Browsing by Author "Akpalu, Wisdom"

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Bio-economics of Conservation Agriculture and Soil Carbon Sequestration in Developing Countries
(2010-02-15T07:13:57Z) Akpalu, Wisdom; Ekbom, Anders
Improvement in soil carbon through conservation agriculture in developing countries may generate some private benefits to farmers as well as sequester carbon emissions, which is a positive externality to society. Leaving crop residue on the farm has become an important option in conservation agriculture practice. However, in developing countries, using crop residue for conservation agriculture has the opportunity cost of say feed for livestock. In this paper, we model and develop an expression for an optimum economic incentive that is necessary to internalize the positive externality. A crude value of the tax is calculated using data from Kenya. We also empirically investigated the determinants of the crop residue left on the farm and found that it depends on cation exchange capacity (CEC) of the soil, the prices of maize, whether extension officers visit the plot or not, household size, the level of education of the household head and alternative cost of soil conservation.
Bioeconomic model of spatial fishery management in developing countries
(2010-02) Akpalu, Wisdom; Vondolia, Godwin K.
Fishers in developing countries do not have the resources to acquire advanced technologies to exploit offshore fish stocks. As a result, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea requires countries to sign partnership agreements with distant water fishing nations (DWFNs) to exploit offshore stocks. However, for migratory stocks, the offshore may serve as a natural marine reserve (i.e., a source) to the inshore (i.e., sink); hence these partnership agreements generate spatial externality. In this paper, we present a bioeconomic model in which a social planner uses a landing tax (ad valorem tax) to internalize this spatial externality. We found that the tax must reflect the biological connectivity between the two patches, intrinsic growth rate, the price of fish, cost per unit effort and social discount rate. The results are empirically illustrated using data on Ghana.
Bridging the Research–Policy Gap for Sustainable Development: A Handbook for Policy Engagement and Impact in the Global South
(2025) Aguilar-Gomez, Sandra; Akpalu, Wisdom; Babyenda, Peter; César, Emelie; Chukwuone, Nnaemeka; Das, Saudamini; Ekbom, Anders; Gebreegziabher, Zenebe; Hansson, Petra; Hepelwa, Aloyce; Hoa, Dang Le; Kebede G., Selamawit; Kigundu, Kenneth; Maldonado, Jorge H.; Mellin, Anna; Mercado, Leida; Muchapondwa, Edwin; Mulwa, Richard; Murithi Makandi, Jackline; Saldarriaga, Adrián; Slunge, Daniel; Sterner, Erik; Wango, Virginiah; Wright, Hannah; Zikhali, Precious
Bridging the Research–Policy Gap for Sustainable Development: A Handbook for Policy Engagement and Impact in the Global South provides guidance for researchers seeking to enhance the societal relevance and impact of their work through proactive policy engagement. The handbook draws on experiences and examples from research centers in Africa, Latin America, and Asia involved in the Environment for Development (EfD) Initiative, offering practical tools and strategies applicable across diverse policy and governance contexts in the Global South. Structured in three parts, the handbook introduces key concepts and frameworks for understanding research impact (Part A), provides hands-on guidance for planning and implementing policy engagement activities and evaluating impacts of research (Part B), and offers tools and advice for effective science communication (Part C). Across all parts, it emphasizes the importance of sustained relationships with policymakers, civil society, community-based organizations, and the private sector. By helping researchers navigate complex policy environments, it contributes to more informed decision-making and progress toward sustainability goals at local, national, and global levels.
Enforcement of Exogenous Environmental Regulations, Social Disapproval, and Bribery
(2009-11-30T09:56:01Z) Akpalu, Wisdom; Eggert, Håkan; Vondolia, Godwin K.
Many resource users are not directly involved in the formulation and enforcement of resource management rules and regulations in developing countries. As a result, resource users do not generally accept such rules. Enforcement officers who have social ties to the resource users may encounter social disapproval and possible social exclusion from the resource users if they enforce regulations zealously. The officers, however, may avoid this social disapproval by accepting bribes. In this paper, we present a simple model that characterizes this situation and derives results for situations where officers are passively and actively involved in the bribery.
Essays on Economics of Natural Resource Management and Experients
(2006) Akpalu, Wisdom
Essays on Economics of Natural Resource Management and Experiments
(2006) Akpalu, Wisdom; Department of Economics
This thesis has five self-contained essays. The titles and the abstracts of the various essays are as follows. Paper 1: Natural Resource use Conflict: Gold Mining in Tropical Rainforest in Ghana: Gold is frequently mined in rainforests that can provide either gold or forest benefits, but not both. This conflict in resource use occurs in Ghana, a developing country in the tropics where the capital needed for mining is obtained from foreign direct investment (FDI). We use a dynamic model to show that an ad valorem severance tax on gross revenue can be used to internalize environmental opportunity costs. The optimal tax must equal the ratio of marginal benefits from forest use to marginal benefits from gold extraction. Furthermore, the tax should increase (decrease) when adjusted net return on all other assets in the economy is higher (lower) than the growth in the price of gold. Empirical results suggest that the 3 percent tax rate currently used in Ghana is too low to fully represent the external cost of extraction (i.e., lost forest benefits). Paper 2: A Dynamic Model of Regulatory Compliance in Fisheries: The Case of Mesh Size: This paper employs a dynamic model for crimes that involve time and punishment to analyze the use of nets with illegal mesh size under two management regimes: competitive and regulated open access fishery. The model is based on the consideration that the illegal net is used repeatedly until detection; the net decreases the expected weight recruitment of catchable fish; and lowers the average cost of harvest. We find that under the competitive fishery, the equilibrium stock and harvest are lower if the fishers use the illegal mesh size. However, under regulated open access, the size of the equilibrium stock depends on the ratio of the elasticity of catchability coefficient to the elasticity of the hazard rate. Furthermore, under some condition, the fine for violation should be higher under open access relative to the competitive fishery for any given level of violation. Paper 3: Individual Discount Rate and Regulatory Compliance in a Developing Country Fishery: Studies on compliance with fishing regulations have looked at fishery crimes for which the offender faces a one-period decision problem of maximizing an expected utility. Moreover, the returns to the crimes are uncertain because the offender may lose them if caught. This paper extends these models by considering a fishery crime that generates flow of returns until the offender is caught and then punished. Consequently we incorporate into the existing model, the influence of dynamic deterrence in which the discount rate affects violation levels. The predictions of the model are tested on data from an artisanal fishery in Ghana. Paper 4: Does Ostracism Decrease Over-fishing? A Common Pool Resource Experiment in Ghana: This paper investigates how the presence of ostracism, which is a familiar punishment mechanism to the subjects in an experiment, affects harvest in a common pool resource experiment. The experiment was framed as a fishing problem and the subjects were young fishers in Ghana. We find that the introduction of the possibility to ostracize other members of a group at a cost to the remaining members of the group decreased over-fishing significantly in comparison to the case where ostracism was not possible. Moreover, the subjects demonstrated a strong desire to ostracize those who over-fished. Paper 5: Public Goods and Internalized Norms: This paper links a utility theoretical model based on internalized norms, influenced by Bowles and Gintis (2005), with the results from a novel public goods experiment in Ghana. The results indicate that, on average, people are motivated by conditional cooperation of two kinds: people want to contribute more if others have contributed more in the previous round, and people want to contribute more if others are expected to contribute more. We also found evidence of learning, in the sense that people’s contribution decrease over time even if others’ contribution is held constant.
Natural Resource use Conflict: Gold Mining in Tropical Rainforest in Ghana
(2005) Parks, Peter J.; Akpalu, Wisdom; Department of Economics
Gold is frequently mined in rainforests that can provide either gold or forest benefits, but not both. This conflict in resource use occurs in Ghana, a developing country in the tropics where the capital needed for mining is obtained from foreign direct investment (FDI). We use a dynamic model to show that an ad valorem severance tax on gross revenue can be used to internalize environmental opportunity costs. The optimal tax must equal the ratio of marginal benefits from forest use to marginal benefits from gold extraction. Over time, this tax must change at a rate equal to the difference between the discount rate and the rate of change in the price of gold. Empirical results suggest that the 3 percent tax rate currently used in Ghana is too low to fully represent the external cost of extraction (i.e., lost forest benefits).