The Road to (In)security:

India's Perception of Insecurity Towards the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor

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Abstract

Infrastructural techno-political regimes are growing all over the world. One such regime, the Chinese One Belt One Road project (OBOR) is planned to have transnational connections to over 65 countries, in Africa, Asia, and Europe. OBOR's flagship project is the US$62 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Pakistan and China's common neighbor in the South Asian region, India, is one of few states in Asia that has not agreed to join the OBOR. Instead, India has since the launch of the CPEC continuously voiced security concerns over it. The aim of this thesis is to explore the perception of insecurity that the Indian government create against the techno-political regime of CPEC. Along these lines, this thesis furthers the knowledge of how infrastructural techno-political regimes shape (in)security. It does so by building on the theoretical framework of techno-politics and securitization of infrastructure. The thesis uses discourse analysis and document analysis as methods. It finds that infrastructural techno-political regimes are concerned with securing connectivity, flow, and territorial control, viewing them as referent objects. Simultaneously, however, the same regime might be seen as a security threat by other political entities. In the case analyzed, the infrastructural techno-political regime of CPEC is seen as a securitized threat by the Indian government. Infrastructure technology produced by CPEC promotes a securitized discourse of connectivity, flow, and territorial control as a cause of; regional tension, national rivalries, unnecessary competitiveness, terrorism, and sovereignty issues.

Key Words; *Infrastructure, Techno-Politics, Securitization, China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, South Asia*

Abbreviations

|	
AIIB	Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank
BBIN	The Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal Initiative
BIMSTEC	Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation
BJP	Bharatiya Janata Party
BLA	Baluchistan Liberation Army
BRA	Baluchistan Republican Army
BNF	Baluchistan National Front
CPEC	China-Pakistan Economic Corridor
DAPL	Dakota Access Pipeline
ETIM	East Turkistan Islamic Movement
ETLO	East Turkistan Liberation Organization
ICT	Information and Communications Technology
JeM	Jaish-e-Mohammad
KKH	Karakoram Highway
KPK	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
LeJ	Lashkar-e-Jhangvi
OBOR	One Belt One Road (sometimes referred to as Belt and Road Initiative)
PaK	Pakistan Administrated Kashmir (Referred to as Pakistan Occupied Kashmir by the Indian Government)
SAARC	South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
TTP	Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan

(CPEC 2017a)

1. Introduction

China's One Belt One Road infrastructure project (OBOR), launched in 2013, has gained political as well as academic attention. Aimed at connecting China with 65 countries in Africa, Asia, and Europe, OBOR is bringing big infrastructure to the international arena, via rail, road, and maritime routes (Crow-Miller et al. 2017; The World Bank 2018). OBOR's flagship project, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), is a joint Sino-Pak infrastructure project. With the intention to connect mainland China with the Arabian Sea and at the same time make Pakistan an economic hub, the CPEC will consist of highways, railways, fiber-optics, power-plants, a bus service between China and Pakistan, and a deep-sea port in Gwadar (Garlick 2018; Hussain and Hussain 2017; CPEC 2017b; CPECInfo 2018a,b).

Pakistan and China's common neighbor in the South Asian region, India, is one of the few states in Asia that has not agreed to join the OBOR. Instead, India has, since the launch of the CPEC, continuously voiced security concerns over it (Khan et al. 2016). The Indian government's response to the CPEC brings about questions of how an infrastructural techno-political regime can affect a state's perception of (in)security.

To study how technology produces power, Hecht coined the term techno-politics in her essay "Technology, Politics and National Identity in France" (2001) to analyze how national identity was constructed around the quest for nuclear power in post-World War II France. Researchers in the field of techno-politics are further concerned with techno-political regimes, that is, institutionalized regimes that consist of the people that are involved with the technology, the artifacts themselves, political programs and ideologies that act together to further a political goal (Hecht 2001, 257). Techno-politics were later introduced to international relations and security studies (See for example Mayers et al. 2014; Hansen and Nissenbaum 2009). However, infrastructure as a unique technology and how infrastructural techno-political regimes shape insecurity have so far been overlooked by researchers. Instead, the authors have seen infrastructure as referent objects (See among others Collier and Lakoff 2008, 2015; Savitzky and Urry 2015; Cowen 2010a,b, 2011; Cavelty 2012). While agreeing with these scholars, this thesis argues that the case of the Indian government's response to CPEC creates a possibility to research how infrastructural techno-political regimes shape (in)security.

2. Aim and Research Questions

The aim of this thesis is to explore the perceptions of insecurity that the Indian government create against the techno-political regime of CPEC. By doing so, this thesis builds on the theories of infrastructural techno-political regimes and their relation to (in)security. As such, this thesis' research questions are as follows:

- How does CPEC contribute to the creation of a techno-political regime?
  - How does the techno-political regime of CPEC's hybridity contribute towards securing infrastructure?
- What impact does the techno-political regime of CPEC have on the Indian government's security discourse?

2.1 Relevance to Global Studies

Techno-political regimes are growing all over the world. The OBOR, which CPEC is a part of, is planned to have transnational connections to over 65 countries in Africa, Asia, and Europe (The World Bank 2018). As such, infrastructure technology and its techno-political regimes have become a fundamental part of globalization. Techno-political regimes in general and infrastructural techno-political regimes in particular affect many global dimensions, impacting the environment, the economy, culture, and security on a local, regional, global, as well as a transnational level (See among others Freidberg 2014; Savitzky and Urry 2015; Cowen 2010a,b, 2011; Hecht 2003; von Schnitzler 2018). It is, therefore, of importance to research these infrastructural regimes to understand how they shape their surroundings. By incorporating peace and development studies together with research in international relations, this thesis looks at how the CPEC challenges the security structure in the South Asian region. Thus, it is this thesis' hope that the study on how infrastructural techno-political regimes impact discourses of security will further the knowledge development and theory generation within the field of infrastructure techno-politics and security.

2.2 Delimitation

This thesis focuses on how the infrastructural techno-political regime of CPEC impacts the Indian government's security discourse. Hence other dimensions of security that the CPEC might affect, such as environmental effects in Pakistan, or the effect on local livelihood, have not been studied. Similarly, the strategic triangle that is the China-Pakistan-India relationship is complex with many

different factors shifting the triangular relationship (Bajpai 2001). This thesis has strived to removed itself from security discourses regarding other issues that are not affecting the CPEC in the region, among others; nuclear deterrence and resource competition.

While considering methods for the thesis, interviews were an option for gathering the data. Although interviews could have functioned as a complement to already existing statements by the Indian government, the thesis was unable to conduct interviews due to the amount of time and resources that would have been required. The thesis argues that the material that exists in documents gathered from the Indian government as well as from the techno-political regime of CPEC is enough to analyze and answer the research questions.

Many scholars, such as Blah (2018), Conrad (2017), Garlick (2018), Hussain and Hussain (2017), Javaid (2016), Khan et al. (2016), Khertan (2018), and Pant and Passi (2017), have made many important contributions to the knowledge generation of CPEC and its geo-strategic and geo-economic effects on the South Asian region and are referenced throughout this thesis. While these authors produce many interesting analyses, this thesis' aim is not to understand and analyze the pros and cons of CPEC, but rather, how infrastructure techno-political regimes shape (in)security. As such, these authors are not mentioned in the literature review.

Finally, Seeing CPEC as a techno-political regime means that this thesis does not see all infrastructure in Pakistan as a source of (in)security, but rather, that the infrastructural techno-political regime of CPEC, its discourse, and the infrastructure it produce shape (in)securities between China, Pakistan, and India.

3. Background

This section presents an account of the case of the infrastructural techno-political regime of CPEC and its position in the South Asian region. A brief overview of how and why the infrastructure of CPEC is being constructed will be presented. Further, a short introduction to the relationship between India, China and Pakistan will be given.

3.1 OBOR and CPEC

On the 7th of September 2013, the Chinese President Xi Jinping walked up to the stage at a conference hall in Kazakstan's Nazarbayev University and reminded the audience of the first contact between the Central Asian states and China over 2000 years ago. He spoke of the 2100-year-old transcontinental trade route of the (old) Silk Road before proposing a closer trade co-operation between the Eurasian countries and China in what was initially called the Silk Road Economic Belt (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China 2013). The Silk Road Economic Belt would later be renamed to what arguably would become the biggest techno-political regime in the history of mankind, the OBOR. As for now, OBOR, via rail, roads, and maritime connections, is expected to connect China with 65 countries, in Africa, Asia and Europe, accounting for 62% of the world's population, 75% of known energy reserves, and 30% of the global GDP (The World Bank 2018).

In this grand project that China has initiated, the CPEC is its flagship (Khetran 2018; Weidong et al. 2017). The US$62 billion CPEC project is the co-operation between Pakistan and China within the OBOR regime. CPEC, expected to be finished around 2030, is planned to consist of 1000 Km highway, 1830 Km railway, 21 different energy projects, optic fiber connectivity, the CPEC Passenger Bus-Service between Lahore and Tashkurgan, and the construction of the deep-sea port of Gwadar including all surrounding logistics (CPEC 2017b; CPECInfo 2018a,b). The main objective is to connect the Chinese mainland with the Arabian sea, hence, CPEC infrastructure will be constructed in all of Pakistan, starting with the Gwadar deep-sea port and ending in the Chinese Xinjiang province. The last stretch of the road is the Karakoram Highway (KKH), connecting China and Pakistan together via Pakistan administrated Kashmir (PaK). This already existing highway, built with great effort between 1959 and 1979, will be upgraded to be able to hold heavy freight traffic as well as an oil pipeline (Garlick 2018, 519-520).

China is hoping to gain easier access to the Middle Eastern oil states (Hussain and Hussain 2017, 8). By being able to transport products from the Middle East to Gwadar instead of ports in China, such as Shanghai, China will close the distance between itself and the Middle Eastern states from 12.000km by sea to 2000km by land (Hussain and Hussain 2017, 4). Further, constructing the CPEC infrastructure project would get around the so-called "Malacca Problem". The Malacca problem is, according to Chinese officials, the dependence on security in the Malacca Strait for

Chinese import (Wagner 2016, 316; Pant and Passi 2017, 93-94). The Strait, littered with pirates, is said to carry 80% of China's energy imports (Hussain and Hussain 2017, 4). Finding another way to connect to the Chinese mainland would secure the flow of energy. For Pakistan, the hopes are that CPEC will turn the country into a commercial hub for both Central and South Asia. The infrastructure enhancement is said to improve Pakistani connectivity with Asia, Europe, and Africa and the desire is to attract the whole world to Pakistan (Hussain and Hussain 2017, 5; Javaid 2016, 266).

3.2 CPEC and the South Asian Region

In the South Asian region, where CPEC is being constructed, India is perceived to (and perceives itself to) have hegemonic status since its independence and the partition from Pakistan in 1947 (Wagner 2016, 309; Roy-Chaudhury 2018, 99; Hazarika and Mishra 2016, 147). India, with approximately 80% of the population and three-fifths of the land of the states in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation[1] (SAARC), also has direct borders, land and/or sea, with all of the members but Afghanistan (Deo 2012, 1). While India's relations with its neighbors have far from always been good, the discourse has often been one of unity towards the region with a clear message of India as the South Asian leader (See for example Modi 2014, 2). Hence, a project such as CPEC does not go unnoticed by India.

With India's response to CPEC, the relations between India, China, and Pakistan need to be explored. The relationship between the three countries has been described as a Strategic Triangle by Bajpai (2001) in his piece *"Managing a Strategic Triangle: India, China and Pakistan"*. Calling the relationship a strategic triangle has some inherent meaning. First, the three states have actor autonomy, meaning that they are free to make their own decisions. Second, they are interdependent of each other, meaning that they are aware that their decisions have implications to the others. Third, there are moving alliance formations, meaning that at any given moment, two states can gang-up against the third. And finally, they all expect the mutually influencing relationship to endure (81-82).

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[1] The member states are: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Maldives, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka (SAARC 2018)

3.3 Sino-Pak Relations

While bringing China and Pakistan closer together, the CPEC is far from the first friendly contact between the two states. Instead, the Sino-Pakistani relationship has been characterized as all-weather and time tested (Javaid 2016, 255-256; Weidong et al. 2017, 5). All-weather is understood as the two countries rarely, if ever, taking a diplomatic stance against each other. The meaning of time tested, according to scholars, is long-standing diplomatic ties, established in 1951, that has grown stronger throughout the 20th and 21st century. To give an example, in the border war between India and Pakistan in 1961, China continued the supply of artillery weapon systems to Pakistan while other Pakistani allies, such as the United States, discontinued the delivery of arms (Weidong et al. 2017, 10; Javaid 2016, 256). Similarly, China has continued to supply Pakistan with arms throughout the relationship and even aided in the Pakistani aim to gain nuclear weapon capabilities (Paul 2014, 123). Due to CPEC, the Sino-Pakistani relationship has grown even stronger (Chaudhry 2018, 37).

Scholars speculate about what effects the CPEC have on the relationship between the two states. Researchers such as Hussain and Hussain (2017), argue that the improved relationship between China and Pakistan benefits the two countries equally, while others, such as Blah (2018, 321) argues that China's relation to Pakistan displays neo-colonial tendencies that could become problematic in the future. Lastly, Garlick (2018) argues that China is closing ties with Pakistan to further advance its position in the Indian Ocean region, primarily to balance itself against India. It is not this thesis' aim to get stuck in this academic debate. Whether the reason for the strengthening ties between China and Pakistan, the two nations increased connectivity affects the region.

3.4 Indo-Pak Relations

The Indo-Pak relation has been hostile since the 1947 partition of the two nations. With three border-wars and India's intervention in the partition war of West Pakistan and East Pakistan (later Bangladesh), tensions have increased over the years. In later years the two nuclear powers' main conflict points have become the Pakistani state-sponsored/ affiliated terrorism and the territorial conflict over Kashmir.

As China has moved closer to Pakistan, especially in regards to CPEC, the Indo-Pak relation has worsened as India has started to raise concerns over the infrastructure project (Jacob 2017). The enduring conflict between the two states is based on both the territorial implications due to Kashmir, but also the different identities the states have obtained towards each other (India as secular[2], democratic versus Pakistan as Muslim, authoritarian) (Paul 2013, 223; Varshney 1992). However, Paul (2013, 239), has recently argued that the hostility also builds on both countries desire to be identified as geo-politically important.

The hostilities have continued into 2019 where a suicide attack on the 14th of February, allegedly carried out by the Pakistani based terror organization Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), in Pulwama Kashmir, killed 40 Indian military personnel, resulting in the biggest loss of Indian soldiers in decades (BBC 2019a). This resulted in retaliation from the Indian government, carrying out airstrikes on a madrassa said to be run as a terrorist training camp, in Balakot (BBC 2019b). This was the first time since the 1971-war that the Indian air-force crossed the line of control. While the situation did not escalate further, the relationship between the two countries has been damaged by the incident, with Pakistan closing its airspace for commercial planes from Indian airlines until July (BBC 2019c). The abolition of Article 370 by the Indian government in august of 2019, an article that gave the state of Jammu and Kashmir some autonomy (Bajpai 2013, 113; Wallen 2019), has not been received well by Pakistan, again closing its airspace, cross-border rail lines, and suspending all bilateral trade with India (TOI 2019a,b,c).

3.5 Sino-Indian Relations

The Sino-Indian relation is one of ambivalence. The two countries first got a common border in 1950 due to Chinas annexation of Tibet. Since then, China has claimed the Aksai Chin region as well as parts of Arunachal Pradesh, creating an ongoing border dispute.[3] The ambivalence lies in the response from the leaders of the countries with calming statements about the border conflicts during diplomatic visits and in other forums (Indurthy 2016, 72). Similarly, this ambivalence can be found in all dimensions of the relationship, from trade to security. To give some examples, Chinas foreign investments in India remain abysmally low, even as China has promised large amounts during the

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[2] Some scholars argue that the Gandhian secular identity of India has somewhat lost power against the Hindutva identity since the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) took power in 2014 (Chacko 2019, 60).

[3] The abolition of Article 370 has not been received well by Beijing and the Xi government has argued that India undermines China's: *"territorial sovereignty by unilaterally changing its domestic laws"* (TOI 2019d).

last couple of years (Roy-Chaudhury 2018, 103). The two countries have enhanced their counter-terrorism co-operation, but at the same time, China has blocked every attempt by India to brand the Pakistani associated terror organization JeM's leader Masood Azhar as a "global terrorist" in the United Nations (Roy-Chaudhury 2018, 100; Indurthy 2016, 96-97). Similarly, China has been pushing for OBOR, in which CPEC is a part, in the last decade, using funds from the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), a bank that India is the second largest stakeholder in (Blah 2018, 317; Roy-Chaudhury 2018, 104). India has, as aforementioned, not joined the infrastructure project and is a vocal critic to the CPEC. India has been invited to many of the talks about OBOR and CPEC, such as the second Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation[4] and talks at the Shanghai Cooperation Forum, but has continuously declined to participate (Laskar 2019; Kapoor 2019).

4. Key Definitions

To get an accurate understanding of the key definitions of this thesis, this section presents a definition of *technology, infrastructure,* and *(in)security*.

4.1 Technology

There have been many attempts to define technology. Early definitions have taken a narrow assumption of technology as an artifact that serves the purpose it is created for (Carr 2016). With this definition, a radio is always a radio regardless of what one does with it. This definition has later been expanded to include what we humans do and how we interact with the technology. Hecht (2001) puts it neatly; *"technology [...] include[s] artifacts as well as nonphysical, systematic means of making or doing things"* (256). With this definition, the radio becomes a platform that can be cultural or political, persuasive or just for fun depending on what channel the user tunes into. Hence, technology should be seen as socio-technical in nature (Edwards 2002, 188). The latter definition will be used in this study as it provides the study with the tools to assist in what will be explained as techno-politics.

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[4] Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation is a forum for multilateral cooperation between OBOR countries hosted by China. It will be held on a regular basis (The Second Belt Forum for International Cooperation 2019).

4.2 Infrastructure

While technology should be seen as socio-technical, different technologies are produced for different purposes. As such, infrastructure takes a special role that is different from other technologies.

Infrastructure is be defined as transportation, distribution of essential goods, and government or private services that are essential for everyday lives (Edwards 2002, 187). Due to its socio-technical nature, infrastructure does not create one specific way of moving forward but instead opens the field for actors to alter the environment (Folkers 2017, 858). Infrastructure possesses the unique abilities to produce connectivity, flow, and territorial control (Mann 1984, 189; Folkers 2017, 855-856; Cowen 2011). A deeper theorization of these three concepts will be presented in the theoretical framework.

4.3 (In)security

While the meta-definition of security is an actor being secure from a threat insecurity is defined in opposite terms. However, who the actor is and what should be classified as a threat is debated. The classical assumption of (in)security as physical, i.e. (in)security from death, has been challenged by scholars who are arguing for the need for a broader concept that include other notions of (in)security (See among others Buzan et al. 1998; Huysmans 1998; Mitzen 2006; Hansen 2006). This further means that the paper sees (in)security as subjective, meaning that there are no objective threats, but rather that, actors decide what should be labeled a security threat (Buzan et al. 1998, 30). Lastly, this thesis is using the word (in)security as both security and insecurity simultaneously. (In)security means, this thesis argues, that while one actor does something to "feel" secure, that action can create insecurity for another. To give an example from the world of military technology; the minefield has the potential to create security for the one on the other side of it, while it creates insecurity for the one trying to get to that side. Hence, the minefield shapes (in)security.

5. Literature Review

To further the argument on how an infrastructure project such as the CPEC shapes (in)security, this thesis relies on the contemporary debate within the field of techno-politics and its relation to securitization within international relations. Hence, said literature needs to be reviewed. This

review's purpose is twofold. First, it will display the literature foundation within the field of techno-politics and its connection to securitization theory that is essential for this thesis. Second, it will expose the academic gap that the techno-political theoretical framework possesses. While many scholars presented in this literature review have focused on the relationship between technology, the regimes they create, and (in)security, few have looked into the relationship between infrastructural techno-political regimes and how they shape insecurity. Scholars that are concerned with the topic of infrastructure and security have seen infrastructure as referent objects, meaning the objects that need to be secured (see Collier and Lakoff 2008, 2015; Savitzky and Urry 2015; Cowen 2010a,b, 2011; Cavelty 2012; Cavelty and Kristensen 2008). Agreeing with these scholars, this thesis simultaneously sees infrastructural techno-political regimes as a source of insecurity. In other words, not excluding seeing infrastructure as a referent object, we need to expand the way of seeing infrastructural regimes as a potential threat to security.

As this thesis takes a theory-building approach, the concepts brought forward in the literature review will be integrated into the theoretical framework. As such, this literature review is divided into four parts. First, technologies' relationship to politics will be displayed. Second, the literature review will showcase the connection between technology and international relations. Third, the literature on how technology affects (in)security will be presented. Finally, an argument for why we need a new way of seeing the relationship between infrastructural techno-political regimes and (in)security will be proposed.

5.1 Techno-Politics

Through research on techno-politics, scholars have developed theories that better explain the relationship between technology and politics. As this thesis aims to look at infrastructure-technologies and their effect on the Indian government's security discourse, the theory of techno-politics constitutes an important foundation. Scholars that are concerned with techno-politics have promoted the concept by showing how politics and technology interact. This section will present the findings of these scholars and forward the concept of techno-politics into the field of international relations and security. Techno-politics is defined as *"hybrids of technical systems and political practices that produce new forms of power and agency."* (Edwards and Hecht 2010, 619). Moreover, Hecht suggests that techno-politics concerns how technology is used to *"constitute, embody, or enact political goals"* (Hecht 2001, 256).

Important to note is that technology is not political by itself, but rather an *"independent agent that can be strategically appropriated for different political purposes"* (Kurban et al. 2017, 7). Von Schnitzler (2018) shows how South African infrastructure, and the way it was produced, was essential for the Apartheid regime to uphold racial segregation. Further, she argues that the same infrastructure helped to contain many of the resistance practices used by the majority population well after the liberation. In their study on the techno-politics of information and communications technology (ICT), Kurban et al. (2017) have found that there is a struggle between centralization versus decentralization efforts where different groups use ICT's in different ways. The two studies show the independent agency of technology that different groups can use for different political goals. Hence, going back to the view of technology not only as an artifact but also the human interaction with said artifact, the same technology possess different meaning and discourse for different actors.

Techno-politics is, however, not contained in its own sphere with one political ambition that intersects with one technology. Instead, techno-politics is concerned with techno-political regimes. Techno-political regimes are institutionalized regimes that consist of the people that are involved with the technology, the artifacts themselves, political programs and ideologies that act together to further the goal of the regime (Hecht 2001, 257). Crow-Miller et al. (2017) reveal these regimes and how they function in their article "The Techno-Politics of Big Infrastructure and the Chinese Water Machine". They display the return of big water infrastructure in China, not as a new technology that is more advanced than previous technology, but as an ideological regime shaped by past urges to control nature, driven by the cravings of modernization and nation-building (Ibid). Similarly, Edwards and Hecht (2010) show how the western powers' obsession with nuclearity during the Cold War helped South Africa legitimize the Apartheid regime through its nuclear techno-political regime. These authors show how techno-political regimes are not endogenous, but very much integrated into the society, affecting and reflecting the broader vision of the socio-political order (Hecht 2001, 258).

To understand how the techno-political regimes create, shape, and constitute power, it is important to understand the discourse that surrounds them. In her article "Globalization Meets Frankenstein? Reflections on Terrorism, Nuclearity, and Global Technopolitical Discourse", Hecht (2003) makes a great case of how the post-9/11 discourses were shaped around the Cold War techno-political

hierarchies. By taking the techno-political lens to the discourse around the nuclear non-proliferation regime, she displays the continuation of the "colonizers versus colonized" discourse. The discourse has evolved into a nuclear versus non-nuclear divide and states that cross that line end up in the category of rouge states and then further into the "Axis of Evil" (Ibid). Here, Hecht displays how technology shapes, contains, and challenges political discourses. These political discourses have gained recognition as important components to understand international relations (Chacko 2019, 48). Hence, techno-politics have now made their way into international relations.

5.2 Technologies Move Into International Relations

Technology and techno-politics have made it into the debates within the field of International Relations, a field that for too long has seen technology as something independent (Mayer et al. 2014). Scholars that are concerned with technology in international relations have helped to understand the powers that technology create, shape, and maintain within the state, the regional, international, and transnational dimensions. But also how the state, regional, international, and transnational shapes the powers of technology. Instead of seeing technology as something external and unchangeable, these scholars argue that technology, on the one hand, shapes global politics in new directions, but also that global politics shape technology (Mayer et al. 2014; Carr 2016). As such, Mayer et al. (2014) have structured techno-politics' way of seeing international relations as: *"[H]ow are preexisting entities, processes, practices, and actors affected and transformed by sciences and technologies? And how do they respond and adapt?"* (2). These two questions are a good foundation to stand on when analyzing how CPEC affects the Indian government. However, it is this thesis' argument that a securitization dimension needs to be added.

5.3 Connecting Techno-Politics and Securitization Studies

While techno-politics has moved quickly into all areas of international relations (see for example Peters and Zittle 2014; Suttmeier and Simon 2014), this thesis focus on the Indian government's insecurities towards the infrastructural techno-political regime of CPEC. As previously mentioned, when researching infrastructural techno-political regimes and (in)security, scholars have seen infrastructure as referent objects rather than as a securitized threat. In the field, other technologies, the techno-political regimes created around them, and their effect on (in)security have, however, been extensively researched. While different technologies possess different functions and are

produced for different purposes this thesis presents other technologies and their effects on security as it sheds light on the relationship between techno-political regimes in general and (in)security.

Aside from research of the relationship between infrastructural techno-political regimes and security, it is also worth mentioning nuclear technology (see for example Peoples 2018; Englert and Harrington 2014; Hecht 2003) and cyber technology (see for example Carr 2016; Hansen and Nessenbaum 2009; Cavelty 2012; Eriksson and Giacomello 2014) as two other techno-political regimes with relations to (in)security. The authors concerned with these technologies and their regimes argue that security studies have disregarded the role of technology in world politics. By moving techno-political theory into the light of international relations they do a good job of exploring how technology create, constitute and transform (in)security on the regional, international and transnational arena.

Authors concerned with Nuclear security argue that the global techno-political regime of nuclearity shape the way states think about (in)security. Nuclear technology has a special position as it possesses the ability to both create one of the most reliable sources of energy but at the same time lead to the worst destruction known to man[5] (Englert and Harrington 2014). This has placed nuclear technology in the center for research into technology and techno-politics, but also in relation to (in)security. "Nuclear things", as Hecht (2010) calls it, contains the ability for states to interpret who is creating (in)security on the regional, international and transnational arena, by possessing it. Here, Hecht shows the intersubjectivity of technological threats, meaning that technological security threats are labeled threats through discourse (Buzan et al. 1998, 30, explained in greater detail in chapter 6.2.1). Hecht (2003, 2010) forwards her argument clearly: If NATO or the US use depleted uranium in the Gulf War or the Balkan Wars, they are not a nuclear threat, but if states such as North Korea or Iran so much as dream of one day obtaining nuclear things, they are. The relationship between nuclear techno-politics and (in)security goes further than states having bombs, as Englert and Harrington (2014) explain. Englert and Harrington bridge the divide between military and civil use of nuclear things when they argue that states, or non-state actors, no longer need to have a nuclear bomb. Rather, the possession of nuclear things (or in the case of Iraq in 2003; the idea that a state might have the ability to possess nuclear things) is enough to create insecurity. What Englert and Harrington show is that an artifact, such as a "nuclear thing" does not

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[5] In his famous article "Death in the Nuclear Age", Morgenthau (1961) argues that the destructive force of the nuclear bomb has created the ability not just to kill, but to destroy the meaning of life and death itself.

have to be objectively dangerous to create a securitized threat, but that the discourse around it can be threatening enough.

Cyber-security has gained a lot of attention by many scholars as the cyberspace has become more and more contested by different actors. By looking at cyberattacks such as; Stuxnet, attacks on the Iranian nuclear-regime, and cyber espionage by (other) states, the authors concerned with cyber-security show how states build techno-political regimes to secure themselves from the potential attacks and how these attacks shape the security discourse (Carr 2016; Hansen and Nessenbaum 2009). In their paper "Digital Disaster, Cyber Security, and the Copenhagen School", Hansen and Nissenbaum (2009) argue that cyber-security needs to be examined through a broader spectrum than security as military or physical. In their article, they argue that other dimensions of security are potentially threatened by cyberattacks, such as everyday security practices leading to hypersecuritization (1171). This is echoing the Copenhagen school's way of seeing security in the broader spectrum of securitization, seeing security as multi-dimensional (Buzan et al. 1998).

5.4 Infrastructural Techno-Political Regimes and Securitization

As seen above, the connection between nuclear and cyber technologies, their techno-political regimes, and how they shape (in)security have been well researched. Scholars concerned with the particularities of infrastructural techno-political regimes and the relation to security have, however, yet to fully explore these areas. Instead of seeing the infrastructure technology and the regimes created around it as potential producers of insecurity, authors have focused on infrastructure as referent objects arguing that infrastructural techno-political regimes are labeling infrastructure as critical-systems or vital-systems (Collier and Lakoff 2008, 2015; Cavelty and Kristensen 2008; Cavelty 2012).

Infrastructure are branded critical-systems or vital-systems through a securitization speech act. This means that infrastructure is; "*seen to be existentially threatened and that have a legitimate claim to survival*" (Buzan et al. 1998, 36). Scholars further concerned with bio-political security, meaning, the security of the social and biological life of a techno-political regime's population (Collier and Lakoff 2015, 42-43). They argue that the importance of ensuring connectivity, flow, and territorial control for infrastructure has become an increasing concern for a state's biopolitics (Collier and Lakoff 2015; Cowen 2011; Mukerji 2010; Mann 1984). Hence, any infrastructure that a techno-

political regime, via securitization speech acts, deem essential for the objective to secure the wellbeing of its population would be the focus of an infrastructural techno-political regime (Collier and Lakoff 2015, 21).

5.5 Infrastructural Techno-Political Regimes as Shaping (In)security: Gaps in the Literature

The review of the literature in the field of techno-politics and its relation to security has highlighted how techno-political regimes are constructed and how they relate to security studies. By connecting techno-politics to security studies scholars such as Carr, Hansen, Nissenbaum, Eriksson, Giacomello, Peoples, Englert, Harrington, and Hecht, demonstrate how different techno-political regimes shape (in)security. Nuclear and Cyber-security studies have aided in the understanding of technology's relation to security as subjective and multi-dimensional. However, as the literature review has shown, different technologies possess different unique abilities. Therefore, it is not entirely possible to apply the knowledge on how other techno-political regimes shape (in)security to understand infrastructural regimes. Instead, it is important to analyze them through the three unique abilities of infrastructure: Connectivity, flow, and territorial control.

Scholars concerned with infrastructural techno-political regimes and security have this far focused on seeing infrastructure as referent objects (See among others Collier and Lakoff 2008, 2015; Savitzky and Urry 2015; Cowen 2010a,b, 2011; Cavelty 2012). They have done so by focusing on how the infrastructural techno-political regimes are concerned with securing connectivity, flow, and territorial control. There is, however, a lack of research on how infrastructural techno-political regimes end up becoming a securitized threat. Integrating the theories developed by scholars such as Collier, Lakoff, Cowen, Cavelty, and Kristensen with securitization studies and how other techno-political regimes create insecurity (see among others Buzan et al. 1998; Hansen 2006; Hansen Nissenbaum 2009; Hecht 2003), this thesis argues that infrastructural techno-political regimes can be viewed as having effects on the security discourse of other political entities, outside the regimes' own intended sphere. Therefore, by analyzing the CPEC and how it impacts the security discourse of the Indian government, this thesis understands infrastructural techno-political regimes as not only referent objects but also as securitized threats.

6. Theoretical Framework

This chapter will present the theoretical framework on which this thesis is based. Starting with the theories of techno-political regimes, infrastructural techno-political regimes, and how they are concerned with securing infrastructure, the thesis presents its core concept. The core concept is that while an infrastructural techno-political regime focuses on infrastructure and, in extension, connectivity, flow, and territorial control as the referent objects, it might at the same time shape (in)security by activating a discourse of insecurity from another political entity. Finally, the chapter will also present the Copenhagen School's theory of securitization, which plays a foundational role in this thesis.

6.1 Techno-Political Regimes

CPEC is far from the only infrastructural techno-political regime that operates in Pakistan and in the South Asian region. The theoretical framework of techno-political regimes is used in this thesis to capture and analyze the techno-political regime of CPEC and, therefore, excludes other infrastructure produced in Pakistan and in South Asia. Further, the thesis argues that it is exactly because CPEC is an infrastructural techno-political regime consisting of not only the technology and the artifacts but also political programs, ideologies, and discourse that creates the ability for CPEC to impact the Indian government's security discourse the way it does.

As previously discussed, techno-political regimes are institutionalized regimes that consist of the people that are involved with the technology, the artifacts themselves, political programs and ideologies that act together to further a political goal (Hecht 2001, 257). The theoretical framework of techno-political regimes was first coined by Gabrielle Hecht in her essay, "Technology, Politics and National Identity in France" (2001). It helps to understand how politics, with the help of technology, can forward a political goal, but at the same time, how the technology affects the politics. Techno-political regimes are, therefore, understood as: *"hybrids of technical systems and political practices that produce new forms of power and agency."* (Hecht and Edwards 2010, 619). Hence, the way people within a techno-political regime both discursively and materially constructs the relationship between technology and politics have consequences (Hecht 2001, 287). As such, it is not enough to research what a techno-political regime says, but it is equally important to study

what kind of technology is produced, why it is produced, how it is produced, and where it is produced.

By using the regime metaphor, Hecht has argued that three distinct features of the hybridity between technology and politics are uncovered (Hecht 2001, 258). First, by naming it regimes, she argues that importance is put not only on the technological artifacts but also on the people and ideologies that shape the artifacts. Second, Hecht (2001, 2003, 2010) together with other scholars concerned with techno-political regimes (see among others Crow-Miller et al. 2017; Edwards and Hecht 2010) have shown that the regimes do not prescribe to one practice or politics, but rather reflect the broader vision of the socio-political order (Hecht 2001, 258). That is, a regime's decisions and discourses are shaped by the greater socio-political order in which it is situated. Third, similar to scholars such as Kuban et al. (2017) and von Schnitzler (2018), who argues that the same technology possesses different meaning and discourse for different actors, Hecht (2001) argues that techno-political regimes must grapple with opposition, whether it comes from within the regime itself or externally (258). As such, techno-political regimes are not uncontested (Ibid).

Using the theoretical concept of techno-political regimes enables this thesis to move away from researching just the discourse or just the technology, but instead, sees CPEC as a hybrid of politics and technology. Hecht's three distinct features that techno-political regimes possess are important to understand. Using them creates the ability to not only research CPEC as a techno-political regime but also how it is exogenously perceived. Keeping the theoretical framework of techno-politics and Hecht's three distinct features in mind, CPEC consists of infrastructural technology. As such, the forthcoming subsection of the techno-political framework will continue by exploring the unique abilities of infrastructure techno-political regimes.

6.1.1 Infrastructural Techno-Political Regimes

The techno-political regime of CPEC consists of infrastructure technology. The unique features that infrastructure technology possess, therefore, need to be explored. As aforementioned, infrastructure technology should be defined as transportation, distribution of essential goods, and government or private services that are essential for everyday lives (Edwards 2002, 187). As socio-technical, infrastructure does not create one specific way of moving forward but instead opens the field for the techno-political regime to alter the environment (Folkers 2017, 858). That is, as much as

infrastructure is its own technology, it is up to the regimes where and how infrastructure is constructed. For example, while the technicalities of a paved road would create the ability to manage heavier traffic, it is up to the infrastructural techno-political regime where that road is paved, where its paved from, where the road is paved to, how broad the paved road should be, and so on.

Researchers concerned with infrastructural techno-political regimes have found them to function around three distinct, yet intertwined, features; connectivity, flow, and territorial control (Collier and Lakoff 2015; Folkers 2017; Edwards 2002; Mukerji 2010; Mann 1984). The premise of technology as socio-technical creates the understanding that; as much as infrastructure acts as an enabler of connectivity, flow, and territorial control, it is up to the techno-political regime to decide where and when connectivity, flow, and territorial control should be activated. Understanding infrastructural techno-political regimes as concerned with connectivity, flow, and territorial control means that the three concepts need to be presented:

- Connectivity is the enabling of *"[the] interaction between socially diverse and often spatially dispersed 'communities of practice' [...] and allow for the emergence of national or even transnational political collectives."* (Folkers 2017, 855-856). Here, infrastructure acts as an enabler for techno-political regimes to spread, not only inside a state but also over borders, enabling transnational co-operation and transnational flows. As such, infrastructure, via its techno-political regimes, have the power to move two or more political entities closer together.

- Flow should be understood as the ability to continuously get "stuff" from one place to another (Cowen 2011). Stuff, then, could be anything from energy to other goods, as well as people or ideas. Making sure that the stuff comes in time and with continuity is essential for the functions of a state (Cowen 2010, 2011; Edwards 2002).

- Territorial control is the ability for an infrastructural techno-political regime, via connectivity and flow, to: *"penetrate civil society, and to implement logistically political decisions throughout the realm"* (Mann 1984, 189). Building infrastructure in a territory places the techno-political regime into that area, taking control over the territory (Mukerji 2010; Folkers 2017). Mann (1984) and Mukerji (2010) argues that building infrastructure is one of the ways for states to gain control over their territory and its population by implementing infrastructure to govern daily life and thus

also the people living in the territory (Mann 1984, 189). In areas contested by two states, such as the Kashmir region, infrastructure does not only act as a state-control over the population but also as a power against the other state.

6.2 Securitization Theory

The previous section has shown how infrastructural techno-political regimes are concerned with enabling connectivity, flow, and territorial control. It is equally important for the regimes that connectivity, flow and territorial control are not interrupted (Cowen 2010a,b; Collier and Lakoff 2008, 2015; Cavelty 2012). Cowen (2010b) notes that the threats to the continuity of connectivity, flow, and territorial control, could as easily come from labor actions as from piracy, natural disasters, or terrorism (71). Securing infrastructure, making sure that connectivity, flow, and territorial control are not interrupted, is thus not something that is always done through military might, nor are the threats always objective. Hence, through speech acts, the infrastructure becomes the referent object, meaning; *"things that are seen to be existentially threatened and that have a legitimate claim to survival"* (Buzan et al. 1998, 36).

As shown in the literature review, however, techno-political regimes cannot be viewed as endogenous entities in an ever-changing world, but rather as a part of the society where they are situated, affecting and reshaping it but at the same time being shaped by their surroundings (See for example Edwards and Hecht 2010; Crow-Miller et al. 2017). As such, the powers that an infrastructural techno-political regime creates are not contained in its own intended sphere but are simultaneously affecting its surroundings.

Following these presumptions, the core concept this thesis is presenting is that while an infrastructural techno-political regime focuses on infrastructure and, in extension, connectivity, flow, and territorial control as the referent objects, it might at the same time shape (in)security by activating a discourse of insecurity from another political entity. Previously research from other non-infrastructural techno-political regimes and their effects on insecurity have shown that techno-political regimes are securitizing the technology, meaning that the technology becomes a security threat (See among others Carr 2016; Hansen and Nissenbaum 2009; Hecht 2003; Eriksson and Giacomello 2014). To examine how the political entities surrounding infrastructural techno-political

regimes securitize it, the theoretical framework of securitization, introduced by the Copenhagen School, will be used.

6.2.1 The Theoretical Framework of Securitization as a Speech Act

The base presumption of the theoretical framework of securitization is that security is subjective, meaning that there are no objective threats, but rather, that actors decide what should be named a threat (Buzan et al. 1998, 30). As such, a security issue is presented by an actor via a speech act, using a securitizing discourse to make an issue a security problem (24-25). As language is constructed, so is the way actors speak of security (Hansen 2006). Therefore, actors, by using words and speech linked to the ontology of threats and security, can label something an issue. This does, however, not mean that someone needs to say the word *security,* but rather, that they can use metaphorical security references (Buzan et al. 1998, 27). Securitizing an issue is thus to present the issue as an existential threat, saying that: *"if we do not tackle this problem, everything else will be irrelevant (because we will not be here or will not be free to deal with it in our own way)"* (Buzan et al. 1998, 24).

Applying securitization theory to analyze how infrastructural techno-political regimes affect, not just infrastructure as the referent objects (as scholars such as Collier and Lakoff 2008, 2015; Savitzky and Urry 2015; Cowen 2010a,b, 2011; Cavelty 2012 have previously done) but also labeling infrastructure as a security threat means that we have to examine what discourses of insecurity that are constructed around connectivity, flow, and territorial control.

Drawing further on the work in securitization studies, infrastructural techno-political regimes, and in its extension; connectivity, flow, and territorial control are not entirely military or physical security issues (Cowen 2010a,b; Buzan et al. 1998; Huysmann 1998). Instead, the thesis argues that the (in)security that infrastructural techno-political regimes create are multidimensional as they affect different dimensions of society (see for example Cowen 2010a,b; Collier and Lakoff 2008, 2015; Hansen and Nissenbaum 2009). Hence, infrastructural techno-political regimes and their effect on (in)security needs to be examined through a multidimensional lens (Buzan et al. 1998; Huysmann 1998).

7. Methodology

This thesis aims to build on the theory of techno-politics and how infrastructure shapes insecurity in other political entities. As such, this thesis is theory building. While this thesis only has space to analyze the case of how CPEC impacts the Indian government's security discourse, it is its hope that other infrastructure projects could be analyzed in a similar way in the future to further the knowledge development and theory generation (Finfgeld-Connett 2014, 341). Building on the tradition of techno-politics means that discourse is in focus. As such, this thesis has adopted discourse analysis as a method to understand how infrastructural techno-political regimes shape (in)security. However, using the theory of techno-politics as its foundation, this thesis takes a socio-technical stance to the ontology of discourse. That is, the discourse is produced in relation to the technology, but at the same time; the technology is produced in relation to the discourse (Mayer et al. 2014). This thesis, therefore, moves away from the anti-realist tradition of discourse analysis (*c.f.* Bryman 2012, 529). In this manner, document analysis will be incorporated into the methodology to analyze the non-discursive sources of CPEC. Presented below is how the two methodologies are integrated with each other and the theories of techno-politics and securitization.

7.1 Discourse Analysis and Document Analysis as Method

As theory building, this thesis grounds itself on the theories of techno-politics. As showcased in both the literature review and the theory chapter, the theory is based on the discourse produced by the techno-political regimes with the help of technology. Similarly, the securitization theory designed by the Copenhagen School sees securitization as a speech act. Analyzing the discourse produced by the techno-political regime of CPEC as well as the Indian government is necessary to be able to build on the theory of infrastructure techno-politics and securitization, seeing infrastructure techno-political regimes as shaping (in)security. Using discourse analysis as a method means that this thesis: *"emphasizes the way versions of the world, of society, events and inner psychological worlds are produced in discourse"* (Potter 1997, 146). Discourse is not neutral. Instead, people seek to promote an agenda when they write or talk (Bryman 2012, 529). Along these lines, discourse analysis is used to understand the broader themes of the techno-political regime of CPEC and the Indian government's response to it. By analyzing the use of words and how the speech is presented, a pattern emerge that can be used to answer the questions presented in this thesis.

While discourse analysis was chosen as the method due to the theory building nature of this thesis, one could argue that other sorts of discourse analysis, such as critical discourse analysis, could have been used. Critical discourse analysis, in the tradition of scholars such as Fairclough, Foucault, and Laclau and Mouffe (Jørgensen and Phillips 2011), as a subgenera of discourse analysis has become an increasingly accepted theory and method. However, the aim for this thesis is not, as Fairclough argues, to: *"In the name of emancipation, [...] take the side of oppressed social groups."* (Jørgensen and Phillips 2011, 62). Instead, the thesis argues that "taking sides" in the conflict in the strategic triangle of China-Pakistan-India obstructs the aim of the thesis. Therefore, discourse analysis as: *"emphasiz[ing] the way versions of the world, of society, events and inner psychological worlds are produced in discourse"* (Potter 1997, 146), is preferred for the aim of the thesis.

Document analysis will be integrated into the methodology due to the socio-technical nature of techno-political regimes. Document analysis help analyze the non-discursive parts of the infrastructural techno-political regime of CPEC. The non-discursive parts are the actual hardware of the infrastructure, where the roads are going, how the infrastructure is built, and so on. The use of the word document holds a broader meaning than a paper with text when speaking about document analysis. Instead, it is defined to include everything from visual documents, such as pictures or maps, to internet websites and news articles (Bryman 2012, 543; Bowen 2009). Document analysis, hence, aids this thesis to look at other forms of material than discourse. To give some examples, maps of the highway and railway network constructed under CPEC, as well as the specifications of the Deep-Sea Port of Gwadar have been analyzed via the method of document analysis.

7.2 Data Collection and Sources

The analysis is divided into two parts that are interconnected with each other. The first one answers the question of how CPEC contributes to a techno-political regime and how it secures infrastructure. The second, what impact the techno-political regime of CPEC has on the Indian security discourse. Equally, the gathering of the sources was divided into two parts. First, the discourse that the Indian government produces in relation to the CPEC were gathered. Second, the non-discursive and discursive sources of the techno-political regime of CPEC was gathered. Both primary sources, such as speech from the Indian government and statements from the CPEC techno-political regime, and secondary sources, such as news media and academic papers, have been used.

Only one source is translated from Hindi. The other sources can be found in English on the websites referenced as both India and Pakistan use English as their official language. Therefore, this thesis argues that it captures the "real", "untranslated" discourse produced by both the CPEC as well as the Indian government.

7.2.1 Sources from the CPEC Techno-Political Regime

The hybridization of techno-political regimes create the understanding of it as both political as well as technological. In that manner, this thesis will use both discursive and non-discursive sources that construct the CPEC techno-political regime. The non-discursive sources present the actual hardware of the infrastructure, where the roads are going, how the infrastructure is built, and so on. The discursive sources are from statements and speeches made by Pakistani and Chinese officials involved in the techno-political regime. Both the discursive and non-discursive sources are mostly primary sources from CPEC's own website (cpec.gov.pk), the Pakistan-China Institute's CPEC portal (cpecinfo.com) the Gwadar Port Authority, and the Pakistani National Highway Authority. These authorities and organizations, together with the technology constitute the techno-political regime of CPEC, and the statements that are brought up in this thesis from Chinese and Pakistani officials are official statements from and about CPEC. Hence, statements from these websites should be seen as discourse from the techno-political regime. Finally, in some cases, second-hand media sources have been used to describe CPEC and the challenges it faces. These are not seen as CPEC discourse but rather as complementary sources to further the understanding of the situation in South Asia and how the techno-political regime affects it.

7.2.2 Sources on the Indian Government's Discourse Concerning CPEC

The sources gathered on the Indian government's discourse about CPEC have been the starting point for this thesis. As these sources construct the discourse that expresses insecurity towards CPEC, they were the ones to first be gathered. Hence, the analysis is built on the discourse found in these sources. All of the sources are statements made by Indian government officials about CPEC, connectivity, flow, and territorial control. These statements have been made from 2014, when the CPEC started its planning, to 2019. Most of the sources gathered are primary sources from the Indian government's websites, with two exceptions; an interview with Vikram Misri, Indian Ambassador to China made with Global Times, a Chinese government-owned news-organization

(Xie and Bai 2019); the other, a second hand source from a statement by Indian Minister of External Affairs, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar quoted in an academic article by Pant and Passi (2017, 89).

7.3 How the Analysis was Conducted

This thesis adopts a theory-building approach to infrastructure and (in)security. Seeing the discourses coming from India about the CPEC as signs of insecurity, this paper builds on the previous theoretical foundation that infrastructure techno-politics provides, adding a dimension of securitization, asking how and why the infrastructural techno-political regime of CPEC creates insecurity for the Indian government.

The way the analysis was conducted was first, after the sources were gathered, by analyzing the techno-political regime of CPEC and how it concerns securing connectivity, flow, and territorial control as research by, among others, Collier, Lakoff (2008, 2015), and Cowen (2010a,b 2011). Here, using the combination of discourse analysis and document analysis, the thesis connects the infrastructure of CPEC with the discourse of the officials involved in the regime to display the CPEC and how it secures connectivity, flow, and territorial control. There is no space in this thesis to analyze every infrastructure construction of the US$62 billion project. Instead, while collecting the sources, three projects have appeared to be of main importance to both the techno-political regime of CPEC as well as the Indian government; the deep-sea port in Gwadar, the KKH and the CPEC Passenger Bus Service. It is this thesis' assertion that these three infrastructure projects capture the essence of the techno-political regime of CPEC and the reflection of the broader vision of the socio-political order (Hecht 2001, 258). Similarly, via the discourse analysis, the greater patterns and themes of the techno-political regime of CPEC are exposed. This part of the analysis is done to answer the first question, and it's subquestion: *How does CPEC contribute to the creation of a techno-political regime?* and: *How does the techno-political regime of CPEC's hybridity contribute towards securing infrastructure?*

Following this, the Indian discourse towards CPEC is analyzed. The analysis of the techno-political regime of CPEC is used as a foundation when the Indian discourse is presented and analyzed through a securitization lens. That is, the way the techno-political regime of CPEC concerns connectivity, flow and territorial control and how it secures it affect how the Indian government talks about CPEC. The gathering of these sources was conducted by finding statements made by the

Indian government on CPEC, but also on connectivity, flow, and territorial control in relation to the regime. This section of the analysis is done to answer the central question for this thesis: *What impact does the techno-political regime of CPEC have on India's security discourse?*

For the discourse analysis, the thesis presents sections in the sources that are of special importance in **bold** to make it easy to follow.

7.4 Ethical Considerations

Ethical considerations and ethical issues have for long been debated and are concerning just about all types of qualitative research in social science (Bryman 2012, 130). As the thesis has not interacted with other materials than text and websites, it removes itself from the problems of participant ethics that an interview study would have. However, using the case of CPEC and how it shapes India's security discourse means that this thesis examines a highly politicized case. As discussed in the section about discourse analysis, this paper does not aim to *" [...] in the name of emancipation [...]"* take sides (Jørgensen and Phillips 2011, 62). It is therefore important to make sure the thesis stays objective to the case, to best answer the research questions. That is, it is not this thesis' aim to take a stance on the conflict in the strategic triangle of China, Pakistan, and India, but rather, to understand how infrastructural techno-political regimes shape (in)security.

8. Results and Analysis

This section present and analyzes the findings of this thesis. It is divided into two parts. First, the infrastructure techno-political regime and its hybridization of technology and discourse is presented and analyzed to answer the two first questions proposed in this thesis; *How does CPEC contribute to the creation of a techno-political regime?* and, *How does the techno-political regime of CPEC's hybridity contribute towards securing infrastructure?* The second part of the analysis focuses on the third question; *What impact does the techno-political regime of CPEC have on India's security discourse?* The third question is answered by using the analysis of the techno-political regime of CPEC as a foundation. The first section agrees with scholars such as Collier, Lakoff (2008, 2015), and Cowen (2010a,b) and argues that the infrastructural techno-political regime of CPEC is concerned with securing its infrastructure technology, seeing it as referent objects. The second part explores the perceptions of insecurity that the Indian government creates against the techno-political

regime of CPEC, furthering the core concept of this thesis: while an infrastructural techno-political regime focuses on infrastructure and, in extension, connectivity, flow, and territorial control as the referent objects, it might at the same time shape (in)security by activating a discourse of insecurity from another political entity.

8.1 The Infrastructural Techno-Political Regime of CPEC

This section of the analysis presents CPEC as an infrastructural techno-political regime. Analyzing both the policies and discourses as well as the infrastructure technology constructed by CPEC creates the understanding of CPEC as a hybridization between technology and politics (Edwards and Hecht 2010, 619). By using the theoretical framework of techno-politics, this thesis argues that it is able to capture *"not just policies and practices but also broader visions of the sociopolitical order."* (Hecht 2001, 258). Connecting the theoretical framework of techno-politics with the theory of securitization enables an understanding on how CPEC is securing the technology it produces (Cowen 2010a,b; Collier and Lakoff 2008, 2015; Cavelty 2012).

In the theoretical framework, the three distinct features of infrastructural techno-political regimes; connectivity, flow, and territorial control, were presented (Collier and Lakoff 2015; Folkers 2017; Edwards 2002; Mukerji 2010; Mann 1984). These three features will, in this analysis, act as operationalized tools to structure this analysis of both the discourse and the technology of CPEC. While the three features are intertwined, it is this thesis' argument that structuring the analysis this way showcase the way CPEC secures infrastructure to concern securing; connectivity, flow, and territorial control (In line with Collier and Lakoff 2015; Folkers 2017; Edwards 2002; Mukerji 2010; Mann 1984). As the CPEC is under construction, securing the infrastructure technology is as much making sure that connectivity, flow, and territorial control is created as to protect it ones it is built. The infrastructure techno-political regime is presented and analyzed by dividing it into the operationalized tools[6], but also by dividing it into the technical artifacts and the discourse produced.

8.1.1 Connectivity and Flow of CPEC

This subsection presents the findings of the CPEC techno-political regime and how it promotes Sino-Pak connectivity and flow, national connectivity and flow, and connectivity and flow on the

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[6] As connectivity and flow is very much linked together, the analysis will present them simultaneously.

global scale. These discourses are connected with the features that the infrastructure constructed by CPEC possesses. The artifacts of the infrastructural techno-political regime of CPEC are important for the production of the regime's discourse. Hence, this subsection will first present three important infrastructure projects within CPEC; the Gwadar Deep-sea Port, the KKH, and the CPEC Passenger Bus Service. Later, the discourse concerning connectivity and flow from the CPEC techno-political regime is presented. Seeing the power produced by CPEC as a hybridization of infrastructure and discourse will later aid in the analysis to understand how the infrastructural techno-political regime impacts the Indian government's perception of insecurity.

8.1.1.1 Connectivity and Flow as Technology

Gwadar Deep-Sea Port

The deep-sea port in Gwadar, via its maritime capacities, makes it possible for CPEC to promote a discourse of connectivity and flow to other regions in the world. According to the techno-political regime, the Gwadar deep-sea port is *"[...] an indispensable interchange for the [OBOR]"*(CPECinfo 2018b). Pakistan has previously constructed two larger ports in Karachi and Qasim. However, the two ports did not satisfy the techno-political regime as they did not *"[...] ensure that national development is not hampered by a lack of national port capacity in the future"* (Gwadar Port Authority 2019). Instead, the techno-political regime of CPEC looked towards the small fishing village of Gwadar in Baluchistan. Located only 120km from the Iranian border, Gwadar is one of the closest locations to the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz for CPEC to construct a deep-sea port (Gwadar Port Authority 2019). Transforming the fishing village rapidly into a commercial hub, the Gwadar Port is built to be able to dock and unload large cargo ships containing both dry and liquid cargo as well as facilities to store it in, and will foremost act as a port for energy transfer (Conrad 2017, 56; Khetran 2018, 44). The technicalities of Gwadar and the decisions by the CPEC regime have an impact on the power the port produce. Gaining closer access to the oil-rich Gulf states, thus shortening the distance between China, the middle east, and other parts of the world is the goal for the construction of the deep-sea port (Conrad 2017, 57-58; Khetran 2018, 44). The hybridization of the techno-political regime of CPEC is here displayed. Connectivity efforts are in the case of the techno-political regime of CPEC not only discursive or political but also includes the technology that is produced.

Removing insecure routes and making sure that the: *"[…] indispensable interchange for the [OBOR]"* is able to act as the connected interchange in the CPEC network is of utmost importance for the techno-political regime. Making sure that the port is always able to stay connected is securing connectivity. This further plays into the concept of securing flow. As aforementioned, the deep-sea port of Gwadar helps China to get around the Malacca problem, securing energy-flow from the oil-states of the Gulf.

The Karakoram Highway

The KKH, connecting China and Pakistan over the border at the Khunjerab pass, will be upgraded to hold heavy freight-traffic and oil-pipelines being able to deliver "stuff" during all seasons of the year (Conrad 2017, 58; Garlick 2018, 519-520). The KKH is of high value to the CPEC techno-political regime as it connects Pakistan and China together, crossing the border between Pakistan Administrated Kashmir (PaK) and the province of Xinjiang. All the goods unloaded at Gwadar that are destined for China would have to go via the KKH and through PaK. At an altitude of 4693m, the Khunjerab Pass is the worlds highest paved international border. Due to heavy snowfall in the region during the winter months, the KKH is usually closed between November and April (Dawn 2018). Along the KKH, landslides have many times swallowed the road. When KKH was constructed the first time, more than 1000 Pakistani and Chinese workers died due to landslides (Small 2015, 100-101). In 2010 a major landslide caused the closure of one section of the road until 2015 (Garlick 2018, 524). Similarly, the treacherous weather conditions on the way up to the Khunjerab pass is yet another security threat to the techno-political regime of CPEC. By upgrading the KKH to support all-weather trafficability, the techno-political regime of CPEC is able to secure a continuous flow of "stuff" between China and Pakistan as well as securing the connectivity between the countries during all seasons of the year. Not only constructing an oil-pipeline but also upgrading the highway means that other forms of goods, workers, and tourists are able to cross the border both ways. Tourism and people-to-people exchange, as will be notable throughout this analysis, is one of the discourses that the techno-political regime is producing, the KKH is one way of connecting the two peoples with each other.

CPEC Passenger Bus Service

One of the ways the techno-political regime of CPEC connects people via the KKH is by the newly launched CPEC Passenger Bus Service, operating both ways between Lahore and Tashkurgan, aimed to boost tourism and cultural exchange (CPECinfo 2018a; APP 2018). The 30-hour route, passing through the Khunjerab pass, is presented as a luxurious bus-ride with good food and beautiful views (CPECinfo 2018a; APP 2018). The bus service will *"[…] serve[s] as a step forward towards promoting tourism and is an important platform for 'cultural exchange' under the umbrella of CPEC."* (CPECInfo 2018a). While this bus-route is not aiming to move millions of people over the border, it is still an important symbol of two people moving closer together, reaching over borders.

8.1.1.2 Connectivity and Flow as Discourse

The socio-technical nature of CPEC means that discourse is constructed around the infrastructure projects. By producing technology with the features of connectivity and flow the techno-political regime of CPEC is able to promote a discourse around the same features. China's Chairman of National Development & Reform Commission, He Leifeng, display how the CPEC techno-political regime promotes connectivity between China and Pakistan:

> *"The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor is an important loop in the larger chain of Belt and Road Initiative [OBOR], and would enable the possibility of a 21st Century Maritime Silk Route.* ***It carries the vision of opening-up of and cooperation among the two countries.*** *[…] further enhance trade and investment facilitation, establish a network of free trade areas that meet high standards, maintain closer economic ties, and deepen political trust; enhance cultural exchanges; encourage different **civilizations** to learn from each other and **flourish together**; and promote mutual understanding, peace and **friendship among people** of both countries."* (CPEC 2017c).

Leifeng display how connectivity is more than just about connecting infrastructure over boarders for the techno-political regime of CPEC. Instead, it is connectivity between *civilizations,* not among only economic entities or policymakers, but *peoples*. While the technology of CPEC could be seen as merely an economic or trade co-operation between China and Pakistan, the hybridization of

technology and politics reflects the broader vision of the Sino-Pak socio-political order. That is, according to President Xi, to build a community of shared destiny, with a bright future:

> "To build a China-Pakistan **community of shared destiny** is a strategic decision made by our two governments and peoples. Let us work together to create an even **brighter future** for China and Pakistan." (CPEC 2017c).

The techno-political regime of CPEC use a discourse, via its infrastructure, of two civilizations moving even closer together than the already all-weather and time-tested relationship. By using words such as *shared destiny, flourish together,* and *brighter future,* the discourse promotes CPEC, and the heightened Chinese-Pakistan relationship due to it, as a new regional norm rather than something temporary. This is echoed in the Pakistani Ambassador to China, Masood Khalid's, official statement. He is promoting the historical ties between the two countries as a *natural* force, bringing China and Pakistan closer together via the techno-political regime of CPEC:

> **"China and South Asia are linked historically and geographically through the Ancient Silk Road, and it is but natural that these two regions continue to be linked even more strongly.** We have already taken the first step for greater connectivity by signing agreements on Economic Corridor, and actively pursuing them on-ground." (CPEC 2017c).

What can further be seen by Khalid's statements is an urge for CPEC to be a driving force in connectivity, not just between China and Pakistan, but also the South Asian region as a whole. Khalid continues:

> "This would **benefit China, Pakistan and entire South Asia,** and will facilitate the economic integration of **whole region**. Both countries have embarked on developing the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, which will open up new opportunities for development, enhance connectivity and people to people contacts." (CPEC 2017c).

By bringing the *entire South Asia* into the Chinese-Pakistani connectivity discourse, China, via the techno-political regime of CPEC, furthers its position in the South Asian region. While China has had much exchange with the South Asian region throughout its history (Indurthy 2016), it is not a

member of SAARC, nor a member of any other regional co-operational organizations such as Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), or The Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal Initiative (BBIN). Yet, through the discourse that the techno-political regime creates around connectivity and flow, CPEC creates the ability for China and Pakistan to close the distance between each other and *"allow for the emergence of national or even transnational political collectives."* (Folkers 2017, 855-856). As such, President Xi, in his statement about CPEC, is able to claim that China is included in the South Asian region, naming it *our region*;

> *"[…] we should advance our shared interests and achieve common development. We should use China-Pakistan Economic Corridor to drive our practical cooperation with focus on Gwadar Port, energy, infrastructure development and industrial cooperation so that the fruits of its development will reach both all the people in Pakistan and the people of other countries in* **our region.** (CPEC 2017c).

8.1.2 Territorial Control of CPEC

This section analyzes how territorial control plays a role in the construction of infrastructure within the techno-political regime of CPEC. The Pakistani state lacks territorial control in large parts of Pakistan. In 2011 approximately 30% of Pakistani territory, especially in the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa[7] (KPK), was under Taliban control. The region of Baluchistan, where Gwadar is located, has had a long ongoing violent struggle for independence with organizations such as the BLA, the Baluchistan Republican Army (BRA), and the Baluchistan National Front (BNF) (Paul 2014, 63-64, 132-133). Moreover, the upgraded KKH is being constructed in PaK, a territory contested by India.

8.1.2.1 Territorial Control as Technology

By constructing infrastructure in the regions of KPK, Baluchistan, and PaK, the Pakistani state has the ability to connect the periphery with Islamabad. As previously mentioned, the deep-sea port of Gwadar is being constructed in the western parts of Baluchistan. While the small fishing village of Gwadar has exploded into a commercial-hub in just a few years, with a new airport large enough to handle both domestic and international flights, a state of the art medical facility called China-

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[7] KPK is formerly known as the North West Frontier Province

Pakistan Friendship Hospital, among other projects, the whole region will gain access to CPEC infrastructure (CPEC 2017d). This infrastructure includes the extension of both the railway and highway networks, as well as energy infrastructure (CPEC 2017a; NHA 2019; CPEC 2017e). As seen in the theoretical framework, securing territorial control has much to do with where the technology geographically is placed as what kind of infrastructure is constructed. By constructing infrastructure in Baluchistan, the techno-political regime of CPEC is able to: *"penetrate civil society, and to implement logistically political decisions throughout the realm"* (Mann 1984, 189). Taking control over territory by constructing infrastructure is, however, not without effort. Baluchistan, where the BLA, the BRA, and the BNF, among others, operate has seen increased attacks towards Chinese engineers, workers, and other assets of the CPEC (Chaudhury 2019). On the 11th of May 2019, the BLA took the responsibility of an attack at the luxury Pearl Continental Hotel in Gwadar, saying that;

> *"We warn China to stop her exploitative projects in Balochistan and do not support Pakistan in the genocide of Baloch people, otherwise, we would respond with more attacks."* (SCMP 2019).

Hence, for CPEC, it is of the utmost importance that infrastructure is not only constructed in Baluchistan but also protected when finished. Due to this, the CPEC has deployed around 40.000 Pakistani security personnel to protect workers and infrastructure throughout the project (CGTN 2019).

Another area in Pakistan where Pakistani control over territory is challenged is in PaK. The partition in 1947 did not fully end the territorial dispute over Kashmir between India and Pakistan[8], and as of today, Pakistan controls approximately one-third of the Kashmir region. The techno-political regime of CPEC's decision to construct the KKH in PaK, therefore, not only ensures the connectivity and flow between China and Pakistan but also create the ability for the techno-political regime of CPEC to claim territorial control over PaK. As will be discussed in the second section of this analysis, the territorial control that the KKH brings to PaK is a pillar in the securitization discourse produced by the Indian government.

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[8] The history of the Kashmir issue and the conflict between India and Pakistan because of the territory is complex but for a great article on the topic see Varshney (1992)

8.1.2.2 Territorial Control as Discourse

While the technology works as a tool for CPEC to ensure territorial control, the discourse promotes the concept to CPEC's surroundings and uncovers territorial control as another part of the broader vision of the socio-political order. As such, the discourse displays territorial control for the Pakistani state as an increasing concern for CPEC.

In a press release by the CPEC website, Pakistani Federal Minister for Planning, Development, and Reform, Makhdum Khusro Bakhtyar, in a meeting with the Chief Minister of Baluchistan, Jam Kamal Khan, explain how the Islamabad-Gwadar Western Route is of importance to CPEC:

> *"Western Route is one of the important projects of CPEC [...] implementation of the project would **open up** and **ensure socio-economic development** of **the remote regions** of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa [KPK] and Balochistan."* (CPEC 2017f).

Naming the regions *remote* is placing them in the periphery compared to Islamabad. *Open[ing] up* the regions, therefore, becomes the CPEC's goal, gaining access to the "closed regions". Promoting the infrastructure produced by CPEC as to *ensure socio-economic development* should be seen as discourse to *"penetrate civil society, and to implement logistically political decisions throughout the realm"* (Mann 1984, 189). Bakhtyar's discourse is conforming the Chinese ambassador to Pakistan, Yao Jing, who promotes CPEC as a beneficiary to the periphery of Pakistan, affecting the *local* people directly:

> *"We will also provide KPK province with medical, educational and training projects **in line with the need of local people**, to translate the benefits of CPEC immediately among them. For average persons, the outcomes of the CPEC are tangible, **accessible and enjoyable** to **hundreds of thousands families** across the country."* (CPEC 2017c).

8.1.3 Summary: CPEC Infrastructure as Referent Objects

Displayed in the analysis of CPEC is a techno-political regime as a hybrid between the technology it produces and the discourse it constructs. Further, this thesis has argued that the techno-political regime of CPEC, via the infrastructure it produces, is concerned with connectivity, flow, and territorial control, and making sure that it is not interrupted. By analyzing connectivity, flow, and

territorial control of CPEC the broader socio-political order is displayed. That is, an urge for the two countries of China and Pakistan, via the connectivity that infrastructure provides, to *flourish together* via its *shared destiny* and move the two political entities of China and Pakistan closer. Similarly, via CPEC, China is able to pursue a discourse of South Asia as their region, with CPEC connecting the whole of South Asia. CPEC is not only connecting the political entities of Pakistan and China but is also creating territorial control for the Pakistani state. The hybridity of technology and politics helps CPEC to establish control over parts of Pakistani territory that is either contested by another state, such as in the case of PaK, or to connect and *open up* the *remote regions* of Baluchistan and KPK to Islamabad.

To make sure that the techno-political regime of CPEC is able to promote a continuous discourse of its broader socio-political order connectivity, flow, and territorial control is promoted as referent objects, that is *"things that are seen to be existentially threatened and that have a legitimate claim to survival"* (Buzan et al. 1998, 36). To secure infrastructure technology is, therefore, of importance to the regime. In response to this, the techno-political regime of CPEC has expressed a discourse of working towards securing the connectivity, flow, and territorial control that CPEC provides. One example is China's Chairman of National Development & Reform Commission, He Leifeng:

> *"[…] we need to improve the region's infrastructure, and put in place a **secure and efficient network of land, sea and air passages**, lifting their connectivity to a higher level […]."* (CPEC 2017c).

Agreeing with Collier, Lakoff (2008, 2015), and Cowen (2010a,b) this thesis argues that the techno-political regime of CPEC promotes a discourse of infrastructure as referent objects to secure connectivity, flow and territorial control. The technology of CPEC is threatened by everything from terrorism in Baluchistan to landslides in the area where the KKH is constructed. The broad dimensions of threats towards infrastructure technology create a broad subjective discourse of securitization, capturing more than just military or physical dimensions of security, as seen in President Xi's official message about CPEC;

> *"China will work with Pakistan to tackle **non-traditional security threats** so as to provide a reliable security guarantee for bilateral economic cooperation and common development."* (CPEC 2017c).

Xi's use of *non-traditional security threats* display the diversity of threats that is produced via the securitization discourse around the CPEC infrastructure. As explained by Buzan et al. (1998), non-traditional could be everything from terrorism to labor actions, or other unknown threats to the connectivity, flow, and territorial control the techno-political regime of CPEC promotes.

8.2 CPEC as a Threat: How CPEC Impact the Indian Government's Security Discourse

The analysis above has shown, agreeing with scholars such as Collier, Lakoff (2008, 2015), and Cowen (2010a,b), that infrastructural techno-political regimes are involved in securing connectivity, flow, and territorial control. However, this thesis argues that the infrastructural techno-political regime of CPEC not only constructs a discourse of infrastructure as a referent object but that CPEC itself is branded a security threat, through speech acts, by other political entities. In this analysis, CPEC is displayed to be branded a securitized issue by the Indian government, hence, creating insecurity. As such, the infrastructural techno-political regime of CPEC should be seen as shaping (in)security. As the analysis above, this section is divided into discourses of connectivity and flow, and territorial control.

8.2.1 Connectivity and Flow as a Security Threat

The Indian government has during the last three decades promoted connectivity and flow as a pillar for the Indian civilization to make the 21st century Asia's century (Modi 2017; Singh 2012). For the Indian government, it is therefore, not the concepts themselves that are the subjective threats to India. Instead, the discourse that the Indian government is producing is securitizing the infrastructure techno-political regime of CPEC's "way of doing" connectivity and flow. This is illustrated by India's ambassador to China, Vikram Misri when India declined its invitation to the second Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation:

> *"India shares the global aspiration to strengthen connectivity and it is an integral part of our economic and diplomatic initiatives. We ourselves are working with many countries and international institutions in our region and beyond on a range of connectivity initiatives [...] However, it is also our belief that connectivity initiatives must be based on universally recognised international norms, good governance and rule of law. They must emphasise social stability and environmental protection and*

preservation, promote skill and technology transfers and follow principles of openness, transparency and financial sustainability" (Xie and Bai 2019).

India has indeed been trying to work with others to promote connectivity and flow in the region. Prime Minister Narendra Modi's foreign policy doctrine has been closely associated with the narrative of India as regional hegemon and leader, advocating for more connectivity. In November of 2014, the Modi government (six months into the government's first term) launched the "Neighborhood First" policy on the 18th SAARC summit in Katmandu, pushing for a more connected region (Malik 2016, 18). Modi, hoping to revitalize India's regional profile and to get its neighbors more excited about the huge country in the middle, have since pushed the narrative of India as a good but firm neighbor (Pant 2019, 2; Chaturvedy 2014, 3). The policy had been introduced to:

- Rebuilding connectivity and rejoining India with its immediate and extended neighbors.
- Shaping relationships after India's economic priorities.
- Forward India as a human resource power.
- Forward the Indian narrative on global challenges.
- Spreading the benefits of India's civilizational legacies, including Yoga and Ayurveda.

(Modi 2017, 2)

For Modi, the "Neighborhood First" policy is essential to the South Asian region as:

*"The people of South Asia are **joined by blood, shared history, culture, and aspirations.** The optimism of its youth seeks change, opportunities, progress and prosperity. A thriving well-connected and integrated **neighbourhood is my dream**."* (Modi 2017, 2).

The Indian government is promoting a narrative of a South Asia under one common people and one common identity, by using words such as *blood*, *shared history,* and *culture*. Similarly, using the word *neighborhood* instead of a word such as region should be associated with something closer or more familiar. In the general debate of the 69th Session of the United Nations General Assembly Modi furthered the narrative of India as a connected neighbor;

*"India desires a peaceful and stable environment for its development. A nation's **destiny** is **linked** to its neighbourhood. That is why my Government has placed the highest priority on advancing friendship and cooperation with her neighbours."*(Modi 2014, 2).

Pushing so far as to view connectivity with the South Asian region as India's *destiny*, Modi incorporates South Asia's future into the Indian identity. The techno-political regime of CPEC is contesting India's connectivity efforts with the region, and therefore, its destiny. Using the Indian way of doing connectivity as the referent object, the Indian government is establishing a discourse of CPEC's connectivity and flow as a security threat. An example of such discourse from the Indian government is Indian Minister of External Affairs, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar's speech at the Raisina Dialogue where he criticizes CPEC for not incorporating what, by India, is perceived to be the region's wants and needs:

*"The key issue is whether we will build our connectivity through consultative processes or more unilateral decisions. [...] we cannot be impervious to the reality that others may **see connectivity as an exercise in hard-wiring that influences choices.** This should be discouraged, because particularly in the absence of an agreed security architecture in Asia, it could give rise to **unnecessary competitiveness.**"* (Jaishankar 2016).

The discourse is securitizing CPEC as a threat. By arguing that the techno-political regime sees connectivity as an *exercise that influences choices,* the Indian discourse is manifesting a fear of CPEC seizing control over the way South Asia is doing connectivity, making it more difficult for India to control its own *destiny* of connectivity. Through the securitization lens, the discourse is viewed as the Indian government perceiving their own connectivity efforts, their "way of doing connectivity", as existentially threatened because India *"will not be free to deal with it in [their] own way"* (Buzan et al. 1998, 24). Jainshankar continued his speech at the Raisina Dialogue and argued that: *"Connectivity should diffuse **national rivalries**, not add to **regional tensions.**"* (2016). Using words such as *tensions, rivalries,* and *competitiveness* showcase the Indian discourses of securitization against the connectivity efforts of CPEC, telling the techno-political regime of CPEC (and others in the international arena) that what they are doing is creating a security issue for India.

Connectivity and flow efforts by CPEC is not only affecting the Indian security discourse as threatening towards the Indian *destiny* and its growth. Because of the multidimensionality of insecurity, other discourses are also affected. In 2016, at a private meeting between Xi and Modi at the G20 meeting in Hangzhou, the issue of an increase in cross-border terrorism in Kashmir due to the CPEC was brought up (In a question and answer session after the meeting official spokesperson Shri Vikas Swarup answered the following question):

Question: *"Sir, since a major source of **terrorism** at the Chinese border is the CPEC area, did India express any concern about Chinese **Migration**?"*
Answer (Swarup): *"That issue was also brought up."* (MEA 2016, *Translated from Hindi*).

Connecting, *migration* flow via CPEC with *terrorism* as a threat, yet again, securitizes the connectivity and flow that CPEC produces. In this manner, CPEC, in the eyes of the Indian government, becomes a highway for Uyghur Islamic terrorism[9] from Xinjiang to enter PaK. The anxiety displayed by the Indian government towards the techno-political regime of CPEC is not only about losing its perceived status as a hegemon, lagging behind in the South Asian region, but also one of physical insecurity. The technology of the upgraded KKH here plays a role in what securitization discourse is produced by the Indian government. Enhancing connectivity and flow between China and Pakistan, enabling more people to move across the border and through PaK increases the Indian government's perception of insecurity.

8.2.2 Territory and Sovereignty Issues of CPEC

The techno-political regime of CPEC has aided the Pakistan government to pursue a discourse of territorial control within Pakistan. While the regions of Baluchistan and KHK, as aforementioned, are recognized Pakistani territory, PaK is contested by India. The Kashmir issue has been unsolved since the independence and partition of the two states in 1947. However, the techno-political regime of CPEC has intensified the conflict. As the project of upgrading the KKH has begun and the discourse produced by CPEC has reached India, the Indian government has responded. The

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[9] The Uyghur majority of Xinjiang province have had a long ongoing violent struggle for independence involving organizations such as the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) and the East Turkistan Liberation Organization (ETLO) among others.

discourse from the Indian government is one of sovereignty issues, made clear by Indian ambassador to the UN, Paul's statement in the 39th Session of the Human Rights Council:

> *"Regarding the so-called 'China-Pakistan Economic Corridor', which is being projected as the flagship project of the Belt and Road Initiative, the international community is well aware of India's position. No country can accept a project that ignores its core concerns on sovereignty and territorial integrity."* (Paul 2018).

The technological features that the KKH holds help CPEC create territorial control in PaK. At the same time, it is affecting the Indian security discourse of sovereignty. The way the KKH *"implement logistically political decisions throughout the realm"* (Mann 1984, 189) in PaK, boosts the techno-political regime of CPEC's position in the region, and in its extension, aid the Pakistani state to ensure its position in the Kashmir conflict. The Indian government is adopting the technicalities of infrastructure in their discourse when they, as in the case of Jaishankar's speech at the Raisina Dialogue in 2016, securitize the KKH;

> *"The CPEC **passes through** a piece of land, which we call Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, which is a territory that belongs to India and is illegally occupied by Pakistan."* (Janisankar 2016).

Or Janishankar ahead of the Belt and Road Initiative Forum of 2017;

> *"CPEC violates Indian sovereignty because it **runs through** Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. [...] We were very frank with them in sharing what our concerns were and we share it in public."* (Pant and Passi 2017, 89).

The Indian discourse of securitization is heavily influenced by the technicalities of infrastructure. By using phrases such as *runs through* and *passes through,* the Indian government put emphasis on what the KKH does as a highway. Securitizing the sovereignty issue of KKH in PaK around the way infrastructure creates connectivity, flow, and territorial control is made clear throughout the Indian governments response to the KKH and, in its extension, the techno-political regime of CPEC. As such, the infrastructural techno-political regime of CPEC's unique technological features shape the Indian government's securitization discourse to focus on connectivity, flow, and territorial

control as threats. This is also captured in India's way of securitizing the CPEC Passenger Bus Service connecting Lahore and Tashkurgan with the statement that;

> *"We have lodged strong protests with China and Pakistan on the proposed bus service that will **operate through** Pakistan Occupied Jammu and Kashmir under the so-called 'China-Pakistan Economic Corridor' [...] any such bus service **through Pakistan Occupied Jammu & Kashmir** will be a violation of India's sovereignty and territorial integrity."* (MEA 2018).

The subjective nature of insecurity creates the possibility for the Indian government to label a bus route, such as the CPEC Passenger Bus Service, a security threat. The Bus service not only affects sovereignty concerns of the Indian government but also acts as a symbol of the two political entities of China and Pakistan moving closer together, moving alliance formations in the strategic triangle of China-India-Pakistan relations (Bajpai 2001).

8.2.3 Summary: The Infrastructural Techno-Political Regime of CPEC as a Security Threat

The infrastructure constructed by CPEC has created a discourse of China and Pakistan, two civilizations, moving closer together *"build[ing] a China-Pakistan community of shared destiny"* (CPEC 2017c). Here, the infrastructural techno-political regime of CPEC plays an essential role as the unique abilities of infrastructure technology aids in *"the emergence of national or even transnational political collectives."* (Folkers 2017, 855-856). In the same manner, Pakistan has, via the infrastructural techno-political regime, constructed the ability to ensure its position in the territory of PaK. The Indian government has securitized the CPEC via a discourse closely related to the unique technological features that infrastructure holds. That is, a discourse of the connectivity efforts, flow efforts, and efforts of territorial control by CPEC as security threats. Leaning on the technological features of infrastructure's ability to run through, move people, as well as, connecting political entities, the discourse produced by the Indian government is displayed to promote the infrastructural techno-political regime of CPEC as a cause of; *regional tension, national rivalries, unnecessary competitiveness, terrorism,* and *sovereignty issues*.

The CPEC techno-political regime and its way of doing connectivity, flow, and territorial control are further shifting the power-balance in the strategic triangle of China-India-Pakistan relations

(Bajpai 2001). The response from India, the third player in the strategic triangle (2001), has been one of anxiety of being left out in the *Asian century*. The shift in the triangular relationship, with CPEC seeing the new infrastructure technology shared by China and Pakistan as a *shared destiny* to *flourish together,* and for a *brighter future,* as a new regional norm, means that the Modi governments *dream* of *a thriving, well-connected, and integrated neighbourhood* is no longer India's *destiny* to make, but rather, in the hands of the infrastructural techno-political regime of CPEC.

9. Discussion

The aim of this thesis has been to explore the perceptions of insecurity that the Indian government constructs against the techno-political regime of CPEC. By building on the theories of infrastructure and techno-politics, the thesis has displayed how infrastructure and the techno-political regimes that form around the technology shapes the discourse of insecurity of other political entities. With this in mind, the discussion will first revisit the results of the analysis to understand them as a general conclusion of the case of the techno-political regime of CPEC and its effect on the Indian government's securitization discourse. After that, the theories that the thesis built the core concept on will be revisited to understand how the analysis of CPEC and the Indian government can help advance the theory of infrastructural techno-political regimes and their relation to (in)security.

9.1 CPEC Shaping (In)security

The analysis has shown, by using the theories of techno-politics, that the CPEC integrates the technologies that infrastructure such as the KKH, the Gwadar Deep-Sea port, and the CPEC Personal Bus Service holds to promote discourse of connectivity, flow, and territorial control. To give some examples, the Bus Service's ability to move people across the border aid CPEC's broader vision of the socio-political order to enhance people-to-people contacts and encourage ''*different civilizations to learn from each other and flourish together''* (CPEC 2017c)*.* Similarly, the Gwadar deep-sea port help the CPEC regime to, not only ensure connectivity and flow between the Gulf states, Pakistan, and China, but it also places the CPEC regime into the region of Baluchistan, thus ensuring territorial control in the *''remote regions''* (CPEC 2017f). By constructing infrastructure technology the CPEC can, therefore, promote a discourse of; a *community of shared destiny, friendship among people, cultural exchange* between China and Pakistan*,* and to *ensure socio-*

economic development in the remote regions of Pakistan. The techno-political regime of CPEC's hybridity between technology and politics is what Hecht finds in her essay on how nuclearity shaped national identity in post-world war II France (2001). However, this thesis argues (alongside scholars such as Collier and Lakoff 2015; Folkers 2017; Edwards 2002; Mukerji 2010; Mann 1984) that as an infrastructural techno-political regime, CPEC is involved with creating and maintaining connectivity, flow, and territorial control.

Agreeing with Collier, Lakoff (2008, 2015), and Cowen (2010a,b), this thesis argues that the techno-political regime of CPEC is concerned with seeing infrastructure and connectivity, flow, and territorial control as referent objects. As the CPEC is under construction, the discourse produced is as much focused on making sure that connectivity, flow, and territorial control is produced as it is secured once the infrastructure is constructed. In this manner, the CPEC techno-political regime's discourse is as much aimed to *"ensure that national development is not hampered by a lack of national port capacity in the future"* (Gwadar Port Authority 2019), as well as *"to provide a reliable security guarantee for bilateral economic cooperation and common development."* (CPEC 2017c).

Producing and securing infrastructure and in its extension connectivity, flow, and territorial control creates an understanding of CPEC as a security booster for China and Pakistan. As aforementioned however, scholars have argued that techno-political regimes cannot be viewed as endogenous entities in an ever-changing world, but rather as a part of the society where they are situated, affecting and reshaping it but at the same time being shaped by their surroundings (See for example Edwards and Hecht 2010; Crow-Miller et al. 2017). As such, the security that the techno-political regime of CPEC produces via its hybridity of technology and politics affects the Indian government's security discourse.

The Indian government's response to the infrastructural techno-political regime of CPEC is via a securitization speech act, naming the CPEC a security threat. As seen in the analysis, the securitization discourse is integrating the technicalities of the infrastructure that CPEC is constructing as well as the discourse produced by CPEC to argue that the CPEC's way of doing connectivity, flow, and territorial control is a threat to India. Viewing CPEC, and its way of doing connectivity, flow, and territorial control, as a cause of; *regional tension, national rivalries, unnecessary competitiveness, terrorism,* and *sovereignty issues,* the Indian government promotes a securitization discourse of CPEC as affecting multiple security dimensions of the Indian society. In

addition, this thesis argue that the unique features of the infrastructure CPEC produces impact the Indian government's discourse the way it does. To give an example, the KKH's ability as a road to move people across the border creates the possibility for the Indian Government to produce a discourse of Chinese cross-border migration as a terrorist threat. Similarly, unlike other non-infrastructural technology, the KKH has the ability to *pass through* or *run through* the PaK is producing a discourse of sovereignty issues in Kashmir.

9.2 Building on the Theory of Infrastructural Techno-Political Regimes and (In)security

This section will discuss how this thesis contributes to the theories of infrastructural techno-political regimes and their relationship to (in)security. As seen in the literature as well as in the theoretical framework, scholars such as Collier, Lakoff (2008, 2015), Cowen (2010a,b), Cavelty, and Kristensen (2008) have analyzed how infrastructural techno-political regimes are concerned with securing the infrastructure thus making sure that connectivity, flow, and territorial control are not interrupted. The techno-political regime of CPEC does just that. However, it has been argued that techno-political regimes cannot be viewed as endogenous entities in an ever-changing world, but rather, as a part of the society where they are situated, affecting and reshaping it. The Indian government's response to the CPEC shows that infrastructural techno-political regimes are affecting their surroundings. In this manner, this thesis builds on the research by Collier, Lakoff (2008, 2015), Cowen (2010a,b) and Cavelty and Kristensen (2008), arguing that techno-political regimes see the infrastructure as referent objects. However, they can also become securitized threats.

As mentioned in the literature review, other technologies, the techno-political regimes created around them, and their effect on (in)security have been extensively researched. The thesis previously brought up nuclear technology and its regimes (Peoples 2018; Englert and Harrington 2014; Hecht 2003), and cyber technology and its regimes (Carr 2016; Hansen and Nessenbaum 2009; Cavelty 2012; Eriksson and Giacomello 2014) to display how certain techno-political regimes both see the technology as referent objects as well as securitized issues. Borrowing from the theories constructed around nuclear and cyber-technology and their relation to (in)security, this thesis has shown how infrastructure technology and the regimes that are constructed around it create subjective multidimensional security issues by other political entities that securitize connectivity, flow, and territorial control.

Building on the theories developed by Collier, Lakoff (2008, 2015), Cowen (2010a,b), Cavelty, and Kristensen (2008), this thesis argues that we need to extend the theoretical framework that is infrastructural techno-political regimes and their relationship to security to include infrastructure techno-political regimes as shaping insecurity. Coming back to the definition of (in)security, this thesis argues that infrastructural techno-political regimes shape security and insecurity simultaneously, hence, shaping (in)security.

9.3 Future Research

The thesis has thus far shown that infrastructural techno-political regimes shape multiple dimensions of (in)security. Exactly what dimensions the regime's effect has, however, yet to be uncovered (*cf.* Buzan et al. 1998). Some suggestions could be made by analyzing the case of CPEC and the Indian government, such as, sovereignty issues in Kashmir as affecting physical insecurity and India's destiny as affecting ontological insecurity (*c.f.* Mitzen 2006, Giddens 1991). However, more research needs to be done on this subject. It is, therefore, this thesis' belief that to understand the multiple dimensions of (in)security that infrastructure techno-political regimes affect, more cases needs to be examined. Other cases would aid in the knowledge development and theory generation on how infrastructure shapes (in)security. One such case could be the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe and their conflict with the Dakota Access Pipeline (DAPL), and in the extension, the energy-infrastructure techno-political regime of the US government. Another case could be the Kerch Strait Bridge connecting Crimea with mainland Russia, and how it affects the security discourse, not only between Ukraine and Russia but also the discourse of security in the Black Sea. Analyzing other cases will aid in creating a complete picture of how infrastructural techno-political regimes on the local, regional, and global arenas shape (in)security.

10. Conclusion

The purpose of this thesis has been to understand how infrastructural techno-political regimes shape (in)security. By building on the theories of techno-politics and its relation to security, it has promoted infrastructural techno-political regimes and the infrastructure they produce as both referent objects and as securitized issues simultaneously, meaning that they shape (in)security.

By analyzing the discourse and technology produced by the CPEC regime as well as the Indian government's response to it, a securitization discourse was revealed. The research questions set out to be answered were how CPEC contributes to the creation of a techno-political regime, how the techno-political regime of CPEC's hybridity contribute towards securing infrastructure, and what impact the techno-political regime of CPEC had on the Indian security discourse. The two first questions were answered by analyzing the discourse of CPEC as well as the technological artifacts it produced. The hybridization of technology and politics that is a techno-political regime are visualized in the analysis of CPEC where the technology aids in the production of a discourse of securing connectivity, flow, and territorial control. At the same time, the discourse helps in securing the technology. Viewing the techno-political regime as being involved with securing infrastructure and in its extension, connectivity, flow, and territorial control means that the thesis agrees with Collier, Lakoff, Cowen, Cavelty, and Kristensen. However, the third research question answered in this thesis promotes the argument that while techno-political regimes see the infrastructure as referent objects they can at the same time become securitized threats.

By analyzing the discursive response to the infrastructural techno-political regime of CPEC by the Indian government, through a lens of the theoretical framework of securitization, CPEC is presented as a security issue. The securitization discourse is integrating the technicalities of the infrastructure that CPEC is constructing as well as the discourse produced by CPEC to argue that the CPEC's way of doing connectivity, flow, and territorial control is a threat to different dimensions of the Indian society. Connectivity, flow, and territorial control promote discourses of; *sovereignty issues, regional tensions, unnecessary competitiveness,* damaging the Indian *destiny,* and cross-border *terrorism*, due to the ability of infrastructure to; *"allow for the emergence of national or even transnational political collectives."* (Folkers 2017, 855-856), continuously get "stuff" from one place to another (Cowen 2011), and; *"penetrate civil society, and to implement logistically political decisions throughout the realm"* (Mann 1984, 189).

Finally, adding to the theories of infrastructural techno-politics and its relation to (in)security this thesis has shown that while an infrastructural techno-political regime focuses on infrastructure and in the extension; connectivity, flow, and territorial control as the referent objects, it might at the same time activate a discourse of insecurity from another political entity, hence, shaping (in)security. The discourse of insecurity has been displayed to be constructed around the technological features of infrastructure, that is; connectivity, flow, and territorial control. However,

to better understand what dimensions of (in)security infrastructural techno-political regimes affect, we need to add to the knowledge by examine more cases.

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