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TENSIONS AND INTERPLAY BETWEEN LOCAL AND GLOBAL ACTORS IN PEACEBUILDING

Case study and grassroots subjects' perspectives on the situation in Kosovo

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Abstract

The international community intervened in Kosovo in 1999 to put an end to the devastating conflict. Since then the Kosovar population has lived under the United Nations' administration, went through a partially recognized independence process in 2008, and experienced violent episodes between the different local communities but also with the international interveners. Nowadays, Kosovo is struggling with a complicated state building and slow economic development while international organizations are still present in the field. This case study examines the tensions between local and global actors during the peacebuilding missions in Kosovo. It seeks to discover how those tensions and their consequences are understood by local grassroots subjects and international peacebuilders. Through protests and local resistance, the Kosovar population showed its discontent towards the international interveners' measures and actions. The goal of this study is to give a voice to local grassroots actors, who seem left out of the liberal Western organizations' agendas.

Keywords: Peacebuilding, conflict resolution, local actors, international intervention, tensions

Content

Introduction

Presentation of the problem

In March 1999, former US President Bill Clinton declared on the international intervention in Kosovo: "*We act to prevent a wider war, to diffuse a powder keg at the heart of Europe that has exploded twice before in this century with catastrophic results. And we act to stand united with our allies for peace. By acting now, we are upholding our values, protecting our interests, and advancing the cause of peace*" (The New York Times, March 25th, 1999). This declaration illustrates the liberal interventionism of the Western world and draws the premises of another conflict between local and global actors. The reasons behind the international intervention cannot, however, be solely reduced to the urge to make peace in the region, there are other interests that underline the willingness to intervene (De Coning, 2013).

The study is about giving a voice to the local grassroots subjects on the tensions between local and global actors during peacebuilding processes. The different visions of peace, as well as the expectations of peacebuilding missions of the local and global actors in the field, will be at the center of this research.

The first intervention occurred in March 1999 with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) air operations. It led to the signature of an agreement, the "Kumanovo Treaty", with Yugoslav and Serb forces agreeing to withdraw from Kosovo to make way for an international presence, which marked the end of the war on the 9th of June 1999. The day after, the Security Council of the United Nations signed the 1244 resolution[1], therefore created the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and provided a mandate to intervene in and administrate the territory and is still active today. On the 17th of February 2008, the Unilateral Declaration of Independence of Kosovo (UDI) was self-proclaimed by the authorities in Pristina. 2008 has been an important year for Kosovo, as the European Union launched its rule of law and justice support, the EULEX mission. It is based on a renewable two years mandate from the United Nations, as the European Union could not agree on a common foreign policy regarding the Kosovo case. The peacebuilding mission in Kosovo for the international

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[1] The 1244 UN resolution: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/274488?ln=fr

interveners entailed, according to the 1244 resolution, to perform basic civilian administrative functions; support the reconstruction of key infrastructures; maintain civil law and order; promote the establishment of substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo; facilitate a political process to determine Kosovo's future status - to mention a few.

What is interesting from a research point of view, is to learn more about the tensions that arose from the interplay between local and global actors and how they are understood by the local grassroots subjects and the international interveners in the field. The relation between local and global actors aroused the interest of the researchers to understand the outcomes of peacebuilding and their implications. In the model proposed by Barnett and Zürcher (2009), while they claim that international interveners are quite successful in putting an end to the violent conflict, they also demonstrate that the peacebuilding operations have a mixed record of success. Their inputs are useful to understand the interplay between local and global actors and therefore led me to the reflection on the tensions during peacebuilding processes.

The problem of tensions emerging from the interplay between local and global actors in peacebuilding is due to the various existing dimensions highly complex. The United Nations (UN), NATO and the European Union (EU) as a third party, to which I will also refer to as "Western organizations" throughout the thesis, played an important role in the peacebuilding and state-building processes in Kosovo since 1998. The different missions under which they are still operating today are challenged. The lack of inclusion of the local civil society in the peacebuilding process in Kosovo, a concept called "*local ownership*", is discussed and criticized. It is a necessary measure to increase peacebuilding effectiveness (Leonardsson & Rudd, 2015), as well as to consolidate a more sustainable and resilient peace (Aggestam & Strömbom, 2013). The gradual transfer of externally held power to local representatives seems essential to legitimate the missions and the new local institutions (Narten, 2008). The international organizations and their strategies are an illustration of the liberal peacebuilding, which gather the efforts of powerful Western nations and the United Nations to bring peace in war-torn societies. The peacebuilders have the goal to achieve liberal peace, which includes liberal transformation, where they need the cooperation of state and secondary elites if they are to maintain stability and implement their liberalizing programs (Barnett & Zürcher, 2009). The implementation of liberal values such as democracy, rule of law, and economic liberalism requires not only cooperation and willingness from the different actors in the field but also time.

Also, in Kosovo, it has been a long process: The international interveners came into a devastated and completely destroyed society. UNMIK, through the United Nations mandate, established new institutions, built from the ground, they gave the Kosovar population a new currency (Deutsche Mark at the time), they rebuilt cities and trained people to work for the different institutions. The multi-ethnic environment, the deeply divided society and the trauma from the recent war did not facilitate the work of the international interveners. Peacebuilders tend to push for instant liberalization, however, states emerging from war often do not have the necessary institutional framework or civic culture to absorb the potential pressures associated with political and market competition (Barnett & Zürcher, 2009).

Another point that is vital in order to understand the problem is the time frame, in which the missions were conducted. It is highly topical to study because, in Kosovo, the peacebuilding missions are particularly long, which can develop issues over time. Especially now, it is important to understand, since the mandate of UNMIK from the 1244 resolution, which does not have an end date, has not changed, nor evolved over the last two decades. With an international presence of over twenty years, the contacts with certain actors and not with others as well as the lack of knowledge about the locals and their culture can cause problems. Since 2000, the tensions between the diverse actors in the field are palpable. Protests against the international presence broke across Kosovo, coming from either the Serb or Albanian community. Tensions were more or less visible and violent, and the perception of the international organizations by the different communities evolved over the years, as we will see in the thesis.

Aims, objectives and research questions

The study aims to examine the tensions between local and global actors during peacebuilding processes by analyzing how locals and international interveners describe and understand these tensions.

The term tension is a broad, purposely chosen as it can include physical and violent altercations, anger, and frustration as well as resistance and indirect confrontation. From the dictionary definition [2], tensions, in a sense of *social tensions*, are: "*the feeling caused by a lack of trust*

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[2] Tension (n.d) ; Macmillan Dictionnary online, Macmillan Education.

between people, groups, or countries who do not agree about something and may attack each other". It is also defined as "*a situation in which opposing aims, ideas, or influences cause problems*". In the case of Kosovo and the framework of this study, three dimensions of tensions between local and global actors in peacebuilding are relevant. First, to analyze the conflictual visions of peace of the different actors in the field, then to understand the causes of those tensions according to the participants. Finally, the last dimension requires examining the consequences of the tensions and the peacebuilding missions on the peace, the local population, and the development of Kosovo.

As stated above, the interplay between local and global interveners generally seems to generate tensions, potentially because international organizations and peacebuilders are mainly following their own interests and locals feel neglected by the international community. Therefore, it is highly necessary to understand the different perspectives on these tensions and their consequences on the peacebuilding and state-building process.

The focus of the study is consequently the perspectives of grassroots subjects from different communities as well as insights from international peacebuilders in order to answer the following overarching research question:

"In what way do grassroots and external intervening subjects understand the tensions between local and global actors and their consequences for peacebuilding and state-building in Kosovo?"

From the perspective of the grassroots subjects and external actors, the aim is to understand and get relevant insights on those tensions, as well as to give them a chance to share their views and opinions on the tensions between local actors and international interveners.

In order to delimit the overarching research question further, and guide my research, I have formulated three specified sub-research-questions, addressing the main objectives of the study.

"By sharing their visions of peace and their priorities in peacebuilding, how are depicted the tensions dividing local and global actors by the participants?"

The first objective of the study is to discover what type of tensions spread across Kosovo after the war in 1999, and how different form of tensions are still present today, after the unilateral declaration of independence in 2008. As tensions can be manifested in violence, resistance, or

silence, the aim of this study is the leave space for the different actors to express their visions of peace and opinions on the tensions generated by the peacebuilding missions.

Then, the second objective is to identify *"how the causes of those tensions are described and perceived by the different actors interviewed in the field?"*.

This second sub-research-question is focusing on the "*root causes*" of the tensions, as described by the empirical sources, which can be ambiguous and sometimes unclear. Precisely, to understand how the situation in Kosovo degenerated in the context of -chronologically- bringing peace to the region and building a sustainable state.

And finally, to figure out *"what are the perspectives of the local and global actors on the consequences of the missions and the tensions they arose?"*.

Throughout the thesis and the empirical study, the goal is also to get a deeper understanding of the consequences and implications that the missions and tensions have on peacebuilding and on the development in Kosovo, according to the subjects interviewed in the field.

Outline of the thesis

The thesis is organized into five parts. After the introduction, this paper continues as follows. First, the previous research section, which gives an overview of the literature relevant for this study. The second part elaborates on the theoretical framework. The third part includes the methodology, explaining the choices regarding the method and the case study approach. Then in the fourth part is the presentation of the empirical data. This part is split into two sections, first describing the empirical findings and in a second section discussing those results. Finally, the last part concludes the thesis and answers the research question as well as gives the theoretical implications and addresses thoughts on future research.

Previous research

This section will present concepts from previous research on peacebuilding and on the difficulties local and global actors encountered while implementing peace.

First, a conceptual clarification is necessary. In peacebuilding processes, the previous literature distinguishes three key actors: peacebuilders, who want stability and liberalization; the government of the targeted country, who wants to maintain its power; and secondary elites, who have veto power over any changes that they believe are a threat to their economic and political positions (Barnett & Zürcher, 2009). In my research on the interplay and the tensions between local and global actors, I am using their distinction of the different actors and I am adding another group of actors, the local grassroots subjects. I differentiate the local political elite and the local government officials from global actors, which include all third-party and international interveners, working for international organizations at different levels. Throughout the thesis, international "officials", working in Brussels or New York will be distinguished from "peacebuilders" or "interveners" in the field, who, even though they work for the same organization and pursue a common goal, are confronted with a completely different reality. My contribution will be based on the inclusion of the point of view of local grassroots subjects on the problem, in other words, the "indigenous" or "local population", alongside the insights derived from peacebuilders.

According to the majority of the literature from the last two decades, emphasizing the role of the locals in the effectiveness of contemporary peacebuilding, the voices of the locals are more important than they have been considered by international organizations. Scholars are more and more advising bottom-up processes based on dialogue and inclusivity (Baù, 2016; Leonardsson & Rudd, 2015). Indeed, top-down processes have been criticized in the literature of peacebuilding and conflict resolution (Mac Ginty, 2008; Campbell, 2011; Donais, 2013; Richmond, 2014). A bottom-up peace process seems to be a good start in conflict-affected areas, especially in deeply divided societies (Lederach, 1997; Paffenholz, 2003; De Coning, 2013). Peacebuilding from below includes the idea that in order to reach an effective and sustainable peacemaking process, the latter must be based on the empowerment of war-torn communities. It is important to recognize the significance of local actors and of the non-governmental sector, as well as being aware of local knowledge and wisdom (Ramsbotham et

al., chapter 9, 2011). This is a crucial argument since international peacebuilders need to change their language, goals, and approach to be relevant for the local population's needs and the people living with them. Consequently, the issue is often not whether the international interveners reached their goals of peacebuilding (Wallis, 2017). Regarding international interveners, they are bound to the neutrality principles, which is a challenge as well. In peacebuilding "neutrality" has been reinterpreted as "impartial support" for peace or reconstruction processes, but in intense conflict zones no intervener will be seen as impartial (Ramsbotham et al. chapter 8, 2011). However, even if scholars are aware that internal actors are almost always the most important aspect of peacebuilding interventions, they cannot ignore the fact that devastation is often so great and the civil population's need for support is so pressing that external support for reconstruction is often badly needed. They also mentioned that devastated territories and the urge for reconstruction may not always be the primary reason for outsiders to intervene (Ramsbotham et al. chapter 8, 2011).

A bottom-up process could be a real asset for the construction and practice of everyday peace. Especially, where more traditional and formal approaches of peacebuilding have failed, it can be an important part of the process. Everyday peace is constituted of daily social practices within the war-torn and post-conflict societies (Mac Ginty, 2014). The notion of these local and global encounters and friction do not only happen horizontally (within or between structures) but they do also happen vertically. And in the case of the Kosovo peace-building process, imposed norms usually fail to resonate with local actors (Björkdahl & Gusic, 2015). Björkdahl & Gusic acknowledged that the recipients of norms implemented by global actors are frequently ignored in the literature, however, their focus is on local actors and agencies. The research gap I am trying to fill through this study is of course including these local actors but also less heard and less powerful local individuals, i.e. the grassroots, that are often on the front lines of the tensions with international interveners.

However, it is important to mention that the "*local*" is not a simple and unique notion, it is a complex and constantly evolving notion, where the one-size-fits-all approaches cannot work (Hirblinger & Simons, 2015). Regarding the notion of local turn, MacGinty & Richmond (2013) wrote an article that encourages a reassessment of some of the parameters that have been used to understand and justify international interventions. They warn the reader on the binary way of thinking of Western organizations, while they are, as other scholars, arguing that the

local turn is messy and a cacophony of thinking. However, it has the capacity to be vibrant and relevant to the communities from which it emerges. The concept of hybrid peace is relevant to this study, as it implies the active participation of external and local actors in peacebuilding processes. Peace becomes hybrid when local actors may be capable of autonomous action towards liberal peace interventions, whether it is in adapting it, subvert it, resist it or even ignore it (Mac Ginty, 2010).

These notions lead to the concept of *local ownership*. The latter implies the participation and inclusion of the local (civil society and politicians) in the peacebuilding and state-building process, because initiatives that are not driven by domestic actors are unlikely to reflect local needs or dynamics, to be implemented properly, or to be sustained (Nathan, 2007). Narten (2008) argues that the later significant local ownership is achieved, and external authority transferred to local representatives, the more local actors tend to challenge the legitimacy of the peace-building agenda and engage in confrontation with international actors. Donais (2009) examines the questions of local ownership as well. In post-conflict peacebuilding he suggests that the search for ways to operationalize local ownership principles remains one of the key challenges of contemporary peacebuilding. He also outlines a vision of peacebuilding as a cultural exchange as a way forward. On the other hand, Paffenholz (2015) warns scholars and future researchers on the mistakes peacebuilding scholars can easily make, such as the ignorance of local elites, providing a romanticized interpretation of hybrid peace, and overstating local resistance. Indeed, scholars are warning about the pitfalls of alternatives and "hybrid" peace, as they can reproduce the liberal peace's logic of inclusion and exclusion (Nadarajah et al., 2015).

Another debate on liberal peace and the international institutions (UN, NATO, EU) that is relevant to the research question is the accountability of international organizations. The United Nations, intervening in Kosovo under the UNMIK mission created by the 1244 resolution (1999) benefits from broad immunities. This principle exists since the creation of the UN and has been understood as necessary to achieve the United Nations' purposes. However, immunities (of the organization and its employees) conflict with an individual's right to a remedy and the law's ordinary principle of responsibility for causing harm. This inherent conflict at the center of the immunity doctrine has evolved into a very public rift in the case of three recent mass torts cases against the United Nations, where the independence of the

Organization is perceived by some to have trumped the dignity of affected individuals. One of the cases is the Kosovo Lead poisoning: The population affected by the poisoning in the camps near Mitrovica (Northern Kosovo) saw their claims classified as "not receivable" by the United Nations. Immunities serve in protecting the organization; however, it can have implications for the local population, which leads to questioning the accountability of international organizations in the literature. In an article written by Boon (2016), two proposals regarding the issue have been put forward: a reversion of the functional immunities initially envisioned for the United Nations (under Article 105 of the UN Charter, see Appendix 2) and the purchase by the United Nations of third-party insurance to be able to pay reparations to claim that arise (Boon, 2016). Overall scholars are calling for greater international organizations' regime of accountability than it is the case at present (Wilde, 2006; Boon & Mégret, 2019).

Contribution of this Study

Overall, the research gap I am trying to close in this study is the lack of inclusion of the grassroots subjects' voices in the peacebuilding literature. This study will also be centered on the gap between different visions of peace, while also focusing on the negative reactions, contestations and tensions after the intervention of the international community in the region. As the results of this study will emphasize, the tensions between local and global actors can be of different nature and dimensions. From the missions' negative public opinion, frustration and local resistance to violent protests, the interviewees looked back on these events to share their experiences and opinions.

Moreover, the research aim is also to contribute to the field of European Studies. This case study will highlight different issues, including the limits of the European diplomacy and security policies, through the previous literature and the results of the empirical study.

Throughout the thesis, the different theories discussed will be tested and examined, with insights and perspectives of the empirical sources.

Theoretical Framework

After having exposed why we should expect tensions between local and global actors based on previous research, this section will outline the theoretical framework through the three dimensions that are examined in the empirical study.

Conflictual visions of peace

The concept of the local is complex and involves a lot of actors with different visions of peace. According to Lederach's pyramid (1997, see Appendix 1) and his approach to peacebuilding, he differentiates three types of actors, which are useful for my research. On top of the pyramid, there is the top-level elite leadership that comprises the key political, military, and religious leaders in the conflict. It is followed by the middle-range leadership, including e.g. leaders of mid-level NGOs, education, health, or agriculture, who are more numerous than the first ones. At the bottom of the pyramid are the grassroots leadership, in other words, the people involved in local communities and members of indigenous NGOs, which are representing the masses. This last category is the key cornerstone of my study.

Regarding these global and local encounters, the term *friction* was introduced by Björkdahl & Höglund, and one of the conclusions they made and which is interesting for the case of Kosovo is that when the international peace-builders had entered into post-conflict societies with the promise of delivering peace, liberal democracy, good governance, rule of law and market economy, *frictions* may arise. This idea of frictions in global and local encounters relates to the tensions studied in this research, where tensions are defined as occurring when opposing views, ideologies, and aims trigger problems. Indeed, there has generally been limited space for local actors to construct a peace of their own making. This generated frictions and made this "new" hybrid peace challenging for both sides (Björkdahl & Höglund, 2013). The concept of *peace* and precisely the concept of *liberal peace* is central to this study. The crisis of liberal peace has generated many debates among scholars. They are arguing that bureaucratic organizations face limitations in implementing contemporary peacebuilding, with a lack of flexibility regarding the liberal values and a lack of knowledge of the locals (Williams & Mengistu, 2015). Moreover, scholars are arguing that we need to open up the space for implementing

heterotopias, multiple alternatives to conflict resolution, and peacebuilding and not one liberal strategy that is frequently repeated. "*Liberal peace*" is defined as a specific vision of peace that has come to be leading and that promotes democracy, human rights, free markets, and the rule of law as the solution for war-torn countries around the world. Critics have called for moderated and alternative policy models for what is seen as an imposed agenda, based on Western values and interests. Since liberal peace is essentially a preconceived set of strategies, it leaves little room for negotiations with local actors. Moreover, much of this criticism on liberal peace is in fact criticism of interventionist and top-down approaches, as mentioned in the previous section (Van Leeuwena et al., 2015; Björkdahl & Höglund, 2013).

Another key concept for this dissertation is the *local resistance*. When local actors resist international peace-building efforts through one or many campaigns of resistance it is likely that it involves multiple actors with multiple motivations. One of the (many) forms of local resistance that is particularly important for the research question is the principle-oriented resistance that relates to situations where people resist peacebuilding because they believe the themes set by international actors are not compatible with their principles (Sung Yong Lee, 2015). It is a particularly relevant concept to the case and the research questions, as it demonstrates a gap between the different visions and expectations of peace between local and global actors. The author also implies that one of the motivations of the principle-oriented resistance may be the non-compatibility of liberal principles with local ones.

Moreover, researchers have looked at expectations of peace and gaps between local and global actors during peacebuilding processes, a concept in which I am also interested in this research. When locals have high expectations regarding the peacebuilding interventions, in Kosovo (Mahr, 2018) but also in Israel and Palestine as Aggestam and Strömbom (2013) argued, it is more likely to generate tensions, irritation, and frustration. Through a study on the peace NGOs in Israel and Palestine, they first demonstrate the importance of local NGOs that work towards peace at the grassroots level. Then, the second key argument, which is relevant to this study, is that there are different types of expectations regarding the peace in the region, they differ depending on the level they are coming from (political elites, various peace organizations…). The authors also argued that the peace NGOs have been excluded from official negotiations, which led them to use resistance and advocacy to respond to their lack of influence and discredit.

Indications on the root causes of the tensions

In the literature, previous research demonstrated the existence of tensions and contestations between local and global actors. However, so far local reactions to the mission's deployment, in particular negative reactions, have received relatively little attention in the literature (Mahr, 2018). Nevertheless, the few indications on the root causes of these tensions that emerged are relevant to this study.

Regarding the EULEX mission and peacebuilding in Kosovo, the process was top-down, which led to a conflicting situation with the locals in addition to the initial conflict (Mahr, 2018). Interpretation of key provisions was very diverse depending on which party it was coming from – international third parties, Serbs, or Albanians (Bieber, 2015).

By addressing the EULEX mission from a bottom-up perspective, the article written by Mahr (2018) underlines the limitations of EU policies in post-conflict Kosovo. First, the populations seemed to be supportive of the mission and it was endorsed at the highest political levels. However, it also met contestation by both Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs from the very beginning. Local actors publicly demanded a change in the mission's mandate and/or its operations. While the mission did not react to the public criticism, according to the locals it did not improve its performance, it led to their perception that EULEX failed in its tasks. The article investigates two possible reasons for contestation by a considerable part of the Kosovar society: EULEX's perceived violation of sovereignty and its perceived lack of effectiveness. The author demonstrates that international peacebuilding activities have a direct impact on the ability of local authorities to exercise sovereignty in their country. Indeed, Vetëvendosje saw them as restricting Kosovo's ability to govern itself, which in addition to the agreement to deploy EULEX under the status-neutral UN umbrella (and therefore not acknowledging the independence), triggered strong contestation. Regarding the lack of effectiveness of the mission, if international missions are perceived as ineffective, it likely creates a sense of disappointment and frustration among the local society.

Consequences and implications of the tensions

In this last section of the theoretical framework will be presented the central concepts and arguments relevant to understand what consequences and implications these tensions can have on the peacebuilding efforts and the development of a society.

First, the potential circular effect of the perceived lack of effectiveness of the EULEX mission can be problematic. Indeed, if it leads to contestation it might in turn make the mission's work more difficult, further hindering its effectiveness in the long run (Mahr, 2018).

In the last two decades and especially in the last few years, scholars are increasingly arguing for peacebuilding that is essentially local. In an article that focuses on the local in peacebuilding as a means of emancipation and inclusion of local agency, scholars claim for peacebuilding that is essentially local and from below (Leonardsson & Rudd, 2015). If the tensions might lead to a change in the missions' one should not forget that there are pitfalls and risks: Indigenous empowerment and the role of civil society and local cultural values in peacebuilding is not a straightforward and unproblematic issue (Ramsbotham et al., chapter 9, 2011). Indeed, the local actors can exploit the legitimacy of liberal institutions to advance their political interests or deny the pursuit of justice for the sake of short-term stability. This has happened in Cambodia, Kosovo, and Timor-Leste when the decisions of the local elite failed to reflect the local aspirations for justice and reconciliation (Simangan, 2017).

Representations of the locals are conflictingly conducted by scholars, practitioners, and government officials, telling about the true, the good, and the bad local, empowering some and disempowering other actors, institutions, and practices. These dynamics have tangible effects on peace, conflict, and (in)security. This reflexive perspective on the 'local' in peacebuilding was introduced by Hirblinger & Simons (2015). The tensions raised by the lack of local involvement and the top-down approaches international interveners use too often are also raising legitimacy questions. This entails that not only the legitimacy and credibility of the international interveners are questioned, but the legitimacy of the (few) local actors supported and empowered by the international community can be seen as illegitimate as rule markers and leaders (Hirblinger & Simons, 2015).

Methodology

After having presented the study objectives and the previous research and theoretical frame of this study, the different means for conducting the research are being addressed below. In order to address the tensions between interveners and local grassroots in an armed conflict context, I chose the case study of Kosovo, where the international interveners intervened at the end of the war to stop the violent conflict.

A case study

Regarding the research method and design, I conducted qualitative research, with a case study approach. This method allowed me to focus explicitly on a particular context, on dynamic interactions, and to favor intensity and depth, in the case of the interplay between local and global actors during the peacebuilding process in Kosovo. I am concentrating on a contemporary phenomenon, on the tensions that arose from the interaction between local and global players from 1999 until today, with a focus on the situation since 2008. The case study approach has been chosen, since it fits the study at hand exceptionally well, due to its flexibility. Considering the three sub-research-questions, respectively aimed to focus the study on the tensions and visions of peace, on the potential causes of those tensions, and finally on the different perspectives regarding the consequences of the tensions, a case study allowed me to collect the data I needed for this research. Indeed, a flexible sampling process and adaptable data collection tools were necessary to achieve a comprehensive picture of the situation in Kosovo. The case study also enabled the research to incorporate multiple perspectives, several empirical sources, and different interpretative strategies. To derive a comprehensive understanding of the matter, I went on a three-week research trip to Pristina and Belgrade. I conducted semi-structured interviews with thirteen different actors in the field and observed different environments, cultures, and behaviors in order to answer the following overarching research question.

The topic of my research is sensitive and can therefore raise ethical issues. For instance, I chose to protect the interviewees and ensure their anonymity. By choosing to not cite any names nor the names of the organizations, media, or NGOs, some of the interviewees were working for, they were more disposed to share personal experiences and opinions.

To get a deep understanding of the issue, I wish to explore this case as an illustration of a larger phenomenon, as the tensions between local and global actors were not only witness in Kosovo but also in Timor-Leste or Cambodia (Wallis, 2017; Simangan, 2017). The instrumental case study approach fits perfectly with the goal of my research since the details of this larger phenomenon can be illuminated while focusing on individuals (Stake, 2005). As mentioned, I also was able to choose different approaches. In the following paragraphs the choices regarding the overall design, the data collection method, and the analysis will be explained in detail.

Sampling and data collection

The choice of the site

The choice of the site, in this case, Pristina and Belgrade was directly linked to the feasibility of the study. Considering the available limited time and budget for conducting this research, it was necessary to only focus on the most important sites. Conducting research in Pristina, the capital of Kosovo, was evident and necessary. Belgrade has been deeply marked by the NATO airstrike in 1999, as well as has been forever intertwined with the Kosovar situation. Being able to gather data on opinions of local grassroots subjects on the tensions between Serbs and the international community, but also to gain insights on the Serbian view of the Kosovo situation was highly relevant for the study. In Kosovo, the language barrier prevented me to reach and interview grassroots subjects in the Serbian community, which was more easily in Belgrade. Since this thesis is being written in the field of European Studies, examining a country located in the South of Europe, where the United Nations and the European Union are still operating in the field under the UNMIK and EULEX missions, seemed coherent and logical.

Sampling of interview subjects

For the sampling of the participants, I first used a criterion case sampling (Marshall, Rossman 2016). From the beginning of the research process, I had important characteristics regarding the sampling of the data. Based on the analytical category called ethnicity, and since the conflict was mainly between the Albanian majority and the Serb minority as well as the international community (NATO), I chose to interview Serbs, Albanians, and international actors. It was a

relevant choice in this case; however, they are not representative of the entire ethnic population, they are few voices that give some indications on the issue. Then, I used theoretical sampling (Marshall & Rossman, 2016), which refers to the extraction of concepts and theories from the literature I have read and studied on this topic, to help me chose what kind of participants I wanted to interview. Which led me to concentrate on the opinions of grassroots subjects, people from the local population, not the political elite, because their vision and experience have been under research in the previous literature. This theoretical sampling choice was based on Lederach's pyramid (Lederach, 1997), I was, therefore, able to distinguish the different actors in peacebuilding and identify the people I needed to interview in order the answer the research question. According to the research aim, the focus was on the grassroots subjects' experience regarding the intervention of the United Nations, NATO through their KFOR operations, and the European Union through their EULEX mission. Moreover, in order to answer the research question properly, I decided to include the insights from international peacebuilders, whom I also interviewed during the time I had in the field.

Once I arrived, for three weeks of field research, I had the opportunity to meet unexpected people through the persons I had previously interviewed, therefore I was able to do chain or snowball sampling (Marshall & Rossman, 2016). The different contacts I made there were pertinent and helped me a lot in my research.

The local actors I interviewed at the grassroots level are journalists, local NGOs employees, members of the civil society, artists… As for the international interveners, they are from different nationalities, and for the most part present in Kosovo since the intervention of the United Nations in 1999.

It is relevant to mention the involvement of both women and men in the empirical study. As gender issues are relevant in peace and conflict studies, the participants were half women and half men, both among international peacebuilders and local grassroots subjects interviewed.

Data collection

Regarding the selection of a specific data collection method, the case study approach allowed me to be flexible in this matter as well. For my research, blending genres was necessary. Within the case study on the situation in Kosovo, I used an ethnographic approach, as I studied human groups and analyzed their actions and interactions (Marshall & Rossman, 2016). The ethnographic approach allowed me to use different data collection methods, such as interviews,

observation, and document analysis, to understand the cultural aspects of the tensions between local and global actors. In addition to that, I used, to a smaller extent, the critical discourse analysis, as I included official documents, the reports of the Security Council of the United Nations on the UNMIK mission[3], as secondary data. It has been relevant to get a further understanding of the international organization's position on different tensions and issues that arose during the last two decades. I could also identify the strategy of the international organization, as well as reveal and confront dominant discourses and ideologies. It is an effective method for the study of language and power (Rogers, 2004). The triangulation, the use of different methods to collect data, ensured the validity of my research. It was a useful way to assert the credibility of the interpretation as well. Mixing and blending methods allowed me to test the validity through the convergence or divergence of information that were coming from different empirical sources (Yin, 2014).

The overall strategy for data collection was in-depth semi-structured interviews with individuals, to discuss the shared matters of interests on the peace intervention, and to share point of views (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009). I constructed the interviews with the same frame (see Appendix 3), with important issues I wanted to ask, such as how the local population lived, experienced, and felt about the intervention of Western organizations in the conflict and especially after the conflict. But also, on the effectiveness of the missions and of course the tensions they arose. Although some pre-structured themes were systematically brought up in each interview, in order to ensure efficient data analysis, the semi-structured interview method also leaves space for the unexpected, for the interviewees to add anything they would find relevant (Galletta & Cross, 2013). They also shared many personal memories, from 1999 until today, which I could not predict in advance, therefore the semi-structured interviews helped me to gain insights into dimensions I had not considered in advance. Next to the semi-structured interviews, a few informal interviews (conversations) with different people once operating in the field as well as researchers (via e-mail) were included in the empirical material. As I was in the field, I also used observation and some field notes, which completed the interviews (Marshall & Rossman, 2016). For instance, I traveled around Pristina and to Gračanica, a Serbian enclave in Northern Kosovo. Taking notes of my observations and including them in the research enabled me to derive a comprehensive understanding of the situation. Finally, I resorted to official reports from the Security Council of the United Nations, as mentioned above,

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[3] Source SG reports: https://unmik.unmissions.org/sg-reports

to get the full picture and inform the research questions. It allowed me to compare the testimonies of the different interviewees to the official reports of the Security Council, to show discrepancies or similarities. which were a great source of information as well as neutral on the tensions between local and global actors. Further details and information on the empirical material can be found in Appendix 3.

Analysis

Regarding the analysis part, I first proceeded with manual coding of all the interviews and documents. I created coding tables, and I organized the data into thematic categories. I mixed both inductive and deductive coding. I had a general direction in mind, I made pre-categories from the theoretical framework and the knowledge based on the interviews, the field notes, and the documents from my field research. Then, I opened the coding and from the data material, I got new categories and themes as well as confirmation of my pre-categories (Marshall & Rossman, 2016).

The overall themes, according to the empirical sources, that emerged from the coding process were the following:

1. The frustration and disappointment of the locals and their high expectations toward international interventions and the political elite.
2. Tensions and altercations between locals and international actors.
3. The agenda of Western organizations.
4. The success of the international community.
5. The limits of the success of the international community.
6. The questions of sovereignty and status.
7. The status neutral of the United Nations.
8. The accountability of Western organizations.

These categories were designed to guide the empirical analysis to answer the research question and the three sub-research-questions. Moreover, using open coding helped me to get and develop key ideas from the data, to see certain patterns that I would not have noticed with deductive coding. However, this process was informal, organizing the data was essential, such as making lists and notes through the whole process so I would be able to add new categories and ideas along the way. Immersion of the data was an important phase, as I needed to get to

know the data very well in order to analyze and especially interpret it. Not using any software to code was maybe time-consuming but enabled a full immersion of the data.

The indicators that guided the analysis, through the coding process and the interpretation, were first based on the overall themes presented above, and then I systematically referred to the three sub-research-questions to ensure the fulfillment of the research aims.

The interpretation came as a natural process through the data collection phase; however, I reserved all the thoughts for the analysis part. The interpretation and analysis were both deductive and inductive. I used the data to test theories and hypotheses; it was mainly aimed at finding the causalities of the tensions between local and global actors. Interpreting is telling the story that is behind the data collected. It demands a cautious analysis, since, to ensure trustfulness, I need to discuss other alternatives to be sure that the argument I am presenting is going to be valid and sound and to be sure that another theory and/or argument is not preferable. I looked for similar arguments and claims among the interviewees, through the official documents and my observations, but also opposite and conflicting opinions regarding peace visions, tensions, and their potential causes and implications. Then, from the previous research in this field, I could test the theories, while comparing and examining the empirical material to find out similarities and theoretical implications, which will be presented in the conclusion of this paper. This is what Yin (2014) is calling "*examining plausible rival explanations and interpretations*". I used the analytical strategy of "*pattern matching*" (Yin, 2014, p.130-136) in order to compare an empirical pattern with an expected or predicted one, from the previously studied literature and from the arguments that were being put forward before starting the research. While using an ethnographic approach, it has been a useful tool for empirical analysis, as I could analyze interaction patterns within the communities and organizations. The critical discourse analysis of the SG reports from UNMIK were very informative regarding the language used by international peacebuilders, as well as on the power relations between local and global actors in the field.

I also compared different case studies, based on the literature (Wallis, 2017; Simangan, 2017), to link the Kosovo case to other peacebuilding processes in the world, such as in Timor-Leste and Cambodia, as mentioned above. Then, I went further in the analysis, by including an inductive approach, that became the main tool for the analysis. Based on the method from Marshall & Rossman (2016), I also researched what is called "theoretical sufficiency". As I saw and heard the same patterns repetitively and sensed that not much more can be gained from

further data collection, this was the point called "saturation". In other words, more data would just lead to the same findings.

Limitations of the study

In the following part, I am going to discuss the limitations of the study, to demonstrate that I understood the reality of the qualitative research I conducted. Given the particular context of Kosovo, the time I had to conduct the study as well as the choice of samples, the study can show some limits. The opinions expressed by the participants are not representative of the whole population's opinion, however, it has the capacity to inform and give indications on how the tensions are understood. I also chose to interview and focus on the main parties involved in the conflict (Albanians, Serbs, and international peacebuilders). Inputs from the other communities living in Kosovo could have perhaps been relevant to some extent. While the findings may be transferable to another case, the study cannot be overweening generalized as it is bounded and situated in a specific context (Marshall & Rossman, 2016). The qualitative approach allowed me to study the phenomenon from the participants' perspectives. The purpose is to give a voice to local grassroots subjects, and to compare their point of view to international peacebuilders, all this process through semi-structured interviews. I am only looking at the interplay between local grassroots subjects and international organizations and therefore, I will not examine the impact other (neighbor) countries are having on the situation. To get a wider perspective from more participants, the case study approach allows the researcher to mix both qualitative and quantitative methods. However, I chose not to include a quantitative approach, which would have been not only difficult given the time of the research but less relevant for the study. I, therefore, privileged the quality of the empirical sources over the quantity.

Another issue that I realized once in the field, even if most people could speak basic English, is the language barrier that sometimes made the connection and discussion a bit more difficult, as I could not ask as many deep questions as I wanted. But it only happened twice over the twelve interviews I conducted. Regarding my role as a researcher and the potential biases I had, except for the passion and excitement I had for the research project, I do not have any roots in the region. I became personally involved in the topic, as I spend some time in the field, listening to people's stories and personal experiences. However, I ensured that I kept the role of the observant and objective researcher.

Presentation of the empirical data

This is a case study of one case in which tensions emerged from the interplay between international interveners and local actors. In my contribution, I will expose in the empirical findings the results of the interviews I conducted with local grassroots subjects and international peacebuilders, in perspective with the official documents analyzed (SG reports from UNMIK[4]). Then, in a discussion section, I will discuss those findings more reflexively.

First, I would like to briefly present some factual elements about the conflict and the intervention, for the reader to have a full understanding of the context. The conflict started in February 1998, opposing the forces of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (i.e. Serbia and Montenegro), which controlled Kosovo before the war, and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), a Kosovo Albanian rebel group. The disputed territory, the region of Kosovo, was inhabited by a majority of Kosovo-Albanians, with the presence of other communities such as Serbs, Romas, Egyptians, and Bosnians. The conflict resulted in thousands of lives lost. This is without counting wounded and assaulted women, men, and children. Thousands of people have been displaced during the conflict and the returning process was facilitated by the United Nations that ensured the safe and unimpeded return of all refugees. Since the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in 2008 and the growing influence of the self-determination party Vetëvendosje, the tasks carried out by the UNMIK staff have considerably diminished, the powers have been transferred to the new local institutions. However, the international community is still present today in Kosovo, their mission mainly consists of supporting and advising the local government, in the protection of human rights, as the cohabitation of Serbs and Albanians within the territory can trigger violent episodes, and in working on the trust-building between the different communities.

Empirical findings

In the following section, I am going to expose my empirical findings, that I organized into three thematic sections, which I also divided under different subheadings, following my research objectives. First, I will concentrate on the different tensions between local and global actors,

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[4] Source SG reports: https://unmik.unmissions.org/sg-reports

then I will address the potential causes of those tensions according to the different people I interviewed, and eventually, I will focus on the perspectives of the interviewees on the consequences of the international community's missions. The construction of the empirical findings has been primarily guided by the empirical findings from the interviews I conducted in Pristina and Belgrade. The locals and international interveners I interviewed expressed their opinion and feelings, they are not representative of the whole population. However, it gave me the necessary indications and insights regarding the thesis argument.

From tensions to frustration

There have been undeniable tensions over the last two decades between international interveners and the local population in the region of Kosovo. And there are not only tensions, there is also a growing feeling of frustration as well, which the participants expressed clearly during the data collection process.

Tensions and altercations between local and international actors

The tensions between local and global actors have been more or less visible over the years. They have been witnessed on both sides of the conflict, among the Kosovo-Albanians, the Kosovo-Serbs, and the Serbs. These resentments did not fade over the years and the international actors had to face the critics, the violence, and the resistance from different local communities. From the interviews I have conducted in Pristina and Belgrade, the different interviewees mentioned several events where the tensions with the international organizations were at their peak. The incidents have been confirmed and verified by the SG reports from UNMIK, which I used as secondary data.

During a meeting in Pristina with two employees from a local NGO, they described the international missions as "*unclear*". Unclear in a sense where the international organizations do not have a clear goal, or at least they do not present it formally to the society they are intervening in. Therefore, in Pristina and across the Kosovo region, the tensions stem from the lack of results from various missions. The tensions were always present, however, sometimes less noticeable. The local employee from the NGO specified her point with a concrete example: "*When Vetëvendosje burnt and put up-side-down EULEX cars the tensions were obviously more visible*" (interview n°7). This striking example of the tensions occurred on the 26th of

August 2009, when around sixty Vetëvendosje self-determination activists vandalized 26 EULEX vehicles in broad daylight in Pristina. In the following days, several acts of vandalism against EULEX and UNMIK were recorded, and until the 14th of September 2009 more than a thousand demonstrators called for the withdrawal of EULEX from Kosovo (SG report UNMIK S/2009/497).

As we can see, the altercations that resulted from these tensions have been tainted by violence. The balance of power and forces is rather unequal, an argument that I will illustrate with the incident of 27th September 2011 in Jarinje, Northern Kosovo, and Metohija. The following event was reported to me through an interview with a Serbian researcher. On that day, local Serbs organized civil protests, and the reason for it was the previous arrest of a person of Serbian nationality reported to have "attacked" an armed US soldier. Serb protesters threw rocks and KFOR responded with tear gas. German KFOR continued using tear gas and US combat soldiers emerged and pointed weapons at the civilians already trying to move away from the gas. At that point, gunfire was heard - live ammo and rubber bullets - and the truck driver was shot. The Serbs then ran from the scene as they could not compete with the international forces' weapons (interview n°11). The tensions among the Serbian population and the international interveners started already in 1999 right after the NATO bombing. Indeed, a Serbian journalist made clear that since 1999 the relations between Serbia and the United States of America are "*broken and non-reconcilable*" (interview n°10).

It becomes clear that international actors had to face violent episodes with the Serb and the Albanian community. These outbreaks of violence are not yet in the past for the population of Kosovo and the international interveners in the field, as the last SG report from UNMIK reported another incident against international forces in May 2019. In its report, the Secretary-General stated that "*The arrest and detention of UNMIK staff members on 28th May 2019, the injuries they suffered and the continued legal proceedings against them by Kosovo authorities are of serious concern.*" (SG report UNMIK S/2019/797). These violent events are a direct expression of the tensions and are unfortunately not isolated. The different international organizations present to this day in the region did put an end to the conflict in 1999, but ever since their actions have been triggers to large protests and violent altercations. The tensions did not just violently oppose the international actors and the local population but also generated a

large feeling of frustration among the local grassroots subjects interviewed and the different communities.

The frustration and disappointment of the local population

The locals had high expectations towards the international interveners and their missions. In other words, they saw the international organizations as "*saviors*" when they arrived in 1999 in Kosovo, and deeply believed they will help them not only to stop the violent conflict but to reduce corruption and inequalities (Interview n°7). However, when the missions failed to meet the expectations of the population of Kosovo, this feeling of frustration and disappointment rapidly spread across the region. Unfortunately, the locals lost faith in those missions, they were disappointed and felt let down, which was a point of no return in the relationship between global and local players. During the field trip to Kosovo, I encountered several people expressing a feeling of "*frustration*" and "*disappointment*" towards the international community. One major member of this community since 2008 is the European Union, through its EULEX rule of law mission, and they are facing a lot of critics.

From what I heard and witnessed in Kosovo, EULEX raised a lot of frustration on different levels among the population. Regarding the technical aspects of the mission, an employee from a local NGO in Pristina mentioned during an interview that: "*Everyone had high expectations, especially regarding the EU. It was a big disappointment; the EU did not bring any higher level of officials in the field. In ten years EULEX did not close one case*" (interview n°3). The Albanian grassroots subjects interviewed had clear goals in mind regarding the actions of the European Union in matters of justice: "*When the EU came to Kosovo, they promised a lot, people had high hopes. They said that they will catch big fishes from the political elite, but they disappointed everyone*" (interview n°6). They were expecting the prosecution of the corrupted political elite. Instead, EULEX prosecuted Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) veterans from the 1999 war, which was not what the Albanian community expected from the European Union: "*The people are frustrated, especially about EULEX failure. They do not want to send KLA soldiers to court, but the corrupted elite*" (interview n°7).

The absence or failure in the prosecution of the corrupted elite is directly linked to an extremely important issue to the young citizen of Kosovo: their inability to travel without a visa, except to the neighboring countries of Kosovo. During the interviews with young locals

in Pristina, this was a central issue for them and is still a significant source of frustration. Indeed: "*Kosovo population is still unable to travel, due to the low rule of law and high corruption in the country and they are now blaming the EU that did not stop the corruption*" (interview n°6). Reasons for the visa-situation, as put forward by the EU and the international community, are e.g. too much corruption and an unstable state (interview n°6). But the population is wondering: "*why do we have less than Romania, Serbia, Albania, Montenegro…?*" (interview n°6) and that "*it is not by isolating people that they [the international community] will get somewhere!*" (interview n°7). It also has an impact on the professional lives of the local grassroots subjects, the editor in chief of a local journal is deeply affected, frustrated and very concerned: "*How can I be a successful journalist when I cannot attend a conference in Berlin?*" (interview n°6). They are waiting for a change, for the international community to stand for the freedom of the Kosovo citizens.

Another source of frustration that has been brought up a couple of times is the potential involvement of EULEX in corruption cases. The locals interviewed strongly believe that "*EULEX was involved in corruption scandals*" (interview n°6) and therefore increased the disappointment and frustration, as the population was already struggling with a corrupted political elite. This is a different issue that would require further research and it is not directly linked to the study I am conducting, however, worth to be mentioned.

It seems that the frustration and disappointment mainly come from: "*poor people with no or small education tend to have high hopes*" (Interview n°6). In reality, their expectations towards the European Union were very high, leading to a major disappointment, when those were not fulfilled. We can also question if the expectations of the locals were in adequation with the real aims of the global actors and their missions. Indeed, what the people expected and wanted from the international interveners differ from their global agenda, as I will address it in the following section.

The causes of the tensions according to the interviewees

In this second thematic section, I will expose the causes and reasons for those tensions, based on the different interviews and the personal experience of the local grassroots subjects and the international interveners. Overall, the fact that international peacebuilders do not fully take into

account the interests of the population seems to be a major issue in Kosovo, as the locals I interviewed made clear.

I will divide this section into three subheadings, representing the three major points mentioned in the interviews, starting from the problem of the agenda of the Western organization not reflecting what the locals want and instead put the international community's interests first. Then I will address the issues of sovereignty and status, which are also part of the locals' interests. I will finish this section by exposing the critics regarding the supposed "status neutral" of the United Nations, which apparently also led to some tensions between local and global actors.

The agenda of international organizations

The agenda of the Western organizations has been described as one if not the main cause of tensions between local and global actors by the local grassroots subjects I interviewed. I will first focus on the respect of the interests and needs of the local population (mainly Serbs and Albanians) and if they have been taken into accounts and included in the agenda of the international organizations during this peacebuilding and peacekeeping process. Then, I will address the non-respect of the culture and traditions, an issue that has been mentioned during the interviews and is seen by the interviewees as a cause of the tensions as well. International organizations tend to have their own agenda, an agenda that has been determined by officials often far away from the war-torn countries in question. The local grassroots participants complained about a gap between the agenda and aims of the international community and the actual needs and interests of the local population. The locals did not and still do not feel heard by the global actors who intervene in their post-conflict society. The results of the empirical study did confirm the argument outlined earlier in this thesis. In the following paragraphs, I will report the point of view, often very personal, of the different interviewees regarding the agenda of the Western organizations.

Very early in the research process, a Serbian ex-journalist did confirm the argument by claiming that the international interveners *"have their own interests that are always first on the agenda"* (interview n°2). Indeed, the locals seem to know that the European Union and the United Nations are much bigger players on the international scene. A local activist and NGO employee in Pristina commented on that by saying: "*I do not see us being high on the agenda*

[…] small nations are tailored by big ones - it has always been like that". He has accepted the fact that "*we were not high on the agenda*" (interview n°3).

However, even if the local grassroots subjects are aware of the strategy of the liberal peacebuilders, they did not all accept it either, hence the tensions with the international interveners. The "one-size-fits-all" strategy is a major concern for the two employees of a local NGO in Pristina as they argued during our meeting that the agenda of the United Nations had only one strategy, the same as in other countries (i.e. Timor-Leste; Simangan, 2017), with very specific objectives that are not in consideration of the context. EULEX and UNMIK have their own interests on top of their "*checklists*" as they called it, a term that arose during other interviews as well (interview n°7 & 10). In Belgrade, a Serbian journalist could not agree more with this argument, for him, the diplomats want to achieve a mission, they have clear leadership goals: "*They need and want a deal to calm the tensions even if it is not acceptable to the local population that has to live with it. Then they come back to Brussels or New York and show that they achieved the goal. Which is great on paper but very different in reality*" (interview n°10). A Kosovo – Albanian editor-in-chief also added that "*they were only interested in the success of the mission on paper […] they were too focused on peace: stuck in this idea of no more war in the region that they went too far […]*" (interview n°6).

When the international interveners are focusing on the local population, it also raised some critics as "*They are mostly working with minorities. The organizations were also blinded by the goal of creating a multi-ethnic relation*" (interview n°6), which is not what the Albanian community wanted from them. They wanted help in state-building, in putting an end to the violent episodes, in the protection of human rights. "*The people wanted a State, but this is not our State*", here the interviewee is referring to the Kosovo flag and the circumstances of its creation. The population had no choice, it was presented to them "*look this is your flag*" (interview n°6) on Independence Day. For them, it felt like no one listened nor cared about their voices and interests. He concluded by saying that "*the international community, sometimes through the local elite, is considering the people stupid and they are imposing everything. The State is like a mosaic: a non-finished work and built in a hurry. There was no love nor dedication put in the work. The international actors wanted to not fail for themselves, they did not care about creating a successful state*" (interview n°6). And to this day, Kosovo is facing

major issues in its state-building process, politics are tainted by corruption, personal interests, and poor justice.

The agenda of the Western organizations operating in Kosovo should have evolved over the years, especially in such a unique political and ethnic context. It has been twenty years, and at some point "*they should have to rethink their position, their mission, which they did not do*" (interview n°7). There were so many players (local grassroots people, NGOs, the United Nations, NATO, the political elite, the European Union, etc.) that in order to provide the proper help, they need to adapt to the constantly evolving politics and also to understand the culture - which UNMIK and EULEX are not doing (interview n°6 & 7). The missions depend on the mandate of the United Nations, under the resolution 1244 from 1999. Every slightest change and modification regarding the mandate goals' and the missions must be approved within the Security Council of the United Nations, and the international community did not agree on the Kosovo case since 1999, therefore the mandate has not been changed. UNMIK is well aware of the challenges and its necessity to rethink the mission, in an SG report from 2008, the Secretary-General clearly stated that "*The United Nations is confronting a new reality in Kosovo, with operational implications for UNMIK that it must take into account. It is my assessment that not doing so could lead to increased tension in Kosovo, including, among Kosovo communities, and would contribute to an unwelcoming environment for the international civil presence*" (SG report UNMIK S/2008/354). The international community should stand for the Kosovo citizens' freedom and focus on essential issues of our times (i.e. the traveling visas), however we do not have to forget that they have a twenty years old mandate which does not allow them to intervene on everything. We can witness here a coherence between the different parties' speeches; however, the international community did not manage to agree on any measures nor engagements to improve its mission and therefore the relations with the local communities.

Moreover, the locals mentioned during the interviews that the lack of knowledge of cultures and traditions of the local Kosovo population by the international interveners is a source of tensions. They did not take all the particularities of the society and its culture into account when establishing their agenda. In a region such as the Western Balkans, religions and ethnic groups coexist, and those communities have different cultures and traditions. Kosovo is a great representation of this phenomenon, as not only Albanians and Serbs live next to each

other, but Bosniaks, Turks, Ashkali, Egyptians, Gorani, and Romani too. In 1999, diplomats, peacebuilders, and soldiers from across the world came without knowing anything – the cultures, the traditions, and what the people have been through. In an interview, a local grassroots subject told me that there were restaurants and social events only reserved for the internationals, and besides work, they had no interactions with the locals (interview n°6). The principal critic has been that the international community "*did not know anything - and still do not - about the culture and the traditions in Kosovo. They rejected to know and to understand, and it is when they started to fail*" (interview n°6). According to local grassroots subjects interviewed in Pristina, the ignorance of the Western organizations and their reluctance to adapt their missions with the reality on the field is not only a major source of tensions but a reason for the missions' failure. I will come back to this argument later in the last thematic section.

The population of Kosovo expressed its discontentment quite clearly and loudly by electing a new Prime Minister in October 2019, Albin Kurti, who is the leader of Vetëvendosje and a former rebel: "*He was on the streets protesting for those issues because the international actors had their interests first on the agenda*" and did not respect the local population's interests (interview n°7). It is important to mention that Kosovo needs international aid, to improve and ensure the security and the protection of human rights, especially with all the ethnic groups living close to each other. They do not reject the international presence, as global actors ensure the security of the different communities and protect their human rights. However, the interviewees from both the Serb and Albanian communities reject their manners and their agenda. Indeed, at the end of an interview with two employees of a local NGO, one of them said quite rightly "*Kosovo needs international aid*", and also mentioned that the international programs are good, "*the humanitarian ones, until they get political*" (interview n°7). Everything is up to the political level, political elite and international interveners seem to quickly forget the humanitarian aspect of their missions. Their intervention also raised critics and discontent regarding the sovereignty and Kosovo's status questions, which also reflects the interests of the local population, which leads me to the next part of this section.

Sovereignty and status in Kosovo

The local grassroots subjects I interviewed in Pristina denounced the inadequacy of the international interveners' agenda with the interests of the society they are intervening in. This has led to other issues, such as a lack of sovereignty and a lack of status as a new country. This

generated a public rejection of the international organizations, according to the interviewees, because they put a curb on their political and independence aspirations.

The global actors I met in the field are aware of those critics and the tensions it engendered. In 2008, after the unilateral declaration of independence, the political leaders of Kosovo and the population considered UNMIK over. Indeed, the police were leaving and 90% of the employees left. They were hoping to get full sovereignty at the political and judiciary levels. However, when the political elite did not get what they wanted, they rejected the international presence. In an interview with an international peacebuilder, he added that "*the local political leaders claimed to not need UNMIK anymore. It led to difficulties working for the UNMIK staff that was still working in the field. UNMIK was not welcome. These tensions were top-down, it was only coming from the political elite that did not consult the population before resisting to the UNMIK actions*" (interview n°4). Just like UNMIK, EULEX was targeted and blamed for the locals' lack of authority and power. Indeed, EULEX has "*an executive mandate and some people were not supporting it*" (interview n°8). There were protests against EULEX because it impeached the sovereignty of Kosovo in the judiciary area. But since 2018, all judiciary authorities were transferred to local institutions, and EULEX is "*only here to assist*" (interview n°8).

According to the editor in chief of a local journal, the only way to not have their sovereignty impeached and limited is if "*the international interveners leave*" (interview n°6). The locals and especially the self-determination party Vetëvendosje do not want the international community involved in internal affairs (interview n°9) anymore. Even if the international interveners transferred the power gradually to the local institutions since 2000, the process has been too slow for the locals. They wanted and expected a lot from the international intervention since the beginning, but the missions were prolonged (interview n°7). They did not accept the fact that the Kosovo authorities could not fully govern the State by themselves, even if they were or still are not ready to do so. A lack of authority and power is not helping to improve the position of Kosovo on the international scene. Its status is very poor: "*Kosovo is lacking status to the international community's eyes*" (interview n°7). Moreover, "*Serbia has been campaigning against the recognition of Kosovo as a country and in certain cases for the withdrawal of the recognition*", and they have been quite successful so far (interview n°10). Indeed, more than fifteen countries have withdrawn their recognition of Kosovo. Besides, the

lack of sovereignty within the territory and the agenda of the Western organizations did not encourage a change of status on the international scene. It has generated tensions with the international communities as well as frustration as we have seen in the previous section. The fact that after twenty years the local authorities are still lacking a status has an impact on the everyday life of the citizens, on tourism, on the economy, and is also blocking the country from having a voice on the international scene. Kosovo is therefore not part of Interpol, the European Union, or NATO just to name a few. And unfortunately, without an official and recognized status, it is even harder for a small nation to be on top of the agenda. It is linked to the previous findings, that according to the interviewees the locals do not feel heard, they had expectations regarding their sovereignty as a new country and a goal to have a proper status.

The locals gained autonomy over the years, but did not yet get their entire sovereignty back, they still feel bound to the international's opinion and decisions, which resulted in a lack of trust towards the global actors and their real aims. It does not mean that all relations between local and global actors are altered completely, for instance, the relations between UNMIK and the Albanian community is certainly not as good as it was before the unilateral declaration of independence but there is still an interplay. Indeed, "*it is more informal and non-public relations* […] *UNMIK is working low-profile with Albanian community and political leaders because they are not welcome in public*" (interview n°4). The major concern of the experts and international peacebuilders is whether the government is ready to sustainably govern and run the institutions that were established by UNMIK. To this day, the international organizations are mainly supporting and advising the locals on political, judicial, and economic matters, however, they are quite doubtful about the ability of the government to manage everything on its own (interview n°4 & 5).

While interviewing the different people during the field trip in Belgrade and Pristina, concerns were raised not only regarding Kosovo's status but concerning the "status neutral" of the United Nations, which EULEX is depending on too.

The status neutral of the United Nations

Under the resolution 1244 adopted on the 10th of June 1999 by the Security Council, the United Nations claimed its "status neutral" position towards the conflict. It is a cornerstone of the mission; it guarantees the credibility and efficiency of UNMIK in pursuing the mission for more

than twenty years now. The United Nations has always clearly stated its "status neutral" regarding the different parties involved in the conflict, they promised to respect the integrity of the nations and to not create any obstacles to peace, trust, and state-building. A Serbian journalist confirmed that the "*United Nations are not imposing any solution; it is a neutral organization*" (interview n°10). During an interview with an international peacebuilder, the mandate from the United Nations and the 1244 resolution was a central topic. He insisted on the fact that: "*UNMIK is a status neutral mission*". The international organization and all the employees are bound to the 1244 resolution; therefore, they always have the challenging task to stay neutral and impartial. In a post-conflict society with such a unique context, the security of the population is at stake, even twenty years later. UNMIK must stay neutral to prevent triggering events between the different ethnic groups and not becoming the violence's trigger. For instance, UNMIK has and will always refer to Kosovo as "Kosovo" and not as "the Republic of Kosovo". Sometimes UNMIK has to use language tricks or "*language massages*" in the drafting of agreements to be signed by Serbia and Kosovo, and in that case, they will refer to the "authorities in Pristina" and not to the "Republic of Kosovo". According to the international peacebuilders I interviewed, it is always to help and find practical solutions for the population, even if the Albanian community in Kosovo was not happy with those solutions and the language chosen (interviews n°4 & 5).

We can question this supposed "status neutral", which has been generating tensions between the local population and the Western organizations, as the different communities repeatedly felt disadvantaged, ignored, and forgotten compared to other communities. There is a gap between how Serbs and Albanians perceive security and on how the international interveners should "protect" and "support" them. Indeed, the international interveners are stuck in the middle, for instance, the NATO bombing in 1999 has been perceived as positive and necessary by the Albanian community while the Serbian community denounced it as unfair, violent, and unlawful. Nowadays, from a Kosovo -Albanian perspective, they blame UNMIK for "*mostly working with minorities*" (interview n°6) and therefore "*hurting the normal inter-ethnic relations by privileging minorities*" (interview n°7). When Kosovo – Albanians, who are the most represented community with 92,9% of Kosovo's population are criticizing UNMIK for being biased and acting in favor of the minorities, the Serbs from Northern Kosovo also complain about EULEX which "*despite operating within the status-neutral framework of the United Nations, is perceived by some Kosovo Serb leaders as supporting the interests of the*

Kosovo authorities" (SG report UNMIK S/2009/497). A petition campaign has even been launched at the time against EULEX in Northern Kosovo (SG report UNMIK S/2009/497). The United Nations' neutrality has been challenged, especially since 2008, and the unilateral declaration of independence of Kosovo. The Serb community is aware of the important role of the United Nations and the European Union in everyday security and in providing some stability since "good faith" between the communities is not restored yet (interview n°4 & 11). However, a Serbian researcher pointed out that in his opinion, the international organizations are: "*in clear breach of their mandate since 2008, as UNMIK was formed under the resolution 1244 of the Security Council in 1999, which expressed respect for the territorial integrity of the Republic of Serbia. Since the local authorities in Pristina have proclaimed unilaterally independence in 2008, the continuous support of UNMIK for the operation of these authorities cannot be neutral any longer and they have clearly sided with secessionist authorities*" (interview n°11). On both sides, they are accusing the international actors of favoring one community over another one in their mission and the implementation of projects and security measures. As I have limited my interviews and research to the opinions and experiences of the Albanian and Serb communities, I do not have data regarding the other communities, however, when I interviewed international peacebuilders, their projects seemed to be centered on Serb or Albanian communities. Nowadays, UNMIK's main focus is to work on the trust-building between the communities, to lead the way towards better cohabitation and cooperation in society.

International actors have been facing many critics over the last two decades in Kosovo. During the interviews, the local grassroots subjects blamed them for not putting the locals' interests first on their agenda, they blamed them for restraining the new country's sovereignty, they blamed them for Kosovo's lack of international status and all the issues it generates. And they blamed them for not being neutral and impartial. On the other hand, UNMIK and the other international organizations in the field have a limited mandate, they are trying to navigate through the different missions and stay impartial, which can be a real challenge. It has engendered tensions, frustration, and disappointment among the different communities. Therefore, the success of the missions has been questioned and their flaws brought to light while I was conducting the interviews. Considering that the actions, decisions, and declarations of the international interveners have been a great source of tensions between them and the locals, the interviewees perceived and described the consequences of those missions, which I will address in the next and last thematic section.

Perspectives of the interviewees on the outcomes and implications of the missions

After having exposed the tensions between global and local actors and discussed what the interviewees understood as the causes, the last section of my empirical findings will address the different perspectives of the participants on the consequences and the results of the international actors' intervention not only on the missions but on the society and the development of Kosovo.

I wanted to include a more moderate and balanced opinion and interpretation of the empirical findings, as the results of the interviews pointed out that the perceptions of the consequences of the missions are quite diverse. If we cannot ignore the fact that the intervention of global actors in the regions arose many tensions with the local actors due to their lack of knowledge and often lack of consideration of the local population, we also cannot ignore that they succeed to some extent in their peacebuilding missions. While I was in the field, arguments in favor of the international community's actions and their results were mentioned and will be the focus of the first part of this section. Nevertheless, interviewees revealed that those missions were not a complete success, the international community failed on many levels, which I will address in the second part of this section. I will conclude this empirical section by discussing the accountability of the international interveners, an issue that has been brought up a few times during the interviews, and that called for further reflections.

The success of Western organizations

In the previous sections, I exposed the opinions of local grassroots subjects and international interveners regarding the different missions the international community is conducting in Kosovo. Even if they are to blame for their actions, their inadequate agenda, and the way they are handling the missions, they did put an end to the violent conflict. They have been helpful in a region where everything was destroyed, where violence was peaking, and they made the territory safer for the population.

When I interviewed international interveners, who have been in the region since 1999, they insisted on the success of global actors in putting an end to the conflict and in improving the security for the local population. The United Nations staff arrived in 1999 in a "*devastated and post-war territory*" (interview n°4), they created everything from infrastructures (water,

electricity) to the legal system and the currency. Their role was to create institutions and recruit local people to work for it: "*It was always meant to be temporary and transitional*" (interview n°4). They started the transfer of power to the Kosovo authorities in 2000. The mission is considered a success in the long run, even if "*there is still a need for improvement*" according to the international peacebuilders I met in Pristina (interviews n°4 & 5).

Their most significant success goes back to 1999 when international peacebuilders arrived in Kosovo under the mandate of the United Nations Security Council (1244). NATO, through KFOR its peace-leading operation, and UNMIK were the first and main responders to the conflict and had the goal to stop the conflict and ensure peace, safety, and stability in the region. When Western organizations arrived, the employee of a local NGO told me that "*they were like saviors, everything was going to be okay*". She also remembered that Albanian refugees came back right after the international troupes arrived, they trusted UNMIK and NATO with their safety (interview n°7). In a more critical tone, the editor in chief of a local paper talked about the NATO bombing in 1999 as an episode that "*made them look like saviors in Kosovo*" (interview n°7), a comment I will discuss in the last part of this section. The UNHCR organization must be mentioned, which provided assistance over the last two decades to both Albanians and Serbs when they needed it the most. Their work has been recognized by the different communities, and a Serbian journalist also added at the very end of the interview that "*the United Nations is doing OK and the UNHCR took care of the Serbian refugees coming back from Kosovo*" (interview n°10) which is not claiming their success out loud but still recognizing some good actions from the international community.

Since 2008 and the unilateral declaration of independence, the international community is mostly working to protect minorities, especially the Serb community. Indeed, they became the main targets for the Kosovo Albanians who did not accept the presence of Serbs in Kosovo. The relations between UNMIK and Serbs have improved as they need protection from the United Nations and its presence to stay safe. They are the minority and aware that UNMIK is a guarantor for their human rights. During the interviews with international peacebuilders, they pointed out their important role as mediators, they "*maintain communication and peace between communities and prevent triggering events*" (interviews n°4). The Secretary-General reports of the Security Council of the United Nations confirmed and emphasized the fact that "*UNMIK has continued its successful mediation between the Kosovo Albanian and Kosovo Serb*

communities in northern Kosovo" (SG report UNMIK S/2009/497). While UNMIK is facilitating interaction between the different communities, they also bring support to the communities to "*fill the gap between minorities and communities through new structures and committees*". They are promoting the community's rights and ensure fair representation. Where UNMIK built the foundations, progress has been made, but there is still room for improvement (interview n°5). It is not only about guaranteeing the security of the minorities: for instance, EULEX has managed to "*provide technical help to the Kosovo authorities at the judiciary level*". The Justice Integration Agreement is a cornerstone of the process and ensures equal access to justice, especially to minorities (interview n°8). The European Union also facilitates the exchange of information between Kosovo and Serbia and is working towards a better dialogue between the two countries.

Nowadays, "*peacebuilding is not as big and important as it used to be, it is more trust-building*" (interview n°4). Trust-building is a key concept for UNMIK, and according to international peacebuilders, it has been a great success, to restore trust between the different communities. They brought political, religious leaders and civil society representatives together, and encouraged them to work collectively on small social projects. To be more concrete, the communities have recently worked on a project (a movie and discussion seminars) on violence against women, which has been presented and discussed across Kosovo with the local population (interviews n°4 & 5). These small signs of progress are presented as big successes by the international interveners. If they helped prevent tensions and building trust among locals, it did not rebuild the trust between global and local actors, as I heard during the interviews. Since these international initiatives are held as a success by the same people that initiated them, the real success-rates and goals are questionable and it is not completely certain if they are implemented to serve internationals or the locals. One thing is for sure, it did not improve the relations between global and local actors, tensions are still palpable.

Something striking when I was in Pristina, is the omnipresence of the United States of America. Bill Clinton is held as a hero, not only a statue and a gigantic picture of him welcome anyone entering the city of Pristina, but the main boulevard of the city was named after him. The list can be long, George W. Bush Street, American Hospital, American School, USAid NGO, etc. During an informal conversation with a diplomat in Pristina, she confirmed that "*The presence of the USA is very important, the population is very supportive of the USA*" (interview n°9).

The diplomat added that the population can be blinded by this admiration and trust, and the American diplomats can use that to emphasize the success of their missions. The European Union was, before 2008, also an object of fascination for the locals, but its popularity did not last as we have seen above.

The international interveners did succeed in stopping the conflict in 1999, however, they prolonged their missions over the years, with the reason that they were "*only here to protect and help the society*" (interview n°4). The latter goal is highly questionable, as well as their success in the field. We can wonder at what costs they displayed their "success". They also claimed that thanks to an international presence, "*there is a peaceful coexistence between different ethnics*" (interview n°4). This is without taking into account all the tensions that their multiple missions generated between them and the locals. The success and actions I described above do look good on the official reports, the reality is nevertheless quite different as I will address it in the next part of this section.

The missions' flaws

The interviewees and especially the local grassroots subjects insisted on the fact that the success of the international interveners' missions has some limits. While international organizations presented reports on successful missions, the reality in the field is that they failed on many levels according to the interviewees and the SG reports. Their actions generated tensions and resistance from the local population. Consequently, the tensions between the local and global actors that I exposed in the previous sections appeared, according to the interviews, as an important element that caused the missions' failure. Based on the fieldwork I did in Belgrade and Pristina; I will present three areas where the internationals failed and did not manage to support the local population and therefore where they suffered the most critics.

The first argument was that they have failed in the state-building process. Regarding peacebuilding, "*the international community was successful in stopping the conflict*". However, no matter how well organized they were, their capability stopped at some point. "*With time, success became smaller and smaller because the state-building process must come from the inside, not from international communities and organizations*" (interview n°3). Again, it proves that by not letting the locals have more voice and power in the process, it not only resulted in violent altercations and tensions but in the failure of the mission. Another interviewee argued

in that sense as well, as he stated that "*the State is like a mosaic: a non-finished work built in a hurry. There was no love nor dedication put in the work. The international actors wanted to not fail for themselves, they did not care about creating a successful state [...] they are continuing in the wrong direction*" (interview n°6). Indeed, Kosovo is still struggling to have a sustainable state, with stable institutions and non-corrupted political leaders. Of course, the internationals are not the only ones to blame, but the local grassroots subjects hold it against them because they did not do everything they could. I would like to make precise that even if international interveners deeply want to help the population and sometimes go beyond their duty, they are bound to the 1244 resolution and the United Nations' mandate, they often do not have the power to do more. In 2008, locals had faith in the European Union and the EULEX mission, but in ten years of prosecution, EULEX did not solve any cases. A diplomat I met in Pristina justified the failure by saying that "*there are no pieces of evidence, no witnesses, how to convict people like this? And there is a difference between "making" and "assist", and one mission cannot fix it all [...] It is a two years mandate, and they need to prioritize the cases*" (interview n°8). One mission can hardly fix all the problems – and the question appears what local politicians, who refuse internationals to interfere, do against putting corruption to an end. Because EULEX has now transferred all the cases to the local prosecutors, however, the result is still the same. Both parties are to blame for not putting an end to the massive corruption happening at the highest levels of the State.

Another important finding of this empirical study is the failure of the Western organizations' bureaucratic model. Once again bureaucracy seems to have shown its limits according to the interviewees: "*EULEX is a failure because it has been built on a bureaucratic model. A lot of scandals, corruption, and misuse of information. NGOs failed too; millions of euros were spent*" (interview n°6). In Pristina and Belgrade, local grassroots subjects pointed out that one of the consequences of an agenda prioritizing the Western organizations' interests over the local ones' is the inevitable failure of the missions based on bureaucracy and therefore not in line with the local realities. Most of the important decisions are taken by state officials rather than by elected representatives, or in the unique context of Kosovo by locals and communities' leaders. Following a bureaucratic model, with excessively long and complicated administrative procedures, "*the international organizations are prolonging the missions, and prefer the status quo, which is better for them to stay than to conclude the mission, they have no real goals. The mandate from 1244 will never end. Right now, nothing is changing*"

(interview n°7). According to the local participants, the international interveners lost themselves in a succession of missions, under a twenty-year-old mandate (1244) not compatible with the current situation in Kosovo. They are crawling under administrative tasks, that are not concretely supporting the local population. I will finish with a quote from a Serbian journalist, quite indicative of the failure of the bureaucrats from Brussels: "*you cannot negotiate with them, they are coming with their own agenda, it is like talking to a wall. It is just the way the EU is doing things, this is not against Serbs, it is a systemic problem, non-elected diplomats that just want to prove something*" (interview n°10).

The last major argument that was brought up several times while I was in the field is the following: the international community has failed to speak with one voice. A unique goal, a unique opinion, and a unique foreign policy might have helped the international organizations to restrain the growing tensions with the locals and to limit damages and failures. During the interviews, the lack of a single voice within the international community was a major concern for the interviewees: "*the European Union could have done more but did not have a unique foreign policy. No single voice opinion, not speaking with one voice, which makes it not a strong player. Five EU countries still do not recognize Kosovo as an independent country*" (interview n°3). On top of that, no new resolution was voted for in 2008 at the United Nations, despite extensive negotiations: "*multiple actors refused any new resolution proposed, and not only Russia*" (interview n°4) which demonstrate the inability of the international community to come to a common agreement. Over the years they also were not able to always cooperate. An international peacebuilder commented on that and admitted that "*the cooperation with other international organizations is sometimes difficult, there is competition*" (interview n°5). The diplomatic rivalry between the US and the EU is undeniable and it seems as if both parties want to claim successes for themselves, impairing cooperation between them (interview n°10). The locals are also aware of this problem: "*There are a lot of players on the table. Different programs are working on improving democracy, local and global actors are involved and there are frictions. It is a challenge to coordinate the activities, everyone wants to do their job*" (interview n°7). When I interviewed a diplomat in Pristina, she also pointed out the difficulty to "*work with different mentalities, within EULEX or with the Kosovo authorities. The huge turnover of staff is not really helping, people are staying for just one year*" (interview n°8). A Serbian journalist reported a striking example of the diverse opinions within the international community intervening in the region. At the beginning of February 2020, three diplomats,

including the EU Commissioner for Neighborhood and Enlargement, were on an official visit to Belgrade. And to the surprise of the journalists, each of them had a different version and opinion on the topic discussed. The European Union especially, but the international community in general, failed to show the public a unique position, instead they wasted precious time fighting against each other, where they could have focused on the local population's needs (interview n°10). As international peacebuilders argued, it is hard to cooperate with so many different actors, the staff turnover does not help either, and negotiations at the highest level (New York, Brussels) are often almost impossible (interviews n°5 & 8).

If the internationals would have had included the local particularities and interests in the process to a larger extent, the results might have been different. However, the data I gathered not only confirmed that the missions generated tensions between local and global actors, but also have negative consequences and effects on the society they intervened in. The revealing quote of an employee of a local NGO gives an insight on the state of mind in Kosovo regarding the international interveners' failures: "*We are becoming the European Palestine, the conflict will never be solved, it is and will be a frozen country*" (interview n°3).

Accountability of international organizations

The accountability and responsibility of international organizations became a central question during the whole process. Although not initially the focus of the study, the topic of accountability as being a vital one, became obvious while gathering the empirical data, making it necessary to include. The input from the interviewees in Pristina and Belgrade raised some questions regarding the accountability of international organizations in case of mistakes or mismanagement. In the light of the case in Kosovo, where millions of dollars were spent and missions extended while tensions with local authorities increased, protests became violent and corruption spread, these questions are getting increasingly pressing. The study at hand does not offer the right framework to dive deeper into answering these questions, however, it offers a starting point for discussion, which will conclude the section of empirical findings in the following.

First of all, I heard a critic regarding the international organizations using their success in 1999 as a protection and a pretext for their actions: "*the NATO bombing in 1999 made them look like saviors. And they are always reminding people that they saved them, especially*

whenever the communities were feeling oppressed by international presence. Which led to people not saying anything against them" (interview n°6). International interveners protect themselves against any public accusation and therefore they do not have to engage their responsibility regarding mismanagement of the missions and failures. However, after 2010, a new political group emerged, Vetëvendosje, and "*did not care about what the international community was doing or thinking*" (interview n°6). Even if this party had gained power and weighted in the balance at the highest levels of the State, old habits are still well settled in, as the local government has been approving everything the international actors did for twenty years, in order to stay in power. Indeed, a young employee of a local NGO, confirmed that the "*local politicians did not stand to the international community*" (interview n°7).

The international organizations not only managed to protect themselves against any accountability and responsibility but also made sure that the political elite, who might be able to hold the internationals responsible for their mistakes, was not in a position to do so. Unfortunately for the local grassroots subjects, this situation also serves the political elite. In Pristina, it seems as if the authorities think they can do anything because they have the United States or the United Nations' backup, which deserve completely the population (interview n°9). In an interview with a Serbian researcher, he gave a prominent example of when the international community was not accountable for its actions. He argued that: *"there were several instances in which EULEX and KFOR (EU and UN missions in Kosovo and Metohija) failed in their duties to keep peace and prevent violence and can be held accountable to have breached their UN peacekeeping mandate".* The incident he mentioned was the civil protests of 27th September 2011 in the place of Jarinje, Northern Kosovo and Metohija, an event I lined out in the first section of the empirical findings (interview n°11). None of the international actors involved in the violence against Serbs that day were held accountable, as they are protected by the principle of immunity. An employee from a local NGO also denounced that "*the European Union has no responsibilities whatsoever and had a few corruption scandals*". In 2014 a major corruption scandal involving EULEX judges was published in the media across Europe. One Italian judge was prosecuted, EULEX lifted his immunity (interview n°8), however, he was cleared by the court in 2016. Other judges quit at that time, following the corruption allegations. Therefore, it can be assumed that the public image of EULEX and its justice mission in Kosovo is already impaired. Briefly, about the principle of immunity, it is stated in Article 105 of the Charter of the United Nations (see Appendix 3) and aims at enabling

the organization's officials to exercise their functions. For instance, in the last UNMIK report (SG report UNMIK S/2019/797) the Secretary-General reported incidents where the "*applicable immunities of the staff from arrest and detention and from legal process were not observed*", as "*he* [the international staff member arrested and injured] *was declared "persona non grata" by Kosovo authorities, a doctrine that is not applicable to, or in respect of, United Nations personnel*" and therefore "*urge the Kosovo authorities to ensure respect for the privileges and immunities of United Nations staff*". It is therefore impossible to legally prosecute or charge the international actors for their actions. It has been widely criticized and can be seen as a waiver of responsibility, especially in the case of Kosovo. I am not going to make a list of what the international community allegedly should be held accountable for, nor enter the debate of whether the principle of immunity is indeed necessary for the fulfillment of the organization's purposes, because both arguments are valid and sound. The different opinions are balanced depending on which side the interviewees were and reveal a clear breach in the system. With more accountability, the local population would have a real lever to potentially make the international interveners or more broadly the international organization itself to be held accountable. The locals are in the front line, they need concrete actions and results. The international interveners benefit from special rights in the territory and the locals do not have anything to be able to balance the power.

In this last thematic section, the results of the data collected showed that the international community may have known some real successes in its missions. However, failures cannot be ignored, nor the consequences of their actions and the lack of accountability of the international actors the interviewees denounced. The interviews and the data gathered were useful to have insights on the different issues cited above. I have listened to different voices, let them share personal experiences and opinions, which allowed me to answer the research questions. The process of conducting interviews revealed many details and different facets of the problem. I had the opportunity to have a real sense of these tensions, that I would not have had with a statistical method.

Discussion of the empirical findings

In this empirical reflection section, I will discuss the results from my field research in Kosovo and Serbia and the indications they give us on the situation. The results of my research are based on the personal opinions and experiences of diverse individuals with different backgrounds and nationalities. They are helpful to understand the tensions that emerged from the peacebuilding process in Kosovo and the complex relations between local and global actors. I will also compare the results to other cases, based on the literature.

The tensions understood and described by the interviewees

Regarding the tensions between international interveners and the local actors in the post-conflict situation in Kosovo, the empirical findings lead to an understanding of the kinds of tensions that occurred in the region since 1999. The results confirmed their existence, both local and global players acknowledge those tensions.

The interviewees shared their views on the UNMIK and EULEX missions, which have generated frustration among the local grassroots subjects. The locals apparently had high expectations, I could sense that it was a general frustration in Kosovo, not only regarding the mission itself and its failure to prosecute the corrupted elite, as the population wanted but towards other issues such as the inability to travel without a visa. They were expecting too much of the international organizations, to end the violence and the corruption but as a diplomat in Pristina told me: "*one mission cannot fix it all*" (interview n°8). The protests against the EULEX mission were violent and engendered long-lasting tensions, that should not be ignored, nor the voices they were coming from.

Discussion on the interviewees' perceptions of the tensions' causes

Moreover, the interviewees mentioned potential cause of these tensions, they see the agendas of the Western organizations as a source of the tensions, they claim that the international community is setting up their agendas with their interests first, without taking into account the population's interests and needs. Similar results can be found in the research on the peacebuilding process in Somalia by De Coning (2013). He has been confronted with the tension between local ownership and international self-interest. He wrote about the powerful

but diverse international community with important resources which is in reality a concentration of the strategic political, security, and economic needs and interests of each outside nation and organization is engaged in Somalia.

Some locals also denounced the ignorance of the international community regarding culture and traditions, which can lead to local resistance. The results give indications not only on the lack of knowledge of the international interveners but on the liberal peace crisis. Indeed, the Western organizations are built according to a liberal model, with Western values and with a system based on bureaucracy. The strategy they used in Kosovo to stop the conflict, administrate the territory, and create institutions has not been originally designed for the unique context in Kosovo, but rather applied generally across the world in war-torn and post-conflict societies. The local interviewees were aware of it and criticized it as well as the bureaucratic model. Besides extensive and long procedures, the administrative burdens and the non-election of the diplomats seem to be a problematic issue. As the locals said in the interviews, they are not all dedicated to their work and the well-being of the population they are supposedly helping. I deduced from the different testimonies that the problem is more coming from the individuals, diplomats, peacebuilders, and soldiers that want the success for themselves, they want to present a good report to their hierarchy, putting internationals' interests first. The indications from the empirical material showed the limits of the top-down approach, I will come back to this point in the theoretical implications section. However, I also looked at the problem from another perspective. The global players are, for some of them, trying to do their job with a certain idealism that is often required when working for the United Nations but are bound to a limited mandate, with a limited field of action.

Therefore, by hearing different people's opinions on the potential causes and implications of the tensions, I noticed a confusion of the roles, from the local and global actors. Indeed, the local interviewees insisted on their lack of sovereignty which engendered a lack of international status, while they are also criticizing EULEX and its failure to stop corruption, arguments that are also found in the literature (Mahr, 2018). The population seems to put all the blame on the European Union, who did not succeed in prosecuting the corrupted political elite of Kosovo. In the literature, scholars argue that EULEX's legitimacy has been undermined by allegations of corruption among its staff as well as criticism over its reluctance to prosecute political elites allegedly involved in serious cases of organized crime and corruption (Zupančič et al. 2018).

However, two years ago EULEX transferred all cases to the authorities in Pristina, and the local judges did not do a better job. This is a paradox, on one hand, the local grassroots subjects are demanding the international community to put an end to the massive corruption as well as to ensure their security and on the other hand, they do not want them to interfere in Kosovo's internal affairs. It is confusing, the international interviewees are claiming their goals, support, and good behavior towards the local population, they clearly state that they are here to assist and help the population to build a sustainable society. At the same time, the locals describe the international intervention as very intrusive, without any local involvement. The reality seems to be halfway between "assistance" and "complete intrusion", both arguments are not inaccurate, however, they are questionable.

Another concerning issue is the mandate of the United Nations, which is coming from the 1244 resolution voted by the Security Council in 1999. The mandate did not evolve over the years, it seems as if this happened not because of lack of consideration and will of the international interveners, but more because of a lack of unanimity and unity at the highest level of the liberal organization. It resulted in a constant international presence, through a mandate that will not end yet. The mandate does not follow new dilemmas, both local and global actors are bewildered. Therefore, international interveners still operating in the field do not have the appropriate tools and levers to face contemporary issues. They had transferred the powers to the authorities in Pristina and 90% of the staff left already 12 years ago. They are trying to continue a mission through communities' projects and advisory committees; however, the goals are becoming more and more shallow and unclear. The population noticed it and is, raising concerns about it. No end date to the mandate was settled in the first place. Twenty years later there are too many disparities and the international community does not agree on the Kosovo case anymore, the international interveners will not leave in the foreseeable future, which is not only an issue for the local actors but for the global actors as well. The ones working in the field, for some of them for more than twenty years, are not the ones deciding the future of the mission. All decisions are taken in New York City or Brussels, often not quite in sync with reality. The international community is lacking a single voice regarding international affairs. Twelve years ago, they could not agree on the future of the mission, and still cannot today. Each country and diplomat have a different opinion, and this applies to both the European Union and the United Nations. As the mission did not evolve and change, it has been more and more difficult for

international interveners to implement effective measures, in accordance with the reality in the field.

Without a single voice and unanimity, it is also challenging for the international interveners and diplomats to respect the important United Nations' principle of "status neutral". Based on the several interviews I conducted, the results showed that both Serbs and Albanian interviewees are accusing the United Nations and the European Union of a clear breach of their mandate. According to them, the neutrality principle is not respected, the arguments are either that the international community is focusing too much on the minorities, or either they are supporting the Kosovo-Albanians' declaration of independence and all decisions made by Kosovo's authorities since then. This is a sensitive issue, internationals are operating on thin ice, and we can wonder if it is a realistic principle in such a diverse and unique environment. On the other hand, it is a necessary principle for international organizations, for their credibility among the different communities. The perception of the international organizations by Serbs and Albanians changed over the decades, in 2008 international interveners saw a shift, as the Albanian community that used to endorse and support the United Nations' work and protection was now rejecting its presence. As for the Serb community, they used to see international organizations and forces as invaders, however, since 2008 they are counting on them for the protection of their human rights and their safety. We can see here why the international presence is still important and necessary for the local population.

Discussion on the potential consequences of the missions

Regarding the successes and failures mentioned during the interviews, the results can be discussed. While the local interviewees mostly blamed the international community for the state-building failure and their inability to listen to the local players, they tended to forget the role of the local political elite, to which the powers have been transferred gradually since 2000. We also must consider the limited resources of the international interveners, both regarding the law and the means. Besides, the global players faced local resistance, which made the implementation of measures and projects harder. I am not discussing whether the local resistance was justified, but it was part of the tensions. Some argued in the interviews that the state-building must come from the inside, and that "*one mission cannot fix it all*" (interview n°8). The cooperation seems to be more than necessary, to build a sustainable state for the local

population. This goal has not been achieved yet, even if UNMIK is nowadays mainly working on trust-building among the different communities, which is also very important to bring all actors together. However, there is a cruel lack of trust between local and global players. Without trust and cooperation, as well as transparency from the local government and the international organizations, the missions will be doomed to fail in the field. Regarding the security and the end of the violent conflict, the global players undeniably succeed, the local population is safer. This was also confirmed in a recent study on the EULEX mission, which successfully achieved its overall politico-strategic goals to contribute to the prevention of further violent conflict (Zupančič et al. 2018). Still today UNMIK as well as EULEX and KFOR are working to ensure the safety of minorities. However, the violence did not disappear, every year numerous attacks are reported against the Serb or Albanian community, along with violence between local and global actors.

It seems that the international diplomats will always find a way to make the mission look successful on paper, to ensure their personal success, and the local political elite protecting its position and wealth, leaving the local population on the sidelines. These potential failures and successes are very subjective, depending on which side we are looking at it.

The last reflection is on the accountability of international organizations. According to the results of the empirical study, local grassroots subjects seem to be concerned by the responsibility of the international interveners and the institutions they are working for. They benefit from numerous immunities, granted to them on the ground of the necessity to achieve the purposes of the mission. Those immunities can be lifted by the institutions in extreme cases, such as for the prosecution of a supposedly corrupted judge. As mentioned in the empirical findings section, the local interviewees are asking for the international interveners to be held accountable. The results, with the critics of the present regime of immunities, can be applied more generally, as there are several examples where the United Nations was not held accountable for its actions and mistakes. While the arguments in favor of the immunities' regime are understandable, for the continuity and the purposes of the missions, for the protection of the international interveners, the counter-arguments are hearable as well. Especially when innocent locals physically, mentally, and economically suffered from global actors' actions. It seems that the shift in the immunities regime of the United Nations is not the only change needed, since the local political elite often benefits from endorsing the

internationals' decisions to stay in power. It seems that the local elite exploits the legitimacy of liberal institutions to advance their political interests or deny the pursuit of justice for the sake of short-term stability. In the same way, it happened in Cambodia and Timor-Leste when the decisions of the local elite failed to reflect the local aspirations for justice and reconciliation (Simangan 2017). In addition to that, when reflecting on the responsibility of the international interveners, we can wonder about the responsibility of the corrupted political elite at the local level. Not one of them was convicted. There is massive impunity, at the global level but also the local level. The population is the first to directly suffer from this lack of responsibility, they can claim reparation for the harm caused by the international interveners, however, it is most likely going to be denied by the United Nations. The last point will be further discussed in the theoretical implications.

Conclusion

In the first part of the conclusion, I will present an answer to my research question, based on the data collected during the field study and the interview of grassroots subjects. The question stated in the introduction is the following: How the interplay between local and global actors has been marked by tensions and what are the consequences of these tensions on the peace building and state building in Kosovo?

Through the interviews and the official documents, that both entailed violent events and altercations between local and global actors, as well as the frustration of the local grassroots subjects towards the international community, I could get indications on the potential causes of the tensions and perspectives on the consequences of those tensions. The interviewees shared their frustration, personal feelings, expectations, and delusions, I did not interact with the political elite, as I was looking for the opinions of the local grassroots subjects, who are on the front line of those tensions with the international community. I also interviewed international peacebuilders and diplomats, in order to get the full picture. The interesting personal experiences and opinions from diverse people were invaluable testimonies that helped me to understand how the interplay between local and global actors has been tainted by tensions. I noticed the same patterns, as the critics and experiences were often similar, and I understand it does not represent the opinion of the whole population of Kosovo and Serbia. However, it has given useful and relevant insights on how the participants understood those tensions and their consequences on the development of Kosovo and the life of the local population. The latter has been left out during this peacebuilding process, the agendas of the Western organizations were not established following the local interests, culture, and traditions. The lack of sovereignty and status of the locals as well as the lack of effectiveness of the missions engendered violent episodes over the years, and those tensions are still palpable today. As I also found out in the literature, top-down approaches do not only leave a small space to include the locals in the peacebuilding process but also demonstrate the limits of the liberal peace (Van Leeuwena et al., 2015; Williams & Mengistu, 2015; Björkdahl & Höglund, 2013). Indeed, the liberal values are sometimes hard to implement in a post-conflict society, where the institutions are either non-existent or unstable.

The international organizations are aware of the local realities – as seen in the SG reports – however, there is a gap between what is implemented in the field and the statements in the

Security Council reports. Therefore, locals displayed their discontentment and disappointment, which did not lead to major improvements nor changes. Thanks to the interviews and my research trip to Pristina and Belgrade, I could get some perspective regarding the consequences on the everyday peace and everyday life of the local population, as well as the consequences for the international interveners still operating in the field. There are confusion and uncertainty, the peacebuilding mission of the United Nations will be still active, and the local government in Kosovo is more unstable than ever at the time this study is being conducted. The people in Kosovo cannot travel without a visa, the country is, twelve years after the declaration of independence, still not recognized by enough countries in order to integrate international programs and institutions that could increase the economic and diplomatic development of Kosovo. In Serbia, people seem to be strongly opposed to letting go of the southern part of the country, which makes the task almost impossible for the Kosovo authorities. The inhabitants and the government are struggling with poor economic growth, the communication between Kosovo Serbs and Albanians is still very fragile on every level.

Nevertheless, the blame cannot be put on the international community only, as the international interveners faced local resistance, hostile reactions, and arrived in a devastated territory. They are human beings, with limited resources, and landing in Kosovo in 1999 has been a shock for some of them, something they were not prepared for (interview n°4). They have done an outstanding job in putting an end to the violent conflict, in such a unique context, with so many different actors involved. While the actions and decisions of the international community in the following years are questionable, we cannot ignore the mitigating circumstances and factors. The directives and goals were set by diplomats and officials thousand miles away from the region. Their employees working in the field had to work towards those goals while discovering a completely different reality. This created great confusion for the interveners. During an informal discussion with a diplomat in Pristina, she remembered how the UNMIK staff had to carry and distribute bags of Deutsche Mark to every village, in order to get money in circulation, as there was none after the war in 1999. An international peacebuilder also shared his idealist ideas and philosophy, essential according to him to work for the United Nations. Both parties, local and global actors participated in the spread of tensions and violence. It resulted in serious consequences at the economic, diplomatic, and social levels. It is not the only reason for the slow development of Kosovo, as the well-known corruption in the Balkans' region did not spare Kosovo either, which made the state building

process more complicated. Mistakes were made, the approaches were apparently not the right ones, and innocent people and entire communities are still suffering from it today. Overall, this is a very complex and sensitive issue, with multiple factors and actors, and I only addressed the tip of the iceberg. Nevertheless, a good starting point for further research has been made.

Theoretical implications

The previous research brings some perspectives on the indications I got from the empirical data and are quite important regarding the field of study. The tensions studied are also mentioned in the literature, where scholars often use the term "friction". This term was introduced by Björkdahl & Höglund (2013), as they argued that the international interveners left limited space for local actors to construct a peace of their own, which led to tensions between local and global actors. When considering the "frictions" between local and global actors, however, they mostly interviewed political actors and heads of NGOs, which is different from their study, as I chose to interview grassroots subjects at the local level, and international peacebuilders that were in Kosovo since 1999. This choice was based on the differentiation in Lederach's peacebuilding pyramid (Lederach, 1997), and the main focus of this study is on the grassroots level, with actors involved in local communities and members of indigenous NGOs. They do not necessarily have the means to integrate higher levels of organization or action, however, they have a key role to place in conflict resolution. Indeed, they are at the bottom of the pyramid (and the society), they are dealing with the manifestations and consequences of the conflict on an everyday basis. While the results of this study showed a gap between local and global actors in the peacebuilding process, scholars have also highlighted this gap. Indeed, Aggestam and Strömbom (2013) argued that as local NGOs have been excluded from the peace negotiations, they lost influence and credibility, and therefore it increases the gap. Additionally, their findings support the results from this study, that different visions and expectations of peace can arise tensions, frustration, and contestations.

Regarding more specifically the limitations of EU policies in post-conflict Kosovo, Mahr (2018) indicated that the population first supported the mission, but despite this endorsement at the highest political levels, resistance and protests emerged right after the mission started, and by both Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs. It gives some empirical indications on the potential causes of the tensions, namely the lack of effectiveness of the mission and the lack of

sovereignty of the locals, and similar arguments can be found in my empirical findings and reflection.

Following on the potential causes of the tensions, scholars argued that international peacebuilders need to rethink their language, goals, and approach as Wallis (2017) stated, they need to be in adequacy with the local population. In her article, the researcher also warns on the pitfalls of the local turn, with the emerging evidence from Timor-Leste where the state transferred the responsibility for public goods provision to the local level in order to lessen the burden on the state and to divert attention from ineffective or illegitimate central institutions (Wallis, 2017). This is relevant to the study, as it questions the legitimacy of the local institutions. While the legitimacy of international organizations has been a serious concern for the locals but among scholars, we cannot omit the legitimacy of the local institutions (Hirblinger & Simons, 2015). It has led to a reflection on the local ownership concept, which implies the participation and inclusion of the local (civil society and politicians) in the peacebuilding and state-building process, in order to implement appropriate, coherent, and sustainable measures in the region internationals' are intervening in (Nathan, 2007; Narten, 2008). In the Kosovo case, long-lasting missions are therefore causing problems of legitimacy and local ownership to the Kosovo population, even if UNMIK already started the transfer of competences in 2000, it is a very long process. On the other hand, there are pitfalls and risks to local ownership, some local players can take advantage of such a situation, in Pristina the United Nations still has a privileged position and the local political elite has been exploiting the legitimacy of liberal institutions for their own political interests (Simangan, 2017).

The results of the empirical findings section showed signs that the agendas of the Western organizations are not compatible with the local principles, nor their culture and traditions. The same argument can be found in Sung Yong Lee's article, the international interveners can face principle-oriented local resistance where people resist peacebuilding because they believe the themes set by international actors are based on the interests of the international community first, for who consulting the locals was not an option (Sung Yong Lee, 2015). Scholars witnessed other potential causes of the tensions, which is interesting as it is in the continuity of my own results. The status neutral of the United Nations can also be a source of disagreement not only between local and global actors but among the different communities, as the subjects I interviewed argued. Indeed, Ramsbotham et al. wrote that in peacebuilding "neutrality" has

been reinterpreted as "impartial support" for peace or reconstruction processes, but in intense conflict zones, no intervener will be seen as impartial (chapter 8; 2011), a claim that has been confirmed during the different interviews.

Finally, there are decisive points lined out in the reviewed literature on different issues that can be seen as consequences of the tensions that emerged from the interplay between local and global interveners during peacebuilding operations. Here again, similar claims and results can be found in my field study. First, critics have called for moderated and alternative policy models rather than following the liberal peace strategies, including imposed agenda, based on Western values and interests. And since liberal peace is essentially a preconceived set of strategies, it leaves little room for negotiation with local actors. The top-down approach and massive interventionism have been the main critics of the liberal peace, quite rightly regarding the outcomes of the different missions in the field (Van Leeuwena et al., 2015; Björkdahl & Höglund, 2013; William & Mengistu, 2015). Regarding accountability, which was an important issue brought up several times during the interviews, previous studies have shown an interest in this issue, and help us understand all the consequences it has on the individuals. Authors wrote that there is a need for change in the regime of accountability of the international organizations and their employees, an argument raised by some of the people I interviewed. In the literature, scholars suggested solutions that must be found in order for the United Nations to be able to pay reparations to the individuals to whom they caused harm. The functional immunities established by the Charter of the United Nations in 1945 do not seem fair anymore, considering the nature and the scope of the peacebuilding missions, with all the individuals and different players they involve (Boon, 2016; Wilde, 2006; Boon & Mégret, 2019). Previous research is useful to understand the tensions, their potential causes, and their consequences. While the methods of data collection are different from the ones I used, scholars however had similar findings and arguments in their articles and books.

With hindsight on my field study, and based on the empirical and literature reflections, I have some indications for future research. First, local's opinions should be more represented in the literature, but to fully overcome this gap it would be interesting to combine both points of view in one research, the grassroots subjects', and the officials' ones (local elite). Moreover, I heard accusations, frustration, and discontent regarding the corruption in the region, but I did not ask more questions on that topic. Further research on the corruption at the local and

international level would be enlightening to understand the damages it has on the state building in Kosovo. It appears that the locals do not want the international community to interfere in internal affairs, but it is unclear if they can govern and administrate the country on their own in a sustainable way. It would also be relevant, in a larger study, to compare the tensions that arose during peacebuilding processes across the world. A multiple case study, with testimonies from the local grassroots subjects, the local political elite, the international interveners in the field as well as global actors at the highest level of the international institutions would help to understand how and why the interplay of those players are leading to tensions, which has an impact on the effectiveness of peacebuilding missions.

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Appendix 1: Lederach's pyramid

Types of Actors

Approaches to Building Peace

Level 1: Top Leadership

Military/political/religious leaders with high visibility

Focus on high-level negotiations
Emphasizes cease-fire
Led by highly visible, single mediator

Level 2: Middle-Range Leadership

Leaders respected in sectors
Ethnic/religious leaders
Academics/intellectuals
Humanitarian leaders (NGOs)

Problem-solving workshops
Training in conflict resolution
Peace commissions
Insider-partial teams

Level 3: Grassroots Leadership

Local leaders
Leaders of indigenous NGOs
Community developers
Local health officials
Refugee camp leaders

Local peace commissions
Grassroots training
Prejudice reduction
Psychosocial work
in postwar trauma

Affected Population

Derived from John Paul Lederach, *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997), 39.

Source image: https://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/hierarchical_intervention_levels

Appendix 2: Article 105 - Charter of the United Nations

Chapter XVI — Miscellaneous Provisions

Articles 104 and 105

Article 104:

"The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each of its Members such legal capacity as may be necessary for the exercise of its funcions and the fulfillment of its purposes."

Article 105:

"1. The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each of its Members such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the fulfillment of its purposes.

2. Representatives of the Members of the United Nations and officials of the Organization shall similarly enjoy such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the independent exercise of their functions in connection with the Organization.

3. The General Assembly may make recommendations with a view to determining the details of the application of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article or may propose conventions to the Members of the United Nations for this purpose."

Source: Repertory of practice of United Nations organs

https://legal.un.org/repertory/art104_105.shtml

Appendix 3: Empirical material

Interviews:

1: Informal conversation with a Serbian couple living in France - 11/01/2020 - Lyon

2: Informal conversation with a Serbian Ex-journalist - 15/01/2020 - Lyon

3: Semi-structured interview with an employee from a local NGO - 28/01/2020 - Pristina

4: Semi-structured interview with an international Peacebuilder - 29 & 30/01/2020 - Pristina

5: Semi-structured interview with an international Peacebuilder - 3/02/2020 - Pristina

6: Semi-structured interview with the editor in chief of a local journal - 4/02/2020 - Pristina

7: Semi-structured interview with two young local employees of an NGO - 4/02/2020 - Pristina

8: Semi-structured interview with an international organization employee -5/02/2020- Pristina

9: Informal conversation with a Diplomat from a Western European country - 5/02 – Pristina

10: Semi-structured interview with a local journalist - 8/02/2020 - Belgrade

11: Interview via email with a Serbian researcher - 21/02/2020 - Belgrade

12: Informal conversation with a Serbian artist - 2/02/2020 - Pristina

Documents:

13: SG report UNMIK S/2004/348 (p2 II.4.5.6)

14: SG report UNMIK S/2008/354 (p3 III.10)

15: SG report UNMIK S/2009/497 (p3 IV.11; p6 VII.27; p10 XII.47)

16: SG report UNMIK S/2019/797 (p2 II.6; p3 II.10; p12 IX.55)

Interview guide for semi-structured interviews

This is an illustration of the different themes that guided the interviews.

1) Past

- The Kosovo War in 1998/99
- Intervention of the UN, the UNMIK mission, the bombing of Belgrade
- 2004 riots in Kosovo, ethnic violence against Serbs
- Meeting with UN or EU officials
- Traumatic experiences

2) Present – Recent events

- Since 2008 and the independence of Kosovo, what really changed? Flag, nationality, institutions, feeling to belong to a nation.
- The EULEX mission, EU administration: impacts on everyday life and peace, on the peacebuilding process, on the development of Kosovar institutions, rule of law and EU trials.
- Everyday peace, position of the locals in the peacebuilding – peacekeeping process (institutions, politics...)
- Tensions between global actors and local population: the frustration, the needs...

3) Meaning

- Are your interests considered?
- Respect of your culture and tradition by the third parties and international interveners (EU, UN)
- Link between the past and the present: evolution, changes, peacekeeping

Table for interview with locals (Serb or Albanian)

	1998 - 2008	2008	PRESENT
Violence and traumatizing experiences			
How did you lived the intervention of 3rd parties – tension, frustration			
The respect of your culture			
Are your interests taken into account?			

Table for interview with officials (NGO, EU, UN) + for research on historical documents

	1998 - 2008	2008	PRESENT
Peacebuilding goals, intentions, aims			
Interactions with the locals			
Interests in the conflict, in the peacebuilding process or land			
Protection of who? Locals, political elite, western interests...			