Browsing by Author "Biel, Anders"
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Item Collective action for the marine environment: Lessons from social dilemma research(Havsmiljöinstitutet, 2015-09-01) Biel, Anders; HavsmiljöinstitutetScientific knowledge, evolved from environmental psychology and other disciplines, indicates clearly that people can take care of the environment with good results under some conditions. On the other hand, science also reveals some of the obstacles related to the fact that people are people. How humans think and act regarding environmental problems has been studied in various contexts. These studies are not only interesting to reflect on, but can also form the basis of scientific knowledge to be used by authorities, managers and others with an interest in improving their environmental status. This report syntesises the scientific knowledge gained from social dilemma research on how to handle common properties in cooperation with other people, regions and nations. This may concern how to handle nutrients, quantities, when and what to fish, and other activities on land and at sea.Item Emotions, Morality and Public Goods: The WTA-WTP Disparity Revisited(2006) Nilsson, Andreas; Johansson-Stenman, Olof; Biel, Anders; Department of EconomicsEmpirical evidence suggests that people’s maximum willingness to pay for having a good is often substantially lower than their minimum willingness to accept not having it, and that this discrepancy tends to be especially large when valuing public goods. This paper hypothesizes that differences in emotions (e.g. regret) and moral perceptions can account for much of this discrepancy for public goods. A simple, real-money dichotomous-choice experiment is set up to test these hypotheses, which are largely supported.Item The Willingness to Pay-Willingness to Accept Gap Revisited: The Role of Emotions and Moral Satisfaction(2011-04) Biel, Anders; Johansson-Stenman, Olof; Nilsson, AndreasWhile many earlier studies have found that people’s maximum willingness to pay for having a good is often substantially lower than their minimum willingness to accept not having it, more recent experimental evidence suggests that this discrepancy vanishes for standard consumption goods when an incentive-compatible design without misconceptions is used. This paper hypothesises that there is nevertheless a discrepancy for goods with a perceived moral character, such as contributions to a good cause, and moreover that the reason for this discrepancy can largely be explained by differences in emotions and moral perceptions. The results from a real-money dichotomous-choice experiment, combined with measurements of emotions and morality, are consistent with these hypotheses.