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Browsing by Author "Kairys, Jr., Joseph P."

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    Property Rights and Corporate Finance
    (2005) Kairys, Jr., Joseph P.; Graff, Richard A.; Department of Economics
    We examine a central result in corporate finance – the Modigliani-Miller capital structure irrelevance proposition – from a Coasian property rights perspective. Building upon the work of Coase, Demsetz and Cheung, we develop an enabling methodology to study the impact of positive Coasian transaction costs. When the Modigliani-Miller assumption of default-free debt is relaxed in the analysis of corporate leverage, either long-lived transaction costs related to property rights must be explicitly assumed away, or long-lived transaction costs related to property rights must be incorporated into the analysis.
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    Property Rights, Risk and Leverage
    (2005) Kairys, Jr., Joseph P.; Graff, Richard A.; Department of Economics
    Risk matters when corporate debt has a positive probability of default. Lenders have traditionally used covenants to protect their property rights because the financing and operating decisions of firms can reduce the value of the firm’s outstanding debt. We examine the use of captive finance subsidiaries and special purposed entities (SPEs) to partition default risk within the firm. A more complex arrangement of property rights within the firm allows the parent firm to retain operating flexibility while offering lenders better protection. We conclude that capital structure is a relevant decision variable for corporate managers because firms are able to obtain leveraged finance at a lower cost when risk is partitioned using separate legal structures within the firm.

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