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POWERLESS OPPOSITION

Opposition's Legislative Chances in Autocratizing Regimes: The Case of Ukraine

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Abstract

The assumption permeating this thesis is that, in the consensus democracy, the government should respond to the minority interests, which are operationalized as bills sponsored by the opposition. The research pays attention to the typical case of autocratizing states with gradual democratic backsliding – Ukraine. Arguably, in the context of the steady deterioration on the democratic end, there is a risk of political exclusion and, even more, the democratic breakdown. So, I analyze 2868 bills across three convocations of the Ukrainian parliament, covering the period of 2007-2019. The aim is to see whether ignoring opposition's proposals occurs in autocratizing – yet previously consolidating – democracies. The quantitative analysis shows that, first, bills sponsored by the opposition are less likely to be adopted than those sponsored by the government. Second, the more cosponsors the bill has, the larger are its chances for adoption. The findings are predominantly in line with the previous research on the legislative success determinants. However, one should be cautious with interpreting the increase of the cosponsors' effect since it is different for different cosponsorship groups. The other tested determinants of legislative success, i.e., the proximity of elections and the gender, do not find sufficient support. The case selection with the explicit opposition-government split indicates the necessity of conducting a similar study in the institutional context of temporary issue-based coalitions. Then, it will be possible to argue whether the regime's dynamics influence the opposition's legislative success.

Keywords: legislative success, opposition, consensus democracy, autocratization.

Table of Contents

1. Introduction.....	1
2. Defining Opposition.....	2
<i>Opposition Types</i>	3
<i>Institutional Determinants of Opposition Type</i>	5
3. Legislative Success Determinants.....	6
<i>Institutional and Contextual Factors</i>	7
<i>Individual Characteristics</i>	8
4. Research Hypotheses	9
5. Ukraine: Case-Relevant Information	10
<i>Case Selection</i>	11
<i>Regime Type and Its Alterations</i>	11
<i>Legislative Procedure</i>	15
<i>Dominant Opposition Type</i>	16
5. Data Management	18
6. Operationalization and Method.....	20
7. Data Description	21
8. Analysis and Results	24
<i>Regression Results and Their Interpretation</i>	24
<i>Additional Tests and Discussion of Results</i>	28
9. Concluding Remarks.....	30
References.....	31
Appendices.....	35
<i>Appendix 1. Governmental Factions: Convocations 6 through 8</i>	35
<i>Appendix 2. Defined as Governing Parties within the Indicated Period While Coding</i>	37
<i>Appendix 3. Variables Operationalization</i>	38
<i>Appendix 4. The Crosstabulation of Categorical Variables</i>	39
<i>Appendix 5. List of the Archived Files</i>	41

Table of Figures and Tables

Figure 1. The Universe of Cases.....	11
Figure 2. Ukraine in terms of Liberal Democracy Index Components.....	12
Table 1. The Distribution of Bills in Each Convocation and General.....	21
Table 2. The Crosstabulation of Variables Relevant to H1 and H2.....	22
Figure 3. Distribution of the Bills according to the Number of Initiators.....	22
Figure 4. Distribution of the Bills according to the Number of Initiators within each Initiators' Group.....	22
Figure 5. Distribution of the Bills according to the Approximation of Elections.....	23
Figure 6. Distribution of the Bills according to the Approximation of Elections within each Initiators' Group.....	23
Table 3. Regression Results (Convocations 6,7, and 8).....	25
Figure 7. Average Marginal Probability of the Number of Initiators.....	26
Figure 8. Average Marginal Probability of the Days before Elections.....	26
Figure 9. Average Marginal Probability of Initiator's Group.....	26
Figure 10. Average Marginal Probability of Gender.....	26
Figure 11. Average Marginal Probability of Convocation.....	26
Figure 12. Estimated Coefficients of the Bills Initiated by the Nongovernmental Initiators' Group by the Number of Initiators.....	27
Figure 13. Estimated Coefficients of the Bills Initiated by the Mixed Initiators' Group by the Number of Initiators.....	27
Figure 14. Estimated Coefficients of the Bills Initiated by the Nongovernmental Initiators' Group by Days before Elections (Squared and Divided by 1000).....	27
Figure 15. Estimated Coefficients of the Bills Initiated by the Mixed Initiators' Group by Days before Elections (Squared and Divided by 1000).....	27
Table 4. Regression Results for Model 8 and Clustered SEs.....	28
Figure 16. Comparison of Coefficients for Model 8 and Clustered SEs.....	29
Figure 17. The Goodness of Fit.....	29

1. Introduction

According to Dahl (1971, 1-2), democracy involves “continuing responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its citizens, considered as political equals.” Following this logic, a state on its way to democratization is developing a system and culture, where the government considers all citizens’ opinions, including opposition supporters. Regarding the organization of democracies, Lijphart (2012, 2) differentiates between majoritarian and consensus models, with the majoritarian model being exclusive, competitive, and adversarial, and the consensus model being inclusive and characterized by bargaining and compromise.

Lijphart also notes that the consensus model works better for heterogeneous and even for fairly homogeneous countries. The idea underlying is that in the plural societies – those societies, sharply divided along religious, ideological, linguistic, cultural, ethnic, or racial lines into virtually separate sub-societies, – the majority rule can turn into majority dictatorship and civil strife rather than democracy (Lijphart, 2012, 31-32). The condition behind the success of majoritarian mode is relatively homogeneous societies and that the major parties have usually not been very far apart in their policy outlooks, which tend to stay close to the political center (Lijphart, 2012, 31).

The inclusion in the policy-making process of as many parties as possible, the majority as a minimum, is the condition for the consensus democracies’ success (Lijphart, 2012, 32). The idea behind that is to prevent the dictatorship by the plurality and even the majority. A broad inclusion is also essential for the policies’ stability in the long run when the government and the opposition change their roles, and the turnaround on the pursued policies may occur. Hence, to meet the population’s demands as much as possible, the government, including its parliamentary party or parties¹, should make policies corresponding to the interests of both their supporters and opposition.

Surprisingly, the popular democracy indices do not consider parliamentary opposition’s abilities to implement their policies or incorporate minority interests into the governmental agenda. The indices focus on the measurements of the opposition’s abilities to participate in the electoral competition and their government oversight function abilities. The latter is sometimes not about the opposition per se, but about the system of checks and balances between different branches of power² (Marshall, Gurr & Jagers, 2019; “Freedom in the World Research Methodology,” 2020; Democracy Index 2019, 2020; Coppedge et al., 2020).

To know what the opposition can do, one must analyze their institutional opportunity structure, which can take place in- as well as out-of-parliament and which concentrates around parliamentary opposition two main goals: *controlling the government* and *presenting alternatives* (Garritzmann, 2017,2,8). Among the out-of-parliament institutional opportunities of the opposition, one can name the existence of a constitutional court that has the right to annul government bills or laws, or of referendums, when people can show the opposite to the majority stance. These opportunities are about controlling the government and are not exclusive to the parliamentary opposition. Other actors can also make use of them.

¹ Further, I use only the singular form – “party” – to be more concise. Nevertheless, the usage of “party” or “parties” depends on the political system or the outcome of the elections.

² The Polity IV Project measures, among others, the competitiveness of participation, the regulation of participation, and the executive constraint, which is about “the checks and balances between the various parts of the decision-making process.” The Freedom House measures opposition’s opportunity to increase support or gain power through elections, as well as evaluates the safeguards against official corruption and abuse of power. The Economist Intelligence Unit measures the realistic prospect of opposition parties to achieve government, as well as effective system of checks and balances on the exercise of government authority. The V-Dem data includes the variable on “legislature opposition parties,” measuring the opposition’s oversight and investigatory functions. The “opposition parties autonomy” variable is about opposition parties being independent and autonomous of the ruling regime. V-Dem has also various variables on checks and balances of branches of power, e.g., “Presidentialism Index,” “HOS veto power in practice.”

The elements of the in-parliament opportunity structure are those truly inherent to the various types of opposition in the parliament (considered further). The controlling in-parliament opportunities include addressing oral and written questions to members of the government; setting in motion a vote of no confidence; the right to establish investigation committees; the requirement of qualified majorities while passing constitutional amendments, as well as being able to hold high or even chair positions in committees. All the mentioned opportunities are essential for the executive-legislative balance of power, one the consensus democracy indicators.

However, as discussed above, this study looks at political inclusion and broad power-sharing since compromise and cooperation are key during democratization periods as many divergent interests have to be reconciled. With this respect, the area to concentrate is the opposition's in-parliament presenting alternatives opportunities. These opportunities include the ability to initiate private member bills or amendments and participation in agenda-setting (Helms, 2008, 11; Garritzmann, 2017, 9). In particular, my interest lies with the translation of the opposition's suggestions into policies, since it is the practical implementation of the consensus democracy concept.

The consolidation of democracy is a complex process, which can either proceed or step back. The latter option with a steady deterioration on the democratic end is the other area to focus since, in the context of *autocratization*, political exclusion may push closer to democratic breakdown.

Previous research suggests that the drivers behind the current processes of autocratization mostly function within a legal framework and occur gradually, which makes them difficult to pinpoint (Lührmann and Lindberg, 2019, 1098, 1104). In this research, I aim to probe whether ignoring opposition's alternatives or ideas occurs in autocratizing – yet previously consolidating – democracies. It can demonstrate whether the parliament can be a forum for bargaining and compromise. The opposition's alternatives or ideas are operationalized as the sponsored bills.

To this end, I study Ukraine as a typical case of autocratizing states. Moreover, regarding this case, there is a practical necessity to consider governmental attitudes to the opposition. Currently, Ukraine does not have any specific regulations on the activities of the parliamentary opposition. However, on and off discussions have been initiated by the civil society and parliamentarians (Cheretun, 2020). The current speaker of the parliament Dmytro Razumkov has stressed the necessity to develop the law on the opposition, underlining that, in the past, good initiatives, coming from the opposition, have been dismissed not because they were poor, but because they were not governmental (Shcherbyna and Lelich, 2019).

The structure of the thesis is the following. The second and third chapters present the theoretical framework. I highlight the approaches to defining the opposition and the variables contributing to bills adoption. The built framework allows identifying the research gap and specifying hypotheses in the fourth chapter. In the next chapter, I elaborate on the case-relevant information, i.e., I dwell on the case selection, review Ukraine's regime type and its alteration, legislative procedure and summarize with the dominant opposition mode. Chapters six, seven, and eight are about data management, operationalization, and method, as well as data description. Chapter nine is dedicated to analysis and results. There, I analyze 2868 bills across three convocations. The quantitative analysis shows that the bills sponsored by the opposition are significantly less likely to be adopted. Moreover, with the increase of cosponsors in the opposition bills, their adoption is also less likely. The last chapter presents the concluding discussion, which also covers the generalizability and limitations.

2. Defining Opposition

Before discussing the translation of the opposition's suggestions into policies, one needs to understand what type of opposition is referred to since the literature has several approaches to defining opposition. In the section below, I review them and decide on the one I am going to use further. Within a chosen definition, I consider indicators of opposition type. In a subsequent section, I review institutional determinants contributing to opposition type. So, based on opposition type indicators and institutional

determinants, one may define the kind of opposition expected to exist in each state context. It allows us to build the theoretical framework further in the research.

Opposition Types

Norton (2008, 237) outlines at least four types of opposition. The first one is '*the Opposition*,' which is the principal, usually the largest, nongovernmental party. The second one is the '*opposition parties*.' They comprise all those parties in the legislature that do not form the government. Although the term may sometimes include parties outside the parliament, for this research, any '*extra-parliamentary opposition*,' the other type outlined by Norton, is out of the scope. The term '*opposition parties*' does not account for instances when a party in the coalition government adopts an oppositional position. Such relations are encompassed by the more general term '*opposition*,' which considers the conflict between the actors.

Norton's approach to defining opposition seems to be either too case-specific or too extensive. Identifying the source of the parliamentary opposition in institutional terms is more justifiable if one aims to make the definitions applicable in various contexts. To this end, Kopecký and Spirova (2008) use an approach based on the modes of the executive-legislative relations redefined by Andeweg and Nijzink (1995). The modes of relations describe the interactions of the actors, which, as the game theory posits, can be cooperative or defective. Opposition in such a framework is always about defection.

Initially, King (1976) described the relations within the executive-legislative system³. He distinguishes five possibly coexisting modes of the executive-legislative interaction – *the opposition*, *intra-party*, *interparty*, *non-party*, and *cross-party modes*. These modes may coexist, depending on institutional characteristics (1976, XX). Andeweg and Nijzink (1995) modified King's typology, arguing that three modes should suffice to analyze the executive-legislative relations. These three modes are *non-party*, *cross-party*, and *inter-party modes*, with the latter having two submodes – *intra-coalition* and *opposition submodes*.

In this research, I use Andeweg and Nijzink's typology and, if necessary, refer to the original typology by King. So, following Kopecký and Spiriva's, I point that it is needed to identify and locate the source of the parliamentary opposition in institutional terms (2008, 136). Below, I describe the modes and their indicators.

Inter-party mode. Andeweg and Nijzink's *inter-party mode* is about interactions among parties. It unites King's inter-party mode and opposition modes. The argument for such transformation is that King's "inter-party mode contains the elements of opposition mode" (Andeweg and Nijzink's, 155). Nevertheless, Andeweg and Nijzink keep the distinction between the interactions among a governmental and nongovernmental party or group of parties and the interactions within a coalition of parties⁴. For that purpose, they distinguish the *opposition* and the *inter-coalition submodes*, respectively.

Among the indicators of the inter-party mode, Kopecký and Spirova (2008, 142-144) name the recruitment pattern of cabinet ministers, the (non-)existence of coalition agreements, the level of party discipline, and stability in the legislature. They argue that the inter-party mode is more dominant under several conditions.

The first condition is when the Cabinet recruits ministers from the parliament. Then, there is a closer fusion between the two branches of government. However, this point is only relevant for the systems when the MP can take a seat in the Cabinet. The second condition is the existence of a coalition agreement. It defines the cooperation between government parties and lays out policies that are not legally but politically binding for adoption. The last condition is high party discipline or cohesion.

³ He considers the cases, where the Cabinet members are at the same time the MPs. Nevertheless, one can also utilize King's framework of modes in those political systems, where the Cabinet members do not belong to the parliament. Depending on countries' institutional contexts, which have unique dynamics and structure of power, the modes occurring and prevailing in the systems vary (King, 1972, 32).

⁴ Inter-coalition submode is possible only in the multiparty governments.

Despite Kopecký and Spirova (2008) use the term party cohesion, I argue that it would be more appropriate to use coalition cohesion instead since party cohesion relates to the intra-party interactions.

Speaking about opposition submodes, one may split up the possible types of interplay within them: (1) governmental party supports the nongovernmental party, (2) governmental party opposes⁵ nongovernmental party, (3) nongovernmental party supports the governmental party, (4) nongovernmental party opposes governmental party. So, items one and two demonstrate the attitude of the governmental party towards the nongovernmental party. Whereas items three and four show how far the governmental party's policies are from the interests of the nongovernmental party. Item one also indicates the inclusion of the nongovernmental parties' interests to the government agenda and policies. Regarding the inter-coalition submode, the possible number of interplays depends on the number of governmental parties. One may perceive it as coalition cohesion.

The definition of *the interparty opposition* following from the described interactions is that it is non-cooperation among the parties. In practical terms, it takes place when one party does not support the position, proposal, or bill of the other.

Non-Party and Cross-Party Modes. The substance of cross-party and non-party modes coincide in both King's as well as Andeweg and Nijzink's typologies. For the *cross-party mode*, the critical source of parliamentary interactions are MPs united by the shared interests, which may be sectoral, regional, ethnic, or professional, and, in some cases, they may be of clientelist character (Kopecký and Spirova, 139, 2008; Rakner and van der Walle, 2009, 114). In this mode, partisanship cannot be a base of interaction. Hence, the *cross-party opposition* relates to non-cooperation regarding the issues, which are not characterized by party divisions.

The cross-party mode's indicator is the influential committees that stand against the Cabinet, as well as the parliamentary majority, and put on the agenda sectoral or specialized rather than party interests (Kopecký and Spirova, 2008, 145).

Non-party mode, labeled by King (1976, 20) as "the least important," covers the interaction of ministers and parliamentarians with each other as members of two different institutions (Kopecký and Spirova, 139, 2008). Like in the cross-party mode, the partisan dimension does not matter here, since it may preclude the efficiency. The indicators of the non-party mode are the frequency of the government bills being rejected, the proportion of bills initiated by parliamentary backbenchers, and the role of investigative commissions (Kopecký and Spirova, 2008, 146-147). So, the *non-party opposition* is about the confrontation of the MPs and the government.

The non-party opposition indicators are the high frequency of the rejected governmental bills, the high legislative activity of parliamentary backbenchers, and the influential role of investigative commissions. In terms of the high legislative activity of parliamentary backbenchers, I argue that this indicator is not relevant for the systems, where the executive and legislative branches are separated. In such systems, there is no such notion as "backbencher."

Despite that, the concept of opposition involves disagreement among the parties of the interaction, Norton (2008, 240) argues that being in 'opposition' does not necessarily entail a negative stance regarding motions advanced by the government; it merely stipulates that one is not in government. It is especially noticeable in the non-party and cross-party modes. The former can encompass a negative or constructive approach, while the latter – a constructive, or, at least, consensual approach (Norton, 2008, 240).

Intra-Party mode. Andeweg and Nijzink (1995, 156) state that the *intra-party mode*, which describes interactions within a party, is "redundant in the analysis of the relations between MPs and ministers." They argue that the intra-party mode may exist only for the majority government, and it does not describe the relations within the whole parliamentary-governmental complex but only within the government party. Furthermore, the authors argue that the intra-party mode is void of content, unlike

⁵ Here and further, "oppose" is a synonym to "not support," and vice versa.

the other modes, which are about the common good, or constitutional fastidiousness (non-party mode); political ideology (inter-party mode); and social interests (cross-party mode).

Although this critique may hold for executive-legislative relations in the systems, where MP may hold ministerial positions, it is irrelevant for the systems, where the executives and MPs are differentiated. I argue that the intra-party mode is about party cohesion. So, regarding Andeweg and Nijzink's critique, I suggest moving away from the original King's example of the interaction within the governing party and use the term for describing the interaction within any party.

I insist on the necessity to keep the intra-party mode in the classification and argue that its content is the power struggle and accountability before the electorate. It opposes the claim of Andeweg and Nijzink (1995, 156) of the intra-party mode being void of content. Further, in the research, I adopt Andeweg and Nijzink's framework of the executive-legislative relations apart from their stance on the intra-party mode, which I decide to keep.

Hence, the *intra-party opposition* is the contrary notion to the high levels of party cohesion. On the one hand, unified collective action is necessary for a party to pursue its mutual goals. On the other hand, the discipline required for effective collective action can undermine individual legislators' responsiveness to their constituents (Carey, 2003, 192-193). So, parties may have organized or temporary groupings operating within their ranks, and these groupings may not always approve of the party leadership's line (Norton, 2008, 239). Intra-party opposition leads to a low party cohesion, which, in its turn, precludes predictability of supporting the legislature. The other option to express the dissent is to exit the party. Indicators of this type of opposition are the MPs' defection from the party line in the roll call voting and committee activities, public criticism of own party, party-switching.

Norton (2008, 239) argues that defections from parties (intra-party mode) and defections by parties (intra-coalition submode) is mainly a feature of the parliamentary politics in the developing democracies. The cases of Bulgaria, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in his research are examples. Desposato (2009, 109), in the study for Brazil, supports that opinion, stating that party-switching is most common in the transitioning democracies with evolving party systems. However, with the development of parliamentarism, the defection rates tend to decrease (Norton, 2008, 239). Defections, taking place in long-established legislatures, e.g., the UK Parliament and the US Congress, are likely due to the lack of discipline (Nokken, 2009, 81). Nokken and Pool (2004) indicate that, over 163 years, only 38 US Senators and 160 US House members switched parties, which is rare in comparison (Nokken, 2009, 81).

As Andeweg and Nijzink (1995, 176) note, the prevalence of a specific mode at the time depends on the issue under discussion and the MP's approach herself. I argue that the same is true for the opposition types. Depending on the executive-legislative interaction mode, which, in its turn, depends on the country's institutional framework, the opposition may have several sources: the government or coalition government, governmental party or coalition parties, nongovernmental parties, and MPs.

Institutional Determinants of Opposition Type

In the discussion of the institutional determinants of opposition type, scholars identify regime type, the form of government and electoral institutions, which encompass electoral system, district magnitude, and candidate-selection rules (Carey and Shugart, 1995; Hix, 2004; Jones and Hwang, 2005; Hix and Noury, 2016; Bräuninger et al., 2016;). So, below, I summarize their findings.

Regime type (parliamentary or presidential) and *form of government* (a single-party majority, multiparty majority, and minority) are, according to Hix and Noury (2016, 250), vital institutional variables defining voting in legislatures. Their findings demonstrate that in parliamentary systems with single-party or coalition majority and presidential systems with a single-party majority, there is government-opposition split in parliaments. One may infer that this split corresponds to the opposition submode of legislative-executive interactions. As for parliamentary systems with coalition minority and presidential systems with coalition majority or minority, the split changes from issue to issue and has

no relation to government-opposition duality. So, one may refer this split to the cross-party mode of legislative-executive interactions.

Bräuninger et al. (2016), in their model applicable to parliamentary systems, demonstrate strong incentives for MPs to vote strategically based on the governmental or oppositional origin of a proposal. There is also evidence that the opposition does not support government proposals and vice versa (Bräuninger et al., 2016, 190).

Electoral institutions are the other determinants of possible opposition types. Hix (2004, 196) looks at the electoral system, district magnitude, and candidate-selection rules. Not to dwell on the details, these variables broadly define the extent to which the MPs depend on the party decisions and whether they can or cannot develop personal reputation distinct from the party (Carey and Shugart, 1995, 418).

Regarding the *electoral system*, Hix (2004, 196-198) puts them on the spectrum from the closed-list proportional representation (PR) systems, which represent the most party-centered settings, to fully open-list PR systems and single-transferable-vote systems, which represent the most candidate-centered setting. Single-member-simple-plurality (SMSP) and single-member-alternative vote or double-ballot systems, which promote a mixture of partisan and candidate affinity, are in the middle of that spectrum (intermediate systems). So, on the spectrum from closed to fully open-list PR, the modes shift from the inter-party to cross-party.

So, starting from the intermediate systems and up to the candidate-centered settings, the district's role increases, prompting the MPs to unite on a regional cross-party basis. Jones and Hwang (2005) theorize about provincial or regional factors in roll-call voting using the Argentinian case but fail to find any empirical support. However, they do not deny the local influence on the legislative process but emphasize that it may be exerted through other channels, which, in their case, is the central governmental party. There, the regional factor amplified the government-opposition duality.

Regarding *district magnitude*, Hix (2004, 198) theorizes that in small districts, candidates are more vulnerable to party pressure. One may infer that MP is more likely to stick to the party policies if the MP from a small district has ambitions for the next term. In such a case, the inter-party mode of legislative-executive relations should prevail.

Regarding *candidate-selection rule*, Hix's argument (2004, 199) is that the more centralized the candidate selection process is, the higher the ability of the party leadership to influence its legislators. Here, the dominant mode of interactions is supposed to be the inter-party mode. However, this argument fails to consider MP's intentions to cooperate with that party during the next elections. If that remark is true, the perspective of the cross-party mode is more likely.

3. Legislative Success Determinants

The previous chapter primes that the government-opposition divide may be the determinants of legislative success or failure. However, there are several other possible determinants. Below, I draw from Ellickson and Whistler's (2000, 86) conceptual model of bill-passage success, as well as from Aleman and Calvo's (2008, 14) sets of variables explaining legislative success. The variables predominantly overlap within the outlined groups. Nonetheless, with a few exceptions, authors assign the same variables to different groups, e.g., seniority belongs to individual factors in Aleman and Calvo (2008, 17) and institutional factors in Ellickson and Whistler (2000, 80). If such a contradiction happens, I chose one of the presented options based on personal perception of the determinant. So, in Institutional and Contextual Factors, I discuss *majority-minority*, *responsible committee (issue)*, *the urgency of bill*, *the proximity of elections*, *diversity of cosponsorship*, and *regional interests*. Then, in Individual Characteristics, I consider *gender*, *seniority*, *race*, *education*, *leadership*, *ideology*, and *informal connections*.

Note, this research assumes that MPs initiate bills with the prospects to pass them. Although one should not rule out legislative spam⁶ as a purpose, I ignore such ill practice. Among the MPs' motivations to pass bills, one should single out making public policy, pleasing the electorate, and consequently getting reelected (Anderson et al., 2003, 359-360). By any means, bills passage is one of the primary goals of legislators.

Institutional and Contextual Factors

Majority-minority. The literature on the US Congress posits that membership in the majority party is one of the dominant explanations of legislative effectiveness (Moore and Thomas, 1991, 965; Anderson et al., 2003, 359; Aleman and Calvo, 2008, 14). The expectation is that the bills introduced by members of the majority party would have a higher probability of passage than those sponsored by other parties. The support to that has also been found outside the US context. In the Argentinian case, Aleman and Calvo (2008, 25) have found that members of the largest party in the chamber have a significant advantage over others. Although Kerevel and Atkeson (2013, 988) do not explicitly investigate majority-minority, their results from the Mexican case indicate that belonging to the presidential party is a significant determinant for legislative success.

Responsible committee (issue). Some issues and, subsequently, committees responsible for them may be considered more important than others. So, while setting the agenda, more salient issues are prioritized, which increases the chance for the salient bills to pass.

The urgency of the bill. Given the particular political context, some bills address urgent issues that cannot be postponed or cannot go through the usual legislative flow. So, such hot bills are theorized to be more successful (Aleman and Calvo, 2008, 15; Anderson et al., 2003, 365). Anderson et al. (2003, 371) do not find support for such bills.

The proximity of elections. Aleman and Calvo (2008, 16) theorize that legislators should be less effective in passing their bills during an election year because then the parties are focused on the electoral contest, and many legislators are campaigning for reelection or seeking alternative ways to further their political career. On the other hand, MPs may seek more bill passage closer to elections to demonstrate their efficiency to the electorate or pass bills popular for reelection.

Diversity of cosponsors. More than one initiator of the bill can signal the broader support of the proposal. Moreover, individual characteristics of cosponsored bills initiators may enhance legislative success. Aleman and Calvo (2008, 15) distinguish between within-party and cross-party cosponsorship, suggesting that their effect may vary. Proposals endorsed by members of different parties can imply consensus of the sides, which may help the bill to pass.

On the other hand, cross-party sponsorship may indicate weakness – a lack of attractiveness among co-partisans. Cosponsorship, in general, increases the chances of the bill to be approved (Bratton and Haynie, 1999, 671; Aleman and Calvo, 2008, 15). The positive relation between cross-party cosponsorship and legislative success finds support in the Argentinian context (Aleman and Calvo, 2008, 27). For the US, the evidence of cosponsorship is mixed (Campbell, 1982; Wilson and Young, 1997; Adler and Wilkerson, 2005).

Regional interests. In systems with single-member districts, MPs may group around local interests (Anderson et al., 2003, 369; Aleman and Calvo, 2008, 18; Kerevel and Atkeson, 2013, 895). Moreover, if MPs plan to run from that district again and in the previous elections, they have had a slim electoral margin, they are unlikely to legislate beyond the district's preferences. So, MPs focusing on regional rather than national interests may face more failures because of the national level's lack of local interests support. In line with this argument, Anderson et al. (2003, 366) find significant negative relations between regional specification and legislative success.

⁶ Legislative spam involves submitting many bills aiming to distract or overload the parliament's capacity.

Individual Characteristics

Gender. The evidence that any gender has more advantage in legislative success is mixed. Aleman and Calvo (2008, 27), in Argentinian case, find that women's bills being approved less often than bills from their male counterparts. For the Mexican case, Kerevel and Atkeson (2013, 989) state that bills, sponsored by only males or only females, pass at similar rates and that there is a lack of evidence of female marginalization in Mexican parliament. In the US context, women are generally as likely as men to achieve passage of the legislation they introduce (Bratton and Haynie, 1999, 658). Ellickson and Whistler (2000, 77) conclude that different factors affect female and male legislative success. Men achieve legislative positions and bill-passage success by more extensive involvement in the majority party and traditional legislative politics, while women benefit more from personal attributes and legislative politics.

Seniority. Experienced legislators, who have already served a tenure or more, have higher chances of getting their bills passed due to a better understanding of the legislative process. Junior legislators or freshmen do not have skills to navigate proposals through institutional and partisan obstacles, as well as create attractive bills (Ellickson and Whistler, 2000, 80; Anderson et al., 2003, 367; Aleman and Calvo, 2008, 17). These arguments find mixed support. There is positive relation of seniority and legislative success in the studies of the US context (Moore and Thomas, 1991, 968; Ellickson and Whistler, 2000, 95), as well as in the research of Argentinian case (Aleman and Calvo, 2008, 28). However, Anderson et al. (2003, 378) fail to find significant support for the relations for seniority, although it provides significant results for freshmen struggling to pass their bills. Bratton and Haynie (1999, 665) find seniority significant only for a few cases. When measuring seniority, it is difficult to account for informal connections and previous experience in the field, i.e., not being a legislator but working in tight relationships with them, which may be confounding factors and may distort seniority accuracy.

The race may also be a factor contributing to legislative success. However, the evidence in support is mixed. Bratton and Haynie (1999, 671) find significant support to black representatives less likely to pass their bill in three out of five researched states. The advantage of being white in Ellickson and Whistler (2000, 90) is significant only for male.

Education's higher levels may lead to more considerable policy expertise, hence, drafting the attractive bill. More educated legislators may be more successful lawmakers (Kerevel and Atkeson, 2013, 985). The effects of this variable are mixed. Kerevel and Atkeson (2013, 986) find education not significant for bills passing. Ellickson and Whistler's (2000, 92, 95) results indicate that education is a mild but inconsistent asset, which, in their research, is significant only for males, despite they indeed find highly educated MPs initiate more bills than less educated ones.

The leadership of any kind gives advantages. Aleman and Calvo (2008, 17) and Anderson et al. (2003, 378) argue and find the support that bills initiated by chairs of parliamentary bodies are more successful opposite to rank-and-file MPs. The theory behind this is that the chairs may have a better understanding of legislative preferences. Moreover, chairs can use the institutional advantages to push the bills of their authorship. Leaders of parties or parliamentary factions may also use their influence to collect votes. However, Anderson et al. (2003, 367) theorize the opposite effect. They argue that party leaders do not have time to introduce bills, and the poor number of proposed laws make us expect party leaders to be less successful as a lawmaker. This argumentation seems illogical since the low number of initiated bills is not a precondition for their failure.

Ideology. Extremists tend to pursue non-centrist agendas regardless of chance for success (Aleman and Calvo, 2008, 14). Ellickson and Whistler (2000, 83) expect a negative relationship between ideological extremism and success in bill passage. They find significant positive relations for bill passage and ideologically moderate women.

Informal connections. Ellickson and Whistler (2000, 81) generalize studies on organizational networking, implying that friendship and trust among representatives should increase legislative success.

While studying legislative success determinants, the researchers have not tried to fit them against the regime type. When one does that, it turns out that the existing literature mostly looks at the stable regimes⁷ and not the ones in transition. Possibly, the legislative success determinants could have behaved differently, and the current patterns are inherent only to stable regimes.

The other observation is that the existing literature looks only at the majority-minority split, which is operationalized as the interactions between the parties. However, the inter-party mode of interaction is not always the dominant one. So, to illustrate the conflict between the legislators, one is better to refer to the government-opposition conflict. Arguably, the government and opposition are better operationalization to identify legislative success determinants in the context where majority and minority do not coincide with the government-opposition split.

These remarks point to the vast research gap – whether the mentioned legislative success determinants are significant during democratization and autocratization processes and whether these determinants differ for the periods of stability, democratization, and autocratization. Within the limits of this research, it is impossible to fill this gap fully. However, I aim to address a part of it and concentrate on the legislative success determinants in autocratizing states.

4. Research Hypotheses

Guided by the gaps, in this chapter, I build the theoretical expectations uniting the body of knowledge on autocratizing regimes, legislative success, and opposition. I formulate six hypotheses, which try to explain legislative success. Note, one could form more hypotheses in line with the determinants considered in the previous chapter. However, I stay focused on the determinants related to or interacting with the cosponsorship groups since one of those – the opposition – is the primary focus of this research.

In autocratizing states, one would expect that the opposition proposals are ignored. That may as well apply to some democratic parliamentary systems with a stable regime. One can argue that the opposition's ability to make the laws is not about the type of the regime and its dynamics, but about the institutional system (Hix and Noury, 2016). Indeed, the legislative framework with the majority requirement for the government formation makes the ruling party or coalition a sole dictator of the legislative agenda and successful proposals. So, in many cases, the representatives of minorities do not have the available opportunity to have their bill adopted without help from the government.

However, even in an institutional framework where the opposition lacks the majority, the opposition's bill may still be supported by the government. It demonstrates the inclusion of minority interests. Note, the inclusion may take the other form, e.g., adoption of the opposition's amendments to the governmental bills, or when the government makes policies concerning minorities without cosponsoring together with the opposition's representatives. Arguably, in stable democracies, the minority inclusion manifests itself in the mentioned other forms; and the adoption of the opposition's bills is not as vital for democratic stability. On the other hand, in the autocratizing states, where the opposition tends to be ignored, the minority interests are vulnerable to governmental abuse, and bills initiation is the most pronounced means to attract attention to minority interests.

So, in the polities with democratic backsliding, it is particularly reasonable to expect that opposition's bills are less likely to find support than the government ones. Hence, hypothesis 1 suggests the following.

H₁: Bills sponsored by the opposition have a lower probability of being successful than the bills sponsored by the government.

⁷ Regime stability is observed for Mexican case within 2000-2009 (Kerevel and Atkeson, 2013), Argentinian case is within 1983-2001 (Aleman and Calvo, 2008), and US cases within 1993-1994 (Anderson et al., 2003). For Bratton and Haynie (1999) and Ellickson and Whistler's (2000), it is impossible to account for the indicator's movement. The observations of the former consist of all bills introduced in 1969, 1979, and 1989. The latter considered some of the proposals initiated in 1991.

Aleman and Calvo (2008, 15) distinguish between within-party and cross-party cosponsorship, and state that cross-party cosponsorship may imply consensus, which may help the bill to pass. The same relates to the increase in the number of cosponsors. The underlying argument is that the more MPs work on the proposal, the more support they can gather among their colleagues. It speaks to the interpersonal relations in the parliament. The other side of the coin is that if the bill is potentially successful, then the more MPs would like to join its drafting since they can later position that bill as their achievement. So, the expectation is that the increase in the number of cosponsors positively influences the probability of the bill's adoption. Hypothesis 2 and 3 test Aleman and Calvo's (2008, 15) finding in a different environment and from the perspective of the government-opposition split.

H₂: Bills of mixed cosponsorship have a higher probability of success than the bills sponsored by the government.

H₃: With the increase in the number of cosponsors, the bill's probability of passing increases.

The other relation to look at is the interaction of the number of cosponsors and the initiator's status categories. They may be different. One can assume that the more cosponsors for the opposition's bills, the likelihood of its adoption increases. The reason is that the opposition representatives need to persuade the majority of MPs to support the bill. It requires resources like reputation, personal relations, to say nothing of the bill's issue, which should be likable and relevant. On the other hand, the governmental sponsor already has support from the colleagues. The only issue possibly preventing the governmental bill's success is its content.

H₄: The increase in the number of cosponsors effects various cosponsorship groups differently.

The approximation of the elections is the other possible determinant of the legislative success. On explanation is that, with the approach of the elections, MPs pass more bills since they need to conquer the electorate. The other possible reason is that MPs need time to draft and adopt the proposals. At the beginning of the term, they have less time to work out the bills than towards the end of the parliamentary term. Hypothesis 5 tests the argument.

H₅: With the approach of elections, the probability of the bill's success increases.

The other relation to test is whether the approach of elections influences bills of different cosponsorship groups differently. Potentially, the governing party or coalition should adopt more bills of their sponsorship. One reason is that the government wants to show to the electorate that they are efficient and useful. In some cases, the adoption of the long-awaited bill is a good advertisement. The other reason is to secure the status quo in some areas if the opposition comes to power after the elections. So, hypothesis 6 tests the discussed interaction.

H₆: With the approach of elections, the likelihood of opposition and government bills adoption is different.

5. Ukraine: Case-Relevant Information


This chapter performs several purposes. The first section discusses the universe of cases and explains the case selection. The second section gives a brief overview of Ukraine's democratization endeavors, which is relevant to fit the case in the regime types alterations framework. The third section has a functional purpose. Besides making the reader familiar with Ukraine's legislative procedure, it helps to understand the logic of the decisions made while managing the data (more – the Data Management chapter). The last section, based on Ukraine's institutional framework and opposition types indicators, defines the dominant opposition type, which is required in testing hypotheses 1-4.

Case Selection

The universe of cases for this research covers *autocratizing* polities in the middle range of the V-Dem's regime type scale, i.e., they belong to electoral democracies or possibly can be assigned to this group (Lührmann et al., 2020, 24-26). Autocratization in regimes that were democratic matters more than further deterioration in already autocratic regimes (Lührmann and Lindberg, 2019, 1104).

The cases to consider, from 2009 through 2019 could be Croatia, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Ukraine, and Serbia (see Figure 1). These are European countries, which had a significant decrease in their indicator in the Liberal Democracy Index for these ten years.

However, this research concentrates on one case – Ukraine. I argue that it is a typical case (Seawright and Gerring, 2008) in the case universe. Ukraine has a gradual decline of the Liberal Democracy Index indicator, although it starts at a lower level. It suggests that the conclusions based on the moderate case may be generalized to similar moderate cases and more extreme, e.g., Poland with a steep decline.



The highlighted area around the line for Ukraine reflects the confidence intervals at the 95 percent level.

Source: Coppedge et al., 2020.

Regime Type and Its Alterations

The alterations of the regime type in Ukraine appear to coincide with its system of government. Ukraine has a semi-presidential system. However, the dominance of either the president's or parliament's powers has been fluctuating. In these terms, one can divide the history of Ukraine into four periods. Noticeably, when the president's powers prevail over the parliament's ones, many of the components of the Liberal Democracy Index decrease compared to the previous period (except for the period before the 1996 Constitution).

Since the 1991 establishment of the president's position, the presidential powers prevailed over the parliamentary ones. From its onset, the country had a highly presidentialised semi-presidential regime (Bader, 2010, 1092). Its other characteristic is a "competitive authoritarianism" – elections took place regularly. However, they were utterly unfair and accompanied by undemocratic practices (Way, 2005, 131). Kubicek (2001, 117) argues that under the circumstances back in the 1990s, the democratic consolidation has remained elusive and susceptible to a variety of problems – a weak civil society and weak political parties, regional divisions, unstable political institutions and a lack of the rule of law. According to Wise and Brown (1998, 127), the challenges posing a threat to the consolidation of Ukrainian democracy were poor economic performance, increased dissatisfaction and malaise throughout the electorate, redomination by Russia, and the growing power of criminal elements.

Way (2005, 137) argues that the oligarchic system set up in the late 1990s, although contributing to democratic backsliding (Kubicek, 2001, 117), enabled the development of opposition, which sparked the 2004 revolution. The country translated into a new period, and democratization started. Due to the


adoption in 2006 of constitutional amendments package, the institutional setting for party development improved, and their weight increased. Henceforth, cabinets of ministers were formed by parliamentary majorities, consisting of party coalitions, and a high number of crucial appointments both in and outside government required parliament approval. As a result, Ukraine acquired a regime with a more even balance of presidential and prime-ministerial powers (Bader, 2010, 1089, 1098).

In post-post-communism, the success of the democratic transition, as Kubicek (2009, 325) argues, depend on “just good leaders or the will of the people for a new form of government.” The leaders of the Orange revolution could not manage to keep the coalition together, which enabled the comeback of the previous elites prone to autocratizing the country. In 2010, the Constitutional Court canceled out the 2006 reform, and the state returned to the presidential-parliamentary system. Throughout the Yanukovich presidency (2010-2014), Yushchenko’s democratic progress (2005-2010) rolled back.

However, after the 2014 revolution, the parliamentary-presidential system has been returned and is the current system of government. Delcour and Wolczuk (2015, 472) argue that Russia’s direct threat to Ukraine since 2014 has served to consolidate Ukraine’s democracy. However, the pursue of wide-ranging democratization is crippled by the national security priority and a deep economic crisis.

Hence, for many democracy indicators, the corner dates are 1996, 2004, 2010, 2014, plus-minus a year for the changes to happen and be noticed. Notably, that increases tend to occur in 2004 and decrease – in 1996 and 2010. 2014 is dubious, arguably, due to the argument proposed by Delcour and Wolczuk (2015, 472), – the pro-democratic improvements of the Revolution of Dignity get lost amidst the conflict-induced deterioration. Further, I describe the situation within the period under research on average (see the dynamics of indices in Figure 2), not paying much attention to the decreases around 2010, when Yanukovich, who pushed the autocratizing agenda, became the president.

Figure 2. Ukraine in terms of Liberal Democracy Index Components



Source: Coppedge et al., 2020.

Further, I base the discussion on the V-Dem’s Liberal Democracy Index. I use its components and look at their dynamics to highlight the status quo (sometimes changing) within the period under research – 2007-2019 (explained in Data Management). Analyzing by components makes it easier to relate the results of this study to the universe of cases. For clarity or to underline the context, I occasionally refer to periods before that. This approach enables one to highlight the components, where democratization lags or autocratization evolves, which, in turn, may affect minority rights and the parliamentary opposition from the perspective of the consensus democracy.

Electoral Democracy Index. Regarding the *freedom of expression and alternative information* (scale – 0 to 1⁸) during the reference period, Ukraine’s score has decreased from 0.87 to 0.68⁹, hitting 0.64 in 2014 and 2017. One may group the components contributing to that around two issues – censorship (*government censorship effort, media self-censorship, harassment of journalists*) and freedom of expression on different levels (*freedoms of discussion and academic and cultural expression, print/broadcast media perspectives, print/broadcast media critical, media bias*).

Regarding the censorship, the conclusion is that the government attempts to censor sensitive issues and that the media does not extensively cover politically sensitive topics. There is also the harassment of journalists, i.e., those who offend powerful actors are forced to stop, but others manage to continue practicing journalism freely for long periods.

The freedoms of expression have plunged from top positions in 2014. Since then, there are minor restraints on the freedom of expression in the private sphere, predominantly limited to a few isolated cases or only linked to soft sanctions. However, as a rule, there is no intervention or harassment in case of political statements. One can relate such a change to the Revolution of Dignity and Russian aggression when pro-Russian opinions started receiving social disapproval and be mildly persecuted by the government (Way, 2019, 53-54). From 2010, the leading media started to systematically ignore at least one political perspective that is important in society, which intensified after 2014. In 2010, government criticism by the media decreased. There were outlets, which never find faults with the government. However, from 2013, the situation has been improving. During 2010-2014, the media covered opposition more or less impartially, but they gave only negative or no coverage to at least one newsworthy party or candidate. During other periods under research, the opposition media coverage was better, yet too much attention went to the government.

So, regarding the opportunities of the nongovernmental minority in the context of the *freedom of expression and alternative information*, one may conclude that there are governmental and media limitations regarding sensitive issues, which, among other things, can be opposition related.

During the reference period, the *freedom of association* (scale – 0 to 1) has fallen from 0.85 to 0.63. One may group the components around the events affecting their change – those decreased in 2010 (*opposition parties’ autonomy*), those dropped in 2014 (*party ban, elections multiparty*), and those fallen in both 2010 and 2014 (*barriers to parties* and *CSO repression*). The meaning for the *opposition parties’ autonomy* on average indicates that most significant opposition parties are autonomous and independent of the ruling regime.

The components *party ban* and *elections multiparty* have mainly been influenced by the political responsibility people put on the Party of Regions for the Revolution’s victims and the Russian aggression. The party members, to continue their political activity, were to create or join the other parties. Later in 2015, the Party of Regions allies, the Communist Party of Ukraine, was legally banned in connection with decommunization (Law of Ukraine No. 317-VIII, 2015). Besides these facts, there is no other restriction preventing political associations. Although *2014 events have influenced the CSO entry and exit component*, its period average indicates that the government’s control over civil society is minimal and, even if the government wanted to ban some of them, it would be impossible due to the lack of resources or political expedience.

Regarding *barriers to parties*, the meaning for the period on average indicates modest restrictions while forming a new party, which in practice translates into the occasional political harassment while creating a party, and since 2014 the impossibility to form a new party due to technical reasons connected with not controlling the full territory of Ukraine by the state. The period average for *CSO repression* indicates weak governmental attempts to pursue repressions. The temporal fall in 2014 is due to the authority’s oppression of the activists during the Revolution of Dignity.

⁸ From now on, lower scores mean bad for democracy and vice versa.

⁹ To make the text concise, I do not include a confidence rating.

So, there are minor limitations to the *freedom of association* for the nongovernmental minority. Notably, the change of the ruling parties has not changed that situation. It suggests that the freedom association limitations do not depend on the government in place.

The clean elections index is not stable. It is fluctuating from 0.6 in 2009 to 0.34 in 2018, becoming 0.55 in 2019 (scale – 0 to 1). The components may be grouped around election management (*election voter registry, EMB autonomy, EMB capacity*) and holding elections (*election vote-buying, elections free and fair, election government intimidation, non-state electoral violence, election other voting irregularities*).

Regarding election management, the Election Management Body has been partial to the government on critical issues that influence the outcome of elections. It is unclear how many potential flaws there are in the voter registry and their impact on the electoral results. Moreover, the Election Management Body in 2014 has partial deficits in resources in the uncontrolled territories and cannot hold elections there.

Regarding holding elections, the components show the following. Vote buying is non-systematic but rather common in Ukraine. The usage of double IDs, intentional lack of voting materials, ballot-stuffing, misreporting of votes, and false collation of votes are frequent. The competition and freedom of participation are substantial. However, there may be sporadic instances of harassment and intimidation by the government directed at opposition groups. Non-state electoral violence happened only during the 2014 elections on the territories not controlled by the Ukrainian government; however, it is not spread on the peaceful regions.

In terms of election management, the government can manipulate the election outcomes since the opportunities allow. In terms of holding elections, both sides may make efforts towards rigging the election outcome. In the end, the government has more opportunities. However, the actions of both governmental and nongovernmental parties depend on their honest intentions.

As for *the elected officials' index*, I do not discuss its components since, throughout the countries' existence, the index's score is the highest possible. The same situation is with the *suffrage* – every citizen of full age has the right to vote with a few exceptions when it comes to legal incapacity. Elected official index and suffrage also do not indicate any disadvantage for the nongovernmental minority.

Liberal Component Index. The *equality before the law and individual liberty index* is incredibly sensitive to the 2014 and subsequent conflict-related events, with all its components decreasing around that time (*property rights, freedom of domestic and foreign movement, access to justice, freedom from torture, freedom from political killings, freedom from forced labor, freedom of religion, transparent laws with predictable enforcement, rigorous and impartial public administration*). From an average of 0.8 (scale – 0 to 1), from 2014 and on, the index has decreased to an average of 0.5.

The situation on the uncontrolled territories affects the general score for Ukraine. There, the residents, unlike residents of the other Ukrainian areas, have impediments to movement, property rights exercising, and access to justice. Notably, access to justice for women is higher than for men. While, for the former, justice is usually observed, for the latter, it is inconsistent. Forced labor is more observed for men than for women, although it is infrequent and found only in the criminal underground.

Before 2014, torture and political killings were practiced in a few isolated cases and were not incited or approved by top government leaders. In 2014, such practices turned into occasional. However, with time the situation improves with the lower intensity of the conflict in eastern Ukraine, as well as incorporation into the state armed forces or disbandment of the paramilitary groups (Burdyha, 2018).

Before 2014, public authorities fully respected religion's freedom, and the component found relative stability in the medium-high range. The deterioration of religious freedoms is caused, first, by the persecutions of religious minorities in the occupied territories and, second, by local conflicts between different patriarchies of the Eastern Orthodox Church, mainly due to the desire to get out of the Moscow Patriarchate control (US Department of State, 2019).

The public officials approach the law enforcement arbitrary and biased approach. Nepotism and cronyism are widely spread in Ukraine. Moreover, there is a problem of selective law enforcement and the absence of coherency and stability in the legislation.

The *equality before the law and individual liberty index* indicates many liberty problems. However, one should keep in mind that those problems are predominantly clustered in the uncontrolled territories, which the government cannot hold responsibility. In the context of this research, the law predictability component deserves attention. It speaks to the argument that changing governments are not sustainable in their policies, and each time may turn their strategies in the opposite direction. It may entail minority infringements and imply the pro-governmental interest serving policies.

Since Ukraine's independence, *judicial constraints on the executive index* has been persistently going down, although with situational improvements. Within the reference period, this index has been predominantly fluctuating within the low range scores. The situation leaves much to be desired. The component *executive respects constitution* indicates the executive's capacity to violate the constitution with only occasional legal consequences. *Compliance with the judiciary* component points out that the government only seldom complies with decisions by other courts with which it disagrees. There is a similar situation with *compliance with high courts' decisions* on issues on which the government disagrees. Within the reference period, the components for *high and lower courts' independence* went down in 2009 and increased after 2014 and 2014. Still, these fluctuations occur in the middle-low range, implying that, in cases of government importance, the courts usually rule out favorable to the government.

Legislative constraints on the executive index, within the reference period, has been going down from high to middle-low range and then leveling up at the middle-high range. It means that the legislature and government agencies can rarely fully oversight or investigate the executives. The components for *legislature questions officials in practice* indicates that the legislature routinely questions executive branch officials. However, when it comes to executive violations, the prosecution and final ruling on the executive officer-related case is unlikely. The components for *executive oversight, legislature investigates in practice, legislature opposition parties* point out at uncertainty in an investigation of the government in case of unconstitutional, illegal, or unethical activity by the prosecutors or the legislature. Also, considering that opposition parties may occasionally investigate or oversee the government, the government is likely to get away with its violations.

The nongovernmental minority is in an unequal position with the government. The courts are not independent. Moreover, the government is unlikely to be investigated by the parliament even if the opposition insists.

The major takeaway from the regime overview is that nongovernmental minority interests may be neglected for the sake of the government's ones. It is not necessarily true for every case. However, the institutional framework and previous experience assume the subordinate position of the nongovernmental minority, which fails to meet the consensus democracy principles (Lijphart, 2012, 32).

Legislative Procedure

According to article 75 of the Constitution, the only legislative body in Ukraine is its parliament – Verkhovna Rada (Constitution of Ukraine, 1996). Chapter IV of the Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine thoroughly describes the legislative procedure (Law of Ukraine No. 1861-VI, 2010). The legislative initiative belongs to three subjects – the president, MPs, or the Cabinet of Ministers. It is exercised by submitting to the Verkhovna Rada of bills and regulations, drafts of other acts of the Verkhovna Rada, suggestions and amendments to the bills. In this research, I concentrate on bills initiated by the MPs, i.e., private member bills.

Before becoming the law, the bill needs to pass several stages. First, it should be preliminarily approved at the committee. Then, it should be included in the agenda, and pass from one to three readings. In the end, the MPs should adopt the bill as a whole.

At the preliminary consideration, the respective committee decides whether the bill meets all the regulatory requirements. There are two possible results. First, the bill may be sent back to its initiator – at this point, the proceeding of the bill stops. Second, the committee may recommend including the bill into the agenda. The initiator may voluntarily and freely withdraw the bill if it is not yet included in the agenda. If the bill is included in the agenda, the parliament's support for withdrawal is required. The recommendation to include in the agenda does not mean automatic inclusion. The session and week agendas may change, depending on the Conciliation Board's decision¹⁰.

After the first reading, there are four outcomes for the bill:

1. It is adopted as a basis and is submitted to the responsible committee for the second reading preparation.
2. The bill is rejected.
3. The bill is returned for revision to its initiator or the responsible committee.
4. Publication of the bill for the public discussion with the repeated first hearing.

If MPs decide to follow the shortened procedure, they may adopt the bill as a basis and as a whole during the same day.

Between the readings, bills may be finalized at the committees if MPs submit suggestions or amendments. The responsible committee considers suggestions and amendments, accepts, partially accepts, or denies them, and then recommends adopting the finalized text during the second or third reading. If any MP disagrees with the committee's decision on any suggestion or amendment, one can demand its consideration and voting at the plenary hearing. So, it may happen that due to the successful voting on MP's demand for the suggestions or amendments, the finalized text alters before being voted as a whole.

There are five outcomes of the second reading:

1. It is adopted in the second reading and is submitted to the responsible committee for the third reading preparation.
2. The bill is rejected.
3. The bill is adopted in the second reading and as a whole.
4. The partial adoption of the bill. Then, the non-agreed on parts are submitted for revision to the responsible committee.
5. The bill is returned for revision to the responsible committee for the repeated second reading.

Reading the bill three times is rather exceptional. To be concise, I do not describe its outcomes considering that they are similar to those of the second reading. As a rule, bills are voted in two readings, being adopted as a basis in the first one and as a whole in the second one. Then, the Chairman of Verkhovna Rada signs them, and so does the president, if one approves. The president may veto the bill, and then the MPs can override it by a qualified majority vote. However, I do not dwell on that since it is out of the research context.

With this fluctuation of the system of government, the legislative process has not been changing much. The only thing appearing during the presidential-parliamentary system is the National Bank's opportunity to be the bill's initiator. However, this fact does not affect this research.

Dominant Opposition Type

In this section, I point-by-point refer to previously discussed indicators of opposition mode and its institutional determinants and place them against Ukrainian background to argue about the country's expected dominant opposition mode.

Modes indicators. The *inter-party mode* indicators are ministerial recruitment from the parliament, the existence of coalition agreement, and cohesion. The first indicator is not relevant for Ukraine since it is

¹⁰ It is an advisory body in the parliament, consisting of the Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, the First Deputy and Deputy Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, Chairmen of factions and groups with the right to vote, and the Chairmen of Committees with the right of an advisory vote.

impossible to be the MP and the cabinet member at the same time. However, the MPs often take positions in the Cabinet, although they cease to be legislators. Regarding, coalition agreements, if there is a necessity to form a coalition, they are optional. However, the partnering factions usually put their agenda on paper (see Appendix 1). Coalition cohesion in Ukraine leaves much to be desired. Although coalitions do function within some period during the parliament's convocation, they often fall apart, leading to government change.

The *cross-party mode's* indicator is influential committees, which is not the case of Ukraine. There, committees often do not play a considerable role in considering legislation. The plenary sessions frequently reject their recommendation, even when a committee assesses a proposal unconstitutional (European parliament, 9, 2016). Moreover, the interparty mode may transpire to the committees since they form based on proportional faction quotas. (Constitution of Ukraine, 1996).

The *non-party opposition* indicators are the high frequency of the rejected governmental bills, the high legislative activity of parliamentary backbenchers, and the influential role of investigative commissions. The share of the Cabinet bills rejected in Ukraine is lower than of private members' bills ("Shcho napratsiuvaly Ukrayinski parlamentari za 4 roky?", 2018), which does not look like the stiff opposition to the Cabinet. The majority of MPs may also support the notion of no confidence and dismiss the Cabinet, i.e., there is no point in interacting in the non-party opposition mode where there is an opportunity to change the government. Moreover, the primary task of the Ukrainian Cabinet is to be the executive, not the lawmaker. Concerning "backbenchers," I argue that the term does not apply to the Ukrainian system since the executive and legislative branches are separated. So, this indicator is void of content. Regarding the investigative committees, in 2009, the Constitutional Court found the law regulating their activities unconstitutional. Thus, within most of the period under research, that indicator could not contribute to the non-party mode (Decision of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine No. 20-rp/2009, 2009).

Indicators of *the intra-party mode* are the MPs' defection from the party line in the roll call voting and committee activities, public criticism of own party, party-switching. The mentioned behavior among legislators is not exceptional in Ukraine. In convocations three to eight, 42% of MPs have changed their faction in the parliament at least once. The average number of factions changing among the "switchers" is 2.5. Notably, that MPs elected in the single-member districts have switched the faction more often than the MPs elected in the party list. It, to some extent, is influenced by the "imperative mandate" active in convocations five, six, and eight. It is possible to recall the MP by the political parties, which applies only to the MPs elected in the party list (Krymeniuk, 2019). The imperative mandate is likely to influence party cohesion in terms of defection in the roll-call voting. The evidence for that is the network analyses of the roll call voting of the adopted bills in the fourth and sixth session of the eighth convocation, which indicate several stable defectors amid governmental factions (Ostapchuk, n.d.; Nadelniuk, n.d.).

Institutional determinants. The *form of government* in Ukraine depends on the outcome of the elections. It may be either a single-party majority or a multiparty majority (during the period under consideration – I talk about it in section Data Management, – it has been the latter). However, the expectation about the type of split in the Ukrainian parliament is not straightforward since the referred above Hix and Noury (2016, 251) do not explicitly discuss semi-presidential systems, which is the *regime type* in Ukraine. I look at the theoretical models of legislative politics, which these authors use while building their theory. Since in Ukraine, a particular legislator or group of legislators, i.e., the majority, can restrict the agenda (more – in section Legislative Process), the theoretical model of legislative politics leans towards "cartel agenda model." According to Hix and Noury (2016, 265) findings, the legislations with this model observe *the government-opposition split, i.e., the relations within the inter-party mode*.

This opinion can also find support by comparison with the countries' regimes used in Hix and Noury's (2016, 253) analysis. For example, France and Poland, which have both semi-presidential systems, are considered as those with parliamentary regimes. There, like in Ukraine, the government (via the president) can dissolve the parliament, and subsequently, enforce party discipline. Hence, Ukraine, by analogy, may also be defined as the country with the parliamentary regime.

The *electoral system* in Ukraine during the period under research¹¹ has been different. There was the closed-list PR system for the election of sixth convocation and the mixed system for the seventh and eighth convocations (Law of Ukraine No. 1665-IV, 2004; Law of Ukraine No. 4061-VI, 2011). The Ukrainian mixed system is when half of the MPs are elected according to the closed-list PR system, and another half is elected according to the first-past-the-post (FPTP). In FPTP, the candidates can be independent or receive support from a party. Despite the possibility of minor candidate-centered settings, the Ukrainian electoral system is closer to the party-centered-settings since the party defines its list and supports the district candidates.

Moreover, in the parliaments elected according to the mixed system, FPTP MPs in most of the cases joined governmental factions, so that the number of FPTP MPs exceeded that of PR-list MPs (Viedrov, 2017). This evidence points to the party-dependency of the FPTP MPs. Altogether, *these characteristics contribute to the inter-party mode*.

Regarding *district magnitude*, in Ukraine, they have more or less the same size¹², and it has not changed over time (Law of Ukraine No. 1665-IV, 2004; Law of Ukraine No. 4061-VI, 2011; Law of Ukraine No. 396-IX, 2020). So, this factor is *likely not to influence* the Ukrainian case.

The *candidate selection process* in Ukraine is extremely-party centered. The PR-list and FPTP candidates are decided at party meetings in the manner prescribed by the Party Rules. An independent candidate may be included in the PR-list and receive support at the district levels (Law of Ukraine No. 1665-IV, 2004; Law of Ukraine No. 4061-VI, 2011; Law of Ukraine No. 396-IX, 2020). Hence, there is *more support for the inter-party mode provided the MP's intentions to run in the next elections from that party*.

After the analysis of the indicators of opposition types and their institutional determinants, almost everything points toward the inter-party mode dominance in the Ukrainian parliament. When referring to the opposition in Ukraine, I specifically talk about factions' confrontation, particularly governmental factions versus nongovernmental factions.

The other mode, which may arise from time to time, is the intra-party mode. Unfortunately, in this research, I cannot account for its mild indicators, i.e., defection in voting or party public criticism. Thus, it is one of the limitations. However, when it comes to party-switching – the most explicit manifestation of disagreement with the party line, I account for it and change the MP's status if necessary (more – in section Data Management).

5. Data Management

For this research, I use open government data from the Ukrainian parliament web-portal¹³. Unfortunately, there is no single data set suitable for research purposes. So, I manage ten data sets, arranging the existing variables, and adding the new ones according to the necessities¹⁴.

¹¹ In 2019, Ukraine adopted new electoral legislation that is quite different from the previous one. From 2020 on, the electoral system is going to be a mix of closed-list and open-list proportional representation. If the party passes the 5% threshold, the first nine nominees in the national list, as well as nominees receiving the compensatory seat, get into the parliament according to the closed-list PR. The latter is for those elected in the electoral regions (Law of Ukraine No. 396-IX, 2020). Although the majority of the MPs are to be elected through open-list PR, I argue that the electoral system still tends to be party-centered since the right to nominate candidates is reserved exclusively to political parties, and there is no possibility of self-nomination. Hence, the conclusions will be as relevant for the convocations elected according to the new electoral legislation, as for the previous ones.

¹² After the 2014 Russian aggression, it became fully or partially impossible to have the elections at some districts. At those 12 districts, where it is possible to conduct the elections partially, far fewer voters have supported the MPs elected according to the FPTP system. However, I do not take into consideration this exception since it is not a regular feature.

¹³ <https://data.rada.gov.ua>

¹⁴ R script with the code and the comments and the raw data are attached (see Appendix 5).

I use data covering convocations six through eight (2007-2019). The primary reason is an excessively volatile party landscape, which was tamed after the 2006 and 2007 parliamentary elections. (Bader, 2019, 1089). The other motive is that the constitution edition before 2006 has not had the clause for the coalition's existence. It appeared with the change to the parliamentary-presidential system in 2006, with the coalition being responsible for the prime minister's nomination. The formal requirement for the existence of the coalition means by default that there is the opposition.

Note that within 2010-2014, the then constitution edition in-force did not contain the clause on the coalition, and Ukraine had the presidential-parliamentary system again. However, I still analyze this period since there was an open confrontation between the factions supporting the appointment of the prime minister and the Cabinet.

One may logically divide the data management into three parts: preparing data on MPs, preparing data on bills, and defining variables in the base data set. I code separately for each convocation and then unite everything into one dataset to have as many cases as possible.

While preparing data on MPs, I use four data sets. The first one is a data set on faction (or group) switching and is mutual for all convocations. It has variables on MPs names, the names of factions or groups to which MPs belonged, and the period of that belonging. Three other data sets contain general information about MPs and are separate for each convocation I analyze. The data set on MPs' general information includes variables on MPs' names, genders, and IDs. Here and below, I name only those variables, which I use in the analysis or need for management purposes.

After merging the data sets on faction switching and MPs general information by MPs' names, I receive extended versions of data set on faction (or group) switching (one for each convocation). Then, I create a variable, defining MPs' belonging to governmental or nongovernmental factions at each period. In doing this, I am guided by coalition compositions or factions appointing the government. So, I define MPs from the coalition (or those who voted for the prime minister) as governmental. In their turn, MPs, who belonged to groups and were not coalition members (or did not appoint the government), are coded as nongovernmental, except two groups in the seventh convocation since then they belonged to the coalition (see Appendix 1 and 2).

The prepared data set on MPs contains variables for MP's name, MP's ID, MP's gender, MP's faction or group belonging, the period of this belonging (separate variables for beginning and end), faction or group's governmental or nongovernmental status, and convocation number. Note that if MPs switch faction or group belonging within convocation, their names repeat with the general information. Then, the switching MP cases vary by variables for faction or group belonging, the period of this belonging (separate variables for beginning and end), and faction or group's governmental or nongovernmental status.

While preparing data on bills, I use six data sets – three data sets on the events of the plenary sessions (one for each convocation) and three data sets on all registered bills and regulations within the convocation (one for each). Before moving on with the details of the data management, I need to address the applied restriction.

In this research, I can analyze only the private member bills that have been voted during plenary sessions. The cause is the changing nature of the governmental or nongovernmental status of MPs. It is not stable for two reasons. First, MPs can leave or join the faction anytime. Second, during one convocation, there may be governments formed by the opposing factions. So, the governmental bill, at the time of its initiation, may become nongovernmental at the time of its plenary voting.

Hence, to see whether the governmental or nongovernmental bills pass or not, I need to choose the stage of the proceeding, connected to a specific time point, which can show bills' initiators status at the moment of passing or rejection. As described in the Legislative Procedure section, bills may not succeed at several stages of the proceeding. Unfortunately, the data sets do not include the time of the bills' rejection (withdrawal, sending to the initiator, ignoration to add to the agenda) at any other stage than the plenary session. Therefore, I drop down the bills, which have not reached at least the first reading. Thus, I go on in the research with the bills supported or rejected at the plenary sessions.

Data sets on the events of plenary sessions encompass votings, registrations, and speeches. First, I filter for votings. Then, I filter out, when the voting is for amendments and suggestions¹⁵, regulations, inclusion into agenda, signal, or ranking voting for bills, voting for laws while overriding president's veto, and other procedural decisions. Within the proceed data set, there is no variable for the bill's ID, which I need further. However, the bill's ID is a part of the bill's name, which is there. So, I extract the bill's ID from the bill's name and create a new variable. It appears that bills' IDs repeat because there have been several votings for the same bill, e.g., first, second, repeated readings. I filter for the last voting, i.e., if the bill passes in both first and second readings, I leave the latter. So, the final list includes unique bills, voted as a basis or/and as a whole. Thus, the managed data set on the bill's voted at the plenary sessions contains variables for the bill's ID, bill's name, and the date and time of voting.

Data sets on all registered bills and regulations within the convocation include, among others, variables on bill or regulation's ID, its issue, its initiators, the status of initiators (president, PM, MP), stage of bill or regulation's proceeding. First, I filter out all regulations and the bills initiated by the president or the prime minister since they are not in the scope of this research. Second, considering whether the bill has been adopted in the final reading as a whole, I recode the stage of the bill's proceeding – whether the bill passed or failed. Then, I flatten the nested data frames of the variable initiators to receive vectors of MPs IDs, who have initiated the corresponding bill.

To unite the data on bills, I merge the data sets on the bill's voted at the plenary sessions, and the data sets on all registered bills for each convocation by bill's ID, leaving only the cases from the data sets on the bill's voted at the plenary sessions. Further, I use this data sets as a base (one for each convocation). Hence, the prepared data set on bills includes variables for the bill's ID, date and time of its voting, bill's name, legislative success, bill's initiators, bill's issue.

In the last part of the data management, I finalize the base data sets. Using the variable for MPs IDs in the extended versions of data sets on faction (or group) switching, in the base data sets, I create variables to define the status of the bill in terms of its initiators belonging to (non-)governmental faction. Similarly, I create a variable to determine the gender of bills' initiators. Then, from the variable with MPs IDs, I calculate and create a separate variable for the number of initiators, which is a similar Ukrainian term for sponsors. I also create a variable with the date of the parliamentary elections following the respective convocation. From it, I calculate two other variables – how many days before elections the bill has been voted and its squared value divided by a thousand. In the end, I bind the base data sets for each convocation into one.

So, the final data set consists of bills as cases and has variables for bill's ID, date and time of its voting, legislative success, the status of the bill in terms of its initiators belonging to (non-) governmental faction, the gender of bills' initiators, number of bill's initiators, bill's issue, convocation, days before elections, and its squared value divided by a thousand.

6. Operationalization and Method

In this chapter, I discuss the variables used in the analysis (see Appendix 3) and the method. The operationalization in this research is not conceptually complicated. Notable that data availability highly dictates variables variety, as well as the possibility to extract or calculate desirable information. The software used is R (R Core Team, 2020).

The hypothesis implies that the dependent variable relates to the bill's success, i.e., whether the MPs support or reject the proposal. So, the dependent variable, *legislative success*, is a binary one. It also points to the method used for the analysis, logistic regression (Long and Freese, 2014, 386).

The primary independent variable *initiators' group* is a categorical variable. It indicates the bill's initiators' allegiance at the time of voting for the proposal and is used to test H1, H2. There are three categories possible – *governmental*, i.e., all initiators belong to the governmental faction;

¹⁵ Although one may look at the opposition-coalition dichotomy through amendments and suggestions' support by the respective group, it would require additional data collection efforts in the case of Ukraine.

nongovernmental, i.e., all initiators belong to the nongovernmental faction, and *mixed*, i.e., the initiators of the bill pertain to both governmental and nongovernmental factions.

To test H3, H4, and H5, I add to the model the other independent variables. So, I include the variables for the *number of bill's initiators* and *days before the next parliamentary elections*. To avoid omitted-variable bias, I also control for the *gender of the bill's initiators*, the *bill's issue*, and *bills' convocation*.

The variable for the *number of bill's initiators* is continuous and may range from 1 to 450. The name of the variable the *days before next parliamentary elections* speaks for itself. I also include in the model its square term divided by a thousand. I square in case the relation is non-linear and, at some point, wears off and divide by a thousand not to run into numerical issues, because the numbers can be very high and make the model crash.

The variable for gender uses a narrow binary approach to this concept. There are three possible categories for the *gender of the bill's initiators* – *male*, i.e., all initiators are males; *female*, i.e., all initiators are females, and *both*, i.e., initiators are both males and females. *Bill's issue* is the other variable, possibly influencing the success of the bill. It has seven categories – *bilateral international agreements*, *economic policy*, *humanitarian policy*, *legal policy*, *sectoral development*, *security and defense*, *social policy*, *state-building*.

7. Data Description

The final data set consists of 2868 cases. One can find the distribution of bills in each convocation and general in Table 1. One can see that nearly 57 percent of the cases come from convocation 6. Almost 57 percent of the total cases are rejected. Almost 31.5 percent of bills belong to nongovernmental and mixed initiators' group each, and 37 percent belong to governmental initiators. Males initiated 69 percent of cases, and the most popular issues are sectoral development and economic policy.

Table 1. The Distribution of Bills in Each Convocation and General.

		Convocation 6	Convocation 7	Convocation 8	Total
	Total	1624	367	877	2868
Legislative Success	Support	568	171	499	1238
	Rejection	1056	196	378	1630
Initiators' Group	Nongovernmental	699	98	104	901
	Governmental	587	186	290	1063
	Mixed	338	83	483	904
Gender	Male	1302	272	400	1974
	Female	115	19	29	163
	Both	207	76	448	731
Issue	Bilateral International Agreements	-	3	5	8
	Economic policy	372	81	212	665
	Humanitarian policy	40	7	20	67
	Legal Policy	389	65	138	592
	Sectoral Development	505	115	330	950
	Security and Defense	19	11	50	80
	Social Policy	143	50	76	269
	State-Building	156	35	46	237

Table 2 presents the crosstabulation of the variables (see Appendix 3) relevant to H1 and H2. The nongovernmental bills were rejected in 43 percent of cases. On the contrary, the governmental ones found support in 45 percent of cases. The governmental proposals were supported almost as often as were rejected. Practically, the same is true for the mixed initiators' group. Regarding the


nongovernmental bills, only every fifth one passes. One can find the crosstabulation of all categorical variables in Appendix 4.

Table 2. The Crosstabulation of Variables Relevant to H1 and H2.

Legislative Success		Governmental	Mixed	Nongovernmental	Total
Rejection		501	421	708	1630
Support		562	483	193	1238
Total		1063	904	901	2868


Figure 3 presents the distribution of the bills according to the number of initiators. Almost 43 percent of the cases have a single initiator, about 18 percent – have two initiators, nearly 11 percent – have three initiators. When the value turns to 11 initiators, the values’ share is responsible for less than one percent for each, which in total approximates 7 percent. The maximum number of initiators is 256 MPs.

Figure 3. Distribution of the Bills according to the Number of Initiators



The x-axis is cut off at the point of 50. There are nine outliers left behind. Their values are 53, 56, 58, 65, 75, 76, 77, 93, and 256. Each outlier indicates a single instance of bill initiation.

Figure 4. Distribution of the Bills according to the Number of Initiators within Initiators' Groups



The x-axis is cut off at the point of 50. There are nine outliers left behind. All of them belong to the Mixed Initiators' Group. Their values are 53, 56, 58, 65, 75, 76, 77, 93, and 256. Each outlier indicates a single instance of bill initiation.


Figure 4 presents the bills’ distribution according to the number of initiators within each initiators’ group. In the governmental group, one MP initiates nearly 59 percent of cases, two MPs – almost 21 percent, three MPs – 8 percent. When the value turns to 8 initiators, the values’ shares are responsible for less than one percent for each, which in total approximates 4 percent. The maximum number of governmental initiators is 42 MPs. The mixed group is the most diverse in terms of the distribution of

the number of initiators. For MPs from two to thirteen, the values' shares are in-between 2 and 15 percent. The rest of the cases cover 14 percent of cases within mixed initiators' group. The maximum number of mixed initiators is 256 MPs. In the nongovernmental group, one MP initiates 67 percent of bills; two MPs sponsor 19 percent; three MPs – nearly 9 percent; and four MPs – a bit over 1 percent. Then, the values' shares become less than one percent for each, which in total is less than 4 percent. The maximum number of nongovernmental initiators is 20 MPs.

Figure 5 presents the distribution of the bills according to the approximation of elections. The proposals are grouped by 30 days, i.e., roughly a month. One may see the increasing tendency towards the coming elections. Note that one should treat the variable Days before Elections with caution. The elections following convocation 7 and 8 were snap. For the former, the convocation ended three years before the regular elections if they would have happened. For the latter, the next elections took place only three months earlier than the regular one. So, possibly, the variable does not describe the behavior of MPs to its full. Nevertheless, I keep it since, when MPs find out the date for the snap elections, they possibly may put more effort into passing their legislative proposals.


Figure 6 presents the distribution of the bills according to the approximation of elections within each initiators' group. Starting from a year before the date of the elections, the MPs consider more governmental proposals at the plenary session than mixed or nongovernmental ones. However, there are still periods when there are more nongovernmental bills voted at the plenary sessions.

Figure 5. Distribution of the Bills according to the Approximation of Elections



Note: There are 22 observations, when the parliament voted for the bills after the elections of the new convocation. It causes negative numbers in "Days before Elections" variable. I ignore it and do not exclude those cases.

Figure 6. Distribution of the Bills according to the Approximation of Elections within Initiators' Groups



Note: Bills are grouped by six months.

8. Analysis and Results

In this chapter, I present and discuss the regression results. Then, I do some additional tests. The last section relates the findings to the hypotheses.

Regression Results and Their Interpretation

Table 3 shows the regression results of fitting the models to data. I do not discuss the changes in the models with the addition of the controls to the initiators' group's focal variable since it would be too monotonous. Being guided by the lowest Akaike information criterion as one of the goodness-of-fit measurements, I chose Model 8 to be the basis in the analysis. Notice, in Model 9, the results hold when a large number of additional covariates are included. However, the control variable for the issue does not explain much of the variation. The addition of this variable slightly deteriorates the model's fit. So, I proceed with the analysis of Model 8 as the best-fit model.

Since the primary independent variable – *initiators' group* – is a categorical one, the governmental group is excluded from the regression and is the reference category. It means that the coefficients for the other groups of initiators are interpreted as the change in the dependent variable when moving from a governmental group of initiators to the other groups. The same relates to the variable for *gender*, with the reference category being both genders; *convocation*, with convocation 6 being the reference one; and *issue*, with international agreements being the reference category.

In Model 8, there are several significant coefficients, which I address further. *Nongovernmental* bills are less likely to be adopted compared to governmental bills ($p < 0.01$). The interaction between the nongovernmental bills and the number of initiators signifies that with the increase of the number of initiators, the likelihood of the nongovernmental bill success decreases ($p < 0.01$). The variable for the *days before elections* indicates that the further from the election's day, the probability for the bill adoption decreases ($p < 0.05$). The more comprehensible interpretation is that with the approach of elections, the likelihood of the bill's success increases. The interaction between the nongovernmental bills and the days before elections (squared and divided by 1000) indicates that with the approach of the next election, the likelihood of nongovernmental bills success decreases ($p < 0.01$). Bills initiated by only *males* are less likely to be adopted in contrast to those initiated by both males and females ($p < 0.1$).

In logistic regression, the coefficients are difficult to interpret. Bearing that in mind, I plot the conditional predicted values and average marginal effects of covariates included in Model 8 with a confidence interval of 0.95 (see Figures 7-11). In Figure 7, the magnitude of the confidence intervals of the conditional predicted values of the number of initiators is high. It only narrows down when the variable reaches the meaning of 226, which is a simple majority.

In Figure 8, the magnitude of the confidence intervals of the conditional predicted values of the days before elections is narrower in the middle meanings. In Figure 9, the marginal effects for each initiators' group are almost the same. One can relate it to the about the same number of bills of each group in the data set. When the number of bills in the categories vastly differs, one can see different magnitudes of marginal effects as for gender and to a smaller extent for convocation in Figures 10-11.

In Figures 12-15, I visualize the changes in the coefficient estimates of nongovernmental initiated bills (Figure 12, 14) and mixed initiated bills (Figure 13, 15) in a two-way interaction term conditional on the value of the number of initiators (Figure 12, 13) and the value of the days before elections (squared and divided by 1000) (Figure 14, 15). The plots also include simulated 95% confidential intervals of the coefficients. Confidence intervals for estimated coefficients of nongovernmental, as well as mixed, bills in interaction with the number of initiators have a cone-like shape (see Figures 12-13). One can relate it to most of the cases distributed at the beginning of the number of initiators scale (see Figure 3).


Table 3. Regression Results (Convocations 6,7, and 8).

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>								
	Legislative Success								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Mixed (Ref = Governmental)	0.022 (0.091)	-0.011 (0.098)	0.174 (0.119)	0.142 (0.119)	0.160 (0.119)	0.111 (0.143)	-0.028 (0.150)	-0.133 (0.152)	-0.107 (0.154)
Nongovernmental	-1.415*** (0.102)	-1.412*** (0.102)	-1.040*** (0.167)	-1.057*** (0.167)	-1.000*** (0.168)	-1.308*** (0.189)	-1.281*** (0.192)	-1.248*** (0.191)	-1.216*** (0.192)
Number of Initiators		0.005 (0.006)	0.084*** (0.030)	0.069** (0.030)	0.055* (0.030)	0.075** (0.032)	0.046 (0.032)	0.027 (0.030)	0.026 (0.030)
Mixed * Number of Initiators			-0.081*** (0.031)	-0.066** (0.031)	-0.053* (0.030)	-0.073** (0.032)	-0.048 (0.032)	-0.033 (0.030)	-0.032 (0.031)
Nongovernmental * Number of Initiators			-0.214** (0.084)	-0.204** (0.084)	-0.206** (0.085)	-0.259*** (0.089)	-0.271*** (0.091)	-0.265*** (0.089)	-0.268*** (0.090)
Days before Elections				0.0002** (0.0001)	-0.001*** (0.0003)	-0.001*** (0.0003)	-0.001*** (0.0003)	-0.001** (0.0003)	-0.001** (0.0003)
Days before Elections (^2 /1000)					0.001*** (0.0002)	0.001*** (0.0002)	0.001*** (0.0002)	0.0004** (0.0002)	0.0004* (0.0002)
Mixed * Days before Elections (^2 /1000)						0.0001 (0.0001)	0.0001 (0.0001)	0.0001 (0.0001)	0.0001 (0.0001)
Nongovernmental * Days before Elections (^2 /1000)						0.001*** (0.0001)	0.001*** (0.0001)	0.001*** (0.0001)	0.001*** (0.0001)
Female (Ref = Both)							-0.423** (0.208)	-0.338 (0.210)	-0.341 (0.210)
Male							-0.313*** (0.108)	-0.210* (0.110)	-0.218** (0.111)
Convocation 7 (Ref = 6)								0.293** (0.134)	0.290** (0.135)
Convocation 8								0.508*** (0.105)	0.493*** (0.106)
Economic Policy (Ref = International Agreements)									-0.566 (0.846)
Humanitarian Policy									-0.793 (0.883)
Legal Policy									-0.768 (0.846)
Sectoral Development									-0.838 (0.845)
Security and Defense									-0.569 (0.873)
Social Policy									-0.775 (0.851)
State-Building									-0.975 (0.853)
Constant	0.115* (0.061)	0.103* (0.063)	-0.058 (0.086)	-0.179* (0.099)	0.116 (0.125)	0.168 (0.130)	0.502*** (0.171)	0.295 (0.183)	1.043 (0.873)
Observations	2,868	2,868	2,868	2,868	2,868	2,868	2,868	2,868	2,868
Log Likelihood	-1,827.59	-1,827.15	-1,821.32	-1,818.30	-1,810.94	-1,802.92	-1,798.40	-1,785.81	-1,780.55
Akaike Inf. Crit.	3,661.180	3,662.292	3,654.645	3,650.604	3,637.889	3,625.847	3,620.794	3,599.627	3,603.094

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Figure 7. Average Marginal Probability of the Number of Initiators



Note: the vertical line indicates the simple majority.

Figure 8. Average Marginal Probability of the Days before Elections




Figure 9. Average Marginal Probability of Initiator's Group




Figure 10. Average Marginal Probability of Gender




Figure 11. Average Marginal Probability of Convocation




Figure 12. Estimated Coefficients of the Bills Initiated by the Nongovernmental Initiators' Group by the Number of Initiators




Figure 13. Estimated Coefficients of the Bills Initiated by the Mixed Initiators' Group by the Number of Initiators




Figure 14. Estimated Coefficients of the Bills Initiated by the Nongovernmental Initiators' Group by Days before Elections (Squared and Divided by 1000)





Figure 15. Estimated Coefficients of the Bills Initiated by the Mixed Initiators' Group by Days before Elections (Squared and Divided by 1000)



So, for the results plotted in Figure 12-13, there is a potential problem of extrapolation, i.e., concluding based on the assumption that the trend continues and remains applicable. There, the higher is the value for the number of initiators, the more decreases the confidence in the coefficient since the confidence intervals increase. It indicates that only the estimates at the beginning of the scale may be trusted,

provided that the coefficient is significant. The same partially relates to the estimated coefficients of nongovernmental and mixed bills in interaction with the days before elections (see Figures 12-13).

Additional Tests and Discussion of Results

To take care of the possible differences between the convocations and take out the variation, which may affect the results, I cluster standard errors at the convocation level. Table 4 presents the comparison of the coefficients of Model 8 and the coefficients after clustering. I find broadly similar results. Nevertheless, one should take notice that some of the coefficients become or lose significance. *The number of initiators* becomes positively significant ($p < 0.01$). The *interaction of the mixed group and the number of initiators* becomes negatively significant ($p < 0.01$). The coefficient for *the days before elections* loses significance. The same occurs for *the interaction of the nongovernmental group with the days before elections (squared and divided by 1000)*. In the control variable *gender*, the category for male initiators loses significance, while the one for female initiators becomes negatively significant (** $p < 0.05$). To compare the coefficients for Model 8 and clustered standard errors, see Figure 16.


Table 4. Regression Results for Model 8 and Clustered SEs

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Legislative Success	
	<i>Model 8</i>	<i>Clustered SEs</i>
Mixed (Ref = Governmental)	-0.133 (0.152)	-0.133 (0.201)
Nongovernmental	-1.248*** (0.191)	-1.248*** (0.351)
Number of Initiators	0.027 (0.030)	0.027*** (0.009)
Mixed * Number of Initiators	-0.033 (0.030)	-0.033*** (0.010)
Nongovernmental * Number of Initiators	-0.265*** (0.089)	-0.265*** (0.009)
Days before Elections	-0.001** (0.0003)	-0.001 (0.001)
Days before Elections (^2 /1000)	0.0004** (0.0002)	0.0004*** (0.0001)
Mixed * Days before Elections (^2 /1000)	0.0001 (0.0001)	0.0001 (0.0003)
Nongovernmental * Days before Elections (^2 /1000)	0.001*** (0.0001)	0.001 (0.0004)
Female (Ref = Both)	-0.338 (0.210)	-0.338** (0.168)
Male	-0.210* (0.110)	-0.210 (0.154)
Convocation 7 (Ref = 6)	0.293** (0.134)	0.293*** (0.108)
Convocation 8	0.508*** (0.105)	0.508*** (0.091)
Constant	0.295 (0.183)	0.295 (0.284)
Observations	2,868	2,868
Log Likelihood	-1,785.813	-1,785.813
Akaike Inf. Crit.	3,599.627	3,599.627

Note:


* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

Figure 16. Comparison of Coefficients for Model 8 and Clustered SEs



In Figure 17, I estimate the goodness of fit, i.e., how much the real value of the variable legislative success corresponds to the predicted value of this variable. First, based on the model coefficients, I count probabilities for each case in the data set. Then, I need to define the cutoff point and attribute the predicted probabilities to the groups of successful and rejected bills. To this end, I match the specificity (true negative rate) of the prediction with its sensitivity (true positive rate) and its accuracy. The intersection of these indicators is the cutoff, and in this case, it is nearly 0.477. I attribute the cases with the predicted probabilities below 0.477 to the group of rejected bills and vice versa. In the end, I define whether the predicted probability gives the correct prediction that, in this case, is almost 64 percent.

Figure 17. The Goodness of Fit



The vertical line at $x=0.47662$ indicates the cutoff point used to attribute the predicted probabilities to the groups of successful and rejected bills. The cases with the predicted probabilities below 0.47662 are assigned to the group of rejected bills and vice versa.

Hence, in line with H1, bills sponsored by the opposition have a lower probability of success than the bills sponsored by the government. I do not find support to H2 that the proposals of mixed cosponsorship have a higher likelihood of being successful than those of governmental sponsorship since the coefficient is not significant. Based on the basic regression model, I fail to support to H3. However, when the standard errors are clustered, there is a strong relationship between the increase of cosponsors and legislative success. H4 finds full support also in the model with clustered SEs. The increase in cosponsors negatively affects the success of opposition and mixed bills, although, for the latter, the coefficient is smaller. H5 cannot be supported. Although the basic model indicates that, with the approach of elections, the probability of the bill's success increases and the likelihood of opposition bill success decreases, the model with clustered SEs turns the coefficient to not significant. After clustering SEs, H6 cannot be supported. So, there is no support that the upcoming elections influence the adoption of bills of different sponsorship differently.

9. Concluding Remarks

Below, I relate the findings to the broader theoretical perspective. I also speak about generalizability, limitations, and avenues for further studies. In this thesis, I scrutinize whether ignoring opposition's alternatives or ideas occurs in autocratizing – yet previously consolidating – democracies. Based on a typical case with the gradual democratic backsliding, Ukraine, I analyze 2868 bills that reached the plenary voting throughout convocations 6-8 (2007-2019). Along with the oppositional origin as the bill's success determinant, I investigate the influence of the cosponsors' number and the approximation of the elections. I also control for the bill's issue and its initiator's gender.

The findings of this research on the autocratizing regime are predominantly in alliance with the previous studies on stable regimes. *First*, bills sponsored by the opposition are less likely to be adopted than those sponsored by the government. I conclude nothing about the cause of this difference since it may stem from either regime dynamics, as assumed in this study, or from the institutional framework, as theorized in some previous research (Hix and Noury, 2016) or both. The assumption of the regime dynamics is novel, so it requires further investigation.

Second, the more cosponsors, the higher are the chances for bills' adoption. This finding is also in line with previous research (Aleman and Calvo, 2008). However, one should interpret this finding carefully. The predictor *not researched previously* and introduced in this study, the interaction of the cosponsors' number and the cosponsorship groups, indicates that the success of mixed and opposition bills decreases with the cosponsors increasing. It urges to treat the findings regarding the sole influence of the cosponsors increasing with caution, especially when the number of cosponsors in opposition and mixed groups is high. The other previously not researched predictor, by which this study also contributes to the field of the legislative success determinants, is elections proximity. To my knowledge, it has not been tested with continuous operationalization. However, elections proximity fails to find support as a sole predictor of legislative success. The same is true for its interaction with the (co)sponsorship groups.

This research has a few *limitations*. The main one stems from the approach to defining the opposition, which does not account for the intra-party opposition, which is a common occurrence in the history of parliamentary activities (Ostapchuk, n.d.; Nadelniuk, n.d.). So, by ignoring an individual position, I could have assigned the MPs to the de facto wrong initiator's group, which, in turn, could have distorted the findings. The other limitation comes from the cases of analyzed bills. They are restricted to those considered at the plenary sessions and encompass 2868 bills. However, during the research period, MPs initiated 14 700 bills, i.e., nearly 80 percent of initiated proposals are left out of the analysis. One more limitation relates to the assumption that MPs initiate bills with the prospects to pass them. If not, that may influence the quality of the text and content, sponsors' efforts to attract support, etc. If the opposition pursues populist rhetoric and sponsors unrealistic bills, then there is no wonder that political exclusion occurs. It points to the other limitation of the legislative success determinants, which is the content of the bill itself. To evaluate such a predictor in the large-scale analysis would take a lot of coding efforts. However, even with such an investment, the subjectivity of evaluation would leave the room for questioning the results.

The broad implication of the research is that, in the autocratizing regimes, as well as in the stable ones (Anderson et al., 2003; Aleman and Calvo, 2008; Kerevel and Atkeson, 2013), the government pursues its agenda and rarely adopts opposition's policy proposals. So, for the opposition, the parliament is unlikely the right forum for bargaining and compromise. Based on the common patterns, one may suggest that the regime type has nothing to do with opposition's legislative success and that it depends on the institutional system (Hix and Noury, 2016). So, the study's *generalizability* is limited by the institutional systems with the government-opposition split in parliaments (Hix and Noury, 2016) and autocratizing polities.

So, the avenue for further research is to look at the presidential systems with coalition governments or parliamentary systems with minority governments, where coalitions must be built issue by issue. One should consider and compare the cases with different regime dynamics to argue whether the regime's dynamics influence the opposition's legislative success.

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Appendices

Appendix 1. Governmental Factions: Convocations 6 through 8.

Convocation	Faction (Group)	In	Out
Second Tymoshenko Government (18 Dec 2007 – 11 March 2010)			
The Coalition of Democratic Forces (29 Nov 2007 – 17 Dec 2008) ¹⁶			
6	The Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc	29 Nov 2007	17 Dec 2008
6	The Our Ukraine–People’s Self-Defense Bloc	29 Nov 2007	17 Dec 2008
The Coalition of “National Development, Stability, and Order” (17 Dec 2008 – 11 Mar 2010) ¹⁷			
6	The Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc	17 Dec 2008	11 Mar 2010
6	The Our Ukraine–People’s Self-Defense Bloc	17 Dec 2008	11 Mar 2010
6	The Lytvyn Bloc	17 Dec 2008	11 Mar 2010
First Azarov Government (11 March 2010 – 3 Dec 2012)			
Coalition “Stability and Reforms” ¹⁸ (11 Mar 2010 – 12 Dec 2012)			
6	The Party of Regions	11 Mar 2010	12 Dec 2012
6	The Communist Party of Ukraine	11 Mar 2010	12 Dec 2012
6	The Lytvyn Bloc	11 Mar 2010	12 Dec 2012
6	Some MPs	11 Mar 2010	12 Dec 2012
Second Azarov Government (13 Dec 2012 – 28 Jan 2014)			
Factions Appointing the Government ¹⁹ (12 Dec 2012 – 20 Feb 2014)			
7	The Party of Regions	12 Dec 2012	20 Feb 2014
7	The Communist Party of Ukraine	12 Dec 2012	20 Feb 2014

¹⁶ Pro stvorennia Koalitsii democytychnykh syl u Verkhovniy Radi Ukrainy VI skykannia [On the creation of the Coalition of the democratic forces in the Parliament of Ukraine in convocation VI]. (2008). Retrieved 10 May 2020, from <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/n0003001-07>

¹⁷ Uhoda pro stvorennia Koalitsii “Natsionalnoho rozvytku, stabilnosti ta poriadku” [The Agreement on the creation of the Coalition of the “National development, stability, and order”]. (2008). Retrieved 10 May 2020, from <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/n0001001-08>

¹⁸ Pro stvorennia Koalitsii deputatskykh fraktsiy “Stabilnist I reformy” u Verkhovniy Radi Ukrainy shottoho skykannia [On the creation of the Coalition of the factions “Stability and Reforms” in the Parliament of Ukraine of the sixth convocation]. (2010). Retrieved 10 May 2020, from <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/n0001001-10>

¹⁹ Poimenne holosuvannia pro nadannia zhody na pryznachennia Prezydentom Ukrainy Premier-ministrom Ukrainy Azarova M.Y. [Roll-call vote on consent to the appointment of Mykola Azarov by the President of Ukraine as the Prime Minister of Ukraine]. (2012). Retrieved 10 May 2020, from http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/radan_gs09/ns_arh_golos?g_id=8407&n_skl=7

Appendix 1. Governmental Factions: Convocations 6 through 8. – Continued.

First Yatseniuk Government (27 Feb 2014 – 27 Nov 2014)			
Coalition “European Choice” ²⁰ (27 Feb 2014 – 24 Jul 2014 ²¹)			
7	All-Ukrainian Union “Fatherland”	27 Feb 2014	24 Jul 2014
7	Ukrainian Democratic Alliance for Reform (UDAR)	27 Feb 2014	24 Jul 2014
7	All-Ukrainian Union “Svoboda”	27 Feb 2014	24 Jul 2014
7	Group Economic Development	27 Feb 2014	24 Jul 2014
7	Group Sovereign European Ukraine	27 Feb 2014	24 Jul 2014
Second Yatseniuk Government (27 Nov 2014 – 14 April 2016)			
First Groyzman Government (14 April 2016 – 29 August 2019)			
Coalition “European Ukraine” ²² (27 Nov 2014 – 17 May 2019 ²³)			
8	Petro Poroshenko Bloc	27 Nov 2014	17 May 2019
8	People’s Front	27 Nov 2014	17 May 2019
8	All-Ukrainian Union “Fatherland”	27 Nov 2014	18 Feb 2016 ²⁴
8	Self-Reliance	27 Nov 2014	19 Feb 2016 ²⁵
8	Radical Party of Oleh Liashko	27 Nov 2014	1 Sep 2015 ²⁶

²⁰ U Verkhovniy Radi Ukrainy utvoreno koalitsiyu “Yevropeyskyi Vybir” [The coalition “European Choice” is created in the Parliament of Ukraine]. (2014). Retrieved 10 May 2020, from <http://mportal.rada.gov.ua/news/Povidomlennya/88617.html>

²¹ Udar i “Svoboda” vyishly z koalitsii [Udar and “Svoboda” left the coalition]. (2014). Retrieved 10 May 2020, from <https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2014/07/24/7032845/>

²² Uhoda pro Koalitsiyu deputatskykh fraktsiy “Yevropeyska Ukraina” [The Coalition agreement of the factions “European Ukraine”]. (2014). Retrieved 10 May 2020, from <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/n0001001-15>

²³ Koalitsiia prypynyla isnuvannia – rozpusk Rady nemozhlyvyi [The coalition ceased existence – the Parliament cannot be dissolved] (2019). Retrieved 10 May 2020, from <https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2019/05/17/7215275/>

²⁴ Groyzman oholosyv pro vykhid “Batktivshchyny” z koalitsii [Groyzman has declared “Fatherland” left the coalition]. (2016). Retrieved 10 May 2020, from <https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2016/02/18/7099503/>

²⁵ Groyzman lehalizuvav vykhid “Samopomochi” [Groyzman has legalized the exit of the “Self-Reliance”] (2016). Retrieved 10 May 2020, from <https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2016/02/19/7099562/>

²⁶ Liashko oholosyv pro perekhid v opozyttsii i zabrav svoho vitse-premera z Kabminu [Liashko declared about switching to opposition and took his vice-premier from the Cabinet]. (2015). Retrieved 10 May 2020, from <https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2015/09/1/7079763/>

Appendix 2. Defined as Governing Parties within the Indicated Period While Coding

Convocation	Faction	In	Out
6	The Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc	2007-11-23 ²⁷	2010-03-11
6	The Our Ukraine–People’s Self-Defense Bloc	2007-11-23	2010-03-11
6	The Lytvyn Bloc	2008-12-17	2012-12-12
6	The Party of Regions	2010-03-11	2012-12-12
6	The Communist Party of Ukraine	2010-03-11	2012-12-12
6	Some MPs ²⁸	2010-03-11	2012-12-12
7	The Party of Regions	2012-12-12	2014-02-27
7	The Communist Party of Ukraine	2012-12-12	2014-02-27
7	All-Ukrainian Union “Fatherland”	2014-02-27	2014-11-27 ²⁹
7	Ukrainian Democratic Alliance for Reform (UDAR)	2014-02-27	2014-11-27
7	All-Ukrainian Union "Svoboda"	2014-02-27	2014-11-27
7	Group Economic Development	2014-02-27	2014-11-27
7	Group Sovereign European Ukraine	2014-02-27	2014-11-27
8	People’s Front	2014-11-27	2019-08-29 ³⁰
8	Petro Poroshenko Bloc	2014-11-27	2019-08-29
8	All-Ukrainian Union “Fatherland”	2014-11-27	2016-02-18
8	Self-Reliance	2014-11-27	2016-02-19
8	Radical Party of Oleh Liashko	2014-11-27	2015-09-01

²⁷ The first meeting of this convocation took place on Nov 23. It was the only meeting before the coalition formation. I do not code to drop the activities on Nov 23 since then no bill was adopted. http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/radan_gs09/ns_arh_h2?day_ =23&month_ =11&year=2007&nom_s=1&nom_skl=6. Further, the day of the coalition formation coincides with the first meeting of that convocation.

²⁸ Names indicated in the code.

²⁹ Since the dissolution of the coalition on Jul 24, 2014, was a political move to start the procedure of snap elections, I ignore that dissolution and code as if the coalition did not fall apart.

³⁰ Since the dissolution of the coalition on May 17, 2019, was a political move to prevent the President from starting the procedure of the snap elections, I ignore it and code as if the coalition did not fall apart.

Appendix 3. Variables Operationalization

Variable	Name in the Dataset	Type	Meaning
Legislative success	passed	Boolean	Possible values: <i>TRUE</i> for the passed bills, <i>FALSE</i> for the bills, which have not passed.
Group of initiators	init_status	Categorical	Possible values: <i>nongov</i> – for the bills, where initiators did not belong to the governing faction at the time of voting for the bill, <i>gov_all</i> – for the bills, where all initiators belonged to the governing faction at the time of voting for the bill, <i>gov_some</i> – for the bills, where some initiators belonged to the governing faction at the time of voting for the bill.
Number of initiators	no_init	Continuous	Number of MPs, who initiated the bill.
Gender of initiators	gender	Categorical	Possible values: <i>male</i> – all initiators of the bill are males, <i>female</i> – all initiators of the bill are females, <i>both</i> – initiators of the bill are males and females.
Days before next parliamentary elections	days_be	Continuous	Indicates how many days before the next parliamentary elections, MPs voted for the bill.
Days before next parliamentary elections (squared and divided by 1000)	days_be_sq_1000	Continuous	Indicates how many days before the next parliamentary elections, MPs voted for the bill (squared and divided by 1000).
Convocation	convocation	Categorical	Possible values: 6 – bill belongs to convocation six, 7 – bill belongs to convocation seven, 8 – bill belongs to convocation eight.
Issue	rubric	Categorical	Possible values: <i>Bilateral International Agreements</i> , <i>Economic Policy</i> , <i>Humanitarian Policy</i> , <i>Legal Policy</i> , <i>Sectoral Development</i> , <i>Security and Defense</i> , <i>Social Policy</i> , <i>State Building</i> .

Appendix 4. The Crosstabulation of Categorical Variables

Issue	Gender	Legislative Success	Initiators' Group		
			Governmental	Mixed	Nongovernmental
Bilateral International Agreements	Both	Rejection	0	0	1
		Support	4	0	0
	Female	Rejection	0	0	0
		Support	0	0	0
	Male	Rejection	0	0	2
		Support	0	0	1
Economic policy	Both	Rejection	16	45	15
		Support	23	71	6
	Female	Rejection	10	2	15
		Support	4	1	3
	Male	Rejection	97	47	84
		Support	162	40	24
Humanitarian policy	Both	Rejection	0	6	1
		Support	3	9	0
	Female	Rejection	0	0	3
		Support	2	0	0
	Male	Rejection	11	2	16
		Support	10	3	1
Legal policy	Both	Rejection	9	36	10
		Support	12	26	7
	Female	Rejection	2	1	14
		Support	2	1	3
	Male	Rejection	91	43	155
		Support	86	44	50
Sectoral Development	Both	Rejection	19	94	22
		Support	31	113	19
	Female	Rejection	17	0	26
		Support	13	8	9
	Male	Rejection	123	87	155
		Support	98	82	34
Security and Defense	Both	Rejection	2	6	0
		Support	8	8	0
	Female	Rejection	1	0	0
		Support	2	1	0
	Male	Rejection	10	9	7
		Support	12	10	4
Social Policy	Both	Rejection	7	9	11
		Support	11	13	5
	Female	Rejection	4	0	7
		Support	2	1	1
	Male	Rejection	40	12	72

		Support	35	23	16
State-Building	Both	Rejection	6	13	8
		Support	7	19	0
	Female	Rejection	0	0	8
		Support	0	0	0
	Male	Rejection	36	9	76
		Support	35	10	10

Appendix 5. List of the Archived Files

R script:

1. "1. Data Management - Convocation 6.R"
2. "2. Data Management - Convocation 7.R"
3. "3. Data Management - Convocation 8.R"
4. "4. Data Description.R"
5. "5. Analysis.R"

Data sets downloaded from <https://data.rada.gov.ua/>

6. "mps-trans_fr_arh.csv"
7. "mps06-data.csv"
8. "mps07-data.csv"
9. "mps08-data.csv"
10. "plenary_event_question-sk16.csv"
11. "plenary_event_question-sk17.csv"
12. "plenary_event_question-sk18.csv"
13. "bills-sk16.json"
14. "bills-sk17.json"
15. "bills-sk18.json"

Data sets downloaded from <https://www.v-dem.net/>

16. "cases.csv"
17. "UkraineLDI.csv"