citizenship in Sweden during the first few decades of the twentieth century. (Sundevall 2017, 66)

In the analysis of political reformations with relation to the next time-period (WWII), this 'non-military' rationalisation of maintaining a strong military and keeping up the production of conscripts, indicated by Sundevall's quote, reappears.

In other words, I aim to illustrate further on in the chapter how the military as a place where 'boys turn into men' is something that develops during the early and middle of the 20th century. Nevertheless, I will in the subsequent section (4.4) turn to military narratives that are created in the wake of the political reformations discussed above, and as such analyse how these narratives help institute a military practice where production, education and bureaucracy are central elements in the construction of how the military manage, neutralise and/or silence death and violence.

But before going into the discursive space of bureaucratisation, I outline a critical backdrop to what military death and violence can mean, in order to facilitate a critical discussion of how military practice is narrated during this era.

4.3 A Narrative of Death and Violence: The Battle of Loos, September 1915

> Many men fell in the 500 yards of No Man's Land. But they were not missed then by those who went on in waves — rather, like molecules, separating, collecting, splitting up into smaller groups, bundling together again, on the way to the first line of German trenches. A glint of bayonets made a quickset hedge along the line of churned-up earth which had been the Germans' front-line trench. Our guns had cut the wire or torn gaps into it. Through the broken strands went the Londoners on the right, the Scots on the left, shouting hoarsely now. They saw red. They were hunters of human flesh. They swarmed down into the first long ditch, trampling over dead bodies, falling over them, clawing the earth, and scrambling up the parados, all broken and crumbled, then on again to another ditch. Boys dropped with bullets in their brains, throats, and bodies. German machine-guns were at work, at close range. "Give 'em hell!" said an officer of the Londons — a boy of nineteen. There were a lot of living Germans, in the second ditch, and in holes about. Some of them stood still, as though turned to clay, until they fell, with half the length of a bayonet through their stomachs. Others shrieked and ran a little way before they died. Others sat behind hillocks of earth, spraying our men with machine-gun bullets until bombs were hurled on them and they were scattered into lumps of flesh. (Gibbs 1920, 140).

This account of violence comes from Philip Gibbs, a war correspondent with several years of service on the WWI western front. It is not a story told for the daily press though, as it comes from the book "Realities of War" (1920) that Gibbs wrote to "[…] get deeper to the truth of this war and of all war, not by a more detailed narrative of events, but rather as the truth was revealed to the minds of men, in many aspects, out of their experience; and by a plain statement of realities, however painful, to add something to the world's knowledge […]" (Gibbs 1920, v). Gibbs's story of military violence is joined together with official military narratives (analysed further below) by their similar aims (they make claims of truth regarding the nature of war and battle). Besides this similarity, much else differs. The official military discourses of violence are genuinely instrumental. That is, the discourses that depict military practice as heavily anchored in the use of violence as a military tool. Gibbs, on the other hand, depicts military violence as sometimes *pointless, emotional, mys-*

tifying and uncontrollable (e.g. Gibbs 1920, 35, 75, 111, 116, 117, 138, 139, 203, 298).

In Gibbs account of military practice, it is more uncertain how military violence should be characterised. Uncertainty is in itself something that adheres to this context of military practice. Violence can even be seen (ironically) as fun.

> In digging new trenches and new dug-outs, bodies and bits of bodies were unearthed, and put into sandbags with the soil that was sent back down a line of men concealing their work from German eyes waiting for any new activity in our ditches. "Bit of Bill," said the leading man, putting in a leg. "Another bit of Bill," he said, unearthing a hand. "Bill's ugly mug," he said at a later stage in the operations, when a head was found. As told afterwards, that little episode in the trenches seemed immensely comic. Generals chuckled over it. Chaplains treasured it. (Gibbs 1920, 109).

Ironically, bodily, humorously, emotionally, even cynically, Gibbs proceeds with his tale of military practice on the western front. Horror is imbued in his narration of violence; it lies underneath every account of military micro practices, covered only so much in the way in which daily life in the trenches is portrayed.

Pict. 1. Facsimile from newspaper produced on the western front (Beaver 1973, 182).

Gibbs's narrative is strengthened by stories from the soldiers and officers taking an active part in these events. The "Agony Column" is one of many examples, displayed here (pict. 1) as found in a reproduction of "The Wipers Times" March 5th, 1917. This 'newspaper' was created by a British unit first stationed in Ypres (hence the name "Wipers", as Ypres was by jargon called so by British soldiers) and it was in production on and off during 1916-1918 (it changed its name depending on where the editor's Division was stationed/fighting) (Beaver 1973, xv, 182). "Minnie" is slang for a German trench mortar (Minenwerfer) and "Flying Pig" is a nickname for German trench mortar bombs (approx. 25 cm in diameter) (Beaver 1973, 360, 363). "M.O" is an abbreviation for Medical Officer (Ibid).

This text is typical for "The Wipers Times" in the way in which it is saturated with irony. In fact, an overwhelming part of all of the preserved issues of the newspaper provides an ironical, humoristic understanding of military violence. Since those who contributed texts were officers and soldiers taking active part in the fighting, the 'nature' of military violence as instrumental, or machine-like, is in question. One

might disregard such an argument by stating that the texts of "The Wipers Times" are expressions of humans trying to cope with an unbearable situation, i.e. expressions of psychology, not violence. That might be the case, but the reason behind *why* these soldiers and officers took the chance of writing about life in the trenches is not of interest here. It is, as with most discourse analysis, what these texts themselves do to disrupt military violence as '*naturally*' managed through bureaucratisation of the military practice that is of interest for the current chapter. And in that latter aspect, "The Wiper Times" adds more to Gibbs's disruptive narrative on military violence through its ironic, humorous, and utterly emotional descriptions of death and violence.

With this story on the 'realities' of war and military violence, I now move on to the analysis of military narratives which operate to illustrate a different type of military reality.

4.4 Analysing Narratives: Swedish Military Discourse of Violence, 1914 - 1939

The following section comprises the results from analysing books, manuals and pamphlets used by the Swedish Armed Forces at the time of WWI, up till the beginning of WWII. It is divided into three parts where the meaning-making 'process' of the different analysed narratives is discussed. These parts are divided into the themes of production and education; order and bureaucracy; technology and science. The 'naming' of these themes has, as previously mentioned, been influenced by the political reformations discussed above but also emerged in my process of analysing the material. After these themes have been analysed and discussed, language found in the material that depicts military violence as something else (than what these themes suggest) is considered in an attempt to resist the risk of my analysis depicting the military practice as 'closed' by these themes. In sum, section 4.4 offers the first step in answering the question of how (by what themes of military narratives) are violence and death presented, naturalised and/or silenced in the *portrayal* of Swedish military practice?

Analysis of articulations of Production and Education

Initially this segment of the analysis comprises articulations and meaning-making processes of education and production found in narratives that on a general level portray military violent practice. The analysis then proceeds to include specific narratives of close combat.

Language of production can be identified in the 1914 instruction for assault on fortified positions, as it states that "Undertaking large-scale enterprises requires that all infantry is taken into use" (Utkast till instruktion för anfall mot befästningar 1914, 15 (my translation)). By 'borrowing' the term 'enterprise' from corporate discourse, the narrative informs military understandings of violence so as to comprise elements

of 'producing war'. Enemy attacks are also depicted as "enterprises" that are "hostile", which certainly from a contemporary perspective may seem unproblematic (Instruktion för ställföreträdande arméfördelningschef 1917, 38). But the fact that the Swedish military in 1914 (and onwards) used "enterprise" to describe a large-scale military violent practice indicates that the modern military identity is narrated with the help of notions of production. At the present time, the term is used consistently when the military describes activities conducted by the Air Force and in some cases, operations within the Navy (e.g. Wennerholm 2006).

The military practice understood as producing fire (power) is thoroughly established in the way which the Swedish Army Command depicts attacks on fortified positions. The goal of such attacks is fulfilled as the military units "*work* their way towards the position of the enemy" and thus gain terrain "to *establish* a *superior mass* of fire over the opponent so that the opponent cannot actively oppose the fulfilment of the attack" (Utkast till instruktion för anfall mot befästningar 1914, 18–19 (my translation and italics)). Here, the military practice is set in the context of modern production: The "working troops" (1914:25) must fulfil their (productive) goal by establishing (creating/assembling) a functional platform from which a mass of metal objects (fire) can be directed towards one central pre-identified place. This is a type of job that in this period is often connected to the digging of trenches, but assaults can also be described as something that keep the troops "occupied" during long periods of boredom or idleness (Holmgren 1918, 6). To be occupied is to be in some sort of productive state, and in this case the killing of the Other or loss of one's own life, which is an intrinsic part of an assault, is naturalised by a discourse of production. The enemy is to be "occupied" as promoted in descriptive accounts of the purpose of battle: "The intention of combat is either to achieve a decisive outcome, or to merely delay the enemy in order to gain time, occupy, hold or deceive him" (Fälttjänstreglemente: (F.R.). 1917, 124 (my translation); also in: Tingsten 1921, 98).

This type of military language imposes productiveness in the construction of military discourse, but it also promotes usefulness and control as central parts of military violence. Bearing in mind Gibbs's narrative of a British attack against heavily defended German fortifications, there could be serious doubts regarding the plausibility of usefulness and control in such situations. But regardless of actual plausibility (which is not an issue here) the myths of usefulness and control weave images of violent activities, images that can construct understanding of military practice as a practice of production.

> Whereas the machine gun's rate of fire as well as accuracy is considerably great, this weapon possesses, intrinsic to its appearance in combat, the fundamental quality of being able to develop considerable fire power from a limited front space. Only through an appropriate service in addition to energetic and dedicated guidance can this valuable ability come to its right (Utkast till skjutinstruktion för kulspruteförband 1914, 1 also on p. 1 in part 2. (my translation)).

The quote above from "Draft Firing Instruction for Machine Gun Units" (1914) furthers the understanding of violent military practices as practices of production. The text breathes prospects of a relationship between the military and machines - the ingenuity of the machine, its "valuable ability", and its ability to activate human qualities assembles the machine to an icon representing all the collected benefits of productiveness. Furthermore, it is clarified that with the right training, this man-made ingenuity can come to its full utilisation. But the perfect use and innovation of the machine, and its need to be maintained and operated, overshadows its deadly and destructive purpose. Discourses of production and education are to such an extent fused together in the narratives that describe this object that the machine gun becomes an instrument of modernity, not death (see also Pick 1996).

Violence is furthermore portrayed as productive in itself. Using violence to provoke the enemy into revealing his position, as suggested in "Draft Instruction for Attack against Fortified Positions" (1914) engraves understandings of military violence with productivity, as violence is depicted to be used for achieving a preconditioned outcome. In other words, it is in this narrative useful to use violence to this end (finding the enemy) and it is clear that there is no doubt regarding the possibility of *applying* violence in any given situation. Military violence is thus shown to be used for a productive purpose (it is a product taken from the shelf and put in use when needed) which is a strikingly common way of depicting military violent practices of this time period (Utkast till instruktion för anfall mot befästningar 1914, 11). Furthermore, training to enhance this productive use of violence is also informed by the political reformations, discussed above, which connects violent practices with notions of education of 'the people' (young men).

> *The purpose of military training is to strengthen the spirit and the body of the individual, as they at the same time are brought to attention to the required military proficiency.* […] The military training is also intended to promote the fostering of good members of society, and in addition to creating prerequisites for good health and stamina during the coming work in the name of peace. (Soldatinstruktion. Allmän del: Vårt Fädernesland och Dess Försvar 1930, 11 (italics in original, my translation)).

This quote manifests a representative condensation of how narratives of military violent practices utilise production and education in the endeavour to promote a 'non-violent' use of the military institution. Arguably, the violence that is inherent in gathering humans in masses and arming them with weapons is nowhere to be seen in this overarching purpose of military training. Instead, the military is used as a fostering institution to secure the inflow of "good" citizens into society (see also: Sundevall 2017). This is to be done by engaging the military in an educational process built upon the virtues of physical training. Below follow some reflections of 'data' found depicting this process.

Gibbs's narrative above helps us understand that combat with bayonets is one for the time period central violent practice of the military (as he refers to how German soldiers get gutted by such weapons). Surely one such physically close (to the Other)

activity must be narrated with some discursive elements that fracture the discursive field that creates and sediments bureaucratised understandings of violence? And yes, some indications that this practice actually is meant to kill or hurt another human can be found in the way in which "Regulations for Training Bayonet Combat" (1921) outlines this practice.

Picture (pict. 2) offers some insight into how such indicators of violence are manifest in the material. The picture depicts a straw man which is recommended to be used when training with bayonets. The rings on the sack are instructed to be "target dots" for the head, the location of the heart and the groins (Föreskrifter för utbildning i bajonettstrid 1921, 12). One might think that engaging in this activity must then be disruptive to the otherwise bureaucratic articulations and practices provided by the discourses of production and education. But this is not quite the case from two perspectives: Firstly, the military use discourses where educational articulations is central when narrating about the use of bayonets, which imbeds this activity into a context of gymnastics. The handbook of 1921 recommends that the training is best conducted as a part of physical training. Something that still lives on as I myself met with this way of encapsulating use of force when I did my own basic training in close combat (in 1993).

Pict. 2. Scan from Regulations for Training Bayonet Combat, 1921 (Föreskrifter för utbildning i bajonettstrid 1921, 11).

Nevertheless, this articulatory practice relocates the bodily, deadly, aspect of bayonet combat into the shadows as the activity is performed in a context much like the mechanical drill that is the foundation of learning any type of sport. Here, the taxonomy of sport replaces violence towards another human as an intrinsic part of combat. This move towards *the competition* as a meaning-making practice of military violent activities can also be found in the instructions for use of hand grenades (see: Skjutinstruktion för trupper beväpnade med eldhandvapen och kulspruta. D. 5, Utbildning med Hand- och Gevärsgranater 1929, 10, 17), and is also perceivable in the development of the system for shooting contests (money and medal reward) that invade the narratives of military violent practices during this time. The latter receives more and more attention in the Swedish Armed Forces' instructions for using firearms and machine guns and in the late 1920s and early 1930s is established as a

widespread narrative depicting military violent practice (in comparison, the 1914 version of instruction for machine guns does not comprise any activity that resembles the one which is described by these later narratives). The shooting contest narrative is constructed through the use of paragraphs, tables, indexes, and the like, thus fortifying links between military education and another discursive theme: order and bureaucracy (analysed below) (e.g. appendix to: Skjutinstruktion för trupper beväpnade med eldhandvapen och kulspruta : (SIe och ksp). D. 3 1932, 24-25,36-40; also appendix to: Skjutinstruktion för trupper beväpnade med eldhandvapen och kulspruta. D. 2, Skjututbildning med gevär, karbin och kulsprutegevär 1932, 86–92, 106, 128).

The second reason why close combat training, like bayonet training, does not disrupt this process of neutralising and silencing death and violence emanates from the regulation of the activity itself. The instructions for training with bayonets (and hand grenades for that matter) rigorously cut the practice into small parts of mechanical movements which pervade the entire activity with notions of production (Föreskrifter för utbildning i bajonettstrid 1921, 3–9 and the entire Appendix 1. Skjutinstruktion för trupper beväpnade med eldhandvapen och kulspruta. D. 5, Utbildning med Hand- och Gevärsgranater 1929, 13–18). That is, the violent practice of close combat is understood to be one which can be deconstructed, in the sense that it can be taken apart into entities that together form a functional practice, much like the dismantling of a machine. These single parts are thus bodily movements that can be manufactured through drill, and the automated learning of each movement is in combination imagined to function as 'combat'. Thereby, close combat as a violent practice is removed of any traces of emotional, corporeal, bodily aspects that were exemplified by, and discernible in, Gibbs's narrative. At least until its practitioners really meet the Other (i.e. the enemy).

Analysis of articulations of Order and Bureaucracy (part 1)

The importance of order and its interconnections with bureaucracy can be visualised by a simple exercise in counting the pages that, for instance, the Field Regulations (1917) devote to describing other (peripheral to combat) military activities. The 'nature' of combat is restricted to 10 pages (of a total of 262 pages) whereas "Service messages" is allocated 26 pages, "Requisitions" 8 pages, "Accommodations" 14 pages.[8] Each of these latter chapters contain paragraphs that regulate, create and motivate a plethora of military activities that are not directly aimed at the use of force. These tales of how military practice functions in the close context of war postulate order to that very context. Order is assembled from those needs that are identified by the narrators surrounding the military use of force, as it seems logical

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[8] In the Draft Field Regulations of 1928 the complete second part (135 pages) is devoted to combat. So clearly there has been a development of how the Swedish Armed Forces put emphasis on the matter of combat. However, the context of these 135 pages does not create a discursive resistance towards a meaning-making process which works to neutralise violence and death in military practice. On the contrary, these pages are filled with aspects of battle which are portrayed as a controllable, orderly and purposeful activity, with very few exceptions.

to fulfil these needs. If there is no regulation of these needs, there will be no order in the army, and chaos and utter defeat will surely be at its doorstep. The possibility of engaging in detailed descriptions of more or less necessary practices has an alluring effect on the 'rational' mind. That which is countable, or is possible to control, will be measured and regulated to such an extent that what was meant to be the very core of the original practice is lost. Such excesses in order and control fill military minds with usable narratives that can legitimise the bureaucratisation of military practice.

What I want to elucidate here is that the construction of meaning of military violence is made possible with the use of *regulation*s. Such narratives create stories about militarily violent activities in which regulation is an expression of the hierarchically imposed order, or 'rational' bureaucracy, that I discuss in Chapter 2. For example, in "Service Instructions for the Army" (1931) everything from the conduct of greeting, clothing, inspections, transportation and quartering to ranks, assigned positions, guard duty and veterinarian services are regulated in detail (Tjänstgöringsreglemente för armén (TjR.) 1931). Analysis of literature, which, in contrast to the Service Instructions, has battle as a context, reveals strong similarities to the Service Instructions, by the tone of the texts and the construction of how the texts tell stories of the practices at hand. This comes as no surprise as regulation, or bureaucracy if you will, works as a discourse of its own, and thereby influences the language of the entire military institute. The will to categorise, sort, and regulate is part of every story of military practice that I have come across in the archives, and this furthers a bureaucratisation of these practices. Or in the words of Antoine Bousquet;

> [...] the worldviews articulated under the scientific way of warfare is a distinct approach to control and to the problem of order and chaos. The exercise of armed force and its instrumentalisation by political entities such as the state require the establishment of an intellectual and organisational framework which provides a degree of predictability and control over its outcome [note to Black in Stroud: Sutton, 2000]. In this sense warfare can be seen as part of a quest for order, the search for regularity and reliability of behaviour, common to most if not all forms of social activity. (Bousquet 2009, 239–40)

Points of reference regarding what military work comprise are created by the way in which military practices are rationalised through the process of regulation, as violent practices are given a meaning based on 'means to an end'. And it is an 'end' where something productive will occur, as discussed above. It becomes, for instance, natural to inform about the officers' training or service as a conscript without ever mentioning anything about war or battle-practices (Drake 1932; Upplysningar rörande utbildning till officer på aktiv stat och i reserven vid armén. 1939). The creation of a narrative where military practice is perceived as symbiotic with regulation, thus starts with the soldiers' or cadets' initial meeting with military texts, and proceeds during the training (compare with the element of production and education where even the most violence imbued activities (i.e. bayonet combat) are regulated). Discourses of order and bureaucracy thus provide a large number of regulations, and these work to conceptualise the military violent practice to comprise a sequenced,

orderly and 'rational' activity. This regulatory discursive practice calls for a more detailed investigation of how order and bureaucracy utilise categorisation as an articulatory praxis for sustaining the myth of the productive and orderly use of military force.

Part 2 of the theme of order and bureaucracy: Analysis of articulations of Categorisation.

Common to the instructions and regulations during the 1910s is that they introduce combat by categorising and delimiting different types of military activity. The *field* is an important concept for understanding violent military practice as it is used to define in what kinds of situations violence is used. In "Draft Instruction for Attack against Fortifications" (1914) the concept of the "field" enables a categorisation of different types of military operations: the field war (battles without strong fortifications), the positional war (battles with fortifications constructed in the field) and finally the fortress or fortification war (battles concerning temporary or permanent strong fortifications) (Utkast till instruktion för anfall mot befästningar 1914, 5). In "Field Regulations" (1917) and "Instruction for Deputy Commander Army Division" (1917) the importance of establishing a "scene of war" occupies the entire introduction to the regulations/instructions through the categorisation and dissection of to whom is war an issue and at what place war may be staged (Fälttjänstreglemente: (F.R.). 1917, XII; Instruktion för ställföreträdande arméfördelningschef 1917, 7–19).

While analysing the 'empirical' corpus of this time period, it stands clear that military narratives are constructed through the use of articulations and signifiers which aim at categorising the military practice. This brings forth an order to the military violent practices where war is separated from society (by categorising war and its practices as naturally handled by the military in pre-identified "scenes"), but foremost it creates possibilities to narrate about war and violence as separate entities of military practice (they belong to the "field" or the "scene") and as entities that are under (military) control. The dislocation of war from other parts of society described above might be viewed as a product of its time, since the Swedish Armed Forces later describe war as "total" (Soldatinstruktion för armén, Allmän del 1953, 13). Despite this more modern narration where war is depicted as influencing all of society, and the "de-categorisation" it ought to promote, the wide use of the concept "scene of war" still lingers on in contemporary narratives of military practices (e.g. Tuck 2014, 80). As such, the articulatory praxis of using elements of categorisation persists in the construction of narratives of military violent practices during the modern and post-modern era.

Categorisation as a language technique for constructing narratives of bureaucratised violence is perhaps best visualised, more to the point, with the help of narratives of military violent practices that are infused with aspects of production (as discussed above). Production as an element of storytelling should offer some 'products' that

need to be categorised. And one of the physical 'products' of military violence is a dead human. Oddly enough this fact does not take much space in the texts analysed here, despite the fact that they are all more or less aimed at violent practices. Perhaps this is because it is self-evidently clear that this is the case with the practice at hand and thereby there is no need to address the matter at any length (see: Scarry 1985 for a critique on how the dead are used in military discourse).

Regardless of reasons for this absence of the dead, this lack of visualising the dead in these narratives of military practice has consequences for how military practice is understood. The bits of bodies that are mixed with dirt and shovelled into bags or into walls of fortifications (as illustrated by Gibbs's narrative) are not perceptible to those fresh minds that come to engage in military practice. In other words, the prospect of becoming a part of your comrades' shelter is not a viable one, for those who are subjected military narratives of violence. Especially in early writings dead bodies are conceptualised as "the fallen", which is a somewhat poetic way of describing killed humans. "The fallen" connotes not agonising pain and punctured flesh, but more of an exit from the actual combat. They are not in play anymore. Nevertheless, when, which is seldom, the dead appear as "the dead" in the texts, they are visualised as a logistic item that require categorisation. They are to be collected, counted, sorted, dressed, registered and numbered (Fälttjänstreglemente: (F.R.). 1917, 131–32). The stories told about the human body as a part of military violence become stories that objectify the body through the element of categorisation, making it a biproduct of the 'war machine' (see also: Winter 1995).

Pict. 3. Scan of an appendix outlining enemy positions (Holmgren 1918, 45).

The Other (the enemy) is also narrated by the help of articulatory elements/techniques of order and categorisation. How they appear, how they move and how they should be met are some examples of themes in these narrations. The picture (pict. 3) injects more aspects of categorisation to the construction of military violence in the way it 'dots out' positions of enemy forces (Holmgren 1918, 37, 45). The position of the Other resembles musical notes where a certain order of hitting keys will result in success. In similar ways as the body is portrayed as a product of military violence, the reification of the Other is here used to underline a context of order to the 'battlefield'.

What else can this sketch tell us regarding the construction of narratives of military practice? In the context of the trench wars of WWI, the sketch provides meaning to expressions like: "To take a line" or "to hold a line". The picture is thus an example from the archives where the depiction of military practice as 'taking lines' are con-

structed through classifications of *order*. It could be argued that this could be a result of an aim to create order to a chaotic context, as Clausewitz depicts frictions as an intrinsic part of war. The possibility of disorder in battle is noticeable in narratives used for educating officers, but they are concentrated to single sentences. These few sentences do more to pay tribute to Clausewitz magnum opus "On War" (i.e. that the creator of the military narrative has read it), than they do to create disruptions to a narrative of order (e.g. Tingsten 1921, 51). In contrast, panic and disorder are mostly narrated as products of fighting at the wrong time and/or place. If the military only follow the regulations found in tactical instructions, the battle will proceed as planned ("do not attack during night, as it will leave everything to chance": Tingsten 1921, 57 (my translation)).

As I have tried to visualise here, the articulatory technique of categorisation occurs frequently in the literature that narrates military practice of war. It can express itself as division of society, geography, type of terrain, size of war (the large and the small war), the reduction of the Other to dots on a sketch and so on (Tingsten, 1921, pp. 109–135 unfolds a comprehensive view of these categorisations.).

Analysis of articulations of Technology and Science

In 1914 technology has a firm grip on how narratives of military practice are constructed. The following quote is typical of the discursive linkage between technology and military violence: "The main line of attack is decided […] by the possibility to effectuate superior fire effect towards the points of entry, […]" (Utkast till instruktion för anfall mot befästningar 1914, 12–13 (my translation)). The conduct of battle is thus narrated as regulated by the 'effect' of the machines and not by 'irrational' human needs. This articulates the 'machine' as holding a superior position in military discourse and underlines the existence of a mythological 'industrial' character of warfare (see: Keegan 2004, 230). As such, the theme of technology and science effectively reduces the discursive space for narrating about military practice as a social, human activity (Malešević 2010, 3 f.). Furthermore, technology is used to establish how machines can "be of great service" in military practices (1914:11). In both these approaches of constructing technological myths about military violence, the 'effects' of weapons are used to link the 'natural' position of understandings of violence to the supremacy of technology. This is particular clear in how military decisions are narrated to be guided (or even governed) by the possibilities provided by technology (Cohn 1987; see also: Pick 1996, 21). For instance, the decision where to attack is gradually reduced to a calculation of possibilities, thus conceptualising military violence as *scientific* (see Bousquet 2009 for an entire study on the scientific understanding of war).

Pict. 4. Scan from Machine Gunner Instruction, 1923, outlining a horse hoof (Kulsprutesoldatinstruktion 1923, 7)

"Instruction for the Machine Gunner" (1923) manifests some striking aspects of how science permeates the narratives of early twentieth century military practices. The four first pages (of a total of 184) of the book guide the reader in the structure/order of the machine gun company. Then, a long chapter (34 pages) is devoted to the maintenance of horses, and this picture (pict. 4) can be found on page 7. It describes the inner mechanisms of a horse's hoof. This chapter is then followed by an extensive and in-depth account regarding the innermost details of the machine gun and how it is best kept in working order.

The existence of cross-sections of a horse (and a machine gun, see pict. 5) concentrates the military practice to science in a way that removes all aspects of military violent practices given by Gibbs's narrative. Or in other words, both of these long chapters give nothing to promote the deadly position that the object 'machine gun' can represent while it is in actual use. Wallowing in the deadliness of the machine gun was surely not the purpose of the instructions (and others similar to it), but yet again, the purpose of the texts is not interesting. Rather, of interest is what the reoccurring use of this scientific and technological 'tone' in these narratives of military practice does to military minds that during their service are constantly subjected to them.

Pict. 5. Scan from Machine Gunner Instruction, 1923, outlining the main components of Machine Gun m/14 (Kulsprutesoldatinstruktion 1923, 43).

What happens here is that the death and destruction of violence are 'naturalised' by the use of science as a discursive element in the construction of narratives of military practices. It is not just that the machine is in the centre of narrating how battle is conducted; it also is portrayed as an object that the soldier serves (by the focus on how it should be maintained).

Pict. 6. "Female with organs" by Mikael Häggström.

If it was killing that really was in focus for the machine gunner, had not this type of picture been more appropriate (pict. 6)?[9] Even if this is clearly hypothetical reasoning (and still a scientific narrative), it is a useful exercise for the mind when reflecting on the construction of military discourses of violence. For if killing humans is something that is a 'reality' or even quite a reasonable part of having a military institution in society, would not the gunner need to know more about human anatomy? This would surely be theoretically feasible (the scientific knowledge did/does exist). In the 1925 "Fire Instruction for Troops Armed with Handguns and Machine Guns, Part One" there is a two-page description of what 'effect' a bullet has on living targets. What is essential to this description is that it is "desirable that a hit from a gun is instantly effectual, i.e. that the one who is hit, is *immediately* taken out of a combat ready state" (Skjutinstruktion för trupper beväpnade med eldhandvapen och kulspruta (S.I.e. och k.). 1925, 37–38 (italics in original, my translation)).

This description is the closest to bodily 'effect' of military violence that can be found in the literature of this era. However, the narrative of the 'effects' of the single bullet to living tissue is thickly surrounded by page up and down of the science of guns and their use (gunnery). This makes it almost unnoticeable for the reader who is engaged in the other 67 pages of formulas, graphs and ballistic theory. And the narrative itself is constructed with a scientific context where the bullets' ability to pierce the human body is related to the bullets' capacity to penetrate different types of inanimate material (e.g. wood, sand, dirt, metal). Finally, the technological narrative is here constructed with *effect* as a central theme, visualised by how the text describes the desired outcome of firing the gun. Putting the Other in a state of having no *effect* in combat is repeatedly used to circumscribe the killing, maiming or hurting of another human (Föreskrifter för utbildning i bajonettstrid 1921, 4; e.g. Tingsten 1921, 126).

On a final note, from 1914 to 1939 the emphasis on the science of guns is articulated through the development and production of more complex and detailed narratives regarding the function of guns in military practice. After the end of WWI, the Swedish Army published new editions of, and new appendices to, Fire Instructions for

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[9] Pict. 6 - Licensed under Creative Commons Zero, Public Domain Dedication via Wikimedia Commons - http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Female_with_organs.png#mediaviewer/File:Female_with_organs.png

Machine Guns in 1920, 1923, 1925, 1927, 1929, 1932 and 1933. In 1914 the instructions were quite modest, with their total of 87 pages including appendices and tables. In 1932 the number of pages for the same type of content as in the 1914 version of instruction is at this point 274. This increase in page numbers signifies the impact that technology and science have on how narratives of military violent practices are formed during this period. Other research confirms these reflections from the archives; Daniel Pick's walkthrough of how the concept of the machine is reinforced and replaces earlier notions of military violence (as competitive, subjective, or enjoyable) during the industrialisation of the late 19th early 20th centuries, is perhaps the best example of such research (see Pick 1996, 70–74, 206–9).

Swedish Narratives of Military Violence, 1914-1939 – Summary

In conclusion, the themes of production and education, order and bureaucracy, and finally of technology and science, are in plentiful use in literature narrating military violent practices. As such, these themes are key ingredients in understanding *how* military work is constructed to manage, neutralise and/or silence the death and violence of military force. Particularly as the analysis of these themes unmasks how the removal of the dead, and the reification of the Other, is made possible by a gradually increasing bureaucratisation of military narratives.

Counter Discursive Elements: language that indicates non-bureaucratic understandings of violence

Gibbs's narrative has helped me stay alert to language which may create non-bureaucratic understandings of violence. I have tried to visualise my train of thought regarding this as the analysis proceeded above (there are some references to Gibbs's narrative in the analysis above), but to clarify this I summarise below the findings that made me aware of whether some military language may pose a counter-discursive force towards the buraucratisation of violence.

I found that "Ruthlessness" appears in early writings (e.g. 1914:7, 8) and although the concept represents a human emotional state of mind (and thus should stand against discourses of bureaucratisation) its disruptive effect is severely hampered, as "ruthlessness" is clad with control. It is imbedded with language that describes it as a feeling that can be switched on and off depending on the *need* of the situation. Feelings are through this sort of meaning-making themselves set to be instrumental, i.e. to be used as a means for a goal. On the other hand, ruthlessness can be found in the depiction of performance of some military practices (1914:16). I will come back to this aspect of violence further on in this chapter.

Furthermore, the concept of "Fierce fire" (e.g. 1914:10) indicates uncontrollable aspects of human behaviour and society (i.e. to be fierce is not to be in total control and/or not to be of 'rational' senses), but it is imbued with the same aspects of control as ruthlessness is, as the military language of the archived material dislocates the

uncontrollable aspects of "fierceness". The concept is interlocked with the use of technology (i.e. the use of weapons that can rapidly and simultaneously discharge a large amount of metal objects) and the possibility of control (i.e. the discharge of weapons is done on command and in synchronisation).

Some aspects of emotional use is also evident in Lieutenant General L.H. Tingsten's "Introduction to Tactics" (8th ed. 1921), a book seen as a standard reference work on the nature of battle and thus widely used in officers' education during this period (Norberg et. al., 1992, pp. 202–203, 257). According to this book, a bayonet attack is to be conducted while forcefully shouting "Hurray" (Tingsten 1921, 69). The word "hurray" has a traditional use as a battle cry, but had during the 19th century started to get widespread use as a celebration call for royalty and for general support (Dalin 1830, 718). In present time, it is used exclusively as a celebration call, but besides the development of the application of the word, it signifies that there is a need for mass emotional courage and/or frightening the Other in the engagement in military violent practices. As such, its use in Tingsten's narrative of military practice somewhat disrupts an all-emotionless bureaucratised discourse of military violence.

Part 2 of Chapter 4 - Analysing Swedish Discourses of military violence, 1939 – 1964

In this second part of the chapter I expand my analysis of how bureaucratised understandings of violence become a naturalised part of Swedish military practice, to comprise the time period 1939-1964, thus adding WWII and its aftermath as influential events used in the narration of military practice. This part of the chapter is initiated directly below by a walkthrough of how the political reforms of the previous time period have developed during this era. This section is then followed by a close reading of a story that has helped me deepen the analysis of which points of reference are used in the management, neutralisation and/or silencing of military violence. Particularly the theme of military masculinity is added to the analysis. Before the actual conduct of the analysis where the use of this 'added' theme is scrutinised, I discuss how the archive material of this period relates to the previously identified points of reference/themes in military discourse.

4.5 Political Reformations of the mid 20th Century – How Bureaucracy is Instilled in the Modern Swedish Military

Neutrality

As stated earlier, neutrality had developed into a policy of unity among the Swedish political parties, even though public debate was characterised by clashes between 'warmongers' and 'pacifists' in the early 20th century. This political unity remained

unchanged, even though ideological shifts between left and right wing parties occurred on the question of ideological legitimacy supporting the neutrality policy (Björklund 1992, 9 ff.). Non-alignment and neutrality successfully established themselves in Swedish foreign policy due to the articulations and connotations this policy produced, allowing for ideological opponents with different motives for neutrality to stand on common ground (Hugemark 1986, 32–33). This meant that the Swedish military practice could 'flourish' as the political strengthening and stabilisation of neutrality gave grounds for building a powerful military in order to deter aggressors (foremost the Soviet Union) (Aggestam and Hyde-Price 2016). Despite this, research indicates that the military harboured a strong longing for alignment to the Western Bloc (Kronvall and Petersson 2005, 42 f.).

Despite the historical fact that Sweden made some preparations for receiving military support from the Western Bloc (e.g. Dalsjö 2014), I argue here that neutrality provides a discursive setting in which Swedish military practice 'becomes' a practice of education and training, rather than one of fighting wars. It is thus here narratives of violence stabilise and help the military work to take form, constructing understandings of the military as an educator and producer of conscripts. From the middle of the 1960s and especially during the 'Palme-era' of Swedish politics, i.e. after the time-period analysed here, neutrality shifted from being a driver for practical solutions to international tensions and crises, to a normative framework for engaging in 'active foreign policy' (e.g. Agrell 2000; Dalsjö 2014). This means that in the time after WWII, neutrality was in addition to its 'official' purpose of keeping Sweden out of a possible third world war, used in various ways to educate and 'reform' the male citizens. In other words, the 'armed neutrality' of Sweden made it possible to direct the military *practice* to take the education of conscripts as its main purpose. Here the political grand narrative of 'the people's collective defence force' (*folkets samlade värnkraft*) was particularly useful to enhance and develop the political reforms of the 'Total Defence' (Agrell 2011, 45, 189).

'Total Defence' and the establishment of Swedish military practice as a practice of social development

During this era, government inquiries are conducted in order to facilitate for joint efforts of societal defence, which initiate and establish a Swedish 'Total Defence' reform (Munck af Rosenschöld 2014, 8). In short, the concept of 'Total Defence' was used to merge and combine the defence efforts of the military, civilian, economic and psychological defence in order to create a resilient society. At the end of the time period of interest here, the 1963 parliamentary decision states that the main task for the Total Defence is to "be so prepared for war that it works as a peace-keeping force" and that the "different parts of the total defence cooperate and support each other, in order to maximise defence effectiveness" (cited in: Munck af Rosenschöld 2014, 19 my translation).

As I see it, there are at least three vital political strategies that are used to support this defence transformation, and which make 'Total Defence' a vital part in understanding how bureaucratisation of military work has been politically fuelled. Firstly, 'Total Defence' was strongly interconnected with the idea of having a conscript army. Military service was politically promoted as important for creating an understanding and acceptance for the 'Total Defence'. In addition to the view that after doing their military service, citizens could work to strengthen the civilian and economical defence in their ordinary jobs, the time of service was also portrayed as a time of maturity where men learned to work together towards a higher cause (Dahlström, Söderberg, and Olofsson 2002, 61–65, 170–72). In other words, having a conscript army was central to supporting the implementation and the political and military stability of 'the Total Defence' reformation. Secondly, the political focus on creating and maintaining a male conscript army, stimulated the use of a continuously diversifying narrative where certain masculine norms were implemented and sustained (Kronsell and Svedberg 2001). Here the political articulations in forms of legislative language concerning which parts of the population were subject to service ensured a closure for women to affect military understandings of military practice, and in prolongation, of military violence. Particularly, military masculinity was formed with focus on norms where Swedish military violence was constructed as "just and virtuous" and men were to do their "duty" in relation to the benefit of the People (Kronsell and Svedberg 2001, 163). Insomuch, the political reform of 'Total Defence' and its focus on conscription of young males constructed a diversion in the Swedish society where men had the ownership of a type of 'protective' military violence (Ibid). This political reformation underlines the need to analyse how militarised masculinities are discursively linked with military narratives that supported a construction of bureaucratised violence.

The third and final phenomenon related to this political reform that I want to highlight before entering further analysis of military narratives, is how the 'Total Defence' isolates *military violence* from the rest of society. It may seem counterintuitive to argue that a 'Total Defence' concept actually isolates something of the military practice, but there is a point to be made here. As a political strategy that underpins the formation of social (formal and informal) rules and behaviour as well as narratives that help actors and institutions create a secure identity, the 'Total Defence' concept helped sustain a consensus between (seemingly) diverging norms in the Swedish in society. For those who attached themselves to the grand narrative of Sweden as a peaceful nation, neutral in war and a breeding ground for higher moral/living standards, 'Total Defence' provided the means to diminish understanding of the Swedish military as violent.[10] In this narrative, the military does not need to be scrutinised or pondered upon, as the sole responsibility for defence is not the

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[10] For the impact of modernity and welfare on this narrative, see Alf W. Johansson, p. 202 f. On how higher moral standards infused this story of Sweden (and the narrative's promotion for Swedes to turn a blind eye to violence), see Patrick Salmon, p. 310 f., 314. Both in Almqvist & Glans, 2001. See also Alf W. Johansson, p. 205, 211, 218 in Huldt & Böhme, 1995, for more on the Swedish strong (political) will to focus on modernity and peace rather than war and violence.

military's, especially since the military's main task is discursively framed as educating and forming young boys into men (as previously noted).

The homogenised political strategy of 'Total Defence' affects many institutions in Swedish society during this period, where everything from a farmer's tractor, national communications, industry and medical capabilities is assigned a governmentally structured place in the defence of Sweden. There is thus an abundance of practices facilitated by this political reformation, and the military's role as one cog in this defence machinery actually removes some light from its violent potential (e.g. Cronqvist 2008; Hjort 2004). Most importantly, 'Total Defence' brings with it a story of peace, not war. It enhances the military to be narrated as a 'peace-creator', which in turn reduces its possibility to be narrated as an aggressor (Agius 2006, 105 ff.). In this way, the narratives used to promote and secure the implementation of the 'Total Defence' transformation create space for the emergence of a silence regarding military violence (as a destructive and potentially escalating force). Instead, narratives of military practice were built upon societal discourses which, as outlined below, promote an understanding of military violence as 'productive' and 'efficient'. The narration supporting the implementation of the 'Total Defence' also leaves the Swedish Armed Forces to internally develop their understandings of violence, since public debate and political controversy on the subject of Swedish use of force is held to a minimum (this lack of debate still lingers in the Swedish context, see: M. Wendt and Åse 2016).

In sum, political reformations of the mid 20th century regarding neutrality and 'Total Defence' promote further steps in the bureaucratisation of the Swedish military. These political strategies open up discursive space for military work to be narrated in terms of 'productivity and education'. But they also facilitate a construction of a type of military masculinity where conscription and its interconnected norms of duty and protection are instilled to millions of Swedish men (see: Kronsell and Svedberg 2001, 158). Finally, these political reforms has also worked to reduce debate and to neutralise and silence the actual existence of Swedish military violence, which makes this context salient for investigating how bureaucratisation has taken hold of the military.

In the next section I expand upon the alternative narrative that Gibbs and the 'Agony Column' offered above, as a critical support for the subsequent analysis of military narratives. But here I draw upon a narrative that represents a development of how violence is portrayed in the wake of WWII, but it also provides some specification regarding the stories that are created to support the political reformations of neutrality and 'Total Defence'.

4.6 A Narrative of Death and Violence: The Continuation War

In the book "The Unknown Soldier" (1955) Väinö Linna tells a story about the lives (and deaths) of Finnish soldiers and officers during the Continuation War (Finland's war against the Soviet Union, 1941-1944). Linna was himself a non-commissioned officer during this war, which probably gives the story extra weight when it comes to realism and accuracy regarding details of military practice. This book is referred to in the introduction of Swedish Army Instruction "Command, Discipline and Morale" (1956), as the most influential fictional work of that time with respect to military conditions in the field and in battle (despite the influx of American postwar accounts of WWII at that point) (Befälsföring, disciplin och förbandsanda 1956, 5). "The Unknown Soldier" became an instant success despite (or perhaps due to) its unconventional and realistic portrayal of military violence and harsh criticism of higher military leadership during the war. Translated into at least 14 languages, it has been claimed that the book represents "the peak of what world literature has to offer within this genre" (fictional war literature) (see preface to the English version: Linna 1957, XI). The book has also been made into film several times, as recently as 2017. There is little doubt that the narrative provided by Linna had an effect on public opinion in Finland and to some extent also in Sweden when it comes to the Continuation War (a war that Finland lost).

"The Unknown Soldier" is in many ways representative of a narrative that can disrupt institutionalised understandings of violence, much like Gibbs's narrative posits in section 4.3 of this chapter. But the book also, as manifested by the analysis below, enhances a bureaucratisation of violence in some ways and this dualism in the narrative makes it interesting as a guide for picking up on articulations and signifiers used in the discursive struggle of forming a coherent discourse on what military violence comprises.

I have analysed the Swedish translation from 1955, partly because the English version is poorly translated (entire sections are missing in the English version), but mostly because this is the first version that was made available to the Swedish speaking audience. In general, the book forms a strong anti-militaristic and anti-violence statement as it, in correspondence to Gibbs' narrative, effectively portrays the meaninglessness and arbitrary character of violence (e.g. Linna 1955, 147, 162, 164–65, 352, 374, 442). It also critically questions such traditional military areas as drill and discipline (foremost the imbalance in relations of power they create), and also the need for military rituals and social traditions. As such, the narrative is aimed at criticising the power that permeates the military practices of this time, foremost the power to dominate those with lower rank (often members of the working class or equiv.). Linna convincingly shows how the 'best' soldiers (i.e. those who can keep their cool while killing the Other and during intense fighting) resist such forms of domination, despite the fact that these soldiers are portrayed as 'the salt of the earth'.

The 'heroes' of the story resist and agitate against disciplinary formalities and assignments that they find dislocated from the act of killing, or from acts that are directed towards their own unit's survival. And these main characters draw upon the self-reassurance that they get from killing and surviving in order to succeed with this resistance to certain formalities and assignments (Linna 1955, 245, 326). The officers that try to impose their power on these soldiers are in the end faced with the choice of shooting their best soldiers for insubordination, or letting go of their power. The previous choice succumbs to the latter in all cases but one, which informs military violent practice with the usefulness of being a good killer (you can 'get away' with obstructing military formalities if you have proven your worth as a killer). And a good killer is, according to the narrative, perceived as a *hard, cool-headed, strong, bold, ruthless and rational man* (Linna 1955, 158, 162–63, 265).

As such, Linna's narrative provides something more to military discourses in comparison to the stories of Gibbs and the 'Agony Column'. It increases the complexity of military discourse in at least two ways: It informs military practice with a traditional *masculine* perspective (Chinkin and Kaldor 2013, 168; Pin-fat and Stern 2005, 27,28,33), and in addition, it reveals the *struggle of power* that lies inherent in military practice. Both of these aspects have not been identified in my analysis above of WWI-related narratives. In the WWI-section of this chapter, the military discourse outlines violence as a mere means to an end, thus inherently having a clinical 'rationality' in its formation as an object of use: *"If we attack here (apply the tool violence), the operation will succeed (the goal (end) will be fulfilled)"*. The masculine message that Linna's narrative comprises is, however, not convincingly set apart from narratives that create such understandings of violence. This is partly due to the web of connotations that forms between masculinity and some 'products' of modernity: the (manly) industrial worker, the (manly) rational bureaucrat and the (manly) elite athlete (R. W. Connell 1998, 8,11).

The above could then be summarised by saying that the Swedish Army was through the popularity of Linna's book provided with a non-bureaucratised narrative of violence, apart from its reproduction of traditional masculine attributes of military violence (on the book's importance for Swedish understandings of combat, see Smedberg in Dahlström et al. 2002, p.133). In other words, the potential disruptive discursive force of the narrative lies in the story's descriptions of the meaninglessness and arbitrariness of military violence. However, "The Unknown Soldier" is so skilfully written that it bears with it a possibility of conveying other understandings of violent practices than that of the meaninglessness of violence. For instance, Linna had the ability to combine credible descriptions of human psychology with contexts of military tactics and operations. The narrative can thus be read as a historical novel which gives insight into regimental, battalion and company level tactics.

> On the right the company which crossed after them had joined the battle and easily penetrated the Russian positions, for Kariluoto's advance along the trench had paralysed the defence. Thus when they established contact with this company's left flank Kariluoto's men made their way back.

Meanwhile part of the Third Company cleaned up in the opposite direction, for the Russians were everywhere retreating. (Linna 1957, 102)

The quote above illustrates this duality of Linna's narrative. It is constructed by combining some non-bureaucratising aspects of military violence - fear (paralysation) - with the discursive elements of production (cleaning up) and order (in the way the companies are attributed to act). It also indicates masculinity (penetration) which here attach the male dominance into violent military practices. Despite these dualistic aspects of the quote, the text can be read as an account of how military units act in situations similar to the trench war. It can thus be used to convey meaning for those who invest interest in military theory and tactics, in the way which the narrative describes the unfolding events. The point here is not to establish how Linna's narrative should have been used but to display how this complex story can be used to produce multiple meaning which helps construct narratives of bureaucratisation, despite the book's descriptions of the horrors and meaninglessness of violence.

Here the Swedish instruction "Command, Discipline and Morale" (1956), briefly mentioned above, comes into the picture. This military instruction exemplifies how Linna's narrative was used as leverage when constructing new (at the time) military narratives regarding the productive aspect of violence. First, the preface to the Swedish instruction downplays some of the 'irrationalities' of Linna's story as another, more 'sober' story regarding the realities of the Continuation War (provided by a high ranking officer) is presented as an alternative view of the events. This 'sober' story actively disavows Linna's narrative, and strips it of the very thing that makes it unique, as it promotes a "dispassionate" and a "matter-of-fact" (unemotional and practical) analysis of soldiers' psyches. Such an analysis is seen as productive as it can be used to develop new instructions for peace-time education of non-commissioned officers and officers (Befälsföring, disciplin och förbandsanda 1956, 6). This military narrative thereby promotes utilisation of those aspects of "The Unknown Soldier" that 'fit' into the construction of bureaucratisation through discourses of production and education.

Secondly, "Command, Discipline and Moral" uses Linna's narrative to promote usefulness of military violence, as it make use of episodes from "The Unknown Soldier" which describe how officers overcome their lack of natural leadership abilities by compensating with courage and an active participation in the killing of the Other (Befälsföring, disciplin och förbandsanda 1956, 25). The message is that officers that show courage and proficiency in close combat will automatically gain respect, or at least acceptance, from their soldiers. Hence, the instruction makes use of the masculine norms promoted by Linna's narrative in a way which underlines the value of being a good and active killer. As such, military violence (the killing of the Other) becomes a product, or a tool, that can be used for strengthening officers' grip on soldiers. Finally, the Swedish instruction, seen as a narrative of military practice, directs the use of narratives portraying the 'realities' of war to studies of leadership. It thereby separates stories of military violence (and their possible critical interpreta-

tion of military violence) from other parts of the military educational practice, i.e. areas such as strategy and tactics, war studies and operational planning. In other words, it is possible that the instruction contributes to the creation of the Swedish military traditional practice of touching on critique of military violence only when specific issues of leadership are dealt with (e.g. how to get soldiers to fight etc.).

In sum, Linna's narrative supports the analysis of military narratives of violent practices belonging to the time period 1939 – 1964 by adding the following to the previously found articulations and signifiers of how military work is narrated: *Masculinity*, understood as comprising strength, ruthlessness, heroism (including sacrifice), boldness and practical knowledge of using violence.[11] In the following section, these articulations and signifiers will be used as a way of unfolding how understandings of violence are connected to certain ways of portraying military masculinity. But the section will first outline how the previously analysed themes of production and education, order and bureaucracy, technology and science are in use during this era to form points of reference for military understandings of death and violence.

4.7 Analysing Narratives: Swedish Military Discourse of Violence, 1939 - 1964

This section will initially add more discursive elements (ways of articulating and signifying bureaucratisation) to the analysis (in the form of 'short summaries'), found in the Swedish military narratives created during the mid 20th century. But the main area of analysis in this section comprises, as briefly mentioned, an investigation of how articulations and signifiers of a certain military masculinity operate so as to create bureaucratised meanings of military violence. Insomuch, this section offers the second step in answering the question of how (by what themes of military narratives) is violence and death presented, naturalised and/or silenced in the *portrayal* of Swedish military practice?

Short summary: Analysis of articulations of Order and bureaucracy

To start with, order has become vital for portraying violent practices and has been further discursively entrenched since the earlier time period. Exemplified here by this quote from "Army Regulations, Part 2" (1952):

> Combat is terminated, when planned, or if its prolongation should cause unreasonable loss of force in proportion to that which stands to be gained. (Arméreglemente, Del 2 1952, 2:28-42 (my translation)).

The quote above could be read critically as portraying a military practice of fleeing from/giving up/never engaging in combat activities. But in the archived materials,

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[11] In comparison, Claire Duncanson in a modern study of British soldiers' identity construction utilises "action, aggression, bravery, heroism, risk-taking and sacrifice" to identify skills and attitudes associated with masculinity and combat (Duncanson 2013, 73, 76).

violence is narrated as possible to regulate and measure, which creates a meaning to violence as something that can end 'with the flip of a switch'. When reading the material, there is not much that makes resemblance to images of soldiers fleeing from, or not engaging in, combat due to fear, exhaustion or for that matter, due to insight that the current combat is pointless. Order as a central component in understanding military violence is forced upon the reader through these types of narrations. Military discourse thus envisions combat as an on/off activity (it can be terminated) and doing this, the archived material furthers the idea that violent practices can be controlled and events can be foreseen (as also evident in the analysis of the material on WWI).

In addition, categorisation is further used and enforced as a central element of narratives of violence during this era. Picture 7 outlines how the dead are supposed to be handled during times of war. Dead bodies are still narrated as logistic items which in sum imprint the dead as 'an item causing a problem which should be

Pict. 7. Scan of picture outlining the "principles for war burial service"(Arméreglemente, Del 2 1952, 21:76-83).

solved in an orderly fashion'. This creates the need for a separate service of military practice: the "war burial service" which in turn produces paragraphs that further the objectification of the human body and entrench bureaucratised meaning of violence (for a representative sample, see: Arméreglemente, Del 2 1952, 21:61-71).

Short summary: Analysis of articulations of Technology and science

Narratives found in the archives that build upon technological and scientific discourses are plentiful in the military litterateur of this era. Stories about military vehicles, firepower and weapons illustrate a military understanding of violence where the machines take superiority over the human subject. The priority of machines (over humans) is promoted in similar ways as during the previous time period, but now there are more effective ways of building such narratives (the technology needed to create pictures comprising cross sections of machines has developed). Now there are several more military instructions in play, and they cooperate in order to instil the importance of technology as a vital part of violent military practices. For instance, the preface to "Fire Instructions for the Army, Part 1 A: Basics" (1953)

sets the tone for how narratives of military practice are permeated with the themes of technology and science. It states that:

> [T]he conditions of the target and the time when the fire, for tactical reasons, should hit the target, decides the gunner's activity and the measures taken at firing and observation stations. (Skjutinstruktion för Armén. Del 1A, Grunder 1953, 5 (my translation)).

"Tactical reasons" are found in other, supporting narratives, to comprise the overarching principle "concentration of fire" (Arméreglemente, Del 2 1952, 2:5-9). Nevertheless, this quote narrates the spatial and bodily prerequisites for the activity of the 'gunner' to be ruled by how to most efficiently produce a massive amount of firepower. In other words, the weapon's (technical) potential is discursively positioned as governing the military body. As such, it is technology that 'decides' when, where and how violence is performed by the military, at least if we accept the power that lies in narratives to affect understandings of 'reality'. Reliance on technology to 'govern' the use of military force has of late been, as discussed in Chapter 2, the subject of the academic debate regarding how military violence is managed, neutralised or silenced in the Western military. Particularly when it comes to the use of military drones (e.g. Holmqvist 2013a; Schwarz 2016; I. Shaw and Akhter 2014). Here the analysis of the military regulations of this time period reveals that this 'supremacy' of technology lies imbedded in the historical construction of military discourse.

Short summary: Analysis of articulations of Production and education

In similar ways as the other themes, production and education are further established as crucial for constructing narratives of violent practices during this era. "The competition", as found in previous narratives, is developed as a theme for depicting violent practices, typically composed of sentences like "Remember, he who hits the target fastest, wins" (Soldaten i fält 1960, 70 (my translation)).

Pict. 8. Scan of picture outlining combat as a board game (Soldaten i fält 1960, 198).

Furthermore, although some pictures portray soldiers in combat-ready positions (pencil drawings in black/grey), the majority of pictures outlining violent practices expand 'the competition theme' by adding 'the game' as a corresponding theme, as observable in picture 8. Displaying human activity with game pieces makes connotations to the board game, which orders and objectifies human practices (see Foucault regarding objectification in: Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983,

165,182,208). Such connections are continuously made in military discourse as the picture, and several similar to it, are displayed in the book "The Field Soldier" (1960). This is a book which is meant to impart knowledge about war and combat to new soldiers in the army (Soldaten i fält 1960, 7). In that aspect, the educational purpose of the handbook that this picture is taken from marks the use of educational and productive (the production of conscripts) discourses, supported by narratives of 'the game' as well as the competition (see also: Soldatinstruktion för armén: Allmän Del 1951, 156; and: Soldatinstruktion för armén: allmän del (SoldI A) 1955, 113).

In sum, the use of themes in the creations of narratives of military violent practices during 1914-1939 have continued to enhance and recreate bureaucratised under-standings of violence in the aftermath of WWII. Two generations of officers and approx. 45 classes of conscripts have been subjected to the discursive enforcement of bureaucratisation and modernization illustrated by my analysis. During this time, narratives of military violent practices have been in conflict with eyewitness ac-counts and media coverage from two of the bloodiest wars in history. Despite these accounts of 'real world' events, the use of these themes has not diminished in the construction of military narratives of violent practices. On the contrary, the impact and admiration of technology, the striving to inject order into military practices and the regularity of the rhythm of conscript education seems to have the upper hand against the messages provided by potentially disruptive narratives of war and battle. Still, a deeper understanding of how specific use of language enforces this resistance towards alternative understandings of military violence is of interest, particularly by using the previously outlined norms/narratives of masculinity in the analysis of the archived material. The following part of this section on WWII-related narratives thus aim at disclosing how the narratives at hand make use of discursive elements of masculinity, in order to provide an extended analysis of how bureaucratisation pre-vails and develops.

Analysis of articulations of Masculinity

Arguably, the Swedish military practice could be seen as discursively gendered partly by Linna's narrative of violence, as it held a central place in the Swedish military discourse of the late 1950s and early 1960s. But the question is how (by what means and with what type of language) articulations of masculinity are con-nected to a process of bureaucratising violence? The following part presents the results of reading military instructions of violent practices in search for an answer to this question. In other words, the analysis has searched for how elements of mascu-linity have worked to reinforce or counter bureaucratised understandings of military violence.

The 1952 Army Manual, part 2, introduces itself with a nearly blank page. There are only four words present on the page: "Stand firm – Strike hard". The formal intro-duction follows up on this message by promoting "strength" as the key ingredient for securing the preservation of the Swedish nation (Arméreglemente, Del 2 1952,

1–4). There is clearly a story here where the 'hegemonic' masculine values from Linna's narrative are in use, and the following outlines how the Swedish military narratives of its practice gendered in light of this use.

Strength, boldness and ruthlessness are in the material drawn together when different forms of attack are depicted. During the mid 20th century, Swedish military practice has gone from the trench war style of infantry tactics that was present in the material analysed earlier in this chapter, and is now deeply affected by German and Russian forms of tactics. Speed, surprise and concentration of force are constantly encouraged in the instructions and manuals of this time (e.g. Arméreglemente, Del 2 1952, 2:1-4, 3:1-4, 3:7-8; Taktiska anvisningar. Häfte 2, Stridsavsikt (stridsuppgift) och stridssätt 1944, 3). It is only through the practice of attack that the enemy can be beaten, and defence is given a weaker meaning. "Attack is the only form of combat that can enforce a decisive moment in battle" the 1952 Army Manual concludes while drawing up the basics for combat (Ibid, p. 2:29). The discursive promotion of bureaucratisation made possible by how such statements depict military violence as conducted in an orderly fashion has already been discussed in the previous sections of this chapter, but by searching for a gendered meaning-making process something new appears. As such, the texts create masculine imprints on the practice of attack, since it is narratively constructed to be stronger than defence. Concentration of force (or fire) is an example of this construction as it is portrayed to be performed "strongly", "with strength" or "as strong as possible" (Arméreglemente, Del 2 1952, 2:1-4, 3:7-8, 3:21-22). This practice of, for a short period of time, culminating the military ability for violence is also connected to "ruthlessness" in several passages (e.g. Ibid 3:1-4, 3:11-22). Today those who have had a modern education in military matters (the theory of war, tactics, strategy, operational art etc.) will recognise that the concept of concentration of force is a prevailing convention for military success (e.g. Jordan et al. 2016, 96).

In addition to concentration of force, another concept of importance in the military practice that has prevailed in the 20th century and is still in use today is "surprise". The weight of surprising your opponent is endorsed both by Western and Russian doctrine in the aftermath of WWII (see: Tuck 2014, 87, 92) and Swedish literature of this period is no exception to this endorsement (Arméreglemente, Del 2 1952, 2:1-4; Taktiska anvisningar. Häfte 2, Stridsavsikt (stridsuppgift) och stridssätt 1944, 2; Taktiska bestämmelser. 1 1940, 6). In "Tactical Regulations" (1940), the Army Command conducts an analysis of recent events (Soviet's attack on Finland and Germany's invasion of Denmark and Norway) and concludes that surprise is one of three principles used in the "new methods of attack" (Taktiska bestämmelser. 1 1940, 6). "Boldness" is in these regulations presented as a key ingredient in succeeding with surprising the opponent and the practice of narrating boldness in relation to surprise is firmly set in publications of the later years (Arméreglemente, Del 2 1952, 2:1-4, 3:9-10; Soldaten i fält 1960, 132; Taktiska bestämmelser. 1 1940, 7). Boldness is further idealised through statements like "Boldness may lead to great results" (Arméreglemente: Del 1 1950, 8 (my translation)), and by describing boldness as a

preferred ability among those wanting to serve as rangers (elite soldiers) (Taktiska anvisningar. Häfte 4, Fria kriget 1944, 5). The concept of surprise thus furthers an already active use of the masculine signifier boldness, and this concept is in the narratives connected to greatly enhancing the prospects of "winning".

Ruthlessness, boldness and strength are masculine norms that I have found in Linna's narrative, as previously discussed, and they are here moulded into the practice of concentrating force. As such, the modern historical foundation for the sometimes occurring premeditated and excessive use of force in current operations is to some extent based on the masculine ideal that lies in the historical construction of the "attack practices". Rokka and Koskela, the soldiers in Linna's story that represent the heroes of war, display these traits. In Rokka's case perhaps best visualised in the passage where he by using a tommy gun kills 52 (!) Russians trying to pass over a snow covered swamp (his strength is bolstered by how the man, Lampinen, that fills his cassettes with new ammunition is portrayed: weak, stunned with fear and on the edge of running away). Rokka is injured during the combat but after being stunned for a moment "The tommy gun resumes its clatter. The survivors were not running now, but were trying to tunnel their way to safety. Some succeeded, but they were few compared to those who lay silent on the swamp."(Linna 1957, 183). When the rest of the platoon arrives on the scene, the baffled platoon commander inquires what has happened:

> - Was all the firing yours?
> - Well, most of it. The little Ivan did didn't amount to much. Cut my head open though, the bastards. I was stunned for a moment.
> - And I tried to run, Lampinen said humbly as though to show that he had no intention of denying that he had been scared.
> Rokka only laughed good-humoredly [SIC] and said:
> - So you did. But put a bandage on my head, will you? It's stopped bleeding, but it's best to dress it just the same.
> Lampinen applied the bandage. He was not at all ashamed of having been afraid as he said with humble admiration:
> - You're sure one hell of a man… (Linna 1957, 184)

Ruthlessness is in this context understood as being able to use violence towards the Other, without having any remorse and without giving any pardon. The message here is that a "hell of a man" has the strength to resist injuries and is not emotionally moved by massive killings. The weak (feminine) man panics easily and tries to flee from combat, and is furthermore in humble admiration of the strong soldier. He (Lampinen in this case) is good for tending to wounds but not for much else. As mentioned earlier, "Command, Discipline and Moral" (1956) strips Linna's story of the arbitrary and meaninglessness of military violence which could counter a bureaucratised understanding of military violent practices, but in addition to this, supports the iconic portrayal of Rokka as an ideal for valour and bravery (e.g. Befälsföring, disciplin och förbandsanda 1956, 6, 21). By endorsing the ideal that Rokka upholds and linking it to the Swedish military practice of education (with

suggestions on how to better train soldiers), the instruction helps infuse this type of masculine ideal into the military practice.

Summary: masculinity and bureaucratised understandings of violence

I can thus conclude that strength, ruthlessness and boldness are central to the construction of a linkage between masculinity and the portrayal of military violence during this period. Most importantly, this linkage is constructed in such a way that it *strips Linna's narrative of its political anti-war message*. In other words, the narratives that construct bureaucratised violence manage to rearticulate and reshape a critical narrative that speaks against such understandings of violence (e.g. the 'productive' use of force) and use this very narrative for entrenching a gendered discourse of violence. Furthermore, the focus on the principles 'concentration of force' and 'surprise' incorporates promotion of certain masculine ideals. As I have tried to illustrate previously in this chapter, the treatment of principles as something that can be applied to combat when deemed necessary for winning, is a treatment that is closely interconnected to the bureaucratisation of violence. In sum, masculinity bureaucratises violence through the theme of production and education as the military discourse articulates surprise (the principle endorsed by boldness), which is to be used on command. Furthermore, the theme of order and production interconnect masculinity with bureaucratisation of violence by how the military narratives illustrate ruthlessness – as something that can be controlled and used only when needed. Through the theme of technology and science military masculinity is connected to bureaucratisation by endorsing the technological development to create more opportunities to concentrate force. Strength is thus an ideal that is enforced by narratives of the perks of military technology.

Presently, feminist thinking aims to disclose a linkage between a dominating form of ideal for military men's identity and the sometimes counterproductive use of force in modern missions (a battle which is in line with lessons identified by several military missions in Afghanistan and Iraq) (see Duncanson 2013, 2-3,18-23). We can see here that in the Swedish historic narratives of military practice, such ideals have a substantial part in the construction of violent practices.

4.8 Conclusions

In sum, the question of how (by what rationalities/reforms) the Swedish military was bureaucratised and modernised during the early and mid 20th century can be answered by two points. Firstly, the political balancing between the diverging normative forces inherent to the Swedish context of neutrality created a political story underlining the need for a strong, neutral and transparent/predictable, but still passive, military. Due to this, the military as an institution in Swedish society is discursively constructed as being a non-violent, disciplinary, professional producer of military units. In other words, the Swedish military is politically shaped to relate to its use of violence in light of having its identity constructed as a 'productive' and

'educational' societal institution. The politics of neutrality thus facilitated the use of narratives where military violence could be depicted as a controllable and delimited product of military practice. Arguably, as the military practice is already in the aftermath of two world wars, and during the ongoing Cold War, politically narrated as a practice of peace, neutrality must be approached as one condition that has created the contemporary political and public silence regarding Swedish military violence. It is thus the idea of the Swedish military as an instrumental producer of military peace that historically contextualise a bureaucratisation of violence.

Secondly, the political focus on conscription as a way of gathering the People and making use of the collective force of society underlined a further need to bureaucratise the military. As this focus was politically aligned with the development of the Swedish 'Total Defence', conscription came to mean more than just filling the ranks of the military – to educate conscripts was to adhere to a national norm of creating a 'rational' and 'productive' place for each man. But also to shape and discipline a young man into a masculinised protective subject who would understand and take responsibility for 'his' role as a cog in the national defence machinery. Since recruitment of new officers was made by a careful selection of the 'best' conscripted soldiers, these norms were reinforced into the military practice as these new officers advanced in the ranks of the modern military.

The second question of how (by what themes of military narratives) violence and death are presented, naturalised and/or silenced in the *portrayal* of Swedish military practice is in much answered by how the analysis illustrates examples of such portrayal. But so as to offer a more theoretically anchored answer to this question, the themes of the bureaucratisation discourse are directly below concluded with the help of terms from Chapter 2.

The themes used to elucidate the construction of bureaucratisation of death and violence in the military discourse offer insight into how a process of identification is made possible through a particular use of language. The relation to the dead and the human body is of particular interest here as it illustrates how language and images operate to underline a process of reification. It is an objectifying process which trivialises the dead and the fact that military violence actually inflicts harm to the human body. The body becomes a logistic item and a 'problem' of war which can be solved by issuing regulations and creating organisations (units and hierarchies of responsibilities), furthering bureaucratisation as a central aspects of how death and violence are neutralised in military practice.

In addition, the analysis reveals how technological language and imagery are set as central points of reference for how identification can operate through military discourse. Central to this operation are that technological possibilities, such as what machines make possible in terms of firepower, is discursively constructed to take precedence over human considerations. What this means is that the technological aspect of the materiality of war encompass a human-object relation which suggest

that the machine (with its possibilities of use) creates a yard-stick for military 'rationality'. In other words, the military discourse constructs the possibility for the existence of a relation between the military agent and the materiality of the practice, in which the possibilities of the machine hold the 'normative higher ground'.

The relation between technology and the military subject illustrated in this chapter feed into the mythology of bureaucratised military violence through the way in which military narratives separate killing from a human, irrational and emotion-clad activity, to an industrialised, mechanised and automated, performance. In these narratives the soldier who does the killing is reconstructed from killer to an operator of machines. The killed is transformed from victim to casualty and then to a product of war (logistic item). These transformations bring with them new (to the 20th century) rationales through the automated production of killing humans. The implementation of mechanical skills is one such rationale, as it is intrinsic to the promotion of 'the soldier' as being able to become a craftsman of machines. Those subjected to this narration of military violence get gratification from such human norms/ideals as perfection, craftsman skill and procedural efficiency. The narratives are powerful in affecting our understanding of military violence through the use and portrayal of the following elements/components: the machine gun/gunner's identity as a producer of a product (machine-gun fire); the promotion of the usefulness of training; technological progress; the rationality inherent in action; the micromanagement of practice i.e. structuralising and ordering social activity. Thus the narratives in this chapter do not tell tales of killing humans, they tell tales of modernity, where the promotion of these types of norms and practices are in close concert with how modern society is conceptualised (Bauman 1989, 35–37, 51, 55, 78; P. M. Hardt and Negri 2000, 74–75, 83–84, 126). Clearly the relation between machines, and military subjects as 'operators', which contemporary research critically investigate (e.g. the social relations between drones and the drone-operator) has a historicaly constructed 'origin' in how military practices has been bureaucratrised and 'rationalised'. (see Holmqvist 2013a).

Furthermore, the analysis of the military narratives conducted in this chapter illuminates that production and education of soldiers are closely connected to regulation of the military practice. Here the discourse offers avenues of categorisation and ways of ordering the military practice by techniques of fragmentising combat practices and the spatial aspects of war. By fragmenting close combat, for instance, the military practice is bureaucratised and reformed into something similar to health education (the training of the soldier's body) – death and violence are here neutralised and silenced by how the language and materiality of the practice rewrite violent practices with educational and competitive points of reference.

On a final note, the masculine norms found to be central for how the military narrates its violent practices infuses the military discourse with ways of identifications that are anchored in an 'on/off' understanding of human emotions. In particular, the military discourse portrays masculine norms as something that should be learned

and endorsed, but from a 'clinical' perspective where the arbitrariness, meaninglessness, possible fun or sadistic pleasure of violence are removed and replaced by principles of 'winning'. Masculine norms thus work to enforce the ways of identification made possible by military narratives of violence, by endorsing and making use of the points of reference where military use of violence is discursively silenced or neutralised.

In the following two chapters I will examine how contemporary operational military practices connect to some of the ways of identifications that I have tried to visualise here. But the following chapters also engage with how the language and materiality of operational work comprise subjectivities which work to bureaucratise death and violence.

5

Chapter 5: Operational Staff Work

In this chapter, operational staff work is critically investigated in order to analyse how military staff practice shapes understandings of violence and death through bureaucratic routines and the workings of daily social relations. Furthermore, the chapter also investigates how reification and misrecognition of the Other exist and operate in the bureaucratised labour of the operational staff practice. Additionally, the chapter also analyses what values and norms come into the forefront in the construction of military masculinity in the context of military operational bureaucratised labour. In line with the thesis' theoretical and methodological setting, the aim here is in other words to spell out how subjectivities and ways of identifications form (and recreate) understandings of violence through the actions taken by the agents of the operational staff work. It is thus the ways of articulation, the rituals and the relations of a Swedish military staff that outline the main body of 'data' analysed here. Initially the context of the Swedish Joint Forces Command Support Staff is introduced whereafter the chapter moves to discuss findings from the ethnographical and autoethnographical investigation conducted during the spring of 2016. In conclusion the chapter summarises how social rules and norms, and the struggles within the practice, provide a reinforcement of bureaucratised understandings of military violence.

5.1 Context of the operational staff

The environment

Compared to the intensity of the international staff exercise (outlined in the next chapter) the daily life at the Joint Forces Command Support Staff consists of a routine that resembles ordinary work at any Swedish governmental institution. People start between 7.30-8.30 a.m. and leave work at 4.30-5.30 p.m. There is generally a coffee break at 9.30 a.m, lunch at 11.30 and another coffee break at 2.30 p.m. Most people sit in separate offices and work when they are not attending meetings in conference rooms. Some of them actually do not leave their desk much except for going on breaks, but this is dependent on their position and related engagement in the different work processes at the departments of the staff. People who are engaged in operational planning and support to ongoing operations spend more time in meetings compared to those who, for instance, work with administrative issues. All in all,

day-to-day work at the staff gives quite a non-military impression of the context of work, were it not for the security surrounding the building, and the (occasionally) military-related decorations on walls and shelves. And, of course, the fact that many people, of which a majority are men, are in uniform. The context of the practice is far from the cliché of military men standing around a map, pointing at crucial sections of the terrain, and discussing different options for how to best achieve operational goals. Discussions where operational issues are in focus do exist, but these are confined to conference rooms, and often conducted by a small number of area experts (intelligence/logistics/command and control/tactics etc.). I need only a couple of days in this environment to be reminded of the power that lies inherent in the work carried out by these staff officers and civilian experts. The Swedish system puts much of the preparations, planning and to some extent also conduct of operations on these people's shoulders, and their daily work can consist of tasks that are close to the execution of military force. They work with such diverse and complex things as, for instance, creating a draft of the commander's intent (outline of how entire operations are to be conducted) or outlining such central things as a detailed logistical plan for deployment of troops. This way of letting the 'Indians' serve the 'Chiefs' with suggestions on courses of action, new directions, or development of certain issues, fits into the 'rational' idea that the experts are the ones best equipped to prepare, outline and give suggestions.[12] These verbs are helpful when thinking about what the practice "operational staff work" is comprised of and what the majority of people engage in it do. In this rationality, the higher officers and senior civil servants are used as 'decision-making machines'. They evaluate the work of the experts (staff officers and/or civilian experts) and give a "go" (sometimes with some changes) or a "no-go". In this, the use of PowerPoint presentations is the prevailing tool for the 'Indians' to use when briefing the 'Chiefs'. Therefore, apart from attending meetings, the daily staff work entails preparations for presentations and writing orders. Such work is sometimes done in the solitary confinement of the office, or in a small group where each picture in the presentation is thoroughly discussed: if its message is clear, if it is necessary information for the commander to have, and what level of detail it should comprise.

Most of the Joint Staff's space in the dark brown brick clad building consists of long corridors that run parallel to each other, turning in 90 degrees at the corners of the building. The building itself is an eight storey high cubic edifice with two inner courts. Work-offices are situated on the outer edges of these two corridors, and conference and a few coffee rooms are located in-between the corridors, leaving most of these latter spaces without any windows. The walls are painted plain white or light beige, the floors are of a light brown plastic material and there is a ceiling of white rectangular metal plates. Here and there framed posters hang on the walls. Pictures of soldiers talking to women in traditional Muslim clothing or smiling at children playing in the streets of foreign cities, or of UN vehicles roaring through desert

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[12] My colleagues use the terms "Indians" and "Chiefs" quite commonly when they describe their own work and/or their position in the chain of command. "I'm just one of the Indians…" is a type of phrase that often initiates articulations that belong to questions of roles and responsibilities among my interlocutors.

landscapes are some of the motives that meet me every day. But these types of motives are concentrated around the area where the Chief of Joint Operations and the Deputy Chief have their offices. Otherwise the decorations consist mostly of reproductions of classic art hanging here and there. There are empty, or nearly empty, wooden bookshelves in the corridors, which give me a feeling of temporality, as if they were placed there to be moved to another location. In the hallway of the main entrance to the department there are some glass cupboards that display the Chief of Joint Operation's different gifts from other countries' armed forces, and framed pictures of the general/admiral meeting high-ranking foreign officers. The purpose of this display is probably to show visitors that if they bring a gift (commonly a small shield on a wooden plate, or a large coin engraved with the giver's country, rank, name and unit) these are shown to other guests/visitors. Other parts of the Headquarters (HQ) also have these types of decorations, where plates, pictures, medals and sometimes a flag represent the Armed Forces' long tradition of international engagement and cooperation with other countries.

One of my first thoughts on this tradition of decoration was that they help uphold certain traits of military identity. That is, putting coins, medals and national flags as central objects of a military culture is something that is closely related to our understanding of what is important for defining a military Self. Giving the subject some more thought, I realise that I had to 'be' an ethnographer to see these objects at all. Searching for cultural attachment to these objects within myself gives nothing: they are indeed peripheral objects to my military Self. Their importance lies thus on aggregating a myth of what the military should encompass when it comes to symbols and objects. They are in other words 'supposed to be there'. One benefit of being a 'halfie' ethnographer is that there are possibilities to go beyond such first impressions and search for the objects and symbols that actually matter for constructing identity and Self within oneself. Medals, for instance, help me 'read' colleagues when meeting them, but I must actively think about doing so. I do not automatically look at other officers' medals for information. To me they are insignias of working experience (if you have been to a NATO mission and/or a UN mission and so forth). But my peripheral interest in them limits their worth to just that: identifying international engagements. I simply do not know/remember what all the colours and markings mean and I also think that those who know details like that are 'overly interested' in military matters.

In the Swedish military there is an expression for that type of person: Military Overly Interested Person, or MOP. These are the ones that have an 'unhealthy' relationship to military practice in that they do not keep their distance to it. This may be a unique trait for the Swedish military culture to define a behaviour as 'overly military'. It is beyond this investigation to find that out, but nevertheless, it is important to note as part of the context description here that mythological military symbols (such as medals and flags) do not necessarily have a central place in the construction of operational military culture just because they are placed on display in the corridors of the building. On the other hand, such symbols still offer ways of identifica-

tion for the personnel working in this building by the mere fact that they actually have been placed here.

Organisation and tasks

The HQ consists of several different staffs. First of all, it is divided (both physically and conceptually) between staffs that work with planning/current operations, and staffs that work with production/management of units. This separation runs through the entire Swedish Armed Forces (AF) and is based on an idea that there are major differences between the production of units and the conduct of operations. There is thus a 'war-time' organisation and a 'production' organisation in the Swedish military. And the organisation of staffs in the HQ mirrors this division (see pic. 1 (below) where the Joint Forces Command represent the 'war time' organisation and the Training & Development Staff represent the 'production' organisation). What this means is that management and production are not supposed to be a major part of the operational job. Instead, the staffs working with military operations are to focus on planning, conducting and evaluating both national and international missions.

The "joint" in Joint Forces Command means that it handles all the branches of the military: army, navy, air force and special operations. There are four tactical staffs (Tactical Component Commands or simply 'CC's') and these are placed beneath the operational staff, both in hierarchy and actually in levels of floors in the main HQ building. These staffs are engaged in current missions and in the training of standing units, within respective branches of the military. In addition, there is a higher staff (the Defence Staff) that 'rules them all' which functions as the strategic level, comprising the institution's connection to the parliament and government (and is placed on the top floor of the building). The Joint Support Staff has a NATO-inspired organisation where the departments are divided by numbers with standard meanings ("J" indicates "Joint"): J1 – Personnel; J2 – Intelligence; J3 – Current operations/short term planning; J4 – Logistics; J5/7 – a merger of long term planning (no. 5) and training/exercises (no. 7); J6 – Signal/Command and Control; J8 – Finance; J9 – Civil/military cooperation. The staff also has a coordination department (support to the Chief of Staff and also includes advisers to the Chief of Joint Operations) and a department for evaluating operations and exercises. The staff is led by a Chief of Staff (COS) and a Deputy Chief of Staff (DCOS).

Pict 1. Organisation of the Swedish Armed Forces Headquarters at the time of the ethnographical investigation. (Swedish Armed Forces, 2016)

Most of my time at the staff was spent on following the activities of J3 and J5/7, but I made sure to engage in conversations with all heads of the departments (booked meetings) and as many of the staff workers as I could (regardless of their position in the HQ). Interaction with people from different departments came quite naturally since Swedes tend to take coffee breaks at given times during the day. In addition, a rough estimate is that I knew at least a third of the officers working in this environment from my previous stationing and positions. This made my job generally easier and I could join a department's coffee break or lunch without much social resistance. After a couple of weeks of 'defrosting' it became more common that people would pop into my room for a chat, or invite me into their offices when I, during slow moments, roamed the corridors of the staff. Needless to say, I owe these people a great deal for their welcoming attitude and generosity in sharing their thoughts on everyday life at the staff.

With that said, there were a number of times when I had to 'turn in the door' as my presence was seen as a problem for some of the work done at the staff. Military organisations are excluding towards foreign entities in general, but work that includes classified material becomes even more inaccessible for researchers, even military ones. This was more common at the beginning of my stay at the staff as people did not know how to 'handle' me. After some time, these occasions were minimised and my presence at meetings was more and more accepted. This meant that I could participate in much of the meetings that handled the Swedish mission to Mali and also other types of meetings where operational issues of a wide span (both

national and international) were to be coordinated and discussed. The point here is that I have focused my ethnographical investigation on a staff that, in theory, should be closest to the preparation of, and support to, the use of force. The operative level is often described as being the link between strategic/political interests and goals and the tactical execution of missions (Angstrom and Widen 2015, 64). To be on the operational level means that you have to be able to transform long-time strategic or political aims into concrete operational goals, as well as set together these goals with appropriative resources and other means by the use of creating plans or giving current operational directions to the tactical levels.

One could argue that the tactical staffs (the CC's) are much closer to the use of force than the Joint Support Staff. Several of my interlocutors did point that out during my conversations with them (e.g. CR1_02090930-1000). My reason for insisting on following the practice of the Joint Support Staff rests on my conviction that operational work is central when it comes to conditions of possibility to engage in military violence. In other words, it is a practice that paves the way for violence. Also important for choosing it is its transformative character. Operational work can face many complexities when trying to turn political and strategic goals into 'reality', which can either rupture a bureaucratised approach to violence or enforce it, depending on how the practice is constructed. And finally, my interest in how military practice handles political issues creates a need to follow the work of those who have to make operations out of strategy and policies: it is a position where daily routines meet with the contingency of the political. Thus, the operational level is in this investigation seen as the place where *the social* meets *the political* when it comes to the use of force.

> The social is the realm of sedimented practices, that is, practices that conceal the originary acts of their contingent political institution and which are taken for granted. As if they were self-grounded.
> […]
> The frontier between the social and the political is essentially unstable and requires constant displacements and renegotiations between social agents. (Mouffe 2005, 17–18)

In short, I see operational staff work as a practice where agents need to relate to and position themselves with regard to how the political is formed. "Relate" in this context might mean that they ignore the political aspects of their work entirely, or that they frequently discuss and involve aspects from the political realm in their work (and anything in between these positions). The point is that the political aspect of using military force must be dealt with somehow in this practice and as a political scientist (in becoming) this intrigued me. But the focus for my investigation is nonetheless to find out how operational work manages, neutralises or silences the inescapable presence of death and violence.

The meetings of the operational staff

As touched upon above, I have followed a number of groups, meetings and persons' daily work at the Joint Forces Command. Most time has been spent on the working group "AG MINUSMA". It is a type of meeting housing representatives (I sometimes also call them delegates, and they are staff officers and/or civilian experts a.k.a 'Indians') from a wide range of departments and other staffs, even some from other governmental authorities like the Swedish Defence Material Administration (FMV). During my time following AG MINUSMA the average attendance at meetings was 22 people, which indicates that very few of those that were called were missing from the meetings. However, this number only accounts for those who are in place for the standard 45-60 minutes meeting where the agenda for coordination is quite strictly followed. AG MINUSMA was very often followed by what are called "after-sittings" which are forums for specific issues that need to be discussed in detail. Attendance at such 'sittings' fell to an average rate of 9 staff members. Delegates were most commonly from current operations on the Land Component Command (G3 LCC), the Training & Development Staff's Army Department and Infrastructure Department, and representatives from the operational staff's departments J2, J3 and J5/7. So despite the large organisation of the HQ and its staffs, current operational issues (for this mission) are coordinated in detail by relatively few people. These 'after-sittings' could last for everything between 20-30 minutes to several hours.

The purpose of the meetings is, as mentioned, to "coordinate" issues regarding the Swedish contribution to the UN-mission MINUSMA in Mali. This mission is in comparison to the Afghanistan mission seen as a classic peacekeeping UN-mission. "It is not Afghanistan" to quote several of my interlocutors at the staff, which means that even though Mali is by no means a country in peace, the level of violence is expected to be fairly low (R102171115). The official branding of the mission is that it is a Chapter VII "stabilisation mission": "United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali" or MINUSMA (Regeringen 2015, 4). The Swedish contribution (2015/2016) consists of an Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Task Force (ISR-unit) and a National Support Element (NSE). Approximately 250 soldiers and officers are involved. It has been in place since December 2014 and has had its main area of operation in the western parts of Mali, with a base camp on the outskirts of the city of Timbuktu. When I arrived at the operational staff at the beginning of February 2016, the work with renewing the National Support Plan (NSP) for the Swedish contribution to MINUSMA was in full motion. The details of this plan are quite inconsequential for understanding how the practice is bureaucratised, and they are also classified. But on a general level it can be said that the plan was meant to provide the means for keeping the mission supported and to provide the staff with tools for measuring how well the mission has proceeded. The work with the support plan followed a method called "Swedish Planning and Command method" (SPL 3.0) which is a 238 page long document that outlines the process of constructing and coordinating operations. This document rests heavily on NATO's equivalent document: NATO Allied Command Operations

Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD) which thus provides NATO staffs support on how planning and guidance of military operations are to function.

While AG MINUSMA is a J3-led working group, and thus handles issues regarding the current mission, the creation of the National Support Plan was a J5/7 task. This is due to how the military divide responsibilities for work by what time frame the product of the work is related to. A National Support Plan is a product that is created to support a coming rotation of new units into the mission area and support for these new units during their time in the operational area. This means that such a plan is first developed by J5/7 (long term plans) and when the time for rotation of units approaches, it is handed over to J3, as they work with current and short term planning.

Another type of coordination meeting that I have followed is the Joint Coordination Board Working Group, most commonly referred to as the JCBWG. This is a type of meeting that has the highest level in the 'coordination hierarchy' in the operational staff work. The purpose is to bring together those Officers with Primary Responsibility (OPRs) who are leading working groups throughout the staff and have them inform each other of their work. In addition to the OPRs, the JCBWG is supposed to have at least the same type of broad representation that the other working groups have, but during my time at the staff it had a much lower attendance rate than AG MINUSMA (an average of 17). The outcome of the meeting is to decide what issues need to be "nominated" for a place at the Commander's Decision Meeting (described below). So the members of this meeting, led by an OPR from J3, discuss if an issue needs to be prepared (and by whom) and eventually presented for the Chief of Joint Operations. JCBW has no 'after-sittings' and is, in my view, more of an event where information is shared, not discussed (as compared to AG MINUSMA's after-sittings).

A third type of meeting that was part of my ethnographical investigation is the Commander's Decision Meeting, a meeting inspired by the Joint Coordination Board (JCB) from the NATO staff process. Here different staff officers present their respective planning products, often with a final picture where the suggested decision is highlighted. Officers presenting are most commonly those who lead the different planning groups on the staffs (so called OPRs). This responsibility is often tied to those who work on J5 or in some cases J3 (the latter when there is something connected to ongoing operations). The room where these meetings take place consists of tables that are placed in the formation of an 'open rectangle'. Participants are the heads of departments, advisers to the Commander, and the chiefs of the tactical component commands (or their respective COSs). Most of the advisers and experts sit in "back seat" position, i.e. in chairs placed alongside the walls of the room. There are 27 participants in average at these meetings so the room is usually quite crowded. For those that sit at the table there are plastic signs with the acronyms of their respective department marking their designated seat. There is a white canvas screen at the far end of the room and several whiteboards and maps on the walls.

Furthermore, the room also has a projector which displays PowerPoint presentations on the screen. Some units participate on video-link and are seen on a big screen TV in the far right corner of the room (seen from the Commander's place at the short end of the formation of tables).

J1	J2	J3 IO	J4	J5	J6	J7	J8	J9	Verkan	J3 Plan
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11

SC INSATS

C INSATS

JCB

C J3

J3 Plan

12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23
ATS	MTS	FTS	FMLOG	FMTIS	SFL	PROD	MUST	JURS	PERSS	INFOS	Regional stab

| LNO ATS | LNO MTS | LNO FTS | INSS Koord.avd | C INSATS Rådgivare | Övriga FMV m.fl |

Pict. 2 outlines a generic description of the meeting as found in the Swedish Planning and Command Method (SPL 3.0). "C INSATS" is the Swedish wording for "Chief of Joint Operations". (Försvarsmakten 2015b, 220)

There is always a formal procedure for these meetings, the details of which make these meetings different from the other meetings I have participated in. While waiting for the commander, the Chief of the Joint Support Staff (COS) comes in and tells us to stand up. One person goes out to let the chiefs know we are ready. Then the Commander (and sometimes the Deputy Commander) enters and says "Good afternoon" and "Please be seated". During my time at the staff the commanders leading this meeting normally wore the "casual" staff uniform (no tie or jacket, but a short sleeved collared shirt). Presenters and those involved in managing the meeting wear staff uniforms with tie and jacket. So there is a clear difference here: presenters make an effort to look tidy for this type of event and it is also an unwritten rule that they should wear a tie and jacket. When the Commander (and the rest of us) have taken our seats, the COS tells the Commander what today's briefing is about (which the Commander already knows as he/she gets the information beforehand). After the COS has finished talking, and the Commander has approved of the agenda, the head of the department responsible for the issue to be briefed stands at attention next to the canvas screen and says "Admiral (or "General" depending on the commander's rank), JX (x equals the department number) ready for briefing". The Commander says "Go ahead" or "Please start". The head of the department then stands at ease and reports to the Commander what is going to be briefed. This person then takes

his/her seat at the table and the actual briefer gets up 'on stage'. If this person is a military officer, he/she also stands at attention and says "Admiral (General)" and waits for a nod, or a short "Go ahead"/"Proceed" from the Commander.[13] The briefer then stands at ease and delivers his/her presentation. Sometimes at the end of the presentation the presenting officer yet again stands at attention waiting for the Commander's decision. The decision meetings are quite short (30 min) and contain 1-3 issues for the commander to take decision on. They are performed approximately once every two weeks, but it varies depending on the need.

Specific details on material and method for the investigation of the operational staff

Before getting to the main results from my investigations, some numbers should be presented. Of the approximately 900 people working at the HQ, the Joint Forces Command amounts to 264, of which 45 are women (all numbers include military and non-military personnel). In my cartography of the practice, I have met very few women, 6 civilians and 3 officers have been in close proximity to the work I have followed (In 2015, only 6% of those serving in the Swedish Armed Forces officers corps were women, Försvarsmakten 2015a, 40). I was placed as researcher at the Joint Support Staff from February 1 2016, to the middle of June 2016. My archive consists of 31 notes from interviews and conversations, and 37 written observations of meetings and social encounters (such as lunch/coffee breaks). I have tried to write my notes in in a way that gives a rich context to events without including details that would render them classified. But much of the specific content (details about issues worked with) in meetings has not been written down due to the level of classification on that information. All in all, my archive for the operational staff work consists of approximately 45 500 words. In addition, I also have several hundred pages of material (books, manuals, products) that are used in the practice itself.

In the following I have divided the analysis into how ways of identification and subjectivities exist as social rules and norms, vital for shaping the operational work into a bureaucratised type of labour. These sections are in turn divided into subsections that aim to clarify what points of reference these social rules and norms comprise: which *relations* are vital for the function of the social rule/norm in focus; how *meaning-making* operates to bureaucratise the practice; and how the transformative operative language and its materiality *sediment* bureaucratised understandings of violence. As explained by Glynos and Howarth, making estimates on how articulated elements of discourse best are sorted into such social rules/norms requires a form of expertise (Glynos and Howarth 2007, 183 f). A researcher can acquire the needed expertise to make judgments in many ways (e.g. historical studies of a case, or theoretical studies of a specific phenomenon). For me it has been on the one hand a part of the ethnographical practice to learn as much as possible of the work at the Joint

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[13] I often got the feeling that the Commanders at this point in the meeting were quite tired of the formalities surrounding the briefings. At a minimum, the commander must give some form of "go ahead" for at least three times before the actual event 'goes ahead'.

Staff. On the other hand, I have tried to increase my expertise in 'judging correctly' by studying theories that discuss relations between discourse, language and practice. I have had a head start in the former area of expertise compared to others with no knowledge of military work, but in the other I have had the same 'uphill climb' as any novice researcher. But increasing my own expertise has, as noted, only been one part of the process. The other strategy of finding social rules/norms of bureaucratisation has been to discuss what I have seen and learned with the practitioners themselves. In several cases such discussions have helped me understand how certain aspects of the practice are more central than others when it comes to how social relations, language and activities are formed. Furthermore, this has been a way for me to adhere to a central theme in contemporary ethnographical investigations: the importance of providing relevance for, and inclusion of, the interlocutors (Lassiter 2005, 16 ff). In the end I have focused on analysing the material in the light of the following social rules/norms: consensus; order and bureaucracy; and finally masculinity/production. How these social rules/norms help form the practice is accounted for below.

5.2 The Social Rules of Consensus: Maintaining Social Bonds and Control

In this section I will account for my analysis of the ways of identification and subjectivities of the social rules/norms of consensus. After a short introduction, I expand upon how consensus affects the social relations of the practice. Thereafter I proceed to discuss how consensus provides meaning to the practitioners and their work. Following this, the analysis proceeds by engaging in how consensus operates to inform the practitioners with a sense of naturalness when it comes to how the practice is conducted. Finally, this section is concluded by a discussion on how consensus relates to the formation of bureaucratised understandings of violence.

Introduction

> "We will not bring an issue to the commander if we do not have consensus on it." (OPR JCBWG, O26_04131430-1502)
> "My task is to create a solution to this… a solution that we all can agree on, so that we can go to the commander with a suggestion that is based on consensus." (OPR Working group, O10_03160900)

The first law of Swedish operational practice is to create consensus. It is a rule that is both directly articulated during daily work and found in interpretation of actors' behaviour. This rule becomes more dominant with increasing importance of an issue: if an issue is deemed to involve higher commanders (flag officers, i.e. generals/admirals) the articulations of consensus become more common (O13_03220900-1000; O26_04131430-1502; O30_050310:18-11:09). 'Issues' are central objects of the practice, and they can consist of many things related to planned and ongoing operations. For example, a plan for supporting a mission, or a detailed question

where the operational level gives very specific guidance to the tactical staff are typical issues. Consensus might seem like a straightforward concept in this context (as opposed to, for instance, in a context of philosophy) but it is not a simple agreement among agents that is at play here. Admittedly, agreement on an issue is the *theoretical* idea behind the rule, but it contains much more than that. And its outcome is only theoretical in that consensus in this practice is practically impossible to achieve. This impossibility is to some extent based on the fact that preparations of issues have been constructed in a complex and sometimes mystifying way for the agents taking part in it. I account for this complexity in more detail in the next section of this chapter as it originates from other rules and norms of the practice. Here I want to focus on what consensus encompasses in terms of what social relations it upholds and what meaning-making effect it has, and how it sediments certain aspects of the practice despite the practitioners' dismay with it. All of this is done in order to increase our knowledge of the social rule that "makes it [the practice at hand] tick" (Glynos and Howarth 2007, 135).

Relations – driving force behind the practice

First of all, it is with reference to its productive use in work methods that agents rationalise the rule of consensus. But from my observations I conclude that its place in the practice actually is sprung out of fear for breaking social bonds and threats against identity (on the centrality of consensus in Swedish identity construction, see: Agius 2006, chap. 3). The senior agents' own view of it rests on the argument that consensus is a goal in staff work and to get there you have to twist and turn everything which thus makes the issue at hand very thoroughly discussed on the way towards this goal (C20_04051300-1350; C30_05310800-0855). Another argument made trying to rationalise consensus is that it is really about anchoring solutions to 'issues' among different chiefs in the organisation and that it is not about agreement at all (C28_05241300-1355). The agreement part just comes along when people equate the act of anchoring with the concept of consensus (Ibid). Contradictory to these explanations, observations made of the practice indicate an emotional driving force behind its use. Staff officers really do not want to stand in front of an assembly of high ranking officers and get questions or statements that they have not previously dealt with. When, which is very seldom, this happens, I can feel the embarrassment of the onlookers and the agents involved. By using myself as an instrument, listening to how I react and feel while observing events and watching others in the practice interacting, the function of consensus stands clear (Adams, Jones, and Ellis 2015, 26): It is in place to avoid shame, resentment and/or discomfort.

Conversations with the 'Indians' of the practice strengthen this particular understanding of this social rule as they express critique after these rare events. For example, one of my interlocutors expressed resentment after getting questions from a commander during a briefing where many high ranking officers were attending. Questions that (the interlocutor argued) could have been asked before the briefing took place (e.g. O31_05031230-1315). Sociological studies show that feelings like

shame are powerful drivers of how humans interact, and that shame actually can be understood as a threat to social bonds (Scheff 2000). The threat (in this context) lies in the exposure of unprofessionalism and reduction of esteem from high-ranking officers. The former can hamper the relations between the shamed and his/her colleagues in the progress of further staff work, whereas the latter can affect the afflicted person's possibilities for making a career. At least, the threat is thus perceived. If it really has such effects is unclear, but it does not matter for the function of the rule. As long as subjects of the practice believe that breaking consensus equals unprofessional behaviour and in addition perceive this as creating embarrassing social situations, the practice will be informed by it. Professionalism and career are two very integrated aspects of military identity as previous studies of military show (in the British context: R. Woodward and Neil Jenkings 2011, 258 f; in the Swedish context: Ydén 2008, 246 ff). Consensus thus works as a rule that is meant to keep military identity intact by making sure that social bonds are not broken.

A situation that is threatening to break the bond that provides a secure place for us is indeed a powerful driver in forming military practice. Military identity is strong. It has always been rewarding in the sense that it has given me a secure place in relation to others. But on the other hand, it also breeds fear of exclusion (see: Grimell 2015 on how exclusion from military life often results in some form of trauma). Even as I write this analysis of what I have seen, heard and learned from my time at the HQ, I feel the urge to disregard and hide the aspects of consensus. Writing about it makes me feel the risk of exclusion. But as it is clear to me that it is a social rule which lies beneath much of what the practitioners actually do at the staff, I really cannot avoid it. The task here is to penetrate the surface (of the superficial explanations) of the practice and dive in deep.

Meaning-making – how consensus shapes staff practice

The rules and norms of consensus are not continuously successful in regulating social relations within the practice. But the ambition to live by this rule creates and gives meaning to several parts of operational work. Here I want to explore a second aspect of consensus: its strong function in completing the ideal set out by the term "professional staff work". This ambition rests on how my observations indicate connections between the need to uphold social bonds and how the practice is outlined. For instance, to avoid being questioned or getting strong counter-arguments during final briefings, the practice has created a system where sending the calling message out to a broad list of recipients is seen as a basic rule of good staff work, because then you can always argue that parts of the staff have had a chance to participate (O20_04051038). While observing meetings I have seen many example of how consensus is understood to emerge by sheer participation. Filling a position at the meeting does not mean that agents will actively engage in discussions or give comments on issues. Silence is regarded as agreement. Even the given, but not taken, possibility to participate may be enough to establish that the rule of consensus has been adhered to (O23_ 04061430, O26_04131430). When representatives from

departments or other staffs are not present at meetings, there is no direct action taken. In some cases, OPRs for the major forums, like the JCBWG, have had a discussion with departments/staffs that have a low (estimated) frequency of attendance. But as one OPR laconically notes at the beginning of one such meeting "apparently I lost that discussion", since the department in this particular case was yet again not present (O16_03231430). But, as mentioned, there is no direct action taken when meetings have low attendance or are manned by uninformed personnel. It seems that the *image* of a broad participation of the different parts of the HQ (other staffs) is important to preserve. Such sometimes 'imaginary' broad representation is a way to practically counter the risk for breaking social bonds in the way described above, as it gives the impression that consensus 'is at work'.

If one of the tactical staffs, the Land Component Command (LCC) for example, has had participation in the working group that has had the responsibility to solve a particular issue, then it is hard for the commander of the LCC to ask critical questions during the final briefing for the Operational Commander. This comes from the simple reason that the LCC commander risks disavowing his/her own personnel posing such questions. But even more grave (for the LCC commander in this example) is that asking many critical questions during final briefings exposes that chief to another critique: that he/she does not have knowledge of the job, and the trust of the staff worker, on his/her staff. This becomes evident as the briefer, often the Officer with Primary Responsibility (OPR), can counter 'any' critique by pointing at the fact that all functions of the staff have been 'involved' in the preparation of the issue. This way of forming the practice also has the effect of creating an understanding among chiefs that the products of the work (orders, briefings) have been well-prepared and suggested solutions are anchored in the different staffs of the HQ. This is not really the case in many of the issues that I have followed where the work really has been done by a small number of people, who also have had very limited time to prepare the issues because of the many meetings taking place.

I have seen how consensus can produce a mode of silence during decision briefs, but also during some regular work meetings where very few questions or comments are made. Conversations with some of the heads of departments confirm this; some (but not all) see themselves as mainly filling a seat during some types of meetings (C17_03221325, C25_0517009). But as in many cases of social interaction between humans, there are exceptions. Some higher commanders simply ignore the risks mentioned here and ask questions anyway. But the result is that fractures emerge in the relations between the commanders and their staffs. Furthermore, such behaviour fuels the practitioners' use of the consensus rule. The staff learns and adapts to what kind of questions their commander has a tendency to ask during briefings. If one commander recurrently asks for details on specific issues, then the briefings will become more complex and it becomes even more important for briefers to be able to refer to participation by different experts in the preparation of the issue (C9_181010, C15_03101000, C29_05250920). This type of behaviour infuses the practice with activities like involving civilian economy experts or technical experts into the staff

work. The result is that working meetings at the operational staff mostly discuss details about economy, personnel and equipment. Some commanders are not that interested in specific issue related details, but will instead ask about involvement and how well the current issues are known by the staffs (O2_02231107, O33_05311500). Thus, either approach reproduces the importance of creating consensus.

Furthermore, professional staff work also includes pre-briefings. Created by the rules of consensus, this phenomenon is in place to secure lower ranked chiefs' (colonel or one-star general) approval of briefings that are to be given to higher commanders. By performing a rehearsal of the briefings that are intended to be given the higher commanders, the agents involved (both the briefer and his/her closest chief) establish an agreement on what is going to be said and shown to the higher commander. This part of the practice helps counter a situation where the lower ranked chief is put in a position where he/she is faced with questions from the higher COM that they cannot answer. It also helps them be informed about what is going on in different issues which is how this piece of the practice is often rationalised. But this rationalisation goes against the theoretical idea of operational military staff work which says that it is those with the detailed knowledge of issues, and with the responsibility for sorting them out, that brief commanders. So in theory, low ranking chiefs are not supposed to be informed at a detail level as they are not the ones to answer questions of that sort. For me it is clear that the force driving this 'pre-briefing practice' is more connected to securing a smooth performance during decision briefs. There are other ways, less time-consuming than the act of pre-briefing, available to a low ranking chief to be up to speed on current work in the staff.

Taken together, the way of letting the practice form under the rules of consensus provides it with a certain aspect of theatrical performance. I often get the feeling that I am witnessing rehearsals for a play when I attend meetings. And the main play itself is certainly the commander's decision brief. It follows a strict script. Words have been chosen carefully and have been rehearsed (pre-briefings). It follows certain formalities that mark the different actors' social position (level of power). It requires preparation of stage equipment (briefings, computer and screen, tables set in position, seatings set with signs, people standing/sitting in the right places) which when faulty creates a significant level of stress for the responsible officers (O33_05311500). Participants have designated roles to play (briefer, adviser, commander 'decision-taker', administrator, prefect (COS), audience 'seat-filler'). Their roles provide them with a certain set of words to use and moments for when to speak. But it is a social play that is performed, not an aesthetic one. The former aims to establish "[…] structure, clear division, stability between different categories, monotony and repeatability, predictability […]" in the practice (Bauman 1995, 222 my translation). This brings me to the third and final aspect of the consensus rules: their function in the process of fixating the practice.

Sedimentation – this is simply what we do

> When someone of whom I am afraid orders me to continue a series, I act quickly, with perfect assurance, and the lack of reason does not trouble me. (§212 Wittgenstein 2009, 90)

The staff practice "lack of reason" (e.g. the meaning of participation in meetings, the importance of mundane details, the silence during decision briefs) is not as in Wittgenstein's paragraph untroublesome for the agents of the practice. Many of the people I have talked to individually do see problems created by consensus (e.g. C19_04051130, C25_0517009). But they act by it, and reinforce the rules when 'in concert'. As the quotations at the beginning of section 5.2 indicate, agents of the practice even articulate consensus as a product of staff work. For an outsider this might seem strange: how can they be critical to it in one moment, just to enforce it in the next? For me the answer is connected partly to the fear of breaking bonds, as discussed above, but also partly to the fact that operational staff practice is strictly routinised. It is indeed fear (of shame or shaming) that subordinates the agents of the practice under the rules of consensus. But this alone is not a viable explanation to the behaviour of critique and acceptance of the rules, as there is resistance among the practitioners to this particular fear. To stay in place, consensus draws from the social play that is performed in day-to-day work. It is the fabric of the monotone workday that breaks down the agents' resistance to the rules of consensus. Wittgenstein's (inner) dialogue on how series of signs are reproduced in a repeated pattern provides some food for thought on this latter aspect. Especially since the facility to follow given or set procedures seems to be predominant among the members of the staff (and myself). There is a certain safety in finding routines and following them, but repeatedly informed behaviour will eventually speak for itself.

> "How am I able to follow a rule?" – If this is not a question about causes, then it is about the justification for my acting in *this* way in complying with the rule.
> Once I have exhausted the justifications, I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: "This is simply what I do." (§217 Wittgenstein 2009, 91)

One type of bedrock that I have encountered during my time in the staff is the procedure of conducting meetings. Every meeting that I have followed during my time at the HQ starts with an agenda. The agenda is always the same for the same type of meetings. This is in no way particularly surprising, but I often get the feeling that my military colleagues follow the agenda because that is what they usually do when having meetings, not because every point on it has some value. The roll call which begins every meeting is one example. The absence of departments/other staffs does not result in any steps taken, it is just noted and the proceedings continue. What is the point of saying "they're not here" and then going about business as usual? Do they not fill a part of the meeting? Why should they be there in the first place? These are some of the questions that pop up in my mind when I repeatedly watch this type of event. And the question of "Why am I here, when they can be absent?" lingers in my military mind. The summing up of the meeting is another example of how the agenda rules our behaviour: the JCBW has one point in the agenda for when the

representatives at the meeting are to share general information that may be of interest (the word travels around the table). The next point on the agenda is the need for collaboration between staffs/departments, which means that the word travels around the table again. The following type of misunderstanding can occur:

> One of the delegates asks: "The point where we report need for collaboration, is it now?" OPR JCBWG: "No, it comes on the next page" (refers to the agenda on the screen). Questioner: "Ok, then I'll wait" (some lighter laughter is heard) (O16_03231430).

I interpret the merriment as a reaction to the representative's inflexibility (the way the officer strictly adheres to the agenda). It is a sort of appreciative laughter as opposed to a laughter that would have elicited disapproval from the members of the meeting. It reveals (together with other impressions of the practice) compliance to routines and regulations as an operational military norm.

The "Working group" meetings are another example of how routines are created by the agenda. These meetings are actually very seldom comprised of work in the meaning of preparing current issues. They are more of a forum where the participants share information on issues and mainly confirm that work on a particular issue is actually taking place somewhere in the organisation of the HQ. Much time is spent creating a state of information flow so that officers with responsibility can learn how to provide answers to issues. So despite the name "working meeting" it is more about fulfilling the rules of consensus. Novice participants who try to provide actual solutions to issues, or inputs for the preparation of issues, quickly learn to get in line and to only share such details with smaller groups (O13_03220900). So the working group meetings are established as a 'speaking point event' where participants only report according to what the agenda sets (generic example from Working group MINUSMA):

1. Attendance – participants confirm their presence
2. Intelligence report – Military intelligence officer speaks
3. Land Component Command reports status of units – LCC delegate speaks
4. Effectuated, Current, Upcoming (issues) – OPR speaks, comments from delegates
5. Coming decision meeting – OPR speaks
6. Task manager – OPR speaks, comments from delegates
7. Comments from delegates – speaking turn goes around the table
8. Need for collaboration – OPR checks with the participants if there is need for it
9. Need for 'after sittings' – OPR decides if there are to be follow-up meetings
10. Next meeting – OPR speaks

Some delegates attending these types of meetings can sit there for an hour and only say "here" (answer to point no 1) and "Nothing to report" (answer to point no 7).

They are thus 'seat-fillers', a position created by social rules of consensus. On the other hand, some delegates get to speak much more - most commonly those who work with personnel or economic and logistical issues. This is also a part of the consensus fabric as it often is these types of issues that the responsible officers must be able to master before briefing the higher commanders. Nevertheless, the point here is to highlight the power of the agenda in military practice. It establishes patterns and routines which help secure the way military minds understand operational staff work. Consensus as a set of social rules is strengthen by the form of the meetings and eventually hidden for the delegates that participate in them. This is why they contribute to its existence and infuse it further in the daily work, despite being (individually) critical towards it.

Bureaucratisation of violence and the rules of consensus

What is it about abiding by the laws of consensus that provides bureaucratised understandings of violence? It is the focus on resources and the disregard of affective aspects of the use of military force that strike me as most central to this question. This relates to bureaucratisation in that minds subjected to this particular way of relating to the military practice tend to focus on details of production, and think about the military practice as a function of resources. I briefly mention above that those who speak during the meetings where consensus is to be achieved are in most cases actors that have a role to play in issues of finance, logistics and manning. OPRs know that when they are to conduct briefings, they must be able to provide answers to questions about such things, despite the fact that both I and they think that such issues are best to leave to the experts. This knowledge of how the practice of briefings functions provides fuel for the constant re-establishment of bureaucratised labour. Officers with long educational backgrounds of conducting military operations and experience from participating in international missions find themselves in a position where they have to collect and condense information that is similar to that of management in private companies or civilian governmental authorities. Even though the staff where my ethnographic endeavour was conducted is situated in the 'wartime organisation' of the Swedish Armed Forces, not much of the actual work differs from that on the Training and Development Staff (which belongs to the 'peacetime organisation' of the Armed Forces). In short, the desire to comply with the demands of consensus in combination with the routinisation of the practice is a part of the ontic fabric of bureaucratisation of violence. Seen as a script for establishing the social play of the practice, consensus thus supports an understanding of what counts as 'issues' when conducting operations and as such forms understandings of the 'nature' of the ongoing military missions. This has the effect of blurring the line between the 'wartime organisation' and the 'peacetime organisation' consequently leaving the former doing much work that then must be conducted again at the latter. Consider this example of how one representative (from J5, long term planning) talks about the continuation of the mission in Mali:

"Problems with a future contribution are well-accounted for in the answer" (they are discussing the content of the answer that the operational level has supplied to the higher staff). The delegate from J5/7 symbolises this by talking about a stretched rubber band. "You all know how a rubber band, when stretched, eventually gets these white edges? Well, that is what we describe in the answer, if you get my point" (O4_03080900)

The focus of this meeting when talking about the effects of continuing the mission in Mali is put entirely on resources. The soldiers and officers of the mission are being reified into objects in that they are a part of the supply and demand chain of the production of this mission.

Additionally, in my discussion on previous research I have argued that the misrecognition of the enemy Other is one particularly aspect of how violence becomes bureaucratised. In the operational work, the Other, i.e. the opponent or enemy if you like, is touched upon very briefly during the meetings. There is a formality to this in the routines of the practice: the working meetings on AG MINUSMA had a representative from the Military Intelligence and Security Service Staff presenting the current situation and assessment on the near future in the mission area. During these short briefings (between 5-8 minutes) the Other is described as "Islamist violence-promoting groups" (e.g. O17_04050900, O28_05030900). These short talks were delivered by a young man dressed in formal civilian clothes who after his presentation left the room. This created a situation where the only reference, or articulated trigger, of that violence is (or can be) a part of the mission comes from outside the working group. By someone who (visibly) does not belong to the community of officers working with operations and who even leaves the room when he has delivered his product (i.e. finished his presentation). The routinisation of the meetings creates a divider between what must be said for the sake of form (the power of the agenda) and what really matters (talking about resources). An excerpt directly from my notes from one such event might bring some more light on this curious relation between violence and the focus of the operational staff work:

Setting: this is an AG MINUSMA meeting.

Representative from MUST talks and shows pictures with the phrase "Islamist violence-promoting groups"

The rep. talks about how a unit (not Swedish) from the MINUSMA operation has had to shoot at a violent demonstration. And it is reported that there have been "a number of dead and wounded" (formulated both on the slide and orally). ---> there are no questions asked about this, and the event is treated as a problem which sorts under "information operations" as it can hamper the reputation of the mission. "The attitude towards MINUSMA is expected to deteriorate" the rep. assumes.

The rep. from MUST talks about the situation in the area during 09:01-09:06:30. When the rep. has talked for about 5 min the OPR for the working group says: "I'll give you one more minute".

In an effort to speed things up, the rep. shows his last two slides for about 4-5 seconds each. These are slides that I recognise from previous briefings from this representative, and they usually sum up the security situation. They consist of a time sequence "short - mid - long" and corresponding squares with arrows in them. And all of this in the colours green, yellow and red (I draw a generic example).

Short	Mid	Long

MUST rep. leaves the room.

Then it's the rep. from LCC. He talks until 09:08 about our own units. Focus shifts from "security" which the MUST rep. has been talking about, to more mundane things: LCC rep. talks about our units in terms of how they are trying to save electricity and how they are managing their own security. --> we learn nothing about what they actually do in Mali. Or, this is what they actually do?

 After this quick brief, the OPR for the group takes over, and goes through the items on the "completed - current – future" list. The reps. are asked how things are on the different issues that are on the slide. I notice that some of the reps. talk production language: "… we in the working group have outlined a BU (basis of requirements)…" "… soon we can place an order…" "How about starting up a project group that is tasked with creating a list of needs?"

"We are ready, together with FMV, to create a list of needs and to set a price tag on that" (O28_05030900)

There is some formality imbued in the performance of the representative from the Military Intelligence and Security Service Staff (MUST). When he is reprimanded for running out of time, he shows his last slides just because he is supposed to do so, not to underline a deeper understanding of what they comprise. We barely have the time to identify what they are to outline and I find myself shrugging at the pictures and the presentation. Falling back into my subject position as staff officer I think that clearly the pictures have no greater value as they are so quickly rushed through. This is underlined by the fact that the briefer leaves the room when he is done. What is important for us in the working group begins with his exit: the details surrounding the maintenance of the mission. Bureaucratisation of violence is thus discernible in this excerpt by how the production language has a position of domination. Not just by how much time is spent talking about it but also, most importantly, what system of relations controls the conduct of the meeting. This system is, as my observations reveal, partly constructed through the rules of consensus (there are other social rules and norms at play too) and there is thus a link between such social rules and our understanding of military operative staff work.

The description given above of the sustaining function of consensus in the operational staff work runs the risk of giving a 'matter of fact' impression. It would be counter-theoretical to claim that my description is that of some 'essence' or 'truth'. Even so, it is based on observations and conversations made during my time at the

staff and is thus *my and several of the practitioners'* impression of the practice. But there are cracks and ripples of resistance in the homogeneity of the practice. It is therefore important to clarify that the rules of consensus can, on rare occasions, be actively broken by actors, and that some of my interlocutors do not share my observation of its impact (C20_04051300). As for the first case, I have not witnessed any active resistance myself, but some of the interlocutors have told me stories about when they themselves, or some of our colleagues, have bypassed the rules (C28_05241300). In the latter case, some of the chiefs that I have talked to plainly do not agree with my interpretation of how the rules play out: they tell me that yes, they exist, but that consensus does not hinder people from speaking their mind whenever needed (C21_04121500). They do not see, or agree with, my emphasis on the impact that social rules have on how the daily work is performed.

Summary

In summary, consensus functions in complex ways: it gives meaning to why a certain part of the practice exists, but at the same time provokes the practitioners to think that it is an unwanted aspect of their daily work. Its rules stabilise social relations in that consensus enables briefings and meetings to be held undisturbed by critical questions or comments, in line with what the professional staff practice requires, but at the same time goes against the 'so-often-in-theory-described' operational military professional norm that critique is always to be allowed (before decisions taken). Consensus provides ideas/images of decisions actually being well-prepared and thoroughly grounded in the organisation's different departments and staffs, at the same time as it is clear that practical constraints of time and amount of personnel make it impossible for them to adhere to these demands. Additionally, consensus creation of routines and enforcement of actors' performance in social plays, provides the practice with a certain plastic, or artificial, aspect. Most importantly for discussions further on, the rules of consensus conform military minds in their understanding of what operational staff work is, and in prolongation, what military missions are. And the rules of consensus tell us that operational staff work is a practice of production, where acts of violence are reduced to 'events' or 'disturbances' in the instrumental application of military force. The *rules of consensus thus keep violence, and the effects of using it, as an unspoken and sometimes unseen aspect of operational work.* A clearly established outcome of this suppression of violence through bureaucratisation is that the 'enemy Other' is neutralised and even disappears from the operational discourse. What the above excerpt, where the MUST-representative leaves the room after a short 'brief' on the 'enemy Other', elucidates is an empirical illustration of how the misrecognition of the Other operates through the bureaucratised labour of operational work. Such misrecognition thus functions through often unspoken agreements among the social agents, as they through a consensus-based discourse establish a normative framework in which the practice is formed to exclude the 'outcome' of violence, and instead include material details.

The rules of consensus are something that I did not encounter in my historical investigations of how bureaucratised relations to death and violence have emerged. The archived material that was the corpus for the analysis of military practice in Chapter 4 provided no hint of these rules, probably because consensus is something that I have discovered while watching practitioners in action. This indicates that theoretical descriptions of a practice cannot give us a comprehensive insight into how a practice is understood and performed. It must be complemented with investigation where social relations between the practitioners are elucidated. Oddly enough, I had not reflected on this 'consensus-aspect' of my own practice as a military officer before engaging in my academic studies. Surely I myself must have been in the midst of it, reproducing it as a part of my daily work. Nevertheless, the forthcoming sections will pick up threads from the historical analysis in Chapter 4 as it connects contemporary observations and conversations with historically established points of reference for how death and violence have become bureaucratised.

5.3 The Social rules of Order and Bureaucracy

In this section I will account for my analysis of the social rules and norms of order and bureaucracy. After a short introduction, I expand upon how these rules affect the social relations of the practice. Thereafter I proceed to discuss how bureaucracy and order provide meaning to the practitioners and their work. Finally, this section is concluded by a discussion on how the social norms and rules of order, bureaucracy and categorisation operate to keep bureaucratised understandings of violence in place.

Introduction: Rules that make Operational Staff Work both Possible and Impossible

> Colonel Sandurz (CS): "Try here. Stop". Dark Helmet (DH): "What the hell am I looking at? When does this happen in the movie?" CS: "Now. You're looking at now, sir. Everything that happens now, is happening now." DH: "What happened to then?" CS: "We passed then." DH: "When?" CS: "Just now. We're at now now." DH: "Go back to then." CS: "When?" DH: "Now." CS: "Now?" DH: "Now." CS: "I can't." DH: "Why?" CS: "We missed it." DH: "When?" CS: "Just now." Dark Helmet: "When will then be now?" Colonel Sandurz: "Soon." (Spaceballs, (1987), Brooksfilms and Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer)

The quote from the movie Spaceballs (1987) is here to transfer a part of my fieldwork experience from participating in agents' renegotiation of operational staff work. That is, watching agents of the practice engage in conversations that aim to explain how the process of planning is (or should be) conducted, I have found that some take the role of Colonel Sandurz (trying to explain the rationality behind the impossible task of playing the movie while in the midst of making it) and others fill the shoes (or helmet) of Dark Helmet (trying to grasp what is being said, and to handle an increasing feeling of confusion and discomfort). In other words, a situa-

tion where participants of a practice are not quite comfortable with how it is performed in terms of complexity, but still go along with it and even let it guide their daily work. Here the practitioners in the former role sometimes identify themselves as "method men" or "concept fascists" (C10_02241015, CR_02161230), but mostly this 'educational role' is occupied by those with long experience of working at the HQ. While talking about the observed tendency to put much time and effort into discussing work procedures and the meaning of concepts during meetings, my interlocutor (one of the OPRs) says "CJTF [Combined Joint Task Force] concepts are our times' military Latin" (C29_05250920). Much of what I want to shed light on here can be read in these few words: the position of precedence that military concepts have in the practice and the complexity that follows with ways of ordering the practice by such concepts. Observations and noted conversations where questions like "who?", "what?" and "when?" have been a central part of the practice and have thus formed the base for this part of the chapter.

Nevertheless, normally I would refrain from discussing results of analyses under a header that sets out an aporia for the reader. But from my observations of this particular aspect of operative staff work, I find no other means by which it can be critically explained. In Chapter 4 I show that historically, order and bureaucracy (among others) have permeated military narratives. They came to dominate how military practice is depicted and understood during the first half of the 20th century. In contemporary military practice, these themes or points of reference have come to evolve, creating new meaning and systems to uphold social relations within the military. The will to 'rationalise' the practice through the use of the rules and roles that bureaucracy and order provide, have, on the other hand, also made military practice impossible in the way these rules immerse every aspect of operational staff work in complexity. Apart from endorsing the discussions on concepts and methods, order and bureaucracy invest the practice with structure that upholds positions of power. I have chosen to focus on this latter aspect of the rules in the subsection where social relations are discussed. The meaning-making aspect of the rules in focus will here be analysed in the subsequent part after the relational aspects have been discussed, and there I will put more emphasis on how order and bureaucracy provide content to the complexity of the practice. I will thus map out how these social rules and norms support the formation and conduct of the main activities of operational staff work.

Relations – mandate and responsibility, the fabric of operational military hierarchy

COS starts by explaining that he has "the mandate to, under the Commander, in peacetime lead 5 staffs and in wartime to lead the conduct of operations". (C21_04121500)

"We just deliver the milk here now" Dep. Chief of Joint Operations regarding the Joint Forces Command's mandate after the latest re-organisation within the HQ (C22_04131030)

> Head of J3 tells me "I have a far-reaching mandate, and obligations, within the frame of JCBWG, I can acquire resources that lie outside of the Joint Support Staff if it's needed." And regarding "contact surfaces" with Government Offices and with the strategic level: "[I have] the commander of joint operations' mandate to talk to them directly." (C24_04141241)

> Head of J9: "The mandate in the game between LedS, InSS and PROD has been a bit unclear, but we have started up dialogues that aim to clear this up." (C25_0517009)

Many of my military colleagues speak about mandates during my conversations with them. They use this concept to situate themselves and their responsibility in relation to other practitioners. Obviously, mandate has the official function of regulating responsibility but it is its relational function that is in focus here. Mandate is in this latter aspect connected to how the rules of order aim to establish predictability in relations between agents and parts of the organisations. The HQ has several documents that regulate who is responsible for what, and what possibilities there are for the different staffs and meeting forums to 'acquire resources' from each other (e.g. Försvarsmakten 2016a, 25). These documents also closely regulate what the staffs are supposed to do and when things are to be done. Their importance for the practitioners cannot be underestimated: such documents are very often referred to in my talks with the heads of departments and they lock the practice in a routinised but still complex pattern of meetings (e.g. C9_02181010, C21_04121500, C24_04141241).

It is clear from these documents and from my time at the staff that mandate has, in some cases, an overriding effect over rank. A large part of the 'Indians' are equal in the rank of lieutenant colonel (as myself) but those bearing this rank who work as OPRs for working groups and other forums (and as Dep. Chief of Joint Support Staff) have through the concept of mandate the possibility to engage people in work, that they through the chain of command would not have access to. On a first, superficial, level of analysis this might have meant that these 'Indians' are believed to be in a position of power (within the military organisation). But they are not. They are ruled by the concept of mandate in itself by how it puts them in positions where they have very little space to manoeuvre the operational work in directions outside of the established routines. Routines held securely in place by the rules of order and bureaucracy. That is, mandate is the grease that makes the complex organisation 'function' in accordance to the rules set out by order and bureaucracy. Without the use of mandate, all meetings and working groups would have to be organised through the chain of command. That would overload the chiefs with the management of request of participation in the existing plethora of such events. So in order to sustain meetings and working groups with personnel the OPRs are given the direct authority to send calling messages outside of their staff and sections.

But this only creates an illusion of authority, for the person in charge of these meetings cannot break away from provided rhythm that the ordering of the practice has provided: meetings are held despite their sometimes meagre significance and low output, and some agents participate even if they have nothing to add or contribute.

These 'faults' of the practice are not unknown to those in charge of these meetings but they feel that they have a very limited position from where they can change the routines. Indeed, mandate with its inherent provision of responsibility is a concept that epitomises the rules of order and bureaucracy in the way it works to secure sedimentation of roles and daily work. The following observation of an AG MI-NUSMA meeting is one of several such observations that lie behind my argumentation of this embodiment of order and bureaucratisation. The excerpt from my notes is quite lengthy but needed to explicate how the practice is under heavy influence of regulations, and also to show how this influence affects the relations between the actors:

Setting: this is another "after-meeting" following directly upon the previously one. It is about an inspection that has been done on the camps in the mission area. A report has been issued that includes several things that must be dealt with.

OPR: starts the meeting by showing a slide where he has organised the points made by the report in a table. He asks "Given that you all have read the report with great care, do you share my view that these are the issues brought up by it?" --> There is sarcasm in the way the OPR formulates the question to the representatives at the meeting. That is to say, it is clear that he suspects that the main part of them have not, in fact, read the report.

There is silence. Some shifts in weight on chairs. People look down at their papers. It is clear to me that there is some justification to the sarcasm expressed by the OPR (1).

Without further ado the OPR hands the report to one of the reps. and asks him to help out while he goes through each point. The he sits in front of the computer and fills in the empty places in the three columned table that is on the screen. The headlines for the columns are: "issue" (already filled in with the points made by the report), "action" and "responsible". (2) Each point from the report is worked on by applying this question: "Who is responsible for this?" e.g. One rep. asks: "Who is in charge of setting the directives for this type of training?" (3) regarding one point that is aimed towards adding another aspect to the training of soldiers before going to the mission.

One rep. asks: "A question of principles: the report is not assigned to FMV, but they are clearly responsible for several of these points?" another answers: "But PROD actually sets the tasks for FMV regarding things that need to be done" (3)

OPR asks the rep. from FMV if it is OK that he writes "FMV" in the square for "responsible" for the current issue that they are going through. FMV rep. says "I'm counting on that the issue will be brought up on the next PROD-coordination meeting" and looks at the rep. from PROD, who nods and answers affirmatively. (4)

The people at the meeting continue categorising the issues brought up by the report (deviation or observation) and discussing responsibility and who should handle each issue. (3)

One of the reps. from LCC asks a question about the details of one of the points made by in the report. OPR: "Hell, you were given the task to read this through before the meeting!" LCC rep an-

swers calmly: "I didn't receive any notice about this meeting, and no document to read." Despite this, the meeting just continuous as if nothing had been said. (1)

A couple of minutes after this, another rep. asks: "What does that [point] mean? What more does the report say [about that point]?" --> the rep. helping OPR reads it. This shows that there are several more participants that have not read the report. (1)

The OPR concludes the meeting by stating that the way the meeting has been conducted has created a traceability and tells people to work as quickly as possible with assigned tasks so that tasks can be "marked green". --> important driver for the practitioners, to get things marked green.

In the small talk after the meeting (I am checking some dates and timings for coming meetings with the OPR) one of the reps. says "These old truths: summon everyone to your meetings so that they can exclude themselves".

One rep stands silent besides us, apparently waiting to say something to the OPR. OPR : "Do you have a question for me?" rep.: "Yes" OPR: "If I'm thinking of killing myself?" ---> this is a typical example of the black humour that often comes up in relation to the practice. For me, it's something that seems to help the participants to cope with the impossibility of practice, which in turn seems to be related to the complexity of it. (O20_04051038)

The frustration that lies behind the joke that ends this particular observation is related to how the agents are trapped by their mandate and responsibilities. I feel a strong need to escape while observing this everyday event, immersed as it is in aspects of categorisation, bureaucracy and order. And I know from conversations with my colleagues that many of them share this feeling. But responsibility in the meaning of acting according to mandate and regulations weigh heavy on us. The excerpt above shows that meetings comprise (some of these are marked by corresponding number in the excerpt): 1, participation without knowledge of the issues at hand; 2, categorisation of tasks that could easily have been done by one or two people; 3, navigating the complexity of the organisation, creating an educational focus on finding out who is to do what; 4, a duplication of efforts and tasks.

The existence of these oddities are partly related to the rules of consensus that I discuss above, but also to how social relations in the practice are constructed by the function of regulation. Job descriptions, standing operating procedures and military manuals are the artefacts of the social rules and norms under scrutiny here. They regulate the practice by dividing responsibility and issuing mandate, as well as settings for which and how activities are to be performed. But there is a tension in the operational work between the need to follow regulations and the need to escape the formalities created by them. Consider the fact that there is a constant flow of meetings (similar to the one described above) at the HQ. Not many workdays are spared in general from these central activities of the practice. And then relate this to the fact that not one of the colleagues that I interacted with during my time at the staff expressed anything positive about going to meetings. On the contrary, they all complained about it (as did I). But they still attend and also in many cases run these

meetings. How can it be like this if there is resistance amongst us officers against this order? The answer lies in the creation of the subject 'staff officer'. This is a constant ongoing process where meetings are the construction site for the identity of the staff officer. Here the content of the role staff officer is renegotiated through the identification with familiar routines and articulations.

Meetings are as such a place of securing oneself in the relations with others at the work place, as the familiarity of the activity and its reinforcement of bureaucratised labour provide content to "me" and "us" as staff members. In addition, this act of identification that the meetings comprise also provides the agents in the operative staff work with the possibility of feeling enjoyment in the Lacanian meaning (fr. *jouissance*) (D. R. Howarth 2013, 174 ff. Mouffe 2005, 26–27). That is, enjoyment in the sense that the pain of following regulations (of the meeting practice) is in itself what the subject takes pleasure in. There is thus a psychoanalytical aspect at play here in the social relations, which bolsters a repeatability of the meeting practice. It takes its articulatory form in expressions of theft: 'If I only could be released from these meetings I would be able to do a better job' is generally a perspective shared by the participants in staff work. The meetings steal something that would make us ideal as staff officers but this is in itself impossible: there can never be a perfect closure of identity in one singular subject position like the staff officer (Laclau 1990, 210–11). A subject position must be inherent with flaws and these flaws actually become the very structure of our forms of identification. So the meetings continue with something that resembles self-inflicted pain.

Formal mandate thus provides little leverage when it comes to power to influence others or the outline of the activities within the operational practice. What I have witnessed and lived through at the staff indicates that such power is instead connected to knowledge of how the complex organisation functions. Those agents, be it 'Chiefs' or 'Indians', that have a broad working knowledge of who does what in the HQ are the ones who can influence decisions and in some measure also form the outline of the practice (e.g. C22_04131030). This brings me to the next aspect of the impact of the rules of order and bureaucracy: the way these points of reference provide the operational staff practice with meaning.

Meaning-making – how order and bureaucracy shape operational work

The method that the Swedish National Planning Process (SPL 3.0) outlines affects the daily work at the staff in several ways. It provides terms and forums for the creation of plans and for the continuous work with ongoing operations: Core Planning Teams (CPT) comprise a small number (5-6) of people and can be viewed as a working group. They control the direction of the planning and create drafts of the main part of the order; the Joint Operational Planning Group (JOPG) consists of 16-20 people depending on the task at hand. Here the JOPG-leader checks the status of work and assigns new tasks for the different departments and branches of the HQ. The work is strictly governed by a timeline, created in consideration of the time

when the final product (the plan/order) is to be handed over to lower levels of command. The work is also shaped by the meetings and briefings provided by the method of planning. Below, picture 3 provides an example of how such planning processes are typically illustrated in documents that outline methods of operational planning.

Pict. 3. The 'flow chart' depicting the Swedish national planning process in SPL 3.0 (2015), p. 26, is very similar to how NATO illustrates their 'Crisis Response Planning' (Försvarsmakten 2015c; NATO 2013b, 4–4)

Together with the organisation of the staffs in the HQ, the Swedish version of operational planning methods provides the backbone for the existence of certain subjectivities, objects (products) and for relationships between practitioners. The connections to the rules of order and bureaucracy lie in how the method regulates the planning practice and creates an environment where bureaucratisation can thrive (compare with Chapter 4 and the excess in regulation depicted there). The complicated practice that is the product of order and bureaucracy requires full attention to matters of categorising issues and tasks to the right staff or department. Here the possible and the impossible meet: my interlocutors spend much time discussing if an issue should be handled in their current forum, or if it is for another forum (e.g. O9_03151200). The rules thus create a foundation for the practice to function, but it also complicates it so that time must be spent on understanding the "what, who and why" of many of the issues that go through the system (compare to Weber's iron cage, discussed in Chapter 2). In addition to this, the regulation of the practice through Swedish National Planning Process (SPL 3,0) also creates content to some of the meetings. Conducting evaluations of how things are progressing in the missions is one such content in the staff work that is created by the planning process document. I have inserted an example of what such an evaluation comprises in order to elucidate what bureaucratisation does to the meaning of the act 'evaluation':

Setting: this is an 'after sitting' from the MINUSMA coordination meeting. We are here to do an operational evaluation. It is a product of staff work consisting of a number of assumptions, conclusions and goals that are to be evaluated in a document.

The OPR takes attendance, who is represented and which dept. are missing (some are missing but that does not seem to matter much).

He then goes on to explain what the group is supposed to do. "An operational evaluation consists of a number of people, sitting in a room trying to be as smart as possible."

Thereafter he reads out loud the first assumption in the document (there are no computers or screens in the room, he has a printed version of the document in front of him as support). He asks the participants if it is fulfilled or not: "Is it done? Yes or No?" The participants cannot answer by yes or no, instead they include a number of complicating details in their answers. As a result, the assumption cannot be evaluated now, as some things must be checked with the unit currently in the mission area. This clearly cannot go on as the meeting will take forever (there are several pages of things to assess). The OPR speeds things up.

The OPR proceeds with assumption after assumption. The printed list has colour markings (green-yellow-red) which indicate the status of each assumption. He checks if there are any changes by referring to the colours: "It is red"

"Is this unaltered or does it go towards minus?" ---> they have, beside from the colours, also markings on some of the parts of the list that are "minus (-)" "zero (0)" or "plus (+)"

+ 0 - relates to how each point on the list is expected to develop (taking into account how things have developed so far).

OPR: "We need to change that so we get the right colour in each square, so it's clear that we're working on that"

One of the items of the list is estimated to be "green" by the representative who is responsible for evaluating that particular issue. But he explains that it is because of "the actual tasks that the function has". This task is not correct. It is more comprehensive in the written text, the order assigned to the unit, where the formulation of the goal in question speaks of something more. Which means that it should not be green. OPR says "I see it [the written goal] as a fact since the Commander has signed the order". But it gets marked as green anyway.

They discuss how to get two different tables in sync as they are both grounded in the same information.

"Those two are assessed. They have been given a colour" --> pointing at different squares in the document. (O14_03221015)

It is striking to me, watching this from a research position, that 'evaluation' does not mean making a judgement about the value of the mission in Mali, or how it is actually proceeding. Instead, evaluation means filling in colours and signs in a document

so that the product 'operational evaluation' can be completed. Even so, the phrase "… so it's clear that we're working on that" catches something of how the evaluation process means something more than this 'colouring book activity'. It is clear that the motivation behind the actions taken by the agents are a desire to display progress in work. This progress is in turn connected to the work done by the operational and tactical staffs. The evaluation focuses as such on those issues that the practitioners feel that they can have an effect on which means that, yet again, issues of finance, logistics and personnel take precedence over other potential issues of conducting international missions in conflict environments. The rules of order and categorisation, of sorting things and giving them a specific position, number or code, thus transforms the act of judgement into a 'colouring book activity'. Intertwined with these rules, the language of production (touched upon in the next section on masculinity) provides more meaning to this act. The evaluation becomes a product of the staff work and as such it moulds into something that represents *internal* progress within the staffs of the HQ.

When I, during informal conversations, ask my colleagues about their views on the Mali mission, they quickly conclude that it is being conducted to gain Swedish political leverage in the UN and/or that the Swedish Armed Forces need an international mission to boost recruitment and development of materiel (O12_03211300). There is a stable, solid conviction that no changes of importance will be achieved in the country by our mission. This 'matter of fact' position creates a further deepening impact of the rules of order and bureaucracy on creating meaning for the practice. Because these rules provide language and objects (like database and lists) that are manageable and in some sense worthwhile to put effort into.

Sedimentation – keeping bureaucratisation in place

> When one of the issues is discussed, one of the participants actually provides a comment that includes a possible solution to the problem at hand. But this is quickly disposed of as "that belongs to a working meeting where we can talk about details" by the main responsible rep for this issue. I felt it myself: my initial reaction to the person providing this possible solution was that this meeting was the wrong forum for that type of comment. Which is odd in hindsight since this was supposed to be a 'working meeting'. (O17_04050900)

My most closely learnt lesson from my study of autoethnography is that it emphasises the importance of being mindful of one's own reactions and feelings in social settings. This has proved particularly challenging since I have struggled during my time at the staff with my tendency to slip into the position of staff officer. Such slips can go unnoticed and important observations can be overlooked. But sometimes I have managed to note my reactions to events at the staff in a way that actually reveals something of how my state of mind conforms with my interlocutors. The quote above from my field notes reflects one such event where my mind obviously is ruled by the bureaucratisation of the practice as it is clear that I am 'on track' with how things are supposed to be run at the staff. As such, sedimentation by the social rules

of order and bureaucracy can be found within myself in the way I act and think, according to these rules.

Another example of the conforming power of order and bureaucracy can be found in the way I sometimes interact during meetings: I have given suggestions about who (what organisational part of the HQ/persons in particular positions etc.) can help with a task, provided knowledge on how financial issues are to be solved and I have discussed issues of organisation, to give but a few examples. These are clearly a type of topics that are made central to the practice by the rules that I have described above. Once one of the OPRs told me that he got a question from one of the chiefs about who had the most knowledge about one major current issue regarding the mission to Mali besides himself (he was going on a short vacation). "That would be Andreas" was his answer, he said to me with a smile.[14] This made me feel very satisfied initially, and a bit proud that he saw me as someone who could at least answer some questions about this particular issue. Here I felt like dropping the entire research project and going back to the HQ to work at the staff. This is because I felt included in the social settings of the practice and that is a very powerful feeling. Even so, there was also a feeling of bitterness: was this really it? Can I really be one of few with a comprehensive understanding of this issue after so many meetings, attended by so many? The point here is to clarify that the content of the operational staff practice is not something that has a life of its own. It thrives and is reproduced by the practitioners as we are set on what the main activities are and how things should be when doing staff work. In other words, operational work upholds the bonds that connect us with each other and provides us with recognisable roles.

Anyhow, newcomers through their meeting with day-to-day work quickly learn what is expected to be said and done in which type of situation. Soon it becomes routine to focus on 'who? what? and when?' in the daily work. This accumulation of exposure to the social rules of the practice seems to suffocate the critical question of 'why?'. The academic endeavour to critically explain why military minds understand the use of force as bureaucratised labour, and what effects such ontology has on the international use of violence, does by no means thrive in such an environment. This is even more difficult when taking into account the position that the rules of production have in providing bureaucratised understandings of military practice. I tend to cling on to the question of usefulness of my research, of what the alternatives are to doing things in the way we do at the operational staff and to the idea that I must formulate key conclusions that will sum up years of research. Alas, all of these questions are indeed 'products' of the rules of production. Usefulness is a strong norm in the military, something that I meet within myself and in interaction with my colleagues. To produce is good, but to produce something that is easily understandable and directly applicable to the practice is even better in the eyes of the military officer. The question of 'why? does not help much in the endeavour to 'keep it short, keep it simple'. Especially if it calls into question established norms and rules such

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[14] When he told me about this episode and I pointed out that my first name is Anders, he was very apologetic. But this is quite a common mistake in my experience and tells me more about the stressful environment than anything else.

as the central points of reference exposed in this chapter. Thus, the question of 'Why?' disrupts sedimentation of a practice and can only be asked if it is moulded into a question that incorporates the rules and norms of the practice. This will be discussed in more detail in the next section of this chapter where the infusion of gender norms represents issues that potentially bring with them questions of "why".

Summary

In summary, the rules created by order and bureaucracy provide stabilisation to an otherwise fragile understanding of what military operational work is, and offers avenues of identification which help reconstruct the subject 'the staff officer'. In the practice, agents reinforce their sense of Self and their understanding of what military practice comprises, in relation to acts of answering questions of who, what and when. It is thus bureaucratised labour - the interconnected relationship between operational planning routines, manuals and computer-related work with templates and lists – that makes up the main points of reference for what military operational work is. And in this bureaucratised labour, violence cannot be seen as anything other than productive and useful, although its usefulness is not connected to specific problems in the geographical area of its use. Instead, violence is productive and useful in relation to needs *internal* to the military organisation (the organisation needs to exist and have a meaningful activity), and this cements a neutralisation and silencing of the death and violence that is made possible by the operational work. In sum, bureaucratised labour ensures that the practices dependence and close relation with the materiality of military work is sedimented as a 'natural' avenue for identification and belonging – working with meetings, lists, procedures and templates is simply what the operational agent is 'supposed to do'.

5.4 Masculinity and Production: Links between Production and the Construction of Masculinities

The following section introduces the linkage between bureaucratisation, production as a central point of reference in the operational work, and the infusion of gender policies at the operational staff. After the introduction, the analysis is divided into two parts where the first investigates how resistance and alteration of gender policies relates to the *internal* norms and rules provided by a focus on production. The second part comprises an analysis of how the use of military force in international missions provides further (externally directed) resistance to a certain set of gender norms, while others are accepted. In combination with my autoethnographical method, where my own emotions and subjectivities are to be used as ways of understanding how bureaucratisation and masculinities interact to shape the ways of identifications and subjectivities constructing the 'staff officer', the text below will, on occasion, become 'defensive'. Particularly when the text elucidates the 'gender aware man's' (my own) struggle with issues of gender. That said, the concluding part of this section includes a summary of what values and norms come into the forefront in the construction of military masculinity in the context of bureaucratised labour.

Introduction – the relation between bureaucratisation, production and issues of gender

> […] there is a brief about a new handbook, which aims at getting the Commander's approval for publication. After the presenter is finished, the Commander asks "Has this book been reviewed from a gender perspective? What do you say?" and he looks at the gender adviser. She tells him that it has been reviewed 1,5 years ago, early in the process of making it. The Commander points to the importance of this being a part of the process before he can approve it. And adds "Let it just pass the gender adviser so we can get a tick in the box on that. When that's done, you can come to me and I'll approve it." (extract from notes from a Commanders Decision Brief, (O33_05311500))

How can we understand and see the discursively and socially constructed points of reference that underpin the way the Commander in the quote above relates to issues of gender? In the fourth chapter of this thesis concepts and norms such as strength, ruthlessness, heroism (including sacrifice), boldness and practical knowledge of using violence were identified as particularly evident in the historical portrayal of the Swedish military use of violence. These are masculine norms scarcely used, or found, in the operational staff work that I have investigated, and cannot be 'applied' to the analysis in a natural way. Naturally, because the operational practice is a type of 'war-practice' which is largely bereft of 'war-as-fighting' and thus contains another type of relationship to the use of military force. Here, as illustrated by the quote from the commander, it is the bureaucratised procedures, hierarchical relations and focus on production that stand in the forefront as normative frames.

This fact, in combination with my particularly difficult position (the fact that I have worked in a military organisation for the major part of my adult life) to pinpoint what it is in my military self that defines me as masculine[15], makes masculine rules and norms hard to analyse. But instead of starting at the point of what the theoretical right to use violence provides the military practice in terms of masculine ideals, I still aim to start with the practice and myself. This means that the practice, its agents and my own interrelation with issues of gender form the muddy riverbed where masculine aspects of the practice are to be found.

During my time at the Joint Operational Staff I engaged the Gender Adviser (GENAD) in the *problématique* of pinpointing the social effects of the male numerical domination of the practice, and asked her for her view on what specifically is a masculine aspect of the practice at the staff (C3106021400). A particular pathetic attempt to find a shortcut out of my dilemma. Or a natural part of engaging my interlocutors in my research. Unfortunately, GENAD could not provide me with a clear

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[15] I imagine that most people would have some problems fixating aspects of their work that contribute to their masculine or feminine 'Self'. It easily becomes a situation where answers are moulded into premade forms. If we ask a stone to describe itself and it says "Well, for starters… I'm pretty solid and hard. It comes with the job of keeping this world together." we would say "Aha, you define yourself as a masculine stone then?!". But if the stone says "I have quite a smooth, curved surface, very gentle to touch, from my time lying on the beach" we would say "So… what are you doing tonight? How about a drink?".

perspective on this even though we had a rewarding discussion. Apparently, she and some of her closest colleagues had recently had a discussion about "is masculinity a necessary part of killing?" without coming to a final answer. My own reflection on this question was "no", which I motivated in our discussion by pointing out that there are numerous events in the world that show us that women are just as good at killing as men (e.g. Whitworth 2004, 154). Nevertheless, in our discussion it was clear that we could not clarify what operational military masculinity comprises.

But the discussion kept returning to the difficulties for GENAD to reach out with ideals related to the gender perspective. This, and some following discussions with academic colleagues working with gender research, made me realise that that the masculine trait of the operational work which I study is best highlighted by describing its relation to issues of gender. In particular, my colleagues and my own reactions to the concept and introduction of gender issues in the organisation are of interest as they give clues to what it is that is at stake by taking in this concept in the practice. It is an approach based on my identification of "gender issues" as something which contradicts masculinity or puts 'the meaning' of masculinity in motion (see also; Eichler 2011). Following Hutchings' (2008) observation that even if masculinity as a concept is empty of signification, the concept's context dependent created meaning can be found by investigating how masculinity takes form when meeting with such contradictions (Hutchings 2008, 401). This will illuminate what it is that is threatened by gender issues and in turn, this might prove to be what 'masculinity of the staff officer' contains in the operational context. But first something more should be said in general about the work with gender issues at the operational staff.

GENAD was during my time at the staff a female captain that had served in this position for several years. A successor (a male major) had been appointed at the time of my departure from the staff. The name of the position is quite telling: the gender adviser gives advice on issues of gender (and equality) to the Joint Forces Commander and the staffs connected to the Joint Operational Staff. But the job is much more complex than the name reveals. Since issues of gender are about power and structures in society, giving advice on gender is really about working for integration of equality and awareness of such structures. From my academic perspective it is a *political* struggle in the first place. GENAD tells me during one conversation that "It [gender issues] is political insofar that it gives space and power for calling things into question." (C3106021400). But the strategy used by GENAD is connected to "maximising use" as she puts it. That is, during her time in this position she has learned that the best response to her advice is connected to how well *the use* of the perspective is clarified for members of the different staffs (ibid). The Special Operations Command is quite easy to work with, she tells me, as "they see the direct operational use of gender". This makes me realise that the instrumentality that rules military minds does not 'just' depoliticise the use of violence, but it actually seems to have the same effect on any political issue. It is 'the use' of something that speaks to our military minds and creates a 'fit' in our practice. Production, seen as a discur-

sive theme of bureaucratisation, has been discussed previously (Chapter 4) as central to how military violence is historically portrayed and presently understood as to provide solutions to practical problems. But in my conversation with the gender adviser I came to the understanding that bureaucratisation of violence is so powerful in the military that it reshapes the power struggle of gender issues into another (among many) component in the production line.

- What's this?
- It's about women's liberation and equal rights in society.
  [blank eyes]
- You know, seeing and working for the women in society as an equally important part of it?
- Eh… good, seems good. [mind wanders off]
  [a moment of contemplation in silence] [everyone is starting to feel a bit awkward]
- But, you know, if you guys were able to get someone that could speak to women, wives of the locals so to speak, more freely? Like a female soldier or officer…
- Speak about what? Anything?
- Well, yes… I suppose that's OK as long as they'll agree to it.
- So you're saying that this gender stuff can help us get intel from women?
- Yeah, but that's not really…
- Sounds great! Let's get one!

This fictional conversation between a spokesperson for gender issues and some military officers tries to highlight just this particular aspect of how usefulness is important for acceptance by the military mind. Is this typical for operational work? Or can other institutions in Western societies harbour the same type of mentality? Probably, but this is outside the scope of this investigation. More central here is that I have seen and experienced operational work as a practice that tries to fix things. It is a type of work that establishes that a state of being is unwanted (by the help of political guidance) and also how this particular state of being should be in the future. In military operational terms, we talk about "unacceptable conditions" within a frame of problems. And the conduct of military operations will lead to an "end state", which contains a number of "acceptable conditions". The end state is to be reached by employing a number of operations that will affect those aspects of the unwanted situation (decisive conditions) that will help transform an unwanted state of being into the goal of "acceptable condition". In short, military operations are ontologically seen as events that fix bad things and create something good. Which is quite a historical transformation in the understanding of the use of violence gazing back, perhaps, to the millennia of military violence used before the Westphalian Peace.

Contemporary western military practice has in this transformation into 'do-gooders' been formed by the idea that liberal rights can be established in 'suffering' countries by the use of force. Hence the enforcement of the 'fixing mentality' in the operational work. But one could easily argue that the 'nature' of military violence is something unproductive and destructive even if it is meant to produce 'acceptable

conditions' (examples of academic debate on war in the name of liberal rights: Burke 2004; Geis, Müller, and Schörnig 2013; Heathershaw 2008; Jarvis and Holland 2014).

Pict. 4. "The Hierarchy of planning elements". Swedish Planning and Command Method (2015), p. 51 (my alteration).

Insomuch, contemporary military discourse 'violently' enforces the productive aspect of violence by how it depicts the practice. As seen in pictures 4 and 5, the military operation is clearly portrayed as giving effect in a specific direction. Every element of a military operation has a productive purpose in that it in a linear way leads towards eradicating a problem. In its most simple but also most closely violent interpretation this means that in a situation where the military have someone posing a problem (interfering with the way towards the operational goal), they kill them. Sliding on the scale of violence might mean that the military try to physically move 'the problem' from a geographical area (which might mean that they end up killing people anyway, depending on 'the problem's' willingness to cooperate). Or going further from the concept of physical violence, it might mean that the military (with weapons in their hands) try to talk people into accepting their way of seeing things. But all these activities are, as shown in the pictures below, meant to achieve certain effects that 'naturally' will lead to succeeding with the military operational goals.

Pict. 5. How operations contribute to goals, which give effect towards an end state.
Swedish Planning and Command Method (2015), p. 29 (my alteration).

Then why is it that political and normative struggles connected to gender issues are downplayed when they meet with the operational practice? Well, this question is answered on a general level when viewed in light of how military focus on productivity and the usefulness of things are central for providing a place for them in the organisation. But to dig deeper into what lies behind the firm hold that bureaucratisation of violence has on the military, and specifically why the political and normative aspects of gender are downplayed, I must investigate the introduction of gender issues in the operational work from a perspective of a clash of social norms. This is an analytic exercise which aims at illuminating the strains created by the introduction of a ready-made concept of social norms (gender issues) into the military practice. Seen as such, gender issues provide a formal addition of a set of new social rules, placed 'upon' a system of historically established (bureaucratic/military) social rules. In the following this clash is analysed from two perspectives: the reactions and resistance to applying gender issues internally (in the operational staff); and the reactions and resistance to applying gender issues externally (to the conduct of military operations).

Resistance to gender issues related to social rules and norms in the practice

My first meeting with formal attempts to introduce gender issues in my military practice was during an obligatory gathering of personnel, taking place at my armoured regiment some 15 years ago. In the assembly hall we watched as a pair of male officers and female employees (we did not have any female military officers at this point, save one), that recently had been on a course in the capital, talked in an 'amusing' way about "the creative differences between men and women". We were exposed to how the distinct traits that belonged to the two different groups "men" and "women" provided practical benefits for the military practice. For instance, women's 'natural' way of keeping track of the many issues of a household and their disposition to keep it tidy, was said to balance men's 'inherent' flaws in those areas. Which meant that women's place in the military as soldiers and officers was connected to their ability to 'multitask' and to sweep up the mess we men left behind us. I remember that I thought that this was nonsense from the very beginning, based on the measurement that most of us employ when evaluating something: myself. I had

no such tendencies related to the sloppiness and singlemindedness that were described as 'typical male' traits. I did not recognise the situations they talked about as 'typically' male or female from my own life and I saw this as another example of how the AF had too many 'old-timers' in its organisation. Who else saw men and women bearing these traits, but those belonging to an older generation? It was, in short, a bit embarrassing and insulting to watch. This does not mean that I was very clear-sighted and everybody else was not. On the contrary, it took approximately a year and then I heard that the whole project had been cancelled as it was discovered to actually promote differences between men and women, rather than working against such prejudices. I must confess that the whole event gave me some good laughs. I submerged myself in the sweet irony of it, shrugged my shoulders and went on with my work.

This initial fumbling with issues of equality for women and men seems to have left a mark on some of my colleagues. They still speak of women as bringing something different to the organisation. They cling on to there being a natural order that makes men and women inherently different, besides their physical differences. And that this is what makes it desirable to integrate more women in the organisation. Conversely, for me it is about numbers. Add 50% more recruits and minds to the equation, and you will be given a larger chance for more ingenuity. Not because we add women per se, but that we add more minds. My position on the matter is obviously something deriving from the bureaucratisation of military practice, and particularly from production as a central point of reference in this bureaucratisation. However, this has actually very little to do with the resistance to gender issues and how they fall into a (bureaucratised) order of things in the operational work. It is mostly relevant as a historical backdrop to the analysis made here and specifically as the history of the analytical mind conducting this analysis. And my personal stand in the question of women in the military is probably worth spelling out before going any further: I have always believed that women have an equal place in the military. Workplaces dominated by a single sex (military, fire department, hospitals, eldercare etc.) seem to me to suffer from tendencies of juvenile behaviour that sometimes affect professional conduct in a negative way. For me, then, gender equality is about achieving a higher degree of professionalism in the military. There is no doubt in my mind that seeing women as equal to men in all aspects will help us produce better killers in the AF (for an overview of research on women as aggressors, see Wibben 2011, 22). And this state of mind brings me to the masculinity that resists the infusion of gender issues into the practice of operational staff work.

In the introductory part of this section I describe gender issues as inherently being a political and normative aspect of society, but that it is transformed to fit into the bureaucratised labour of the military so that it is instead something of practical use and not a question of norms. The struggle is within myself:

Is the idea of those politicians working with gender that the infusion of women in the military will bring about a more peaceful world? It certainly seems like that from my perspective, based on what I have read

and heard so far. But that is just not really logical, is it? If men and women are equally equipped to work in the military, as I believe we are, it must mean that we will be better at doing our job in the AF if we get more women. And our job, as pointed out by the discourse of military legitimacy to use force, is to destroy, kill, fight and in any way possible try to enforce our national will on an opponent. How then, do women's rights to bear arms create a more peaceful world? Their natural place in this organisation speaks against some form of inherent (to them) will to not do the tasks provided by our political leadership. So is it that gender issues provide some form of diminishing effect on aggression in the minds of those wanting us to embrace the gender norms they promote? But that makes no sense either to my mind. Women can be just as aggressive as men as I see it. And the existence of structural differences in the upbringing of girls and boys, where girls are moulded into passivity and boys into aggression, cannot be an argument for bringing gender issues into the military for the sake of diminishing a possible aggressive stance of the practice. It speaks against the end of those differences in upbringing and schooling of boys and girls as this structural establishment would have to be continuously ongoing to feed the military with persons of a less aggressive 'nature'. I do not by that assert that you on the one hand can say that women are morally better equipped than men to withstand aggressive behaviour, and at the same time say that there are really no static normative differences between men and women. And finally, my resistance to gender issues as a peace creating normative framework within the military also rests on the fact that women were also active in of one of mankind's greatest crimes: the Holocaust. The professional duty that the guard, administrator or bureaucrat in the organisation of this event leaned on in the destruction of all those people was just as effective at eradicating higher moral standards from men as from women. Moral standards of an organisation are thus not about men and women per se, they are about the possibility to think critically and have the guts to voice that critique in the practice. (LtCol Malm)

The above excerpt from LtCol Malm's reflection regarding my resistance to accept gender as a normative framework speaks (defensively) about a division between formal (pacifying) gender norms and the acceptance of women in the organisation. Women are not a threat to me as a military officer, but the peace-content of the normative message wrapped in the gender context is. It is its proclamation of peace that make me resist it.

> Thus, unravelling the band of brothers myth is essential to demystifying and ending wars. My objective is not simply to see more women join the US military, or make a case as to whether women are "good" or "bad" soldiers. My objective for this book has been to deconstruct the band of brothers myth in order to change the conversation about war, and to make it more difficult to romanticise and legitimise war. (MacKenzie 2015, 198)

MacKenzie's aim of her book is an example of how this split aspect of gender issues takes form in academic discourse. She works with the normative aim of trying to change discourses about war in order to make them less likely to happen. But her main argument is that women can fight and should therefore, in the name of equality, be allowed to do so. I agree with her on both accounts: Yes, myths built upon ideas of warrior code, male bonding and the like should be actively resisted by the military practice. And yes, women should be able to serve in the military with equal rights. Indeed, these are two inherently different things because in the discourse of gender, they speak about two very different sets of norms: the norm of restraining the use of violence (pacifying normative framework) and the not related norm of

equal rights between men and women (framework of equality) (see Wibben 2011, 24 for a summary of previous research that identifies this tension in feminist studies of military matters).

But in a discourse of bureaucratisation, both the reduction of male myths and equal rights are compatible in a certain form because they both speak about creating a more professional, efficient military (which in turn means a military that will use violence in a way that will grant the practice more success in achieving cohesive political goals). In this latter discourse the abolishing of 'traditional masculine ideals' is as functional as in the pacifying gender discourse, but they have very different driving factors. That is, in the perspective of bureaucratisation, old masculine ideals are seen as contra-productive as they split the working force and create unnecessary friction between men and women in the production of violence. Therefore, traditional ideals of male bonding and domination should be abolished as such ideals work against effectiveness in an inclusive military organisation.

It does not fit in my military mind that anyone would like to internally pacify the military practice by adding women to it. Aspirations of reducing the use of military force should emphasise the study of political science, international relations and the practice of diplomacy. But also studies of military violence and how the military practice relates to and understands its own practice. Even if we are discussing tasks that belong to 'peacekeeping' the military role is closely connected to the use of force. This is precisely what my own research wants to elucidate, that rearticulating the military practice as a creator of peace hides its violent side, and promotes an unpolitical use of force. The diffuse inclusion of gender norms in the name of peace makes me feel uneasy about how gender issues are then turned to be of productive use in the military. More precisely, about how their normative message (naturally) disappears and gender is used instead to enhance military efficiency to conduct operations. What if these operations have flaws in their legitimacy? Have we then with such operations committed crimes against the democratic values that gender issues speak of by using them to enhance military efficiency? Gender as a conjurer of peace is, to return to the terms of social rules and norms, a framework of rules that does not fit into the existing normative rules of operational staff practice. That is why I feel resistance towards gender as a formal framework driven by ideas that pacification should be included into the military practice. But I feel no resistance to gender as a set of ideas providing equal rights and opportunities to women soldiers or officers, whom I easily accept as any other colleague in the organisation. One of my interlocutors on the staff (one of the Chiefs) tells me when we are speaking about this: "We attend the formal sessions on gender that we're obliged to do, but my guys at the department always ask afterwards "How are we to fit this into our work? Military plans for defending our nation, how does a gender perspective add anything to how we are to stop an aggressor against our nation?" and I have no good answer for them. Because I cannot see it either." I think this sheds some light on this internal clash of norms, as the use of force is something of a last resort to us, and seen as such, violence is not something normatively 'good'. Gender issues, on the other hand, are something normatively good in their formal presentation and this creates resistance. (LtCol Malm and the researcher struggles)

Another aspect of internal resistance which I have not felt myself, but witnessed among some of my colleagues, is the resentment to be told what kind of private norms you should harbour. In some cases, this can be seen in how some officers

become angry when the infusion of gender issues into the practice is the topic of discussion. They feel that norms are a separate and a very private thing of their lives and that an employer has nothing to do with telling employees what they should think or feel. This is from a philosophical and historical point of view nothing surprising as there always has been resistance to formal attempts to alter people's norms.

> […] Here also is a hint for the explanation of the paradox, why it was precisely in the most Christian period of European history, and in general only under the pressure of Christian sentiments, that the sexual impulse sublimated into love (amour-passion). (Nietzsche n.d., 152)

Nietzsche refers to the dogmatic rule of the Christian church and the counter movement in the form of an emerging romanticism and how such resistance is typical for human reaction towards the (forceful) introduction of norms. The authoritarian form that the introduction of gender issues sometimes takes in the Swedish military is, ironically, simply not well-received. Colleagues mumble about "communist regime" and "Stalinism" when they react to such attempts, but these reactions are very seldom spoken of in any official discourse. But many of us that have experience of the practice know about this kind of reaction and some key players have also identified the need to adjust gender issues to the ruling norms of the practice. The strategy to conform gender issues to military social rules and norms is evident even in academic work that has evaluated implementation of such issues:

> The Swedish Armed Forces have been among the forerunners in implementing a gender perspective in military organisations and operations."
> […]
> "Second, the analysis in this book ascertains that the change agents within the Swedish Armed Forces made a strategic decision to approach the implementation of a gender perspective in the organisation as *an issue of operational effectiveness* – as opposed to one 'merely' of gender equality, women's rights, or human resources."
> […]
> "The strategic placement of the Gender Adviser and the focus on operational effectiveness not only amplified the implementation of a gender perspective in the Swedish Armed Forces as a core issue of output in terms of operations, but also sent a strong signal to the organisation regarding the importance of a gender perspective as an issue of operational effectiveness. (Egnell, Hojem, and Berts 2014, 2, 6, 7)

Egnell (et al.) present their findings from evaluating the 'success' of implementation of gender in the Swedish Armed Forces and thus highlight the transformation of the issues into the framework of production (output and effectiveness in operations). From my academic understanding of gender (as political and normative issues that have to do with equality and/or pacifying the military) this is not so much an example of successful implementation of such issues. On the contrary, it is an example of how powerful bureaucratisation is in the practice. The very fabric of gender issues is twisted to make them fit into the military framework in that its multidimensional aspects are downplayed and what is left is its 'good use' in the military organisation.

As you take a pause from the assembly line and join the gathering of other members of the production team, nothing in the social relations between the workers should negatively affect your capacity for assembling our product in the most efficient way. You are treated with an equal amount of respect regardless of your physical traits. Our factory sets the boundaries for your identity: you are all, regardless of your sex, ethnicity, religion, age or the like, defined by the professionalism that producing our high quality product demands. You are not woman/man/father/mother/old/young. You are all professional producers of military violence. (LtCol Malm)

If the norms that oppose the acceptance of pacifying gender issues are equivalent to masculine norms, then 'production' is indeed a contemporary operational military masculine norm.[16] This is an aspect which I touch upon in the historical chapter of this thesis and which seems to be strengthened in the contemporary military discourse. Thus the internal resistance to gender issues is not connected to risks of diminishing some form of traditional warrior ideal, as evident in some other military forces (studies of the US Armed Forces provide insight in such resistance. E.g. Mann 2014, 179). Instead, resistance is actually connected to the staff practices reliance in the social rules of bureaucratisation. Or as the new gender adviser at the operational staff puts it in one of our discussions: "It seems like the gender perspective doesn't fit the templates" (C31_06021400).

Resistance to gender issues related to the conduct of operations

Here I leave the internal clash of social norms for a moment and present some findings from the operational staff regarding how gender policy is understood in relation to international missions. This is, of course, related to the internal struggle discussed above but my material points to these two different aspects of military struggle with gender, and I therefore let the 'data' guide the outline of the analysis. This has the benefit of providing some insight into how bureaucratisation goes hand-in-hand with what some academics would call an ontology adhering to neorealism (e.g. A. Wendt 1992, 392). I identify neorealism as coexisting with bureaucratisation by how my colleagues at the staff speak about our international missions. Here it is clear to me that a perspective of 'self-interest' in international relations prevails as a dominant among them. In this particular perspective, Sweden is conducting missions for political leverage and for gaining military benefits like increased interoperability and creating a certain show of our capabilities. As such, international security is based, in the minds of the staff personnel, on a constant ongoing struggle between all nations. And UN missions, or other forms of military coalitions, are used as a means for levelling out differences in levels of power:

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[16] This is a conclusion drawn from situating the investigation of the military practice internally. Analysing on a higher level of abstraction, the level of society, one could say that the very institutionalising of an organisation for using military force in society is driven by masculinity. In such an analysis, historical 'traditional' masculine traits would be more in focus since this establishment is performed in another context.

"But why are we in Mali for instance? It would have been helpful for us to know that for sure, because we will not be able to change anything major down there. As it is now, we see it like a political marker, that Sweden supports the UN. […]" (C30_05310800)

[excerpt from notes] He then describes how another of the nations is also competing for a place in the UN-Security Council. ---> this is how the practitioners understand the political use of force: that it is for gaining prestige and power. O32_05310900

[excerpt from notes] During this discussion which is otherwise completely free of political or moral/ethical considerations, one of the officers remarks: "the election to the security council is soon upon us, so…" Meaning that there is little political interest in reinforcing the mission to Mali since it will not be in time for increasing political influence to get a place on the council. Another officer responds, ironically: "Now you're just being cynical" and smiles (O12_03211300)

The most apparent link between bureaucratisation and neorealism is that both put emphasis on a certain type of productive, linear causality in a system of hierarchy: you can (must) apply certain strategically chosen parts of your national resources (where military force is one such resource) in a consequently ordered way to achieve your goals. Such goals are always linked with providing a better position in the hierarchical order of nations (to get some leverage on the Other). Gender issues that naturally consist of norms of equality have some trouble finding their place in such hierarchies, due to their normative aim of removing positions of dominance and altering identity. Stability in these latter positions are the very conditions that make neorealism function as an ontology, which consequently makes gender a threat to the bearer of this particular world view (e.g. Hopf 1998, 176). Or it at least provides a tension in that agents of neorealism have problems with fitting such a normative framework within their understanding of actions taken by nations.

This tension is something that sometimes emerges when talking with the practitioners at the staff about Swedish policies related to international relations. An excerpt from one such conversation is given below where I discuss the Armed Forces' tendency to answer on the political level by saying what we can do, but at the same time not giving much advice on consequences beside those related to resources. Note that I have so far in the conversation not mentioned gender or in other ways talked about issues of equality before this occurs:

My old colleague confirms this as we speak [the Armed Forces' tendency to officially reply what can be done in terms of resources]. His experience from working at the Government Office also tells him that people there do not have the time to analyse such things either. Again due to shortage of time.

"Besides, Sweden hasn't any strategy [security policy] anyhow" he says, and continues: "Gender can't be a strategy. To make sure that girls can go to school in Afghanistan cannot be a specific Swedish interest. A global one, maybe, but not specifically Swedish. It's of course good if we can do some good as well."

> Then he talks about how hard it is for the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to create a coordinated foreign policy. This is because the Swedish governmental institutions are traditionally so strong, that they can act internationally and thus conduct foreign policy themselves. This without being governed by a clear strategy for foreign, and security politics.

> He suddenly comes back to gender: "I like gender, it's an important tool, but it is a part of the way ahead, not an end state in itself. What Sweden needs is a clear goal with its strategy" (C7_02161540)

That gender is understood as a "tool" is natural to emerge in an environment of bureaucratisation, but here I start to learn something about how gender relates to the 'outcome' of military practice. This was just one conversation but it occurred timely at an early stage of my fieldwork. It made me note if there were other articulations that indicated something awry with the relationship between gender issues, official policies and the conduct of operations. Such things emerge during 'small talk' and informal meetings with other workers at the staff. In more formal conversations, and especially with those in 'Chief' positions, not much of the tension between gender and security policies is elucidated. There is certainly a gap between what a staff worker and a chief can say to a researcher, where the former tends to be more outspoken about their position on such sensitive things as gender.

My impression of the practice at a general level is that there is a fear of speaking frankly about such issues among the agents, which I do not relate to some form of 'political correctness', but more to the social rules of consensus. The rules of consensus produce silence of disparate views as previously shown, and gender issues are no exception. In any case, the conversation above contains several troublesome 'facts' about the interrelation between the Armed Forces and the political level, but the interesting fact here is that my colleague actually provides me with hints about how gender policies are resisted: they are seen as something that cannot govern military strategy because gender policies cannot frame a (neorealist) end state for military operational work. It is again the incompatibility of norms that haunts the practice as the neorealist does not see the function of eradicating structures of hierarchy with the use of military force.

Even though I do not count myself as a person bearing a realist ontology, I do understand that point of view as my military profession has always been focused in a setting of winning. That is, military force is (in theoretical and historical societal discourse) applied to defeating an opponent (e.g. Clausewitz 1991). This is done in order to gain a position of dominance where military force is used to make the Other comply with political demands. It is important to understand that this is not something that is confined to regular warfare or belongs to remnants of old views on national warfare. On the contrary, this understanding also applies to modern theories of counter insurgency (COIN) and peace enforcement, which in turn have been much of what the practice has been doing for the last two decades (e.g. Tuck 2014, 196). Understanding military practice within a framework of 'winning' creates little space for gender as a possible goal, but indeed as a tool towards victory. This com-

petitive framing of the practice has a modern history previously discussed in Chapter 4, as a part of the narratives that makes use of production and education as themes for sustaining a bureaucratisation of the military. Clearly the *contest* has survived after the 20th century and continues to influence military minds in the form of realism, and now creates tensions between gender and the conduct of military operations.

Lastly there is one other aspects of resistance to the external application of gender issues that I want to touch upon before concluding this chapter. And that is how the pacifying normative 'taint' of gender policies clashes with conducting military operations. In this, external (policy) related resistance to gender issues is connected to how the military is being turned into 'do-gooders' by contemporary political rhetoric on liberal peace, and specifically in the liberation of oppressed women in other countries.

> For the postnational defence, a pertinent query is whether the changing tasks of 'doing peace instead of war' also is a way to demilitarise the military defence organisation. (Kronsell 2012, 145)

That is, it is clear to me that there is a place for a certain version of gender issues in operational staff work, but the acceptance of these issues suffers from 'slips' in the reasons for why they should be invoked by the practice. I am certainly not alone in detecting that some form of obscure pacifying agenda lies behind the infusion of the concept in the practice. But gender issues still live on by their adjustment to the social rules of the practice. Even if aspects of gender fit in the organisation insecurely something important is lost in the process of bureaucratised transformation: the perspective of domination. Gender equality is, as previously mentioned, about balancing levels of power by reducing a dominant part's position to dominate others. Conversely, gender understood as increasing military operational effectiveness, provides further ways for western military forces to dominate people in other countries. The only one that I meet in the staff who clearly formulated such a critical connection was the Gender Adviser (C31_06021400), but others made similar statements. Here one of my colleagues points to the possibility of backlash when using military force in the name of gender equality:

> Our time is up, but as I am leaving for my next talk he tells me that "Wallström's feministic foreign policy will be held accountable when an IS-suicide bomber explodes in central Stockholm". (C27_05241230)

Sweden, which mixes foreign policy and security policy, has a clearly stated feministic action plan for these policies (which incidentally state that Sweden is to be the first country in the world with such a foreign policy, ironically spilling into the framework of competition). "Peace operations" are briefly mentioned in this action plan but otherwise there are no clear articulations of the use of military force in it (see: Regeringen 2016, 20). But the emphasis on UN resolution 1325 in the governmental white paper on the mission to Mali visualises the connection of policies: "Resolution [1325] commitments should permeate operations undertaken by the

Swedish unit" (Regeringen 2015, 13 my translation). So the mission to Mali is undertaken under the auspices of official policy to protect women and girls and to work for the possibilities for these groups in Malian society to have equal human rights. But as my colleague knows, the actual conduct of such missions is far from peaceful as the missions comprise armed military personnel deployed in areas with a high amount of hostility. The exposure of Swedish military forces to violent groups in Mali increases the risk for attacks against Sweden carried out on Swedish territory. Attacks which, in line with terrorists' modus operandi, would target civilians.

So the resistance to using military force in the name of gender equality is twofold: partly by the way it actually increases our opportunity to dominate others, and also by how international missions are seen to increase risks for violence in the national setting. These are not as separate as one might think, as the 'oppression' of another always comes with risks of retaliation. The problem for my colleague is that the feministic foreign policy does not take this aspect (of violence) into account when proclaiming Sweden's ambitions of liberating the women of the world. Oddly enough, this is one of the few times during my time at the staff that someone actually identified destructive and escalating aspects of violence in relation to Swedish military missions. For me this 'strong' reaction is a sign of how gender issues build up a certain level of tension within the practice. I would in theoretical terms explain this type of resistance as springing from the ability of gender issues to rupture a bureaucratised hegemony when gender issues' origin as a political struggle is manifested in the practice. In other words, gender issues' political origin brings about a hegemonic struggle which comprises threats to identity by the risk this struggle poses to sedimented practices. This is due to how hegemony provides us with unity between theory and practice and as such helps us make sense of what we do (Gramsci 2003, 333–34). Much of what is secured and stabilised by bureaucratisation is in motion when gender issues are normative instead of productive, and this insecurity creates resistance.

Summary

In conclusion, production as a discursive point of reference promotes a certain type of masculine norms and social rules that create resistance to gender issues. This is clearly much more difficult to pinpoint compared to how traditional masculine warrior ideals resist the infusion of equality in the military practice. These latter ideals provoke clashes in the practice and create a more noticeable oppression of women in combat roles, whereas the masculinity imbued in the norms of production lies hidden in the processes of bureaucratisation. Another type of resistance is thus created by the 'grey' daily work of an operational staff, as such work forces gender issues take a form that fits into the rules that promote operational efficiency. It is a resistance based on categorising gender from the perspective of usefulness, leaving out those aspects of such issues that speak about a more peaceful world. From this follows that the discursive focus on production provides rules to the practice that will sustain a resistance regarding the pacifying trope that lingers in gender equality even

in times of 'peace' or of minimum violent activity. Most importantly, the confusion that arises when the bureaucratised adaptation of gender issues is ruptured (for instance, by new types of political or institutional articulations on what gender actually is and what it aims at) provides further categorisation of the many different aspects of gender issues. In this confusion (struggle of hegemony) that spawns a division of questions about gender equality, practical solutions for including more women in the Armed Forces seems to be lost to us that serve (in this, both men and women seem alike). Finally, one very central observation from this part of my fieldwork is how bureaucratisation of military operational work has the power to depoliticise gender issues through the same techniques as it neutralise violence. Here the normative goal of gender issues to reduce levels of domination is sundered and in its bureaucratised form gender issues actually increase our possibility to dominate other people by the use of force.

5.5 The Social Rules of Operational Work: A Summary

If I were to brief the Commander, I would talk about what we can do: We have the capability to deploy units in an area of operations. We have the financial and logistical resources needed, and also a stock of personnel enough to do as our politicians ask. I would say that risks connected to a mission are calculated with regard to how it will strain our resources, in case we need to do something else during the operation. I can add my thoughts on how an international mission is good for us in the Armed Forces, as it helps us to keep up to speed with materiel development and boosts recruitment efforts. It will, despite straining our resources, promote an increase in production of units. And I would also point out that our units are to be trained according to our new handbook on gender, as this will further increase our operational efficiency in a mission area. I can foresee the Commander asking about details such as if our soldiers can be provided with nutritious food. Since such issues have put a negative light on previous missions (by the media) I will strive to see to it that I can answer with assurances that our soldiers can eat as well as, or nearly as well as, Swedish standards. I would conclude my briefing by saying that it is the staff's suggestion that the Commander take a decision to send these considerations as a formal answer to the higher staff for further relay to the political level. (LtCol Malm)

The question of how military staff practice shapes understandings of violence and death through bureaucratic routines and the workings of daily social relations is to some extent mirrored in the autoethnographical reflection above. But this section aims to further summarise and clarify this question.

Consensus rules the practice by its laws of language-use and social interaction. What can be said without breaking social bonds is narrowed down to materiel aspects of military missions. Finance, logistics and personnel are 'issues' in operational work that the practitioners agree on before presenting them to higher commands. Consideration is taken regarding media reactions and political questions from previous missions. But experience of such media reactions/political questions has taught the practitioners that these concerns are related to materiel aspects of the missions as well, so there is really no greater external strain to the bureaucratised discourse of the practice. Furthermore, the bureaucratisation enclosing the operational staff prac-

tice is further enforced by how hierarchy freezes the practice in a status of duty-related responsibility – a responsibility that for the agents of the practice is the embodiment of Weber's Iron Cage. In addition, the social rules of and language of consensus provide the higher chiefs with an image of active participation in what the staff deems important issues. Complementarily, the social rules of order and bureaucracy support the hold that consensus has on the practice through their ability to sediment day-to-day activities. These latter rules provide the practitioners with routines, levels of hierarchy and defined responsibilities. In this they also inform the practice with norms related to compliance to given routines and regulations. When materiel issues are not in focus for the agents, discussions about the meaning of concepts and procedures of the staff working process set the boundaries of discourse. There is not much room for anything else besides what these social rules and the language of bureaucratisation infuse into the practice. Meetings, briefings, discussions on who, what and when fill the practitioners' days. The few existing moments of contemplation must be used to talk about something else. Home, family, a trip or perhaps some gossip about who will be the next Chief are topics that provide some momentary escape from the bureaucratisation of the practice.

As elucidated in the analysis above, the social rules of consensus and those of order and bureaucracy, *give practitioners a sense of meaning and place in the operational work*. Violence is not seen as a practical outcome of this particular meaning and place, and is treated as a state of exception, originating from groups of religious fanatics or criminality. The 'fact' that violence is relational, that it is a human activity and that Swedish military missions play a part in the existence of this activity is hard to fathom in this context. Above all else, the social rules and norms of operational staff work ensure that bureucratised labour prevails and sediments into a natural way of understanding the point of military practice: to enable a secure place of belonging for its practitioners and a productive operational use of military force. The ironic consequence of this is that practitioners in the operational staff do not think that they have much to do with military use of violence. Instead they are 'planning', 'producing', 'meeting', 'supporting' or 'briefing'. These are the activities that take space for moral considerations and about which discussions concerning *responsibility* take place. In other words, neutralisation and silencing of death and violence is something which is a central aspect of operational work. And this is achieved through how social relations are, one the one hand, constructed by formalised procedures and levels of hierarchy, as a reflection of idolising the perks of 'rational' bureaucracy.

But importantly, the social rules and norms of 'rational' bureaucratisation are complemented by the actors themselves, through formal and informal agreements on how the operational work is to function. The discursive focus provided by 'rational' bureaucratisation - a focus on procedures and formal rules, "without regard for persons" – is thus strengthen by the subjectivities of the operational work (M. Weber 2009, 215). Which leads me to the question of how reification and misrecognition of

the Other exist and operate in the bureaucratised labour of the operational staff practice.

Firstly, reification – to deem "the Other as a mere object or an inanimate thing" – is in the above analysis shown to operate through the actors' strong identification with the materiality of the operational work (Lindemann 2014, 490). Admittedly, the Other is seldom a part of the operational discourse investigated in this chapter, but when the Other appears, it is as part of lists, templates and/or statistics. And this materiality is closely integrated with how the actors of the practice are linked to each other, through a common bureaucratic language, which forms the boundaries for what is supposed to be dealt with in operational work. It becomes natural to objectify the Other, as both the materiality and the language of the practice offer such clear avenues of identification with bureaucratised discourse. Secondly, the operational work described and analysed in this chapter further underlines the disappearance of the Other from contemporary military discourse, as discussed in Chapter 2. The misrecognition of the enemy Other, as Delori puts it "the blanks in the contemporary discourse.", clearly extends to also contextualise the buraucratised labour of operational work (Delori 2014, 525). In operational work, this misrecognition operates both through formalised procedures (such as allocating intelligence reports little time and discursive space in the practice) but also through how the social rules and norms of the practice establish points of reference for the actors which do not relate to war and violence. I will go deeper into this question on reification and misrecognition of the Other in the next chapter, as it deals with the operational work which is directly pointed at using military force.

On a final note, the chapter also analyses what values and norms come into the forefront in the construction of military masculinity in the context of military operational bureaucratised labour. And it is evident that the biggest challenge to the prevailing hegemony of bureaucratisation in operational work, is posed by the infusion of gender issues into the practice. But bureaucratisation prevails and overcomes this challenge as its close relations to the language of production provides a neat fit for a certain version of these gender issues. After a period of adjustment and assimilation, *questions of gender are understood as increasing operational capability and efficiency*. Consequently, 'neorealism' and bureaucratisation go hand-in-hand subjugating gender issues to tools of the military trade with the subsequent effect of depoliticising gender struggles. Insomuch, the subject position 'staff officer', or for that matter 'civilian staff worker', are encapsulated in articulations and actions that ensure that masculinity is provided meaning derived from discourses of productivity. Here, the infusion of gender as a normative 'framework' guiding the development of military practice is actually proven to become a move enforcing the productive aspect of military masculinity. In other words, gender creates a possibility to deem 'traditional' warrior ideals as *unproductive*, thus pushing them to the margins of military identity construction. But in this process, ideals of masculinity, connected to those norms and rules found in the practice to rely on the language and materiality of production, are enhanced. Bureaucratisation has thus been shown here to not only

prevail over political aspirations of altering a military normative framework, but also to be *strengthened* by such attempts.

In Chapter 7, the social rules and norms investigated here will be discussed in the light of what they say about *how* military violence becomes bureaucratised and what that does to the management, neutralisation or silencing of death and violence in the military. And there the artificial aspect of military operational practice, evident in its rituals and routines, moves into the foreground of the discussion. But for now I leave the operational staff work and its indirect relation to military violence, and step into the central practice of preparing for, and engaging in, operational use of force.

6
Chapter 6: the Targeteer

6.1 Introduction

This second of two chapters on contemporary military practice and the management, neutralisation or silencing of death and violence in operational work turns here to the practice of targeting. Investigating operational military work with targeting, and specifically how the subject position 'targeteer' forms through daily work with targeting processes, provides a complementary understanding of the bureaucratisation violence. Specifically, the previous chapter gave insight into the rules and norms of daily operational work in *support* of a military mission, but the direct use of violence is, for the agents of that practice, quite distant to that reality. This distance means that the social rules analysed in Chapter 5 set the position of the operational staff officer in a status of indirect use of military violence and as such, neutralise some possible dilemmas and disruptive events found in the more direct use of force. The intention here is therefore to add to the insights provided by the previous chapter by examining what social rules hold joint operational targeting -the governing of operational military violence- in a status of bureaucratised naturalness. The chapter is thus meant to expand our knowledge of how military violence is used and understood to function within the framework of operational military work, by investigating how the 'targeteer' is shaped by his/her daily work with the targeting process.

The data for this chapter has been collected during three international staff exercises conducted in Sweden 2015, 2016 and 2017. Targeting during these exercises has been conducted within the framework scenario of a *Peace Support Operation*, and has as such much in common with how the practice of targeting was formed during NATO missions such as Operation Unified Protector (Libya, 2011) and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF, Afghanistan, 2001-2014).[17] I have learned from conversations with experienced 'targeteers' that the exercise provides the participants with opportunities to work with processes and objects that are close to how 'real' targeting is conducted (C01 251420, C02 261310, CJSE 17). But before going any further one central objection must be met: what relevance is there in investigating how military work in exercises contributes to bureaucratised understandings of

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[17] Specifically, this means that the type of targets, such as extremists, terrorists, informants and irregular forces are similar in category to those that were common in those military missions.

violence? Are exercises not just something temporal and simulated and thus have little weight in providing avenues of identification and subjectivities? Exercises are relevant for this investigation as they are generally seen as central for increasing the ability to solve central tasks of a military organisation, and they therefore hold a place of importance in most military organisations (e.g. Hedlund and Österberg 2013, 90). It is during exercises that military minds are shaped in ways which prepare agents of the practice to face 'reality' and consequently they also affect how that 'reality' is perceived. Perhaps the relevance is best described by how the typically short military expression "train as you fight – fight as you train" establishes a link between what is done during exercises and the 'real' practice (e.g. S. Rietjens, Van Fenema, and Essens 2013, 27–28). Naturally, the practice of participating in exercises, field training or staff courses contributes to shaping military subjectivities and offers a certain way of identification, and such events are therefore central to any investigation where the aim is to elucidate how understanding of violence is constructed in military work (see also: R. Woodward and Neil Jenkings 2011).

I have participated in numerous meetings and conversations during these three years of ethnographical investigations, but for this chapter I have chosen to focus on those that relate to the function of targeting. Starting my observations in the 2015 exercise, I had a broad span of interest concerning operational work, but from 2016 and 2017, my main observations and interaction with participants have been pointed at the targeting practice. This choice is based on the fact that targeting is central to how the operational level uses violence, and thus to how military violence is provided with specific content through the practice of targeting. As participants learn and adjust to the vocabulary and activities involved in this practice, they 'evolve' and become 'targeteers'. My interest here is thus to investigate the content of this particular subject position ('the targeteer') in order to shed some light on how bureaucratisation of violence is formed through the ways of identification and subjectivities that construct this particular subject position. That is, the targeting practice comprises activities and discursive elements that help reinstate and place bureaucratised understandings of violence as natural for military personnel.

With reference to how they speak and act when 'doing targeting', the 'targeteer' is an operative function which is distinctly different from the broader position 'staff officer', whereof the latter I describe and analyse in Chapter 5. The 'targeteers' differs from the 'staff officers' in that they require specific knowledge of the targeting practice, including an understanding of the targeting-related language and procedures inherent to targeting. For me, as a staff officer, targeting has, before my research engagement with it, been shrouded in mystery due to the distinctly different way the practice is talked about, compared to the more 'all-round' military operational way of speaking in staffs. This 'distinctiveness' in language is laid out in the following context description and subsequent results of analysis of the targeting practice, elucidating some of the mystery of the targeting practice. It is important not to lose sight of the observation that targeting is a practice that internally to military organisations can be seen as distinctively different from 'ordinary' operational work

and also somewhat mystical to onlookers. I will return to this observation in the analysis below and also in Chapter 7, where the thesis results are further discussed.

Targeting is a concept that has emerged from the linguistic move from the noun "target" to the verb "targeting" as it signifies a practice performed by military forces. But the practice goes under several different names, such as "Joint Fires", "Joint Targeting", "Joint Effects" even though most of the military personnel that I meet during my investigations just use the word "targeting" while talking about this particular function in military organisations. This simplification may be necessary as the practice with its meetings, routines, lists and language is quite overwhelming even for us who are used to military acronyms and practice-related language. But in this chapter I will still make an effort to lay out the basis of the practice as it has been outlined during the exercises. It must be done in order to make the chapter's subsequent analysis (reasonably) intelligible.

As in most ethnographical investigations, context description is not 'just' a tale of the research environment. It is also needed in order to provide insight into how the context relates and contributes to agents' formation of Self/Other and to how bureaucratised labour forms in relation to what these agents do in their daily work. As a reminder from Chapter 1, bureaucratised labour is in this investigation seen as shaped in the relation between the formation of social relations and the language/materiality of the practice at hand. This means that the meaning which bureaucratised labour provides is dependent on how agents of the practice identify with their job and the content of targeting. Therefore, the next section introduces the targeting practice in the context of the international staff exercises that I have participated in. After this overview of the practice at hand, the chapter commences with describing the result from analysing the practice in the light of social rules and norms. Here the ethnographical data (field notes and audio recordings) are used together with regulating documents of the practice, and with my own reactions from interacting with the agents of the practice. This corpus of material provides insights into how the subject 'targeteer' emerges and establishes itself as a central position for military use of force, as well as insights into how articulations and actions in the practice form a specific type of bureaucratised understanding of violence. The chapter is then concluded with a summary of the main findings from the analysis. But first a short note on some methodological differences compared to the previous chapter.

The difficulty of becoming a 'targeteer'

In my investigation and analysis of the operational staff work in Chapter 5, I was often faced with the tendency to slip into my role and subject position as 'staff officer'. As outlined in my methodological chapter, this is something I have made use of in order to deepen my analysis of the operational work at hand. In particular, the self-reflexive method of autoethnography has helped me to identify what it is that pulls me into a 'secure' and familiar position of identity in the practice. Or in theo-

retical terms, to identify ways/moments of identification and subjectivities. In extension, this tells us more about how the social relations and meaning-making of the practice at hand establish a 'normality' of the workplace, and also how this *modus operandi* interacts with discourses of bureaucratisation. But the life-world of the 'targeteer' has not been as easy to access for me, as was the case with the operational staff practice. I have felt estranged/alienated by how the targeting practice is conducted, and subsequently, the subject position of the 'targeteer' is a type of identity that I have not established as a part of my Self. In other words, I do not identify myself as an 'targeteer'. I will come back to this fact in Chapter 7, where I make some notes on my learnings from combining autoethnography and discourse analysis, but for now some central points must be made regarding what this means for the following analysis. Most importantly, since my 'lack of desire' to become a 'targeteer' was quite clear to me early on, I used this as a supporting research question: why (what in the practice) is it that makes me uphold a distance from it? This question has helped me identify connections between what it is in the daily targeting work that is important for how the subject position of the 'targeteer' forms. For me, it seemed plausible to assume (with help from my knowledge of the theoretical base for my research) that my resistance to the 'targeteer' must be connected to what the practitioners do, how they interact and how they speak. The following context description and its subsequent analysis are thus structured in relation to what I have found to be the most central parts of the targeting practice, insomuch that they are central to mystifying the practice. But these aspects of the practice are not just mystifying (for me) but also something that fill much of the time available to a 'targeteer' to perform the targeting activity. In conclusion, this means that I will emerge less as 'LtCol Malm' in this chapter, and more as 'the ethnographer' trying to clarify what it is that upholds the social fabric of the targeting practice.

6.2 The Combined Joint Staff Exercise (CJSE) – a Wider Context

Staff exercises are perhaps not the most thrilling experience an officer can encounter in his/her military life. Joining one is often connected to the burdensome task of reading through thick scenario descriptions, *Standing Operating Procedures* (SOPs) and process descriptions of how certain functions within the staff (such as the targeting function) are meant to be performed, just to mention but a few not so exciting chores. And if it is an international staff exercise, as in this case, then joining is also connected to challenges of speaking English[18] and collaborating with military personnel from foreign countries. Such joint efforts are always complicated by formal and informal rules of interaction between participants, where the risk of slips in revealing national classified information perhaps stands in the forefront of what is seen as problematic. But there are benefits with participating as well. For officers working with operational planning and with support to ongoing missions, staff exer-

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[18] For those who do not have English as their first language this might pose an obvious challenge, but there are also challenges for those that are from English speaking nations, as these persons will have to adjust to the language levels of the participants.

cises provide opportunities to work as close to the theoretically outlined procedures as possible. To find and establish a common use of routines, templates for staff work and a common understanding of the meaning of concepts is in the military world seen as necessary for achieving professional standards. Participation in staff exercises are therefore an important experience for any aspiring officer who is destined for staff work (the latter in many cases inescapable in most military organisations for those officers that aim for higher positions in the chain of command). The overall norms that frame a Western military staff exercise, like the *Combined Joint Staff Exercise* (CJSE), are thus those that place military professionalism in context. To be a professional participant in an international staff means, from my own experience, that you abide by the rules created by descriptions of routines and processes, as well as definitions of concepts. Moreover, that you socially can set aside possible national differences between yourself and your fellow staff workers.

CJSE[19] is an event organised by the *Swedish Armed Forces* in cooperation with the *Swedish Defence University*, and its aim "is to train and educate participants to be part of a multi-national staff. For the participants from the Swedish Armed Forces, a further goal is to be part of the development and the use of Command and Control procedures at the operational and tactical level. The focus of the exercise is to train staff procedures and processes for the Commanders and the Staff members." (Försvarshögskolan/Försvarsmakten 2015b, 5). It has approximately 1200 participants, originating from 24-27 different countries and it is a 9-10-day long exercise. The scenario for the exercise is quite complex as it is created to simulate aspects of peace operations in regions of crisis and instability. There is thus a multitude of fictional organisations, key agents and armed/unarmed groups in the scenario that have different agendas and can create problems for the participants (at least those who are a part of the staff, often referred to as the Training Audience (TA)). The CJSE is manned with a "game" function that comprises officers and civilians who are responsible for creating inputs, providing the Training Audience with seemingly 'real' problems that originate from these fictional agents and groups. It is interesting to note that despite this 'play and pretend' situation being known to everyone participating in the exercise (that it is 'not for real'), sometimes discussions become heated among members of staff when missions go wrong or when solutions to problems are discussed. For some participants, the exercise becomes so real that they show emotions of distress, anger or frustration when 'chaos' emerges through inputs from the gaming side. On the other hand, occasionally simulated reports of atrocities, casualties and abuse have slipped through the TA without much concern. The closest I can get to some form of stable observation of this phenomenon is that it is dependent on the level of engagement of the key agents of the participants, and to some extent also on how much pressure these players have on them in their roles of being responsible for the staff work.

Nevertheless, the scenario is constructed to train officers to deal with crisis situations, not conventional interstate war. The different staffs (there are several staffs on

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[19] CJSE 'becomes' an even larger staff exercise every 3rd or 4th year, and is then named VIKING.

the tactical level, and one operational staff) have 'resources' in form of military units that the gaming cells simulate and therefore the staffs are trained in both dealing with current events and with planning for further actions. There is a challenge imbedded here, in the outline of the exercise, of making use of military units in a way that does not escalate or trigger further violence among the (fictional) local population. As briefly mentioned in the introduction, the scenario and the outline of CJSE mirrors real life challenges from past NATO missions in Afghanistan and Libya, and current challenges in ongoing UN-led operations in several African nations like Mali or Somalia. In order to conceptually support the staff members in their effort to separate warring factions, hinder atrocities and pave the way for disarmament, the doctrinal idea of a "comprehensive approach" is included in the guidelines for operational work (e.g. Försvarshögskolan/Försvarsmakten 2015a). This is a concept that is meant to combine military operations with civilian (e.g. diplomatic, economic, logistic, medical) relief efforts. In general, the idea is to coordinate actions taken by military and civilian organisations in an area of conflict in order to create 'desired effects' (such as compliance to peace agreements and creating a "safe and secure environment"). The military part of this approach includes such concepts as "Precision Fires", "Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR)", "Lethal and/or Non-Lethal Effects" to mention but a few.

The operational staff: Bogaland Forces Headquarter (BFOR HQ)

My ethnographical investigation has on a general level been concerned with the staff life at the operational headquarters of the fictitious NATO organisation "BFOR". This is an organisation manned by approximately 165 officers, civilian experts and administrators. It is led by a *Chief of Staff*, normally a colonel working at the *Swedish Joint Forces Command* or some other part of the Swedish Headquarters, from which the commander (general/admiral) is also usually brought in to the exercise.[20] As indicated in the overall aim of the exercise, Swedish personnel are (apart from military students) usually taken from the Swedish Joint Forces Command as they then will be given the opportunity to train staff procedures according to NATO standards. For example, during the CJSE 2016 110 of 160 persons in the BFOR HQ were from Sweden and of these 39 were from the Swedish Headquarters. But a major part of the participants are military officers who are studying different types of staff officer courses.

The operational headquarters was situated in the small city of Enköping where the *Command and Control Regiment* stands as host for a major part of the CJSE. This is a town where the inhabitants 'roll in the sidewalks' at 6 p.m. so there is nothing that could potentially lure participants of the exercise to leave the regiment at the end of the day. This, in conjunction with the quite intense tempo of the exercise, creates an environment where participants are quickly forced to adjust to the routines and the 'internal world' of the CJSE. The typical day at the staff exercise begins with breakfast in the main dining hall at 06.30-07.00 a.m. Participants then gather in their re-

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[20] During CJSE 17, the position of chief of staff was manned by a colonel from the Swedish Defence University.

spective sections/working groups/cells and conduct a quick run-through of the day's schedule, before converging at the main initiating activity for each day: the *Commander's Update Brief* (CUB), which starts at 08.30 a.m. This event is in place to brief the commander on how the operation is proceeding and to provide the staff with guidance from the Commander and the Chief of Staff. It takes place in a large assembly hall and is indeed a formal and 'theatrical' part of the exercise day. Even though this is an exercise, much of the theatrical aspects of this event have strong resemblance to how formal briefings are conducted in the Swedish Armed Forces Headquarters (se Chapter 5). In other words, here officers learn the importance of rehearsed, scripted and simplified ways of informing higher Commanders of ongoing military missions.

After the CUB participants return to their different staffs and working spaces. The generic exercise day is filled with a variety of meetings where the operational staff 'coordinate' and gives orders and guidance to lower staffs. As might be expected, in the first days of every exercise the meetings consist mostly of talking about 'who does what' when it comes to procedures and routines. Even if this becomes less relevant for discussion after a couple of days, such content to meetings is a common part of 'real' staff life as well, as I show in the previous chapter. During the day participants go for lunch and dinner and many functions of the staff take turns so there is always someone manning every particular branch of expertise (e.g. different sections of the staff, such as for example logistics, intelligence and long term planning). A typical day ends with an internal meeting called 'hot wash up' at approximately 7.30 – 8.00 p.m. where every team (section or cell) gathers and talks about what they have done and what is to be done the following day. Evenings are spent on working out or relaxing in the barracks or the mess hall.

Accommodated in either a large staff training hall, or in a building usually hosting military education, the participants often share cramped working spaces, putting focus on the importance of functioning social interaction between them. English is obviously used to communicate between participants from different nations, but it is also used to socially include those who do not speak Swedish. I have sometimes come across Swedish personnel communicating in English without any non-Swedish personnel in the vicinity. This behaviour is related to how the participants adjust to speaking English as an act of social inclusion, setting them as "stuck" in the exercise language. In addition to this socialisation, a major part of the participants also share living quarters during the exercise. These are situated in barracks where the sleeping quarters holds 6-10 persons per room. Every floor in the barracks has 4-5 such rooms and the residents on each floor share showers and toilets. Participants in the exercise are triggered by these circumstances to quickly adjust to being a part of a new group as there is little or no room for privacy. My observations indicate that there are more things uniting military personnel from different countries than dividing them, as many of the agents make a quite smooth transition from national entities into, if not unified then at least functioning, working groups. But there is still a tendency among participants to gather in their primary, national, groups during

breaks from work. This is in no way surprising behaviour as these groups offer a secure position of identity and provide a breathing space for those who struggle when speaking English.

In summary, the staff exercise includes powerful instigating techniques for disciplining the participants' freedom of movement, limiting their possible identification and subjectivities to relate to the content of their role in the exercise. The targeting practice and the creation of the 'targeteer' is thus framed within an environment that provides very little room for the subjects to release themselves from the grip of practice-related discourse.

6.3 The Context of Targeting[21]

> "We do targeting to minimise the use of force" (R1605271115)

The quote above is taken from a lecture on the subject of targeting that I attended in spring 2016. The air force lieutenant colonel educating us on the subject of targeting used this phrase as a way of introducing those with little knowledge about targeting into the rationale behind the practice. Despite having studied the staff work concerned with this function during two exercises (at the point where the lecture took place) I reacted to this articulation. It was a reaction based on the fact that I have not once heard this as a motivation for targeting among my interlocutors at the exercise. And from my point of view the statement 'minimising violence' seems to be a legitimising idea constructed after the practice has formed. Conversely, targeting stems from the technological advances that allow for precision air strikes (see Osinga & Roorda in Ducheine, Schmitt, and Osinga 2016). And precision has arguably been an important part of military practice ever since the introduction of gunpowder (perhaps a medieval manufacturer of crossbows and longbows would argue that precision as a concept in the military has an even longer history). Furthermore, such ideas about precision have to do with another central concept in the military: effect. Precision is a *norm* in the military since it is connected to the importance of afflicting the opponent in such ways that he/she ceases to be a threat to, or hinder, military goals (but it also indicates an 'ethical' use of violence, see: Zehfuss 2011). In other words, effect and precision go hand in hand in military minds and in contemporary military practice. This is as clear as it gets when it comes to targeting. From my perspective, the nexus between *effect* in military operations and *affecting* a target can be seen in this NATO definition of Joint Targeting:

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[21] Please note that the way the targeting practice is outlined varies from different types of exercises and also between 'real' operational headquarters. So, the context description below accounts for what it means to be working with targeting during the CJSE (2015, 2016 and 2017). Despite this, many of the concepts and activities described here as a part of the targeting practice are very similar between, for instance, NATO and US doctrine. In addition, many of the concepts, such as 'Time Sensitive Targeting' or 'Collateral Damage Estimation' has been in use by the Western military in operations such as Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom (US forces in Afghanistan and Iraq) (see Ducheine, Schmitt, and Osinga 2016, 58–65).

> Joint targeting is the process of determining the effects necessary to achieve the commander's objectives, identifying the actions necessary to <u>create the desired effects</u> based on means available, <u>selecting and prioritising targets</u>, and the synchronisation of fires with other military capabilities and then assessing their cumulative effectiveness and <u>taking remedial action</u> if necessary. At the operational level, targeting focuses on determining specific actions to take, physical and psychological, to <u>create the desired effects</u> and realise the JFC's operational objectives. While carrying out an action, either physical or psychological, on a target remains a tactical event, the <u>effect</u> must be relevant to the JFC's operational objectives. The targeting process is crucial to the application of joint fires. (NATO 2011, 1–13 my alteration (underlining)).

"Taking remedial actions" is the language used here that connects desires of achieving effect with actions of affecting a target. Here the central role that the operational level has in the military for the execution of military violence is also observable. The quote above is a type of statement where the centrality of production in military language is visualised, as violence is articulated as a means that will create (produce) solutions to military goals (objectives). These goals are in the quoted text implied to be measurable in terms of how well the selected type of violence will work to achieve them. This ambition to measure 'effect' is very much a result of how Western militaries have tried to incorporate a 'spawn' of New Public Management – Result-Based Management – into the practice of conducting military operations (see S. J. H. Rietjens, Soeters, and Klumper 2011). Minimising the use of force might be a voiced legitimation for targeting now, but the *raison d'être* behind targeting thus rests firmly upon an ontology where military violence is possible to control and utilise in an orderly fashion.

To some extent contemporary discourses on targeting have established connections to legitimacy, although still in the name of effect. To minimise 'unwanted' casualties and what is called 'collateral damage' is arguably a part of 'the liberal way of war', but it is also, in military (and academic) discourse, connected to the problem of losing public support for military operations (e.g. K. Grayson 2012; Owens 2003). In other words, the technological possibility to "cut the serpent's head", and thus minimise the use of force, is driven by the idea that such actions will mitigate public antagonism towards military campaigns (see Coker in Ducheine, Schmitt, and Osinga 2016). Hence, here we have a practice that thoroughly connects to legitimacy, but not to ideas of some form of humane warfare as some proponents of targeting suggest. As outlined in the analysis below, legitimacy in the targeting practice is connected to what is practically possible to do without breaking formal rules or endangering established social relations within the framework of a targeting community. In simple terms, morality as in 'I reduce my contribution to taking lives because it is a fundamentally bad thing' does not exist as a normative framework in a 'targeteer's' daily work (naturally, such moral considerations can exist on an individual basis). Instead, legitimacy for a 'targeteer' is strongly connected to maximising the use of available instruments in order to gain approval for nominated targets (in turn to gain certain effects). The organisation of the targeting function during the staff exercises (outlined below) mirrors how precision, effect and control/order are intertwined in practice.

The targeting community

Experienced 'targeteers' sometimes talk about "the targeting community" when educating new 'targeteers' (e.g. CJSE 17, 251315 JTCB, OTTM comment (34:40)). It is a phrase that captures how the practice, regardless of organisational level or belonging, includes practitioners within the targeting process into a distinct group of staff officers. To belong to this group means that you can master the language of the practice and that you perform according to the professional standards set by the requirements of the targeting process. From a social relations-perspective, this means that the primary pre-conditions for belonging to this group rests on knowledge (of the targeting process) and process induced behaviour (that the social agent acts accordingly to process). I will elaborate further on this during the analysis below. Here, as a part of understanding the particularities of the targeting context I want to call attention to the fact that the targeting practice in this way offers an additional group of belonging for members of different military staffs.

The CJSE has divided the BFOR HQ into branches in accordance with NATO standards, which means that the function for running targeting, the *Joint Effects Cell* (JEC) is located within the branch/department J3 (which handles current events within an area of operation). Manning of the *Joint Effects Cell* includes a chief and heads of the sections *Information Activities* (who is responsible for the non-lethal/non-kinetic types of activities within the targeting process) and *Joint Fires* (which is responsible for running the meetings and coordinating the work with the *Joint Prioritised Targeting List*). The *Joint Effects Cell,* and in particular the 5-6 officers in the section *Joint Fires*, need to work in close cooperation with the *Target Support Cell* (TSC) which is located within the branch/department called J2 (handles intelligence). This latter cell has a chief and 2-3 staff officers who are responsible for receiving and evaluating the 'target nominations' from the Component Commands (the lower level of the organisation). The J3 and J2 targeting functions were located in different rooms or cubicles during the exercises, but they often moved personnel between them to facilitate cooperation. When not in formal meetings, many of the staff officers from these two functions were engaged in smaller meetings where they exchanged information and cooperated on evaluating the intended effects on the nominated targets. So, what is it that these people do when they have become/are becoming 'targeteers'? The short contextual description for this can be found in two words: "lists" and "meetings". Within these words lie several avenues of subjectivity which enable formation of this specific version of military identity. The description below provides some insight into how the subject can establish itself as a 'targeteer' by acting within the framework of 'lists' and 'meetings'.

In order to understand the importance of these activities, I will provide a short description of how the targeting process is meant to be performed. In the following I will use the actual 'nomination' and 'processing' of 'target-id 6002' conducted during CJSE 17 as an example.

The construction of a target[22]

The following text uses the bureaucratised language of the targeting practice in order to describe how 'targeteers' can, with the help of such language, re-create a human subject to fit the mould of a 'target'. To indicate this language, and to make an effort of not re-establishing bureaucratised discourse, I have increased my use of quotation marks (' and '') in this particular part of the chapter. Furthermore, it is important to stress that the process outlined below does not just transform a (fictive) human subject (*Kristina* in the following example) into an entity that fits computer generated folders and forms. The process itself also shapes the practitioners understanding of what being a 'targeteer' means. That is, in the process of becoming a 'targeteer' the agents of the practice identify with bureaucratised discourse on a regular basis.

In the scenario, the *Gute Rams*, an extremist organisation with kidnappings, atrocities and violence against a minority part of the population stand as a 'central problem' for BFOR. Member networks of such armed groups are 'targeted' in order to achieve the 'operational goals' of 'reducing the threat level' in the area of operations. By detailed analytic work and using informants in the field, the 'intelligence branch' of the military forces (and special forces) produce 'diagrams' of which people and/or objects are of central importance for the 'function' of such organisations as the *Gute Rams*. The (fictive) person *Kristina Blofält* is initiated as a presumptive 'target' by the Special Forces branch during CJSE 17, as she is understood to act as a link between the *Gute Rams* and its main supporter, one of the neighbouring countries (see 170423-CJSE17-BFOR-Target folder 6002, p. 5 ff.). The logic behind this analysis rests on a belief that the possibilities for the extremists to cause trouble will be reduced as their influx of money and weapons will be hampered by removing their contact with their main benefactor.

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[22] When presenting earlier drafts of this chapter, military colleagues with field experience in targeting have voiced some critique about my focus on the nomination process and the following decision meetings (the boards). In short, this critique has been related to the fact that before a person is being 'nominated', staff officers might have spent weeks, even months on mapping this person and coming to 'know them as a human'. The point of the critique is that this part of the process can provide 'targeteers' with subjectivities and possible identifications that might contribute to their resistance to the powerful bureaucratised discourses inherent to the practice. My response to this is twofold: firstly, the purpose of 'mapping' a person is in itself a part of the bureaucratised labor ruling the practice (that a person can have a productive function in gaining certain military effects). Secondly, even if a 'targeteer' in the chain of command 'feels for the person' being investigated as a presumptive 'target', such emotional 'content' is effectively removed by how the 'nomination process' and the work within the 'boards' are conducted. That is, in the 'process' of fitting correct data into lists and through the social games inherent to the meetings of the targeting practice, possible humanising traits of the 'target' are removed (e.g. I. Shaw and Akhter 2014, 226 ff.).

Pict. 1. The Joint Targeting Cycle, (NATO 2016, 2–2)

When the 'nomination' of this 'target' is received by the *Target Support Cell* in the operational headquarters, it is in the form of a digital file called "target folder". It consists of filled out templates in Word, Excel -and/or Power Point format where the 'nominated target' is rationalised as 'valid' (of interest) through the use of established military analytical concepts. One such central concept is "desired effects" which is used to underscore how the 'target' is to be affected by military 'means' and to what 'end' it is affected. For *Kristina*, now provided with a "target identification number" (6002), the 'effect' that the 'targeteers' aim for is to "detain" and thereafter to "disrupt" and "exploit" (see 170425-CJSE17-BFOR-FRAGO 061 AN-NEX 1-JPTL (D+46)-J3-JEC).

What this means is that the 'target' is to be 'captured' by the use of force (if necessary) and held in detention for a time period (indicted by the use of 'desired effect' "detain"). During this time, the intention is to 'hamper the function' of the *Gute Rams* (indicated by the use of 'desired effect' "disrupt") and to use the temporary loss of their 'link' (*Kristina*) to gather further 'intelligence' on their possible alternative ways of communicating with their benefactor (indicated by "exploit"). *Target ID 6002* is also to be interrogated during 'its' incarceration which will further military 'operational chances of exploiting' 'its' knowledge of the *Gute Ram* 'network'. It is also possible that detaining this 'target' will damage 'its' relations of trust with the 'extremist network' and/or 'its' supporter, further 'disrupting' their ways of communicating.

Anyhow, the 'target' is moulded into a standardised format by the use of the main working tool of the 'targeteers', the *Joint Prioritised Target List* (JPTL).

| RESTRICTED/NO STRIKE | TYPE OF RE-STRICTION OR PRO-HIBITION | TARGET SET | TARGET ID | | | NAME OF TARGET | PRIO * | BFOR DC * | DMPI Description | Target Folder * | TASKING | | | | | | |
			Area	Tgt Cat	#						Desired effect *	DTG *	DTG NLT *	CC Tasked *	Weapon tasked / Means	ROE *	Remarks
NIL	NIL	MCF	GOT	22	6002	Kristina BLOFÄLT Aka. ANGRY BIRD	1	3	N/A	LCC	Detain, Disrupt, Exploit	240000Z APR 17	UFN	LCC, ACC	Kinetic	181A-183A, 421-424	ROE 421-424 already delegated to SOCC on GOTLAND. Exploit IOT penetrate the network.

Pict. 2. Example of draft of Joint Prioritised Target List (JPTL) taken from CJSE 17. Altered to fit by author.

The lists of the practice are central, both for how targets as objects of the practice are conceptualised and for the construction of the 'targeteer' as an identity.[23] I have observed during the exercises how 'targeteers' gather around print-outs of lists such as the *Joint Prioritised Target List*, or sit in meetings with the *Joint Prioritised Target List* displayed on the big screen, discussing the content of each column and the meaning of, and attachment of, concepts appropriate for each target. But let us get back to 'target ID 6002' (I will expand upon the importance of the *Joint Prioritised Target List* (and other lists) in the next section).

The 'target' in the example above is understood to have possible limitations in the form of restrictions (in the upper left column). These are limitations connected to legal aspects of engaging the intended 'target', but in this case, the abbreviation "NIL" (Nothing In Line) indicate that the 'targeteers' deem the 'target' to be possible to engage within the legal framework of the mission. The agents of the targeting practice learn quickly that the legal aspects concerning intended targets take prece-

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[23] Lists are a major part of the materiality of the practice and as such help establish the targeting process, mainly by filling the practice with content and acting as main points of reference, as the 'targeteers' utilise these lists in the day-to-day staff work. On a general NATO-level, there are 6 major lists which are central to the targeting practice: The Integrated Data Base (IDB) which is a NATO system where nations add targets. Secondly, there is the Joint Target List (JTL) which is a list that concerns particular NATO missions (or campaigns as the NATO AJP-01 doctrine calls them), and some of the information in that list comes from the IDB. Thirdly there is the No-Strike List (NSL) which contains such targets that are prohibited and in need of 'de-confliction'. Fourthly, there is the Joint Prioritised Target List (JPTL) which contains the targets of the current mission and a prioritising of these targets made by the operational level. Fifthly, there is the Restricted Target List (RTL) which contains targets that are considered legal but still have some restrictions connected to them, and are therefore 'on hold' by the Joint Forces Commander. Sixth and last, there is the Prioritised Target List (PTL) which belongs to each Component Command (i.e. those in charge of tactical operations within each branch of the military, generically: Air Force, Navy, Army and Special Operations)

dence, as they cannot proceed with their work on that particular target if it is not considered juridically correct to engage some form of action against it. After eventual limitations are sorted out, the agents of the target practice engage in what language and social rules of order provide for the practice: placing the intended 'target' into different types of categorisations, providing it with codes that relate to location, type of target ("Tgt Cat 22" means Paramilitary Forces/Terrorists) and simply giving it a unique number to keep track of it (it is here *Kristina* becomes a number). Furthermore, in the staff work with the *Joint Prioritised Target List* some type of negotiation must be performed in order to decide what target 'deserves' the highest prioritisation. This is a type of staff effort that is closely connected to setting the 'target's' relation to "BFOR DC", which is a designation for one of the missions "Decisive Conditions", and also to "Desired Effect". If affecting a target is deemed to have a high impact on moving towards fulfilling a certain "Decisive Condition", then the target will be taken into consideration for a high prioritisation. This is due to how "Decisive Conditions" are understood to be central in moving the operations of the mission in a direction that will eventually lead to the fulfilment of the "operational objectives". Or, as stated in the NATO document Allied Joint Doctrine (AJP-01(D), 2010), "decisive conditions" are:

> A combination of circumstances, effects, or a specific key event, critical factor, or function that when achieved allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an opponent or contribute materially to achieving an operational objective. (NATO 2010, Lexicon-7).

In the pictured *Draft Joint Prioritised Target List* above there is a numerical reference (no. 3) to "BFOR DC" which means that the 'targeteers' anticipate that engaging the 'target' will contribute to the achievement of Decisive Condition 3: "Influence of irregulars diminished." (Försvarshögskolan/Försvarsmakten n.d., 26). Here the focal point of efficiency and precision, as mentioned above as central to the ideas behind targeting, is yet again elucidated by how the use of violence and the production of solutions to military problems are interconnected in the concept of "decisive conditions".

Violence as a means for achieving certain "desired effects" is perceivable in this extract of a *Joint Prioritised Target List*, and the term used for this is "kinetic". The alternative term is "non-kinetic" which usually is in use when there are targets that need to be influenced by 'Information Activities' or set under 'surveillance' (which, on the other hand, may, despite the term 'non-kinetic, result in physical violence and/or other forms of violations, such as related to a person's integrity, i.e. both kinetic and non-kinetic may include violence). In addition, the 'target' is, by the use of this list, connected to the abbreviation "ROE". This is a term used for *Rules of Engagement* and its place again creates the need for the practitioners to sort the intended actions into specific categories. These are categories related to the *International Humanitarian Law*, sometimes also called *Laws of Armed Conflict*.

In summary, *Kristina* is now conceptualised as 'target ID 6002', an object which has gained meaning from two main avenues of understanding: Firstly, it (she) is a 'target' as it (she) will contribute to producing 'objectives' and 'effects' in a certain foreseeable order. This is what I previously have shown to be an intrinsic part of military bureaucratised labour (Chapter 4 and 5) as it is an understanding fueled by the discursive points of reference of production, order and bureaucracy. Secondly, in close connection to being deemed useful for the operation, it (she) is a 'target' because it (she) is 'legitimate to engage'. This aspect of military violence has not been discussed in the previous chapters and is really only in play when there is an actual use of violence at stake in the practice (as in the targeting process). Therefore, legitimation of targets, and "legitimacy" as a concept, will be central to the following analysis of the practice.

But before *Kristina* can be an approved 'target', the 'targeteers' must, through a series of meetings, argue and discuss her appropriate position (that she really is 'valid') as such an object. These meetings are outlined further below as, together with the 'targeteers' interaction with the materiality of lists, they enhance a particular understanding of "legitimacy" and "responsibility", and provide content to the subject position the 'targeteer' (what it means to be a 'targeteer'). For now, I would like to go deeper into the question of why the use of different lists is so central to the specifics of the targeting practice.

The lists of the targeting practice and the subjectivities provided by 'listology'

The *Joint Prioritised Target List* (JPTL), often orally referred to as the "JayPiTtLe" in the language used by the agents of the practice, is a product that requires a great deal of negotiation and information exchange between different sections/cells of the HQ. In its finalised form the *Joint Prioritised Target List* affects the use of key 'resources' in the area of operations, such as Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets or measures for Electronic Warfare (EW). Due to its status as directly affecting how such limited resources are to be used (in what order, amount, type and/or during which time) there is much need to 'de-conflict' the content of the list. In addition, the legal aspects of the intended targetings must be considered, which is futile without the involvement of an LEGAD – an adviser in matters of law – sometimes a position filled by a military officer with a degree in law, or a civilian expert.

The *Joint Prioritised Target List* is one example of how the targeting practice revolves around a complex web of materiality, which I call *listology*. This is a concept that I use to emphasise the discursive force intrinsic to a network of lists and the practitioner's attempt to master these lists. In other words, listology provides practitioners with possible avenues of identification with list-related objects that pervade and limit a 'targeteer's' ontology. Listology stands thus for a specific formation of bureaucratised labour and is as such both part of the context and the analysis of the

targeting practice. As shown in the example above of how a target is created, the lists provide meaning which allows the targeteers to fit humans and objects into the framework of bureaucratised labour, giving them a 'natural' place as 'productive targets' in the striving to achieve "operational effects".

But the creation of targets in one list such as the *Joint Prioritised Target List* is not the only action connected to the use of lists. The division of targeting into "Deliberate Targeting" (which is the process of planning for targeting, as in the case of *Kristina*) and "Dynamic Targeting" (which is the process of handling targets that might appear during the course of operations)[24] creates a further need to cross-reference the existing lists that were previously mentioned, and to create new ones. For example, the idea of "Time Sensitive Targeting (TST)", which is based on the understanding that some targets are "fleeting" (in simple terms that some things in this world are not static and actually may be mobile or appear randomly, e.g. Joint Publication 3-60 Joint Targeting 2007, A-1) provides the need for the construction of a matrix. This matrix is yet another list that helps the 'targeteers' keep track of when certain targets are 'valid' for targeting and by whose authority actions can be taken. Picture 2 below outlines an example of a TST-matrix where an artillery system belonging to the armed group "*Protectors of Truth*" appears.

TARGET PRIORITY	TARGET SET	TARGET TYPE	DESIRED EFFECT	APPLICABLE ROE's	RISK TO BFOR	DECISION TAKEN BY	CDE ESTIMATE	TST VALID DTG	ANTICIPATED CC	REMARKS
5	GFF	ARTILLERY AND MORTAR SYSTEMS	DESTROY	232,423-425, 427	MED	COM BFOR	YELLOW	20160424 0600Z	LCC, ACC, SOCC	Only applicable when in BOGALAND Requires release of ROE's

Pict. 3. Example of Joint Time Sensitive Target Matrix taken from CJSE 16. Altered to fit by author.

As seen in the picture, words and concepts like "priority", "desired effect" and "ROEs" reappear in this matrix, which indicates some of the discursive centrality of these concepts. But added, compared to the *Joint Prioritised Target List*, are the concepts of "Risk", "Decision" and "CDE estimate" where the latter means "Collateral Damage Estimation (and there is a duplication of words here in the column "CDE Estimate"). In this example this means that due to the target's 'unwillingness' to stand still or disinclination to announce time and place for its intention to break the rules and enter the demilitarised zone (which categorises it as a "Time Sensitive Target") the analysis expands. Now the 'targeteers' must include such things as trying to foresee how affecting this target would generate (own) casualties ("Risk to BFOR" column) and also the likelihood of "Inadvertent casualties and destruction in civilian areas caused by military operations." (this latter is a quote from the NATO definition of "collateral damage", see NATO, 2013, pp. 2-NaN-6).

In this example the Collateral Damage Estimation is set to "yellow" which means that the targeteers estimate that there will be "no CD Object(s) inside 250m from

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[24] In simple terms, dynamic targeting is a concept indicating that certain parts of warfare cannot be anticipated and planned for. Sometimes an event happens (e.g. ambush) that makes it necessary to engage a target without going through the time-consuming process of deliberate (planned) targeting.

intended impact point" (qoutation taken from the exercise "manual" on targeting, see Försvarshögskolan/Försvarsmakten 2016, 10). "CD Object(s)" is short for collateral damage object(s) and the practitioners are provided with (more) lists that will help them check if the deemed geographical appearance of the 'target' will include such objects that are not to be 'affected' by military operations.

In the complex matrix of lists there is need for simplification, which is usually achieved by coding information in three types of colours: green (i.e. approved), yellow (i.e. restricted) and red (i.e. prohibited). Mimicking the use of traffic signals the red colour indicates different types of 'stops' in the targeting process. This does not mean that 'target sets' that are indicated in the colour red will be 'spared' from military violence. Indeed, the targeteer can 'nominate'[25] a target (via a *Target Nomination List*, TNL) with a "Collateral Damage Estimation Red" and motivate that the target should be actively engaged despite this estimation. In practical terms, such action will place the decision of acting on the 'target' to the Commander of the Joint Operation (or even on higher command, depending on the type of collateral damage foreseen by the 'targeteers'). This means that the 'listology' of the targeting practice includes, among other types of analyses, a summarising act of different values (and colour codes) which will determine by whose authority will the target be affected. The level of authorisation is in targeting terms expressed as "Target Engagement Authority" (TEA), and "Target Approval Authority" (TAA).

If we return to 'target ID 6002', the incorporation of correct 'data' in the appropriate columns of the *Joint Prioritised Target List* will ensure that the 'target' gets approved by the board that evaluates and discusses the list (more on the meetings below). But this only means that the 'target' will stay on the version of the list that will be forwarded to the Commander for his/her decision. As soon as the list is 'approved' by the Commander, the 'data' in the specific columns will tell the executing part of the military organisation what 'level of authorisation' the specific 'target' is connected to. For *Kristina*, the applicable *Rules of Engagement* to capture her are delegated to the lower command, and as soon as the list is approved by the operational Commander (and distributed), the assigned (lower level) Component Command will 'plan and execute' the mission.

'Target approval' is thus most commonly gained through a series of meetings, about which I will come back to below, and/or through possibilities to 'delegate authority'. For now, it is enough to add this contextual detail that the language used by the 'targeteers' often returns to the expressions "TeEeAiy" (TEA) and "TeAiyAiy" (TAA) when discussing the progress of 'nominating' new targets. The concept of 'nomination' is also important to pay attention to as it sets some of the working environment into light. 'Targeteers' are in a position of trying to get acceptance of

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[25] It is important for the following analysis to note that the use of the word 'nomination' is not a product of my context description. The word is frequently used by the members of the CJSE operational staff and it is also used in NATO and US doctrines that describe the development of targets (e.g. Joint Publication 3-60 Joint Targeting 2007, sec. ll-5; NATO 2011, para. 192(h))

targets, which is an activity that takes them through a series of meetings and information gathering from different actors (for instance specialists such as the LEGAD or the POLAD (the political adviser)) and with the interaction of different lists. In other words, the professionalism of the targeteer is closely connected to getting solid control of the information needed to get targets 'approved' (master the lists). This professionalism thus evolves under the procedures connected to working with the nomination process and is thus central to how the subject position the 'targeteer' is constructed.

In summary, the language and materiality connected to the use of lists creates understandings of how violence (and/or non-kinetic actions) will achieve certain foreseeable effects, and these are in turn understood to provide solutions to 'problems' that the military face in the mission. Moreover, the lists emphasise a specific social rule of legitimation (discussed below) where *Laws of Armed Conflict* and social relations connected to the position held by the *legal adviser* come in the foreground of the targeting practice. In addition to this, the lists provide the agents with a system of meaning and interconnection between hierarchy and responsibility (for the use of force). As such, the central position held by lists in the targeting practice, 'listology', provides the agents physical and mental focus which goes beyond the mere existence of a digital 'object' viewed on the screen of a computer. 'Listology' is thus a discursive force (the phenomenon relates to both language and materiality, as listology both affect how agents of the practice speak and how they use their bodies, objects and technology) and in that respect affect how 'targeting-reality' is perceived by the practitioners. In other words, the subject position 'targeteer', a specific military version of identity, is constructed through the identifications and subjectivities provided by 'listology'. I will therefore come back to the concept of 'listology' during the discussion below on my results from analysing the social rules and norms of the targeting practice. As previously mentioned, the 'targeteers' need to discuss the construction ('nomination') of every single 'target'. These performative actions lead me to the second activity mentioned above that will give more information on how the targeting practice on the operational level bureaucratise violence: the meetings.

The meetings of the targeting practice

Time is of essence in the targeting practice. During my years in military service I have never encountered another part of our work that has such close linkage to time and the practice of scheduling. Targeting processes rotate around the numbers 72, 48 and 24 as it is 72 hours that the people working with air operations (e.g. air strikes) need for preparation (48 hours) and execution (24 hours). Naturally, not all targets in the targeting process are to be 'affected' by air force abilities, but since these timings are understood as preferable for facilitating the use of the limited but powerful resources of the *Air Component Command* (commonly referred to as the air force), they come to rule the sequences of the targeting practice (e.g. NATO 2011, 4–14). Incorporated into a schedule that is called "the Battle Rhythm", the meetings required to manage the 'production', 'refinement', 'nomination' and 'approval' of

targets are set to match the 72-hour cycle. In other words, this is a cycle that controls the actions taken by the 'targeteers', in so much that it regulates the what, when and who of the process. Military personnel who belong to experienced staffs and who 'live' with the targeting practice during real missions may object and point to the fact that targeting is not as rigid as I claim here. Be that as it may, this 72-hour cycle is the basis of how meetings and timings are connected, but admittedly there is also room for practitioners to 'act in between meetings'. Still, there is a rigidity to the daily work that I want to make clear here in the context description. This is due to how the process of becoming a 'targeteer' is linked to the centrality of time, the scheduling of meetings and to the content of these timings and events.

Time and Subjectivity - The Battle Rhythm

> The method used to fuse staff effort is the battle rhythm. This is a disciplined routine of meetings, briefings and miscellaneous gatherings contained within 24-hour cycles and used to maintain an optimum tempo for all levels of command, location and time zone. It is the essential mechanism for maximising concurrent activity and aiding synchronisation. (NATO 2011, para. 0424)

The word "battle" in this context does not really refer to activities between units in the field, even if that might have been the original intention with the creation of the concept of *Battle Rhythm*. From my observations, and in accordance to the quote above from the NATO doctrine for "conduct of operations", I conclude that the "battle" in *Battle Rhythm* is provided with meaning that stems from order as a point of reference.[26] The often intensive working day of an operational staff is filled with meetings, briefings, reports and responses to what NATO doctrine calls "incidents", the latter meaning events that have not been foreseen in the operational planning activities (NATO 2011, para. 436). The *Battle Rhythm* provides structure to this otherwise unmanageable amount of information exchange. Its physical (or electronic) form is in the shape of a schedule (see pic. 4 below) and it is as such central to regulating spatial and temporal aspects of the staff members working environment. But the *Battle Rhythm* does not just monitor the 'where and when' of the staff members' working day, it also attempts to alter and adjust time itself. "Zulu Time" is used to create an internal operational time which then may be used to synchronise activities that span over several time zones.

At times, this provocation of 'normal' time leads to misunderstandings when the untrained staff mixed up which time they were using when calling to meetings, but such misunderstandings were often quickly resolved and most members of the staff adjusted to the steady, predictable, rule of the 'rhythm' of the schedule. As contrast to the official NATO articulation of the function of the Battle Rhythm described by the quote above, I would like to relay this sociological idea of what this rhythm is:

> [on the central features of total institutions] Third, all phases of the day's activities are tightly scheduled, with one activity leading at a prearranged time into the next, the whole sequence of ac-

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[26] Another, similar interpretation, is that "battle" means "efficiency" in this context (see Öberg 2016, 10)

tivities being imposed from above by a system of explicit formal rulings and a body of officials. (Goffman 1991, 17)

As provoking this might seem, Goffman's (1991) sociological ethnography of what he called "total institutions" visualise some of the power that lie in the way the 'targeteer' is disciplined and formed by the *Battle Rhythm*. The schedule that the 'targeteer' is subjected to is created within a military bureaucracy where it is 'natural' that hierarchical structures impose limitations on the subject. These limitations are, as pointed out by Goodman already in the 1950/60s, more than just 'timings' insomuch that they create a certain life world for the exposed subject (e.g. Goffman 1991, 24). In short, the *Battle Rhythm* contributes to the construction of a bureaucratised labour of violence in the way the 'targeteer' identifies with the 'objects' of the schedule.

The Battle Rhythm is connected to how the subject position of the 'targeteer' includes a specific understanding of, and relation between, time and violence. As discussed in the context of 'listology', a 'targeteer' understands violence as governed by time in a way where precise timing of the use of force will produce 'desired' operational 'effects'. According to the mind of the 'targeteer' it is, as such, possible to foresee the (productive) result of using violence. Here there are two main aspects that the incorporation of the *Battle Rhythm* into the practice adds to the identity formation of agents of the targeting practice. First, the 'targeteer' can stabilise the otherwise fragile ontology of 'productive' results of violence by how time itself is, by the act of scheduling, shaped around the notion of foreseeable 'effect'.

Secondly, the *Battle Rhythm* does not just order the meetings in the operational staff, it adds to the discursive power of 'listology' and creates a focus on linearity and future events. This brings with it a reduction of interest in history and a discursive focus on *one* possible future. And this is a future that contains threats that must be taken care of *before* they can reduce 'operational effectiveness'. As such, the ordering of time in the practice of targeting ensures that there will be a continuous stream of targets to nominate, and pervades the construction of the 'targeteer' with an unyielding 72-hours focus on the 'kill-chain' (see also: Adey, Whitehead, and Williams 2011; B. Anderson 2011b, 2011a; Dillon and Reid 2009). The repetitive function of the Battle Rhythm enhances the routinisation of the daily work, which in turn strengthens the impact that these two aspects have on the formation of the 'targeteer'.

BRAVO TIME	ZULU TIME	JOINT	HQ	HQ parallell activity	R&R	VTC	LOCATION	MISC
07:00	05:00							Breakfast
07:15	05:15							Breakfast
07:30	05:30							Breakfast
07:45	05:45							
08:00	06:00		COM - COS		All reports from CC IN		COM BFOR Briefing room	
08:15	06:15							
08:30	06:30		BFOR CUB				Assembly Hall	
08:45	06:45		BFOR CUB				Assembly Hall	
09:00	07:00			COS Coord MTG				COS Coord MTG Assembly Hall
09:15	07:15		COM BFOR - SPEC.STAFF				COM BFOR Briefing room	
09:30	07:30		JCB WG	COMBFOR - CC LNO update			Geopressen	COM BFOR Briefing room
09:45	07:45		JCB WG	COMBFOR - CC LNO update			Geopressen	COM BFOR Briefing room
10:00	08:00		JCB WG				Geopressen	
10:15	08:15		CCB				STRATCOM briefing room	
10:30	08:30	J2 CC2s VTC	CCB			X	STRATCOM briefing room	
10:45	08:45	J2 CC2s VTC				X		
11:00	09:00	DARB VTC	JOPG			X	Geopressen	Lunch
11:15	09:15	DARB VTC	JOPG			X	Geopressen	Lunch
11:30	09:30	SPEC.STAFF -CC SPEC. STAFF	JOPG			X	Geopressen	Lunch
11:45	09:45	SPEC.STAFF -CC SPEC. STAFF	JOPG			X	Geopressen	Lunch
12:00	10:00	ACC-LNO VTC				X		Lunch
12:15	10:15	ACC-LNO VTC				X		Lunch
12:30	10:30	MCC-LNO VTC				X		Lunch
12:45	10:45	MCC-LNO VTC	IA CB	BFOR JMC Meeting		X	Geopressen	Lunch
13:00	11:00	LCC-LNO VTC	IA CB	BFOR JMC Meeting		X	Geopressen	Lunch
13:15	11:15	LCC-LNO VTC	IA CB	BFOR JMC Meeting		X	Geopressen	
13:30	11:30	JLSG-LNO VTC	COS BFOR-COS UNAMIB	BFOR JMC Meeting		X		
13:45	11:45		COS BFOR-COS UNAMIB	BFOR JMC Meeting				
14:00	12:00	CLC VTC incl JLSG		BFOR JMC Meeting		X		
14:15	12:15	CLC VTC incl JLSG		BFOR JMC Meeting		X		
14:30	12:30	CLC VTC incl JLSG	CICOM			X	Geopressen	
14:45	12:45	CLC VTC incl JLSG	CICOM			X	Geopressen	
15:00	13:00	JTCB - VTC	CICOM		CC INTSUM	X	Geopressen	
15:15	13:15	JTCB - VTC	CICOM			X	Geopressen	
15:30	13:30	JTCB - VTC	Assess WG			X	J5	
15:45	13:45	JTCB - VTC	Assess WG			X	J5	
16:00	14:00	JIMB	Assess WG			X	J5	Dinner
16:15	14:15	JIMB	Assess WG			X	J5	Dinner
16:30	14:30							Dinner
16:45	14:45							Dinner
17:00	15:00	COM JLSG -SUCO VTC	COM BFOR - JFC VTC			X	Origo	Dinner
17:15	15:15	COM JLSG -SUCO VTC	COM BFOR - JFC VTC			X	Origo	Dinner
17:30	15:30	COM JLSG -SUCO VTC				X		Dinner
17:45	15:45	COM BFOR - CC VTC				X		Dinner
18:00	16:00	COM BFOR - CC VTC				X		Dinner
18:15	16:15	COS BFOR - CC VTC				X	Geopressen	
18:30	16:30	COS BFOR - CC VTC				X	Geopressen	
18:45	16:45						Geopressen	
19:00	17:00		COS Coord MTG		BFOR INTSUM		COM BFOR Briefing room	
19:15	17:15		COS Coord MTG				COM BFOR Briefing room	
19:30	17:30		COS Coord MTG				COM BFOR Briefing room	
19:45	17:45							Hot Wash Up
20:00	18:00				BFOR DOWN REPORT			Hot Wash Up/Close of Business

Pict. 4. Battle Rhythm, BFOR HQ 26APR16 (taken from CJSE 16, altered to fit by author).

Moreover, the targeting practice is interconnected with the *Battle Rhythm* as the practitioners need the Commander's attention and decision in order to proceed with engaging several types of targets. It also, as previously indicated, ensures the right regulations of the time spans needed to use military assets as 'efficiently' as possible. By borrowing from the corporate world, NATO-inspired military operational work is here governed by "boards" in which an appointed "chairman" makes decisions based on recommendations by the board members. One such central organ is the *Joint Coordination Board* (JCB) in which the Joint Force Commander, among other things, gives "… approval of all products from the joint targeting coordination board (JTCB), information operation coordination board (IOCB) and other established working groups."(NATO 2011, para. 427(c)). It is thus in the *Joint Coordination Board* that targets which require special prioritising (usually due to conflicts in

the allocation of resources), or that have restrictions/prohibitions affixed to them, and/or need to be coordinated with other efforts within the staff, are presented to the commander before being executed. In other words, it is here that the final decision is taken for initiating actions that will achieve the military desire to "detain, disrupt and exploit" 'target ID 6002'. Due to the fact that the Commander is in meetings most of his/her day, the briefings and information given must be short, concrete and already 'staffed', meaning that all issues (such as target approval) must have been prepared beforehand. A professional 'targeteer' must be able to answer possible questions from the Commander and balance the provision of complex details that are included in the 'target folder' by delivering a timely and comprehensive briefing to the Commander. Therefore, the development of target folders and preparation of briefings are central to the 'targeteer's' daily work, and the information within these folders/briefings are thoroughly discussed during meetings conducted before the *Joint Coordination Board*.

One such pre-meeting is the *Joint Targeting Coordination Board* (JTCB) where 'targeteers' from the operational staff meet with 'targeteers' from the tactical commands, special advisers on legal and political matters, such as the LEGAD, POLAD and sometimes also a gender adviser (GENAD). These advisers and experts are joined in the struggle to evaluate the staff work done on suggested targets, which means going through parts of the information that is included in each target folder. Typical questions for the *Joint Targeting Coordination Board* are if a 'target' is sufficiently 'developed' to be put on the *Joint Prioritised Target List*, if there is need for de-conflicting, and if the target needs to be presented to the Commander for further consideration/decision.[27] Furthermore, the board is chaired by a *Targeting Director* (who also is DACOS J3, i.e. second in charge of the department J3: current operations) who based on the recommendations given by the members of the board either rejects (for further development) or approves the nominated target.[28]

Due to the complexity of the targeting process and its possibility to affect the use of limited resources (thus putting internal conflict over such resources in play), the issues brought up on the *Joint Targeting Coordination Board* must in turn be prepared before each meeting.[29] Such preparations were formalised during CJSE 15/16/17 by another meeting: The *Joint Targeting Working Group* (JTWG).[30] Here

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[27] "developed" is here related to how well and how much of the templates in the targeting folders are filled with information deemed relevant.

[28] That the Joint Targeting Coordination Board is chaired by a Targeting Director is quite generic, but there may be variations in which staff member of the operational staff will hold this position. During the exercises that this analysis concerns, the board has been chaired by the DACOS J3. But from conversations with 'targeteers' who have real life experience of the targeting process, I have learned that the JTCB has been chaired by the deputy Joint Force Commander, or the head of J3 (operations). (CJSE 2017, C02 261310)

[29] There are in addition to this other reasons for preparing meetings. These are related to social rules and relations such as discussed in Chapter 5.

[30] There are several other meetings that interconnect with this production of targets, such as meetings that coordinate the gathering of intelligence and the use of such resources, or meetings that coordinate how Information Activities are to be conducted. These latter meetings are important parts of the targeting process as both the domain of Intelligence Service and that of conducting Information Activities have the possibility to provide more data on prospective targets, as well as

the 'targeteers' meet with several of the same specialists and experts that are a part of the *Joint Targeting Coordination Board*, but there is more room for discussion in this working group compared to the two previously described forms of meetings. The 'target folders' and the process of 'nomination' are the main focus of the working meetings, even if these 'products' are prepared (staffed) beforehand by the 'targeteers'. 'Target ID 6002' is one example of a 'product' from these activities, as the nomination of *Kristina* must be checked with the expert advisers before the *Joint Targeting Coordination Board* is conducted. Making such preparations is not always possible which opens up for the possibility that the 'targeteers' must *argue* for the 'validity' and 'productive use' of placing *Kristina* on the list during the conduct of the targeting meetings. What this provides us with when it comes to insight into the practice, is that the 'targeteer' is a type of subject who identifies with actions such as *negotiation* and *persuading*. Furthermore, the 'targeteer' is, through the way this process is outlined, placed in a social setting where there is a risk of losing face when failing to argue for 'nominated' targets. The format of 'the board' thus singles out individuals and puts their expertise on display for other members of the board to evaluate.

In summary, the complexity of the process and the demand for various types of information create a context where the subject position 'targeteer' develops with focus on the internal lifeworld of the operational staff. It is a world characterised by following procedures, collecting information for the performance of 'listology', and preparing and participating in meetings. The *Battle Rhythm* stabilises the 'targeteer's' understanding of how violence and time are interconnected and centres this understanding on linearity and productivity (there are always future targets waiting to be included in the nomination process). Furthermore, the social structure and discursive context of the meetings inform the targeting practice with corporate-related social rules and norms (discussed in detail below) which in turn provide aspects of negotiation and norms of professional performance that the 'targeteer' identifies with. Moreover, both the lists and the meetings of the practice provide a certain relation to, and understand of, legitimacy and responsibility. This latter aspect lies deeply imbedded in how subjectivities and identifications of the 'targeteer's' everyday work revolves around hierarchical responsibilities and expert (legal/political) knowledge.

From here I now turn to the analysis of the social rules and norms that underpin the targeting practice. As briefly mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, these are made up by language/materiality and social relations that provide stability and meaning to the operational use of military violence and as such add to the previous social rules/norms described in Chapter 5. This means that consensus, for instance, is not discussed here, but it is still present as a social rule in the work done by the

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providing possible non-kinetic actions for the targeteer to consider while developing his/hers target nominations. Given these connections with other parts of the operational staff, the targeteer must be prepared to sit through, or interact with participants of such meetings like the Daily Assets Reconnaissance Board (DARB) and the Information Activities Coordination Board (IACB).

operational staff at the exercise. In this sense, the practices of 'real staff work' and 'exercise staff work' are constructed by similar social rules and norms, which perhaps might seem natural as the latter is in place to prepare officers for working in the former environment. Instead of repeating such governing social relations and meaning-making that were discussed in Chapter 5, here I focus on such aspects that work to set the targeting practice apart from other operational staff work. This is a choice made in order to allow for an in-depth investigation in how bureaucratised labour includes social rules and norms that govern operational use of force, and to further create insight into how agents identify with the role of the 'targeteer'.

6.4 The Social Rules and Norms of Targeting

The following section of this chapter outlines the social rules and norms of the targeting practice. These have been identified by observing and talking to 'targeteers', but they have also emerged in close relation to how the context of the practice forms, which is to say with regard to how 'listology' and meetings can function as meaningful activities. As briefly mentioned above, there are other social rules at play which ensure that the operational staff functions, such as those discussed as rules of order and bureaucracy, or masculinity for that matter, but since these are more fully investigated in the previous chapter they are not discussed here in any greater depth. Still they are in the background of my analysis of how the 'targeteer' is constructed as a possible position of identity and therefore references to the discursive points of reference and social rules found in Chapters 4 and 5 will occasionally be made. There are, as indicted by the description above of the targeting practice, two main areas of social rules and norms at play here: the rules of legitimation and those related to corporate discourse. The former springs from the central role of the function/person LEGAD and the *Rules of Engagement* have in the 'targeteer's' daily activities. Furthermore, the language of legitimation provides meaning to the content of the lists used by 'targeteers', and is as such central to how 'targeteers' conceptualise targets. The latter, the corporate related discourse, relates to how hierarchies and forms for interaction provide the 'targeteers' with roles and relations that ensure the function of targeting. Here the naming of these two points of reference stems from the strong discursive influence that resides in how the positions and meetings of the practice are outlined.

The Social Rules of Legitimation

'Targeteers' are shaped by how they constantly struggle with *Rules of Engagement* and cope with demands of finding a path through the complicated sets of social, and formal, rules that govern acceptance or rejection of targets. Here I will outline how the practice can be understood to create certain meaning and relations between legitimation and violence. Moreover, this part of the section will also include an analysis of how the key agents of legitimation infuse the 'targeteer's' working environment with specific sets of social rules and hierarchies. This subsection is concluded with a short summary of how the language and social relations of legitimation coincide

with bureaucratisation and what that means for the 'targeteer's' understanding of violence.

Meaning-making and the Laws of Armed Conflict (LOAC)

Legitimacy is pivotal for the targeting process as it is perceived as something that needs to be in place in order to proceed with the use of force. Several of my observations elucidate how *Rules of Engagement* (ROE) are seen as formalities that provide opportunities to use violence. They are thus not *used* as a normative framework of rules that are in place to ensure the safeguarding of humanitarian values. Even if this is how a targeteer would answer a direct question about what these rules are, the actual practical forms of utilising them reveal a different story. Consider the following transcription from a *Joint Targeting Coordination Board* that I participated in during CJSE 16:

> (7:19) "The TAA and the TEA, which we discussed yesterday as well, is at the COM BFOR. So do not engage targets without approval from the correct authority level. And do not use ROEs… as an… you can say, pre, pre, pre-emptive mission. So, for example if there is a SA22 [mobile short range air defence system] in the area you can't use ROEs at your own discretion. It needs to shoot something before you can use self-defence. And if you want to attack it! You need to contact ah, J3 JOC, and then we go through the TST. Now there have been quite a few questions like "can we put in ROEs and attack the SA22?" for example. No, you can't. The TAA and the TEA are at COM BFOR level." (8:14) (CJSE 16 O18_04241500)

Here we are instructed by a Finnish air force captain[31], who is placed at department J3's *Joint Operations Centre* (J3 JOC), on the relations between *Rules of Engagement* (ROE) and levels of authority. What is referred to here are the lower levels of command's desire to have the freedom to act on 'targets' within their own level of authority. In simple terms, the lower levels want the operational level to "release" the applicable *Rules of Engagement* so that they may act with less restraints. In this case, this is not possible as the level of authority, referred to as *Target Engagement Authority* (TEA), and *Target Approval Authority* (TAA), is held by the operational Commander. Which in short means that the intended 'target' cannot be engaged even if the lower level of command would have access to the applicable *Rules of Engagement*. They also need formal approval from the higher command to use force against it.

In this discourse of 'request – release – approval/refusal – authority' strong connotations between ownership of rules and approval from authority shape the basis of the practical outcome of the concept legitimation. All of this is of course not necessary if the 'target' should become hostile which would simplify matters in that then the

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[31] This agent of the practice uses the title "targeteer" when introducing himself in the meeting ((5:25) CJSE 16 O18_04241500)

forces can use self-defence to engage it.[32] The 'targeteer' in the quote above is point-ing at this possibility by saying "… it needs to shoot something before you can use self-defence." which reveals, in this context, legitimacy as a threshold that must be exceeded in some way. This is to say, the discourse of legitimacy indeed consists of complex rules of authority and acceptance into the lists of the practice, but it also includes backdoors which simplify the legitimate use of force (this desire to be able to use self-defence was also observed in meetings during CJSE 15, e.g. 181400 (21:35)). In this, the need to either proceed in accordance to the framework of 'lis-tology', or in the framework of possible self-defence, indicate the 'tick-in-the-box' mentality that the language and rules of legitimacy sediments within the targeting practice. As such, legitimacy is thus pivotal for the 'targeteers' as it is central for the possibility to proceed with the practice, and as such also pivotal for the re-construction of the subject 'targeteer'.

But pivotal does not mean that the rules connected to this centrality are of an ethical character, it only means that legitimacy needs to become 'green' - within the frame-work of authority, or within the framework of self-defence. In the language of the targeting practice, there is no sign of liberal values, no expression of humanitarian concerns, no consideration of what might be plausible in normative terms. Instead the discourse of legitimacy is constructed with articulations that position *procedures* at the 'core' of what it means to 'legitimately' use military force. In the following excerpt two 'targeteers' are trying to find common ground on when a specific 'tar-get' (in this case belonging to the fictive irregular armed group *Protectors of Truth* (POT)) can be legitimately targeted:

(8:38) LCC rep. "Shall I comment?"

BFOR rep. "Yes please"

LCC rep. "Okay, comment from LCC. Eh, it's [the use of force against the target] only if entering Bogaland. So, we will of course prosecute these targets, and we have planned for prosecuting the targets in case then it enters Bogaland, and that applies to all of the POT targets on the JPTL."

BFOR rep. "Roger that. So they're still not eh… because of reasons for de-confliction, you still have this pending, so we will need, sort off, some update on when these might be actually en-gaged. … But that is for after this meeting."

LCC rep. cuts in "so, yes but I'll like to comment on that the, I mean as was mentioned at the meet-ing, that the TEA is retained at… COM BFOR level. So, we have to prosecute them dynamically when we find, when we engage them. But we are planning to engage [use force on] them though.

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[32] This is somewhat of a practical simplification of the theoretical rules stemming from the Laws of Armed Conflict. In theory, there are restrictions on the level of violence that can be used, that is, it needs to be proportionate in its execution. Unfortunately, it is mostly a question for the remaining forces and its country of origin to decide if such actions were, indeed, proportionate (there is much written in the trope of international law about this. But proportionality (and necessity for that matter) stands out as a vague concept in light of how military operations and targeted killings in Iraq and Afghanistan have developed. See C. Gray 2008, 148–56, 160–66, 203–16).

Clearly some of the confusion in this exchange stems from the agents being part of an exercise and not used to working together. But what is more important is that their articulations reveal the connection between authority and legitimation. In order to 'prosecute targets' (meaning, in this case, that someone will be subject to the use of military violence) the *Land Component Command* (LCC, which in common terms would be called "the army") needs the approval of the higher operational command (which is COM BFOR in this case). Clearly the army staff personnel are preparing for the use of force and need the higher command to grant permission for using it. The matter of using violence becomes dependent on the geographical location (of the intended 'target') and the possibility for getting the 'target' accepted into the matrix of lists (the *Joint Prioritised Target List*, JPTL). Here the discourse of legitimation, apart from the procedures which lie at its core, includes a physical aspect of intrusion: the 'target' in this example is seen as legitimate to engage if 'it' enters 'Bogaland' (which, as a reminder, is the fictive name of the country where in the exercise scenario the mission for the military forces is to create a "safe and secure environment"). But the physical location of a 'target' is not enough, as it is clear, again, that the level of authority plays an important role in providing legitimacy.

When it comes to the act of filling in lists and gathering information for the completion of 'target folders', legitimation provides the practitioners with a specific view of what law is. Or expressed differently, the format for a legal act of killing is provided with content as the formal corpus of legal discourse for the targeting practice is retrieved from the *Laws of Armed Conflict*. But it is not the 'targeteer' who reads or otherwise interacts directly with these laws. There are legal experts who provide the 'targeteers' with the link between legitimate actions and the *Laws of Armed Conflict*. Besides providing the targeting practice with specific types of social relations, which I discuss below, this ordering of the practice also provides the 'targeteer' with meaning that sets legal issues in the hand of experts. This means that the practice of targeting does not 'just' set *hierarchal* authority in the foreground of legitimacy, but it also places *expert* authority as a central meaning of how the concept of legitimacy is understood in the targeting practice.

In this meaning-making process, it is the judgments made by the legal adviser that 'guarantee' legitimacy and as such create linkage between lawful acts of violence and expert authority. In sum, both the authority of the Commander (or higher commanding staff/officers) and also the authority of the legal expert inform the concept of legitimacy with meaning. Such infusion of authority is what helps create the pivotal aspect of legitimation, as authority is naturally imbued with the power of giving a 'go' or a 'no-go' as judgment of the efforts of the 'targeteer'. And these efforts are visualised in the creation of the lists and the 'target folders', as these are the main product of the practice. This brings me to a final meaning-making aspect found in

the discourse of legitimation, before going further to the social relations related to legitimation, and that is the aspect of approval.

The discourse of legitimation gives meaning to the targeting practice and the role of the 'targeteer' by placing the production of 'approved nominations' as a norm of the practice. What this means is that for a 'targeteer', the approval of 'target nominations' is understood as success, whilst a rejection of a nomination is considered a failure. To achieve success and gain approval of nominations, 'targeteers' need to know how to navigate within the rules provided by the discourse of legitimation. There is no, or a very slim, possibility for a 'target' to get approval without having the right linkage to *Rules of Engagement* and levels of authority. Which, by the way, must seem like a naturally good thing for those who might think that military use of violence needs restraining. But the point here is that the language and materiality of legitimation does not provide meaning of restraining violence. Conversely, the practitioners interaction with acts of legitimation provides meaning of utilising violence as applicable as possible to given rules. Or as expressed by a legal adviser during a *Joint Targeting Working Group* conducted at CJSE 15:

> "The rules of engagement are not about preventing the use of force, it's about regulating it. And COM BFOR uses that in order to develop or to decide what amount of force he wants to be projected over the theatre."[33] (CJSE 15 181400 (19:26))

As such, legitimation is not about following norms of what is morally right, but what is technically possible and most efficient in relation to the *Laws of Armed Conflict*. This is what is invested in getting approval of nominations: it confirms that the 'targeteer' is professional enough to know how to navigate through the rules of legitimation. It would be hard to imagine, in contrast, an agent of the practice continuously reporting at meetings that he/she has no targets to nominate (see also: D. Gregory 2011a).

On a final note on meaning-making and legitimation, as a shift into the social relations connected to this particular discourse, the discursive force of 'listology' (the central place of lists as objects of identification and meaning-making in the targeting practice) forms a 'targeteer's' understanding of what constitutes a 'legitimate target' by underpinning the importance of *validity*. For a targeteer on lower levels of command, such as the tactical level, a 'valid target list' is central for being able to execute missions (e.g. CJSE 17, 211315). Without a valid *Joint Prioritised Target List,* the tactical level of the Air Force (the *Air Component Command*), for instance, cannot issue any *Air Tasking Order* (ATO) with details on missions connected to targeting. In simple terms, if there is no valid list with targets, there will be no flying. What this means is that lower levels of command put pressure on the 'targeteers' of the operational level to 'produce' targets that fit the lists so that targets may be ap-

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[33] This is also a typical example on how bureaucratisation takes practical form in the different discourses of the practice. Violence is here seen as possible to control ("projected over the theatre") with the help of Rules of Engagement, thus supporting the creation of bureaucratised understandings of violence by using a discourse of law.

proved and branded 'valid'. Furthermore, this material focus on valid/not valid (list) increases the influx of discursive effect to the 'targeteer's' understanding of legitimacy, even further fixating legitimacy as a concept belonging to a chain of production.

Social relations and legitimacy – authoritative morality

In an observation (in 2015) I note in my field journal that the LEGAD and the 'targeteers' of this particular exercise seem to relate to each other as in a parent-child relationship:

> [I note that] The body language and tone of voice from this particular LEGAD resembles that of a parent that constantly is asked tiresome questions from a child that wants to fix things the easiest way. The tone of voice is somewhat distant and guarded. The LEGAD is resting the weight of the upper body, via his arms, on the table, leaning over a thick set of documents (presumably comprising laws and rules of engagement). The position and the documents enhance the impression of parental authority. (CJSE 15 171530)

This particular authority, where the LEGAD fills the role of a parent holding in their power allowing or denying actions suggested by the 'targeteer', has been observed in the two following exercises as well.[34] The authority is moral in the sense that it relates to what is permissible according to rules. But these rules are, as in most parent-child relations, not absolute or completely set with clear boundaries. In fact, there exists a possibility for the 'targeteer' to *persuade* the LEGAD of the need to take specific actions, and thus be granted the legitimacy needed to take actions against an intended 'target'. The following extract illustrates how the possibility for persuasion emerges in the targeting discourse (*Joint Targeting Working Group* meeting, CJSE 16):

> (30:53) LEGAD: "As for the question of operating to uphold our mandate outside of the exclusion zone, this is very similar to the discussion we had yesterday concerning the eh smugglers and this ship coming from from eh HANGÖ. We have taken the position that outside of the exclusion zone such operations cannot be done unless one can say that it's very clear that they are on their way over. So it is, you know, one can play a little bit with that as well, but but eh to plan operations outside in the eh in the space between the mainland and GOTLAND, on the international waters [inaudible], eh, would be more difficult to eh get a green light from. We're always open to be persuaded of course but the exclusion zone is eh green but [inaudible] would not be." (31:48) (CJSE 16 O22_04251400)

The 'parental' relational aspect of legitimacy is not constructed by the targeting practice just because the LEGAD actually articulates the possibility of persuasion. It is also in place by the way the LEGAD refers to himself as 'we', indicating that he belongs to another group (different from this group of 'targeteers') where decisions

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[34] CJSE 17 had a LEGAD who was new to the 'trade' and who had a less outspoken way of exercising his power. Still, the 'go or no-go' function inherent to the position was noticeable during the meetings.

are made and the power to legitimate resides. Here legitimacy provides social relations which underpin regulation of morality as something that is govern by authority, and something that is only absolute in that approval of action comes from a position outside of the subject position 'targeteer'. Or as Derek Gregory (2011) aptly puts it:

> The invocation of legality [in targeting] works to marginalise ethics and politics by making available a seemingly neutral, objective language: *disagreement and debate then become purely technical issues that involve matters of opinion, certainly, but not values.* The appeal to legality – and to the quasi-judicial process it invokes – thus helps to authorise a widespread and widening militarisation of our world. (D. Gregory 2011b, 247 my italics)

In other words, the 'targeteer' is confined to something that is similar to the moral space navigated by a child not yet socialised into being a moral subject on its own. This does not mean, however, that agents acting as 'targeteers' have the moral capabilities of such a child. Naturally other influences, such as the sway that other possible subject positions invoke on the agent's understanding of morality, can provide some resistance to this authoritarian aspect of morality. Unfortunately, observations made of this practice do not indicate any 'relief' from which 'targeteers' can gain momentum for activating other possible ways of relating to norms that lie outside of the practice. That is to say, the continuously shielded and repetitive way of acting whilst fulfilling the tasks provided by 'listology' and meetings give little or no opening for activation of resistance to the rules provided by legitimation. For instance, in the confinement of the operational staff, the 'targeteers' are not provided visual feedback of the impact of their daily work, other than the occasional reviewing of air footage from long distance strikes. This distance to the effects of violence is not exclusively dependent on these being scenario-based exercises with no 'real' impact of the decisions taken.

Let me return to the now constructed and approved 'target ID 6002' for an example of how 'targeteers' review the use of force. The following excerpt is taken from a *Joint Targeting Working Group* meeting (CJSE 17) which takes place after the 'detainment' of *Kristina*. According to procedure, the 'targeteers' evaluate the impact of executed missions linked to previously nominated and approved targets.

> (2:36) J2 Target Support Cell: "Target ID six zero zero two [6002] Kristina Blofält was detained as desired"

> Chairman: "Next Slide"

> Targeteer SO J3: "Eh, Fires. According previous information you already know that this target was executed and detained. That means that this target effectually goes directly to operational effective three point one [Operational Effect 3.1]. Slide please. It means that from valid JPTL-List D+44 this could be removed. And also highlight that the SOCC is not valid anymore. And additional questions about Rules of Engagement were raised up eh with LCC, and this question about targets will be discussed later on."

Chairman: "Okay, thank you xxxx [first name of reporting SO] […]. And with regard to, to target ID 6002, we will discuss how we proceed and if it stays on the, on the JPTL or not in accordance with what exactly will happen to the, to the individual after, after the detainment. […] (5:04) (CJSE 17, 241315 JTWG)

The language used by the 'targeteers' provide insight into how distance to the actual use of violence is constructed and how reification works within this practice. The 'desired effect' "detain" has been achieved and this is connected to the operational effect (3.1) that the 'targeteers' had *foreseen* to be affected by this action. What this implies is that the action was a success. The question that remains for the 'targeteers' is if the 'target' should stay on the list, and if it should in that case be with some form of adjustments. In other words, the main question is if there exist any further ways of using 'target ID 6002' in the military operations, which reveals how the practice identifies 'targets' as objects that creates military productivity. What is also evident by this excerpt is that when the detention of 'target ID 6002' is concluded to be in line with what was expected in terms of 'effects', there is no discussion about it being correct from a moral point of view. In fact, there is no discussion at all. So, what the process and its activities provide when it comes to filling the concept of legitimation with meaningful content, in addition to what was discussed above, is an emptiness of articulations that refer to morality in terms of humanitarian values. This is not in any way related to if *Kristina* is 'really' an extremist and as such deserves a slight dose of military violence. It is instead related to the fact that she is a 'legitimate target' according to the targeting process and that she 'fits' into how the targeting community understands (authoritative) legitimacy.

Social relations and legitimacy – the regulating function of operational command

(56:24) "That will be decided upon tomorrow and it will depend eh heavily upon your request for Rules of Engagement. If you get, if we, if the application is approved we can put it on the JPTL and you can act upon it. And If not, its its gonna go to the TST-matrix and at the time if its becomes a threat, then we have to make an TST-decision and go in to the Commander again [and say] *now its active you have to act upon it.* And so." (56:57) (Chief of Joint Fires, CJSE 15 181400)

The above transcript is taken from a *Joint Targeting Working Group* meeting and outlines the *Chief of Joint Fires* (at the operational headquarters) answer to a request, made by the lower tactical level (the *Air Component Command*), to engage a target 'kinetically'. Besides being one of the first recordings where I realise that 'targeteers' have a language of their own, the quote itself is also important for how it links *Rules of Engagement* with the operational command level. This is a link that the discourse of legitimacy creates out of necessity, by how the social rules have, as discussed above, created a pivotal meaning to legitimacy and an authoritative understanding of morality. In such meaning-making and relational dependence there must

be a figure of power with the task of 'approving' or 'rejecting', or else agents would be lost on how to abide by the social rules. The operational level of war (that is to say, the operational staff and its commander) is in contemporary Western doctrine a centre of references to typical bureaucratised labour, such as balancing the flow of resources and keeping the efficiency of military units at a high level (NATO 2010, para. 0115). But here, in the light of social rules, operational command is shown to have other functions. Mandate appears again (as it did in the former chapter) as central to how legitimacy creates social relations. Specifically, one operational Commander and his/her deputy, cannot in practice oversee the entire need of requests made by lower levels of command (or indeed by their own operational staff). Therefore, the power to give legitimacy to military actions, as in making decisions on activating certain *Rules of Engagements*, must be delegated throughout the chain of command.

The reply outlined above, given by the 'targeteer' *Chief of Fires*, concerns a set of *Rules of Engagement* that have not been 'released' to the lower level of command, but these rules can tentatively be delegated to the tactical level. In doing so, the operational Commander will not just transfer the authority to 'engage the target' according to those specific rules, the operational Commander will also transfer the power to legitimise actions to the lower level of command. What this indicates is that legitimation contains an aspect of self-imposed normative hierarchy which is dependent on how *Rules of Engagement* are categorised. Here the impact of the social rules of bureaucracy and order shine through and their sedimentation of how military practice is ordered underpin military understandings of legitimation. What can be said about practicing delegable legitimacy? Given that 'legitimacy' is a concept empty of content until it is placed in the context of a specific human practice, the anchoring of the concept's meaning lies here in the act of imposing a 'delegate-and-categorise' aspect to *Rules of Engagement*. Other possible social norms and rules than those relating to hierarchy, delegation and procedures of request have no place in such discourse. The targeting practice cannot hold other meaning and relational rules related to legitimate use of force other than what this bureaucratisation and 'rationalisation' promote. There is little, or no, space for humanitarian values, for instance, as legitimacy is something that is owned by authority and can be, by the use of procedure, moved between different subjects of power. In contrast, this hierarchical aspect of the *Rules of Engagement* is nowhere to be seen in the theoretical principles of the *Laws of Armed Conflict*:

> Despite the detailed codification of much customary international law […], four fundamental principles underlie the whole law of armed conflict. In 1966, in continuation of his ground- breaking article of 1937 [note to Verdross (1937)], Verdross came to the conclusion that the "humanitarian principles underlying these conventions are basic principles of general international law with the character of *jus cogens*." [note to Verdross (1966)] These principles are military necessity, humanity, distinction, and proportionality. [note to UK Ministry of Defence] The law is intended to minimise the suffering caused by an armed conflict rather than to impede military efficiency. [note Id.] It thus is a compromise between the diametrically opposed impulses of military necessity and humanitarian requirements. [note to Greenwood in Fleck (ed.) (1999)] (Otto 2012, 215–16)

If 'targeteers' were to articulate and include the principle of "humanity" that is indicated in the quote above, we would see something more than the authoritative and pivotal meaning of legitimacy, mentioned at the beginning of this subsection, when questions of legitimate use of force are in play. Thus, despite the apparently heavy focus on taking legitimate actions in this targeting context, what the discourse of legitimation contains is an internal framework for regulating authority of actions. Ironically, this means that of all the people working with targeting, the few agents concerned by possible moral (humanitarian) considerations are the ones with the authority to make decisions about releasing or activating *Rules of Engagement*.

This activity of 'releasing', 'activating' and/or 'delegating' the possibility to use certain *Rules of Engagements* can be followed by the excerpt below from my notes, and a transcription of a recording from a *Joint Coordination Board* meeting (CJSE 17), where the Commander is briefed on several *Rules of Engagement* that the lower command requests to be released to their level:

> [I note that the] LEGAD shows slides on lower command's (LCCs) requests of Rules of Engagement which could allow for them to act more forcefully. After talking about some rules that already have been delegated, the LEGAD comes to rule number 425, a rule that allows BFOR military forces to attack hostiles that have previously attacked BFOR's own forces.
>
> (12:30) LEGAD: "The red doesn't show very well I realise now, but basically for the next one which is one of the most permissive rules we have, that's the one that allows to attack a force that has previously at one point in time attacked [BFOR], whenever they are found at a certain point in time without any further attack [on BFOR]. This is a very aggressive rule. From our perspective, [inaudible] I do not know if the POLAD wants to add something on this particular one? But, from my perspective, from a legal perspective, you know, it's fine either way [the LEGAD, standing up during the briefing, shifts his shoulders and holds out his arms when saying that it is "fine" from a legal perspective, indicating with his body language that strictly legally it is no issue, but that perhaps there might be other concerns?]. It's really what you, how are you comfortable using this very aggressive rule, with the components." (13:10)
>
> […]
>
> (13:23) ACOS J3 advises the Commander: "I think it's better to delegate this as much as possible in this, in this condition I would say. So, if not having it on COM BFOR level is fine with you, Sir, I think we should delegate it."
>
> Chief of Staff adds: "I agree with ACOS J3, I think we should give it for this time. So, until the situation on Gotland settles and then we can, we can take a step back and make sure we don't escalate further in the situation" (13:57)
>
> They proceed to other rules and to other matters.
>
> The Commander comments in the end: (23:50) "Okay, thank you very much. I signed a couple of FragOs, [orders for the lower command] and, also the JPTL. And related to the ROEs I would like

> to say that I would like to delegate as much as possible. To give freedom of movement because that's also related to my command and control philosophy, mission oriented command. There's only one thing which, Chief of Staff said, that's about Gotska Sandön. I mean we don't need it, or they [the LCC] don't need it right now, so we can keep that one. Otherwise I will have a go for the rest of them." LEGAD: "Thanks" COM: "Okay? [looks at LEGAD]" LEGAD: "Yeah, understood" COM: "thank you". (24:30)

> And now the possibility to engage and pursue previously hostile entities in the area of operations are delegated to the lower commands.

A number of important points stand out in this exchange between expert advisers, senior staff members and the Commander. First, in what way is the violence made possible by this exchange visualised and grasped by the actors? Or, from another perspective, how would a political legitimation of this mission be formulated, if the type of violence made possible here were taken into account? This latter question is particularly interesting as the level of violence here delegated to the Component Commands is certainly very close to allowing for traditional ways of warfighting (which might have not been the initial idea when labelling BFOR "stabilisation force").

Second, of further interest for our understanding of the rules of legitimation is how the relations between the legal expert authority (the LEGAD/POLAD), the military expertise (the ACOS/COS) and the hierarchal authority (the Commander) seem to make the question of responsibility look like a shuckle (the metal/plastic puck) on a shuffleboard table. Responsibility glides between these agents as they rely on each other to take the responsibility their particular expertise/authority requires. It is not that they do not take responsibility, they certainly do, but it is different types of responsibilities that bounce from one actor to another. The legal adviser takes the responsibility for evaluating the legal concerns and the military experts take responsibility for evaluating the possible productive gains of delegating the rules.

Thirdly, this leaves the Commander to take the moral responsibility and to consider possible humanitarian effects of increasing the level of violence in the operational area. Which is a question not raised, as somehow it is implied that at least the political and legal advisers should have thought of such implications. The body language and articulations of the LEGAD indicate that something is a bit awry: "from a legal perspective, you know, it's fine either way" but… what? This leaves the Commander to utilise what he knows best, which naturally is military matters conceived within an ontology of bureaucratised labour. Hence the 'logical' articulation that delegation (no matter the issue) is good since it strikes a chord with military nomenclature on best practice of command and control (to delegate is central to mission oriented command). All within the timeframe of a 30-minutes meeting, conducted under the regulations and norms provided by the social rules of consensus, as discussed in the previous chapter.

One could argue that the Commander's and his advisers ease in increasing the potential level of violence in the area of operations is connected to the situation being within the framework of a military exercise. Nothing 'real' is going to happen, so what does it matter if the actors treat this question in this way? Well, it matters because the practice of 'delegating rules', utilising process-infused understandings of responsibility and conceptually frame levels of violence as possible to control, provides further establishment of bureaucratised labour. The rules of legitimation are thus here demonstrated through the way the exercise unfolds and as such leaves a discursive effect on both the partakers and the onlookers. It is an effect which help sediment the way legitimacy and violence are connected and how these concepts are understood to function in military operational work.

Summary – bureaucratisation and the rules of legitimation

The intention of the *Laws of Armed Conflict*, as evident in the quote in the subsection above, is to mitigate human suffering whilst, at the same time, not hindering the 'efficiency' of military actions. There is thus something of an internal contradiction built in the framework of the *Laws of Armed Conflict* as these two aspects of the law are pulling the practice in different directions. Can military violence, the 'tool' which is used for ensuring 'efficiency', at the same time mitigate human suffering caused by its use? This complexity within these laws is 'dissolved' by bureaucratisation. Within the ontology of bureaucratised labour, the rules of legitimation extracts military 'efficiency' out of these laws and creates a framework of meaning and norms that stabilises the laws as 'tools' of the military trade.

In addition, by placing 'the expert' as a figure of *authority* in the targeting context an over-emphasis on efficiency and a downplay of mitigating suffering is further established as natural (there are no indications that this order of things is in question by the agents of the practice). The conclusive result is that humanitarian considerations are lost. Simply put, bureaucratised labour prevails in the way the discourse of legitimation recreates the concept of legitimacy into a check-in-the-box-function of military operations. In the end, 'efficiency' as a concept works well with the conditions of possibility on which the targeting practice rests which, in turn, helps downplay the idea that there is suffering going on in the field of battle. This latter aspect is something that I will go further into in the next section, where the distance between the 'board member' and actions taken in the field is (among other things) discussed.

Social Rules and Norms of the Targeting Practice: The Corporate Discourse

In the following I will proceed with analysing the targeting practice-based on how its meetings are constructed and how the meetings comprise and recreate certain roles, rules and relations. By naming this analysis "the corporate discourse" I aim to

explicate the discursive and social interconnections between partaking in military activities in the role of a 'board member' and that of utilising military force. In short, the corporate discourse stems partly from how the agents of the practice act and speak when in meetings. But in addition, the discourse at hand is also based on how the operational staff organises meetings and names the participants of these meetings. Finally, the corporate discourse captures a certain set of norms and social rules that are in play when 'targeteers' meet and discuss the process of 'nominating' and 'accepting' sets of targets into their framework of lists.

Meaning-making – how bureaucratisation of violence interconnects with running a company.

> The challenge of all military technology in the past hundred years is that it creates death while destroying the experience of it. It is much easier to become desensitised, distanced from the consequences of our actions. It is quite another thing to become altogether disconnected from what our actions mean for others. By acting without meaning we are in danger of being stripped of our moral core. (Coker in Ducheine, Schmitt, and Osinga 2016, 20–21)

Coker (2016) points here to how technology destroys the experience of death for those wielding it (the 'targeteers' in this case). This reification and misrecognition of the Other is evidently clear in the targeting practice, but what is not is that 'targeteers' act without meaning. There are social rules and meaning-making in play whilst acting as a 'targeteer' and this creates an instable set of norms for the subject position 'targeteer' which, if left unchallenged in turn will sediment into a specific version of targeting-morality. Naturally, the following analysis is a small step in a direction that tries to unsettle such sedimentation, simply by making these norms and social rules discernible.

In Chapters 4 the machine gun was used to elaborate on how production and other discourses of modernity infused narratives of early 20th century military practice. There I argue that this device becomes iconic for all its benefits of 'productiveness' and that the modern Swedish military practice becomes focused on its maintenance and usefulness, setting its deadly purpose aside. A century later, military operational work, and here the targeting practice specifically, is deeply invested with aspects of modernity that draw heavily on the discourses of production, order and bureaucracy. But these discourses are not specific enough to capture how 'targeteers' are subjected to meaning-making practices by attending an endless stream of meetings. Just as industrial production has acquired multiple levels of governance and hierarchy, military violent practices are now infused with more organisational layers than was the case at the beginning of the 20th century. The machine gun is no longer a central object for those practitioners who reside in the operational level as it belongs in the field. In fact, operational work with military violence is now mostly confined to the materiality of meeting rooms, video conferences and desks filled with computer screens (as observed in Chapter 5). There is, at the operational level of command, a

lack of identification with such otherwise theoretically central military objects like guns, tanks, airplanes and for that matter, masses of soldiers. In close concert with the NATO organisation of operational level of command, spatial aspects of the daily work for a 'targeteer' are therefore open to be formed by other types of identifications. And the meaning of violence becomes, as a result of this, also open to be shaped into another type of bureaucratised labour than what was presented in Chapters 4 and 5. Here military operational violence is transformed into a product of the corporate 'board'. It is the manufactory of 'lists', 'targets folders' and of new (target) 'nominations' that drive this meaning-making.

The picture below (pict. 5) is taken from a presentation that was held during a *Joint Targeting Working Group* meeting, CJSE 15. The 'targeteer' speaking (to this picture) aims to clarify how the targeting practice is connected to the *Battle Rhythm* and whilst doing so he draws heavily on corporate discourse. Partly because the presenter articulates several central concepts belonging to the corporate world, such as "product" "meeting" and "nomination", but also in the way the gathered collective of 'targeteers' is instructed to follow a certain set of procedures. Speaking the type of 'Bad English' that we who are used to working in international staffs and participating in exercises recognise well, the presenter walks us through the process of 'target nominations'.

Pict. 5. Battle Rhythm review, BFOR HQ 20APR15 (taken from CJSE 15, altered to fit by author).

These 'nominations', the 'targeteers' learn, are a part of the *Battle Rhythm* as this object is presented as a process chart with an influx and outcome of products (nominations/lists). This strengthens the 'targeteers' affiliation of working at a corporation that produce goods according to a certain set of processes. Furthermore, the presenter speaks about this "working group" as a producer of "[a] list" that will be sent to a board (the *Joint Targeting Coordination Board*) for further consideration, which establishes this group as one, of several, producing function(s) in the productions process.

> (08:33) "So, to be sure we're on the same page of music, we explain order battle rhythm and more particular if you see Monday is Dee D+33, every, every day you should have target nominations and you should sent those to J2 and upload to particular homepage. Not later than 9 a.m. Then after, BFOR HQ will have a pre-meeting and all your nominations are going to be discussed on the BFOR HQ level and made critical analysis. This is an input for Joint Targeting Working Group which we are making at the moment. And result of this meeting would be that we have [a] list, which will be input to the Joint Targeting Coordination Board. If you have any refinements, any comments [inaudible] after Joint Targeting Working Group, SOP [Standing Operational Procedures] says that you should send them to J2 not later than nineteen hundred. […] after JTCB, which will be held tomorrow, we should have a product ready for BFOR Commander to be signed." (10:15) (J3 SO1, RS15201400, CJSE 15)

Moreover, the agents of the targeting practice are guided here towards a producing function by how the presenter, and the *Battle Rhythm*, encourage target nominations on a daily basis. Finally, the presenter ends his description of the work process/*Battle Rhythm* by accentuating the outcome of all the collective efforts of the 'targeteers': a product, ready for the commander to sign (which, in targeting terms is the final draft of the *Joint Prioritised Target List*). Despite this being a single, short, excerpt from a targeting meeting (although representative for how these types of meetings are played out), 'targeteers'' understanding of the practice is formed in relation to process, production, PowerPoint charts, regulation, refinement, nomination and the organisation of 'the Board'.

> Often depicted as the apex of the corporation, boards are a distinctive feature of the corporate form. Boards are often populated by directors of other corporations. While they may develop through mimesis inspired by interlocking directors, [note to Caswell (1984)] they can be constituted, in size, shape and composition, in a wide variety of ways. In the absence of legal prescriptions, codes seek to describe which categories of board designs are legitimate. (Nordberg and McNulty 2013, 359)

Although written in a completely different academic strand, Norberg & McNulty point to the centrality and symbolism of "the board" in the corporate discourse. The codes they speak of are those of providing guidelines for how boards are to be constituted and how they should (principally) operate. Such similar guidelines are noticeable in NATO doctrine where the different types of boards of an operational

headquarters are described. Below is one such description presented as it outlines a 'code' for the board of the targeting practice.

> **Joint Targeting Coordination Board (JTCB).** The JFC [Joint Forces Commander] may establish and task an organisation to accomplish targeting oversight functions or may delegate the responsibility to a subordinate commander. The JFC may create a JTCB with <u>representatives</u> from the JFC HQ and all components of the JF [Joint Forces] and, if required, national liaison <u>representatives</u>. If the JFC so designates, a JTCB would be an integrating centre providing a high-level targeting <u>review mechanism</u>. This should be a joint activity with <u>representatives</u> from the JFC and all components of the JF and, if required, their subordinate units. Typically, the JTCB would <u>review</u> target information, develop targeting <u>guidance</u>, priorities, and may prepare and refine joint target lists for <u>recommendation</u> to the JFC. […] (NATO 2011, para. 0430 my alteration)

"Representatives", "review mechanism", "guidance", "recommendations" and the task of preparing lists (and nominations) are concepts and tasks that can be found in corporate governance codes (e.g. Financial Reporting Council 2016). Besides providing 'targeteers' with subjectivities and objects of identification that stem from the corporate world, the discourse at play here also helps create norms for the function of the meetings. Such 'best practice' is established in the way doctrinal texts, in their corporate language, provide practitioners with guidelines of how the practice should be conducted. The meaning-making process which is fueled by the corporate discourse is thus one that positions 'the board' as *the* (only) way of preparing for, and ordering violence at the operational level. Here, corporatisation of the targeting practice furthers the production-inspired bureaucratisation of violence into a mentality of instruments that perceive violence not as a central tool in the production process, but as a bi-product of the targeting process. The corporate discourse thus encompasses meaning-making that reshapes military understanding of violence by the use of the process of 'nomination' and the processes of 'the board'. Or in other words, the dynamics of nominating (targets) encompass the main point of reference for a 'targeteer's' relation to military violence.

Another meaning-making aspect of the corporate discourse is how it provides fuel to the notion of creating certain 'effects' by the use of 'kinetic' or 'non-kinetic' 'means'. Which is something previously discussed, and also chimes well with Ducheine's (2016) definition of targeting "[…] as the application of capabilities (against targets) to generate effects to achieve objectives." (Ducheine in Ducheine, Schmitt, and Osinga 2016, 203). In particular, this understanding of creating 'effects' is connected to the corporate discourse in how 'targeteers' learn to evaluate their processes in order to 'maximise the utility' of military means. Just as it is a central task for a corporate board member to critically evaluate how the company processes are functioning, the 'targeteer' is tasked with the same type of work. Here it is exemplified by a doctrinal instruction from US Joint Publications (2007):

> Targeteers work closely with operations planners to balance the available employment options with their expected effects. The targeteers' recommendations should reflect an objective assess-

ment of the most appropriate capability to create the effect required to meet the commander's objective, no matter the source. (Joint Publication 3-60 Joint Targeting 2007, para. F-2 my alteration)

Such "assessment" is not just about checking if the right 'product' is used for achieving the expected goal, but also to examine the processes of the targeting cycle and evaluating if business is running smoothly. Concurrently, board meetings during CJSE include discussions on both means and effects, as well as how the operational work is proceeding. In the following field note excerpt from a *Joint Targeting Coordination Board*, 'targeteers' articulate and create connections between board recommendations (nominations), lists, targets, effects and assessment/evaluation (underlined by me).

> [I note that] Target support cell rep. speaks about a target that is already valid and set for execution since a couple of days. It is a mobile broadcasting station that is set for "the desired effect diminish":
>
> (27:01) "And our comment is that there has been no BDA report received or evaluated. And our assessment is that the effect of the diminish action towards the mobile broadcasting station, is yet known… not known. And the BDA diminish, the BDA of the diminish action should first be collected and evaluated before starting another desired effect involving any sort of kinetic action. So our proposition… recommendation would be, to remove it from the list… pending your decision Sir. (27:50)
>
> (28:01) LCC rep. makes a comment on the new nomination of this target, and that they need time to evaluate the effect of jamming it (which is the practical aspect of the desired effect "diminish"). But the rep. also explains why the target has been put on the nomination list for this meeting, thus answering the comment from Target Support Cell that it should be removed since it is already approved and under execution.
>
> (28:41) "Furthermore, I would like to add that, the LCC's opinion right now is that we would in the next cycle nominate it for, for capture or to, to, neutralise it by asking SOCC to actually seize this… equipment, but that is for the next cycle. So LCC does not concur to the fact that it should be removed from the list. It should stay on the list with jamming and we will contin, continouly, continuously, evaluate the effect of the jamming. Thank you." (29:15) (CJSE 16 O27_04261500)

BDA stands for Battle Damage Assessment which is a formalised form of evaluating the 'effects' of targeting. In this type of discussions, members of the board make use of how the targeting process is meant to be performed whilst trying to convince their discussant of the best way of doing things. It is clear to me that the engagement required to proceed with these types of discussions must be based on comprehensive identification with meaning that links 'process' with 'evaluation'. But it is a type of evaluation which, adhering to the corporate discourse, strives to optimise the best (sales) 'effect' for achieving given (company) goals.

Furthermore, this meaning-making creates a setting where the individual board member's ability to use the 'nomination' process and concepts linked to 'listology'

as 'weapons' of persuasion is put to the test, which is something that I will return to in the next subsection where social relations are discussed. For now, it is enough to point to the 'fact' that the targeting practice, as evident in the above excerpt, includes agents positioning around the question of nominating, or not nominating targets. And in addition, the agents abide by norms where providing the most effective solution to achieve the 'desired effects' of the military operation are central.

Provided with codes of how boards are to operate and given the guidelines of how to work with 'nominating' and 'approving' targets, the 'targeteer' subjected to the corporate discourse is in such provision bound by certain norms (social rules) and relations. The following passage will investigate these relations and rules in order to illuminate how bureaucratisation relates to the targeting practice.

Social relations and the corporate discourse – games of persuasion and power

After twenty years, I still remember my basic training and the following training as a squad leader in the mechanised infantry. I can, despite being away from these practices for a very long time, recreate the movements of my body using an automatic rifle. I can move (perhaps with slightly less stamina) like a soldier in combat, and I can order other soldiers to move in specific tactical patterns. These engraved functions of my being are typical aspects of having your body disciplined by military practice, as shown in several other studies (e.g. Samimian-Darash 2013). Moreover, I bear with me feelings of comradeship, teamwork and the externally focused feeling of competition (against other squads, platoons or companies) as central to my life as a soldier. I still feel much of the joy of being part of a team, and I have therefore tried to guide my service as a staff officer (in retrospective, quite unreflexively) to the work of planning groups. But such socially connected provisions of military training and life as a soldier change when some social settings are abandoned and replaced by others. The social world of the 'targeteer' is different from such planning groups, as you in the latter, but not in the former, can find some remnants of the social relations of the mechanised infantry squad. It occurs to me when trying to analyse my observation of the targeting practice that my distance from it, and my initial feeling of being mystified by it, lies not only in the fact that 'targeteers' share a different language. They also have a different set of social relations, rules and norms guiding their work compared to what I am familiar with as a 'staff officer' working with operational planning. What this indicates is that not even such a small unit as an operational staff can be said to be homogeneous in its internal social world.

As shown in the discussion above on the social rules of legitimation, 'targeteers' are prone to guiding their work into the format of expert recommendations, either from the 'targeteer' him/herself, or in relation to agents of authorised knowledge (such as the legal adviser). In contrast, a 'staff officer' working with operational planning often creates and presents team-based solutions to military problems. Thus, we have

here a social setting where the military officer distances him/herself from 'the team' as a unit of social reference, to a setting where relations are based on individuals and personal expertise.

In what way is this aspect of the internal life world of the operational staff related to the corporate discourse? Well, firstly, the individualisation which is a part of the 'targeteers' daily life at the staff bears with it a particular relation with working in the format of 'the board'. Although 'targeteers' who are organised in the section *Joint Fires* (in J3) have this as their primary group of belonging, 'the board' (and the target nominations) is what drives their work. In contrast to a planning team, which is to a large extent driven by the internal dynamics of the group, the 'targeteer' works in a corporate inspired setting that puts emphasis on the singular performance of the 'board member'. Secondly, as a consequence of this singular performance, the 'targeteer's' social context is one where the individual agent is much more exposed to relations of persuasion and power, than what is the case with a member of a team (where in the latter case, team members are to some extent protected by the unity and group performance of the team). Simply put, the targeting boards that I have observed have been imbued with a clear social distance between the partakers.[35] Perceptions of individual accuracy and professionalism are what is at stake for the active members of the board, and articulations are often made in wordings and tones that insinuate the other board members' inferior knowledge of the targeting processes. On occasion, even officers who are positioned in the exercises as mentors for aspiring 'targeteers' come off as patronising when providing feedback regarding the performance of the 'members of the board' (e.g. CJSE 15_181400, CJSE 16 O09_042113:55).

My first thought, which I quickly scrapped, was that this 'coldness' of the working climate for the 'targeteers' was connected to the grim realities of their practice, i.e. the amount of violence it projects. As it turns out, the "grim realities" of the targeting practice have very little to do with the physical and psychological violence that airstrikes, drone attacks or other types of targeting related 'activities' produce. The reality of the 'targeteer', as elucidated in the context description above, is instead one created when the 'targeteer' identifies, and forms his/her subjectivity, in relations to the activities of 'listology' and the meetings of the *Battle Rhythm*. When it comes to the agent's identification with lists and the process of shaping the subject 'Targeteer', listology delimits the subject's conception of what the 'reality' of military use of force is. In fact, listology includes subjectivities that construct a version of use of military force where 'the world' is written up by the content of the lists of the targeting practice. From my observations, I can conclude that the cold climate of the targeting boards stems partly from how the practice is formed by its process-

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[35] This differs from other functions within the exercises' operational staffs and has very little to do with the exercise putting together strangers in working groups. Both my own experience as a partaker of new teams in the exercise, and my observations of other parts of the operational staff point in the direction of this peculiarity of the 'targeteers' social context. Which leads to the conclusion that it is the context of the targeting practice itself that shapes these differences in social relations.

induced complexity and particular 'list-related' language, and partly by how the meetings are organised to mimic corporate boards. One of these aspects would not be enough for shaping the relations in this individual, competitive, direction. For instance, other parts of the operational practice utilise the system of a board and I have not experienced the same type of games of relations while observing those types of meetings. It is thus when 'listology' meets 'the board' that the atmosphere alters and fear of being exposed as a 'uninformed targeteer' is activated as a factor in how the agents relate to each other.

Due to the risk of being exposed to critique for failing with 'nominations' of targets, and by being in a subordinate position towards the experts and positions of power in the board (chairman, Co-chair), agents in contact with the targeting practice must establish identifications with new objects of knowledge. During board meetings, expert knowledge related to legal framework/*Rules of Engagement* together with expert knowledge of the targeting process clash, oddly enough, with traditional fields of military knowledge, such as technology and tactics. The following exchange took place during a *Joint Targeting Coordination Board* (2016) and it elucidate how 'targeteers' need to relate to knowledge. The corporate discourse brings with it a normative framework that enhances 'processes of nomination' and 'legality of actions' as central objects of knowledge, and reduces (counter intuitively) tactical prowess. Allow me to quote at length, in order to illustrate how a 'targeteer' in becoming is disciplined by the use of targeting-process related knowledge:

> [I note that] The target support cell speaks about how targets nominated by the MCC are incorrect as they (the MCC) already have the mandate to handle the targets on their own. And the legal adviser points to flaws in how the nominations are prepared concerning appropriate choice of rules of engagement:

> (17:20) Target Support Cell: "Yes Sir, I would like to… eh take in target two two three nine [2239] as well as two seven seven four [2774], their both Neustrashimy-class war ships. And our comment is Annex E to OPLAN CJSE 16 dated the 17th of January treats the rules of engagement including hostile intent, hostile act and when to fire. And our assessment is that the ROE necessary for escorting transport vessels to Gotland are already covered in the MCC mandate, mission and ROE. And therefore, we recommend the board to reject! This nomination."

> (18:20) Joint Fires Chief [Co-chair]: "Yes, recommendation of rejecting both target ID twenty-two thirty-nine [2239] and target ID twenty-seven seventy-four [2774], eh legal?"

> (18:32) LEGAD: "I had a question. It says in the pack [target folder], sorry, about the first, the frigate, it says the desired effect is "monitor" and "prevent" these ships to interfere with the MCC operation in the vicinity of Gotland. And then it says rule four twenty-seven [427] and that is pretty much the sharpest tool we have in the shed. It seem that may need a little bit more development… I thought that that was discussed?"

> (19:05) Joint Fires Chief: "MCC, would you like to comment on these two targets?"

(19:11) MCC: "Yeah, the comment is that… why I bring them up is that if there are no threat or they are not acting any hostile intent, let us to have freedom of movement with all the operations that we are doing, we are not reacting in any way. But if they start acting hostile or we have to give a boarding to them… so that's why we have taken them there. And if you look at the weapon systems on those ships so every CC would be a little bit worried. If they are there in… our way when we are moving our troops."

(19:55) LEGAD: "Yeah I know, I accept that, but the reason for my question was that when we had the work group it said use of minimum force if needed to protect our own operation. Sorry this is my note, but… then I see four twenty-seven [427] which is a very different type of situation. So, that's the point of my question, but I understand what you mean […]"

POLAD also questions the need for the nomination of the suggested targets and thereby supports the critique from Target Support Cell and the LEGAD.

Here I note that the Co-chair lets the legal adviser comment on the relation between rules of engagement and the function of the Joint Prioritised Target List. The legal adviser 'educates' us on how he sees the relation between these two objects of the practice. While doing this, he takes support from a thick pack of documents lying on the table in front of him, from which he reads out loud parts of how the targeting process is to be conducted. His point is that MCC's request has no function that makes it necessary for being on the list. They can just use self-defence if the warships interfere with the sea-based troop reinforcement to the island of Gotland. This is 'correct' in legal terms and in line with what the targeting processes tells us about how the targeting function is to work. The discussion proceeds:

[I note that] The MCC answers that they need help from the ACC to protect them from these ships, due to the capabilities of the warships weapon systems (the potential enemy ships can fire at the convoy from a very long range). And that such support from the air force must be planned ahead in order to be functional. The MCC sees that the ACC has "assets in the list" which can help them with this. → this is a request that is based on a tactical evaluation of the situation.

(24:53) DCOS J3 [Chairman of the board]: "So, so if I understand you [MCC] correctly, you want that on the JPTL just because if they are entering the military exclusive zone you want help from the ACC? If that's correct? Ehm, I think that should not be on the JPTL, cause then we'd had to put every aircraft that the [inaudible] has on the JPTL. So, therefore it has to be a coordination if things like that happens. That's what, its what we're having this organisation for, to cord, the joint cord… the joint level to coordinate if things like that happens. Ehm, so … yes. So, I, I can't see really purpose of having it on the JPTL. You understand? my thoughts?"

(25:50) MCC: "It's your call, Sir"

Some sighs, and one small laugh is heard among the board members.

[a short silent pause occurs] Then Joint Fires Chief sums the discussion up by saying (26:17) "… target ID twenty-two thirty-nine [2239]and target ID twenty-seven seventy-four [2774], will be removed from this list, Sir?

(26:27) DCOS J3: "Yes, they will be removed!"
(CJSE 16 O27_04261500)

The MCC representative, faced with critique from the key players on the board (the legal and political advisers, the expert 'targeteers' and the chairman), submits to the knowledge claim these agents make regarding the nominated targets. The sighs, and one small laugh, that I notice (also audible in the recording) when this happens are clearly directed towards the MCC representative's inability to comprehend the function of the *Joint Prioritised Targeting List*. In this excerpt, a 'targeteer' in becoming (the MCC rep.) is socialised into the position of 'targeteer' by being taught which objects of knowledge matter when working in the targeting practice. As such, 'targeteers' learn to understand the *Rules of Engagement* as 'tools' that are to be in tune with 'effects' and, in addition, that the targeting practice is centralised on the manufacturing of correct lists according to processes found in manuals.

Moreover, this socialisation subjects the 'targeteer' to new sets of norms that reside in the corporate discourse (and of legitimation) by how subjectivity is realigned towards process knowledge and 'listology'. In other words, such central objects of knowledge like tactics and weapon capabilities are to some extent downplayed and removed to the periphery of how the 'targeteer' identifies with his/her practice. It is not that these things no longer matter (they are still needed to be able to prepare 'target folders' for instance) but the socialisation that takes place within the framework of the corporate discourse destabilises the secure ground held by these traditional military objects of knowledge. Argumentation from a tactical/technical traditional military discourse simply does not work as well as arguments sprung from the process-related discourse of the targeting practice. To become a 'targeteer' is thus to learn how to talk in terms of 'operational effect' and process-effectiveness, as well as learn how to use *Rules of Engagement* as a base for arguments.

Summary – the corporate discourse and bureaucratisation

Having the corporate discourse providing its specific version of production-based norms and social rules into violent military practice, bureaucratised understandings of violence move into new territory. The bureaucratised labour of the 20th century, where violent practices were moulded into the shape of a factory production line, is by the corporate discourse transformed to reside in process charts and 'effect-based' thinking. Furthermore, by introducing military personnel to the boardroom and its inherent corporate social rules, the classical team-based approach to the production of violence is replaced by a focus on acts of persuasion between individual experts. Doctrine, manuals and rules are placed even more in the centre of using violence which furthers the agents' distance to an already peripheral understanding of violence as something that actually inflicts pain and suffering on human subjects. Focus lies instead on establishing oneself as an unthreatened expert within the board whose 'nominations' of targets are accepted into the order of lists on a daily basis.

6.5 Conclusions – The Construction of a 'Target' (and bureaucratised violence)

"We don't talk about non-kinetic or kinetic, we talk about Joint effect" (CJSE 16, 04261030)

'Efficiency' and 'precision', these are concepts that form the base for how operational military violence has evolved into a contemporary targeting practice. During my investigations, I cannot find any agent, event or articulation that questions this 'fact'. But there are moments when some of the targeting practice's (foreseeable) effect-infused take on military violence is disrupted, as when a legal adviser asks the 'targeteers' at a targeting working group "How do we downgrade a person's function? Kneecaps? (participants giggle) Or detain? It's ok to use these kinds of words as long we all know what it means" (CJSE 16 O10_04211500).[36] That there is a 'giggle-reaction' to this question/comment relates to how the legal adviser connects the effect 'neutralise' with shooting a person (the target) in his/her knees, thereby physically 'neutralising' the person's ability to move. It might seem utterly harsh to joke about such things, but for me this actually is a relief in this otherwise unconditionally formal practice. Humour has an ability to release some of the grip that bureaucratisation has on military understandings of violence, as elucidated in Chapter 4 and 5, even if it is achieved in a macabre way.

Nevertheless, rare as these moments are, ethnographical investigations of operational targeting are something that put the researcher in an individualised and process-saturated environment. To learn the transformative language of the 'targeteers' I have been forced to examine and re-examine recordings of meetings, read wearisome doctrines and manuals like *Standing Operational Procedures* (SOPs), and, naturally, attend a plethora of formal and informal meetings between 'targeteers'. But it is perhaps in the conversations with those 'targeteers' who have real-life experience of the targeting practice that I have learned the most important lesson: this is how it is done, aside from the participating officers' lack of formal training in the targeting practice. One such interlocutor tells me that he thinks that two of the biggest differences from his own work with targeting in Afghanistan, is that the students of the exercise are not *formal enough* during their meetings, and that normally there is more *arguing and persuading* (regarding nominations) going on in the 'real' meetings (CJSE 17, C01 251420).

It seems reasonable to summarise this chapter by letting 'target ID 6002' re-emerge. What have I witnessed and learned as this 'target', this 'object' and artefact of military bureaucratised labour, is created and processed in the lists and meeting of the targeting practice? First of all, the targeting practice is despite its complex web of prohibitions, rules and red colours very efficient in depriving the subject of any other content than its possible use for military gain. The discourse of legitimation

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[36] This relates to a target nomination where a target has been nominated with the effect "neutralised".

deprives the humanitarian aspects of the *Laws of Armed Conflict* in the way the practitioners make use of the *Rules of Engagement*, which makes room to use the rules as permissively as possible. *Kristina's* first step in becoming an 'object' of military efficiency lies in her ability to fit the mould for 'target category 22' (irregular forces), which automatically validates her as applicable for the rules that allow for 'kinetic means'. *Kristina* cannot escape from the power inherent to the initial placement of her in the list of targets as the targeting practice's step upon step of categorisation and filling out of columns, applications of 'effect' and 'means', and through the targeteers discussions, only further her position as as a viable 'target'. As legitimation is understood as pivotal (gives a go, or no-go) and also as imbued with regulating (expert and hierarchical) authority, there is no further need to discuss her 'validity' as a target. Only the most efficient and productive way of utilising this formal 'go' is left for debate.

Secondly, the responsibility for approving *Kristina's* status as a 'target' lies with the Commander. But the presentation and 'packing' of 'target ID 6002' presumes that all legal, political, cultural and gender-related issues have been considered before the 'target' comes to his/her attention. When the list of targets is presented for approval, it is in the final stage of being finalised under the norms and rules provided by the social relations of consensus, and this means that voicing critique during the decision meeting is left to the Commander. Adding the social rules of legitimation, with its inherent slippery way of creating different types of responsibilities (e.g. strictly legal), to the act of approval, removes the possible support this single authority could have in terms of thinking outside of frames provided by bureaucratised labour. The result is that 'target ID 6002', by the means of how 'it' has been constructed within the targeting practice, no longer is an entity suitable for humanitarian concerns. The bureaucratised labour has thoroughly removed the tension in the *Laws of Armed Conflict* between mitigating human suffering and achieving military 'efficiency', and removed the possibility for the actors to perceive this tension as put in effect by approving the nomination of *Kristina*.

Thirdly, the fact that the 'targeteer' is an actor working within the format of the 'board' brings with it norms and relations that equal military professionalism with individual proficiency in using 'target nomination' processes, and the *Rules of Engagement*, as topics for arguments. The corporate discourse provides 'targeteers' with opportunities to exchange punches made out of process-knowledge, and with the satisfaction of getting nominations accepted into the networks of lists. Furthermore, it sediments the actors' understanding of responsibility as belonging to expert knowledge and higher authority. In this quite homogenised discourse, there is no space for voicing concerns regarding non-productive issues such as if the violence used really is proportionate. Perhaps even more interesting, there is little that indicates that actors who are formed by this corporate discourse, actually think of the outcome of their work in terms of violence. In the language used by the 'targeteers', words exists in order to escape the outcome of the practice, and instead of talking

about violence, they talk about "desired effects" (*Kristina* was connected to "detain, exploit and disrupt"), "means" and "decisive conditions".

In the end, *Kristina* has become an 'object' of military bureaucratised labour. Not a human, in other words, but reified as a 'target'. This is what Judith Butler would have called being placed on the outside of the frames of war, where the existence of human life no longer is possible to recognise or even apprehend (Butler 2010). But what is a fascinating and certainly also a fragile aspect of the targeting practice and its ultimate use of bureaucratised violence, is that it kills, through the subjectivities of listology, the possibility for questioning the identification of *Kristina* as really having the 'function' she is supposed to have. As soon as she is in the first draft of the lists, the process, with its norms and social rules, ensures that she stays there. In fact, the desire to get 'nominations' accepted, and to achieve certain 'productive effects' (which the practice even has named "*desired* effects") seem to hinder any second thought on if the initial intelligence gathering may have any flaws. This is a *sociological* expansion of what previously has been critically voiced regarding the function of *technology* in targeted killings:

> The fact that your weapon enables you to destroy precisely whomever you wish does not mean that you are more capable of making out who is and who is not a legitimate target. The precision of the strike has no bearing on the pertinence of the targeting in the first place. That would be tantamount to saying that the guillotine, because of the precision of its blade –which, it is true, separates the head from the trunk with remarkable precision- makes it thereby better able to distinguish between the guilty and the innocent. (Chamayou 2015, 143)

Adding to Chamayou's deflation of what proponents of targeting call 'ethical warfare', my investigation of the targeting practice indicates that the process-induced way of 'doing' targeting is *self-propelling* in a way that resists self-critical evaluation of what is posed as a 'legitimate target'. Furthermore, as several academics have shown in other studies, and as discussed in relation to the effects of the *Battle Rhythm*, the way the practice is instilled with a particular narrow understanding of the future enforces this dynamic momentum (e.g. Öberg 2016). Perhaps we here have the answer to the ever-emerging question (posed from outside of the military practice): how come they bombed a family, wedding, funeral, hospital etc. when it should have been clear that such action (aside from being morally questionable) must be counterproductive to achieving 'a safe and secure environment' in the mission area? Whether or not this is the case, what can be said with certainty is that despite the practice's close connection to formal laws and regulations, 'doing' targeting mitigates the existence of critical thinking in its 'true' meaning.

Nevertheless, the repetitive aspects of the targeting practice – the meetings of the *Battle Rhythm*, the material acts of 'listology' – create a social setting where the subject 'targeteer' is formed by how the agents perform these repetitive acts. What we have witnessed in this chapter is thus an account of how a subject position is constructed by that which Butler calls performativity: "[…] that reiterative power of discourse to produce the phenomena that it regulates and constrains." (Butler 1993,

2). The ironic part of the targeting practice is thus that not 'only' are humanitarian subjectivities removed from the 'target' created by the practice, they are also removed from the acting 'targeteer'. In the next chapter I will proceed to discuss what these 'findings' mean in terms of the overall question of how violence and death are managed, neutralised or silenced in operational work.

7

Chapter 7: Conclusions and Contributions

How is the inescapable presence of death and violence managed, neutralised or silenced in military practice? This question has, as discussed in Chapter 2, in more recent scholarship been answered by directing our attention towards a bureaucratising impact of language and materiality. It is indicated by this research that military violence has come to take the shape of a form of bureaucratised labour, in which bureaucratic systems and processes reshape and objectify military relations to, and understandings of, violence. But this previous research has been focused on specific technological systems (e.g. drones) or the reification and misrecognition of the Other that operate at lower levels of Western military organisations. Little attention has been guided towards the operational work that enables and sustains the use of Western military force, and this is particularly troublesome as this work is arguably the focal point of bureaucratisation of violence. This thesis has aimed at filling some of this gap in our understanding of what bureaucratised labour is, and how it operates, by investigating and analysing such operational work. In particular, by making a point that bureaucratisation is a process that is only partly constructed through the use of language, but also through how agents of a practice create and abide by social rules and norms, the thesis expands previous knowledge of how bureaucratised labour operates within military discourse, so as to include sociologically related understandings of how violence is managed, neutralised or silenced in military practice.

In this concluding chapter, I will summarise my findings from the 'empirical' chapters and single out what it is in bureaucratised labour of operational work that differentiates it from other empirical context that has been the focus of previous research, so as to clearly illustrate my contribution to our understanding of what military violence 'is'. After this, the chapter proceeds to comprise a reflection on some possible ethical implication of bureaucratised labour. The chapter is then concluded with suggestions for further research and a brief autoethnographical reflection on military violence.

7.1 Central Conclusions from the Empirical Investigations

In the following section I first summaries my historically related findings by discussing how the research context of operational work has gradually been politically influenced, and militarily narrated, to include a specific type of bureaucratised relation to violence and death. Then I provide a summary and concluding answer to each of the supporting research questions that have guided the investigations of the thesis. In these answers I intend to highlight the theoretical gains – what we have learned – regarding how bureaucratised labour operates in ways that neutralise and silence death and violence in military practice.

Summary – the formation of bureaucratised relations to violence and death in Sweden, 1914-1960

Chapter 4 outlines how political reformation of the military practice 'paves the way' for a bureaucratisation of military relations to, and understandings of violence. Partly through the political balancing between the diverging normative forces inherent in the Swedish context of neutrality, but also through the political focus on conscription as a way of gathering the People and making use of the collective force of society. Due to this, the military as an institution in Swedish society was discursively constructed as being a non-violent, disciplinary, professional producer of military units. This means, on the one hand, that the politics of neutrality facilitated the use of narratives where military violence could be depicted as a controllable and delimited product of military practice. Complementarily, conscription came to mean more than just filling the ranks of the military – to educate conscripts was to adhere to a national norm of creating a 'rational' and 'productive' place for each man. But also to shape and discipline young men into a masculinised protective subject who would understand and take responsibility for 'his' role as a cog in the national defence machinery. Since recruitment of new officers was made by a careful selection of the 'best' conscripted soldiers, these norms were reinforced into the military practice as these new officers advanced in the ranks of the modern military.

But the main take-aways from Chapter 4 comes from the analysis of military narratives. Here the discourse analysis reveals that military violence is narrated through the use of certain themes, or discursive points of reference. The themes used to elucidate the construction of bureaucratisation of death and violence in the military discourse offer insight into how a process of identification is made possible through a particular use of language. The objectifying relations to the dead and the human body is one such insight as it illustrates how language and images operate to underline a process of reification. It is an objectifying process which trivialises the dead and the fact that military violence actually inflicts harm to the human body. In these historical narratives, the body becomes a logistic item and a 'problem' of war which can be solved by issuing regulations and creating organisations (units and hierar-

chies of responsibilities), furthering bureaucratisation as a central aspects of how death and violence are neutralised in military practice.

In addition, the historical analysis reveals how technological language and imagery are set as central points of reference for how identification is made possible to operate through military discourse. Central to this operation is that technological possibilities, such as what machines make possible in terms of firepower, are discursively constructed to take precedence over human considerations. What this means is that the technological aspect of the materiality of war encompasses a human-object relation which suggests that the machine (with its possibilities of use) creates a yardstick for military 'rationality'. In other words, the military discourse constructs the possibility for the existence of a social relation between the military agent and the materiality of the practice, in which the possibilities of the machine hold the 'normative higher ground'. Those subjected to this narration of military violence get gratification from such human norms/ideals as perfection, craftsman skill and procedural efficiency. This underlines similar observations made by researchers investigating contemporary use of military drone technology (e.g. Holmqvist 2013a).

Furthermore, the analysis of the military narratives conducted in Chapter 4 illuminates the fact that production and education of soldiers are closely connected to regulation of the military practice. The discourse analysis reveals how ways of 'rationalising' the military practice operate by techniques of fragmentising combat practices and the spatial aspects of war. By fragmenting close combat, for instance, the military practice is bureaucratised and reformed into something similar to health education – death and violence are thus neutralised and silenced by how the language and materiality of the practice rewrite violent practices with educational and competitive points of reference.

In addition, the masculine norms found to be central for how the military narrates its violent practices infuse the military discourse with ways of identifications that are anchored in an 'on/off' understanding of human emotions. In particular, the military discourse portrays masculine norms as something that should be learned and endorsed, but from a 'clinical' perspective where the arbitrariness, meaninglessness, possible fun or sadistic pleasure of violence are removed and replaced by principles of 'winning'. Masculine norms thus work to enforce the ways of identification made possible by military narratives of violence, by endorsing and making use of the points of reference where military use of violence is discursively silenced or neutralised.

In sum, the historical chapter provides insights into how political reforms and military discourse are interlinked in the bureaucratisation of violence, and offers a background to how the operational work that I investigate in Chapter 5 and 6 can exist as bureaucratised labour. The analysis reveals *how* processes of modernisation and 'rationalisation' of a military organisation create discursive ways in which death and violence are neutralised and silenced in military practice. In other words, the chapter

offers insight into how contemporary military discourse has historically formed (in the context of Sweden) so as to make possible a further pervasion of the bureaucratisation of violence.

Summary – what are the main subjects or points of reference in operational military discourse? In particular, how does military staff practice shape understandings of violence and death?

In stark contrast to Carol Cohn's (1987) investigation of the nuclear discourse, where technology was show to hold a central place in the management of military death and violence, my investigation illustrate that in operational work, main points of reference for the agents are drawn from discourses of bureaucratisation. The bureaucratisation enclosing the operational staff practice is enforced by how hierarchy freezes the practice in a status of duty-related responsibility – a responsibility that for the agents of the practice is the embodiment of Weber's Iron Cage. It is a type of duty which relates to the norm of following rules, and abiding by routines and processes. The "value-based system of control" which I highlight in Chapter 2 as part of how bureaucratisation forms in contemporary organisations, is in operational staff work shown to exist 'on top' of the classical 'rational' and hierarchical bureaucratisation that creates this duty to follow rules (Barker 1993, 434). The thesis illustrates how value-based discourse operates in the operational work, in the shape of the social rules and language of consensus, which comprise unwritten and socially agreed upon ways of performing in the practice. Insomuch, the formal rules of 'rational' bureaucracy support the hold that consensus has on the practice through their ability to sediment day-to-day activities. In other words, the format of 'rational' bureaucracy provides the practitioners with routines, levels of hierarchy and defined responsibilities, but the agents' own socially agreed upon norms of how operational work should be done further entrenches a bureaucratisation of the practice.

This brings about a discursive hold on the practice which puts focus on materiel issues and on discussions about the meaning of concepts and procedures. Meetings, briefings, discussions on who, what and when fill the practitioners' days. There is simply no room for death and violence in this situation of a 'double bureaucratisation' – the hierarchical 'rational' bureaucracy and the self-imposed rules and norms of operational work mitigate the agents' apprehension of the 'real' consequences of their work. Which is why I often had to discuss the 'impossible' question of why I chose to investigate understandings of violence at the operational level with my interlocutors. A majority of the practitioners felt that their work had nothing to do with violence. Instead, the social rules of consensus and those of order and bureaucracy, *give practitioners a sense of meaning and place in the operational work*.

Violence is not seen as a practical outcome of this particular meaning and place, and is treated as a state of exception, originating from groups of religious fanatics or criminality. The 'fact' that violence is relational, that it is a human activity and that

military missions play a part in the existence of this activity is hard to fathom in this context. Above all else, the social rules and norms of operational staff work ensure that bureucratised labour prevails and sediments into a natural way of understanding the point of military practice: to enable a secure place of belonging for its practitioners and a 'productive' operational use of military force. My investigation and analysis of operational work thus builds upon the growing attention that Critical Military Studies put on the sociological aspects of military practice and military relations to violence. What I have outlined in the thesis is a cartography of how military minds and bodies are shaped by the language and materiality of bureaucratisation, and it offers in some ways an unique insight into the inner workings of 'real' operational work. The thesis can show that the bureaucratisation of the military practice removes violence and death from military minds, and as such constructs a military life world which is similar to any other type of civilian governmental or corporate job. If it were not for the fact that the operational practice still 'produces' military violence, this effect of bureaucratisation would have been little to pay attention to, but as we know, this is not the case. I will therefore, further below, take the opportunity to reflect on some possible ethical problems of this bureaucratic state of affairs in the military relation to violence.

Summary - how does reification and misrecognition of the Other exist and operate in the bureaucratised labour of operational staff practice and in the practice of targeting?

The discursive focus provided by 'rational' bureaucratisation - a focus on procedures and formal rules, "without regard for persons" – is in the thesis revealed to be complemented by the subjectivities of the operational work, both in 'ordinary' staff work and in the practice of targeting (M. Weber 2009, 215). The question of how reification and misrecognition of the Other exist and operate in this context of bureaucratised labour can be answered by two points that are closely interlinked with each other.

Firstly, reification – to deem "the Other as a mere object or an inanimate thing" – is in the thesis shown to operate through the actors' strong identification with the materiality of the operational work (Lindemann 2014, 490). If the Other appears in the practice, it is as part of lists, templates and/or statistics. And this materiality is closely integrated with how the actors of the practice are linked to each other, through a common bureaucratic language, which forms the boundaries for what is supposed to be dealt with in operational work. Hence, it becomes natural to objectify the Other, as both the materiality and the language of the practice offer such clear avenues of identification with bureaucratised discourse. But in stark contrast to the military discourses of the early and mid 20th century, my contemporary analyses reveal an almost complete disregard for the existence of the Other, except in the form of a productive 'thing'. Reification is as such a part of how operational work is designed by NATO doctrine, and by 'best practice' of staff work, to be aimed at achieving measurable goals and to search for achieving 'effects'. Here the operational dis-

courses are aligned to create a simplification of conflict as a human endeavor, as (complex as they are) operational procedures take for granted that the dynamics of human conflict can be measured, weighted and 'rationalised' into effects. Reification thus lies embedded in the ontological framework of operational discourse, and what is remarkable with this military type of work is its grip on the practitioners' minds and bodies – they think and act in liaison with this ontological framework and reification of the Other becomes a 'natural part' of operational work.

Secondly, the operational work described and analysed in this thesis further underlines the disappearance of the Other from contemporary military discourse, as discussed in Chapter 2. The misrecognition of the enemy Other, as Delori puts it "the blanks in the contemporary discourse", clearly extends to also contextualising the buraucratised labour of operational work (Delori 2014, 525). In operational work, this misrecognition operates both through formalised procedures (such as allocating intelligence reports little time and discursive space in the practice) but also through how the social rules and norms of the practice establish points of reference for the actors which do not relate to war and violence. Previous research has illustrated that technology is central for how military agents reshape military violence so as to leave the Other aside (e.g. Cohn 1987; Delori 2014; Holmqvist 2013a). But what we learn from my investigations is that the material content of bureaucratised labour, such as targeting lists, databases and templates, have a more central place (compared to technology) in creating a misrecognition of the Other in the operational work. What this tells us is that it is not technology or administrative types of material *per se* that drive a misrecognition of the other. Instead, my complementary research indicates that contemporary military practice is discursively and socially inclined to construct its practice as being similar to civilian (bureaucratic and corporate) work, and the enemy Other is therefore excluded from operational work. Even a 'violent' practice such as targeting is in much empty of a relation to the enemy Other, as the materiality of listology and the discourses of legitimation and the corporation align targeting as a part of achieving goals and effects, not about killing and death.

Summary - how does the bureaucratisation of violence relate to military masculinities? In particular, what values and norms come into the forefront in the construction of military masculinity in the context of bureaucratised labour in an operational staff?

The thesis also analyses which values and norms come into the forefront in the construction of military masculinity in the context of military operational bureaucratised labour. And it is evident that the biggest challenge to the prevailing hegemony of bureaucratisation in operational work is posed by the infusion of gender issues into the practice. But bureaucratisation remains on top as its close relations to the language of production provides a neat fit for a certain version of these gender issues. After a period of adjustment and assimilation, *questions of gender are understood as increasing operational capability and efficiency*. Insomuch, the subject position 'staff officer', or for that matter 'civilian staff worker', is encapsulated in

articulations and actions that ensure that masculinity is provided meaning derived from discourses of productivity. Here, the infusion of gender as a normative 'framework' guiding the development of military practice is actually proven to become a move enforcing the productive aspect of military masculinity. In other words, gender creates a possibility to deem 'traditional' warrior ideals as *unproductive*, thus pushing them to the margins of military identity construction. In contrast to the mid 20th century discourse on military violence that I analyse in Chapter 4, operational discourse has left 'traditional' warrior norms aside. This chimes well with more recent research on how military masculinities develop in military practices that have distance to the direct use of force (such as drone operators, see Chapter 2). But in operational work, ideals of masculinity, connected to those norms and rules found in the practice to rely on the language and materiality of production, are enhanced. Bureaucratisation has thus been shown here to not resist political aspirations of altering a military normative framework (through gender-related reformations), but to be *strengthened* by such attempts.

In simple terms, the military officer and the civilian servant working with operational matters are formed into bureaucrats, more than warriors. Not a revolutionary observation in itself, but when taken into account what this does to understandings of violence (neutralising and silencing death and violence) this buraucratisation of the practitioners emerged as a problem. That is to say that analysing hegemonic masculinity as closely connected to an understanding and practice of a type of military violence, the explicit killing of enemies, might lead the research to a dead end. What discourses of productivity add here is that they exemplify how the content of both military violence and military masculinity develop to sustain a 'functioning' military institution. So in a reciprocal move of exchanging articulations and social norms, *the development of bureaucratised understandings of military violence feeds the development of what type of masculinity dominates the military identity construction*.

What this reciprocal exchange does in terms of neutralising or silencing violence is that it entrenches a situation in the military where the use of force is treated as a dispassionate part of operational practice, and, as shown in Chapter 5, even creates a situation where violence is not perceptible as an 'output' of the practice at all. With no little amount of irony I conclude that the type of masculinities where feelings such as hate (for the Other), aggression and traditional ideas about sustaining honour are central, can actually facilitate a political and ethical identification of an excessive use of military force. What 'hidden' bureaucratised violence does is to mitigate such ethical and political critique, as the military use of force is realigned as 'effects' to achieve operational 'goals'. The discourses of production thus create both military violence as 'rational' and 'necessary', but they also have the effect of depoliticising the use of force (and gender reforms).

My analysis of the targeting practice also addresses this reciprocal relationship between the social rules and norms of bureaucratisation, the formation of military violence, and the construction of types of masculinities. The NATO-inspired opera-

tional work which legitimates the use of force in terms of Rules of Engagement and the social norms of 'the corporation' naturally construct a type of hegemonic masculinity as well. But it was clear to me that the key to analysing the subject position of the 'targeteer' was to analyse how the articulations and practices of the agents provide subjectivities and acts of objectifications. The 'targeteer' is naturally a gendered subject position but there was nothing in the practice that I found to disrupt a military masculinity built upon discourses of production. What this tells me is that I failed in my attempt to find some cognitive dissonance to the bureaucratised understanding of violence in the targeting practice. Instead, Chapter 6 outlines a practice and a subject position which stands for 'the height of bureaucratisation' and as such comprises no social rules or norms which could work against how the discourses of production inform military masculinities at the operational staff.

Previous research on military masculinities, as discussed early on in this thesis, are fairly consistent in that masculinities in the military organisation work to legitimatise military violence. So the question here is more of engaging in how this legitimation works, and in particular, how bureaucratised understandings of violence relate to such a process of legitimation. It is clear to me that the literature on military masculinity and violence has heavily invested its analyses of the formation of masculinity in such areas as preparation for boys becoming soldiers, and/or in how men are shaped into soldiers by the military institution. Here masculinities are seen to prepare boys/men for, and eventually to sustain, the military use of violence (Higate and Hopton 2004; e.g. Whitworth 2004). But this literature takes a 'leap' in the way its analyses move from the subject of the soldier to a conceptual level of society, where in the latter masculinity is approached as in need of realigned social constructions in order to end/minimise the use of military violence (Cockburn 2013; e.g. Enloe 2015).

As mentioned in Chapter 2, there is not much research done on the higher military organisational levels that include analyses of where masculinities are recognised as a part in how these practices function. Furthermore, there has been a tendency in IR studies that the majority of male researchers in the field avoid the concept of masculinity in their analyses of military power, which leaves the gender aspect of military violence aside (Carver 2014). This brings about a situation where men's experiences and their subjectivities do not explicitly enter the academic field from the research 'position', with some notable exceptions of course.[37] Which in turn delimits both the recognition of gender as a driver for social conflict, but also leaves out possible insights and critical explanations derived from being a male researcher in a male dominated research environment. My analysis of the operational staff practice is in light of this foremost a contribution of 'empirical' character as it fills some small space in the lack of research in these two aspects: the higher organisational level of

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[37] Since much of modern research has historically been drawn up by men, the construction of how research is conditioned and conducted and what it comprises is 'naturally' formed by types of masculinities. But what I point to here is a situation where male researchers deliberately use the lenses provided by masculinities as an analytical approach in their research.

military practice, and the analysis of masculinities made explicit by the male (military) researcher. In other words, my investigation allows others to peek into the social play of a military staff and the practice's relations to violence, and in particular, how military minds 'deal' with gender issues.

Summary - how are military subjects relation to violence shaped through the transformative language and materiality of NATO targeting lists and practical procedures?

As mentioned above and as discussed in Chapter 2, technology has had a central place in research that invests time and effort to unravel the meaning of materiality and war. What my analysis of the operational work 'targeting' reveals is that bureaucratisation of violence moves another type of materiality into the foreground. But more importantly, the analysis elucidates that the databases, templets and lists of the targeting practice are a central part of what drives the 'production' of violence to resemble something of a self-propelling practice. In the thesis, I call this complex web of materiality *listology*. This is a concept that I use to emphasise the discursive force intrinsic to a network of lists and the practitioners' attempts to master these lists. In other words, listology provides practitioners with possible avenues of identification with list-related objects that pervade and limit a 'targeteers'' ontology. Listology thus stands for a specific formation of bureaucratised labour and is as such both part of the context and the analysis of the targeting practice. As shown in Chapter 6, the lists provide meaning which allows the targeteers to fit humans and objects into the framework of bureaucratised labour, giving them a 'natural' place as 'productive targets' in the striving to achieve "operational effects".

Furthermore, the attempt in Chapter 6 to disturb the neutralisation and silencing of violence inherent in the bureaucratised labour I met in the operational staff practice, by uncovering the 'mysteries' of the targeting practice, provides some further insights into how bureaucratised labour operates. First of all, the analysis of the language of the targeting practice shows how the discourse of targeting helps neutralise the possible 'negative' consequences of using military force to solve conflicts. The process of selecting, evaluating, merging-with-lists and nominating a 'target' provides an appearance of a bureaucratic but still judicial practice. In other words, the use of military violence is established by the practice as being similar to other societal juridical processes in which the professionalism of the 'targeteer', and the legal adviser, stands as a 'guarantee' for a correct execution (of violence). In addition, the neutralisation and silencing of violence, analytically identified in the investigation as a outcome of bureaucratised labour, has the power to portray the use of military violence as efficient, precise and lawful. A process similar to the creation of what James Der Derian (2009) calls "[…] "virtuous war." At the heart of virtuous war is the technical capability and ethical imperative to threaten and, if necessary, actualise violence from a distance - *with no or minimal casualties*." (Der Derian 2009, xxxi italics in original).

The investigation thus provides empirical 'evidence' of how use of military violence is discursively 'repacked' as a 'clean' practice, so as to be accepted as a 'normal' part of contemporary Western liberalism. Other studies have pointed in a similar direction, but then with focus on tactical and/or specific use of certain technologies, often within the US context of warfare (e.g. Roderick 2010). What my analysis of targeting indicates and adds is the existence and formation of an operational bureaucratised labour which is dependent on the discourses and practices of other parts of society for its sustainment and development. The 'cleansing' of violence through the discourses of bureaucratisation, with their close connection to civilian juridical discourse and corporate life, work in favour to keep military operational violence in the background of military practice.

In close connection to the theoretical implication of my analysis discussed above lies the 'fact' that the investigation reveals that the social play of the operational staff is realigned in the targeting practice to include close connections to the workings of corporate boards. The learned and embodied aspect of bureaucratised labour, enters here as a pertinent element of the conclusions from investigating the construction of the 'targeteer'. For instance, the advisers (on legal and political implications) have been represented by both military and civilian personnel during my ethnographical investigations. But as outlined by my analysis, this has not resulted in any clear difference in how these advisers play their parts in the board meetings. On the contrary, what has been noticeable was if they were new to the role of adviser, in that they showed some signs of uncertainty in how to navigate the social rules of the meetings. What is indicated by my investigation is thus that the naturalisation of military violence as legally correct and politically plausible is something that these agents of the practice *learn as they socially adjust* to the targeting practice. As they are forced to deliver answers to questions of instrumental character, such as which Rules of Engagement are applicable to facilitating a correct 'nomination' of a 'target', they adjust to this bureaucratised discourse. This observation strengthens the theoretical conclusion from Chapter 5, which implies that the 'correctness' and 'natural' way of using military force to achieve certain productive results are something that cannot just be approach as a deliberate, thought through process. The discursive force of the social rules of bureaucratisation are thus a 'mechanism' in the construction of a particular type of bureaucratised labour where the use of military violence is shaped as 'legitimate'. But as seen in the analysis of the practice, it is a type of legitimacy which is of a procedural and hierarchical character.

In relation to how bureaucratised labour can be understood and analysed as something that exists undisturbed in a society where war and the use of military violence is something generally confined to television screens and computer games, the practice of targeting stands for a 'truth' about what war and military violence is. So what is the 'truth' that the 'targeteer' and the practice of 'selecting, nominating and executing targets' produce regarding violence? What is clear from the investigation is the close connection between legitimacy, bureaucracy and authority when 'targeteers' learn to 'process' operational violence. What this means in terms of neutral-

ising and silencing violence is that the discursive effect, i.e. the meaning-making provided by these identifications, is a construction of use of military violence as necessary (and legitimate, as already pointed out).

Furthermore, in the targeting practice there exists an ongoing objectification of humans into 'targets', as visualised in the chapter, which redraws the traditional Clausewitzian 'war-like' image of military practice into a spectacle of production. Targeting thus includes a discursive reduction of the existence of a 'traditional' clear-cut enemy in this objectification of 'targets'. And the process of revising the military use of force, inherent to the targeting practice, facilitates for less disputes on what the practice actually does (see also; Nordin and Öberg 2015). In other words, there are few indications in the practice that there actually is any reciprocal exchange of violence ongoing in the 'field', which arguably contributes to sedimenting military practice as 'non-violent' and as a practice of precise deliverance of 'payloads' (e.g. Chamayou 2015). Here, the construction of military violence as legitimate and necessary indicates that bureaucratised labour works to portray military violence as a 'natural' part of the social world.

7.2 Ethical Implications of Bureaucratisation – Hegemony of Bureaucratised labour and Problems of Silence and Responsibility

The ethical implications of using military force in the context of bureaucratised labour are multifaceted, but what I aim at here in this part of the chapter is to discuss those ethical problems that are closely related to the way military practice is socially and discursively constructed. In the bureaucratised way of portraying and using violence there lies a compelling story about rationality and a 'natural' and 'given' way of understanding military force. "In what way should we do it, if not as we do it now?" several of my military colleagues ask during my fieldwork, when discussing the problems with bureaucratised labour. And I asked myself this question as well many times during the course of research until I finally understood that the problematic aspects of bureaucratisation were not intrinsic to 'the way' military force is prepared and used. The pressing ethical problems are instead connected to the 'fact' that bureaucratised ways of understanding and practicing military force holds a place of hegemony in the military. As touched upon elsewhere, in this thesis hegemony is a concept which points to a domination of a certain type of articulations and meaning-making within a discursive structure. But it is not a mere numeric domination of particular words or acts that hegemony points to. Here, as elsewhere in poststructural discourse theory, hegemony is illustarted by how social relations operates within the military practice (Laclau and Mouffe are following the developments made by Gramsci in this respect, see Laclau & Mouffe 1985, pp.56–61, 79). In other words, hegemony indicates those aspects of discourse (language/practice) that unite ideas and practice into a seemingly 'natural' whole (see also; Gramsci 2003, 333–34). And it is precisely the status of 'naturalness', existent in both language and the so-

cial relations of a practice, that hegemony can be identified and used to initiate a critique. As such, in line with Laclau's and Mouffe's view on hegemony, bureaucratised labour comprises a hegemonic ontology for how military violence can be portrayed and understood.

The frustration felt, for me and my military colleagues, while posing the question of 'how should we work with, and think about, violence if not as bureaucratised labour?' indicates that there thus exists a hegemonic relationship between bureaucratising discourse and military practice, as we who pose the question/feel the frustration, do so from 'inside' of the practice. Hegemony is as such not just a question of discourse shaping the ways of a practice as 'natural', but it is also, in its relational character, a concept which points to the construction of subject positions within the practice (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, 101–8). Even if the frustration regarding the question of 'how' might seem out of place here, what my 'empirical' chapters elucidates is how the military operational practice, with its agents, is constructed as bureaucratised labour. And this bureaucratisation is shown to stand undisputed and as central in how the relations of the practice are outlined, thus 'revealing' the hegemonic status of bureaucratisation in operational work. The following two subsections discuss the ethical problems of identifications and subjectivities closely related to this domination of bureaucratised labour. These sections are not in place to imply a practical change to the military practice (and as such answering the question of 'how'), but to facilitate a theoretical position from where the hegemony of bureaucratisation can be challenged. As such, the subsections below reflect upon the wider question: what does the (in the thesis) identified close dependence on bureaucratic language and materiality tell us about what ethical problems the use of military violence posits in operational work?

Silence – who speaks about using violence and illustrates its 'effects' in the hegemony of bureaucratised labour?

> […] nothing can function as a mechanism of power if it is not deployed according to procedures, instruments, means and objectives which can be validated in more or less coherent systems of knowledge. (Foucault 2007, 61)

When contemplating the question of 'who speaks' about violence in a discourse of bureaucratised labour, my initial thought was 'no one'. But that answer would, besides being typically militarily short and assured, pose a problematic position of disavowing my research endeavour as it implies a complete silence regarding military violence. As pointed out in the quote above by Foucault, military violence cannot exist without the 'procedures, instruments, means and objectives' of the military practice. Meaning that the hegemony of bureaucratisation 'must' be in place in the practice, for it provides a 'truth' about what military violence is, and what it means to use military force. But from an ethical perspective, the keyword here is 'power'. And by power I here mean both the possibility to prescribe the ontological and the ontic status of military violence.

What bureaucratised labour does is to establish a normality in operational work where, as previously discussed, violence is reduced to a product or is left aside altogether. Here the canon of Western violence exists in a status of 'normality' through the mundane routines of political and military practices. This positions the use of force in a fragile but still relatively undisputed position as normatively 'good'. I have not encountered anything that suggests that this position should be in motion due to Swedish operational work turning to a national focus (as compared to international missions). And as seen in Chapter 6, by the power of bureaucratised hegemony even the enemy 'Other' disappears as a 'natural' connotation to the use of military violence. This means that the incarnation of military force as politics by other means dissolves, and the Clausewitzian ontology collapses in relation to the existence of bureaucratised labour. For the Clausewitzian dictum rests on an identification of both violence and the enemy 'Other' in how it facilitates a philosophical connection between war and politics (see Clausewitz 1874, chap. 1).

The hate, enmity and passion that Clausewitz's instrumentalisation of violence (where he portrays violence as a political means) depends on, is not recognisable in the contemporary bureaucratised depiction and practice of military violence. Instead the 'faceless' bureaucrat is passionlessly applying military force in the precisely right amount of doses needed to achieve the operational 'effects'. What this tells me is that the critique of Clausewitz's concept of 'absolute war' as instigating war is much less relevant for discussing military violence corresponding to the operational context. In a similar vein, others have searched for more relevant positions for an ethical critique of the de-politicising of war and Western military violence by the power of articulating it as something else than use of violence, and found it through the critique of the 'Liberal Way of War' (e.g. Dillon and Reid 2009).

The removal of the enemy 'Other' becomes particularly relevant as a part of this critique, or as in the words of Brad Evans "Unlike Clausewitzean confrontations, which at least provided the strategic comforts of clear demarcations (them/us, war/peace, citizen/soldier, and so on), these [Liberal] wars no longer benefit from the possibility of scoring outright victory, retreating, or achieving a lasting negotiated peace by means of political compromise. Indeed, deprived of the prospect of defining enmity in advance, war itself becomes just as complex, dynamic, adaptive and radically interconnected as the world of which it is part." (Evans 2010, 422). This is something that I could show in the way the targeting practice is outlined. For instance, how it is driven by a continuously production of 'nominations' and 'targets' which are 'objects' of a process without an end that has meaning outside of the corporate discourse. The 'end' is in itself the production of targets, and the sustainment of the operational practice.

This is to say that by elucidating the workings of bureaucratised labour, and its relation to a neutralising and silencing of violence, I can offer some new insights into how the 'Liberal Way of War' is constructed in Western societies where, unlike the

US and British context, war is far from the public domain. This is important from an ethical perspective as previous critique of the way Western nations use force in the name of Liberalism has had a point of origin foremost in US and British militarism (Amoore 2009; Evans 2011; e.g. D. Gregory 2011a; O'Malley 2010). From my point of view, the early literature on the ethical implications of the 'Western Way of War' also bears with it a problem of anchoring the ethical critique in an 'empirical' context of violence. Especially in the way this academic discourse focuses on the term 'security' in their critique (see Browning and McDonald 2013 for a discussion on the "weakness" of the security concept; also: Eastwood 2018). In other words, as rewarding as it may be for other research purposes, utilising 'security' when discussing the ethical implications of bureaucratisation of violence provides little which is new to the debate on the 'Liberal Way of War'.

As a complement to the broader concept of 'security', and as the recent rise of interest in Critical Military Studies implies, ethical deliberation of military violence might gain momentum from studying how war and violence are understood within the military institution. For instance, identification of legality functioning as a 'driver' for use of military force by analysing the actual military practice and the agents that works with 'effectuating' violence, provides a research context that those subjected to this practice can relate to. In other words, it seems plausible to me that to gain a momentum in creating a position of critical reflection regarding the use of force, and to instigate a possibility for subjects of the practice to speak about their own work in critical terms, the research needs to be recognisable for them. Similarly to the ethical debate regarding the use of drones, where the concept of technology is used foremost to 'ground' ethical arguments in a practical environment, ethical debate on the use of force can gain by drawing together concepts such as violence and production (see Schwarz 2016 for more on technology, ethics and drones). The elucidation of the social rules and norms of bureaucratised labour is in relation to the context of daily military work a way of visualising the 'oddities' imbued in the practice, and they provide leverage for practice-near discussions on how military force is initiated and sustained. As such, the social rules analysed and illustrated in this thesis can be used to discuss what ethical problems a language and practice which omits the use of force create for the military practitioners. This is to say that the social rules and norms of bureaucratised labour, read as a way of conceptualising a cartography of the operational military practice, provide practice-related concepts that can be used to counter the hegemony of bureaucratisation.

In other words, to approach the military organisation and think that the subjects that inhabit the military life world are 'lost causes' in terms of critical normative reflections is to create 'straw men'. If Critical Military Studies are to adhere to a normative idea where the 'ease' by which military violence is in use can be mitigated and resisted, then the research must take into consideration the possibility of 'activating' the agents of the practice's own ethical awareness.

This leads me to the concluding part of this section where the question of responsibility will be discussed in relation to this position of creating an ethical awareness, within a bureaucratised military practice.

Responsibility – where lies the responsibility for using force in the hegemony of bureaucratised labour?

As seen in the previous chapters the military institution exists, at least in the operational context, in a discontinuity between theory (self-image) and practice (daily work). In particular, the military (and political) ideas of existing in separation from the 'rest' of society, and the theoretical self-image as a wielder of violence in inter-state conflict provided by the Clausewitzian ontology, clash with the practice outlined in the pages of this thesis. This points to a situation where conceptually, the practitioners at the operational level adopt an ethical position imbued with assumptions about who assumes responsibility for 'activating' the use of force. Namely, the politicians or the practitioners closest to the use of force (in the 'field').

In the first case, the idea is that the democratic process of accepting a government proposal for sending troops on international missions equates a responsibility for accepting the consequences of such decisions. The problem here is that as long as the practice exists in the status of bureaucratised labour, the multiple meanings of the violence inherent in, or potentially released by, such missions are discursively downplayed. Meaning that the responsibility taken by the political decision-makers is reduced in its span by the 'promises' made by the military discourse where violence is 'effects' or 'products', and the enemy 'Other' is removed from the broader picture of what the military practice is. *The operational language, and/or the language of the 'targeteer' work as such as a mitigation of political responsibility for military use of violence.* Furthermore, by the meaning-making power of discourse, the operational bureaucratised language and its social relations, also teach the politicians about the 'how' and 'what' of military practice. In contrast to the theoretical ideas 'framing' the existence of the military institution, this is a meaning-making process that takes leverage from common societal discourses found in corporations and other government institutions. The operational practice, in its bureaucratised representation, thus underlines on a daily basis a reduction of the responsibility taken by the political level by the military affiliation with other 'non-violent' societal practices. This is a provocative thought for many of my military colleagues, I am sure, but what this means is in plain words *that it is the military practice itself that reduces the level of political responsibility taken for the use of force.*

When it comes to the second case of responsibility mentioned above, where the operational level points to the responsibility of the use of force as resting with those in the 'field', some reflections from the investigation can be of use to dislodge this idea. First of all, the centralisation of the use of force that is produced by the 'targeting process' includes a meaning-making process where responsibility is conceptualised and embodied by 'the Commander'. Here the 'go or no-go' by the Commander

offers an (albeit illusory) escape from the ethical burden by the soldier in the field: if the Commander takes the decision to accept nominations of targets, then he/she is implicated when things go 'wrong' (this is from a juridical perspective somewhat unclear, see: C. Gray 2008; Gunneflo 2016, 195–215). But it is foremost the symbolism that this meaning-making process supports that removes the ethical burden from the 'field'. Particularly in how the operational governing of force creates a mythological idea, or imagination, of operational violence 'being' a legal and bureaucratic process which comprises several opportunities for setting a 'red light' on the use of force. Ethical deliberations are implied to exist in the operational targeting process by following procedures and listening to advisers. But as shown in the thesis, the regulations, lists and meetings lack such ethical reflections. This can only lead to the logical conclusion that the ethical burden lies not (only) with the commander, or in the 'field', but with those who prepare, nominate and recommend 'targets' (see also: Hood 2011, 31–32).

In summary, this boils down to a situation where military decision-makers and their staffs must articulate in open deliberation the problematic situation that, on the one hand, the existence of military ambitions of getting acceptance for deployment, with, on the other hand, the ethical burden of being responsible for the violence such deployment can instigate. As I cannot control my impulse to get practical, although I say in the beginning of this section that I would refrain from it, a policy suggestion is in light of this that such deliberations are noted and accounted for in discussion with the political level. This might lead to a greater restraint in the use of military force, and perhaps also mitigate the domination of the bureaucratised language that otherwise is used in the military narrative of what a military mission would entail. But foremost, such deliberation would at least disrupt the normative 'content' of operational practice as comprising the responsibility belonging to bureaucratic production intrinsic to the tasks of the operational staff. Meaning that articulating and visualising the possibilities for an escalating, messy, fun and destructive use of violence on the operational agenda might bring about a cognitive dissonance to what type of responsibility a practitioner at the operational military level has.

7.3 Reflections and Suggestions for Further Research

In Chapter 2, I briefly discuss the recent focus on a wider (sociological) concept of militarism in critical studies of International Relations and military masculinities. In this section I take the liberty to suggest some possible avenues of researching militarism, that might gain from critically seeing military violence as a form of bureaucratised labour. Considering the keywords here (militarism and critical) there are possibilities for researchers to embrace the social workings of military-related practices without having to abide by an agenda of uncritical support. Or, for that matter, an ethical pathos of pacifism. I have, despite my deep connection to the Swedish military, engaged in an investigation where few stones have not been turned, and I am convinced that such research endeavours are needed if we are to learn more about how we situate military use of force as 'normal'. But critical analysis of different

forms of militarism are not necessarily unsupportive or supportive of military use of force. Critical research is from my point of view a result of questioning the argument that something is 'normal' with military practice in the first place. And it is thrilling and rewarding, at least for a researcher, to search for what it is that makes practices and their articulations and relations set in a framework of 'just how things are'. That said, there is in Critical Military Studies a clear pathos of anti-militarism driving many of its researchers, but as pointed out by Cynthia Enloe (2015), such normative agenda work best in the form of a 'sceptical curiosity':

> Sceptically critical military analysts' questioning is wider and deeper. At its most reliable, it is infused with a feminist curiosity. Such analysts are interested in militaries that become dysfunctional, not just because those dysfunctions connote political failure, but because those dysfunctions are analytically interesting; they expose all the dynamics that have to be in working order for any military to appear deceptively coherent. (Enloe 2015, 8)

I adhere to Enloe's words as they indicate that there is much to gain from being curious about the military, and that to use such curiosity is to dismantle an illusion of coherence regarding how military violence is 'naturally' understood and used.

In my mind, I see bureaucratised labour as problematic from several perspectives, of which some are discussed above. Problems include identifying the use of violence, and engaging in ethical discussions regarding taking responsibility for its use. But there are aspects not touched upon as they are peripheral to my research aim, such as the larger impact of having a foreign policy practice which, on the one hand, supports the use of military force (even though through the discourse of the Liberal Way of War). And, on the other hand, speaks about peace, consensus, diplomacy and actively projects a general depiction of Sweden as a 'non-violent' nation. In other words, one can ask what consequences such 'vagueness' has for a political practice internally to the nation's ability to create national incentives for working in either of these diverging strands. Or, what consequences such obscure behaviour has for Sweden's ability to create stable relations with its neighbours. Even though such questions have been asked previously by other researchers, there is a difference in point of departure here that I would like to clarify.

Strictly speaking, if research on International Relations starts in the end where conditions of possibility for a socially embedded bureaucratised understanding of violence is identified and analysed, then policies of security and international politics may be 'read' in a new light. What 'rationalities' are given for Sweden's diverging foreign policies and international activities as a way of maintaining a 'status quo' in such bureaucratised relations to violence, for example? Likewise, several internal practices of a state can be analysed as ways of trying to stabilise the continuous existence of the military institution in society, but, again, rationalised through 'non-military' discourse. Practices such as the maintenance of a thriving arms industry with references to job security and technological development in the light of the shift from historical arguments of the importance of manufacturing one's own weapons due to, in the Swedish context, a political policy of neutrality.

In addition, IR's return to militarism, understood as a sociological phenomenon, is as I see it interesting as a study of how 'the military normal', is established on a level of subjects and 'micro-practices' in a society. In contrast to the level of political policy, or principles of economic development, such research engages in the underlying conditions under which militarism lives and thrives in a society through constructions of particular subjectivities. But what are these subjectivities? How is the spatial and temporal ordering of a subject a part in creating and maintaining such subjectivities? In other words, is the 'rational' and hierarchical bureaucratisation that I have illustrated here operating on a wider societal level? Or, what is the role of legacy and the passing on of narratives and practices with military connotations in the maintaining of a particular type of militarism? Furthermore, in what way do societal developments, such as the infusion of gender equality, or an increase in immigration work as 'fuel' for sustaining or reshaping a phenomenon of militarism? Such questions are, for me at least, most pertinent in relation to how IR and Critical Military Studies are developing to embrace a more context- and practice-dependent strand of research regarding the workings of militarism and bureaucratised understandings of violence.

Autoethnography is one way to 'access' such subjectivities but this research method is not available for all as it is regarded with some degree of scepticism in larger academic circuits, or because its requirement of an open reflective 'posture' of the researcher's 'Self' in the research is too overwhelming. There are several ethical concerns, as discussed in Chapter 3, to consider as well. But on the other hand, very few research endeavours are spared ethical deliberations even if some researchers leave them out of their written work. In my case I have faced problems with balancing the clarity and openness of my description of the research context and the analysis with possible damage such transparency could inflict to the Swedish Armed Forces as an institute in society, and/or to my military colleagues or myself. Autoethnography is in this regard a way of directing the possible 'damage' away from all these instances, as even my own openness is set in relation to a theoretical framework which 'dampens' the blow.

Consider the story about "the Officer, the Child and the Tank" that initiated this thesis. The narrative reflects two different avenues of disruptions from the homogenising effect of bureaucratised discourse. Firstly it describes a disruption where my daughter's reaction makes me aware of that there is something in my own relation to the use of force that has normalised and delimited my understanding of military violence. But in a second move, the story reinterprets this disruptive event in relation to my encounter with a child (a baby boy in a tram) during my ethnographical investigation of the operational staff. Even though these two events are separated in time (8 years between the different events), and by completely different contexts of work (the military and the academic), they can be used to theoretically illustrate how something in the military discourse delimits 'the meaning' of violence. In other words, the use of autoethnographical accounts are limited in the thesis to such con-

tent where my own experiences and narratives mean something for the development of the analysis. Furthermore, Poststructural Discourse Theory enables the analysis to move between the positions of subjectivity that these reflections create, and to let LtCol Malm speak about 'his' bureaucratisation and masculinity without collapsing the analysis of the practice. In sum, personal narratives can offer avenues for new research endeavours and open up for further investigations into how military violence is managed, neutralised or silenced in our society. And this is precisely what will conclude this thesis.

'I' reflect on 'moments' of naturalisation of violence:

Bunker archaeology light
Me and my friend are exploring the long beach line not far from my parents' farm. Although we're only ten or eleven years of age, we roam freely and are only governed by the clock that our stomachs direct, planning to turn back 'in time' for evening supper. The beach is riddled with garbage, everything from empty shampoo bottles to tyres and the occasionally refrigerator. We look for stuff to play with, or to break, and our walk slowly take us to a place where the concrete bunker lies. It is supposed to be locked (we think) but the lock is gone and the rusty door is stuck in a partially open position. No match for two small boys to pass through. Inside we look for traces of weapons and we find some empty shells from small arms fire. Joy! Such things are the hard currency of exciting projects, such as building small 'bombs' out of crackers. We know from other explorations that the coastline of our island is riddled with these bunkers, and they disrupt the shoreline with their ugly faces of crumbling concrete and narrow slits for eyes. But for us, they are cool containers (both conceptually and literally) where you can fantasise and play defender and attacker.

/./
"Keep it tight to your shoulder"
It is the early traditional spring break where Swedish kids are encouraged to try different sports. We have been given a paper from our school outlining the different activities that are open for us to try. Bowling, horseback riding, and yes, shooting is among the things offered during the one week long break. Normally it is the type of shooting with rifle airguns but I tried that before and I think that's boring. The airguns are large, clunky and really not that cool. But this year something else has been pointed out by my friends at school. The Swedish Federation for Voluntary Defence, Education and Training is arranging an opportunity for us to try and shoot with their 6,5 mm Mauser (.26 caliber). And so it is. When in place at the crude shooting range the old man acting as instructor tells me about the weapon and how to use it. "Keep it tight to your shoulder or else it will bruise you with the impact of the recoil." And he chuckles. The next day I check my shoulder and it's fine, it only feels a little tender. Apparently I had some skills at this but I actually found the shooting range quite boring. So I choose to not take it up on a permanent basis. I am twelve at the time.

/./
"No Rambodian tendencies!"
I am sitting at the first gathering of my newly formed officer class. The major speaking is addressing us with the usual welcomes and telling us that we are selected from a large body of applicants and that the

screening process has been thorough, and what not. But what makes me react is when he says "But I will not tolerate any Rambodian tendencies!". Referring to the fictional character Rambo the major is telling us that the officer course is not a place for those who are 'overly interested' in weapons and the like. My reaction is one of surprise, because, if we have been so thoroughly vetted, who of us is the type that idolises such behaviour? Nah, such weapon nerds can't be in this lot, I think and look around me. If there is, they will have a hard time finding a girl when we go out for the weekend. Such things shine through.

2. utkast till skjutinstruktion för trupper utrustade med kulspruta M/14. - 1914

Andra manuskript till arméreglemente. D. 3, Begrepp. - 1962

Anvisningar för fria kriget. - 1944

Anvisningar för trupputbildning. - 1969 - 1969 års upplaga

Arméhandbok. D. 4, Stabstjänst, personaltjänst. - 1954 - 1954 års uppl.

Armésoldat: soldatinstruktion för armén. allmän del. - 1957 - 1957 års uppl.

Arméreglemente, Del 2. 1952.

Arméreglemente: Del 1. 1950.

Att bli befäl: armén. - 1968 - 1968 års uppl.

Beskrivning av kulsprutegevär m/37. - 1958

Beskrivning över kulsprutegevär m/21. - 1926 - 1926 års uppl.

Bestämmelser för grundutbildning av värnpliktiga vid armén: allmän del. - 1970

Befälsföring, Disciplin Och Förbandsanda. 1956.

Donner, Edvard af. - Hjälpreda för värnpliktiga / utgifven av major Edv. af Donner. - 1915

Ett yrke för dig: upplysningar om underbefälsyrket vid armén. - 1958

Fälttjänstreglemente: (F.R.). 1917.

Föreskrifter för utbildning i bajonettstrid: fastställda 1921. - 1921

Förslag till bihang 2 till tredje delen av SIe och ksp : indirekt eldgivning med ksp m/14 och m/14-29 (6,5 mm am m/94) m m. - 1933 - 1933 års uppl.

Förslag till skjutinstruktion för trupper beväpnade med kulspruta m/14 : Förslag S. I. Kulspr : anbefallt till användning genom gen.-order d. 12 april 1920. - 1920 - 1920 års uppl.

Första manuskript till arméreglemente. D. 3, Begrepp. - 1961

Handgemäng: anvisningar för utbildningen. - 1956 - 1956 års upplaga

Hjälpreda för värnpliktiga: innehållande utdrag ur värnplikslagen med dithörande författningar, bl. a. beträffande värnpliktig tillförsäkrade rättigheter och förmåner m.m. samt förmulär till olika slag av ansökningar / utgiven av överstelöjtnant Gösta Drake. - 1932 - 23. uppl.

Hjälpreda för värnpliktiga: innehållande utdrag ur värnplikslagen med dithörande författningar, bl. a. beträffande värnpliktig tillförsäkrade rättigheter och förmåner m.m. samt förmulär till olika slag av ansökningar / utgiven av överstelöjtnant Gösta Drake. - 1934 - 25. uppl.

Hjälpreda för värnpliktiga: innehållande utdrag ur värnplikslagen med dithörande författningar, bl. a. beträffande värnpliktig tillförsäkrade rättigheter och förmåner m.m. samt förmulär till olika slag av ansökningar / utgiven av överstelöjtnant Gösta Drake. - 1940 - 31. uppl.

Hjälpreda för värnpliktiga: innehållande utdrag ur värnplikslagen med dithörande författningar, bl. a. beträffande värnpliktig tillförsäkrade rättigheter och förmåner

m.m. samt förmulär till olika slag av ansökningar / utgiven av överstelöjtnant Gösta Drake. - 1941 - 32. uppl.

Hjälpreda för värnpliktiga: innehållande utdrag ur värnplikslagen med dithörande författningar, bl. a. beträffande värnpliktig tillförsäkrade rättigheter och förmåner m.m. samt förmulär till olika slag av ansökningar / utgiven av överstelöjtnant Gösta Drake. - 1938 - 29. uppl.

Holmgren, Justus. - Exempel å gruppering och ordergivning vid anfall under ställningsstrider / av Justus Holmgren. - 1918 - 1-2 uppl.

Instruktion för ställföreträdande arméfördelningschef. - 1917

Kulsprutesoldatinstruktion. 1923.

Provisoriskt arméreglemente. D. 1. - 1958 - 1958 års upplaga

Samlingspärm för taktiska anvisningar. - 1944

Skjutinstruktion för armén: eldhandvapen och markkulsprutor. - 1971

Skjutinstruktion för armén. 1 B, Skjutregler: Eldhandvapen,kulsprutegevär och markkulsprutor. - 1959

Skjutinstruktion för armén. 1 C, Skjutregler: 9 cm pansarvärnspjäs, granatgevär, raketgevär och pansarskott. - 1962

Skjutinstruktion för armén. 1 C, Skjutregler: Granatgevär, raketgevär och pansarskott. - 1959

Skjutinstruktion för armén. 1 F, Skjutregler: granatkastare. - 1961

Skjutinstruktion för armén. 1 G, Skjutregler: pansarvärnsrobot. - 1960 - 1960 års upplaga

Skjutinstruktion för armén. 1 H, Skjutregler: Infanterikanonvagns- och stormartillerivagnskanoner. - 1963

Skjutinstruktion för armén. 1 J, Skjutregler: pansarbandvagnskanon och eldhandvapen vid skjutning från pansarbandvagn. - 1965

Skjutinstruktion för armén. 2 B, Skjututbildning: eldhandvapen, kulsprutegevär och markkulsprutor. - 1963

Skjutinstruktion för armén. 2 C, Skjututbildning: 9 cm pansarvärnspjäs, granatgevär, raketgevär och pansarskott. - 1963

Skjutinstruktion för armén. 2 C, Skjututbildning: granatgevär, raketgevär och pansarskott. - 1960

Skjutinstruktion för armén. 2 D, Skjututbildning: stridsvagns-och pansarvärnskanonvagnspjäser. - 1961

Skjutinstruktion för armén. 2 J, Pansarbandvagnskanon och eldhandvapen vid skjutning från pansarbandvagn. - 1967

Skjutinstruktion för armén. D. 1A, Grunder. - 1953

Skjutinstruktion för armén. D. 1B, Skjutregler: Eldvapen, kulsprutegevär och markkulsprutor. - 1955

Skjutinstruktion för armén. D. 1D, Skjutregler: strv-, bandpv- och pbpjäser samt 57 mm pvkanon. - 1953

Skjutinstruktion för armén. D. 1E, Skjutregler: Lvskp och 20 mm lvkan. - 1954 - 1954 års upplaga

Skjutinstruktion för armén. D. 1F, Skjutregler: grk. - 1956

Skjutinstruktion för armén. D. 1F, Skjutregler: grk 1955. - 1955 - 1955 års upplaga

Skjutinstruktion för armén: eldhandvapen, kulsprutegevär och markkulsprutor. D. 2, Skjututbildning. - 1968

Skjutinstruktion för armén. Del 2D, Skjututbildning: strv-, bandpv- pbpjäser samt 57 mm pvkan. - 1953 - 1953 års upplaga

Skjutinstruktion för trupper beväpnade med eldhandvapen och kulspruta. D. 1, Allmän inledning samt skjutlära och skjutregler. - 1925 - 1925 års uppl.

Skjutinstruktion för trupper beväpnade med eldhandvapen och kulspruta. D. 2, Skjututbildning med gevär, karbin och kulsprutegevär. - 1923 - 1923 års upplaga

Skjutinstruktion för trupper beväpnade med eldhandvapen och kulspruta. D. 2, Skjututbildning med gevär, karbin och kulsprutegevär. - 1932 - 1932 års uppl.

Skjutinstruktion för trupper beväpnade med eldhandvapen och kulspruta. D. 3, Skjututbildning med kulspruta. - 1923 - 1923 års uppl.

Skjutinstruktion för trupper beväpnade med eldhandvapen och kulspruta. D. 4, Skjututbildning med pistol. - 1927 - 1927 års uppl.

Skjutinstruktion för trupper beväpnade med eldhandvapen och kulspruta. D. 5, Utbildning med hand- och gevärsgranater. - 1929 - 1929 års uppl.

Soldaten I Fält. 1960.

Soldatinstruktion. Allmän Del: Vårt Fädernesland Och Dess Försvar. 1930.

Soldatinstruktion För Armén, Allmän Del. 1953.

Soldatinstruktion För Armén: Allmän Del. 1951.

Soldatinstruktion För Armén: Allmän Del (SoldI A). 1955.

Tabeller för skol- och prisskjutning: SkjutI II B Bihang. - 1963

Tabeller för skol- och prisskjutning m m: fastställda 1957. - 1957

Taktiska Anvisningar. Häfte 2, Stridsavsikt (Stridsuppgift) Och Stridssätt. 1944.

Taktiska Anvisningar. Häfte 4, Fria Kriget. 1944.

Taktiska bestämmelser. 1. - 1940

Tjänstgöringsreglemente för armén: ändringar och tillägg. - 1918

Tjänstgöringsreglemente för armén (TjR.): fastställt 1931. - 1931

Upplysningar rörande utbildning till officer på aktiv stat och i reserven vid armén / utarbetade inom lantförsvarets kommandoexpedition. - 1939 - 1938 års uppl.

Utkast till Instruktion För Anfall Mot Befästningar. 1914.

Utkast till skjutinstruktion för kulspruteförband. - 1914

Observation scheme 'Operational Planning'

Research activity	Code	When	Where	What	Who	Why	How/regarding	Symbol/representation	Analytical indicator	Theoretical support (all relates to each O/C)
Observation Conversation	O1, O2, O3…	TNR: month_date start time – end time	Different locations (location is noted in field notes)	!. Coordination meeting MaI //. AG MINU/SMA +. JOPG MAI. * JCBWG Int. OP. # Other.	v. mix. w. Me. x. Staff officer (f/m). y. Com officer (f/m). z. Civilian expert (f/m). zy. Civilian chief (f/m)	To capture how planning practice that initiate and sustains operations relates to bureaucratisation. To investigate how these activities help form a understanding of violence and formation of identity. To elucidate how interlocutors construct meaning between objects and subjects.	a. Internal discussion. b. Formal presentation. c. Answer to question (higher com).d. Answer to question (same level) e. Internal briefing (C JOPG giving directions) ee. Internal briefing (members report status of work). ff. Other.	wc: combat uniform. sc: staff uniform. hc: formal civilian clothes. lc: leisure clothes. ix: exposure of other identity. mx: exposure of feeling.	1: meaning through action. 2: meaning through concepts. 3: meaning through narration. 4: creation of myth. 5: creation of practice related language. 6: creation of routine. 7. relation to/creation of object: 8: n/a	Social rules and norms of a practice: "those aspects which make it tick" (Glynos&Howarth (2007) p. 135).
Observation Conversation	C1, C2, C3…	TNR: month_date start time – end time	Different locations (location is noted in field notes)	X. Booked meeting.)). Informal, my initiative. ((Informal, respondents initiative. # group.	v. mix. w. Me. x. Staff officer (f/m). y. Com officer (f/m). z. Civilian expert (f/m). zy. Civilian chief (f/m)	To investigate how self practice. To elucidate how military subjectivities and ways of identification. To elucidate relations between objects and subjects.	a. (we)-Self - group/dep. b. (I)-Self - subject. c. (Us)-Self - HQ/staff. d. (Politica)-Other. e. (Swedish)-Self - society. ff. Other.	wc: combat uniform. sc: staff uniform. hc: formal civilian clothes. lc: leisure clothes. ix: exposure of other identity. mx: exposure of feeling.	1: meaning through action. 2: meaning through concepts. 3: meaning through narration. 4: creation of myth. 5: creation of practice related language. 6: creation of routine. 7. relation to/creation of object: 8: n/a	"[…] the rules or grammar of the practice, as well as the conditions which make the practice both possible and vulnerable" (Glynos&Howarth (2007) p. 136).
Observation Conversation	OD1, OD2, OD3…	TNR: month_date start time – end time	Different locations (location is noted in field notes)	!. Coffee Break //. Lunch + Office work.	v. mix. w. Me. x. Staff officer (f/m). y. Com officer (f/m). z. Civilian expert (f/m). zy. Civilian chief (f/m)	To capture how daily activities informs (sediment or break with) bureaucratisation. To investigate how the 'mundane' every-day life at the staff creates and sustains relations between subjects and objects.	a. work-related discussion. b. solitary work. c. not work-related discussion. ff. Other.	wc: combat uniform. sc: staff uniform. hc: formal civilian clothes. lc: leisure clothes. ix: exposure of other identity. mx: exposure of feeling.	1: meaning through action. 2: meaning through concepts. 3: meaning through narration. 4: creation of myth. 5: creation of practice related language. 6: creation of routine. 7. relation to/creation of object: 8: n/a	A practice comprises; particular set of subject positions, objects, a system of relations and meanings connecting subjects and objects (materiality) and institutional parameters (Glynos&Howarth (2007) p. 136).
Observation Conversation	CR1, CR2, CR3…	TNR: month_date start time – end time	Different locations (location is noted in field notes)	X. Booked meeting.)). Informal, my initiative. ((Informal, respondents initiative. # group.	v. mix. w. Me. x. Staff officer (f/m). y. Com officer (f/m). z. Civilian expert (f/m). zy. Civilian chief (f/m)	To engage respondents in the question of how (we) understand violence and operational work. To talk about my research and see how I and others react to it.	a. discussion. ff. Other.	wc: combat uniform. sc: staff uniform. hc: formal civilian clothes. lc: leisure clothes. ix: exposure of other identity. mx: exposure of feeling.	1: meaning through action. 2: meaning through concepts. 3: meaning through narration. 4: creation of myth. 5: creation of practice related language. 6: creation of routine. 7. relation to/creation of object: 8: n/a	Social rules/norms found in the character of the practice, and in the self-interpretations of actors (Glynos&Howarth (2007) p. 137 ff.).
Code summary	O_C_OD_CR			!._//_+_*_#_X_)).((/m)_xf/m)_zy(f/m)	v._w_xf(f/m).yf(f/m)_xf(f/m)_zy(f/m)		a_b_c_d_e_ee_ff	wc_sc_hc_lc_ix_mx	1_2_3_4_5_6_7_8	
Reflection	RS1, RS2, RS3…	TNR: month_date start time – end time	Different locations (location is noted in field notes)	O1_O2_O3_O4_C1 _C2_C3_C4	me	To evaluate how the different activities comprise identifications that help create bureaucratised labor.	Writing in journal		Discourse of bureaucratisation: 10. Production and education. 11. order and bureaucracy. 12. Categorisation. 13. Technology and Science. 14. Masculinity	"why specific practices and regimes 'grip subjects'" (Glynos&Howarth (2007) p. 145) Hegemony. Myth. Narrative. Lack.
Reflection	RD1, RD2, RD3…	TNR: month_date start time – end time	Different locations (location is noted in field notes)	O1_O2_O3_O4_C1 _C2_C3_C4	me	To evaluate how different activities collide in the formation of a stable relation to operational work. To highlight disruptions of bureaucratised labor.	Writing in journal		Disruptive aspects of bureaucratised violence: 20. uncareralableness. 21. passion (anger/hate/lust) 22. Humour. 23. Mystifying. 24. Pointless. 25. Emotional	Articulation. Discursive breaks. Micro-narratives. Radical contingency of the social emerges.
Reflection	RA1, RA2, RA3…	TNR: month_date start time – end time	Different locations (location is noted in field notes)	O1_O2_O3_O4_C1 _C2_C3_C4	me	To evaluate how my observations moves me into a position of 'staff worker'. To elucidate how my mind struggles with bureaucratisation.	Writing in journal		Discourse of bureaucratisation: 10. Production and education. 11. order and bureaucracy. 12. Categorisation. 13. Technology and Science. 14. Masculinity	Autoethnography: tales of the field. My contribution to them. My role in forming culture. (see Adams et al. p.82)

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