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FREEDOM OF RELIGION FOR MUSLIM IMMIGRANTS

The politicisation of religion in 2010s Sweden

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ABSTRACT: Globalization and a rising migration have led to an increasing religious pluralism in Sweden. During the last decade, a large proportion of the migrants have been Muslims, especially immigrants arriving during the European refugee crisis in 2015. Islam, sometimes perceived as an un-European religion, is more visible than traditional Swedish Christianity, and Muslims are using their right to Freedom of religion and are expressing their faith publically and collectively. This is leading to new problems in Sweden, being one of the most secular countries in the world, where religion has become a private matter. This increasingly pluralistic religious landscape in Sweden has led to reactions from politicians in the parliament. This thesis investigates the politicization of religion during the period of 2011 to 2020 - overlapping the European refugee crisis in 2015 - by examining parliamentary motions on the issue of religion, connecting it to the issue of migration. It uses quantitatively content analysis on parliamentary motions on religion, migration and Freedom of religion, and qualitatively idea analysis in order to analyze the motions on Freedom of religion, differentiating between Freedom *from* religion and Freedom *to* religion. The findings show that motions on the issue of religion (especially on Islam), on the issue of religion and migration combined and on Freedom of religion increased during 2011-2020, that the increase in Freedom of religion primarily was due to an increase in Freedom *from* religion, and that proposals in motions on Freedom of religion was increasing in strength and comprehensiveness.

KEYWORDS: Religion; Freedom of religion; Islam; politicisation; migration

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Introduction

The religious landscape in Sweden is changing. In line with the rest of Europe, globalization (as the complex and multi-layered concept it is) is making the world smaller and weakening national borders. Globalization and a rising migration have led to an increasing religious pluralism in Europe, where Islam stands out in the numbers as to where the growth is happening. The last decades of migration to Europe come with big challenges, and one of the most profound revolves around the increasing religious pluralism in the European countries migrants migrate to (Casanova, 2007, p. 61). The increasing religious pluralism in Sweden is a fact (Kühle, 2011, p. 208), and it has led to increased visibility of religion. And even though all European countries (Sweden included) is protecting the right for every individual to privately express his religious faith, as a human right, the difficulty appears when members of the perceived un-European religion of Islam is expressing it publicly and collectively (Casanova, 2007, p. 65). This has a stark contrast to traditional Christianity in Sweden. Therefore, the increasing visibility of Islam is leading to new problems for countries such as Sweden, with a historically a homogenous religious landscape (Casanova, 2007, p. 66-67). In Sweden, being one of the most secular countries in the world (Inglehart & Welzel, 2008), religion has become a private matter. Freedom of religion has a uniquely strong position, but with this homogenetic religious landscape, this freedom has not been controversial at all. With an increasing number of Muslims in the Swedish population – many being either immigrant themselves or having one or both parents as immigrants – the stance on Freedom of religion in Sweden is now being tested. Questions arise on what is to be considered an "acceptable" religion and "acceptable" religious practices, what is to be considered a private matter or a public matter with regards to religion, and where the limits of Freedom of religion is – and where the Freedom *from* religion should step in. Jonas Lindberg (2014, p. 568) argues that when globalization and migration lead to these changes, a development that sometimes happens at a rather quick pace, political parties need to react in some ways as the change affects the society in which the population lives in. It is, according to Lindberg (2014, p. 568) in this negotiation and re-negotiation of boundaries that religion might be transformed into a political matter, where religion is politicised. In the secular country of Sweden, globalization and increasing migration leads to a more pluralistic religious landscape. This new reality is affecting society, forcing politicians to act on it. This has led to - and will likely continue to lead to - an increased political debate on the issue of religion, and increased politicization of religion.

Aim and contribution

The purpose of this study is to examine to what extent parties in the Swedish Parliament politicise religion due to the migration of Muslims. This study is intended to contribute to the understanding of how religion is used in politics and to be an addition to the ongoing scientific discussion on the "return" of religion in politics. It investigates the rapidly changing religious pluralistic landscape in Sweden, by connecting it to the issue of migration. Research on politicisation of religion in politics with a focus on Sweden and the Nordic countries has been conducted before, but not with the time span of 2011-2020, overlapping the European refugee crisis in 2015, analysing the possible correlation to the issue of migration. This focus on politicisation of religion in relation to migration during this time frame makes the thesis important and valuable.

Outline

This thesis will proceed as follows: First, for terms used in the study to be understood correctly, a section of definitions will be presented. Here, "Politics", "Religion" and "Freedom of religion" (including "Freedom *from* religion" and "Freedom *to* religion") will be defined. This is followed by the presentation of the theoretical framework, where religion in the secularized Sweden, Muslim migration, "Freedom *to* religion" and "Freedom *from* religion", and politicisation are discussed. After this, the causal mechanism and the study's hypotheses are presented, followed by a review of the previous research on the topic.

After this, the research design is introduced. First, the choice of material and time frame of the study is motivated. This is followed by a discussion on the methods used: Quantitative content analysis and qualitative idea analysis. This leads to the operationalization, where a more detailed instruction of how the methods will be used is presented, and a section stipulating the criteria for conclusions. The research design is finalized with a reflection on the study's validity and reliability. The results will be presented using graphs and tables and will lead to the analysis where a more thorough discussion on the findings will be held. Here, the hypotheses will also be tested and discussed in light of the results. The study is finalized with a concluding discussion.

Definitions

Politics

Since this study is investigating religion in politics, both terms need to be defined in order for the reader to be clear on what the terms mean. The concept of politics will in this study be understood as "*predominantly oriented toward the authoritative allocation of values for a society*" (Easton, 1965, p. 50), meaning value distribution, both material ones - such as economic, natural resources, etc. - and non-material ones - such as norms on what is harmful or beneficial for society.

Religion

It is difficult to say the least to describe what religion is, hence there are numerous definitions with varying focus. James Beckford (2003, p.4) argues that religion is something that changes over time, that it does not have agency and is constantly open for negotiation and re-negotiation, meaning it must be defined in the context it is used. Scholars using the concept of religion struggle with each other with two different traits of definition: "Religion" used as a substantial definition or "Religion" used as a functional definition. While the substantial definition is focused on what religion really *is*, with an emphasis on transcendent and supra-empirical aspects, the functional definition is focusing on what religion *does*, meaning it can stir away from the central reference of transcendence by focusing on the social and psychological purposes it has (Beyer, 2006, p. 4). The definition that will be used in this thesis is a substantial definition, as it is more compatible with the aim of the study than a functional definition. "Religion" is hence understood as institutions, languages, symbols, beliefs, and activities – all used in different ways to handle the division between empirical and supra-empirical perceptions of reality.

Freedom of religion

Freedom of religion was first introduced in Sweden in 1951. This was the first time it was legally free to both practice the faith of your choice or not to practice any faith at all. This law included all of Sweden's population, not only some specific groups or individuals as was done earlier. Freedom *from* religion (also called negative Freedom of religion), meaning your right to not practice or adhere to any religion, and Freedom *to* religion (also called positive Freedom of religion), meaning your right to practice and adhere to any religion, has since

been part of the Swedish Freedom of religion (Myndigheten för stöd till trossamfund, 2019, p. 11). In this study, Malin Wimelius' (2002, p. 57), Associate professor and Deputy head of Department of Political Science at Umeå University, definition of Freedom *to* religion as the right to practice your faith the way you like, and Freedom *from* religion as the right to not be involved in any religious activity, will be used. Freedom *from* religion is not understood, as sometimes bluntly done, as the right to avoid facing religion in everyday life. Freedom of religion has today, together with the other fundamental laws on freedom and rights, a very strong position in Sweden. Wimelius (2002, p. 57) argues that the Swedish interpretation of Freedom of religion is focusing on the individual, hand in hand with how religion per se is understood in the country. This is a problem since Freedom of religion also is relevant on a collective basis. In the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which Sweden has ratified, the collective and public is much more prominent:

> Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching. (United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, article 18.1)

This will all be kept in mind when analysing the material of Freedom of religion, including Freedom *to* religion and Freedom *from* religion. According to the Swedish Agency for Support to Faith Communities, in its report on the religious landscape in (Myndigheten för stöd till trossamfund, 2019, p. 15), regulations used by the Swedish state in its interpretation of Freedom of religion does not always match how the Swedish population is understanding religion and its role in the Swedish society. This will be an important standpoint in the study. This means that where religious issues are being argued for in conflict with other democratic values and rights, such as Freedom of speech or Freedom of expression, this discrepancy will be taken into account in the analysis.

Theoretical Framework

In this chapter, the theoretical framework will be presented. First, a discussion on the state of religion in a secularized country such as Sweden will be held, where secularization, sacralization, and (de)privatisation of religion is highlighted. Secondly, Muslim migration to Europe and Sweden is outlined, where the refugee crisis in 2015, integration, and the increasing merging of "immigrants" and "Muslims" are discussed. Thirdly, a discussion on

the politicisation of migration and Freedom of religion together, and the collective identities and the experience of the threatening "otherness" of Muslim immigrants is held. Lastly, politicisation as the step-by-step process of lifting an issue on the agenda is discussed, where differentiation between politicisation of religion and religionization of politics is established.

Religion in secularized Sweden

The secularization theory and its claims that religion will decrease and eventually disappear in line with the increasing secularization and modernization have not held up entirely. There is an ongoing scientific debate whether or not the theory has any empirical support, with scholars arguing against it, for example see Rodney Stark's *'Secularization, rip'* (1999), and scholars arguing for it, for example see Steve Bruce's *'God is dead: Secularization in the West'* (2002). Arguably secularization cannot be taken for granted, it looks different in different parts of the world. For example, at the end of the 20th century, many secular regimes such as Iran, India, and in the east and central Europe fell and were replaced with political structures that accepted more influence from religious actors. In line with that, one could argue that at least secularization has decreased in speed, and religion has increased its influence in politics. But the scientific discussion on the secularization theory is not black and white. José Casanova (1994, p. 7) is critical of the traditional stance of the secularization theory, but does not think it should be abandoned. According to Casanova (2007, p. 64), the Western Europe's secularization was a self-fulfilling prophecy in line with the secularization paradigm accompanied by a secularist self-understanding that the decline of religious affiliation was not only normal and modern but a natural progressive transformation of social change. In hand with the increasing modern societies was secularization. Casanova (2001, p. 13788) defines secularization as the result of three different subtheses: (1) as a differentiation of the secular spheres from religious institutions and norms, (2) a decrease in both religious practices and religious beliefs, and (3) marginalization and privatisation of religion, away from the public sphere. Modern society and its increased concentration of populations have led to increased competition and an increased need for the population to specialize in work. In complex modern societies, religion has lost its role to contribute with values. (Casanova, 2001, p. 13788-13789). Religion once was a sacred canopy (Berger, 1967), but not anymore.

Looking at Sweden, established religions have lost many members and lost the activity of the members they still have, while at the same time there has been a growing interest in

spirituality on an individual level (Inglehart & Baker, 2000, p. 41). Casanova (2007, p. 63) argues that with this in mind, the use of secularization should be replaced with "unchurching" and of "religious individualization". Grace Davie (1994) uses the term "believing without belonging" to capture this. But the high levels of members in churches and the high amount of people identifying as Christians means the opposite could also be argued for, just as Danièle Hervieu-Léger (2004) does when she uses the term "belonging without believing". Some scholars argue that religiosity has not died in the Swedish society, it has just transformed from being a public matter to a private matter where individuals turn to religion in order to find meaning in their lives as they live in a secularized society (Geels & Wikström, 2017). This concept, called "sacralization" does, unlike the secularization theory, acknowledge that religiosity still exists in large quantities, even in Sweden, being one of the most secular countries in the world (Inglehart & Welzel, 2008). It has just changed form, from traditional religions to spirituality, and shape, from public to private.

Casanova (1994, p. 40-41) does not oppose this trend of privatisation of religion, but presents an opposing trend of 'de-privatisation' of religion occurring simultaneously. Even if religious beliefs and practices are declining globally, a fact contested and difficult to measure, it would not mean that the world is not religious anymore. This seemingly contradicting fact is true according to Casanova due to the self-fulfilling prophecy of secularization, earlier discussed. Functional differentiation leads to that religion loses its historic role and that it becomes a private matter (Casanova, 1994), but this trend has though been accompanied by an opposing trend, one of 'de-privatisation' of religion, which has been ongoing since the 1970s (Casanova, 1994, p. 40-41).

Muslim migration

It could be argued that when immigration to Sweden increases from countries with a big proportion of the population adhering to a religion other than Christianity, the religious landscape in Sweden becomes more pluralistic. During the last decade, overlapping the European refugee crisis in 2015, this is exactly what has happened. Immigrants from the countries such as Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan, all with over 90% Muslim population, increased rapidly due to unstable states and conflicts, but also because of emerging globalization. But the increase of the Muslim population in European countries is not a 2010s phenomenon. Islam has for some decades now been, and most likely still is, the fastest

growing religion in Europe, and Muslims are the second-largest religious group in many European countries - such as France, Germany, and The UK (Nielsen, 1999, Klausen, 2006, Cherribi, 2003). At the same time, anti-immigrant rhetoric and prejudice are especially focused on Muslims and Islam in Europe (Koopmans, 1996; Koopmans & Stratham, 1999). Of course, it is unknown how religious people are, which does not only concern Muslims. But with that said, Norris and Inglehart (2004, p. 79, 217) argue that immigrants tend to be more religious when living in precarious surroundings in this age of globalization.

Sam Cherribi (2007, p. 113) argues that there has been a variety of integration policies in Europe, all towards increasing ethnic and religious pluralism, but that the general outcome has been disappointing. The integration of Muslim religious minorities into European countries has not been successful. In Cherribi's study (2007), the findings show that even though there is a growing acceptance within the academic sphere that religion needs to be incorporated and paid attention to, the knowledge of how Muslims are perceived as a problem is limited. The study also shows that there is a strong convergence in the political spectrum in how the issues of how to integrate Muslims into European countries are constructed. In the scientific field, three different categories map the issue of Muslim migration to European countries (Koopmans & Statham, 2000): "Ethnic" or "exclusive", making it very difficult for Muslims to integrate. Switzerland and Austria are two countries characterizing this. "Assimilationist", where integration is possible but where cultural difference is not recognized. Here France is a typical example. And "pluralist", where formal citizenship is fairly easy and where the right to cultural difference is highlighted. Here Britain and the Netherlands are examples. Ruud Koopmans and Paul Statham (2000) criticise these categories, arguing that they are simplifying the issue. Especially the "pluralist" type, where the numerous policy instruments used to tackle discrimination based on cultural, racial, or ethnic differences sometimes just reinforces the discrimination instead, increasing the informality of it. Koopmans and Statham (2000, p. 27) exemplify this with an example from The Netherlands, where: *"state policies have reinforced the image of migrants as a problematic, disadvantaged category in need of constant state assistance — not only in the eyes of the majority population, but also in those of many migrants and their representative organizations.''*

Casanova (2007, p. 62) argues that in Europe, *"the immigrant, the religious, the racial, and the socioeconomic disprivileged other all tend to coincide"*. A large part of the immigrants in

many European countries are Muslims, and the vast majority of Muslims in the countries are immigrants. It is also often these people that are the socioeconomic disprivileged in European societies. This way of identifying immigrants as Muslims becomes even more prominent when Muslim immigrants arriving from the same country establish themselves in one specific country, city, or area (Cesari, 2004; Vertovec & Peach, 1997; Maréchal, Allievi, Dassetto, & Nielsen, 2003).

Freedom *to* religion and Freedom *from* religion

Marie Demker (2018), Professor at the Department of Political Science and Dean at the Faculty of Humanities, is discussing the changing public opinion on migration in Sweden and sees that it has a close correlation with the public opinion on Freedom of religion. According to Demker (2018), Freedom of religion and migration are two issues that are being politicised together. In line with the migration issue becoming more and more central for the Swedish public opinion, the question of Freedom of religion has followed. Analysing Swedish public opinion she has come to the understanding that religion has increased its role considerably in relation to the opposition against migration and multiculturalism. The same group of people that sees migration as a threat, also sees the Freedom of religion in Sweden being threatened while at the same time being strongly negative towards immigrants' right to Freedom of religion. This stance is highlighting the question of how they understand Freedom of religion in the first place (Demker, 2018). Demker argues that it is most likely that the reason for this seemingly paradoxical stance is that they perceive that it is the immigrants that are threatening the Freedom of religion in Sweden, with its different cultures, religion, and ways of life and most primarily this regards Muslim immigrants. Hence, it is not Freedom of religion as a principle that is threatened, but rather the Freedom of religion for those who are either traditional Swedish Christians or not adhering to any religion at all that is threatened (Demker, 2018).

Casanova (2007, p. 66-67) agrees, as he argues that even though European societies usually are tolerant towards the individual's right to Freedom of religion, the states that have pressured religious people to practice their faith in private are the same states that have difficulty in recognising any role for religion in public life or for any collective group identities forming in the name of religion.

> Therefore, the problems posed by the incorporation of Muslim immigrants become consciously or unconsciously associated with seemingly related and vexatious issues concerning the role of religion in the public sphere, which European societies assumed they had already solved according to the liberal, secular norm of privatization of religion. (Casanova, 2007, p. 67)

These collective identities formed by Muslim migrants is seen as a religious otherness as it is neither Christian, European nor secular. Ola Sigurdson (2009) argues that the secularisation of the society has led to religion and religious practice being put aside to the private sphere of society, leading to that migrated religions such as Islam with a much more public religious practice is considered as threatening.

Politicisation

The politicisation of an issue by a political party could be said to happen when the party expects the decisions to affect the voters' opinions. John W Kingdon (2011, p. 196-198) defines politicisation as a process of gradually setting the future agenda. If a specific disaster or crisis, such as the European refugee crisis in 2015, is endangering values it can be turned into a politicised problem. The concept of politicisation will in this study be understood in line with how Kingdon (2011, p. 197-198) understands it: as a step-by-step process of changing the agenda, where a crisis often is the starting point. The event and the consequences of it may lead to a focus on specific conditions, which if seen to threaten important values could be turned into a problem. The more essential the threat is, the higher the possibility that the problem might climb on the political agenda. The problem is also more likely to be categorized as a specific problem if possible. In line with this definition of politicisation, Jonas Hinnfors (1992) describes a step-by-step strategy that politicians use in order to politicise an issue. Step one is the construction of standpoints on the issue, step two is the consideration of the likeliness of attracting more voters in the competition on the issue with other parties, step three is the consideration of how likely members of the party will agree on the issue, and step four is the evaluation on the likeliness of succeeding in the change they want to make on the issue, being very different depending on the size of the party.

Lastly, it is important to understand and separate the difference between when religion re-emerges into politics and when religion is being politicised. When a religious actor, such as a religious organisation or more specifically a person in the role as a representative of a

religious organisation, etc., is taken part in politics in order to transform society in the ways of the religion, it is an example of the former (Lindberg, 2015, p. 20). Ivanescu (2010, p. 313, 322-323) conceptualize it as 'religionization of politics', and explain it with the example of when religion has both presence and influence in politics, such as when politicians consult religious actors on issues regarding the religion, hence making the religion both an object and a subject. But when non-religious actors, such as politicians or political parties, are using religion in politics it is an example of the latter. It is this, when religion becomes politicised, that is of interest in this study.

Causal mechanism and hypotheses

This study investigates whether or not an increased level of migration from countries with a high level of Muslim population to Sweden with its secular context affects the political parties' politicisation of religion. The causal mechanism, therefore, looks like this:

Figure 1. Causal mechanism

In order to investigate whether or not there is any validity to this causal mechanism, and with a basis in the theoretical framework, three hypotheses (having the role of research questions in this thesis) are stipulated in advance:

1. The parliament parties´ reference to religion in general, and to other religions than Christianity in particular, has increased.
2. The parliament parties' reference to religion has been increasingly related to the issue of migration.
3. The parliament parties' references to Freedom of religion has increased, and the parties' are increasingly emphasizing Freedom *from* religion more than Freedom *to* religion.

Previous Research

Politicisation of religion has been investigated before. Jonas Lindberg (2014), Doctor of Philosophy, studied changes in how politicians politicised religion in Scandinavia during 1988-1989, 1998-1999, and 2008-2009 through looking at parliamentary debates in the Scandinavian states. His main take from the study was that there was a substantial change to be found in Norway and Denmark, but not in Sweden. The number of speeches and debates, and the amount in which politicians problematized the issue of religion increased in these two countries mainly due to right-wing populist parties in their parliament. The fact that Sweden did not have such a party in the parliament until 2010 is likely, according to Lindberg, the reason for the different outcome of politicisation of religion in Lindberg's study (2014, p. 565). Lindberg concludes that globalization has had an impact on the politicisation of religion in Scandinavia during the period of 1988-2009, and hence that higher levels of migration to Sweden would presumably lead to even more politicisation. He found no such evidence, but rather that the emergence of right-wing populist parties was the driving force to this development (Lindberg, 2014, p. 581). It could hence be assumed that the level of politicisation of religion started to increase in Sweden when the Sweden Democrats entered the Parliament, which was in 2010.

Carolina Invanescu's (2010, p. 322), Doctor of Humanities at the University of Amsterdam, study on politicisation of religion in the Netherlands with a focus on Islam and Muslims showed that even though Islam from the nation-state's point of view is understood as a public and visible religion, and hence as a threat to secularism, it is the democratic principles, all part of the essence of liberal western civilization, and the willingness of integration of immigrants that leads to politicisation of religion. She argued that Muslims in the Netherlands in 2004 were portrayed as impossible to integrate into a secular and modern society because they maintained their roots in religion and tradition (Invanescu, 2010, p. 315). When discussing Islam's take on individual and collective identity, and how migrants and minorities is concerning through the eyes of the nation-state, Invanescu argues that:

> (…) when transformed into policy practice, the voice of religion is distorted by other parallel politicised discussions. Entangled in the discussion about Islam are concerns about migration and integration of migrants and their descendants, state security concerns and changes in the structure of the nation-state itself. (Ivanescu, 2010, p. 312)

Migration, especially Muslim migration, is challenging for the nation-state because it sparks a religious revival. The separation of the religious sphere and the private sphere, and the marginalization of religion, is challenged by migrants and minorities expressing their religious views public and collective (Ivanescu, 2010, p. 311-312).

In Göran Gustavsson's, Professor of Sociology of Religion and Honorary Doctor of Theology at Lund University, research from 1985, he investigated religious change in Nordic countries during 1930-1980. The finding showed that globalization, with migration included, had limited or no impact at all on the religious change occurring in Nordic countries during those 50 years (Gustavsson, 1985). This was early research, but most previous literature that covers the European refugee crisis does not take religion into consideration. And most research on religion does not take the European refugee crisis into account. This is also what Ulrich Schmiedel and Graeme Smith argue (2018, p. 5-6), in their anthology covering exactly that. In the anthology, Sturla J. Stålsett investigated the Norweigian public policy on religion and found that the policy mostly focused on how integration was affected by the immigrants' religiosity, and concluded that this area was not substantiated enough but rather led to *"the fear of the faith of the other"* (Stålsett, 2018, p. 119). Johan Cato (2012) has studied how the picture of Islam and Muslims were perceived and constructed in Swedish politics between 1975 and 2010. During the 90s, there were several changes to this picture. Political issues around Muslim migrants increased in numbers and Muslim migrants were more polarized than before, which was a reaction to increased Muslim migration. Cato (2012, p. 268, authors translation) mentions *"The bill on active refugee and immigration policy"* as an example where Muslims were portrayed as a threat to Swedish norms and values. During this decade, Muslim immigrants were also portrayed as a group with specific demands, not only hindering integration but also increasing confrontation with native Swedes. During the first decade of the 21st century, the picture of Islam and Muslims in Swedish politics continued to change. Muslims and antisemitism were more frequently connected, and this hatred towards Jews was pictured as a part of the general Muslim identity, - for example not separating Islamists fundamentalists from liberal Muslims - increasing scepticism towards Muslims in the country. This scepticism was also an issue that increased in visibility during this decade (Cato, 2012, p. 268-274).

Research Design and Methods

In this chapter, the research design will be introduced. First, the choice of parliamentary motions as material and the time frame of 2011-2020 will be motivated. Second, the choice of using a 'mixed method' of quantitative content analysis and qualitative idea analysis will be described and operationalized. This will be followed by an outline of the criteria for drawing conclusions. Lastly, some reflections on the study's validity and reliability will be held.

Material and time frame

Parliamentary motions can be put forward by any elected politician to the Swedish parliament during a specific time in the fall every year. One or several politicians can sign it, from the same or different parties, and it does not necessarily have to be the official standpoint from the party/parties. This makes parliamentary motions a good source of data to use in this study since there is more variance to it, meaning it is easier to find nuances and trends in how politicians in the Parliament are discussing the issue of religion. Using for instance parliamentary debates or official party documents such as election manifestos or party programs would mean a more clear-cut official standpoint of the party, but probably miss more latent changes in opinion in the parties. Motions are also proposals for bills, meaning it is not only political strategies before elections or political speeches in debates, it is proposals for changing the law. Parliament motions from 2011 to 2020 will be included in the data. This period is chosen because it covers the European refugee crisis in 2015, making it possible to investigate any correlation to this event. Including a few years before and after 2015 makes it more likely to detect any change, and especially the years after 2015 since the change might not have happened directly after the European refugee crisis in 2015.

Method

To examine the material collected, and to be able to test the three hypotheses, two different methods will be used. First, in order to test the first and the second hypotheses, and partly the third hypothesis, I will conduct a quantitative content analysis. Second, in order to finalize the testing of the third hypothesis, I will conduct a qualitative idea analysis. The content analysis will be used to cover a larger amount of parliament motions, while the idea analysis will focus more narrowly in a qualitative essence. When using already existing political material, such as parliamentary motions, idea analys is a useful method for this purpose

(Bergström & Svärd, 2018, p. 138). Many scholars are arguing that because quantitative and qualitative studies are so different, a combination of them both is an advantage (Teorell & Svensson, 2007, p. 273-275). This 'mixed methods' is suggested because of its ability to answer research questions that either quantitative or qualitative studies can by itself, since it offers a greater variety of viewpoints with for instance stronger inferences (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2003, p. 10-15). Texts are already qualitative to begin with, so including a quantitative approach to the method will add some systematisation (Krippendorff, 2013, p. 88-90). Since the study will test hypotheses and hence try to find inferences that proceed from generalization to particular, the study has a deductive approach.

Quantitative content analysis

Quantitative content analysis is used on large amounts of data, and when the researcher is putting a value on the amount of something in the material that is considered to be of importance outside of the material. The research question, or in this case the hypotheses, are often drawn upon theory and are the base for the analytical tool (Boréus & Kohl, 2018, p. 50). The fundamental definition of content analysis used in this study will be the one stipulated by Klaus Krippendorf (2013, p. 24-25): *"Content analysis is a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from texts (or other meaningful matter) to the contexts of their use"*, as content *"… emerge in the process of a researcher analysing a text relative to a particular context"*. All content analysis requires coding. How that coding should be done depends on if the content analysis is quantitative or qualitative, and on what the researcher is looking for. In qualitative content analysis, the coding could be done manually. This requires that the researcher reads all the material used (Boréus & Kohl, 2018, p. 58). In this study, quantitative content analysis is going to be used since a large amount of data will be covered, where a specific set of keywords are looked for. Hence, computerized coding will be conducted. Computerized coding means in this study that I will search for specific words or combinations of words over a large amount of material, using the Swedish government's database on parliamentary motions. The words and combination of words are the recording units and works as the analytical tool. Motions consisting of these words or combinations of words are the sampling units (Boréus & Kohl, 2018, p. 59-60). The result of the coding is later best presented in a chart showing frequencies (Boréus & Kohl, 2018, p. 63). A more detailed description of the process in this study is found in the paragraph covering "operationalization" later in this chapter.

There are critical notions to take into consideration regarding content analysis. First, it is not always of interest to measure quantities. Just because something is represented more often, does not necessarily mean that it has greater importance than something less represented. Therefore, it is important for the researcher to justify why the amount is of interest. There is also a risk that the researcher misses the latent message while conducting a content analysis, since the focus is on shallow messages - what is explicitly stated. While what is not said could be the implicit message, it could also just be an obvious fact that hence does not need to be stated. Other text analysis, such as discourse analysis, is better suited to discover latent messages. The coding also makes it possible for the researcher to miss what the main plot is in the data, because the focus is on specific keywords. This, and the fact that the recording units are taken from its context could lead to validation problems (Boréus & Kohl, 2018, p. 79-81). Many of these issues regarding content analysis are in this study mitigated with the inclusion of qualitative idea analysis.

Qualitative idea analysis

The "idea" in idea analysis does not include a random thought that happened to pop up in an individual's head. The term is rather used for constructed thoughts of ideas that are sustainable over a longer period of time, which are shared between people in groups and that have a role in guiding how the people in the group acts. Basically, it is ideas as social phenomena that are of interest, phenomena that lead to real consequences in society (Bergström & Svärd, 2018, p. 133-134). The fact that these ideas are of interest in research means that the researcher perceives people and their language as meaning-making, an hermeneutic insight that is common in Social Science research (Bergström & Svärd, 2018, p. 139).

In this study, I will conduct an idea analysis with the purpose to explain (Bergström & Svärd, 2018, p. 140-144). There is no interest in describing something in the material that it does not explain itself, or to introduce an alternative interpretation, hence is the purpose not to describe. Neither is the purpose to criticise, since I am not interested in deciding whether or not the ideas in the material are scientifically sustainable or not, which is the focus in conducting a critical idea analysis (Bergström & Svärd, 2018, p. 143-144). What is of interest in this study is the origin of the ideas, what consequences the ideas might lead to, and how they connect to other events, processes, and structures in society (Bergström & Svärd, 2018, p. 142). Hence is the purpose of this study to explain, which will be done with the use of a

clear design. In this study, different typologies will form the analytical tool which will be used in the analysis in order to find the essential aspects of the phenomenon of interest in the material. Conducting an analysis with typological classification requires that the components of the typologies are formed in a way making it possible to operationalize, that they can be found in the material, and that the classification is based on clear principles (Esaiasson, et. al., 2012, p. 137-138). The typologies also need to be mutually exclusive - meaning the findings should as far as possible fit into one category and not another - and collectively exhaustive - meaning the findings should as far as possible fit into any category and not be left out (Collier, Laporte & Seawright, 2008, p. 6). Collectively exhaustive typologies are easiest formed when they logically exhaust each other, such as direct-indirect, up-down, in-out, and vertical-horizontal. If that is not the case, and collective exhaustive typologies are not possible, at least they need to be as covering as possible (Esaiasson, et. al., 2012, p. 139).

It is important for the researcher to understand and to be open with the fact that an idea analysis always includes some level of *interpretation* of the material, and that the picture drawn by the analysis therefore never is a neutral and completely objective fact. The descriptive idea analysis always includes some *argumentation*, since the interpretation is the researcher's and might not be shared by others (Bergström & Svärd, 2018, p. 141). This is an important fact that the researcher needs to be aware of and open with.

Operationalization

As discussed earlier, I will use a 'mixed method' in this study, where a combination of qualitative and quantitative aspects will be drawn upon. The first two hypotheses are going to be tested quantitatively, while the third hypothesis will be tested both quantitatively and qualitatively.

In order to test the first hypothesis, I will operationalize the procedure as follows: First I use specific keywords on religion to find motions on the issue of religion, in order to detect any change in volume between 2011 and 2020. The keywords chosen are inspired by how the NOREL project set up their set of keywords in their research on religion in Nordic states[1]. I

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[1] Keywords on "Religion", all translated into Swedish (using a * means that all forms of the word have been taken accounted for): religi*, Islam*, Muslim*, Christian*, Jew*, Hindu*, Buddhis*, church*, mosque*, synagogue*, temple, "The Salvation Army", pentacostal, "Jehovah's Witnesses", Jesus, God, Prophet, Buddha, Brahma, Allah, bishop*, priest*, pastor*, imam*, puraji*, purohit*, deacon*, rabbi*, congregation*, worship*, prayer, bible*, quran*, satanis*, angels, meditation, spirit*, "new age",

also separate "Christianity", "Islam" and "Judaism" into three different categories. The percentage of motions on these categories is expected to be different, possibly making a direct comparison somewhat problematic. Even so, the percentage increase in each category will be compared, since the expectation is that it still holds value. In order to test the second hypothesis, keywords on the issue of migration will be added[2]. This makes it possible to see how many of the motions on the issue of religion that are connected to the issue of migration, and how this combination increases or not during the time frame used.

In order to test the third hypothesis, I will operationalize the procedure as follows: First I look at the amount of parliament motions on "Freedom of religion" in order to see if there is any increase during the period investigated[3]. Secondly, a qualitative idea analysis will be conducted. This is necessary since Freedom *to* religion and Freedom *from* religion is not always measured best quantitatively. The distinction between them is sometimes too complex in order to capture change using numeric values. For instance, critics of Freedom *from* religion will in quantitative measures mean a higher ratio on Freedom *from* religion, but in reality, it is rather a case for Freedom *to* religion, which would have been understood with a qualitative study. Hence, a qualitative analysis where words are used instead of numbers increases the reliability of the study. The qualitative idea analysis will begin with a strategic sampling of the motions on "Freedom of religion", using *centrality*, or what Martyn Denscombe (2010, p. 34-36) calls *purposive sampling*. Purposive sampling is well suited for the qualitative part of this study since it operates on the idea that hand-picked sampling based on relevance increases the chance of finding the best valued data. In the case of this study, every year must be represented in the data, making it possible to understand the possible change occurring after 2015. Purposive sampling is also useful in the qualitative part of this study since it makes it possible to focus more narrowly on the parts of the collected data on "Freedom of religion". The data, collected quantitatively, will probably have a variety of

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hijab, niqab, burqa, cross, "the star of david", "the crescent and star", kippa, aum, dharmacakra, dhammacakka, "the dharma wheel", Ramadan, "Yom kippur", Chanukka, holy, secular*, lifestance, humanis*, atheis*

[2] Keywords on "Migration", all translated into Swedish: migra*, immigr*, emigr*, refuge*, asylum*, "unaccompanied minors", "residence permit", citizenship, immigrant*, "quota refuge*", "family reunification", integrat*, assimilat*

[3] Keywords on "Freedom of religion", all translated into Swedish: "Freedom of religion", " Freedom from religion", "Freedom to religion", "negative freedom", "positive freedom"

primary focus issues, all already accounted for in the quantitative analysis. Purposive sampling also makes it possible to single out the parliamentary motions that are more outstanding, for instance, the ones signed by politicians with important positions. Purposive sampling on the data that has Freedom of religion as the primary focus issue will broaden the overall quality of the study.

The motions sampled will then be separated into five different categories, ordered by typological classification. The five categories are: (1) Explicit Freedom *to* religion, (2) Explicit Freedom *from* religion, (3) Implicit Freedom *to* religion, (4) Implicit Freedom *from* religion, and (5) Freedom of religion in general (where there is no discernible tendency for either Freedom *to* religion or Freedom *from* religion). This is where the second motive for a qualitative study comes in. Measuring quantities does not grasp the magnitude of the data either, meaning all motions mentioning Freedom *from* religion or Freedom *to* religion are valued equally. Using qualitative analysis, it is possible to measure the extent of the motions - the different strength and comprehensiveness of the different motions used in the study. The differentiation between Freedom *from* religion and Freedom *to* religion needs to be clear. The meaning of Freedom *from* religion is the right to not adhere to any religion, to not be forced into any religion, and to not be forced to stay within any religion. An increasing emphasis on prohibition is in this study understood as an expression of Freedom *from* religion. The meaning of Freedom *to* religion is the right to adhere to any religion of your choice, the right to be able to express your religion in private or in public, by yourself or together with others, and to do this without persecution in any way. An increasing emphasis on rights is in this study understood as an expression of Freedom *to* religion. An analytic tool formed by two dimensions will be used to find the change, a tool described well by Bergström & Svärd (2018, p. 153-155). The first dimension will measure the strength of the motions (that is how strong the proposals of prohibitions or rights are) and the second dimension will measure the comprehensiveness of the motions (that is how comprehensive the proposals of prohibitions or rights are), as seen in Figure 2. The dimension of "strength" is measuring to what extent the proposals in the motions are demanding, and the dimension of "comprehensiveness" is measuring how wide the proposals in the motion will affect the population. For instance, the proposal of prohibiting a minor branch of a small religion with a few members in Sweden is high on the dimension of "strength" since the people adhering to the faith cannot exercise their Freedom of religion anymore, but low on the dimension of "comprehensiveness" since it will not affect many people. On the opposite, making a minor change on how the subject of

religion is taught in elementary school across the country is high on the dimension of "comprehensiveness" since all children are affected by the change, but low on the dimension of "strength" since the change is so small that not much really changes in reality.

Figure 2. Dimensions on "Strength" and "Comprehensiveness"

By analyzing the motions with the help of this analytic tool, I will be able to understand if there is a qualitative change in the motions on Freedom of religion. The Swedish interpretation of Freedom of religion, which focuses on the individual and the private rather than on the collective and the public (as discussed earlier in the paragraph on the definition of Freedom of religion), will be kept in mind during the analysis. This could, for instance, be issues on Islamic call to prayer, religious clothing in public, and prayer during working hours - all being part of the public and political debate in Sweden during the last few years. While the differentiation between Freedom *from* religion and Freedom *to* religion is clear, there are still gray areas within both of them. This is where this study expects to find a change towards more strength and more comprehensiveness, meaning a move upward and rightward in the graph seen in Figure 2. The change is also expected to be found especially in Freedom *from* religion due to the perception of Islam as a threat and Muslims as the threatening "otherness", as earlier discussed.

Criteria for drawing conclusions

As outlined above, the first and second hypotheses are tested quantitatively, and the third is tested both quantitatively and qualitatively. In order to investigate if the amount of motions on "Religion", "Christianity", "Islam", "Judaism", "Religion" and "Migration", and on "Freedom of religion" did increase between 2011 and 2020, the findings need to be done compared with the development of the total amount of motions in the Swedish Parliament every year. If the increase of parliamentary motions overall were the same as the increase of parliamentary motions in each sampling unit, the increase would not be significant at all. Hence, the change in the total amount of motions in each sampling unit is not of interest, but only the percentage increase of the total amount of parliamentary motions each year. A percentage increase in each of the sampling units is understood as an increased politicisation of religion, and a percentage increase in "Islam" and in "Religion" and "Migration" combined is understood as an increasing correlation between the issues of religion and migration.

The criteria for drawing conclusions from the qualitative study is based on the change in strength and comprehensiveness in the motions of Freedom of religion, where emphasis on rights is understood as Freedom *to* religion, and emphasis on prohibition is understood as Freedom *from* Religion, in line with the definitions of Freedom *to* religion and Freedom *from* religion earlier outlined in this study. As discussed earlier, here the researcher needs to be aware and open with the fact that idea analysis always includes a level of interpretation and argumentation. The material and the picture drawn by the researcher are not neutral nor completely objective, and might not be shared by others (Bergström & Svärd, 2018, p. 141). In this study, a clear analytical tool, transparency, and the complimentary use of quantitative content analysis are mitigating this problem. An increasing strength and comprehensiveness on rights in Freedom *to* religion and on prohibition in Freedom *from* religion is understood as an increased politicisation of religion, and higher growth in emphasis on Freedom *from* religion is understood as an increasing correlation between the issues of religion and migration.

Validity and reliability

In order to achieve a high level of validity and reliability in research, actions must be taken to minimize systemic and non-systemic measuring problems (Teorell & Svensson, 2007, p. 55-

57). Validity could be defined in two different ways: *Concept validity* - that the theory is matching the operationalization of the analytical tool, leading to the absence of systematic errors; and *Results validity* - that the study really is measuring what it is intended to measure (Esaiasson, et. al., p. 55-60). If the concept validity is high and the reliability is high, meaning the absence of un-systematic or randomized errors, the results validity is also high, and the results are a measurement of what the study wanted to measure (Esaiasson, et. al., 2012, p. 63-65). Using both qualitative and quantitative aspects in the study increases both the validity and the reliability of the results. Qualitative methods focus on a smaller number of data and therefore bring depth to the analysis, increasing the validity. Quantitative methods focus on a bigger amount of data and therefore bring width to the analysis, increasing the reliability (Teorell & Svensson, 2007, p. 264-270).

Results

In this chapter, the results of the data will be presented. First, the data on parliamentary motions in total will be presented and discussed, making it possible for the rest of the quantitative data to be compared with it. Secondly, the coding conducted through quantitative content analysis will be in focus, where the data on religion and migration will be presented with graphs, making the data more visual and therefore easier to understand. Lastly, I will turn the focus to the qualitative idea analysis, where the data on "Freedom of religion" will be presented and examined with a table, and the qualitative change in strength and comprehensiveness in the motions of "Freedom *from* religion" (prohibition) and of "Freedom *to Religion*" (rights) will be presented with the help of quotes from the motions. In the next chapter, an analysis of the findings will be conducted.


Figure 3. Total amount of motions in the Swedish Parliament, from 2011 to 2020

The amount of motions in the Swedish parliament has been increasing during the last decade, as seen in Figure 3. From 2011 to 2020, the amount increased by 12.0%. But the data also show that the amount was lowest the year of a general election (in 2014 and 2018) and then increasing every year until the top the year before a general election (in 2013 and 2017). This made the percentage increase from the year 2011 to the year 2020 skewed since 2011 is a year after a general election whilst 2020 is right in between two general elections. While

starting the measuring in 2012, the increase was therefore a bit smaller, but still an increase of 8.4%. This increase in percent is only presented as an indication of the overall increase. It should not be compared to the upcoming data presented, as that is the percentage of the total amount of motions overall.

Figure 4. Share of parliamentary motions on "Religion" of the total amount of parliamentary motions, from 2011 to 2020

Looking at the data on parliamentary motions on "Religion", presented in Figure 4, there is a visible increase during the last decade. In 2011, 35.28% of the total amount of motions referred to "Religion", increasing to 41.29% in 2020. This means an percentage increased by 17.04% from 2011 to 2020. As seen in Figure 4, the percentage of motions saw a minor decrease from 2011 to 2014, before it in 2015 started to increase. This increase continued every year up to 2020, slowing down a bit in the last two years.

Figure 5. Share of parliamentary motions on "Christianity" of the total amount of parliamentary motions, from 2011 to 2020

So far so clear that the issue of religion is getting more attention in parliamentary motions. But in order to understand if there is any big difference between different religions, three different coding measurements were required. Here I separated "Christianity", "Islam" and "Judaism" from each other and looked at their trend over the last decade. First, "Christianity", presented in Figure 5, has increased from 8.26% in 2011 to 9.91% in 2020, which means an increase by 19,98%. The increase was not very stable but had three years where most of it accrued - 2013, 2015, and 2020. It also saw a drastic decrease in 2014 and a slowly decreasing tendency from 2016 to 2018.

Figure 6. Share of parliamentary motions on "Islam" of the total amount of parliamentary motions from 2011 to 2020

Second, looking at the results from "Islam", presented in Figure 6, a clearly increasing trend is visible. The percentage increased from 1.07% in 2011 to 3.38% in 2020, which means an increase of 174.8%. The increase is rather stable, with two years of major increase (2015 and 2018) and two years of minor decrease (2017 and 2019). The increase in percentage needs to be compared with the increase in percentage of "Christianity" with care since the percentage is at a much lower level. Even so, the increase in motions on "Islam" is arguably drastic.

Figure 7. Share of parliamentary motions on "Judaism" of the total amount of parliamentary motions from 2011 to 2020

Lastly, investigating the data on "Judaism", presented in Figure 7, the increasing trend is visible. From a percentage of 0.59% in 2011 to a percentage of 1.35% in 2020, means an increase of 128.81%. As seen in Figure 7, the percentage was stable between 2011 to 2016 and saw the increase drastically start in 2018. The percentage more than doubled between 2016 and 2018. The increase in percentage on "Judaism" starts from even lower levels than on "Islam", but the percentage of change is still not as high. Even so, there is arguably a rather drastic increase in the last decade regarding motions on "Judaism".

Figure 8. Share of parliamentary motions on "Religion" and "Migration" of the total amount of parliamentary motions from 2011 to 2020

The issue of religion is clearly getting more attention in parliamentary motions during the last decade, and the increasing trend is visible in all three religions measured. In order to investigate if the issue of religion is increasingly related to the issue of migration, the recording units which combines the keywords on "Religion" and keywords on "Migration" was used. As presented in Figure 8, the percentage increased from 5.95% in 2011 to 10.23% in 2020, meaning an increase of 71.93%. Between 2011 and 2014 the percentage decreased, before drastically increasing in 2015. Between 2014 and 2015 the percentage increase from 5.56% to 12.4%, meaning an increase of 123.02%. In 2016 it decreased to a percentage of 9.42% and has been fairly stable until 2020. This development arguably has a strong correlation to the European refugee crisis in 2015.

Figure 9. Share of parliamentary motions on "Freedom of religion" of the total amount of parliamentary motions from 2011 to 2020

The percentage of parliamentary motions on "Freedom of religion" also showed an increasing trend, as presented in Figure 9. The percentage increased from 0.41% in 2011 to 1.32% in 2020, meaning an increase of 221.95%. There has been a rather stable increase, but with two years of major increases (2014 and 2018). The increase starts from a low level in 2011, which should be taken into consideration when considering the increase up to 2020. But even so, the last decade saw a rather drastic development of motions on "Freedom of religion".

Table 1. Typologies of Freedom of religion

Year	Explicit Freedom *to* religion	Explicit Freedom *from* religion	Implicit Freedom *to* religion	Implicit Freedom *from* religion	Freedom of religion in general	Total
2011	4	2	0	1	1	8
2012	6	4	0	2	0	12
2013	5	4	0	1	0	10
2014	8	3	0	0	3	14
2015	4	4	1	0	4	13
2016	4	5	0	1	1	11
2017	5	5	0	3	2	15
2018	4	8	1	3	2	18
2019	4	8	3	2	1	18
2020	8	12	1	2	2	25

Of the total amount of the 318 parliamentary motions on "Freedom of religion" between 2011 and 2020, 144 was found using centralizing and purposive sampling to be of interest for the qualitative idea analysis in this study. The categorization of them is stapled and presented in Table 1, where these 144 motions represented all years in the study. The findings show an overall increase in the number of parliamentary motions on "Freedom *from* religion, and a stable development on parliamentary motions on "Freedom *to* religion". Motions explicitly on Freedom *from* religion were stable during 2011-2017, only to increase drastically from 2018 to 2020. Several parliamentary parties were represented in these motions. The two standout parliamentary parties were the Christian Democrats (CD) and the Sweden Democrats (SD), but The Moderate Party (M) was also represented in a large matter. The Liberal Party (L), The Left Party (LP), and The Social Democrats (S) were also represented in the motions.

Now I will turn to the results of the idea analysis of the parliamentary motions on "Freedom *from* religion" and on "Freedom *to* religion", in order to understand if the proposals presented in them are increasing in strength and comprehensiveness. Since the motions are written in Swedish, I have translated all quotes.

Freedom *to* religion

The amount of parliamentary motions on Freedom *to* religion is not changing to any large extent, but the ideas that the motions are built upon is. Parliamentary motions on Freedom *to* religion is mostly focusing on the prosecution and protection of Christians. In the early years of the data, the focus was mainly internationally, on foreign policy and the work in the UN and the EU. This is mainly due to the ongoing situation in the Middle East and the Syrian war leading to that many Christians fled the region. Many of these parliament motions are holding Freedom *to* religion very high, and asks for more work by the Swedish government, exemplified in this parliamentary motion from the Christian Democrats:

> With this in mind, the Swedish government, in its contacts with those in power in the Middle East, must be quick to affirm the right to protection of individuals and religious minorities against any act of persecution due to religious affiliation. (Motion 2013/14:U254)

There are also recurrent parliamentary motions through the years that focus on the issue that Sweden is not taking Freedom *to* religion seriously enough, not in the international nor the national arena, and that Swedes have a hard time understanding the prosecution of religious people in other parts of the world, which is visualized in the parliamentary motion from M:

> Like the other fundamental freedoms, Freedom of religion is something that everyone benefits from, because it creates the conditions for peace, democratization, development and other human rights (...) It is easy to take Freedom of religion for granted, and it can be difficult for us who live in Sweden to familiarize ourselves with the conditions that millions of people experience every day. (Motion 2012/13:U259)

This quote points towards the idea that the Swedish population is having a hard time understanding that many suffer from prosecution due to their religious faith, highlighting the idea that Sweden is a secular country with not only non-existing religious persecution, but with a primarily non-religious population that is lacking knowledge on the issue. In this parliamentary motion though, the argument is used to argue for an enhanced focus on the issue internationally:

> Sweden should to a greater extent than today prioritize issues of Freedom of religion, as this also provides better conditions for achieving results in other foreign policy priorities (...) One way to seriously

integrate the issue is to create the conditions for, implement and report the results of an active integration of Freedom of religion issues in foreign policy and development cooperation. (Motion 2012/13:U259)

The parliamentary motions focusing on the international arena are growing in both strength and comprehensiveness during the years covered in this study. There are calls for new country strategies for international programs in aid and education in Freedom of religion for all Swedish diplomats working abroad (Motion 2019/20:3157), based on "*the fact that a majority of the world's population describes themselves as religious and that religious leaders often inspire the greatest trust among different groups*". There are also calls for that all work through SIDA (Swedish International Development Agency) should focus more on Freedom *to* religion (Motion 2019/20:38) and that Sweden should appoint a UN delegate (Motion 2019/20:1280) and an ambassador (Motion 2018/19:2777) on Freedom of religion. The UN delegate should have the mission to "*map the threats and persecution against Christian residents and with the task of developing an action plan to protect and secure the existence of Christian residents in several places in the world...*" (Motion 2019/20:1280), and the ambassador on Freedom of religion should be able to "*make demands when trade agreements are concluded, or condemn regimes that oppress religious minorities*" (Motion 2018/19:2777). These parliamentary motions show the increase in strength and comprehensiveness that motions on Freedom *to* religion have during 2011-2020.

Up until 2016, the focus was mostly internationally, but from 2016 it was also directed at a national level, and the protection of Christian refugees arriving in Sweden during the European refugee crisis is addressed both by S and CD (Motion 2016/17:1867, Motion 2016/17:3398), an issue addressed every year up to 2020. In 2020, CD also filed a parliamentary motion with the proposal of a national investigation regarding Christophobia, where they call to "*promptly initiate a survey of Swedish Christophobia, including analysis of the underlying causes and proposals for measures against ignorance, prejudice and hate crimes with Chrostophobic motives*" (Motion 2020/21:491). Apart from this, there are parliamentary motions almost every year lifting that fact that Freedom of conscience is part of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and that it should be discussed in Sweden as well, focusing on nurses' obligation to conduct abortion.

Freedom *from* religion

Unlike the parliamentary motions on Freedom *to* religion, the amount of motions on Freedom *from* religion has been increasing, especially since 2018. The overall theme of these motions during the last decade has been regarding different prohibitions against religious actions from Muslims. SD is in 2012 the only parliament party calling for a ban of Islamic call for prayer in all of Sweden, a motion that returns with minor or zero changes every year since. This motion is formed around the idea that Islam is not compatible with the Swedish values, since Sweden is a historically Christian characterized country, a fact that cannot be ignored:

> Freedom of religion is also a freedom from coercion, a freedom from religious expression and religious propaganda in the public sphere. The latter is also particularly relevant as Islam has time and time again proved to be incompatible with our Western values of, for example, democracy and gender equality. (Motion 2012/13:K356)

In 2018, CD also started to write motions problematizing the Islamic call to prayer (Motion 2018/19:1751). The right to not adhere to any religion is clear in this motion, in a way that has not been seen in the party's motions earlier:

> (…) and Freedom of religion is also the right to not have a religious belief. One should be able to choose to refrain from being repeatedly met with religious creeds and pressure. People should therefore not involuntarily have to hear regular prayer calls when being at home or out in their own residential area. (Motion 2018/19:1751)

In this motion, and several other motions on the issue written years earlier and years later, it is not uncommon that the Islamic call for prayer is compared to the Christian church bells. The argument in the motions is that the difference between them is big since the Islamic call to prayer is not just a call to prayer, but also a message to the whole residential area that they belong to the religion. It is also common with arguments in motions that faith is a private matter, and only a private matter, and that the individual adhering to any religion should hence conduct religious matters on private grounds. In some motions, it is suggested that refugees arriving in Sweden must have known that Sweden is a secular country (sometimes the phrase "secular society" is used) and that that is the reason they choose to migrate to Sweden. The overall call for in motions is that the Islamic call to prayer should be prohibited

since it violates people's Freedom *from* religion and that it hinders the integration of Muslims into Swedish society.

Another phenomenon that gets increasingly mentioned is children's right to not be forced into religion and their right to not encounter religion in schools. SD is first to mention the issue between 2011 and 2020 when they 2013 argued that private confessional schools should be prohibited to conduct religious activities during school time (Motion 2013/14:Ub582). In 2016, the argument in parliamentary motions from SD on the issue has changed. Now the call for a ban of all confessional schools, and a ban for religious organisations to run schools (Motion 2016/17:2257). The idea is that confessional schools hinder the integration of immigrant children and second-generation immigrants since they oppose the Swedish secular tradition which has made Sweden immune to negative religious impact on the society, such as religious fanaticism, honor-based violence, oppression of women, antisemitism, etc. That is why there needs to be a ban on all confessional schools:

> We can in no way let faith take the precedence over science or accept that groups of people are relegated to a community based on religious fundamentalism. Society today needs tools to reduce segregation, not increase it, which is why confessional schools are directly inappropriate (...) To ensure functioning integration of new arrivals and their children in the society, as well as strengthen the humanistic parts of the school curriculum, the government should therefore ban all confessional independent schools in Sweden. (Motion 2016/17:2257)

SD is hence going from calling for a ban of religious activities during school time for confessional schools in 2013 to calling for the ban of confessional schools entirely in 2016. This is an increasing development in both strength and comprehensiveness. In 2020, S (Motion 2020/21:1474) calls for a ban of confessional schools with similar arguments. In a motion from LP in 2017 (Motion 2017/18:2339), the call for a ban of all confessional schools and for all religious symbols in schools was made. Their overall idea is similar to SD's, that it hinders integration and democratic development in the country. LP though adds the reason that confessional schools hinder religious children to exercise their faith. In another motion from LP (Motion 2017/18:3186) it is argued that schools should not bond to any ideology or religion, but be based on science and "*... on the equal value of all people, which some schools today are not. When girls and boys are already separated on the bus on the way to and from school (...) the school's curriculum falls*". This separation of boys and girls is in other motions from LP called "gender apartheid" (Motions 2018/19:370) and is pointing towards

the other main argument for prohibiting confessional schools - the equality problem between boys and girls and the violation of girls' human rights through religious constraints. Overall, more parliament parties, and more motions from these parties, calls for the ban of confessional schools, increasing the issue in strength and comprehensiveness.

In a motion from 2012, SD was the first party in this study's time frame to call for a ban of Islamic veils for girls in public schools. The idea in this motion is similar to ideas in the upcoming motions calling for a ban of the Islamic veil up until 2020, revolving around the idea that the Islamic veil is a religious symbol that sexualize and oppresses women and girls, which is exemplified well here:

> The Islamic veil is a symbol with both a strong religious and political message, with a meaning that goes against the Western values of men and women's equal value. Its purpose is to cover girls and women in order to not arouse the desires of men. This is an approach that both objectifies all women and considers men as primitive beings whose sexual drive cannot be controlled. This in itself is a view of humans we in no way can stand behind. In addition, when young girls are also expected to wear this symbol, this means nothing more than that the sexualized objectification is already applied to girl children. This is of course completely unacceptable in a society that stands up for children's right to be children. (Motion 2012/13:A394)

SD was first with parliamentary motions problematizing Islamic veils on children, and they were the only parliament party with parliament motions until 2019 when a motion from M also brought it up as an issue. In 2019 and 2020, M wrote motions calling for a governmental investigation on the prohibition of Islamic veils on girls in preschools and elementary schools (Motion 2019/20:3374, Motion 2020/21:3514). In the motions, it is argued that many countries are standing up for women's freedom in their ban of Islamic veils in elementary schools, and that Sweden should consider doing that as well. They point out that this has nothing at all to do with Freedom of religion or immigration hostility, but that:

> The Islamic veil is basically a symbol of oppression of women. Hair and body are covered so that girls and women do not arouse the desire of men (...) Why should we allow a symbol that discriminates half of the world's population? We must not be so tolerant that we tolerate the intolerant. (Motion 2019/2020:3374)

But parliament motions on Islamic veils are not limited to schools. In 2018, L (Motion 2018/19:2923) wrote under the title "The limits of Freedom of religion" that employers

should be able to restrict specific clothing if necessary, and SD (Motion 2020/21:639) wrote a motion that all governmental work should be neutral, meaning that religious clothing should be forbidden. In 2018, CD (Motion 2018/19:2972) calls for an investigation on the legislation on discrimination, since it is not clear enough in regards to religious aspects. In the motion, it is argued that religious people consider themselves discriminated against when they cannot use Islamic veils at work or when they do not want to greet others through the use of handshakes, which is a problem since it should not be a case of discrimination. The Swedish habit of *" greeting each other by looking in the eyes and taking each other by the hand"* is a sign of respect and a sign of gender equality, which creates trust and cohesion between people (Motion 2018/19:2972). In the motion, it is argued that employers should be able to deny employment to people not accepting these habits, and the argument is based on the idea that *"Freedom of religion, for example, is also the right to not have or convey a religious belief"*. Apart from this, in 2016 M (Motion 2016/17:3547) wrote a motion calling for that the exception to the masking ban on sport contexts based on religion should be removed since it can be used by non-religious people in order to cover their face while conducting illegal matters. The problematization of Islamic veils is overall increasing in strength and comprehensiveness by being mentioned by more parties and in more areas in society.

In 2019, a motion from SD (Motion 2019/20:3195) called for a change in the Swedish constitution, so that it is clearly states that Sweden is a secular country. In the same motion, it is called for a change in the legislation on Freedom of religion, so that it becomes clear that it also includes Freedom *from* religion (in a similar motion from 2020, the call for change in the constitution on Sweden as a secular country is erased (Motion 2020/21:2882)). It is argued in the motion that religion has been given a special position in Swedish society. The idea is that faith only exists collectively and that it is in opposition to science. There are clear indicators that religion has become something that is considered a problem in society:

> Faith is based on the fact that a number of people collectively is believing it to be true, but it can disappear if the common perception ceases. In other words, unlike science, it exists only because there is a belief, not because it is facts. Despite the fact that the vast majority agree with this, religion has been given a special position in society. (Motion 2019/2020:3195)

In the motion, it is stated that special treatment on a religious basis is happening in the Swedish secular society, and that this is a big problem. For instance, examples when it comes

to gender equality and for the Freedom of religion, meaning Freedom *from* religion is brought up. It is stated in the motion that: *"Religion is a private matter, but when religion becomes politics, it is no longer a private matter, then it concerns everyone. For a secular country like Sweden, it is extremely important that politics and religion are kept separate in the legislation"* (Motion 2019/2020:3195). Sweden is portrayed as one of the most secular countries in the world, but that the Swedish Christian heritage, and hence Swedish values, are important for Swedes, while religion in its essence is to be considered history. These are proposals that raise the strength and comprehensiveness even higher regarding the issue of religion since it is a change in the constitution and in one of the strongest human rights in the Swedish legislation. Islam or Muslims are not mentioned in the motion, but it is obvious that the issue is primarily here. Specially adapted food in public catering, gender-segregated activities, or offensive and recurring propaganda from a certain religion in loudspeakers is mentioned, pointing clearly to Islam. And there are more parliamentary motions on Freedom *from* religion that does not single out any religion, motions that are covering areas such as stricter control or prohibition of religious schools, prohibition of religious symbols in schools, the end of school graduations in Swedish Churches, and stop of state contribution to religious organization overall or to specific religious organizations that do not follow and adhere to democratic values. No religion is singled out in these parliamentary motions, but the fact that the different areas to which they are focusing are increasing, that they are growing in total numbers, that the amount of parliament parties writing these motions are increasing in total numbers, and that most of this development happens after 2015 makes the claim that the European refugee crisis and the increasing Muslim migration to Sweden have sparked the political debate on and increased the politicisation of religion and Freedom of religion more valid.

Analysis

In this chapter, the analysis of the findings will be conducted. First, the focus will be on the quantitative findings where a content analysis will test the first and the second hypotheses. Second, the focus will be on the quantitative findings on "Freedom of religion", and then on the qualitative idea analysis in order to test the third hypothesis.

The first hypothesis in this study was two fold - first that political parties' references to religion in general would increase, and secondly that the increase would be more significant in other religions than Christianity. The data indicate that there is support for both of these statements, and hence for the first hypothesis. The percentage of parliamentary motions on "Religion" increased from 35.28% in 2011 to 41.29% in 2020, meaning an increase of 17.04%. As seen in Figure 4, the motions on "Religion" first started to increase in 2015, coming from a few years of stable numbers. This has an interesting correlation with the peak of the European refugee crisis in 2015. Parliamentary motions on "Christianity" also increased during the period investigated. In 2011, the percentage of motions was 8.26%, which increasing to 9.91% in 2020, meaning an increase of 19.98% during this period. As seen in Figure 5, most of the increase came during three years - 2013, 2015, and 2020. Apart from this, there was a drastic decrease in 2014 and a minor decreasing trend occurring from 2016 to 2018. Unlike the motions on "Religion", there was no visible correlation to the European refugee crisis in 2015. The parliamentary motions on "Islam" had a much faster development. From a percentage of 1.07% in 2011 to a percentage of 3.38% in 2020, the increase was 174.8%. Looking at Figure 6, it is visible that the increase was rather stable during this period, with the only noticeable major increase in 2015 and 2018, and a minor decrease in 2017 and 2019. The increase in 2015 is especially interesting due to the European refugee crisis that year. Looking at the parliamentary motions on "Judaism", the increasing trend also occurred there. In 2011, the percentage was 0.59%, which increased to 1.35% in 2020. This means that the motions on "Judaism" increased by 128.81% during this period. Visible in Figure 7, almost all of the increase occurred between 2016 and 2018, with rather stable development before and after those years, but on a higher level after. It is important to note that the increase of parliamentary motions on "Islam" and especially on "Judaism" started from a low level in 2011, making the percentage increase more intense than for "Christianity", which started at a much higher level. This means that the comparison between the different religions needs to be done with care. Interestingly, the percentage increase

during the last decade is much stronger for "Islam" than it is for "Judaism", even though the percentage of motions on "Judaism" in 2011 was much lower than for "Islam" the same year. Noted here, parliamentary motions on "Judaism" were on a stable level up until 2016, just to more than double the percentage between 2016 and 2018. Even though the comparison is difficult, parliamentary motions on "Judaism" and in particular on "Islam", has increased faster than parliamentary motions on "Christianity". Parliamentary motions on "Religion" overall also increased, which means that there is support for the first hypothesis.

The second hypothesis was stipulated towards the issue of migration and its correlations with the issue of religion. In order to test if the correlation increased or not during the last decade, I measured the percentage of parliamentary motions on both "Religion" and "Migration" of the total amount of parliamentary motions. In 2011, the percentage was 5.95%, which increased to 10.23% in 2020. This means that during this period motions on "Religion" and "Migration" increased by 71.93%. But as can be seen in Figure 8, almost all increase occurred in 2015. From a percentage of 5.56% in 2014, it increased to a percentage of 12.4%, which means that motions on "Religion" and "Migration" increased by 123.02% the year the European refugee crisis peaked. In 2016 the percentage decreased to 9.42% but has since been slowly increasing up to 2020, staying on a much higher level than before 2015. The drastic development in 2015 indicates that the European refugee crisis had an instant impact on the amount of parliamentary motions connecting the issue of migration with the issue of religion. The data found shows that there is support for the second hypothesis.

The third hypothesis was stipulated against the issue of Freedom of religion, where I expected to find that parliament parties' references to Freedom of religion had increased, and that the parties increasingly emphasized Freedom *from* religion more than Freedom *to* religion. This hypothesis was tested both quantitatively and qualitatively. First, I measured the percentage of parliamentary motions on "Freedom of religion" of the total amount of parliamentary motions, in line with how I measured the parliamentary motions on the first and second hypotheses. Visible in Figure 9, the parliamentary motions on "Freedom of religion" saw a clear increase during the last decade. From 2011 and a percentage of 0.41% to 2020 and a percentage of 1.32%, the increase was 221.95%. The increase started from a low level of percentage in 2011, making the increase look very fast in percentage. Even though it is, it should not without care be compared to other percentage increases presented earlier in this study. However, this development supports the first part of the hypothesis.

Next, the qualitative findings presented in Table 1 show an overall increase in the amount of parliamentary motions on "Freedom *from* religion", and stable development on parliamentary motions on "Freedom *to* religion". While the amount of parliamentary motions on Freedom *to* religion is not changing to any large extent between 2011 and 2020, there is a change in the ideas that are presented in the motions. First of all, the focus was to a large extent on Christians. In the first years of the time frame, the proposals in the motions were primarily directed towards international work, in the UN, and the EU. The Syrian war and the situation in the Middle East led to Christian refugees that according to the motions were not taken seriously enough by the Swedish government. Education in Freedom of religion for all Swedish diplomats working abroad, more focus on religion in all work done by SIDA, and the appointment of a UN delegate and an ambassador on Freedom of religion were all proposals which should enhance the work on the rights contained in Freedom of religion. From 2016 and onwards, the proposals in the motions were also directed nationally, towards the protection of Christian refugees arriving in Sweden. In 2020, a proposal of a national investigation on Christophobia was argued for in a motion.

The overall focus is that the issue of religion, with a focus on Freedom *to* religion, has been neglected by Sweden, both internationally and nationally, which is visible in the parliamentary motions on Freedom *to* religion used in this study. It is also clear that it is Christianity that is threatened, and Christians that are persecuted both internationally and nationally. The proposals in these motions overall are to enhance the discussion on the issue of Freedom of religion in all areas of politics, to demand more protection of Christians internationally, and to protect Christian refugees arriving in Sweden during the European refugee crisis. The parliamentary motions are increasing in strength and comprehensiveness on many levels, and from 2016 onwards, the focus is not only internationally but also on Sweden, which likely has been affected by the European refugee crisis and the increasing amount of Muslim immigrants.

While the amount of motions on Freedom *to* Religion did not change to any large extent, the opposite was true for motions on Freedom *from* Religion. From 2011 to 2020 it increased, especially from 2018 and onwards. The overall theme was different prohibition against religious action from Muslims. As presented in the results, all these proposals increased in strength and comprehensiveness during the time frame. The prohibition of the Islamic call for

prayer intensified both in argument and in scope, and increased in both the number of parties and amount of motions suggesting it. The same could be said for the issue of confessional schools, as the proposals went from stricter control to prohibition, and for a ban of Islamic veils on girls in schools. The main argument for these proposals of prohibition was that it goes against the right to avoid facing religion in everyday life, against gender equality, and that it hinders the integration into the Swedish society. These proposals of prohibition are motivated by what Ivanescu (2010) found to be the primary driving force of politicisation of religion, namely willingness from the country to integrate the immigrants, and by what she found to be secondary, namely Muslims collective and public expression of their faith. Other proposals, such as that all governmental work should be neutral and free from religious clothing, was motivated by the argument that religion is a private matter that individuals should practice in their private time and space. This privatisation of religion in secular countries such as Sweden has led to problems of integration of Muslim immigrants, which is what Sigurdson (2009) and Casanova (2007) are highlighting, as discussed earlier in this study.

The clearest sign of increased strength and comprehensiveness in proposals on prohibition in motions on Freedom *from* Religion came in 2019 and 2020 when motions were written with the proposal of changing the constitution in the way making it clear that Sweden is a secular country, and of changing the legislation of Freedom of religion so that it includes the term Freedom *from* Religion. In this motion, and many other motions, Muslims or Islam were not mentioned. Even so, there are clear signs that the issue is directed towards them, as activities in schools where boys and girls are separated, special food in public catering, and offensive and recurring propaganda from religious loudspeakers are some of the problems highlighted in them. Overall, the findings indicate that parliament motions on Freedom *from* religion are increasing in strength and comprehensiveness in the proposals of prohibition, and that parliament parties increasingly emphasize "Freedom *from* religion" more than "Freedom *to* religion", during the time frame of this study.

Concluding discussion

The religious landscape in Sweden is changing. Globalization and increased Muslim migration have increased the religious pluralism in Sweden, and the political parties in the Swedish parliament are reacting to it. This study has been investigating how this materializes in parliament motions between 2011 and 2020, connecting the issue of religion to the issue of migration. The purpose was to understand to what extent parties in the Swedish Parliament politicise religion due to the migration of Muslims, and was intended to contribute to the knowledge on how religion is used in politics, contributing to the ongoing discussion on the 'return' of religion in politics by connecting the issue to the refugee crisis in 2015.

Three hypotheses were stipulated and tested: (1) The parliament parties' reference to religion in general, and to other religions than Christianity in particular, has increased, (2) the parliament parties' reference has been increasingly related to the issue of migration, and (3) the parliament parties reference to Freedom of religion has increased, and the parties are increasingly emphasizing Freedom *from* religion more than Freedom *to* religion. The data, and the analysis conducted upon it, was found to be supporting all three hypotheses, but with some caveats.

As seen in Figure 4, the parliament parties in Sweden are increasingly bringing up the issue of religion, and the data found is showing a rather substantial development. Interestingly, the increasing development is first starting in 2015 indicating a correlation to the European refugee crisis. Looking at the different religions included in this study, "Christianity", "Islam" and "Judaism", it is clear that neither "Christianity" nor "Judaism", Figure 5 and Figure 7, is the driving force in that change in 2015 and 2016, but rather "Islam" as seen in Figure 6. This also indicates that a correlation to the refugee crisis, with its increasing Muslim migration. Parliamentary motions on "Judaism" saw a fast increase between 2017-2018. Even though the increasing amount of motions are a fact, there are some problems with comparing the different religions to each other. Parliamentary motions on both "Islam" and "Judaism" are on a much lower percentage level of the total amount of parliamentary motions than "Christianity" is, making their increase in percentage much bigger. This weakens the quality of the first hypothesis, since a comparison between the three religions is difficult. Even so, the trend is clear and the data suggest that hypothesis 1 is supported. Looking at the motions on "Religion" and "Migration", seen in Figure 8, the increasing correlation between

the issue of religion and the issue of migration becomes even more clear. The drastically increasing amount of motions on the issue of religion and the issue of migration combined that occurred in 2015 is a clear sign of change. But since the refugee crisis was such an important event, most issues probably increased in correlation to the issue of migration this year. The increase is though significant, and the fact that the percentage remained at a much higher level after 2015 indicates support for the second hypothesis.

The parliament parties' references to Freedom of religion also increased during this period, as seen in Figure 9. A big proportion of the increase happened in 2014, making the correlation to the European refugee crisis non-existent. The fact that it stayed on these high levels after 2014 and increased even more since 2018, indicates that the increasing relevance of Freedom of religion is here to stay. Looking at Table 1, it is also clear that parliament parties are increasingly focusing on Freedom *from* religion while Freedom *to* religion is remaining on a stable level. The analysis of the parliamentary motions on Freedom *to* religion also showed that the proposals in the motions are increasing in both strength and comprehensiveness during this period. Motions on Freedom *to* religion is demanding more focus on the issue of religion both internationally - with education for diplomats and integration of the issue of religion in the work done by the government in other countries, and stronger protection of persecuted Christians - and nationally - with better protection of Christians being persecuted, mostly focusing on Christian refugees arriving during the European refugee crisis in 2015 or afterwards. Motions on Freedom *from* religion are increasing in its prohibition of particularly Muslim attributes. While the proposal of prohibiting Islamic call to prayer and Islamic veils on girls in schools or on women in different workplaces are obviously directed at Islam, the proposal of controlling or prohibiting confessional schools is more or less also clearly directed at Islam due to the argument for it - that it is better for successful integration. Invanescu's (2010) study on politicisation of religion, with a focus on Islam and Muslims, showed that it was primarily this willingness to integrate Muslim migrants that increased politicisation of religion in the Netherlands, and the idea that Islam is a religion expressed collectively and publicly was only secondary. This separation was difficult to do in this study, but both of these aspects were clearly part of the politicisation of religion found in this study. The proposal of changing the constitution in a way making it clear that Sweden is a secular country and changing the Swedish legislation on Freedom of religion, where the term Freedom *from* religion was proposed to be included, is also a clear sign of increased emphasis

on Freedom *from* religion, and a clear increase in strength and comprehensiveness. All things covered, the data and the analysis indicates that there is support for the third hypothesis.

In Lindberg's study (2014) on politicisation of religion in Scandinavia during 1988-2009, he found that Sweden was the one country that did not have a substantial increase during this period. Both Norway and Denmark did though, and Lindberg concluded that globalization and migration were not the driving force for increased politicisation of religion, but rather a right-wing populist party in the Parliament (Lindberg, 2014, p. 581). Hence, Lindberg predicted a similar development occurring in Sweden from 2010, when the Sweden Democrats entered the Swedish Parliament. This study found this prediction to be true, but the increasing development did not really pick up speed until 2015 and the European refugee crisis, making the case that migration did have a part in the increasing politicisation of religion during the last decade, unlike the two decades before investigated by Lindberg.

The time frame used in this study might have had some unintended implications for the data used. Since the Sweden Democrats first entered the parliament in 2010, members of the parliament from that party could start writing motions in 2011. Hence, the amount of motions overall could have increased from that year. Also relevant to this is that the party had a major part of the total amount of motions on the issue of religion. This does not have any implication on the trend from 2011 and forward, hence not having a negative impact on this study, but comparisons to data on parliamentary motions before that could become a skewed. Future research on politicisation of religion should most certainly find value in other material than parliamentary motions, for instance party programs and parliamentary debates, and in connecting the issue of religion to other issues than migration. Also, this study has not had its focus on how the different political parties in the Swedish Parliament politicise religion, even though it has not neglected to mention its relevance. Going forward, analyzing how parties according to ideological tradition use religion in politics is much relevant in order to increase the understanding of the "return" of religion in politics.

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Motion 2017/18:3186. Hedersförtryck, utbildningsinsatser och samhällsorientering. Recieved
from https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/dokument-lagar/dokument/motion/hedersfortryck-utbildningsinsatser-och_H5023186

Motion 2018/19:2777. Utgiftsområde 5 Internationell samverkan. Recieved from
https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/dokument-lagar/dokument/motion/utgiftsomrade-5-
internationell-samverkan_H6022777

Motion 2018/19:1751. Stoppa offentliga böneutrop. Recieved from
https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/dokument-lagar/dokument/motion/stoppa-offentliga-boneutrop-
_H6021751

Motion 2018/19:370. En jämställd skola och ett samhälle utan barn- och tvångsäktenskap.
Recieved from https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/dokument-lagar/dokument/motion/en-jamstalld-
skola-och-ett-samhalle-utan-barn-_H602370

Motion 2018/19:2923. Liberal integrationspolitik: stärk individen och motverka
parallellsamhällen. Recieved from https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/dokument-
lagar/dokument/motion/liberal-integrationspolitik-stark-indviden-och_H6022923

Motion 2019/20:3157. Utgiftsområde 7 Internationellt bistånd. Recieved from
https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/dokument-lagar/dokument/motion/utgiftsomrade-7-
internationellt-bistand_H7023157

Motion 2019/20:38. Förföljelse av kristna. Recieved from
https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/dokument-lagar/dokument/motion/forfoljelse-av-kristna--
_H70238

Motion 2019/20:1280. Förföljelse av kristna. Recieved from
https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/dokument-lagar/dokument/motion/forfoljelse-av-
kristna_H7021280

Motion 2019/20:3374. Utred slöjförbud i grundskolor och förskolor. Recieved from
https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/dokument-lagar/dokument/motion/utred-slojforbud-i-
grundskolor-och-forskolor_H7023374

Motion 2019/20:3195. Religionsfrihet på riktigt. Recieved from
https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/dokument-lagar/dokument/motion/religionsfrihet-pa-riktigt_H7023195

Motion 2020/21:491. Kartläggning av kristofobi i Sverige. Recieved from
https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/dokument-lagar/dokument/motion/kartlaggning-av-kristofobi-i-sverige_H802491

Motion 2020/21:1474. Religiösa friskolor. Recieved from
https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/dokument-lagar/dokument/motion/religiosa-friskolor_H8021474

Motion 2020/21:3514. Utred slöjförbud i grundskolor och förskolor. Recieved from
https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/dokument-lagar/dokument/motion/utred-slojforbud-i-grundskolor-och-forskolor_H8023514

Motion 2020/21:639. Polisfrågor. Recieved from https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/dokument-lagar/dokument/motion/polisfragor_H802639

Motion 2020/19:2972. Översyn av diskrimineringslagstiftningen. Recieved from
https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/dokument-lagar/dokument/motion/oversyn-av-diskrimineringslagstiftningen_H6022972

Motion 2020/21:2882. Religionsfrihet på riktigt. Recieved from
https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/dokument-lagar/dokument/motion/religionsfrihet-pa-riktigt_H8022882