MIGRATION ATTITUDES IN GERMANY AND THE UK IN TIMES OF CHANGE

A quantitative study comparing attitudes toward migration in 2002 and 2016

Thomas Hendrik Kok

Abstract

This paper studies differences in migration attitudes between 2002 and 2016 in two of the most important European migration countries, Germany and the United Kingdom. These years are interesting from a migration perspective as 2002 was just before a large EU expansion, while 2016 was just after the migration crisis of 2015, and the year of the Brexit referendum. The research question in this paper is: *how have the attitudes toward migration changed between 2002 and 2016 in the United Kingdom and Germany?* Using different regression models, differences can be found between the years. The findings show, opposing common perceptions, that the attitudes are more positive in 2016 than in 2002. Also, that Germans are slightly more positive than British individuals toward migration. Other findings show that education and income have a positive impact on attitudes, and that age and political placement have a negative impact on attitudes toward migration. The findings correspond well with previous literature and the results are as expected. None of the independent variables used in this study are sufficient to explain the change in attitudes.

Table of Content

List of Tables

1. Introduction

Migration is seen as one of the most important issues within Europe, especially since the migration crisis of 2015. Questions like how to distribute migrants from abroad and how migrants might affect the national identities of European countries have gained ground in the last few years (Davidov et al., 2020). At the Brexit referendum, immigration was seen as the main issue for the individuals voting "leave", partly because of the migration crisis of 2015 (Zappettini, 2019). At the same time, the question of migration is not a new one, individuals have migrated as long as they exist and there is a long history of migration. In the early 2000s, the EU 2004 expansion created new questions regarding migration, for example, would the 106 million new EU citizens flood the other member states with migrants due to the high unemployment in the east. Germany was already struggling with citizenship and immigration, so they were especially afraid of a potential flooding of labor immigration (Taras, 2003). When migration becomes an important topic, individuals take on different attitudes toward migration depending on the migration situation e.g. how many migrants are entering the country and how they are affecting the host country. This paper examines attitudes on migration in times of EU changes and when migration was seen as a main issue or was expected to become a main issue[1].

1.1. Purpose and Research Gap

When migration becomes a more debated issue, the research on the topic gets more attention as well. Recently, many papers have been published explaining the determinants of migration attitudes, and most findings show that individual characteristics such as education, age, and income shape attitudes toward migration (Esipova et al., 2015, Gonzalez-Barrera & Connor, 2019, Davidov et al., 2020, Mclaren & Paterson, 2020). Contextual characteristics also shape migration attitudes, for example Heath et al. (2019) argue that attitudes toward migration often differ between countries. Different countries have different histories regarding migration; some have a colonial history with migrants from former colonies, and some have history with large migration from neighboring countries. Many of the papers on migration attitudes used data from the 2014 European Social Survey (ESS). The purpose of this paper is to find changes in migration attitudes before the EU 2004 expansion and during the migration crisis of 2015. In

---

[1] Attitudes on how many migrants to allow to the country.

order to do so, the 2002 and 2016 European Social Surveys will be used. Moreover, much of the previous literature makes analysis on the whole ESS data which makes it hard to make clear arguments regarding to national differences. Therefore, this paper goes into more detail on the national level by comparing two important migration countries with each other.

This paper contributes to the field of migration attitude studies by finding how migration attitudes changed between 2002 and 2016, and what shapes these over time changes. In these two years, migration was a central topic and attitudes play an important role in the future of migration. To account for national differences, not all countries will be analyzed, instead two central countries in the migration topic are chosen. The countries that will be analyzed are the United Kingdom and Germany. The reason why these two countries were chosen is that they both had migration as a central issue in the years 2002 and 2016. In 2002, just before the EU 2004 expansion, Germany and the United Kingdom were expected to receive great amounts of migrants from the new member states. This made the discussion about migration highly relevant and both countries implemented different policies and transition periods to restrict the flows of migration. Germany was expected to receive large flows of migrants due to its closeness to eastern European countries, while the United Kingdom was expected to receive a substantial share of migrants as many individuals were already speaking English, making it less of a risk to migrate (Alvarez-Plata et al., 2003, Wadensjö, 2007).

Similarly, in 2016, again migration was heavily debated, both in Germany and the United Kingdom. On the one side Germany received the highest share of asylum seekers of all European countries during the 2015 migration crisis (Connor, 2016). On the other side, Zapettini (2019) argues that the United Kingdom left the EU because of the migration issue. By analyzing attitudes toward migration in 2002 and 2016 in Germany and the United Kingdom, this paper will contribute to the studies of migration attitudes and European studies by creating a better understanding for different determinants of migration attitudes and find how they changed between 2002 and 2016. What determinants were more important and how did these determinants affect an eventual change over time. How the general opinion toward migration changed between 2002 and 2016 will also be analyzed. These two years are surrounded by three major European events; the EU expansion of 2004, the migration crisis of 2015 and the Brexit referendum of 2016. Germany and the United Kingdom are in the European context somewhere

around the average when looking at migration attitudes. They are not particularly negative nor positive, the differences between Germany and the United Kingdom are not large (Heath & Richards, 2019).

The research question that will be answered in this paper is the following:

How have the attitudes toward migration changed between 2002 and 2016 in the United Kingdom and Germany?

2. Theory and Previous Research

An interesting part of migration is that it has been criticized by different actors through the years. The biggest critique on migration is often toward immigration sizes, how many migrants should be allowed. This has lately evolved into an important issue dividing individuals all over Europe. The European Social Survey (ESS) performs surveys through interviews every two years on different social aspects including attitudes toward migration, which will be used in the current paper. The theory and previous research of this paper are as follows. First, different determinants on migration attitudes will be presented, followed by a short historical background to migration in the specific countries. Lastly, the expectations of the study will be presented.

2.1. Determinants of Migration Attitudes

2.1.1. Socioeconomic Determinants

Many studies have focused on the relationship between different socioeconomic factors and perceptions toward immigration (Esipova et al., 2015, Gonzalez-Barrera & Connor, 2019, Davidov et al., 2020, Mewes & Mau, 2013 and Gorodzeisky & Semyonov, 2018). Most of these studies have indicated a link between factors such as, education, employment status, age and perceptions of immigration. Education is one of the most important determinants of attitudes toward migration. It was found that the higher the education is, the more positive the individuals are toward migration (Esipova et al., 2015, Gonzalez-Barrera & Connor, 2019, Davidov et al., 2020).

Employment status is also found to be a common determinant in previous research. Findings show that employed individuals often are more likely to have positive attitudes toward migration than unemployed individuals. Competition over the same jobs can explain why this is the case (Esipova et al. 2015, Davidov et al. 2020, Gorodzeisky & Semyonov, 2018). Another determinant of attitudes toward migration which is closely related to employment status is income. Different papers have discussed income as a determinant and most conclude that higher income leads to more positive attitudes toward migration (Davidov et al., 2020, Esipova et al., 2015). Often low-income individuals compete for the same jobs as immigrants because many immigrants often take on less prestigious jobs with lower wages. Using the same line of argument, it was found that individuals from wealthier European countries tend to be more

supportive toward migrants from poorer European countries because they would not compete on the same jobs as the wealthier individuals, and instead take less prestigious jobs that natives are not willing to perform. At the same time, individuals from less wealthy European countries are more likely to support immigration from richer European countries than poorer because they won't be a burden on the social welfare system (Davidov et al., 2020, Gorodzeisky & Semyonov, 2019, Gorodzeisky, 2011). In other words, socioeconomic vulnerable individuals are more likely to oppose migration. A similar finding is that when the national or personal economic situation is better, individuals are more likely to be supportive toward migration, and vice versa (Esipova et al. 2015, Davidov et al. 2020, Gorodzeisky & Semyonov, 2018).

Another factor that was found in some papers is age. The general finding is that age has a negative effect on migration attitudes, the older you are, the more negative you are toward migration (Esipova et al. 2015, Mclaren & Paterson, 2020). McLaren & Paterson (2020) also discuss that age as determinant can be seen from different perspectives. They argue that there hasn't been enough research on the topic of generational changes and how they affect attitudes toward migration. Age is counted as a main variable in many migration attitudes studies, but whether there is a generational effect is not clear. They argue that it is important to distinguish between age, period and cohort effects. Age effects refer to differences between different age groups within society, for instance old individuals or young individuals as a group. Period effects refer to differences in time or special events, for instance a group of individuals who lived through a time of war or economic depressions. Cohort refers to differences in groups of individuals experiencing a similar initial event, mostly proximity in birth years. When measuring the variable age, most studies conclude that older individuals are less tolerant toward migration than younger individuals. Thus, McLaren & Paterson (2020) ask the question if this means that when we get older, we also get less tolerant toward migration, or that it is a generational issue instead. The findings show that there is a change in attitudes when getting older, and that generational differences can affect the attitudes. Also, political actors try to influence the process. Because political values are often shaped early in life, politicians are trying to target younger adults and change attitudes. Especially parties from the far right use this method to promote anti-immigration attitudes. It is though hard to distinguish between age and generational differences, a broader focus on generational change can be achieved by categorizing the different ages into generations. This paper will though not focus on the

generational change, but rather on the differences in age, thus no such categorizing will be done. Cohort effects will not be measured either.

Finally, theory states that when individuals are more socially distant from migrants, the perceptions to migration size are larger (Esses, 2020, Heath et al. 2020). Contact with migrants reduces the negative attitudes and perception on migration size, if the contact is of positive character. However, having social contact with immigrants is said not to be sufficient as an aspect in creating positive attitudes toward migrants, rather the quality of the experience plays a significant role. Having friends or acquaintances that are immigrants does have a more positive effect, this could depend on the same theory that good experiences are more important than just the contact, as being friends is often a sign of good experiences with a person (Ibid).

The socioeconomic factors being analyzed in this paper are age, education and income. Contact with migrants will not be used as a variable, but it should be taken into consideration that this could affect the migration attitudes. For example, in Germany, individuals are more open to close contact with migrants, some were willing to take migrants into their own homes (Scholle, 2019). Thus, the attitudes are expected to be more positive in Germany than in the United Kingdom.

2.1.2. Psychological Determinants

The main psychological determinant being presented is perceived threat and competition. Perceived threat and competition can be in different aspects. For example, on economic, cultural, security or demographic levels. The "group threat" theoretical model explains prejustice and discrimination toward ethnic and racial minorities. The group threat model builds on fear of competition resulting from an increase in a group coming from elsewhere, such as migrants. According to this theory, anti-immigrant sentiment is higher in places with higher competition, for example through large migrant populations. Other findings show that when perception of threat from immigrants is high, the acceptance of migrants shows lower values, and vice versa. Professional and skilled migrants are often perceived more positively than lower skilled migrants, and individuals are more supportive of migration from European countries than non-European countries (Esses, 2020, Gorodzeisky & Semyonov, 2018, Davidov et al., 2020, Heath et al., 2020). Misperceptions about migration size can also influence attitudes, most

individuals overestimate their country's migrant populations size, but these misperceptions are smaller in countries with large migrant populations (Gorodzeisky & Semyonov, 2019).

Personality traits can affect attitudes toward other social groups including migrants. For instance, individuals open to experiences are often more positive to migration while neuroticism is a predictor of more negative attitudes (Esses, 2020). A similar determinant: Emotions and stereotypes is a determinant about stereotypes and empathy. Emotions such as anxiety, anger, fear or contempt can change attitudes toward migrants (Esses, 2020). It should be noted that while these are important determinants of attitudes on migration, they will not be included in this study due to them not being included in a useful way in the ESS data.

Individuals' ideology is an important determinant of attitudes on migration as it was found that conservative and nationalist individuals have a higher tendency to oppose migration. Individuals with a left-wing ideology tend to a greater degree agree that migrants contribute to their country than ideologically right-wing individuals. When migration policies focus more on integration, the individuals are usually also more supportive toward more migration. Similarly, individuals with more traditional and conservative values are more likely to have lower acceptance toward migrants and universalist individuals are more likely to have higher acceptance. In addition, perceived threat toward migration is also higher among traditional and conservative individuals than among universalist individuals (Esses, 2020, Gonzalez-Barrera & Connor, 2019, Davidov et al., 2020).

From the psychological determinants, only political views (left/right) will be used in the analysis. National attachment can be related to the political left/right scale because right-wing individuals often have a greater national attachment than left-wing individual (Esses, 2020). Unfortunately, emotions, stereotypes and personalities will not be included in this study as there is no ESS data is available for these determinants.

2.1.3. National Determinants

There are national differences in opposition toward migration and the migratory history of a country plays a role in shaping these opinions. For instance, countries with a colonial history tend to receive more migrants from former colonies, while other countries might have received

more migrants from other parts of the world. Countries with several generations of labor migration have to deal with other issues compared to countries with a shorter migration history (Heath et al. 2020, Gorodzeisky, 2011, Gorodzeisky & Semyonov, 2018). For example, significant cross-country differences in attitudes were found after the migration crisis in six European countries (Gonzalez-Barrera & Connor, 2019). Greece, Germany and Italy had less individuals thinking that migrants strengthened their country, while Spain, the United Kingdom and France had a higher number of individuals thinking that migration strengthened their country.

Around the world, individuals are more supportive toward migration than what general perceptions might suggest (Esipova et al., 2015). Although Europeans are the most negative individuals opposing migration, the attitudes have become more positive in Europe as well. Nonetheless, cross-country differences exist; Northern European countries with an exception for the United Kingdom are generally more positive toward migration than the southern European countries (Esipova et al., 2015, Gonzalez-Barrera & Connor, 2019, Davidov et al., 2020).

Media coverage can also affect attitudes toward migration, as the ideological climate shows how migration issues are being reported in the receiving country. This ideological climate is mainly shaped by news sources, but political organizations try to influence the ideological climate as well. When the media coverage is mainly negative on migration, and the country already has a large migration stock, individuals tend to be more negative toward migration (Esses, 2020, Heath et al. 2020, Boomgaarden & Vliegenhart, 2009). This is important to consider when analyzing the political left/right scale. In Germany and the United Kingdom, the ideological climate differs, which can have an impact on the results. Political agendas might differ between the countries, as the German right-wing might be less critical toward migration than the British right-wing. How critical major news sources are on migration in the two countries will also play a role.

2.2. Historical Background

2.2.1. Migration in Europe after WWII

The literature holds that post-World War II immigration to Europe can be divided into four major periods: the decolonization period (1945-1973), the economic stagnation and restructuring (1973-1989), the end of the cold war (1989- 2008), and the post-great recession slump (since 2008). The first period was the first time Europe became a migration destination, many individuals were displaced after WWII and during the decolonization, many individuals moved from former colonies to the old colonizers, especially in the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands and Belgium. The second period was known for the more anti-immigration period. High unemployment led to the idea that guest workers would migrate home. Instead, the opposite happened, many families got reunited and new migrant communities started growing. The third period was known as the time when many migrants from eastern Europe moved to western Europe. After 2008, the recession created a large unemployment among migrant workers. Less migrants came during these times, although similar to the second period, no huge flows of migrants moving home occurred and new communities got created. After the recession, the 2015 migration crisis partly due to the war in Syria brought many new migrants to Europe (de Haas, 2020).

2.2.2. Background: Germany

Germany has had a long history of migration since the late 19th century. During industrialization in the late 1800s to early 1900s, many poles moved to the Ruhr Valley in western Germany, and after WWII, many migrants from southern Europe, northern Africa, the Balkans and Turkey entered Germany. These migrants were not always as welcome, it was normal for especially the polish migrants during the industrialization to be treated hostilely by the local population, reasons for this might have been religion or the fact that the migrants were poor and refugees. Most migrants moved to the west, whereas the east of Germany never experienced high amounts of migration during these periods. After the German reunification in 1990, integration and multiculturalism gained support. During the migrant crisis of 2015 and the war in Syria, many individuals were open to help the refugees coming to Germany. At the same time, anti-immigration movements like Pegida grew and gained more attention. It should be noted that after the 2015–16 New Year's Eve sexual assaults in Germany, many started to question the integration and multiculturalism idea. Questions like "how would the integration

deal with "criminal" migrants and was the integration of the older migrants and their children a success or not?" were brought up. In addition, the question of Islam fitting with German integration gained ground. The anti-immigration party Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) also gained support after the migration crisis and entered the Bundestag for the first time in 2017 getting 12.6 percent of the votes. (Scholle 2019).

That being said, data from Eurobarometer (2018) shows that a majority of the Germans believe that migrants enrich cultural life in Germany and have a positive impact on the economy. But also, that they are a burden on the welfare system and worsen the crime problem. When asked if migrants take jobs away from Germans, a majority disagreed. Overall, Germans have become slightly less pessimistic toward migration in 2018 compared to the migration crisis of 2015. Other findings show that when the media covers migration, it has a slight positive effect on migration attitudes in Germany. It was argued that more media coverage on migration makes individuals get a familiar feeling toward migrants (Scholle 2019, Boomgaarden & Vliegenhart, 2009).

2.2.3. Background: The United Kingdom

The migration question has become a key public concern in the United Kingdom since the early 2000s. While in 1983, two thirds of the UK population believed that the number of migrants should be reduced, by 2003, this share had risen to around three quarters and stayed stable until 2009 (Saran, 2009). British individuals were more hostile and concerned toward migrants compared to other European countries. That being said, migration is not a new problem in the United Kingdom, but recent inflows and greater media coverage has made it a bigger public concern. In the United Kingdom, individuals read national newspapers more than in other European countries. Saran argues that this might be one of the reasons British individuals are more concerned about migration on the national level. A low share considers immigration to be a problem in their local neighborhoods, which can be a result of less media coverage on the local level. Though, only media coverage would be too simplistic to explain differences between countries in negative attitudes, but can play a part (Saran, 2009, Crawley et al. 2013).

In the survey *Transatlantic Trends: Immigration*, attitudes are being compared between the United states and six European countries, including the United Kingdom and Germany.

Migration is seen as a bigger issue in the United Kingdom than in the other countries. The United Kingdom had the highest number of respondents saying that immigration is a decisive question when choosing which party to vote for. The British were a bit more skeptical about giving migrants access to the social welfare system than the other European countries (Saran, 2009). Crawley et al. (2013) argue that the British attitudes toward migration are on a downward trend and will not stop soon. At the same time, there are differences within the United Kingdom, individuals from London are relatively more supportive toward migration than the rest of the country, although this might depend on the ever-rising share of London inhabitants being higher educated.

2.3. Summary of Findings and Expectations

Most papers seem to agree that education has an important role in the shaping of attitudes toward migration, the higher the education, the more positive opinion toward migration. Another frequently found determinant is age, older individuals tend to be more negatively toward migration than younger individuals. The employment status is found to often affect the attitudes, unemployed individuals are generally more negatively toward migration than employed individuals. In addition, perception about the magnitude of migrant share is said to have an effect on attitudes toward migrants, for example when perception is higher than actual numbers of migrants, attitudes tend to be more negative. Media coverage is argued to affect the attitudes, national differences play a bigger role here because all countries have different media channels. Different countries also have different migratory situations and history. This paper will look further into these national differences by looking at two of the most central European countries in the migration issue, analyze their migration attitudes and compare values on specific determinants including education, age, income, and placement on the political left/right scale. Because these determinants are among those most common in previous research, these will also be tested on how much they affect an eventual change in attitudes over time.

2.3.1. Expectations and Hypotheses

Many of the studies concluded that migration attitudes in general have become more positive during the last decades (Heath & Richards, 2016, Esipova et al., 2015, Gonzalez-Barrera & Connor, 2019). Thus, it is expected that this paper will come to the same conclusion. Even

though the situation with Brexit, this is expected in both countries. Thus, the following hypothesis is made:

H1: Attitudes toward migration are more positive in 2016 than in 2002.

Education is according to many papers seen as one of the most important determinants of migration attitudes. The higher the education, the more positive toward migration (Esipova et al., 2015, Gonzalez-Barrera & Connor, 2019, Davidov et al., 2020). The second is hypothesis is therefore:

H2: Education has a positive impact on migration attitudes, where higher educated are more positive than lower educated.

Older individuals tend to have more negative attitudes toward migration than younger individuals (Esipova et al. 2015, Mclaren & Paterson, 2020). The third hypothesis is thus:

H3: Age has a negative impact on migration attitudes, where older individuals are more negative than younger individuals.

Income is said to affect migration attitudes in a positive matter (Davidov et al., 2020, Esipova et al., 2015). Therefore, the fourth hypothesis is:

H4: Income has a positive impact on migration attitudes, where richer individuals are more positive than poorer individuals.

Right-wing individuals are more negative toward migration than left-wing individuals (Esses, 2020, Gonzalez-Barrera & Connor, 2019, Davidov et al., 2020). The fifth hypothesis is thus:

H5: Being political right wing has a negative impact on migration attitudes.

It is expected that Germans will be slightly more positive toward migration than British individuals. In 2002, the United Kingdom might have slightly more negative attitudes because British individuals have become more worried about migration since the 1980s (Saran, 2009, Crawley et al., 2013). Whereas Germans were more open to multiculturalism and migration after the reunification of 1990 (Scholle, 2019). Germany is also expected to be slightly more positive toward migration than the United Kingdom in 2016. This is because Germans in general were welcoming the refugees during the migration crisis of 2015 (Scholle, 2019), where

others state that the United Kingdom left the EU because they wanted less migrants (Zappettini, 2019). Thus, the sixth hypothesis is:

H6: Germans are more positive toward migration than British individuals.

As the world is becoming more polarized (Heath & Richards, 2016), more individuals are higher educated and income gaps grow, it is expected that the effect of higher education and income is larger in 2016 than in 2002. Thus, the seventh and eight hypotheses are:

H7: The effect of higher education is larger in 2016 than in 2002.

H8: The effect of net income is larger in 2016 than in 2002.

None of the papers to my knowledge argue that the effect of age has changed over the years, thus it is expected that this study will not find a difference in age over the years.

H9: The effect of age doesn't change between 2002 and 2016.

As many anti-immigration parties gained ground especially on the right wing (Scholle, 2019, Esses, 2020), it is expected that the effect of the political left/right placement is stronger in 2016.

H10: The effect of the left/right placement is larger in 2016 than in 2002.

3. Methodology

3.1. Method

To answer the research question and test the hypotheses, a fitting method will be used. The method will be of quantitative character and consist of three main parts. First, basic descriptive statistics will be presented, this will be useful to see differences in shares between 2002 and 2016. Differences in shares can show us how groups have changed over time, for example, how the age distribution is, or how the share of higher educated has changed.

The second part will consist of different multivariate regression analyses for each country and year separately. In total four different regression models will be presented, one for Germany in 2002, Germany 2016, the United Kingdom 2002 and the United Kingdom 2016. The dependent variable will be *Allow many/few immigrants of different race/ethnic group from majority*. The independent variables will be *Highest level of education, Age of respondent, Household's total net income* and *Placement on left/right scale*. These models will enable us to see to what extent the set of independent variables explains attitudes toward immigration in the two countries at different periods.

The third section will be based on a multivariate regression of a pooled sample for the two years for each country. By pooling the two years' samples together for each country, I will be able to shade light on over time changes in attitudes toward immigration and the factors that might explain these over time changes. The model for Germany will consist of all German data from ESS round 1 (2002) and ESS round 8 (2016). Similarly, the model for the United Kingdom will consist of all British data from ESS round 1 and ESS round 8[2].

By merging the datasets as described above, differences between the years will be measured using a year dummy, which represents the main effect; differences in the mean attitudes toward migration between 2002 and 2016. In addition, interaction terms will be added to the models to

---

[2] Appendix 1 and 2 show similar models on the years 2002 and 2016 separately by pooling the two countries datasets similar as in the above model. These different multivariate regression analyses have the aim to measure between country differences. The 2002 model will consist of all data from 2002 in Germany and the UK. The 2016 model will consist of all data from 2016 in Germany and the UK. A country variable will be computed in the models 2002 and 2016 to measure differences between the countries, where the country represents Germany. The variables *Country X Education, Country X Age, Country X Net income* and *Country X Left/right* will be computed to measure differences in variables between the countries.

enable the effect of each independent variable to vary over time. These interaction variables are *(1) Year X Education, (2) Year X Age, (3) Year X Net income* and *(4) Year X Left /right*. These variables are chosen because previous research has shown them to be associated with attitudes toward immigration. This paper does not have the intention to find whole new determinants, rather it has the purpose to find differences and similarities over time in the patterns on attitudes toward migration in the two countries.

The choice of regression analysis is because it fits the characteristics of the data. The aim is to show correlations between attitudes toward migration and the determinants, and to assess which determinants are stronger, and which are weaker. Then compare these over two different years and countries and see how they changed. The descriptive part is useful because it can show differences in shares over times. Many of the previous studies used either one of these methods, which indicates that it is a common and proven method in migration attitudes studies.

3.2. Material

The data used in this study is from the European Social Survey 1 (2002) and the European Social Survey 8 (2016). The European Social Survey (ESS) is an academic driven cross-national survey providing data on attitudes to different kinds of questions[3]. The 2002 and 2014 surveys are more focused on migration topics. 2016 was not focused on migration, but a few migration related questions were asked. This shows to be enough to provide a comparison on migration attitudes between 2002 and 2016. Migration is usually one of the topics being tested. In the ESS 1, migration was more of a central topic than in ESS 8, but the data is still sufficient to work with. The ESS releases new surveys every two years with the most recent being the ESS 9 in 2018. 2002 and 2016 are chosen because of the proximity to major events in European history: the EU 2004 expansion, the migration crisis of 2015 and the Brexit referendum of 2016. Over the years, 40 different European countries have participated in the different ESS studies. There are no ESS rounds where all countries participated, but often a good range of countries participated. In the ESS 1 from 2002, 22 countries participated, and in the ESS 8 from 2016, 23 countries participated. In Germany, 2919 individuals participated in 2002 and 2852 individuals participated in 2016. In the United Kingdom, 2052 individuals participated in 2002, and 1959

---

[3] http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/about/

individuals participated in 2016[4]. The ESS is based on random sampling which is an important factor when making conclusions on whole populations. The number of respondents is important to be high to fit with the model assumptions. Because the two countries used in this study have relatively high numbers of respondents compared to other countries, they prove to fit well with the method.

3.2.1. Dependent Variable

The dependent variable in this study is based on the question *to what extent do you think [country] should allow individuals of a different race or ethnic group as most [country] individuals to come and live here?* This variable is suitable for the research question of the current study. The variable is coded like this: *4: Allow many to come and live here, 3: Allow some, 2: Allow a few 1: Allow none, 7: Refusal, 8: Don't know, 9: No answer.* Where 7, 8 and 9 are not being accounted for in the analysis, therefore the scale of the variable ranges from one to four[5]. Thus, the higher the value, the higher the support toward migration. In both years, there were migration inflows from countries that can be seen as more different than the majority population in Germany and the United Kingdom. For example, migrants from Slavic countries in 2002 and migrants from Syria and northern Africa in 2016.

3.2.2. Independent Variables

The first independent variable is *educational level,* this variable differs between the countries because both countries have different levels of education and education systems. The questions asked are *what is the highest level of education you have achieved?* (2002), and *what is the highest level of education you have successfully completed?* (2016). Because the two countries differ in levels of education, the variables will be recoded into the following dummy categories: *0: no higher education completed* and *1: higher education completed*, where higher education is counted as a university degree of at least bachelor level. This will enable us to compare the two countries in terms of the effect of education on attitudes toward migration and will distinguish between higher educated from lower educated individuals. The next independent

---

[4] The 2002 survey consisted of 42 359 respondents in total and the 2016 survey consisted of 44 387 respondents in total.

[5] In the pooled models for Germany, there were 1149 (20%) missing values, in the pooled models for the United Kingdom, there were 957 (23,9%) missing values.

variable is the *Age of respondent*, this variable is assessed similarly in the two countries, but their way of calculating differs over time. With this variable, the effect of age is analyzed.

Household's total net income, from all sources is a variable measuring income. Previous research argued that this was a major determinant of migration attitudes. The variable is coded according to ten different income deciles where the lowest value represents the lowest income decile. The reason for this being a suitable variable is that it takes into account all types of income on the household level, no considerations to individual income are made here. This means that if the attitudes change because of income, it counts better than individual income. The individual income might be low, but your household might have a higher income, which still results in a higher disposable income.

The last variable is *placement on the left/right scale*. Previous research argues that political placement is a good indicator on migration attitudes, where right-wing individuals are more critical toward migration than left-wing individuals. The variable is coded on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 = left and 10 = right. In other words, the higher the value, the more right-wing the respondent is. It is always hard to measure political differences between countries because different countries have different political parties with different values. But using a general left/right scale is a good generalized political scale able to be used in many countries. Higher values of left/right scale are expected to give lower values of the dependent variable.

3.3. Limitations and Scope

There are several disadvantages that should be considered when working with these kinds of data and models. The main limitation of working with the country level instead of the whole survey is the amount of data. As can be seen in the previous chapter (3.2.), there are significant differences in how many individuals participated in the total study compared to the country level. The total survey consisted of over 40000 respondents were the national level circles around 2000 respondents. In general, a higher number of respondents will result in more accurate correlations when using regression analysis. It is possible that the findings will not be significant on the national level compared to the whole survey. Another limitation is that some of the questions are not entirely similar over the years or the countries, they are for instance asked in different languages. This could result in the respondents interpreting the question

differently and hence give other answers. In addition, some of the questions can be sensitive and lead to the respondent either not answering at all or answering different. For example, the questions about income or political views can be seen as sensitive. Finally, the fact that school systems are not entirely the same results in the chance that respondents answer differently in both countries. Although, using data from the ESS helps us with addressing these issues. The ESS data is found to be the most suitable for these kinds of studies, in particular because they operate over many European countries and give us the opportunity to compare. The differences would be even bigger if different datasets would be used.

4. Results & Findings

In this chapter, the results and findings of the analysis will be presented. First, differences in attitudes toward migration will be presented by showing statistics in the format of a diagram. In addition, descriptive statistics of the sample will be presented. In the second phase, regression models for each country and year will be presented. After this, the different main regression analyses will be presented. First, the results for Germany will be presented, how did the results differ between 2002 and 2016. Then the data for the United Kingdom will be presented the same way as Germany.

4.1. Attitudes Toward Migration - Descriptive Overview

When looking at the shares of individuals supporting migration from different ethnicities than the majority ethnicity, there is as expected a shift toward more positive attitudes between 2002 and 2016 in both Germany and the United Kingdom. *Figure 4.1* shows how the shares of different attitudes have changed between 2002 and 2016 in Germany and the United Kingdom. The two negative attitudes (*allow none & allow a few*) have both decreased its share. The two positive attitudes (*allow many & allow some*) have both increased its share. In Germany, the shares of positive attitudes grew from 56,4 percent to 72,2 percent, which is a notable increase. In the United Kingdom, the shares of positive attitudes grew from 50,3 percent to 65,7 percent, which also is a mentionable increase. The attitude *allow some* is the most common attitude in both countries with around 50 percent of the total shares in 2016 (DE: 49,1 percent, UK: 51,8 percent) and around 45 percent of the shares in 2002 (DE: 46.3 percent, UK: 43 percent). The most positive attitude *allow many* has increased in both countries, in Germany from 10,1 percent to 22,1 percent, and in the United Kingdom from 7,3 percent to 13,9 percent.

These findings can give support to *hypothesis 1* and *hypothesis 6*, which asserts that the attitudes toward migration are more positive in 2016 than in 2002, and that Germans are more positive toward migration than British individuals. These findings alone are not sufficient to draw clear conclusions; the disparities between the two countries and over time might result from differences in the samples. For example, the positive change in attitudes over the years may result from the increase in the share of highly educated individuals, who are expected to have more positive attitudes. Therefore, *Table 4.1* presents a descriptive overview of the sample by

country and year. Both hypotheses will be assessed again using multiple regression analyses, which these potential differences will be controlled for.


Figure 4.1 Changes in attitudes in Germany and the UK between 2002 and 2016

In *Table 4.1* below, descriptive statistics are presented through frequency tables. The frequencies count for the pooled samples consisting of Germany in both years, the United Kingdom in both years, the year 2002 in both countries, and the year 2016 in both countries[6]. The findings show similar to *Figure 4.1* that the positive attitudes are more common than the negative. The table also shows that most respondents have not achieved a higher education degree, but that more individuals are higher educated in 2016 compared to 2002. When comparing this to the attitudes, it could be predicted that education has a positive effect on migration attitudes. Looking at the net income variable, it could be seen that the mean always is above five, which means that the sample is overrepresented by high income individuals. Because the question in the survey asks the respondents to estimate their total net income from all sources, and it can be hard to count for other individual's incomes, it might be that respondents tend to overestimate their total net income. For the left/right scale variable, it should be noted that answer *5* is overrepresented, this could mean that individuals do not want to answer the question and choose the most neutral answer.

---

[6] Instead of one country for one year as in figure 4.1.

Table 4.1 Frequency table on both dependent and independent variables

	Germany	United Kingdom	2002	2016
Allow many / few migrants				
Mean	2,734	2,565	2,514	2,82
Std. dev.	0,803	0,831	0,81	0,799
Allow none %	6,4	11,8	11,4	5,8
Allowe a few %	29,8	30,5	34,8	25,3
Allow some %	47,7	47,3	44,9	50,2
Allowe many %	16,1	10.5	8,9	18,8
High education				
High educated %	30,8	36,5	27,8	38,6
Low educated %	69,2	63,5	71,9	61,4
Age				
Mean	47,93	49,94	47,83	49,7
Std. dev.	18,177	18,623	18,077	18,653
Total Net Income all Sources				
Mean	6,28	6,04	6,82	5,56
Std. dev.	2,491	2,887	2,25	2,882
1st decile %	4,4	7	0,7	10,2
2nd decile %	4,4	6,7	1,3	9,3
3rd decile %	5,5	7,7	2,7	10,1
4th decile %	9,9	12,5	12,2	9,7
5th decile %	13	11,2	14,7	9,9
6th decile %	13,7	10	15,3	9,1
7th decile %	14,1	9,3	13,6	10,7
8th decile %	12,4	8,6	10,8	10,8
9th decile %	13,4	14,5	17,6	10,1
10th decile %	9,2	12,6	11	10,2
Left / right scale				
Mean	4,5	5,04	4,82	4,6
Std. dev.	1,853	1,826	1,828	1,888
Left %	3,5	2,5	2,4	3,8
1 %	1,9	1,3	1,4	1,9
2 %	7,6	4,1	5,5	6,9
3 %	15,4	8,7	12,5	13
4 %	13	11,5	12,1	12,8
5 %	37,7	42,4	40,6	38,5
6 %	8,3	11,4	9,5	9,6
7 %	7,1	8,9	8,3	7,4
8 %	3,8	6,1	5,2	4,2
9 %	0,5	1,2	0,9	0,7
Right %	1,1	1,9	1,6	1,3
Total				
N of cases	4622	3054	3760	3916

4.2. Attitudes Toward Migration by Country and Year

Table 4.2 presents four different multivariate regression analyses for each country and year separately. The findings show as expected that higher education has a positive impact on migration attitudes in all four models. This means that individuals who have achieved a higher education degree, are on average more positive toward migration than individuals without higher education degree. In both countries, the effect seems to be more positive in 2002, but such conclusions cannot be made through just this kind of analysis, the next part of the results will enable us to assess this further and make clearer conclusions. Similar to education, net income has a positive correlation to migration attitudes, higher income results in more positive attitudes. Opposite to education and net income, age and left/right placement have a negative impact on migration attitudes. This means that older individuals are more negatively toward migration than younger individuals. The further right on the left/right scale you are, the more negative toward migration you become. These findings are in line with the expectations and show us what the general relations look like.

Table 4.2 Multivariate regression analyses on Germany 2002 & 2016 and the UK 2002 & 2016 without comparison.

	Germany 2002	Germany 2016	UK 2002	UK 2016
High education	0,245 (0,037)***	0,204 (0,032)***	0,417 (0,043)***	0,299 (0,042)***
Age	-0,006 (0,001)***	-0,005 (0,001)***	-0,005 (0,001)***	-0,006 (0,001)***
Net income	0,061 (0,008)***	0,041 (0,006)***	0,020 (0,009)*	0,025 (0,007)***
Left/right scale	-0,094 (0,009)***	-0,105 (0,008)***	-0,050 (0,011)***	-0,065 (0,010)***
Constant	2,820 (0,081)***	3,250 (0,065)***	2,686 (0,101)***	3,111 (0,083)***
R^2 Adjusted	0,126	0,126	0,11	0,115
N	2165	2457	1595	1459

Significance levels: +: p< 0,1, *: p< 0,05, **: p<0,01, ***: p<0,001

4.3. Over Time Changes in Migration Attitudes - Germany

When looking at the over time changes in migration attitudes in Germany using the regression data of 2002 and 2016 combined, several findings can be made. In *table 4.3* four different models are presented. Model 1 consists of a regression model testing only the variables on Germany without adjusting for the year, the correlations are as expected and show the same directions as in *Table 4.2*.

In model 2, the same variables are used with an addition of a year variable, this variable represents the year 2016. As the variable is positive, it means that if the respondent is from 2016, the attitudes are on average more positive than in 2002. This suggests that overall, attitudes toward migration have become more positive over the years in Germany. All other variables show the same directions of correlations (positive/negative) as in model 1. However, model 2 does not assess whether differences in the sample characteristics explain the positive change in attitude toward immigrants over the years, or that individuals with the same characteristics became more positive toward immigrants. To examine whether differences in sample characteristics, such as average level of education or income levels, are the main factors that explain the positive trend in attitudes, Model 3 and 4 present the interactions between the survey year (2016) and the other independent variables. Model 4 is the model being analyzed the most, where model 3 only serves as a possibility for the variables *Year X EDU* and *Year X Age* to be controlled for. Though, education shows a slight decrease in effect between the years, it is not significant, and no differences can be found, implying that education does not explain the differences in attitudes over time. The same counts for age, no significant results can be shown, suggesting that age doesn't explain the differences in attitudes over time either. In Germany, the only significant difference in a variable over time is net income, which is significant on the 0,05 level. The effect of net income is slightly less positive in 2016 compared to 2002. In other words, belonging to a higher decile in 2002 was associated with more positive attitudes toward migration then that of 2016. This implies that there is some kind of convergence between the income deciles over the years in attitudes toward migration. That being said, the convergence effect is somewhat small, while in 2002 the gap between the highest and the lowest income decile is 0,576 point of the scale, in 2016 it is 0,549. In sum when looking at the overtime changes in the attitudes toward migration we can see that most of the change is

not explained by the changes in the explanatory variables, rather through other factors not being accounted for in this study.

Table 4.3 Regression models for Germany

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
High education	0,279 (0,024)***	0,223 (0,024)***	0,267 (0,042)***	0,251 (0,043)***
Age	−0,005 (0,001)***	-0,005 (0,001)***	-0,006 (0,001)***	-0,006 (0,001)***
Net income	0,034 (0,005)***	0,047 (0,005)***	0,048 (0,005)***	0,064 (0,009)***
Left/right scale	−0,102 (0,006)***	-0,100 (0,006)***	-0,099 (0,007)***	-0,093 (0,010)***
Year (2016)		0,295 (0,022)***	0,248 (0,065)***	0,430 (0,104)***
Year X EDU			-0,009 (0,007)	-0,006 (0,007)
Year X Age			0,000 (0,000)	0,000 (0,000)
Year X NI				-0,003 (0,001)*
Year X L/R				-0,002 (0,002)
Constant	3,151 (0,051)***	2,915 (0,053)***	2,938 (0,062)***	2,820 (0,081)***
R^2 Adjusted	0,123	0,155	0,155	0,156
N	4622	4622	4622	4622

Significance levels: +: p< 0,1, *: p< 0,05, **: p<0,01, ***: p<0,001

4.4. Over Time Changes in Migration Attitudes - The United Kingdom

For the United Kingdom, a similar regression was done, with similar results. In *table 4.4.* four models are presented the same way as with Germany. Model 1 shows a regression model without adjusting for the year. The results are similar to previous models, the positive/negative directions are the same for all independent variables, which indicates that the determinants work in the same direction for both countries. It should be mentioned that net income is not significant in model 1, but becomes significant in models 2, 3 and 4 after controlling for year of the sample. This insignificance can be explained by individuals answering inconsistent in 2002 compared

to the other year's trends. Especially in the lower income deciles, the year 2002 sticks out from the rest. *Table 4.1* shows that in 2002, only 0,7 percent chose the lowest income decile, while this number in the other 3 datasets lays between 4 percent and 10 percent. Because the frequencies in 2002 are inconsistent with the trends in the other years, the frequency distribution might not lead to a correlation. *Table 4.2* corresponds with this insignificance, in the United Kingdom 2002, net income was less significant than the other four models. When the model below is adjusted for the changes in year, the income variable becomes significant.

Model 2 includes a year variable showing the difference between the two years. Because the variable is positive it indicates that British individuals were more positive toward migration in 2016 than in 2002, which corresponds well with previous findings such as in *Figure 4.1*. It also indicates that the trend in migration attitudes consists of a positive change over time in both Germany and the United Kingdom. However, model 2 doesn't assess whether this change over time is explained by differences in the sample characteristics, or that individuals with the same characteristics became more positive toward immigrants. By presenting the interactions between the survey year (2016) and the other independent variables, models 3 and 4 try to explain if the independent variables are factors explaining the positive trend in attitudes.

Model 3 serves as a possibility to control for the variables *Year X EDU* and *Year X Age*. For the case of the United Kingdom, only one of the variables had a significant change, which is education. Having a higher education has a less positive effect in 2016 than in 2002 in the United Kingdom. Both are significant on the 0,1 level. The other variables are not significant when testing for change over the years. In other words, this could mean that lower educated are more positive toward migration in 2016 than in 2002, reducing the gap in attitudes between higher and lower educated. This would imply that there is a convergence between being lower or higher educated in terms of the attitudes toward migration. Though, the convergence effect is small, the gap between having completed a higher education degree or not was 0,434 point of the scale in 2002, and 0,417 in 2016. Similarly to Germany, in the United Kingdom, we can see that the differences in attitudes between the years cannot be explained by the variables being used in this model, rather through other factors.

Table 4.4 Regression models for the United Kingdom

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
High education	0,427 (0,030)***	0,360 (0,030)***	0,428 (0,047)***	0,434 (0,049)***
Age	-0,006 (0,001)***	-0,006 (0,001)***	-0,005 (0,001)***	-0,005 (0,001)***
Net income	0,002 (0,005)	0,022 (0,006)***	0,023 (0,006)***	0,019 (0,010)*
Left/right scale	-0,060 (0,008)***	-0,057 (0,008)***	-0,058 (0,008)***	-0,048 (0,013)***
Year (2016)		0,308 (0,029)***	0,399 (0,088)***	0,425 (0,131)**
Year X EDU			-0,015 (0,008)+	-0,017 (0,009)+
Year X Age			0,000 (0,000)	0,000 (0,000)
Year X NI				0,001 (0,002)
Year X L/R				-0,002 (0,002)
Constant	2,994 (0,065)***	2,741 (0,068)***	2,696 (0,079)***	2,686 (0,099)***
R^2 Adjusted	0,111	0,142	0,142	0,142
N	3054	3054	3054	3054

Significance levels: +: p< 0,1, *: p< 0,05, **: p<0,01, ***: p<0,001

5. Conclusions

The aim of this paper has been to find over time differences in migration attitudes in Germany and the United Kingdom between 2002 and 2016 and find what this difference can be explained by. The reason for this was that not many studies have compared the years 2002 and 2016 with each other. Moreover, previous research argued that there have been few studies looking into national differences when analyzing migration attitudes. The research question has been: *How have the attitudes toward migration changed between 2002 and 2016 in the United Kingdom and Germany?* With this research question in mind, common determinants of migration attitudes were chosen as variables to measure these differences, and to test effects in different regression models. From this research question and these variables, ten different hypotheses were derived. Among the findings, support can be found for seven of these hypotheses.

The first part of the results chapter showed that attitudes toward migration have become more positive over the years in both countries. This is an interesting development corresponding with findings by Heath & Richards (2016), Esipova et al. (2015) and Gonzalez-Barrera & Connor (2019), which shows that even in times when migration is seen as a main issue; after the migration crisis in 2016, the attitudes were more positive than in 2002, before the large EU expansion of 2004. Though some argue that Brexit happened because of migration critical arguments, the general migration attitudes were more positive in the year of Brexit, than before the EU 2004 enlargement. This raises the question if Brexit has affected the British attitudes toward migration. This paper doesn't analyze short term trends and can hence not answer this question. It is interesting for future studies to see if the attitudes were on a rise or on a decline in 2016 compared to 2014. To connect this part of the findings to the research question, it can be said that attitudes became more positive in 2016, but the following parts analyzing the regression models will go into further details on this change.

The second part of the results assess the effect of different individuals' attributes on immigration attitudes using separate regression models for Germany and the United Kingdom in 2002 and 2016. The aim was to find the correlations between the independent variables and migration attitudes. The second parts' findings show that education and net income have positive impacts on migration attitudes and that age and left/right placement have a negative impact on attitudes toward migration. This corresponds with previous findings by Esipova et

al. (2015), Mclaren & Paterson (2020), Gonzalez-Barrera & Connor (2019) and Davidov et al. (2020), which means that higher educated on average are more prone to take on positive attitudes toward migration than lower educated. The same counts for individuals who receive higher net incomes. When individuals get older or are more right-wing, the attitudes are on average more negative.

The third and last part of the results aimed to find over time differences in migration attitudes in the two countries. In addition, it provided insight on how the independent variables affect this change. The third parts' findings show that in both countries, attitudes toward migration were more positive in 2016 than in 2002, which corresponds with the descriptive statistics in *Figure 4.1*, and with previous findings (Heath & Richards, 2016, Esipova et al., 2015 and Gonzalez-Barrera & Connor, 2019). The independent variables in this study are chosen after being presented in many papers as good determinants of migration attitudes. However, not as many papers have looked into over-time changes in these determinants. The general findings in this paper are that these common determinants are not good explainers to why there is a change over time in migration attitudes. Most variables resulted in no significant findings, with the exception for net income in Germany and education in the United Kingdom. It should be mentioned that the direction of these two changes were unexpected and do not correlate with hypotheses 7: *the effect of higher education is larger in 2016 than in 2002,* and hypothesis 8: *the effect of net income is larger in 2016 than in 2002.* The reason for this might be that more individuals are higher educated, which might result in a more diverse group of higher educated individuals representing more different values. Another reason might be that the income distribution is more equal in 2016 among the respondents, as in 2002, the lower income deciles were underrepresented (see *table 4.1*). The explanatory effects of these variables are though small, therefore are these determinants not sufficient to explain the changes in attitudes. This could open up for a follow up study instead focusing more on the specific determinants affecting change instead of the change in general.

In summary this paper's findings can give support to seven out of ten hypotheses. But there are no findings to support hypotheses 7: *The effect of higher education is larger in 2016 than in 2002,* hypothesis 8: *The effect of net income is larger in 2016 than in 2002,* and hypothesis 10: *The effect of the left/right placement is larger in 2016 than in* 2002. In other words, this means

that the attitudes are more positive in 2016 than in 2002, and more positive in Germany than in the United Kingdom. The directions of the correlations are as expected. The models are though not sufficient to describe what the change in attitudes is based on.

This paper contributes to the field of study by showing that migration attitudes have become more positive in both Germany and the United Kingdom, even though the national differences, there is a similar trend ongoing, which is in line with other papers (Heath & Richards, 2016, Esipova et al., 2015 and Gonzalez-Barrera & Connor, 2019). Another contribution is that the variables education, age, net income and political placement, even if being good determinants of migration attitudes, do not affect the change over time in attitudes. These findings are not in line with other papers. Other papers would suggest that a change in migration attitudes is explained by the presence of foreign-born populations (Borgonovi & Pokropek, 2019) or by concerns over the conditions or characteristics of a regional immigrant population (Markaki & Longhi, 2013). These variables were not analyzed in this paper because the ESS does not have sufficient data for these determinants. It would not have helped to add the migration shares to our models because they would not be connected to any attitudes.

The aim of this paper has been to analyze differences in migration attitudes in two countries between two years. The used research question is derived from previous literature on migration attitudes about the importance of looking at national differences. This gives for future research many ideas to go even further into studying national differences in migration attitudes, for example by studying other countries. An interesting study would be to use different years, for example 2014 and 2016, to see if the migration crisis of 2015 has affected the migration attitudes. Lastly, where this paper failed to find what determinants affected the change in attitudes, a future study could instead look more specifically into what drives this change, similar to the studies by Borgonovi & Pokropek (2019) and Markaki & Longhi (2013).

References

Alvarez-Plata, P., Brücker, H., & Siliverstovs, B. (2003). *Potential Migration from Central and Eastern Europe into the EU-15 – An Update*. Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung.

Boomgaarden, H. G., & Vliegenthart, R. (2009). *How news content influences anti-immigration attitudes: Germany, 1993–2005*. European Journal of Political Research, vol. 48 (4), p. 516–542.

Borgonovi, F. & Pokropek, A. (2019). *Education and Attitudes Toward Migration in a Cross Country Perspective*. Front. Psychol. Vol. 10 (2224).

Connor, P. (2016) *Number of Refugees to Europe Surges to Record 1.3 Million in 2015*. PewResearchCenter.

Crawley, H., Drinkwater, S., & Kauser, R. (2013). *Regional variations in attitudes toward refugees: evidence from Great Britain.* Centre for Research and Analysis of Migration.

Davidov, E., Seddig, D., Gorodzeisky, A., Raijman, R., Schmidt, P. & Semyonov, M. (2020). *Direct and indirect predictors of opposition to immigration in Europe: individual values, cultural values, and symbolic threat*. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, vol. 46 (3), p. 553-573.

De Haas, H. Castles, S. & Miller, M. (2020). *The Age of Migration*. London: Red Globe Press.

Esipova, N., Ray, J., Pugliese, A., & Tsabutashvili, D. (2015). *How the World Views Migration.* International Organization for Migration (IOM).

Esses, V. M. (2020). *Prejudice and Discrimination Toward Immigrants*. Annual Review of Psychology, 72.

Gonzalez-Barrera, A., & Connor, P. (2019). *Around the World, More Say Immigrants Are a Strength Than a Burden.* PewResearchCenter.

Gorodzeisky, A. (2011). *Who are the Europeans that Europeans prefer? Economic conditions and exclusionary views toward European immigrants*. International Journal of Comparative Sociology, vol. 52 (1-2), p. 100-113.

Gorodzeisky, A., & Semyonov, M. (2009). *Terms of exclusion: Public views toward admission and allocation of rights to immigrants in European countries.* Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol. 32 (3), p. 401-423.

Gorodzeisky, A., & Semyonov, M. (2018). *Competitive threat and temporal change in anti-immigrant sentiment: insights from a hierarchical age-period-cohort model*. Social science research, vol. 73, p. 31-44.

Gorodzeisky, A., & Semyonov, M. (2020). *Perceptions and misperceptions: actual size, perceived size and opposition to immigration in European societies.* Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, vol. 46 (3), p. 612-630.

Heath, A., & Richards L. (2016). *Attitudes toward Immigration and their Antecedents: Topline Results from Round 7 of the European Social Survey.* European Social Survey.

Heath, A., & Richards L. (2019). *How do Europeans differ in their attitudes to immigration? Findings from the European Social Survey 2002/03 – 2016/17.* OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers.

Heath, A., Davidov, E., Ford, R., Green, E. G., Ramos, A., & Schmidt, P. (2020). *Contested terrain: Explaining divergent patterns of public opinion toward immigration within Europe.*

Markaki, Y., & Longhi, S. (2013). *What determines attitudes to immigration in European countries? An analysis at the regional level.* Migration Studies, vol. 1 (3), p. 311-337.

McLaren, L., & Paterson, I. (2020). *Generational change and attitudes to immigration.* Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, vol. 46 (3), p. 665-682.

Mewes, J., & Mau, S. (2013). *Globalization, socio-economic status and welfare chauvinism: European perspectives on attitudes toward the exclusion of immigrants*. International Journal of comparative sociology, vol. *54* (3), p. 228–245.

Saran, A. (2009). *Public Attitudes on Immigration: The United Kingdom in an International Context.* Migration Policy Institute.

Scholle, T. (2019). *Migration and public opinion: The case of Germany*. Foundation for European Progressive Studies.

Taras, R. (2003). *Poland's Accession into the European Union: Parties, Policies and Paradoxes.* The Polish Review, Vol. 48 (1), p. 3-19.

Wadensjö, E. (2007). *Migration to Sweden from the New EU Member States*. Institute for the Study of Labor.

Zappettini, F. (2019). *The Brexit referendum: how trade and immigration in the discourses of the official campaigns have legitimised a toxic (inter)national logic.* Critical Discourse Studies, vol. 16 (4), p. 403-419.

Appendix

Appendix 1. Regression models for 2002

2002	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
High education	0,308 (0,028)***	0,322 (0,028)***	0,382 (0,041)***	0,417 (0,042)***
Age	-0,005 (0,001)***	-0,005 (0,001)***	-0,004 (0,001)***	-0,005 (0,001)***
Net income	0,040 (0,006)***	0,041 (0,006)***	0,041 (0,006)***	0,020 (0,008)*
Left/right scale	-0,082 (0,007)***	-0,076 (0,007)***	-0,077 (0,007)***	-0,050 (0,011)***
Country (Germany)		0,132 (0,025)***	0,257 (0,076)**	0,134 (0,129)
Country X EDU			-0,107 (0,054)*	-0,172 (0,057)**
Country X Age			-0,002 (0,001)	0,000 (0,001)
Country X NI				0,041 (0,012)***
Country X L/R				-0,044 (0,014)**
Constant	2,819 (0,063)***	2,712 (0,066)***	2,636 (0,080)***	2,686 (0,099)***
R^2 Adjusted	0,113	0,12	0,12	0,125
N	3760	3760	3760	3760

Significance levels: +: p< 0,1, *: p< 0,05, **: p<0,01, ***: p<0,001

Appendix 2. Regression models for 2016

2016	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
High education	0,232 (0,025)***	0,239 (0,025)***	0,272 (0,040)***	0,299 (0,042)***
Age	-0,005 (0,001)***	-0,005 (0,001)***	-0,005 (0,001)***	-0,006 (0,001)***
Net income	0,037 (0,004)***	0,036 (0,004)***	0,035 (0,004)***	0,025 (0,007)***
Left/right scale	-0,093 (0,006)***	-0,090 (0,006)***	-0,090 (0,006)***	-0,065 (0,010)***
Country (Germany)		0,067 (0,025)**	0,066 (0,076)	0,139 (0,106)
Country X EDU			-0.055 (0,050)	-0,095 (0,053)+
Country X Age			0,000 (0,001)	0,001 (0,001)
Country X NI				0,016 (0,009)+
Country X L/R				-0,040 (0,013)**
Constant	3,209 (0,051)***	3,161 (0,054)***	3,160 (0,071)***	3,111 (0,083)***
R^2 Adjusted	0,124	0,126	0,126	0,128
N	3916	3916	3916	3916

Significance levels: +: p< 0,1, *: p< 0,05, **: p<0,01, ***: p<0,001