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The Perpetual Colonial Situation
Language and Dominance in Taiwan

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Abstract

In Taiwan today, 96% of the population speaks Mandarin. Yet, Mandarin speakers were rare, if not totally absent, on the island before 1945. How should we understand this transformation? Throughout history, the island had been governed by various colonial regimes, and official language policies and language use in Taiwan have been altered several times in accordance with their political agendas. My TV-services observation, on-site observation, media content analysis, and interviews demonstrate that there is a clear pattern within the Taiwanese society: Mandarin is the 'high-end' and dominant language, while Hoklo, the language of the majority of the island's population, has become a 'low-end,' subaltern language. In this thesis I analyse this fundamental linguistic change since 1945 from a colonial perspective, drawing on Pierre Bourdieu's theories of habitus, field, and symbolic capital. Using a range of data from popular media, public observation, and interviews of three different generations of Taiwanese people, I show how symbolic and physical practices that elevate Mandarin and denigrate Hoklo have brought about today's Mandarin domination among Taiwanese people, accompanied by a severe decline of local language use. While the local Taiwanese elites who took control of the government in the 1990s have implemented Hoklo and other local language revival efforts, I argue that the symbolic power of Mandarin, which I understand as a form of colonialism, has caused these initiatives to fail.

Keywords: language policy, colonialism, Hoklo, Mandarin, sociology, habitus, field, capital, Taiwan, China

Introduction

Today almost everyone in Taiwan speaks Mandarin, for it is the 'national language' of this nation. Taiwan has also been a popular destination for international students who want to learn the language. However, just seventy years ago, Mandarin was as foreign as English for the people of Taiwan. After the Republic of China (ROC) took over Taiwan in 1945, its coercive Mandarin policy and Sinocentric education made it "natural" for Taiwanese to speak Mandarin instead of their mother tongues. While the question of whether Taiwan is still living under a colonial political regime can be debated, given the implementation of democracy and the rise of local political parties since the late 1980s, in everyday life, language practices in Taiwan suggest that the island remains colonised, at least in a linguistic sense.

Many people on Taiwan have been struggling to decolonise. In 1996, the Taiwanese got the first chance to elect a local Taiwanese as the president of the ROC, marking the end of political colonisation. The local political party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which took over the presidency in 2000, continued this process. This included policies to revive local Taiwanese languages as a means of linguistic decolonisation. Unfortunately, for seventy years, the Nationalist Party (*Kuomintang*) or KMT's colonial language policy constituted what sociologist Pierre Bourdieu called the linguistic 'habitus' (1990) and 'symbolic power' (1991). This has led to a failure of the local language revival efforts.

In this thesis, through my observation of everyday language use, I verify the continuing Mandarin-language domination. My analysis of a popular Taiwanese movie, TV-series,

observations at a popular temple, and interviews with different generations of Taiwanese people reveal how Mandarin has colonised daily life. For example, in movies and TV series, Mandarin speakers are portrayed as smart, powerful, specialised, elegant, kind, young and innocent. By contrast, Hoklo speakers are usually elderly, grassroots, vulgar, criminal and suspicious. This symbolic violence assigned to the Hoklo language has resulted in very low levels of Hoklo language use, even in local temples where one might expect to hear the language that many Taiwanese consider to be 'native.' Furthermore, as my interviews show, a coercive Mandarin education created an unfair situation for Hoklo speakers, forcing them to alter their linguistic habitus. Through media stereotyping, Mandarin-language education, and physical violence, a Mandarin habitus has been produced. This habitus has affected the younger generations of Taiwanese, who, often unintentionally, reproduce the Mandarin domination. Despite almost twenty years of efforts to revive local Taiwanese languages, the Mandarin domination caused by Chinese colonialism is still far from being shattered, signifying the limitation of Taiwanese decolonisation.

Aim and Research Questions

Language in colonial situations is an effective tool for the colonisers to control the colonised. While forcing the colonised to learn the colonial language, the colonial power degrades the local languages and culture as low-end, grassroots and vulgar, while the colonial ones are depicted as high-end, elegant and intellectual. Colonial languages contribute to a mentality of inferiority among the colonised, severely damaging their dignity and integrity as human beings.

The influence of the colonial languages can be seen around Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Even after World War II, it is still difficult for many former colonies, now independent states, to decolonise the languages. In Taiwan, as a multi-ethnic island nation ruled by various colonial powers, everyday language use has been strongly affected by these colonialists. Most significant in recent decades has been the implementation of the KMT's Mandarin language policy after the ROC took over Taiwan, and the decline of local Taiwanese languages since 1946. The KMT's colonial Mandarin policies have constituted the contemporary linguistic field and habitus of the Taiwanese. Hence, this thesis aims to present and analyse the process through which colonial Mandarin came to be the dominant language in Taiwan, and the limits of linguistic decolonisation. This research can be understood as a case study for understanding the impacts of colonial language policies.

In this thesis I investigate the following three questions:

1. How can we understand the Mandarin language in Taiwan from a colonial perspective?

2. What does the everyday language situation look like in present day Taiwan?

3. Why have the efforts to revive local Taiwanese languages, implemented by Taiwan's first decolonial government, failed to stop their decline?

My discussion of Mandarin as a colonial language on Taiwan, which has constituted the linguistic habitus for contemporary Taiwanese, centres on a history of colonisation on Taiwan, and a theoretical investigation using Bourdieu's ideas of habitus, symbolic field, and symbolic violence (1990, 1991). My investigation of everyday language use on contemporary Taiwan is based on empirical research using television, film,

interviews, and observations. My examination of the limited effects of the DPP's local language policies derives primarily from my interview materials, linked to the theoretical and historical understanding that I describe earlier in the thesis.

Delimitations

The island of Taiwan is a multi-ethnic society, and the socio-politics of inter-ethnic relations could be a thesis in itself. Taiwan is inhabited by Aborigines, Hoklos, Hakkas, and mainland Chinese (who migrated after 1945), all of whom have differences in language, culture, and customs. In this thesis, I focus on the relationship between Mandarin and Hoklo. The folk considered to be Hoklo, and to have Hoklo as their 'native' language, constitute more than 70% of the population in Taiwan. The Aborigines and Hakkas will be mentioned, but are not the focus of the analysis.

Relevance to Global Studies

In the realm of global studies, research on colonialism and post-colonialism are critical for understanding the context and dynamics of globalisation. As Ali Rattansi indicates, 'imperial expansion and colonialism were key constitutive features, and indeed set both globalization and Western capitalism in motion and acted as continual fueling forces' (Rattansi, 2009, p. 74). After World War II, as a former Japanese colony, Taiwan did not share the same fate as other former colonies, which predominantly became independent states. Instead, under the arrangement of the Allies, Taiwan was taken over

by the Republic of China based on geopolitical struggle and alignment. The oppressive and Sino-centric policies of the KMT regime in Taiwan, including its Mandarin language policy, constituted an embodiment of colonialism. By studying Mandarin dominance and the struggle for Taiwanese linguistic decolonisation, this thesis provides a relevant case study for understanding the colonial language policy and its aftermath.

Historical Background

We can think of the history of Taiwan in terms of multiple colonial phases. In this section, I offer a concise periodisation of this history, which can be divided into six segments:

1. Pre-17th century.

2. The Dutch East India Company (1624-1662).

3. The Kingdom of Tungning (1662-1683).

4. The Great Qing Empire (1683-1895).

5. The Great Japanese Empire (1895-1945).

6. The Republic of China since 1945.

In the following section, I briefly describe each era, noting the demographical transformations and the different language policies of different regimes.

Taiwan prior to the 17th Century

Before the 17th century, Austronesian aboriginals, who came to Taiwan around 8,000~6,000 B.C., were the primary inhabitants of Taiwan, with just a few Japanese merchants and fishers, and a few Han Chinese settlers from the South-East coastal

provinces, including the Hoklo and the Hakka. The island was not controlled by a single government, and demographically the Hans were a minority compared to the aboriginals (Rubinstein, 2006, p. 10). With no modern polity such as a state, or nation, the local society before the 17th century was clan-based. There was of course no central language policy during this era.

The Hoklo（福佬）people, also known as the Hokkien（福建）people in South-East Asia, or the Southern Min（閩南）people in China, originate from the Fujian province and parts of the Guangdong, Zhejiang and Hainan provinces of China. The language of Hoklo is one of the varieties of the Min language group under the branch of Sinitic languages (Norman, 1988). The Hakka（客家）people, literally the 'guest people,' are mostly from the Guangdong province, and the southern part of the Fujian province. The Hakka's population in China is comparable to the Hoklo, but demographic competition made the Hakka people scatter over Fujian and Guangdong and become a minority in both provinces, which are dominated by the Hoklo and the Cantonese. As languages, Hoklo, Hakka and Mandarin belong to the same Sinitic language branch, but are mutually unintelligible.

The Dutch East Indian Company (1624-1662)

After a failed attempt to occupy Portuguese-controlled Macau, and the Ming Dynasty-controlled Penghu (Pescadores), the Dutch East India Company came to the southern part of Taiwan and established the first colonial regime on the island. The Spanish, in an attempt to compete with the Dutch, came to the northern part of Taiwan in 1626 and briefly established a second colonial regime. In 1642, the Dutch forces marched north and successfully expelled the Spanish from the island. In the early stage of Dutch

administration, an insufficient labour force was a troubling issue. The Company initially tried to pursue and push the aboriginals to work on large-scale plantations, but the result was unsatisfactory. Thus, the Dutch started to bring Chinese settlers to the island to serve as the plantation workforce (Andrade, 2008). This form of colonialism in Taiwan, combining a Dutch administration and a Chinese labour force – what Tonio Andrade (2008) refers to as 'co-colonisation' – marked the outset of large-scale Chinese immigration to Taiwan. However, the majority of the population was still aboriginal. The Dutch adopted a language policy for missionary purposes. After failing to teach the Dutch language to the aboriginals, the Dutch mission thus decided to learn aboriginal languages and to introduce Latin scripts (Li X.-H. , 2004). Robert Junius established the first school in Taiwan to teach aboriginal children reading and writing. Since the Siraya tribe in the current Tainan City area was the major ethnic group of Taiwan in the 17th century, the Mission's language policy was based on learning and teaching the Siraya language (Ibid.).

The Kingdom of Tungning (Formosa) (1662-1683)

After the Manchus eliminated the Ming Dynasty in 1661 and established the Qing Dynasty, a Ming loyalist, General Zheng Cheng-Gong (also known as Koxinga), travelled to Taiwan. He and his forces defeated the Dutch and established the Kingdom of Tungning (also known as the Kingdom of Formosa) in 1662. The Kingdom and Zheng himself were primarily Hoklo. During this period, the total population of Chinese settlers surpassed the number of aboriginals, and Hoklo became a dominant language (Rubinstein, 2006, p. 27), The Kingdom operated independently and had vibrant trading activities with the South East Asia region for 20 years. During the reign of Tungning, the government introduced the Confucian education and civil service

examination system. Literacy in classical Chinese was the focus of the educational system. Since classical Chinese can be read, written and pronounced by all Sinitic languages (also Japanese, Korean and Vietnamese, similar to Latin for Medieval Europe), both Hoklo and Hakka populations could be educated in their own languages. Another focus of the Tungning Kingdom was to Sinicize the aboriginal population. Thus, unfortunately, many aboriginal populations were forced to Sinicize, beginning a process that lasted many centuries (Wu C.-L. , 2012).

The Qing Empire (1683-1895)

In 1683, the Qing Empire invaded Taiwan and eliminated the Kingdom of Tungning. For the first time, Taiwan came under the direct control of mainland China. During the Qing era, the population, especially the number of Chinese immigrants, substantially increased, from around 25,000 in the 17th century to 2,492,784 at the end of the 19th century (Rubinstein, 2006, p. 10). The language policy during the Qing era resembled that of the Kingdom of Tungning. Both Hoklo and Hakka people could learn classical Chinese in schools and join the civil service examination to serve the Qing Empire. The Mandarin language was only spoken among high-level bureaucrats. Because the Manchu Qing Dynasty was itself a colonial empire, and its rulers were concerned with preventing the Han Chinese from rebelling, the Qing government established a rotation system for high-level bureaucrats and prohibited any of them from working in their home provinces. Hence, during the two centuries of the Qing regime, the bureaucrats in Taiwan were always from other provinces in Mainland China and had to rely on the educated local Taiwanese gentry class for communication with the local population (Li X.-H. , 2004). In addition, due to the communication difficulties between the Qing officials and the local population, and the overall passive ruling policy of the Qing

government on Taiwan, armed conflicts were pervasive during this era. Sanguinary battles within the Hoklos, between Hoklos and Hakkas, and between the Chinese settlers and aboriginals, happened frequently during the Qing Dynasty's rule on Taiwan.

The Japanese Empire (1895-1945)

In 1895, the Japanese defeated the Qing in the First Sino-Japanese War. China ceded Taiwan to the Japanese. However, the Japanese encountered severe resistance by the Taiwanese while attempting to take over the island. It was not until 1902 that the Japanese forces were able to put down the continuous guerrilla warfare by the Taiwanese militia (Rubinstein, 2006, p. 205). According to historical records, the Japanese occupation resulted in 96,000~100,000 deaths between 1895 and 1945 (玩物喪志, 2011).

According to Rwei-Ren Wu's research (2003), Japan's modernisation since 1868, also known as the 'Meiji Reform,' came about because of the victory of the Japanese South-Western elites, including the Satsuma and Choshu Domains, over the Tokugawa Shogunate. The Meiji regime engaged in Japanese nation-building, modernisation, and colonialist expansion concurrently after the occupations of Okinawa (Formerly the Ryukyu Kingdom) in 1879 and Taiwan in 1895. Wu describes Japanese colonialism as 'nationalising colonialism.' Through the process of 'differential incorporation,' the Meiji regime established hegemony between the Tokyo centre and others as peripheries. Taiwan's status of being peripheral caused the Taiwanese, regardless of ethnicity, to fight for their rights, and in the process developed Taiwanese nationalism (2003, p. x). Japanese oppression and colonialism brought together the various ethnic groups of Taiwan in an anti-colonial resistance.

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Under the Japanese rule, the Japanese language was prescribed as the national language. However, the government had a bilingual policy in the first forty-two years of its reign in Taiwan. Taiwanese and Japanese children went to different schools, and both Japanese and Taiwanese languages could be used in daily life and publications. Due to the limitation of classical Chinese for writing local Taiwanese languages, the 'Pèh-ōe-jī,' an orthography created by the British Presbyterian mission in Xiamen, the Fujian Province of China, was introduced to Taiwan in 1890 in order for the Hoklo and Hakka languages to be written in Latin script. Péh-ōe-jī became another popular written form among the educated Taiwanese intellectuals for writing their mother tongues (Chen M.-J. , 2015). Nevertheless, fluent Japanese language skills were still a precondition for Taiwanese people to enter Japanese higher education.

After the second Sino-Japanese War broke out in 1937, the Japanese started an intensive assimilation policy in Taiwan. Taiwanese languages were prohibited. As of 1944, 71.3% of Taiwanese children went to compulsory education, and more than 200,000 people went to the Japanese mainland for college education (Huang, 2009, p. 99).

The Republic of China (1945-present)

The defeat in the first Sino-Japanese War in 1895, and the loss of Taiwan, were factors that contributed to the Chinese Revolution. In 1911, a group of Chinese revolutionaries overthrew the Qing Dynasty and established the Republic of China (ROC). When the ROC was established, however, Taiwan part of the Japanese territory and was not part of the newly established Chinese republic.

After the defeat in the first Sino-Japanese War, the Qing Dynasty intellectuals were

influenced by the Japanese Meiji reform, and they were fascinated by the effectiveness of the Japanese national language standardisation during the reform. Following the Chinese Revolution, the ROC's initial Beiyang (literally *Northern Ocean*) Government in Beijing, led by the former Qing Dynasty General Yuan Shih-Kai, initiated a Mandarin standardisation policy in the 1910s. After serious debates regarding the selection between the Nanjing and Beijing dialects, the national language committee finally chose the Beijing dialect as the standard national language of the new Chinese republic. The national language thus became the standard curriculum for mandatory education in mainland China, serving the purpose of Chinese nation-building and industrialisation (Liao, 2015). This Mandarin standardisation policy was continued by the KMT and later by the CCP after they took control of the mainland.

When the ROC took over Taiwan in 1945, after the defeat of the Japanese in WWII, most Taiwanese could not speak Mandarin. This language barrier contributed to conflicts between KMT officials and Taiwanese civilians. After the February 28th Massacre in 1947 (which I discuss in more detail below), the ROC prohibited the use of the Japanese language entirely and enforced a Mandarin policy. Taiwanese elites, who were mostly trained in Japanese, were instantly deprived of status. In 1956, the ROC implemented the 'Please Speak the National Language' (請說國語) policy. Students in schools who spoke Japanese or any Taiwanese languages were fined or physically punished.

These official language policies have severely affected the ability of the Taiwanese to speak their mother tongues. In particular, seventy years of a Mandarin language policy have caused the use of Taiwanese languages to decrease. According to a 2015 survey of language use among college students in the southern city of Kaohsiung, the second

largest city of Taiwan, 76.52% spoke Mandarin, 15.39% spoke Hoklo, 1.03% spoke Hakka, and 0.29% spoke Aboriginal languages (Yu, 2015). This result was inconsistent with Taiwan's ethnic composition, which is 76.97% Hoklo, 10.9% Hakka, 10% Mainland Chinese, and 1.4% Aboriginals (Population Association of Taiwan, 2004). The decreasing use of Taiwanese languages among the younger generation indicates that Mandarin has come to dominate daily life for most Taiwanese.

The February 28th Massacre and the White Terror

The KMT resumed civil war with the CCP in 1946. For military reasons, the KMT transferred a vast amount of resources from Taiwan to support their battles in the mainland, which rapidly worsened the economy and increased social instability in Taiwan. As the situation deteriorated, a flashpoint occurred in Taipei on February 27th, 1947. A Chinese police officer accidentally gunned down a young bystander while having a dispute with a vendor selling illegal cigarettes on the street. The death of an innocent civilian stirred up a demonstration, which surrounded the police headquarters on the morning of the 28th. The demonstration ended up with the KMT security forces shooting the demonstrators with machine guns. Martial law was enacted by the Chinese authority to counter the revenge actions from the Taiwanese toward Chinese civilians and officials. The situation led to island-wide armed resistance, causing the governor to request military reinforcement from Chiang Kai-Shek in Nanjing. Reinforcements arrived on March 8th, and the situation soon became a massacre of both Taiwanese and mainland Chinese, under the rubric of mutiny. The number of victims of the massacre was from around 18,000 to 28,000 (Chen T.-L. , 2009). After the massacre, the martial law was declared, which lasted from 1949 to 1987. The number of victims during the

'white terror' period, including the death penalty and imprisonment, are estimated to be around 200,000 (Chang, 2013).

After the February 28th Massacre, the KMT successfully suppressed any Taiwanese resistance and stabilised their administration on Taiwan. However, the KMT's Civil War in the mainland deteriorated rapidly. The CCP won the Civil War and forced the KMT to retreat to Taiwan. Since the defeat of the KMT in mainland China, the ROC on Taiwan has been operating independently: in some respects, this situation is similar between the Kingdom of Tungning and the Qing Dynasty. Now limited to the territory of Taiwan, the ROC government continued its political oppression and re-Sinicized the Taiwanese with a Mandarin language policy and a Chinese-centric education.

Previous Research and Theoretical Framework

Previous Research

Conceptualising Colonialism

In *Culture and Imperialism*, Edward Said describes colonialism as '…a consequence of imperialism' (1993, p. 9). Jürgen Osterhammel writes (2005, p. 15):

Colonialism is a relationship between an indigenous (or forcibly imported) majority and a minority of foreign invaders. The fundamental decisions affecting the lives of the colonised people are made and implemented by the colonial rulers in pursuit of interests that are often defined in a distant metropolis. Rejecting cultural compromises with the colonised population, the colonisers are convinced of their superiority and their ordained mandate to rule.

Both Said and Osterhammel imply the intertwinement between imperialism and colonialism by mentioning the 'distant metropolis'. Their definitions were based on European colonialism since the 16th century and mainly focused on the Western domination of non-Western territories and people. Arif Dirlik categorises such definitions as 'imperial colonialism' (Dirlik, 2018, p. 59), with the goal of extending the definition of Western-oriented colonialism so as to incorporate non-Western colonial domination.

As Julian Go indicates, in Pierre Bourdieu's early work, *The Algerians*, Bourdieu cited Georges Balandier's term the 'colonial situation,' and he 'conceptualised colonialism as a constitutive force' (Go, 2013, p. 55, see also Bourdieu, 1961, p.120, 129, etc.).[1] Bourdieu theorises colonialism in two ways. First, colonialism is a system of racial domination, where race is more important than class (Ibid., see also Bourdieu 1961). As Go explains, Bourdieu considers 'racism to be built into the system of colonialism as a legitimate mechanism' (Go, 2013, p.55). In Bourdieu's words, 'The function of racism… is none other than to provide a rationalization of the existing state of affairs so as to make it appear to be a lawfully instituted order' (1961, p.133; see also Go, 2013, p.55). Second, Bourdieu indicates that colonialism is facilitated by and grounded in coercion, or in other words, naked force. He opposes the modernisation theory by Germaine Tillion, a supporter of the French colonialism in Algeria in the 1950s, who described modernisation as occurring by choice (see discussion in Go, 2013, p. 55). Bourdieu argues the power of choice, which usually 'belongs to those societies that confront one another, has not been granted to the dominated society' (Bourdieu 1961,

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[1] Although Octave Manonni also brought up the term 'colonial situation' in his work *Prospero and Caliban: The Psychology of Colonization* in 1956, Georges Balandier brought out this term earlier in his 1951 work *Cahiers Internationaux de Sociologie* (Merle, 2013).

p.120; see also Go, 2013, p.55).

Bourdieu's notion of colonialism helps us conceptualise how the colonial invasions forcefully alter the pre-existing social space and fields of the colonies. The colonisers occupy the dominant positions, denying the power of choice to the indigenous people.

Ronald J. Horvath defines colonialism as '...a form of domination—the control by individuals or groups over territory and/or behaviour of other individuals or groups' (1972, p. 46). Horvath also indicates that domination occurs both inter-groups and intra-groups. Intergroup domination refers to a domination process occurring in a culturally heterogeneous society, while intragroup means domination within a culturally homogeneous society. Horvath takes Britain as an example: the English domination over the Welsh, Irish and Scots was a clear embodiment of intergroup domination, and the hierarchical arrangements of power, wealth and status within the English society could be seen as intragroup domination. He indicates that since intragroup domination refers to the relations within a culturally homogeneous society, it is not considered a form of colonialism; it is the intergroup domination which can be considered colonialism (Ibid.).

As Paul et al. argue: 'Culture is defined as a social domain that emphasizes the practices, discourses, and material expressions, which, over time, express the continuities and discontinuities of social meaning of a life held in common' (Paul , Magee, Scerri & Steger, 2015, p. 53). Taiwan had a very different social practice to China under the Japanese colonial rule, and such social practice later became a vital essence of Taiwanese identity and nationalism (Wu R.-R. , 2003). So instead of being a part of a Chinese nation-building process in the early 20th century, Taiwanese nationalism was parallel with the Chinese (Dirlik, 2018, p. 92). In the 1930s, both Mao Zedong and

Chiang Kai-Shek, under the Japanese invasion, supported the Korean and Taiwanese resistance and independence for the sake of Chinese national security (Snow, 1968, pp. 147-148; Hsiao, 1981). When the Chinese took over Taiwan in 1945, the cultural, social and language differences between the Chinese and Taiwanese were no less than the differences between the Chinese, Japanese, Korean and Vietnamese. The contemporary similarity between the Taiwanese and Chinese is the result of re-Sinicization since the ROC took over. My point here is simply to show that the Chinese presence in Taiwan after the Japanese rule should be considered colonial. This was not a case of intragroup relations, but instead a true colonial situation – itself following several other colonial regimes.

Conceptualising Language under Colonialism

Throughout history, language has been used as a tool of colonialism. The Roman and Han Chinese Empires used Latin and Mandarin as their administrative languages and demanded their officials and local chiefs to use such languages as well (Muscato, 2018 ; Anderson, 2007, p. 50). As scholars have argued, when a colonial language becomes the language of politics, it prevents all the colonised people who do not have the fluency of such languages from gaining political power (Muscato, 2018). Language continues to be a central issue in post-colonial research. Frantz Fanon, quoting Paul Valéry, has described the colonial language situation as 'the God gone astray in the flesh' (Fanon, 1986, p. 9). Ngugi wa Thiong'o points out that language and culture are inseparable, and both are the products of each other. Therefore, language is 'inseperatable from ourselves as a community of human beings with a specific form and character, a specific history, a specific relationship to the world' (as cited in Margulis & Nowakoski, 1996).

Hence, under colonialism, as a form of domination, it is understandable that language policy is a vital instrument for the colonisers to control the colonised. As Bill Ashcroft et al. indicate, '…one of the main features of imperial oppression is control over language. An imperial education system installs a 'standard' version of the metropolitan language as the norm and marginalises all 'variants' as impurities' (Ashcroft, Griffiths & Tiffin, 2002, p. 20).

Louis-Jean Calvet identifies two steps that occur in linguistic colonisation (Léglise & Migge, 2008, p. 5). The first is the 'vertical step,' which refers to the social spread of the language. Colonial languages first spread into the 'upper class' of the colonised society, and only then into the 'lower class.' The second is the 'horizontal step,' which refers to the geographical spread. The colonial language diffuses from the capital to small cities and finally to the villages. Calvet further indicates that the colonisers are successful due to the effort put into the education systems. Education 'instill[s] this asymmetrical social ideology in their colonial subjects' and is 'constantly being reaffirmed and generated by a range of other social and linguistic practices' (Ibid.).

Identical to Calvet's two steps process, Pierre Bourdieu, in *Language and Symbolic Power* (1991), had a detailed explanation of the process through which a legitimate (or dominant) language is created. Although Ferdinand de Saussure considers both language and dialect to have no natural limits since the phonetic innovation will determine their own 'areas of diffusion by the intrinsic force of its autonomous logic' (Bourdieu, 1991, p. 44), Bourdieu criticises Saussure's notion of language, for it 'conceals the properly political process of unification whereby a determinate set of "speaking subjects" led the practice to accept the official language' (Ibid.). Based on the historical process of French state-building, Bourdieu presents how the Parisian

dialect, under the formation of a monarchical state, through the process of the objectification and codification of the written language, became dominant among the *langues d'oïl* and degenerated other dialects into *patois,* or vernacular, since the 14th century. The process of establishing administrative institutions in the area of *lagues d'oc* that linked to the royal power in Paris since the 16th century gradually made the Parisian dialect take over the written language, and thus created a bilingual situation in southern France. The aristocracy, commercial and literate petit bourgeoisie, especially those who had a degree from the Jesuit colleges (which were institutions of linguistic unification), had more frequent access to the use of the official language. These bilingual elites, as Bourdieu points out, were destined to fulfil the function of intermediaries (1991, p. 47). This bourgeoisie benefitted from the policy of linguistic unification during the French Revolution, which gave them *the de facto* monopoly of politics since they communicated with the central government and its representatives. The process thus defined local notables under the French republic. Bourdieu, based on this historical and political background, claims that only with the formation of a 'nation,' it becomes possible for a group which contains a great deal of differences to forge a 'standard language,' and thus to normalise the corresponding linguistic habitus (1991, p. 48).

Like both Ashcroft and Calvet, who mention the role of the education system in linguistic colonisation, Bourdieu also emphasises the importance of the education system in the situation of dominance. He indicates that all educational processes represent symbolic violence since they enforce a particular culture. By controlling educational institutions, the dominant class thus enhances and perpetuates its dominant position within the struggle of all fields of the society, and reshapes the habitus of the dominated people, accumulating more cultural and overall symbolic

capital for its permanent domination (Bonnewitz, 2002, p. 151). As this brief discussion suggests, Bourdieu's theories of field, habitus and capital will be the primary tools for this thesis. I will further elaborate on these concepts in the subsequent sections, in order to analyse the contemporary language situation in Taiwan.

Comparative Research on the Language Situations of Catalonia and Ireland

As the targets of English and Castilian colonialism, both the Irish and Catalan had been through the oppression of London and Madrid toward their languages and cultures in the past centuries. Kathryn Woolard (1985) argues that hegemony, Antonio Gramsci's notion which she equates to Bourdieu's domination, cannot be read directly from the institutional domination of a language variety as Bourdieu had emphasised (p. 741). She uses the language situation in Catalonia for example to question Bourdieu's structuralist perspective, in which controlling educational institutions will perpetuate the dominance of the legitimate language. The Catalan people, according to Bourdieu's model, after the end of Franco's authoritarianist domination, should completely recognise the Castilian domination and would not consider the revival of the Catalan language. However, the fact is that the Catalan language has widely revived and took over almost every domain in the area. Thus, Woolard indicates that despite institutional dominance, resistance by the dominated can occur. One relevant factor in this case is that although Franco had controlled economic growth through his central government and stymied local economies, he did not obliterate the Catalan local bourgeoisie, who still had firm control of the internal economic structure in Catalonia. In other words, power relations within the Catalan economic field were dominated by the Catalan people. This economic dominance played a role in the Catalan people's successful

revival of their language after the death of Franco.

In my reading, Woolard may be ignoring Bourdieu's broader and constructivist concept of 'field.' Bourdieu defines the field as '…a network, or a configuration, of objective relations between positions.' These positions are objectively defined by their occupants (social agents or institutions) during a dynamic situation of distribution of various kinds of power (or capital). The situation of such distribution (of power or capitals) can define those positions as domination, subordination, homology, etc. Therefore, the entire society is constituted by various autonomous configurations of such positions, or fields (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 97).

Due to its dynamicity, Bourdieu also points out that agents and institutions must constantly struggle within the field, based on its regularities, or even struggle with the rules themselves. The struggle will thus diversify the probability of success. So 'those who dominate in a given field are in a position to make it function to their advantage, but they must always contend with the resistance, the claims, the contention, "political" or otherwise, of the dominated' (1992, p. 102). Hence, within a field, it is about the relations of different positions of forces trying to undergird and guide their strategies which aim to safeguard, or improve their position, and impose the most favourable hierarchy to their own products (1992, p. 101). The various strategies of reproduction, such as the educational reproduction for the enhancement of linguistic domination, is the tool of a strategy for a dominating position to enhance their hierarchy. The effectiveness of these various strategies of reproduction, as Bourdieu considers, depends on the instruments possessed by various social agents. These strategies will also fail, or fluctuate due to structural contradictions, transformation, and conflicts among agents (Bonnewitz, 2002, p. 92).

In Catalonia's language situation, as Woolard mentioned, the economic growth in the 1980s not only empowered the Catalan bourgeoisie but also enhanced their capabilities to contest the dominant Castilian language in the linguistic field and thus revive their language. Bourdieu's emphasis on the reproduction of linguistic dominance through educational institutions is an example he gave for understanding how a reproduction strategy by a dominant group can establish and perpetuate the situation of dominance. He does not assert that the structure of a field cannot be changed. While Woolard questions Bourdieu's emphasis on institutional domination, she does not explain how the Catalan people's successful revival of their language could have been brought about without their re-controlling of the Catalan institutions after Franco died.

Ireland had the opposite situation from Catalonia. During the English colonialist era, the Irish language, similar to the situations of Catalan and local Taiwanese languages, was suppressed by London. Irish became the lower language in a diglossic[2] situation in the late 17th century (Li K.-H. , 2012, p. 178). Although Irish intellectuals still managed to create the Irish renaissance, a movement which re-accumulated the cultural and linguistic capital of the language, the severe famine and economic struggle that the Irish encountered in the mid-18th century, which caused almost 25% of the population to be lost (to death or migration), along with the implementation of compulsory English education, had further degenerated the use of the Irish language (Brádaigh, 2000). Thus,

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[2] Diglossia was originated by Charles Furgerson in 1959, which he defined as 'a relatively stable language situation in which, in addition to the primary dialects of the language (which may include a standard or regional standards), there is a very divergent, highly codified (often grammatically more complex) superposed variety, the vehicle of a large and respected body of written literature, either of an earlier period or in another speech community, which is learned largely by formal education and is used for most written and formal spoken purposes but is not used by any section of the community for ordinary conversation' (as cited in Schiffman, 1999).

after the Irish independence, the founding elites, through the newly established institutions, initiated the revival of Irish in the first half of the 20th century. The measures included 'Pressure, Preferment and Projection' (McDermott, 2011, p. 27). Pressure is to make Irish a compulsory subject in the education sector. The Preferment is, first of all, enshrining the language as the first official language and demoting English as the second in the 1937 constitution, then privileging qualified Irish speakers with priority access into occupations such as public services, healthcare, judicial service, and the education sector. Projection is to ensure that the Irish language becomes a visible and normalised element of everyday life. Therefore, bilingual road and street signs, public institutions, official documents, post stamps, banknotes could be seen everywhere in the new republic (Ibid.).

However, while the institutional efforts by the new republic have increased the use and normality of the language, the economic stagnation of Ireland in the early 20th century compelled the Irish government to focus more on the revival of the economy. In 1973, both the UK and Ireland entered the European Communities, and in the same year, the Irish government passed a new law that no longer made the Irish language certificate a requirement for graduation (in the secondary cycle). In order to increase the international trade and economic growth of Ireland in the 1980s, the English thus re-dominated the Irish society for the English language has more economical and cultural capital compared to Irish. Even the establishment of the *Gaeltacht*, the Irish speaking community, could not stop the decline of Irish use. In 2007, only 24% of the young generation within the Gaeltacht areas spoke Irish in their daily life, not to mention the percentage outside the Gaeltacht. The lack of bottom-up, communal efforts, combining the 'institutional paralysis', and economic suction is the reason why the English habitus cannot be altered (Giollagáin, 2014; Tiun, 2008).

Bourdieu's notions of field, habitus, practice, and capital can be used to create a better analysis of the cases of Catalonia and Ireland. For Bourdieu, it is the total volume and composition of capital, namely the economic, social, cultural and symbolic capital[3], as well as the social trajectory (or social mobility), which defines the three-dimensional space called 'class'. Within various fields where Catalan and Irish were struggling with the Castilian and English domination, through the historical and political process of state-formation, the structure, or disposition of the field was altered due to significant incidents such as Franco's death and the Irish War of Independence. Regarding the linguistic field, in particular, although both the Catalan and the Irish re-established their institutional dominance within their historical territory, the economic factors became the main difference.

The Irish were facing economic stagnation when they were reviving their language. In the 1950s, Ireland had to attract more foreign investment through various open trade policies, which reinforced the practice of English since it served as the intermediate for accumulating economic capital. The practice thus reinforced the habitus of the Irish people, and both the linguistic capital and symbolic capital of English surpassed the Irish language. The total volume of capital that the Irish elite class possessed was accumulated through English, which can explain why the institutional paralysis happened and the revival of the Irish language has failed. On the contrary, when the Catalan regained control of the administration of Catalonia in the mid-1970s, the economy of Catalonia was rapidly growing (Woolard, 1985, p. 742). The economic

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[3] Borrowing form the notion of economic theory, in Bourdieu's view, the economic capital is the most straightforward type of capital; social capital accrues from networks of relationships, especially institutionalised relationships, such as family, peers and bureaucracy; the symbolic capital refers to the other types of capital assumed when the arbitrariness of their nature is misrecognised (Power, 1999, p. 50).

growth, along with the institutional efforts, reshaped the habitus of Catalan people who can now accumulate all kinds of capital through the Catalan language as the intermediate. Even the Castilians who live in the area can only be subordinate in different sectors of Catalonia, especially in the economic sector. That is the main reason for the opposite consequences of the language revival of Catalonia and Ireland.

Researches on the Language Situation of Taiwan

Previous scholars have drawn on Pierre Bourdieu's linguistic capital for explaining language transformation in Taiwan (Friedman, 2004; Sandel, 2003). In Kerim Friedman's doctoral research, he draws on the idea of the linguistic market from Pierre Bourdieu, and the idea of cultural hegemony from Antonio Gramsci, to examine the linguistic market and language policy of Taiwan as a historical process, class alliance, and form of identity politics. By asking why the dominant Japanese and Mandarin policies did not completely overtake the local languages, especially the Hoklo, Friedman considers that the language market in Taiwan should be seen as a by-product of the process of state formation, whose 'primary goal is the formation of a stable historical bloc' (2004, p. 103). A historical bloc, in Gramsci's view, 'refers to a unity between the structure and superstructure, on the other hand, Gramsci uses the concept as a homogeneous political-economic alliance which does not have internal contradictions' (Neo-Gramscianizm Portal , 2011). Based on his view on the failure of the Italian revolution, Gramsci further indicates that during the formation of the historical bloc, in addition to coercion and consent, corruption is an in-between factor among the dominant and subordinate classes which accelerates the formation. The cultural hegemony is thus established by the cooperation of such historical bloc (Ibid.). Therefore, Friedman indicates that the construction of the language market in Taiwan,

during the Japanese and the KMT regimes, was through the political alliance between the colonial ruling elites and the subaltern groups, namely the Taiwanese local gentry class. The formation of such alliance was also the reason why both regimes were unable to eliminate the local Taiwanese elite groups and their languages completely.

Friedman's research in Taiwan was predominantly conducted in the Eastern cities of Taiwan, where the majority of the population is aboriginal. Similar to other indigenous studies conducted on a global scale, Friedman is more focused on the overall oppression of Han Chinese settler colonialism to the Aborigines. Therefore, he implies that the local Han Chinese settlers in Taiwan are rather a part of the Han historical bloc instead of targets of colonial oppression, since the local gentry class, mostly constituted by the Hoklos, are still influential in contemporary Taiwanese politics. This influence paved the way for various language revival policies in the 1990s (2004, pp. 103-105). Under these revival policies, writes Friedman, the 'situation is better for Hoklo, which is now widely heard in the mainstream media' (2004, pp. 55-56). Freidman further claims that only the Austronesian languages are facing the danger of dying out completely.

I argue that this is not the case for Austronesian languages only, but rather for all local languages, including Hoklo and Hakka. Hoklo, as the majority of the population, has a higher tolerance to this threat, or in other words, it takes the longest time before being completely wiped out. In addition, since a historical bloc refers to a homogeneous political-economic alliance, which has no internal contradictions, the way Friedman categorises all Han Chinese settlers, along with the Japanese and the KMT regimes, as a historical bloc neglects the constant struggle between the local Taiwanese elites and the colonial powers within political, economic and cultural fields. Furthermore, while Friedman considers that all Hans in Taiwan should be categorised as pertaining to a

historical bloc and represents their languages as vibrant compared to the Aboriginal languages, my own research suggests that the Hoklo and Hakka languages are dying out. I return to the current situation of Hoklo in the mainstream media and individual practices in later sections.

Todd L. Sandel (2003) uses Bourdieu's idea of linguistic capital in order to explain the impact that the language policy of the KMT has on the Taiwanese. He compares the election campaigns of former president Lee Teng-Hui and the 'province governor' James Soong, both of whom chose to speak Hoklo to their supporters on various occasions. Sandel suggests that this is an example of Bourdieu's notion of a 'strategy of condescension' (Bourdieu, 1989, p. 68). Bourdieu describes how, during an activity in Béarn, France, the mayor of Pau city chose to speak Béarnais instead of French. The audience should perceive this as a 'thoughtful gesture' since a Béarnais mayor should speak Béarnais. By deliberately ignoring the notion or the unwritten law that French is the national language, this strategy works to accumulate symbolic capital to the politician based on the fact that French is the dominant language. Lee and Soong's use of Hoklo should be viewed the same way, according to Sandel. I note that his argument opposes Friedman's. Friedman considers the use of Hoklo on various occasions, especially during elections, as evidence that the local gentry class is so strong that the Chinese and Japanese have not only failed in their attempt to eliminate it, but have also had to cooperate with it, in order to form the historical blocs.

In Taiwan, the ban on local languages was lifted in 1987, and the education system started to introduce local language courses. Sandel wants to investigate how the local language courses affect the actual language use within Taiwanese families. He interviews the relatives of his Taiwanese wife across three different generations,

including elders who had experienced the coercive prohibition of local languages, and young adults who commenced their education in the mid-1980s. All twenty-five participants in Sandel's study are bilingual speakers of Mandarin and Hoklo and went to schools from the northern to the southern part of Taiwan. Among them, Sandel finds out that all but one young adult who started grade 1 in 1988 have endured punishment for speaking Hoklo: this includes the other two young adults who started school in 1984 and 1985. The participants who had experienced punishment exhibited behaviours that Bourdieu refers to as a form of 'euphemism' or self-censorship (as cited in Sandel, 2003, p. 535). While talking about the punishments, which included fines, or wearing a placard saying 'Please speak Mandarin (請說國語),' one participant said that he did not have the money to pay the fine, so the only option for him was to wear the placard. However, when Sandel asked him whether he had ever worn that placard, he replied 'I never had it put on me. I never talked. At school, I was like someone who is dumb' (Sandel, 2003, p. 536).

Two of Sandel's participants stated that although they spoke Mandarin to their children due to the concerns of competitiveness in school, both of them later changed their attitude and started to speak more Hoklo with the children. One of them is a Hoklo teacher, who shares her experience of changing her mind-set after moving to Bangkok, Thailand with her family, and finding out that most of the Taiwanese immigrant families in Bangkok were speaking Hoklo instead of Mandarin. Sandel suggests that after former president Lee Teng-Hui's localisation of the ROC's administrative institutions, the efforts revalorised the local languages and thus inspired more local language speakers to pick up their mother tongue once again. Sandel also indicates that his findings speak to Bourdieu's notion of how national policy and institutions enhance the linguistic capital of national language and reshape the habitus of the local population.

However, he also questions Bourdieu's insistence that the unconsciousness of practice 'reflects a general attenuation of agency.' Sandel further indicates that Bourdieu 'does not explain how or why individuals can consciously conform to, resist, or moderate a set of dispositions,' and 'does not explain why language practiecs and associated values appear to be changing' (Sandel, 2003, p. 548). Hence, based on the replies from his participants, who were starting to change their perception regarding the use of Hoklo, Sandel considers the future of local Taiwanese languages, at least Hoklo, to be promising.

I agree with Sandel in the sense that Bourdieu's explanation regarding individual dynamic within a field or structure is vague and abstract. The closest explanation I found on Bourdieu in regard to individual reality, is while someone asks him how one determines the existence of a field and its boundaries, he replies with an analogy of economic firms, 'constantly work to differentiate themselves from their closest rivals in order to reduce competition and to establish a monopoly over a particular subsector of the field' (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 100). Thus, the need to differentiate is a reason why agents struggle, resist and moderate the disposition within a field. However, as Sandel is voicing the same critiques on Bourdieu as Woolard, Sandel is also overlooking Bourdieu's notion regarding the field, where social agents are constantly struggling and their strategies are either failing or fluctuating due to structural contradictions, transformation, and conflicts among agents. The local Taiwanese president Lee Teng-Hui and the local Taiwanese party DPP took control of the ROC institutions that fundamentally transformed the structure of various fields of the Taiwanese society. It would be difficult to imagine how such shift in mentality among the local Taiwanese regarding their own languages would be brought about if none of the Taiwanese elites took over the administrative institutions.

Even so, for Sandel's research, this finding is vital for he presents valuable first-hand opinions from Taiwanese people, who had experienced the coercive language policies and explained the transformation through Bourdieu's theories. His research also builds up an essential foundation for this thesis, which will expand and extend Sandel's research. But as I mentioned in the previous section, in Kaohsiung, a southern metropolis where Hoklo is being considered a pervasive language, among the younger college generations, only 15.39% speak Hoklo, while 76.52% speak Mandarin. In the official census in 2010, although the digits were better from a nation-wide perspective, the number of Hoklo speakers under 45 years of age is still declining, from 83.2% to 69.7% (2010, p. 27). So even including the rural areas, where Hoklo is traditionally more pervasive than the city areas, the use of Hoklo is still declining. I can confirm this based on my own experience. I come from a family with a Hoklo father and a Hakka mother, both of whom come from large families. I have one sibling and 41 cousins aged from 13 to 56. Many of those over the age of 30 have had children, so I have 35 'nieces and nephews' (or first cousins once removed). None of them speak Hoklo or Hakka with their parents or in their daily routine. I do not share the optimism of Sandel, based on the statistics and my own experience, and his neglect on the predominant Mandarin habitus of Taiwanese people.

Theoretical Framework

In this thesis, I will use Pierre Bourdieu's theories, including field, habitus, and capital, in order to explain how the Mandarin domination prevails through practices of mass media representation and institutional reproduction and thus consolidates the Mandarin habitus of the Taiwanese people. Bourdieu's notion of fields, as David Swartz summarises, 'denotes arenas of production, circulation, and appropriation of goods,

services, knowledge, or status, and the competitive positions held by actors in their struggle to accumulate and monopolized these different kinds of capital' (Swartz, 1997, p. 117). Habitus, in Bourdieu's words, is a 'system of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is as principles which generate and organize practices and representations' (1990, p. 53). Habitus is produced by a particular set of conditions which constitute a particular social class. It can objectively adapt to its outcomes, but does not necessarily need a presupposing consciousness to do so (Ibid.).

Individuals' primary habitus is formed during childhood, as a result of family influence, and is thus the most durable one. The secondary habitus is usually influenced by education systems. Habitus is a process of internalising externality; thus it is not constant (Bonnewitz, 2002, p. 102). In addition, regarding practice, Swartz summarises this Bourdieusian notion as '…conceptualize actions as the outcome of a relationship between habitus, capital and field' (1997, pp. 141-142). He also points out that practice cannot be equated as habitus or field, but as an 'interrelationship' (Ibid.).

Power further explains that 'Habitus is not only the producer of practices, but it is also the reproducer of structures… Habitus shapes and produces practice, but does not determine it' (1999, p. 49).

Hence, in order to use Bourdieu's set of theories for analysing the language situation of Taiwan, I will borrow the three-step process proposed by Bourdieu (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, pp. 104-105; see also Swartz, 1997; Power, 1999):

1. Analyse the position of the field vis-à-vis the field of power.
2. Map out the objective structure of the relations between the positions occupied by the agents or institutes who compete for the legitimate form of the specific authority

of which this field is the site.

3. Analyse the habitus of agents, the different systems of dispositions they have acquired by internalising a determinate type of social and economic conditions, and which find in a definite trajectory within the field under consideration a favourable opportunity to become actualised.

Research Methods

In order to understand the dynamics of the Mandarin domination in Taiwan, I conducted mixed methods research. In the following section, I will discuss my methods and how they relate to my research questions.

Qualitative Content Analysis

I hypothesise that Mandarin is the dominant language used in Taiwan today. I have used the qualitative content method of analysis to test this hypothesis. Content analysis, as H. Russel Bernard indicated, is 'concern with testing hypothesis from the start' (Bernard, 2006, pp. 506-507). I analyse the contemporary Taiwanese cultural industry and mass media to see the current disposition in the linguistic field within the Taiwanese society. I have selected the most popular films and television programmes for analysis, to ensure that the samples reflect the broader society. My analysis will proceed in two sections:

Television service observation: frequency of language use.

I conducted a general observation on two of the most popular political talk shows on Chung Ti'en Television (CTI TV) and Formosa Television (FTV). The reason for selecting these two talk shows was that they are the two top rated shows in the country and represent different political stances. The show from CTI TV is the most popular pro-China talk show, and the one from FTV is the most popular pro-independence talk show (Rainmaker XKM International Corporation, 2017). The CTI TV is a one-hour programme that airs from 20:00 to 21:00 from Monday to Friday. The show from FTV is a two-hour program that airs six days a week (Monday to Saturday) from 20:00 to 22:00. According to a survey from the AC Nielson (2015), the highest daily use of Taiwanese television services is between 18:00 and 23:59. Thus, my observation captured this peak viewing time. I observed both shows for five days, from Monday to Friday. The purpose was to calculate the proportion of Mandarin to Hoklo speakers within the shows. I excluded Hakka and Aboriginal languages because these languages have their own broadcasting services established in 2003 and 2005, respectively. However, there is no Hoklo television service running as of today, despite the fact that Hoklo is the language of 73.3% of the Taiwanese population (Hakka Affairs Council, 2004, p. ii). This observation provided data on the frequency of language use in popular media.

The coding scheme is as following:

1. The percentage of Mandarin and Hoklo speaking people.

2. The percentage of Mandarin and Hoklo speaking people based on gender.

3. The percentage of Mandarin and Hoklo speaking people based on age.

4. The percentage of Mandarin speakers that switched to Hoklo.

5. The percentage of Hoklo speakers that switched to Mandarin.

The reason why I included gender and age is that I also want to know if the language use in Taiwanese varies based on age or gender. It will help me determine a pattern of language use on TV services.

Textual analysis of media content.

I conducted the content analysis of two particular media outputs: a Taiwanese produced movie and television series. I chose outputs which had the highest box office and ratings in 2017. According to the Taiwan Film Institute (TFI), the Taiwanese made movie with the highest box office rating in 2017 was *The Tag- Alone 2*, a horror film based on a popular Taiwanese urban legend. On television, *The Teenage Psychic,* a miniseries with six episodes, had the highest rating in the year 2017 (台灣偶像劇場, 2017). I watched episode six of the series since most characters were in the finale. I coded the content of the two outputs using a model from Elizabeth Hirschman's research in 1987 about how people sell themselves to one another in personal ads; this research was described in Bernard's methods book (Bernard, 2006, p. 510). I used five categories for coding:

1. The proportion of Mandarin and Hoklo language use among characters.

2. Demographic information of characters (ethnic groups, gender, age, marital status, residence).

3. Intellectual/educational characteristics of characters (e.g., illiterate, college, etc.)

4. Occupational characteristics of characters (e.g., doctor, worker, etc.)

5. Personality presentation (e.g., violent, considerate, etc.)

My purpose was to understand how Mandarin and Hoklo language speaking characters were represented in popular media. I consider mass media outputs as critical cultural goods, which represent the current power relations between Mandarin and Hoklo speakers.

Structured, Non-participant Observation

In addition to the content analysis of media, I studied language use through observation in Taipei. Structured observation, as Bryman indicated, 'is a technique in which the researcher employs explicitly formulated rules for the observation and recording of behavior' (2012, p. 272). The reason for choosing Taipei as the target area is because it is the capital city of Taiwan and has a population of over 7 million, around 30% of the total population in Taiwan (Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, 2010). Taipei is also the political, economic and media centre of Taiwan. While Taipei has the highest amount of population who immigrated after 1949, the DGBAS census in 2010 still indicated that even in Taipei, Hoklo speakers still represent over 73.5% of the total population (2010, p. 26). Given these facts, Taipei constituted an excellent location for testing actual language use in Taiwan.

Bernard (2006, p. 427) proposes five key questions when conducting observational research:

1. Whom do I watch?

2. Where do I go to watch them?

3. When do I go there?

4. How often do I go there?

5. How long do I spend watching people when I get there?

I used these five questions to develop the following protocol:

1. The observation will focus on the language use among different participants based on their age and gender.

2. The observation will take place in a famous temple of Taiwanese folk religion in New Taipei City.

3. The schedule will last for five days from Monday to Friday, 16:00~17:30.

The coding scheme of this observation will focus on:

1. The proportion of Mandarin and Hoklo speakers.

2. The percentage of Mandarin and Hoklo speakers based on gender.

3. The percentage of Mandarin and Hoklo speakers based on age, from young, mid-age to elderly.

4. The percentage of Mandarin speakers that switched to Hoklo.

5. The percentage of Hoklo speakers that switched to Mandarin.

This on-site observation was intended to be a cross-reference to the talk show observation, to examine whether the representation of language use on talk shows conforms to the daily language use of regular Taiwanese people. The reason why I chose a famous temple is because temples in Taiwan, especially famous ones, have both religious and tourist affections. Visitors to a popular temple are both local and international. Also, the visitors were of a different age and gender. Therefore, a temple is a suitable choice for obtaining diverse data.

Semi-structured Interview

In order to understand how people understand and feel about their language use, I used semi-structured interviews. My choice of participants included people who had been subjected to the coercive Mandarin policy from the 1950s to the 1970s, and the younger generation born in the 1980s, who were no longer affected by the harsh language policy after the end of martial law. As Bryman pointed out, the qualitative interview has 'much greater interest in the interviewee's point of view,' and the 'interviews reflect the

researchers' concerns' (Bryman, 2012, p. 470). Interviews should help us understand the context of the language transformation in Taiwan and the colonial situation behind such transformation. The interviews shed light on how the coercive Mandarin policy had transformed the mentality and linguistic habitus of the Taiwanese people. In addition, the outcomes of the interviews can also be a cross-reference to the content analysis of the TV series and movie. The mass media outputs themselves play a role in perpetuating power relations within the linguistic field.

There were four main questions for every interviewee:

1. What language do you speak at home?

2. Thinking about a person who speaks Taiwanese, what is your first thought about this person?

3. Have you spoken Taiwanese while at school or work? How was the experience?

4. What do you think about the local language lecture in elementary and junior high school?

Some of the interviews also required follow-up questions, for clarification or further elaboration of the answers to these questions.

I selected the interviewees by the following conditions:

1. Three interviewees from the older generation, born between the 1940s and 1960s, who had experienced the coercive Mandarin policies.

2. Three interviewees from the younger generation who was born between the 1970s and 1980s, who had grown up between the end of coercive policies and the beginning of local language revival.

3. Three interviewees from the young generation born after the 1990s, who had grown up taking local language lectures in elementary and junior high schools.

Ethical Considerations

Because this thesis includes observation and interviews, it is essential to reflect upon ethical concerns. Edward Diener and Rick Crandall point out that there are four main areas that researchers should pay attention to while conducting social research (as cited in Bryman, 2012, p. 135):

1. Whether there is harm to participants;

2. Whether there is a lack of informed consent;

3. Whether there is an invasion of privacy;

4. Whether deception is involved.

Harm to participants implies possibilities of physical, personal development, self-esteem degradation, stress and inducing participants to conduct reprehensible acts (Ibid.). Lack of informed consent implies that while conducting participant or contrived observation, the researchers' identities are unknown to the participants. Such behaviour might lead to transgressions to privacy or personal harm. Invasion of privacy implies that participants' personal information is being revealed against their will, so it is related to the lack of consent. Deception means that the researchers inform the participants whether the research purposes do not conform to the real ones.

Within the framework of this thesis, the observation I conducted was a structured observation, or a non-participant observation, a method in which researchers implement explicitly formulated rules, and an observation schedule, for observing and recording the behaviour of the participants. This method aims to 'ensure that each participant's behavior is systematically recorded so that it is possible to aggregate the behavior of all those in the sample in respect of each type of behavior being recorded' (Bryman, 2012, p. 272).

Since my observation at the temple, a public space, did not involve any contact with the observed, the behaviour of the observed was not affected by my presence (I was sitting on a chair near the front door). My observations did not entail any contact with the people I observed, and my presence in this space entailed no harm to the participants. Furthermore, the observation did not focus on specific individuals or the conversation among the observed, but rather just on the languages they were speaking. Since this temple is understood as a public space, open to anyone, with no prescribed set of activity, my presence in the temple as an observer fell within the norms of visitor behaviour. I did not seek informed consent for this non-participant observation, not only because no private or personal information was gathered, leaked or transgressed during the observation, but also because approaching other people in order to ask for permission to listen to the language they were speaking was likely to cause changes of behaviour among the observed. This would nullify the original purpose of this observation.

For the interviews, I explained my research project and received consent from the participants. However, because the contested nature of the idea that 'Taiwan is undergoing a colonial situation,' I chose to not to mention terms such as colonialism and the colonial situation to my interviewees. Instead, I focused the interviews on personal experiences and the historiography of the language situation in Taiwan. I chose not to mention colonialism prior to or during the interviews in order to avoid influencing interviewees' views, and to lessen any concern of saying something that they would perceive as unwelcome or offensive (Bryman, 2012, p. 139). All interviewees were assured that I would keep their identities confidential, and I have kept the interview data secure on a private computer.

Results and Analysis

Results

Television Services Observation

Figure 1. Language use by demographic characteristics – CTI TV Talk Show (Pro-China)


Figure 2. Language use by demographic characteristics – FTV Talk Show (Pro-Independence)


Five days of observation of two of the most popular talk shows suggest that Mandarin

speakers are dominant on both shows. In the pro-China talk show from CTI TV, there were a total of 40 people on the show, including the hosts and guests. From Monday to Friday, December 25th to 29th, 2017, 65% of them were male, 35% were female, 85% of them were mid-age (visually estimated between 30-65 years of age), 15% were elderly (visually estimated over 65 years of age), and none of them were youth (visually estimated under 30 years of age). Among all 40 people, only one of them, who appeared on Tuesday, December 26th, 2017, was speaking Hoklo. He was a mid-age male guest, and had to switch back and forth between Hoklo and Mandarin since all the other guests and hosts were speaking Mandarin only.

Significantly the pro-Taiwan independence show produced by the FTV was also dominated by Mandarin speakers. There were a total of 52 people on the show, including the guests and hosts, from Monday to Friday, December 25th to 29th, 2017. 83% among them were male, 17% were female. 71% among them were mid-age (visually estimated between 30-65 years of age), 25% were elderly (visually estimated over 65 years of age), and 4% were youth (visually estimated under 30 years of age). Only one mid-age male guest who appeared on Tuesday, December 26th, 2017, spoke Hoklo, and he also had to switch back and forth between Hoklo and Mandarin. There was one Mandarin speaker featured on Wednesday, December 27th, 2017 who occasionally switched back and forth between Mandarin and Hoklo, while giving his opinion. Gender and age wise, there are no significant variations since the Mandarin domination is pervasive in every set of coding schemes.

Structured, Non-Participant Observation

Figure 3. Language use by demographic characteristics – On-site Observation

On-Site Observation

I conducted structured, non-participant observation from 16:00 to 17:30, Monday to Friday, January 15th to 19th, 2018, in 'Hongludi Nanshan Fude Temple,' Zonghe District, New Taipei City (新北市中和區烘爐地南山福德宮). This temple is one of the most popular folk religion temples in Taiwan. Followers and tourists from all areas of Taiwan visit this temple, praying to the 'Tudigong' (土地公; God of the Land) and the 'Caishen' (財神; God of Wealth) for safety and fortune.

During the five days and 450 minutes of observation, I saw 251 people. 45% (113) were male, and 55% (138) were female. 38% (94) were youth (visually estimated under 30 years old), 53% (134) were mid-age (visually estimated between 30-65 years old), and 9% (23) were elderly (visually estimated over 65 years old). Among the 113 males, 79% (89) spoke Mandarin. 80% (111) of the 138 females spoke Mandarin. Male Hoklo speakers were 21% (24) of the total, while female Hoklo speakers were 20% (27). Among the 94 youth, 96% (90) of them spoke Mandarin. 76% (102) of the 134 mid-age people were Mandarin speakers, and the percentage of Mandarin-speaking elderly was 26% (6) among the total of 23 people. Regarding the percentage of visitors who switched between Mandarin and Hoklo, 92% (230) did not switch language during the

observation, 6% (16) of them switched from Hoklo to Mandarin, and 2% (7) switched from Mandarin to Hoklo. According to the data, there was no significant variation in gender. However, age-wise, the number of Hoklo speakers decreases significantly among the elders, middle-aged and youths, from 74% to 24% and ended up only 4% of the youths spoke Hoklo. In addition, the people switching from Hoklo to Mandarin were twice compared to the opposite (16 people : 7 people).

Textual Analysis of Media Content

TV-Series: The Teenage Psychic

The series *The Teenage Psychic* was the most popular TV-series in Taiwan in year 2017. The story is based on the real story of a young woman who had worked in a temple as a part-time psychic while pursuing her high school education in Taipei City. The series combines the genres of teenage romance, thriller and Taiwanese folk religion, which made it a major hit. In 2017, the series had six episodes and almost two dozen characters. I will break down episode six, since it is the finale and most of the characters show up in the scenes. The characters will be characterised based on the five coding schemes in the methodology section, and the names of the characters will be translated in the Wade-Giles System.

1. Ya-Chen Hsieh (謝雅真):

   Ya-Chen was the main actress of the series. She was a Mandarin speaker but occasionally spoke Hoklo while doing psychic works, especially while being possessed by holy spirits. She was a high school student, participating in the school's drama society, and in a relationship with the leading actor Yun-Lo. Ya-Chen had an outspoken personality and good peer relations. However, at the same time, she often

felt torn between her dual identities as a student and as a psychic and often felt shy in front of her boyfriend Yun-Lo.

2. Yun-Le Ho (何允樂):

Yun-Le was the main actor and a Mandarin-speaking character. He was a newly transferred student at the local high school. In his first day at school, he met Ya-Chen, and later they became a couple. Yun-Le had an extroverted, spontaneous, humorous personality, and was active in the relationship with Ya-Chen. He also had strong charisma among his peers, and he was an actual leader in the school's drama society. Unfortunately, during the fifth season, he accidentally died in a car crash and appeared as a spirit in the finale.

3. Shen-Tsai Chin (金勝在):

Shen-Tsai was the main supporting actor. He was middle-aged, single and a Hoklo speaker. But he occasionally switched to Mandarin while speaking to young characters and the city councillor. As the host of the temple where Ya-Chen works, Shen-Tsai was also a father figure of Ya-Chen since she lost hers in her childhood. He had sophisticated and tactful personalities, and was always wearing tacky outfits. In addition, due to the hardship of running the temple, he was in debt with the city councillor and was constantly worrying about financial problems. Therefore, he was often acting coercively towards Ya-Chen while she was reluctant to do psychic works. However, in the finale, he got admitted to a college MBA program through self-study, which he believed could help with the future management of the temple.

4. Chin-Huo Chao (趙金火):

Chin-Huo was the supporting actor in this series. He was middle-aged, married and a Mandarin speaker. His occupation was being the fictional city councillor of Taipei. His educational status was unknown. The councillor had authoritative, insidious and domineering characteristics, and he was very affectionate with his wife. The

councillor always showed up well-dressed, but he was gang-related and had three gang members working for him.

5. Chao's Secretary:

The councillor's secretary was a supporting actor. He was middle-aged and a Hoklo speaker. His marital and educational status was unknown. As a secretary, he had sophisticated, polite, loyal, obedient characteristics, and always showed up casually dressed.

6. Three men in black suits:

As supporting actors, these three gang members, who worked for councillor Chao, were young and Hoklo speakers. Their marital status was unknown, but they were apparently ill-educated. Their characteristics were presented as violent, irritable and vulgar.

7. Hon and Siou (阿宏與阿修):

These two were appearing as supporting actors. They were young, single and Mandarin speakers, but they occasionally switched to Hoklo. They were members of staff of the temple who worked for the host Shen-Tsai Chin. Their educational status was unclear, but they were apparently not highly educated personnel. Personality-wise, they had honest, simple and comedian characteristics, and always showed up casually dressed.

8. Hui-Lan Lee(李惠蘭):

Hui-Lan was the supporting actress. She was middle-aged, a Mandarin speaker, and the wife of councillor Chao. As a cancer patient, she was portrayed as a character with illness, dejected, gentle and obedient. Her education status was unknown. She always showed up well dressed but on a wheelchair.

9. Father of Yun-Le Ho:

The Father of Yun-Le was a supporting actor. He was middle-aged, married and a

Mandarin speaker. His occupation was a doctor of the NGO 'Doctors without Borders (MEF).' Thus, he was a highly educated specialist. Personality-wise, he was gentle, sad (shows up after his son's death), caring and considerate. He was house arrested by Middle Eastern rebels for years before showing up in the finale.

10. Mother of Yun-Le Ho:

The mother was a supporting actress. She was middle-aged, married, and a Mandarin speaker. She appeared as a housewife, and her educational status was unknown. Personality-wise, she was gentle, sad and virtuous.

11. Doctor in the hospital:

As a carefree character, the doctor was middle-aged and a Mandarin speaker. As a highly-educated specialist, he was the surgery operator of Hui-Lan Lee. However, after he told councillor Chao that his wife's illness was untreatable, the doctor was in an awkward situation with the councillor. Thus the doctor was flinching in front of the furious councillor.

12. Seven classmates of Ya-Chen:

The classmates were supporting actors and actresses. There were four girls and three boys, portrayed as single Mandarin speakers. All of them were the members of the school's drama society. They had different characteristics but were overall vibrant and energetic teenagers.

13. Followers of the temple (around 10 to 15 people):

These were carefree characters. Their age was from youth to mid-age. They were all Hoklo speakers. Their educational and marital status was unknown. They showed up during Ya-Chen's temporary leave after she had lost her boyfriend, Yun-Le, and were yelling at the temple staff, Hon and Siu, for Ya-Chen's service. Thus their images were that of a group of unreasonable, furious and anxious people.

Of the 36-41 characters on the finale, 15-20 characters spoke Hoklo and 26 characters spoke Mandarin. The Hoklo speakers were the temple host Shen-Tsai Chin, the councillor's secretary, the three gang members, and the 10-15 care-free characters gathered outside the temple. The Mandarin speakers were the leading actress Ya-Chen Hsieh, the main actor Yun-Le Ho, the councillor Chin-Huo Chao and his wife Hui-Lan Lee, Hon and Siu, the father and mother of Yun-Le, the seven classmates of Ya-Chen and the doctor in the hospital.

Movie: The Tag-Alone 2

The movie *The Tag-Alone 2* is a sequel to the 2015 movie *The Tag-Alone*. The story is based on a famous urban legend in Taiwan, which is about a wicked spirit with a little girl's appearance who wears a red dress. The spirit haunts the area around in some popular hiking areas in northern Taiwan. The leading roles encountered various mysterious events and finally went face-to-face with the horrifying spirit. Ultimately, the protagonists purify the spirit and put the troubles to an end. This movie had the highest box office rating among the movies produced in Taiwan in 2017 (excluding the Hollywood movies) and went viral on mass media and internet within the Taiwanese society. Thus, it is an excellent example for the analysis of the relationship between language and representation. The characters are as follows:

1. Ming-Hao Chang (張明浩):

   He was the first character and victim in the movie. His marital and educational status was unknown. He was a Hoklo speaker and a criminal of timber theft and trespass. In the first scene, he was illegally employing and exploiting a small group of Thai immigrant workers who work for him. Thus, he had sneaky, anxious and irascible images. He ended up being killed by the sorcery of the red dress little girl.

2. Shu-Fen Lee (李淑芬):

   Shu-Fen was the main actress. She was middle-aged, a single mother and a Mandarin speaker. Her occupation was working as a social worker of the city government's department of social welfare. Thus, she was a highly-educated specialist. Personality-wise, she had a courageous, protective and independent image. She was trying to save her daughter who was being lured by the spirit into the mountains.

3. Yi-Chun Shen (沈怡君):

   Yi-Chun was the leading actress of the first *The Tag-Alone* and appeared as a main supporting actress in the sequel. She was middle-aged, a widow (the husband and son were the victims in the first movie) and a Mandarin speaker. She was the host of a radio show in the first movie. Thus, she was a highly-educated specialist. But in the sequel, she was still experiencing severe trauma since the last incident. Thus she was intense, insecure, and mentally disordered throughout the movie.

4. Master Lung (阿龍師):

   The Master was a supporting actor. He was elderly and a Hoklo speaker. He worked as the host of a temple, and he was the grandfather of Chun-Kai Lin. His marital status was unknown and was likely ill-educated. Characteristic-wise, he was sophisticated, steady and religious.

5. Chun-Kai Lin (林俊凱):

   Chun-Kai was the main supporting actor. He was young and a Mandarin speaker. He was a high-school student and working in his grandfather's temple as a psychic. Thus, he occasionally spoke Hoklo with his grandfather and colleagues of the temple. He was in a relationship with Shu-Fen's daughter Ya-Ting Lee. He had decent, courageous, religious and positive personalities.

6. Ya-Ting Lee (李雅婷):

   Ya-Ting was the supporting actress. She was young and a Mandarin speaker. She

was the daughter of Shu-Fen and a high-school student. She was in a relationship with Chun-Kai. Since she found herself pregnant, she was insecure but acting rebellious towards her mother. She was trying to keep her child while her mother was opposing the idea. She ran from home after a quarrel with Shu-Fen over the child and went missing.

7. Mei-Hua Lin (林美華):

Mei-Hua was the supporting actress. She was middle-aged and a Mandarin speaker, also a single mother of two daughters. Her educational and occupational status were unknown. Since her first daughter, Yung-Chin, died in an accident, she was unable to get back on her feet. Thus, she tried to resurrect her daughter through sorcery in an almost mad attempt. However, she eventually resurrected the evil spirit which occupied her daughter's body and caused the whole incident. Throughout the movie, she was anxious, protective, superstitious and fiery.

8. Yung-Chin (詠晴):

Yung-Chin was a supporting actress. She was six years old and a Mandarin speaker, and also the second daughter of Mei-Hua. She was smart but unsociable. Since Mei-Hua was afraid that the elder daughter's evil spirit will come and harm the little one, she confined Yung-Chin at home and got her body-wide hand-painted sigils.

Of the eight characters in the movie, two of them spoke Hoklo and six spoke Mandarin. The Hoklo speakers were the timber thief Ming-Hao Chang and the temple host Master Lung. The six Mandarin speakers were the main actress Shu-Fen Lee, the supporting actresses Yi-Chun Shen, Ya-Ting Lee, Mei-Hua Lin and Yung-Chin, and the supporting actor Chun-Kai.

Semi-Structured Interview

The final source of data are interviews with nine people, three born in the 1950s, three born in the 1980s, and three born after the 1990s. The selection of interviewees was guided by Todd L. Sandel's research. My first three interviewees went to school from the 1950s to the 1960s, and they belong to Sandel's 'first-generation' (Sandel, 2003, p. 533). Other three interviewees went to school between the 1980s and the 1990s. They conform to Sandel's 'third-generation', roughly the same age as the first-generation's children. I define them as my 'second-generation'. In order to extend the historical scope of the transformation of Taiwanese language use, I interviewed another three interviewees who went to school in the 1990s and 2000s. They are younger than the 'third-generation' in Sandel's research. I define them as my 'third-generation'.

Of the three interviewees who went to school from the 1950s to the 1960s, all three had experienced or witnessed physical and financial punishment for speaking Hoklo. In the interviews, most of the interviewees called the Hoklo language 'Taiwanese', since it is how Hoklo-speaking people define the language they speak. Among the first three interviewees, one of them has a mainlander father from the Yunnan province (雲南省) of China and a Taiwanese mother. Another two interviewees are local Taiwanese and were speaking Hoklo as their mother tongue when they were kids, but both learned fluent Mandarin in school. Regarding their impressions toward a Hoklo speaker, there was a clear difference between the two local Taiwanese and the one with a mainlander background (self-translated):

Lin: I feel really close (to someone who speaks Taiwanese). Since I have been doing business,
I often go to the middle and southern part of Taiwan, and my clients over there are all

Taiwanese speakers you know? If you speak Mandarin to them, they won't bother to hear you. They'll consider you are not the same people as them. But if you speak Hoklo, they'll feel closer to you.

Chen: I will feel really close. Like… we are the same people you know… Everybody will feel closer to each other.

Chou: Do you remember the story I told you about the shameful memory I had with the old lady? When I was a teenager, studying at the Wesley Girl's High School, I was so conceited. Once an old lady asked me for directions in Taiwanese, I just pretend I did not understand Taiwanese and ignored her. (Me: Why?) It was because I was despising Taiwanese. At that time, I considered Taiwanese to be vulgar.

On the other hand, regarding the punishments for speaking Hoklo, three interviewees from the first-generation with different backgrounds also had different experiences:

Lin: (In elementary school) It was… during the break time, I was playing with my classmate, and I spoke some Taiwanese, and someone snitched on me. They were like 'oh! You speak Taiwanese! You speak Taiwanese!' and put a dog tag on my neck and said, 'Speak Mandarin.' I also got fined for a dime. (Me: How did you feel?) … hum … yeah, it feels kind of … embarrassing in the class… But actually, it was in college that I felt more pressure about speaking Mandarin. Yeah, when I was a freshman (In Taipei), and I was from the south, where everyone was used to speaking Taiwanese. But in college, about a third of my classmates were from Taipei, and they liked to make fun of our (Mandarin) accent … they considered … not the accent … they just looked down on us … like we were vulgar or rednecks … because we spoke Taiwanese.

Chen: The teacher just forced you to speak Mandarin. Like if you didn't … they were like trying to assimilate you by forcing you to speak the same language. So you'd get punished if you didn't speak Mandarin. (Punishments) Such as go to time-out, squat or squat-jump. (Me: how did you feel?) I was not happy about it … Just … it feels very uncomfortable… … I had two kinds of feelings … envious (for those who spoke fluent Mandarin) … and the other kind of feeling was … why do I have to? Why do we Taiwanese have to speak Mandarin? It's (Taiwanese) our language so why shouldn't we?

Chou: Actually, I didn't remember whether there were kids who got punished for speaking Taiwanese… I always minded my own business you know.
…While I was in elementary school, kids like me who could speak fluent Mandarin would easily get better grades because we could understand the teachers easily. Those who

didn't, for example, the farmer's kids, who even came to the school barefoot (couldn't afford shoes), often got bullied by the teachers because they didn't understand what the teachers were saying. The kid (in my class) was often being cornered by the teacher in the classroom and (the teacher) just kicked him on the shin.

However, for the younger generations, it was quite different. The interviewees from the second and third-generations went to schools since the 1980s and the late 1990s, when the punishment for speaking Hoklo was terminated by the government. Although all of them have Hoklo speaking parents or grandparents, they usually speak Mandarin to each other and mix it with some Hoklo occasionally. While I asked them about their first image of a Hoklo speaking person, all of them described a middle-aged or an elder individual, for example:

Hsu (second-generation): Normally ... most of all ... I consider it'll be middle-aged or elder people... man or woman ... both are possible. Both are fine. (Man or woman) It's kind of hard to picture though. Speaking of occupation ... hum ... let me think about it ... A lot of street food vendors are speaking Taiwanese you know (laugh), or people who were retired. You know if some people can talk to you in Taiwanese ... That means it is their first language. That usually means they are most possibly elders.

Liu (third-generation): Do you mean if I randomly bump into a Hoklo speaker on the street? I will say that one is a southerner (laughing). An old one. Man, or woman ... both are possible I guess. And occupation ... hum ... the first image we are talking about right? I will say he (or she) should be a business owner or a salesperson.

Su (third-generation): An old man. Occupation ... hum ... nothing special. I think about a retired old man.

On the other hand, while talking about the local language classes in the elementary and junior high schools, which started since the 1990s, all interviewees gave me negative thoughts, for example:

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Chou (first-generation): *Oh, I am not familiar with the policy though. But I still don't find kids around me speaking Taiwanese you know. They still speak Mandarin to me. I am not sure about the effectiveness of those Taiwanese classes. But if they only got a few hours per week and the parents still speak Mandarin… I mean… Whenever I see young parents outside with their kids, I never heard any of them speaking Taiwanese. Everyone speaks Mandarin.*

Hsu (second-generation): *I think (local language classes) it's idiotic. I mean of course it's nice to learn them. But what you'll learn is just smattering. Speaking of language learning … If you don't have the environment … I mean … Language shapes the taste and lifestyle of a person. So if you don't have the environment of that language… Those classes will be worthless but for students to cope with exams since they are not actually speaking the language in daily life. Besides, an hour or two per week is way less than enough for learning a language. I mean… for those elementary and junior high students, their English classes are way more than an hour or two per week. So how do you expect the hours for local languages to be enough?*

Su (third-generation): *We had one class per week back in elementary school. But nothing in junior high school… I don't think it helped… Because we never speak the language in daily life, and we only had that forty minutes per week. Even in the class, we didn't have much opportunity to practice… So it didn't matter, either for those who already speak the language or for those who don't.*

It is worth noting that the experiences of punishments for speaking Hoklo from the first-generation led to a transformation of language behaviour which affected the later generation. One interviewee from the first-generation told us about his thought:

Lin: (Me: Younger people like us don't speak fluent Taiwanese anymore.) Yeah… same as my kids. Because back in the days, in Taipei, (speaking) Mandarin is an advantage you know. For our generation, we had suffered enough for not being able to speak proper Mandarin. So we don't want our kids to be looked down upon for the same reason as us. So we spoke Mandarin with our kids at home out of instinct, hoping others won't despise them… So we kind of forgot the fact that the language (Taiwanese) is dying slowly… It was too late when

we figured this out…

The effect of this mentality transformation regarding language use can be seen on the other interviewee from the second-generation (not connected with the first-generation interviewee):

Hsueh: They (her parents) speak Taiwanese to each other, some Mandarin occasionally. If they want to express themselves more appropriately, they will speak Taiwanese… But if they are talking to us, they are always speaking Mandarin. (Me: Why?) Hum… let me think about it… yeah, why is that? What's the reason? It's strange… I've never thought about it to be honest… (Me: Is it because you don't understand Taiwanese?) Not really, because I do understand Taiwanese. I don't speak (Taiwanese) fluently, but I understand everything they are saying… But I think… since we were starting to babble, our parents were already speaking Mandarin to us… so when they were teaching us how to speak, they were teaching us in Mandarin. Like 'Dad,' 'Mom,' 'Car,' 'Chair'… We started learning everything in Mandarin.

Analysis

Media Presentation and On-Site Observation

Based on the result of the language situation in Taiwan, we can map out the structure of the linguistic field. For the percentage of Mandarin and Hoklo speakers, the Mandarin domination is apparent. On the country's favourite television talk shows, over 96% of the guests were Mandarin speakers, and those less than 4% of Hoklo speakers had to switch back and forth between Hoklo and Mandarin. That means no one on the talk shows was able to only speak Hoklo.

This pattern can be compared to the result of the on-site observation at the temple in

New Taipei City, where over 79% of the observed were Mandarin speakers. In addition, the number of Hoklo speakers who switched to Mandarin (16 people) were more than twice as many as the number of Mandarin speakers who switched to Hoklo (7 people). This suggests that Hoklo speakers are facing more pressure to switch between languages than Mandarin speakers in daily situations. In addition, the percentage of Hoklo speakers is decreasing significantly by age, from 73.91% among the elders to 23.88% among the middle-aged, and only 4.26% among the youth.

If we compare the television service and daily language use, Mandarin domination can be seen in both situations. I interpret Hoklo as the low variety in the diglossia started from the Japanese colonial era, and further degenerated by the KMT's coercive Mandarin policy from 1956 to 1987. This policy, which lasted almost four times longer than the Japanese language policy (1937-1945), successfully made the Hoklo disappear in every official and educational section, and eliminated the written form of Hoklo, until the revival efforts in the 1990s. Despite 20 years of revival efforts, the decline of Hoklo use, especially among the younger generations, does not seem to have stopped.

The diglossia created by the Japanese, and later replaced by the KMT, was a result of the competition in the linguistic field. Under the colonial situation, the colonisers' language becomes 'high.' Locals must learn the colonisers' language from scratch in order to compete with the coloniser in the political, economic, social and cultural fields. This language prejudice ensures the advantage of the coloniser. Since the language of the colonised is prohibited in the political, educational and cultural fields, it severely deteriorates the accumulation of linguistic and cultural capital of such languages. The colonised language thus loses the capability to adopt new ideas and items brought by the colonial modernisation. This further propels the intellectuals of the colonised to use

the high language instead of their mother tongue, and causes internal conflicts in terms of identity and inferiority. Examples can be seen in the work of various post-colonial intellectuals such as Frantz Fanon, Aimé Césaire, Edward Said, etc.

Linguistic Representation on Film and TV-Series

The movie and TV-series exhibited particular patterns in how they presented Mandarin and Hoklo speakers. Both the most popular Taiwanese movie and TV-series in 2017 had religious content, making the patterns in both works ideal for cross-reference. First, in the TV-Series *The Teenage Psychic,* out of all 35 to 40 characters, around 15 to 20 of them (37%-50%) of them were Hoklo speakers. But if we exclude the 10 to 15 care-free characters who were just gathering outside the temple arguing with the staff for less than 20 seconds, the percentage of Hoklo speakers was 24%. This low percentage of Hoklo speakers resembles what we saw in the talk shows and on-site observation. Second, among the five Hoklo speaking main characters, three of them are gang members. They, along with the secretary, are all working for the Mandarin-speaking city councillor with a powerful image. The power relations and image of these five characters, namely the councillor, the secretary, the three gang members, created a stereotype of Mandarin and Hoklo speakers. The Hoklo speakers are subservient, vulgar, guileful, grassroots, unsophisticated and have low-or-uneducated images, while the Mandarin-speaking roles are mostly powerful, leading, highly educated, specialised, elegant, kind and innocent.

A similar pattern can also be seen in the movie *The Tag-Alone 2*. Among all eight main characters, only 2 (25%) of them are Hoklo speakers: one is a criminal, and the other one is the host of the temple. While the Hoklo speaking roles in the movie have criminal,

religious, grassroots, and older images, the Mandarin-speaking roles have a wider variety of images and emotions throughout the whole movie, such as highly educated, specialist, caring, kind, anxious, suspicious, conflicting, courageous, etc.

Both *The Teenage Psychic* and *The Tag-Alone 2* have young psychic characters, the leading actress Ya-Chen Hsieh of *The Teenage Psychic* and the main supporting actor Chun-Kai Lin of *The Tag-Alone 2*. Excluding the three young gang members in *The Teenage Psychic,* Ya-Chen and Chun-Kai were the only two positive young characters in both works who spoke some Hoklo. However, the opportunities for those two young characters to speak Hoklo were limited to only religious rituals or when they were talking to older characters. Thus, this on-screen arrangement of language use represented an image that the young generation does not speak Hoklo unless they are dealing with the elderly, grassroots, or religious affairs.

Films and TV-series are part of the cultural field which generates symbolic codes that construct a symbolic world. This world influences how consumers view their own experiences and thus helps construct social relations. Through the production within the cultural field, the arrangements of language representations in Taiwanese films and TV-series, such as *The Tag-Alone 2* and *The Teenage Psychic,*   play a vital role for the social reproduction of Mandarin dominance. Such representations encourage viewers to internalise such dominance. As Bourdieu said, the mainstream culture is the culture of dominators. Through such long-term efforts of legitimisation, the dominators thus make people forget that the dominant culture was once an indifferent culture as well, and that is how the dominators take advantage in the symbolic struggle (Bonnewitz, 2002, pp. 123-125).

Interviews

I found a strong relationship between the on-screen representations and the interviews I conducted with the younger generations. My younger interviewees told me that in their minds, a Hoklo speaker is a mid-aged or older person. None of them considered themselves or someone their age as Hoklo speakers, even though 5 out of 6 younger interviewees I interviewed were bilingual speakers in their childhood.

The interviews also sketched the transformation of the linguistic habitus. Among the three interviewees from the first-generation, two of them are local Taiwanese, and the other one's father was a mainlander. They went to school during the late 50s and 60s when the coercive Mandarin policy had just started. In their experiences, there was a clear difference regarding their childhood memories in schools. While the two local Taiwanese interviewees were sharing their experiences about how they got punished for speaking Hoklo by speaking Hoklo, and how they felt resentful, uncomfortable and embarrassed at the time, the other one who spoke fluent Mandarin was never being punished, and thus she could 'always mind her own business'.

Between the two Taiwanese first-generation interviewees and the other one with mainland heritage, they had different primary linguistic habitus before they went to school, which they acquired from their families, a decisive and most enduring habitus according to Bourdieu's theory (Bonnewitz, 2002, p. 102). However, after they went to school, the coercive Mandarin policy in school created an unfair structure for those who came from Hoklo-speaking families. In schools, which Bourdieu regarded as the most crucial place for forming secondary habitus, the Hoklo-speaking students were being uprooted from their primary linguistic habitus and had to reconstruct a new Mandarin

habitus in order to accommodate the school curriculum and to avoid being punished by the teachers. But the Mandarin-speaking students, who mostly have mainlander heritage, were able to smoothly establish their secondary habitus in school and connect their secondary habitus with the primary habitus. This convenience saved much energy for Mandarin-speaking students so they could focus on their performance, while other Hoklo-speaking students had to worry about their language in order not to be snitched by others and get punished.

In Bourdieu's view, school culture is never neutral. It serves for the interests of the dominators' culture. Hence, instead of decreasing the social unfairness, the schools enhanced the reproduction of such unfairness (Bonnewitz, 2002, pp. 144-145). The discrepancy of primary and secondary linguistic habitus for Hoklo speakers, to use Bonnewitz's terms, created the 'hysteresis' among them, which means a disorder caused by the changing of social conditions, the present habitus formed by previous social conditions became inconsistent after the change. Such disorder will cause social agents to act clumsy, inappropriate or with indecency (Bonnewitz, 2002, p. 115). However, as Bourdieu pointed out, habitus is durable but not permanent. It is an 'open system of dispositions that is constantly subjected to experiences' (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 133). Linguistic habits are reshaped based on social agents' experiences. Among the two local Taiwanese interviewees from the first-generation, the fact that both of them now speak fluent Mandarin (despite the accent) is the result of their adjustment for the change of social conditions. They further internalised such change of linguistic habitus and thus affected the next generation. As one of them pointed out, they taught their children to speak Mandarin from the beginning in order to prepare their children for a better start.

Such 'externalizing of internalization' (Bonnewitz, 2002, p. 114)' indeed affected the formation of the primary habitus of the next generation. The six younger interviewees, grew up speaking Mandarin or at least mixed with Mandarin and Hoklo. Like Hsueh, from the second-generation, remembered, since she started learning how to speak, her parents were teaching her in Mandarin, even though her parents usually talked to each other in Hoklo. The younger generations thus had a consistent connection between their primary and secondary linguistic habitus from their families and schools. Such change of linguistic habitus formation among the younger generations thus created the 'network externality', which means 'a change in the benefit, or surplus, that an agent derives from a good when the number of other agents consuming the same kind of good changes' (Liebowitz & Margolis, 1998). This effect will further enhance and endure the Mandarin domination within the linguistic field since fewer and fewer parents would speak Hoklo to their children, as Chou from the first-generation mentioned, she never heard any young parents in Taipei speaking Hoklo to their children.

Reactions like Hsueh's from the second-generation, who could not figure out in the first place why her parents were talking to her in Mandarin, is an embodiment of Bourdieu's 'symbolic violence'. Bourdieu writes that symbolic violence 'is the violence which is exercised upon a social agent with his or her complicity' (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, pp. 167-168). Regarding the essence of such violence, he further referred to 'misrecognition', which social agents recognise without perceiving it as such. Social agents recognise such violence under a 'set of fundamental, pre-reflexive assumptions', and they engage by 'the mere fact of taking the world for granted, of accepting the world as it is….' When Hsueh was being asked why her parents are always talking to her in Mandarin while they are usually talking to each other in Hoklo, she did not realise such inconsistency of linguistic habitus among her family members before hearing this

question. Furthermore, when Lin of the first-generation said that he taught his children to speak Mandarin based 'on instinct', and the younger generations picturing a Hoklo speaker as middle-aged or as an elder, these phenomena were showing a clear 'misrecognition' among the interviewees regarding the power relations between Mandarin and Hoklo. Such symbolic violence and linguistic habitus are the reason why the linguistic decolonisation efforts after the local Taiwanese elites took control of the ROC institutions encountering so many difficulties.

Although Mandarin has the dominant position, Hoklo still has some competitiveness in the economic sectors, especially among self-employed workers and small enterprises (Yap, 2017, p. 73). In the interviews, while asking about what kind of job they think a Hoklo speaker will do, the interviewees gave me examples such as salesperson, street vendor, greengrocer, and proprietor. Chou from the first-generation is a proprietor. Although Mandarin is her mother tongue, she speaks fluent Hoklo after she started her own business since she said it is a must for her to do business with her customers. Also, she told me that her son, who is helping her with the business, also became fluent in Hoklo after he started to become involved in the business. However, comparing Chou and two other first-generation interviewees, their children, who are now working as software engineers and insurance salespersons, are not fluent in Hoklo like Chou's son. Moreover, among the younger generation interviewees, who had various occupations, none of them are able to speak fluent Hoklo nowadays. Based on these phenomena, although Hoklo is still competing within the linguistic field, it is losing ground.

As Bourdieu indicated, educational institutions are critical for forming a legitimate language, and Mandarin in Taiwan can be seen as an embodiment of this idea. However, as with languages, such as Catalan and Irish, which were being revived through state

independence or the control of administrative institutions, Taiwan has also been trying to revive local languages since the first local Taiwanese president Lee Teng-Hui came to power. Local language classes became standard curriculum in elementary and junior high schools after the first local Taiwanese party, the DPP, took control of the administrative institutions. Unfortunately, the situation of Taiwanese local language is more like the case of the Irish than the Catalan, and is in fact worse. The current measures of Taiwanese language revival are way less strict than in the case of Irish. Comparing the 'Pressure, Preferment and Projection' policies of Irish, Taiwanese languages got nothing more than school curricula and teaching certifications. Thus, in the interviews, all nine interviewees gave negative or pessimist opinions regarding the current local language classes. All of them referred to the insufficient hours of local language classes, and the lack of bottom-up (family and community) support for creating the language environment.

Conclusion

Reflections

Through various observations, interviews and analyses, this thesis presents and reflects upon the current Mandarin domination in Taiwan from a colonial perspective, and also presents how such colonial language policy has been restraining the Taiwanese linguistic decolonisation. Hoklo, as the local Taiwanese language, was once the language of Hoklo-speaking people for their everyday life, studying, thinking, creating and loving. However, since the Japanese colonialism, the use of Hoklo has declined, first due to the Japanese assimilation policy, an era during which every Taiwanese had

to learn the Japanese language and to try to become as Japanese as possible. After the ROC regime took over in 1945, the Taiwanese went through another assimilation policy, in which Hoklo was suppressed by the KMT's coercive Mandarin policy, a language that nearly no one had spoken before 1945. Similar to the situations in Ireland and Catalonia, Mandarin was enforced in almost every public sector of the Taiwanese society, while Hoklo had to retreat to families, local markets or among small proprietors, where it still is losing ground day by day. As my first-generation interviewees pointed out, they had suffered for not being able to speak proper Mandarin, and they refused to let the same thing happen to their children. Therefore, they taught their children everything in Mandarin, including teaching their own children to call them 'dad' and 'mom' in an entirely different way than they called theirs.

Seventy years later, people can only hear Mandarin on their favourite TV-talk shows, occasionally seeing a few Hoklo speakers awkwardly switching back and forth between Hoklo and Mandarin. People rarely speak Hoklo in daily life as well. Even in the temple, where younger generations were also praying sincerely, perhaps in ways very similar to their parents and grandparents, they did so in a different language. When people are watching their favourite TV-series or movies, they see many Mandarin-speaking lead actors and actresses playing roles with rich characteristics. They are smart, kind, powerful, elegant, and highly-educated. At the same time, they see Hoklo-speaking characters in supporting roles, with criminal, gang-related, grassroots, and religious associations. All these experiences in schools and stereotyping in the public media have led the Taiwanese to internalise the idea that Hoklo is a subordinate language, not as advanced as Mandarin. Since the older generation decided not to pass their mother tongue onto their children, it is 'natural,' for younger generations like my second- and third-generation interviewees, to consider Hoklo to be a language only for the old folks,

not themselves.

When the KMT colonised Taiwan, their colonial language policies established Mandarin domination within the Taiwanese linguistic field. As Pierre Bourdieu pointed out, by controlling the educational institutions and cultural reproduction, the Mandarin-speaking colonisers thus enhanced and perpetuated their power. This dominance fundamentally altered the linguistic habitus of Taiwanese people from Hoklo to Mandarin. The power of this linguistic habitus caused later efforts to revive local languages, a decolonisation effort by the Taiwanese political elites, to encounter serious difficulties, even though a local political party, the DPP, had taken over the administrative institutions of the ROC. None of the interviewees, including those who had been through the local language classes, considered that such classes worked. Given the lack of class hours, and the absence of other revival measures like those seen in the Irish and Catalan cases, the current Taiwanese language revival cannot create an environment that could shatter the dominant Mandarin linguistic habitus and its dominant position within the linguistic field of Taiwan.

Future Research

In 2016, the DPP won the presidential and congressional election against the KMT party once more. It was the first time a local political party took control of the administrative and legislative institutions at the same time. Based on this advantage, the DPP is now pushing for new legislation such as the 'National Language Development Act (國家語言發展法) (The Executive Yuan of the Republic of China, 2018). This policy aims to promote all local Taiwanese languages as national languages, and plans to enhance the language classes and training of qualified teachers. The act

also aims to establish the first-ever full Hoklo television service. The content of this act suggests that the situation in Taiwan will become more similar to that of Ireland. However, Ireland's significantly more comprehensive 'Pressure, Preferment and Projection' policies, were still not sufficient for reviving the Irish language. Therefore this new act may perhaps still be insufficient for a successful Taiwanese language revival. Nevertheless, the change in the field of power since the 2016 election can be seen as a new phase of the Taiwanese decolonisation. Thus, a follow-up research will be needed in the future in order to observe the level of influence of the new revival policy.

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Appendix

Interview Questions

1. **What language do you speak at home?**

   您在家裡說什麼語言？

2. **Thinking about a person who speaks Taiwanese, what are your first thoughts about this person?**

   請問您對說台語的人的第一印象是什麼？

3. **Have you spoken Taiwanese while at school or work? How was the experience?**

   請問您在學校或工作場合說過台語嗎？請敘述您的經驗

4. **What do you think about the local language lectures in elementary and junior high school?**

   請問您對中小學本土語言選修課的看法？