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Financial Economics

**Corporate Social Responsibility and the  
Equity Markets: A quantitative analysis**

**Bachelor thesis 15 hp**

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## **ABSTRACT**

The purpose of this thesis is to examine the relationship between Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) disclosure and equity prices in the financial markets. An event study combined with a textual analysis is used to research this relationship. The thesis is based on the European market and the sample period is between 2018 and 2019. Insight is given into the immediate and short-term effects of CSR disclosure and the significant results suggest that we can conclude that there exists a relationship between CSR disclosure and equity market reactions. The results indicate both a negative effect on abnormal return but also a positive effect in terms of lower volatility.

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## 1. INTRODUCTION

In 2017 the European Union (EU) through Directive 2014/95/EU legislated about required Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) reporting in the EU. These regulatory changes brought on the question: is CSR disclosure used by investors and if so, how is it interpreted? In this thesis, we are specifically looking at and evaluating the relationship between equity markets and company CSR disclosure. The thesis is an effort to examine how investors use CSR information and how it is expressed in the stock market.

CSR is an umbrella term that emphasizes the responsibility of the corporation regarding societal issues, such as gender equality, the environment, and poverty. A firm Practicing CSR is taking responsibility for society and tries to make sure that they make a positive contribution (Chen 2020). CSR is not a new concept but environmental and social issues have become increasingly important to almost all stakeholders in the corporate world, enhancing the importance of CSR work for firms across the globe (McPherson 2020). The increased awareness has led to policies about mandatory sustainability but until now mainly in individual countries. CSR reporting is, due to Directive 2014/95/EU, mandatory for all publicly traded companies and public-interest companies with more than 500 employees, within the European Union. The directive states that these companies have to include non-financial statements that give the reader an understanding of the company's performance, development, position, and the impact of its activity that relates to environmental, social, and employee matters, respect for human rights, anti-corruption and bribery matters. However, research on the capital market response to this type of reporting is limited and the subject is not as thoroughly examined as for example financial reporting.

The results of the research on the relationship between financial statements and stock returns suggest that financial reporting is essential. Capital markets have found that disclosures within the financial statements have a predictive value of firm performance and therefore the stock price (Mulyono & Khairurizka 2009). Non-financial statements in annual reports such as the president's letter and other management discussion and analysis (MD&A) with voluntary forecasts and predictions as well as other non-financial communication has also been shown to be useful (Li 2010). MD&A analysis shows that narratives are important for

actors in equity markets when valuing a firm. What is not determined is how CSR disclosure is used by market participants and how it affects a firm's perceived value.

The purpose of financial reports and official communication is also important to keep in mind. The annual report is a firm's main way of communicating with owners and other stakeholders. This communication is important to bridge the gap of information asymmetry between company insiders and outsiders. In this case, regulation is used to prevent informational abuse to protect outsiders from information omission or distortion by company insiders, like the firm's management. Furthermore, regulation is used to enforce disclosure conformity to make said disclosure more readable, comprehensible, and comparable. In turn, harmonization of accounting practices are believed to bring transparency, accountability, and efficiency to financial markets (IFRS n.d.). When legislating regarding company communication it is therefore important to examine the results so that the regulation does not add noise and defeat its purpose. The EU has a more extensive directive regarding financial statements than CSR disclosure and the harmonization of accounting practices has been shown to lower the cost of capital and increase investors' predictability within the EU (Lee, Walker and Christensen, 2020). Because the EU used a directive instead of a regulation to drive change in the reporting standards of CSR disclosure the harmonization is lower than regular financial accounting. This could mean that investors might have difficulties interpreting the information and might question its reliability. Whether more or less regulation is needed is difficult to say but what is examined in this thesis is whether or not the stock market reacts to different types of CSR communication. There are admittedly significant other stakeholders in companies besides shareholders, however, their perspective will not be examined in this thesis.

The reporting firms are providing the markets with several different reports each year containing different forms of CSR communication, making it hard to analyze. This becomes a problematic feature, both for this thesis and the financial markets, due to that CSR communication is not consolidated into a single report. For example, there is the annual report, the corporate responsibility report, and the environment, social and governance report (ESG). Since the directive does not state how the CSR is supposed to be disclosed, it is up to every member state to either legislate or let the firm's practice CSR-reporting in the way they

see fit. This means that not all firms release a separate report, like a corporate responsibility report or ESG report, but instead disclose CSR in the annual report. In this thesis, we will, therefore, focus on the effects of the annual reports and the corporate responsibility reports to conclude whether equity markets react to the CSR disclosure included in these reports. In short, the annual report is mainly focused on financial performance, but since it is often a firm's main way of communication it also sheds light on CSR related issues. The corporate responsibility report is instead focused on specific firm CSR work. For instance, a report can describe the firm's work on gender equality or environmental work but this varies between companies and firms often focus on different areas in different years.

The purpose of this thesis is to examine whether there is a relationship between investor sentiment and CSR disclosure in both the corporate responsibility reports and annual reports. Previous research that exclusively examines the market reaction to the publication of CSR disclosure is harder to find. We found research similar to ours in a Japanese context, but the European market is yet to be examined. This study will be useful for both investors but also for political entities to gain an understanding of the relationship between CSR disclosure and the stock market.

To fulfill the outset purpose of the thesis we first examine if there are abnormal returns attributable to the release of the annual reports or the corporate responsibility reports. Through an event study methodology, we find that the market does not seem to react to corporate responsibility reports but that it does react to the annual reports. Secondly, we use textual analysis to examine if there is a relationship between the CSR related word usage in firms' annual reports and the firms' stock price. This is done through a series of regressions which to a large degree are based on a categorized word count of the annual reports to reveal CSR focus and CSR intensity. Through our methodology, we find that most CSR disclosure is connected with lower abnormal returns, however, it also seems to have a relationship with lower stock volatility across the board. The shown effects are quite minor but statistically significant.

## **2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK & LITERATURE REVIEW**

The basis of event studies like the ones conducted in this thesis is the semi-strong form of market efficiency as suggested by the efficient market hypothesis. An event study examines the impact of an event on the financial markets to see if it has any value altering effects and the semi-strong form of market efficiency states that all publicly available information is incorporated into the stock price (Law 2016). Therefore, if an event has any value altering effects, these should be reflected in the stock price once the event is public. In our case, the examined events are the releases of the annual reports and the corporate responsibility reports and since these contain previously unknown information this new information should be incorporated into the stock price. The question is: do CSR disclosure in financial and CSR reports affect the value of the releasing firms?

### **2.1 THE PROFITABILITY OF CSR WORK**

The fact that information becoming public could have an impact on the firms' stock price is one thing, but to also try and define whether this information is positive or negative from an investor's point of view is another. To investigate this, we reviewed prior research on effects of CSR-work on a firm's financial performance.

There has been a lot of research into finding the true effects of CSR on financial performance but the results vary due to differences in methodology and the measurement of corporate social performance (CSP) (Beurden & Gössling 2008). However, Beurden & Gössling (2008) conclude through their literature study that there is a significant positive relationship between CSP and corporate financial performance (CFP). If this was true then the stock markets would have a reaction and we would see companies that are reporting a lot or increasing their CSR efforts, to achieve this positive CFP Beurden and Gössling were describing and be valued accordingly.

Cavaco & Crifo (2014) found that the relationship between CSR and financial performance is dependent on synergistic effects and trade-offs between different CSR components, i.e. the way firms incorporate CSR is crucial. They conclude that a focus on human resources and business behavior has a synergistic effect on financial performance. However, environmental work could be substitutable input to financial performance and might lead to over-investment

if both are undertaken simultaneously. This suggests that CSR focus is important and that not all CSR work is the same. Therefore one has to consider not only the intensity of which CSR is practiced but also which CSR focus a firm has.

Epstein & Freedman (1994) found that shareholders in the majority demanded disclosure of firms' CSR-work and that shareholders ranked CSR-work related to reducing pollution and increasing product safety as the most important. The findings of Epstein & Freedman (1994) also support the idea of shareholders caring the most about CSR-activities that will reward the owners with a higher future profitability.

## 2.2 EQUITY MARKET REACTION

To understand how prices are set on the equity market, we depend on the theoretical framework provided by the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). The CAPM is a widely used theory in finance for pricing risky assets and calculating expected return given risk (Perold 2004). The research conducted on the financial market reactions to news and disclosure regarding CSR topics are many. A common event study methodology to examine whether the stock market cares for CSR-work is to use the inclusion or exclusion of companies in different "environmentally friendly" lists, for example, America's 100 best corporate citizens or FTSE4Good UK Index. Brammer, Brooks & Pavelin (2009) found small positive abnormal returns from the event of being included in America's 100 Best Corporate Citizens, but as Martin Curran & Moran (2007), the results were insignificant, suggesting that either the proxy used for CSR-work is flawed or that investors do not care for CSR-work in the short-run.

Flammer (2013) researched all publicly listed companies in the US that were covered by a positive or negative story in the Wall Street Journal in the sample period of 1980-2009 and found that shareholders care for the sustainable footprint and also argues that environmental CSR is a resource with decreasing marginal returns over time. News about sustainable actions was followed by a significant stock price increase, while news about unsustainable actions had the opposite effect. The results showing that environmental-work has decreasing marginal returns over time is something that could have effects on the data and the results of this thesis because it examines a much later period than Flammer did. This could mean that



the results will show that CSR disclosure has a small or no effect on the stock price today, but would have had a larger effect historically.

Nuzula & Kato (2011) researched partly the same event as this thesis, the publication of CSR reports, but in Japan instead of Europe. The research found no significant results regarding abnormal returns when examining the short event window of three days, but found small significant abnormal returns in the longer event window of 19 days. The research conducted by Nuzula & Kato (2011) is acting as a guide for the first part of our methodology, which will be described further.

As we mentioned in the introduction, some firms do not provide a separate report for CSR, the CSR communication is instead conducted through the annual report. Keeping in mind that this thesis's purpose is to analyze whether investors use CSR disclosure for decision making, we looked at previous research to understand how CSR disclosure can be extracted and measured through the annual report. Clarkson, et al. (2020) showed through their research that CSR performance can be rather accurately predicted by the number of words and sentences in the corporate responsibility report, with an accuracy of 81 %.

Since CSR-work is expected to be correlated with increased profitability, and shareholders both have knowledge and demand for disclosure of a firm's conducted CSR-work, the disclosure of information should logically have a positive effect on the stock price. Although previous research on the equity market reaction tells us that investors do not seem to value this information, at least not in the short term. Compared to the previous studies this thesis will examine not only the European market but it will also examine a different more recent time period. Additionally, the thesis evaluates different relationships between CSR reporting and stock market performance in a way that was yet to be explored.

### 2.3 HYPOTHESIS

Based on our literature study the following hypotheses were constructed to further examine the relationship between CSR disclosure and equity markets.

To determine how valuable it would be to analyze corporate responsibility reports we formulated hypothesis I to see if the stock market reacted to the reports at all. The null hypothesis predicts that the immediate and short-term effects of the publication of a corporate responsibility report will not affect the publishing firm's stock price.

*H<sub>1</sub> = The stock price for a firm will not change due to the release of a corporate sustainability report*

As with the corporate responsibility report, of interest is to examine if there is a market reaction to the annual report to determine whether the publication is worth researching further. The thesis null hypothesis II states the immediate and short-term effects of the publication of an annual report will not affect the publishing firm's stock price.

*H<sub>2</sub> = The stock price for a firm will not change due to the release of an annual report*

Since the stock market reaction to corporate responsibility reports was limited, which is later expanded upon, the thesis focuses on the publications of annual reports. The null hypothesis III tests if the area of which the CSR disclosure is focused on affects the firm stock price and states that the focus of CSR work communicated through the annual report will not have any immediate or short-term effect on a firm's stock price.

*H<sub>3</sub> = The stock price for a firm will not be affected by the CSR focus disclosed in the annual report*

Also of interest is if the amount of CSR disclosure influences the firm stock price. The amount is used to measure how intensely the firm focuses on CSR. The null hypothesis IV is formulated to see if the intensity of CSR disclosure in the annual report has any immediate or short-term effects on a firm stock price.

*H<sub>4</sub> = The stock price for a firm will not be affected by the CSR intensity disclosed in the annual report*

### 3. METHOD

To research whether CSR disclosure affects a company's stock price we use two different methods. First, an event study is carried out to examine whether the actual return differs from the expected return, in the chosen time intervals surrounding the release date of the given report, by using a sign test similar to the event study conducted by Nuzula & Kato (2011). Secondly, we apply a multivariate regression analysis to analyze whether focus or intensity of CSR disclosure, included in the annual reports, affects the equity markets.

#### 3.1 THE EVENT STUDY

An event study is commonly used by researchers in the field of financial economics to find out how the equity market reacts to an event, such as the publication of a news article or press releases by firms. This method is built upon the semi-strong form of Efficient Market Theory that implies that all public information is incorporated into the stock price. In our case, the event is defined as the release of either the corporate responsibility report or the annual report. The event study is conducted to answer hypotheses I and II and to provide a foundation for the rest of the thesis.

Through our literature review, we found event studies using a variety of time intervals. For example, Lorraine, Collison & Power (2004) used a 21-day interval, including 10 days before, the day of, and 10 days after the event. Nuzula & Kato (2011) used two different time intervals to include both an immediate market reaction as well as a short term reaction, in their case the event windows were 3 days and 19 days. In our event studies, we use four time periods, firstly we examine the day before, the day after, and the day of the report and then also a 41-day interval (-10, 30). The event date is noted as day 0 and to both capture eventual leakage of information before the actual event, a period before day 0 is examined, and to capture the effects of more slowly incorporated information a period beyond day 0 is also examined. The reason for using different time intervals than the previously mentioned studies is that we believe that when accounting for the length of the reports and the density of information being disclosed, the market practitioners could require a longer time to price the disclosure provided. The longer time interval of 41 days proved to be a better model, exhibiting higher R-squared values in our initial testing, and is therefore included in this

thesis. In our initial testing, we tested several different time intervals and used metrics that determine the explainability of the model as guidance for what intervals to use for the thesis. Due to the importance of clarity all the time intervals that were examined are not included.

To capture the equity market's reaction to CSR disclosure we examine whether there is a difference between actual returns and expected returns. To do this we use a sign test to conclude whether the difference is statistically significant or not, showing if investors think that the release CSR-information is positive or negative to their valuation of the firm.

### 3.2 REGRESSION ANALYSIS

Due to the broad coverage of the annual report, covering areas such as yearly financial information, forecasts, and other MD&A, it is necessary for the regressions to quantify the amount of the report that is CSR related. To quantify the CSR disclosure we use a textual analysis approach, extracting and categorizing sustainability-related words in the annual reports. This is done with the help of a software called Atlas.ti and the adjusted sustainability dictionary created by Pencle & Mălăescu (2016) (see appendix 2). For each of the four categories in the dictionary the number of words is counted and used to form our "word count" variables. Through the word count, the fraction of the total report that focuses on the CSR categories is calculated creating a second variable of interest, "word fraction". The scaled word count and word fraction are then used as proxies for CSR disclosure intensity in our regression analysis which examines whether there are capital market effects explainable by the intensity of CSR disclosure.

As mentioned, there are four CSR word categories. The categories are as follows: Employee (EPM), Social & Community (SOC), Human Rights (HUM), and Environment (ENV). All with a word count and a word fraction, giving us a total of eight variables of interest so far. Further, a dummy is defined to reveal the CSR focus of a given company. Specifically, the dummy variable revealing focus is defined as being '1' for the relatively largest focus of the company and is always '1' for only a single category in both word count and word fraction. Explicitly the chosen category is the category achieving the highest value when dividing the category variable by the variable average in that category, for each company report. This focus test variable is used as a proxy for company CSR disclosure focus in the regressions, to

determine whether stock market effects can be explained by the focus of the CSR disclosure. Giving us a total of sixteen variables of interest so far.

Lastly, we also tested the change from one year to another where a scaled change of word count (defined as this year's word count minus last year's word count divided by last year's word count) and is used to determine if there is any causality between the CSR disclosure intensity and capital market effects. The total variables of interest used in the regressions thus add up to 20.

For our main analysis, multivariate OLS regressions are used to test the hypotheses. The models use the CSR categories as specified by our chosen dictionary (explained in the data section) in different ways as explanatory variables while stock market effects are the dependent variables. The control variables used in all regressions are the scaled measurements of the total words in the report, EBIT, total equity, total assets, market capitalization while also controlling for volatility, release year, and industry effects. The regressions shown in the empirical results are run on chosen capital market effects, specifically the stock volatility the day of the report as well as the abnormal return the day after the report and cumulative abnormal return in the time interval of 41 days (-10, 30) relative to the release of the report).

All regression models are a version of the following:

$$CME_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 ENV_{di} + \beta_2 EMP_{di} + \beta_3 SOC_{di} + \beta_4 HUM_{di} + \beta_5 EBIT_{di} + \beta_6 EQUITY_{di} + \beta_7 ASSETS_{di} + \beta_8 MARKET\ CAP_{di} + \beta_9 VOLATILITY_{di} + \beta_{10} TOTAL\ WORDS_{di} + \beta_{11} CONTROL_{di} + U_{di}$$

With the following definitions, appropriately scaled for clarity:

CME = Capital Market Effect, either CAR, AR or VOLATILITY

CAR = *Cumulative Abnormal Return*

AR = *Abnormal Return*

VOLATILITY = *stock volatility*

d = *Date of the report*

*t* = What time interval analyzed

*i* = The firm analyzed

*ENV*, *EMP*, *HUM*, *SOC* = Focus variable, word count, word fraction or the year to year change in word count or fraction, related to Environment, Employee, Human rights and Social & community respectively

*TOTAL WORDS* = Total number of words in the report or the year to year change in the total number of words in the report

*EBIT* = Earnings before interest and tax

*ASSETS* = Total assets

*EQUITY* = Total equity

*MARKET CAP* = Market capitalization

*CONTROL* = The Model is also controlling for year and industry

### 3.3 DEPENDENT VARIABLES

The dependent variables are the abnormal return and cumulative abnormal return (CAR) as well as volatility. The abnormal return is the actual return minus the expected return on a single day, while CAR is the sum of abnormal return in a time interval (more precise equations are presented and explained below). CAR is commonly used in event studies and research to determine how the equity markets respond to information (Lorraine, Collison & Power, 2004; Brammer, Brooks & Pavelin, 2009; Martin Curran & Moran, 2007; Flammer, 2013). The CAR shows how the return deviates from the expected return in an interval and violates the CAPM. Volatility is used both as a control variable and as a dependent variable (not at the same time for obvious reasons) and is calculated through taking the sample standard deviation of the daily data for the two most recent years (504 trading days) to the day of the report and annualizing it through multiplying it with the square root of 252.

To calculate the CAR for each company, we relied on previous research by Curran & Moran (2007) and Nuzula & Kato (2011) who used a CAR calculation based on the market model. First, we calculate the actual return from a firm's historical share price through equation 1:

$$R_{jt} = LN\left(\frac{P_{jt}}{P_{j,t-1}}\right) \quad (1)$$

Where  $R_{jt}$  is the actual return for firm  $j$  on the day  $t$  and  $P_{jt}$  is the price for firm  $j$  on the day. Then we calculate the expected return using the market model, equation 2:

$$E(R_{jt}) = \alpha_j + \beta_j R_{mt} + \varepsilon_{jt} \quad (2)$$

Where  $\alpha_j$  is the intercept for firm  $j$  and  $\varepsilon_{jt}$  is the error term for firm  $j$  on the day  $t$ , where  $\alpha_j$  is assumed to be close to zero and  $\varepsilon_{jt}$  assumed to be zero. The  $R_{mt}$  term is the market return on day  $t$ .  $\beta_j$  measures the sensitivity of market risk for firm  $j$ . In turn,  $\beta$  was calculated using an equal-weighted index of the company sample. The reason for not using the STOXX 600 index is that many of the companies are not trading on all the days that the index is open and vice versa. Since we are using daily data we decided it is satisfactory to make an index and calculate  $\beta$  against it since an index is not specified in the capital asset pricing model. We used the following formula, equation 3, when calculating  $\beta$ :

$$\beta_j = \frac{\text{Covariance}(R_j, R_{mt})}{\text{Variance}(R_j)} \quad (3)$$

We calculate the abnormal return through equation 4:

$$AR_{jt} = R_{jt} - E(R_{jt}) \quad (4)$$

And CAR through equation 5:

$$CAR_j = \sum_{t-a}^{t+b} AR_{jt} \quad (5)$$

Where  $t-a$  is the start for the time interval and  $t+b$  is the end.

### 3.4 TEST VARIABLES

The first four variables of interest are the word count for each category which are calculated by adding the occurrence of each word in each category together. The second four are the fraction which is taking the word count and dividing it by the total words found in the report. Additionally, eight variables are included that are dummies based on the previously mentioned variables respectively. The dummies are defined as the relatively highest variable for each company. It takes the value of the variable, divides it by the average value, and then finds which of these values is highest as compared to the average for all the categories for a company, leaving zeros in all but one category. The last four variables of interest are the percentage word count change from one year to another, giving us as mentioned a total of 20 variables of interest.

### 3.5 CONTROL VARIABLES

Multiple control variables are used in the regressions, such as EBIT, total assets, total equity which all are taken from a database and divided by one million (to make the regression results clearer). Market capitalization is calculated through the number of shares in a company multiplied by the share price and then also divided by one million. The year is simply a variable with 1 representing the release year 2018 and 2 representing the release year 2019. The total words are calculated by adding up the total words recognized by the program Atlas.ti, with exceptions for the default stop list, and then divided by a million. The industry is also controlled for, by creating a dummy for each of the 55 industries.

### 3.6 HYPOTHESIS TESTING

Testing our hypothesis we rely on two methods. Our first two hypotheses are tested through a two-sided sign test and the second two through regressions. These methods produce statistics with which you can either accept or reject the null hypothesis.

#### 3.6.1 SIGN TEST

First, to determine if the stock return is positive or negative in relation to the report the average is taken. However, this does not say very much about the reliability of the result. To ascertain the reliability of the results a two-sided sign test is used which produces a



probability, a P-value, which is used to see if the result is statistically different from a random input. A low P-value signifies an unlikely result and a high data reliability.

### 3.6.2 REGRESSION TEST VARIABLES

A regression produces a number of statistics which are of interest when trying to evaluate an hypothesis. The R-squared is used to see how much of the dependent variable is explained by the models in the given test. The R-squared is a statistic that quantifies how much of the model that can be explained by the variables of interest and the control variables in the regressions. Since the R-squared can be very high through just adding more variables the Adjusted R-squared is included, which penalizes the statistic for including extra variables with little explanatory power. R-squared and adjusted R-squared are provided by StataSE and not manually calculated.

The F-test is testing the entire model to see if the model collectively has predictive value. Put in another way the resulting probability value shown in the Empirical Results section shows how likely it is that the result is random. The F-test is used to assess the aggregate quality of the inputs to the regressions and determines if the results are different from that of a normal distribution. The F-test is another measurement of the model quality.

A T-test is used to determine the statistical significance of the variables of interest and their coefficients in the regressions. This test has a lot in common with the F-test but is based on another distribution, suitable for determining likelihood if a single variable differs from a normal distribution. In the regression tables these T-test probabilities are signified by asterisks and defined below the table.

## 4. DATA

### 4.1 THE DATA COLLECTION PROCESS

The majority of our data is gathered from Bloomberg and includes financial reports as well as specific company information for each stock. The biggest portion of data is the financial reports which were downloaded for each stock in the STOXX 600 index. All reports provided in English released in 2018, and 2019, which were tagged as an annual report or corporate

responsibility report are included in the raw sample. All the reports were also appropriately named with a ticker and a filing date which were used for the rest of the study. The specific stock information gathered through Bloomberg is the Last Price, which is the closing price for a certain stock on a specific day. The specific company financial information gathered through Bloomberg were total equity, total assets, Earnings Before Interest and Taxes (EBIT), and current shares outstanding. In addition to Bloomberg, we also used the stock function in excel to easily access an industry classification for each company. All the financial statement information is in millions of euros, converted by Bloomberg.

#### 4.2 THE ORIGIN OF THE WORDLIST

We use the CSR dictionary that was constructed by Pencle & Mălăescu (2016), which is freely downloadable from <https://provalisresearch.com/Download/CSR.zip>. We decided upon the dictionary since it was constructed in a way that suits the purpose of this thesis and thoroughly reviewed by scholars with prior research done in the field of CSR reporting. The dictionary had to be modified through the removal of open compound words and the subsequent duplicates. Left is a total of 1,428 words, structured in four categories: Employee, Environment, Human Rights, and Social & Community (see appendix 2).

#### 4.3 CLEANING THE DATA

From screening the collected reports we discovered that Bloomberg often had multiple copies of virtually the same report and many press releases were marked as annual reports. Companies file several editions of their reports with what we assume are corrections or small alterations. Since the goal is to determine if CSR disclosure has an effect on equity markets the reports had to be reduced to a single annual report for each company at any given year. To remove the noise we manually cleaned the data.

To remove press releases, larger reports were chosen over smaller reports and to remove re filings with minor changes, older reports were chosen rather over newer versions. Several reports were unreadable by the analysis software, often being from non-digital origin like scanned paper documents, these filings had to be removed as well. Lastly, some companies had an annual report for 2019 but not for 2018 or vice versa and were removed from the sample to be able to analyze the year-to-year effects. We decided against finding the missing

reports elsewhere since it was still problematic to find the publishing date. This process left us with 497 companies in the sample and a total of 994 reports. Because of the manual cleaning process, we decided against winsorizing the data since it had been examined thoroughly and outliers had already been removed. If we were to use the raw sample winsorizing would have made more sense. Looking at descriptive statistics in the next section also shows the min and max values are not alarmingly high or low. We also reasoned that the manual cleaning of the data removed more data than winsorizing would and additional exclusion could lower the sample quality.

The software Atlas.ti included a “stop list” that was automatically applied and excluded words such as “about”, “it” and “because” (see appendix 1). These words were not included in the dictionary and were excluded from the total word count of the report. The economic impact of the usage of these words could be thought to have non-causal relationships with the stock return at most and will be considered unimportant in this thesis.

#### 4.4 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS & PAIRWISE CORRELATION

The following tables provide information regarding our dataset with regards to the dependent variables, variables of interest, and control variables. With table clarity and readability in mind, some of the variables of interest were excluded from the pairwise correlation matrix, specifically those related to year change and focus.

Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the dependent variables, variables of interest, and control variables, stating the mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum values in our dataset for each variable. The word fraction focus for each category and word count focus for each category are both dummy variables, which is why the table presents a maximum value of one and a minimum value of 0, when examining these two variables the mean might be of more interest. Our assumption was that these groups would change significantly between years, this was not the case. One could assume that most companies care about the same area while other areas go completely ignored. This was not the case. As shown in the table on the next page, there is certainly a skew but to us the similarities between the categories was surprising. We are unsure if this is due to the dictionary not being mutually exclusive or if this is due to a general sustainability interest of firms.

**Table 1 - Descriptive statistics**

<b>Dependent variables</b>	<b>Observations</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Std. Dev.</b>	<b>Min</b>	<b>Max</b>
Abnormal return the day after the report	740	-.000084	.0027	-.016	.016
CAR for the 41-day interval	994	.00074	.012	-.065	.082
<b>Word fraction for each category (scaled)</b>					
	<b>Observations</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Std. Dev.</b>	<b>Min</b>	<b>Max</b>
Social & Community	994	.0028	.00062	.00026	.0053
Employee	994	.0032	.00065	.00017	.0052
Human Rights	994	.0023	.00046	.00014	.0038
Environment	994	.0027	.00066	.00015	.0056
<b>Total word count for each category (thousands)</b>					
	<b>Observations</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Std. Dev.</b>	<b>Min</b>	<b>Max</b>
Social & Community	994	3.38	2.076	.094	13.9
Employee	994	3.88	2.293	.082	14.1
Human Rights	994	2.77	1.674	.056	10.2
Environment	994	3.19	1.964	.109	18.4
<b>Word fraction focus for each category (scaled)</b>					
	<b>Observations</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Std. Dev.</b>	<b>Min</b>	<b>Max</b>
Social & Community	994	0.21	0.41	0	1
Employee	994	0.18	0.39	0	1
Human Rights	994	0.29	0.45	0	1
Environment	994	0.32	0.47	0	1
<b>Word count focus for each category (scaled)</b>					
	<b>Observations</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Std. Dev.</b>	<b>Min</b>	<b>Max</b>
Social & Community	994	0.19	0.39	0	1
Employee	994	0.21	0.40	0	1
Human Rights	994	0.26	0.44	0	1
Environment	994	0.34	0.47	0	1
<b>Year fraction change for each category (scaled)</b>					
	<b>Observations</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Std. Dev.</b>	<b>Min</b>	<b>Max</b>
Social & Community	496	0.011	0.095	-0.093	1.02
Employee	496	0.023	0.161	-0.094	1.80
Human Rights	496	0.012	0.120	-0.092	1.46
Environment	496	0.021	0.154	-0.092	1.67
<b>Control variables</b>					
	<b>Observations</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Std. Dev.</b>	<b>Min</b>	<b>Max</b>
Total words (Million)	994	0.11802	0.06633	0.0033	0.5746
EBIT (Trillion)	994	0.00045	0.00010	-0.0045	0.0098
Total Assets (Trillion)	994	0.07791	0.23334	1.0e-06	2.2338
Equity (Trillion)	994	0.01056	0.01820	-0.0011	0.1696
Market Capitalization (Trillion)	978	0.00857	0.01925	1.1e-07	0.2040
Volatility	970	0.24475	0.08187	0.1114	0.8227

Table 2 shows the pairwise correlation matrix with the correlation between the dependent variables, some variables of interest, and control variables. Each variable has an assigned number that can be viewed on the left-hand side of the matrix which corresponds to the same number in the first row of the matrix. As expected the word count has a high correlation but

also shown is that category fraction also has a high correlation which might not be as expected. Firms that report on one sustainability category also seem to a large degree report on the other categories as well, however, the effect can also be explained by the fact that the words in the categories are not mutually exclusive. One word could be counted and included in multiple categories.

**Table 2- Pairwise Correlations**

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1 Abnormal return the day after the report	1.000						
2 CAR 41-day interval	0.137*	1.000					
3 Social fraction	-0.069	-0.073*	1.000				
4 Employee fraction	-0.065	-0.054	0.827*	1.000			
5 Human fraction	-0.059	-0.068*	0.820*	0.877*	1.000		
6 Environ fraction	-0.069	-0.022	0.735*	0.598*	0.556*	1.0000	
7 Social word count	0.015	-0.066*	0.483*	0.367*	0.437*	0.3037*	1.0000
8 Employee word count	0.019	-0.070*	0.413*	0.412*	0.440*	0.2420*	0.9745*
9 Human word count	0.020	-0.069*	0.406*	0.361*	0.466*	0.2304*	0.9787*
10 Environ word count	0.014	-0.049	0.432*	0.319*	0.378*	0.4456*	0.9507*
11 Total words	0.051	-0.060	0.083*	0.012	0.0875*	-0.0188	0.8701*
12 EBIT	0.070	0.014	0.058	-0.087*	0.0333	0.0251	0.1950*
13 Total Assets	0.020	-0.085*	-0.093*	-0.031	-0.0479	-0.1681*	0.4071*
14 Equity	0.057	-0.064*	-0.049	-0.088*	-0.0544	-0.0819*	0.4520*
15 Market	0.046	-0.047	0.045	-0.064*	0.0400	-0.0205	0.1875*
16 Volatility	-0.038	-0.199*	-0.067*	-0.017	-0.0442	-0.0356	-0.1106*
	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
8 Employee word count	1.000						
9 Human Word Count	0.985*	1.000					
10 Environ Word Count	0.921*	0.925*	1.000				
11 Total words	0.878*	0.885*	0.830*	1.000			
12 EBIT	0.141*	0.181*	0.189*	0.174*	1.000		
13 Total Assets	0.476*	0.451*	0.340*	0.559*	0.003	1.000	
14 Equity	0.466*	0.466*	0.422*	0.566*	0.330*	0.778*	10000
15 Market	0.153*	0.186*	0.150*	0.213*	0.334*	0.277*	0.456*
16 Volatility	-0.096*	-0.102*	-0.098*	-0.100*	-0.120*	-0.090*	-0.168*
	15	16					
15 Market	1.000						
16 Volatility	-0.255*	1.000					

\*p&lt;0.05

## 5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS

This section shows the results for the hypotheses. Each table is preceded by a short explanation and interpretation of the data.

### 5.1 SIGN TEST RESULT - HYPOTHESIS I & II

Table 3 is the compiled results of the two-sided sign test conducted on the abnormal return of the time intervals around the release date of the corporate responsibility report. When looking at the number of observations in the Day -1 and Day 1 time periods these differ greatly. This difference stems from weekends. When a report is published on a Friday, markets are closed the day after (Saturday) and therefore there is no price data for those companies and the same problem occurs in reverse when looking at Monday releases.

Focusing on the results, the row of P-values shows that none of the time intervals seem to have a statistically significant abnormal return. The results of table 3 do therefore not allow us to reject the null hypothesis of hypothesis I, which states that the immediate and short-term effects of the publication of a corporate responsibility report will not have any effects on the publishing firm's stock price.

**Table 3 -CR reports**

	<b>Day -1</b>	<b>Day</b>	<b>Day 1</b>	<b>41 Days</b>
Mean AR	0.00051	-0.00017	0.00090	0.02825
P-value	0.810	0.378	1.000	0.931
% AR-positive	49.3	48.0	49.90	56.20
Average CAR	0.00051	-0.00016	0.00090	0.0079
Number of reports	431	512	407	522

Table 4 presents a similar two-sided sign test of the abnormal return of the time intervals related to the release of the annual reports. Here we find statistical significance but only on the release day of the annual report, noticeably the column with the highest average abnormal return. Again, the number of observations is affected by the weekends and differs therefore between the tests. Noticeably there is an observation missing, caused by a change of ticker in one of the companies, dropping it from the test. Table 4 allows us to reject the null hypothesis for hypothesis II, which states that the immediate and short-term effects of the publication of an annual report will not change the publishing firm's stock price.

**Table 4 - Annual reports**

	<b>Day -1</b>	<b>Day</b>	<b>Day 1</b>	<b>41 Days</b>
Mean AR	-0.000794	0.002013	-0.000074	0,000776
P-value	0.065	0.019	0.091	0.849
% AR-positive	46.74	46.21	53.16	62.49
Average CAR	-0.000794	0.002013	-0.000074	0.030583
Observations	828	976	743	997

## 5.2 REGRESSION RESULTS - HYPOTHESES III & IV

The following tables all contain multiple regression results with one regression for each column. All regressions in a column are for a single period. The difference between the regressions is that the first regression to the left cross controls for all variables while the rest of the regressions only use a single variable of interest. Word category count is as mentioned on thousands of words while word category fraction is on a tenth of a fraction. If any of the control variables are missing the observation is dropped from the sample, an example of this is if a firm is not traded during the regressions period the price data is missing.

## 5.3 MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION MODEL

Table 5, displays the results from regressions using word fractions as the variables of interest on the CAR for the 41-day interval. The table consists of five different regressions, one where all variables are included in the regression and four where the variable of interest is run separately. The only variable of interest that shows significant results at  $p < 0,05$  or lower is Social & Community, telling us that when more information about this category is disclosed in the annual report it hurts the CAR in the 41-day interval. When looking at the cross controlled regression the result for Social & Community has an even higher statistical significance and the coefficient is even more negative. Noticeably all the other categories have negative coefficients even though no statistical significance is found. Table 5 supports us in rejecting the null hypothesis of Hypothesis III, which states that the focus of CSR

disclosed through the annual report will not have any immediate or short-term effect on a firm's stock price.

**Table 5 - Regression results**

	Regressing word fraction on the CAR of the 41-day interval (-10,30).				
Social & Community	-0.4562*** (0.1574)	-0.1635** (0.0677)			
Employee	0.1226 (0.1651)		-0.0914 (0.0639)		
Human rights	0.0645 (0.2053)			-0.1309 (0.0895)	
Environment	0.1874* (0.1031)				-0.0393 (0.0682)
Total Words	-0.0065 (0.0079)	-0.0083 (0.0077)	-0.0109 (0.0076)	-0.0099 (0.0077)	-0.0111 (0.0077)
EBIT	0.1534 (0.4953)	0.0496 (0.4886)	0.0137 (0.4904)	0.0633 (0.4896)	0.0403 (0.4906)
Total Assets	-0.0026 (0.0033)	-0.0027 (0.0033)	-0.0023 (0.0033)	-0.0025 (0.0033)	-0.0026 (0.0033)
Total Equity	0.0047 (0.0462)	0.0057 (0.0462)	0.0081 (0.0463)	0.0072 (0.0464)	0.0119 (0.0463)
Stock Volatility	-0.0281*** (0.0051)	-0.0282*** (0.0051)	-0.0275*** (0.0051)	-0.0276*** (0.0051)	-0.0271*** (0.0051)
Market Capitalization	-0.0354 (0.0270)	-0.0394 (0.0269)	-0.0420 (0.0270)	-0.0414 (0.0270)	-0.0416 (0.0270)
Constant	0.0180** (0.0090)	0.0192** (0.0090)	0.0162* (0.0090)	0.0161* (0.0089)	0.0135 (0.0088)
Observations	990	990	990	990	990
R-squared	0.150	0.146	0.142	0.142	0.141
Adjusted R-squared	0.0927	0.0907	0.0870	0.0871	0.0853
F-test	7.82e-10	8.70e-10	2.89e-09	2.81e-09	4.96e-09
Controlling for industry	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controlling for year	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table 6, shows results from the regressions on abnormal returns of the day after the release of the report, using the word fraction of each category as the variables of interest. The table consists of five different regressions, again one where all variables are included and four where the variable of interest is run separately. The first regression shows that the market has a hard time differentiating between the categories and shows no statistical significance, however, the rest of the regressions show statistically significant results. In the regressions where the variables of interest are run separately the categories Social & Community and



Environment are significant at  $p < 0.05$  and for the Employee and Human rights categories we find  $p < 0.1$ . All showing a negative relationship to abnormal return for the period. With that said the low Adjusted R-squared and the F-test just barely under  $p < 0.1$  suggests that the model is not very good. Table 6 only mildly supports us in rejecting the null hypothesis of Hypothesis IV, which states that the intensity of CSR disclosed through the annual report will not have any immediate or short-term effect on a firm's stock price.

**Table 6 - Regression results**

	Regressing word fraction on the abnormal return of the day after the release of the report				
Social & Community	-0.0072 (0.0421)	-0.0383** (0.0184)			
Employee	-0.0014 (0.0442)		-0.0329* (0.0174)		
Human rights	-0.0103 (0.0556)			-0.0444* (0.0247)	
Environment	-0.0320 (0.0274)				-0.0427** (0.0184)
Total Words	0.0046** (0.0023)	0.0046** (0.0022)	0.0040* (0.0021)	0.0043** (0.0022)	0.0044** (0.0022)
EBIT	0.1165 (0.1308)	0.1301 (0.1284)	0.1176 (0.1290)	0.1354 (0.1284)	0.1140 (0.1287)
Total Assets	-0.0008 (0.0010)	-0.0007 (0.0010)	-0.0007 (0.0010)	-0.0006 (0.0010)	-0.0009 (0.0010)
Total Equity	0.0029 (0.0130)	0.0022 (0.0129)	0.0025 (0.0129)	0.0015 (0.0130)	0.0038 (0.0129)
Stock Volatility	-0.0013 (0.0014)	-0.0013 (0.0014)	-0.0012 (0.0014)	-0.0012 (0.0014)	-0.0012 (0.0014)
Market Capitalization	0.0026 (0.0069)	0.0028 (0.0069)	0.0022 (0.0069)	0.0024 (0.0069)	0.0024 (0.0069)
Constant	-0.0011 (0.0022)	-0.0014 (0.0022)	-0.0017 (0.0022)	-0.0016 (0.0022)	-0.0013 (0.0022)
Observations	737	737	737	737	737
R-squared	0.105	0.103	0.102	0.102	0.105
Adjusted R-squared	0.0228	0.0251	0.0240	0.0235	0.0266
F-test	0.0809	0.0593	0.0667	0.0703	0.0501
Controlling for industry	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controlling for year	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$

Table 7 shows the results from regressions run on the abnormal return, using the change in the word count for each category between 2018 to 2019 as the variables of interests. Here we seem to have found a causal relationship between an increase of CSR disclosure intensity and

negative abnormal return for all categories with a statistical significance of  $p < 0.05$  in all but the Human rights category where it was found at  $p < 0.1$ . Regression on the interval of 41 days was also run but showed no significant results. Again the adjusted R-squared is very low and the F-test does not reach  $p < 0.1$ . Table 7 supports us in rejecting the null hypothesis of Hypothesis IV, which states that the intensity of CSR disclosed through the annual report will not have any immediate or short-term effect on a firm's stock price.

**Table 7 - -Regression results**

	Regressing the word count compared to the previous year on the abnormal return the day after the release of the report				
Social & Community	-0.0052 (0.0071)	-0.0028** (0.0013)			
Employee	-0.0028 (0.0062)		-0.0016** (0.0008)		
Human rights	0.0041 (0.0065)			-0.0021* (0.0011)	
Environment	0.0014 (0.0061)				-0.0016** (0.0008)
Total Words	0.0015 (0.0034)	0.0027* (0.0015)	0.0022 (0.0013)	0.0028* (0.0017)	0.0020 (0.0013)
EBIT	0.1287 (0.1368)	0.1278 (0.1362)	0.1281 (0.1363)	0.1281 (0.1364)	0.1293 (0.1363)
Total Assets	-0.0002 (0.0011)	-0.0001 (0.0010)	-0.0001 (0.0010)	-0.0001 (0.0010)	-0.0001 (0.0010)
Total Equity	-0.0032 (0.0153)	-0.0022 (0.0152)	-0.0024 (0.0152)	-0.0020 (0.0152)	-0.0022 (0.0152)
Stock Volatility	-0.0006 (0.0015)	-0.0005 (0.0015)	-0.0005 (0.0015)	-0.0005 (0.0015)	-0.0005 (0.0015)
Market Capitalization	0.0061 (0.0074)	0.0060 (0.0074)	0.0061 (0.0074)	0.0060 (0.0074)	0.0060 (0.0074)
Constant	-0.0015 (0.0024)	-0.0016 (0.0024)	-0.0016 (0.0024)	-0.0016 (0.0024)	-0.0016 (0.0024)
Observations	375	375	375	375	375
R-squared	0.188	0.186	0.185	0.183	0.184
Adjusted R-squared	0.0292	0.0363	0.0353	0.0333	0.0345
F-test	0.180	0.125	0.132	0.144	0.137
Controlling for industry	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$

#### 5.4 COMPANY FOCUS DUMMIES

In the regressions on table 8, it is shown that when looking at the highest CSR disclosure focus of each firm there is a significant difference between the categories. Namely that all categories seem to have a higher CAR than Social & Community in the 41-day interval. When regressing on the categories separately, only Social & Community is statistically

significant, supporting the results of the combined regression. Additionally, an Adjusted R-squared reaching for 0.1 and an F-test approaching 0 gives additional weight to the result. Table 8 supports us in rejecting the null hypothesis of Hypothesis III, which states that the focus of CSR disclosed through the annual report will not have any immediate or short-term effect on a firm's stock price.

**Table 8 - Regression results**

	Regressing the word fraction focus variable on the CAR of the 41-day interval (-10,30 days).				
Social & Community	<i>Omitted</i>	-0.0027**			
		(0.0011)			
Employee	0.0032**		0.0011		
	(0.0014)		(0.0011)		
Human rights	0.0022*			-0.0000	
	(0.0012)			(0.0009)	
Environment	0.0030**				0.0012
	(0.0012)				(0.0009)
Total Words	-0.0044	-0.0047	-0.0072	-0.0082	-0.0080
	(0.0077)	(0.0077)	(0.0076)	(0.0076)	(0.0076)
EBIT	-0.3046	-0.3442	-0.3819	-0.4017	-0.3523
	(0.5287)	(0.5263)	(0.5278)	(0.5290)	(0.5286)
Total Assets	-0.0024	-0.0024	-0.0022	-0.0018	-0.0016
	(0.0033)	(0.0033)	(0.0033)	(0.0033)	(0.0033)
Total Equity	-0.0462	-0.0447	-0.0452	-0.0442	-0.0453
	(0.0505)	(0.0504)	(0.0506)	(0.0506)	(0.0505)
Stock Volatility	-0.0320***	-0.0321***	-0.0311***	-0.0311***	-0.0314***
	(0.0056)	(0.0056)	(0.0056)	(0.0056)	(0.0056)
Market Capitalization	0.0369	0.0372	0.0352	0.0343	0.0336
	(0.0271)	(0.0271)	(0.0271)	(0.0272)	(0.0271)
Constant	0.0143*	0.0170**	0.0144*	0.0144*	0.0144*
	(0.0085)	(0.0085)	(0.0085)	(0.0085)	(0.0085)
Observations	990	990	990	990	990
R-squared	0.153	0.152	0.147	0.146	0.148
Adjusted R-squared	0.0964	0.0975	0.0921	0.0911	0.0928
F-test	1.92e-10	8.78e-11	5.35e-10	7.60e-10	4.33e-10
Controlling for industry	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controlling for year	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

## 5.5 REGRESSIONS ON VOLATILITY

Table 9 displays the regressions run on volatility when using word category counts as variables of interest, including all other control variables. From the first regressions on the left, we see that there does not seem to be a difference between categories when looking at volatility but in the following regressions, we see that there is a negative relationship between

all categories of CSR disclosure and volatility significant at the at  $p < 0.05$  or lower. Furthermore, the models have an acceptable adjusted R-squared and an F-test firmly at 0. Table 9 supports us in rejecting the null hypothesis of Hypothesis IV, which states that the intensity of CSR disclosed through the annual report will not have any immediate or short-term effect on a firm's stock price.

**Table 9 - Regression results**

	Regressing the word category counts on the volatility the day of the report release.					
Social & Community	-0.0083 (0.0085)	-0.0071*** (0.0026)				
Employee	0.0108 (0.0080)		-0.0053** (0.0023)			
Human rights	-0.0118 (0.0108)			-0.0088*** (0.0033)		
Environment	-0.0016 (0.0049)				-0.0064** (0.0026)	
EBIT	-2.1981 (3.1953)	-2.7586 (3.1562)	-2.9974 (3.1601)	-2.6153 (3.1585)	-3.0569 (3.1585)	
Total Assets	0.0254 (0.0224)	0.0317 (0.0214)	0.0369* (0.0214)	0.0349 (0.0213)	0.0271 (0.0216)	
Total Equity	-0.7616** (0.3004)	-0.7766*** (0.2971)	-0.7945*** (0.2977)	-0.8035*** (0.2975)	-0.7307** (0.2976)	
Market Capitalization	-0.2451 (0.1754)	-0.2608 (0.1738)	-0.2785 (0.1741)	-0.2708 (0.1738)	-0.2801 (0.1739)	
Constant	0.0830 (0.0554)	0.0858 (0.0551)	0.0805 (0.0551)	0.0799 (0.0550)	0.0789 (0.0550)	
Observations	990	990	990	990	990	
R-squared	0.312	0.310	0.308	0.310	0.309	
Adjusted R-squared	0.2658	0.2666	0.2646	0.2662	0.2655	
F-test	0	0	0	0	0	
Controlling for industry	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controlling for year	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$

In the last table, Table 10, the results again show a difference between Social & Community and the other categories but now on volatility. When running together, the volatility of all other categories is significantly different from the Social & Community category but when to run separately neither category focus shows any statistically significant effect, even though they all have positive coefficients. Again the R-squared of the models are acceptable and have an F-test at 0. Table 10 supports us in rejecting the null hypothesis of Hypothesis III, which states that the focus of CSR disclosed through the annual report will not have any immediate or short-term effect on a firm's stock price.

**Table 10 - Regression results**

	Regressing the word fraction focus on volatility on the day of the report release.				
Social & Community	-0.0144** (0.0060)				
Employee	0.0137* (0.0080)		0.0027 (0.0065)		
Human rights	0.0126* (0.0069)			0.0019 (0.0053)	
Environment	0.0166** (0.0070)				0.0078 (0.0054)
Total Words	-0.0079 (0.0450)	-0.0077 (0.0448)	-0.0243 (0.0446)	-0.0263 (0.0442)	-0.0242 (0.0442)
EBIT	2.4739 (3.0901)	2.3405 (3.0792)	2.1118 (3.0876)	2.0157 (3.0912)	2.3682 (3.0899)
Total Assets	0.0145 (0.0195)	0.0139 (0.0194)	0.0169 (0.0195)	0.0176 (0.0194)	0.0187 (0.0194)
Total Equity	-0.0160 (0.2955)	-0.0127 (0.2951)	-0.0338 (0.2959)	-0.0282 (0.2961)	-0.0322 (0.2956)
Market Capitalization	-0.8630*** (0.1561)	-0.8589*** (0.1559)	-0.8706*** (0.1563)	-0.8694*** (0.1564)	-0.8772*** (0.1561)
Constant	0.1670*** (0.0494)	0.1811*** (0.0496)	0.1682*** (0.0495)	0.1678*** (0.0495)	0.1682*** (0.0494)
Observations	990	990	990	990	990
R-squared	0.350	0.350	0.346	0.346	0.348
Adjusted R-squared	0.3077	0.3088	0.3047	0.3047	0.3061
F-test	0	0	0	0	0
Controlling for industry	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controlling for year	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p&lt;0.01, \*\* p&lt;0.05, \* p&lt;0.1

## 6. DISCUSSION

In this section, we will interpret and discuss our findings that are presented above in the empirical results, but first, we shed some light on the limitations and shortcomings of this thesis by conducting a critical discussion regarding both our methodology and the data sample.

### 6.1 CRITICAL DISCUSSION

Since we are analyzing the European equity market we chose the STOXX600 index to get a large sample that covered the entire EU. A problem with covering a large geographical area with different countries and laws is that the stocks in the sample are not always traded simultaneously due to for example holidays. This problem of different trading days became

apparent when we tried to calculate our beta variable for each firm, resulting in the need to create a new index to find a reasonable beta variable. This could have had negative effects on our results.

The sample period used is two years, this could be viewed as a short and it is also possible to argue that a study examining the effects of CSR disclosure in the period before the directive as well as after would entail a more comprehensive result of the legislative effect from the directive. Although our results show that the sample period is sufficient for this thesis' outset purpose, a longer sample period could provide more clarity.

In hindsight, it would have been interesting to analyze corporate responsibility reports in the same way we did annual reports. If the regression models were conducted in the same fashion on corporate responsibility reports it might have yielded additional insights into CSR disclosure through the corporate responsibility report as well.

Eventual bias could also be discovered since the samples for the day before and the day after are smaller than the other samples in the regressions on abnormal return. A relationship between the release of the report and the weekday of release was not controlled for and should have been explored. However, the conclusions of the study do not lean too heavily on these results that would be affected by this potential bias.

We also decided to not winsorize our data, which could be viewed as a weakness in our results. However, as previously argued, to winsorize our data could weaken our results because we examine whether the focus of CSR disclosure is considered by actors in capital markets. Winsorizing in this situation would cut off the firms that are heavily focused in one area while not mentioning another, making our dataset centered only on firm's that are diverse in their CSR disclosure, which would mean losing valuable insights in whether the focus is a factor that affects capital markets or not. Furthermore, cleaning the data manually made us confident in its quality.

## 6.2 HYPOTHESIS I & HYPOTHESIS II

Our first two hypotheses examine whether investors react at all to the release of the corporate responsibility report (I) and the annual report (II). These are tested by looking at the abnormal returns using a sign test to conclude whether the abnormal return differs from zero.

Table 3 shows that no significance in abnormal return is found, indicating that investors do not interpret the disclosure in the corporate responsibility to be positive or negative. We can therefore not reject the null hypothesis of Hypothesis I. The results of our sign test do partially concur with the results from Nuzula & Kato (2011) by showing the same insignificant result in the immediate period, but different results in that they found significance in their period for examining the short-term effects. An explanatory theory for our insignificant findings could be what flammer (2013) found in her research, i.e. that Environmental CSR work exhibits decreasing marginal returns. Our sample takes place in a later sample period than both Nuzula & Kato (2011) and Flammer (2013), and if investors view Environmental CSR work as a type of insurance for future environmental costs, as argued by Flammer (2013), the investors might think that the European market is sufficiently insured against those future costs.

The Table 4 results show that investors do respond to the publication of the annual report, by showing a significant Average-CAR value of +0.0020 on the publishing day, and we can, therefore, reject the null hypothesis of Hypothesis II. As previously mentioned the annual report consists of an array of topics and is not only focused on CSR like the corporate responsibility report, this means that we cannot really interpret anything regarding investors' reaction to CSR disclosure but this is further examined in the following hypotheses.

## 6.3 HYPOTHESIS III

To answer whether investors respond to the sustainability focus that is disclosed in the annual report we conducted several regression models that were presented in Empirical Results. The results are somewhat inconclusive, not all categories show significant results in all regressions, but the results in table 8 that is using the focus dummies as test variables show that investors seem to use the disclosure of CSR focus, supporting rejection of the null hypothesis of hypothesis III. Furthermore, one category is consistent throughout all

regressions, and we argue that it is rather clear, in table 5 and 8, that firms who focus and report a majority on CSR that is categorized as Social & Community achieve lower abnormal return when compared to the three other categories. Previous research by Epstein & Freedman (1994) shows that investors care more for CSR that is correlated with higher profitability, a way of interpreting the negative market reaction to Social & Community focus could, therefore, be that this type of work is less correlated or believed by investors to increase profitability for the firm.

In table 10 we find statistical significance in two out of three categories when running all the focus test variables in a regression on volatility. The regression suggests that companies that focus on the Employee ( $p < 0.1$ ), Human rights ( $p < 0.1$ ), and Environment ( $p < 0.05$ ) categories in their annual reports have higher volatility than companies with a focus on Social & Community. However, when the regressions are run on a single dummy only the Social & Community focus is significant, telling us that the only thing we know with high significance is that Social & Community focused companies have lower volatility than companies focused on another of our categories. Nevertheless, we get additional support in rejecting the null hypothesis of Hypothesis III concluding that CSR focus does affect the stock price.

#### 6.4 HYPOTHESIS IV

To answer whether investors consider the CSR disclosure intensity in the annual reports, we used another group of regression models that were presented in the Empirical Results. The results are not all conclusive, again not all categories show significant results in all regressions and time intervals. Looking at table 6 regressing word category fraction on the abnormal return, we can see that a relatively high number of CSR related words have negative effects on abnormal returns the day after the release of the report for all categories. While not as conclusive in the short term, table 5 shows that the same is true for at least the Social & Community category. Nevertheless, there were two statistically significant reactions in table 6 at  $p < 0.05$  and one statistically significant reaction at  $p < 0.05$  in Table 5 when running the variables separately, supporting the rejection of the null hypothesis of hypothesis IV. Noting that not all types of CSR disclosure have a statistically significant effect at all time intervals. Table 7, regressing yearly change of category word count on abnormal return



tells the same story in the immediate term with three variables at  $p < 0.05$  and it is also a sign of a causal relationship because of the variable independence.

A stronger relationship is also shown through the regressions on volatility where companies with high CSR disclosure intensity are shown to have lower volatility for all categories. In table 9, regressing the word category count on the stock volatility, a statistically significant relationship between volatility and the intensity is shown in all of the CSR categories at  $p < 0.05$ . Even though the results of the regressions on the abnormal returns are quite clear, the relationship between CSR disclosure intensity and volatility seems to be even stronger. The fact that companies with a lot of CSR disclosure have lower volatility in the equity markets could be explained with what was argued by Flammer (2013). She argues that CSR can, from an investor's point of view, be classified as a type of insurance from for example future misconduct, fees from environmental crime or mishappenings, and faulting product safety. The fact that CSR disclosure lowers volatility while paying for it with a lower abnormal return supports that the argumentation made by Flammer (2013) could be correct in the EU.

## 7. CONCLUSION

This thesis focuses on whether equity markets react to CSR disclosure and how it is interpreted by investors. Previous research exists regarding events connected to CSR-performance, -news, and similar types of information, although research purely examining the effects of corporate responsibility reporting and CSR disclosure is limited. Furthermore, the thesis uses more recent data compared to previous research which provides more insight in a time where sustainability and environmental effects are of more concern to companies and the general public (McPherson 2020). We argue that this thesis informs both unaware investors and other stakeholders of the connection between CSR disclosure and stock prices as well as shed a light on the value of this type of information. Stakeholders such as legislative entities could benefit from research such as this to formulate regulations like the Directive 2014/95/EU, which can render CSR a more useful metric.

First, through the event study, we discover a statistically significant abnormal return of  $p < 0.05$  on the day the annual report is released, allowing us to reject the null hypothesis of hypothesis II, while finding no similar effects on the corporate responsibility report, making

us unable to reject the null hypothesis of hypothesis I. Secondly we find a relationship between CSR usage and abnormal return as well as volatility. The results indicate a relationship between all the categories of CSR disclosure and lower abnormal returns in the immediate term but only found a strong connection to lower abnormal returns in the short term for the Social & Community category. This is especially clear when regressing on the company focus dummies where Social & Community focus companies had significantly lower abnormal returns than the other categories. These findings give us support in rejecting the null hypothesis of Hypothesis III and IV. Thirdly we found a strong relationship between volatility and CSR disclosure, showing that there is a relationship between volatility and word count as well as category focus in the examined categories, thus letting us more firmly reject the null hypothesis of Hypothesis III and IV.

For further studies, we suggest the study is carried out with a larger sample, both in terms of sample period but also in terms of the number of companies. This to capture the long-term effects of year-to-year changes and differences in reaction in a distressed market environment. A study like this could also examine what relationships are the most stable across countries and industries as well as examine more casual relationships. We also suggest controlling for other known effects of contents in annual reports, such as management discussion and analysis as well as content specificity. Lastly, we realize that the four categories might be lacking in that it does not represent all the different focuses of which CSR can take and therefore suggest an expansion of these categories.

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## APPENDIX

## 1. Atlas.ti DEFAULT ENGLISH STOPLIST

a	between	further	how's	myself	that's	until	whom
about	both	had	i	no	the	up	who's
above	but	hadn't	i'd	our	their	very	why
after	by	has	if	ours	theirs	was	why's
again	cannot	hasn't	i'll	ourselves	them	wasn't	with
against	can't	have	i'm	out	themselves	we	won't
all	could	haven't	in	over	then	we'd	would
am	couldn't	having	into	own	there	we'll	wouldn't
an	did	he	is	same	there's	were	you
and	didn't	he'd	isn't	shan't	these	we're	you'd
any	do	he'll	it	she	they	weren't	you'll
are	does	her	its	she'd	they'd	we've	your
aren't	doesn't	here	it's	she'll	they'll	what	you're
as	doing	here's	itself	she's	they're	what's	yours
at	don't	hers	i've	should	they've	when	yourself
be	down	herself	let's	shouldn't	this	when's	yourselves
because	during	he's	me	so	those	where	you've
been	each	him	more	some	through	where's	
before	few	himself	most	such	to	which	
being	for	his	mustn't	than	too	while	
below	from	how	my	that	under	who	

## 2. Wordlist Categories

### 1. HUMAN RIGHTS

ABORIGINAL	ADVERSE	AWARENESS
ABORIGINALS	ADVERSELY	BALANCING
ABUSE	AFRICAN	BASELINES
ACCEPT	AFRICANS	BELONGING
ACCEPTED	AGED	BENEFICIALLY
ACCOMMODATING	AGENT	BENEFICIARY
ACCOMMODATION	AGES	BENEFIT
ACCOUNTABILITY	AGREEMENTS	BENEFITS
ACTIVITIES	AIDS	BYLAWS
ACTS	ALASKA	CARE
ADOPT	ALASKAN	CERTIFICATION
ADOPTED	ALTERNATIVE	CERTIFICATIONS
CHARITABLE	AVOID	CERTIFY
CIVIL	AWARD	CERTIFYING
CLAIMS	DEVELOPMENT	DIVERSIFY
CLASS	DIED	DIVERSIFYING
COACH	DIES	DIVERSITY
COMMITMENTS	DISABILITY	DUTY
COMMITTEE	DISABLED	EDUCATE
COMMUNITIES	DISADVANTAGE	EDUCATING
COMMUNITY	DISADVANTAGED	EDUCATION
CONSTITUTION	DISADVANTAGEOUS	EDUCATIONAL
CONSTITUTIONAL	DISADVANTAGES	ELECTED
CORE	DISASTERS	ELECTION
COVENANTS	DISCRIMINATING	EMPLOY
CROSS	DISCRIMINATION	EMPLOYED
CULTURES	DISCRIMINATORY	EMPLOYEE
CUSTODIAN	DIVERSE	EMPLOYEES
	DIVERSIFICATION	EMPLOYEES'
	DIVERSIFIED	EMPLOYEES

EMPLOYING	FIDUCIARY	INVOLVED
EMPLOYMENT	FIRST	INVOLVEMENT
EMPOWER	FREE	LABOR
EMPOWERED	FREEDOM	LAWFUL
EMPOWERING	GAY	LAWFULNESS
EMPOWERMENT	GAYS	LAWS
EMPOWERS	GENDER	LEGAL
ENABLING	GENDERS	LEGALITY
ENGAGE	GOD	LESBIAN
ENGAGING	GOVERNANCE	LESBIANS
ENHANCEMENTS	HABITAT	LIFE
ENHANCING	HAZARDOUS	LIFESTYLES
ENTITLED	HEALTHCARE	MATE
EQUAL	HEALTHCARING	MEDICAID
EQUALITY	HIRE	MEDICARE
EQUITY	HIRING	MEDICINAL
ERGONOMICALLY	HONEST	MINORITIES
ETHIC	HONESTY	MINORITY
ETHICAL	HUMAN	MISSION
ETHICALLY	HUMANITARIAN	NATIONALITY
ETHNIC	HUMANS	NATIONALIZATION
ETHNICALLY	HUNGRY	NATIONALIZE
ETHNICITIES	IMPRISONMENT	NATIVE
ETHNICITY	INCLUSIVE	NATIVES
EXERCISE	INCLUSIVENESS	NATURAL
EYES	INFRINGE	OPPRESSIVE
FACE	INFRINGEMENT	ORIGINAL
FAIR	INFRINGING	OUTSIDERS
FAIRNESS	INTERESTS	OUTSOURCE
FAMILIES	INVOLUNTARILY	OUTSOURCES
FAMILY	INVOLUNTARY	OUTSOURCING
FEMALE	INVOLVE	OWNERSHIP



PARTIES	REGULATE	UNIONIZED
PARTNER	REGULATIONS	UNIONS
PARTNERS	REGULATORY	UNLAWFUL
PARTNERSHIPS	RELATIONS	VOTE
PAYROLL	RELATIONSHIP	VOTING
PEER	RELATIONSHIPS	VULNERABILITY
PENSION	RELIGIOUS	WELLNESS
PEOPLE	RESERVATION	WHEELCHAIR
PERFORMANCE	RESPECT	WHEELCHAIRS
PERFORMERS	RETIREMENT	WOMEN
PERSON	RIGHT	WORKDAY
PERSONAL	RIGHTS	WORKER
PERSONNEL	SAFETY	WORKERS
PERSONS	SALARIES	WORKFORCE
PHILANTHROPY	SAME	WORKFORCES
PHILOSOPHIES	SCHOLARSHIPS	WORKPLACES
PLURALITY	SEXUALLY	WORKSPACES
POOR	SHARED	
PREJUDICED	SICK	
PREJUDICES	SOCIAL	
PRESERVATION	SPOUSE	
PRIVILEGES	STRENGTHS	
PROTECTED	TALENTED	
PROTECTIONS	TEAMWORK	
RACE	UNALIENABLE	
RACES	UNBIASED	
RACIAL	UNCONDITIONAL	
RAPE	UNDERREPRESENTED	
REALLOCATE	UNEMPLOYABLE	
REALLOCATED	UNEMPLOYMENT	
REBUILDING	UNETHICAL	
RECOGNITION	UNFAIR	

	CIVIL	EMPLOYEES'
	CLAIMS	EMPLOYEES
	CLASS	EMPLOYER
<b>2. EMPLOYEE</b>	COLLECTIVE	EMPLOYERS
	CONTRIBUTION	EMPLOYERS
ABUSE	CULTURES	EMPLOYING
ACCOMMODATING	CUSTODIAN	EMPLOYMENT
ACCOMMODATION	CUSTOMS	EMPLOYS
ACCOUNTABILITY	DEVELOPMENT	EMPOWER
ADOPTED	DIED	EMPOWERED
AFRICAN	DIES	EMPOWERING
AGED	DIRECTOR	EMPOWERMENT
ALCOHOL	DISABILITY	EMPOWERS
ALTERNATIVE	DISCRIMINATING	ENABLING
AMERICANS	DISCRIMINATION	ENGAGE
BALANCING	DISCRIMINATORY	ENGAGING
BATHROOMS	DIVERSE	ENHANCEMENTS
BELIEVING	DIVERSIFICATION	ENHANCING
BENEFICIALLY	DIVERSIFIED	ENJOYABLE
BENEFICIARY	DIVERSIFY	ENVIRONMENT
BENEFIT	DIVERSIFYING	EQUAL
BENEFITS	DIVERSITY	EQUITY
BLENDED	DRUG	ERGONOMICALLY
BODY	EDUCATE	ETHIC
BONUS	EDUCATING	ETHICALLY
BOUNDARIES	EDUCATION	ETHNIC
BYLAWS	EDUCATIONAL	ETHNICITIES
CARE	ELECTED	ETHNICITY
CERTIFICATION	EMPLOY	EVEN
CERTIFICATIONS	EMPLOYED	EVENLY
CERTIFY	EMPLOYEES	EXERCISE
CERTIFYING	EMPLOYEE'S	EXPERIENCE

EXPERIENCED	INTERNAL	MORTALITY
EXTENDED	INVOLVED	MULTINATIONAL
FAIR	JOBS	NATIVE
FAIRNESS	KNOWLEDGE	NONEMPLOYEE
FAMILIES	KNOWLEDGEABLE	NONRENEWAL
FAMILY	KNOWLEDGEBASE	OCCUPATIONAL
FEMALE	LABOR	OFFICER
FIDUCIARY	LABORERS	OFFICERS
FREEDOM	LAWFULNESS	OUTSOURCING
GAY	LAWS	PAID
GAYS	LEADER	PARTICIPANT
GENDER	LEADERS	PARTICIPANTS
GOAL	LEADERSHIP	PARTICIPATING
GOALS	LEARNED	PARTICIPATORY
GOVERNANCE	LEARNING	PARTIES
GREEN	LEGAL	PARTNER
HARD	LESBIAN	PAYROLL
HEALTH	LESBIANS	PEER
HEALTHCARE	LIFE	PENSION
HEALTHCARING	LIFESTYLES	PEOPLE
HEALTHY	LIVES	PERFORMANCE
HIRE	LIVING	PERFORMERS
HIRING	MANAGEMENT	PERSON
HUMANITARIAN	MATE	PERSONAL
HUMANS	MEALS	PERSONNEL
INCENTIVES	MEDICAID	PERSONS
INDIVIDUAL	MEDICARE	PHILOSOPHIES
INDIVIDUALLY	MEDICINAL	POSITIONS
INFRINGE	MINORITIES	PRACTICES
INFRINGEMENT	MINORITY	PREJUDICED
INFRINGING	MISSION	PRESCRIBED
INSURANCE	MORAL	PRINCIPLES

PRIVILEGES	SALARIES	TUITION
PRODUCTIVITY	SATISFACTION	UNDERSTAND
PROFESSIONAL	SCHOLARSHIPS	UNDOCUMENTED
PROFESSIONALS	SEASONAL	UNEMPLOYABLE
PROFIT	SELECTION	UNEMPLOYMENT
PROMOTION	SENSITIVITY	UNETHICAL
PROTECTED	SERVED	UNFAIR
QUALITY	SERVES	UNION
RACE	SERVICE	UNIONIZED
RAPE	SERVICES	UNIONS
RATE	SEXUALLY	UNPRODUCTIVE
REALLOCATE	SHARED	UNSAFE
REALLOCATED	SICK	VACATION
RECOGNITION	SIZE	VISION
RECOGNIZE	SOCIAL	WAGE
RECOGNIZED	SOCIALLY	WEAR
REGULATE	SPOUSAL	WELFARE
REGULATIONS	SPOUSE	WELLNESS
REGULATORY	STAKEHOLDERS	WHEELCHAIR
REIMBURSE	STRENGTHS	WHEELCHAIRS
RELATIONS	SUITABILITY	WIFE
RELATIONSHIP	SUITABLE	WOMEN
RELATIONSHIPS	SUSTAIN	WORK
RELIGIOUS	SUSTAINS	WORKDAY
RESPECTS	TALENTED	WORKER
RESPONSIBILITY	TEAM	WORKERS
RESPONSIBLE	TEAMS	WORKERS
RETIREMENT	TEAMWORK	WORKFORCE
RIGHT	TENURE	WORKFORCES
ROLE	TRAINED	WORKING
SAFE	TRUST	WORKMEN
SAFETY	TRUTHFULNESS	WORKPLACES

WORKS	CERTIFICATIONS	CSR
WORKSPACES	CERTIFY	CULTURAL
	CERTIFYING	CULTURES
<b>3.SOCIAL AND</b>	CHARITABILITY	CUSTODIAN
<b>COMMUNITY</b>	CHARITABLE	DELEGATION
	CHARITABLY	DEMOGRAPHIC
ABUSE	CHARITIES	DEVELOPMENT
ABUSED	CHARITY	DIET
ABUSES	CHILD	DISABILITY
ACCEPT	CIVIC	DISABLE
ACCEPTED	CIVIL	DISABLED
ACCOMMODATING	CLASS	DISCLOSURE
ACCOMMODATION	CLEAN	DISCLOSURES
ACCOMPANIED	CLEANED	DIVERSE
ACCOUNTABILITY	CLEANER	DIVERSIFICATION
ACCOUNTANCY	CLEANING	DIVERSIFIED
ACTIVITIES	CLEANLINESS	DIVERSIFY
ADOPT	CLEANUP	DIVERSIFYING
ADOPTED	COLLECTIVE	DIVERSITY
AFFORDABLE	COLLECTIVELY	DRINKING
AGED	COMMITMENTS	EDUCATE
AGES	COMMON	EDUCATING
AIDS	COMMUNAL	EDUCATION
AMERICAN	COMMUNITIES	EDUCATIONAL
ARMS	COMMUNITY	ELECTED
BENEFICIALLY	CONCERN	ELECTION
BENEFICIARY	CONFLICT	EMPLOY
BENEFIT	CONTRIBUTION	EMPLOYED
BENEFITS	CORPORATE	EMPLOYING
BRIBE	COUNTRIES	EMPLOYMENT
BUILDING	COUNTRY	EMPLOYS
CERTIFICATION	COUNTY	EMPOWER

EMPOWERED	HUMANITARIAN	MEANINGFUL
EMPOWERING	HUMANS	MEDICAID
EMPOWERMENT	HUNGRY	MEDICARE
EMPOWERS	IMPACT	MEDICINAL
ENABLING	IMPROVE	MINIMIZE
ENGAGE	IMPROVEMENTS	MINORITY
ENGAGING	INDIGENOUS	MISSION
EQUAL	INNOVATION	MORAL
ETHIC	INTELLIGENCE	MORTALITY
ETHICALLY	INVOLVE	MULTINATIONAL
FAIRNESS	INVOLVED	NATIVE
FAMILIES	INVOLVEMENT	NATURAL
FAMILY	JEOPARDIZE	NATURALLY
FEMALE	JEOPARDIZED	NATURE
FOOD	JEOPARDIZES	NOT
FOODBANK	JEOPARDIZING	OPEN
FOODBANKS	JOB	OPPRESSIVE
FREEDOM	LABOR	ORGANIZATIONAL
FUND	LAWFULNESS	ORGANIZATION'S
FUNDRAISING	LAWS	ORPHAN
FUNDS	LEAD	ORPHANS
FUTURE	LEADERSHIP	OUTPERFORM
GIVING	LEARNED	OUTSOURCE
GOVERNMENT	LEARNING	OUTSOURCES
GOVERNMENTS	LEGAL	OUTSOURCING
GROUPS	LESS	OWNERSHIP
HABITAT	LIFE	OWNS
HEALTHCARE	LIFESTYLES	PARTICIPANT
HEALTHCARING	LIVES	PARTICIPANTS
HELP	LIVING	PARTICIPATING
HOPE	LOCAL	PARTIES
HUMAN	LOCALE	PARTNER

PARTNERS	RECOGNIZE	SPONSORS'
PARTNERSHIPS	RECOGNIZED	SPONSORSHIP
PARTY	RECOVERY	STAKEHOLDERS
PEOPLE	REDEEMABLE	SUSTAIN
PERFORMANCE	REDUCE	SUSTAINABILITY
PERFORMERS	REDUCES	SUSTAINABLE
PERSON	REGULATE	SUSTAINED
PERSONAL	REGULATIONS	SUSTAINING
PERSONS	REGULATORY	SUSTAINS
PHILANTHROPIC	RELATIONS	SWEAT
PHILANTHROPIES	RELATIONSHIP	TALENTED
PHILANTHROPY	RELATIONSHIPS	TEAM
PHILOSOPHIES	RELIABILITY	TEAMS
PLAN	RELIGIOUS	TRAINED
PLURALITY	RELY	TRANSPARENCY
POOR	RENEW	TRANSPARENT
PREJUDICED	RENOVATION	TRUST
PREJUDICES	RESPECT	TRUSTEES
PRESERVATION	RESPECTS	TRUTHFULNESS
PRESERVE	RESPONSIBILITY	UNCONDITIONAL
PREVENTED	RESPONSIBLE	UNEMPLOYABLE
PRINCIPLES	ROLE	UNETHICAL
PRIVILEGES	SAFE	UNFAIR
PROFIT	SAFETY	UNFRIENDLY
PROJECTS	SCHOLARSHIPS	UNIONIZED
PROTECTED	SERVICE	UNIONS
PROTECTIONS	SERVICES	UNITED
PUBLICLY	SHARED	UNRESTRICTED
RACE	SICK	UNSAFE
RAPE	SOCIAL	UPROOTING
REBUILDING	SOCIALLY	URBAN
RECOGNITION	SOCIETAL	URBANIZATION

VOLUNTARILY  
VOLUNTARY  
VOLUNTEER  
VOLUNTEERISM  
VOLUNTEERS  
VOTE  
VOTING  
VULNERABILITY  
VULNERABLE  
WATER  
WATERS  
WELL  
WELLNESS  
WOMEN  
WORK  
WORLD  
WRONGDOERS  
WRONGDOING  
WRONGFULLY  
ZONE  
ZONES



<b>4. ENVIRONMENT</b>	AUDITOR	CARBONATE
	AUDITORS	CARBONATED
ABUSE	AUTHENTICATE	CARBONATES
ACCEPT	AUTHENTICITY	CARBONS
ACCEPTED	AWARENESS	CARRYING
ACCOMMODATING	BALANCING	CATASTROPHIC
ACCOMMODATION	BARGE	CHEMICALS
ACCOUNTABILITY	BASELINES	CHLORIDE
ACID	BASIN	CHLORINE
ACTIVITIES	BEAUTIFUL	CITY
ADOPT	BEAUTY	CIVIL
ADOPTED	BENEFICIALLY	CLEAN
ADVERSE	BENEFICIARY	CLIMATE
ADVERSELY	BENEFIT	CO2
AFFLUENCE	BENEFITS	CODE
AFFLUENCES	BIO	COLLECTIVE
AGREEMENTS	BIODIVERSITY	CONFLICT
AGRICULTURAL	BOARD	CONSERVATION
AGRICULTURE	BODY	CONSERVATIONIST
AGRO	BOUNDARIES	CONSERVATIONISTS
AIDS	BRIBE	CONSERVATIONS
AIR	BROAD	CONSERVE
ALTERNATIVE	BROMIDES	CORN
AMAZON	BROMINE	CORPORATE
ANCIENT	BROMINES	COUNTIES
ANIMAL	BUILDING	COUNTRIES
ANTI	BULL	COUNTRY
ARMS	BURN	COVENANTS
ASSURANCE	BYLAWS	CROPS
ATTENTION	CAGE	CRUD
ATTRIBUTABLE	CAGED	CULTIVATION
AUDIT	CARBON	CUSTODIAN

CUSTOMS	EMISSIONS	FOSSILS
CYCLE	EMPLOY	FREE
DELEGATION	ENERGY	FREEDOM
DEMOGRAPHIC	ENHANCEMENTS	FUNDRAISING
DEPLETED	ENHANCING	FUNDS
DEPLETES	ENVIRONMENTAL	GENETICALLY
DEPLETING	ENVIRONMENTALIST	GLOBAL
DEPLETION	ENVIRONMENTALISTS	GOLD
DEPLETIONS	ENVIRONMENTALLY	GOOD
DESIGN	EPA	GREEN
DIOXIDE	EQUIP	GRI
DIOXIDES	ESG	GROUNDWATER
DISCLOSING	ETHIC	GROVES
DISCLOSURE	ETHICALLY	GROW
DISPOSAL	EVOLUTION	GUIDELINES
DIVERSE	EXCEED	HARM
DIVERSIFICATION	EXCEEDED	HARMONY
DIVERSIFIED	EXCEEDS	HARNESS
DIVERSIFY	EXCESS	HAZARDOUS
DIVERSIFYING	EXIT	HCFC
DOUBLE	EXPAND	HISTORIC
DWINDLING	FACILITY	HUMANITARIAN
EASEMENTS	FAIR	HUMANS
ECOLOGICAL	FAIRNESS	HUNGRY
ECO	FARM	HYBRID
EDUCATE	FARMER	HYDROGEN
EDUCATING	FARMLAND	HYDRO
EDUCATION	FARMLANDS	IIRC
EDUCATIONAL	FLAMMABILITY	IMPAIRMENTS
EFFICIENCIES	FLIES	IMPLEMENTING
EFFICIENTLY	FOODSERVICE	IMPROVE
EMISSION	FOSSIL	IMPROVEMENTS

INCENTIVES	PIPELINES	RESERVES
INDEMNIFICATION	PLANT	RESERVOIR
INDEPENDENT	POLLUTANT	RESOURCE
INDICATIONS	POLLUTANTS	RESPECTS
INFRINGE	POLLUTING	RESPONSIBILITY
INFRINGEMENT	POLLUTION	RESPONSIBLE
INFRINGING	POWER	REUSABLE
INNOVATION	PRACTICES	REUSE
ISO	PRESERVATION	REUSES
KLD	PRESERVE	RIGHT
LAND	PRESERVES	RIVER
LIFESTYLE	PREVENTION	ROYALTIES
LIVES	PRO	SAFE
LIVING	PURIFICATION	SAFETY
LOCALE	QUALITY	SALTWATER
MAINTENANCE	RAINFOREST	SCIENCE
MAPS	REASONABLE	SCIENTIFICALLY
MATERIAL	REBUILDING	SCIENTISTS
MATERIALS	RECOVERABLE	SEASONAL
MAXIMUM	REDUCE	SEASONALLY
MEANINGFUL	REDUCES	SEED
MEMBERS	REGULATE	SELECTION
MIGRATION	RENEW	SENSITIVITY
MSCI	RENEWABLE	SHIPYARDS
NATURAL	RENEWAL	SHORE
NATURE	RENEWALS	SHRINKING
NUCLEAR	RENEWED	SITE
ORGANIC	RENEWING	SMART
OVERCAPACITY	REQUIREMENTS	SOLAR
OXIDATION	RESEARCH	SOLUBILITY
OZONE	RESEARCHERS	SOLVENTS
PETROLEUM	RESERVE	SOURCING

STAKEHOLDERS	UNPROFITABLY	ZONING
STEWARDSHIP	UNRESTRICTED	
SUITABILITY	UNSAFE	
SUITABLE	UNUSABLE	
SULFUR	UPROOTING	
SURVEYS	URBANIZATION	
SUSTAIN	VEGETABLES	
SUSTAINABLE	VOLCANIC	
SYMBIOTIC	VOLUNTARILY	
TARGET	VOLUNTARY	
TECHNOLOGIES	VULNERABILITY	
TEMPERATURE	VULNERABLE	
TERRORIST	WARM	
THREAT	WASTE	
TORNADOES	WASTELAND	
TRADEOFFS	WATER	
TRANSPARENCY	WAVE	
TRANSPARENT	WEATHER	
TREE	WETLAND	
TRIPLE	WETLANDS	
TRUTHFULNESS	WILDERNESS	
TURBINE	WILDLIFE	
UNAVOIDABLE	WIND	
UNBIASED	WINDMILL	
UNDERUTILIZATION	WOOD	
UNDERUTILIZED	WORLD	
UNECONOMIC	WRONGDOING	
UNECONOMICAL	WRONGFULLY	
UNECONOMICALLY	YARD	
UNETHICAL	YIELDS	
UNFAIR	ZONE	
UNPRODUCTIVE	ZONES	