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Degrowth in Swedish Climate Politics

A Study of Political Parties

Master Thesis in Global Studies

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Abstract

Climate change is one of the most pressing problems of the contemporary world and has led to a number of global agreements aimed at solving the situation. In doing so, sustainable development and economic growth are usually the promoted solutions, with the argument that it will lead to increased well-being and environmental protection. However, there are those who oppose this positive view to such solutions, one example being the proponents of degrowth, which poses a radical critique of the current economic system. One of the foundations of degrowth is political ecology, a field concerned with the local and global connection, but also how politics, power and structures affect the environment and people's use of it. Sweden and its political parties are no exception in aiming to decrease climate change. This thesis will therefore study how the central concepts of political ecology are manifested within climate change politics of the Swedish political parties and, based on the results, what the possible effects of the expressed views might be from a degrowth perspective. This has been achieved by using critical ideology analysis on relevant motions presented by the parties. The results indicate that within Swedish climate politics the concepts of political ecology, and therefore degrowth, are barely present, except for in a few instances. This thesis therefore concludes that the parties need to reconsider their views of climate politics in Sweden, and most likely in the rest of their politics as well, in order to reach a much needed sustainable development path.

Keywords: climate change, consumption, degrowth, economy, growth, politics, technology

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1. Introduction and background

Loss of habitat, decreased biodiversity (Centrum för biologisk mångfald, 2017, p. 10), over-exploited fish stocks (Centrum för biologisk mångfald, 2017, p. 13) and pollution of water bodies (Havs- och vattenmyndigheten, 2018; UNICEF, 2018) are only some of the problems facing the contemporary world. One of the most pressing issues is climate change, affecting not only the environment but also human societies. Global discussions on how to deal with climate change has taken place since the late 1980s and has resulted in a number of conferences (Svenska FN-förbundet, 2009, p. 1) and agreements, such as the 2015 Paris Agreement and the Agenda 2030 for sustainable development. On paper this demonstrates a will from decision-makers to prevent, mitigate and adapt to climate change. However, this far it has not been successful and emissions of climate changing greenhouse gases are still increasing (Naturvårdsverket, 2018f, p. 45).

1.1. Drivers and effects

During the last three decades Earth's surface has likely been the warmest during the period of existing climate data, with the latest decade being the warmest of the three (IPCC, 2014, p. 2; Naturvårdsverket, 2013, p. 4; Naturvårdsverket, 2018f, p. 46). This climate change is mostly caused by anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions, mainly carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide (Bernes, 2016, p. 22). Emissions stem from activities like burning of fossil fuels, cement production and flaring, but also tropical deforestation and agriculture (IPCC, 2014, p. 3; Naturvårdsverket, 2018f, p. 46). Additional factors are economic activities, lifestyle and climate policies (IPCC, 2014, p. 8). Among the purposes for these activities are needs for heating, electricity production, industry and transportation (Naturvårdsverket, 2018h, p. 9; Naturvårdsverket, 2018f, p. 46). Approximately half of the world's greenhouse gas emissions are caused by the richest 10 %, while the poorest 50 % only contribute with 10-13 % of global greenhouse gas emissions (Picketty & Chancel, 2015, p. 2).

Climate change exposes ecosystems, people, societies and economic sectors to risks (IPCC, 2014, p. 2, 36; Naturvårdsverket, 2018f, p. 44) and effects can be direct, indirect and vary between places (Naturvårdsverket, 2018a). Examples of the effects include, but are not limited to, melting ice caps, increased temperatures, more extreme weather events (Naturvårdsverket, 2018d; IPCC, 2014) and decreased food security due to changed ecosystems (IPCC, 2014, p. 13). Although many effects are known, the extent of future climate change is uncertain and much depends on the ability of human societies to prevent increasing temperatures and by mechanisms of human and natural systems (IPCC, 2014; SMHI, 2017).

1.2 Targets and future climate scenarios

The 2015 Paris Agreement has set the target to keep the increase of the average global temperature to less than 2°C above pre-industrial levels and strive for limiting the increase to under 1,5°C (United Nations, 2015a, p. 3). If greenhouse gas emissions are not curbed, scenarios made by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) estimates that the global average temperature can increased between 0,3 °C to 4,8 °C in the year 2100 (IPCC, 2014, p. 10, 20ff; SMHI, 2017). Currently, the amount of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere

are increasing, and not decreasing as required (Naturvårdsverket, 2018f, p. 45), making it difficult to not only stay below the target of a 1,5°C or 2°C temperature increase, but also to stay under a 3°C temperature increase (IPCC, 2014, p. 22). But even if humanity was to cease all greenhouse gas emissions there would still be enough greenhouse gases remaining in the atmosphere for climate change to occur for centuries to come (IPCC, 2014, p. 16).

1. 3 Climate change prevention

To solve environmental, social and economic problems, increased economic growth and sustainable development are often suggested solutions, regardless of location, due to the view that this will increase progress, development and well-being (Barroso, Chaves, Martins, & Branco, 2016, p. 1400; Regeringskansliet, 2016a; Xue, Arler, & Næss, 2012, p. 87; United Nations, n.d.a.; United Nations, 2015b). Climate change is no exception and the IPCC (2014, p. 17) considers sustainable development crucial for curbing climate change and mitigating and adapting to its effects. On the other hand, limiting climate change is considered a requirement for achieving sustainable development (IPCC, 2014, p. 17).

While economic growth has improved the life of many people (O'Neill, 2018, p. 141; World Bank Group, 2018, p. 1), neither economic growth or sustainable development have delivered on their promises (Sneddon, Howarth & Norgaard, 2006, p. 256). Paradoxically, climate change might actually run the risk of decreasing the rate of economic growth (IPCC, 2014, p. 16; O'Neill, 2018, p. 141f). Critique towards sustainable development as a pathway to solve environmental and social problems includes that sustainable development is a vague concept, open for to many interpretations, and that the three pillars of sustainability are not properly integrated with one another. They are often treated individually, like when economic and environmental interests are in conflict (Berglund, Gericke & Chang Rundgren, 2014, p. 319f) and the critique is often that economic growth and environmental protection are incompatible. Additional critique is the failure of sustainable development to take power imbalances into account when developing measures for sustainable development. (Sneddon et al., 2006, p. 254, 256).

Strong critique of economic growth and sustainable development when dealing with climate change is articulated by proponents of degrowth. Degrowth, rooted in political ecology, poses a radical critique of sustainable development and economic growth as universal means for solving environmental problems. Instead they argue that a radical transformation of society is necessary, or the relentless pursuit of growth and development will cause more environmental, social and economic disaster (D'Alisa, Demaria & Kallis, 2015, p. xx; Järvensivu, 2013, p. 198).

2. Aim and research questions

If continuing on the present development path it is unlikely that humanity will succeed in meeting the target to limit global the temperature increase to 2°C (IPCC, 2014, p. 22; United Nations, 2015a, p. 3). It is therefore clear that not enough is being done to prevent climate change, despite claims that sustainable development and economic growth are the answers. Sweden is no exception, where it is estimated that the national environmental goal of reducing climate change and being climate neutral by 2045 will fail (Naturvårdsverket, 2018f, p. 14; Regeringskansliet, 2017). This demonstrates the inability of both government and parliament to implement policies to prevent one of the most pressing environmental problems today, as well as the inability to do so within the current economic system. Therefore, a more radical approach is clearly needed.

Degrowth, with a focus on political ecology, is such an approach. Political ecology is a strand of thought which studied the role of politics and institutions within environmental conflicts, unequal distribution of natural resources, environmental harms (Benjaminsen & Svarstad, 2010; Douglas, Kirshen, Daolisso, Watson, Wiggin, Enrici & Ruth, 2011, p. 539; Robbins, 2011; Schlosberg & Collins, 2014), and how the local and global affect one another (Gallardo, Saunders, Sokolova, Börebäck, van Laerhoven, Kokko & Tuvendal, 2017, p. 669; Robbins, 2011, p. 88). Political ecology is suitable perspective for this thesis since climate change does not occur in isolation but is rather a result of both local and global action, such as the fossil-fueled based economic system and pursuit of economic growth. With degrowth as the overarching perspective, and political ecology as an analytical tool to understand climate politics in Sweden, the aim of this thesis will be to create a greater understanding for if the political parties of Sweden are on the path towards a degrowth transition or, if not, how they can enable such a transition.

In order to gain a greater understanding for the possibility of such a transition, the following research questions will be answered:

- How are the central concepts of political ecology indicated within climate change politics of the Swedish political parties?
- Based on the result, what are the possible effects of the views expressed by the political parties, from a degrowth perspective?

3. Delimitations

For a complete Swedish degrowth transition, all parts of society need to be onboard, not only the climate change politics, but since time is limited it is not possible to study all areas of Swedish society. Climate change was chosen since it has serious implications for the entire world, not just isolated places, including both human and nature. Studying climate change politics is therefore highly important.

To accomplish this, party-motions and committee group motions were chosen since they can be accepted by the parliament and have real-life implications in society. Other options were to study party programmes or speeches and interviews of party members, but these options were not chosen since they will not lead to changes in legislation on a national level. However, noteworthy is that I have not taken into consideration whether the motions have been approved by the parliament. This choice was made since it will not matter to the thesis's purpose of understanding the views, ideas and ideologies of the parties. Secondly, the motions are presented by individual party members, and not the entire party, and might therefore go against the official view of the party. However, party members are the ones creating its ideology and represent the parties in the parliament. They most likely have the same ideological background as the rest of the party, and have thus been chosen for representing the parties.

The Social Democrat Party, one of the government parties since the previous electoral period, have not presented any motions in the parliament during this time, but instead a number of government bills. I have chosen not to study these bills since they do not express the ideologies of the party alone, but is a product of negotiations between the Social Democrat Party and other parties. To find its views on climate change the choice was made to study the programme and political guidelines instead. As for the Green Party, which is also part of the government since the last electoral period, some motions are presented, which will be used.

Finally, I could also study the local and regional level, such as municipalities and regions. While they are highly important I argue that since this thesis studies a degrowth transition in Swedish climate politics one needs to study the national level, since it is here the possibility for a true degrowth transition exists. If other actors are to also achieve such a transition, they need support from the parties of the parliament.

4. Relevance to global studies

This thesis is relevant for global studies first of all due to its theoretical foundation. Degrowth and political ecology share a focus on the interconnectedness of the local and the global (Gallardo et al., 2017, p. 669; Missoni, 2015, p. 440; Robbins, 2011, p. 88; Theodoropoulos, 2014, p. 14). Secondly, climate change is an acute global problem, affecting everyone everywhere (United Nations, n.d.b). No individual actor is responsible since the effects are caused by the combined actions on both local and global level, for example Swedish consumption and greenhouse gas emissions (Naturvårdsverket, n.d.). One must therefore study climate change within a Swedish context to gain a greater understanding for how the

climate politics in Sweden affects global climate change. By studying Swedish political parties a greater understanding for localised contributions to global climate change can be achieved. Sweden has the ambition to be climate neutral by 2045 (Naturvårdsverket, 2018f). However, there was almost no change in the amount of Swedish greenhouse gas emissions between 2016 and 2017 (SCB, 2018a). It is therefore important to study other options than the current development path in Sweden. In this context, political parties of the parliament are important to study since they are able to implement laws and policies to prevent, or enable others to prevent, climate change. They therefore carry much of the responsibility for this failure. Because of this, the study is relevant for global studies, since it helps to understand how the actions of individual countries have global effects.

Sweden is also part of the European Union and therefore has obligations and is affected by its agreements and regulations (Naturvårdsverket, 2018g; Sveriges Riksdag, n.d.) and, on a broader scale, integrated into the global community and economic system (Jakobsson, 2007). For example, trade is important for the Sweden's economic growth (SCB, 2018b) while simultaneously affecting the climate greatly, with 64 % of the CO₂-emissions occurring abroad (Naturvårdsverket, 2018e). By studying how the parties perceive Sweden's position in relation to climate change, this study can contribute to the global studies perspective of understanding the interconnectedness of the local and the global, as well as a greater understanding for alternative pathways for a more climate friendly society.

Concerning the academic contribution, as will be demonstrated in "Chapter 5", the amount of research on political ecology and degrowth in a Swedish context is limited. By applying these perspectives to climate politics in Sweden it will contribute to a greater knowledge of climate change, as well as for political ecology, degrowth and sustainable development.

5. Previous research

Climate change is a well researched topic, with research conducted by large international bodies, like the IPCC, to individual researchers with local, regional, national and global focus. Simultaneously there is a variety of research related to both degrowth and political ecology. Not all of this research is focused on the effects of climate change but also on how actors perceive climate change, which can be linked to this study and its focus on ideology of political parties. Some of this research is presented below.

5.1 Individual actors and local research

Focusing on the individual, Häkkinen & Akrami (2014) conducted two studies aimed at understanding if ideology and information affect climate change denial. Results of the study indicate that what they call Social dominance orientation (SDO), i.e. if a person is more prone to favour hierarchy of groups, is a better indicator for predicting climate change denial than right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and left-right political orientation (PO) (Häkkinen & Akrami, 2014).

5.2 Decision-making

Apart from individual perceptions of climate change, others have studied how decision-makers perceive climate change action. Buhr, Roth & Stigson (2014) studied how negotiators, stakeholders and ENGO's participating at COP-17 in Durban, 2010, perceive pledge- and review, i.e. a bottom-up approaches in climate agreements and how they perceive critique towards pledge- and review, especially in the context of intergovernmental climate negotiations. They find that respondents in general agree with critique posed towards pledge- and review, although in different amounts (Buhr, Roth & Stigson, 2014). While this research has an international perspective, other researchers apply a political focus in a Swedish context. Zannakis's 2009 doctoral thesis studies the importance of institutions and politics when solving environmental problems, such as climate change. Efforts to handle them are often not enough and it is difficult for actors to find common ground. The state plays an important role and the dissertation studies how Sweden attempts to achieve both national and international environmental targets, but also how political players are involved in climate politics and how climate change and different goals are framed within a Swedish political context (Zannakis, 2009). Verendel, Johansson & Lindgren (2015) are on a similar track regarding the problematics for political actors to find common ground in climate change prevention. With the help of a game theoretic model, the purpose of their study is to find out more about actors' strategic reasoning in climate change negotiations, predicting actions and behaviours of others involved in the process. The purpose is to understand what affects the possibility for agreement and damage prevention, and the possible role of strategic reasoning. Their study suggests that when actors apply strategic reasoning, it might further their own gain but obstruct reaching an agreement and avoid damage from climate change (Verendel, Johansson & Lindgren, 2015).

5.3 Political ecology and degrowth

Broadening the perspective, there is also research studying climate change combined with degrowth and political ecology. Political ecology has mostly studied environmental issues of the South, but increased attention is given to the North, including Nordic countries. Benjaminsen & Robbins (2015) discuss that the Nordic countries have some similarities with the South, notably in how the growing interest for natural resources in the Arctic region affects the environment and native communities. Production and consumption in the Nordic context are also strongly linked to globalisation and the global economy, making political ecology useful for understanding their impact within and outside the Nordic countries. The importance for understanding who has the ability to set agendas and how power affects governance in the Nordic countries can therefore not be excluded (Benjaminsen & Robbins, 2015). With a Swedish focus, Gallardo et al., (2017) have conducted a fieldwork studying how Sami from four samebyar in Norrbotten county perceive effects of extractive and economic activities on reindeer herding, as well as using and comparing political ecology and social-ecological systems (SES) perspectives for understanding reindeer herding. The authors conclude that using these theoretical perspectives will generate different understandings of reindeer herding, as well as different solutions. Both of these studies exemplify how political ecology can be used within a Nordic context, providing new perspectives for understanding

challenges faced when using nature and natural resources, and how this affects people (Gallardo et al., 2017).

There is also research on economic growth and power, two important issues for degrowth and political ecology. In a European perspective, Balsalobre-Lorente, Shahbaz, Roubaud & Farhani (2018) examine CO₂ emissions and economic growth in five countries of the European Union between 1985-2016, taking into account aspects such as renewable energy, technological innovation and trade openness (Balsalobre-Lorente et al., 2018, p. 356). Results indicate that economic growth will lead to environmental improvement to a certain point, after which it seems to cause more environmental degradation, such as CO₂ emissions, despite increased use of renewable energy (Balsalobre-Lorente et al., p. 218).

Other researchers focus on the economic system. Klitgaard & Krall (2012) discuss the effects of the economic system on a planet with finite resources, stating that it is not a viable combination. The economic system is, long-term, unable to solve social issues, thus requiring a degrowth transition. For this to occur institutional change is a must, promoting an economy not built on fossil fuels, economic growth and market forces (Klitgaard & Krall, 2012). Also studying economic growth and social problems is Victor (2012). The study researches the inability of economic growth to solve environmental issues and increase human well-being, especially in countries where people already have good incomes. The study aims to create an understanding of possible future pathways for not exceeding ecological limits, and utilises a simulation model (called LowGrow) based on the Canadian economy, testing different economic scenarios, one being degrowth. From the scenario in this study, emissions of greenhouse gases were decreased with almost 80% (Victor, 2012).

Some researchers incorporate power into their research on climate change, the economic system, political ecology or degrowth. Koch (2015) discusses climate change in relation to capitalism, Marxism, Fordism and different political systems, as well as how production and consumption patterns are important for understanding greenhouse gas emissions. This includes the power of western countries to set the climate change agenda. If climate change is to be prevented it is also necessary to work with social inequalities and capitalist development simultaneously as climate change. The view of growth as a mean to well-being is questioned due to its adverse effects on climate and other environmental aspects. A transition to a degrowth economy is thus required for overdeveloped countries, creating room for those in need of increased material well-being and not exceeding natural limits (Koch, 2015). On a similar track, Martínez-Alier (2012) discusses the importance for rich countries in the North to start a degrowth transition, since the current pursuit of growth leads to environmental destruction, like climate change. To do so, Martínez-Alier advocates cooperation with environmental justice movements in the South. Environmental justice is an intrinsic part of political ecology. It is highly important for preventing climate change and promote a transition into a degrowth society, since it aims towards equity in resource use and inclusion of the excluded in decision-making, thus focusing on power relations within climate change prevention (Martínez-Alier, 2012).

The research presented in this chapter is just a small sample of existing research on climate change, but also on degrowth and political ecology. However, there is little research on political ecology and degrowth in a Swedish climate context, or in a Swedish context overall. This thesis can thus contribute to filling a research gap by contributing with a degrowth and political ecology analysis of Swedish climate politics.

6. Theoretical framework and key concepts

Degrowth is both a concept and social movement (Martínez-Alier, 2012, p. 60), posing a radical critique of the current economic system (Alexander, 2012, p. 361ff) of relentless pursuit of increased economic growth as a political target (Alexander, 2012, p. 352). Instead, degrowth advocates a radical transformation of society at its core, building on ecology and solidarity (Fritz & Koch, 2018, p. 216; Puggioni, 2017, p. 16) and mainly advocates change in the North (Latouche, 2007, p. 1; Muraca & Schmelzer, 2017, p. 174). The current economic capitalist system and consumption patterns among the rich is highly connected to identity and status but does not actually produce increased well-being anymore. Instead it causes ecological destruction and social inequalities. The economy must therefore be downsized among the rich North, including decreased consumption (Gezon, 2017, p. 589f). Degrowth's goal with such a transformation is to generate more well-being for everyone, while simultaneously staying within ecological limits (Fritz & Koch, 2018, p. 217).

One of the theoretical foundations of degrowth is political ecology, which is a broad theoretical field including research and perspectives from a number of different researchers. Below a theoretical framework has been created from selected researchers, chosen because they discuss the importance of understanding the human-nature relation and how governance and politics shape our understanding of climate change.

Like degrowth, political ecology is critical towards the dominant economic capitalist system and sustainable development for solving environmental problems, as well as stating the importance of the North to curb its consumption and downscale their economies (Gezon, 2017, p. 590f). Political ecology is concerned with the human-nature relation and how humans use the environment (Benjaminsen & Svarstad, 2010, p. 14), perceiving nature and human societies as two unseparable sides of the same coin (Robbins, 2011, p. 232). Political ecologists study changes in the environment and how human action affect such changes (Benjaminsen & Svarstad, 2010, p. 11), including environmental destruction and degradation (Robbins, 2011, p. 105ff), but also resource conflicts, distribution and use (Benjaminsen & Robbins, 2015, p. 191; Benjaminsen & Svarstad, 2010, p. 13, 15). This interaction between human and nature has mostly been studied in the South but increased attention is given to the North (Benjaminsen & Svarstad, 2010, p. 11; Jönsson & Andersson, 2017, p. 19). Because of the human-nature relation environmental problems are considered to be socially constructed and that decision-making affects not only the physical world but also the relation between

people and how institutions work (Benjaminsen & Robbins, 2015, p. 192; Gezon, 2017, p. 585, 591; Robbins, 2011, p. 11ff, 85).

Due to the focus on human action for understanding environmental problems, there are several important concepts within political ecology that are relevant for this study:

6.1 Holism

Political ecology applies a holistic perspective, investigating how local environmental practices and problems are affected by both local events and policies, as well as by the global economy and politics (Gallardo et al., 2017, p. 669; Robbins, 2011, p. 88). One example is over-exploitation occurring from increased pressures based on integration into larger markets and institutions, harming the environment and exposing people and societies to the risk of uneven resource distribution and abolishment of previously sustainable practices (Robbins, 2011, p. 159f). In addition, an historic understanding is vital since previous processes and events, such as colonialism (Robbins, 2011, p. 88) have shaped the present world (Young, 2006, p. 113).

6.2 Environmental justice

While some argue that one needs to study the actions of individuals, others focus on social processes causing structural inequalities between people and groups (Young, 2001, p. 2, 9ff). People inhabit different positions within social structures and are thus presented with differentiated opportunities and resources to affect the lives of themselves and others (Young, 2006, p. 111f). If structural inequalities are not studied it will not be possible to understand obstacles facing people (Young, 2001, p. 2, 9ff). In political ecology environmental justice is concerned with how marginalised people are exposed to disproportionate environmental harms compared to richer, non-marginalised people (Douglas et al., 2011, p. 539; Schlosberg & Collins, 2014). In climate change there are large differences between responsibilities for greenhouse gas emissions, where rich countries and people generally emit more (Hermele, 2017, p. 109), both currently and historically (Balsalobre-Lorente et al., 2018, p. 356). They therefore have an ecological debt (Martínez-Alier, 2012). Furthermore, not everyone is affected equally by environmental burdens, or have equal access to environmental goods. Differences can be found depending on gender, social class and race, and between the North and the South (Martínez-Alier, Pascual, Vivien & Zaccai, 2010, p. 1741f; Young, 2001). Minority groups and people suffering from marginalisation tend to experience more adverse environmental effects than non-minority and non-marginalised groups (Robbins, 2011, p. 87ff). Such structural inequalities strongly connect environmental justice to power and since degrowth is concerned with inequalities of consumption- and pollution patterns it is highly relevant to understand what inequalities exist within climate governance, and why they exist.

6.3 Power

Understanding power is central to political ecology (Benjaminsen & Svarstad, 2010, p. 20). It can be wielded in a number of ways and has no single, conclusive definition (Haugaard, 2002b, p. 1). Some argue that power is the capability of actors to impose their will upon others and contribute to their own favoured outcomes, while for others it is less tangible and occurs on a societal level (Giddens, 2002, p. 151). Important to note is that actors inhabit different positions within social structures and thus enjoy different possibilities to utilise their resources of power to act in favour of their own interests and desires (Young, 2001, p. 10; Young, 2006, p. 112, 127). Therefore, some can use their power to improve their own

powerful positions in the structures, but also its function, reinforcing existing power relations (Young, 2001, p. 13; Haugaard, 2002a, p. 150). For some it is therefore beneficial to maintain unjust social structures (Young, 2006, p. 128) while others find themselves dominated and their actions constrained (Haugaard, 2002a, p. 149). For this thesis I will make use power related to social structures and institutions.

Power inequalities are present in climate governance (Benjaminsen & Robbins, 2015, p. 191) and in political ecology the understanding of power is important for several reasons. Through institutions it is possible to affect the social lives of people (Giddens, 2002, p. 160ff) through policies and decision-making (Benjaminsen & Svarstad, 2010, p. 24). Studying power helps us understand what interests are allowed to be heard (Gallardo et al. 2017, p. 670), what actors are allowed to shape climate action, like setting the agenda at negotiations (Martínez-Alier, 2012, p. 65) or who can impose their values and norms upon others (Benjaminsen & Robbins, 2015, p. 192). Those setting the agenda can create dominant narratives, pushing out other world views and prevent less powerful actors from making their realities and knowledge heard, but also prevent implementation of non-dominant solutions and practices (Benjaminsen & Robbins, 2015, p. 193). By finding what these uneven power relations look like, and what causes them, one can change institutions that maintain the status quo and that prevent some people and groups from participation in climate work (Gallardo et al, 2017, p. 669f). The faith in technology (Giddens, 2002, p. 160ff) and decoupling as preferred solutions for environmental problems can decrease and instead changes to institutions and social structures can be focused, such as more autonomy in decision-making and increased self-sufficiency (Gezon, 2017. p. 591; Theodoropolous, 2014, p. 3, 12).

7. Method

This study will conduct a qualitative content analysis since it is a good way to study both written and non-written content and messages provided by different actors (Bryman, 2016, p. 284f), providing the possibility to discuss what is directly and latently manifested in the material (ibid, p. 184, 563). More specifically, a *critical ideology analysis* will be conducted. Ideology has different definitions. It can have a neutral meaning referring to a set of ideas, but not necessarily the effects of those ideas. Other definitions focus on the effects of the ideologies (Bergström & Boréus, 2012, p. 140f), which is suitable for this study since ideas of the parties can have real-life implications. In this case ideology signifies what a group thinks about different subjects; what is and what should be, as well as how society should function (Börjesson & Rehn, 2009, p. 70f). The purpose of this method is to analyse ideology and put it in relation to reality and social contexts with the aim of “exposing” the ideology (Bergström & Boréus, 2012, p. 148, 160). This includes studying how society is governed, making this method suitable since the thesis will examine ideas expressed by political parties. They enjoy power through their positions as members of the parliament who can create legislations, also making critical ideology analysis suitable since ideology is connected to power and politics (ibid, p. 148). Furthermore, the method looks at how the material presents solutions, and then

relates the solutions to specific theories (ibid p. 160), making it suitable for this study which uses theory as an analytical lens.

The critical ideology analysis will be combined with the use of dimensions as an analytical tool, which will be developed based on political ecology and degrowth on one end and their opposites on the other. The dimensions thus represent different ways of understanding the world (Bergström & Boréus, 2012, p. 156ff). By presenting what end of the dimension the parties lean towards one can create a broader picture of how they understand the world and how society ought to function, and put this in relation to the chosen theories (ibid, p. 160). The views will be demonstrated through quotes taken from the material and translated into English. The original quotes in Swedish are found in "Appendix 1".

7.1 Operation of the study

When conducting the study, party motions and committee group motions were chosen. Party motions are signed by the leader of the party or the group leader, and committee group motions are signed by committee members from the same party. These types of motions were chosen since, if accepted by the parliament, they have actual real-life implications in society. By being developed by commissioners of a single party, they are considered more representative of that specific party than if commissioners from two or more parties would have been involved in the motion. In this way one can distinguish the individual ideologies of the parties.

The motions were found on the official website of the Swedish parliament. The choice was made to use motions for the period 2018/19 since they represent the most current views of the parties. When collecting the material I searched for "climate"¹ and "climate change"², choosing motions where climate did not have a different meaning. To broaden the search I also searched for "sustainable development"³, "consumption"⁴, "growth"⁵, "green growth"⁶ and "degrowth", in order to find related, but relevant, material. However, the majority of those motions were the same as for the first search. Ultimately the choice was made to only use motion where the word "climate" was present, in order to connect it to climate change. For the Social Democrat Party, the material was found on the party's official webpage. For simplicity, this material will also be referred to as either "material" or "motion".

After choosing the material it was analysed in relation to the dimensions. This was done by reading the material, marking sections relating to each dimension, presented under "Analytical framework" below. After presenting the results for each dimension a compilation of how the parties are situated in the dimension will be presented, providing an overview of the ideologies of the parties. It will thus be possible to see whether the parties' ideologies are in line with a degrowth transition or not. After all dimensions have been presented, the views will be related to the theoretical framework in a final discussion

7.2 Analytical framework

Each text was read individually and the analytical framework applied. As previously explained, the analytical framework is based on the critical ideology analysis method, where it is suitable to choose a number of dimensions, or indicators. These dimensions are presented below and are based on political ecology and degrowth. Each dimension includes a number of important concepts (Bergström & Boréus, 2012, p. 156ff) in order to study whether the parties have the same or opposite view as political ecology and, ultimately, degrowth. These concepts will be presented with each dimension.

7.2.1. Human versus nature

For political ecologists, nature and human societies cannot be separated but are deeply entwined and affect each other (Benjaminsen & Svarstad, 2010, p. 14; Robbins, 2011, p. 232). This dimension studies whether the political parties acknowledge this relation, or if they separate humans from nature. For studying this I will look at if the parties specifically write that climate change is human-induced and what the possible effects are. Do the parties only mention effects on humans and human societies, or do they also express that natural systems might be at stake? Finally, do the parties clearly state that nature should be protected for its own sake and not only for the benefits it provides humanity with?

7.2.2 Holism versus reductionism

Political ecology applies a holistic perspective, studying the connection of the local and the global (Gallardo et al., 2017, p. 669; Robbins, 2011, p. 88). This dimension will investigate whether the parties express an understanding for the role of Swedish climate politics on external places and people, such as the effects of Swedish climate politics. Do the parties discuss issues of increased pressure on natural systems in some parts of the world (Robbins, 2011, p. 159f) due to actions of Sweden and other actors in the North? Finally, is the historic aspect discussed, recognising that the North has benefitted more from emitted greenhouse gases (Robbins, 2011, p. 88)?

7.2.3 Individual versus structural inequalities

Political ecology understands the importance of focusing on structures when studying environmental problems, and not only actions of individuals, providing the means to understand how some people are disfavoured (Young, 2001; Young, 2006; Douglas et al., 2011, p. 539). This dimension will study whether the parties aim at taking action towards individual behaviours rather than people's differentiated abilities to affect climate change based on gender, race and socio-economic status (Martínez-Alier et al., 2010, p. 1741; Young, 2001). Are they applying a historic perspective to climate change, recognising historic patterns that have benefitted the North (Robbins, 2011, p. 88; Young, 2006, p. 113). When analysing the material, concepts to search for include "inequalities" and "structures" but also how the parties present Sweden's role in climate change. Is Sweden and other rich actors considered to have the largest responsibility for climate change or does the focus lie on improvement in developing countries?

7.2.4 Technology and decoupling versus downscaling of the economy and consumption

The high-consuming North needs to downscale its consumption and economy in order to stay within ecological limits and create room for those in need to satisfy their basic needs (Fritz & Koch, 2018, p. 217; Gezon, 2017, p. 589f). Many actors promote improved technology and decoupling as the solution to environmental problems instead of changed behavior of high-consuming people and societies (Gezon, 2017, p. 591; Theodoropoulos, 2014, p. 3). Since degrowth and political ecology promote the North leaving ecological space for the South (Gezon, 2017, p. 589f) it is important that Swedish parties promote the decrease of not only domestic emissions, but also to curb consumption of products and services emitting greenhouse gases abroad, including taking responsibility for the distribution of climate changing activities. Concepts to search for includes "consumption", "production", "technology", "market" and "trade".

7.2.5 Power

Power can manifest within all dimensions presented above and this dimension will analyse if, first of all, the respective parties even mention the word "power" in the material (Benjaminsen & Robbins, 2015, p. 191). Secondly, the dimension studies who is supposed to take action and who decides what action to take. This includes the view on institutions, such as if the parties promote a top-down approach that can prevent some actors from participating in climate work or if they promote people's capability of increased self-sufficiency and autonomy in decision-making (Gezon, 2017, p. 591; Theodoropoulos, 2014, p. 3, 12). Lastly, do the parties consider the need for institutional change, both in Sweden and abroad, in order to increase participation of excluded groups and prevent unequal power relations?

7.3 Alternative methods

Alternative methods were thought of, but not chosen, for this study. Discourse analysis also studies how language shapes the world around us and how some discourses are more dominant than others (Bryman, 2016, p. 531ff). Especially in critical discourse analysis, interested in power and language and why some discourses are more prominent than others (Bryman, 2016, p. 540). However, critical ideology analysis was chosen since it provides the ability to not only discern how the parties view climate change, and to put these in relation to the theories through the creation of the dimensions. Differences and similarities between the parties and theories can thus be found. It is this ability to freely create such dimensions that made the critical ideology analysis the more suitable choice.

Another possible approach was to conduct interviews of with politicians to get their views on climate change. However, since I will investigate political parties in the parliament I deemed it more suitable to study written material. Motions are official documents and are available for everyone to read, and thus for others to evaluate the findings of this thesis. Since politicians of the parliament also would be difficult to reach for interviews, I could have interviewed politicians at the local and regional level instead. However, since the commissioners of the parliament, with a high position in the parties, have greater possibility to shape the parties' politics on a national level, and thus the overall function of Swedish society, it was still more suitable to use motions.

8. Results and analysis

8.1 Swedish climate politics

There are a number of global agreements aimed at preventing climate change and Sweden is no exception in the claim of preventing climate change and striving for the Agenda 2030 goals (Regeringskansliet, 2016a) and the Paris Agreement (Regeringskansliet, 2016b). A number of actors are involved, such as organisations, companies, public sector and government agencies (Svenska Miljöinstitutet, 2018), acting on local, regional and national global scale (Sveriges miljömål, 2018). This thesis focuses predominantly on the national scale, due to its aim of studying ideologies of Swedish political parties in the parliament, but has also a global and international connection since climate change politics has implications abroad.

In 2017 the majority of the parties in Swedish parliament voted in favour for a climate policy framework (Klimatpolitiska rådet, 2018, p. 3, 10) aimed at creating long-term goals for the Swedish environmental politics, a system for planning and follow-up and a climate policy council (Klimatpolitiska rådet, 2018, p. 15). In the climate policy framework a climate act was also created (Klimatpolitiska rådet, 2018, p. 15), including that the government is required by law to base its climate policies on national climate goals, joining the goals of budget and climate policy and create a climate action plan every fourth year (Ministry of the Environment and Energy, n.d., p. 2f). Connected to the climate policy framework is the Swedish environmental objectives system. This system includes an overarching "generational goal", aimed at directing Swedish environmental work, and is by the parliament defined as *"The overall goal of Swedish environmental policy is to hand over to the next generation a society in which the major environmental problems in Sweden have been solved, without increasing environmental and health problems outside Sweden's borders"*⁷ (Klimatpolitiska rådet, 2018, p. 15; Naturvårdsverket, 2018c).

To reach the generational target, 16 environmental quality objectives exist, with additional milestone targets, which are followed up annually (Naturvårdsverket, 2019). Since Sweden is part of the European Union, this target is based on European laws and Sweden's commitments as a member state (Naturvårdsverket, 2018b, p. 11f). Important to note is that this goal only applies to territorial emissions in Sweden (Naturskyddsföreningen, 2017, p. 5).

One of the 16 environmental quality objectives is *Reduced climate impact*⁸, aimed at keeping the global temperature increase to under 2°C, but preferably under 1,5°C. Both national and international commitment is important and in Sweden the territorial target is to have no net-emissions of greenhouse gases by 2045 (Ministry of the Environment and Energy, n.d.; Boberg & Nyström, 2018). To reach this national target it is estimated that the emitted amount of greenhouse gases domestically would need to be less than one tonne per person in 2045 (Ministry of the Environment and Energy, n.d., p. 3). However, according to The Swedish Environmental Protection Agency, Sweden will not achieve its national climate target (Naturvårdsverket, 2018f, p. 14), despite a decrease of Swedish greenhouse gases by approximately 26 % between the years 1990 and 2017. However, between 2016 and 2017, the decrease was 0,5% (Naturvårdsverket, 2018i), to be compared with the required emission

decrease of 5-8 % annually for Sweden to reach its 2045 emission target (Naturvårdsverket, 2018b, p. 21).

Furthermore, these emissions are territorial emissions, based only on activities taking place within Swedish borders and is the data used for reporting progress to the European Union and the United Nations (Naturvårdsverket, 2018i; Naturvårdsverket, 2018j). However, a second type of measure are based on production, measuring emissions from Swedish actors both domestically and abroad (Naturvårdsverket, 2018b, p. 11f; Naturvårdsverket, 2018j). A third type of measure is based on Swedish consumption, both domestically and abroad (Naturvårdsverket, 2018j). When using the consumption perspective emissions in the entire production chain are measured (Naturvårdsverket, 2018e). According to the IPCC, in order to limit the global temperature increase to 1,5°C, global per capita emissions of greenhouse gases, depending on the climate scenario used, need to decrease to three to four tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalents each year by 2030 and by 2050 only one tonne. If only counting Swedish territorial emissions they on average accounted for 5,2 tonnes per capita in 2017. If also taking considering Swedish consumption of products and services originating abroad, in 2016 this average was almost the double amount, with 10 tonnes of emitted carbon dioxide equivalents per capita (Naturvårdsverket, 2018b, p. 7f).

As demonstrated above, Sweden on average emits much more greenhouse gases than is acceptable for preventing climate change and achieving the IPCC 1,5°C limit, especially when applying a consumption perspective. This suggests that not enough is being done on the Swedish part to prevent climate change. While there are many different actors on different scales involved in climate work, within the national climate target it is stated that it is important that the public sector leads the way, while everyone in Swedish society must contribute to lifestyle changes to save resources as well as reuse and recycle products and materials (Sveriges miljömål, 2018; Wårdhe, 2018). The parliament is responsible for creating climate policies that affect Swedish society and enables or limits other actors, giving the parliament a large responsibility for climate changing actions in Sweden. How the parties perceive climate change affects such policies. These views will be presented in the dimensions presented below, followed by an analysis of each dimension. After this a final discussion on the collected results and analysis will be presented.

8.2. Human versus nature

This dimension focuses on how the parties perceive the connection between human and nature, such as if they describe them as being connected or separated, and if they consider it important to protect nature for its own sake or for the benefits it provides humanity with.

In the studied motions, none of the parties denies climate change, but presents it as highly problematic and caused by human action. Starting with the Social Democrat Party, the party presents the view that climate change is a severe problem, caused by human action. This is demonstrated by the writing that "the climate question is the critical issue of our time"⁹ (Socialdemokraterna, 2013a, p. 21) and that it causes harmful effects for both humans and non-humans, demonstrated by the statement that it "will lead to severe consequences for life on Earth. Melting glaciers, rising sea-levels, increased droughts and extreme weathers

threaten many of the world's ecosystems. Animal- and plant species risk dying out and people's opportunities for livelihood threaten to disappear"¹⁰ (Socialdemokraterna, 2013a, p. 21). The Social Democrat Party puts responsibility for climate change on humanity, which can be taken from the statement "human burning of fossil fuels has caused severely increased concentrations of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere"¹¹ (Socialdemokraterna, 2013a, p. 15), as well as that "Earth's ecosystems are pressed to hard by resource demanding production techniques and the equally resource demanding consumption patterns developed in the industrialised world"¹² (Socialdemokraterna, 2013a, p. 21). Due to the current situation the Social Democrat Party describes that "the climate crisis and environmental destruction have clarified that the human cannot live without taking nature into consideration"¹³ (Socialdemokraterna, 2013a, p. 4).

A similar perspective is presented by the Green Party, which considers climate change to be "an alarming global issue"¹⁴ (Motion 2018/19:2315, p. 3) so severe that "the ongoing and accelerating climate changes are an existential threat, especially towards humanity, but also for the animals and nature as we know it"¹⁵ (Motion 2018/19:2732, p. 4). Regarding humanity's relation with nature the Green Party also broadens its thought to the environment in general, and references to two authors, whose view on nature they present in a positive light. They state that "we need to increase the knowledge and awareness about nature on all levels of society, from individual to nation. In order to understand how we humans are a part of nature, we need to re-establish contact with it"¹⁶ (Motion 2018/19:2315, p. 4).

For the Moderate Party, climate change is described as "one of the greatest challenges of our time"¹⁷ (Motion 2018/19:2947, p. 2), stating that "we now know that human activity during the last century has had the average temperature rise faster than ever"¹⁸ (Motion 2018/19:2895, p. 3f) putting responsibility on human action. The effects are severe and the Moderate Party describes that "more and more extreme weather have befallen us, in the form of floodings, drought and melting polar ice. Ecosystems are thrown off balance and the consequences become disastrous"¹⁹ (Motion 2018/19:2895, p. 4).

In its general environmental politics, the Christian Democrat Party describes that its "environmental politics is based on the stewardship principle"²⁰ (Motion 2018/19:2726, p. 8), meaning that humanity is "steward of- and not master over - the creation"²¹ (Motion 2018/19:2726, p. 8). We shall therefore "act with a long-term comprehensive view with respect for our contemporary surroundings and future generations"²² (Motion 2018/19:2726, p. 8). When specifically discussing climate change, the party presents it as "the greatest challenge of our time"²³ (Motion 2018/19:2726, p. 12) and that humanity has a responsibility based on the stewardship principle (Motion 2018/19:2726, p. 8). The Christian Democrat Party describes the effects of climate change to be serious, indicated by the statement "when the Earth's average temperature increases the developing countries are affected especially hard by drought, soil erosion, floodings, parasites and spread of tropical diseases"²⁴ (Motion 2018/19:2764, p. 15), indicating a connection between the human and non-human world.

When presenting climate change, the Centre Party remarks that "the use of fossil energy is harmful for the climate"²⁵ (Motion 2018/19:2840, p. 6) and that "the effects of climate change befalls the entire humanity with more extreme weather events and natural disasters. Drought, floodings and hunger forces people around the world to flee from their homes"²⁶ (Motion 2018/19:2426, p. 6). According to the Centre Party climate change does not only cause

harmful effects in Sweden but "also in other parts of the world large problems arise in the tracks of climate change"²⁷ (Motion 2018/19:2426, p. 10).

The Left Party also presents an awareness that changes in the climate affect human societies, demonstrated by the view that climate change causes harmful effects and that "extreme weather events such as droughts and floods today already strike hard towards people in many parts of the world"²⁸ (Motion 2018/19/757, p. 37), like "weakened food supplies, hunger disasters and mass movements"²⁹ (Motion 2018/19:392, p. 9).

The detrimental effects of climate change are recognised by the Liberal Party, on both humans and non-humans, indicated by the statement that "it affects all life on Earth"³⁰ (Motion 2018/19:2956, p. 1; Motion 2018/19:2255, p. 3).

Finally, the Sweden Democrat Party presents the view that emissions of greenhouse gases are negative, indicated by the quote "emissions of greenhouse gases are negative for the global development and that Sweden should contribute to solving, dampen or otherwise counteract the effects of these problems"³¹ (Motion 2018/19:2820, p. 4f). However, the party presents a slightly more careful view on the effects of climate change, demonstrated by the quote "we can also be rather certain that the climate will vary and that Sweden and other countries will face challenges following extreme weather events, regardless of what the underlying cause is and regardless of how many billions we chose to spend on different climate investments"³² (Motion 2018/19:2820, p. 5).

8.2.1. Discussion

In the material one can see that all of the eight parties demonstrate the view that climate change is a severe problem that needs to be dealt with, which is an important beginning for preventing climate change. The second part of this dimension concerned how the parties think of the value of nature, more specifically if they present the view that nature should be protected for its own sake or because of the benefits it provides humanity with. All of the parties mention that non-human systems will be affected, but not necessarily that these changes are negative for nature itself but rather for humanity. The Social Democrat Party, the Green Party, the Liberal Party and the Moderate Party all write that climate change will have harmful effects on natural systems, such as ecosystems and animals, without necessarily connecting it to human societies. Remaining parties, the Left Party, the Sweden Democrat Party, the Centre Party and the Christian Democrat Party, do not really bring up this aspect of nature, but rather focus on the effects climate change has on human societies. However, even in the cases where the parties do bring up the issue of changes to natural systems the discussion tend to stop there. It is not stated that nature in itself is important and should be valued as much as human life and societies.

To summarise this dimension one can note that there are traces of political ecology, and thus degrowth, in the motions of the parties, in the knowledge that human and nature are connected and that humanity and climate change therefore affect one another. Other than this a political ecology and degrowth perspective is not presented from any party, since they do not value nature for its own sake.

8.3. Holism versus reductionism

This dimension investigates the parties' ideas on the local and the global, such as if they do or do not think that Swedish climate politics affect places and people outside of Sweden, such as increased pressures on natural systems. Lastly, this dimension includes if the parties have an historic perspective on climate change, such as who has historically emitted greenhouse gases and who is responsible.

8.3.1. Cooperation and relation to other actors

One present theme in the material was the idea of cooperation between different actors, domestically but also with external actors, such as in the European Union and on a global scale, in order to meet the climate change challenges.

For the Social Democrat Party cooperation is necessary for handling climate change, which in a Swedish context is demonstrated by ideas such as that "policy, research, business and civil society are working together to make Sweden a leading-edge green country" (Socialdemokraterna, 2017, p. 30) but also that "for us Social Democrats it is obvious that the politics is completely necessary to achieve the climate transition"³³ (Socialdemokraterna, 2013b, p. 22). When broadening the perspective to not only include Swedish actors in a domestic context the Social Democrat Party states that it is necessary with "a cohesive global and national political work to secure a good environment in the future also"³⁴ (Socialdemokraterna, 2013b, p. 22) and for environmental work in general the Social Democrat Party writes that "the EU is our most important arena in global environmental work" (Socialdemokraterna, 2017, p. 33).

The Moderate Party is also positive to cooperation which is suggested by the writing "in order to meet the global climate changes and environmental challenges every part of society must carry its share of the burden"³⁵ (Motion 2018/19:2896, p. 9), suggesting that no single actor is responsible. Joint efforts are required. When the Moderate Party broadens the discussion to the international level it presents the idea that "a good international cooperation is crucial for us to be able to move forward"³⁶ (Motion 2018/19: 2895, p. 4). Trade agreements are lifted as one important approach since "through trade agreements Sweden has the possibility to affect other countries"³⁷ (Motion 2018/19:2895, p. 26), although "the main competence for negotiating trade agreements is in Brussels"³⁸ (Motion 2018/19:2895, p. 26). This suggests that cooperation within the European Union is of great importance for the Moderate Party.

While the domestic arena is important, the Centre Party considers the international arena to be the most vital, indicated by the view that "effective answers to the challenges we face need to be international"³⁹ (Motion 2018/19:2426, p. 16). For the Centre Party the European Union is considered important for dealing with a number of issues, like climate change, and it is suggested that "Sweden shall push that the member states conduct EU-cooperation in issues where better cooperation today is necessary"⁴⁰ (Motion 2018/19:2859, p. 4).

For the Liberal Party cooperation is also highly important when working with climate change, indicated by the writing that "environmental destruction and climate threat knows no boundaries and it requires collective solutions"⁴¹ (Motion 2018/19:2255, p. 4). According to the Liberal Party the EU is the preferred forum for Sweden to work in, demonstrated by the quote "the environment and the climate needs more EU-cooperation"⁴² (Motion 2018/19:2956, p. 2).

The Sweden Democrat Party promotes cooperation in the international arena, demonstrated by the writing "global cooperation is a precondition for an efficient climate politics"⁴³ (Motion 2018/19:2820, p. 3). Furthermore, the party brings up cooperation not only between actors but also of different political areas, stating that "the environment- and climate politics cannot be isolated from politics in general but shall be seen as a part of whole"⁴⁴ (Motion 2018/19:2367, p. 1).

For the Christian Democrat Party no single actor is given responsibility for climate change but instead "responsibility, which is the linchpin in the stewardship principle, is both individual and collective. [] It is not possible to pass on responsibility on other persons, or on society at large, when it comes to lifestyle changes"⁴⁵ (Motion 2018/19:2726, p. 9). The individual is highly important but society needs to enable people to make environmentally friendly choices, demonstrated by the ideas that "simultaneously it is not enough with only individual decisions. It requires overarching frameworks and conditions which enable and encourage a long term sustainable lifestyle"⁴⁶ (Motion 2018/19:2726, p. 9). For a change to occur it is necessary with "people's will and motivation to participate"⁴⁷ (Motion 2018/19:2726, p. 9). When specifically discussing the international arena, like previous parties the idea is that "cross-border cooperation is crucial if an unacceptable global temperature increase shall be avoided"⁴⁸ (Motion 2018/19:2764, p. 15) and that it "requires both regional, national and global solutions"⁴⁹ (Motion 2018/19:2726, p. 12).

The Green Party does not diverge from the previous parties in presenting cooperation in a positive light, stating that "it is obvious that this challenge is not something which single individuals, municipalities or even nations can solve on their own. Cooperation is necessary"⁵⁰ (Motion 2018/19:2733, p. 7) and "all parts of society must participate in the transition and work collectively and dedicated to decrease emissions"⁵¹ (Motion 2018/19:2733, p. 14). For the Green Party the international arena is important since "for the 1,5°C target to be met it requires a powerful international climate work. In this Sweden has an important part, and of course is also our work in the EU crucial"⁵² (Motion 2018/19:2733, p. 14).

Finally, the Left Party's view on cooperation is positive since "in order to transition to a more sustainable direction it requires that all parts of society and all inhabitants take collective responsibility and work together in a more sustainable direction"⁵³ (Motion 2018/19:1761, p. 2), further saying that if we do not manage to live within ecological limits "it hits ourselves but also other countries' inhabitants and future generations"⁵⁴ (Motion 2018/19:392, p. 6). For reaching national climate targets the Left Party states that "it is the government which ultimately is responsible for the authorities to manage their work in such a way that the targets set by government and parliament can be reached"⁵⁵ (Motion 2018/19:1761, p. 7). However, the Left Party does not put much emphasis in the EU but rather presents the view that "the only sustainable approach is to decide that it should be reached completely through only national efforts"⁵⁶ (Motion 2018/19:392, p. 17).

8.3.2. Sweden as a role model

Another commonly presented theme is Sweden as an international role model. According to the Social Democrat Party, it is important that some countries lead the way for others since "the necessary transition to ecologically sustainable development is a responsibility for the entire international community, but the rich countries which today stand for the large part of

emissions must lead the way”⁵⁷ (Socialdemokraterna, 2013a, p. 26) and that Sweden can be a ”forerunner in the own, national climate politics”⁵⁸ (Socialdemokraterna, 2013a, p. 26).

For the Left Part, one can see that it wants Sweden to be an international climate role model, demonstrated by the writing ”Sweden shall belong to the leading countries in the climate transition”⁵⁹ (Motion 2018/19:392, p. 16) and in order to achieve this, focus is put on the national level where ”the only sustainable approach is to decide that it should be reached completely through national efforts only”⁶⁰ (Motion 2018/19:392, p. 17).

Deviating somewhat from the Social Democrat Party and the Left Party, others express value in the economic arena for being an international role model. The Moderate Party’s opinion is that economic growth is vital and that ”it is not enough to lower the Swedish emissions for other countries to want to follow us”⁶¹ (Motion 2018/19:2895, p. 5). Instead the Moderate Party writes that ”the key to an actually succesful climate politics lies in being able to decrease emissions even during a strong boom year”⁶² (Motion 2018/19: 2895, p. 5) and by achieveing this ”Sweden can continue to be a leading country which shows that decreased emissions and strong growth go hand in hand”⁶³ (Motion 2018/19:2947, p. 3). The individual is also very important for the Moderate Party, demonstrated by the quote ”in the environment and climate-work, as in our politics in general, we take our point of departure in the human. Knowledgeable consumers with more money left in the wallet can make a large difference for the environment and the climate by using their consumer power”⁶⁴ (Motion 2018/19:2895, p. 7). The Centre Party demonstrates a similar view as the Moderate Party, namely that ”when other countries falter the voice of Sweden and the European Union needs to be clear”⁶⁵ (Motion 2018/19:2426, p. 16). The Centre Party also disucsses that combining economic growth with decreased environmental impact is important because then will ”Sweden go ahead, lead the way and become a climate model for the rest of the world”⁶⁶ (Motion 2018/19:2426, p. 7). A third party advocating economic growth is the Christian Democrat Party, presenting the idea that Sweden must ”be showing that it is possible to combine low emissions with good economic development”⁶⁷ (Motion 2018/19:2726, p. 12) and that ”Sweden shall continue to push for the EU to be a climate- and environmental political rolemodel”⁶⁸ (Motion 2018/19:2726, p. 12). Finally, the Liberal Party also writes that ”Sweden shall show that it is possible to combine prosperity and growth with responsibility for the environment and climate”⁶⁹ (Motion 2018/19:2255, p. 4). Furthermore, the international arena is important for the Liberal Party, indicated by the line ”EU and Sweden shall be a driving force and show leadership in order to reach the goals of the Paris Agreement”⁷⁰ (Motion 2018/19:2956, p. 2).

Putting less emphasis on the economic aspect is the Green Party, although still linking decreased emissions with increased welfare, stating that ”by combining radical climate politics with a well functioning welfare society can Sweden be an even stronger leading country for other countries to be inspired by”⁷¹ (Motion 2018/19:2732, p. 4) and be ”forerunners who show that it is possible to decrease emissions and simultaneously live a good life is a condition for the world to succeed. Here Sweden has an important role”⁷² (Motion 2018/19:2733, p. 7). Furthermore, aiding others is also vital for the Green Party, indicated by the view that it is important that ”Sweden goes ahead in the international work and supports countries that are stricken particularly hard of climate change”⁷³ (Motion 2018/19:2733, p. 13).

Deviating from the opinions of the other parties, the Sweden Democrat Party does not want Sweden to take on larger responsibilities than other countries. The reason for this is that the party is of the opinion that by doing so "Sweden today contributes to increasing the possibility of other member states to decrease their ambitions on the area"⁷⁴ (Motion 2018/19:2820, p. 9). The Sweden Democrat Party states that greater emission cuts than other countries is also negative since "the problem with this strategy is that there is nothing which indicates that it works"⁷⁵ (Motion 2018/19:2820, p. 5).

8.3.3 Carbon leakage

A third theme found in the motions is carbon leakage. Three parties raise this issue, suggesting that Swedish climate policies can have negative impacts on the climate through companies and activities moving to places with lesser environmental protection. The Centre Party writes that "we have a responsibility also for environmental impacts arising outside of Swedish borders and if Swedish production shuts down or moves it will lead to us instead having to import food, material and commodities which can have been produced with a higher environmental impact in another part of the world"⁷⁶ (Motion 2018/19:2426, p. 9). A similar view as the Centre Party is presented by both the Sweden Democrat Party and the Moderate Party, The Sweden Democrat Party writes that "according to the theory of carbon-leakage it can even be so that this politics contributes to increased emissions in other countries. It must be fundamental for Swedish climate politics that politics on the area does not lead to emissions in Sweden migrating to other countries"⁷⁷ (Motion 2018/19:2820, p. 5). Lastly, the Moderate Party presents the view that "as soon as we implement measures in Sweden to lower emissions there is a risk that the emission-generating activity moves to another country. This can even lead to larger emissions, globally speaking, if products instead are produced in countries with higher emissions"⁷⁸ (Motion 2018/19: 2895, p. 6).

8.3.4 Historic perspective

Among the eight parties of the parliament, two raise the issue of historic emissions. The Left Party presents an awareness that historic inequalities have affected present day climate change, where the rich have emitted more and simultaneously enjoyed the benefits. This is demonstrated by the quotes "the world's rich people have caused climate change"⁷⁹ (Motion 2018/19:757, p. 19) and thus it is "the rich countries that have the historic responsibility for climate change and which now also have the largest responsibility to decrease their emissions"⁸⁰ (Motion 2018/19:392, p. 7; Motion 2018/19:757, p. 19). That the Left Party is of the opinion that the rich countries have benefitted the most from climate changing activities is demonstrated by the idea that industrialised countries "have taken a very large portion of the total emission space and thus limited other countries' development"⁸¹ (Motion 2018/19:392, p. 16).

The second party that presents a historic perspective on responsibility of climate emissions is the Social Democrat Party, which can be seen through the statement "it is we in the rich industrialised countries that have historically been responsible for the largest emissions of greenhouse gases and it is the poorest countries that are affected the hardest by climate change. Therefore we mean that the basic principle is that the industrialised world has an historic responsibility for the climate changes"⁸² (Socialdemokraterna, 2013b, p. 22).

8.3.5. Discussion

Looking at the relation between the local and the global one can see that all of the parties to some extent advocate cooperation with other actors, both nationally and internationally. The European Union is a prominent arena for the international cooperation. This suggests that the parties believe that Sweden can affect global climate change, if not alone then at least by combining forces with other countries of the European Union. It also suggests the idea that individual actors alone are unable to solve climate change, indicating a more holistic perspective in this regard, and that the individual parts, in this case countries, need to come together on a global scale. The parties state that it is important to prevent climate change in order to limit negative effects. Among these parties the Left Party sticks out slightly, by the view that if we do not manage to live within ecological limits "it hits ourselves but also other countries' inhabitants" (Motion 2018/19:392, p. 6), which more specifically brings up the effects on people in other places of the world.

Secondly, one noteworthy theme found in the motions is the view on Sweden as a role model. All the parties, except the Sweden Democrat Party, stated that they saw the importance of Sweden to be a role model for other countries. This suggests that these seven parties are of the opinion that Swedish actions can have a positive impact on the climate, preventing its negative effects and inspiring others to take action. The Sweden Democrat Party presents a different view than the other seven parties by stating that Sweden should not aim for higher targets on emission increases than other members of the European Union, since it can increase the possibility for other European countries to increase their greenhouse gas emissions. While understanding that the actions of one country can affect others, the Sweden Democrat Party fails to understand responsibility of industrialised countries for climate change emissions. As for the remaining seven parties, apart from advocating cooperation, it is not discussed how Swedish climate policies can increase or decrease pressures on people and places outside of Sweden.

Thirdly, the concern for carbon leakage is presented by three parties: the Centre Party, the Sweden Democrat Party and the Moderate Party. Their concern for how Swedish environmental politics in Sweden must be developed to prevent the movement of harms and damaging activities abroad suggests an alignment with a political ecology perspective of understanding how the actions in one country can affect climate change.

Finally, when discussing the historic perspective only two parties, the Left Party and the Social Democrat Party, recognise the historic responsibility of Sweden and the North, aligning with a political ecology perspective, while the remaining parties do not express this perspective in their motions.

When compiling the results of this dimension one can see that there are traces of political ecology present in the material. All parties consider cooperation to be important, suggesting the view that Swedish climate policies can affect the surrounding world. The idea of Sweden as a role model from seven of the parties further demonstrates this. Additionally, three parties cover the issue of carbon leakage, indicating a political ecology perspective by acknowledging that Swedish environmental policy can have implications abroad. But beyond this it is remarkably how little attention is given to the effects of Swedish activities outside of Swedish borders. That only two parties realise the historic responsibility of Sweden and the North demonstrates this even more and this shallow focus indicates that the parties do not have

enough of a political ecology perspective to realise the responsibility of different actors to prevent climate change.

8.4. Individual versus structural inequalities

This dimension studies whether the parties focus on individual actors or structural inequalities in climate politics. The dimension includes if the parties apply a consumption- or production perspective on greenhouse gas emissions, but also a historic perspective. If the parties have an historic perspective on climate emissions or not has already been discussed under *holism versus reductionism* in section 8.3.

The focus on structural inequalities varies greatly between the parties. The most prominent focus is presented by the Left Party, which states that "the environmental issue is basically a question of distribution of limited resources"⁸³ (Motion 2018/19:392, p. 5), making environmental politics "a question of justice and solidarity"⁸⁴ (Motion 2018/19:392, p. 5). It presents a critique towards the capitalist system, through quotes such as "capitalism distributes the Earth's resources extremely unequal, between classes, between rich and poor countries and – in interaction with patriarchal structures – between women and men"⁸⁵ (Motion 2018/19:392, p. 6; Motion 2018/19:757, p. 19). The Left Party presents a consumption perspective, indicated by the line "the world's richest people have caused climate change and still have the largest effect on the climate. Those who are affected are however the world's poor people" (Motion 2018/19:392, p. 7; Motion 2018/19:757, p. 19). To deal with such inequalities the Left Party is of the opinion that there is a need for "a climate policy where the rich countries and the multi-national companies take their responsibility"⁸⁷ (Motion 2018/19:757, p. 8), and that "it requires a new economic world order with a clear redistribution of power and resources from the rich countries and rich people to poor countries and poor people, and from men to women"⁸⁸ (Motion 2018/19:757, p. 8).

The Social Democrat Party discusses the presence of structures, but not in the same extent as the Left Party. The Social Democrat Party writes that "both economic and social structures obstruct the necessary transition to ecological endurance"⁸⁹ (Socialdemokraterna, 2013a, p. 21), while presenting the understanding that "the rich countries account for the greatest emissions and at the same time they attract the greatest benefits" (Socialdemokraterna, 2017, p. 31), indicating a consumption perspective on climate change. The party's consumption perspective is present also in the statement that "Earth's ecosystems are pressed to hard by resource demanding production techniques and the equally resource demanding consumption patterns developed in the industrialised world"⁹⁰ (Socialdemokraterna, 2013a, p. 21).

The Liberal Party to some extent presents an awareness of structural inequalities, at least in Sweden. One example is subsidises, where the party writes that "environmental subsidies are redistributive politics since the largest contribution goes to those with the biggest purchasing power. It is simply not reasonable to use tax money to subsidise purchases of cars, bikes and outboards"⁹¹ (Motion 2018/19:2956, p. 4). Furthermore, when discussing climate change in Sweden the Liberal Party brings up the issue of changes in the tax deductible travel expenses, stating that "conditions are different in our wide country"⁹² (Motion 2018/19:2956, p. 2). Regarding the consumption- or production perspective, the Liberal Party's opinion is that "the one polluting shall also pay more"⁹³ (Motion 2018/19:2956, p. 2; Motion 2018/19:2255, p. 4).

However, this is not applied to a global perspective, but focuses on activities taking place in Sweden.

The Green Party does not discuss structural inequalities directly, but there is a presence of it within the material, one example being the differentiated effects of climate change on people, demonstrated by the quote "as often it is the most vulnerable groups in the world that are affected the hardest: the world's poor and especially women"⁹⁴ (Motion 2018/19:2732, p. 4). The Green Party also presents a consumption perspective, demonstrated by "if the entire Earth's population consumed as much as the Swede does on average it would be needed just over four globes with natural resources. This is partly due to that the socio-economic system we have rests upon a technological paradigm: cheap fossil energy"⁹⁵ (Motion 2018/19:2732, p. 11). Furthermore, the party is aware of the fact that much of Sweden's consumption, from both individuals and society at large, is occurring in other countries and that "this means that Sweden's environmental impact in other countries is increasing in the same pace as emissions in Sweden are decreasing"⁹⁶ (Motion 2018/19:2733, p. 9).

The Christian Democrat Party is not specifically stating structural inequalities to be a problem, but it is present in its motions. In regards to other countries the party states that "we have a moral responsibility to help and support the poor countries on their way towards a sustainable development"⁹⁷ (Motion 2018/19:2726, p. 13) such as through a green climate fund and thus "it requires that the richer countries prioritise putting capital to the fund so that the developing countries shall be able to contribute to the collectively agreed climate targets"⁹⁸ (Motion 2018/19:2726, p. 13), indicating that the party is aware of inequalities between groups of people. However, the largest responsibility is put on the individual, and for societal change to actually be effective "the success of such a system is ultimately determined by people's will and motivation to participate"⁹⁹ (Motion 2018/19:2726, p. 9). At the same time, the Christian Democrats expresses some awareness that different places have different preconditions for handling environmental issues and are also aware that "environmental challenges look very different locally and regionally"¹⁰⁰ (Motion 2018/19:2726, p. 10). Therefore "an individual environmental policy reform rarely strikes as well everywhere in our country"¹⁰¹ (Motion 2018/19:2726, p. 10).

Some of the parties do not to a great extent discuss structural inequalities. The Moderate Party does not specifically discuss structural inequalities but rather presents the view that "in order to meet the global climate changes and environmental challenges every part of society must carry their share of the burden"¹⁰² (Motion 2018/19:2896, p. 9) and that "the climate challenge puts demands of the entire world to transition"¹⁰³ (Motion 2018/19:2895, p. 23).

The Centre Party also does not focus on structural inequalities in their motions, although the party is aware that our actions affect the climate, indicated by the statement that "sustainability work demands political leadership, but we all also carry a responsibility of our own where our behaviours and choices can make a difference. In the Centre Party's green and liberal politics we trust in people's ability to take responsibility for their own choices"¹⁰⁴ (Motion 2018/19:2426, p. 7). When it comes to the production- or consumption perspective the party presents the view that those that pollute the most shall pay the most and "that to decrease and in the long run completely phase out environmentally harmful subsidies, for example fossil fuels and material, is another way to let those who pollute stand for the entire cost"¹⁰⁵ (Motion 2018/19:2426, p. 8).

The Sweden Democrat Party shares the view of the other parties, namely that "those who emit the most also shall have the largest commitment to decrease their emissions"¹⁰⁶ (Motion 2018/19:2820, p. 4). However, regarding the 2015 Paris Agreement the party also writes that "demands are set very low on developing countries, where the potential is great for large emission increases in the future"¹⁰⁷ (Motion 2018/19:2820, p. 8), suggesting that the party fails to take into account the need for many developing countries to grow and improve the lives of people. Furthermore, a production perspective is indicated by the quote "since Sweden only stands for just over one parts per thousand of the world's total emissions of greenhouse gases, in parity with our share of the world's population and even lower if consideration is taken to changed land use, it is not reasonable that Sweden straight off shall shoulder larger emission decreases than other countries"¹⁰⁸ (Motion 2018/19:2820, p. 4).

8.4.1. Discussion

This dimension includes how the parties understand inequalities within climate politics, more specifically if they focus on social structures or the individual. For some of the parties one can see that they have some focus on structural inequalities. The most prominent one is the Left Party, discussing that climate change affects, and is affected by, people in different ways, where men and the rich tend to emit more, and that a new economic world order is needed. Social structures is also relatively prominent for the Social Democrat Party, which raises the issue of how social and economic structures are partly responsible for present day economic problems. The Liberal, Green and Christian Democrat Party touch upon structural inequalities, although to a lesser extent than The Left Party and the Social Democrat Party.

Among the three remaining parties, structural inequalities is not brought up, more specifically the Moderate Party, the Centre Party and the Sweden Democrat Party. The Moderate Party states that everyone has a responsibility to do their part, but does not discuss structures any further. The Central Party presents the view that those that pollute should pay, but it is not discussed in relation to responsibility of, for example, rich and poor countries. The Sweden Democrat Party is not focused on social structures either and rather presents the opinion that developing countries are not given enough responsibility in international climate agreements. Noteworthy though is that none of the eight parties write in their motions that individuals have the sole responsibility for climate change. So while only the Left Party and the Social Democrat Party do raise the issue of social structures one cannot say that the remaining six parties falls into the category of individual inequalities either. However, these six parties, in this dimension, do not align with a degrowth perspective either.

8.5. Technology and decoupling versus downscaling of the economy and consumption

This dimension studies how the parties perceive technological development and decoupling in climate politics, as well as their opinions on the economy and consumption.

8.5.1. Technology and decoupling

According to the Social Democrat Party technology is part of the solution to climate change, indicated from the statement that "the environmentally friendly technology is developed and spread to slowly"¹⁰⁹ (Socialdemokraterna, 2013a, p. 21), suggesting that the party wants to speed up such a development. Technology can also improve the Swedish economy, since "the transition to a sustainable society means large opportunities for new innovations, more jobs and increased quality of life"¹¹⁰ (Socialdemokraterna, 2013a, p. 22) and that "Sweden can also take a leading role as exporter of new energy-saving and environmentally adapted technology and new forms of energy production"¹¹¹ (Socialdemokraterna, 2013a, p. 27).

The Moderate Party writes that "the climate challenge puts demands on the entire world to transition. This requires that environmental technology continues to be developed"¹¹² (Motion 2018/19: 2895, p. 23). Technology can be brought to other places where "technical successes and method-development can become important export-products which can help other countries to a faster transition"¹¹³ (Motion 2018/19: 2895, p. 6). This demonstrates a positive view on technology. Concerning decoupling, the Moderate Party has the opinion that "it is not enough to lower Swedish emissions to make others want to follow. We must also show that it is possible to break the link between growth and increased emissions"¹¹⁴ (Motion 2018/19: 2895, p. 5). Furthermore, the party writes that since many domestic measures have already been taken, in Sweden "the large emissions reductions that are left to do will be dependent on technological leap-frogging"¹¹⁵ (Motion 2018/19: 2895, p. 6).

The Centre Party is also positive towards technology for dealing with climate change, not decreased economic growth, stating that "it is by the human ingenuity and a green growth which we manage the climate transition. Our technology and smart solutions can contribute to jobs and growth here, simultaneously as it decreases emissions in the surrounding world"¹¹⁶ (Motion 2018/19:2426, p. 6f). According to the Centre Party technology should not only be kept within Sweden, but instead "we can create export-possibilities for technology, knowhow and renewable energy, simultaneously as we ensure electric power supply for us and for our neighbours"¹¹⁷ (Motion 2018/19:2426, p. 11). Decoupling is another suggested solution from the Centre Party, indicated by the quote "the climate crisis demands that we unite increased economic growth with less emissions"¹¹⁸ (Motion 2018/19:2694, p. 4) and that it is important with "a politics which by effective means unites economic growth with decreased emissions and less environmental impact"¹¹⁹ (Motion 2018/19:2426, p. 8).

The Liberal Party is positive towards technology and market-based solutions for dealing with climate change, not lifestyle changes, demonstrated by the idea that "science, facts and technology development finds the solutions. The market-economy and free trade, not politicians or prohibitionism, propel smart, sustainable solutions"¹²⁰ (Motion 2018/19:2956, p. 1f; Motion 2018/19:2255, p. 4).

The Sweden Democrat Party's opinion on technology is that "in order to decrease emissions an increased focus needs to lie on research and technological development, rather than general tax increases for decreasing emissions within Sweden's borders"¹²¹ (Motion 2018/19:2820, p.

6). This view is further demonstrated by the statement that the party suggests "an offensive environment- and climate politics that affirms technological development and cooperation with the trade and industry"¹²² (Motion 2018/19:2367, p. 1). Furthermore, the Sweden Democrat Party has the opinion that technological improvements also can be positive for the Swedish economy since "it also provides Sweden with export revenues and job opportunities, simultaneously as Sweden's position as a knowledge nation is strengthened"¹²³ (Motion 2018/19:2367, p. 5) and that such technology "can be spread to other countries and thus lead to considerable improvements globally"¹²⁴ (Motion 2018/19:2367, p. 5). Decoupling is also presented as important by the party, demonstrated by the view that "emissions of greenhouse gases shall be low in an international perspective, simultaneously as the economic development continues"¹²⁵ (Motion 2018/19:2820, p. 6).

The Left Party is also positive towards technology in climate change prevention, not only in Sweden but also in developing countries. The party expresses the view that "for developing countries to have any possibilities to slow down their own emissions and simultaneously develop they need to get access to modern environmental technology"¹²⁶ (Motion 2018/19:392, p. 23). To enable this the Left Party wants to make it easier and cheaper for developing countries to acquire such technology (Motion 2018/19:392, p. 23).

While the Christian Democrat Party considers lifestyle changes and sustainable consumption important for environmental protection (Motion 2018/19:2726, p. 9) the party also promotes decoupling, indicated by the view that "by showing that it is possible to combine low emissions with good economic development Sweden can contribute to deflate the internationally far too prevailing myth about the opposite"¹²⁷ (Motion 2018/19:2726, p. 12).

The Green Party presents a positive view on decoupling, indicated by the statement that "the economy has to fit within planetary boundaries and lead to the development of society being decoupled from over-consumption of resources"¹²⁸ (Motion 2018/19:2732, p. 11). However, when it comes to the faith in technology the Green Party is expressing that the role technology plays in society and for human consumption has contributed to climate change. This can be discerned by the writing "if the entire Earth's population consumed as much as the Swede does on average it would be needed just over four globes with natural resources. This is partly due to the socio-economic system we have rests upon a technological paradigm: cheap fossil energy"¹²⁹ (Motion 2018/19:2732, p. 11).

8.5.2 Economy and consumption

In order for a change into a more climate friendly society the North needs to downscale both consumption and the economy in general to make room for those in need to grow. However, such a downscaling is not considered an alternative for many of the parties of the Swedish parliament.

The first example of a positive approach to economic growth is the Centre Party, which voices the opinion that "a better environment goes hand in hand with economic development and growth"¹³⁰ (Motion 2018/19:2426, p. 7) and that "the climate is not saved by stopping growth and looking backwards. It is not by discarding all the good which human ingenuity och growth has provided us that we decrease emissions"¹³¹ (Motion 2018/19:2426, p. 6). When it comes to consumption there are certain areas where the Centre Party considers a decrease to be desirable, such as meat consumption since "by eating less but better meat the environmental impact on our surrounding world would decrease. By replacing imported food

with higher impact on climate and environment with locally produced food with high climate- and climate consideration which delivers ecosystem services is an important way for Sweden to take global responsibility¹³² (Motion 2018/19:2425, p. 25). The responsibility of the individual consumer is raised by the party when discussing consumption, although with the perspective that politics and companies need to be involved in helping consumers make environmentally friendly choices, since it is difficult for regular people to obtain all the necessary information about a product and "therefore demands must be put on products' lifespan, energy use and recyclability, so called eco-design requirements"¹³³ (Motion 2018/19:2426, p. 18). The Centre Party also suggests more sustainable consumption and that "the long term tax burden should shift from work to environmental destruction and consumption"¹³⁴ (Motion 2018/19:2694, p. 4).

A positive view on growth is also held by the Liberal Party, presenting the view that "Sweden is ahead when it comes to environment- and climate work, something we shall use and make a competitive edge"¹³⁵ (Motion 2018/19:2956, p. 2; Motion 2018/19:2255, p. 4) and also that "Sweden will show that it is possible to unite prosperity and growth with responsibility for environment and climate"¹³⁶ (Motion 2018/19:2956, p. 2; Motion 2018/19:2255, p. 4). The Liberal Party also advocates improvements to help consumers make more climate friendly choices, indicated by the writing "it must be easy for people to act climate smart"¹³⁷ (Motion 2018/19:2255, p. 6). The market is considered to be of great importance for the Liberal Party, where one example being electricity production where "for us liberals it is obvious that the expansion shall be driven by the market and built when it is needed and where it is needed"¹³⁸ (Motion 2018/19:2924, p. 5; Motion 2018/19:2955, p. 2).

The Moderate Party is no exception to the growth imperative, stating that "it is important that there are conditions for growth in the entire country"¹³⁹ (Motion 2018/19:2895, p. 13). A general decrease of consumption is not advocated. Instead the idea is that "from a political point of view we should strengthen the consumers, partly through tax concessions which create bigger economic room and greater opportunities to make conscious choices, and partly through demands on information about products' environment- and climate impact"¹⁴⁰ (Motion 2018/19:2895, p. 7) and regarding different aspects of consumption, such as how it affects the climate, "by being well prepared the consumer owns the possibility to solve issues that arise in connection with consumption"¹⁴¹ (Motion 2018/19:2830, p. 2). The public sector also needs to be involved, indicated by the idea that one through public procurement can "steer consumption in a more sustainable direction"¹⁴² (Motion 2018/19:2895, p. 8). The market is also considered important for the Moderate Party, one example being in the energy sector where it is considered that "an ambitious politics for business enterprises, free trade and innovations goes hand in hand with a modern energy politics"¹⁴³ (Motion 2018/19:2895, p. 24) and that there is need for studies on "what measures would be required for Sweden to continue to be competitive"¹⁴⁴ (Motion 2018/19:2895, p. 24).

The Sweden Democrat Party advocates increased economic growth for preventing and counteracting effects of climate change, indicated by the view that "economic development occupies an important role, since lack of resources makes countries more vulnerable to the whims of the climate"¹⁴⁵ (Motion 2018/19:2820, p. 5). According to the party climate politics must also be included in other political areas, demonstrated by the statement that politics "cannot ignore production and competitive power, since it among other things constitute the conditions for a future offensive environmental politics"¹⁴⁶ (Motion 2018/19:2367, p. 1). The

market is thus considered an important actor and it is for example stressed that "a more just and market-driven competition in the energy area"¹⁴⁷ (Motion 2018/19:2820, p. 5) is needed and that "we consider it of the greatest importance that competitive power for both the Swedish as the European industry does not deteriorate to such an extent that carbon-generating production moves to countries with a less ambitious climate politics"¹⁴⁸ (Motion 2018/19:2820, p. 5). By "exporting energy efficient products"¹⁴⁹ (Motion 2018/19:2820, p. 6) emissions of carbon dioxide can decrease globally.

The Christian Democrat Party aims to pursue growth for environmental protection, and the party refers to the stewardship principle for developing their environmental policies and "the Christian Democrat Party's environmental politics is therefore designed in a way which harmonises with increased growth and more jobs"¹⁵⁰ (Motion 2018/19:2726, p. 9). The party states that "the market is an effective engine for change"¹⁵¹ (Motion 2018/19:2726, p. 9) but is not stated as a factor which should determine development of effective climate measures. Furthermore, the party has the view that everyone has a responsibility "when it comes to changing lifestyle"¹⁵² (Motion 2018/19:2726, p. 9) and that "it requires overarching frameworks and conditions which enable and encourage a long term sustainable lifestyle"¹⁵³ (Motion 2018/19:2726, p. 9).

The Social Democrat Party presents the view that "the economic development must be in unison with the ecologically sustainable"¹⁵⁴ (Socialdemokraterna, 2013a, p. 25) and meeting the climate challenges "requires a wise and responsible economic policy" (Socialdemokraterna, 2017, p. 3). Furthermore, the party says that "the transition to ecologically sustainable development is a strong driving force for economic growth, since it creates demand for resource-efficient technology, new transport solutions and new forms of energy production"¹⁵⁵ (Socialdemokraterna, 2013a, p. 26). Regarding consumption the party states that "it requires very powerful decreases of today's resource consumption, and thereby changes in both production- and consumption patterns. It requires a new view on prosperity, economic rationality, new guidelines in community planning and urban planning, global agreements and an individual responsibility for one's own consumption"¹⁵⁶ (Socialdemokraterna, 2013a, p. 26). This suggests that both consumption and society as a whole needs to change. The rich industrialised countries are considered to contribute the most to climate change, exemplified by the statement "Earth's ecosystems are pressed to hard by resource demanding production techniques and the equally resource demanding consumption patterns developed in the industrialised world"¹⁵⁷ (Socialdemokraterna, 2013a, p. 21), and that "countries with the best economic conditions contribute most to the problem, while they also often have the best preconditions to manage climate change"¹⁵⁸ (Socialdemokraterna, 2013a, p. 21). Therefore the Social Democrat Party states that they "must also take the largest responsibility to decrease climate emissions"¹⁵⁹ (Socialdemokraterna, 2013a, p. 21). When it comes to the market the party presents the view that the market has also contributed to the problem, demonstrated by the statement "the market's inability to economise with resources which lack price has led to an exploitation which threatens everyone's existence"¹⁶⁰ (Socialdemokraterna, 2013a, p. 15) and that "the market cannot handle this transition on its own, but together policy and market can achieve a lot" (Socialdemokraterna, 2017, p. 33).

The previous parties have directly presented a positive view on economic growth in climate work. Remaining parties are not stating that economic growth is something negative but it is not presented as a specific solution to climate change. The Green Party indicates the

importance that "the economy has to fit within planetary boundaries and lead to the development of society being decoupled from over-consumption of resources"¹⁶¹ (Motion 2018/19:2732, p. 11), thus advocating decoupling. The party presents the opinion that Swedish consumption influences climate change, demonstrated by the quote "if the entire Earth's population consumed as much as the Swede does on average it would be needed just over four globes with natural resources. It partly depends on that the socio-economic system we have rests upon a technological paradigm: cheap fossil energy"¹⁶² (Motion 2018/19:2732, p. 11). Also, according to the Green Party "this means that Sweden's environmental impact in other countries is increasing in the same pace as emissions in Sweden are decreasing"¹⁶³ (Motion 2018/19:2733, p. 9).

The Left Party takes a slightly different approach to many of the other parties by discussing a fair environmental space, stating that "it requires political decisions so that rich countries shall decrease their environment- and climate impact and for poor countries to be given the ability to develop"¹⁶⁴ (Motion 2018/19:392, p. 6). Regarding consumption "consumption related emissions need to decrease"¹⁶⁵ (Motion 2018/19:392, p. 19) and "emissions taking place in other countries, due to our consumption, is growing and is today larger than Sweden's territorial emissions"¹⁶⁶ (Motion 2018/19:392, p. 19). The party presents the view that "to dampen the rich's consumption through redistribution to public sector creates not only a more just society, but also a more sustainable one when trips to Thailand, SUV-purchases and other luxury consumption decreases"¹⁶⁷ (Motion 2018/19:392, p. 35). At the same time, however, the party presents a similar view to many other parties, namely that a conversion to a more climate friendly society "goes hand in hand with the creation of new jobs and a working welfare"¹⁶⁸ (Motion 2018/19:392, p. 22). Neither is the usefulness of the market ruled out completely but instead "a government investment bank is needed to increase investment in sustainable solutions where the market's short-term profit direction is not able to cover the long-term needs"¹⁶⁹ (Motion 2018/19:392, p. 32).

8.5.3 Discussion

In the results for this dimension one can see that all of the parties present a positive view on technology, except for the Green Party which raises the concern that technology has contributed to Swedish consumption and therefore also to climate change. Connected to technology is the idea of decoupling and for this concept none of the parties are negative towards decoupling for dealing with climate change. The Moderate Party, the Centre Party, the Sweden Democrat Party, the Christian Democrat Party and the Green Party all state that decoupling is an important pathway for working with climate change. The remaining parties, the Social Democrat Party, the Liberal party and the Left Party, do not specifically write that decoupling is important but they do not consider it to be problematic either. These generally positive attitude towards technology and decoupling indicate that a political ecology perspective is missing among the parties.

This dimension also includes how the parties perceive the economy. None of the parties discuss the need for a downscaling of the economy. Instead the Centre Party, the Liberal Party, the Moderate Party, the Sweden Democrat Party, the Christian Democrat Party and the Social Democrat Party all specifically write that growth is important for solving environmental problems. The Green Party and the Left Party are not presenting economic growth as a solution but do not discuss the negative aspects of it either. Part of the economic aspect is the view on the market, which the Liberal Party, the Moderate Party, the Sweden

Democrat Party and the Christian Democrat Party are all positive towards as an important factor for dealing with climate change. At the same time the Green Party does not discuss the market in such a specific way, while the Social Democrat Party and the Left Party are more sceptical to the approach of using the market as a tool for dealing with climate change.

Finally, the issue of consumption is highly important for political ecology when studying climate change. Few of the parties discuss the need for a decrease of overall consumption in Sweden and the North. An exception to this is the Left Party which specifically writes that Sweden needs to decrease its emissions from consumption originating from abroad. The Social Democrat Party reasons in a similar way with the view that the rich industrialised countries are responsible for climate change, partly through its consumption, and must decrease its emissions. However the party does not clearly state that the consumption needs to decrease. The Green Party discusses the problematics of Swedish consumption, such as how it affects other parts of the world, but does not clearly say that Swedish consumption needs to be downsized. Among the remaining parties, downsizing general consumption is not stated as an option, but the Centre Party, the Liberal Party and the Moderate Party instead discuss sustainable consumption.

For this dimension there is very little suggesting that a political ecology perspective is present among the parties. The Green Party states that technology has contributed to climate change, but otherwise the parties are positive towards both technology and decoupling and do not discuss the importance of decreasing the entire economy of Sweden or the North. For consumption the Left Party and the Social Democrat Party write that consumptive patterns need to change in the rich industrialised world in order to let others satisfy their needs, indicating a political ecology perspective. Other than that, however, the remaining parties do not discuss a general downscaling of the economy.

8.6. Power

This dimension will first of all study if the parties discuss power and secondly how they view institutions, autonomy and people's place in decision-making, including localised solutions and the distribution and creation of knowledge and technology.

Many of the parties do not discuss power directly but they still bring up themes which one can discuss in relation to power. Starting with the Centre Party, it discusses decision-making on the local level, such as that "it is important to move decisions on important everyday questions closer to the ones affected by them"¹⁷⁰ (Motion 2018/19:2426, p. 27) and generally the party argues that it is necessary with "an environmental politics where global environmental responsibility is combined with local environmental work. It also requires a local environmental politics which considers that preconditions look different in different parts of the country and which gives people, companies and municipalities the tools to contribute to a more sustainable Sweden"¹⁷¹ (Motion 2018/19:2426, p. 7). This includes giving municipalities greater ability to "design rules and fees according to environmental performance and have control over possible revenue these give"¹⁷² (Motion 2018/19:2426, p. 27). Abroad the party states that the local can be supported through aid (Motion 2018/19:2859, p. 6) with the goal that the aid "prioritises the poorest countries and strives for a good governance with special support for failing states and post-conflict states"¹⁷³ (Motion 2018/19:2859, p. 6). Technology, innovation and development is presented as possibilities to

be used for dealing with climate change and "we can create export opportunities for technology, knowhow and renewable energy"¹⁷⁴ (Motion 2018/19:2426, p. 11) and that "our technology and smart solutions can contribute to jobs and growth here, simultaneously as it decreases emissions in the surrounding world"¹⁷⁵ (Motion 2018/19:2426, p. 6f).

Part of the Moderate Party's politics aims at helping others deal with climate change, one example being related to economic growth where the party writes that "it is central that we give the countries that are now facing a growth journey the possibility to avoid the mistakes we made. Through our aid we can contribute to precisely this"¹⁷⁶ (Motion 2018/19:2895, p. 27). Clean Development Mechanisms is another preferred pathway and is referred to as "one of the most cost-efficient tools within climate politics"¹⁷⁷ (Motion 2018/19:2947, p. 5). Technology is also important since "technological successes and method development can be an important export product which can help other countries to a faster transition"¹⁷⁸ (Motion 2018/19:2895, p. 6). Regarding knowledge, the party presents the view that "we must continuously strive for improving our knowledge base regarding how climate change affect us as how we develop new ways to lower our emissions. This requires research and knowledge which can lead us in the work to protect the environment and stop climate change"¹⁷⁹ (Motion 2018/19:2947, p. 7).

The Liberal Party also has a positive attitude towards technology for dealing with the challenges posed by climate change, indicated by the statement "science, facts and technology development finds the solutions. The market-economy and free trade, not politicians or prohibitionism, propel smart, sustainable solutions"¹⁸⁰ (Motion 2018/19:2956, p. 1f; Motion 2018/19:2255, p. 4).

The Christian Democrat Party writes that "we have a moral responsibility to help and support the poor countries on their way towards a sustainable development"¹⁸¹ (Motion 2018/19:2764, p. 15; Motion 2018/19:2726, p. 13). One way to help can be demonstrated by the party's suggestion that "by 2030 shall among other things the infrastructure be expanded and the technology upgraded, in order to deliver modern and sustainable energy services to everyone in the developing countries, especially the least developed countries and small island nations under development"¹⁸² (Motion 2018/19:2764, p. 15). Local conditions are important since, in a Swedish context, "the environmental challenges look very different locally and regionally"¹⁸³ (Motion 2018/19:2726, p. 10) and thus when it comes to political action "an individual environmental policy reform rarely strikes as well everywhere in our country"¹⁸⁴ (Motion 2018/19:2726, p. 10). In Sweden local environmental work can be promoted by "giving right of disposition over more means of control to the municipal level and thus enable municipalities to implement measures that best suit their geographical conditions. This would enable more municipalities to better meet the challenges they are facing"¹⁸⁵ (Motion 2018/19:2726, p. 10). Lastly, making decisions on climate change "requires that the decisions made are well substantiated by research and that the connections can be explained in a credible manner for those affected"¹⁸⁶ (Motion 2018/19:2726, p. 9).

The Green Party presents the view that "it is important that the local climate work gets support and guidelines so that it can take off all over the country"¹⁸⁷ (Motion 2018/19:2733, p. 15) but also that "local predecessors have an important role to play in inspiring other municipalities in their climate work, and in identifying obstacles in the local climate work which need to be addressed on the national level"¹⁸⁸ (Motion 2018/19:2733, p. 9). When the

party broadens the perspective and discusses environmental impact abroad, it presents the view that "it is of the greatest importance that Sweden in a systematic way starts to work to decrease its environmental impact in other countries"¹⁸⁹ (Motion 2018/19:2733, p. 9).

For the Sweden Democrat Party emissions of greenhouse gases can be decreased by reducing the use of fossil fuels and the party states that "examples of how Sweden can contribute to both lower use of fossil fuels and to development, is support to the expansion of hydropower or photovoltaic plants in the parts of the world where the effect is high"¹⁹⁰ (Motion 2018/19:2367, p. 3). Connected to development is also the view on technology, where the Sweden Democrats state that "development of products that benefit the bio-economy and climate in Sweden can also be spread to other countries and thus lead to significant improvements globally"¹⁹¹ (Motion 2018/19:2367, p. 5). On the international level the party presents the view that "efforts on international climate investments should be increased at the expense of inefficient measures in Sweden"¹⁹² (Motion 2018/19:2820, p. 13). Lastly, when it comes to the production of knowledge "the Sweden Democrats also want to put in a higher gear regarding research on global environmental problems in a broader perspective and allocate more funds for this purpose"¹⁹³ (Motion 2018/19:2367, p. 5).

The Left Party directly raises the issue of power in its motions, for example demonstrated by the view that in climate work "it requires a new economic world order with a clear redistribution of power and resources from the rich countries and rich people to poor countries and poor people, and from men to women"¹⁹⁴ (Motion 2018/19:757, p. 8). The gender aspect is brought up by the party, stating that women are generally affected harder by climate change, due to for example "lack of political and economic power"¹⁹⁵ (Motion 2018/19:392, p. 10). The party says that it is of importance to "strengthen women's power and influence in all international cooperation"¹⁹⁶ (Motion 2018/19:392, p. 11) but also that "it is important that women are included in decision-making about the climate question and are included in work that concerns environment and life conditions"¹⁹⁷ (Motion 2018/19:392, p. 11). Furthermore, the party states that "to increase women's possibilities to education and livelihood can contribute to improve the individual woman's position, promote gender equality in large and also contribute to the entire society's development towards increased sustainability"¹⁹⁸ (Motion 2018/19:392, p. 12). Additional work with climate change that the party considers important is climate investments, since "investments contributing to new decreases of the emissions and which shall not be used to reach our national climate target"¹⁹⁹ (Motion 2018/19:392, p. 17). Another tool focused outside of Sweden is aid, where the party states that in this "high-income countries like Sweden have a great responsibility to contribute with resources to low-income countries"²⁰⁰ (Motion 2018/19:392, p. 23). Such support can help the poor countries to "be able to handle the effects of the emissions from the rich part of the world"²⁰¹ (Motion 2018/19:757, p. 19). Decision-making of municipalities should also be increased, indicated in the issue of extraction of fossil fuels where municipalities should be given "the right to veto against extraction of fossil energy"²⁰² (Motion 2018/19:392, p. 25).

In the studied material of the Social Democrat Party, power is not a prominent issue. However, like for other parties, there are parts of the material which power can be discussed in relation to. For example, the party presents the view that "a new global market is rapidly developing for goods and services that limit emissions. Swedish companies are ready to sell the innovations that the world demands" (Socialdemokraterna, 2017, p. 30). Furthermore, the party presents the view that "with purposeful investments in sustainable development in

cooperation with the public and the business sector Sweden can also take a leading role as an exporter of new energy-efficient and environmentally adapted technology and new forms of energy production”²⁰³ (Socialdemokraterna, 2013a, p. 27). In addition, the Social Democrat Party states the importance to create just climate policies and related to this the party states that ”Sweden builds its credibility by choosing the international before the national and that the municipal level takes precedence while we still take local preconditions into consideration” (Socialdemokraterna, 2017, p. 31).

8.6.1. Discussion

In the studied material power is not a very prominent question in the parties’ climate politics and only one party, the Left Party, visibly discusses power. The Left party both discusses that there are power imbalances in climate change, such as between rich and poor as well as between men and women, but also states that we need ”a new economic world order with a clear redistribution of power”²⁰⁴ (Motion 2018/19:392, p. 8). Concerning the remaining seven parties, they bring up topics that power can be discussed in relation to, although the parties themselves do not discuss power directly. For example, the issue of technology as an export product is one solution proposed by the Centre Party, the Moderate Party, the Christian Democrat Party, the Sweden Democrat Party and the Social Democrat Party. However, they do not discuss power issues related to this, such as whether it risks imposing solutions upon others, where it is not needed or requested. This can also be applied to aid, innovation and knowledge aimed at helping other countries and people, which is also suggested among the parties. Furthermore, questions of participation in decision-making, as well as taking local conditions into consideration, is another aspect of power present in the material. The Centre Party, the Christian Democrat Party and the Left Party all discuss this, but in a Swedish context and not in a global one, such as how to promote localised solutions abroad.

9. Final discussion

The purpose of this thesis has been to create a greater understanding for if the political parties of Sweden are on the path towards a degrowth transition or, if not, how they can enable such a transition. To achieve this aim, the following research questions were asked:

- How are the central concepts of political ecology indicated within climate change politics of the Swedish political parties?
- Based on the result, what are the possible effects of the views expressed by the political parties, from a degrowth perspective?

When studying the results of this thesis, and compiling the individual discussions, one can see that it does not seem like a degrowth transition in the climate politics is happening in Sweden. There are traces of political ecology, and thus degrowth, among the view’s of the parties, yes, but many of the main points are missing. Since none of the parties is considerably aligning more with a degrowth perspective than other parties, but rather present quite similar views in many aspects of their climate politics, they will be discussed jointly on a more general level.

Starting with the relation between human and nature, one can see that climate change is recognised as a serious problem among all of the parties and that it is caused by human actions. This is of course positive since recognition of the problem is the first step towards a transition into a more climate friendly society. However, as was also demonstrated, they did not consider it as important to protect nature for its own sake but rather to prevent climate change based on the negative effects it presents humanity with. This also includes the Social Democrat Party, the Green Party, the Liberal Party and the Moderate Party that did mention that climate change affects the non-human world. The failure to value nature for its own sake and not raising humanity above it demonstrates that this part of the parties' politics is not yet mature enough for a degrowth transition.

When it comes to the dimension of holism or reductionism, the results and the discussion demonstrate that the parties do not apply a degrowth perspective. They are all aware that the local and the global are connected, demonstrated by them advocating cooperation between actors both nationally and internationally, suggesting that they believe that the actions of countries is connected to global climate change. That all parties except the Sweden Democrat Party also consider it important for Sweden to be a role model furthers this perspective. At the same time the parties fail to realise the deep impact Swedish actions have on other countries. Carbon leakage is discussed by the Sweden Democrat Party, the Moderate Party and the Centre Party, which of course is positive, but this is not discussed among the remaining parties and not more in-depth. Furthermore only two of the parties, the Left Party and the Social Democrat Party, raise the issue of the historic responsibility of rich, industrialised countries, including Sweden, for climate change. Taking responsibility for Sweden's actions, such as consumption, will therefore be more difficult, if not impossible, and a degrowth perspective is thus missing. In this dimension one can thus see that there are traces of degrowth present but clearly not enough for a degrowth transition since the parties lack the necessary holistic perspective of present day actions combined with a knowledge of Sweden's historic responsibility for climate change.

Moving on to the dimension of individual versus structural inequalities, it is positive to see that the parties do not put responsibility on a single actor or part of society. Sure, the parties have slightly different angles on responsibility but state that everyone in Sweden still needs to pitch in and contribute. However, for most of the parties this is where the structural focus ends. The party that most visibly and thoroughly discusses structures as an actual problem is the Left Party, which, for example, discusses distribution differences between classes and genders, and how the North has benefitted from its position. The Social Democrat Party also raise the issue of structural inequalities, but not quite to the same extent as the Left Party, for example in the view that it is the rich, industrialised countries whom have emitted and benefitted the most. For both these parties a consumption perspective is simultaneously demonstrated. A consumption perspective is also present within the motions from the Green Party, the Liberal Party in a Swedish context and partly for the Christian Democrat Party when it discusses moral responsibility of rich countries to help poor countries. For the Moderate Party, the Sweden Democrat Party and the Centre Party social structures are not brought up. One can thus see that the understanding of structures vary between the parties and a global focus is often absent, which is important for a degrowth transition in a very unequal

world. This failure to take responsibility for one's actions does not contribute to environmental justice, where those responsible carry their share of the burden. Degrowth is thus mostly present within the material for the Left Party and the Social Democrat Party.

The fourth dimension contains the parties' views on technology, decoupling, economy and consumption. Critique of the economic system is a vital part of degrowth and of interest is therefore what the parties think of the growth-focused economic system. In the material none of the parties write that the entire economic system is flawed and fails to deliver on its promises of environmental protection, in this case by preventing climate change. They fail to realise that a downscaling of the entire economy of the North, including the Swedish one, is necessary in order to leave room for others to grow. Instead they tend to promote a business-as-usual approach, indicated by the belief in economic growth, decoupling and technological development as solutions to climate change. By doing so it is clear that they fail to realise that the economic system, with its growth paradigm, fail to deliver on its promises, while climate change continues to wreak havoc on the world. Economic development might be positive in countries where the quality of life for many people needs to be improved, but it is not necessary that these countries want that kind of development. They might want to choose their own path, one that does not cause the kind of climate problems that development in the rich, industrialised world has. Furthermore, technology does not have to be negative but instead improved technology can be positive since emissions can decrease, but it is not certain that it magically solves climate change. For a degrowth transition to transpire those that consume the most have to reduce their consumption in order to make room for others to improve their lives. Having a consumption perspective on greenhouse gas emissions is therefore highly important since it helps us realise who needs to take responsibility for their actions. A consumption perspective is demonstrated by the Left Party, the Social Democrat Party and the Green Party, but since they do not demonstrate a degrowth perspective in other regards, such as the economic system, it is not enough to have the knowledge that the North is the most responsible for climate change.

Finally, central to the study is the issue of power and only one of the parties actually discusses the issue of power directly, namely the Left Party. This is for example being done in relation to gender and socio-economic status. Since politics in Sweden can affect other places and people it is unfortunate that not more parties discuss power, and the Left Party can also discuss the issue further. The Centre Party, the Christian Democrat Party and the Left Party raise the importance of local decision-making but this is discussed in a Swedish context, not that climate change needs to take the local perspective all over the world. Furthermore, the Centre Party, the Moderate Party, the Christian Democrat Party, the Liberal Party, the Sweden Democrat Party and the Social Democrat Party discuss export of technology as a way to work with climate change and prevent greenhouse gas emissions, but fail to discuss that one has to be careful not to impose the will and preferred solutions of some actors upon others, especially since Sweden is a developed country with large emissions from consumption. With this in mind it seems unlikely that Sweden actually have solutions for dealing with climate change but instead only imposes its own flawed views of development upon others. Similar discussions can be held in instances where the parties bring up the importance of knowledge and fail to discuss that different knowledge is useful in different contexts, and that what works

in Sweden might not work in other places. It is also not discussed that different knowledge has value, but the parties' seem to have a very single-minded view on knowledge.

10. Conclusion and future research

This thesis has studied how the climate politics of the Social Democrat Party, the Moderate Party, the Sweden Democrat Party, the Left Party, the Centre Party, the Christian Democrat Party, the Liberal Party and the Green Party stand in relation to degrowth. When summarising the results one can see that not one of the parties has a climate politics suitable for making a degrowth transition of Swedish climate politics. There are traces of it, yes, but all parties fail in important parts such as how the economy is presented. What the implication of this will be is difficult, if not impossible, to say. But from a degrowth perspective it is very likely that the North will continue to consume too much and contribute even more to climate change than they already have, while still reaping the benefits. The possibility of others to improve their lives will thus decrease since the North will take up too much environmental space. Emissions of greenhouse gases are likely to continue increasing, causing even more harmful consequences for the human and non-human world. Furthermore, since most of the parties fail to taking power imbalances into account it is also not unlikely that some people and countries will continue to be pushed to the side line in climate politics and that powerful actors can continue to act in their own favour, with exclusion and environmental destruction as a result. The effects will be unevenly shared, since the environmental justice perspective will not be taken into account.

What, then, is needed for the future? This thesis has contributed to a greater understanding on if degrowth is present within the climate politics of the Swedish political parties, or maybe more precisely what is missing. However, for understanding how a degrowth transition can occur there is much more research that needs to be done. Climate change is not an isolated political area, but rather affects and is affected by other areas of society. It is therefore necessary to study degrowth in relation to other political areas, such as sustainable development, to see what is present and what is missing for a transition to a degrowth society. Such an understanding is not only necessary in a Swedish context but also in other parts of the North and the political arena thus needs to be studied in other countries as well.

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Appendix 1: Untranslated words and quotes presented in the thesis

- 1) Klimat
- 2) Klimatförändring
- 3) Hållbar utveckling
- 4) Konsumtion
- 5) Tillväxt
- 6) Grön tillväxt
- 7) Det övergripande målet för miljöpolitiken är att till nästa generation lämna över ett samhälle där de stora miljöproblemen är lösta, utan att orsaka ökade miljö- och hälsoproblem utanför Sveriges gränser
- 8) Begränsad klimatpåverkan
- 9) Klimatfrågan är vår tids ödesfråga
- 10) Kommer det att leda till allvarliga konsekvenser för livet på jorden. Smältande glaciärer, stigande havsvattennivåer, ökad torka och extremt väder hotar många av världens ekosystem. Djur- och växtarter riskerar att dö ut och människors möjligheter till försörjning hotar att försvinna.
- 11) Människans förbränning av fossila bränslen har medfört kraftigt förhöjda halter av koldioxid i atmosfären.
- 12) Jordens ekosystem pressar alltjämt för hårt av den resurskrävande produktionsteknik och de lika resurskrävande konsumtionsmönster som utvecklats i den industrialiserade världen.
- 13) Klimatkrisen och miljöförstörelsen har tydliggjort att människan inte kan leva utan att ta hänsyn till naturen
- 14) Är en alarmerande global fråga
- 15) De pågående och accelererande klimatförändringarna är ett existentiellt hot, framförallt för mänskligheten, men också för djuren och naturen så som vi känner den
- 16) Vi behöver öka kunskapen och medvetenheten om naturen på alla nivåer i samhället, från individ till nation. För att kunna förstå hur vi människor är del av naturen, behöver vi återetablera kontakten med den
- 17) En av vår tids största utmaningar
- 18) Vi vet nu att mänsklig aktivitet under det senaste århundradet har fått medeltemperaturen att stiga snabbare än någonsin
- 19) Allt fler extremväder har drabbat oss, i form av översvämningar, torka och smältande polarisar. Ekosystem sätts ur balans och konsekvenserna blir katastrofala
- 20) Miljöpolitik grundar sig på förvaltarskapsprincipen
- 21) Förvaltare av – och inte herre över- skapelsen
- 22) Agera med en långsiktig helhetssyn med respekt för vår samtida omgivning och kommande generationer
- 23) Vår tids största utmaning
- 24) När jordens medeltemperatur ökar drabbas utvecklingsländerna särskilt hårt av torka, jorderosion, översvämningar, parasiter och utbredning av tropiska sjukdomar
- 25) Användningen av fossil energi är skadligt för klimatet
- 26) Effekterna av klimatförändringarna drabbar hela mänskligheten med fler extrema väderhändelser och naturkatastrofer. Torka, översvämningar och hunger tvingar människor runt om i hela världen att fly från sina hem
- 27) Även i andra delar av världen uppstår stora problem i klimatförändringarnas spår

- 28) Extrema väderhändelser såsom torka och översvämningar slår idag redan hårt mot människor i stora delar av världen
- 29) Försvagad livsmedelsförsörjning, hungerkatastrofer och massflyttningar
- 30) Det påverkar allt liv på jorden
- 31) Utsläppen av växthusgaser är negativa för den globala utvecklingen och att Sverige bör bidra till att lösa, dämpa eller på annat sätt motverka effekterna av denna problematik
- 32) Vi kan också vara tämligen säkra på att klimatet kommer variera och att Sverige och andra länder kommer att ställas inför utmaningar till följd av extremväderhändelser, detta oavsett vilken den bakomliggande orsaken är och oavsett hur många miljarder vi väljer att lägga på olika klimatsatsningar
- 33) För oss socialdemokrater är det uppenbart att politiken är helt nödvändig för att klara klimatomställningen
- 34) Ett sammanhållet globalt och nationellt politiskt arbete för att säkra en god miljö även i framtiden
- 35) För att möta de globala klimätförändringarna och miljöutmaningarna måste varje del av samhället bära sin del av bördan
- 36) Ett gott internationellt samarbete är avgörande för att vi ska kunna ta oss framåt
- 37) Genom handelsavtal har Sverige möjlighet att påverka andra länder
- 38) Den huvudsakliga kompetensen att förhandla handelsavtal finns dock i Bryssel
- 39) Effektiva svar på de utmaningar vi står inför behöver vara internationella
- 40) Sverige ska driva på för att medlemsstaterna genomför EU-samarbetet i frågor där bättre samverkan idag är nödvändig
- 41) Miljöförstöreling och klimathot känner inga gränser och det kräver gemensamma lösningar
- 42) Miljön och klimatet behöver mer EU-samarbete
- 43) Global samverkan är en förutsättning för en effektiv klimatpolitik
- 44) Miljö- och klimatpolitiken kan inte isoleras från politiken i övrigt utan ska ses som en del av helheten
- 45) Ansvar, som är grundbulten i förvaltarskapsprincipen, är både personligt och gemensamt. [] Det går inte att vältra över ansvaret på andra personer, eller på samhället i stort, när det gäller att ändra livsstil
- 46) Samtidigt räcker det inte bara med individuella beslut. Det behövs övergripande ramar och förutsättningar som möjliggör och uppmuntrar en långsiktigt hållbar livsstil
- 47) Människors vilja och motivation att medverka
- 48) Samarbete över gränserna är avgörande om en oacceptabel temperaturökning ska kunna undvikas
- 49) Kräver såväl regionala, nationella som globala lösningar
- 50) Det är uppenbart att denna utmaning inte är något som enskilda individer, kommuner eller ens nationer kan lösa på egen hand. Samarbete är nödvändigt
- 51) Alla delar av samhället måste delta i omställningen och jobba gemensamt och målmedvetet för att minska utsläppen
- 52) För att 1,5-gradersmålet ska nås krävs ett kraftfullt internationellt klimatarbete. I det har Sverige en viktig del, och givetvis är också vårt arbete i EU avgörande
- 53) För att ställa om till en mer hållbar riktning krävs att alla delar av samhället och alla invånare tar gemensamt ansvar och arbetar tillsammans i mer hållbar riktning
- 54) Det drabbar oss själva men också andra länders invånare och kommande generationer

- 55) Det är regeringen som har yttersta ansvaret för att myndigheterna bedriver sin verksamhet på ett sådant sätt att de mål som regering och riksdag har ställt upp kan uppnås
- 56) Det enda hållbara förhållningssättet är att besluta att det ska nås helt och hållet genom enbart nationella insatser
- 57) Den nödvändiga omställningen till ekologiskt hållbar utveckling är ett ansvar för hela världssamfundet, men de rika länder som idag står för den stora delen av utsläppen måste gå före
- 58) Föregångare i den egna, nationella klimatpolitiken
- 59) Sverige ska tillhöra de ledande länderna i klimatomställningen
- 60) Det enda hållbara förhållningssättet är att besluta att det ska nås helt och hållet genom enbart nationella insatser
- 61) Det räcker inte att sänka de svenska utsläppen för att andra länder ska vilja följa efter oss
- 62) Nyckeln till en verkligt framgångsrik klimatpolitik ligger i att kunna sänka utsläppen även under en stark högkonjunktur
- 63) Kan Sverige fortsätta vara ett föregångsland som visar att sänkta utsläpp och stark tillväxt kan gå hand i hand
- 64) I miljö- och klimatarbetet, liksom i vår politik i övrigt, tar vi utgångspunkt i människan. Kunniga konsumenter med mer pengar kvar i plånboken kan göra stor skillnad för miljön och klimatet genom att använda sin konsumentmakt
- 65) När andra länder vacklar behöver Sverige och EU:s röst vara tydlig
- 66) Sverige gå före, visa vägen och bli ett klimatföredöme för resten av världen
- 67) Visa att det går att kombinera låga utsläpp med god ekonomisk utveckling
- 68) Sverige ska fortsätta driva på för att EU ska vara ett klimat- och miljöpolitiskt föredöme
- 69) Sverige ska visa att det går att förena välstånd och tillväxt med ansvar för miljö och klimat
- 70) EU och Sverige ska vara en pådrivande kraft och visa ledarskap för att nå parisavtalets mål
- 71) Genom att kombinera radikal klimatpolitik med ett väl fungerande välfärdssamhälle kan Sverige bli ännu starkare föregångsland för övriga länder att inspireras av
- 72) Föregångare som visar att det är möjligt att minska utsläppen och samtidigt leva ett gott liv är en förutsättning för att världen ska lyckas. Här har Sverige en viktig roll
- 73) Sverige går före i det internationella arbetet och stöttar länder som drabbas särskilt hårt av klimatförändringarna
- 74) Bidrar Sverige idag till att öka andra medlemsstaters möjlighet att sänka sina ambitioner på området
- 75) Problemet med denna strategi är att det inte finns något som tyder på att det fungerar
- 76) Vi har ett ansvar även för miljöpåverkan som uppstår utanför Sveriges gränser och om svensk produktion läggs ner eller flyttar leder det till att vi istället tvingas importera mat, material och varor som kan ha producerats med högre miljöpåverkan i en annan del av världen
- 77) Enligt teorin om koldioxidläckage kan det till och med vara så att denna politik bidrar till att öka utsläppen i andra länder. Det måste vara grundläggande för svensk klimatpolitik att politiken på området inte leder till att utsläpp i Sverige migrerar till andra länder

- 78) Så fort vi genomför åtgärder i Sverige för att sänka utsläppen finns en risk att den utsläppsgenererande aktiviteten flyttar till ett annat land. Det kan till och med leda till större utsläpp, globalt sett, om varor istället produceras i länder med högre utsläpp
- 79) Världens rika människor har orsakat klimatförändringarna
- 80) De rika länderna som har det historiska ansvaret för klimatförändringarna och som nu även har det största ansvaret för att minska sina utsläpp
- 81) Har tagit en mycket stor del av det totala utsläppsutrymmet och därmed begränsat andra länders utveckling
- 82) Det är vi i de rika industrialiserade länderna som historiskt stått för de största utsläppen av växthusgaser och det är de fattigaste länderna som drabbas hårdast av klimatförändringarna. Därför menar vi att grundprincipen är att den industrialiserade världen har ett historiskt ansvar för klimatförändringarna
- 83) Miljöfrågan i grunden är en fråga om fördelning av begränsade resurser
- 84) En fråga om rättvisa och solidaritet
- 85) Kapitalismen fördelar jordens resurser extremt ojämnt, mellan klasser, mellan rika och fattiga länder och – i samspel med patriarkala strukturer – mellan kvinnor och män
- 86) Världens rika människor har orsakat klimatförändringarna och har fortfarande störst påverkan på klimatet. De som drabbas värst är däremot världens fattiga människor.
- 87) En klimatpolitik där de rika länderna och de multinationella företagen tar sitt ansvar
- 88) Det krävs en ny ekonomisk världsordning med en tydlig omfördelning av makt och resurser från rika länder och rika människor till fattiga länder och fattiga människor, och från män till kvinnor
- 89) Både ekonomiska och sociala strukturer försvårar den nödvändiga omställningen till ekologisk uthållighet
- 90) Jordens ekosystem pressas alltjämt för hårt av den resurskrävande produktionsteknik och de lika resurskrävande konsumtionsmönster som utvecklats i den industrialiserade världen
- 91) Miljösubventioner är fördelningspolitiskt felaktigt eftersom det största bidraget går till den som har störst köpkraft. Det är helt enkelt inte rimligt att använda skattepengar till att subventionera höginkomsttagarens inköp av bilar, cyklar och utombordare
- 92) Förutsättningarna är olika i vårt vidsträckta land
- 93) Den som smutsar ner också ska betala mer
- 94) Så som ofta är det de mest utsatta grupperna i världen som drabbas hårdast: världens fattiga och då särskilt kvinnor
- 95) Om hela jordens befolkning konsumerade lika mycket som svensken i genomsnitt gör skulle det behövas drygt fyra jordklot med naturresurser. Det beror bland annat på att det samhällsekonomiska system vi har vilar på ett teknologiskt paradigm: billig fossil energi
- 96) Detta innebär att Sveriges miljöpåverkan i andra länder ökar i samma takt som utsläppen i Sverige minskar
- 97) Vi har ett moraliskt ansvar att hjälpa och stötta de fattiga länderna på sin väg mot en hållbar utveckling
- 98) Det krävs att de rikare länderna prioriterar att sätta in medel till fonden för att utvecklingsländerna skall kunna bidra till de gemensamt överenskomna klimatmålen
- 99) I slutändan avgörs framgången i ett sådant system av människors vilja och motivation att medverka

- 100) Miljöutmaningarna ser väldigt olika ut lokalt och regionalt
- 101) En enskild miljöpolitisk reform slår sällan lika väl ut överallt i vårt land
- 102) För att möta de globala klimatförändringarna och miljöutmaningarna måste varje del av samhället bära sin del av bördan
- 103) Klimatutmaningen ställer krav på hela världen att ställa om
- 104) Hållbarhetsarbete kräver politiskt ledarskap, men vi alla bär också på ett eget ansvar där våra beteenden kan göra skillnad. I Centerpartiets gröna och liberala politik litar vi på människors förmåga att ta ansvar för sina egna val
- 105) Att minska och på sikt fasa ut miljöskadliga subventioner, till exempel av fossila bränslen och material, är ett annat sätt att låta den som förorenar stå för hela kostnaden
- 106) De som släpper ut mest också ska ha de största åtagandena att minska sina utsläpp
- 107) Kraven är mycket lågt ställda på utvecklingsländerna, där potentialen är stor för kraftiga utsläppsökningar i framtiden
- 108) Eftersom Sverige endast står för drygt en promille av världens totala utsläpp av växthusgaser, i paritet med vår andel av världens befolkning och ännu lägre om hänsyn tas till förändrad markanvändning, är det inte rimligt att Sverige utan vidare ska ta på sig mycket större utsläppsminskningar än andra länder
- 109) Den miljövänliga tekniken utvecklas och sprids för långsamt
- 110) Omställningen till ett hållbart samhälle innebär stora möjligheter för nya innovationer, fler jobb och ökad livskvalitet
- 111) Kan Sverige också ta en ledande roll som exportör av ny energisnål och miljöanpassad teknik och nya former av energiproduktion
- 112) Klimatutmaningen ställer krav på hela världen att ställa om. Det förutsätter att miljötekniken fortsätter att utvecklas
- 113) Tekniska framgångar och metodutveckling kan bli till viktiga exportprodukter som kan hjälpa andra länder till en snabbare omställning
- 114) Det räcker inte att sänka de svenska utsläppen för att andra länder ska vilja följa efter oss. Vi måste också visa att det går att bryta länken mellan tillväxt och ökade utsläpp
- 115) De stora utsläppsminskningar som finns kvar att göra blir beroende av tekniksprång
- 116) Är det just genom den mänskliga uppfinningsrikedomen och en grön tillväxt som vi klarar klimatomställningen. Vår teknik och smarta lösningar kan bidra till jobb och tillväxt här, samtidigt som det ger minskade utsläpp i omvärlden
- 117) Vi kan skapa exportmöjligheter för teknik, kunnande och förnybar energi, samtidigt som vi tryggar vår och våra grannländers elförsörjning
- 118) Klimatkrisen kräver att vi förenar ökad ekonomisk tillväxt med mindre utsläpp
- 119) En politik som med effektiva verktyg förenar ekonomisk tillväxt med minskade utsläpp och mindre klimatpåverkan
- 120) Vetenskap, fakta och teknikutveckling finner lösningarna. Marknadsekonomi och frihandel, inte politiker eller förbudspolitik, driver fram smarta hållbara lösningar
- 121) För att minska utsläppen måste ökat fokus ligga på forskning och teknisk utveckling, snarare än generella skattehöjningar för att minska utsläppen inom Sveriges gränser
- 122) En offensiv miljö- och klimatpolitik som bejakar teknikutveckling och samverkan med näringslivet

- 123) Dessutom ger det Sverige exportintäkter och arbetstillfällen, samtidigt som Sveriges ställning som kunskapsnation stärks
- 124) Kan även spridas till andra länder och därmed leda mot betydande förbättringar globalt
- 125) Utsläppen av växthusgaser ska vara låga i ett internationellt perspektiv, samtidigt som den ekonomiska utvecklingen fortgår
- 126) För att utvecklingsländer ska ha några möjligheter att bromsa sina egna utsläpp och samtidigt utvecklas behöver de få tillgång till modern miljöpolitik
- 127) Genom att visa att det går att kombinera låga utsläpp med god ekonomisk utveckling kan Sverige bidra till att slå hål på den internationellt sett alltför förhärskande myten om motsatsen
- 128) Ekonomin måste rymmas inom planetens gränser och leda till att samhällsutvecklingen frikopplas från överkonsumtion av resurser
- 129) Om hela jordens befolkning konsumerade lika mycket som svensken i genomsnitt gör skulle det behövas drygt fyra jordklot med naturresurser. Det beror bland annat på att det samhällsekonomiska system vi har vilar på ett teknologiskt paradig: billig fossil energi
- 130) En bättre miljö går hand i hand med ekonomisk utveckling och tillväxt
- 131) Klimatet räddas inte genom att stoppa tillväxten och blicka bakåt. Det är inte genom att förkasta allt det goda som människans uppfinningsrikedom och tillväxten har gett oss som vi minskar utsläppen
- 132) Genom att äta mindre men bättre kött skulle påverkan på vår omvärld minska. Att byta ut importerad mat med högre påverkan på klimat och miljö mot närproducerad mat med hög miljö- och klimathänsyn som levererar ekosystemtjänster är ett viktigt sätt för att Sverige ska ta ansvar globalt
- 133) Därför måste krav ställas på produkters livslängd, energianvändning och återvinningsbarhet
- 134) Skattebördan på sikt skiftas från arbete till miljöförstöring och konsumtion
- 135) Sverige ligger långt framme när det gäller miljö- och klimatarbete, något vi ska nyttja och göra till en konkurrensfördel
- 136) Sverige ska visa att det går att förena välstånd och tillväxt med ansvar för miljö och klimat
- 137) Det måste vara enkelt för människor att handla klimatsmart
- 138) För oss liberaler är det självklart att utbyggnaden ska drivas på av marknaden och byggas när den behövs och där den behövs
- 139) Är det viktigt att det finns förutsättningar för tillväxt i hela landet
- 140) Från politiskt håll bör vi stärka konsumenterna, dels genom skattelättnader som skapar större ekonomiskt utrymme och större möjligheter att göra medvetna val, och dels genom krav på information om produkters miljö- och klimatpåverkan
- 141) Genom att vara påläst äger en konsument möjlighet att själv lösa frågeställningar som uppstår i samband med konsumtion
- 142) Styra konsumtionen i en mer hållbar riktning
- 143) En ambitiös politik för företagande, frihandel och innovationer går hand i hand med en modern energipolitik
- 144) Vilka åtgärder som skulle behövas för att Sverige ska fortsätta vara konkurrenskraftigt

- 145) Intar ekonomisk utveckling en viktig roll, eftersom brist på resurser gör länder mer sårbara för klimatets nycker
- 146) Kan inte heller ignorera produktion och konkurrenskraft, eftersom detta bland annat utgör förutsättningarna för en framtida offensiv miljöpolitik
- 147) En merrättvis och marknadsstyrd konkurrens på energiområdet
- 148) Vi anser det vara av största vikt att konkurrenskraften för såväl den svenska som den europeiska industrin inte försämras i sådan utsträckning att koldioxidgenererande produktion flyttas till länder med en mindre ambitiös klimatpolitik
- 149) Exportera energieffektiva produkter
- 150) Därför utformas den kristdemokratiska miljöpolitiken på ett sätt som harmonierar med ökad tillväxt och fler jobb
- 151) Marknaden är en effektiv motor för förändring
- 152) När det gäller att ändra livsstil
- 153) Det behövs övergripande ramar och förutsättningar som möjliggör och uppmuntrar en långsiktigt hållbar hållbar livsstil
- 154) Den ekonomiska utvecklingen måste vara i samklang med det ekologiskt hållbara
- 155) Omställningen till en ekologiskt hållbar utveckling är en stark drivkraft för ekonomisk tillväxt, eftersom den skapar efterfrågan på resurssnål teknik, nya transportlösningar och nya former för energiproduktion
- 156) Det förutsätter mycket kraftiga minskningar av dagens resursförbrukning, och därmed förändringar i både produktions- och konsumtionsmönster. Det kräver en ny syn på välbefinnande, ekonomisk rationalitet, nya linjer i samhällsplaneringen och stadsutvecklingen, globala överenskommelser och ett individuellt ansvar för den egna förbrukningen
- 157) Jordens ekosystem pressas alltså för hårt av den resurskrävande produktionsteknik och de lika resurskrävande konsumtionsmönster som utvecklats i den industrialiserade världen
- 158) Länder med de bästa ekonomiska förutsättningarna bidrar mest till problemet, samtidigt som de oftast också har godast förutsättningar att klara klimatförändringarna
- 159) Måste också ta det största ansvaret för att minska klimatutsläppen
- 160) Marknadens oförmåga att hushålla med resurser som saknar pris har lett till en exploatering som hotar allas vår existens
- 161) Ekonomin måste rymmas inom planetens gränser och leda till att samhällsutvecklingen frikopplas från överkonsumtion av resurser
- 162) Om hela jordens befolkning konsumerade lika mycket som svensken i genomsnitt gör skulle det behövas drygt fyra jordklot med naturresurser. Det beror bland annat på att det samhällsekonomiska system vi har vilar på ett teknologiskt paradigm: billig fossil energi
- 163) Detta innebär att Sveriges miljöpåverkan i andra länder ökar i samma takt som utsläppen i Sverige minskar
- 164) Det behövs politiska beslut för att rika länder ska minska sin miljö- och klimatpåverkan och för att fattiga länder ska få möjlighet att utvecklas
- 165) Konsumtionsrelaterade utsläppen ska minska
- 166) Utsläpp som sker i andra länder, som en följd av vår konsumtion, växer snabbt och är idag större än Sveriges territoriella utsläpp

- 167) Att dämpa de rikas konsumtion genom omfördelning till offentlig sektor skapar inte bara ett rättvisare samhälle, utan också ett hållbarare sådant när Thailandsresor, SUV-inköp och annan lyxkonsumtion minskar
- 168) Går hand i hand med skapandet av nya jobb och en fungerande välfärd
- 169) Det behövs en statligt grön investeringsbank för att öka investeringar i hållbara lösningar där marknadens kortsiktiga vinstriktning inte förmår täcka de långsiktiga behoven
- 170) Är det viktigt att flytta beslut om viktiga vardagsfrågor närmare de som berörs av dem
- 171) Då krävs en miljöpolitik där globalt miljöansvar kombineras med lokalt miljöarbete. Det krävs också en närodlad miljöpolitik som tar hänsyn till att förutsättningar ser olika ut i olika delar av landet och som ger människor, företag och kommuner redskapen att bidra till ett mer hållbart Sverige
- 172) Utforma regler och avgifter efter miljöprestanda och råda över eventuella intäkter som dessa ger
- 173) Prioriterar de fattigaste länderna och eftersträvar god samhällsstyrning med särskilt stöd till sviktande stater och postkonfliktstater
- 174) Vi kan skapa exportmöjligheter för teknik, kunnande och förnybar energi
- 175) Vår teknik och smarta lösningar kan bidra till jobb och tillväxt här, samtidigt som det ger minskade utsläpp i omvärlden
- 176) Det är centralt att vi ger de länder som nu står inför en tillväxtresa möjligheten att undvika de misstag som vi begått. Genom vårt bistånd har vi en möjlighet att bidra till precis just detta
- 177) Ett av de mest kostnadseffektiva verktygen inom klimatpolitiken
- 178) Tekniska framgångar och metodutveckling kan bli till viktiga exportprodukter som kan hjälpa andra länder till en snabbare omställning
- 179) Vi måste kontinuerligt sträva efter att förbättra vårt kunskapsunderlag gällande såväl hur klimatförändringarna påverkar oss som hur vi utvecklar nya sätt att sänka våra utsläpp. Då krävs forskning och kunskap som kan vägleda oss i arbetet för att värna miljön och stoppa klimatförändringarna
- 180) Vetenskap, fakta och teknikutveckling finner lösningarna. Marknadsekonomi och frihandel, inte politiker eller förbudspolitik, driver fram smarta hållbara lösningar
- 181) Vi har ett moraliskt ansvar att hjälpa och stötta de fattiga länderna på sin väg mot en hållbar utveckling
- 182) Senast 2030 ska bland annat infrastrukturen byggas ut och tekniken uppgraderas, för att leverera moderna och hållbara energitjänster till alla i utvecklingsländerna, i synnerhet de minst utvecklade länderna och små önationer under utveckling
- 183) Miljöutmaningarna ser väldigt olika ut lokalt och regionalt
- 184) En enskild miljöpolitisk reform slår sällan lika väl ut överallt i vårt land
- 185) Ge rådigheten över fler styrmedel till kommunal nivå och på så sätt möjliggöra för kommuner att själva genomföra åtgärder som bäst passar deras geografiska förutsättningar. Det skulle möjliggöra för fler kommuner att på ett bättre sätt möta de utmaningar som just de står inför
- 186) Krävs att de beslut som fattas är väl underbyggda av forskning och att sambanden på ett trovärdigt sätt kan förklaras för dem som berörs

- 187) Det är viktigt att det lokala klimatarbetet får stöd och riktlinjer så att det kan ta fart i hela landet
- 188) Lokala föregångare har en viktig roll att spela i att inspirera andra kommuner i deras klimatarbete, och i att identifiera hinder i det lokala klimatarbetet som behöver åtgärdas på nationell nivå
- 189) Det är av största vikt att Sverige på ett systematiskt sätt börjar arbeta för att minska sin miljöpåverkan i andra länder
- 190) Exempel på hur Sverige kan bidra till såväl lägre användning av fossila bränslen som till utveckling, är stöd till utbyggnad av vattenkraft eller solcellsanläggningar i de delar av världen där effekten är hög
- 191) Utveckling av produkter som gynnar bioekonomin och klimatet i Sverige kan även spridas till andra länder och därmed leda mot betydande förbättringar globalt
- 192) Satsningarna på internationella klimatinvesteringar bör ökas på bekostnad av ineffektiva åtgärder i Sverige
- 193) Sverigedemokraterna vill också lägga in en högre växel vad gäller forskning kring globala miljöproblem i ett vidare perspektiv och avsätta mer medel för detta ändamål
- 194) Det krävs en ny ekonomisk världsordning med en tydlig omfördelning av makt och resurser från rika länder och rika människor till fattiga länder och fattiga människor, och från män till kvinnor
- 195) Brist på politisk och ekonomisk makt
- 196) Stärka kvinnors makt och inflytande i internationellt samarbete
- 197) Det är viktigt att kvinnor inkluderas i beslutsfattande om klimatfrågor och inkluderas i arbete som berör miljö och livsvillkor
- 198) Att öka kvinnors möjligheter till utbildning och försörjning kan bidra till att förbättra den enskilda kvinnans ställning, främja jämställdhet i stort och dessutom bidra till hela samhällets utveckling mot ökad hållbarhet
- 199) Investeringar som bidrar till nya minskningar av utsläppen och som inte ska användas för att nå vårt nationella klimatmål
- 200) Har höginkomstländer som Sverige ett stort ansvar att bidra med resurser till låginkomstländer
- 201) Kunna hantera effekterna av utsläppen från den rika delen av världen
- 202) Vetorätt mot utvinning av fossil energi
- 203) Med målmedvetna satsningar på hållbar utveckling i samverkan mellan det offentliga och näringslivet kan Sverige också ta en ledande roll som exportör av ny energisnål och miljöanpassad teknik och nya former av energiproduktion.
- 204) En ny ekonomisk världsordning med en tydlig omfördelning av makt